


COLLECTED WORKS OF

**ARNE
NÆSS**

DEEP
ECOLOGY

VOLUME 3



BERSERKER

BOOKS



Militant atheism in the traditional sense is thus fully compatible with theism in Tillich's sense, perhaps even a necessary condition. Gandhi refused to call the atheist social workers of India "godless." Tillich refuses to call militant traditional atheists "atheists." "He who knows about depth knows about God" (Tillich 1948: 63 f.). Hence, militant atheists know about God; hence, they are not atheists.

Many Hindus denied that Gandhi was an orthodox Hindu and rejected his interpretations of the sacred texts, but he did not give up his universalist tendency for that reason. "If I am a Hindu, I cannot cease to be one even though I may be disowned by the whole of the Hindu population" (*Young India* 29.5.1924: 175; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 116).

His discussion with the atheist social worker G. Ramachandra Rao ("Gora") gave Gandhi the opportunity to stress the distinction between accepting God in theory and accepting God in practice: "You may call yourself an atheist, but so long as you feel akin with mankind you accept God in practice."²

For Gandhi, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of the sentences "N. N. believes in God," "N. N. accepts God," "N. N. believes in the existence of God," and "N. N. is not godless" that N. N. lives and acts in certain ways. N. N. may never have used the term *God*, or N. N. may be a militant atheist — these characteristics are not among the decisive ones.

Holding that belief or disbelief in God could only be shown and tested in practice, Gandhi did not take Rao's professed atheism as proof of disbelief in God. Nor would he take professed theism as proof of belief in God.

One may say that Gandhi accepted a pragmatic criterion, an action-oriented criterion, of truth for sentences like "God exists." He has no ontological conception of God such that those who believe that God has or does not have certain properties believe in God and those who believe he has or does not have certain other properties do not believe in God.

As to the certainty of our (intercultural) knowledge about God, Gandhi was largely an agnostic and stressed our limited powers of understanding. "God is the undefinable 'something' that we shall follow but do not know" (*Young India* 5.3.1925). He makes a distinction between God as worshiped and sought and God as the object of our thoughts and reflections. It is the former that counts.

*Multiple Use of Language: To Inform,
Convince, Preach, Agitate*

Gandhi was a great religious preacher, but in his sermons he combined preaching with ordinary factual information and political debate. There is no way of clearly separating the various uses of language. It is not possible, for instance, to separate performative uses of various kinds from cognitive uses. The term *God* mostly occurs in sentences that clearly exemplify performative religious uses, but it also occurs in sentences or is connected with sentences of ordinary cognitive use.

Religious uses are exemplified by passages like the following: "God is conscience. He is even the atheism of the atheist. For in His boundless love God permits the atheist to live. He is the searcher of hearts. He transcends speech and reason . . ." (*Young India* 5.3.1925: 81; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 49).

If one lists together some of the vast number of sentences of the kind "God is such and such," it seems clear that it would be misleading to apply the principle of contradiction and other rules covering ordinary cognitive speech. In what follows, we shall quote and use religious sentences without any attempt to clarify to what extent they are intended to have a cognitive function. They may have none.

The latter solution is compatible with the trend to separate holy texts, such as the Bhagavad Gita and the New Testament, from organized religion.³ It elaborates and makes cognitive, whereas inspiration from the writings may be acognitive and noninstitutional.

The use of the terms *truth*, *Truth*, *truthful*, and so on, is bewildering in Gandhi's speeches and writings, but this has to be expected considering the incompatibility of his aims both to be understandable to everybody and to convey deep thoughts inspired by complex metaphysical views. He studied Hindu philosophical works throughout his life, and his terminology in part reflects that reading. We cannot, however, expect a high level of doctrinal consistency. He was not a professional philosopher and claimed no profound erudition. Further, he tried in his speeches to be at once a preacher, an agitator, a politician, and also a reliable informer of facts. This furnishes one more reason for not worrying too much about inconsistencies on the purely verbal, cognitive plane. In what follows, we shall present the reader

with some of Gandhi's most important sayings relating to truth (in various meanings), starting with the relation between God and Truth.

Vast metaphysical or theological jungles may grow from words uttered without the slightest attention to meaning, whether metaphysical, philosophical, or scientific. To educate oneself in nonviolence, one must keep this in mind when reading Gandhi's exhortations. Consider these two pieces of autobiography touching the key terms *God* and *Truth*:

When a child, my nurse taught me to repeat Ramanama whenever I felt afraid or miserable, and it has been second nature with me with growing knowledge and advancing years.

(*Harijan* 17.8.1934: 231; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 80)

Though my reason and heart long ago realized the highest attribute and name of God as Truth, I recognize Truth by the name of Rama. In the darkest hour of my trial, that one name has saved me and is still saving me.

(*Harijan* 18.3.1933: 6; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 80)

The use of language exemplified by the repetition of *Rāmanāma* is central in religious incantations. Incidentally, *Rāma* was the only word Gandhi uttered when he was assassinated. To say it means or names God, a metaphysical entity, or that it signifies Truth, is misleading.

Truth and God

I claim to know millions. All the 24 hours of the day I am with them. They are my first care and last, because I recognize no God except the God that is to be found in the hearts of the dumb millions. They do not recognize His presence; I do. And I worship the God that is Truth or Truth which is God through the service of these millions.

(*Harijan* 11.3.1939: 44)

We believe—and I think it is the truth—that God has as many names as there are creatures and, therefore, we also say that God is nameless and since God has many forms we also consider him formless, and since He speaks to us through many tongues we consider Him to be speechless and so on. . . . I would say with those who say God is Love, God is Love. But deep down in me I used to say that though God may be Love, God is Truth, above all. . . . But two years ago I went a step further and said that Truth is God. You will see the fine distinction between the two statements, viz. that God is Truth and Truth is God.

(Quoted in Gandhi 1961, vol. 1: 10–11)⁴

The meaning of these statements becomes clearer if we compare them with the following passage, in which Gandhi says that he *worships* God as Truth only. Insofar as God is proclaimed to be something beyond or apart from Truth, Gandhi does not worship God:

There are innumerable definitions of God, because His manifestations are innumerable. They overwhelm me with wonder and awe and for a moment stun me. But I worship God as Truth only. I have not yet found Him, but I am seeking after Him. I am prepared to sacrifice the things dearest to me in pursuit of this quest. (Gandhi 1948: 6)

Philosophically, Gandhi here may be said to illustrate a conception of an immanent, not transcendent, God. There are as many definitions of God as there are manifestations. God is nothing apart from the particular creations, so he has “as many names as there are creatures” (*Young India* 31.12.1931; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 51). These are “his” manifestations, but not manifestations of something beyond or behind the creatures themselves. We may compare these formulations with Spinoza’s saying that individual beings are varieties of expressions of (the immanent) God. However, one should refrain from trying to pin down Gandhi’s utterances concerning God to any definite theological or philosophical conception.

Five Components of Gandhi’s Use of the Term Truth

Gandhi’s conception of Truth—with a capital *T*—may be said to have as many as five components, at least one of which is alive or operative in any definite occurrence of the term. Only in rare cases are all five components operative.

The first component is *ontological* and stems from the metaphysical identification of *truth* with “what really is,” “what can be said really to be, in the most exacting sense of being.” Gandhi refers in this connection to the meaning of the Sanskrit word *sat*,⁵ and he subscribes to the view that what undergoes change and has a component of passivity (being acted upon) has an inferior way of being.

A second component is *epistemological*. We all speak about beliefs and assertions being true if and only if they correspond with reality or the facts. *Factual correctness* is another term for truth in this sense. We may also use a

formula: “S” is true if and only if S, where “S” stands for a verbal expression of a belief or assertion.

There is also a *personological* component, *true* being another word for truthful, honest, genuine, and faithful as predicated of persons. The term *personological* is used instead of the more usual *psychological*, because the question “What is a person?” should be taken as a question more comprehensive than any question subsumable under a science of psychology. Truthfulness, genuineness, authenticity, and openness are today terms of psychological and metaphysical import. Gandhi sometimes uses *true* for a rather general concept of genuine, for example, “That economics is untrue which ignores or disregards moral values” (*Young India* 26.10.1924: 421; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 263).

A fourth component is *pragmatic*. Here Truth is identified with consistently acting selflessly (and therefore with consistent *ahimsā*). Finally, there is a *religious* component, in which “the Truth” is used in the sense of the true Faith. These components are interwoven in many and sometimes obscure ways. Here we shall limit ourselves to a recommendation to remember the five ingredients when interpreting the expressions *true*, *truth*, *Truth*, and so on in Gandhi’s writings.⁶

In Gandhi’s terminology, it is perfectly justifiable to ask whether it is true or not true that such-and-such things ought to or should be done. What we often formulate as questions about what is right, good, or correct, Gandhi mostly discussed in terms of what is true. Thus if he says that what is true for one person may not be true for another, we might rather say that what is right for one person to do may not be right for another.

Being an objectivist in ethics, Gandhi also applies the epistemological truth concept in reference to norms, prescriptions, and imperatives. They too may be true or false. This objectivism is well exemplified in quotations below. Gandhi has much to say on the criterion of truth, that is, on how we get to know the truth, stressing this question when it applies to prescriptions.

Truth “is what the voice within tells you” (*Young India* 31.12.1931: 427), but this formulation of the criterion is a crude simplification. The voice within must be cultivated by training of various sorts. However, even then, in spite of earnest, prolonged seeking, different individuals’ inner voices may be in conflict.

How do we decide then? Do we, notwithstanding this situation, have a single criterion? Gandhi at this point, like the Sceptics in their argumenta-

tion against the Stoics, argues against the existence of infallible criteria. There is no guarantee that we find the truth in any matter. However, continued selfless devotion in search of truth will make the seeker aware of errors and thus lead him toward truth.

Fallibility, Pluralism, and Scepticism (Zeteticism)

Terrifying internal conflicts in India culminated in 1947 with the creation of two hostile states threatening each other with military invasion. The tragedy has as its metaphysical background the rejection of Gandhi's insistence on fallibility of judgment, the belief in historical necessity, and the deadly grip of a self-righteous refusal to reexamine conclusions.

Some quotations will make Gandhi's thinking on these issues clearer:

Sacrifice of the lives of others cannot be justified on grounds of necessity, for it is impossible to prove necessity. . . . One good reason for non-violence is our fallible judgment. The inquisitors implicitly believed in the righteousness of their deeds, but we now know that they were wholly wrong.

(*Young India* 21.5.1925)

It [*satyāgraha*] excludes the use of violence because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore, not competent to punish.

(*Young India* 23.3.1921)

The golden rule of conduct . . . is mutual toleration, seeing that we will never all think alike and we shall always see Truth in fragment and from different angles of vision. Conscience is not the same thing for all. Whilst, therefore, it is a good guide for individual conduct, imposition of that conduct upon all will be an insufferable interference with everybody's freedom of conscience.

(*Young India* 23.9.1926; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 420)⁷

Gandhi believes in the plurality, not the relativity, of conscience. The difference is fundamental. If some say "There is but one color, red," and I oppose this dictum by saying that there are a variety of widely different colors, I am not submitting to a "relativism of color perception." I have asserted plurality, not relativity. Similarly, in an ethically relevant situation, the dictum of conscience is not one in content, but a spectrum of distinct, often opposite, dicta. What a person asserts to be the only correct way of acting according to conscience Gandhi takes to be an expression of opinion. The truth of an as-

sertion of the kind “The only correct way to act is so and so” may be untestable from a practical standpoint, because my conscience dictates to me as an individual, not to mankind in general.

What . . . is Truth?

A difficult question . . . but I have solved it for myself by saying that it is what the voice within tells you. How, then, you ask, [do] different people think of different and contrary truths? Well, seeing that the human mind works through innumerable media and that the evolution of the human mind is not the same for all, it follows that what may be truth for one may be untruth for another, and hence those who have made these experiments have come to the conclusion that there are certain conditions to be observed in making those experiments. Just as for conducting scientific experiments there is an indispensable scientific course of instruction, in the same way strict preliminary discipline is necessary to qualify a person to make experiments in the spiritual realm. Everyone should, therefore, realize his limitations before he speaks of his inner voice.

(*Young India* 31.12.1931: 428)

The inner voice is supreme as source, but the need for its purification (*brahmacarya*) is unlimited. The direction of its impulses may differ radically according to differences in past experiences and the internal and external situation. Gandhi thus has a short but forceful formula for explaining the source of an inescapable pluralism of views in ethics, politics, and all other realms in which human minds turn against each other. It is clear that Gandhi's conception of antagonisms as springing from plural, contradictory views is radically different from a conception in which different views stem from faults, negligence of clear truth, evil intentions, and so forth. Consequently, efforts to eliminate antagonisms will also differ from those conceived as crusades against wicked people. What may be truth for one may be untruth for another.

The mind of the social reformer or revolutionary has, of course, also gone through a definite evolution and works through definite media; there is therefore need for preliminary investigations and soul searchings before entering a conflict. This in turn presupposes mental discipline.

But how is one to realize this Truth, which may be likened to the philosopher's stone or the cow of plenty? By single-minded devotion [*abhyasa*] and indifference to all other interests in life [*vairagya*]—replies the Bhagavadgita. In spite, however, of such devotion, what may appear as truth to one person will often appear as untruth to another person. But that need not worry the

seeker. Where there is honest effort, it will be realized that what appear to be different truths are like the countless and apparently different leaves of the same tree. Does not God Himself appear to different individuals in different aspects? Yet we know that He is one. But Truth is the right designation of God. Hence there is nothing wrong in everyone following Truth according to his lights. Indeed it is a duty to do so. . . . (Gandhi 1957: chap. 1)

In such selfless search for Truth nobody can lose his bearings for long. Directly he takes to the wrong path, he stumbles and is thus redirected to the right path. Therefore the pursuit of Truth is true *bhakti* [devotion]. It is the path that leads to God. (Ibid.)

According to the Bhagavad Gita, each person has a definite path to pursue (*svadharma*, *svamārga*). It may eventually lead two persons or groups to kill each other. The main thing is to follow or express what one is convinced is the truth. Loss of bearings is not loss of insight in one truth common to all, but a person's insincerity or weakness in pursuing the truth according to "his lights." The disagreement with others need not worry the seeker.

Disagreement may persist, and has persisted, in spite of immense efforts to reach agreement. If, therefore, a successful search for Truth implied arriving at one opinion — one ethical, political, or religious conception — there would be few examples of success. If, however, it means searching for and following one's own light, the inner voice, success according to Gandhi is normal, provided the search is intense and persistent.

God is, because Truth is. We embark upon the search because we believe that there is Truth and that it can be found by diligent search and meticulous observance of the well-known and well-tried rules of the search. There is no record in history of the failure of such search. (*Harijan* 21.9.1934)

In order to be consistent with the frequent sayings of Gandhi that he is always on the way to and has never entirely reached Truth, the above use of *Truth* may be interpreted in the direction of truthful, trusting action in accordance with one's conscience or, in Kierkegaard's terms, as subjective truth, truth for me. "[M]an, a finite being, cannot know absolute truth" (*Harijan* 7.4.1946: 70; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 45). "Relative truth is all we know. Therefore we can only follow the truth as we see it" (*Harijan* 2.6.1946: 167; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 45).

What is true to me, my path, is not invariable, and fallibility also covers personal truth. Therefore your opponent is not only a potential follower of you, but you are also a potential follower of your opponent. There is no ending to this except death. The Gandhi scholar has expressed this point very well:

Never once, during my lifelong association with him did I hear from his lips an uncharitable expression or a harsh judgment about any of his opponents, critics or even maligners. It was not forgiveness but whole-hearted acceptance on his part of their standpoint as *their* truth, which might one day become also *his* truth.⁸ (Pyarelal 1956, vol 1: 10)

Gandhi sometimes accepts the norm “Forgive!” but strictly speaking, his theory of fallibility is such that one cannot know who ultimately should forgive whom.

It has sometimes been maintained that Gandhi held his own judgment to be infallible. On many occasions, certainly, he was stubborn, and even to very devout students he seemed not always to have admitted errors or inconsistencies. (He once paradoxically even made a virtue of inconsistency, but he was then clearly thinking of “inconsistency” in the sense of maintaining one conclusion at a certain date and a different conclusion on the same subject at an earlier or later date. This is, however, merely change of opinion and not inconsistency in the usual logical sense.)

On the whole, Gandhi showed a willingness to learn and to change his opinion when evidence seemed to him to require it. There is a wealth of interesting material supporting this in the annals of arbitration and, of course, also in the history of campaigns. Thus he first concluded that students should leave colleges to join campaigns of liberation, then later concluded that they should stay (being of more help when properly educated).

Another example: In May 1942, Gandhi announced that the British must go, must withdraw their troops from India immediately. However, in June, he changed his fallible opinion.

Abrupt withdrawals of the Allied troops might result in Japan’s occupation of India and China’s sure fall. I had not the remotest idea of any such catastrophe resulting from my action. Therefore, I feel that if, in spite of the acceptance of my proposal [to liberate India] it is deemed necessary by the Allies to remain in India to prevent Japanese occupation, they should do so. . . .

(Fischer 1943: 114–15)

In this instance Gandhi admitted his weak judgment, his failure to consider possible consequences of an action, and he reversed his opinion. More famous is the mistake he called his “Himalayan miscalculation”:

I am a humble but very earnest seeker after Truth. And in my search, I take all fellow-seekers in uttermost confidence so that I may know my mistakes and correct them. I confess that I have often erred in my estimates and judgments. As for instance, whereas I thought from insufficient data that the people of Kheda were ready for civil disobedience, I suddenly discovered that I had committed a Himalayan miscalculation and saw that they could not offer civil disobedience inasmuch as they had not known what it was to tender willing obedience to laws which might be even considered irksome but not immoral. Immediately I made the discovery, I retraced my steps. A similar error of judgment was committed by me when I represented what has been described as the Bardoli ultimatum. . . .

(*Young India* 21.4.1927; quoted in Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 13)

But I am not aware of having changed my opinion about the necessity of killing certain dangerous animals in certain circumstances specifically mentioned in my articles. So far as I am aware of my own opinions, I have ever held the opinion expressed by me in those articles. That however does not mean that the opinion is unchangeable. I claim to have no infallible guidance or inspiration.

(Ibid.)

These quotations from Gandhi’s own writings and speeches might be summed up in the following way: it is ethically unjustifiable to injure an opponent if it is not verified that he is wrong and you are right. Now, it is always more or less unverifiable that he is wrong and you are right. Therefore, it is always unjustifiable to injure an opponent.

The carrying out of *satyāgraha* sometimes led to the injury of opponents. Even if this injury was unintentional, the *satyāgrahin* would, according to the above view, incur guilt. Gandhi did indeed feel that guilt.

The fallibility arguments quoted from Gandhi suggest that an agent might be justified in using violent means in a struggle, namely, when the agent knows with absolute certainty that he is right in both the norms and the hypotheses that form the basis of his decision to commit violence. It so happens, however, that all human beings are, and perhaps must be, incapable of *knowing* with perfect certainty. Nonetheless, Gandhi does seem to acknowledge that if knowing with perfect certainty were possible, then violence would in some cases be ethically justifiable.

These reflections show clearly that scepticism of the kind expressed by Gandhi is not sufficient to derive norms of nonviolence. Something must be added—for instance, the position that ultimately all life is one—so that the injury of one's opponent becomes also an injury to oneself. Nothing would then be gained by violence even if one had the means to ascertain facts and justice absolutely.

The most highly developed philosophical scepticism is not that which denies the possibility of arriving at truth or knowledge, but the scepticism of Pyrrho, which requires the maintaining of a basic attitude of abstinence from final theoretical judgment (Zeteticism, zetetic Pyrrhonism). This *epoché*, or suspension of judgment, is consistent with action because theoretical certainty is not a necessary condition of action, even of forceful action. For Gandhi, similar views play a fundamental role in the ethical justification of nonviolence: how can we justify killing if, perhaps, our antagonist is nearer the truth than we are, or if there are two ways of seeing the matter?

Only God knows the whole truth, but since God is Truth, we arrive at the somewhat strange formulation “Only Truth knows the whole truth.” Gandhi comes close to such forms of expression:

The whole truth is only embodied within the heart of that Great Power—Truth. I was taught from my early days to regard Truth as unapproachable—something that one cannot reach. A great Englishman taught me to believe that God is unknowable. He is knowable, but knowable only to the extent that our limited intellect allows.

(*Harijan* 7.4.1947: 109; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 73)

In the light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that Gandhi characterized himself as a sceptic, an *anekāntavādin* (*Young India* 21.1.1926: 30). This complex term may be analysed into *an-eka-anta-vad-in*, a person who holds that there is more than one end, that is, more than one conclusion. It is an apt term for the ultimate pluralism of religious, moral, and political views compatible with human experience and reflection. Any human view is fragmentary and uncertain.

Gandhi read the Bhagavad Gita constantly and found in it the best support for nonviolence. He was also quite aware that opposite interpretations were possible. He recognized that he might well be killed by people who found it their duty, based on faith in the teachings of the same holy poem,

to kill a traitor. And to certain sects of Hinduism, because of his support of the Muslim minority, Gandhi was indeed the great traitor.

One of the two men sentenced to death in connection with Gandhi's murder in January 1948 was Nathuram Godse. "Godse had made a study of Bhagavadgita and knew most of its verses by heart. He liked to quote them to justify acts of violence in pursuing a righteous aim" (Khosla 1963: 218). Gandhi was in touch with these people and supported their claim to follow their conscience and their honest interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita.

After the first unsuccessful attempt on his life, Gandhi said at his prayer meeting:

[N]o one should look down upon the misguided youth who had thrown the bomb. [The youth] probably looked upon the speaker as an enemy of Hinduism. After all, had not the Gita said that whenever there was an evil-minded person damaging religion, God sent some one to put an end to his life?

(Tendulkar 1951–54, vol. 8: 331)

This is one of the clearest examples of Gandhi's belief in the plurality of incompatible views based on the voice of conscience. He would insist both that Truth was one and that men would never see it in the same way; and that we must accordingly live with irremediable conflicts and not take for granted that some dominant view comes nearer to the Truth than a minority view.

Truth, God, and Self-Realization

The Trinity of Realizations

We have started with an elucidation of Gandhi's use of the term *truth* and related terms. Search for Truth may be viewed as a fundamental principle or prescription in Gandhi's ethics. It is, however, inseparably connected with his conception of God, self-realization, and a variety of other central terms in Indian thought. Being a man of action and no great admirer of purely speculative thought, Gandhi introduces a simplification into traditional Indian metaphysics that is well worth mentioning. The way in which he does this shows a firm grasp of pragmatic thinking: "*To realize God,*" "*to realize the Self,*" and "*to realize Truth*" are three expressions for the same

development. “To realize God” is another expression for “to become like God” and “to face God.” The identification of this development with that of self-realization is clearly stated in, for instance, Gandhi’s highly interesting and original interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita:

Man is not at peace with himself till he has become like unto God. The endeavour to reach this state is the supreme, the only ambition worth having. And this is self-realization. This self-realization is the subject of the *Gita*, as it is of all scriptures. But its author surely did not write it to establish that doctrine. The object of the *Gita* appears to one to be that of showing the most excellent way to attain self-realization. That which is to be found, more or less clearly, spread out here and there in Hindu religious books, has been brought out in the clearest possible language in the *Gita* even at the risk of repetition.

(Desai 1946: 128–29)

The following excerpts support the same identification, and also simplify matters by adding the link to “liberation” (*mokṣa*, *mukti*).

What I want to achieve,—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years,—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain *Mokṣa*. I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end!

(Gandhi 1927, vol. 1: xiv)

The denotational or extensional (not necessarily intentional or connotational) identity of “to find Truth”—if this is the same as “to realize Truth”—and “to become perfect” is plain from the following famous passage:

I am but a seeker after Truth. I claim to have found a way to it. I claim to be making a ceaseless effort to find it. But I admit that I have not yet found it. To find Truth completely is to realize oneself and one’s destiny, oneself to become perfect. I am painfully conscious of my imperfections, and therein lies all the strength I possess, because it is a rare thing for a man to know his own limitations.

(*Young India* 17.11.1921)

The Devotion of a Karmayogin

The practical aspect of the development is seen from Gandhi’s stress on action, his life as a *karmayogin*, a yogi of social action:

I do not know whether I am a Karmayogi or any other Yogi. I know that I cannot live without work. I crave to die with my hand at the spinning wheel. If one has to establish communion with God through some means, why not through the spinning wheel? "Him who worships me," says the Lord in the Gita, "I guide along the right path and see to his needs." My god is myriad-formed, and while sometimes I see Him in the spinning wheel, at other times I see Him in communal unity, then again in removal of untouchability, and that is how I establish communion with Him according as the Spirit moves me.

(*Harijan* 8.5.1937)⁹

In other words, the way of the Bhagavad Gita, the way of selfless action, is not a way leading up to a direct confrontation with God; it is itself the confrontation, provided the selflessness is consistent.

The same kind of pragmatic interpretation Gandhi attaches to the central notion of devotion:

A devotee may use, if he likes, rosaries, forehead marks, make offerings, but these things are no test for his devotion. He is the devotee who is jealous of none, who is a fount of mercy, who is without egotism, who is selfless. . . . We thus see that to be a real devotee is to realize oneself. Self-realization is not something apart.

(Desai 1946: 130)

In short, Gandhi identifies "to be maximally devoted" (or in his own words, "to be a real devotee")¹⁰ with "to live the life of selfless action," and as this is to face God, other pragmatic interpretations follow.

The expression "to be a real devotee," however, is apt to mislead a Western reader unfamiliar with Indian philosophy. The devotion is intimately connected with detachment. In most Western philosophy, the latter is associated with aloofness and indifference. The extreme detachment that Gandhi tried to develop throughout his life, however, is not aloofness. A central expression of this detachment is "indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits of action whether in this or in a future life" (Sanskrit: *ibāmutrārthaphalabhogavirāga*, here-and-yonder-action-fruit-enjoyment-indifference). We have a norm resembling this in Christianity, namely, "You shall not have regard for the fruits of your action." In Indian philosophy, detachment in this sense is intimately connected with political philosophy through the conception of active inaction. Perhaps the most important aspect of such detachment is a certain lack of regard for past failures that allows them to not

be viewed as determinants of future conduct or achievements. "Detachment enables one to overcome the effects of past faulty practice as well as handicaps of heredity and environment" (*Harijan* 7.4.1946: 72; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 463).

As Gandhi sees it, the importance of the combination of devotion and detachment is not to be underestimated: "A burning passion coupled with absolute detachment is the key to all success" (*Harijan* 29.9.1946: 336; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 464). Sometimes, however, Gandhi uses the term *passion* in such a way that every passion is by definition a passion *for the fruit of an action*. If passion is conceived in this way, then, detachment implies an absence of passion because the term *passion* includes passion for the fruit of an action.

To attain to perfect purity one has to become absolutely passion-free in thought, speech and action; to rise above the opposing currents of love and hatred, attachment and repulsion. (Gandhi 1948: 616)

The maximal development of detached passion and of devotion that springs from an identification with the universal Self is named *nirvāṇa* in some *mahāyāna* Buddhist philosophies (Shcherbaskoi 1965). Although Gandhi was no philosopher, his thinking is nevertheless inspired by classical Indian philosophy.

From the above quotations and interpretations, it follows that according to Gandhi, the supreme intersubjective and intercultural goal of each individual is self-realization. Without some kind of concept of a self, however, the notion of a search for truth (in the epistemological and the ethical sense) becomes unintelligible. There must be someone who seeks and there must be something that he seeks.

The Self of Egotism and the Universal Self

Humility, Egotism, and Self-Realization

The term *humility* is used in many important connections in Gandhian writings, and not only to express "lack of arrogance or pride." One sense seems relatively clear and acceptable to persons with different ideological backgrounds: a person lacks humility to the extent that he suffers from egotism (self-conceit). By "shedding the ego," one then means shedding the

egotism. To reduce oneself to zero — a phrase often used by Gandhi — is accordingly to be understood as reducing the egotism-self to zero, that is, to eliminate it.

We prefer the expression “shedding the egotism” to “shedding the ego,” because the latter expression suggests a weakening of the resourcefulness or individuality of a person. The individual is “the supreme consideration” according to Gandhi, and certainly he should not be “shed.”

Egotism in the sense of self-conceit is present when, for instance, one is too proud and self-important to confess one’s errors, to retrace one’s steps. Without retracing steps, or learning from painful errors, however, one cannot find the truth, or at a minimum, the speed of the process is reduced indefinitely. It is understandable, therefore, that Gandhi maintains a good deal of humility (in the sense above).

One also has the duty to give advice or tell the truth even if it sounds arrogant, and therefore Gandhi frequently uses the phrase “in all humility.” It might mean something like “without pretending that I am more able than any other to tell what is true” or “without superiority or self-righteousness.”

The injunction to seek and follow truth results in fanaticism and violence only when the person who accepts the injunction has some form of superiority complex. One would not expect such a person, once he believes he has found the truth, to refrain from the oppression of deviants — for racial or other reasons. In fact, being nonviolent cannot really be regarded as an isolated trait, whether psychological or social. It must be studied as an aspect of a set of traits. This is clear from the way nonviolence is treated in the Bhagavad Gita; that is, as one virtue among others.

Gandhi finds support for his opinion that humility is necessary for truth-finding in the Bhagavad Gita, discourse 13, verse 7. He believes the virtues there listed to be conditions of insight, or even somehow aspects of it. He takes “freedom from pride and pretentiousness” to be equivalent to humility.

Here are two translations of verse 7:

Freedom from pride (*amānitva*) and pretentiousness, nonviolence (*ahimsā*), forgiveness, uprightness, service of the Master, purity, steadfastness, self-restraint (*ātma-vinigrāha*).
(Translation by Gandhi)

Absence of pride and deceit, nonviolence, patience uprightness, service of a teacher, purity, steadfastness, self-control.
(Mascaró 1962)

In his commentary, Nataraja Guru says that *amānitva* (freedom from conventional pride) belongs “to a source different from society.” “A man concerned with his emancipation or self-realization is hardly concerned with what society thinks of him” (Guru 1961: 545–46).

Radhakrishnan says in his commentary:

It is clear from this list of qualities that jñāna or knowledge includes the practice of the moral virtues. Mere theoretical learning will not do. By the development of moral qualities the light of the ever changeless Self witnessing all but attached to none is discriminated from the passing forms and is no more confused with them.
(*Bhagavadgita* 1956: 305)

The gist of the matter is that there is something called “self” (*ātman*) that should be and can be reduced toward zero and something very different from this that should be and can be realized or cultivated maximally — and which is also called “self.” The latter, however, is mostly written with a capital S.

When the egotism-ego vanishes, something else grows, that ingredient of the person that tends to identify itself with God, with humanity, with all that lives. Therefore Gandhi may also say that once the reduction of one’s egotism-self is complete, one comes face to face with God, finds Truth, and realizes the universal self, the Self. The way of humility is essentially the way of reducing egotism.

There are other senses of *humility*, or other parts of a doctrine of humility. However, they seem more difficult to incorporate into a fairly generally acceptable ethics of group struggle. Thus, for Gandhi to have placed himself last among his fellow creatures would likely have taken unreasonable steps. Eating as little as the starving, or traveling as slow, would have rendered it impossible for Gandhi to fulfill his obligations. It was a duty, considering the importance of his work, to take care of himself more than many others and to enjoy many privileges. One may, of course, say that all this is consistent with placing oneself last among one’s fellow creatures — but only with considerable arbitrariness, it seems. Gandhi says that he will try to reach perfection even though he grants that no one has as yet reached it, and he thinks that he has practiced nonviolence more and longer than others just as he thinks he has a special or unique mission in India. In this and other respects, it is clear that Gandhi places himself before many others. However, we should not take this more or less realistic assessment of

the importance of his own personality to express a lack of humility. In what follows, therefore, we shall continue to interpret *humility* in the direction of “lack of self-conceit, egotism, or pride.”

Much of Gandhi's activity, for instance in his campaigns in favor of higher wages for poor laborers, is directed toward a kind of egalitarian justice. It does not in any direct way aim at increasing the self-realization of the laborers in terms of their diminishing egotism. It must be taken for granted that what the poor laborers themselves, and other underdog groups, looked forward to reaching by victorious campaigns were goals acceptable to Gandhi, or at least not repugnant to him. Our conclusion, then, is that there are stages or phases on the way leading to maximal realization of the Self when it is justified or even necessary to fight against exploitation by others. Submission or self-extinction is no virtue. It is the submission and extinction of egotism that Gandhi proclaims.

What Gandhi accepted as goals for his campaigns can be subsumed under the heading of “self-realization,” in empirical, social scientific senses—and can include self-government in political science terminology. He wishes to contribute to *svarāj*, a set of conditions not directly defined by or correlated with absence of egotism. The modern Indian *svarāj* (anglicized to *swaraj*) derives from the Sanskrit *svarājan*, self-rule, self-command, lordship of the Self. Some of its connotations are not far from those of “self-realization.”

This concern of Gandhi for self-realization in the mundane empirical sense does not contradict his concern for realizing the big or universal Self, that is, for Self-realization. He seems to believe that increases in self-realization (in the empirical senses), insofar as they do not involve an increase in egotism, are favorable to the condition of Self-realization in the ethico-metaphysical sense. Such increases are neither necessary conditions for Self-realization nor sufficient, but favorable for the development of a personality adapted to the task of reduction of egotism. Not all goals are subservient to the fight against egotism—Gandhi was a man of many joys.

The Universal Self

In order to understand nonviolence as perfected by Gandhi and others, it is imperative to understand how *selfless* action is compatible with complete *self*-realization of the individual person. How can Gandhi say that to make oneself a zero is to realize oneself completely?

The answer, as suggested in the previous section, is that self-realization is conceived by Gandhi, together with a whole tradition of thinkers in the West as well as the East, as realizing not “oneself,” but “the Self.” This makes it necessary for us to elaborate on the concept of Self with a capital S. Its position in metaphysics is described well by the Indologist H. Zimmer:

The supreme and characteristic achievement of the Brahman mind (and this has been decisive, not only for the course of Indian philosophy, but also for the history of Indian civilization) was its discovery of the Self (ātman) as an independent, imperishable entity, underlying the conscious personality and bodily frame. Everything that we normally know and express about ourselves belongs to the sphere of change, the sphere of time and space, but this Self (ātman) is forever changeless, beyond time, beyond space and the veiling net of causality, beyond measure, beyond the dominion of the eye. (Zimmer 1961: 3)

Gandhi’s thought when approaching philosophical questions is close to that of Advaita Vedānta. In this system, the word closest to the meaning of *self* (with a small *s*) is *jīva*; to that of *Self* (with a capital *S*) is *Ātman* (with a capital *A*); to *God* in the writings of Gandhi, *Brahman*.¹¹ In his monograph on conceptions of self, Troy W. Organ says:

Liberation or salvation in Advaita Vedānta is self-realization. The process of liberation will usually begin when a person becomes disgusted with worldly life. At last there dawns upon a person the conviction that in his egoistic restlessness and clinging passions he is not moving in the direction of his highest values. He follows the path of self-knowledge until he attains a direct grasp of the unreality of the qualities of finitude and separation of the *jīva* and of the reality of infinitude and unity of *Ātman*. (Organ 1964: 109)¹²

It is characteristic of Gandhi as a *karmayogin* that he conceives the path of self-knowledge as the path of selfless action. That is, the discrimination between self and Self is fostered by reducing egotism toward zero — serving the suffering masses or in other ways as required by the social conditions confronting the yogin.

This makes it important to know how the Self (*Ātman*) is related to God and Truth. At this point, Gandhi may safely adhere to tradition: the Self somehow reveals itself both as God (*Brahman* in the old Indian tradition) and as Truth (*Sat*). Thus, there is no need for subtle differentiations so long as we follow Gandhi’s thinking. Self as *Ātman* corresponds to the notion of

the Absolute in Western thinking—something completely beyond ordinary description but somehow basic both to God and the World.

The Supreme Conceptual Bridge: From “Truth,” “self,” “Self,” and “Egotism” over “Essential Unity of Humanity” to “Nonviolence”

In conclusion, we may say that the self referred to in Gandhi's term *self-realization* is the *Ātman*, what might be termed “the universal Self,” or “the great Self.” The self as an object of study in psychology and social science we might, in contrast to *Ātman*, call “the small self.” For the purposes of our systematization, we shall distinguish two components, the egotism and the nonegotism component of the small self. When reducing the egotism component toward zero, the faculty of orientation in the empirical world is not adversely affected. On the contrary, its functioning is perfected because pride (the main part of egotism) is an obstacle to truth seeking. The egotism-ego is therefore not the whole empirical self, but that component Gandhi has in mind when he says that we must reduce “ourself” to zero.

The metaphysics of Gandhi is such that he might insist, as he certainly suggests, that the process of reducing egotism to zero involves in practice (if not in theory) a process of understanding oneself and that in completing the process, one reaches complete self-realization (and thus “sees God face to face”). Thus, according to this branch or part of Gandhi's metaphysics, reducing one's own egotism to zero is a sufficient condition for complete self-realization. Degrees of self-realization and degrees of reduction of egotism may accordingly be taken to be the same. The world as seen by the increasingly self-realized person will be the world as seen by the decreasingly egoistic person. In order not to get into unnecessary metaphysical controversies, one may hold these equivalences to be extensional, not conceptual.

With increasing power of discrimination between self and Self, the universality of the Self is discerned. This leads to the conception of the essential oneness of all humanity. “I believe in the essential unity of man and for that matter of all that lives” (*Young India* 4.12.1924: 398; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 439). One's own self-realization must therefore somehow include that of others. The requirement of helping the self-realization of others, “service,” and hurting no one, follows without further assumptions. The central place of this unity is well described by Pyarelal:

The rockbottom foundation of the technique for achieving the power of non-violence is belief in the essential oneness of all life. . . . The achievement of soul force depends on re-establishing our unity consciously with all psyches which manifestly exist beneath the threshold of individual consciousness and communicating that experience to others. (Pyarelal 1956–58, vol. 2: 792)

From causes of a psychological, social, and other kinds that are as yet little known, not a few people, from their earliest youth, perceive, apperceive, or feel a basic unity with and of all the human beings they encounter, a unity that overrides all the differences and makes these appear superficial. Gandhi was one of these fortunate people:

I have known no distinction between relatives and strangers, countrymen and foreigners, white and coloured, Hindus and Indians of other faiths, whether Musalmans, Parsis, Christians or Jews. . . . I cannot claim this as a special virtue, as it is in my very nature, rather than a result of any effort on my part, whereas in the case of *ahimsā* (non-violence), *brahmacharya* (celibacy), *aparigraha* (non-possession) and other cardinal virtues, I am fully conscious of a continuous striving for their cultivation.

(Gandhi 1948: 338; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 419)

To this may be added that people who have been haunted in their youth by a perception of their difference from others, of the essential hostility of strangers, suffer a formidable handicap. Service to mankind, nondiscrimination, and acceptance of extreme forms of egalitarianism are difficult to undertake or to tolerate when the basic perception of humanity is that of diversity and discord.

To facilitate the development of the feeling of kinship and unity must, according to the above, be a major concern of social policy. Thieves, to mention one example, should not be punished, according to Gandhi.

But whilst we may bear with the thieves, we may not endure the infliction. That would only induce cowardice. So we realize a further duty. Since we regard the thieves as our kith and kin, they must be made to realize the kinship. And so we must take pains to devise ways and means of winning them over. This is the path of *Ahimsā*. It may entail continuous suffering and the cultivation of endless patience.

(Gandhi 1957: chap. 2; quoted in Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 26)

Also, one might add, it entails a decentralized society composed of small units — we must be able to get to know the thieves.

Such terms as “the universal Self” can scarcely be given experiential meaning without recourse to psychological and social processes of intense identification. They can be facilitated by the practice of yoga, but also by various kinds of voluntary social work as these are now carried out by dedicated people in many countries. The recent development in psychiatry and psychology favoring reciprocity in the therapist-patient relationship helps to make the identification easier.

There is an intimate relation between a belief in the ultimate oneness of all that lives and the belief that one cannot reach one’s own complete freedom without bringing about the freedom of others or remove all feelings of pain without relieving the pain of others.¹³

I do not believe . . . that an individual may gain spiritually and those who surround him suffer. I believe in *advaita* (non-duality), I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore I believe that if one man gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him and, if one man falls, the whole world falls to that extent.

(*Young India* 4.12.1924: 398; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 439)

Gandhi’s tendency toward collectivism and egalitarianism is beautifully expressed in the following words:

A drop torn from the ocean perishes without doing any good. If it remains a part of the ocean, it shares the glory of carrying on its bosom a fleet of mighty ships.

(*Harijan* 23.3.1947: 78; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 440)

Synopsis

“To seek Truth” = to try to face God
= to try to realize the Self
= to try to reach salvation

Obstacle: Overpowering influence of sense impressions from which desires (infatuation) and egotisms arise. They hide the essential unity of one’s self with the universal Self and frustrate attempts at self-realization. Therefore:

“To try to realize the Self” = to try to act with detachment
= to try to act selflessly
= to act “without regard to the fruits of one’s action”

It involves trying to shed the egoistic component of the person.

On the other hand, the Self as “witness” in my person is the Self as “witness” in other persons. This is seen to the extent that the Self (i.e., its operation) is discriminated from the empirical self. The Self is seen as the essence of all persons, and self-realization, insofar as it involves the essence, involves self-realization of all. Therefore, a setback in self-realization or in the (material or spiritual) conditions of self-realization is a general setback for humanity. Hurting oneself is hurting others; hurting others is hurting oneself. Similarly, a gain is a general gain.

It remains to characterize selfless action: selfless action, if consistent, *is* being face to face with God, *is* actualizing the full essential identity with the Self, and *is* finding or embodying Truth. There is no transcendent God, Self, or Truth; they are immanent in the action. Furthermore, selfless action is action, intended to increase the general self-realization without special regard for any definite self, but starting with those who are worst off—the starving, exploited, subjected, and depressed.

Nonviolence

Himsā and Ahimsā: Broad and Narrow Concepts

The Sanskrit word *ahimsā* as applied in Indian philosophy has many meanings related in different ways to absence of violence, suppression, exploitation, and malevolence.

Occurrences of *ahimsā* in the Bhagavad Gita point to rather narrow concepts because the term is used for one single characteristic among a series of others. Compare, for instance, the enumeration of good qualities in discourse 13, verse 7, quoted on page 31. In this list, *ahimsā* occurs as one single good quality. It is not inappropriately rendered by “nonhurting,” “noninjuring,” “nonharming,” or “nonviolence,” but it requires a more specific meaning in relation to the other qualities. If a wider concept were intended, some of these others would only be parts or aspects of *ahimsā*, and it would be unnecessary or misleading to mention them on a par with it. Gandhi’s terminology is such that some of the other qualities listed would make up part of the connotation (intension) of *ahimsā*, while most of the others would be covered in its extension.

The general tendency in Gandhi's writings is toward equating *ahiṃsā* with all good qualities put together and *bhīṃsā* with all bad ones. For example: because stealing is bad and nonstealing good, stealing tends to be taken to exemplify *bhīṃsā* and nonstealing (as a principle), *ahiṃsā* (cf. p. 40). Several meanings may occur in the same paragraph: "It is not enough that there is no violence. A violent speech is often as injurious as a violent deed" (Tendulkar 1951–54, vol. 1: 331). In the first sentence, a narrow, physical concept is intended, a concept narrower than "injurious"—there are instances of injurious acts that are not violent. However, the adjective *violent* in "violent speech" has a different meaning. A violent speech is *not* taken to be a species of violence.

A taste of philology: *A-bhīṃsā* is Sanskrit for absence of *bhīṃsā*. The latter is correctly written *bhīṃsā* or *bhīṃsā* (harming, hurting, injuring) from the root *bhīṃs* (harm, hurt, injure, slay). The word *bhīṃ* may, in turn, have been a form of the verbal root *han*, which has a large number of meanings: strike, smite, slay, kill, destroy, dispel (darkness), and so forth. These meanings seem on the whole to be more predominantly physical than those of *bhīṃs*.

Gandhi, in his application of the term, makes use of several of the meanings of *ahiṃsā*, and he adds at least two others: (1) *ahiṃsā* as a designation of his ethics of group struggle—in this sense, the term is a proper name for a doctrine or a closely related set of prescriptions and descriptions; (2) as a designation of actions or practice in accordance with *ahiṃsā* in the first sense.

Let us see what he himself says about the term:

Ahiṃsā means avoiding injury to anything on earth in thought, word, or deed.
(*Harivan* 7.9.1935: 234)

Adopting a wide interpretation of *injury*, the quotation exemplifies a very wide concept of *bhīṃsā*: not avoiding injury to *at least one thing* on earth in thought, word, or deed. "Things" would include all living beings and perhaps also a selection of nonliving things. Destruction as part of sabotage is sometimes referred to as *bhīṃsā* even if the things destroyed are not the property of anyone. To keep things we do not need, but which others might need is "injuring," that is, reducing certain chances that others may have for self-realization.

Non-stealing does not mean merely not to steal. To keep or take what one does not need is also stealing. And, of course, stealing is fraught with violence.

(Hingorani 1968: 5)

Under mental forms of injury, the wide interpretations include hurting people's feelings, hurting their dignity, and hurting relations between others or between others and oneself. The feelings and relations referred to must be positively valued. It would not be *himsā* if person *A* hurts the feelings of hatred harbored by person *B* or his own feelings of hatred toward *B*. Thus, the wide conception of *himsā* presupposes an ethics. Consequently, an adequate account of the notion of *himsā* implies an account of the ethics in which *himsā* is just one of many notions. As is usually the case in philosophical inquiry, we are led from consideration of a part to that of a total view.

As an example of a broad use of *himsā* (violence), the following is well known:

I cultivate the courage to die without killing, but for the man who does not have this courage I would wish him to cultivate the art of killing and being killed, rather than flee shamefully from danger. For he who runs away is guilty of mental violence: he flees because he has not the courage to be killed in killing.

(*Young India* 2.11.1920)

What the coward violates may be said to be a relation to himself, that of striving for self-realization. A more specific interpretation of the violence of the coward may be given, but our point here is mainly to establish that, used in the wide senses discussed here, the assertion "This is *himsā*!" does not say much more than "This is ethically bad!"

The concept of *abimsā* made by negating the wide concept of *himsā* is correspondingly narrow. This has the important consequence that much is required of a struggle in order to be in accordance with *abimsā*. The wider the concept of *himsā*, the narrower, of course, will be the corresponding concept of *abimsā*. Considering the need for degrees of *abimsā*, the narrow concept might be expressed by the term "perfect *abimsā*." Such a grading is applied rather often by Gandhi. If we take "violence" and "non-violence" as conventional renderings of *himsā* and *abimsā*, we will find that corresponding relations between the English words hold. In order to avoid misunderstanding, one might prefer to use the terms *nonviolence* and *nonviolent* without a hyphen to express high degrees of *abimsā*—degrees required according

to the doctrine of *ahimsā*. The unhyphenated term *nonviolence* would then have a positive quality that is not well expressed by the simple negation, non-violence. Because this distinction would often not be noticed and because, unlike in Gandhi's era, contemporary usage eliminates the hyphen, even when communicating the simple negation, we shall not attempt to use the hyphen (or its absence) to make such distinctions.

It is sometimes useful to point out an ideal limit, however great or small the chances of reaching it. Gandhi may be said to refer to a "zero degree" of *himsā* and a "maximum degree" of *ahimsā*. Yet, he has made it amply clear that no one on this planet can help transgressing a norm expressible by "Avoid doing injury to anything in thought, word, or deed." The extension of the narrow concept as applied to persons is therefore strictly speaking zero—like the concept of an ideal gas or of "the economic man." As Gandhi points out:

Ahimsā means not to hurt any living creature by thought, word, or deed, even for the supposed benefit of that creature. To observe this principle fully is impossible for men, who kill a number of living beings large and small as they breathe or blink or till the land. (Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 28)

It is not difficult to find instances in which Gandhi explicitly repudiates what he says here about *himsā* in relation to benefit. The following is a defense of euthanasia:

Non-violence sometimes calls upon us to put an end to the life of a living being. For instance a calf in the Ashram dairy was lame and had developed terrible sores; it could not eat and breathed with difficulty. After three days' argument with myself and my co-workers I had poison injected into its body and thus put an end to its life. That action was non-violent, because it was wholly unselfish inasmuch as the sole purpose was to achieve the calf's relief from pain. It was a surgical operation, and I should do exactly the same thing with my child, if he were in the same predicament. (Gandhi 1959: 44)

Much terrorism has perhaps been performed "wholly unselfishly," for instance, terrorism perpetrated by religious movements. Gandhi would not likely accept the postulate of unselfishness as sufficient for the qualification of nonviolence. Gandhi also subscribes to a graduated norm of minimizing *himsā*: to avoid as much as possible, and as often as possible, the injury of beings. Mostly, or perhaps always, he has living beings in mind, but recent

development of the movement against injury to nature may well find it adequate to subsume its basic norms under the above very general principle of *ahimsā*, either read as an imperative or as a valuation: it is of negative value to injure anything. This formulation conveniently points to the near vacuity of the principle as long as we do not explain how we define or would exemplify injury.

Another, still more severe conception:

[E]very act of injury to a living creature and endorsement of such an act by refraining from non-violent effort, whenever possible, to prevent it, is a breach of *ahimsā*.
(*Young India* 30.8.1928: 294)

This declaration so widens the concept as to make it an act of violence to *abstain* from efforts to prevent injurious acts, for instance, suppression, manipulation, and exploitation. Unjust societies are violent in this sense. Retreat to the dead regions of the Himalayas or the Antarctic does not avail: sitting there, you are violent if some preventable violence of the active or passive kind is taking place somewhere else. The width of the above conception depends on how widely we conceive the “possible”: you are violent if you do not prevent violence that it is possible for you to prevent. Taking “possible” in a wide sense, we get another zero-degree of *himsā* and a maximum of *ahimsā*, useful as an indication of an ideal limit, but otherwise inapplicable.

When Gandhi, in his life as politician, declared that this or that was violence, he mostly had such narrower concepts of violence in mind. They must be placed somewhere between “crude malevolent physical violence” and “physical or mental injury, temporary or permanent.” What he had in mind in each instance cannot be found by looking at any definition or at general accounts of his views.

The study of the etymology or the various usages of *ahimsā* and the various concepts of *ahimsā* that Gandhi may have had in mind is of limited usefulness. It should not be neglected, but neither should it be taken to offer any key to the understanding of the immense complexity of Gandhi’s thought and action.

One may justifiably talk about “the political ethics of nonviolence (as conceived by Gandhi).” However, since Gandhi never attempted any systematization himself, his ethics can only be explicated in the form of a *hypothetical reconstruction*. If we consider the vast area of activity to which Gandhi

applied ethical valuations, it is not surprising that his ethics, if at all systematizable, must be immensely complex. There are no easy ways of deriving fairly concrete policies of action from the general and abstract, and often noncognitively expressed, basic rules or maxims of “nonviolence” as applied to political life. Gandhi himself clearly realized this difficulty:

There are problems of Truth, but it is not very hard to understand what Truth is. But in understanding Ahimsā we every now and then find ourselves out of our depth. Ahimsā was discussed in the Ashram at greater length than any other subject. Even now the question often arises whether a particular act is violent or non-violent. (Harijan 27.11.1949)

Some admirers of Gandhi insist that his ethics should not be systematized because no living ethics can be and because such an effect is foreign to his spirit. However, the intense and protracted discussion, favored by Gandhi himself, regarding whether this or that act is consistent with *ahimsā* furnishes a convincing refutation of the “irrationalists.” The important thing is to keep the pretensions of any rational reconstruction realistic, that is, at a rather modest level.

Gandhi on Nonviolence

After so much conceptual gymnastics, the reader ought to be rewarded by enlightening quotations from the Mahatma himself.¹⁴ They show the intended universal applicability, active character, and multifarious forms of nonviolence:

Ahimsā is not the crude thing it has been made to appear. Not to hurt any living thing is no doubt part of Ahimsā. But it is its least expression. The principle of Ahimsā is hurt by every evil thought, by undue haste, by lying, by hatred, by wishing ill to anybody. . . .

In its negative form, it means not injuring any living being whether by body or mind. I may not, therefore, hurt the person of any wrong-doer or bear any ill-will to him and so cause him mental suffering. This statement does not cover suffering caused to the wrong-doer by natural acts of mine which do not proceed from ill-will. It, therefore, does not prevent me from withdrawing from his presence a child whom he, we shall imagine, is about to strike. Indeed, the proper practise of Ahimsā requires me to withdraw the intended victim from the wrong-doer, if I am in any way whatsoever the guardian of such a child. . . .

Ahiṃsā really means that you may not offend anybody, you may not harbour an uncharitable thought even in connection with one who may consider himself to be your enemy. . . .

If we resent a friend's action or the so-called enemy's action, we still fall short of this doctrine. . . . If we harbour even this thought, we depart from this doctrine of ahiṃsā. Those who join the ashram have to literally accept that meaning. That does not mean that we practise that doctrine in its entirety. Far from it. It is an ideal which we have to reach, and it is an ideal to be reached even at this very moment, if we are capable of doing so. . . .

In its positive form, Ahiṃsā means the largest love, the greatest charity. If I am a follower of Ahiṃsā I must love my enemy. I must apply the same rules to the wrong-doer who is my enemy or a stranger to me as I would to my wrong-doing father or son. This active Ahiṃsā necessarily includes truth and fearlessness. As man cannot deceive the loved one, he does not fear or frighten him or her. Gift of life is the greatest of all gifts; a man who gives it in reality, disarms all hostility. He has paved the way for an honourable understanding. And none who is himself subject to fear can bestow that gift. He must therefore be himself fearless. A man cannot then practise Ahiṃsā and be a coward at the same time. The practise of Ahiṃsā calls forth the greatest courage. . . .

My reverent study of the scriptures of the world has led me to the belief that all register emphatic and unequivocal testimony in favour of non-violence being practised by all, not merely singly but collectively as well. In all humility I have often felt that having no axes to grind and having by nature a detached mind, I give a truer interpretation of the Hindu, Islamic or other scriptures. For this humble claim I anticipate the forgiveness of Sanatanists, Christians and Mussalmans. . . .¹⁵

Gandhi on Truth

Even at the cost of some repetition, we shall stress the relation between a nonviolent ethics of struggles and persistent disagreements and an honest unrelenting search for Truth.

The most famous dialogue on the relation between Truth and nonviolence is that between the Hunter Committee's council and Gandhi in 1919. Since the details of the dialogue, however well known, have still not sufficiently impressed all students of Gandhi, we find it justifiable to quote from it:

Council: However honestly a man may strive in his search for truth, his notions of truth may be different from the notions of others. Who then is to determine the truth?

- Accused: The individual himself would determine that.
- Council: Different individuals would have different views as to truth. Would that not lead to confusion?
- Accused: I do not think so.
- Council: Honestly striving after truth differs in every case.
- Accused: That is why the nonviolence part was a necessary corollary. Without that there would be confusion and worse.

The most crucial point is perhaps Gandhi's admission that "honestly striving after truth differs in every case." Such an admission makes it altogether natural to look at violent opponents, even terrorists, without moral indignation insofar as they are honest strivers after truth. Further, who is able to judge the degree of honesty of others? Gandhi's line of information and persuasion is firmly based on the admission of honestly held opposite views and of our high degree of ignorance concerning the efforts made by different people to arrive at facts or plausible hypotheses.

Highly significant are the following three central passages concerning the relation of *ahimsā* to truth:

The more I search after Truth the more I feel it is all-inclusive. Truth is not covered by non-violence. But I often experience that non-violence is included in truth. What a pure heart feels at a particular time is Truth; by remaining firm on that, undiluted Truth can be attained. This does not involve any conflict of duty or conscience either. But difficulties often arise in determining what non-violence is. The use of bacteria-destroying liquid is also violence. It is only by firm adherence to truth that one can live non-violently in a world which is full of violence. I can, therefore, derive non-violence out of truth.

(*Harijan* 27.11.1949)

In this quotation, the personological and pragmatic component of Gandhi's use of the term *truth* has gained the upper hand. The epistemological component has been submerged, and it is only this that makes it not too unlikely that nonviolence can be derived from truth. Mostly, Gandhi—as shown above—stresses the difficulty of finding truth and the inevitability of conflicting views. If there are opposite views about what is happening in a conflict, one may unintentionally injure one or both sides. A "pure heart" is not enough, as Gandhi often shows; one must try to reach a true opinion about what is going on.

It is perhaps clear from the foregoing, that without *Ahiṃsā* it is not possible to seek and find Truth. *Ahiṃsā* and Truth are so intertwined, that it is practically impossible to disentangle and separate them. They are like the two sides of a coin, or rather of a smooth unstamped metallic disc. Who can say, which is the obverse, and which is the reverse? Nevertheless *Ahiṃsā* is the means; Truth is the end. Means to be means must always be within our reach, and so *Ahiṃsā* is our supreme duty. (Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 27)

Most of the components of the Truth concept are manifest in the following elucidation of the relation of Truth to nonviolence:

But it is impossible for us to realize perfect Truth so long as we are imprisoned in this mortal frame. We can only visualize it in our imagination. We cannot, through the instrumentality of this ephemeral body, see face to face Truth which is eternal. That is why in the last resort one must depend on faith.

It appears that the impossibility of full realization of Truth in this mortal body led some ancient seeker after Truth to the appreciation of *Ahiṃsā*. The question which confronted him was: "Shall I bear with those who create difficulties for me, or shall I destroy them?" The seeker realized that he who went on destroying others did not make headway but simply stayed where he was, while the man who suffered those who created difficulties marched ahead, and at times even took others with him. (Ibid., p. 25)

In short, the seeker after Truth understands that it never will be within reach, that he always will be more or less in untruth and error. This makes him nonviolent.

In our attempt to condense and systematize Gandhi's teaching on group conflicts, it has been necessary to cut out some of these themes relating to Truth and nonviolence. We have adopted the subordination of nonviolence to Truth, the latter notion split into two: truth with a small *t* and self-realization.

A Conceptual Reconstruction

Gandhi often speaks about realizing Truth and realizing God;¹⁶ he speaks somewhat more rarely of realizing self.¹⁷ He nevertheless maintains, as has already been mentioned, that "self-realization is the subject of the *Bhagavad Gita* as it is of all scriptures" (Desai 1946: 1). In order to condense the teaching and make it more universally understandable, the aspects of realization may be reduced to two: the search for self-realization or God or Truth with a capital *T* and the search for truth (with a small *t*).

From truth with a small *t*, or from the ontological or epistemological concept of truth, no *abimsā* principle can be derived. One may, however, construct a derivation by taking “search for God or Truth” to be, in the main, other names for the more understandable self-realization and adding a metaphysical postulate announcing the essential or ultimate oneness of all living beings. From the premises that one should realize one’s self and that all (living) selves are ultimately one, the necessity of both truth seeking and *abimsā* may be derived.

We now introduce the concept of an individual *P*’s self-realization as realization of *P*’s potential for complete expression. The actual level of self-realization attained may show variation and can never reach the theoretical maximum. There are different kinds of measures of level of self-realization. Therefore, when applied in the following, Gandhi’s criteria are presupposed. According to Gandhi, the path toward an individual’s maximum self-realization does not necessarily obstruct the paths of others; on the contrary, mutual aid is possible and desirable.

For the sake of our condensed conceptual reconstruction we shall now introduce a general concept of nonviolence:

Himsā (violence) is avoidable direct influence in the direction of a lower level of self-realization. *Abimsā* (nonviolence) is direct influence in the direction of a higher level of self-realization.

According to Gandhi, a decrease or increase of self-realization in one individual involves a decrease or increase (not necessarily of the equal magnitude) of the self-realization of others.¹⁸ Thus, *himsā* by anyone against anyone is also *himsā* against me.

The main motive for introducing this broad concept of violence, and the corresponding narrow concept of nonviolence, is to allow us to subsume under this broad concept of violence all those phenomena that Gandhi actually does subsume. To put it more directly, we wish to subsume exploitation, suppression, and other phenomena that are best defined without reference to any person’s acting with manifest physical violence against another. Impersonal, structural, sociological phenomena that in an avoidable way decrease or obstruct the increase of self-realization are all subsumable under this broad concept of violence.

How Gandhi himself made such subsumptions will be clear later. Here we shall only recall his dictum that the essence of violence is exploitation and that an unjust law “is itself a species of violence” (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 150).

*Graphic Presentation of Principles and Norms:
Systematizations *E and *F*

In what follows, those principles and norms from which the norms and hypotheses of Gandhi's teaching on group struggle are explicitly derived are, first of all, made explicit and then fitted into a graphical presentation. There are, of course, many ways to present such derivations. The one offered here is called Systematization *E for easy reference.

SYSTEMATIZATION *E

- *N₁ ≡ Seek complete self-realization.
- *H₁ ≡ Complete self-realization requires seeking truth.
- *N₂ ≡ Seek truth (from *N₁ and *H₁).
- *H₂ ≡ All living beings are ultimately one.
- *H₃ ≡ Violence against yourself precludes realizing your self.
- *H₄ ≡ Violence against any living being is violence against your self (from *H₂ and *H₃).
- *H₅ ≡ Violence by anyone against anyone precludes complete self-realization of anyone (from *H₃ and *H₄).
- *N₃ ≡ Act so as to reduce and eliminate violence (from *N₁ and *H₅).
- *H₆ ≡ Your complete self-realization involves that of others (from *H₂ and *H₅).
- *N₄ ≡ Act so as to help others in their quest for self-realization (from *N₁ and *H₆).
- *N₅ ≡ Act so as to help others in their quest for truth (from *N₁, *H₁, and *H₆).

The immense weight Gandhi attached to the term *Truth* in his speeches and prayers makes it important to try out a systematization with "realize Truth" as the formulation of the top norm. Systematization *F is such an attempt. It is clear, I think, that the systematization is unduly complicated and the derivations not as obvious, on average, as those of Systematization *E.




Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the norms and hypotheses of Systematization *E.

The reason for the shortcomings is to be found in Gandhi's multiple use of the word *Truth*.

The basic sentences "Seek complete self-realization," "Realize Truth," "Realize God," and "All are ultimately one" are intended to convey something that is prior to the distinction between an injunction and a description. The True and the Real in much philosophy from Rigveda to Bradley are not adequately thought of as a world or cosmos or anything existing here and there. There is a basic positive valuation of some sort that makes it not quite adequate to formulate the basic "norms" as prescriptions rather than descriptions. On the other hand, the formulation "All living beings are ultimately one," grammatically a description, has a prescriptive component. The oneness is something to be realized; it is not, rather, merely a fact.

The combined descriptive and prescriptive function of basic metaphysical utterances makes it unwarranted to accuse Gandhi of making the naturalistic fallacy. He does not, to take one instance, derive a norm ("Act non-violently") from a description ("All life is ultimately one"). The latter is a component of the metaphysical utterance concerning the universal Self, neither a prescription nor a description.

There are many ways in which Gandhi's ethics and principles of group struggle can be derived from his metaphysics. However, certain positions




Figure 2. Graphic presentation of Gandhi's norms as depicted in Systematization *F.

must be considered central in any derivation: the ultimate unity of all life, the inescapable fallibility of ethical as well as factual judgments, and the close dependence of what can be achieved (the goals) on how we proceed to achieve it.

From the point of view of analytically oriented philosophy, the wording of Systematizations *E and *F is inordinately vague and ambiguous. Nevertheless, to take this as an objection suggests a misconception of the role of analysis. That role is eminently that of explication and making precise, taking the spontaneous and intuitive metaphysical utterances as initial formulations or starting points.

The formulations *E and *F are starting points for interpretations articulated with a higher degree of preciseness. Thus, "oneness of all living beings" might be made more precise by dynamic interpretations using the process of identification rather than the status of identity. Identification, again, might be considered as a psychological, a sociological, or a biological term, or it might be substituted by a combination of these aspects plus an ethical and political norm. Such substitutions are clearly made by Gandhi. In *Yeravda Mandir*, for example, the religious concept of sacrifice is identified by an ethico-political concept of work:

A Conceptual Reconstruction

The divine law, that man must earn his bread by labouring with his own hands, was first stressed by a Russian writer named T. M. Bondaref. Tolstoy advertised it and gave it wider publicity. In my view, the same principle has been set forth in the third chapter of the *Gita* where we are told, that he who eats without offering sacrifice eats stolen food. Sacrifice here can only mean Bread labour.—Reason too leads us to an identical conclusion.

(Gandhi 1957: 35)

The background of Gandhi's thinking is such that theology, metaphysics, and politics simply cannot be separated—neither in life nor in semantics!

III

Norms and Hypotheses of Gandhian Ethics and Strategy of Group Struggle

Introductory Remarks

Aim of the Systematization

Any normative, systematic ethics containing a perfectly general norm against violence will be called an ethics of nonviolence. The content will show variation according to the kind of concept of violence adopted. In order to do justice to the thinking of Gandhi, the term *violence* must be viewed broadly. It must cover not only open, physical violence but also the injury and psychic terror present when people are subjugated, repressed, coerced, and exploited. Further, it must clearly encompass all those sorts of exploitation that indirectly have personal repercussions that limit the self-realization of others.

The corresponding negative term *nonviolence* must be viewed very narrowly. It is not enough to abstain from physical violence, not enough to behave peacefully.

In what follows, we offer a condensed systematic account of the positive ethics and strategy of group struggle, trying to crystallize and make explicit the essentials. We use the adjective *positive*, because the systematization does not include a treatment of evils, for instance, a classification into greater and less great evils. (Whereas violence is always an evil, it is sometimes a greater evil to run away from responsibility.)

According to Gandhi's ethics, explicitness is a duty. His politically relevant actions were innumerable, and he offered running commentary on them, factually as well as in terms of ethical appraisals. Few politicians have talked so much on the metalevel. Furthermore, because he never worked behind closed doors, there were always witnesses. We are spared the feeling

that the most important decisions, the most important statements of policy, were worked out in secret sessions.

The resulting vast material makes it practicable to work out broad interrelated groups of sentences representing rational reconstructions or models covering Gandhi's politically and ethically relevant behavior and attitudes.

The primary sources for this kind of reconstruction are historical documents and other materials concerning Gandhi's activities, his own systematic writings, his correspondence, and the conversations and speeches. They were recorded or summarized by D. G. Tendulkar, Shri Pyarelal, Mahadev Desai, and others. Much of this material has already been printed and is easily available.

If we were to mention a publication of particular value for rational reconstructions, I should choose the first volume of Gandhi's *Non-violence in Peace and War* (1942, 1944) edited by Desai, one of his distinguished companions. It includes not only a variety of newspaper articles and letters, but also recordings of conversations. They are all dated, and most of them refer to well-known political actions going on at the time. The concrete nature of the problems at issue does not reduce the philosophical value of the material. On the contrary, the interpretation of professional philosophers' ethical texts is usually hindered by an almost complete lack of reference to application in concrete situations. This is true of Plato, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and others. Without abundant application to concrete, historically well-known situations, ethical doctrines are impenetrable to analysis.

Of the many compilations of quotations from Gandhi, the enlarged edition of *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi* (1967), edited by R. K. Prabhu and U. R. Rao, is outstanding. Unhappily, those extremely important sources from which we have already drawn, Gandhi's periodicals *Young India* and *Harijan*, are practically unavailable. References to these must therefore, in many cases, be supplemented by supporting references to the compilations.

In the following, one particular version, *E*, of one particular rational reconstruction of Gandhi's ethics is outlined in the form of a normative system. The system belongs to the class of systems that outline, structure, reflect, or portray not all Gandhian thought but primarily Gandhi's ethics of group struggle between 1907 and 1934. After 1934, political life in India becomes increasingly complicated, making it more difficult for Gandhi to apply his ideas in a simple, surveyable, unambiguous way.

Concerning the adequacy of Systematization *E*, the following should be added: The norms N_1 through N_{25} and most of the hypotheses are selected on the basis of a survey of norms and hypotheses in Gandhi's writings and the interpretation of his actions in campaigns. Some of our formulations are close to those of Gandhi; others are only indirectly or in part derived from him. Our main concern has been to ensure that all norms¹ of group ethics necessary to justify and explain *satyāgraha* (as described by Gandhi) are included in N_1 through N_{25} , and that no norm is contrary to the spirit of the formulations found in Gandhi's texts.² Thus completeness or comprehensiveness has ranked high in our choice of Systematization *E* among many different versions. Unhappily, the wideness of the perspective has necessitated a relatively high level of abstractness. For concrete applications that elucidate the abstract norms and hypotheses, one must consult the relevant sections in chapter 4.

The ethics of group struggle is conceived as a component of ethics in general, but with some degree of independence: the total set of its norms is derived from a very small number of norms, ultimately only one, which concerns group struggle in general. The dependence on general ethics is structurally shown by the derivation of a basic norm concerning group struggle from norms of other parts of ethics.

The dependence is also clear from the fact that some of the norms of the particular version of the ethics of group struggle outlined in what follows can be derived from norms of other parts of ethics by processes of inference that circumvent the basic norm of the ethics of group struggle. Thus, norm N_8 , "Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent," is derived from norm N_{14} and hypothesis H_9 , that is, from "If you are not able to subsume any of a group of relevant actions or attitudes as in themselves violent or constructive, then choose that action or attitude that most probably reduces the tendency to violence in the participants in the struggle" and "You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating and provoking him." However, norm N_8 might also be derived from a general code of conduct concerning behavior toward others, whether or not a struggle is imminent. The possibility of such circumventions is not, of course, very alarming. The historical data permit different explications of the relation between general ethics and the ethics of group struggle.

In what follows, we ignore directives as to how to fight for a bad cause—for instance, for an increase of violence—and assume tacitly that

the goal for a struggle is acceptable from the point of view of Gandhi's ethics as a whole. This assumption is used in relation to all hypotheses and norms of Systematization *E. The acceptance of the assumption is important because otherwise one cannot assume, as in H_2 , that there is an incompatibility between goal-directed motivation and destructive, violent tendencies. Destructive means are often good for destructive goals!

A systematization of Gandhi's ethics of group struggle with only one basic general norm appears to make all more specific norms instrumental and to rob all values, except those defined by the basic general norm, of their status as intrinsic values. Thus, if all more specific values are derived, then the only intrinsic good will be the realization of the basic general norm; all other values are instrumental. If all this is a fair interpretation of a pyramidal systematization, then we have arrived at a utilitarianism more comprehensive than that of, for instance, Fanon (see here on pp. 98 ff.), but a utilitarianism nevertheless.

This interpretation, however, is grossly misleading. "Universal self-realization" is not an object *in addition to* specific steps of self-realization at a definite time in a definite situation. The postulation or hypostatization of such an object would express a crude conceptual realism that is squarely incompatible with the function of systematizations. Further, the individual acts of seeking truth do not serve as instruments by which one creates something different from these acts, namely, "truth seeking in general." Thus individual steps toward self-realization and acts of truth seeking cannot without misapprehension be termed useful for universal self-realization and seeking of truth. The pyramid of norms and hypotheses is not one quality or value. The good attained by following a norm at the lowest level is not a good of the lowest kind, a slight and unimportant good. Levels of derivation do not correspond to levels of goodness or value or quality. Derivation depends on generality, not quality. A low value is not "derived" from a high value, a low norm is not derived from a high and more respectable norm.

Action is always specific and singular, therefore no norm can be followed if it is not specific enough to enlighten us about how to act in concrete situations. The lower levels of the pyramid are levels with increasingly specific norms and hypotheses. From "Act so as to minimize violence on this planet" nothing follows when one is in doubt about an act of sabo-

tage. A high place in the pyramid, taken in isolation, is on the whole an indication of lack of usefulness in practice.

Our conclusion: The relation of values defined by lower level norms to those defined by higher ones is not one of usefulness but one of derivation. Thus, this relation of values is not utilitarian in the sense of mere usefulness.

The Particular Norms and Hypotheses

A norm is said to be on level k , $k > 1$, if it is directly derived from a norm of level $k-1$. This is said to be so even if the derivation also requires acceptance of some hypotheses. A hypothesis is said to be of level k if it is used in the derivation of a norm of level k .

First and Second Levels

From "Act so as to reduce and eliminate violence," $*N_3$ of the meta-physical systematization, we derive the level one or fundamental "norm of nonviolence in group struggle":

$N_1 \equiv$ Act in group struggle and act, moreover, as an autonomous person in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence.

The derivation of N_1 from the basic general norms of self-realization and a hypothesis concerning the ultimate oneness of life permits us to picture the ethics of group struggle as an application of that norm to particular situations.

It should be noted that N_1 is not characteristic of consistent pacifist positions since it may, for instance, be argued without violating N_1 that killing in group struggle may be more conducive to the long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence than not killing. We shall comment on the relation to pacifism later.

Sentence N_1 is intended to express the top norm of the system. All other norms are conceived to be derivable from this norm + hypotheses. The normative power of such pyramidal systems rests with N_1 and N_1 alone.

By there being only one top norm, dependence on the metaphysical position is reduced and made clear and simple. All derivations go through one checkpoint. On the other hand, some norms and hypotheses of Systematization *E* might, as we have already suggested, more naturally and comprehensively be derived from norms and hypotheses of the metaphysical position than from the exhortation to reduce violence in group struggle. The relative independence of the systematization from the details of a metaphysical view is, however, a decisive advantage, and it also makes it easier for others to substitute a different metaphysics from ours, retaining the basic norm of the group struggle system.

The *derivability* of all norms from a single norm does not imply that the top one has any higher normative status. Derivability is not of ethical import. Nor does the derivability of a norm mean that the realization of the norm does not represent a good in itself or an intrinsic value. "Make A. Smith happy" is derivable from "Make all Smiths happy," but this does not imply that it lacks intrinsic value to make A. Smith happy.

Instead of using the phrase "hypotheses and norms of the system," we could also employ the phrase "descriptions and prescriptions." The term *hypothesis* is used because it suggests what we wish to emphasize—the empirical, a posteriori character of the statements—and because we want by our terminology to constantly suggest the possibility and relevance of research programs revising norms and to reflect changes in political and social settings. Since all norms of the system except N_1 are prescribed under the condition that certain hypotheses are true, the whole system, except the single top norm N_1 , is, in principle, open to scrutiny from the point of view of empirical research. That is, the validity of every single statement of the ethics of group struggle depends on the truth and tenability of a set of empirical hypotheses. Gandhi looked on his life as one of *experimentation* with nonviolence.

It so happens that most of the hypotheses are at the moment to some extent testable by the techniques of the social sciences. Or, to be more modest: if the formulations of the hypotheses are made more precise by making use of the terminology dominant in social science today, we can find for each of our hypotheses at least one reformulation that expresses a scientifically testable working hypothesis.

The largely impersonal top norm N_1 is preferred to a norm that simply states, "Do not use violence" because, among other things, it would be too

narrow. The top norm envisages a reduction of violence in complete generality, not only the reduction of one's own violence. It is a pivotal point in Gandhi's thinking. Who does the violence? is a secondary question. Gandhi demands not only personal abstention from violence, but a conduct that does not provoke violence on the part of the opponent or anyone else affected by our conduct. Thus we should not humiliate an opponent by certain kinds of passive resistance because this is likely to produce hatred, which, in turn, may strengthen his disposition toward future use of violence. Further, Gandhi asks for a society, "the nonviolent society," that minimizes the potential role of violence.

There is another important aspect of N_1 : it requires that we *act* in group struggles. Seek the center of troubles and do not run away from the area of conflict. Here the basic attitude of the *karmayogin* reveals itself: one cannot retreat to the solitude of the Himalayas in order to better follow N_1 , because nonviolence by mere isolation from others is not likely to induce nonviolent behavior in others. It is by personal interaction in conflict situations that we can best reduce violence. Further, it is only in difficult (mostly also disagreeable) situations that we can hope to increase our own power of nonviolence. The "benevolent" bystander living in a peaceful suburb may turn out to be a beast when at last he is tested in a fierce riot, whereas a seasoned soldier may keep control of himself and apply nonviolence at a high level.

$H_1 \equiv$ The character of the means used in a group struggle determines the character of the results.

The means-end philosophy of Gandhi and of most other thinkers who feel at home in the camp of nonviolence is important not only from a theoretical point of view, but also didactically. In dialogues carried out in conflict situations, adherents to nonviolence show systematically less confidence in devious ways of arriving at goals generally accepted as good. However, in part because of its central character, the means-end philosophy does not lend itself easily to any clear single expression.

Gandhi sometimes formulated his view on this point in a paradoxical and categorical way. For instance, he says: "Means and ends are convertible terms in my philosophy of life. . . . They say, 'means are after all means.' I

would say, 'means are after all everything.' As the means so the end" (*Young India* 26.12.1924: 424 and 17.7.1924: 236–37; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 226). Taken verbally, the convertibility leads to paradoxes. If a strike is carried out in complete nonviolence, it does not ipso facto constitute the end. The strike is a means to an end, for instance, food for hungry workers. However ethically formidable in its implementation, a strike does not produce food. Nor does it make sense to invert the process, making food for hungry workers a means for achieving a strike.

There are, happily, other formulations that are more clear. Gandhi has expressed his idea in this way: "The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree" (*Hind Swaraj* 1958: 71; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 226). Taken literally, this formulation also leads to paradoxical or at least strange and awkward conclusions. We have tried to circumvent such interpretations by saying in H_1 that the character of the means determines the character of the results. This is very vague or indefinite, but it helps when combined with certain additions that introduce a typology of means and that also relate this typology to a typology of results.

When an action is said to be a means toward an end, no complete characterization is, of course, given of the action. The logic of these words is similar to that of "cause" and "effect."

Just as one and the same thing may be a cause in one relation and an effect in another, it may be a means in one and an end in another. There are chains of means and ends, just as in the case of causes and effects. (However, means do not *cause* the end.)

If, for example, what is designated by *means* is a definite raid and the end is political independence, there will nevertheless be a large number of actions that count as means in relation to that specific raid as their end. Think of preparations for the raid. Just as in the case of cause and effect, "means-end" is a relation that only takes care of the relation in respect to one single characteristic: the means-end relation.

This already precludes an adequate evaluation of an action that in a given case has a means-end relation to a given goal. Ends do not justify means, Gandhi asserts, just as motivation cannot justify actions—provided, of course, by *justify* we do mean something more than merely "contributing to a justification."

If a *satyāgraha* campaign is a campaign consistent with the ethics of nonviolence, any action that forms part of that campaign must be consistent with that ethics. That requirement already makes it clear that violence cannot be part of (100 percent) pure *satyāgraha*. Thus, if an action is a violent means to an end, no characterization of the end is needed in order to conclude that it cannot be part of (100 percent) pure *satyāgraha*. What is usually gained in ethics of nonviolence by postulating that “means determines ends” or even “means are exchangeable with ends” can be more convincingly and clearly gained by insisting, first, that any end or means in a conflict be subordinate to the norms of nonviolent struggle—it is not enough that ends be confronted with the norms—and, second, that ends definable as features of nonviolent society be anticipated by nonviolent means insofar as they involve acting as though in a nonviolent society. Use of a great variety of such means involves taking up the form of life envisaged for a nonviolent society. However, as long as the end, strictly speaking, includes the nonviolent behavior of the opponents, the (complete) end is not realized before the struggle ends in complete victory. Therefore, means and ends are not exchangeable or synonymous (convertible) if we compare behavior during the application of the means with behavior once the end (victory for nonviolence) has been achieved.

If we take self-realization to be the ultimate goal (as in Systematization *E) and a nonviolent society to be a necessary condition for reaching supremely high levels of self-realization, then all nonultimate ends and all means must be judged in relation to self-realization and the nonviolent society.

For some important means M_i advocated by Gandhi, “genuine, strong use of the means M_i ” and “realizing the end E_i , in relation to which M_i is a means” are very near each other, perhaps extensionally identical. This holds well for the means *abimsā* in relation to “seeing God face to face” or “knowing God to the extent of seeing Him face to face.” Gandhi says that for him, the only certain means of knowing God is nonviolence — love. However, it is clear from other places that if a person performs perfectly pure *abimsā*, he ipso facto “sees God face to face.” Perfectly pure *abimsā*, however, must be considered practically impossible, at least for an individual in a violent society, because it implies complete self-realization and this can only be achieved when others have been dragged out of their violent habits. (“My self-realization is coupled to the self-realization of others.”)

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

$H_2 \equiv$ In a group struggle, you can keep the goal-directed motivation and the ability to work effectively for the realization of goals stronger than the destructive, violent tendencies and the tendencies to passiveness, despondency, or destruction only by making a constructive program part of your total campaign and by giving all phases of your struggle, as far as possible, a positive character.

By “struggle with a positive character” here is meant “struggle, some genuine parts of which show (concretely, perceptually) the desired end by partially anticipating it.” The struggle is, when positive, manifestly and evidently *for* something. Only by implication is the struggle against something. The constructive character is the manifest one; the destructive is implied. The violent opponent faces a state of affairs that shows him the desired end, not a group engaged in destruction or mere opposition against something not desired.

A quotation from Gandhi’s journal *Harijan* indicates how important he conceived the constructive program to be:

By hammering away at it through painful years, people have begun to see that there is a potency in non-violence, but they have not seen it in all its fullness and beauty. If they had responded to all the steps that had to be taken for the effective organization of non-violence and carried out in their fullness the various items of the eighteenfold constructive programme, our movement would have taken us to our goal. But today our minds are confused because our faith in constructive work is so weak. (Harijan 10.2.1946)

The goal alluded to in this quotation is “complete freedom (*pūrṇa svarāj*) for India,” that is, not only political independence from the British, but solution of the conflict between different religious communities (Hindus versus Muslims, Muslims versus Sikhs, etc.). The following quotation also illustrates the central position of the constructive programs:

Civil Disobedience, mass or individual, is an aid to constructive effort and is a full substitute for armed revolt. Training is necessary as well for civil disobedience as for armed revolt. Only the ways are different. Action in either case takes place only when occasion demands. Training for military revolt means learning the use of arms ending perhaps in the atomic bomb. For civil disobedience it means the Constructive Programme. (Gandhi 1945: 5)

$N_2 \equiv$ Make a constructive program part of your campaign.

N_2 is conceived as derivable from N_1 and H_2 . The special place of constructive programs in nonviolent struggles is further commented upon on pages 86 ff.

$H_3 \equiv$ Short-term violence counteracts long-term universal reduction of violence.

A violent man's activity is most visible, while it lasts. But it is always transitory . . . Hitler . . . Mussolini . . . and Stalin . . . are able to show the immediate effectiveness of violence. But it will be as transitory as that of Ghenghis' slaughter. But the effects of Buddha's non-violent action persist and are likely to grow with age. . . . [E]xperience convinces me that permanent good can never be the outcome of untruth and violence. Even if my belief is a fond delusion, it will be admitted that it is a fascinating delusion.

(Quoted in Pyarelal 1958, vol. 2: 802)

The qualification "long-term, universal" is used in order to provide a basis for the argument that, even if the short-term result of a war or a minor violent act may completely suppress a large-scale violence, the long-term effects of the use of violence result in more violence than was avoided as an immediate result.

I do not believe in armed risings. They are a remedy worse than the disease sought to be cured. They are a token of the spirit of revenge and impatience and anger. The method of violence cannot do good in the long run.

(*Young India* 9.6.1920: 3; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 139)

$N_3 \equiv$ Never resort to violence against your opponent.

Many people who favor war subscribe to N_1 . They conceive of war as a means to end all future wars or at least as a necessary evil on the way to ultimate reduction of violence. Norm N_3 goes against this and is conceived to be derivable from N_1 and H_3 .

Actually, no derivation is possible in any formal logical sense. Such derivation would require formalization of the system and the addition of a vast number of uninteresting premises that we have left out. Here we shall

only offer a point of departure for explications with highly explicit logical relations. Remarks similar to this are called for in many other instances in the following discussion where the terms *derive* and *derivable* are used. They are not used in the narrow sense of formal logic.

If a group *A* exploits *B* and a person or a group *C* starts *satyāgraha* on behalf of *B*, the aim of *satyāgraha* must be a state of affairs desirable for *A*, *B*, and *C*. The ideal of *satyāgraha* is to leave only victors when the struggle is over. Gandhi appealed to the British to leave India (as rulers) also for their own sake, and he meant it! Exploitation also “exploits” the exploiter: his self-realization is damaged, as not only Gandhi would affirm, but also theorists like Georg Hegel, Karl Marx, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Slaveowners are slaves of their slave ownership. In an area where Hindus dominate Muslims, domination hurts both, just as in areas of the opposite relation of domination. Exploitation is a form of violence (see *Harijan* 1.9.1940: 271–72; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 264–66), but it is a mutual violence, the exploiters against the exploited and the exploited against the exploiters.

In N_3 and in many norms and hypotheses that follow, we use such expressions as “the opponent,” “those for which we apply *satyāgraha*,” and so on. These refer to the manifest struggle. At a deeper level, *satyāgraha* is undertaken on behalf of all participants in the struggle. This point has been largely overlooked among theoreticians.

Satyāgraha is therefore, strictly speaking, done on behalf of the exploiters as well as the exploited. The manifest opponents are the exploiters, but the obstacles, the weaknesses that must be overcome, belong to both groups. The weaknesses foster the antagonism.

$N_{4a} \equiv$ Choose that action or attitude that most probably
reduces the tendency toward violence of all parties
in a struggle.

This norm is conceived to be derived from N_1 as a specification of it. It is an auxiliary norm we use when deriving N_{13} from H_{13} ; it stresses a nondiscriminating and comprehensive concern for all violence with which we might have contact. Outgroup violence is affected by our ingroup policies. Instead of N_3 , “Never resort to violence against your opponent,” we could have stated “Never resort to violence” or “Never do violence.” From $*N_1$,

“Seek complete self-realization,” and $*H_3$, “Violence against yourself precludes realizing your self,” follows “Do not resort to violence against yourself” (or we can derive this norm from $*N_1$ and $*H_5$). In giving N_3 the form we do, we are deliberately limiting ourselves to group struggle. In any case, the systematization admits a completely general norm against violence. Further, such a norm is not an instrumental norm; it is not utilitarian.

The systematization seems to present a utilitarian ethics of nonviolence because there is a supreme norm, “Seek complete self-realization,” above any norms against violence. However, this interpretation goes against the kind of derivation intended when deriving norms against violence from other norms, as explained on pages 57 f. The relation of nonviolence to self-realization is intrinsic (internal), not external. That is, a state of complete self-realization is intrinsically one of complete nonviolence. It is not like the relation between a strike and a resulting gain in foodstuffs for the workers. Analysis of the food cannot reveal the strike, in spite of the strike being used to achieve, and being instrumental in relation to, the improved state of nourishment. Analysis of a state of self-realization, however, reveals an absence of violence. Derivations in a normative system are not limited to external relations. On the contrary, the intrinsic relations are the normal ones. If this could not be taken for granted, the term *involvement explication* should be used instead of *derivation*. Self-realization involves nonviolence, according to Gandhi.

Nevertheless, Gandhi sometimes viewed nonviolence as of thoroughly instrumental value, or at least said things that might be thus interpreted, for example: “Nonviolence being a policy means that it can upon due notice be given up when it proves unsuccessful or ineffective” (Gandhi 1951b: 75).

$N_{4b} \equiv$ Never act as a mere functionary, a representative of an institution, or an underling, but always as an autonomous, fully responsible person.

The top norm, $*N_1$, “Seek complete self-realization,” involves realizing oneself as an autonomous, fully responsible person, and therefore also acting as such. Furthermore, $*N_2$, “Seek truth,” requires personal independence because truth is not a property or monopoly of any person or institution. Au-

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

tonomy as opposed to heteronomy does not involve more than personal identity: one's own, not someone else's, inner voice is the ultimate source of direction.

The next norms, twelve in all, are derived from norms N_2 , N_3 , and N_{4a} with the aid of additional hypotheses, numbered H_4 through H_{17} . In order to facilitate the survey of the systematization as a whole, we shall proceed in a somewhat schematic way.

First-Level Norm:

N_1

Second-Level Norms and Hypotheses:

$H_1, H_2, H_3 \rightarrow$ the latter two derived from the former

$N_2 \rightarrow$ derived from N_1 and H_2

$N_3 \rightarrow$ derived from N_1 and H_3

$N_{4a} \rightarrow$ derived from N_1

$N_{4b} \rightarrow$ derived from N_1

Third-Level Hypotheses

We now proceed to the formulation of the third-level norms and hypotheses. As evidence of the Gandhian character of the latter, we shall sometimes interpolate one or more quotations from his writings, speeches, and dialogues. The weight of this evidence shows great variation from case to case. A more thorough documentation can be made by careful analysis of his campaigns.

The hypotheses of level 3 fall into four groups. The first have to do with securing constructivity and positivity (H_4, H_5, H_6, H_9); the second, with the securing of sympathetic understanding ($H_{10}, H_{11a}, H_{11b}, H_{12}, H_{13}, H_{16}$); the third, with the permanent possibility of convincing (H_{14}, H_{15}, H_{17}); and the fourth, with the role of common goals (H_7, H_8).

$H_4 \equiv$ You can give a struggle a constructive character only if you
conceive it and carry it through as a struggle in favor of human

beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists (positive struggle).

Antagonisms are defined structurally without specifying the function of particular persons. Where there are antagonisms, violence is already at hand as structural violence, or violence is to be expected.

$H_5 \equiv$ It increases your understanding of the conflict, of the participants, and of your own motivation to live together with the participants, especially with those for whom you primarily fight. The most adequate form for living together is that of engaging jointly in constructive work.

We use the qualification “primarily” in order not to create the misunderstanding that *satyāgraha* is carried out on behalf of only one of the contending groups.

$H_6 \equiv$ If you live together with those for whom you primarily struggle and do constructive work with them, this will create a natural basis for trust and confidence in you.

$H_7 \equiv$ All human beings have long-term interests in common (derivable from $*H_2$).

Development of the self toward maturity includes a process of widening interests and identifications. Therefore the self-realization of the mature self requires that of others. On the less metaphysical level, Gandhi stressed concrete, tangible common interests among groups in conflict. Hindus and Muslims, “touchables” and untouchables, landlords and peasants, capitalists and laborers.

I do not think there need be any clash between capital and labour. Each is dependent on the other.

(*Young India* 4.8.1927: 248; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 209)

The interdependence of conflict groups makes *satyāgraha*, not riots and police violence, the appropriate way of “fighting” it out. Such fighting may

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

result in the radical change of existing institutions. The interdependence does not imply that the group structure is permanent.

[I]f both labour and capital have the gift of intelligence equally developed in them and have confidence in their capacity to secure a fair deal, each at the hands of the other, they would get to respect and appreciate each other as equal partners in a common enterprise. They need not regard each other as inherently irreconcilable antagonists. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 208)

$H_8 \equiv$ Cooperation on common goals reduces the chance that the actions and attitudes of participants in conflict will become violent.

$H_9 \equiv$ You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating or provoking him.

Thus, if as part of a boycott of a university or a shop, you lie down in the corridors so as to make it impossible for those seriously opposed to the boycott to avoid stepping on you, your opponent is humiliated. He may either refrain from entering the building for respectable ethical reasons or do it but with resentment and anger. He is not likely to be won to your case, but, on the contrary, he will be more willing to use and more able to justify extreme measures in the conflict, for instance, calling the police.

$H_{10} \equiv$ Thorough understanding of the relevant facts and factors increases the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign.

Gandhi devoted much of his time to acquiring a thorough knowledge of relevant circumstances before he acted. He warned his adherents against advocating their cause before they also deeply understood the different aspects of the problems involved.

$H_{11a} \equiv$ Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your case and the plans for your struggle reduce the chances both for a nonviolent realization of the goals and for the success of future struggles.

Rumor and loose talk played in India, just as they do in present-day conflicts, a fundamental role in fostering hatred of the antagonist or outgroup and complacency and righteousness in the ingroup. Organized violence depends on this incompleteness and distortion. "Truth is the first casualty in war," it is said; on the contrary its absence precedes war as a partial cause.

The classic kind of escalation can be seen in the following scenario: Muslim scolds Hindu boy who has stolen a cake; Hindus in next street tell about Hindu being beaten by Muslim; Hindu kicks Muslim, who denies the charge; Muslims in next street tell about the murder of a coreligionist; Muslims murder an innocent Hindu; . . . general riot.

$H_{11b} \equiv$ Secrecy reduces the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign.

The intention to keep certain plans, moves, motives, and objectives secret influences our behavior so that we cannot face our opponent openly (poker-face development). The intention and its implementation are also more easily revealed to the opponent than we are likely to believe. Our poker face alerts the opponent. Furthermore, once a secret is revealed, the opponent cannot know how many other secrets are kept, and a general suspicion poisons the communication channels.

On the other hand, if the opponent is in power, he may arrest all the leaders of a planned direct action. This stresses the need for democratic leadership, making it possible for a larger group to assume leadership.

The norm against secrecy is not a norm against refusal to give information that endangers the life of innocents.

$H_{12} \equiv$ You are less likely to take on a violent attitude if you make clearer to yourself the essential points in your cause and struggle.

A *satyāgraha* is not undertaken unless the fighters are convinced of the rightness of the cause. However, in an action, the direct confrontations are rarely with the most responsible opponents. More often, the direct confrontations are with subordinates of the opponents or with the police. In case of injury to material possessions, these possessions may belong to completely

innocent people. During direct actions, the distance between the positive aim of the campaign or movement and the concrete moves and doings of the fighters is considerable. Clear perception of both the positive aim and this distance makes it less likely that violence ensues: the nonviolent fighters are aware how misdirected, how *mal placé* the violence would be. They are aware of the futility of violence.

The importance, for Gandhi, of distinguishing essentials from nonessentials also derives from his teaching that one should always be willing to compromise on nonessential matters (cf. *N₂₂*, p. 82).

$H_{13} \equiv$ Your opponent is less likely to use violent means the better he understands your conduct and your case.

One might object that Hitler and many other leaders of group struggle profited immensely from ignorance. Knowledge of Hitler's conduct was apt to make his opponents consider any means! Against this we must respond with the reminder that the "case" must be consistent with the ethics of non-violence—if not, Gandhi does not claim that anything will be gained from conducting the struggle nonviolently.

On the whole, Gandhi would insist that we inform our opponent more completely than is customary, even in rather friendly disputes, and that we do this by open actions rather than by proclamations.

$H_{14} \equiv$ There is a disposition in every opponent such that wholehearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favor of a good cause is able to convince him ultimately (general convincibility).

In the application of the method of nonviolence, one must believe in the possibility of every person, however depraved, being reformed under humane and skilled treatment (*Harijan* 22.2.1942).

Gandhi tended to include any normal person in the intended field of validity of this hypothesis, interpreting "normal" widely enough to cover even Adolf Hitler. A person's capacity to convince the opponent may be inadequate, but it can be developed immensely.

Hitherto he [Hitler] and his likes have built upon their invariable experience that men yield to force. Unarmed men, women and children offering non-violent

resistance without any bitterness in them will be a novel experience for them. Who can dare say that it is not in their nature to respond to the higher and finer forces? They have the same soul that I have. . . .

(*Harijan* 15.10.1938: 290; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 149)

According to the metaphysics of Gandhi, all human beings, including Hitler, are ultimately one. It may be right, however, for a person to kill another. In the Third Reich, there were many situations of nonviolent helplessness in which Gandhi's norm to use violence rather than to surrender was applicable.

$H_{15} \equiv$ Mistrust stems from misjudgment, especially of the disposition of your opponent to answer trust with trust and mistrust with mistrust.

There are many examples in Gandhi's writings of this conception of trust and mistrust. His life likewise offers examples of the way he trusted people strongly opposed to him and the courage he thus proved. He repeatedly risked his own life by believing that he could trust his opponents when he met them personally. His "experiments" with trust were on the whole successful.

A grave question, however, is what to trust in the opponent. Sometimes one may press an opponent to promise something, but it would be quite unrealistic to expect him to keep the promise. Gandhi might say here that to trust a person does not mean to trust anything he says; it means to trust something in the opponent that listens to appeals and makes progress possible. The opposite, the mistrust of the whole person, is to give up any appeal.

$H_{16} \equiv$ The tendency to misjudge and misunderstand your opponent and his case in an unfavorable direction increases both his and your tendency to resort to violence.

When Gandhi arrived in Durban in 1897, people were enraged because of biased reports about his speeches in India concerning race discrimination in Durban and other places. He was severely attacked. Recovering, he gave a fair account of the incident, decreasing the chance of further violence. He was to experience similar verifications of his hypotheses during the next fifty years.

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

$H_{17} \equiv$ You win conclusively when you turn your opponent into a believer and active supporter of your case.

Persistent communication with the perceptible aim of convincing the opponent makes chances of solving the conflict greater than does communication that manifests resignation as to the possibility of influencing the beliefs of the opponent. If this sounds improbable, our reluctance to accept the hypothesis may stem from thinking in terms of pure conflicts of interest. Gandhian strategy presupposes common aims that bridge such conflicts. In matters of divergent interest (not touching upon justice), the strategy requires compromise.

No effort has been made explicitly to derive some of the hypotheses from others. By suitable modifications, H_{15} and H_{17} might, for instance, be derived from H_{14} .

Third-Level Norms

The third-level norms deal with the same four classes of subjects as the hypotheses that are used in their derivation—in short, principles of constructivity, understanding, convincing, and common goals.

$N_5 \equiv$ Fight antagonisms, not antagonists: conceive of your struggle and carry it through as a positive struggle in *favor* of human beings and certain values (derived from N_2 and H_4).

The essence of nonviolence technique is that it seeks to liquidate antagonisms but not the antagonists themselves. (*Harijan* 29.4.1939)

Nonviolence does not signify that man must not fight against the enemy, and by enemy is meant the evil which men do, not the human beings themselves.

My non-co-operation, though it is part of my creed, is a prelude to co-operation.
My non-co-operation is with methods and systems, never with men.
(Prabhu and Rao 1967: 184)

It may be mentioned, as an example, that in the first part of his most famous campaign, Gandhi supported the people in making salt rather than instigating them to rise up against the empire salt producers and their fac-

tories. The desired situation was anticipated. One should fight the antagonism, not the antagonists.

$N_6 \equiv$ Live together with those for whom you struggle and do constructive work for them (derived from N_2 and H_5 or from N_4 and H_6).

Gandhi's experience in India covered hooliganism, riots, and many other kinds of violent disturbances. He did not have to deal with narcotics and gangs of rebellious youths. Studying the following quotations, the reader might have the typical social problems of the 1970s in mind. The main conclusion is that these problems can only be solved by large-scale mobilization of ordinary citizens, not by police action. The effort of the ordinary citizen to hire and pay a police army to solve problems he himself has created violates a number of Gandhian norms and hypotheses.

To quell riots non-violently, there must be true *abimsā* in one's heart, and *abimsā* that takes even the erring hooligan in its warm embrace. Such an attitude cannot be cultivated. It can only come as a prolonged and patient effort which must be made during peaceful times. The would-be member of a peace brigade should come into close touch and cultivate acquaintance with the so-called *goonda* (hooligan) element in his vicinity. He should know all and be known to all and win the hearts of all by his living and selfless service. No section should be regarded as too contemptible or mean to mix with. *Goondas* do not drop from the sky, nor do they spring from the earth like evil spirits. They are the product of social disorganization, and society therefore is responsible for their existence. (*Harizan* 15.9.1940; quoted in Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 345)

They should contact the criminals in their homes, win their confidence and trust by loving and selfless service, wean them from evil and unclean habits and help to rehabilitate them by teaching them honest ways of living.

(Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 127)

I am a Hindu, I must fraternize with the Mussulmans and the rest. In my dealings with them I may not make any distinction between my coreligionists and those who might belong to a different faith. I would seek opportunities to serve them without any feeling of fear or unnaturalness. . . . Similarly, to meet the menace of thieves and dacoits, he will need to go among, and cultivate friendly relations with, the communities from which the thieves and dacoits generally come. (*Harizan* 21.7.1940)

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

$N_7 \equiv$ Try to formulate the essential interests that you and your opponent have in common and try to establish a cooperation with your opponent on this basis (derived from N_2 and H_7 or from N_4 and H_7 and H_8).

Behind my non-co-operation there is always the keenest desire to co-operate on the slightest pretext even with the worst of opponents.

(Prabhu and Rao 1967: 183)

I would co-operate a thousand times with this Government to wean it from its career of crime, but I will not for a single moment cooperate with it to continue that career.

(Gandhi 1951b: 126)

$N_8 \equiv$ Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent (derived from N_3 or from N_4 and H_9).

When living and working together with opponents (and people on your own side), you provoke them if you try to impose your standards of conduct on them. "The golden rule of conduct," says Gandhi,

is mutual toleration, seeing that we will never all think alike and we shall always see Truth in fragment and from different angles of vision. Conscience is not the same thing for all. Whilst, therefore, it is a good guide for individual conduct, imposition of that conduct upon all will be an insufferable interference with everybody's freedom of conscience.

(*Young India* 23.9.1926: 334; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 420)

$N_9 \equiv$ Acquire the best possible understanding of the facts and factors relevant to the nonviolent realization of the goals of your cause (derived from N_4 and H_{10}).

In every branch of reform constant study giving one a mastery over one's subject is necessary. Ignorance is at the root of failures, partial or complete, of all reform movements whose merits are admitted. For every project masquerading under the name of reform is not necessarily worthy of being so designated.

(*Harizan* 24.4.1937; quoted in Bose 1948: 209)

$N_{10} \equiv$ Do your utmost to present unbiased descriptions, to be in full accordance with the truth when describing individuals, groups,

institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle
(derived from N_4 and H_{11a}).

In a fierce labor struggle, Gandhi attributed his success to the habit of correctness in details—factual truth:

Incorrect or misleading reports, therefore, . . . and their ire, instead of descending on me, would be sure to descend on the poor fear-stricken ryots and seriously hinder my search for the truth about the case.

In spite of these precautions the planters engineered against me a poisonous agitation. All sorts of falsehoods appeared in the press about my co-workers and myself. But my extreme cautiousness and my insistence on truth, even to the minutest detail, turned the edge of their sword.

(Gandhi 1948: 507)

On the other hand, there should be no soft-speaking when harsh truths must be communicated:

False notions of propriety or fear of wounding susceptibilities often deter people from saying what they mean and ultimately land them on shores of hypocrisy. But if non-violence of thought is to be evolved in individuals or societies or nations, truth has to be told, however harsh or unpopular it may appear to be for the moment.
(*Harijan* 19.12.1936; quoted in Bose 1948: 151)

Of special importance is a close scrutiny of ingroup gossip. It is all too easy to form a pleasant but biased picture of the campaign when conversing with comrades. This is a main source of satisfactory relations between campaigners during inactivity. They tell each other nice things about the campaign that place the opponents in a ridiculous position. The ingroup feeling is supported by conformity and by falsity of the picture. However, interacting incorrectly with other groups and with the opponent may lead to false steps and undermine the success of the campaign. There are always warm, positive, nice things to be said that do not violate the norm of truthfulness.

$N_{11a} \equiv$ Do not use secret plans or moves or keep objectives secret
(derived from N_4 and H_{11b}).

No secret organization, however big, could do any good. Secrecy aims at building a wall of protection round you. *Abimsā* disdains such protection. It

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

functions in the open and in the face of odds, the heaviest conceivable. We have to organize for action a vast people that have been crushed under the heel of unspeakable tyranny for centuries. They cannot be organized by any other than open truthful means. I have grown up from youth to 76 years in abhorrence of secrecy. (*Harijan* 10.2.1946; quoted in Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 2–3)

I do not appreciate any underground activity. I know that millions cannot go underground. Millions need not. A select few may fancy that they will bring swaraj to the millions by secretly directing their activity. Will this not be spoon-feeding? Only open challenge and open activity is for all to follow. Real Swaraj *must* be felt by all—man, woman and child. To labour for that consummation is true revolution.

(*Harijan* 3.3.1946; quoted in Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 50)

According to Gandhi, not all people have at all times the right to know everything about anything. Thus, it may be our duty to keep away information or plainly refuse to give certain information. Such cases were frequent during riots. Hooligans have no right to an answer when asking for the whereabouts of people they intend to rob or kill.

There is another aspect of the duty sometimes not to tell the truth. Gandhi formulated the principle “A reformer cannot be an informer.” Speaking at Uruli about a nonviolent attitude toward criminals, he stated that for a *satyāgrahin* to go to the police in order to give information “would be gross betrayal of trust.” He is also reported to have “mentioned several instances of how he had refused to give information to the police, about persons who had been guilty of violence and came and confessed to him. No police officer could compel a *satyāgrahin* to give evidence against a person who had confessed to him” (*Harijan* 11.8.1946; quoted in Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 126–27). A *satyāgrahin* would never be guilty of a betrayal of trust.

$N_{11b} \equiv$ Withdraw the intended victim from the wrongdoer (derived from N_4).

This norm has wide applications under terror regimes. It is often difficult to avoid a conflict of norms: the keeping away of potential victims from a criminalized police may develop into a large project requiring detailed planning that must be kept secret.

The wording of N_{11b} is taken from an article by Gandhi in his *Harijan* (part of it was quoted on page 43).

N_{12} \equiv Announce your case and the goals of your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from nonessentials (derived from N_4 and H_{12} and H_{13}).

N_{13} \equiv Seek personal contact with your opponent and be available to him. Bring conflicting groups into personal contact (derived from N_4 and H_{13}).

The would-be member of a peace brigade should come into close touch and cultivate acquaintance with the so-called *goonda* (hooligan) element in his vicinity. He should know all and be known to all and win the hearts of all by his living and selfless service. No section should be regarded as too contemptible or mean to mix with. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 344)

Peace brigades have a special mission in riot areas: . . . Theirs will be the duty of seeking occasions for bringing warring communities together, carrying on peace propaganda, engaging in activities that would bring and keep them in touch with every single person, male or female, adult or child, in their parish or division. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 344)

Gandhi tried to come into personal contact with the British administrators and succeeded to an amazing degree. The graver the conflicts, the more intense was his effort to be in personal touch with the opponent.

Perhaps, however, Gandhi did not consistently make efforts to be in personal contact with the very shy and suspicious Jinnah, the Father of Pakistan. If that is the case, it was another mistake "of Himalayan dimensions," judged from its consequences. It is difficult, however, to find the sources in studying the relation between Gandhi and Jinnah. One of its few students, S. K. Majumdar, has some painful things to point out:

Throughout 1937 and 1938, Jinnah tried his level best to come into personal contact with Gandhiji for the purpose of settling Congress-League disputes. But Gandhiji and the Congress High Command did not think it worth while to cultivate Jinnah's good will. Feeling aggrieved . . . Jinnah became very bitter only when he found that his conciliatory overtures were contemptuously ignored. Until his self-respect was wounded, his speeches were never characterised by any bitterness, but . . . (Majumdar 1966: 159 and 160)

Some of the close collaborators of Gandhi in the 1940s say that it was impossible to penetrate Jinnah's personal defenses. However, according to the hypotheses of *satyāgraha*, it must have been possible. Perhaps Gandhi did

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

not feel strong enough in his nonviolent attitude toward Jinnah? He talked surprisingly little about the possibilities of personal contact.

$N_{14} \equiv$ Do not judge your opponent harder than yourself (derived from N_3 or from N_4 and H_{16}).

$N_{15} \equiv$ Trust your opponent (derived from N_4 , H_{14} , H_{15} , and H_{16}).

A Satyāgrahi bids good-bye to fear. He is therefore never afraid of trusting the opponent. Even if the opponent plays him false twenty times, the Satyāgrahi is ready to trust him for the twenty-first time, for an implicit trust in human nature is the very essence of his creed. (Gandhi 1950: 246)

$N_{16} \equiv$ Turn your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or exploit him (derived from N_1 , N_4 , H_{14} , and H_{17}).

The *satyāgrahi's* object is to convert, not to coerce, the wrong-doer. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 78)

But there is no such thing as compulsion in the scheme of non-violence. Reliance has to be placed upon ability to reach the intellect and the heart—the latter rather than the former. (*Harijan* 23.7.1938)

How can I, the champion of *ahimsā*, compel anyone to perform even a good act? Has not a well-known Englishman said that to make mistakes as a free man is better than being in bondage in order to avoid them? I believe in the truth of this. The reason is obvious. The mind of a man who remains good under compulsion cannot improve, in fact it worsens. And when compulsion is removed, all the defects well up to the surface with even greater force.—Moreover, no one should be a dictator.

(*Harijan* 29.9.1946; Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 138)

Despite much controversy about fasting as a coercive means, Gandhi persisted in the application of fasts. He considered them necessary companions of prayers.

My religion teaches me that, whenever there is distress which one cannot remove, one must fast and pray.

(*Young India* 25.9.1924: 319; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 34)

[T]here is no prayer without fasting, and there is no real fast without prayer.

(*Harijan* 16.2.1933: 2; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 35)

It is not to be denied that fasting can be really coercive. Such are fasts to attain a selfish object. . . . I would unhesitatingly advocate resistance of such undue influence. . . . (Harijan 9.9.1933: 5; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 36)

Coercion is taken to be a sort of violence and is therefore inconsistent with pure nonviolence. The questions of permissibility and avoidability of coercion have been debated. We shall discuss this issue separately.

Fourth-Level Hypotheses

A new set of hypotheses, together with norms N_8 , N_{10} , N_{14} , and N_{16} , will give rise to a last group of norms.

$H_{18} \equiv$ You provoke your opponent if you deliberately or carelessly destroy his property.

$H_{19} \equiv$ Adequate understanding of your opponent presupposes personal empathy.

Immediately we begin to think of things as our opponent thinks of them, we shall be able to do them full justice. I know that this requires a detached state of mind, and it is a state very difficult to reach. Nevertheless for a *satyāgrahi* it is absolutely essential. Three-fourths of the miseries and misunderstandings of the world will disappear, if we step into the shoes of our adversaries and understand their standpoint. (Bose 1948: 186)

$H_{20} \equiv$ Avoiding misjudging and misunderstanding your opponent and his case requires understanding him and his case.

$H_{21} \equiv$ If you keep in mind your own fallibility and failures, you are less likely to exaggerate those of your opponent. Opponents are then less likely to be misjudged in an unfavorable way, and their case is also less likely to be underestimated intellectually or morally.

$H_{22} \equiv$ Every political action, your own included, is likely to be based, in part, on mistaken views and to be carried out in an imperfect way (universal imperfection).

$H_{23} \equiv$ You make it difficult for your opponent to turn and support your case if you are unwilling to compromise on nonessentials.

$H_{24} \equiv$ It furthers the conversion of your opponent if he understands that you are sincere.

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

$H_{25} \equiv$ The best way of convincing your opponent of your sincerity is to make sacrifices for your cause.

The notion of sacrifice (and also suffering) in Gandhi's thought stems from the corresponding religious notion in the Baghavad Gita—consider the Sanskrit term *yajña* ("offer," "token of devotion"). In nonviolent group struggle, hardships undertaken with joy for the cause count as sacrifice. "*Yajna* is not *yajna* if one feels it to be burdensome or annoying" (from Gandhi 1957; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 230).

The use of the terms *sacrifice* and *suffering* to translate *yajña* will suggest masochism to many Western readers. Let us therefore take note of Gandhi's explanation:

Yajna means an act directed to the welfare of others, done without desiring any return for it, whether of a temporal or spiritual nature. "Act" here must be taken in its widest sense, and includes thought and word, as well as deed. "Others" embraces not only humanity, but all life. . . .
(from Gandhi 1957; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 228)

The best way to convince the opponent is to make sacrifices for the cause, but hardships undertaken in order to impress the opponent are not *yajña*, according to the above quotation.

$H_{26} \equiv$ During a campaign, change of its declared objective makes it difficult for opponents to trust your sincerity.

Gandhi has in mind the expansion of objectives at moments of weakness in the opponent and contraction when it seems that the strength of the opponent has been underrated.

Fourth-Level Norms

$N_{17} \equiv$ Do not destroy property belonging to your opponent (derived from N_8 and H_{18}).

I see neither bravery nor sacrifice in destroying life or property for offence or defence. I would far rather leave, if I must, my crops and homestead for the enemy to use than destroy them for the sake of preventing their use by him. There is reason, sacrifice and even bravery in so leaving my homestead and

crops, if I do so not out of fear but because I refuse to regard anyone as my enemy—that is, out of a humanitarian motive. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 388)

$N_{18} \equiv$ Cultivate personal *Einfühlung* (empathy) with your opponent
(derived from N_{14} and H_{19} and H_{20}).

By *Einfühlung*, we here think of placing oneself as much as possible in the situation of the opponent and understanding his actions in that context rather than one's own. It depends on the ability and willingness to identify with fellow humans, whatever their relation to one's own private interests. It does not, of course, preclude an intensive fight against the position of the opponent in the conflict. Gandhi's talk on the day after the unsuccessful attempt on his life (January 20, 1948), furnishes an example of how well he succeeded in his cultivation of personal *Einfühlung* with the opponent and of his consequent high level of unbiasedness. Tendulkar reports on this event:

God only knew how he would have behaved in front of a bomb aimed at him and exploding. Therefore, he deserved no praise. He would deserve a certificate only if he fell as a result of such an explosion, and yet retained a smile on his face and no malice against the doer. What he wanted to convey was that no one should look down upon the misguided young man who had thrown the bomb. [The youth] probably looked upon the speaker as an enemy of Hinduism. After all, had not the Gita said that whenever there was an evil-minded person damaging religion, God sent some one to put an end to his life? That celebrated verse had a special meaning. The youth should realize that those who differed from him were not necessarily evil. The evil had no life apart from the toleration of good people. (Tendulkar 1951–54, vol. 8: 331–32)

Gandhi knew that the people trying to take his life were devout Hindus. The one who succeeded (January 30) knew the Bhagavad Gita practically by heart, and the reference to the Bhagavad Gita in the above example must be said to make the opponent's view stand out in its full strength. That Gandhi was a kind of tyrant, that his followers were charmed and awed, not convinced by reason and sentiment, was a conviction held by a considerable minority. Among the leaders, Jinnah was of that opinion, and to one with a different philosophy of means and ends, it might easily be considered a virtue to get rid of Gandhi. The quotation ends with the metaphysical point that evil does not exist as such, but only insofar as it is tolerated by ordinary "good" people. This is a point taken up by many West-

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

ern philosophers, for example, Spinoza, and springs from the metaphysical conception of reality as something beyond good and evil.

$N_{19} \equiv$ Do not formulate your case, the goals of your campaign, or those of your opponent in a biased way (derived from N_{10} or from N_{14} and H_{20}).

$N_{20} \equiv$ Try to correct bias in your opponent only insofar as it is necessary for the campaign (derived from N_{10} or from N_{14} and H_{20}).

If your opponent describes your case in a biased way, this is not sufficient reason for you to use your time to try to correct him. If the misrepresentation is clearly relevant for the conduct and success of the campaign, an effort to change his presentation is advisable.

I am used to misrepresentation all my life. It is the lot of every public worker. He has to have a tough hide. Life would be burdensome if every misrepresentation had to be answered and cleared. It is a rule of life with me never to explain misrepresentations except when the cause requires correction. This rule has saved much time and worry. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 7–8)

$N_{21} \equiv$ Keep in mind and admit your own factual and normative mistakes, and look for opportunities to correct your judgments (derived from N_{14} and H_{21}).

$N_{22} \equiv$ Always be willing to compromise on nonessentials (derived from N_{16} and H_{22} and H_{23}).

I am essentially a man of compromise, because I am never sure that I am right. (Fischer 1943: 102)

[F]ull surrender of non-essentials is a condition precedent to accession of internal strength to defend the essential by dying. (*Harijan* 10.11.1940: 333; quoted in Dhawan 1951: 129)

A Satyāgrahi never misses, can never miss, a chance of compromise on honourable terms, it being always assumed that, in the event of failure, he is ever ready to offer battle. He needs no previous preparation, his cards are always on the table. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 172)

Indeed life is made of such compromises. *Abimsā* simply because it is purest, unselfish love, often demands such compromises. The conditions are impera-

tive. There should be no self in one's action, no fear, no untruth, and it must be in furtherance of the cause of *abimsā*. The compromise must be natural to one-self, not imposed from without. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 126–27)

All my life through, the very insistence on truth has taught me to appreciate the beauty of compromise. I saw in later life, that this was an essential part of *satyāgraha*. It has often meant endangering my life and incurring the displeasure of friends. But truth is hard as adamant and tender as a blossom.

Human life is a series of compromises, and it is not always easy to achieve in practice what one has found to be true in theory.

There are eternal principles which admit of no compromise, and one must be prepared to lay down one's life in the practice of them.

(Prabhu and Rao 1967: 39)

$N_{23} \equiv$ Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent
(derived from N_{16} and H_{24}).

This highly characteristic norm is commented on below (pp. 87 f.).

$N_{24} \equiv$ Be willing to make sacrifices and suffer for your cause (derived
from N_{16} and H_{24} and H_{25}).

In passive resistance there is always present an idea of harassing the other party and there is a simultaneous readiness to undergo any hardships entailed upon us by such activity; while in *satyāgraha* there is not the remotest idea of injuring the opponent. *Satyāgraha* postulates the conquest of the adversary by suffering in one's own person. (Bose 1948: 185)

Self-sacrifice of one innocent man is a million times more potent than the sacrifice of a million men who die in the act of killing others. The willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful retort to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God or man.

(*Young India* 12.2.1925: 60; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 139)

Gandhi has made it clear that the suffering, that is, the hardship, must be functional. He was not in favor of martyrs or sufferings not caused by acts conducive to the solution of the present conflict or future potential conflicts.

$N_{25} \equiv$ During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its
goals wider or narrower (derived from N_{16} and H_{24} and H_{26}).

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

In a pure fight the fighters would never go beyond the objective fixed when the fight began even if they received an accession to their strength in the course of the fighting, and on the other hand they could not give up their objective if they found their strength dwindling away.

(Gandhi 1950: 422–23)

I distinctly said, that it would be dishonest now, having the opportunity, to take up a position which was not in view when *Satyāgraha* was started. No matter how strong we were, the present struggle must close when the demands for which it was commenced were accepted. I am confident, that if we had not adhered to this principle, instead of winning, we would not only have lost all along the line, but also forfeited the sympathy which had been enlisted in our favour. On the other hand if the adversary himself creates new difficulties for us while the struggle is in progress, they become automatically included in it. A Satyāgrahi without being false to his faith, cannot disregard new difficulties which confront him while he is pursuing his own course.

(Ibid., pp. 209–10)

For the proper use of this norm, we shall distinguish between action, campaign, and movement: Gandhi planned and carried out a number of campaigns for political independence of India and also a number of campaigns for other large goals, for example, the abolition of untouchability and mutual tolerance and respect between religious communities. The always well defined and limited campaigns are thus parts of larger, sometimes more ill defined, diffuse movements with supreme goals. The latter are in general not liable to precise delimitation. *Svarāj* was never defined or specified, leaving each group some freedom of interpretation. “Communal peace” was even less definite. Norms pertaining to campaigns are therefore not automatically generalized to movements. If the two are not kept apart, we are apt to require too much of movements and too little of campaigns. Within campaigns, we may speak of direct actions. Thus, the salt march might be taken as one action and the salt raids as other actions within the “abolish the salt monopoly” campaign. This example, however, is a difficult one, as it appears to suggest that the borderline between action, campaigns, and movement cannot be defined precisely.

Norm *N*₂₅ says essentially that the opponent must get an honest answer to “What do you want through your present action?” and that if we achieve what we have said we want, then that action is to be terminated, whether its termination is opportune or not.

Elaboration and Exemplification

Constructive Programs

In this section, we shall illustrate how the above meager outline of a systematization can be taken as a starting point for a more substantial presentation. First, we shall elaborate on one of the norms of the system, N_2 , "Make a constructive program part of your campaign," in order to make it more understandable and also more open to critical examination. The paramount importance of this norm stems in part from Gandhi's conviction that if it is ignored by some sections of the supporters of *satyāgraha*, the strongest non-violent methods in the fight for political freedom are rendered inapplicable. Only those who are able to take upon themselves the task of constructive community service are sufficiently mature for intense massive nonviolent struggle. At a critical juncture in 1930, Gandhi stressed that he could not recommend civil disobedience campaigns because the requirement of a constructive program was unlikely to be fulfilled. Insufficient constructive content in the fight for freedom would make it overwhelmingly probable that there would be violence and that the people, even if victorious, would prove to be too immature for implementing radical reforms.

Gandhi was determined to stop a civil disobedience campaign in the case of such immaturity, as at Chaura Chauri, where some English policemen were murdered. However, only late in his life was he able to admit to himself how far behind he was in developing an institution of constructive work.

Gandhi insisted on constructive or positive conceptions of goals and subgoals and consequently demanded that Indians belonging to groups likely to get into violent conflict in case of crisis should work together on economic and other projects, thereby acquiring a spirit of mutual understanding and trust and a habit of sacrifice, that is, of engagement in the interest of wider long-range goals.

In India, such work was organized and planned under the name of the Constructive Program. The norms stating that one should contribute to the implementation of the constructive program make up an integral part of the Gandhian ethics of group struggle. They are not mere accessories.

A quotation will make the point clearer. In his statement of January 1930, Gandhi said among other things that the atmosphere was not conducive for initiating a mass civil disobedience campaign:

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

Constructive programme is not essential for local civil disobedience for specific relief as in the case of Bardoli. Tangible common grievance restricted to a particular locality is enough. But for such an indefinable thing as Swaraj (freedom), people must have previous training in doing things of All-India interest. Trust begotten in the pursuit of continuous constructive work becomes a tremendous asset at the critical moment. Constructive work therefore is for a non-violent army what drilling etc., is for an army designed for bloody warfare. Individual civil disobedience among an unprepared people and by leaders not known to or trusted by them is of no avail, a mass civil disobedience is an impossibility. The more therefore the progress of the constructive programme, the greater is the chance for civil disobedience. Granted a perfectly non-violent atmosphere and a fulfilled constructive programme, I would undertake to lead a mass civil disobedience struggle to a successful issue in the space of a few months.

(*Young India* 9.1.1930)

In the booklet *Constructive Programme*, Gandhi even says that mass civil disobedience might be dispensed with if the constructive program were taken seriously by all concerned. He says:

Civil disobedience is not absolutely necessary to win freedom through purely non-violent efforts, if the cooperation of the whole nation is secured in the constructive programme. . . . My handling of civil disobedience without constructive programme will be like a paralysed hand attempting to lift a spoon.

(*Diwakar* 1946: 187)

Constructive work, on the other hand, cannot be dispensed with:

The best preparation for, and even the expression of, non-violence lies in the determined pursuit of the constructive programme. Any one who believes that without the backing of the constructive programme he will show non-violent strength when the testing time comes will fail miserably. It will be, like the attempt of a starving unarmed man to match his physical strength against a fully fed and panoplied soldier, foredoomed to failure.

(Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 398–99)

The constructive work is of various kinds. A few of the many activities one might work to promote include eliminating untouchability, spreading hand-spun and handwoven cloth, developing village sanitation and other village industries, cultivating basic education through crafts, and creating literacy programs.

Gandhi also had in mind the effect on the opponent. In the eyes of the opponent, the revolutionary seems mainly to have destruction in view.

Gandhi requires methods whereby the constructive intent is made completely clear and trustworthy to the sceptical opponent.

As a demonstration against the British salt tax and salt monopoly, considered to be profoundly unjust, Gandhi and a mass of poor people marched to the sea to make salt illegally. While the campaign was going on, Gandhi used much time for other tasks, such as instigating house industry and cleaning up slum quarters. The latter activity was a genuine part of the campaign and part of the struggle for *svarāj* as a whole. It was a demonstration *ad oculos* that helped the followers and opponents fix their attention on the positive goals rather than on the means and the inevitable destructive components, that is, disabling the British administration.

One may say that the norm to partake in a constructive program is the supreme anti-antimovement norm in the system: those tendencies present in organizations or groups that favor the destruction of something (the organized anti-Semites, anti-Communists, anti-Fascists, etc.) are denounced; every action should have a clear, positive pro-character.

We have used the norm "Give your campaign a constructive content" to illustrate the rich, scarcely surveyable material that has to be studied in order to proceed from a mere diagram toward a full presentation of Gandhi's political ethics. It should be clear from the comments and quotations that constructivity of main goals, constructivity of subgoals, and the so-called constructive program are means by which Gandhi tried to contribute to the implementation of many norms. It should also be clear that some norms may be viewed as occupying a lower position in relation to the norm requiring constructive work. Actually, the constructive work was a kind of partial anticipation of the condition Gandhi called *pūrṇa svarāj*, real independence, an ideal state of society. The political independence was not, as such, a constructive goal for him, since it was defined as *absence* of British domination.

Nonexploitation of Weakness

Let us elaborate on another norm, N_{23} , "Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent," that is, insofar as the weakness is due to factors irrelevant to the struggle.

Victory in the sense of bringing the opponent to accept the stipulated conditions for terminating the *satyāgraha* is not necessarily a victory of the kind intended by the *satyāgrahin*. If the surrender is caused by some misfor-

tune the opponent has experienced that makes it necessary for him to call off his struggle with the *satyāgrahin*, the opponent may, after the surrender, be as much opposed to the goal of the *satyāgraha* as before it all started. Surrender without conversion is not the ideal kind of termination of the struggle. If by factors irrelevant to the struggle and therefore unrelated to the conversion of the opponent, the *satyāgrahin* are able to get what they desire in terms of conditions, they should, if it is practicable, postpone the campaign until the opponent has recovered his full strength.

As an example, we may take what happened at the last stage of the *satyāgraha* campaigns in South Africa. Gandhi fought against certain laws that he considered discriminatory against the Indian minority. Their repeal was the condition of bringing the *satyāgraha* campaign to a stop. The Indian leaders were planning a march as part of the *satyāgraha*. When a railway strike broke out among the white employees, the government was in a dangerous position and might well have been willing to settle the conflict with the Indians in order to meet the situation created by the strike. Let me quote what Gandhi says in his narrative. Its reliability is not contested by his adversary — and great admirer — General Smuts. Gandhi said:

Just at this time there was a great strike of the European employees of the Union railways, which made the position of the Government extremely delicate. I was called upon to commence the Indian march at such a fortunate juncture. But I declared that the Indians could not thus assist the railway strikers, as they [the Indians] were not out to harass the Government, their struggle being entirely different and differently conceived. Even if we undertook the march, we would begin it at some other time when the railway trouble had ended. This decision of ours created a deep impression, and was cabled to England by Reuter. (Gandhi 1950: 325)

When World War II broke out, pressure was brought on Gandhi to intensify the fight against the British. He declined to take up mass civil disobedience during the war. He said:

There is neither warrant nor atmosphere for mass action. That would be naked embarrassment and a betrayal of nonviolence. . . . By causing embarrassment at this stage, the authorities must resent it bitterly, and are likely to act madly. It is worse than suicide to resort to violence that is embarrassment under the cover of nonviolence.

(Declaration published in all Indian newspapers, October 30, 1940)

Gandhi's argumentation and behavior in these two instances are in conformity with his admonition to not exploit weaknesses in our opponents' position (N_{23}).

Later, during World War II, Gandhi intended to start a mass movement. This plan creates a problem for our Systematization *E*. It requires either a hypothesis that the British then, in the autumn of 1942, were no longer in a temporarily weak position, or a decision that Gandhi violated his own norms, or perhaps a decision to modify our systematization so as to make Gandhi's behavior in both 1920 and 1942 conform to the explication of his ethics. We tentatively take the view that in 1942 Gandhi violated his own norms and are thus able to continue to regard the metaphysical Systematization **E* as adequate.

Coercion

Inherent in the concept of group struggle is an acknowledgment of a conflict of wills. "I do not want what you want, and I oppose you." When a *satyāgraha* campaign starts, a conflict of wills is taken for granted.

By definition, a successful *satyāgraha* campaign ends with wills in harmony (within the field covered by the always limited campaign). Normally, the direction of the wills of both parties is changed during the campaign. The antagonism disappears within a limited area without anyone being the victor. There is no vanquished and, therefore, no victor, but there is a victory. How this has happened is demonstrated in the history of *satyāgraha* campaigns; it is not our topic here.

If the parties had heard beforehand about the solution to be agreed on afterward, they would normally have rejected it as contrary to their will. Conceptually, this does not imply that the *satyāgraha* campaign forced a solution on the unwilling contestants. Coercion is not conceptually implied.

This conceptual discussion of volition and *satyāgraha* is important for its clarifying power in relation to the unfortunate acceptance by some researchers of coercion as a positive ingredient in a *satyāgraha* campaign. Thus, Joan Bondurant argues:

Coercion has been defined as "the use of either physical or intangible force to compel action contrary to the will or reasoned judgment of the individual or group subjected to such force." Despite the protestations of a few followers of

NORMS AND HYPOTHESES OF GANDHIAN ETHICS

Gandhi that satyāgraha is always persuasive and never coercive the method does contain a positive element of coercion. Non-cooperation, boycott, strike—all of these tools which may be used in satyāgraha involve an element of compulsion which may effect a change on the part of an opponent which initially was contrary to his will—and he may suffer from the indirect results of these actions. (Bondurant 1958: 9)

As a consequence of her stand at this point, Bondurant also thinks that ideal democracy, the non-coercive society as conceived by Gandhi, retains and therefore contains an element of coercion. “Dhawan errs,” Bondurant contends, when he suggests that Gandhi’s democracy would be “based on non-violence instead of coercion” (ibid., p. 173). As statements of principle not concerned with more or less unavoidable weaknesses in practice, these contentions are important.

Let us, for the sake of discussion, retain the definition of *coercion* by Paullin, adding the version suggested by Bondurant, “application of either physical or moral force to induce another to do something against his will” (ibid., p. 10; for the above-mentioned definition of *coercion* see Paullin 1944: 6).

Suppose person *P* wills *A* at time t_1 and *B* at time t_2 . Something has changed the direction of *P*’s will, and this could not have been his will itself (he neither willed to nor willed not to change his will!), but something foreign to his will. However, from this influence of something on the direction of *P*’s will, one cannot infer that *P* was coerced. Any change of opinion, for instance, may influence the direction. That *P* at time t_1 would have rejected a settlement *B* of a conflict that at time t_2 he accepted is not an indication that he was coerced into willing *B*. He may not have been coerced at all by any person in any respect during the interval $t_2 - t_1$. If he were *led* to acquire certain information or to receive certain impressions (perceptions) of suffering and these changed his reasoned judgment, we would not say he was coerced.

If the change of will follows a scrutiny of norms and hypotheses in a state of full mental and bodily powers, this is an act within the realm of personal freedom. *P* exercises his freedom of will—he changes his opinion under optimal conditions. The closing of ears and eyes and maximal obstinacy is not characteristic of a person with reasoned judgment. If a pure *satyāgraha* was required to end with a settlement that had already been agreeable to both parties at the beginning of the conflict, why ever start a

satyāgraha? Normally the ultimate formula agreed on after a *satyāgraha* campaign would not be agreeable—or even understandable—to the opponents before the *satyāgraha* was started.

Suppose, for a moment, that *M* carries *P* against his will into the streets where there is a riot and that as a consequence of what he sees, *P* changes some of his attitudes and opinions. Was the change coerced? We suggest that the change of *P*'s opinions or attitudes was not coerced, but that *P* himself was coerced into seeing something that caused the change. The distinction is relevant because *satyāgraha* is certainly incompatible with coerced changes of opinions or attitudes. Gandhi himself insisted on convincing, not coercing. "Coercion is inhuman" (*Harijan* 24.3, 1946; Gandhi 1960: 238).

Even if changes of opinion or attitude are uncoerced, a *satyāgraha* may involve coercion: opponents may perhaps be forced or compelled to witness certain things or to hear certain arguments. However, coercion within a campaign decreases the degree of its consistency. It is characteristic that this anticoercive view of *satyāgraha* colors the excellent exposition by Bondurant in spite of her theoretical acceptance of coercion as a genuine element of *satyāgraha*:

In the instance of the Ahmedabad *satyāgraha*, Gandhi came to see that his fasting introduced an element of coercion which detracted from the true character of *satyāgraha*. The adherence to persuasion as opposed to coercion was best exemplified in the Vekom *satyāgraha*: after the State had withdrawn its support of the opposition and the roads had been legally opened to untouchables, the *satyāgrahis* did not take advantage of this development to enter the roads against the persisting opposition of the Brahmans. They continued the *satyāgraha* until they had persuaded their opponents that denial of passage to untouchables was morally indefensible. . . . In examining *satyāgraha* in action, it becomes clear that *satyāgraha* operates as a force to effect change.

(Bondurant 1958: 104)

Satyāgraha operates as a force to affect change—a keen force to affect deep changes. However, a force does not have to *force*. This makes *satyāgraha* possible. Where there is an element of forcing, of coercion, it is Gandhi's claim that the *satyāgrahin* by his or her training and outlook should be able to detect and get rid of it. He himself did not always succeed. Thus, in the fight against the position of certain mill owners, some of whom were his friends and therefore concerned about his health, Gandhi nevertheless initiated a fast:

With the mill-owners, I could only plead; to fast against them would amount to coercion. Yet in spite of my knowledge that my fast was bound to put pressure upon them, as in fact it did, I felt I could not help it. The duty to undertake it seemed to me to be clear. (Gandhi 1948: 528)

The fast had other aims than to *make* the mill owners change their position. However, the negative side effect, the pressure put on these people, Gandhi thought he had to put into the bargain. The result was a *satyāgraha* of less than 100 percent purity, but this outcome does not undermine the position that *satyāgraha* may be carried through without such pressures.

If the above is acceptable, Dhawan's short characterization of Gandhi's conception of the ideal democracy may be adequate: a classless society "of autonomous village communities based on nonviolence instead of coercion, on service instead of exploitation, on renunciation instead of acquisitiveness and on the largest measure of local and individual initiative instead of centralization" (Dhawan 1946: 3).

Strict and Less Strict *Satyāgraha*

The foregoing system of norms formidably restricts the field of justifiable forms of conflict resolution. It is, however, the claim of the proponents of ethics of nonviolence that such a system omits no form of conflict resolution that is effective in the long run. It is presupposed that the goal is justifiable from the point of view of general ethics. It is claimed, therefore, that no effective (powerful, adequate) form is excluded for those who fight for an ethically acceptable cause.

The criteria of goodness offered by Gandhi and others are such that no statesmen today would openly reject them. That is, contemporary men in power would proclaim their goals to be good in the sense required. They claim justice, legitimate interest, and freedom as goals. (Whether their practice supports the claims is another question.)

Defining a maximally strict *satyāgraha* campaign as a group struggle completely fulfilling the norms of nonviolent group struggle (here represented by Systematization *E), we have an ideal that one cannot expect to be realized anywhere. However serious the intention of the leaders to realize the ideal struggle, one may expect that the situation sometimes at least momentarily gets out of control or that slight violations of at least one norm

simply “happen” in the heat of the struggle. Then there are circumstances under which even leaders with advanced nonviolent attitudes will deliberately violate one or more norms.

Let hundreds like me perish, but let truth prevail. Let us not reduce the standard of truth even by a hair's breadth for judging erring mortals like myself.
(Gandhi 1948: 7)

Gandhi stressed the importance of holding up an ideal of *ahimsā* even if we do not “practice that doctrine in its entirety” (see the quotation on page 44). The standards of nonviolence should not be lowered: “It would be wholly wrong for us to lower the standards of ahimsa because of our own frailty or lack of experience. Without true understanding of the ideal, we can never hope to reach it” (*Harijan* 28.4.1946). One might add that without adequate understanding of the maximum requirements or the ideal requirements, there will be inadequate understanding of the lesser requirements and the approximations.

A typology of violations must work with several dimensions: with the number of violations of each norm and the seriousness of the violence; with intentionality, i.e., the question of whether the leaders “should have foreseen the eventuality of this or that violation (at certain stages) and made precautionary measures” or their “degree of recklessness in hoping for the best”; and with the extent to which violations are due to non-belief in certain hypotheses.

Thus, we may believe in exceptions to H_{18} , “You provoke your opponent if you deliberately or carelessly destroy his property.” Destruction of instruments of mishandling or of weapons might in some cases be understood by the immediate opponent. Tiny pieces of technical installation could be destroyed in order to avoid great destruction of nature (dams).

More importantly, one might replace the term *violence* in N_1 (“Act in group struggle and act, moreover, as an autonomous person in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence”) with *injury*, and claim that the opponent is not always injured by physical violence. A man educated in the tradition of the Wild West may understand a left to the jaw much better than other forms of being shaken up. In riots, the use of fists against looters may have a good effect, some might maintain. In addition, many would claim that nonviolence left them altogether

helpless in the case of the rapid development of a riot or of some other great physical disturbance. Thus, very few would in practice believe in the empirical basis of N_3 , "Never to resort to violence against your opponent."

The multitude of forms of non-quite-strict *satyāgraha* campaigns make them unsuitable for systematic formulation. This is the basis for our strongest counterargument against those who think that the systematization of an absolutely strict *satyāgraha* is unimportant because of the unlikelihood of there being any case of its realization. It is considered too idealistic, remote, and moralizing. However, if we ask these "realists," What systematization do you favor, if any? there is such a diversity of answers, so much arbitrariness in the rules adapted to a reasonably realistic code, as to frustrate all efforts at systematization.

For example, the realist says that some sort of secrecy must sometimes be used. Yes, but how are we to make rules about it? Where are we to draw the line between justifiable and unjustifiable secrecy within *satyāgraha*? The outcome of attempts to formulate rules tends to show that it is better to keep the formulations of the ideal *satyāgraha*, banning secrecy without qualifications, but to introduce somewhat narrow criteria of secrecy, making it different from merely not answering a question or not publishing a plan for direct action.

Take as an instance the important rule of nonviolence that says there is some piece of information that it is your duty to withhold. It cannot be your duty "to tell the truth" about the place where your children are hiding during a riot. The negation of " x tells the truth to y " is not " x tells something untrue to y ," but "it is not so that x tells the truth to y ." There is room for every thinkable behavior except one: *telling* the truth. Within that room, you have, for instance, the option of silence. However, in what cases does silence in such a context constitute dishonesty, untruthfulness, and therefore *himsā*? It seems clear that the protection of innocents against a wild mob, an execution unit of the SS, or any other group or individual set on murder more or less inevitably leads to infringements of some codes of nonviolence and that ethical assessment of the relative seriousness of the violations cannot be made on the basis of a systematization of nonviolence, if on the basis of systematization at all.

We are not, of course, arguing here that systematizations can solve a problem of ethical decision. In the last analysis, the acting person has to reaffirm his adherence to a rule before applying it, and this reaffirmation

does not have its sole justification in any rule. Otherwise, the individual retreats from his status as an individual person. There is no automatism in ethics! We may derive norms from other norms, but not ethically relevant decisions.

Mostly the argumentation against the systematization of pure nonviolent struggle is based on an absolutistic, methodologically naive conception of the aim of a systematization. Only close discussion of scientific methodology can help here. One must make oneself familiar with the peculiar aspect of the use of models and reconstructions, in short, with the *heuristics* of theory construction.

We know from physics, economics, and other sciences that concepts and theories may not fit anywhere but may nevertheless be fruitful. Thus, although the concepts of a vacuum, rigid bodies, economic man, free enterprise, and so forth, do not strictly apply anywhere, they have been useful as part of the scientific enterprise. However, that *part* must not be located incorrectly!

A thorough discussion of the role of systematization tends to conclude with agreement on a rather modest conception of systematization. Our adversary may then exclaim: "Is that all you are trying to do! How can you spend months or even years of your life on such modest aims?" This is a very understandable reaction, but a subsequent question put to the adversary about what *he* deems more rewarding tends to confirm the systematizer in his belief that he hasn't done so badly in his choice of occupation.

IV

Nonviolence and the “New Violence”

The Contemporary Reaction Against Nonviolence

The period spanning the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s witnessed an upsurge of physical violence and a proliferation of recommendations to use manifest violence, physical and verbal. It inundated colonial, racial, and educational controversies in Europe, America, India, and many other areas. Sometimes it has been systematically and consistently anti-Gandhian, being in part a direct reaction against the limited success of Gandhian and pseudo-Gandhian preaching and practice.

We shall not enter here into the controversies about the causes of this development, which we vaguely characterize as the “new violence.” A symptom, rather than a cause, is widespread dissatisfaction, indignation, and impatience when considering the slowness of the movement of liberation in the colonial, racial, and educational spheres. The imperatives “Do it quicker!” and “Freedom *now!*” have testified to this demand for immediate, radical change. The slogan “Revolution!” has invaded all spheres of discussion. Revolution is generally conceived as a violent overthrowing, idealizing “power over” and coercion at the cost of “power to.” Changes should be forced on opponents; agreement and compromise should be shunned. The slogans are sometimes formed consciously so as to be in direct opposition to the preaching of nonviolence.

Young leaders of opinion mostly have no knowledge of the revolutionary aspects of Gandhi’s campaigns. This even seems to hold for Indian leaders. Their image of him is more likely to be of a man concerned with means rather than with ends, more concerned with prevention of open violence than with the elimination of the hidden structural violence built into societies in the form of exploitation. They do not know that Gandhi intended

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

to make, and in fact made, gigantic efforts to destroy structural violence and that his timetable was that of a revolutionary. This fact is important for assessing the potential that improved information on Gandhi might have in the future—even if it must be admitted that Gandhi did not achieve the rapid changes he envisaged early in his life.

Young people on several continents have joined the reaction against the preaching of consistent nonviolence. It is in many ways a fight against the vast flood of hypocrisy, false idealism, suppressed hatreds, and disguised sadism that masquerade as civility, peacefulness, and tolerance. It is perhaps also part of youth's painful realization of lack of spontaneity and genuine self-expression. The usual descriptions of Gandhian ideology stress moralism, saintliness, humility, and sacrifice (conventionally interpreted) and neglect the basic norm that you should follow your inner voice whatever the consequences. The distortion has contributed to the neglect of militant nonviolence as a possible way of protest.

The new emphasis on violence is clearly formulated by such leaders and authors as Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, C. V. Hamilton, and Sartre. In what follows, we limit our references to the writings of these men, and in spite of the many differences in their opinions, we shall refer to their strategy of conflict as that of the "New Violence."

Comparing the Recent Norms of Violence with Those of *Satyāgraha*

A comparison of the maxims of contemporary violence-promoting leaders with those of nonviolence suggests that on the metaphysical level, it is not the oneness of all life or of humanity that is stressed, but a Lutheran dichotomy between the good and the bad. Certain groups regarded as comprising the good, brave, honest, and just are contrasted with exploiters, suppressors, liars, and traitors. There is, further, a theory of basic contrasts of interest: "[T]he colonial context is characterized by dichotomy," Frantz Fanon asserts, and he continues:

The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher unity . . . they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the two terms, one is superfluous. (Fanon 1966: 31)

Power is considered largely to be in the hands of the “bad,” and since violence is taken to be the only adequate means of change, violence is necessary: Self-realization of the “good” group requires using violence against the “bad.” Complete self-realization of the “good” is impossible without violence against the “bad,” and killing does not prevent self-realization of the killer. On the contrary, it helps him. So even if brutality is in some sense “regrettable,” it is morally justified when considered as unavoidable.

From the point of view of Gandhi, the characterization of a human being as (categorically) bad is verbal violence. It denies the possibility of its increasing self-realization and thus justifies its treatment under certain circumstances as a nonliving thing.

As to the possibility of political liberation in the colonies, Fanon holds:

For the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler. (Fanon 1966: 72)

The native . . . is ready for violence at all times. From birth it is clear to him that his narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called in question by absolute violence. (Ibid., p. 31)

The future society envisaged by the advocates of violence seems, on the other hand, to be one of nonviolence and spontaneous conformity in opinions. (Pluralistic ideals are rare, and it might be asserted that this antipluralism is in its consequence a form of violence if conformity is not spontaneous.) Contemporary advocates of violence, in contrast to Fascist theorists, do not see violent activity as an end, but only or mainly as a means to obtain a new social order characterized by harmony and nonviolence.

The belief in such a transition implies a direct negation of a basic maxim of nonviolence, “The character of the means determines the character of the ends,” or in terms of our systematization, “The character of the means used in a group struggle determines the character of the results.” The “fanonization” of means will fanonize the emerging society. According to some advocates of the New Violence, however, the killer is free when he has killed the opponents. The past killing does not cast any shadow into the future.

Any amount, or a very substantial dose, of violence is consistent with a later realization of nonviolence, according to the principles of the New Vi-

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

olence, and some terror may even cleanse the soul and make the transition to nonviolence faster. Fanon considers short-term, preliminary, and immediate violence to be fully consistent with an emphasis on long-term universal reduction of violence. This certainly conflicts with Gandhi's hypotheses! It is in direct opposition to the hypothesis disclaiming that short-term violence may help: "Short-term violence counteracts long-term universal reduction of violence" (*H*₃, p. 63).

Destruction, sabotage, burning, and stealing manifest small-scale violence, and external expressions of and incitement to hatred are used as a means for strengthening the revolutionary resolve.

"Make a destructive program part of your campaign" (cf. *N*₂, p. 63) cannot be said to be a norm among the violence-promoting leaders, but the stress on "moral" encouragement by destruction of the bad is often present.

Physical violence is advocated by Fanon as a means of "burning bridges":

The group requires that each individual perform an irrevocable action. In Algeria, for example, where almost all the men who called on the people to join in the national struggle were condemned to death or searched for by the French police, confidence was proportional to the hopelessness of each case. You could be sure of a new recruit when he could no longer go back into the colonial system. This mechanism, it seems, had existed in Kenya among the Mau-Mau, who required that each member of the group should strike a blow at the victim. (Fanon 1966: 67)

Nonviolent actions strengthen the disposition for more (and stricter) non-violent action, according to Gandhi. However, there is, unhappily(!), no irrevocability. At any level, one may slide back to violence.

The radical distinction between antagonisms and antagonists (cf. *H*₄, pp. 66–67) is not accepted by Fanon. It would ruin the appeal to hatred and vengeance. Hatred against suppression is hatred of the suppressors, says a politician advocating violent revolution in South America.

The negation of the existence of interests that are common to all (cf. *H*₇, p. 67) plays a considerable role.

The intellectual who for his part has followed the colonialist with regard to the universal abstract will fight in order that the settler and the native may live together in peace in a new world. But the thing he does not see . . . is that

the settler, from the moment that the colonial context disappears, has no longer any interest in remaining or in co-existing. (Fanon 1966: 36)

Labor and capital, poor whites and blacks, these and other antagonists have no common interest of the kind that can furnish a basis for future cooperation (cf. *H*₈, p. 68). But in Kenya and many other places, a considerable percentage of successful white settlers remained in the colony after political liberation. Fanon's view on this point was historically not quite adequate.

The adherents of violent campaigns might subscribe to hypothesis *H*₉ (p. 68), that we invite violence from our opponent by humiliating him or provoking him, but this relation is taken sometimes to be a pro-argument for provocation and humiliation. In student demonstrations, premeditated provocation of the police and faculty plays a prominent role in many instances. We are reminded that theories of conflict can always be used in two ways: to exacerbate the potential of violence or to reduce it.

The Gandhian norm that you should move into the center of a conflict favors intensification of the conflict because you support the weaker part, the underdog. The norm implies a policy of confrontation, but not of provocation. The line may be difficult to draw, and there is in militant nonviolence always the risk of coercion and provocation. This practical difficulty, however, does not invalidate the distinction.

The student revolt has elicited what might be called "the new police violence" in many Western countries. The education of the police has not, until very recently, stressed nonviolence under strong verbal provocation ("pig!" etc.). The answer to such provocations is often what is aptly termed "unnecessary brutality." Official rules learned by the police in England and many other countries preclude physical or verbal violence as an answer to verbal violence from demonstrators. The officially sanctioned way of pushing or carrying people away from prohibited places does not involve physical violence. People are coerced — they are carried or (leniently) pushed "against their will." Theoretically such a procedure should not injure physically, and it should be tolerated insofar as one admits the authority of the police. If the number of police is insufficient to achieve the goal in this manner, the order to push or carry should not be given. The use of clubs to hit and injure is not an alternative. It would transgress the limits of police action (toward demonstrators occupying places without a warrant) and theo-

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

retically make the police part of a military force. The classical official doctrine of police action is a doctrine of nonviolence—with an exception, namely the rules for coercing without physical injury.

In nonviolent struggles in which the opponent has the necessary status to make free use of police forces, it is in the long-run interest to try to influence the police in the direction of consistent nonviolence. On certain occasions in the United States, such influence has prevailed. The police are, so to speak, interposed between the nonviolent fighters and the real opponent. To behave so as to make the police the main opponent is a grave misunderstanding of nonviolent strategy. The police and prison officers are important potential collaborators, in Gandhi's view, and the more contact with such people, the better. Confrontations are part of efficient communication; not so, provocations.

Secrecy of moves, keeping the opponent in ignorance, makes it possible to surprise him and enables one to retain the initiative, a prominent feature in today's violent struggle. However, this secrecy runs counter to the norms of (consistent, high-level) nonviolence (cf. H_{11b} , N_{11a} , pp. 69 and 75).

Journalists and reporters should be well received, but, of course, this does not preclude pestering them because of their distorted reports. The militant nonviolent fighter tries to keep informed about how actions are described in the mass media and tries to convert the reporters to his view. Secrecy stems in part from pessimism: reporters who have been against us cannot be turned into helpers. Fanon says:

Frequently reporters complain of being badly received, of being forced to work under bad conditions and of being fenced round by indifference or hostility: all this is quite normal . . . when a journalist from the West asks us questions, it is seldom in order to help us. (Fanon 1966: 60)

In a great many cases, Gandhi answered hostile journalists, but he was not always able to convert them into supporters. His failures cannot and should not change the strategy, but they reflect a major difficulty—getting time for in-depth discussions—and they remind one of the importance of constructive, direct actions. The mere sight of the place of action and the action itself should as often as possible suffice to reveal its aim. This makes long explanations unnecessary. If a campaign consists mainly of such actions, unfair reporting is difficult even if the journalists disapprove.

As to the quest for truth in general, Fanon stresses the impossibility of truthfulness in the colonial situation:

In every age, among the people, truth is the property of the national cause. No absolute verity, no discourse on the purity of the soul can shake this position. The native replies to the living lie of the colonial situation by an equal falsehood. His dealings with his fellow-nationals are open; they are strained and incomprehensible with regard to the settlers. Truth is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects the natives, and ruins the foreigners. In this colonialist context there is no truthful behaviour. (Fanon 1966: 40)

According to the Gandhian hypotheses, truthful behavior in the colonialist context is not only possible, but has, in fact, been realized many times. The behavior of Abdul Ghaffar Kahn, first in India, then in Pakistan, furnishes many impressive instances. Furthermore, those hypotheses imply that there will be a transfer of untruthfulness from the colonial to the postcolonial struggles and also a transfer of narrow, pragmatic concepts of truth, for example, "Truth is what furthers *our* party in the struggle."

Perhaps the Gandhian concept of truth is also pragmatic, if not narrow too? In terms of our systematization, we might consider accepting the maxim "Good is what furthers universal self-realization." But the concept of truth as agreement with reality is conceptually independent of the good even if that maxim is adopted. Truth cannot possibly be a property of a national cause or any cause whatsoever, even the cause to further universal self-realization. The utilitarianism or pragmatism of Fanon and a great many others who are willing to give their lives for their cause is incompatible with the ethics of nonviolence. This ethics requires a concept of truth that is not dependent on causes. Truth cannot be monopolized by any cause whatsoever. The relation of this nonpragmatic conception to the aim of our pyramidal systematization is discussed on pages 56 f.

The question of truth, as Fanon sees it, is obscure. If an attack is made on a human dwelling belonging to a foreigner, the relevant questions are clear: Is anybody killed or injured? What relationships have those killed or injured to the goals of the campaign? What has been done to evacuate children? What has been done to influence the adults? To what use, favorable to the campaign, might the house be put? What will be the influence of the attack on foreigners in the neighborhood? On the attackers themselves? It is

on this concrete level that the sceptical attitude of Gandhi is relevant: Does this particular action lead to the short-term objective? What are the long-term effects? Could this or that particular case of burning or of meeting trust with distrust be avoided?

Systematic distortion of information and biased rendering of all moves by the opponent are of special importance in stimulating hatred and isolation and in tightening the cadres of fighters. Employing these techniques facilitates the formation of a homogeneous ingroup. The leaders must, of course, even according to Fanon, try to distinguish truth from (their own self-made) fiction, but it seems difficult to keep up an intensive flow of invectives without gradually beginning to believe in them or beginning to substitute propaganda for information. The case of Goebbels is a famous example of a man's ultimate surrender to his own propaganda.

Self-scrutiny and insight into one's own goals and motives make for less violent attitudes (cf. H_{12} , p. 69) provided there is a basic willingness to stand up only for causes one is confident are just. However just the cause, one's own motives are generally mixed. The resulting tension between belief in justice and one's own mixed motivation engenders for reluctance to use violence.

This way of reasoning may be foreign to Gandhi, however. He was aware of, and did not hide, mixed motivation as a feature of past campaigns, but it seems that he required the *satyāgrahin* to be able to answer yes to the question "Is my motive when starting this new direct action unmixed: is it limited to realizing the goal of the campaign or might it also involve a wish to injure the opponent or some other deviant motive?" The main question seems not to be whether motives are mixed or not, but whether, during the campaign, no irrelevant motive is capable of diverting the action from the path that is thought to be the best in order to reach the objective. A campaigner may, from very mixed motives, take a number of photographs of the opponent during a physical attack, but he will only make such use of them as is completely consistent with the goal of the campaign. A campaigner will in part for purely egocentric reasons try to avoid being maltreated, but he will try this within the limits of the norms of the campaign.

Your opponent is more likely to use violence if he thinks your case is unjust, and this he is likely to think if he sees his own point of view distorted and caricatured and your case described without regard to your actual, far-from-perfect behavior (cf. H_{13} , p. 70).

The term *fanonization* has been used extensively at universities where sporadic physical and constant verbal violence has colored the campaigns. The “establishment” has hit back with renewed structural violence. Communication among outgroups is often retained, and a fierce picture of the struggle with ingroups is often maintained.

The general convincibility postulated in H_{14} (p. 70) is denied in a fanonized struggle: some opponents are, and always will remain, uninfluenced, however good and just one's cause. They are only impressed by “guns,” by force and threats. In such cases, it is of course considered time lost to try to convince the opponent.

It is surprising how such pessimistic views about the opponent crop up in practically every intensive struggle. Their influence just before and during riots or wars cannot easily be underestimated. They are used to justify the termination of conflict-resolving communication and to justify the absence of honest attempts to resume it after the breakdown.

The verbal violence on the campuses, especially the use of epithets and extreme accusations, is often an agreeable outlet of emotion and has little to do with those aspects of the interaction between the hostile groups that are causally effective. A wave of mutual accusations and denunciations may terminate seemingly without anyone admitting the correctness of any statement made by the adversary. Nevertheless, after some time, in a more relaxed atmosphere, some sort of solution or a compromise is arrived at on the practical level. The opposing groups have influenced each other, and their views have come to diverge less than before, but nothing of this is clearly admitted. The verbal violence perhaps functions as a secondary emotional gratification, making it easier to accept unwelcome compromises and ad hoc solutions with manifest drawbacks. If this is the case, the Gandhian purist would rather complain about a general lack of mental discipline (*brahmacharya*) than of serious violence. Some of the leaders of rebellion would concede this but point out that the lack of mental discipline is due to the frustrations caused by a thoroughly repressive system. One has to mobilize all who are willing to fight the system, whatever their level of mental discipline. If leaders were to demand acceptance of Gandhian norms, too few would partake in the fight.

It would take too much space to go through the rest of the norm system in our confrontation of Gandhi and the New Violence. Suffice it to say that the tendency to justify or accept violence leads to a thoroughly different conflict strategy from that of nonviolence.

What to Learn from the Reaction Against Nonviolence

Instead of pursuing a contrast of contemporary ideas of violent social revolution with nonviolent social revolution, we shall concentrate on certain basic similarities between the two ways of thinking and also on important necessary conditions or prerequisites of successful nonviolence today. The critique of postwar nonviolent campaigns has helped to remind us of such conditions.

The leading supporters of violence interpret the term widely. Their interpretation is at one point strikingly similar to Gandhi's use of the term, which includes suppression and exploitation under the concept of violence.¹ Open violence is contrasted to *structural* violence.

"*P* uses structural violence in relation to *Q*" may be thus defined: "*P* introduces or supports a set of coercive social relations that create barriers against *Q*'s complete self-realization." The coerciveness usually depends on a judicial system that can threaten *Q* if he rebels against the suppression. The social relations usually have an economic character, but conceiving of them as fundamentally economic leads to narrowness of perception.

The definition does not, of course, furnish us with a clear concept, but it seems to cover an important use of the term *structural violence*, and it connects with the metaphysics of *satyāgraha*. One weakness of the definition consists in the tacitness of the assumption that the barriers are objectively unnecessary, that is, that economic and other conditions are such in the society in which *P* and *Q* act that one could afford *Q* the higher degree of self-expression made possible by lifting the barriers. In order to clarify this assumption, we would have to introduce a large portion of contemporary (highly controversial!) sociological and economic conceptual theory.

Absence of manifest physical person-to-person violence is not enough to characterize a relation as nonviolent, according to theorists of the New Violence. Barriers to complete self-realization or, more precisely, to a degree of self-realization deemed practically realizable given certain existing economic and technical resources are taken to indicate conditions of violence. The economic underdog-top dog relation is taken equally seriously by Gandhi and the new leaders of violence as a kind of violence (*himsā*). Gandhi once even called exploitation "the essence of violence" (*Harigan* 4.11.1939: 226; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 369). However, there are also other similarities.

The criticism of past nonviolent campaigns concerning race relations has centered around the slowness of the machinery and the timidity and modesty of their claims. Nonviolent movements in the United States have not until recently asked for “justice now.”

Gandhi at least sometimes asked for immediate basic changes. In 1942, he started the “quit-India!” campaign — one of his least successful, perhaps — but not untypical of his impatience and “immodesty”; it reflected his belief in the practical possibility of, as well as the immediate need for, a rapid radical change, that is, a nonviolent revolution. Appeals to students to leave the colleges and fight for freedom are examples of actions based on a requirement of rapid change. What made Gandhi sometimes choose rather modest targets was the very realistic suspicion that the Indian populace was far from ripe for taking over the institutions led by the British. Further, what made him sometimes cancel campaigns was the also realistic suspicion that the population was not yet sufficiently nonviolent, which means that they would not be able to achieve what Gandhi saw as the goal: a non-violent society.

But on the whole, revolutionary impatience is something the new leaders of violence have in common with Gandhi. It is also a point where he differs from Martin Luther King, Jr. and some of the other great civil rights personalities. Gandhi had a roughness and disregard for bloody confrontations that many Christian pacifists felt bordered on savagery.

There is still another similarity: the brutal Gandhian norm “Seek the center of the conflict” or, more generally, the stress on activist confrontations with the system. Gandhi strongly resented passivity or mere verbal support of fighters, and he emphasized how participation in direct action radicalizes.

The new tendency is to proclaim that things cannot continue as they are, radical change must come immediately; no one can be allowed to remain passive. Polarization of opinion, however painful, is necessary. Further, with the present productive capacity and manpower, a just and nonviolent society can be realized.

Some of these points reveal the stress on antagonisms, on structures rather than on antagonists. This stress is a main feature of Marxist thinking. Certain antagonisms must immediately be eliminated — but without necessarily eliminating any of the antagonists.

As a consequence of proclaiming it a duty to act vigorously and immediately, the new leaders, just as Gandhi, engage in lively direct agitation and

preaching at the grass roots, refusing to be hampered by democratic machinery. If the machinery is ill equipped to cope with large-scale injustice, direct action must be resorted to. Gandhi did not try to quell communal riots through laws and parliamentary action.

Indian nationalist politicians of the Congress Party accepted Gandhi as a leader because of his unrivaled influence among the masses, at the grass roots, but there was always uneasiness about his relation to the party system and later to the whole parliamentary setup. It suited neither his temper nor his philosophy.

There is, in Gandhi's view, nothing sacred about the electoral or legal system. Yet there is, of course, a grave responsibility associated with suspending or violating the system. Every plan to break a law must be thoroughly discussed and illuminated before its implementation.

The Basic Requirement of Self-Respect: Fearlessness

When Gandhi left South Africa and started work in India, he realized that the masses in India could not immediately be mobilized to political action for independence, for *svarāj*.

From prolonged hunger or undernourishment apathy follows. Gandhi sometimes complained that the most frustrating thing of all was the unwillingness of the hungry to do anything to change their own personal lot. He found that the basic obstacle when trying to mobilize the masses was their feeling of powerlessness, uselessness, and insignificance. From this attitude there follows a lack of personal identity and personal norms and, of course, lack of initiative to find ways of producing more and better food.

Gandhi was unable to effect any radical change in the food situation; he could not eliminate undernourishment and unemployment. However, in spite of this, he managed to awaken the masses and to mobilize them. How? One of his greatest inventions was the Khadi.

The Khadi movement and certain similar undertakings had a variety of aims. But one basic aim was precisely to get the poor, unemployed, suppressed, and passive to realize that they were persons with an identity, a dignity; they were worth something, and they were not completely helpless.

At this point, it might be inserted that political opponents of Gandhi described the Khadi movement as if it were Gandhi's complete answer to In-

dia's economic crisis. This way of misconceiving the movement was repeated in a well-known article by the author Arthur Koestler in the *Sunday Times*, October 5, 1969. But Gandhi did *not* nurture "the fantastic hope of solving India's economic problems by bringing back the handloom and the spinning wheel." He had great confidence in intensive agriculture, including irrigation, using refined machinery. He had less confidence in industrialization as a means of overcoming poverty and lack of work in the villages. The increasing flow of the unemployed toward great cities created terrible problems. The ugly riots were all starting in the big slums. Gandhi saw the necessity of creating conditions such that people could on the whole remain in their villages except for the few that big industry would need. Indian Marxists were squarely against his economic views, being convinced that the proper course of India was the one followed in Soviet Russia in the years after the revolution, that is, immediately giving first priority to heavy industry. The correctness of this policy is now much disputed, but its advocates in the 1920s and 1930s of course found Gandhi's stress on agriculture insufferably reactionary.

Gandhi's propaganda for the spinning wheel was first of all a successful campaign against the total passivity and resulting lack of self-respect of the very poor. Making their cloth meant for thousands of jobless wretches the start of a new kind of life and participation in a national struggle for liberation. Marxists at that time were very much against the religious aura surrounding the spinning wheel, and the poet Tagore detested the frenzy of the campaigns.

If a hundred or two hundred million underfed and more or less jobless villagers in India were to try to get industrial work in the cities, what would happen? "Heavy industries will need to be centralized and nationalized. But they will occupy the least part of the vast national activity which will mainly be in the villages" (cf. Gandhi 1951c). He had "no partiality for return to primitive methods," but village industry was the only "way of giving employment to the millions who are living in idleness." Gandhi went perhaps too far in his fight for decentralization and against the creation of big proletariats, but recent developments in the West have made Gandhian value priorities worth serious study.

The participation of the poor and underprivileged in the Khadi movement and vigorous campaigns such as the salt march, with obvious, spectacularly direct relevance for their economic well-being fostered that minimum

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

of self-respect indispensable for meaningful participation in nonviolent campaigns. One may say that Gandhi's strategy included as a preliminary step the lifting up of people from the status of nonentities to a level at which self-realization was conceivable as an aim. Only on that level could self-discipline, born of self-respect and dignity, be reckoned upon under harsh provocations and frustrations. Self-respect, in short, is a prerequisite for non-violent mass campaigns.

Martin Luther King, Jr. was completely clear about the basic function of self-respect in struggles for liberation:

With a spirit straining toward true self-esteem, the Negro must boldly throw off the manacles of self-abnegation and say to himself and the world: "I am somebody. I am a person. I am a man with dignity and honor."

(King 1967: 43–44)

However, to exhort a black man in the ghetto who does not feel he is somebody to boldly tell the world "*I am somebody*" is not a meaningful strategy. The strategy had to be one of leading black people from "nothing and nowhere" toward a point at which they could honestly say "I am somebody." Only then may the process start of boldly throwing off all the signs of slavery. "Psychological freedom, a firm sense of self-esteem, is the most powerful weapon against the long night of physical slavery," says King (see p. 115). Yes, but that weapon must be forged, and those who do not have that firm sense of self-esteem are precisely those who cannot do the forging by themselves.

Gandhi and King both faced the question of creating self-respect, but it seems that Gandhi may have been more inventive in his choice of methods or that the social and cultural condition of the Indian peasants was in certain senses better than that of the American blacks in their ghettos.

Violence Preferable to Cowardice

Fearlessness is indispensable for the growth of the other noble qualities. How can one seek Truth, or cherish Love, without fearlessness? (Bose 1948: 24)

Gandhi held fearlessness to be a necessary condition for all other high qualities. It has a position in his system that can only be justified by linking it

closely to necessary conditions of self-realization and therefore of active search for truth.

To run away from danger, instead of facing it, is to deny one's faith in man and God, even one's own self. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 144)

If a person is not willing to take risks, he will not follow any insight, any personal conviction if it seems dangerous to do so. Lack of fearlessness Gandhi likes to call cowardice, even if this lack is rather modest and quite common.

The long road toward nonviolence cannot be followed, according to Gandhi, if one does not fight cowardice—even when it entails acting with violence. Some quotations are needed in order to develop his somewhat complicated views on this point.

I found, throughout my wanderings in India, that India, educated India, is seized with a paralyzing fear. We may not open our lips in public; we may not declare our confirmed opinions in public. . . . [I]f you want to follow the view of Truth in any shape or form, fearlessness is the necessary consequence. . . . We fear consequences and therefore we are afraid to tell the truth.
(YMCA address, "The Vow of Fearlessness," 1916;
quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 308)

I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.
(*Young India* 4.8.1920: 5; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 142)

Critics of King stress that a man who lacks self-respect and self-identity cannot—or at least cannot be expected to—refrain from violence when met with violence, except out of cowardice. His reflexes answer violence with violence; the question is only, Do I dare? King and pacifists in general have tended to reject counterviolence at the same time as they have deplored cowardice.

It is the choice between violence and cowardice in such cases that the Black Power critics (in the wide sense of the term *Black Power*) tell us characterizes the situation for the majority of black citizens in the United States. They meet daily structural discrimination and structural violence.

If the choice between violence and cowardice is constantly repeated and if the victim of violence answers every time to "Dare I?" by turning

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

away — avoiding the conflict or meekly turning the other cheek — a cowardly attitude is reinforced. The chance of standing up next time and of hitting back decreases. In the long run, the chances of standing up in any way whatsoever decrease.

This kind of description by the Black Power leaders not only reminds us of similar descriptions by Gandhi; it follows Gandhi's utterances word by word.

The new leaders exhort their poor followers to hit back if insulted. Compare this with Gandhi:

If you feel humiliated, you will be justified in slapping the bully in the face or taking whatever action you might deem necessary to vindicate your self-respect. The use of force, in the circumstances, would be the natural consequence if you are not a coward. But if you have assimilated the non-violent spirit, there should be no feeling of humiliation in you. (*Harijan* 9.3.1940)

One might add that the person with nonviolent spirit does not feel humiliated by insulting behavior on the part of others because his self-respect nullifies the effect of the insult. The insulting words or deeds simply do not impress him, and he naturally does not feel any smaller. There is no feeling of shame, of reduction in status, of loss of dignity. It is the aggressor that loses in dignity, not the so-called victim.

The quotation makes a priority clear: of the two goals "Stop conceiving of yourself as humiliated" and "Stop answering violence with violence," the first is prior. Only when the first goal has already been reached can the second be accepted unconditionally.

The quotation is not only significant as one among dozens of clear statements assessing the negative value of cowardice as greater than the negative value of violence; it is also one of the few but clear indications of the immense importance Gandhi attached to self-respect. Faced with a potential loss of self-respect, it is the prime concern of the individual to avoid the loss. Loss of self-respect must be avoided even if the only way to do it, as perceived by the individual, is to be violent, to be criminal, to murder. This seems to be the consequence of Gandhi's remark on humiliation and violence.

How can Gandhi justify going to such extremes? The answer is that without a minimum of self-respect, of inner security, one cannot even reach the road leading toward self-realization, and this again means that one can-

not start on the road toward nonviolence. That road takes off from the road toward self-realization, not vice versa. The man feeling he is nobody, a no-person, may help himself to be somebody by acts that cannot be tolerated by mature persons.

An important lesson expressed by the quotation can be summed up as follows: participants in a conflict perceive the situation differently according to their level of self-respect. At a very low level, the behavior of the opponent is likely to be experienced as humiliating and provocative. To let oneself be provoked indicates loss of self-respect and admission of powerlessness. At a higher level, with higher degrees of self-security, no violent behavior of the opponent is experienced as humiliating, and none as provocative. Then, one's own violence may be experienced as humiliating, not that of the opponent. A concentration camp guard tends to believe that when a prisoner is forced to creep through mud in front of hundreds of his fellow inmates, the prisoner loses dignity and self-respect, whereas the witnesses only see the loss of these qualities in the guard.

In India, Gandhi succeeded to an unprecedented degree in raising the weak masses to a substantial level of self-respect. They were made capable of following a leader. The magic spell of Gandhi was even stronger than the imperative force of a man in uniform swinging a formidable club (*lāṭhī*) and throwing people in jail. But, of course, nonviolence never matured into a deep-rooted power in India. Provocations such as those experienced in the years 1946–48 proved too strong, and there was a lapse toward large-scale violence among the masses.

In the United States, the urbanized blacks did not feel they had a living cultural tradition strong enough to furnish a source of self-respect and nonviolent power. When Martin Luther King, Jr. began his bus campaign in 1955, mobilizing fifty thousand blacks, he seems to have started with masses on an even lower stage of development of self-respect and dignity than did Gandhi when in April 1919 he inaugurated his all-India *satyāgraha* movement to secure withdrawal of the Rowlatt Bills. Black Power leaders have proved to possess a keen eye for means of raising the level of self-respect. Thus, their demand for large-scale instruction in African culture at schools and universities shows their deliberate effort to give their followers inner security. The propaganda for African hairstyles, clothing, and other external signs of pride in being black manifest the same tendency.

Violence as a Means to Increase Self-Respect

Whatever the causes, King and his faithful followers did not succeed in mass mobilization on a continental or subcontinental scale. Wonderful feats of nonviolence under brutal attacks and supreme personal achievement in civil rights cases could not make up for the lack of mass support. Impatience grew by leaps and bounds, and the cry for immediate, radical change was heard more and more often. It issued from people who knew the potentialities of nonviolence: "[Y]ou know history has been triggered by trivial-seeming incidents. Once a little nobody Indian lawyer was put off a train, and fed up with injustice, he twisted a knot in the British Lion's tail. *His* name was Mahatma Gandhi!" (Malcolm X 1965: 272). But they did not believe in the prospect of consistent nonviolence in the crisis of race relations.

Now, what the Black Power leaders have done is essentially to tolerate and to some extent encourage counterviolence, to hit back when hit; and it is my hypothesis that the subtle, not always conscious, but strong motive has been that of building up self-respect, a sense of dignity, and a feeling of inner security. There have, of course, been mixed motives, and the expressed aims testify to this; but there is enough evidence and material, verbal and nonverbal, to maintain the self-respect theory of Black Power violence.

Incidentally, Sartre seems (in his preface to Fanon's book) to agree with Black Power leaders on the function of counterviolence:

The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself creates his self. Far removed from his war, we consider it as a triumph of barbarism; but of its own volition it achieves, slowly but surely, the emancipation of the rebel, for bit by bit it destroys in him and around him the colonial gloom. . . . [T]o shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time; there remain a dead man, and a free man. . . .
(Sartre in Fanon 1966: 18–19)

Fanon puts it in this way:

At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.
(Fanon 1966: 73)

At a deeper, psychoanalytic level, Erik H. Erikson traces the connection between Fanon's killing and the basic Gandhian hypothesis that violence against the other is violence against oneself (cf. *H₄, p. 48):

That killing, in fact, may be a necessary self-cure for colonialized people was Dr. Frantz Fanon's conviction and message. . . . An implicit therapeutic intent, then, seems to be a common denominator in theories and ideologies of action which, on the level of deeds, seem to exclude each other totally. What they nevertheless have in common is the intuition that violence against the adversary and violence against the self are inseparable; what divides them is the programme of dealing with either. (Erikson 1969: 74)

King, in a quote cited earlier, puts it in a slightly different way:

With a spirit straining toward true self-esteem, the Negro must boldly throw off the manacles of self-abnegation and say to himself and the world: "I am somebody. I am a person. I am a man with dignity and honor." (King 1967: 43–44)

Showing his understanding of the basic function of self-respect in the struggle for liberation, King continues, as cited earlier (p. 110):

Psychological freedom, a firm sense of self-esteem, is the most powerful weapon against the long night of physical slavery. (Ibid., p. 43)

Our contention is that a minimum of self-esteem is a necessary condition for nonviolent as well as violent struggle and that no exhortations but only action can help to create that minimum requirement if it is absent. The critical question, however, is, Must the action be violent? Gandhi's answer is no, that of Sartre and Fanon, yes.

One is justified in concluding that none of the tough Black Power leaders take physical violence to be more than a preliminary to more constructive efforts. The mental violence—abuse, vilification, distortion in words—will perhaps remain popular as an outlet, but sooner or later constructive efforts will be seen to suffer disproportionately from the hot flow of verbal provocation. There will probably be a tendency toward nonviolent noncooperation and the building of parallel institutions, at least in the economic sector. The war of words and small-scale, unorganized, personal aggressiveness will be found to be uneconomical, too costly, if not degrading, and undig-

nified for race-conscious blacks who clearly see that such tough behavior is characteristic of the whites they despise.

Our aim has been to describe and compare different points of view, not to offer criticism. Perhaps it will therefore be not entirely inappropriate to make a small personal comment: we agree that nonpremeditated, spontaneous violence is sometimes a cleansing force. However, the cleansing force is dependent on spontaneity. Premeditated violence instigated by gang leaders and supported by articulated group norms is scarcely a cleansing force. Therefore, the policy of violence, deliberate plans to use violence as a means in certain group conflicts, cannot be vindicated as a means of creating self-respect. Nor does this policy seem able to solve the long-range problems King had in mind. Furthermore, Black Power leaders tend to defend violence mainly as a desperate means to protect themselves individually against murderous police forces. We thus return to the nonviolent approach, but with a better understanding of the indispensability of constructive programs and an appreciation of the necessity of efforts to increase self-respect among the weakest groups.

Satyāgraha Is Not a Set of Techniques

In a description of Gandhi's *satyāgraha*, one error has perhaps been more damaging for adequate understanding than all the others put together: the description of *satyāgraha* as a mere bundle of techniques. A central characteristic of a technique is its pure instrumentality, its character of being a mere means to an end.

Consider the technique of shooting: a gun may be used by anyone with sufficient know-how. Its use may be quite independent of the thoughts and motivation of the person using it. But this is emphatically not the case with nonviolence. For an action to be part of a nonviolent campaign, it must conform, at least roughly, to the norms and hypotheses characteristic of nonviolence, these being the conscious expressions of nonviolent behavior, attitudes, and institutions. The normative system implied may, of course, be conceived in somewhat different ways and one may have different degrees of approximation to an ideal campaign. However, the techniques, described in terms of overt behavior, cannot be detached from the characteristic norms and hypotheses. A strike, a stay-at-home, or a fast, described in terms of behavior, are not yet instances of *satyāgraha*. They must conform with norms and hy-

potheses of *satyāgraha*, and they are therefore unsuccessful if the opponent or the general public perceives only the behavior, not its symbolic aspect.

Joan Bondurant and others have tried to compare levels of purity of non-violence in different campaigns. One must, of course, allow for practical errors of judgment and some transgression of norms, but there is less room for variation in intention. If there is no serious resolve to act nonviolently, following most of the norms, this has immediate consequences for how one appears to and is interpreted by the opponent. It is in most cases easy to detect superficiality. One of the most ruinous attitudes is that of trying out nonviolence, and, if that does not lead to success, intending to use violence. This strategy leads to a head-on collision with the norms and hypotheses of nonviolence. The thought "I shall first be nonviolent, and if it does not succeed, I am justified in using violence" is contradictory. There can be no such first-stage nonviolence.

The (implicit, rarely explicit) rejection of *satyāgraha* by the leaders of the New Violence is based in part on this misleading picture of *satyāgraha*: black people are described as partaking in a march or other action as if the external behavior were identical with the action of *satyāgraha*. The picture lacks a description of a positive content of the action itself, its goal-revealing aspect. Furthermore, the attitude of black people is described in terms of humiliation and passivity: their being abused, hit in the face without their "doing anything."² They have also been described as obsessed by fear and hatred all along. Their church is burned; what shall they do? Nothing, according to certain black-leader descriptions of the nonviolence of Martin Luther King, Jr.

From the preliminary definition of a *satyāgraha* campaign as a campaign consistent with, and expressive of, a nonviolent system of norms and hypotheses, it immediately follows that *satyāgraha* is not a technique. The inclusion of hypotheses is essential; one cannot be asked to believe in certain hypotheses as part of a technique. The technique of firing a gun is independent of any beliefs concerning the meaning and consequences of the behavior involved in firing it.

Individuals are not simply masters of their own beliefs; they cannot normally adopt and reject beliefs according to the needs of the moment. Insofar as they are able to do this, they violate the requirements of truthfulness. Nor can they believe in a norm, or respect it, as part of a technique. But they can believe in norms and hypotheses as part of a total creed and develop

techniques of action that are consistent with, and expressive of, this creed. Thus, they may be asked to break a law, to distribute food, to carry a banner, and so on, as part of a campaign expressive of a creed. If the creed is absent, they cannot do what is asked.

To call *satyāgraha* a method rather than a technique is less misleading because the etymological meaning involves that of *a way* of acting or living. But if a nonviolent campaign is said to be a way of planning and carrying out a campaign, it is only a way that can be adopted by persons who share certain beliefs and attitudes. The confusing point about this terminology is that some of these beliefs and attitudes are part of "the way." Thus, in discussions in which theoretical clarity is at issue, *satyāgraha* should not be classified only as a method or way of struggle or conflict solution.

How much is required of shared beliefs depends on one's role in the campaign. Gandhi expected much more of a leader and strategist than of a follower. Confronted with the hypotheses characteristic of belief in *satyāgraha*, many people, including military leaders, will hesitate to squarely reject or accept them as true or as convincing or highly probable. Uncertainty prevails as to their relative validity or invalidity. It therefore makes sense when military leaders or others who traditionally support institutions of violence favor experiments in *satyāgraha*. They favor its tentative use in various kinds of situations. It makes sense insofar as it is a reasonable way of testing the hypotheses that the *satyāgrahin* assert with some dogmatism. However, those engaged in mere testing are not yet *satyāgrahin*. *Satyāgraha* cannot be used properly because it is not a technique, not an instrument.

This point is of importance because the opponent cannot be expected to be impressed by an appeal to the brain and the heart, when the appeal is an *experimental* appeal, a test of power. The difference from a genuine appeal is all too clear in face-to-face confrontations. An appeal to the heart is expected to come from the heart, not from the brain of the experimenter.

The mistake of taking *satyāgraha* to be a technique is, of course, not as widespread as the tendency to use the word *technique* for it. Some of the theoreticians (Bondurant and others) who use the word make it clear that it is not a technique in the sense of a mere instrumentality, independent of the convictions and attitudes of the user. The various activities involved in *satyāgraha* may contain the use of techniques—for instance, making salt, spinning, preparing meals, beating drums, singing songs, building houses, and operating banks. But these are not characteristic of the *satyāgraha* as a whole.

The lighthearted use of the term *technique* and the neglect of systematic study of the roots of nonviolence in ethics and metaphysics has facilitated an incorrect classification of some political, racial, and student campaigns as nonviolent. Demonstrations, strikes, and fasts have been classified as Gandhian and conceived as nonviolent when they have only avoided manifest physical violence. Their lack of success, however, often seems to be due to their neglect of the basic norms of Gandhian struggle.

Isolated traits of Gandhian conflict behavior have been studied from the point of view of game theory. Thus, R. E. Klitgaard uses “two-party conflict models” to study *satyāgraha* “as a tactic” (Klitgaard 1971: 143). He does not deny that it is sometimes a successful tactic but finds that it contains “many contradictions and inconsistent strategic implications” (ibid., p. 152). This is hardly surprising. What is lamentable is the more or less implicit assumption that one has to either think of Gandhi as a tactician or treat him as a saint and refrain from analysis. Gandhian conflict behavior must be studied in relation to a norm system. Any analysis solely in terms of tactic, technique, or method must lead astray.

The Use of Violence as a Sign of Impotency

As systematized by our set of norms and hypotheses, any kind of violence in any kind of conflict situation violates at least one norm. Violence is never right. One may quote Gandhi in support of this unrestricted condemnation. But, as is very well known and has been extensively discussed since the time of the Boer War, Gandhi gave his moral support to groups engaged in war or other violent conflicts. Furthermore, he accepted, recommended, and justified the physical violence to, and injury of, human beings. He has even postulated it as a duty under certain circumstances for certain persons to use physical violence against opponents. This last duty seems to flatly contradict norm N_3 (p. 63), never to resort to violence against an opponent.

There is no easy way of bringing consistency into this seemingly confused aggregate of sayings and actions. The least intricate way, in our opinion, is to take the consequences of three facts:

1. Gandhi’s acceptance, recommendation, vindication, and “duty-postulation” of an act of violence occurs only in relation to a definite person or (small) group of persons.

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

2. The persons by whom the violence is positively (or at least not negatively) valued are in a state of impotency and manifest helplessness. They are at least momentarily not able to follow the norms against physical violence.
3. For such persons it is an inescapable duty to act immediately in the situation in which they find themselves—to act in support of a manifest, high-level goal.

The state of impotency does not have as a consequence a rejection of the system of nonviolence, but the system is nevertheless violated by these persons; they create an evil. However, the evil does not discredit them as persons. It is rather their lack of foresight, their lack of training in nonviolence that is discreditable.

There are, for these persons, ethically meaningful questions to be asked: What can I, should I, or must I do, being in a momentary state of impotency? Gandhi has some answers to these questions. They are not part of his teaching on nonviolence, and they cannot be made part of its systematization. They nevertheless lie within the framework of his total ethics. The ethics of group struggle, as portrayed on pages 53–57 does not take into account comparisons of evils, that is, ethically valid judgments of the kind “A is a greater evil than B.” A person in a state of impotency may have to decide to create evils, but his attempt to create a minimum is in this situation laudable, not damnable. The act does not discredit the person. On the other hand, the state of impotency may be due in part to the neglect of training in nonviolence. It was a recurring lament of Gandhi’s that the Hindus neglected this training and that the politicians of the Congress Party did not support his plan of nonviolent brigades in every danger area of religious conflict. The frequent clashes between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs would give ample training in nonviolence. This would minimize the chance of situations of nonviolent impotency.

In conclusion, we may say that Gandhi did not condone violence in any situation. Violence, not specified as the violent act of a definite person, is as such always an evil. On the other hand, given a definite person in a definite situation, an act of violence committed by that person sometimes justifies our saying, “N. N. acted correctly,” “It was a duty of N. N. to act as he did.” The terms *correct* or *right* and *wrong* attach here directly to the person: “The

person was right in doing so-and-so," "It would have been right for any other person in this state and in this situation to act as N. N. did."

This way of looking at the matter not only brings formal consistency into the teaching of Gandhi, but shows how naturally the seemingly contradictory maxims can find their dwelling within one person.

Gandhi's Notion of Nonviolence: Axiology or Deontology?

The claims made by the norms of our systematization are *deontological*: they say what must or should be. One such claim is that anyone should do as the norms tell. There is no gradation: either you should do it, or it is not the case that you should. *Tertium non datur*. In a value system, there is gradation. Some values are taken to be higher than others, a relation not to be confused with that of derivation.

It is tempting to solve the problems Gandhi poses for the systematizer by recommending violence under some circumstances by taking "courageous defense of the helpless, whether nonviolent or violent" as a higher value than "abstention from violence because of cowardice."

The axiological view might be formulated as follows: "Values are worth realizing, but there is a hierarchy of values, there are priorities, in both the positive and the negative realm." Thus, the most important function of grading positive and negative values in making a conceptual reconstruction is to make precise what to do under non-ideal conditions, especially when the shortcomings taken for granted are those of humans.

It follows that the unconditional abstention from violence is, strictly speaking (according to Gandhi), only the highest realizable value for a definite person *P* in a definite situation *S*, provided *P* is not a firm believer in violence in *S* or provided *P* is a coward (is dominated by fear in *S*). If *P* is dominated by fear, he should act violently rather than run away. And if he is convinced that an act of violence is the only possible means of reaching a (good) end in *S*, he should perform the violent deed.

In these sentences, we have used deontological language ("should") together with axiological ("best"). The complications resulting from Gandhi's outlook on cowardice may be addressed with a normative, deontological system, but it is much more convenient, even natural, to use an axiological system. A person who in *S* behaves nonviolently and fearlessly is realizing a

higher value (his behavior is better) than a person who in *S* behaves violently and fearlessly. Further, this person is again acting more valuably than one who acts nonviolently out of cowardice. Of the three values, two are positive and one negative. The less high value is positive insofar as the action is recommended in certain situations. If Gandhi even goes so far as to make it a duty to act violently in certain cases, a positive value must in those cases somehow be realized by the violent action.

Grave consequences, however, flow from the axiological approach. According to this interpretation, it is not sentences of the form "If *x*, then use violence" that reflect Gandhi's thinking, but rather those of the form "If you cannot do what you should do, prefer violence to cowardice." In this sentence it is implied that what you do is wrong. This is very different from the point of view of the performatory use of language, which implies that what you do is the next best or next to the next best. According to Gandhi, (1) there is no definite limit to the strengthening of one's nonviolent capacity, and (2) one is not permitted to calculate beforehand what one might not be able to do nonviolently in a future situation. Gandhi did not argue that we could decide on the limits of our capacity for nonviolence well in advance of a particular, acute conflict situation. "Impotency is avoidable." This hypothesis is taken to be valid until the conflict situation is present physically in the form of a threat to persons who are obviously too weak to resist direct physical attack. In such situations the *satyāgrahin* may be justified in proclaiming that he is in a state of impotency, and it may be his duty physically to attack the aggressor.

In conclusion, we shall retain the deontological approach. We shall also speak of degrees of wrongness, weakness, and error and distinguish degrees of the seriousness of breaks with norms of nonviolence. However, we shall not try to incorporate norms such as "Be violent rather than a coward" into the norm system.

When heavily exploited, some people today resort to physical violence, while others respond with widespread indignation and a warning to resort to legal means. If we take the term *violence* to cover any avoidable severe curtailment of the possibilities of self-realization of others, the indignation is misplaced if not accompanied by a parallel indignation at the structural and sometimes physical violence suffered by those who are being exploited. As it is now, the outcry is rather one of "How dare you do violence!" instead of "How dare we remain passive!"

Constructive, Goal-Revealing Campaigns

Gandhi was a great believer in person-to-person contact. He was a believer in the possibility of showing, rather than telling, the opponent what a campaign aims toward. Excepting the Khadi movement, he did not take very seriously the talk about campaigns and the glorifying accounts of their implementation. He expressed a low estimation of the function of his periodicals *Harijan* and *Young India*. He did not deplore their suppression! He thought that a campaign would have a stronger appeal when it showed what the campaigners wished to realize than when he talked about it. To him, a campaign would be more powerful when it showed the positive future state of affairs (untouchables praying in temples, making salt) than when it showed the present negative state of affairs (the clubbing of campaigners, pictures of fat rich people, and so forth).

The requirements or ideal of constructivity favor the establishment of parallel institutions and parallel business. This is the main reason why the slogan "Take care of business" (T.C.B.) may be regarded as the indirect offspring of the nonviolent campaigns in the United States.

Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton conclude their book *Black Power* with the following highly relevant proclamation:

[W]hatever the consequences, there is a growing—a rapidly growing—body of black people determined to "T.C.B."—take care of business. They will not be stopped in their drive to achieve dignity, to achieve their share of power, indeed to become their own men and women—in this time and in this land—by whatever means necessary. (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967: 184–85)

The work in parallel institutions can go admirably hand in hand with other parts of a constructive program. Selfless work is needed in order, for instance, to build and operate a cooperative or a school.³ Teachers may perhaps not get a decent salary in the first year but will they be "ruining" their careers? There is ample opportunity for constructive suffering.

Gandhi tried to implement the formation of parallel institutions, but not with great success. Some of the basic parts of the constructive program, such as help for the untouchables and the Khadi, exhausted most of the available energy of his followers. There was not much left for building schools, establishing law courts, and so on.

NONVIOLENCE AND THE “NEW VIOLENCE”

In the case of the salt *satyāgraha*, the manufacturing and storing of salt and its distribution to the poor were all positive measures consistent with a T.C.B. norm.

Struggle by means of constructive campaigns seems to have a great future in societies with a fairly high level of personal, not necessarily private, enterprise. With sufficiently widespread public support, almost anything can be realized by a simple resolution to act as if an institutional change were already realized. This holds well, for instance, in educational institutions.

Central authorities may stop financial support of one rebelling school, but if nearly all schools are radically changed by teachers and students, it is unlikely that financial support can be stopped.

If a tiny group favors a radical institutional change that the rest of the community ignores or considers worthless, the conflict is, of course, of a very different kind. The small group must somehow get the rest to pay attention and reconsider, and at that moment, acts of violence are (in many countries) more likely to get reported in the mass media than anything else.

Does the constructive approach go against those who ask for an immediate and radical change in society, a change that destroys all present institutions? Not necessarily. A judicial system is destroyed by not being used by anyone; the same holds for voting. If an institution is left to die because a completely different one is being created, there is a radical constructive, not destructive, change. There is no limit to the application of the approach; but inertia makes it highly improbable that old institutions can be destroyed overnight. The experience of Mao Tse-tung is a recent grand-scale manifestation of this point. On the other hand, physical destruction also has limited consequences. All prisons might be blown up without the prison system being affected. New, more solid prisons may be built, and the sale of dynamite curtailed!

In short, the maxim “The whole system must be destroyed” does not rule out constructivity. What rules it out is the addition “before we can think of what might replace it.” No definite new system may be needed, but new mores are at least required in a radically changed situation.

Constructivity and Destructivity in Gandhi’s Salt *Satyāgraha*

Constructivity—the visual, concrete, clear manifestation of goals—is of the utmost importance when trying to solve the constant problem of com-

munication with immediate opponents, for instance, with the police and soldiers (national guard and so forth). In severe conflicts, the *satyāgrahin* is not confronted with an antagonism, but with physically present antagonists. The antagonist directly in front of him may not even know about the antagonism.

Let us take the salt *satyāgraha* as an example, clearly announced to the viceroy in the famous letter of March 2, 1930. To march 241 miles is in itself communicative only as proof of persistence, will, and stamina. But the salt march was one from Ahmedabad to the sea, where it was announced that salt was to be made from seawater.

The direction of the march plus the culminating manifestation, the easily understandable making of salt, made the salt march positive and indicative of the goal of the campaign. Compare this with the poor people's march to the bureaucratic center in Washington, D.C. What were they to do in Washington except speak against the government and experience the deteriorating effect of unemployment? They could not perform actions in Washington that showed what they wanted. The campaign lacked salt.

There was an obvious need for poor people in India to use salt and there was an obvious difficulty for them to pay taxes and get the necessary salt from the British monopolistic stores. Nevertheless, police had to interfere with the very process of making salt because it violated a law. The campaign was arranged in such a way that violence against the campaigners struck them at the moment of realizing, of anticipating, the kind of social relations envisaged only in a nonviolent society. The opponent had to try to destroy this very relation, attacking even the making of a small pinch of salt for personal consumption.

Let us contrast this action with a later development of the salt *satyāgraha* that did not have this positive, goal-revealing nature.

In the beginning of May 1930, Gandhi prepared a notice to the Viceroy:

God willing it is my intention on . . . to set out for Dharasana . . . and demand possession of the salt works. The public have been told that Dharasana is a private property. This is mere camouflage. It is as effectively under government control as the Viceroy's House. Not a pinch of salt can be removed without the previous sanction of the authorities.

It is possible for you to prevent this raid, as it has been playfully and mischievously called, in three ways: by removing the salt tax; by arresting me and

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

my party unless the country can, as I hope it will, replace every one taken away;
by sheer goondaism, unless every head broken is replaced, as I hope it will.

(Tendulkar 1951–54, vol. 3: 36)

Gandhi does not tell in whose name he would demand possession of the salt works or from whom he could expect to get a concession at the site of the salt works.

Gandhi was arrested, and leadership was transferred, first to Mr. Abbas Tyabji, then to Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. Let us quote from the narrative by Tendulkar, one of the most careful writers on the subject:

On May 21st over 2,000 volunteers led by her [Mrs. Naidu] and Imam Saheb raided Dharasana salt depot, about 150 miles north to Bombay. Mrs. Naidu led the volunteers in prayer and addressed them briefly: "Gandhiji's body is in jail, but his soul is with you. India's prestige is now in your hands. You must not resist, you must not even raise a hand to ward off blows." With Manilal, Gandhi's son, in the forefront, the throng moved forward towards the salt pans, which were now surrounded by four hundred Surat Police with half a dozen British officials in command. The police carried big lathis, five-foot clubs tipped with steel. Inside the stockade twenty-five riflemen stood ready.

(Ibid., p. 40)

We all know how things developed. There was bloodshed on a large scale. An American journalist named Miller, who visited a temporary hospital, counted 320 injured, many still insensible with fractured skulls, and others writhing in agony from kicks in the testicles and stomach. The same journalist has an interesting piece of commentary from the battlefield itself:

Group after group walked forward, sat down, and submitted to being beaten into insensibility without raising an arm to put off the blows. Finally the policemen became enraged by the non-resistance, sharing, I suppose, the helpless rage I had felt at the demonstrators for not fighting back. They commenced savagely kicking the seated men in the abdomen and testicles. The injured men writhed and squealed in agony, which seemed to inflame the fury of the police, and the crowd almost broke away from their leaders.

(Ibid., pp. 40–41)

Before I comment on this, it should be mentioned that already in April a "large quantity of contraband salt was forcibly seized"; "later a large quantity was sold or distributed in the village of Dandi" (ibid., p. 32). Later, salt

was carried away—in Wadala, “sackfuls”; in Karnatak, “thousands of mounds of salt” (ibid., p. 41). One must presume that the briefing of the police before the clash with the raiders at Dharasana included a justified prediction that they would take away salt.

Now, if there is any situation in which policemen feel completely justified in stopping people with forcible means, it is where they are trying to steal private or public property. When salt is forcibly seized, policemen tend to believe it is stolen, and they act accordingly if not convinced by outsiders that what is going on is not theft.

The policemen at Dharasana must have looked on the campaigners as raiders, as private citizens trying to get hold of large quantities of salt. It is quite a different thing to try to stop people from making their own small quantity of salt out of seawater or to demonstrate for the right to do so.

Our conclusion is therefore that the preliminaries before taking up direct action were not taken care of in the salt raids of May and June 1930. The campaigners provoked and invited violence from their opponents (cf. *N*₈, p. 74).

When the police find themselves justified in brutal beatings, and their opponents do not stop their direct action, the effect may well be as the journalist Miller described it: the police become more enraged and lose control over themselves. This effect is the opposite of that intended by *satyāgraha*. The opponent must not be made to debase himself, to lose face. And one must renounce the propaganda value of displaying police and others who have lost control over themselves or are committing atrocities.

The salt raids were inconsistent with the *satyāgraha* norms in several respects: on meeting the opponent, in this case the guardians of the salt depots, there was no sustained effort to communicate with them. If it is argued that the real opponent was the viceroy and other high officials, a distinction then becomes highly relevant—between direct and indirect, near and remote opponents. Gandhi worked by personal contact, and during a direct action, it is always the near, not the remote, opponent who is to be met and persuaded.

The leader, Mrs. Naidu, asserted, as if it were already a fact, that the campaigners would be clubbed down. Therefore, no effort to communicate could reasonably be made as part of the campaign action. Perhaps it was not practically possible? The available sources do not discuss the point.

NONVIOLENCE AND THE "NEW VIOLENCE"

Further, it may be argued that the objective of the action was not properly defined. What was "to take possession" to mean? What was the relation between a law forbidding the *manufacturing* of salt to an action by which possession of already manufactured salt is proclaimed?

The objective of the action was at least not justified explicitly, it seems. The characterization (used by Tendulkar, Fischer, Bondurant, and others) of the action as a raid was unbiased, but not the phrase used by Gandhi when saying that the action had been "playfully and mischievously" called a raid. There is no clear indication that the action was not properly called a raid, and raids are certainly not 100 percent pure *satyāgraha*.

The actions themselves included important features in addition to the proclaimed objective: salt was removed and transported to unknown places, sometimes in great quantities. This exemplifies a breach of N_{25} ("During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its goal wider or narrower"). Does taking possession of include transportation and distribution? It seems that if there was a plan for how to use the salt or operate the works, the opponent ought to know about it. In a future nonviolent society, distribution and use of salt will have to be regulated somehow. The raid did not picture an ideal future situation.

Are we then forced to conclude from the foregoing that the so-called salt raids in 1930 do not exemplify *satyāgraha*? Not quite. First of all, the available historical sources are incomplete. Further, there is a wide margin of uncertainty regarding what might have been done but was not done, or what was done but did not work.

Second, the confrontation of an actual campaign with a systematization containing 25 norms can reasonably only have the aim of finding out how far and in what features the campaign differs from a campaign satisfying to an ideal degree all the norms. It would be unreasonable and unjust to limit the designation *satyāgraha* to campaigns completely satisfying all the norms. In such a case, Gandhi would not have carried through a single *satyāgraha* campaign. "I know what an inadequate follower I am of myself, for I cannot live up to the convictions I stand for" (Bose 1957: viii).

Conclusion

A confrontation of the New Violence with Gandhian nonviolence reveals similarities. Some key phrases:

Conclusion

1. Extreme activism.
2. Impatience: result now!
3. Concern for self-respect and personal identity.
4. If you lack self-respect, retaliate rather than submit to insults.
5. Make plans for parallel business and institutions.
6. Suppression, exploitation, and manipulation are forms of violence.

But there are also deep divergences:

1. Short-term physical and verbal violence may reduce long-term violence.
(Rejected by Gandhi, accepted by New Violence)
2. Fight antagonisms, not antagonists.
(Accepted by Gandhi, in part rejected by New Violence)
3. Hate suppression, not suppressors.
(Accepted by Gandhi, largely rejected by New Violence)
4. There are always basic interests in common.
(Accepted by Gandhi, rejected by New Violence)
5. First destroy all that is bad, then start building.
(Rejected by Gandhi, accepted by some New Violence leaders)

The outlook for the future is in some respect encouraging from the point of view of Gandhian thinking. The T.C.B. slogan of New Violence indicates a resolve to build up parallel institutions and furnish a constructive program.

V

Comparison with Certain Other Philosophies of Conflict

Luther and Gandhi

We hope now to have given a fairly clear, if not wholly complete, picture of Gandhi's ideas and intentions in the limited area of group conflict. Let us compare them, then, with what we know of the ideas and intentions of some other men who have lent their minds to the problems of conflict. Such a comparison can do more than put the Gandhian approach in clearer perspective. It can tell us where the comparison and contrast of different views can significantly be made and where it must fail.

There are few contemporaries who would call themselves Lutherans, but Lutheran views have contributed significantly to the political ethics of some Western countries. We find Martin Luther's views on group conflict in his doctrine of the two regiments, or realms, the spiritual and the worldly. The worldly realm, which is in a sense the kingdom of evil and which exists only because there is evil in man, is the world of militarism. God has laid the world of evil beneath the sword, as men have put wild beasts in chains.

Luther's two regiments cannot be straightforwardly identified with the church and worldly power. The Swedish theologian Anders Nygren puts Luther's view in this way:

In the worldly regiment God will maintain justice and peace, and the means he uses in this regiment are power and the sword. In both the one and the other kingdom he uses men as his servants. (Nygren 1942: 99)

Princes, soldiers, and those who are subjected to imprisonment are all servants of God. Nygren goes on:

Through the gospel God rules his spiritual kingdom, forgives sins, justifies and sanctifies. But in no way has He thereby made the worldly regiment out-dated,

COMPARISON WITH CERTAIN OTHER PHILOSOPHIES OF CONFLICT

or done away with it. In its domain the worldly regiment shall rule with power and the sword. If one tries to inject the gospel into its regime, then one commits a two-fold sin, and so will be doubly punished. Primarily one corrupts the gospel; but in addition to this one harms and corrupts the world.

(Nygren 1942: 99)

The gospel is not to be used in order to eliminate militarism, for that would be to corrupt the gospel. Luther himself says:

If someone will rule this world according to the gospel and abrogate all worldly justice and the sword . . . [w]hat will he accomplish thereby? He will turn loose the wild, evil beasts from their bonds and chains.

(Ibid., p. 101)

The substance, then, of Luther's view seems to be that if one interferes with the worldly regiment, the very few good people who do live according to the gospel will be killed. In his 1527 treatise *Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können* (Whether the soldier can be considered a Christian), Luther says:

Therefore God also sets the sword on high, which obeys his will, and does not want man to say or to believe that man has discovered it or invented it. For the hand which uses this sword and kills is no longer a human hand, but God's hand, and not man but God hangs, breaks on the wheel, delivers, kills, and makes war. All the work and the justice are his. [Editor's note: Naess's translation]

For our own purposes, Luther's separate points can be listed as follows. No effort is made to reduce their harshness:

1. War and other forms of organized physical violence will and must continue indefinitely. To try to eliminate these evils is to interfere with God's rule.
2. Political life will remain essentially the same. Defense against autocracy is therefore in vain.
3. Treatment of lawbreakers will and must continue as it was in the 1500s. "Good men," as he says, must be protected against "wild animals" by any means.
4. Even if administrative institutions in a state cannot be wholly identified with God's worldly kingdom, their connection with God is nonetheless so close that any change in the institutions is tantamount

to a change in God's own regime. Thoroughgoing reforms must therefore be interpreted as rebellion against God. It is the duty of every ordinary person to obey the ruling powers. But there are, according to Luther, certain interesting exceptions. A tiny minority has the right to disobey the ruling classes. In order to have that right, one must be a so-called *Wundermensch* (miracle man), that is, one must have a special commission from God to go against worldly power. Such commissions Luther considered to be very rare. But he thought of himself as one such *Wundermensch* when he nailed his theses to the church door.

5. Luther divided men, as we have said, into the good and the evil and did not count on the possibility of the good exerting any decisive influence on the evil. The good men, the real Christians, were, according to Luther, few in number, perhaps no more than one in a thousand.
6. Evil men will not flinch from exterminating the good men if the worldly regiment did not use the sword to protect them. Luther compared evil men to wolves who would devour the sheep if the sheep were not protected. This situation would be especially serious if there were a thousand wolves to each sheep! It is no more than reasonable under such circumstances to sanction any imaginable means of defense, especially since the use of brutal means by good men does not, according to Luther, make these men any less good.
7. God sees to it that princes and other men in power are more or less morally superior to the masses. Those who have become rulers may be assumed to have certain powers that their subjects lack. There are exceptions, however.
8. There are two moralities, individual morality and the morality of rulers, or, rather, common morality and superior morality. "Thou shalt not kill" holds for the commonalty, but not for the ruling order. At times, however, the commonalty may kill: "Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt not torture" need not hold for them either; as servants of the ruling order, they do have the right and often the duty to kill, but never on their own initiative.
9. The morality of the ruling order follows the "law of justice," that of the subject follows the "law of love." This is not the case, however, in situations in which commoners carry out the wishes of the ruling

order. In such cases, in war, for example, to follow the law of love would be to rebel against God.

Much of the harshness of Luther's teaching is thought to be inseparable from the spirit of his age. It has therefore been considered unjust to compare him to such a man as Gandhi, who lived in an age that had more or less rejected the idea of the innate goodness of the ruling classes. Let us remember, however, that there are still people today who support Luther's teaching, accepting even its harshest features. There is therefore more than academic interest in a comparison between Gandhi and Luther. It should also be remembered that some people at the time of Luther courageously condemned the cruelty and fanaticism of his teaching. Erasmus is an example.

Gandhi and Luther both criticized the political and personal conduct of their age. But Gandhi thought it not only possible, but desirable, to effect radical changes, and should such changes require the elimination of certain institutions, so much the worse, he felt, for those institutions. Institutions themselves were, for Gandhi, far from divine. War and the threat of war, for instance, were bad institutions. The structure of society needed to be changed, but it was not necessary to be a superman or a *Wundermensch* in order to oppose ruling authority.

Gandhi wanted revolution, but not violence. He saw how Hinduism had become decadent, and he wanted to purify it. Until late in his life, he considered that the original caste system (with only four castes, each having equal status) had a valuable core, but that it had grown corrupt over the centuries. Such an institution was not to be eliminated, but restored. Toward the end of his life, he proclaimed that "caste must go root and branch."¹ In short, even if there is much evil in the world, even if human institutions are never perfect, passivity in the face of evil is, according to Gandhi, altogether unjustifiable. For Luther, matters stood quite differently. No existing institution could, in principle, be bad, for God had created it. Although those who supported such an institution could be evil, as when a ruler conducted an evil war, the repetition of this evil could, according to Luther, only be avoided by the ruler's being converted and becoming a true Christian. If a Christian were to start not only good wars, but also an evil war, he would no longer be a true Christian. Evildoers may be done away with, but not institutions and their representatives.

Whereas Luther thought that since the office a man held was inviolable and that the tenure of that office afforded such a man the personal rights of respect and nonviolation, Gandhi felt it was the opponent's person (and not just his body) that was inviolable and that his acts as a representative of a ruling order were something that could be systematically opposed. Gandhi respected persons, not systems; Luther respected systems, not persons. In Gandhi's anti-British campaign, for instance, the Prince of Wales was boycotted as a representative of the ruling order, but as a man and an individual he had to be accorded every respect; neither he nor the opponents of the boycott were to suffer any injury.

Gandhi felt not only that maltreatment and torture must cease, but also that imprisonment must be abolished altogether. No distinction, said Gandhi, should be made between the law of justice and the law of love. There exists only one morality, the morality of love, and according to this morality, all people, commoners and rulers alike, stand on the same level.

Furthermore, from a moral point of view, no man can act for another man: if the hangman is to justify himself, he must do so only within his own personal morality; his role or function provides him with no excuses or justification. The basis of Gandhi's teaching in connection with group conflict is that men, wherever they have dealings with one another, must meet and interact as individual persons, not as representatives, functionaries, or underlings (see *N₄₆*, p. 65). Every man is more than the sum of his functions, and what he cannot excuse or justify in terms of his totality is not to be excused or justified in terms of those functions.

In the systematizing of Gandhi's norms of conflict behavior it is unnecessary to introduce the highly controversial and philosophically difficult distinction between moral norms and norms that it would be ethically or strategically bad but not morally bad to break. Similarly, it is not necessary to specify whether on given occasions the verdicts bad and good are moral judgments or not. When used without specification, good and bad relate to the goals articulated in the systematization. Something is good if conducive to the realization of those goals. This is a test or criterion, not a definition.

The above paragraph is a preliminary to what follows. We are going to use the terms *good* and *bad* rather freely! All men are susceptible to influence, but not, indeed, to influence by just anyone. The more a man has developed, the greater the possibilities of his being susceptible to a good

influence. Gandhi's view is usually summed up as perfectionism (better, perfectibilism) or meliorism. Man can always change: "[H]owever debased or fallen he may be, [he] has in him the capacity of rising to the greatest height ever attained by any human being" (*Young India* 9.5.1929; quoted in Gandhi 1949b: 56).

Furthermore, an action may be good or bad; not so a man. If we talk about good and bad persons, our statements must be understood in reference to the actions and attitudes of persons, not to the persons themselves. A man may behave like a lamb or like a wolf, but this makes him neither a good nor a bad man. Luther thinks otherwise, and here he perhaps has most moralists on his side.

The point is essential to Gandhi's *satyāgraha*, for that way of trying to solve conflicts would certainly be a tragically vain one if one did not believe that one's opponent could be influenced by appeals to head and heart.

Luther wanted above all to bring himself into agreement with the Bible and was a member of a powerful biblical tradition of pessimism about the world and earthly existence.

In this connection, Albert Schweitzer's interpretation of Christianity is highly relevant. Johan Hygen states that as far as his views on the New Testament are concerned, Schweitzer represents the "consistent eschatology":

The religion of Jesus, according to Schweitzer, is not a religion which wishes to remake the world, but a religion which lives in expectation of the world's end. Its view of the world is pessimistic. Along with this interpretation of the earliest Christianity, Schweitzer maintains that the increasing dominance of the optimistic element came in at the Renaissance as a result of our somewhat changed attitude to the Christianity of the first centuries. It was a structural change. Indeed Schweitzer goes so far as to say that in exchanging optimism for pessimism Christianity lost its original essence. (Hygen 1954: 59)

Since early Christians expected the end of the world to come any day, there was little reason for them, downtrodden as they were, to try to change the Roman Empire and its institutions. They might attempt to convert an occasional member of the ruling order, but what would be the point in trying to change institutions just as the world was coming to an end? If one believes, however, that the end of the world is some way off, one's interest in institutions and the possibility of putting them to rights may grow considerably. Luther, on the other hand, in trying to retrace the progress of his

church back to early Christianity, unquestioningly took over the traditional view of the imminent end of the world.

We referred above to some of the tacit assumptions in Luther's teaching—assumptions about the immutability of the worldly regime, among other things. If Luther's social ideas are to provide us with any guidance today, we must believe that Luther made use of these assumptions about the worldly regime quite consciously. On the other hand, we may well doubt that he went at all deeply into worldly or social questions. His main wish, after all, was to be a guide to his own age, and we do him an injustice if we see him as trying to provide basic truths of sociology.

Most theologians recognize the uncertainty of determining what Luther's views would be if he lived today. For instance, there is some controversy about how to interpret the expression "just war," which Luther used to designate wars that he approved. A just war has been traditionally interpreted as one that is declared by a country's legal government, but this interpretation is now looked on as being as much a product of his age as was the Augsburg Confession. We cannot argue, that is, that Luther's views would imply his advocacy of just warfare today. The question of his position in contemporary controversy in this respect is still, and must remain, an open one.

According to their interpretations of Luther and of the evagelic Lutheran faith, most Lutheran theologians have felt that both the man and the faith are at a very great distance from Gandhian political morality. Nevertheless, there has always been among Lutherans a current of nonviolence. There is a widespread feeling that attitudes have changed a good deal since Luther's day, and some tend to think that the sixteenth article of the Augsburg Confession provides an adequate basis for Gandhian-like decisions on matters of politics. The words of the Lutheran creed can be given a meaning that includes sympathy with Gandhi's political morality; but they can also be given an interpretation that includes sympathy with a diametrically opposed morality.

Among dignitaries of Christian churches today, the most ardent adversaries of nonviolence are perhaps those who do not concentrate on how to make men obey the law of Christ, but on how to deal realistically with groups considered to be the most disobedient. According to Reinhold Niebuhr:

[There] is not the slightest support in Scripture for this doctrine of nonviolence. . . . It is rather remarkable that so many modern Christians should be-

lieve that Christianity is primarily a "challenge" to man to obey the law of Christ, whereas it is, as a matter of fact, a religion which deals realistically with the problem presented by the violation of this law.

(Davis and Good 1960: 140, 148)

Reinhold Niebuhr, like Luther, sees the camp of good people surrounded by hordes of bad and stresses a need for military "defence" against the bad (*ibid.*, pp. 300–302). In Gandhi's thinking, on the other hand—his identification with hooligans, criminals, and even foreign aggressors—prevents him from seeing the world in black and white. It also makes him eager to meet the "bad" people—the murderers, fanatics, and exploiters—in his search for a way out of devastating conflicts.

Nietzsche and Gandhi

It is a simple matter to set Friedrich Nietzsche and Mohandas Gandhi in opposition to one another; in fact, one may think it too easy to be interesting. Nietzsche's views on war and his expressed admiration for Napoleon and other great warriors of the past offer what looks like an absolute, and therefore unrewarding, contrast with Gandhi. Furthermore, insofar as Nietzsche contributed little to political morality, directly or indirectly, it surely does no justice to the great philosopher-poet to enlist him into the ranks of political philosophers. Nevertheless, the attempt to do so has been made. It is therefore valuable to clarify those points at which Nietzsche's views seem vulnerable to such wayward interpretations as we find, for example, in Sorel and the National Socialists, and, of course, it is at times useful to see just where comparisons cannot be made.

Consider first Nietzsche's views on war. How are we to interpret his approval of war, violence, and cruelty? There are two traditional interpretations of Nietzsche, the external-literal and the internal-symbolic. The literalists take Nietzsche at his word: wars can, generally speaking, be good things. According to Nietzsche, however, contemporary wars, including the Franco-Prussian War, were inglorious affairs. The Prussian victory over France was no victory at all, and the Era of Bismarck was an era of "Germans made stupid"! Could the only fault of contemporary warfare be its ingloriousness? Would wars, shorn of their accidental ignobility and tricked out with a few positive characteristics, be quite all right, or even desirable?

The answer must be a firm no. Even if Nietzsche, in his conversation and diaries, had shown enthusiasm for contemporary wars and violence because they served the repression of the physically and economically weak, the validity of the external-literal interpretation of Nietzsche's works would still not be established.

Nietzsche showed little inclination to engage personally in political controversy or group struggle. It is without undue exaggeration that Marius P. Nicolas could say, "Neither directly nor by implication, neither in practice nor in theory, was Nietzsche ever concerned with politics" (Nicolas 1938: 125). Sources for studying Nietzsche's life often lend themselves to interpretation by means of individual, rather than social, psychology. This seems evident at least in the cases of the biographical studies by Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, A. Ahlberg, Carl Roos, and Hugh A. Reyburn. The difference in the scope and quality of the critical literature in the cases of Nietzsche and Gandhi is enormous. Compared with Gandhi, Nietzsche is almost unknown to us.

It would require too much space to launch into a detailed justification here of the internal-symbolic interpretation of terms in Nietzsche's works such as war, cruelty, and violence and to define them in terms of inner struggles or conflicts fought in the mind by those concerned with their own weakness. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche seems clearly to have conceived himself to be continually declaring and waging "wars." These could not be meant otherwise than symbolically. Of his book *Human All-Too-Human* he writes that it constituted "a hundred-fold declaration of war." He fought established Christianity with the same intensity as did Kierkegaard. "It is now that we shall need warriors," he remarked after the immense Prussian so-called victory at Sedan. These and other sayings show his preference for a martial vocabulary, which, however, omits entirely any reference to international relations. Attempts, therefore, to construct a political morality or a theory of group conflict on the basis of Nietzsche's writings would seem doomed to failure. Comparison with Gandhi at this level, then, is impossible.

But what about Nietzsche's noble warriors? Are they anything like Gandhi's *satyāgrahin*? These warriors are courageous, and honest, and they are masters of open combat. They make sacrifices, take responsibilities upon themselves, and never extol suffering. They are truth seekers, free spir-

its and their personal *Weltanschauung* is the arbiter of all their decisions. They neither evade issues, shun conflicts, nor flee from fearful, even deadly, consequences, but hold their ground, come what may.

Gandhi expected similar qualities of his *satyāgrahin*; in fact, he has often been criticized for the harshness and cruelty of his demands. His admiration for the proud but warlike Pathans and his criticism of the weakness of some Hindus seem to reflect an uncompromisingly strong and militant attitude.

No systematic comparison of Gandhi and Nietzsche, however, is possible even in this area. The problems involved in interpreting the two men are vastly different. Nietzsche, perhaps intentionally, never makes it clear when he is trying to convey something in a highly suggestive but not fully literal way as opposed to when he intends people to be able to point to some sentence and say, "There, that is what Nietzsche thinks about it." In other words, whereas Nietzsche talks to us through an opaque screen of inspiration, Gandhi utters the most direct statements in the simplest of prose.

Furthermore, if we can talk at all of Nietzsche's system of morality, it is clear that we can say that it lacks any account of how to proceed or what to expect in particular situations. His statements about contemporary events are confined to remarks about, inter alia, wars, Jews, the British, the French, and so forth. The generality of such references lends support to what seems the correct way of interpreting Nietzsche, a way that implies that these general statements are less straightforward references to real instances than illustrations of aspects of the great struggle man must have with himself if he is not to be destroyed. The key, it would seem, to much of Nietzsche's discussion of war in *Also sprach Zarathustra* is to be found in the statement "Your highest thought shall thou let me bid you and cry out: Man is something that shall be overcome."² The picture we are given of contemporary man is of a weak and cowardly being, passive, compromising, dishonest, evasive and foolish, a being that feels compassion but refuses to commit itself to the hazards of moral action. The man Nietzsche would conquer is a self-abnegating, un-self-realized man. Self-realization is a matter of self-conquering, insofar as the self must be overcome. This notion of annihilating the weakness of man and thereby admitting a great self that has no known bounds is perhaps the main principle that emerges from any prolonged acquaintance with the works of Nietzsche. Here Gandhi and Nietzsche agree.

For Gandhi, self-respect and self-realization require the expansion of the self. His self-lessness has as its opposite egotism and self-abnegation.

It is impossible, however, at least at the present time, to explicate any further principles in Nietzsche's philosophy that would allow us to compare the Nietzschean system with others. As for Nietzsche's connection with Gandhi, although we can say they have certain values in common, such as fearlessness, we can say little more.

Tolstoy and Gandhi

Leo Tolstoy was Gandhi's great inspiration in the latter's efforts to evolve a theory of politics that could accommodate his moral system. With regard to opposing the powers that be, Tolstoy was the more radical and uncompromising of the two. In specifying very clearly how the authorities should be approached in an actual conflict, Gandhi expressed his belief that there are times when a good cause can be supported by working together with the authorities, even though they are responsible for violence and oppression. Tolstoy's belief seems to have been, on the contrary, that a good cause can never be supported in this way. In one important respect, then, Gandhi appears to have differed from his main source of inspiration.

In his detailed accounts of the cruelties inflicted on the peasants by the czarist authorities, Tolstoy gives free rein to his indignation. There is never a hint of any possibility of future cooperation with the perpetrators of such terrible violence. He writes as though he intended to convey to his readers a mood of hatred not just for the institutions, but for all of their representatives as well.

With Gandhi, it was quite otherwise. He presents the assaults and injuries suffered by himself and his followers in such a way that we are roused more to sorrow than to hatred and to a willingness to fight the causes of animosity and distrust rather than to a desire to wreak vengeance on the offenders. Gandhi had a rare gift for the vehement condemnation of an act without condemning its agent. His unwillingness to make personal accusations extended to fanatics and terrorists since even they were to be regarded as potential fellow workers. They were truth seekers, just as he was. They were trying to influence in their direction, he in his. No one possessed the truth, everyone erred more or less, and no one could know his own error but

by further nonviolent struggle. In this truth seeking, no one could be written off; no one was beyond redemption.

The tone of Gandhi's writings differs from that of Tolstoy's as the mental attitude of a builder does from that of a destroyer. Romain Rolland, in his book on Gandhi, written in 1924, said with some justice:

With Gandhi everything is nature—modest, simple, pure—while all his struggles are hallowed by religious serenity, whereas with Tolstoy everything is proud revolt against pride, hatred against hatred, passion against passion. Everything in Tolstoy is violence, even his doctrine of nonviolence.

(Rolland 1924: 147)

This is vast exaggeration but it points to a central difference of posture, a difference relevant in recent years between Tolstoyan haters and destroyers of the establishment and Gandhian builders of new lifestyles.

In his "Letter to a Hindu," Tolstoy interprets the holy writings of Hinduism to be consistently of a nonviolent character.³ Of one of these scriptures, the Hindu Kural, he says:

The aim of the sinless One lies in not doing evil unto those who have done evil unto him. Even if a man causes suffering to those who hate him without any reason, he will ultimately have grief not to be overcome. (Nag 1950: 86)

But there is more than enough grief in the world, and the sinister Tolstoyan prediction of grief not to be overcome goes against the *karmayoga* function of the Gandhian approach. If he harbors a "grief not to be overcome," whatever the cause of the grief, the Gandhian *yogi* of action will work to eliminate just that grief.

Following these passages from the Kural, Tolstoy, in referring to attitudes in Russia and Europe, concludes:

The recognition that love represents the highest morality was nowhere denied or contradicted, but this truth was so interwoven with all kinds of falsehoods which distorted it, that finally nothing of it remained but words. It was taught that this highest morality was only applicable to private life—for home use, as it were, but that in public life all forms of violence—such as imprisonment, executions and wars—might be used for the protection of the majority against a minority of evil-doers, though such means were diametrically opposed to any vestige of love. (Ibid., p. 86)

Lenin praises this criticism of injustice and exploitation but condemns Tolstoy's doctrine of nonresistance and the lack of a program of action (Gandhi 1958, vol. 15: 202–09; vol. 17: 49–53).

Tolstoy paints a dark picture of the terrifying perversions into which this highest of moralities has today been transformed, but he does not call on those who still uphold such a morality to act in defense of it. In fact, in one of his letters to Gandhi, Tolstoy went so far as to say that “as soon as resistance is admitted by the side of love, love no longer exists” (Nag 1950: 72). Gandhi did not resist evil—he ignored it. Gandhi wanted to build; he wanted to evolve and test a strategy that aimed at reestablishing respect and faith in the morality of love. It was essential, moreover, that this be done with the cooperation of those responsible for the distortion. He did not resist their game but started his own. His principles invited such cooperation, a cooperation his trust in human nature allowed for as a possibility. Cooperation, and inevitably compromise, with men of authority led to Gandhi's accepting, for the time being, a number of disagreeable features in the existing institutions. This earned him the alarmed protests of the Tolstoy camp, which rejected any kind of cooperation with any state institution.

Vain protests! The program of Gandhi was to cooperate as much as possible with the leaders of institutions without committing himself to acceptance of those institutions. He cooperated with jailers but never accepted the institution of imprisonment. The Tolstoyans did not accept the distinction between man and institution. Gandhi, on the other hand, was not always able to be entirely consistent in his applications of the distinction.

In terms of his own political strategy and in contradistinction to those of Tolstoy, Gandhi was able to lay stress on the not always sinister aims of those who did violence, and he rejected, moreover, the idea that the negative value of an action increased proportionally to the intensity and extent of the violence employed in it. His attitude toward representatives of vast military organizations was therefore not, as in the case of Tolstoy, one of abhorrence. Gandhi could admire those who fought in a way they considered to be appropriate for what they deemed right; if this involved violence, then it should be remembered, said Gandhi, that such people are also more likely to be courageous enough to employ nonviolent methods than are those who habitually avoid all physical conflicts. The absence of physical violence

can be due to cowardice; its presence may be due to love. Gandhi defended lovers of a pure Hindu society who tried to kill him. They had the courage to do what others only wished. Gandhi sought, however, to lead the force of love into constructive channels wherever it had gone astray, and he was always ready to meet men to try to persuade them to relinquish their trust in violence as a method.

Unhappily, the Gandhian approach is not readily taken up by people who today feel more or less helpless in their relations to "the establishment." They are more likely to join a Tolstoyan camp of haters and pessimists, of nonresisters or of promoters of violence.

Jaspers and Gandhi

Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) is one of the few philosophers of this century who commands respect in all quarters as a sincere, intellectually honest, erudite, and versatile philosopher. Starting as a psychiatrist, he soon developed a comprehensive view of history, society, and man. Unlike some of his colleagues, he courageously stood up against Hitler's repressive bureaucracy. He was dismissed as a professor in Heidelberg in 1937 but was reinstated as director (*Rektor*) in 1945.

Jaspers's close experience of overwhelming terror left a deep imprint, and he may well count as one of the weightiest doubters regarding the outlook for nonviolent overthrow of terror regimes. But the same experience made him also a staunch believer in the necessity and feasibility of infusing something suprapolitical (*überpolitisch*), something over and beyond politics, in the aims and workings of politics: an ultimate aim, a quest for freedom, dignity, and justice to direct the day-to-day efforts of the struggling politician.

In his *The Future of Mankind*, he uses the phrase "politics as such" in the sense of rather tough *Realpolitik*, taking it as axiomatic that the aim of politics as such is power and the increase of power—without any further aim except the personal aggrandizement of the politician. Gandhi's experience in South Africa and India did not induce him to accept this rather pessimistic view of the self-realization of politicians!

A politician cannot as such possibly have anything against violence or even large-scale terror, Jaspers maintains, except out of a purely opportunis-

tic regard for rapid success. "Politics is essentially a commerce with *Gewalt*" (Jaspers 1958: 63).⁴

Now, what is *Gewalt*? Here we touch on an important ambiguity in German philosophy of history and politics. The term oscillates in its use between the fairly general one of "power" ("being able to") and the more specific one of "violence" (or "coercive, repressive capability").

When Jaspers declares that with abstinence from *Gewalt*, "politics comes to a halt," it is clear that he has a surprisingly broad concept in mind because in the following, he suggests that only in very special circumstances have very few individuals abstained from the use of *Gewalt*:

This has actually happened in the lives of the saints who followed the Word from the Sermon on the Mount: "Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." Where such a life remains consistent it has its own dignity, however undignified it may be politically. It is a life that is heedless of either living or not living, a life indifferent to itself, existing because of chance and circumstance, entirely absorbed by something outside this world, to which the world does not matter.

(Jaspers 1961: 63)

The saint perpetually hiding himself in the desert not only renounces violence, but renounces his potential to exercise the power of influence. But a person making use of his full power to convince rather than coerce cannot be said to be "entirely absorbed by something outside this world." In the above quotation, Jaspers therefore has in mind a renunciation of power in an extremely wide sense, for instance, of "interaction with others." He does not answer the question "Is politics without violence but with exercise of power an absurdity?" Jaspers's reference to religionists who manifest extreme indifference toward political questions does not allow him to give a clear answer.

But let us look at the following syllogism: "Politics without *Gewalt* is an absurdity. Gandhi made politics. Therefore Gandhi realized the absurd."

Jaspers actually draws such a conclusion. Gandhi willed the impossible: politics by nonviolence (*Gewaltlosigkeit*). He had great success: the liberation of India. So the impossible is possible?

Jaspers's ultimate answer is no. Gandhi used *Gewalt*, not physical, but moral. He merely shifted from one form of *Gewalt* to another.

At this point, the nearest verbal equivalent of *Gewalt* is *compulsion*. According to Jaspers, Gandhi *compelled* the British to withdraw because the moral sensibility and the high moral ideals of the British made it impossible for them to resort to systematic terror against the Indians. Terror, if in sufficient doses, always succeeds politically:

Absolute rule is impossible whenever it does away with restrictions and qualms, whether in naive political action or by referring to a revealed deity. Such terror makes for submission, in which proud nations that value their freedom will perish. Nations do not react alike. (Jaspers 1961: 38)

We can no longer doubt that unlimited terror will destroy all resistance that does not consist of equal physical force. The subjection of Hungary has shown to the dumbest eye that the totalitarian Russian terror would have preferred Hungary as a desert to Hungary free. Against total violence there is no help in less violence, nor in nonviolence. (Ibid., pp. 39–40)

Apart from the implausibility of the idea of a nation being destroyed without its own help, the conclusion does not follow from the premises as far as they concern the strategies of Gandhi. The premise “Gandhi made politics” is correct, but the other premise, “Politics without *Gewalt* is an absurdity,” perhaps only holds for the very wide concept of *Gewalt*, the concept of interaction with others or influencing others. Jaspers has only referred to the fact that saints in deserts cannot make politics. There we can agree!

We must therefore formulate a second syllogism: “Politics without exercise of power *in any form* is an absurdity. Gandhi made politics without using the form of power of violence and preponderantly without even the use of a subspecies of violence, coerciveness. Therefore, Gandhi realized the absurd.”

The conclusion is clearly wrong. Only if Gandhi renounced power of *any* form does the conclusion follow. Actually, Gandhi is completely clear in his acceptance of the use of power, and the translation of *satyāgraha* into “soul force” or “moral power” strikes something essential. His stress on activism, his aim to influence, is a central feature of his teaching. An increase in self-realization involves an increase in “power to,” not “power over”—an increase in ability to reach one’s goals, not an increase of domination.

Let us then go back to Jaspers’s conception of Gandhi’s relation to the empire: Gandhi used the nonpolitical moral principle of the British to

compel them to give up India. He did not resort to this act of blackmail (*Erpressung*) consciously. On the contrary, he tried to avoid compulsion and stopped a *satyāgraha* if it developed into violence. He denounced moral coercion and tried, sometimes unsuccessfully, to eliminate moral coercion from his fasting.

The success of Gandhi's method is, according to Jaspers, relative to a set of moral values: it presupposes an opponent who would rather relinquish power than transgress his own morality. Without saying as much, however, Jaspers implies that the imperial policy of Britain was suprapolitical—that goals of justice and morality intruded into it in a decisive way:

It was only under the British, and only under their attempt at liberal rule which is unique in the history of empires, that Gandhi could succeed. Never before would such nonviolent policies have led to the same outcome, and in the future they could lead to it only under conditions analogous to British liberalism, freedom of speech, and legality. The liberation of India is far more a matter of British politics, far more the consequence of England's struggle with herself, than it is an Indian feat. (Ibid., p. 38)

Before critically discussing this point of view, we shall continue our presentation of Jaspers's view.

Extreme terror can only be met and conquered by violence (*Gewalt*). Whatever the outcome, the violent resistance against terror has a value in itself. It exemplifies the kind of sacrifice human beings must continue to perform in order to remain human. Life is not worth living when the eventual sacrifice of it is not accepted.

But bound up with the sacrifice is something timeless, hypersensory, and unconditional. Even if "useless," it is not "senseless." (Ibid., p. 43)

A lasting peace could only be achieved if the greatness, the strength, and the valor of the sacrifice hitherto shown in history by the soldier would now materialize in no lesser form. (Ibid., p. 56)

The responsible politician in an extreme situation must, according to Jaspers, use violence and order the soldier to kill. However, he cannot wholeheartedly will this killing because "thou shalt not kill," and he cannot accept the convenient distinction between private and state morals. He must,

as “ethician of responsibility” (*Verantwortungsethiker*) remain permanently in a state of immense (*ungebeuer*) strain.

Jaspers here lets his eminent compatriot Max Weber speak:

So Max Weber asks, ‘What kind of man must one be to put one’s hand in the spokes of the wheel of history?’ And he sees it as immensely moving when someone who feels responsible for the consequences—directly and wholeheartedly—at some point says: I cannot do otherwise, here I stand. For this situation must sooner or later confront all of us who are not dead inside.⁵

(Jaspers 1958: 77)

The limited aim of our comparison compels us to make a stop here. The question must be answered, How do Jaspers’s views (1) of Gandhi and Gandhi’s campaigns and (2) of *satyāgraha* compare with the views presented in the previous chapters?

It seems that for Jaspers, Gandhi’s political activity consisted only of fighting for the political independence of India and that one of his decisive weapons was that of coercive fasting. This is surely a one-sided view. In our presentation, we have stressed the other politically relevant campaigns in South Africa and elsewhere. Gandhi saw no ultimate aim in political independence from Britain, and only a fraction of his work was devoted to that end. Most of his *satyāgraha* was devoted to internal politics. On the day of independence, August 15, 1947, he, of all leaders, refused to deliver any public message. He fasted and prayed. His more important goals were as far away as ever.

It is generally doubted that Gandhi used fasting consistently in accordance with the norms of nonviolence, and Gandhi himself is one of the doubters. In certain cases, his fasting was a threat. His 1947 fast in Calcutta was of a terrible kind insofar as he pressed his followers to make the leaders of the riots sincerely promise not to continue rioting. Without this pressure, his followers would presumably not have tried so desperately to convince the rioters of the futility of rioting. Without the threat of fasting to death, rioting might have continued in East Bengal. There is, of course, no theoretical reason to believe that *only* a fast by Gandhi at that time could have elicited such a great effort to find and persuade the rioters. In this case, as in most others, we are not warranted in concluding that no other kind of action on the part of Gandhi—and Gandhi mastered a great number of different kinds of direct action—could have

brought about the same result or, even more absurdly, that nonviolence in general, apart from the very special activity of Gandhi, cannot dispense with coercive fasting.

The picture of Gandhi's activity as something that sometimes had to become coercive cannot be upheld if a more detailed account is given of the various campaigns he led during the fifty years of his struggle.

Fasting is then seen to be a minor issue. Even if the picture drawn by Jaspers is left unchallenged, the consequences for an appraisal of nonviolence as presented by norms, hypotheses, and non-Gandhian campaigns remain to be explored. After all, Gandhi erred and was sometimes led astray, as he himself conceded.

Jaspers refers in his bibliography to only two writings on Gandhi, that of the saintly Andrews (Gandhi 1930) and the learned and painstaking work of W. E. Mühlmann (1950). Andrews is highly idealistic and unworldly when considering Gandhi's relevance for fighting totalitarian terrorism, and Mühlmann is deplorably dependent on German conceptual frameworks, as is shown in the last chapter of his book, where it appears as if he suddenly forgets what he has painstakingly described in his first chapters. We may perhaps be permitted to suggest that Jaspers might have acquired a still more favorable picture of Gandhi's activity—and perhaps a somewhat less idealistic picture of the British policy of repression—if he had used British and Indian sources more extensively. One thing that Jaspers could have taken profitably from Mühlmann is the latter's translation of *himsā* to *Violenz*, a rather awkward term in German, but nevertheless a much better translation than *Gewalt*. With *Violenz*, it is difficult to maintain that politics is in its essence a commerce. The use of this term also makes meaningful and important the question of to what degree a politician can dispense with *Violenz*—that is, organized physical violence. This is clearly a different issue from the strange question of to what degree a politician can dispense with power.

When the nonviolent leader more or less *compels* an opponent to listen, using the Socratic way of not leaving anybody at peace, he still does not compel the opponent to believe in what he has to say. If the opponent, after listening (more or less against his will), arrives at the conclusion that there is, after all, some reason and justice in what is said, he does not take the act of persuasion to be an act of coercion. If I am genuinely persuaded about something, if reason or justice motivate the change in belief, the influences

leading up to my change of opinion are not, and should of course not be, classed as coercive. My change of attitude is in that case my change, proceeding from my thinking and feeling. If the opponent appeals to my ethical convictions and makes use of them in order to inspire me to change my attitudes in a crisis, this is not an encroachment on my sovereign freedom. My power (*potentia*) resides in my ability to act out of my own individuality, spontaneously and without compulsion from the persuader. My power is not that of resisting or shutting out impulses from the outside, but of choosing how to act on them. My freedom is here that of choosing with my total personality on the basis of evidence.

Gandhi admits there are momentary situations of nonviolent powerlessness, that is, in which persons confronted with a situation require a level of nonviolent power and ability that at the time they do not possess. It is then right for a person to use physical violence or other kinds of violence in order to defend what it is his deepest responsibility to defend. However, Gandhi condemns the organization and planning of future situations of helplessness. You are not allowed to declare yourself or your nation helpless next year. I think this can be generalized to all who adhere to nonviolence in group struggle. Jaspers stresses that at a given moment, there is in the world a capacity of total terror, of the complete annihilation of peoples, that if released, nonviolence could not stop. However, if we follow the injunction to seek the center of conflicts, there is, in Gandhi's view, no place for passivity until mechanized divisions cross the border, and there is no place for armament. The situation calls for training in nonviolence, not declarations of future nonviolent powerlessness.

It is scarcely controversial that the rise of Hitler and the deportation of Jews were only possible because of widespread passivity. In facing the future, there are threats of terror and organized violence from many quarters. These threats must be resisted immediately. It is during armistice, conventionally called "peace," that campaigns of nonviolence have the best chance of winning. The predominant military outlook teaches, however, that supreme sacrifice and patriotism are things that are only called for in war, not in the shorter or longer periods between wars. Jaspers directs his attention toward the sacrifice of soldiers in war but does not study similar sacrifice during so-called peace. He does not consider the possibility of creating brigades of nonviolence and other institutions that call for sacrifice between wars.

When it comes to theoretical, ultimate conclusions, there is nevertheless a great similarity of outlook between Jaspers and Gandhi.

Jaspers works with a notion of a "responsible statesman" who has goals identical to those envisaged in the metaphysics of Gandhi and who in his dealings with the opponent follows nearly identical maxims (Jaspers 1961: 326 ff.). (Such a statesman is a politician in Gandhi's terminology, but not in that of Jaspers.) When facing totalitarian dictators, the responsible statesman will communicate as Gandhi would have tried:

The statesman will address the totalitarians without replying in kind. He will not return lie for lie, abuse for abuse; rather, his very word will be truthful. He will speak calmly and simply. His words and questions and statements will unmask falsehood without having to call it false in so many words. Thus he will reach the souls of the totalitarian leaders; at first, he may well be the man they hate the most. But he will go on patiently, ceaselessly, and on the strength of an attitude that hides no mental reservations, he will not only open the eyes of more and more free peoples but will get through to the subjects of total rule. It is difficult to speak like this, not once but all the time, and to make such language ring as the irresistible voice of the world. Today we hear it on occasion, like a miraculous note that touches us and quickly fades away; it is anything but the common tongue of politicians in free countries. But if it is to grip men as the harbinger of truth, it must be heard every day.

(Jaspers 1961: 245)

Here we see expressed the norm of maximal, persistent verbal communication and the belief in the unlimited power of truth to reveal both itself and untruth (Spinoza). But acts count more, and when Jaspers lets the responsible statesman take part in the armaments race, this activity communicates a formidable threat. If the responsible statesman is quite sincere when opening negotiations, he will have to include something like the following admission: "Since I am now trying to be completely truthful, open, and sincere, it is my duty to mention that if our present negotiations should take a tragic turn, there will come a moment after which I shall have to try to deceive you as best I can. Unhappily, I cannot at that moment tell you that the period of truthfulness is over, as this would defeat my effort to deceive you. It is, however, my sincere hope that such a moment will not come."

According to the tenets of nonviolence, only very limited trust can be expected when there is a threat of violence behind the proposals made. "If our extremely modest and reasonable demands are not met, then . . ." Are

COMPARISON WITH CERTAIN OTHER PHILOSOPHIES OF CONFLICT

they really modest? Who is the judge? Behind the policy of nonviolence, there is a hypothesis of fallibility, an uncertainty regarding the reasonableness and justice of one's own claims and one's own analysis of the conflict situation.

The statesman, as conceived by Jaspers, cannot stand naked before the opponent as the leader of nonviolent struggles is supposed to do. With one hand, the "responsible statesman" grasps the hand of his opponent, but the other has a firm hold of the telephone linking him to the headquarters of psychological and physical violence, "keeping the powder dry."

One cannot have it both ways: penetrating the soul of a tough opponent by one's utmost sincerity and taking no undue risks should he not be properly impressed. There is no indication, however, that Jaspers does not see the perils of his own position or that he underestimates the difficulties of giving a reasonable, clear account of how to react to powerful terror regimes and to the existence of atomic weapons. The above abstracts do not do complete justice to his thinking. His main effort is to underline that mankind is at a turning point: either the more-than-political aims must penetrate politics or we shall all perish. Having this in mind, he is in no doubt as to where to place Gandhi:

Today we face the question of how to escape from physical force, and from war, lest we all perish by the atom bomb. Gandhi, in word and deed, gives the true answer: Only a superpolitical force can bring political salvation.

(Jaspers 1961: 39)

Appendix I

Life of Gandhi: Chronology of *Satyāgraha*

[*Editor's note:* Liberal use has been made of the chronology of *satyāgraha* in Prabhu and Rao's *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi*. The roman letters I–VI suggest the six phases of struggles.]

- 1868 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi born October 2, youngest of three sons. Father: Karamchand (Kaba) Gandhi. Mother: Putlibai, his fourth wife. Caste: Vaishya (trading caste).
 - 1876 Betrothed to Kasturbai, daughter of a merchant. Lives at Rajkot state.
 - 1883 Marries Kasturbai.
 - 1885 Father dies.
 - 1887 Matriculation.
 - 1888 Travels to London and therefore expelled from his caste. Studies jurisprudence. Lessons in dancing and music. Becomes a vegetarian. Does not experience race discrimination.
 - 1889 Rediscovered the Bhagavad Gita. Lives in increasingly spartan manner.
 - 1891 Called to the bar. Sails for India.
 - 1892 Legal draftsman in Rajkot.
- I**
- 1893 Sails for South Africa. Joins a Muslim legal firm. Exposed to crude race discrimination. Decides to stay in South Africa and fight discrimination.
 - 1894 Advocate of Supreme Court of Natal. Studies Tolstoy, Koran, Bible.

APPENDIX I. LIFE OF GANDHI: CHRONOLOGY OF SATYĀGRAHA

- 1896 Picks up his family in India. Discovered by politician and religious philosopher Gokhale, who becomes Gandhi's *guru*.
- 1897 Continues fight against race discrimination. Attacked in Durban, hospitalized.
- 1899 Organizes Indian Ambulance Corps in Boer War.
- 1901 Returns to India. Practices in Rajkot.
- 1902 Sails for South Africa. Continues fighting.
- 1904 Organizes hospital during plague. Reads Ruskin's *Unto This Last*. Founds a collective farm. Birth of "prophet" Gandhi.

II

- 1906 Supports home rule for India. Vow of chastity (*brahmacharya*) for life enhances nonpossession (*aparigraha*). Organizes first *satyāgraha* in Transvaal. Calls it passive resistance.
- 1908 Adopts term *satyāgraha*. Sentenced to prison after prosecution by General Smuts. Compromise with General Smuts results in release. Attacked and nearly killed by Pathans because of compromise with the opponent.
- 1909 Arrests and releases. Correspondence with Tolstoy.
- 1910 Tolstoy farm.
- 1913 Faces severe race discrimination. *Satyāgraha* march into Transvaal. Arrested. Released.
- 1914 Agreement with Smuts, "Indian Relief Act."
- 1915 Back to India. Continues fight for South Africa Indians.
- 1917 *Satyāgraha* on behalf of indigo plantation laborers.
- 1918 Fasting on behalf of textile workers.

III

- 1919 *Satyāgraha* against Rowlatt Bills. Arrested. Three hundred and seventy-nine killed at Amritsar. Confesses "Himalayan miscalculation" and suspends *satyāgraha*.
- 1921 Boycott of foreign cloth as part of escalating *satyāgraha* against British domination.

APPENDIX I. LIFE OF GANDHI: CHRONOLOGY OF SATYĀGRAHA

- 1922 *Satyāgraha* in Bardoli. Twenty-one members of police burned. *Satyāgraha* suspended. Sentenced to six years in prison. Writes *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*.
- 1924 Hospitalized. Released. Fast for Hindu-Muslim unity.

IV

- 1929 Declaration of complete independence for India.
- 1930 Salt march. Arrested with more than one hundred thousand others.
- 1931 Released. Irwin-Gandhi pact.
- 1932 Arrested. "Fast to death" concerning casteless people (*Harijan*).
- 1933 Starts weekly paper *Harijan*. Imprisoned. Released.
- 1934 Decides to retire from politics and devote himself to village industry.

V

- 1940 Meets Viceroy on war. Civil disobedience.
- 1942 "Quit-India" resolution. Arrested.
- 1944 Death of Kasturbai. Release. Talks with Jinnah on Pakistan.

VI

- 1946 Impending division of India and civil war between religious groups. Talks with Viceroy, Cripps, and others concerning independence and Pakistan. Riots in Calcutta.
- 1947 Tours riot-affected areas. Collaborates with new Viceroy, Mountbatten. Tries to quell riots.
- 1948 Works for settlement with Pakistan. Works for Muslim refugees. Bomb explosion at prayer meeting, January 20. Shot on way to prayer meeting, January 30.

Appendix II

Norms and Hypotheses: A Survey

First-Level Norm:

$N_1 \equiv$ Act in group struggle and act, moreover, as an autonomous person in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence (p. 57).

Second-Level Hypotheses:

$H_1 \equiv$ The character of the means used in a group struggle determines the character of the results (p. 59).

$H_2 \equiv$ In a group struggle, you can keep the goal-directed motivation and the ability to work effectively for the realization of goals stronger than the destructive, violent tendencies and the tendencies to passiveness, despondency, or destruction only by making a constructive program part of your total campaign and by giving all phases of your struggle, as far as possible, a positive character (p. 62).

$H_3 \equiv$ Short-term violence counteracts long-term universal reduction of violence (p. 63).

Second-Level Norms:

$N_2 \equiv$ Make a constructive program part of your campaign (p. 63).

$N_3 \equiv$ Never resort to violence against your opponent (p. 63).

$N_{4a} \equiv$ Choose that action or attitude that most probably reduces the tendency toward violence of all parties in a struggle (p. 64).

$N_{4b} \equiv$ Never act as a mere functionary, a representative of an institution, or an underling, but always as an autonomous, fully responsible person (p. 65).

APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

Third-Level Hypotheses:

- $H_4 \equiv$ You can give a struggle a constructive character only if you conceive it and carry it through as a struggle in favor of human beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists (positive struggle) (pp. 66–67).
- $H_5 \equiv$ It increases your understanding of the conflict, of the participants, and of your own motivation to live together with the participants, especially with those for whom you primarily fight. The most adequate form for living together is that of engaging jointly in constructive work (p. 67).
- $H_6 \equiv$ If you live together with those for whom you primarily struggle and do constructive work with them, this will create a natural basis for trust and confidence in you (p. 67).
- $H_7 \equiv$ All human beings have long-term interests in common (p. 67).
- $H_8 \equiv$ Cooperation on common goals reduces the chance that the actions and attitudes of participants in conflict will become violent (p. 68).
- $H_9 \equiv$ You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating or provoking him (p. 68).
- $H_{10} \equiv$ Thorough understanding of the relevant facts and factors increases the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign (p. 68).
- $H_{11a} \equiv$ Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your case and the plans for your struggle reduce the chances both for a nonviolent realization of the goals and for the success of future struggles (p. 68).
- $H_{11b} \equiv$ Secrecy reduces the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign (p. 69).
- $H_{12} \equiv$ You are less likely to take on a violent attitude if you make clearer to yourself the essential points in your cause and struggle (p. 69).
- $H_{13} \equiv$ Your opponent is less likely to use violent means the better he understands your conduct and your case (p. 70).

APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

- H_{14} \equiv There is a disposition in every opponent such that wholehearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favor of a good cause is able to convince him ultimately (general convincibility) (p. 70).
- H_{15} \equiv Mistrust stems from misjudgment, especially of the disposition of your opponent to answer trust with trust and mistrust with mistrust (p. 71).
- H_{16} \equiv The tendency to misjudge and misunderstand your opponent and his case in an unfavorable direction increases both his and your tendency to resort to violence (p. 71).
- H_{17} \equiv You win conclusively when you turn your opponent into a believer and active supporter of your case (p. 72).

Third-Level Norms:

- N_5 \equiv Fight antagonisms, not antagonists: conceive of your struggle and carry it through as a positive struggle in favor of human beings and certain values (p. 72).
- N_6 \equiv Live together with those for whom you struggle and do constructive work for them (p. 73).
- N_7 \equiv Try to formulate the essential interests that you and your opponent have in common and try to establish a cooperation with your opponent on this basis (p. 74).
- N_8 \equiv Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent (p. 74).
- N_9 \equiv Acquire the best possible understanding of the facts and factors relevant to the nonviolent realization of the goals of your cause (p. 74).
- N_{10} \equiv Do your utmost to present unbiased descriptions, to be in full accordance with the truth when describing individuals, groups, institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle (pp. 74–75).
- N_{11a} \equiv Do not use secret plans or moves or keep objectives secret (p. 75).
- N_{11b} \equiv Withdraw the intended victim from the wrongdoer (p. 76).
- N_{12} \equiv Announce your case and the goals of your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from nonessentials (p. 77).

APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

- $N_{13} \equiv$ Seek personal contact with your opponent and be available to him. Bring conflicting groups into personal contact (p. 77).
 $N_{14} \equiv$ Do not judge your opponent harder than yourself (p. 78).
 $N_{15} \equiv$ Trust your opponent (p. 78).
 $N_{16} \equiv$ Turn your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or exploit him (p. 78).

Fourth-Level Hypotheses:

- $H_{18} \equiv$ You provoke your opponent if you deliberately or carelessly destroy his property (p. 79).
 $H_{19} \equiv$ Adequate understanding of your opponent presupposes personal empathy (p. 79).
 $H_{20} \equiv$ Avoiding misjudging and misunderstanding your opponent and his case requires understanding him and his case (p. 79).
 $H_{21} \equiv$ If you keep in mind your own fallibility and failures, you are less likely to exaggerate those of your opponent. Opponents are then less likely to be misjudged in an unfavorable way, and their case is also less likely to be underestimated intellectually or morally (p. 79).
 $H_{22} \equiv$ Every political action, your own included, is likely to be based, in part, on mistaken views and to be carried out in an imperfect way (universal imperfection) (p. 79).
 $H_{23} \equiv$ You make it difficult for your opponent to turn and support your case if you are unwilling to compromise on nonessentials (p. 79).
 $H_{24} \equiv$ It furthers the conversion of your opponent if he understands that you are sincere (p. 79).
 $H_{25} \equiv$ The best way of convincing your opponent of your sincerity is to make sacrifices for your cause (p. 80).
 $H_{26} \equiv$ During a campaign, change of its declared objective makes it difficult for opponents to trust your sincerity (p. 80).

Fourth-Level Norms:

- $N_{17} \equiv$ Do not destroy property belonging to your opponent (p. 80).

APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

- N_{18} \equiv Cultivate personal *Einfühlung* with your opponent (p. 81).
 N_{19} \equiv Do not formulate your case, the goals of your campaign, or those of your opponent in a biased way (p. 82).
 N_{20} \equiv Try to correct bias in your opponent only insofar as it is necessary for the campaign (p. 82).
 N_{21} \equiv Keep in mind and admit your own factual and normative mistakes, and look for opportunities to correct your judgments (p. 82).
 N_{22} \equiv Always be willing to compromise on nonessentials (p. 82).
 N_{23} \equiv Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent (p. 83).
 N_{24} \equiv Be willing to make sacrifices and suffer for your cause (p. 83).
 N_{25} \equiv During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its goals wider or narrower (p. 83).

Appendix III

Key Expressions in Norms and Hypotheses

Admit failure N_{21}	Humiliation H_9, N_8
Antagonisms H_4, N_5	Imperfection H_{22}
Availability N_{13}	Living together H_5, H_6, N_6
Bias $H_{11a}, N_{10}, N_{19}, N_{20}$	Long-term H_3, H_7, N_1
Change of objective H_{26}, N_{25}	Means and ends H_1, N_1
Coercion N_{16}	Mistakes H_{22}, N_{20}, N_{21}
Common goals H_8	Mistrust H_{15}
Common interests H_7, N_7	Misunderstanding H_{16}, H_{20}
Compromise H_{23}, N_{22}	Nature, human H_{14}
Confidence H_6	Personal contact N_{13}
Constructive character $H_4, H_5,$ H_6, N_6	Positive H_2, H_4, N_2, N_5
Constructive program H_2, N_2	Property destruction H_{18}, N_{17}
Constructive work H_5, H_6, N_6	Provocation H_9, H_{18}, N_8
Contact N_{13}	Sabotage $H_{18}, H_{23}, H_{25}, N_{17}$
Conversion H_{17}, H_{24}, N_{16}	Sacrifice H_{25}, N_{24}
Convincibility, general H_{14}	Secrecy H_{11b}, N_{11a}
Cooperation H_8, N_7	Sincerity H_{24}, H_{25}, H_{26}
Destruction of property H_{18}, N_{17}	Suffering N_{24}
Distortion H_{11a}	Support from opponent $H_{17}, H_{23},$ H_{24}, H_{25}, N_{16}
<i>Einfühlung</i> H_{19}, N_{18}	Truthful description N_{10}
Ends and means H_1, N_1	Trust $H_6, H_{15}, H_{26}, N_{15}$
Essentials $H_{12}, H_{23}, N_7, N_{12}, N_{22}$	Unbiased description N_{10}
Explicitness $H_{20}, H_{24}, N_9, N_{12}$	Understanding $H_5, H_{10}, H_{13}, H_{19},$ H_{20}, H_{24}, N_9
Exploit a weakness N_{23}	Violence H_9, H_{16}, N_3
Facts H_{10}, N_9	Violence, reduction of H_3, N_1, N_{4a}
Fallibility and failures H_{21}, N_{20}, N_{21}	Violence, short-term H_3
Goodness of human nature H_{14}	Withdrawal N_{11b}
Hard judgment N_{14}	

Notes

Chapter I: Gandhi's Experiments

1. [Editor's note: A source for this quote did not appear in the original edition of this work. The editor has been unable to find the correct source; however, a corroborating assessment of Gandhi's view on atheism appears in *Young India* 5.3.1925.]
2. My refusal to judge Gandhi's personal level of morality does not mean that I consider that level low. I am against such judgments for reasons best formulated by S. Kierkegaard in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1941).
3. Compare the two opposing trends in crowd psychology led, respectively, by Gustave Le Bon and F. H. Allport. Le Bon (1934; originally 1895) proposed that a crowd's conduct and psychology differ essentially from the individual's. Among his pupils, W. D. Scott (1907) stressed that a crowd has a high emotional level and lacks the feeling of responsibility, and E. O. Martin (1920) described the psychopathic character a crowd can display in giving vent to its repressed impulses to aggression and sadism. William McDougall (1920) and later psychologists have done something to correct this view, Le Bon's account being shown to apply only to spontaneously formed groups that have no firm inner organization. McDougall grants that groups may act recklessly and in a primitive and uncontrolled way, but that there are conditions under which they may also behave rationally and display considerable morale and unselfishness. In opposition to Le Bon's school, Allport (1924: 295) proposed that individuals in crowds acted as though they were alone, "only more so." Allport does not accept Le Bon's claim that a "crowd mind," with its own characteristics, is formed.
4. Accounts of this episode have been chronicled in many places (Tendulkar 1951, vol. 1: 146–48; Gandhi 1950: 325; Dhawan 1946: 201).
5. This, of course, is not to say that the amount of energy that an individual is actually able to put into realizing a moral principle is a direct measure of moral worth. A man of quite ordinary ability, placed in an environment that restricts his development, perhaps wasted by disease and with a number of undeserved disabilities, is not thereby prevented from reaching as great a level of

moral excellence as a man who is brilliantly endowed in every way. Very likely, however, the former individual will be far less effectual, and the actual energy of his attempt to comply with a moral principle may never be sufficient to give rise to any significant result (characters in Graham Greene's novels might be mentioned here). If we are not to confuse moral worth with greatness, with what Kierkegaard called "the world-historical," the weak must be put on an equal footing with the mighty.

Chapter II: The Metaphysics of *Satyāgraha*

1. See also D. Bonhoeffer's (1954) *Prisoner for God* and other writings referred to in John A. T. Robinson (1963). They make important reading for the many who find traditional religion and spirituality completely meaningless. A clear, but narrow criticism of Tillich's conceptualizations is found in A. Edward (1970).
2. See note 1, chapter 1.
3. Cf., for instance, Bonhoeffer's distinction between Gospel and Christianity in his *Prisoner for God* (1954).
4. From a speech of Gandhiji before a gathering of conscientious objectors in Villeneuve in Switzerland that appeared in Desai's *Letter from Europe*.
5. In order to understand the saying that nothing is, except God, one must take into account the usual distinction between "to be" and "to exist." God *is*; he does not *exist* in certain philosophical senses. Gandhi takes changelessness as a criterion of (real) being (*Young India* 11.10.1928: 340–41; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 47–48): "I do dimly perceive that whilst everything around me is ever-changing, ever-dying, there is underlying all that change a Living Power that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves, and re-creates. That informing Power or Spirit is God. And since nothing else I see merely through the senses can or will persist, He alone is." Gandhi's terminology conforms in many places with the religious poem Bhagavad Gita as, for example, in 17.26–17.28 of that work:

(26) The word sat is employed in the sense of reality and goodness; and so also, O Pārtha (Arjuna), the word sat is used for praiseworthy action.

(27) Steadfastness in sacrifice, penance, and gift giving is also called sat, and so any action for such purposes is also called sat.

(28) Whatever offering or gift is made, whatever penance is performed, whatever rite is observed, without faith, it is called asat. O Pārtha (Arjuna); it is of no account hereafter or here.

Regarding this last saying, one is reminded of Kierkegaard's distinction between factual truth and "being in Truth." Whoever prays with inwardness and passion is in Truth even when factually or theologically wrong about the object of prayer, whereas whoever prays without this is in Falsity even if praying to the Christian God.

6. E.g.: “Whatever difficulties we encounter, whatever apparent reverses we sustain, we may not give up the quest for Truth which alone is, being God Himself” (Gandhi 1957: chap. 2). Here the ontological aspect is dominant, but the pragmatic is also present: doing the right things.
7. One must, I think, be permitted to assert that Gandhi often violated his own principles of freedom of conscience. As we have noted, his family life shows an authoritarian attitude with imposition of his own standards of conduct on his wife and sons. He admitted this himself. But the principles have a standing in Indian and other traditions that make Gandhi’s personal failures of little relevance.
8. Pyarelal is here perhaps slightly rhetorical. Gandhi rarely, but sometimes, uses harsh terms that seem to be intended to be applied to persons, not only to their actions. See the quotation from his autobiography (Gandhi 1948: 507): “. . . the planters engineered against me a poisonous agitation.” This occurrence is characteristically associated with a symptom of self-righteousness: “. . . my insistence on truth, even to the minutest detail. . . .”
9. Except for Gandhi himself, there is scarcely anyone who does not consider him a *karmayogin*. “Gandhiji was a Karmayogi par excellence” (Gandhi 1961, vol. 3: viii).
10. After outlining the virtues of the devotee and the selfless actor, he says (Desai 1946: 130): “We thus see that to be a real devotee is to realize oneself.”
11. On Gandhi’s relation to the Bhagavad Gita and the Advaita Vedānta, see Desai (1946), *passim*.
12. The last three lines of the quotation are taken from Vedānta-Sūtras, I, 3.19 (Badarayana 1962, vol. 34: 187).
13. We are here at the source of the distinction between *mahāyāna* and *hināyāna*, the two Buddhist movements, the latter asserting the possibility of individual salvation, the former denying it. Gandhi’s Hinduism is heavily influenced by Buddhism. Indeed, he seems simply to regard reformed Hinduism as embracing the teachings of Buddha.
14. The following quotations are all to be found in the collections of Prabhu and Rao (1967) and of Gandhi (1961) under “nonviolence” and related headings.
15. Concerning Islam, Gandhi says: “I would like to say that I claim to have studied the life of the Prophet and the Koran as a detached student of religions. And I have come to the conclusion that the teaching of the Koran is essentially in favour of nonviolence” (*Harizan* 13.7.1940: 193; quoted in Gandhi 1961, vol. 3: 349). Regarding the Muslim practice of nonviolence, Gandhi would refer to the formidable fighter for India’s freedom, and later against Pakistan’s dictatorship, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Kahn! The followers of the ancient Vedic religion are called Sanatanists.

16. Cf. “But it is impossible for us to realize perfect Truth . . .” (Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 25), “. . . how is one to realize this Truth . . .,” “This freedom from all attachment is the realization of God as Truth” (Gandhi 1957: chap. 2), “Man’s ultimate aim is the realization of God” (quoted in Gandhi 1965: 250). Gandhi did not strive after two different things, Self-realization and the realization of God! The two must be thought of as identical in extension, if not in both extension and intension.
17. Cf. “The existence of the body is possible only by reason of the ego. The complete annihilation of the body is salvation (or self-realization). He who has completely destroyed the ‘ego’ becomes an embodiment of Truth. There is no harm in calling him even God” (Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 15; *Harizan* 27.11.1949: 340). See also the second quotation in the previous note, and “These productions of man’s Art have their value only in so far as they help the soul onward towards self-realization” (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 55).
18. In this respect, Gandhi sides with *mahāyāna* Buddhism rather than *hināyāna*. The “degree of self-realization” can be equated with degree of freedom, power, “being in itself,” substantiality, and nearness to God in Spinoza’s *Ethics* (see Naess 1969).

Chapter III: Norms and Hypotheses of Gandhian Ethics and Strategy of Group Struggle

1. By *norm*, we mean in this chapter the same as “not completely instrumental norm.” Something recommended purely and completely as a means to something else is not characteristic of a norm in our terminology. And the goal or aim must itself have a “normative plus” component: it must itself be required to be realized—if not under any circumstances, at least under the circumstances in which the means are recommended.
2. Sometimes what Gandhi says, rather than what he does, has determined our systematization. Gandhi himself pointed out weaknesses, mistakes in his political activities, and errors in his campaigns and in his decisions, more generally. Then, too, we have ourselves certain doubts about his activities that are not aired by the Mahatma himself. An important instance: we do not think he contacted the Moslem League (with Jinnah as its leader) as energetically as his norms required. In such cases, our formulations adapt themselves to Gandhi’s sayings rather than to a historically adequate account of what he did.

Chapter IV: Nonviolence and the “New Violence”

1. For Gandhi’s views on exploitation as violence see, e.g., *Harizan* 1.9.1940: 271–72; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 264–66.
2. Absence of retaliation or even masochistic provocation of violence from the opponent is, of course, also taken to be the essence of nonviolence by people

who have nothing to do with Black Power. On receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Martin Luther King, Jr. was addressed in the following words: “The name of Martin Luther King will live because of the way he conducted his fight. He has through this given life to the words that were spoken to mankind. If somebody hits your right cheek, turn also the other towards him. 5,000 Negroes followed this commandment in December 1955, and won” (from the translation of G. Jahn’s speech, 10.12.1964). Absence of retaliation goes against the norms of nonviolence. They require only absence of retaliation in kind, that is, absence of violence in retaliation, not absence of response — absence of communication with the opponent when he expects and waits for a response.

3. Black-owned “soul banks” are now [in 1969] fairly common in the United States. They “demonstrate that the Negro doesn’t want everything handed to him” (a black banker quoted in *Time* 23.2.1969). However, they also demonstrate a belief in reform rather than revolution.

Chapter V: Comparison with Certain Other Philosophies of Conflict

1. Personal communication from Ramachandra Prabhu. According to this source, the young Gandhi astonished his followers by his optimism and conservatism on this topic, whereas the old Gandhi astonished them by his radical rejection.
2. For a detailed, nonliteral interpretation of *Zarathustra*, see Messer (1922).
3. Tolstoy’s letter, with an introduction by Gandhi, appears in *Tolstoy and Gandhi* (Nag 1950: 86).
4. Other quotations are from this book or from the English translation, *The Future of Mankind* (Jaspers 1961). Just before he died (February 1969), Jaspers wrote a short article on Gandhi, published in *Unesco Courier* (October 1969: 26). It contains no essentially different formulations from the above works.
5. The quotation was not translated in the English edition, the original German follows: Max Weber fragt daher, “was für ein Mensch man sein muss, um seine Hand in die Speichen des Rades der Geschichte legen zu dürfen?” Und er erfährt es als “unermesslich erschütternd,” wenn ein Mensch, der die Verantwortung für die Folgen real und mit voller Seele empfindet, an irgendeinem Punkte sagt: Ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich. Denn diese Lage muss freilich für jeden von uns, der nicht innerlich tot ist, irgendwann eintreten können.

References

Books or articles appearing in the *Selected Works of Arne Naess* are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

- Allport, Floyd H. 1924. *Social Psychology*. New York: Houghton.
- Badaraya. 1962. *The Vedānta-Sūtras*, vol. 1, translated by George Thibaut. New York: Dover.
- Bhagavadgita, The*. 1956. With English translation by S. Radhakrishnan. Bombay: Allen and Unwin.
- Bondurant, Joan V. 1958. *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. 1954. *Prisoner for God: Letters and Papers from Prison*, edited by Eberhard Bethge and translated by Reginald H. Fuller. New York: Macmillan.
- Bose, Nirmal K. 1947. *Studies in Gandhism*, 2d ed. Calcutta: India Associated Publishing Co.
- . 1948, 1957. *Selections from Gandbi*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1953. *My Days with Gandbi*. Calcutta: Nishana.
- Datta, Dharendra M. 1953. *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandbi*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Davis, Harry R., and Robert C. Good, eds. 1960. *Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics*. New York: Scribner.
- Desai, Mahadev. 1946. *The Gospel of Selfless Action, or, the Gita According to Gandbi*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Dhawan, Gopi N. 1946. *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandbi*. Bombay: Popular Book Depot (2d rev. ed., Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1951).
- Diwakar, Ranganath R. 1946. *Satyāgraha: The Power of Truth*. Bombay: Hind Kitabs.

REFERENCES

- Edward, A. 1970. "Professor Tillich's confusions." In *Philosophy of Religion*, edited by Steven M. Cahn. New York: Harper and Row.
- Erikson, Erik H. 1969. *Gandhi's Truth on the Origins of Militant Nonviolence*. New York: Norton.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1966. *The Wretched of the Earth*, translated from the French by Constance Farrington with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre. New York: Grove Press (London: Penguin).
- Fischer, Louis. 1943. *A Week with Gandhi*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- . 1950. *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*. New York: Harper (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951). Abridged as *Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World*. New York: Signet Key Book (1954).
- Galtung, Johan. 1992. *The Way Is the Goal: Gandhi Today*. Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidyarthi.
- Gandhi, Mahatma. 1930. *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, edited by Charles F. Andrews. London: Allen and Unwin.
- . 1941, 1945. *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1942, 1944. *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. 1. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1948. *Gandhi's Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, translated by Mahadev Desai. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press (Ahmedabad: Navajivan 1927–29).
- . 1949a. *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. 2. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1949b. *For Pacifists*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1950. *Satyagraha in South Africa*, revised 2d ed., translated by Valji G. Desai. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1951a. *Satyagraha: Non-violent Resistance*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1951b. *Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, compiled and with an introduction by Ronald Duncan. Boston: Beacon Press (London: Faber and Faber).
- . 1951c. *Towards Non-violent Socialism*, edited by Bharatan Kumarappa. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1957. *From Yeravda Mandir: Ashram Observances*, translated by Valji G. Desai. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1958–84. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (1884–1948)*, 90 vols. New Delhi: Publications Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
- . 1959. *Ashram Observances in Action*, translated by Valji G. Desai. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.

REFERENCES

- . 1960. *My Non-violence*, compiled and edited by Sailesh Kumar Bandopadhyaya. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1961. *In Search of the Supreme*, 3 vols., edited by V. B. Kher. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1965. *Glorious Thoughts of Gandhi*, compiled by N. B. Sen. New Delhi: New Book Society of India.
- . 1968. *A Thought for the Day*, compiled and translated by Anand T. Hingorani. New Delhi: Publications Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
- Guru, Nataraja, trans. 1961. *The Bhagavadgita*. Bombay and New York: Asia Publication House.
- Harijan*. Weekly paper, started 11.2.1933. Published in Poona, later in Ahmedabad. Edited chiefly by Gandhi. An important source, but difficult to obtain.
- Hingorani, A. T., ed. 1968. *A Thought for the Day*. New Delhi: Ministry of Education.
- Hind Swaraj* or Indian Home Rule. 1958. Edited by Mahatma Gandhi. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Hygen, Johan. 1954. *Albert Schweitzers tanker om kulturen*. Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke.
- Jaspers, Karl. 1958. *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen*. München: Piper. Translated as *The Future of Mankind* by E. B. Ashton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1961).
- . 1969. "One of Karl Jaspers' last commentaries: Gandhiji." *Unesco Courier*.
- Kabir, H., ed. 1953. *Gandhian Outlook and Techniques*. New Delhi: Ministry of Education.
- Khosla, Gopal D. 1963. *The Murder of the Mahatma*. London: Chatto and Windus.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1967. *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?* New York: Harper and Row.
- Klitgaard, Robert E. 1971. "Gandhi's non-violence as a tactic." *Journal of Peace Research* 2: 143.
- Le Bon, Gustave, and F. H. Allport. 1934 (originally 1895). *Psychologie des Foules*. Paris: F. Alcan. Translated as *The Crowd*. New York: Viking (1960).
- Majumdar, S. K. 1966. *Jinnab and Gandhi*. Calcutta: Mukhapadhyay.
- Malcolm X. 1965. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, with the assistance of Alex Haley. New York: Grove Press.
- Martin, Everett O. 1920. *The Behavior of Crowds*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

REFERENCES

- Mascaró, Juan, trans. 1962. *The Bhagavad Gita*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Mashruwala, Kishorlal G. 1951. *Gandhi and Marx*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- McDougall, William. 1920. *The Group Mind*. Cambridge: The University Press.
- Messer, August. 1922. *Erläuterungen zu Nietzsches Zarathustra*. Stuttgart: Strecker und Schroder.
- Monier-Williams, Monier. 1970. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, new ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Naess used this work to assess the meaning of words of Sanskrit origin used by Gandhi.
- Mühlmann, Wilhelm E. 1950. *Mahatma Gandhi. Der Mann, sein Werk und seine Wirkung*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.
- Naess, Arne. 1969. "Freedom, emotion and self-subsistence." *Inquiry* 12 (enlarged edition, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1975 [SWAN VI]).
- . 1965. *Gandhi and the Nuclear Age*. Totowa, NJ: The Bedminster Press.
- Nag, Kalidas. 1950. *Tolstoy and Gandhi*. Patna: Pustak Bhandar.
- Nicolas, Marius P. 1938. *From Nietzsche Down to Hitler*. London: W. Hodge and Company.
- Nygren, Anders. 1942. "Luther och staten." *Svensk Tidsskrift*.
- Organ, Troy W. 1964. *The Self in Indian Philosophy*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Paullin, Theodore. 1944. *Introduction to Non-Violence*. Philadelphia: The Pacifist Research Bureau.
- Prabhu, Ramachandra K., and U. R. Rao, eds. 1967. *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi*, 2d ed., revised and enlarged. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Pyarelal, N. 1932. *The Epic Fast*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1956–58. *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*, 2 vols. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Robinson, John A. T. 1963. *Honest to God*. London: SCM Press (Philadelphia: Westminster Press).
- Rolland, Romain. 1924. *Mahatma Gandhi: The Man Who Became One with the Universal Being*. New York and London: Century.
- Scott, Walter D. 1907. *The Psychology of Public Speaking*. Philadelphia: Pearson Bros.
- Sharp, Gene. 1960. *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Shcherbaskoi, Fedor I. 1965. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Shridharani, Krishnalal. 1962. *War Without Violence*. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.

REFERENCES

- Tendulkar, Dinanath G. 1951–54. *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*, 8 vols. Bombay: Publications Division of the Ministry of Information with Jhaveri and Tendulkar.
- Tillich, Paul. 1948. *The Shaking of the Foundations*. New York: Scribner's Sons.
- Young India*. English weekly journal edited by Gandhi from 8.10.1919 to February 1932 in Ahmedabad. An important source, but difficult to obtain (republished in 13 vols., Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1981).
- Zaehner, R. C. 1969. *The Bhagavad Gita*, with commentary based on the original sources. London: Oxford University Press.
- Zimmer, Heinrich. 1961. *Philosophies of India*, edited by Joseph Campbell. Cleveland: World Publishing.

Other Works

- Bose, Nirmal K. 1957. *Selections from Gandhi*, 2d ed. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles V. Hamilton. 1967. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*. New York: Random House.
- Förster-Nietzsche, Elizabeth. 1912–15. *The life of Nietzsche*, 2 vols., translated by Anthony M. Ludovici. New York: Sturgis and Walton.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, translated by W. Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Luther, Martin. 1527. *Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können* (Whether the soldier can be considered a Christian). Nurnberg: Jobst Gutknecht.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1910–11. *Human All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, 2 vols., translated by Helen Zimmern (vol. 1) and Paul V. Cohn (vol. 2). Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis.
- . 1960. *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Stuttgart: A. Kroner.
- Reyburn, Hugh A. 1948. *Nietzsche: The Story of a Human Philosopher*, in collaboration with H. E. Hinderks and J. G. Taylor. London: Macmillan.
- Roos, Carl. 1940. *Nietzsche und das Labyrinth*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
- Roy, Kshitish, ed. 1949. *Gandhi Memorial Peace Number*. Santiniketar: Prabhatkumar Mukhopadhyaya.

Index

- action
 - direct actions, 84, 107
 - norms of Gandhian ethics and, 56–57, 59, 84, 116–18
 - selfless, 33–34, 37, 38, 167n8
 - self-respect created by, 115
- Advaita Vedānta, 34, 167n10, 167n11
- abhiprā*, 38–44
 - in Bhagavad Gita, 31, 38
 - compromise and, 82–83
 - in conceptual reconstruction, 42–43, 47
 - conversion of opponent and, 36, 78
 - toward criminals, 36, 73
 - degrees of, 40–42, 61, 93
 - Gandhi's striving for, 36
 - secrecy and, 75–76
 - self-realization and, 47, 61
 - Truth and, 20, 45–46, 47
 - See also nonviolence
- Ahlberg, A., 139
- Allport, Floyd H., 165n3
- amānitva*, 32
- Andrews, Charles F., 149
- antagonisms, not antagonists
 - Gandhi's view, 22, 66–67, 72–73, 129, 141–42
 - in Marxism, 107
 - in New Violence, 100, 129
 - Tolstoy's view, 141
- aparigraha*, 36
- atheism, 2, 16, 17, 165n1
- Ātman*, 34–35
- ātman*, 32
- autonomy, 57, 65–66, 135
- axiological approach, 121–22
- Badaraya, 167n11
- being, 19, 166n4, 167n5, 168n17
- Bhagavad Gita
 - acognitive inspiration from, 17
 - abhiprā* in, 31, 38
 - Gandhi's enemies and, 26–27, 81
 - Gandhi's relation to, 26, 167n10
 - on humility, 31–32
 - on sacrifice, 51, 80, 166n4
 - sat* in, 166n4
 - self-realization and, 28, 29, 32, 46
 - on truth, 22–23
- bias
 - vs. *Einfühlung* toward opponent, 81
 - in presenting case, 68, 74–75, 82, 104
- Black Power, 111–12, 113, 114, 115, 116, 168n2
- Bondaref, T. M., 51
- Bondurant, Joan V., 89–90, 91, 117, 118, 128
- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 166n1, 166n2
- Bose, Nirmal K., 74, 83, 110, 128
- Bradley, F. H., 49
- brahmacharya*
 - as celibacy, 36
 - as mental discipline, 105
- Brahman*, 34
- Buddha, 2, 63
- Buddhism, 30, 167n12, 168n17
- campaigns vs. movements, 84
- Carmichael, Stokely, 98, 123
- caste system, 134, 169n1
 - untouchables, 67, 84, 86, 91, 123
- celibacy, 36
- center of conflict, seeking, 59, 101, 107, 150
- change of objective, 80, 83–84
 - in salt campaign, 128
- Christianity
 - Bonhoeffer on, 166n2
 - Gandhi and, 2, 44
 - Kierkegaard and, 139, 166n4
 - Luther on, 132, 134, 136–37
 - Nietzsche and, 139

INDEX

- Christianity (*continued*)
 nonviolence and, 44, 137–38
 Schweitzer on, 136
- civil disobedience
 constructive programs and, 62, 85–86
 Himalayan miscalculation and, 25
 during World War II, 88
- coercion
 fasting as, 78–79, 91–92, 147, 148–49
 in imperfect *satyāgraha*, 91–92, 101
 norm about, 78–79
 vs. persuasion, 78, 89–92, 149–50
 as violence, 53, 79, 97, 106
- colonialism, 97
 Fanon on, 98–99, 100–101, 103–04, 114–15
See also India
- common goals, 66, 68, 72
- common interests, 67, 74, 100–101, 129
- compromise
 on nonessentials, 70, 72, 79, 82–83, 143
 rejection of
 by “new violence,” 97
 by Tolstoy, 143
 in student revolt, 105
- conscience
 plurality of, 21–22, 23, 27, 74, 167n6
See also inner voice
- Constructive Programme*, 86
- constructive programs, 85–87, 123–25
 New Violence and, 115–16, 123, 129, 169n3
 norms and hypotheses about, 62–63, 66–67, 72–73
- conversion of opponent, 72, 78, 79–80
 vs. coercion, 91
 vs. surrender, 88
- convincibility of opponent, 66, 70–71, 72, 136
 denied in fanonized struggle, 105
- cooperation, 68, 72, 74
 Tolstoy vs. Gandhi on, 141, 143
- courage, 40, 44, 71, 110–12
 of violent people, 143–44
See also fearlessness
- cowardice, 40, 44, 111–12, 121–22, 144
- criminals, 36, 73, 76, 77, 138
- crowd psychology. *See* mass psychology
- Davis, Harry R., 138
- decentralization, lxviii, 36, 92, 109
- democratic leadership, 69
- democratic societies, lxvii, 90, 92
- deontological approach, 121–22
- Desai, Mahadev, 28, 46, 54, 166n3, 167n9, 167n10
- destruction. *See* property, destruction of
- detachment, 29–30, 37, 44, 79
- devotion, 29–30, 80, 167n9
- Dhawan, Gopi N., 82, 90, 92, 165n4
- direct actions
 within campaigns, 84
 radicalizing effect of, 107
- distortion. *See* bias, in presenting case
- Dirwakar, Ranganath R., 86
- domination. *See* exploitation
- duties vs. rights, 7
- E*, 54–57, 89
See also ethics of group struggle; hypotheses; norms
- **E* (metaphysical systematization), 48–51, 61, 89, 92
 H_2 and, 56
 N_1 and, 57, 58, 64–65
- ecology movement, lxviii, 41–42
- economics
 moral values and, 20
 structural violence and, 106
- Edward, A., 166n1
- egotism, 30–31, 32–33, 34, 35, 37–38, 168n16
 Nietzsche vs. Gandhi on, 140–41
- Einfühlung* (empathy), 79, 81
- Einstein, Albert, 1
- empathy (*Einfühlung*), 79, 81
- ends and means. *See* means and ends
- enemy. *See* opponent
- epoché* (suspension of judgment), 26
- Erasmus, Luther condemned by, 134
- Erikson, Erik H., 14, 115
- essentials
 clarification of, 69–70, 77
 in common with opponent, 74
 compromise on nonessentials, 70, 72, 79, 82–83, 143
- ethics of group struggle
ahimsā as designation for, 39
 humility in, 32
 systematizations of
 aims of system, 42–43, 94–95
 deontological character, 121–22
 general ethics and, 5–6, 55
 graphical presentation, 48–51
 limits of application, 12–13
 logical status, 63–64

INDEX

- metaphysical (*E), 48–51, 56, 57, 58, 61, 64–65, 89, 92
- moral judgments and, 135
- positive character of, 53, 55–56
- primary sources, 53–54, 55, 168n2
- pyramidal structure, 56–58
- satyāgraha* conforming to, 92–95, 116–19, 128
- scope, 54–55
- terminology, 46–47, 53, 168n1
- See also* hypotheses; norms
- euthanasia, 41
- evil
 - Gandhi's views, 53, 81–82
 - vs. Luther's, 134
 - vs. Tolstoy's, 143
 - Luther's views, 131–33, 134
 - New Violence and, 98, 99
- experiments with nonviolence, 6–11, 58, 165n4
- explicitness, 53, 77
- exploitation
 - exploiter as evil, 98
 - exploiter harmed by, 64
 - of opponent, 78
 - of opponent's weakness, 83, 87–89
 - selfless action for the exploited, 38
 - as violence, 42, 47, 53, 64, 106, 129, 168n1
 - structural, 47, 97–98, 106, 122
- *F, 48, 50
- fallibility
 - Gandhi on, 10, 21–27
 - his own fallibility, 1, 2–4, 24–25, 28
 - humility and, 31
 - nonviolence and, 21, 25–26, 46, 152
 - in systematizations of ethics, 50, 79, 82
- Fanon, Frantz
 - on colonialism, 98–99, 100–101, 103–04, 114–15
 - on journalists, 102
 - utilitarianism of, 56, 103–04
- fanonization, 99, 105
- fasting, 4, 78–79, 91–92, 147, 148–49
- fearlessness, 44, 78, 110–12, 121–22
 - Nietzsche and, 141
 - See also* courage
- Fischer, Louis, 24, 82, 128
- forgiveness, 24
- Förster-Nietzsche, Elizabeth, 139
- freedom
 - self-realization and, 168n17
 - svarāj* (swara) as, 62, 86
- game theory, 119
- Gandhi, Mahatma
 - alternative philosophies and
 - Jaspers, 144–52, 169n4
 - Luther, 131, 134–36, 137, 138
 - Nietzsche, 138–41
 - Tolstoy, 141–44, 169n3
 - asceticism of, 4
 - assassination, 18, 27, 81
 - attempted assassination, 81, 144
 - caste system and, 134, 169n1
 - untouchables, 67, 84, 86, 91, 123
 - chronology of life, 153–55
 - democracy envisioned by, 90, 92
 - essential aspect of teachings, 5–7
 - ethics of group struggle
 - abimsā* as designation for, 39
 - humility in, 32
 - systematizations of, 5–6, 12–13, 42–43, 46–95, 116–19, 121–22, 128, 135, 168n1, 168n2
 - experiments with nonviolence, 6–11, 58, 165n4
 - on fallibility, 10, 21–27
 - his own, 1, 2–4, 24–25, 28
 - family life, 1–2, 167n6
 - glorification by supporters, 2–4
 - Hindu opposition to, 16, 27, 81, 144
 - influence on masses, 108, 113
 - as *karmayogin*, 28–29, 34, 59, 142, 167n8
 - metaphysics of, 15–51, 166n3, 166n4, 167n5, 167n9, 167n13, 167n14, 168n15, 168n16, 168n17
 - moral character of, 1–5, 9–10, 165n2
 - self-righteousness, 167n7
 - striving for virtues, 36
- New Violence vs.
 - constructive programs, 115–16, 123–28
 - ethical norms, 99–105
 - metaphysical concepts, 98–99
 - revolutionary character, 97–98, 107
 - satyāgraha* misunderstood, 117
 - self-respect and, 108–16
 - similarities, 106–08, 168n1
 - summary, 128–29
- pragmatism of, 11–14, 16, 29
 - about Truth, 20, 103, 167n5
- psychological motivations of, 14

INDEX

- Gandhi, Mahatma (*continued*)
 religious beliefs of, 2, 15–19, 134, 165n1, 167n10, 167n12
 as revolutionary, 76, 97–98, 107, 134
 sense of humor, 11
 violence justified by, 25–26, 71, 111, 112–13, 119–22, 150
- Gandhi, Manilal (son), 126
- Gewalt*, 145–46, 147, 149
- Ghenghis Khan, 63
- goals
 change in, 80, 83–84
 in salt campaign, 128
 common, 66, 68, 72
 constructive programs and, 85
 destructive, 55–56
 explicitness about, 77
- God
 Gandhi's concept, 15–19
 atheism and, 2, 16, 17, 165n1
 being and, 166n4, 167n5
 Self and, 34–35
 self-realization and, 27–28, 32, 35, 46–47, 61, 168n15, 168n16
 in systematization of ethics, 49
 Truth and, 18–19, 26, 27–28
 Luther's concept, 131–34
 Spinoza's concept, 19, 168n17
 Tillich's concept, 15–16
- Godse, Nathuram, 27
- Goebbels, Joseph, 104
- Good, Robert C., 138
- gondas*, 73, 76, 77
See also criminals
- "Gora" (G. Ramachandra Rao), 16
- Greene, Graham, 165n5
- group struggle. *See* ethics of group struggle
- Guru, Nataraja, 32
- Hamilton, Charles V., 98, 123
- Harijan*, 54, 123
- Hegel, Georg, 64
- Himalayan miscalculation, 4, 25
- himṣā*, 38–43
 in conceptual reconstruction, 47
 German translations of, 149
See also violence
- Hinduism
 Advaita Vedānta, 34, 167n10, 167n11
 Gandhi as traitor to, 16, 27, 81, 144
 Gandhi's beliefs, 2, 15, 17, 18
- Buddhism and, 2, 167n12
 on purification of Hinduism, 134
- Muslims vs. Hindus, 62, 64, 67, 120
- Tolstoy on, 142
- See also* Bhagavad Gita
- Hitler, Adolf, 11, 63, 70, 71, 144, 150
- Hobbes, Thomas, 54
- Hume, David, 13
- humiliation
 by opponent, 112–13
 of opponent, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101
- humility, 30–33
- Hygen, Johan, 136
- hypotheses
 descriptive character of, 13–14, 49
 empirical character of, 58
 exceptions to, 93
 fourth-level, 79–80
 Gandhi's psychology and, 14
 key expressions in, 163
 levels of, defined, 57
 of metaphysical systematization, 48–51, 56, 58, 65
 New Violence and, 99–105
satyāgraha conforming to, 12–13, 116–19
 second-level, 59–63, 66
 selection of, 55–57, 168n2
 survey of, 157–61
 third-level, 66–72
See also ethics of group struggle
- imperfection. *See* fallibility; mistakes
- imprisonment, institution of
 Gandhi rejects, 135, 143
 Tolstoy rejects, 142
- India
 crisis of 1947, 21
 Gandhi's influence on masses, 108, 113
 independence
 campaigns during World War II, 24, 88–89, 107
 constructive programs and, 62, 87
 Jaspers on, 145, 146–47, 148–49
 readiness of masses for, 108
 for sake of British also, 64
 Khadi movement, 108–09, 123
 politicians and Gandhi, 108, 120
 religious conflicts, 62, 64, 67, 84, 120
 salt campaign, 72–73, 84, 87, 109–10, 124–28
- injury
 to opponent, 25

INDEX

- vs. violence, 93–94
- inner voice
 - militant nonviolence and, 98
 - truth and, 20, 22, 23
 - See also* conscience
- Islam
 - Gandhi and, 2, 44, 167n14
 - Hindus vs. Muslims, 62, 64, 67, 120
- Jahn, G., 169n2
- Jaspers, Karl, 144–52, 169n4
- Jesus, 2
- Jinnah, 77–78, 81, 155, 168n2
- jīva*, 34
- journalists, 102
- Kahn, Abdul Ghaffar, 103, 167n14
- Kant, Immanuel, 13
- karmayogin*, 28–29, 34, 59, 142, 167n8
- Khadi movement, 108–09, 123
- Kierkegaard, Søren, 23, 139, 165n2, 165n5, 166n4
- killing, justification of
 - by Fanon, 99, 115
 - Gandhian ethics and, 57, 71
 - Indian moral tradition and, 6
 - by Jaspers, 147–48
 - by Luther, 133
 - See also* war
- King, Martin Luther, Jr.
 - patience and, 107
 - retaliation and, 168n2
 - self-respect and, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115
 - violence and, 116, 117
- Klitgaard, Robert E., 119
- Koestler, Arthur, 109
- Le Bon, Gustave, 165n3
- Lenin, 2, 143
- living together, 67, 73
- love
 - abhimāsa*, 82
 - God as, 18
 - justice and, 133–34, 135
 - Luther on, 133–34
 - nonviolence as, 61
 - Tolstoy on, 142–43
 - violence motivated by, 144
- Luther, Martin, 98, 131–38
- mahātman*, 4
- Majumdar, S. K., 77
- Malcolm X, 98, 114
- Mao Tse-tung, 124
- Martin, Everett O., 165n3
- Marx, Karl, 64
- Marxism, lxviii, 107, 109
- Mascaró, Juan, 31
- mass psychology, 6, 9, 165n3
- McDougall, William, 165n3
- means and ends, 59–61
 - in New Violence, 99
 - norms are not means, 168n1
 - satyāgraha* is not a means, 116
- meliorism, 136
- Messer, August, 169n2
- metaphysical concepts
 - of Gandhi, 15–51, 166n3, 166n4, 167n5, 167n9, 167n13, 167n14, 168n15, 168n16, 168n17
 - of New Violence, 98–99
 - See also* God; oneness of life; self-realization; Truth
- metaphysical systematization (*E), 48–51, 61, 89, 92
 - H*₂ and, 56
 - N*₂ and, 57, 58, 64–65
- Miller (journalist), 126, 127
- misrepresentation. *See* bias
- mistakes, 79, 82
 - See also* fallibility
- mistrust, 71
- misunderstanding opponent, 71, 79
- Mohammed, 2
- mokṣa*, 28
- moralism vs. pragmatism, 11–14
- moral systems. *See* ethics of group struggle
- moral worth
 - vs. greatness, 165n5
 - perfectibility of, 136
- movements vs. campaigns, 84
- Mühlmann, Wilhelm E., 149
- mukti*, 28
- Mussolini, Benito, 63
- Nag, Kalidas, 142, 143, 169n3
- Naidu, Sarojini, 126, 127
- Napoleon, 138
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3
- New Violence
 - defined, 97, 98
 - vs. Gandhian nonviolence
 - constructive programs, 115–16, 123–28
 - ethical norms, 99–105

INDEX

- New Violence (*continued*)
 metaphysical concepts, 98–99
 revolutionary character, 97–98, 107
satyāgraha misunderstood, 117
 self-respect and, 108–16
 similarities, 106–08, 168n1
 summary, 128–29
- Nicolas, Marius P., 139
- Niebuhr, Reinhold, 137–38
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 54, 138–41
- nirvāṇa*, 30
- nonviolence
 antagonisms and, 72
 Christianity and, 44, 137–38
 constructive programs in, 62–63, 86
 defined, 53
 in democratic ideal, 90, 92
 effectiveness of, 5–11, 12
 experiments with, 6–11, 58, 165n4
 fallibility as argument for, 21, 25–26, 46, 152
 fasting in, 148–49
 fundamental norm of, 57–59, 63, 64–65, 93–94
 Hinduism and, 44
 in Bhagavad Gita, 31, 38
 human nature and, 6
 as instrumental value, 12, 65
 Islam and, 44, 167n14
 Jaspers on, 144–52
 in New Violence, as goal, 99–100
 oneness of life and, 26, 35–37, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57
 in philosophical traditions, 6
 powerlessness and, 150
 reinforces itself, 100
 self-respect and, 110, 115
 strategy and tactics, 13, 53
 Truth and, 44–46
See also *ahimsā*; ethics of group struggle; *satyāgraha*; violence
- norms
 for campaigns vs. movements, 84
 deontological, 121–22
 vs. descriptive assumptions, 5–6, 13–14, 49
 empirical character of, 58
 first-level (N), 57–59, 63, 64–65, 93–94
 “Forgive!,” 24
 fourth-level, 80–84
 instrumental, 56–57, 168n1
 key expressions in, 163
 levels of, defined, 57
 of metaphysical systematization, 48–51, 57, 58, 64–65, 92
 New Violence and, 100, 102
satyāgraha conforming to, 12–13, 92–95, 116–19, 128
 second-level, 63–66, 85
 selection of, 55–57, 168n2
 specificity of, 56–57
 survey of, 157–61
 third-level, 72–79
 truth of, 20
 violations of, 92–95, 128
See also ethics of group struggle
- Nygren, Anders, 131–32
- oneness of life
 New Violence and, 98, 115
 nonviolence derived from, 26, 35–37
 in *E*, 57
 in **E* and **F*, 47, 48, 49, 50
- opponent
 common interests with, 74, 100–101, 129
 constructive intent and, 86–87
 conversion of, 72, 78, 79–80
 vs. coercion, 91
 vs. surrender, 88
 convincibility of, 66, 70–71, 72, 136
 denied in fanonized struggle, 105
Einfühlung with, 79, 81
 exploitation of, 78, 83, 87–89
 humiliation of, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101
 injury to, 25
 judging of, 78
 misrepresentation by, 82
 misunderstanding of, 71, 79
 personal contact with, 77–78, 127
 property of, destruction, 79, 80–81, 93, 100
 provocation of, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101
 vs. confrontation, 102
 exception to hypothesis, 93
 by property destruction, 79
 in salt raid, 127
 taken to be nonviolence, 168n2
 trust in, 71, 78
- Organ, Troy W., 34
- pacifism, 57, 107, 111
- panchayat* system, lxviii
- parallel institutions, 123–24, 129
- passive resistance, 83

- passivity
 - being and, 19
 - vs. constructive programs, 62
 - vs. direct action, 107
 - powerlessness and, 150
- Paullin, Theodore, 90
- perfectionism, 136
- personal contact with opponent, 77–78, 127
- Plato, 54
- pluralism, 21–24, 26, 27, 45, 74
 - Gandhi's personal failures with, 167n6
 - of Gandhi vs. Tolstoy, 141–42
 - rejected by New Violence, 99
- police
 - informing to, 76
 - violence by, 76, 101–02, 127
- positive struggle. *See* constructive programs
- power
 - Jaspers on, 144–47, 149
 - New Violence and, 99
 - nonviolence and, 150
 - self-realization and, 146, 168n17
- powerlessness, 108, 150
- Prabhu, Ramachandra K.
 - on caste system, 169n1
 - See also* Prabhu and Rao
- Prabhu and Rao, *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi*, 1
 - asceticism, 4
 - bias, 82
 - capital and labor, 67, 68
 - compromise, 82–83
 - convincing opponent, 71, 78
 - cooperation, 72, 74
 - detachment, 30
 - economics, 20
 - exploitation, 64, 106, 168n1
 - fearlessness, 111
 - God, 26, 166n4
 - Hinduism, 16, 18
 - imperfections, 1, 3, 4
 - means and ends, 60
 - nonviolence, 167n13
 - oneness of life, 35, 36, 37
 - plurality of conscience, 21, 74
 - prayer and fasting, 78–79
 - sacrifice, 80, 83
 - self-realization, 168n16
 - truth, 23, 26
 - violent methods, 63
- pragmatism
 - of Fanon, 103
 - of Gandhi
 - about devotion, 29
 - about Truth, 20, 103, 167n5
 - vs. moralism, 11–14
 - See also* utilitarianism
- prayer, 78, 148
- preciseness, of *E and *F, 50
- pride, 30–33, 35
- propaganda, 104, 127
 - See also* bias
- property, destruction of, 79, 80–81, 93
 - innocent people's property, 69–70
 - New Violence and, 100
- provocation
 - by opponent, 112–13
 - of opponent, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101
 - vs. confrontation, 102
 - exception to hypothesis, 93
 - by property destruction, 79
 - in salt raid, 127
 - taken to be nonviolence, 168n2
- psychotherapy, reciprocity in, 37
- pūrṇa svarāj*, 62, 87
- Pyarelal, N., 1, 24, 35–36, 54, 63, 167n7
- Pyrrho, 26
- Radhakrishnan, S., 32
- Rao, G. Ramachandra ("Gora"), 16
- Rao, U. R. *See* Prabhu and Rao
- religion
 - conflicts in India, 62, 64, 67, 84, 120
 - Gandhi's beliefs, 2, 15–19, 134, 165n1, 167n10, 167n12
 - Truth and, 20
 - See also* Buddhism; Christianity; Hinduism; Islam
- revolution
 - Gandhi as revolutionary, 76, 97–98, 107, 134
 - violent, 97
- Reyburn, Hugh A., 139
- rights vs. duties, 7
- Robinson, John A. T., 166n1
- Rolland, Romain, 142
- Roos, Carl, 139
- Roy, Kshitish, 1
- sacrifice, 50–51, 80, 83, 85
 - Jaspers on, 147, 150
 - sat* and, 166n4
- Saheb, Imam, 126
- salt campaign, 72–73, 84, 87, 109–10, 124–28

INDEX

- saṃnyāsin*, 4
 Sanatanists, 44, 167n14
 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 64, 98, 114, 115
sat, 19, 34, 166n4
satyāgraha
 benefits all, 64, 67
 change of goal in, 84, 128
 clarity about essentials in, 69–70
 coercion in, 78, 89–92, 147, 148–49
 compromise in, 82–83
 constructive programs in, 85–87, 123–25
 detachment and, 79
 effectiveness, vs. violence, 12
 exploitation of weakness in, 83, 87–89
 fallibility as argument for, 21
 injury to opponents in, 25
 means and ends in, 61, 116
 vs. New Violence, 98–105, 117, 128–29
 norms of, 55
 personal contact with opponent, 77–78
 sacrifice in, 83
 salt campaign, 72–73, 84, 87, 109–10, 124–28
 strictness of, 10, 61, 92–95
 techniques vs., 116–19
 translations of, 10, 146
 trust and, 76, 78
 See also ethics of group struggle; nonviolence
- scepticism, 20–21, 26
 Schweitzer, Albert, 3, 136
 Scott, Walter D., 165n3
 secrecy, 69, 75–76, 94, 102
 seek the center of conflict, 59, 101, 107, 150
 Self, 32, 33, 34–35
 universality of, 35–38
 self, 30–33, 34, 35
 selfless action, 33–34, 37, 38, 167n9
 Self-realization, 33, 35, 168n15
 self-realization
 courage and, 40, 110–11
 decrease or increase in, 47, 168n17
 devotion and, 167n9
 of exploiter is damaged, 64
 Gandhi's use of term, 46, 168n16
 God and, 27–28, 32, 35, 46–47, 61, 168n15
 humility and, 32
 limitation of, as violence, 53, 106
 in mundane sense, 33
 Nietzsche on, 140
 oneness of humanity and, 35–38, 39, 67
 power and, 146, 168n17
 selfless action and, 33–34, 37, 38
 self-respect and, 110, 112–13, 141
 svarāj as, 33
 in systematization of ethics, 46–49, 56, 57, 61, 65, 67
 Truth and, 27–28, 37–38, 46–47, 48–49, 168n15
 violence as means to, 99
 self-respect, 108–13, 129, 141
 violence as means to, 114–16
 semantics, in ethical formulations, 50–51
 Shcherbaskoi, Fedor I., 30
 sincerity, 79–80, 152
 Smuts, General Jan, 88
 Sorel, Georges, 138
 South Africa, 7–9, 10–11, 13, 88
 Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch)
 evil and, 82
 immanent God and, 19
 self-realization and, 168n17
 truth and, 151
 Stalin, Joseph, 63
 strategy of group struggle, 13, 53
 student revolt, 97, 101, 105, 119
 suffering, 36, 80, 83
 suspension of judgment (*epoché*), 26
svarāj (swaraj), 33, 76, 84, 86, 87, 108
 pūrṇa svarāj, 62, 87
 Systematization *E*, 54–57, 89
 See also ethics of group struggle; hypotheses; norms
 Systematization **E*, 48–51, 61, 89, 92
 *H*₂ and, 56
 *N*₁ and, 57, 58, 64–65
 Systematization **F*, 48, 50
- Tagore, Rabindranath, 109
tapas, 4
 Tendulkar, Dinanath G., 7, 39, 54, 81, 126, 128, 165n4
 Tillich, Paul, 15–16, 166n1
 Tolstoy, Leo, 51, 141–44, 169n3
 trust
 constructive work and, 67, 85, 86, 87
 informing to police and, 76
 in opponent, 71, 78
 sincerity and, 80
 threat of violence and, 151–52
 Truth
 ahimsā and, 20, 44–46, 47
 being and, 19, 166n4, 167n5

INDEX

- fearlessness and, 111
- Gandhi's use of term, 17–21
- God and, 18–19, 26, 27–28
- pluralism about, 21–23, 26, 27, 45, 74
- Self as, 34
- self-realization and, 27–28, 37–38, 46–47, 48–49, 168n15, 168n16
- strict standard of, 93
- as top norm, 48–50
- vs. truth, 46–47
- truth
 - autonomy and, 65–66
 - in colonial situation, 103–04
 - compromise and, 83
 - experiments with, 9
 - Gandhi's use of term, 17–18, 19, 20
 - self-righteous, 167n7
 - humility about, 31
 - Jaspers on, 151
 - of norms, 20
 - pluralism about, 21–24, 26, 45, 141–42
 - scepticism about, 20–21, 26
 - self-realization and, 56
 - vs. Truth, 46–47
 - unbiased, 74–75, 82
- Tyabji, Abbas, 126
- understanding, 66, 72
 - empathy for opponent, 79, 81
 - of facts, 68, 74
 - misunderstanding opponent, 71, 79
 - by opponent, 70
 - working together and, 67, 85
- unity of humanity. *See* oneness of life
- untouchables, 67, 84, 86, 91, 123
- utilitarianism
 - experiments in nonviolence and, 10
 - of Fanon, 56, 103–04
 - minority interests and, 1xvii
 - norms of Gandhian ethics and, 56, 57, 65
 - See also* pragmatism
- Vedānta, Advaita, 34, 167n10, 167n11
- violence
 - defined broadly, 42, 47, 53, 79, 168n1
 - is mutual, 64
 - by supporters of violence, 106, 129
- distortion of truth and, 69
- effectiveness vs. nonviolence, 5
- bhimsā* as, 39–41, 47, 149
- impotency causing, 119–21
- Jaspers on, 144–52
- justification of
 - by Gandhi, 25–26, 71, 111, 112–13, 119–22, 150
 - in New Violence, 98–101, 105, 111–12, 114–16
- Luther on, 132, 133
- Nietzsche on, 138–39
- positive motivations for, 143–44
- self-respect and, 114–16
- short-term, 63, 100, 104, 129
- structural, 47, 67, 97–98, 105, 106, 111, 122
- in systematization of ethics
 - common goals and, 68
 - defined, 53
 - in *E, 48
 - essential points and, 69
 - humiliation and, 68
 - provocation and, 68
 - short-term, 63, 100
 - top norm *N*₁ and, 57–59, 63, 64–65, 93–94
 - understanding and, 70, 71
- threat of, 151–52
- Tolstoy on, 142
- violates pure *satyāgraha*, 61
- See also* killing; New Violence; nonviolence
- Wales, Prince of, 135
- war
 - Jaspers on, 150
 - long-term effects of, 63
 - Luther on, 137
 - Nietzsche on, 138–39, 140
 - See also* killing
- Weber, Max, 148, 169n5
- working together. *See* constructive programs
- yajña*, 80
- Young India*, 54, 123
- Zeteticism. *See* scepticism
- Zimmer, Heinrich, 34

Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence

The Selected Works of Arne Naess

I

Interpretation and Preciseness
A Contribution to the Theory of Communication

II

Scepticism
Wonder and Joy of a Wandering Seeker

III

Which World Is the Real One?
Inquiry into Comprehensive Systems, Cultures, and Philosophies

IV

The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise
Rich Descriptions, Abundant Choices, and Open Futures

V

Gandhi and Group Conflict
Explorations of Nonviolent Resistance, *Satyāgraha*

VI

Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence
The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's *Ethics*

VII

Communication and Argument
Elements of Applied Semantics

VIII


Common Sense, Knowledge, and Truth
Open Inquiry in a Pluralistic World
Selected Papers

IX

Reason, Democracy, and Science
Understanding Among Conflicting Worldviews
Selected Papers

X

Deep Ecology of Wisdom
Explorations in Unities of Nature and Cultures
Selected Papers



The Selected Works of Arne Naess

Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence

The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's *Ethics*

VOLUME VI

Contents

<i>Series Editor's Introduction</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Author's Introduction to the Series</i>	<i>lv</i>
<i>Author's Preface to This Edition</i>	<i>lxi</i>
<i>Author's Preface to the First Edition</i>	<i>lxv</i>
<i>Abbreviations</i>	<i>lxvii</i>
Introduction	i
I. The Fundamental Dual Distinction: "In Itself" and "In Something Else"	9
Survey A	9
Survey A Using Symbols	14
II. Existence and Freedom	23
Survey B	24
Survey B Using Symbols	28
III. Causation, Cognition, and Action	31
The Hypothesis of Cognitive-Causal Parallelism	31
Survey of Theorems	33
Causation, Understanding, and Existence	33
Activeness	37
Human Beings as Part of Something Else	39
Survey C Using Symbols	41
IV. Grading Basic Distinctions	53
Survey D	53
Freedom: A Matter of Degree	53

CONTENTS

Grading "Being in Itself"	57
Power	62
Survey D Using Symbols	65
Grading "Conceived Through Itself"	71
Grading Requirements for "Being" and "Being Conceived"	74
Grading Other Previously Introduced Predicates	76
Power Relations	77
V. The Road to Freedom Through Active Emotion	83
Introduction	83
Survey E Using Symbols	87
States of Emotion	87
Basic Human Striving	91
General Striving	92
VI. Joy	95
Survey F Using Symbols	95
Joy	95
Perfection	97
Self-Preservation	101
Cheerfulness (<i>Hilaritas</i>)	104
Pleasurable Excitement (<i>Titillatio</i>)	106
Sorrow, Melancholy, and Pain	107
VII. Good and Bad and Usefulness	113
VIII. Virtue and Reason	119
Virtue	119
Reason	121
IX. Self-Satisfaction	125
<i>Appendix I: Approximate Signification of Single-Letter Symbols</i>	<i>131</i>
<i>Appendix II: Approximate Meaning of Multiple-Letter Symbols</i>	<i>133</i>
<i>Appendix III: Basic Equivalences</i>	<i>137</i>
<i>Notes</i>	<i>139</i>
<i>References</i>	<i>143</i>
<i>Index</i>	<i>145</i>

Author's Introduction to the Series

At ninety-two it is a great honor to be still alive and to witness the publication of my selected works in English. Few philosophers have their work published in a series, fewer still receive this honor before they die. When I was originally approached with the idea of publishing my complete works, I was overwhelmed and overjoyed, but added that not all my books and articles were important enough to merit such an honor. Selected works? Yes, and I am extremely grateful for this initiative and the final result, which presents a representative selection of my work from the earliest to the most recent. [*The Selected Works of Arne Naess* are hereafter referred to as SWAN.]

My interest in philosophy began with Spinoza's *Ethics*, which as a seventeen-year-old I was fortunate to read in Latin. I appreciated Spinoza's grand vision and trusted him implicitly as a person. I accepted that human beings could, and should, have a general outlook with the grandeur of Spinoza's, but I recognized that our individual views on this grand scale will not be identical. Through the years I have realized that there is a splendid variety of interpretations of Spinoza (SWAN VI and IX). His texts are exceptionally rich. As the years have gone on, I have focused on how he leads us to realize we can increase our freedom and sense of connection with the world through strengthening and intensifying our *positive* emotions. For example, loving and caring for our place and others leads to an expansive sense of being part of a much larger world. Emphasizing hatred and anger, on the other hand, makes us feel smaller and isolated from the world. Spinoza, as I interpret him, would express this by saying that "We are as large as our love." Increasing our freedom as human beings leads us toward life in communities colored by friendship, sharing joy and sorrow.

Before I left gymnasium [the end of secondary education] the headmaster asked me, "What do you intend to be?" My immediate answer was "A philosopher." In fact, I had already conceived of myself as one. I viewed the

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

writings of many contemporary philosophers that I was familiar with, however, as vague and airy and certainly not as inspiring as Spinoza.

My doctoral thesis in philosophy of science was an effort to remind us that in science the content of a theory is not independent of research behavior—the activities of observing, confirming, disconfirming, and so on, and that these are set within a deep context of place, history, and culture. Later, as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California at Berkeley, I studied the behavior of experimental psychologists doing animal research.

In 1934 and 1935 I studied in Vienna and while there became a member of the famous Schlick seminar, the main discussion group of the Vienna Circle. Their quest for clarity and cordial cooperation in pursuit of knowledge led me to appreciate that “What do I mean?” is an open question. I concluded that we never intend to express anything extremely definite, even in mathematics or symbolic logic. I saw the importance of using empirical methods to find out how we actually use certain expressions and sentences. I developed and applied a wide variety of such methods, which became part of the core for the empirical semantics that runs through my work. I continued to do this type of research into the 1990s, my last project being one in which I questioned experts and policy makers about their ideas of values intrinsic to the natural world (in SWAN X).

In one of my earlier studies, I reviewed about 700 articles from philosophers concerning their use of the word *truth*. For the most part, I found these unconvincing and soon started on empirical studies of the use of *truth* among ordinary nonprofessional people and schoolchildren (in SWAN VIII). Many philosophers seemed to assume that ordinary people hold very naive views about these deep matters. I found through research that, on the contrary, the views articulated by these “ordinary” people were every bit as sophisticated as those held by professional philosophers. This reinforced my conviction that, generally, we greatly underestimate ourselves. Much academic philosophy was narrowly focused and abstract. Philosophers who elicited interest in wide-ranging issues of practical and global importance, such as nonviolence and social justice, have in my lifetime said things that were considered creative, but often too far out. In spite of consistent proclamations that science neither would nor could take over all the problems discussed by philosophers, I tried to argue in ways that reminded readers of science done as open inquiry, and I tried to emphasize that it is occasionally

necessary to perform empirical research to illuminate or support a philosophical viewpoint.

My empirical and historical research led me to realize that there are no certainties and that there is a great diversity in our spontaneous experience as well as endless ways to describe and appreciate the complexities and values of the world. Thus, I realized that I am one of those lifetime seekers that the ancient Greeks called a *zetetic* (see SWAN II and VIII). From my research on scepticism and the foundations of science and logic, it became clear to me that pluralism (every event has many descriptions and possible outcomes), possibilism (anything can happen), and a healthy scepticism (always seeking the truth but never claiming it) make up the most consistent approach to respecting the perspectives and experiences of others, human and nonhuman.

From my empirical studies of semantics, and from my knowledge of several languages, I came to appreciate the complexity of communication. Being committed to Gandhian nonviolent communication, I saw the importance of avoiding dogmatism and fanaticism. One of the most important discoveries coming from this research, leading to the publication of my major book, *Interpretation and Preciseness* (SWAN I), was the insight that we cannot avoid values in any field of endeavor or research. There are no value-free inquiries or theories. Even if we refuse to express our values, this is itself an expression and choice of values. We must, therefore, be clear about our value choices and try to make them explicit. The choices we make, as Spinoza pointed out, shape the quality of our lives, and values emphasizing positive emotions or feelings are expansive and lead to our growth. We must become ever more aware of our choices and the values involved. Even pure logic assumes certain norms. Empirical research can shed light on these matters. My colleagues in philosophy often found my empirical work perplexing. I, in turn, grew to underrate the necessity of visiting great centers of philosophy, as I preferred to be close to or in the mountains.

When I visited the United States, it was mostly to climb in the mountains or walk and camp in the desert. On one fortunate visit, I dropped in at the graduate students' discussion room at Harvard. Speaking with students who were writing their doctoral theses in philosophy, I understood that my knowledge of contemporary philosophy, and of recent important contributions in its various fields, was narrowly limited to special themes of lively personal interest. Even in later years, the tendency to take personal inclina-

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

tion very seriously colored my contribution to the philosophical literature. As can be seen, though, from the titles in these *Selected Works*, my strongly felt interests span a rich variety of fields, philosophical traditions, and movements.

Since childhood I have experienced an intense joy in being together with animals and plants and in contemplating the immense evolutionary development of life on earth over millions of years. From an early age I also developed an intense love for mountains and for being in them. Much of my creative philosophical work was done at Tvergastein, my mountain hut in Norway (see SWAN X). My devotion to outdoor life is in the Norwegian tradition called *friluftsliv* (literally, free-air-life). In many respects, I approached philosophical and cross-cultural studies as if I were a field ecologist or naturalist. It was against this background that my work from the 1960s onward focused with close attention on cultural diversity, biodiversity, sustainability, and the deep ecology movement.

My work since the Second World War has been increasingly within movements such as those furthering social justice, peace, and ecological responsibility. During the war, I engaged in anti-Nazi activism, and from that time also in promilitant Gandhianism, a nonviolence that is not pacifist in the usual sense but insists that if it is a bloody fight for justice against injustice, we seek "the center of the conflict" and, if necessary, cooperate with people who use arms. During the Cold War, I participated in the "third side," against both communism and extreme anticommunism, for example, as the scientific leader of a UNESCO project bringing Marxist and anti-Marxist politicians and political science researchers together in an unbiased discussion of the essence of democracy and freedom. Some of the relevant publications are included in SWAN IX.

The broad spectrum of books and articles included in the *Selected Works* represents, in many ways, a chronicle of my passions and influences. The *Selected Works* record, albeit in an inevitably fragmentary way, one possible expression of these. My dream and hope is that some readers will be inspired by their sheer variety, and that young philosophers will be encouraged to let strong personal motivations steer their studies.

Working habits vary. Some people write an article and go on to the next without looking back on the old one; others come back from time to time, radically revising and changing the old one. The latter is my way of working. Lecturing in many places about these subjects, I have found it

natural to revise the old manuscripts until sometimes very little is left of the original. Therefore, I have always viewed my writing as preliminary; a year, five years, ten years after publication of the first editions I have itched to revise, *thoroughly* revise them. When my first book was printed in 1936, I went to watch the hulking presses printing out one page at a time. I was terrified, thinking of mistakes or some awkward sentences being duplicated again and again.

When I was offered the opportunity to have a selected-works series published, I immediately thought I would like to review all my work and ask how, from today's perspective, I might answer the difficult questions I had earlier attempted to probe. Such a task would have been a particularly difficult proposition, because although many of my books and articles contain new ideas, the ideas are often not developed as well as I might have hoped. But alas, I am saved—at my age there is not time for me to accomplish such a comprehensive reevaluation of my work; I do not even have the capacity to do it now in any case.

Who could contemplate undertaking a publishing project of such ambitious proportions? Douglas Tompkins, mountaineer, entrepreneur, protector of wilderness in Chile and Argentina, and creator of the Foundation for Deep Ecology, is such a person. "Miracle Doug," as I call him, likes the idea that the deep ecology slogans and the deep ecology approach were introduced by a philosopher. I am grateful to him for his firm conviction, inspiration, and great generosity. My gratitude, however, extends well beyond my thanks to Doug, to others who have supported and championed this project.

Quincey Imhoff, when executive director of the Foundation for Deep Ecology, supported SWAN with generous grants and other contributions. SWAN has also benefited from faithful assistance and cooperation in the preparation and editing of the manuscripts. The late Professor Ingemund Gullvåg prepared the initial translation of *Which World Is the Real One?* (SWAN III). Professor Alastair Hannay translated the first edition of *Communication and Argument* (SWAN VII) and offered invaluable suggestions for improving the readability of the first editions of *Scepticism* (SWAN II), *The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise* (SWAN IV), and *Gandhi and Group Conflict* (SWAN V).

Most of all, however, I am grateful to Harold Glasser, the series editor, and his assistant, Kim Zetter, who oversaw all aspects of the project from design to production. Glasser's unique combination of intellectual tenacity,

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

attention to detail, mastery of my work, and cooperative spirit made him a natural to take on the monumental task of selecting and editing my works. Glasser not only labored to improve the English and clarity of each manuscript, but his keen ability to ferret out countless technical and pedagogical errors has resulted in substantial new editions of volumes II–VII that are both far more comprehensible and accessible than the originals. I thank him for his valiant work on this project, both during his stay in Norway as a visiting Fulbright professor, where we collaborated on a strategy for revising the previously existing material, and in the subsequent years it has taken to complete the project.

From the beginning of the SWAN Project in 1994, Alan Drengson has encouraged and helped to move this work forward in numerous ways. Especially in the last crucial stages of completing volumes I, VIII, IX, and X, his help and editorial oversight have been invaluable. Thanks for his devotion, good humor, and positive enthusiasm. Thanks to both Drengson and Tim Quick for their extensive bibliographic research. Thanks to Bill Devall for his support and encouragement and especially his help on the completion of volume X, *Deep Ecology of Wisdom*. Thanks to Anne Collins for her outstanding work as the copyeditor of the SWAN volumes. Thanks to George Sessions for his support and encouragement.

Last, but certainly not least, immeasurable thanks go to my wife, Kit-Fai Naess, who has worked beside me throughout the years to provide invaluable assistance, encouragement, and inspiration.

Arne Naess

2004

Author's Preface to This Edition

This work has the long title, *Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's Ethics*. *Self-subsistence* is meant in the philosophical sense of "persistence of the Self," not mere survival. *Emotion* refers to Spinoza's important view that strong positive emotion is necessary to make rapid progress to high levels of human freedom. The application of this view underlies my belief in the indispensable function of Spinoza to supporters of the deep ecology movement. Their positive relation to life on earth is highly emotional. They are led to a positive appreciation for the vast interconnection of life-forms in a wide ecosystem through an emotional care for life-forms of all kinds. A neutral, factual description of this interconnectedness is not enough to move us to act. A cold assessment of the usefulness of certain life-forms does not mobilize a persistent fight against the destruction of species that is going on everywhere.

A book on Spinoza's philosophy generally appeals to people with a background in the humanities, not in analysis and symbolic logic. To the former this book on Spinoza looks formidable: it seems to be filled with formulas. Why use such formulas?

One reason is obvious. Spinoza's *Ethics* is a complex text. There are, for example, more than 270 sentences of the kind "By . . . I mean," ". . . is the same as . . .," and so on, where ". . ." may be entities of some kind, including words, more complex text units, or concepts. Those with a prodigious memory might keep the hundreds of important connections between these 270 entities ready in their minds. Most of us cannot do this, and understanding what we are entitled to call a Spinozan total view escapes us. Extremely simple formal logic notation can help us decisively to keep these interconnections clearly in mind.

Are they extremely simple? I thought so when writing this book: "Only a couple of hours study and you will appreciate the help of the sym-

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THIS EDITION

bols." It seems, however, that the feeling of simplicity owed to my very early experience. When I was seventeen, I found a reference to the three-volume *Principia Mathematica* by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. They were said to have derived mathematics from pure logic—pure thought, I imagined. It sounded romantic, but the three big blue volumes were formidable. What did I pretend? The first series of derivations was peculiarly easy. They did not skip any premises, whereas the proofs in my school mathematics text jumped along like a boy who had hurt his knee. I enjoyed the logical calculi, and as I was young it was easy to learn. Not so easy perhaps for mature humanists, most of whom dislike such formulas. Strong motivation is essential to master such symbols.

The logical structure of Spinoza's *Ethics* leaves many openings for a variety of interpretations of the content. Historical evidence rules out a lot of them as expressions of the strictly personal view of Spinoza, who lived in a period very different from ours in most ways. Within a framework made up of the essential parts of the *Ethics*, there are many possible interpretations. Moreover, Spinoza changed his views in many ways over his lifetime. I am interested in what he would have retained in later editions of the *Ethics*, if he had lived considerably longer.

The difference between the history of ideas and the philosophy of total views is particularly clear in the case of great systematizers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Spinoza. Spinoza scholars like John Yolton who focus on the ideas of young Spinoza interacting with others in a particular spiritual environment find my approach somewhat strange and ahistorical. I think Yolton's findings are of limited relevance to my efforts at reconstruction and the search for salvation. As an example of what a systematic approach might imply, let us look for a moment at the word *Deus* ("God") in Spinoza's text. It is carefully defined. This fact makes it possible to leave it out in a reconstructed text! The definiens is simply substituted for the definiendum. From the point of view of a historian, and especially a historian of ideas, such an omission borders on blasphemy. For the systematician, the history of ideas is an indispensable auxiliary discipline, but only one among other important disciplines, for example, Medieval Latin—as in the use of the term *causa*. These are only auxiliaries, however! My central question has been, How can the texts of Spinoza, together with my more or less intuitively based appreciation of his person and mission, help me in my search for truth? Perhaps some others could be helped in the same way, perhaps not.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THIS EDITION

There is such a splendid variety of Spinoza interpretations. However, it is difficult to understand why no one has focused on his insight into how we can increase our freedom through strengthening and intensifying our positive emotions. Spinoza says increasing our freedom as human beings leads us toward life in communities colored by friendship, sharing joy and sorrow. So many interpretations tend to focus on his so-called determinism, the illusion of free will, our slavery under negative passions, and on human beings as tiny creatures in a vast universe without understandable goals, and yet it is claimed rational to believe in God.

Few interpretations try to use Spinoza's own way of exposition with propositions, proofs, and fundamental axioms and definitions. Because of the great number of closely intertwined concepts, some sort of "Euclidian" method of exposition might or might not be the most convenient and yet be the only way to get a proper survey of his system as expressed in the *Ethics*. In any case, this is what I have tried to do in an exposition of some basic features of his system. For those who have experience using simple logical symbols, this text will be easy reading, but for those who have no such experience, what is said using formulas is also expressed in English.

I am convinced that Spinoza's firmly integrated view of human life, and the way to live it, will in the future inspire more people than ever before. We need Spinoza as a source of inspiration, but of course we also need our personal interpretations. Mine is only one of many.

Arne Naess

2004

Author's Preface to the First Edition

Of the many friends of Spinoza among professional philosophers, very few specialize in his philosophy as a system. This seems to me to be a deplorable situation, since few philosophers, if any, have so much to offer us today.

Spinoza's system belongs to the seventeenth century. Its concepts and structure are very foreign to us. Interpretations that try to be as faithful as possible to all details are necessarily of immense complexity—practically unsurveyable. What follows is a reconstruction of some aspects of the system that to me are of central importance for the understanding of human nature.

I am grateful for the help received from colleagues and students.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in reference to text units of Spinoza's *Ethics*:

D	<i>Definitio</i>	definition
A	<i>Axioma</i>	axiom
P	<i>Propositio</i>	proposition
Dem	<i>Demonstratio</i>	proof
Cor	<i>Corollarium</i>	corollary
Sch	<i>Scholium</i>	note
E	<i>Explicatio</i>	explanation
Aff	<i>Affectus</i>	emotion, affect
App	<i>Appendix</i>	appendix

The references are standardized:

ID7	Definition 7 of part I
IIIP9Sch	Note to proposition 9 in part III
IIIAffD3	Definition 3 of the affects at the end of part III
VP42Dem	Proof of proposition 42 in part V

Introduction

Spinoza's terminology is very rich. Several hundred different words and expressions in his axioms, definitions, theorems, and proofs express together the basic framework of his all-embracing system. Some of these terms are fairly unproblematic in their use, but most are not. One may safely assume that many pairs or groups of terms have the same extension, but this would not prevent them from having widely different meanings in the sense of connotation or intention. Thus, "to be substance," "to be (completely) in itself," and "to be (completely) free" may have the same extension but have different connotations.

Most of the key terms in the *Ethics* have different shades of meaning in different contexts. The differences are obviously relevant to Spinoza's total field of conceptual discriminations, which is so vast that a set of relevant relations between terms runs into the thousands. A survey of such relations was compiled as a preliminary to this work.¹

From a narrow didactic undertaking—the survey of essential terminological relations—I was led to take up the task of partially reconstructing Spinoza's system using a terminology that in some connections may sound strange or far-fetched to some of his students. This is unavoidable, however, if Spinoza's thinking is to be used in our lives.

The reconstruction starts with a set of eighteen theorems concerning that which is in itself or in something else; that which is conceived through itself or by something else; that which does or does not require something else in order to exist; and that which does or does not require other conceptions in order to be conceived.

This beginning is rather abstract and may, I am afraid, bore some readers, but the distinction between "in (through) itself" (*in se*) and "in (through) something else" (*in alio*) occupies a fundamental position in Spinoza's system. The distinction can be called *ontological* insofar as it has to do with ways

INTRODUCTION

of existing or being and *epistemological* insofar as it has to do with ways of conceiving. To avoid misunderstanding, however, I have sometimes elected to use the more dynamic term *lambanological*, which comes from the Greek verb λαμβάνω (to grasp), as opposed to the static and platonic *epistemological*. To be active or to act and to understand cannot be systematically distinguished in the *Ethics*.

The translation of *conceptus* to *conception* rather than to *concept* is preferred to keep the modern discussion of concept, conceptualism, nominalism, and realism at a distance, and also to catch some of the dynamism implicit in the Spinozistic *conceptus*. I take *conceptus* and *conception* to be just a substantivation of *concipere* and *conceive*. No concepts *result* from the acts of conception.

In Spinoza's system, cognition has more to do with "causing," "consuming," "freeing," and "grasping" knowledge than with "possessing" it. The neologism *lambanological* will be given the general sense of "having to do with grasping." Conceiving, understanding, acting, and (human) causing will accordingly be classed as parts or aspects of a unitary process, grasping.

In what follows, we shall often class a statement by Spinoza as either ontological or lambanological. Some comments on the practical criterion may therefore be appropriate. The distinction between ontological and lambanological as applied to the text of Spinoza refers to certain differences well exemplified in the eight definitions of part I of the *Ethics*.

The first definition (ID₁) includes two *definiens* phrases: "that, the essence of which involves existence" and "that, the nature of which cannot be conceived except as existent." The latter makes the definitorial delimitation of a cause of itself directly and explicitly dependent on the act of conceiving. The phrase and its meaning in the introduced terminology are lambanological. The former does not express any such dependency explicitly and directly. It nevertheless refers to something, an entity, an *on* (*ov*). Consequently, I call it ontological. Thus, the first definition has a combined ontological *and* lambanological *definiens*. In short, it is ontological-lambanological. When the same test is used, ID₂ and ID₃ are also classifiable as combined ontological-lambanological. According to ID₄, perceptions of the intellect (substance-perceptions) contribute to the delimitation of "attribute." Actually, nothing else is referred to. The *definiens* is surely lambanological. Since, however, an attribute is said to be that which the intellect perceives, the attribute itself is not a perception or any other feature of cognition. So we might add the adjective *ontological*. ID₅ also exhibits both

lambanological and ontological meanings. ID6 and ID7, on the other hand, do not refer directly and explicitly to any conception or perception. They are purely ontological. The last definition delimits eternity in terms of conceiving and falls into the lambanological-ontological class. Thus introduced, the distinction does not automatically furnish any general criterion for what belongs to ontology and what does not. It definitely does not parallel the Kantian distinction.

Regarding the classical question of ontological or epistemological primacy, it is characteristic of Spinoza that both ontology and epistemology enter at the very bottom or start of his system—if there can be a “start” of a system. His fundamental vision is somehow beyond that distinction, it seems. He permits himself to mix ontological and epistemological statements in his proofs. I shall try to do justice to the fundamental vision of unity by elaborating *equivalences* in a sense to be clarified later. In part I of the *Ethics*, the unity of vision is attested by a series of parallel ontological and lambanological propositions. For evidence of this, see especially ID1, ID3, ID5, ID8, IA4, IA7, IP2Dem, IP3, and IP3Dem.

Many distinctions, for example those between God and man, and substance and mode, are less fundamental in the sense that they already presuppose the dual distinction: in itself or in something else, conceived through itself or conceived through something else. The dual distinction, on the other hand, does not presuppose the distinctions traditionally taken to be fundamental in Spinoza’s system. The notion “conceived through itself,” for instance, does not presuppose the notion of substance, nor does the notion of “in itself” presuppose the notion of God.

It has been argued that the distinction between substance and mode cannot be less fundamental than the one between “in itself” and “in something else,” since the person who makes the distinction is already a mode when forming the latter distinction. The priority is rather the other way around, it is said. Against this, I would answer, first, that the same argument, if valid, also holds against taking the distinction between substance and mode as the more fundamental, since the person making the distinction is already something in something else. Second, the fundamentality of the distinction between “in itself” and “in something else” has to do with Spinoza’s ontological status as a mode—*all* his life.

Why does Spinoza not introduce “in itself” in terms of substance? Why doesn’t he write “By being in and being conceived through itself I under-

INTRODUCTION

stand being substance”? From this and a series of other definitions one might try to reverse his text. My answer is that this would involve not only a change of mode of exposition, but also an unwarranted change of priority in Spinoza’s thinking: he understands and contemplates substance, mode, God, attribute in part as that which is in itself or that which is in something else, and that which is conceived through itself or that which is conceived through something else—not the other way around. The terms *substance*, *attribute*, *God*, *mode*, and *Nature* are expendable in his system, but of course they were necessary on the seventeenth-century scene. Much is gained today in understanding Spinoza by breaking down the traditional domination of those terms in expositions of the structure of his thought.

By means of the third definition of part I (ID₃), we eliminate from the text the term *substance* whenever doing so facilitates understanding. The definition is worth quoting here because of the peculiar shift from ontological to lambanological terminology—a shift I shall make use of in the following pages: “By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing, from which it must be formed.” The property of “being conceived” is completely on a par with “being.” Substance cannot be unconceived, by definition.

The fundamental dual distinction is expressly and directly made use of in the *definiens* formulations or the proofs in the many text units: ID₃, ID₅, IA₁, IA₂, IP₂Dem, and so on. Indirectly, the dual distinction enters all through the *Ethics*. It enters, for instance, into all propositions in part I using ID₃ and into the proofs referring to ID₃, that is, IP₁Dem, IP₂Dem, IP₄Dem, IP₅Dem, IP₆Dem₂, IP₁₀Dem, IP₁₅Dem, IP₁₈Dem, and IP₂₈Dem.

To the ontological axiom 1, “that which is, is either in itself or in something else,” corresponds “that which is, is conceived either through itself or through something else.” This latter lambanological proposition cannot be denied a place in the system in spite of its not being explicitly formulated in the *Ethics*. It occurs as number six in my initial set of eighteen propositions (I call it A6). It is my contention that hundreds of more or less important, so-far-unstated theorems cannot be denied their place in the system. They follow either directly or indirectly from definitions, axioms, propositions, or other central statements in the very core of the *Ethics*.

In reconstructions, the lambanological parallel to axiom 1 can be introduced as a separate axiom, or derived from axiom 1 and a proposition, defi-

nitition, or axiom. There are a number of possibilities open. We shall not, however, take up problems concerning the status of the various propositions as parts of various reconstructions. Instead, we shall leave the subject, repeating that our sets of theorems do claim validity, but not any definite hierarchical place in the expositions or reconstructions of the system, axiomatic or otherwise.

Even the very small set *A* of theorems contains as many as fifteen different predicates of high systematic relevance. To facilitate the survey of the theorems and to remind us of their internal relations, the lower predicate calculus is used to symbolize them in the survey beginning on page 14. To do this requires only seven capital letters. The eighteen propositions are symbolized by means of abbreviated predicate expressions.

In chapter 1, the use of symbols is purely heuristic and has little bearing on our choice of theorems or their derivation. Those who are not familiar with the functional calculus, or dislike symbols in philosophical contexts, may ignore formulations using symbols. In any case, translations of symbolic expressions are always included in the text.

Some logicians have discussed the possibility of formalizing Spinoza's system. Such an undertaking, however, is doomed to be unsuccessful given the complexity of his texts. What I have done in the following chapters has little, if anything, to do with formalization of a doctrine. Only a small (but central) sector of relationships in the *Ethics* is expressed in symbols, and the sector is itself isolated from the rest by more or less arbitrary, but heuristically justifiable, delimitations. The sector expressed by means of symbols in what follows makes up scarcely more than 1 percent of the *Ethics*, even if we limit ourselves to its major conceptual structures. Chapter 2 introduces the notion "conceivability of the nonexistence of something." It is an important ingredient of the notions "essence involving existence" and "freedom." These notions are all linked to the fundamental dual distinction: that which cannot be conceived as nonexistent is nothing else than that which is in itself (and so on). In a set of twenty-one theorems (referred to as B1–B21), various internal relations and relations to the theorems of chapter 1 are clarified.

The basic relation in all this is extensional equivalence—symbolized by "ekv." The relata of extensional equivalence are whole sentences. In the following chapters we make extensive use of a less intimate relation, namely, that of mutual implication: "If *x* has the property *A*, then *x* has

INTRODUCTION

property *B*, and if *x* has property *B*, then *x* has property *A*.” “E_{kv}” implies mutual implication, but mutual implication does not imply “E_{kv}.”

In terms of conditions, the presence of property *A* is a sufficient condition of the presence of property *B*, if *A* implies *B*. If something is in itself, this is, according to Spinoza, a sufficient condition of its being conceivable through itself; but if something is conceivable through itself, it is also in itself. Thus, *B* also implies *A*. The mutual implication makes *A* a necessary and sufficient condition of *B*, and vice versa.

Several hundred sentences in the *Ethics* are formed as some sort of equivalences: “Desire (*cupiditas*) is nothing else than the *conatus* itself to act” (IVP59Dem); “Desire considered absolutely is man’s essence itself . . .” (IVP61Dem); “. . . considered to possess the same sort of eternity or necessity . . .”; “The cognition of bad (*malum*) is the sorrow (*tristitia*) itself insofar as we are conscious of it” (IVP64Dem); “. . . God or Nature . . .” (IVP41Dem); “From the necessity, or (which is the same thing), from the laws only of the divine nature . . .” (IP17Dem).

Chapter 3 makes the transition into parts III and IV of the *Ethics*, introducing the predicates “understanding,” “freedom,” and “action” and linking them to the fundamental dual distinction.

It is seen, I hope, in chapters 4 and 5 how Spinoza’s positive attitude toward emotions and his belief in unlimited progress of freedom are linked to his basic metaphysical distinctions and propositions. I also hope to explain how he can speak of a genuine road toward freedom in spite of the seemingly prohibitive absoluteness of the fundamental dual distinction introduced in part I. There, man is unfree, fragmentary, impotent—he falls on the wrong side of a seemingly knife-sharp partition between in itself and in something else. In parts III, IV, and V, however, the partition is softened. Accordingly, I substitute for hard dichotomies a parallel set of graded predicates. This is done in chapter 4, which introduces the great turning point in my reconstruction. As will be seen, Spinoza himself suggested grading in the latter part of the *Ethics*. The softening is thus not arbitrary; it represents an implementation of some suggestions made by Spinoza himself.

In chapters 6 through 9, central notions such as “joy,” “good and bad,” “useful,” “virtue and reason,” and “self-satisfaction” are discussed using terms introduced in the preceding chapters. Whereas *substance*, *attribute*, and *mode* are eliminated, some basic scholastic terms, such as *in itself*, are retained in the reconstruction. This inevitably raises a question regarding the

extent to which the present reconstruction will be accessible to people with no special training in scholastic philosophy.

It is hoped that in what follows light will be shed on the term *in itself* through the suggestion of extensional equivalences. If some of these prove satisfactory, to be “in itself” can, in a preliminary way, be understood by concentrating on “that which can be conceived by itself” and its relatively easily understood counterpart, “that which can only be conceived adequately by also conceiving something else.” Or one may choose one of the other equivalences.

One may obtain access to the function of a group of extensionally equivalent terms by starting with those that are most readily understood. Say, for example, that term *A* is fairly well understood in its uses in contexts *a*, *b*, and *c*, whereas *B*, well understood in *d*, *e*, and *f*, is less understood in *a*, *b*, and *c*. By transferring *B* to contexts *a*, *b*, and *c*, one can obtain a better understanding of *B*. In this way the equivalences asserted in what follows can assist in an understanding not only of the conceptual links between the fundamental terms of part I and the conceptual framework of parts III and IV, but also—to a modest degree—of the terms themselves.

What I am trying to do, as indicated by the subtitle of the work before you, is to clarify the structure of a central part of Spinoza’s *Ethics*. If his system is presented as a vast circle, the central parts may be likened to the area of a smaller circle within the larger one. The different central parts of the *Ethics* are then parts within the smaller circle. How they should be conceived in their intimate relation to one another I do not pretend to know. The present study draws inspiration from the clearness and broadness of certain interconnections within the system. It does not pretend, however, to cover all central parts nor, of course, the system as a whole. Nevertheless, the system can be conceived adequately only as a *whole*. I shall assume that the reader has some very general conception of this whole, as I cannot furnish more detail within the confines of this study.

I

The Fundamental Dual Distinction: “In Itself” and “In Something Else”

Survey A

(“Add” preceding a survey entry marker denotes an addendum to the entry above it.)

- A₁ That which is, is either in itself or in something else.
- Add A₁ This is a rendering of the ontological IA₁. Later (in chapter 4), I shall take A₁ to mean “That which is, is either *totally* in itself or partly in itself and partly in something else.” The word *sunt* in *Omnia quae sunt* is open to various interpretations that I gloss over just now. Later, for instance, I shall be compelled to distinguish between “*x* exists” and “*x* is,” saying that that which is completely in itself does not exist, and that which exists is not completely in itself.
- A₂ That which is in itself is that which does not require something else in order to be.
- Add A₂ Ontological parallel to the mixed ontological-lambanological ID₃. In chapter 4, the following graded interpretations are adopted: “That which is totally in itself is that which does not at all require something else in order to be” and “That which is in itself in all relations is that which does not in any relation require something else in order to be.”
- A₃ That which is in something else is that which requires something else in order to be.
- Add A₃ From A₁ and A₂, using A₁₆. Ontological parallel to A₆. Interpretation to be introduced in chapter 4: “That which is partly in something else is that which requires something else in order

THE FUNDAMENTAL DUAL DISTINCTION

to be.” Similar interpretations are adopted in relation to A4 and A5. We say “in order to be” rather than “in order to exist,” taking “to be” as a wider property than “to exist” for the reasons stated in chapter 4.

A4 That which is, is in itself if it is not in something else.

Add A4 Ontological parallel to the lambanological IA2. Following Spinoza, we might reformulate A4 as “That which is must be in itself if it cannot be in something else.” Some logicians expect to clarify Spinoza’s thought by applying modal logic. However, I think the value of this approach is limited. Necessity is such a pervasive notion in the *Ethics* that it does not suggest fruitful contrasting properties within the system of theorems.

A5 That which is, is in something else if it is not in itself.

Add A5 Based on A4 and A1, that is, ultimately on IA1. It is doubtful that Spinoza tried to express anything special by giving IA2 a modal form. It seems that he might as well have given most or all other basic sentences that form. Thus, that which *is* in itself *must be* in itself, and *cannot be* in something else, it seems. IA1 might therefore have been formulated thus: “That which is either must be in itself or must be in something else.” Since the being of all things follows by necessity from God, IA1 might even be given the form: “That which *must be*, either *must be* in itself or *must be* in something else.” And A6 might be given the modal form: “That which must be, either must be conceived through itself or must be conceived through something else.” There seems to be no definite limit to this way of introducing modal terms. But the introduction of modal forms creates unnecessary logical complications. Therefore, in what follows, the modal versions are not listed independently of the nonmodal versions of theorems.

A6 That which is, is conceived either through itself or through something else.

Add A6 Lambanological parallel to IA1. In chapter 4, A6 is understood to mean “That which is, is conceived either totally through it-

self or partly through itself and partly through something else.”

It may be argued that there are many things that never happen to be conceived; for instance, many whirling snowflakes in the Antarctic. It may therefore be argued that that which is conceived, whether through itself or through something else, is only a minor part of that which is. Thus, A6 should read: “That which is *conceived*, is conceived either through itself or through something else.” If “*x* is conceived” is taken to be shorthand for “*x* is now at this moment actually conceived by at least one adult human being or by another kind of being capable of conceiving,” the reflection is valid. *Conceived*, however, should be viewed in a wide sense, closer to “conceived or conceivable.” Using this broad sense, we tentatively posit, “That which is, is conceived and that which is conceived, is.”

- A7 That which is conceived through itself is that which is such that its conception does not require any other conception in order to be formed.
- Add A7 Based on ID3. *Conception* is preferred to *concept* because of the static and conceptualistic associations of the latter term.
- A8 That which is conceived through something else is that which is such that its conception requires at least one other conception in order to be formed.
- Add A8 Formed from A6 and A7 using A1 (which is drawn from IA1).
- A9 That which is not conceived through something else is conceived through itself.
- Add A9 The lambanological parallel to IA2. The full importance of this axiom and the closeness of the relation between the lambanological and ontological aspects become apparent in IP8Sch2. Spinoza says that we can have true ideas about nonexistent things if and *only* if they require other conceptions through which they are conceived and these other conceptions refer to existing things. But we cannot have true ideas of a substance in

THE FUNDAMENTAL DUAL DISTINCTION

this way—to have those, we must be directly confronted with substance as it is. The truth of the idea can only be a reflection of this *confrontation* (cf. Edmund Husserl's account of our awareness of the validity of the principle of contradiction). "If therefore somebody would say that he has a clear and distinct, that is, true idea of a substance, and nevertheless doubts whether it is false . . . that would amount to at the same time saying that he had a true idea, but nevertheless doubted whether it was false. . . ." The confrontation implies an elimination of the distinction between the subject and the object of cognition: substance is conceived through itself, that is, without our forming an idea that copies or mirrors the properties of substance. No comparison of idea with *ideatum* is necessary. Falsehood is excluded a priori.

This interpretation of the conception of "that which *is in* and *is conceived through* itself" is the only one, so far as I can understand, that explains satisfactorily the fundamental parallelism between epistemology and ontology in the *Ethics*.

- A10 That which is not conceived through itself is conceived through something else.
- Add A10 Based on A9 (IA2) using A6.
- A11 That which is in itself is that which is such that its conception does not require any other conception in order to be formed.
- Add A11 Derived from definition ID₃ when the latter part of it is considered to be related to the whole expression "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself." Let us call it the holistic interpretation of the conjunction. This conjunction is found in many other places in the *Ethics*; see, for example, IP₂Dem and IP₁₅Dem.
- A12 That which is in something else is that which is such that its conception requires at least one conception of something else in order to be formed.
- Add A12 Derived from A1 and A11. See also IP₈Sch2, the sentence "*Per modificationes. . .*" Spinoza refers to other things in which a

thing may be, or through which it may be conceived. From the example offered of causes and also other features of the context and, of course, from the sentence "*Per modificationes. . .*" itself, I conclude that if x is in y or is conceived through y , y need not be God or substance. Two "in something else" relations must be distinguished: the (universal) relation of things in God, and the chain relations parallel to the cause-effect relations of being in something else.

- A13 That which is in itself is that which is conceived through itself.
- Add A13 From A7 and A11.
- A14 That which is in something else is that which is conceived through something else.
- Add A14 Derived from A8 and A12. Suggested by the second half of ID5.
- A15 That which is conceived through itself is that which does not require anything else in order to be.
- Add A15 Derived from A7 and A18.
- A16 That which is, either requires or does not require something else in order to be.
- Add A16 Ontological parallel to the lambanological A17. The importance of this and the following quasi tautology derives from their generality: "for anything whatsoever that is, it holds that . . ." This assertion of generality implies the meaningfulness or relevance of a distinction in *all* realms of that which there is.
- A17 That which is conceived either requires or does not require the conception of something else in order to be formed.
- Add A17 Lambanological parallel to the ontological A16, suggested by A7 and A8, together with A6.
- A18 That which does require something else in order to be is that which requires at least one conception of something else in order to be formed.

THE FUNDAMENTAL DUAL DISTINCTION

Add A18 An ontological-lambanological equivalence. Derived from A3 and A12.

Survey A Using Symbols

The foregoing theorems and what follows from them are more easily surveyed if certain symbols, made up from one or several capital letters, are introduced to designate properties or express concepts.

Symbols:

Single isolated letters have the following approximate meanings:

E	being (in a vague, inclusive sense) [from the Latin word <i>esse</i>]
N	not- [from Latin <i>non</i>]
S	itself [from Latin <i>se</i>]
A	something else [from Latin <i>alius</i>]
R	require something in order to something [from Latin <i>indiget</i>]
P	possibility, ability, power [from Latin <i>posse</i>]
C	conceive, understand [from Latin <i>concipere</i> , <i>intelligere</i>]

The symbols below, formed by joining two single capital-letter symbols, have the following meanings:

ES as in ES(x)	x is in itself <i>x in se est</i>
EA as in EA(x)	x is in something else <i>x in alio est</i>
CS as in CS(x)	x is conceived through itself <i>x per se concipitur</i>

RE as in RE(x)	x requires something else in order to be
CA as in CA(x)	x is conceived through something else
RC as in RC(x)	x requires another concept in order to be conceived

Spinoza sometimes uses the expression “not to be in itself” as at least extensionally equivalent to “to be in something else.” Perhaps he sometimes even uses the expressions as synonyms. To play it safe, I do not introduce “to be in something else” as simply the negation of “to be in itself.” There might be a third category depending on the interpretation of “to be” (*esse*). Consequently, I make use of a new symbol, EA, instead of just using -ES. (Negation, “it is not the case that . . .,” I symbolize by a closed-up minus sign.) Similarly, it is tempting to introduce “conceived through something else” by simply negating CS, that is, by -CS. I have used the separate symbol CA, however, for the same reason indicated above.

A note concerning “being in something else”: Things that are in something else are in God. This is stated explicitly in IP23Dem. Is this, however, the whole point about being in something else? If it were, one would usually expect Spinoza to write “being in God” instead of “being in something else”—hiding what this something always and invariably would have to be. It is my contention that what is referred to is not always God even when, of course, everything is always also in God. The completely general property of being in God does not exclude something also being in something other than God. The term *being* is used here in two different senses.

Thought and extension are different according to Spinoza. I will express thought as being something different and something other than extension. Both are in themselves and are conceived by themselves as attributes.

Now, motion is not in itself and conceived by itself according to Spinoza. Extension is conceived through itself and in itself, but not so motion; it is conceived through something else, and its conception involves extension. Motion, being conceived through something else, is in something else, if we use Spinoza’s conception of being in something else. Motion is in something else, namely, in extension. Motion is also in God, but, at least conceptually, extension is not the same as God.

Motion is not in the attribute thought. Although neither motion nor thought can be distinguished extensionally from God, both can be distinguished conceptually. This implies that the predicate “to be in something else” also applies to something different (at least conceptually) from God.

The conception of motion involves the conception of extension, but it also involves something more. If it did not, *only* motion could be involved in extension, since any other thing would then be conceptually indistinguishable from motion. If motion is to be differentiated from rest, and from other things conceptually dependent on motion, motion must be conceptually dependent on several conceptions, not just on extension. We are thus led to much more extensive and fruitful applications of the conception of “being in something else” than the merely repetitious “being in God.”

When two different things are completely understood and conceived through God, the formulation of the two conceptions cannot be identical. The second thing must be understood through something other than that through which the first thing is conceived. If when asking “How is this to be understood?” we always got the answer “Evidently, through God,” we would not be satisfied, nor would Spinoza.

The tremendous complexity of answers that Spinoza gives to questions of life and death, to questions of society and morals, is justified by a fundamental distinction between an understanding of something through God taken absolutely (*quatenus absolute consideratur*) and through God as affected some way or other (*quatenus aliquo modo affectus consideratur*).¹ God is also said to be modified by a verb corresponding to the noun *modus*. The difference between modes and God modified and affected in various ways is conceptual, not extensional. Thus, when something is in something else, namely, in God modified or affected in various ways, the something is in modes, and not only in God “considered absolutely.”

The understanding of the various human emotions gained in part III exemplifies conceptions through God because the emotions, or rather the human beings with emotions, are not completely in themselves but in something else—namely, God. Concretely, however, the understanding is described in terms of desire, appetite, acts, situations, personal developments, adequate and inadequate ideas, three kinds of human knowledge, and so on. That is, the modes or particular things are conceived through God as affected in various ways or, more explicitly, conceived through other modes or particular things.

The main thing to note in this work is that “in something else” (*in alio*) is used in a broad sense to do justice to both the relation between a particular thing and God taken absolutely and the relation between a particular thing and attributes, infinite modes, and (finite) particulars. In the latter cases, something may be conceived through a second thing, and therefore is in that thing, at the same time that this second thing is conceived through a third thing, and therefore be in that third thing. We thus have chains of relations corresponding through equivalences to the chains of cause and effect.

The following logical symbols are now introduced:

a	<i>aut</i> , the exclusive sense of “or”
∨	<i>vel</i> , the inclusive sense of “or”
&	conjunction “and”
⊃	material implication “if A then B”
~	mutual implication “if A then B and if B then A”
-	negation “not”
ekv	equivalence (“is extensionally equivalent to”)

Axiom 1 in part I of the *Ethics* (IA1), translated into English, reads, “All things that are, are in themselves or in something else.” Using our symbols, we write: $ES(x) \text{ a } EA(x)$. Because Spinoza routinely uses *vel* when *aut* would be closer to what he means, we must ask, Could there be an x such that it would be valid to say about this x : $ES(x) \& EA(x)$? If $ES(x)$ is taken to mean fully or completely in itself, such an x does not exist. I wish to let $ES(x)$ in this part of the reconstruction stand for just this extreme case. Therefore, in what follows, the axiom receives the form $ES(x) \text{ a } EA(x)$ or, in my shorthand, $ES \text{ a } EA$. The eighteen theorems of survey A can now be reformulated using my abbreviated logical formula as:

Survey A

SA1	ES a EA	IA1, ontological
SA2	ES ekv -RE	ontological parallel to SA11

THE FUNDAMENTAL DUAL DISTINCTION

SA ₃	EA ekv RE	from SA _{3a} and SA ₂ ; ontological parallel to SA ₆
SA ₄	ES \supset -EA	ontological parallel IA ₂
SA ₅	EA \supset -ES	based on SA ₄ and SA ₁
SA ₆	CS a CA	lambanological parallel to IA ₁
SA ₇	CS ekv -RE	based on ID ₃
SA ₈	CA ekv RE	from SA ₆ and SA ₇
SA ₉	-CA \supset CS	lambanological parallel IA ₂
SA ₁₀	-CS \supset CA	based on SA ₉ using SA ₆
SA ₁₁	ES ekv -RE	from ID ₃ , holistically interpreted (cf. A ₁₁)
SA ₁₂	EA ekv RE	from SA ₁ and SA ₁₁
SA ₁₃	ES ekv CS	from SA ₇ and SA ₁₁
SA ₁₄	EA ekv CA	from SA ₈ and SA ₁₂
SA ₁₅	CS ekv -RE	from SA ₇ and SA ₁₈
SA ₁₆	RE a -RE	their logical form reduces A ₁₆ and A ₁₇ to tautologies
SA ₁₇	RC a -RC	lambanological parallel to SA ₁₆
SA ₁₈	RE ekv RC	from SA ₃ and SA ₁₂

Note on the application of symbolic logic: On reading the above symbolic versions, one should have in mind how the symbols \vee , ekv, &, and so on are introduced in a good elementary textbook that avoids unnecessary philosophical commitments and, as a corollary, has only heuristic pretensions as to what is gained by the use of symbols. The symbols used here are not meant to be anything more than convenient tools.

When we write ES ekv -RE, we do not pretend to symbolize (1) what Spinoza means by “in itself” or (2) what Spinoza means by “require something else in order to be”; we are only trying to symbolize the relation be-

tween (1) and (2). There is no way of measuring the semantical distance between the meaning intended by Spinoza and that of a symbolic construction. The distance is one of many dimensions, none of which has any generally recognized measurable unit. Here only some elementary points will be mentioned:

1. In IA1, which says “That which is, is either in itself or in something else” (*Omnia, quae sunt, vel in se vel in alio sunt*), the expressions *omnia* and *sunt* permit various, significantly different interpretations (pending conclusive results of Spinoza research). In connection with universal and existential quantification, I have reasons for avoiding (until chapter 4) these terms, which are among the most slippery in Spinoza’s terminology. We have avoided $\gamma_3(x)$: $E_{sp}(x) \supset ES(x) \vee EA(x)$; “For all x it holds, as an assertion expressing cognition of the third kind, that if x is [in the sense of Spinoza’s *Ethics* IA1], then x is in itself or is in something else.” This would lead to a premature multiplication of concepts.

The false view that there is a systematic difference between “*vel . . . vel*” and “*aut . . . aut*” in Latin, such that “*vel . . . vel*” corresponds to “ \vee ” and “*aut . . . aut*” to “ \wedge ,” made it natural to symbolize the axioms by $ES \vee EA$ rather than by $ES \wedge EA$. But even if only a small bit of context is taken into account, evidence accumulates that “*a*” (*aut*) is nearer than “ \vee ” (*vel*) to the intended meaning (within the rather special dimension of differences of meaning, which is relevant to the distinction between exclusive and inclusive “or”).

2. In rendering IA1 by $ES \wedge EA$ rather than by (x) : $ES(x) \vee EA(x)$, we are deliberately simplifying matters by turning our attention away from the question of how wide the range of values of the predicates “in itself” (ES) and “in something else” (EA) should be, of how wide the class of existents is in Spinoza’s terminology, and of what class of *objects*, in a very wide sense of the word, is such that it suits the intended meaning of the general assertion made by Spinoza. We turn our attention away from questions of range, but the same questions of course relate to the formulas, even if we avoid symbols of quantification. Which are the ranges of the predicates? The question is left unanswered at this point.

There is little reason to expect that, for example, of the twenty most frequently used predicates in Spinoza's theorems, all have the same range of intended application or range of meaningfulness. I assume in what follows that IA₁ is intended to apply to a definite, very wide range, and that this holds for all others symbolized in this work (for example, "free"), and that this range is exactly the same for all. This, of course, introduces a major simplification, and in Spinoza studies simplifications should always be welcomed as long as they are explicitly formulated and not too ahistorical.

In light of the undetermined ranges of variables, a tautology such as RE a -RE (see SA16) is of interest because it says all x 's that make ES(x) and EA(x) meaningful also make RE(x) meaningful, and vice versa.

3. If Spinoza's text affords evidence that three complex sentences A , B , and C form fairly adequate symbolizations of three theorems of the *Ethics*, each considered in isolation from the context, or at least in isolation from the total context of Spinoza's works, logical calculi permit us to derive a number of consequences in an easily testable way. If, now, D is a consequence and D is found to form a fairly adequate symbolization of a theorem, or of a not entirely trivial sentence that intuitively, or according to a rather obvious nonformal chain of reasoning, may be derived from theorems, this discovery is of sufficient interest to be noted. If a logician were to say that this sentence is logically derivable from A , B , and C (which are in harmony with Spinoza's text), and you do not need to note that D stands in a satisfactory relation to the text of Spinoza, the logician would be overlooking the fact that all symbolization is purely hypothetical as regards adequacy, however well tested in a broader context. Any confirmation of our hypotheses should therefore be noted. That D is adequate confirms the symbolization of A , B , and C .

It must not be taken for granted that the often rather strange conclusions that formal logic permits to be drawn from a set of premises are fit to be included in our set of symbolizations of sentences that harmonize with Spinoza's text.

This long note on the use of symbolic logic might be shortened considerably if there were not a tendency to overestimate the philosophical consequence of its use. If a housewife writes ES for Ellen's

syrup and EA for Ellen's apples and uses + and = in her economic calculations, we do not scold her for not having at the same time decided exactly what to express by EA, ES, +, and = in terms of, let's say, chemistry and number theory. Using symbols when surveying the complicated structure of Spinoza's terms and propositions does not make it necessary at the same time to take up all kinds of problems connected with the interpretation of the logical symbols and the predicates symbolized by letters. Our use of symbolic logic is heuristic, not an attempt to philosophize beyond the scope of the nonsymbolic versions of our theorems.

On the other hand, we do not intend to minimize the importance of the problems created by our simplification. We will try to pick some of them up along the road. One of the most difficult tasks we face when forming an exposition of a part of Spinoza's philosophy is just to avoid trying to say all things at once.

II

Existence and Freedom

Spinoza makes extensive use of the distinction between inconceivable things in the sense of things that we cannot conceive as real, existing things, and things that conceivably exist but in fact may or may not exist. About the latter, Spinoza says that they can be conceived, first, both to be and not to be and, second, to exist and not to exist. In addition, there are things (in the extremely broad sense of “thing”) that cannot be conceived not to be. Things that are completely conceived through themselves cannot be conceived *not* to be. The way, and the only way, to conceive them is just to be confronted with them in the act of conception. They cannot be introduced into a discussion in the following way: “I shall now describe to you the essential properties of something, x , and let us then discuss whether it exists or not” (cf. IP8Sch2). If this kind of introduction were possible, this x would be conceivable by means of something else, namely, the description of a set of properties of x .

Some would say that a red hue is either conceived through itself or not conceived at all. Introducing a red hue through the concept of wavelength or use of a color atlas does not help if one does not also have a perfectly direct access to hues. Spinoza would perhaps not agree to this, but the *kind* of argument concerning red hue is analogous to that on substance. Either you grasp it directly, and then you of course cannot avoid attributing existence to it, or you do not grasp it. In that case you do not know what Spinoza is referring to. Either you accept that substance exists, or you do not know what to look for.

There is, as already mentioned, a minor terminological problem confronting us at the very outset: is Spinoza in such contexts talking about being in some broad sense or being in a narrow sense of existing (being at hand, being so that it can be found) or of being in other senses? It seems that he is considering “being” (*esse*) in a broad sense. It is confusing that he

sometimes uses the term *existere* rather than the term *esse*, which better lends itself to broad senses.

We shall, in spite of the too narrow concepts usually expressed by the term *to exist*, nevertheless regularly translate *existere* to *exist*. This means that in our reconstructions, *exist* sometimes expresses what we have already announced shall be expressed by *being* and by *is*. In our special terminology, what is completely conceived through itself does not exist, but *is*. But it is too complicated to consistently carry through this terminology in our translations of Spinoza.

Spinoza often uses *existere* in a way that implies actual existence, “to be there,” *da seiend* in German. He then contrasts this with being involved (*involut*). See, for example, his discussion of Euclid’s section 35 in book 3, IIP8Sch:

In a circle infinitely many equal rectangles are contained, and its idea *involves* all these rectangles. But they do not exist—“none of them may be said to exist.” Nor do we have any idea of them when we have an idea of the circle. But all the rectangles are nevertheless *involved* in the idea of the circle [my italics].

Survey B

- B₁ Something can either be conceived as nonexistent or cannot be conceived as nonexistent.
- Add B₁ This pretty vacant sentence introduces a new predicate “cannot be conceived as nonexistent.” It behaves as do the already introduced predicates “in itself,” “conceive through itself,” and so on, giving rise to a growing set of strict dichotomies parallel to the fundamental dual distinction. B₁ is only a postulation of the universal applicability of such a dichotomy.
- B₁ might be more carefully worded as follows: something can either both be conceived to be and be conceived not to be, or it cannot be conceived not to be. This version makes it clear that the possibility of something that *only* can be conceived not to be is left out.
- B₂ If something cannot be conceived as nonexistent, existence belongs to that without which that something cannot be conceived, and vice versa.

- Add B2 This theorem might be derived from B1 and “That which cannot be conceived as nonexistent can be and can only be conceived as existent” and “That which can only be conceived as existent exists.”

The expression “cannot be conceived except as existent” (*non potest concipi nisi existens*) occurs at the very beginning of the *Ethics*, defining “cause in itself.” In ID1 Spinoza speaks about something the *nature* of which cannot be conceived except as existent. If we take *nature* here not to be different from *essence* in IID2, it seems that if the nature of something cannot be conceived except as existent, then that something itself cannot be conceived except as existent. Therefore, for simplicity’s sake, *nature* or *essence* is not used in B1 and the propositions that follow (We do *not* say “The nature [essence] of that which is conceivable can either . . .”). The near synonymy of *nature* and *essence* in the kind of context studied here manifests itself in IP7Dem, where “*x* is a cause of itself” is equated with both “*x*’s essence necessarily involves existence” and “it belongs to the nature of *x* to exist.”

Preferring *is* to *exists*, we might phrase B2 as follows: if something cannot be conceived not to be, being belongs to that without which that something cannot be conceived, and vice versa.

- B3 If something can be conceived as nonexistent, existence does not belong to that without which that something cannot be conceived, and vice versa.

- Add B3 The expression “that which can be conceived as nonexistent” occurs in IA7. A little later it occurs in the treatment of the existence of God. Proposition B3 is derived in part from the definition of *essence* (IID2): “To the essence of a thing belongs, I say, that which, if given, the thing is necessarily posed [*ponitur*], and which, if not given [*sublato*], the thing is necessarily removed [*tollitur*].”

In the formulation of B3, “If something can be conceived as nonexistent, existence does not belong to *that without which . . .*,” the italicized part is a substitute for the phrase

EXISTENCE AND FREEDOM

its essence and is identical with the last part of the definition of essence, IID2.

- B4 If something can be conceived as nonexistent, it is conceived through something else, and vice versa.
- Add B4 The “something else” is God as modified or affected, somehow.
- B5 If something cannot be conceived as nonexistent, it is conceived through itself, and vice versa.
- Add B5–
B21 This and the following propositions, except B10, are derived from the foregoing propositions and A1–A18 in elementary ways. Those interested are referred to the right-hand column in the symbolic version of Survey B, p. 28.
- B6 If something can be conceived as nonexistent, it is conceived by something else, and vice versa.
- B7 If something cannot be conceived as nonexistent, it is in itself, and vice versa.
- B8 If something can be conceived as nonexistent, it requires the conception of something else in order to be conceived, and vice versa.
- B9 If something can be conceived as nonexistent, it requires something else in order to be, and vice versa.
- B10 If something is free, existence belongs to that without which it cannot be conceived, and vice versa.
- Add B10 The term *free* (*liber*) occurs for the first time in ID7. Something free is said to exist alone from (by force for) the necessity of its nature. Another characteristic is added (in the form of a conjunction). Each member may be taken as self-sufficient, and we choose the first. Eliminating *essence* for *nature*, we apply the definition of essence (IID2). This gives us B10.
- B11 If something is unfree, existence does not belong to that without which it cannot be conceived.

- Add B11 In part I, Spinoza uses *free* for “completely, absolutely free.” *Un-free* is then synonymous with “not completely, absolutely free.”
- B12 If something cannot be conceived as nonexistent, it is free, and vice versa.
- B13 That which is unfree is such that existence does not belong to that without which it cannot be conceived.
- B14 The free is that which is in itself.
- B15 The unfree is that which is in something else.
- B16 The free is that which is conceived through itself.
- B17 The unfree is that which is conceived through something else.
- B18 The free is that which does not require something else in order to exist.
- B19 That which is free is that which does not require the conception of something else in order to be conceived.
- Add B1–
B19 The availability of these theorems taken in isolation is doubtful and precarious to the modern mind. Intensive studies of scholastic and Aristotelian ontology are necessary, and even then, conclusions tend to differ dismally. The aim of our structural analysis at this point may be formulated quite simply as follows: to lessen the burden of understanding by pointing to properties that are easier to grasp and that are extensionally equivalent with the more difficult ones. The system of Spinoza is largely available on the extensional level. Complete understanding of connotations is perhaps beyond our capacities but also largely unnecessary for the application of his philosophy to the problems of human life.
- Most of these theorems are obvious derivations from a small set. Why then extend the exposition to such a length? Because careful and extensive derivation from propositions firmly based on the text of the *Ethics* reveals hidden structures and supports conclusions of importance to any coherent, understandable interpretation.

Survey B Using Symbols

New Symbols:

PCNE(x)	it is possible to conceive x as nonexistent
ENPC(x)	existence of x belongs to that without which x cannot be conceived
L(x)	x is free (<i>liber</i>)

Again, for the sake of brevity, we employ the abbreviated logical formulas.

Survey B

SB ₁	PCNE a -PCNE	cf. ES a -ES, CS a -CS, -RE a RE, etc.
SB ₂	-PCNE ekv ENPC	cf. ID ₁ , IP ₇ Dem, and IID ₂
SB ₃	PCNE ekv -ENPC	from SB ₂ ; cf. IA ₇ and IID ₂
SB _{3a}	ENPC ekv CS	from ID ₃ and IP ₇
SB ₄	PCNE ekv CA	logically derivable from SA ₆ , SB ₃ , and SB _{3a}
SB ₅	-PCNE ekv CS	logically derivable from SB ₂ and SB _{3a}
SB ₆	PCNE ekv EA	from SB ₄ and SA ₁₄
SB ₇	-PCNE ekv ES	from SB ₆ and SA ₁
SB ₈	PCNE ekv RC	from SB ₄ , SA ₈ , and SA ₁₈
SB ₉	PCNE ekv RE	from SB ₈ and SA ₁₈
SB ₁₀	L ekv ENPC	suggested by ID ₇ , IP ₇ , and IID ₂
SB ₁₁	-L ekv PCNE	from SB ₁₀ and SB ₃
SB ₁₂	L ekv -PCNE	from SB ₁₀ and SB ₂

Survey B Using Symbols

SB13	-L ekv -ENPC	from SB11 and SB3
SB14	L ekv ES	from SB7 and SB12
SB15	-L ekv EA	from SB14 and SA1
SB16	L ekv CS	from SB5 and SB12
SB17	-L ekv CA	from SB4 and SB11
SB18	L ekv -RE	from SB1, SB9, and SB12
SB19	L ekv -RC	from SB1, SB8, and SB12

III

Causation, Cognition, and Action

The Hypothesis of Cognitive-Causal Parallelism

In what follows I make use of a general *hypothesis of parallelism*:

If and only if y can be conceived through x , is x the cause of y ; and if and only if x is the cause of y , can y be conceived through x .

The parallelism between causing and the possibility of conceiving is based on the structural parallelism of theorems of causing and conceiving in Spinoza's text. In interpreting the formulation of the hypothesis in various directions, we have had seventeenth-century uses of the Latin *causa* in mind, not every modern use of *cause*.

It should also be borne in mind that the cognition in Spinoza is not the Platonic mirroring but a dynamic process not to be separated from action. The parallelism is therefore better characterized as lambanological-causal. We grasp and, when grasping, act as causes.

For certain classes of x and y , the hypothesis of parallelism is directly and strongly confirmed by references to places in the text of the *Ethics*; for other classes, there is confirmatory evidence of a more or less indirect character. For still others, there is neither direct confirmatory nor direct disconfirmatory evidence. This is the largest class, comprising relations between particular things different from persons. There is, taken all together, more support for the hypothesis than for its negation: "there are x 's and y 's such that although y can be conceived through x , x is *not* the cause of y ; and there are y 's and x 's such that although x is the cause of y , y cannot be conceived through x ."¹

It is not possible to subsume all occurrences of "adequate" (*adequatus*) conception or cognition and causation under a single concept. The particu-

lar concept that is preferred in what follows is directly supported by many passages, for instance by IIP29Sch:

I say expressly that the mind has no adequate but only confused cognition (*cognitio*) of itself, of its body, and of external bodies, when it perceives a thing in the common order of nature, that is, whenever it is determined externally, that is, by fortuitous circumstances, to turn its attention to this or that, and not when it is determined internally, that is, by turning its attention to many things at once, to understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions one to another.

From the above, I infer the following sufficient condition of adequate cognition and conception: A thing (*res*) is an object of adequate cognition and conception when it is conceived in relation to many things (*res*), and when agreements, differences, and oppositions have been noted. Sometimes, but not always, Spinoza uses *in part* (*ex parte*) as a synonym for *inadequate*. This is clear in IIP11Cor, in which he uses the expression “in part or inadequate.” This criterion is well suited as a description of cognition of the second kind (in the terminology of IIP49Sch2).

An example of adequate cognition is an act. It is internally determined and caused, whereas inadequate cognitions are externally determined and caused. That is, the cognizer is active in the former kind of situations and passive in the latter.

The emphasis on “many things” suggests the organic conception of nature. Particular things have internal relations to others in such a way that isolation and delimitation are more or less arbitrary. That a thing is only cognized “in part” should be interpreted as “only in parts of its relevant connections with others.” Particular things are only more or less arbitrarily (fortuitously) isolated parts of more comprehensive (also more or less fortuitously isolated) units, which together form total nature.

One special concept, ‘inadequacy of conception’, is based on this “partiality” relation, making it natural to say that we perceive a thing partially or, in other words, inadequately, *ex parte sive inadequate* (IIP11Cor). Inadequacy may certainly be interpreted in other directions, but the concept of partial perception will carry us quite far, and it has the merits of clarity and simplicity on its side.

If we take things to be thoroughly immersed in fields or structures of relations, we must recognize that any attempt to isolate or abstract from

these relations will result in some inadequacy in perceiving and conceiving things.

In what follows, “inadequate” is taken in an approximate sense of “taking things in isolation, one by one, as in the common order of nature.”² A somewhat more nuanced distinction will be introduced when the fundamental predicate is graded. A rather arbitrary isolation of a thing from internally related contexts may yield cognition that is good enough for certain purposes in limited practical situations. The central metaphysical importance of the awareness of arbitrariness does not exclude the central practical importance of isolation. This is one reason for stressing the adjective *partial* rather than *inadequate*. A partial conception of something may in a sense be just what is needed in a practical situation. I say “in a sense” because the awareness of the partiality and arbitrariness must somehow be required in order for so-called practical, everyday problems to be solved within the framework of the good life or the complexity of human social organization.

In what follows, “inadequate cause” is taken to be a partial cause. There is nothing wrong with inadequate causes—they are just not the total cause of anything! The problems confronting the interpretation of *inadequate* as applied to causes are considerably less heterogeneous than those applied to cognition. In the latter context, one must take up questions concerning inadequate *ideas*—a formidable nest of unsolved problems of interpretation and consistency.

Using the general hypothesis of cognitive-causal parallelism stated at the opening of this chapter, I shall now turn to a systematic presentation of some theorems.

Survey of Theorems

Causation, Understanding, and Existence

C1 If something is the adequate cause of something, the latter can be adequately conceived through the former.

Add C1 IA₄, IID₁, IID₂, IIP₁, and IIP₃.

As an example of positive evidence of C1, let us take IP₃Dem. Here, Spinoza wishes to demonstrate that if a thing *x* has nothing in common with a thing *y*, *x* cannot cause *y*. He uses IA₅, from which he infers that if

x has nothing in common with y , y cannot be intelligently understood through x . The lack of understandability he then takes as proof of lack of causality. He also uses IA₄, saying that the conception of the effect depends on and involves the conception of the cause. Thus, we may rely on a criterion “ x is not the cause of y ,” namely, “ y cannot be understood through x ,” and vice versa.

In order to tackle one difficulty at a time, I frequently use the term *adequately conceived* to cover the terms *understood* and *adequately understood* (Latin terms: *concipere*, *intelligere*). We take “ x is conceived” to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of “ x is understood,” elevating “understanding” to a higher level. The term *conceived*, already used in chapters 1 and 2, we shall interpret in chapter 3 to mean “adequately conceived.” Thus, when making use of, for example, A10, we take it to be synonymous with “What cannot be *adequately* conceived through (itself plus) something else. . . .”

In IIID₁, both *percipi* and *intelligi* are used. It is not difficult to find reasons for *percipi* meaning something different from *concipi* here, but the system of Spinoza seems to require that *concipi* might have been used in IIID₁.³

I have therefore retained the old terminology from chapter 2, using the term *conceive*.

- C₂ If something can be adequately conceived through something, the latter is an adequate cause of the former.

- Add C₂ This is only the converse of C₁. In its generality, it cannot be based on any explicit proposition of the *Ethics*. However, C₂ does not contradict any such proposition. Moreover, the negation of C₂ would lead to inconsistencies or unanswerable problems.⁴ The absence of a possibility of understanding is taken to be a sufficient condition for the absence of a causal relation.

- C₃ That which is an adequate cause of something is something through which that thing can be adequately conceived, and vice versa.

- Add C₃ From C₁ and C₂. The phrase *and vice versa* is added to eliminate an important ambiguity. The ambiguity often makes itself felt when Spinoza says that something, A , *is* something else, namely, B . Is B in such cases also A ?

The modal expression “can be conceived” is used, but later we will use the simpler “is conceived.” We write “an adequate cause” rather than “the adequate cause,” because we will not exclude the possibility of there being many adequate causes. Some causes may be reduced to others. For instance, *A* and *B* might both be adequate causes of *C*, but only *A* might also be an adequate cause of *B*. Then we may say that cause *B* of *C* can be reduced to cause *A*, or *A* to *B*. Here only one of the two is sufficient to be taken as an adequate cause. In other cases, no such reduction of two to one might be possible.

In C1–C3, “cause” is meant to be taken in a wide sense to cover many important subclasses of causes.⁵ This also makes it prudent not to postulate that if *A* is an adequate cause of *B*, then it is the only one (even at the level of connotations). God or substance is always an adequate cause of each and every thing, but as we shall see, a person may also be an adequate cause of something. This suggests that when cause is taken in a sufficiently wide sense, there may be two adequate causes of something. It is unlikely that we can fully understand what Spinoza personally meant by *causa*.

- C4 If something is an inadequate cause of something else, the latter can only be inadequately conceived through the former.
- Add C4 Suggested by IIID1. Instead of *inadequate*, we might say *partial*, *ex parte* (IIP11Cor). In the long run, the part/whole distinction seems to offer the most coherent versions of Spinoza’s system. It is also more understandable or accessible for contemporary readers.
- C5 If something can be inadequately or partially conceived through something else, the latter is an inadequate or partial cause of the former.
- Add C5 The term *partial cause* occurs in the last phrase of IIID2. By analogy, we introduce “partially” and “inadequately” conceived.
- C6 That which is an inadequate cause of something is something through which that something can be inadequately conceived, and vice versa.

CAUSATION, COGNITION, AND ACTION

- Add C6 From C4 and C5.
- C7 If something is the adequate cause of itself, it is (adequately) understood through itself.
- Add C7 As a particular case, where the two somethings *x* and *y* of previous propositions concerning “*x* causes *y*” are the same, we arrive at the notion of *causa sui*. As a corollary we construct a notion “*x* conceived by *x*” (*conceptus sui*—if we permit ourselves to form our own Latin). By means of ID1 and IID1, we make a connection between “adequate causation” and “conceived through itself.”
- C8 If something is understood through itself, it is the adequate cause of itself.
- Add C8 Modal version: if something is capable of being understood through itself, it is the adequate cause of itself.
- C9 An adequate cause of itself is something that is (adequately) understood through itself, and vice versa. (So much for parallelism between causation and conceiving!)
- C10 If something is adequately caused by itself, existence belongs to that without which it cannot be conceived, and vice versa.
- Add C10 According to ID1, “*x* adequately causes *x*” is equivalent to “the nature of *x* cannot be conceived except as existent.” Using the definition of essence (IID2), we reformulate this as “existence belongs to that without which *x* cannot be adequately conceived.” This property has already been introduced in chapter 2. Thus, we are entitled to base C10 on ID1 and IID2.

By means of these propositions, causation and understanding are connected with notions previously introduced. It is therefore easy to derive many propositions of interest by cross-references. As it is more convenient to survey the relation when certain symbols are introduced, a sample of such propositions will only be formulated in their symbolic form.

Activeness

Activeness is so central to Spinoza's world outlook that it should be formally introduced in our reconstruction as early as possible.

A free thing is said, in ID7, to be one that is determined to act (*agere*) or, rather, to be active solely through or from or by itself (*a se sola ad agendum determinatur*). The supplement *be active* is crucial because, according to Spinoza, emotions are forms of *agere*, although scarcely actions in any standard use of *to act*.

Surveying the applications of the term *to be active* (*agere*), we may safely link it to activeness in a wide, positive ("metaphysical") sense, with *being passive* (*pati*), being acted on, sometimes as its opposite, sometimes as a particular way of *agere*, namely, the *more or less* passive way (IIID2, IIIP1, IVP2).

We should not expect these terms to behave exactly as *to be active* and *to be passive* do in current everyday usage. *Agere* is used as part of the technical vocabulary of the system, and it applies to all living things, perhaps all particular things whatsoever. I use it in relation to all living beings in my reconstruction.

The numbering of theorems in the following shows lacunae that are eliminated in the symbolic version, which also introduces some less interesting but necessary propositions. We shall now link "to be active" with "to cause," taking IIID2 as a starting point.

- C30 If x causes y adequately, x is completely (wholly) active in relation to y .
- C32 If x is completely (wholly) active in relation to y , x causes y adequately.
- C34 If something is completely active, it is always an adequate cause, and vice versa.
- C36 If y is understood through x , then x is completely active in relation to y , and vice versa.
- Add C36 From the extensional equivalence of causation and understanding we thus derive an extensional equivalence between "being completely active" and "understanding" (in relation to something).

The above theorems map out the fundamental structural relations of causation, activeness, and understanding.

Even though it is not part of our reconstruction, it is difficult to avoid giving at least a tentative answer to a burning question of content: what would be a typical attitude or behavior such that Spinoza would say it manifests those structures?

Suppose a person makes a hat from leaves and places it on his head. The making of the hat and the covering of the head might be understood (or completely conceived) through him, that is, knowing his personal inclinations and purposes. In this case, he adequately causes the hat and covering to exist, and he is completely active in relation to the hatmaking and covering of his head. This is not the same, however, as to assert sweepingly that a hat in all its total relations to other things is completely conceivable through the hatmaker. We are talking only about a particular event. The hat is an extremely complex phenomenon—as all natural objects are unfathomable and give unlimited opportunities for research. What was said above has to do with particular, temporal acts of the hatmaker and the effects of these acts.

Similar remarks are relevant to causing as it relates to conceiving. Another example: The engineer, having designed and erected an enormous tower as part of the equipment for transporting electricity, is highly active in relation to the tower and a wider field of relations involving the tower. However, the division of labor atomizes and makes highly abstract and incomplete the technical creations. Here, of course, one may dive into the philosophy of labor as developed by Hegel, Marx, and others and connect Spinoza with the deep ecology movement (Naess 1973 [in SWAN XI]).

The complete activeness of a person's relation to nonliving things is relatively unproblematic. On the other hand, we can scarcely say that a person *A* can be completely active in all relations to another, *B*. *A* cannot possibly be the total cause of *B* as long as *B* retains his personhood, and *B* could not possibly be fully conceived through *A*.

All particular things have an essence; they are not "completely in something else." Can *A*, however, totally cause the essence of *B* if *B* is not a person? This seems to be the case. People do make new things (but not natural objects!). After something is made, it has an existing essence and it may cause still more things. Counter to this it may be argued that a particular thing *in extenso* is only partially made by man. He does not *create* particu-

lar things. “A causes B totally” may tentatively be limited to aspects or properties or partial relations of things, if A is not God.

Sub specie aeternitatis, only substance or God is the adequate cause, but this reflection does not concern us here. We are, in taking God into account, concerned by God “insofar” or “as (*quatenus*) affected by something.” This is one of the reasons that we do not introduce the term *God (Deus)*.

So much for adequate or total relations. Considerations of symmetry speak strongly in favor of linking partial activeness with partial causing and partial conceiving.

- C39 If x is an inadequate or partial cause of y , x is partially active in relation to y .
- C40 If x is only partially active in relation to y , x is an inadequate or partial cause of y .
- Add C40 Spinoza’s system does not contain any notion of complete passivity, that is, passivity in all relations. From theorems C39 and C40 we may infer that passivity for Spinoza is a low grade of activeness, not the absence of it. In some relations, particular things may be completely active and in others, completely passive.

Human Beings as Part of Something Else

Spinoza stresses the fundamental characteristic of a person as one particular among other particulars. He also stresses the infinitesimal smallness of an individual’s power in relation to that of the rest of the field of particulars—nature as a whole—and he dwells on the slavery of the immature person under the passive emotions. The following theorems give expression to the location of human beings among those things that are in something else, that are conceived through something else, and so on.

- C43 If x is a person, x is in something else.
- C45 If x is a person, x is conceived through something else.
- C47 If x is a person, x can be conceived as nonexistent.

A person is part of something, and personal identity is relational. Human beings are not part of something in the same way that quartz crystals are part of sand, but rather in the way that oxygen is part of water. Human beings exist *in* the personal relations, as a changing center of interactions in a field of relations. Human beings are not an ultimate constituent of anything. Neither human beings nor the things they relate to exist, as such, apart from these relations. The relata exist only in the relation. This is, briefly, the *relationism* of Spinoza.

Some of the personal relations are such that through them human beings can be said to cause adequately, to conceive adequately, and to act in a given situation without any ingredient of passivity.

On the basis of such considerations, an account of personal identity may be tentatively constructed. After all, it is scarcely an absolute, timeless identity we seek, but something slightly less ambitious. Ruth Saw (1969) seems to find difficulty in giving an account of personal identity in the sphere of extension, but the flame of a candle burning in quiet air provides a good model of "identity in interaction." The particles that move rapidly upward do not define the flame in spite of its being made up from these particles (according to Spinoza and others). A person can be conceived to have the flame aspect extensionally and the unified-soul aspect nonextensionally. This brings us to the brighter side of Spinoza's teaching: human beings do not always in all relations cause or conceive something only partially.

C52 Every human being conceives something adequately.

According to IIP47, human beings have an adequate conception of God's essence. From previous propositions used in proving IIP47, it can be shown that Spinoza also acknowledges other adequate conceptions that are not peculiar to privileged persons but belong to all of us. Thus, there are "common" adequate ideas (IIP38, IIP38Cor). Further, the proof of IIIP1 opens with "Of the ideas of the human mind, some are adequate, others fragmentary and confused."

C54 Every human being causes something adequately.

When a human being conceives something adequately, he ipso facto causes something adequately according to our hypothesis of parallelism

(C2). The theorem is further supported by the doctrine of man's *active* emotions. We are their adequate causes (cf. IIID3, italicized addendum).

Thus, even though human beings start low on their road to freedom, as more or less slaves of passive emotions, they have the necessary causal and cognitive endowment to crawl upward. There are no emotions (according to VP4Cor) from which we cannot form an adequate idea. They all can develop into active emotions.

Instead of "human being" in C52 and C54 one might write "adult human being," taking account of Spinoza's view of children. In his discussion of the stone that believes it is falling from free choice (*Letter* 58), Spinoza seems to take the level of freedom of small children to be somewhere between that of a stone and that of adults.

From the assertion that a human being is sometimes an adequate cause of something, and thus that something can be adequately understood through him, we may infer that in certain relations human beings are *in se*, not *in alio*. In these limited relations or, better, interactions, man has a god-like ontological status that Spinoza does not stress in spite of its existence as a requirement of his system. The interdependence of God or substance and the modes may also be argued forcefully in this connection: When I am an adequate cause of an action, it can be fully understood through me. I am "*in se*," "independent of anything else," and thus, in this relation, like God. The act cannot be, nor be understood, without me. It is "*in me*."

Without the act, without the medium, I cannot be, nor be understood, even in this relation. Thus, I am *in one important sense* always dependent on something else. Unlike God, that is, the totality? No. The same holds for God or substance. Without the mode, nothing is left of God or substance. It is an unavoidable consequence of the principle of immanence.⁶

Survey C Using Symbols

New Characters in Symbols:

H	person, <i>homo</i> , <i>nos</i>
Ad	adequate
In	inadequate

New Symbols:

$D(xy)$	x is a cause of y , adequate or inadequate, partly or totally
$InD(xy)$	x is an inadequate cause of y , x is partly a cause of y
$AdD(xy)$	x is a cause of y , and not inadequately; x is an adequate cause of y , x is a total cause of y
$C(xy)$	through x , y is conceived in part or in toto, adequately or inadequately
$InC(xy)$	through x , y is conceived in part or inadequately
$AdC(xy)$	through x , y is conceived, and not inadequately, but adequately; through x , y is adequately conceived
$G(xy)$	x is active in relation to y , adequately or inadequately, partly or totally
$InG(xy)$	x is passive in relation to y ; x is inadequately (only partly) active in relation to y
$AdG(xy)$	x is adequately or totally active in relation to y
$H(x)$	x is a person
$E(xy)$	x is in y

To avoid the unrewarding complexity of modal logic, we do not picture the “can” in “can be conceived” in our symbols, writing $C(xy)$ indiscriminately for “through x , y is in fact conceived” and “through x , y can be conceived.” If “in fact” is taken in a purely realistic way, no causation between x and y occurs in nature except when there is somebody who actually conceives y through x . This is a drastic kind of “idealism” foreign to Spinoza.

For the sake of simplicity, I use only the two variables x and y . A third variable would help in making the symbolization more adequate: $AdD(xyz)$ — “ x is an adequate or total cause of y in situation (context, relation) z .” When a person does something freely, he causes something adequately, but it happens within a context, not in complete generality. One might, of course, define the two-valued D in such a way that the context is

included as a conceptual characteristic, making y limited to context; but that is terminologically awkward. Introducing this third variable will be convenient in certain later sections.

Survey C

The first nine theorems concern the relations between causality and understanding.

SC ₁	$\text{AdD}(xy) \supset \text{AdC}(xy)$	Based on the first part of IIID ₁ and on IP ₃ Dem. "If something causes something else adequately, the latter is conceived, and not inadequately, through the first." "If x is an adequate cause of y , y is adequately conceived through x ."
SC ₂	$\text{AdC}(xy) \supset \text{AdD}(xy)$	Based on IIID ₁ , first part. "If something is conceived adequately through something else, the latter causes the former adequately." "If y is adequately conceived through x , x is an adequate cause of y ."
SC ₃	$\text{AdD}(xy) \sim \text{AdC}(xy)$	From SC ₁ and SC ₂ . Based on IIID ₁ , first part. "There is mutual implication between adequate causation and adequate conception."
SC ₄	$\text{InD}(xy) \supset \text{InC}(xy)$	Based on the second part of IIID ₁ . "If x is a partial cause of y , y is conceived in part through x ."
SC ₅	$\text{InC}(xy) \supset \text{InD}(xy)$	Based on the second part of IIID ₁ . "If y is in part conceived through x , x is a partial cause of y ."

CAUSATION, COGNITION, AND ACTION

SC6	$\text{InD}(xy) \sim \text{InC}(xy)$	From SC4 and SC5. Based on IID1, second part. "There is mutual implication between causation (<i>ex parte seu inadequate</i>), and conception (<i>ex parte seu inadequate</i>)."
SC7	$\text{AdD}(xx) \supset \text{AdC}(xx)$	From SC1. Cf. ID1 and IID1. "If something causes itself adequately, this something is conceived adequately through itself."
SC8	$\text{AdC}(xx) \supset \text{AdD}(xx)$	From SC2. Cf. ID1 and IID1. "If something is conceived adequately through itself, and not part of it, this something is its own adequate cause."
SC9	$\text{AdD}(xx) \sim \text{AdC}(xx)$	From SC7 and SC8. "There is mutual implication between self-causation and self-conception."

The next twenty theorems (SC10 through SC29) concern the relations that connect causality and understanding to various factors already introduced in chapters 1 and 2.

SC10	$\text{AdD}(xx) \sim \text{ENPC}(x)$	From ID1. "If something is an adequate cause of itself, then existence belongs to that without which it cannot be conceived, and vice versa." "That which causes itself cannot be conceived as nonexistent."
SC11	$\text{AdC}(xx) \sim \text{ENPC}(x)$	From SC10 and SC9. "If something can be conceived through itself, then existence be-

longs to that without which it cannot be conceived, and vice versa.”
 “That which is adequately conceived through itself, is such that it cannot be conceived as nonexistent, and vice versa.”

The symbolic versions of the theorems make certain structural relations clear and explicit. When it comes to “translating” them into words, however, a great variety of questions arises. Apart from ambiguities and differences in preciseness, there are important hermeneutical questions involved in the translations. I have not tried to standardize translations. On the contrary, I have tried to exhibit the great range of wordings that suggest themselves. Part of the value of the symbolization derives from the fact that *only* certain structures are made (visually) manifest; that is, certain internal relations between clusters of terms, notions, and theorems.

Exactly analogous pairs of relations to the pair SC₁₀ and SC₁₁ hold with regard to the five predicates -PCNE, ES, -RE, CS, and -RC. We shall refer to them as SC₁₂–SC₂₁. The six predicates were introduced in chapters 1 and 2 as absolutes characterizing God and substance. Thus, ES(x) would mean the same as “AdES(x),” not “AdES(x) or InES(x).”

SC ₂₂	AdD(xx) ~ AdL(x)	From SC ₁₀ and SB ₁₀ . “If something is an adequate cause of itself, it is completely free, and vice versa.”
SC ₂₃	AdC(xx) ~ AdL(x)	From SC ₁₁ and SB ₁₀ . “If something is adequately conceived through itself, it is completely free, and vice versa.”
SC ₂₄	InD(xx) ~ -ENPC(x)	From SC ₁₀ . “If a thing is only inadequately a cause of itself, existence does not belong to that without which it cannot be conceived, and vice versa.”

CAUSATION, COGNITION, AND ACTION

SC25	$\text{InC}(xx) \sim \text{-ENPC}(x)$	From SC2.4 and SC6. "If a thing is only inadequately conceived through itself, existence does not belong to that without which it cannot be conceived, and vice versa." Similar pairs of relations are obtained with regard to PCNE, EA, RE, CA, and RC.
SC26	$\text{InD}(xx) \sim \text{PCNE}(x)$	From SC12. "If a thing is only in part a cause of itself, it can be conceived as nonexistent, and vice versa."
SC27	$\text{InD}(xx) \sim \text{EA}(x)$	From SC2.4 and SB6. "If a thing is only inadequately a cause of itself, it is in something else, and vice versa."
SC28	$\text{InD}(xx) \sim \text{InL}(x)$	From SC22. "If something causes itself only partially, it is only partially free, and vice versa."
SC29	$\text{InC}(xx) \sim \text{InL}(x)$	From SC28 and SC6. "If a thing is only in part conceived through itself, it is only in part free, and vice versa."

The next thirteen theorems have to do with activeness, especially the important parallelism between being active and understanding.

SC30	$\text{AdD}(xy) \supset \text{AdG}(xy)$	From generalizing IIID2, first part. "If something adequately causes something, it is adequately active in relation to it."
------	---	--

SC ₃₁	$H(x) \& AdD(xy)$ $\supset AdG(xy)$	Suggested by IIID ₂ , first part. Logically derivable from SC ₃₀ . "If a person is the full cause of something, he is fully active in relation to it."
SC ₃₂	$AdG(xy) \supset AdD(xy)$	Suggested by generalizing IIID ₂ , first part. "If something is fully active in relation to something else, it adequately causes it."
SC ₃₃	$H(x) \& AdG(xy)$ $\supset AdD(xy)$	Logically derivable from SC ₃₂ . "If a person is completely active in relation to something, he causes it adequately."
SC ₃₄	$AdG(xy) \sim AdD(xy)$	From SC ₃₀ and SC ₃₂ . "If a thing is fully active in relation to something, it causes it adequately."
SC ₃₅	$H(x) \& AdG(xy)$ $\sim AdD(xy)$	Logically derivable from SC ₃₄ . "If a person is fully active in relation to something, he causes it adequately, and if he thus causes a thing, he is fully active in relation to it."
SC ₃₆	$AdC(xy) \sim AdG(xy)$	Suggested by IIID ₂ , second part. Logically derivable from SC ₃ and SC ₃₄ . "If something is adequately conceived through something else, the latter is adequately active relative to the former, and vice versa."
SC ₃₇	$H(x) \& AdC(xy)$ $\sim AdG(xy)$	Logically derivable from SC ₃₆ . "If something is adequately conceived through a person, this person is adequately active relative to it, and vice versa."

CAUSATION, COGNITION, AND ACTION

SC ₃₈	$CS(xy) \sim AdG(xy)$	From SC ₃₆ . "To understand something through oneself implies being active toward this something, and vice versa."
SC ₃₉	$InD(xy) \supset InG(xy)$	Suggested by IIID ₂ , second part. "If a thing is partly a cause of something, it is partly active in relation to it."
SC ₄₀	$InG(xy) \supset InD(xy)$	Suggested by IIID ₂ , second part. "If a thing is only inadequately active in relation to something, it is only inadequately its cause."
SC ₄₁	$InG(xy) \sim InD(xy)$	From SC ₃₉ and SC ₄₀ . Based on IIID ₂ , second part. "To be partly active in a relation and to be a partial cause mutually imply each other."
SC ₄₂	$InG(xy) \sim InC(xy)$	From SC ₃₉ and SC ₆ . "If something is only partly active in relation to something, the latter is inadequately conceived through the former."

The next nine theorems (SC₄₃ through SC₅₁) concern human smallness as a prelude to the assessment of human greatness—a greatness, however, that must share in some important ways with every particular thing.

SC ₄₃	$H(x) \supset EA(x)$	A person is a <i>modus</i> (IIP10Cor), and a <i>modus</i> is something in something else. Cf. ID ₅ . "A person is something that is in something else."
SC ₄₄	$H(x) \supset -AdES(x)$	From SA ₁ and SC ₄₃ . "A person is not something that is totally in itself."

SC ₄₅	$H(x) \supset CA(x)$	From SC ₄₃ and SA ₁₄ . Suggested by ID ₅ and by the notion of a person as a <i>modus</i> . "A person is conceived through something else."
SC ₄₆	$H(x) \supset \neg AdCS(x)$	From SC ₄₅ and SA ₆ . "A person is not conceived totally through itself."
SC ₄₇	$H(x) \supset PCNE(x)$	From SC ₄₃ and SB ₆ . "A person can be conceived not to exist."
SC ₄₈	$H(x) \supset \neg ENPC(x)$	Suggested by IIA ₁ and IID ₂ . Logically derivable from SC ₄₇ and SB ₃ . "It is not so that human existence belongs to that without which a person cannot be conceived."
SC ₄₉	$H(x) \supset \neg AdL(x)$	From SC ₄₈ and SB ₁₃ . "No person is totally free."
SC ₅₀	$H(x) \supset RE(x)$	From SC ₄₇ and SB ₉ . "A person requires something else in order to exist."
SC ₅₁	$H(x) \supset RC(x)$	From SC ₄₇ and SB ₈ . "In order to be conceived, a person requires the conception of something else."

All these theorems on the smallness or limitations of human beings presuppose the absoluteness of the dichotomies in part I of the *Ethics*. They also presuppose the cleavage straight under the absolute maximum of a predicate: "being in oneself" and "free" are synonymous with "being completely, absolutely in oneself" and "being completely, absolutely free," whereas the least bit of being in something else or being a trifle less free than Spinoza's God immediately pulls a thing down into the region of "being in something else" and "being not free." In the rest of the *Ethics*, however, the dichotomies of part I are mollified.

The following theorems take their point of departure from the very last theorem of part I. That theorem leads us to theorems that mitigate the limitations of man. We are able to cause, act, and conceive adequately.

SC₅₂ $(x) (\exists y) \text{AdD}(xy)$ From IP₃₆.
"Every single particular thing
causes something adequately."

Theorem SC₅₂ will later be used to support a series of nonevident theorems. Its basic position in the system is well formulated by Spinoza's proof of IP₃₆:

Each and every existing thing [*quicquid existit*] expresses God's nature or essence in a certain determinate way (by P_{25C}), that is (by P₃₄), each and every existing thing expresses God's power, which is the cause of all things. Therefore (by P₁₆), there must follow some effect from everything that exists.

If each thing has at least one effect, each causes at least one thing, and it causes this thing adequately. SC₅₂ is a central theorem that, together with the quoted proof, determines a substantial part of Spinoza's *Ethics*.

Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens: non vero transiens (IP₁₈). It is important to note that God's role as the cause of all things does not preclude an infinite number of particular things also causing an infinite many things. God is immanent in them, and what he causes cannot be distinguished except conceptually from what the particular things cause.⁷ He is, in a sense, helpless without particulars!

Since God is immanent, he did not create the particulars nor did he cause them to exist in the sense of bringing them into existence; and there is nothing special in the particulars that reveals the finger of God. He is completely traceless, because a trace is something in something else. There is nothing, however, that does not express God's power, therefore nothing in which to form a trace; all the traces are of particulars.

SC₅₃ $(x) (\exists y) \text{AdG}(xy)$ From SC₅₂ and SC₃₄. Suggested
by IIIP₆Dem.
"Every particular thing is fully,
adequately active in relation to at
least one thing."

In IIP6Dem, it is said that God *acts* through each particular thing. When God expresses himself, he does not do so by means *of*, but *through*, the modes. No other way of expression is mentioned in the *Ethics*. All modes *are* such expressions.

In IIP6Dem, the process of expression may be said to be explained or elucidated by the statement that God *is* and *acts* through particulars. It is an admirable way of formulating the immanence of God. Since God is not different from substance, the activeness of substance is fully contained in, and dependent on, the activeness of modes. Theorems SC52 and SC53 assert something about particular things, not about any thing (*res*) whatsoever. The symbolic form does not take that into account. It could be done by introducing a predicate $\text{Par}(x)$. SC53 would then run as follows: $(x) (\exists y) \text{Par}(x) \supset \text{AdG}(xy)$. For the sake of simplicity I have omitted such a predicate.

SC54	$(x) (\exists y): H(x) \ \& \ \text{AdD}(xy)$	From SC52. "Every person causes something adequately."
SC55	$(x) (\exists y): H(x) \supset \text{AdG}(xy)$	From SC53. "Every person is completely active in at least one relation."
SC56	$(x) (\exists y) \text{AdC}(xy)$	From SC52 and SC3. "Everything is such that there is at least one thing that is adequately conceived through it."

IV

Grading Basic Distinctions

Survey D

Freedom: A Matter of Degree

In part I of the *Ethics*, Spinoza introduces a series of predicates: “in itself,” “conceived through itself,” and others. There is no gradation or qualification, but neither are there any explicit attacks on gradualism. In later parts, however, some of the same predicate words express graded predicates, or they appear with other qualifications that rule out the view that they represent absolute dichotomies. In what follows we shall refer to such deabsolutizing as forms of “grading” in a wide sense.

Thus, in IVP₅₉Dem and IVApp₃₁, perfection is graded. Man is capable of increasing his degree of perfection. In IVP₇₃Dem, the expression “freer” (*liberius*) is used. Man is capable of living *freer*, in *greater* freedom.¹ The theorem itself contains the expression “more free” (*magis liber*): “The rational man [*homo qui ratione ducitur*] is more free in a state . . . than alone.” We may also use degree of freedom to reflect variations in relation to circumstances: “[I]nsofar as he endeavors to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good. . . .”

In *Letter 21*, there is another occurrence of grading: “The external factor is the element of coercion, the inner factor is the factor of freedom—the more the latter predominates, the more free we are [*eo liberiores simus*].” In *Notes to the Theological-Political Tract*, we find several occurrences: “In whatever state a human being may be, he can be free. For certainly, man is to that extent free, to which he follows reason [*eatenus liber est, quatenus ratione ducitur*]. . . . [T]he more man is led by reason, that is, the more he is free” (*Adnotatio 33*). Similar occurrences are found in the *Political Treatise*.

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

In parts III, IV, and V of the *Ethics*, the free man is sometimes characterized by words reserved in part I for God and substance. One might infer from this that the free man is a kind of transcendental ideal, never to be reached. But from many propositions it is clear that there are free men. As regards the basic *in se* predicates, several are applied to the free man, and many other predicates linked to them by equivalences are used in prominent theorems.

From the mutual implications of theorems on freedom and theorems on being in oneself, having power, being adequate cause, and so on, the grading of freedom implies grading of the other *in se* and *in alio* predicates.

Let us for a moment consider what would follow if we make the assumption that in the later parts of the *Ethics* Spinoza uses the absolutist dichotomies of part I. The free man is characterized by his "acting out of the laws of his own particular nature" (*ex legibus propriae naturae agere*; see IVP24Dem), and by his "doing what follows necessarily from his nature" (cf. IVP24, IVP26Dem). The free man acts out of virtue: that is, he performs actions that can be understood from the laws of man's nature alone. This implies that the free man can be adequately conceived by himself, which in turn makes man, according to Spinoza's own teaching in part I, a substance. Ultimately, this implies that each man is God himself. The famous prelude of the fifth part (*Transeo tandem ad alteram Ethices partem . . . , quae ad Libertatem ducit*) could be interpreted as a prelude to a treatise on how to become God. Part V would have to be interpreted as a description of how to reach *absolute* freedom by a sudden metaphysical jump from absolute slavishness (lack of freedom) to the divine level of liberty.

These consequences of extending the absolute dichotomies of part I into parts IV and V are clearly un-Spinozistic. Man is neither an absolute slave nor God. Spinoza's description of the free man can be made consistent with man being different from God and substance by introducing three levels of freedom, power, and other characteristics that are predicated both of God and of men. The levels can be conceived as that of absolute absence of a predicate, limited possession of it, and absolute, unlimited presence. Thus, there is a grading involved. Our reconstruction makes use of *the principle of grading the basic predicates*.

Men participate more or less in freedom, or they are more or less free, because they are more or less reasonable. The more we go into the details of

Spinoza's descriptions of free and unfree man, the more dimensions we see of this freedom. Not only is the simple dichotomy of free versus unfree incompatible, but there are also several dimensions to be distinguished in defining each level.

Tentative definition: a predicate shall be said to be graded if it holds more or less, in some but not all respects, in some but not all situations, sometimes but not always, partially but not totally, in some relations but not in all. The terms *graded* and *in degrees* as used here are thus a collective name for a family of related properties. Gradedness has, *prima facie*, at least four dimensions.

Let us take the case of reasonableness. To act out of virtue is to be led by reason (*ex ductu rationis vivere*), and grading is quite natural here. We may in the time dimension be sometimes, not always, led by reason; we may in certain kinds of situations not at all be thus led—in some relations, not in all. On comparing two people in the same narrow kind of context, we might say that the one acts completely, fully, adequately rationally, the other only inadequately. In a particular context a person may exhibit no trace of irrationality. This suggests that we may also say he acts completely freely in that context, and that he is an adequate cause of his own action. The summing up of irrationality and rationality in one measure is, however, out of the question.

If on being given a definite task at a definite moment in a definite social setting two people act in this same context, we might on the basis of their performance conclude that the one acts more rationally than the other. In the next moment, though, a second act has to be performed, and our judgment might be the opposite; the less rational in the first context acts more rationally in the second. Which person scores best when both contexts are counted together? The principle of grading does not presuppose that there is a rule here. The principle of grading is not a *principle of quantification*.

Similar grading applies to a number of other predicates; for instance, to the predicate "conceive through itself." A conception may be more or less complete, adequate, profound, lively, and dynamic. It may be more or less consistent through time, through repeated applications, or through applications in different situations; and the extent of the relations in which something is conceived through itself may vary. Further, there is a progression from inadequate, indistinct, confused, and fragmentary conceptions to

adequate, distinct, clear, and comprehensive conceptions. This cannot but interact with the level of “understandability through oneself” and of “extent of being in oneself.” The latter expression is used in IIP6.

Already in part I the important but difficult expression “as” or “insofar as” (*quatenus*) introduces a bridge between opposites. God appears “modified,” that is, manifested in particular things. In the long note IP15Sch, Spinoza talks about water “as substance” (*aqua quatenus substantia*). The term *quatenus* is a central one in Spinoza’s system but extremely difficult to comprehend in its several hundred occurrences. We take it to imply a gradation in the very wide sense introduced. A basic idea in its use is this: something, *x*, may be classed as a *y* and not a *z quatenus t*, whereas the same *x* may be classed as a *z* and not as a *y quatenus u*. Or, in the old *esse* terminology of Spinoza: “*x* is *y quatenus t*, and *z, quatenus u*.”

The widest, and therefore best, translation and interpretation of *quatenus* in these contexts seems to be “in relation to.” “Something *x* is *y* and not *z in relation to t*.” Very little is gained by using this expression; nearly all is left to the analysis of each particular occurrence of *quatenus*.

Another important bridge from absolutism to gradualism is furnished by an already mentioned class of expressions—“God considered as . . . ,” “God as affected by . . . ,” and so on—which leads toward a realistic concept of the immanence of God and substance in the world of particulars (cf. IIP9, IIP9Cor, IIP11Cor: “. . . God, not as infinite, but insofar as [*quatenus*] he is expressed by the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, . . .”). The love of the transcendent God as conceived in the three great monotheistic religions makes sense, but love of a purely immanent God is something so different that to use the term *God* may be considered to be misleading. What Spinoza tries to convey is, at least in the seventeenth century, scarcely conveyable through using that term. Through the *quatenus* technique, Spinoza renders the terms *God* and *substance* avoidable in the exposition of the system. Their elimination, however, signifies a vast reduction in the persuasive, positive evaluation of the cosmos or of “what there really is.” On the other hand, the exposition without the terms gains intellectual clarity and acceptability in our century.

The important theorem on self-preservation (IIP6) has a grading: “Everything, insofar as it is in itself [*quatenus in se est*], strives to uphold it-

self in its being." Later, gradation is presupposed when Spinoza discusses how man arrives at higher levels of perfection through joy. Joy is transition "from smaller to greater perfection" (IIIAffD2) and, therefore we may add, from smaller to greater reality (IID6). Also, how is he able to proceed from the first to the second and third kinds of knowledge? A grading of the quality of knowledge is made use of explicitly or at least implicitly. Of considerable importance is the grading of inadequacy of conceiving. Taking IIP29Sch as our point of departure, we note that a measure of adequacy is already introduced when we perceive many things at once. The more we perceive at once, the better. The contrast elaborated by Spinoza in IIP29Sch is that between perceiving a thing in complete isolation and perceiving it in relation to many others:

I say expressly that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies . . . whenever it is determined . . . by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this and that; not at such times as it is determined . . . by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast.

Although there are infinitely many things, man is barred from seeing all in their mutual relations. These are infinite for each thing. Thus, complete or absolute adequacy is out of the question. It is a prerogative of the infinite intellect, that is, of something not existing separately from anything whatsoever. We shall nevertheless assume that man can reach *high degrees* of adequacy perceiving many things in many relations.

Grading "Being in Itself"

Every particular, singular, concrete, finite thing is to a certain extent in itself and to another degree in something else. Similar qualifications apply, then, to all the equivalent properties. The resulting concept of a "particular, singular, concrete, finite thing" is similar to Spinoza's concept of *res particularis* and *res singularis*. There are some differences, but in what follows, we do not take account of them.²

The above delimitation of a thing-concept is meant to furnish an answer to the questions "What kinds of 'things' are the x's in expressions such

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

as 'x is more free than y' and 'x is more in itself than y'?" "What is the range of the predicate?" The answer we give is that the x's are particular, singular, concrete, finite. Among such things, human beings, or better, *persons*, are our primary concern; they make up the "primary field of application." We shall find evidence, however, that the fields are wider than that. In our reconstruction we shall conceive the things (*res*) to be *living* things. Persons as wholes are particulars rather than minds, human bodies, intellects, subjects, or humanity. It is our contention that Spinoza is basically trying to reach knowledge of particulars and to transcend mere knowledge of kinds, *species*. He wishes us to move from the first and second ways of knowing to the third, but not through the elimination of those kinds.

The technical terms *in itself* and *in something else* introduced in chapters 1, 2, and 3 express dichotomies, not graded magnitudes. From now on, these terms are viewed as graded. We retain the terms in our reconstruction but change their use. Rereading chapters 1–3, we shall now take the *in itself* terms as expressions of the absolute maximum of a graded property. Thus, we take *in itself* in chapters 1–3 to mean the same as "completely (wholly, absolutely) in itself"; *conceived through itself* to mean "conceived completely through only itself"; and *does not require something else* to mean "does not require anything whatsoever under any circumstances whatsoever." We take the *in something else* terms as used in chapters 1–3 to be negations of the *in itself* terms, not opposites. Thus, *in something else* stands for "not completely (wholly, absolutely) in itself," and not for "completely, absolutely not in itself" or "totally in something else."

A particular thing is always to a certain extent, however small, in itself, never totally in something else. This is not said explicitly anywhere in the *Ethics*, but it fits the total text better than the opposite assumption. Evidence of this will be referred to at appropriate places. Since Spinoza himself constantly uses all four expressions "in itself," "not in itself," "in something else," and "not in something else," we have from the very beginning avoided the assumption that "not in itself" is identical with "in something else." There is, however, no positive evidence that there is a difference, and from now on we assume that there is none.

We shall now offer a short, abstract, philosophical justification for the project of grading. The God of Spinoza, like the God of many other philosophers, expresses himself in infinitely many things in infinitely many ways.

These things, the particulars (*res particularis*), exist, have existed, or will exist, if we take *exist* to imply having a separable existence from God. However, a basic metaphysical idea of Spinoza is *the immanent God*. God's essence and power are completely expressed through the modes—nothing transcendent remains. Nothing exists as a separable being. The usual meanings of “*x* expresses itself through *y*” break down. An author or poet expresses himself through his poems, but *something* is left over when we strip him of his poems. Without modes, that is, when God is stripped of his expressions, there is no God.

In at least one important respect, therefore, God is dependent on modes. Modes are in God (*sunt in Deo*) and God is in himself (*est in se*), but nevertheless God is nothing apart. Therefore, the “*being* in something else,” insofar as it is characteristic of the relation between modes and God, is nothing but expressiveness of something. Perhaps one may say the immanent God does not exist but “is,” in the traditional scholastic terminology.

There is only one substance, according to Spinoza, namely God. He could have added “Substance is the only God.” I might add “To seek God is devotedly to seek maximum increase in substantiality.” Spinoza himself warns us not to take seriously any other statement about God than that he has extension and thought as attributes. This does not imply that God has a definite extension, finite or infinite, or that he is a definite thought. In that case we would have to assume the existence of God as something apart from other “existents,” and the principle of immanence would be lost.

These reflections are relevant here because they render it justifiable metaphysically to introduce a gradation of substance: *substantiality*. Substance is completely *in se*. The grades of being *in se* we might conceive as degrees of substantiality. It is better, though, to leave out such a term; it does not have the importance it had in the time of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. We shall leave out substance as a separable entity on a par with particular things and retain a property the infinite maximum of that which is named “being in itself” in Spinoza's *Ethics*, part I, and in chapters 1–3 of this work.

Our substitution of degree of substantiality for substance is not necessarily inconsistent with Spinoza's claim that God is not only an *ens rationis* but also an *ens reale*. The concept of a ‘whole’ or ‘concrete universal’ as explained by Wolfson (1961, vol. 1: 325 ff.) is consistent with our idea of a maximal, infinite degree of substantiality. This can only belong to the whole (in

a certain metaphysical sense). The concept of such a maximum may be considered a clarification or “analysis” of the notion of whole.

Spinoza’s way of discussing substances, as, for instance, when he argues that there cannot be several substances, suggests that substances have a thing status rather than a property status. If, however, we use another formulation and substitute the term *maximal substantiality* for *substance*, saying that there cannot be several different maximal substantialities, Spinoza’s way of putting it makes good sense when applied to the text: there can be only one maximal substantiality. There may be a bunch of very closely related properties, such as being perfectly in itself, requiring nothing else to exist, being perfectly free, and so on, all with the same maximum.

The ultimate justification of a shift from substance as something thing-like to substantiality as a property can only be in terms of a shift in emphasis away from the particular theologico-philosophical problems of Spinoza’s time. The grading of “requirements for something, x , in order to exist” may be conceived as having to do with the many things required or the status of each required thing. A similar differentiation may be made in relation to some of the other predicates such as “conceptions required in order that x may be conceived” and “other concepts involved in the concept of x .”

At first glance, the following two basic predicates might seem ungradable: “can be conceived as nonexistent” and “existence belongs to that without which something cannot be conceived.” However, they are scarcely less gradable than the predicate “free” when interpreted in full context, and to give up their grading would, because of the intimate interrelations of properties, create vast difficulties for grading other basic predicates. If something can be conceived as nonexistent, one may ask how many other things are lacking in order to ensure its being inconceivable as nonexistent. Or what status do those things have? The superbly free man may be said to require less than the one who is not that free. A similar gradation is conceivable in relation to the other existence predicates, but scarcely without special difficulties.

To show the implications of grading more clearly, we shall now state a few graded theorems corresponding to the theorems of chapters 1, 2, and 3. The graded theorem corresponding to an ungraded theorem, A_n , where n is a number, is named Ag_n —where “g” stands for “graded.” Thus, the graded theorem Ag_1 corresponds to the ungraded theorem A_1 of chapter 1.

- Ag1 That thing which is, is either totally in itself or partly in something else, but never totally in something else.

Instead of the word *partly* we might use *more or less, to some degree, in some ways, in some relations, in some interactions, in some respects, conditionally, in varying nonmaximum degrees*. We do not consider this wide freedom of choice to be ultimate. Further penetration into the subject of grading must be expected to narrow down the range of adequate topological predicates.

- Ag2 That which is totally in itself is that which does not require anything else other than just itself in order to be.
- Ag4 That which is, must be totally in itself if it cannot be partly in something else.
- Ag6 That which is, is totally and adequately conceived through itself alone, or partly by something else.
- Ag7 That which is totally and adequately conceived through itself is that which is such that its concept does not require any other concepts whatsoever in order to be formed.
- Ag16 That which is, more or less requires other things in order to be, or does not require any such things whatsoever.
- Bg1 Something cannot at all be adequately conceived as nonexistent, or can be so conceived conditionally or in part.

For example: a person *as a whole* is in something else and can be conceived as nonexistent—at any time under any conditions; but when that person adequately “causes something outside or inside himself” (IID2), something inside or outside him can be wholly and totally, that is, adequately, conceived through him. *In this relation he cannot be adequately conceived as nonexistent.*

- Bg11 If something can conditionally or to some extent adequately be conceived as nonexistent, it is to that extent unfree, and vice versa.

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

- Bg12 If something cannot in any relation be adequately conceived except as existent, it is totally free, and vice versa.
- Cg7 If something is the complete, in all relations, adequate cause of itself, it is completely and clearly understood through itself, and vice versa.
- Cg23 That which is in all relations conceived by itself, is free in all relations.
- Cg32 If a person is totally active in relation to something, he causes it adequately.
- Cg43 A person is to some extent in something else.
- Cg44 A person is not totally in himself.
- Cg45 A person is to some extent conceived through something else.
- Cg46 A person is not completely conceived through himself.
- Cg49 A person is not totally free.

Power

There is an ever-increasing consensus among the commentators on Spinoza that his philosophy should be considered primarily as a dynamic power philosophy. Power (*potentia*) is also at the heart of this theory of affects. The affects of an organism are defined in terms of the transitions in its power relations. These transitions, which consist of increases and decreases in the power of the organism, constitute the basis for the positive and negative sentiments, and for the desires which originate in these sentiments. The transitions may be partial or total, depending on whether they are related to some parts of the person (or organism), but not to the whole person, or to some, but not all of his relations to other persons and to nature in general; or whether they concern the person and his relations as a whole.

(Wetlesen 1969: 117)

These words by Jon Wetlesen are well suited as an introduction to the assimilation of power into our conceptual structure.

From IP11Dem3, IP11Sch, and IVP4Dem we infer that every infinite being is more powerful (*potentiora*) than any finite being. Spinoza expressly

states that it is absurd to hold that finite beings are more powerful than infinite ones.

In Spinoza's terminology, to be able to exist is a form of being positively able to do something. His term *potentia* is clearly very broad, a substantivation of the common Latin verb *posse* ("to do" and "to be able to").

"To have the power to" is not as broad as "to be able to," since to be able to not-to-exist (*posse non existere*) is taken by Spinoza to be a form of powerlessness, not a form of power, in spite of being a form of *posse*. In short, a form of "can" (*posse*) in the broadest sense may sometimes be a form of "inability" (*impotentia*). Spinoza distinguishes several forms of power. His terminology is rich at this point. He uses at least six expressions: "*potentia*," "*potentia agendi*," "*potentia cogitandi*," "*potentia cognoscendi*," "*potentia imaginandi*," and "*potentia intelligendi*." We need an inclusive concept covering all these species and we shall designate it simply by "power" (*potentia*). An increase in power will be said to take place only if there is an increase in at least one form of power, and no decrease in any. Similarly, a decrease will be said to take place if there is a decrease in at least one form, and no increase in any other.

If the power of something, *A*, reaches an absolute maximum, we stipulate that its activity (*potentia agendi*) must be at an absolute maximum. When Spinoza uses the simple terms *potentia* and *potestas*, we take them to be synonymous with *potentia agendi*, if the context does not clearly suggest something different. This means, according to IID2, that *A* cannot but be adequate as a cause, and being supremely active will be an adequate cause of anything whatsoever. We are therefore entitled to equate absolute maximum of power with being *causa sui*. Being *causa sui*, in turn, implies having the rest of the in-itself properties. The fundamental Spinozistic postulate of the immanence of God has as a consequence that such an absolute, all-embracing power cannot *exist* apart. But it can, and must, *be*. "Things," or more generally, anything *existing*, will have a power less than infinite (in all respects imaginable), that is, less than the theoretical maximum. Further, we are entitled to equate an increase in power with an increase in activeness and therefore in adequacy as cause. This links the notion of increase of power with that of increase in level of in-itself, or freedom, and of the other basic in-itself properties.

To the various forms of power there will correspond various forms of the other in-itself properties. A stipulation, however, will be applied to

each case: a change is to be reckoned as an increase in the many-dimensional relations only if there is no decrease in any of the dimensions. There is, for example, only an increase in freedom in general if there is no decrease in any form of freedom. (It would raise too many problems here to ask for a measure that would allow one to compare an increase in one dimension with a decrease in another.)

Suppose a person H at time t_2 conceives something with a higher degree of adequacy than before, at time t_1 . Does this imply that he, in the terminology of Spinoza, conceives it better out of, by means of, or through himself? The situation of H at time t_2 is such that the degree of "conceivability through himself" or "capacity of understanding [*potentia intelligendi*] through himself" is raised. This capacity may be taken to be equivalent in its manifestations to the *joint* capacity of being active and of understanding.

In God, being absolutely in itself, the various capacities are symbolically united in one. In other words, at the theoretical maximum or conceptual level, the capacities are united. Thus, according to IIP7Cor, God's thinking power (*cogitandi potentia*) is the same as his power of acting (*actuali agendi potentia*). In human beings this unity cannot be achieved. We shall assume, however, a mutual implication between an increase in an individual human being's ability to conceive particulars A , B , and C and that individual's active relations toward A , B , and C .

If y is conceived (i.e., capable of being conceived) through x , the question arises, Capable of being conceived by what kind of beings? The primary, but not ultimate answer in the context of the *Ethics* is "human beings." If, now, x is a human being and therefore y is conceived through x , I assume that x is theoretically capable of conceiving y . We need not go into the relation of capability to actuality here, but it would be awkward to have to assume that if y is conceived through x , and x is a human being, y must continuously be conceived by a human being.

If we say that total freedom is a property of that which is totally in itself, the formulation may be misleading, because it suggests a difference at the extensional level between the totally free and the totally in itself. The totally free *is* the totally in itself, and vice versa. This does not contradict the fact that there are in the system two different *entia rationis* (conceptual constructions), one expressed by "total freedom" and the other by "being

totally in oneself.” Taking into account how Spinoza characterizes the function of *ratio*, we conclude that the *entia rationis* have all the functions to assist in increasing freedom. To do something that is not conducive to this or is neutral in relation to the ultimate goals is not rational.

There is a kind of democracy among the in-itself predicates insofar as any one of them can, if one wishes, be substantivated and any other one can be used as a predicate in relation to the substantive clause. Thus, one may say “The totally self-conceived is totally in itself” or “The totally in itself is totally self-conceived.” The different wordings should not mislead one into postulating various (independent) dimensions of substantiality at the extensional level.

This may bring us to the question of whether two different things could both have the absolute maximum of substantiality. This is the question of whether there is more than one substance. First, there cannot be two substances of different essence or nature. That would imply that we perceive substance as a member of a class. This is ruled out by substance being conceived through itself and not through any class property. Restated, what is conceived through itself and not through a class property *is* substance.

Second, the thought of two different substances with the same essence or nature is absurd since, being separated from each other, they would have to be in something else, as for instance two only numerically different coins are in a box, or two only numerically different thoughts (one “repeated” thought) are in one mind. Since substance is not in something else, the thought of two or more substances is absurd. Since the essence of substance implies existence, there is one and only one substance. Any other conclusion somehow implies a critique of the very notion of “conceived through itself” and the other in-itself and in-something-else terms.

The above argumentation is, I think, in substantial agreement with Spinoza’s trend of reasoning in part I from the beginning to the eighth proposition. Of special importance is the second half of the scholium that refers to IP7 (misnamed IP8Sch2 by Spinoza).

Survey D Using Symbols

It is convenient to attach subscripts to our previously introduced predicate symbols in order to symbolize gradedness. We shall do this, but it must

also be borne in mind that some of the graded properties to be introduced now are, strictly speaking, new properties, not properties previously introduced and now being graded.

The symbolic formulations of chapters 1, 2, and 3 will be retained, and the basic in-itself predicate symbols in those chapters will be used, as already mentioned, to express the absolute maximum of a property. Thus, "being in itself," as it occurs in chapter 1, is from now on taken to mean "being totally, absolutely in itself" or "being in itself in all relations."

On the other hand, if we take "being in something else" and view the absolute maximum of this property to mean "being totally, absolutely in something else," then many theorems of chapter 1 would have to be reformulated. According to our interpretation of Spinoza's system, no particular thing is totally, absolutely in something else. Particulars are all in God, taken absolutely (*quatenus absolute*), but not totally in God, as modified (*quatenus modificatus*).

We shall therefore take the in-something-else predicate symbols of chapters 1–3 to refer to the simple negation of the in-itself predicates in their absolute sense. Thus, that which is *not* totally in itself will be said to be in something else. To be in something else is thus perfectly consistent with being partly in itself.

Before going into our present subject of symbolization, I have to ask for a substantial amount of tolerance from readers who still do not appreciate the use of symbols in surveying conceptual structures. From now on, the theorems are not listed separately in plain language but are found under each symbolic formulation as a sort of translation. Furthermore, what might perhaps be more irritating, some theorems are offered that say practically nothing: they have some function only within the increasingly complex machinery of derivation of the more important items.

For the general trend of our argument and the interpretations involving grading, it is unnecessary to inspect the paragraph below that begins, "More formally . . .," or to read the detailed proof of SD6, p. 70. Why, then, burden the exposition with these things? Because for anyone interested in the question of whether the symbolic version can be made logically unobjectionable, these formal details are of some importance. Among theorems SD1 through SD45, at least the following are of more than formal significance: 2, 2a, 15, 15a, 16a, 17, 24a, 33, 34, and 40.

New Symbols:

$d(y)$ y is a degree

Let $d(y)$ mean that y is a degree of such a kind that there are only three different degrees: $y = 0$, $0 < y < \infty$, or $y = \infty$. If y is attached to a predicate symbol, this means that the predicate is valid to degree y . Thus, $L_y(x)$ reads “ x has freedom of degree y .” $L_\infty(x)$ reads “ x is infinitely free” or, rather, “ x is free to the theoretically maximal degree,” which can also be recast as “ x is totally free” or “ x is free in absolutely all relations.” This was expressed by our old symbol $L(x)$ in chapters 1–3, but from now on is written as $L_\infty(x)$.

More formally, we can introduce sets of four abbreviations and one axiom related to each syncategormatic symbol:

$$\begin{array}{lll}
 L_0(x) & \underline{\text{Def}} & (\exists y)(d(y) \ \& \ y = 0 \ \& \ L_y(x)) \\
 L_{>0}(x) & \underline{\text{Def}} & (\exists y)(d(y) \ \& \ y > 0 \ \& \ L_y(x)) \\
 L_{<\infty}(x) & \underline{\text{Def}} & (\exists y)(d(y) \ \& \ y < \infty \ \& \ L_y(x)) \\
 L_\infty(x) & \underline{\text{Def}} & (\exists y)(d(y) \ \& \ y = \infty \ \& \ L_y(x)) \\
 (y) [(d(y) \ \& \ L_y(x)) \supset \neg(\exists z)(d(z) \ \& \ z \neq y \ \& \ L_z(x))]
 \end{array}$$

Where “ $\underline{\text{Def}}$ ” stands for “shall be taken to mean” or “means the same as.” The above set, the L -set, relates to freedom. Exactly analogous sets relate to ES, CS, RE, RC, PCNE, ENPC, and so on, or, in short, to each predicate of the in-itself or ES class of predicates introduced in chapters 1 and 2. Further, there is a set related to power, P . In what follows, we assume the resulting nine axioms and thirty-six abbreviations introduced. We consider the predicates EA and CA to be covered by the negations -ES and -CS.

The three degrees may be interpreted as complete absence, presence at a maximum, and a level in between complete absence and presence at a (theoretical) maximum. Thus:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \text{ES}_y(x) & x \text{ is to extent } y, \text{ in itself} \\
 \text{EA}_y(x) & x \text{ is to extent } y, \text{ in something else}
 \end{array}$$

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

Giving y particular values, we have:

$ES_{\infty}(x)$	x is totally, absolutely in itself
$ES_{>0}(x)$	x does not totally lack being in itself, and so on

Using the interval $(0, \infty)$ instead of $(0, 1)$ has some consequences that should be mentioned. No finite number is greater than any other, compared to ∞ ; thus, we have no justification for saying "N. N. has reached a high level of freedom." But levels can be compared: "N. N. has now reached a higher level"; no finite number is near ∞ , so we cannot say "N. N. has reached a level near that of God," but we might say "N. N. has come nearer to the level of God, letting it be understood that nothing more is meant than that he has moved along a line—not away from, but toward—the level of God." The use of ∞ stresses the "transcendence" of that which is *completely* in itself, that which is *completely* conceived through itself, and so on. There is a lack of continuity between the not complete and the complete corresponding to the discontinuity between a finite and an infinite set of numbers.

If, on the other hand, the interval $(0, 1)$ were to be used—that is, a closed interval—we would, in principle, be able to indicate a finite number, for instance 0.01 as a measure of the distance between the freedom of God and that of a very free man. A human being might be said, without any qualification or comment, to have come near the level of God. This would introduce difficulties in the system. According to Spinoza, it is essential that man cannot be God, that no particular thing can be substance. There is a logical or categorical difference between God and man. God does not even exist—in the same way as man.

Other New Symbols:

$P(xy)$	x has adequate or inadequate power in relation to y
$P_g(x)$	x is powerful to the degree " g "
$P_{in}(x)$	x increases its power, partially or totally
$P_{de}(x)$	x decreases its power, partially or totally
$ES_{in}(x)$	x increases its level of being in itself
$D_{in}(xy)$	x is increasingly weighty as cause of y

Survey D

First, we consider grading “being in itself”:

$$\text{SD1} \quad (x) (ES_{>0}(x) \& EA_{<\infty}(x)) \quad \text{from SC54 and IP36}$$

Or, not using the abbreviations:

$$\text{SD1a} \quad (x) (\exists y) (\exists z) [d(y) \& d(z) \& o < y \& z < \infty \& ES_y(x) \& EA_z(x)]$$

The formula SD1 may be read: For all x , it holds that x is in itself to a degree greater than zero and in something else to a degree less than infinite. Or, for all things (that may exist), it holds that they are to a degree smaller than the theoretical maximum in something else. Or, for every particular thing, it holds that it is to some extent in itself and not totally in something else. Or, for every existing thing, it holds that in some, but not in all relations, they are in themselves. The wide margin of readings does not reflect a belief that these differences are completely unimportant, but that differences are not taken into account in the symbolic version. They are not essential to the explication of basic structures of the system.

SD2	$(x) ES_{>0}(x)$	From SD1. “Everything is to some degree in itself.”
SD2a	$H(x) \supset ES_{>0}(x)$	From SD2. “Human beings are to some extent in themselves.”
SD3	$(x) EA_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD1. “Everything is less than completely in something else.”
SD4	$ES(x)$ in chapters 1–3 $\underline{\text{Def}} ES_{\infty}(x)$	“From now on $ES(x)$, as occurring in chapters 1–3, shall be taken to mean the same as $ES_{\infty}(x)$.”
SD5	$EA(x)$ in chapters 1–3 $\underline{\text{Def}} EA_{>0}(x)$	“From now on $EA(x)$, as occurring in chapters 1–3, shall be taken to mean the same as $EA_{>0}(x)$.”

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

SD6	$\neg ES(x)$ in chapters 1–3 $\sim ES_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD2 and SD4, and the axiom pertaining to ES. (That is, the ES-axiom as part of the ES-set. Cf. pp. 67–68.) “If it is not the case that something, x , is totally in itself, then it is less than totally in itself, and vice versa.”
-----	--	--

Proof of SD6 in detail:

1. $(\exists y): d(y) \ \& \ 0 < y \ \& \ ES_y(x)$ from SD2
2. $d(y_1) \ \& \ 0 < y_1 \ \& \ ES_{y_1}(x)$ from (1)
3. $\neg(\exists y): d(y) \ \& \ y = \infty \ \& \ ES_y(x)$ hypothesis: $\neg ES(x)$
4. $\neg d(y_1) \vee y_1 \neq \infty \vee \neg ES_{y_1}(x)$ from (3)
5. $d(y_1) \ \& \ 0 < y_1 < \infty \ \& \ ES_{y_1}(x)$ from (2), (4), and property of “d”
6. $(\exists y): d(y) \ \& \ y < \infty \ \& \ ES_y(x)$ from (5)
7. $\neg ES_{\infty}(x) \supset ES_{<\infty}(x)$ from (3) and (6)
8. $\neg ES_{<\infty}(x) \supset ES_{\infty}(x)$ from axiom pertaining to ES
9. $\neg ES_{\infty}(x) \sim ES_{<\infty}(x)$ from (7) and (8)
10. $\neg ES(x) \sim ES_{<\infty}(x)$ from (9) and SD4

In what follows, the proofs of each theorem are not spelled out in detail.

SD7	$EA(x) \sim ES_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD6 and SA1. “If something is in something else, it is less than totally in itself, and vice versa.”
SD8	$\neg ES_{\infty}(x) \sim EA_{>0}(x)$	From SD5 and SA1. “If something is not totally in itself, it is to some extent in something else, and vice versa.”

SD ₉	$\neg EA_{<\infty}(x) \sim EA_{\infty}(x)$	From SD ₃ and the axiom pertaining to EA. "If something is not less than completely in something else, it is completely in something else, and vice versa."
SD ₁₀	$\neg(\exists x) EA_{\infty}(x)$	From SD ₃ and SD ₉ . Holds even for the narrower concept of 'being' in general, namely 'existing'. "Nothing is completely in something else."
SD ₁₁	$(\exists x) ES_{\infty}(x)$	Suggested by ID ₆ and IP ₁₁ . "There is something that is completely in itself."
SD _{11a}	$(x)(y): ES_{\infty}(x) \& ES_{\infty}(y) \supset x = y$	Suggested by IP ₇ , IP ₇ Dem, and IP ₈ Sch ₂ . "There is one and only one thing that is completely in itself" or "What is totally in itself is unique."
SD ₁₂	$\neg EA_{>0}(x) \sim EA_0(x)$	From SD ₃ and the axiom pertaining to EA. "If something is not to any degree in something else, it is not at all in something else, and vice versa."
SD ₁₃	$ES_{\infty}(x) \sim EA_0(x)$	From SD ₁₁ and SD ₁₂ . "If something is totally in itself, it is in no way in something else, and vice versa."

Grading "Conceived Through Itself"

SD ₁₄	$(x)(CS_{>0}(x) \& CA_{<\infty}(x))$	From SD ₁ and SA ₁₃ . "All things taken one at a time are to some extent conceived through
------------------	--------------------------------------	---

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

themselves and are less than completely conceived through something else.”

Or, without using abbreviations:

SD14a	$(x) (\exists y) (\exists z) [d(y) \& d(z) \& 0 < y \& z < \infty \& CS_y(x) \& CA_z(x)]$	
SD15	$(x) CS_{>0}(x)$	From SD14. “Everything is conceived to some extent through itself.”
SD15a	$H(x) \supset CS_{>0}(x)$	From SD15. “Every human being is to some extent conceived through himself.”
SD16	$(x) CA_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD14. “Everything is less than completely conceived through something else.”
SD16a	$(x) C_{>0}(xx)$	From SD15. “Everything is to some extent conceived through itself.”

This theorem makes explicit that the adequate understanding of something cannot proceed *completely* in terms of something else. A “golden mountain” cannot be conceived *completely* from the two concepts ‘golden’ and ‘mountain’ if a golden mountain *exists* as a particular thing. Similarly, an individual cannot be adequately conceived by reference to social rules “governing” his society and not created by himself. Nor can an individual mouse be adequately conceived solely in terms of the “instincts” of mice in general. The individual differences of mice in a mountain hut are obvious.

SD17	$(x) D_{>0}(xx)$	From SD16a and SC6. “Everything is to some extent its own cause.”
SD18	$CS(x)$ in chapters 1–3 $\underline{\text{Def}} CS_{\infty}(x)$	Suggested by SD4 and SA13. “From now on $CS(x)$ in chapters 1–3 is to mean the same as $CS_{\infty}(x)$.”

SD19	CA(x) in chapters 1–3 Def $CA_{>0}(x)$	Suggested by SD5 and SA14. “From now on CA(x) in chapters 1–3 is to mean the same as $CA_{>0}(x)$.”
SD20	$\neg CS_{\infty}(x) \sim CS_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD15 and SD18, and the axiom pertaining to CS. “If something is not conceived totally through itself, it is conceived less than totally through itself, and vice versa.”
SD21	$CA_{>0}(x) \sim CA_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD20 and SA6. “If something is to some extent conceived through something else, it is nevertheless not conceived in that way in all relations, and vice versa.”
SD22	$\neg CS_{\infty}(x) \sim CA_{>0}(x)$	From SD19 and SA6. “If something is not in all relations conceived through itself, it is in some relations conceived through something else, and vice versa.”
SD23	$\neg CA_{<\infty}(x) \sim CA_{\infty}(x)$	From SD16 and the axiom pertaining to CA. “If something is not less than completely conceived through something else, it is conceived totally through something else, and vice versa.”
SD24	$(\exists x) CS_{\infty}(x)$	Suggested by SD6 and ID3. “There is at least one thing that is completely conceived through itself.”
SD24a	$(x)(y): ES_{\infty}(x) \ \& \ CS_{\infty}(y) \supset x = y$	From SA13, SD19, and SD11a. “There is one and only one thing that is completely conceived through itself.”

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

SD25	$\neg CA_{>0}(x) \sim CS_{\infty}(x)$	From SD22 and the axiom pertaining to CA. "If something is not to some extent conceived through something else, it is totally conceived through itself, and vice versa."
SD26	$CS_{\infty}(x) \sim CA_0(x)$	From SD25. "To be conceived completely through itself is to be in no way conceived through something else."

Grading Requirements for "Being" and "Being Conceived"

SD27	$(x) (\exists y) (RE_y(x))$	Suggested by SD3 and SA3. Logically derivable from SD29. "For all things it holds that there is a grade that indicates the extent to which they require something else to exist."
SD28	$EA_{<\infty}(x) \sim RE_{<\infty}(x)$	Suggested by SA14. "If something is less than totally in something else, it requires in less than all respects something else in order to exist, and vice versa."
SD29	$(x) RE_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD3 and SD28. "Everything does in less than all respects require something else in order to exist."
SD30	$\neg RE(x)$ in chapters 1–3 $\stackrel{\text{Def}}{=} RE_0(x)$	"From now on the expression 'not require anything else to exist,' as it occurred in chapters 1–3, shall mean the same as 'x requires to zero degree something else to exist.'"

SD31	$RE(x) \sim RE_{>0}(x)$	From SD29 and SD30, and the axiom pertaining to RE. "If something requires something else to be, it requires this to some extent greater than zero, and vice versa."
SD32	$\neg RE_{<\infty}(x) \sim RE_{\infty}(x)$	From SD29 and SD30, and the axiom pertaining to RE. "If something does not totally require something else in order to exist, it requires something else in all relations, and vice versa."
SD33	$\neg(\exists x) RE_{\infty}(x)$	From SD29 and SD31. "There is nothing that in all relations requires something else in order to exist."
SD34	$(\exists x) RE_0(x)$	Suggested by ID6 and ID3, second part. From SA2, SD31, and SD11. "There is something that in no relation whatsoever requires something else in order to exist."
SD35	$RE_{<\infty}(x) \sim RC_{<\infty}(x)$	Suggested by SA18. "If something does not totally require something else in order to exist, it does not in all relations require other conceptions in order to be conceived, and vice versa."
SD36	$(x) RC_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD35 and SD29. "All things, each taken separately, are conceived through some other things in less than all relations."

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

SD37	$\neg RC(x)$ in chapters 1–3 $\underline{\text{Def}} RC_0(x)$	“In what follows, $\neg RC(x)$, as it occurs in chapters 1–3, shall mean the same as $RC_0(x)$.”
SD38	$RC_0(x) \sim RE_0(x)$	From SD37, SA18, and SD30. “If something does not at all require the conception of something else in order to be conceived, neither does it require anything else in order to exist, and vice versa.”

Carefully elaborated, these and other theorems may contribute to a highly original life and worldview (*Leben und Weltanschauung*). In contemporary jargon, such worldviews might be labeled biocentric, ecocentric, or cosmocentric: all beings have a series of common properties and urges, and there is some kind of supreme whole.

Grading Other Previously Introduced Predicates

SD39	$L_{>0}(x) \sim ES_{>0}(x)$	Suggested by SD17. “If something is free to some extent, it is in itself to some extent, and vice versa.”
SD40	$(x) L_{>0}(x)$	From SD39 and SD2. “All things are to some extent free.”
SD40a	$H(x) \supset L_{>0}(x)$	From SD40. “Every human being is to some extent free.”
SD41	$\neg(x) L_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD11 and SB19. “Not everything is less than completely free.”
SD42	$L(x)$ in chapters 2 and 3 $\underline{\text{Def}} L_{\infty}(x)$	Suggested by SD4 and SB14. “From now on $L(x)$, as it occurs in chapters 2 and 3, shall be taken to mean the same as $L_{\infty}(x)$.”

SD43	$(\exists x) L_{\infty}(x)$	From SD17, SD24, and SB16. "There is something that is completely free."
SD43a	$(x)(y): L_{\infty}(x) \& L_{\infty}(y) \supset x = y$	From SB14, SD42, and SD11a. "There is one and only one thing that is totally free (Spinoza's God)."
SD43b	$ES_{\infty}(a) \& CS_{\infty}(b) \& L_{\infty}(c) \supset a = b = c$	"If a thing a is totally in itself, a thing b is conceived totally through itself, and a thing c is totally free, then a , b , and c are the same thing."
SD44	$PCNE_{<\infty}(x) \sim EA_{<\infty}(x)$	Suggested by SA3 and SB6. "If something in less than all relations can be conceived as non-existent, it is in less than all relations in something else, and vice versa."
SD45	$ENPC_{>0}(x) \sim L_{>0}(x)$	Suggested by SD2 and SB10. "If something in at least some relations cannot be conceived except as existent, it is to that extent free, and vice versa."
SD45a	$H(x) \supset ENPC_{>0}(x)$	From SD40a and SD45. "Every human being is such that in at least some relations he cannot be conceived except as existent."

Power Relations

SD46	$P_{<\infty}(x) \sim PCNE(x)$	Suggested by ID1 and IP11Dem3. "If something is less than infinitely powerful, it can be conceived as nonexistent, and vice versa."
------	-------------------------------	--

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

SD47	$P_{<\infty}(x) \sim EA_{<\infty}(x)$	From SD46 and SB6. Suggested by IP11Dem3. "If something has less than adequate power in all relations, it is (to some extent) in something else, and vice versa."
SD48	$P_{\infty}(x) \sim ES_{\infty}(x)$	Suggested by IP11Sch. From the definition of $d(x)$ and the axiom pertaining to P and SA1. "If something has adequate power in all relations, it is (completely) in itself, and vice versa."
SD49	$P_{\infty}(x) \sim CS_{\infty}(x)$	From SD48 and SA13. "If something has adequate power in all relations, it can be adequately conceived through itself in all relations, and vice versa."
SD50	$P_{\infty}(x) \sim AdD(xx)$	From SD48 and SC17. "If something has adequate power in all relations, it is its own adequate cause in all relations, and vice versa."
SD51	$P_{<\infty}(x) \sim InD(xx)$	From SD46 and SC27. "If something is less than infinitely powerful, it can only be an inadequate cause of itself."

The power terminology may be used without grading.

SD52	$(y) P(xy) \sim ES_{\infty}(x)$	From SD48. "If something is powerful in relation to all things, then it is totally in itself, and vice versa."
------	---------------------------------	---

SD53	$(\exists y) P(xy) \ \& \ (\exists z)$ $\neg P(xz) \sim EA_{>0}(x)$	From SD47. "If something is powerful in relation to at least one thing, and not powerful in relation to at least one thing, then this something is to some extent in something else."
SD54	$P_{in}(x) \sim ES_{in}(x)$	Suggested by SD47 and SD48. "An increase in power mutually implies an increase in the level of being in oneself."
SD55	$P(xy) \sim L(xy)$	"If something is powerful in relation to something, it is free in that relation."
SD56	$\neg(\exists x): H(x) \ \& \ ES_{\infty}(x)$	From SC44. "There is no human being that is completely in himself."
SD57	$\neg(\exists x) (y): H(x) \ \& \ P_{\infty}(xy)$	From SD56 and SD48. "There is no human being with adequate power in every relation."
SD58	$(x)(\exists y): H(x) \supset P_{<\infty}(xy)$	From SD46 and SC43. "Every human being lacks adequate power in at least one relation."
SD59	$P_0(x) \sim EA_{\infty}(x)$	Suggested by IIID1 and IIID2. "To be completely powerless is to be completely in something else."
SD60	$\neg(\exists x) P_0(x)$	From SD59 and SD10. "Nothing is utterly powerless."
SD61	$(\exists x) P_{\infty}(x)$	From SD11 and SD48. "At least one thing is infinitely powerful."

GRADING BASIC DISTINCTIONS

SD62	$P(xy) \sim G(xy)$	Suggested by IIID2 and IVP37Sch1. “If something has adequate power in relation to something else, it is adequately active in this relation, and vice versa.”
SD63	$AdP(xy) \sim AdD(xy)$	Suggested by IIID1, IIID2, and IVPSch1. From SD62 and SC34. “If something has full power in relation to something else, it causes this latter thing adequately, and vice versa.”
SD64	$AdP(xy) \sim AdC(xy)$	From SD62 and SC36. “If something is adequately powerful in relation to something, the latter is conceived adequately through the former, and vice versa.”
SD65	$P_{in}(x) \sim G_{in}(x)$	Suggested by IIID2 and IIID3. “An increase in level of power mutually implies an increase in activeness (level of activity).”
SD66	$P_{in}(x) \sim ES_{in}(x)$	Suggested by SD48. “An increase in level of power mutually implies an increase in level of being in itself.”
SD67	$P_{in}(x) \sim EA_{de}(x)$	Suggested by SD66. “An increase in level of power mutually implies a decrease in level of being in something else.”
SD68	$P_{in}(x) \sim L_{in}(x)$	Suggested by SD66 and SB14. “An increase in level of power implies an increase in level of freedom, and vice versa.”

SD69	$\text{InP}_{\text{in}}(x) \text{Def } (\exists y) \text{P}_{\text{in}}(xy) \\ \& (\exists z) \neg \text{P}_{\text{in}}(xz) \\ \& \neg (\exists t) \text{P}_{\text{de}}(xt)$	<p>“The symbol $\text{InP}_{\text{in}}(x)$, ‘$x$ increases its power, but only in part,’ shall stand for ‘There is at least one relation in which x increases its power, and at least one in which x does not increase its power, but there is no relation in which x decreases its power.’”</p>
SD70	$\text{InP}_{\text{de}}(x) \text{Def } (\exists y) \text{P}_{\text{de}}(xy) \\ \& (\exists z) \neg \text{P}_{\text{de}}(xz) \\ \& \neg (\exists t) \text{P}_{\text{in}}(xt)$	<p>“The symbol $\text{InP}_{\text{de}}(x)$, ‘$x$ decreases its power, but only partially,’ shall stand for ‘There is at least one relation in which x decreases its power, and at least one relation in which x does not decrease its power, but there is no relation in which x increases its power.’”</p>

Similar symbols may be introduced in relation to some previous predicates:

SD71	$\text{InES}_{\text{in}}(x) \text{Def } (\exists y) \text{ES}_{\text{in}}(xy) \& (\exists z) \neg \text{ES}_{\text{in}}(xz) \& \neg (\exists t) \text{ES}_{\text{de}}(xt)$
SD72	$\text{InG}_{\text{in}}(x) \text{Def } (\exists y) \text{G}_{\text{in}}(xy) \& (\exists z) \neg \text{G}_{\text{in}}(xz) \& \neg (\exists t) \text{G}_{\text{de}}(xt)$
SD73	$\text{InL}_{\text{in}}(x) \text{Def } (\exists y) \text{L}_{\text{in}}(xy) \& (\exists z) \neg \text{L}_{\text{in}}(xz) \& \neg (\exists t) \text{L}_{\text{de}}(xt)$

It may be argued that $\text{InP}_{\text{in}}(ab)$ as an instance of $\text{InP}_{\text{in}}(xy)$ does not make sense because the relation of a to b is *one* relation, and its power is either increased or decreased in this relation. We shall, however, sometimes suppose that a has many relations to b , and that a may be increasing by being active in some but not in all relations. The time dynamic is important in this regard.

These definitions facilitate our transition from Spinoza’s power philosophy to his philosophy of emotions. The above facilitates an understanding of how Spinoza’s philosophy of power differs from Thomas Hobbes’s; Spinoza’s philosophy of emotion does the same thing.

V

The Road to Freedom Through Active Emotion

Introduction

There are many kinds of power according to Spinoza. There are also many kinds of joy. Considering the internal relation between joy and perfection, there must also be many kinds of perfection.

Perhaps the increase of a particular power at least sometimes leaves intact or even reduces the general (total) power of an individual. The purely or unmixed active emotions, the emotions of which there cannot be too much, necessarily increase the general power of an individual. This offers us a connecting link between active emotion and previous notions. We have already introduced the notion of increasing and decreasing power. Emotion is something through which power increases or decreases. The relation is such that whenever power of some kind or other increases or decreases, there is necessarily emotion. The intimacy of the relation limits the validity of the phrase “emotion is something by *means of which* the power increases or decreases.” Whenever all-embracing general or total power increases there is unmixed active emotion, and whenever there is unmixed active emotion there is an increase in total power. We may think of dwelling in a situation we find perfect—nothing we might hope for is left out. The body and soul, the whole personality, are engaged in the situation or the process or in something that is both a situation and a process. On the other hand, total power may be left intact in the case of contrary emotions, that is, when one kind of power increases and another decreases.

An emotion may be strong or weak, persistent or short-lived. We shall suppose that an increase in total power is proportionate to the joint effect of duration and intensity of active emotion. Thus, the more intense and durable the active emotion, the greater the forward leap in power. Now, an increase in power is, according to SD63, an increase in freedom. *The road to freedom is*

therefore the road to activation of emotion. The more active, intense, and persistent the emotions, the more rapid are the transitions to higher levels of human freedom. Lack of emotion, whether active or passive, implies a standstill in the level of freedom. As we start at low levels, lack of emotion arrests development. If the Greek *ataraxia* is interpreted to be an emotionless state, Spinoza spurns *ataraxia*. He does not favor moderation of emotion if this implies an upper limit of intensity or duration. There is no limit to the intensity or duration of *amor intellectualis Dei*, one of the most prominent Spinozistic emotions. The many authors who consider Spinoza a sort of Stoic or who otherwise class him together with wise men in favor of general limitation of the intensity of affects, have been misled. It must be admitted that Spinoza often uses *passio* and *affectus* as synonyms for passive emotions, for emotions that do not go together with increase in power and freedom. His terminology must be considered to be vacillating and open to misinterpretation at this point. But this does not invalidate our conclusion. Active love and joy are emotions.

Making use of the basic equivalences, one may state a series of propositions: increased intensity of active emotion results in increased (1) freedom, (2) level of being in oneself, (3) extent to which one is an adequate cause of one's actions, and (4) understanding of oneself.

After the definition of emotion or "affect" (IID3), Spinoza writes that when we can be an adequate cause of an affect, the affect is itself an "action" (in the wide sense used by Spinoza); if we cannot be an adequate cause, the affect is a "passion." In what follows, I shall distinguish completely active emotions from those that are not completely active. In the first case we are an adequate cause; in the latter, only an inadequate cause.

Spinoza does not believe in any free will. The will of a free man is not free. We do not need a free *will* in order to be free. It is enough that the person as a whole is free—never mind isolated faculties or components of a person such as will. The will is subordinate to the person as a whole.

Humans do not deliberately choose the road to freedom and reject the road to slavery. Such a primordial choice is not necessary because there is a tendency, a certain striving, *conatus*, inherent in all noneternal, finite—that is, limited—things and therefore in every human being.

An aspect of this general *conatus* is the so-called self-preservation or, better, self-perseveration—the striving to remain in one's own being (*in suo esse perseverare*, IIP6). It is a striving toward *consolidation of a being as far as it*

is in itself. It is a tendency to withstand threats to the level already reached of being in itself.

In addition to this, or as an aspect of it, there is a no less fundamental striving to increase the extent of being in itself. This striving increases in force proportionally to the level reached (in other words there is an exponential increase). Humans, and every other living being, have this latter striving. In humans it expresses itself as a desire for clearer and more comprehensive understanding (*intelligere*). The “law of exponential increase” is common to all, but the level at any age may differ considerably from person to person. According to part V of the *Ethics*, the deeper a person is involved in “understanding of the third kind,” the more strongly he desires to have more of it, and the more capable he is of reaching what he desires.

Evidence supporting the above general interpretation is furnished mainly by IIP6, IIP7, IIP9, IIP9Sch, VP25, and VP26. I leave it as an open question whether Spinoza would apply the term *understand* to all living beings. Perhaps *conceiving*, as a weaker and more general term, should be used in the case of nonhumans.

Our human striving toward being in ourselves is, if our basic equivalences hold, also a striving for being conceivable through ourselves, that is, completely and clearly understandable *for* and *from* ourselves. On the other hand, the striving is also one of avoiding being passive in relation to other things, or being acted upon rather than taking the initiative.

The principle of self-preservation is formulated by Spinoza in such a way that it seems that its function is merely to preserve a level of in-itself, which is already reached. The principle is used, however, in a way that implies a striving toward *increased* freedom, power, and perfection. The *conatus* is preserved, not a definite stage of development. There are various ways of reformulation that can bridge the gulf between the uninspiring status quo formulation of IIP7 and the requirement of his system as a whole. One way is to postulate that the self alluded to in IIP6 and IIP7 comprises basically a striving toward higher levels, and that therefore a preservation of the self includes the preservation of the striving toward higher levels. This preservation will then not be one of conservation of a measured level, but of the positive derivative of a function like $f(x) = x^2$.

The development of personality consists of, or at least involves, a gradual integration of imperfectly related emotions of which Spinoza recognizes more than eighty classes. To those classes of emotions correspond sets of

powers and sets of fields of action and cognition. The progress toward freedom depends on the “feedback” from different dispositions for emotion, through cognition—an emotion that represses an active emotion will itself be repressed, and emotion that enhances an active emotion will be enhanced. The “victorious” emotion will be such that it represses none of the active emotions and enhances some or all. Here we meet *bilaritas*, and taking the object-relation into the picture, the *amor intellectualis Dei*.

The above account of the consolidation of the person through increasing the level of “being in oneself” may be used to formulate a theory of personal identity that is consistent with David Hume’s discussions of absolute identity as well as other criticisms and contemporary discussions of “loss of personal identity.” The outcome of such an attempt is uncertain, but I see no genuine obstacles in spite of the not uncommon, Hegel-inspired view that Spinoza lets the individual person disappear in substance or God. If any disappearing is involved, however, it is rather the disappearance of God as a substance in the particular beings.

A remark may be relevant here concerning description and construction. Spinoza has written very little compared to the extent of the problems he covers. It is therefore natural when we ask, What has Spinoza said about this? that the answer is frequently “very little” or “nothing.” Considering also the formidable range of diversity of well-documented interpretations of his text, it is doubtful whether one can pin down his views on anything at all using words and expressions clearly understandable in this age. What we can do as philosophers, however, is to work out reconstructions, as opposed to mere “descriptions” of his views. We can work out comprehensive views that are not only inspired by Spinoza’s text but are also not clearly incompatible with the text.

Having this outlook, it is difficult to see how I could ever report as Ruth L. Saw (1969: 4) does about some of her investigations:

A long-treasured and wishfulfilling belief of mine has finally disappeared—the belief that Spinoza was promising us an account from which we might draw Peter in all his particularity as the object of our highest knowledge.

From a narrow historical point of view there is nothing definite in Spinoza’s text that militates *against* the belief that “disappeared,” nor is there anything definite to support this “disappearance” directly and clearly. A re-

construction may be worked out “in Spinoza’s spirit” that would contain theorems from which we can infer that Peter in his particularity is a proper object of the third kind of knowledge. Is this not enough?

In the following survey, I plot out an easy way to test the consequences of our interpretation of the doctrine of essential striving. Plotting out the theorems, I presuppose an interpretation of emotion and its relation to different kinds of cognition that is argued in detail in *Conation and Cognition* (Naess and Wetlesen 1967). The interpretation of IID₃ stated in *Conation and Cognition* is the basis for the first theorem.

Survey E Using Symbols

New Symbols:

F(x)	x is in the state of emotion (<i>affectus</i>)
AdF(x)	x is in the state of active emotion
InF(x)	x is in the state of passive emotion; x is in a state of passion
... O(x)	x strives to increase its level of . . .
... NO(x)	x strives against an increase in its level of . . .
	x strives to reduce its level of . . .
ESO(x)	x strives to increase its level of being in itself
EANO(x)	x strives against an increase in its level of being in something else

Survey E

States of Emotion

SEi	$F(x) \sim P_{in}(x) \vee P_{de}(x)$ $\vee InP_{in}(x) \vee InP_{de}(x)$	Suggested by IID ₃ . “If x is in a state of emotion, x increases or decreases its power in all or some relations, and vice versa.”
-----	---	--

THE ROAD TO FREEDOM THROUGH ACTIVE EMOTION

From the definition of $P_{in}(x)$, it follows that we may simplify SE1:

$$SE1a \quad F(x) \sim P_{in}(x) \vee P_{de}(x)$$

In other words, we shall take "state of emotion" to be a state of change in power, and we shall take a state of power change to be a state of emotion.

SE2	$-F(x) \sim -P_{in}(x) \& -P_{de}(x)$	From SE1. "If something is not in a state of emotion, it neither increases nor decreases, totally or partially, its power, and vice versa."
SE3	$P_{in}(x) \supset F(x)$	Follows from SE1. "To increase one's power implies to be in a state of emotion." "Without emotion, there is no increase in power. Emotion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for increasing power."
SE4	$AdF(x) \sim P_{in}(x)$	Suggested by IIID3. "Being in a state of active emotion mutually implies increasing one's power."
SE5	$AdF(x) \supset G(x)$	From IIID3. "If something is in a state of active emotion, it is active."
SE6	$(y) AdF(xy) \sim (y) P_{in}(xy)$	From SE1 and SE4. "If something is in completely active emotion toward all things, it increases its power in all relations."

To increase in power, $P_{in}(x)$, need not be the same as to increase in every relation, $(y) P_{in}(xy)$. If x has a small decrease in one relation and a great increase in all others, x will have an increase in total power, but not in every relation. Thus, $(y) P_{in}(xy)$ implies $P_{in}(x)$, but not vice versa.

SE 7	$F(x) \sim \text{Ad}F(x) \vee \text{In}F(x)$	Suggested by IIID3. “If something is in a state of emotion, it is either in a state of fully active emotion or in a state of more or less passive emotion.”
SE8	$\text{In}F(x) \sim P_{\text{de}}(x) \vee \text{In}P_{\text{de}}(x) \vee \text{In}P_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SE1, SE4, and SD70. “If something is in a (more or less) passive emotional state, it is either decreasing its power, totally or partially, or only increasing it partially, and vice versa.”
SE9	$\text{In}F(xy) \sim (y) P_{\text{de}}(xy) \vee (\exists z) P_{\text{de}}(xz) \& (\exists t) \neg P_{\text{de}}(xt) \& \neg (\exists t) P_{\text{in}}(xt) \vee (\exists u) P_{\text{in}}(xu) \& (\exists v) \neg P_{\text{in}}(xv) \& \neg (\exists w) P_{\text{de}}(xw)$	“To be in a state of passive emotion is mutually equivalent to a total decrease in power, or to undergo a partial decrease and no increase, or to undergo a partial increase and no decrease in power.”
<p>If there is a partial increase of power in one relation and a partial decrease in another, the total state of emotion will be considered to be complex and to be constituted by two emotions. This is a consequence of definitions SD64 through SD67.</p> <p>A woman might decrease “just a little” in power in relation to her husband but increase “considerably” in relation to her children. She would still be in a state of passive emotion according to the definitions. This shows the limited value of the definitions. For the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account quantitative changes in power.</p>		
SE10	$\text{Ad}F(x) \sim \text{ES}_{\text{in}}(x)$	Follows logically from SE4 and SD66. “If something is in a state of active emotion, it is increasing its level of being in itself, and vice versa.”

THE ROAD TO FREEDOM THROUGH ACTIVE EMOTION

SE11 $P(x) \supset \neg F(x)$ From SE1.
 “If something is infinitely powerful, it is not in an emotional state.”

This rules out God and substance being emotional—which would have been an awkward consequence of our reconstruction!

SE12	$AdF(x) \sim AdD_{in}(x)$	Follows logically from SE10 and SC14. “If something is in a state of fully active emotion, it increases totally its level of adequateness as a cause, and vice versa.”
SE13	$AdF(x) \sim G_{in}(x)$	Follows logically from SE4 and SD5. “To be in a state of fully active emotion is to increase one’s general level of activity.”
SE14	$AdF(x) \sim L_{in}(x)$	Follows logically from SE10 and SB14. “To be in a state of fully active emotion is to increase one’s general level of freedom.”
SE15	$AdF_{in}(xy) \sim L_{in}(xy)$	From SE14. “If one increases one’s level of active emotion in relation to something, one increases one’s level of freedom in relation to this something, and vice versa.”
SE16	$L_{in}(x) \supset F(x)$	Follows from SE3 and SD68. “To increase one’s freedom implies to be in a state of emotion.”

Without emotion there is no increase in freedom. Emotion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for increasing freedom. The importance of this for educational institutions is formidable: Do they do their utmost to

inspire active emotions and steady increases of such emotions? Are, for instance, the ways in which mathematics and history organized conducive to elicit and maintain positive emotions?

Basic Human Striving

SE17	$(x): H(x) \supset ESO(x)$	Suggested by IIP7Dem. "For all x it holds that if x is a human being, x strives to increase his level of being in himself."
SE18	$(x): H(x) \supset EANO(x)$	Suggested by SE17 and SA1. "All human beings strive to decrease their level of being in something else."
SE19	$(x): H(x) \supset -RENO(x)$	From SE17 and SA12. "All human beings strive to reduce the extent to which they require something else in order to exist."
SE20	$(x): H(x) \supset CSO(x)$	From SE17 and SA13. "Every human being strives to conceive more through himself."
SE21	$(x): H(x) \supset CANO(x)$	From SE17 and SA6. "All human beings strive to reduce the extent to which they are conceived through something other than themselves."
SE22	$(x): H(x) \supset -RCO(x)$	From SE17 and SA6. "Every human strives to be such that he requires fewer things to conceive in order to conceive himself."
SE23	$(x): H(x) \supset PCNENO(x)$	From SE18 and SB6. "All humans strive to reduce the conditions under which they can be conceived as nonexistent."

THE ROAD TO FREEDOM THROUGH ACTIVE EMOTION

SE24	$(x): H(x) \supset LO(x)$	From SE17 and SB14. "All humans strive to be more free."
SE25	$(x): H(x) \supset CO(x)$	From SE17 and SC15. "All humans strive to improve their understanding."
SE26	$(x): H(x) \supset PO(x)$	From SE17 and SD48. "Every human strives to increase his power."

All these strivings are conceptually different. The connotations of the terms differ. According to our basic interpretation of the fundamental equivalences (of the *in se* class), however, the denotations or extensions are identical. We may give general striving the name of "self-realization" (or self-preservation or self-perseveration), but this may not help our reconstruction of Spinoza's system. Similarly, it does not help to identify general striving with *conatus*.

General Striving

Spinoza concentrates his attention on the striving of men, but acknowledges a general striving of *all* particular things. The striving for self-preservation (IIIP6, IIIP7, and so on) is the best known. For reasons given later, such striving cannot be separated from the strivings mentioned in the foregoing. We may therefore tentatively write in complete generality:

SE27	$(x) ESO(x)$	"All particular beings strive to increase their level of being in themselves."
SE28	$(x) PO(x)$	"All particular beings strive to increase their power."
SE29	$(x) LO(x)$	"All particular beings strive to increase their level of freedom."

An attempt to generalize SE20, SE21, and SE25 leads to difficulties. Spinoza is generally regarded as favoring animism (of some kind), and an

extension of his notion of ‘conceiving’ to cover all particulars is not out of place. But, thus extended, it presumably would not have much in common with the notion of ‘conceiving’ as applied to humans. We leave the subject, noting an unsolved structural difficulty. In SE27 through SE29, I use the term *beings* instead of *things*, which would be the closest translation of Spinoza’s term *res*. I personally would like to restrict the use of *beings* to living beings, interpreting “living” in a more or less wide way.

VI

Joy

Under this chapter I have arranged the discussion of a fairly large number of phenomena: joy, sorrow, cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, pain, self-preservation, self-realization, and alienation. The title of the chapter is motivated by the unique place of various forms of joyousness in Spinoza's philosophy.

The mind undergoes considerable changes (*magnus mutationes*) according to Spinoza. It moves to a higher or lower state of perfection (IIIP₁₁Sch) and it increases or decreases in power. The changes reveal the nature of the basic affects joy and sorrow (. . . *explicant affectus laetitia et tristitia*). In the definitions IIIAffD₂ and IIIAffD₃ the term *perfectio* occurs. In this section we eliminate it in favor of *potentia*, using the equivalence of the two terms suggested at the end of IIIAffD₃E.

Introducing the term *joy* (*laetitia*) we shall use the opening sentence of IVP₄₁Dem: "Joy (IIIP₁₁ and IIIP₁₁Sch) is the emotion through which the power of the body to act, increases or is furthered." It is not *only* the body that profits through joy, which would be profoundly un-Spinozistic. According to IIIP₁₁, that which tends to increase the body's power to act tends to increase our power to cogitate (think). And in IIIP₁₁Sch, joy is defined as the passion through which the *mind* becomes more perfect.

Survey F Using Symbols

Joy

On the basis of this we introduce the following:

SF _i	$\text{Lae}(x) \sim \text{P}_{\text{in}}(x)$	Suggested by IVP ₄₁ Dem and IIIP ₁₁ .
-----------------	--	--

JOY

		<p>"If there is joy there is an increase in power, and vice versa."</p> <p>"To be in joy is to (be in affect and) increase one's power, and vice versa."</p>
SF1a	$Lae(x) \sim (\exists y) P_{in}(xy)$	<p>From SF1.</p> <p>"When a being is in joy, it increases in power in at least one relation, and vice versa."</p>
SF2	$(\exists y) P_{in}(y) \supset Lae(x)$	<p>"To increase in power, in part or totally, implies to be in joy."</p>

All increases in power are joyful. We leave it undetermined which class of x 's this holds for. It holds at least for human beings. Considering Spinoza's animistic tendency, the class may be rather large, covering at least living beings.

SF3	$Lae(x) \sim ES_{in}(x)$ $\vee InES_{in}(x)$	<p>From SD61, SD67, and SF1.</p> <p>"To be in joy is to increase one's being in oneself, partially or totally."</p>
SF4	$Lae(x) \sim (\exists y) L_{in}(xy)$	<p>From SD63, SD67, and SF1.</p> <p>"To be in joy is to become freer, in some or all respects."</p>
SF5	$L_{in}(x) \supset Lae(x)$	<p>"To increase in freedom implies to be joyous."</p> <p>Joy is a necessary condition of advancement in freedom.</p>
SF5a	$(x): H(x) \supset LaeO(x)$	<p>From SE26 and SF1.</p> <p>"Every human being strives to be joyous."</p>

The striving to be joyous is but one aspect of the universal striving (*comatus*). If I strive to realize something, A , and there is an internal relation between A and other things, B , C , and D , it may so happen that I do not

strive to get *B* or *C* or *D*. But as symbolized, I am said also to strive for *B*, *C*, and *D* if there is a mutual implication relation between all four. Spinoza's thinking at this point favors a nonintentional term, *striving*. We may consciously say to ourselves that we strive for *A* and not *B*, but if *A* and *B* are internally related, what happens is that we are urged toward both *A* and *B*. It makes no difference whether we consciously set out to seek *A* or *B*.

The matter stands differently, of course, if there is only an *external* relation between *A* and *B*. I strive for a castle (*A*), but in all probability it ruins me (*B*). I do not strive to be ruined and I hope, by miraculous luck, to avoid ruin. No incoherence is manifest here because the two states, having a castle and being ruined, are not internally connected. In the case of joy and increase in power, or joy and increase in self-causedness, the realization of the one without the others is not possible according to Spinoza, even though we might believe we can imagine them separated. The connection between joy, sorrow, and changes in power or perfection results, if our reconstructions are not wholly misleading, in a synthesis of ontological, epistemological, and psychological components in the conception of the human situation.

The foregoing reconstructions, taken as a whole, reveal the basic relations between increases in substantiality (*in se* status), understanding, and intensification of active emotion. They also reveal the optimism in Spinoza's view of the human predicament—a view that I think is essentially correct and true. Joy and integrity, not anxiety and stress, are central in his vision. Circumstances, however, may be such that a human being lives a life of next-to-utter powerlessness, filled with hatred and frustration.

Perfection

In his survey of emotions, Spinoza defines joy as "man's transition from a lower to a higher perfection." Accordingly, we state the following mutual implication, naming perfection "Per":

SF6 $\text{Lae}(x) \sim \text{Per}_{\text{in}}(x)$

Based on IIIAffD2.

"If you are joyous you increase in perfection, and if you increase in perfection, you are joyous."

This is a rather unusual and radical view. It seems that it implies an astonishing corollary: he who thinks he increases his perfection painfully or in an indifferent mood suffers from an illusion or grave error.

The joy theorems are apt to elicit questions such as the following: How does it feel to be in a state of *laetitia*? How does it manifest itself? Is it something like a disposition rather than a "raw feeling" or a "sensation"? Perhaps one may not be clearly conscious of *laetitia*. Alternatively, one may be conscious of it only when looking backward, as when we say, "At *that* time I felt happy and was really happy, but perhaps I did not understand it." Concentrating on questions of structure, I shall not take up these questions at any length. There is, however, no indication in the *Ethics* that Spinoza would class a raw feeling or sensation as anything but an *ens rationis*, a construct resulting from—or, rather, useful in—analysis. In this he would only continue an old tradition starting with Democritus. The large cluster of equivalences involving joy can be incorporated in a materialistic Gestalt psychology, not in a psychology of atomic association.

The internal relation of *laetitia* to *perfectio* is less astonishing when we take into consideration that *perfectio* does not express an absolute such as the English term *perfection* tends to do. The verb *perficere* means to complete, carry through, or make into a whole.

Through SF6 we may place perfection in relation to terms introduced previously:

SF7	$\text{Per}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{P}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF1 and SF6. "To increase in perfection is to increase in power" or, more precisely, "Increase in perfection and increase in power mutually imply each other."
SF8	$\text{Per}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{G}_{\text{in}}(x)$	Suggested by VP40. "An increase in perfection implies an increase in activeness, and vice versa." What Spinoza says is that the more perfect a thing is, the more active it is, and vice versa.

From these theorems it is clear that *perfection* is a broad term. Its increase may increase perfection only in some aspects or relations. There may be increases that do not favor long-term further increases because of the narrowness or one-sidedness of the kind of perfection. We obtain perfections pertaining to all or to only some relations or situations corresponding to the triad joy, *bilaritas*, and pleasurable excitement.

SF9	$\text{Lae}(x) \sim (y) \text{Per}_{\text{in}}(xy) \vee \text{InPer}_{\text{in}}(xy)$	From SF6 and SF7, and definitions. "To be in joy is to increase, partially or in all respects, in perfection, and vice versa."
SF10	$(y) \text{Per}_{\text{in}}(xy) \sim (y) \text{P}_{\text{in}}(xy)$	From SF7. "To increase in perfection in all relations is to increase one's power in all relations, and vice versa."
SF11	$\text{InPer}_{\text{in}}(xy) \sim \text{InP}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF7. "Partial increase in perfection mutually implies partial increase in power."
SF12	$(y) \text{Per}_{\text{in}}(xy) \sim (y) \text{ES}_{\text{in}}(xy)$	From SD61 and SF10. "Total increase in perfection mutually implies total increase in level of being in oneself."
SF12a	$\text{Per}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{ES}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF11, SF12, and SD66. "An increase in perfection mutually implies an increase in being in oneself."
SF13	$\text{Per}(x) \sim \text{ES}(x)$	From SF10 and SF12. "The infinite level of perfection is the infinite level of being in oneself, and vice versa." "If something has absolute perfection, it is absolutely in itself, and vice versa."

Strictly speaking, the following postulate is here and in analogous cases presumed valid: if an increase in level of x is equivalent to an increase in level of y , then the zero and infinite levels of x are equivalent to the zero and infinite levels of y .

It turns out that the term *complete perfection* behaves as the many *in se* or substance terms of our chapters 1 and 2. Thus:

SF14	$(y) \text{Per}(xy) \sim L(x)$	From SF13 and SB14. "Complete perfection is complete freedom and complete freedom is complete perfection."
------	--------------------------------	---

We write $L(x)$, not $L(x)$ as in chapters 2 and 3, following the convention stated in SD42.

SF15	$\neg(\exists x) \text{Per}_o(x)$	From SF7, SF10, SF11, and SD60. "There is no being without some perfection."
------	-----------------------------------	---

Every being is an expression of God and has an essence. It may be a very modest being but not wholly conceivable through something else. We have a series of "Nothing is vanishing" theorems. No thing has: zero level in itself; zero status as cause; zero level of freedom, power, perfection; and so on. From SF7, SF10, and SF11 one may infer the equivalence of power and perfection. This makes it justifiable to maintain that "everything has perfection" corresponds to "everything has power." The formulation "everything is perfect" would be misleading!

In the introduction to part IV of the *Ethics*, Spinoza undermines the other-directedness of perfection measured by standards unrelated to the purpose of individual beings in their particular strivings. He also effectively undermines the classical and medieval notion of a *scala naturae*, a "ladder of life," or universal hierarchy, with man at the top. Levels of perfection are measured in relation to the strivings of *each* thing; there is no general measure such that man might be termed more perfect than an amoeba or a tree. If taken seriously, this Spinozistic view has profound consequences in many fields, including pedagogics.

SF16	$(x): H(x) \supset \text{Pero}(x)$	From E17. “All human beings strive to increase their level of perfection.”
------	------------------------------------	---

Spinoza would probably be willing to extend his theorems to a very large class of beings apart from humans.

Self-Preservation

With the ten theorems on striving, SE12 through SE21, and SF16, we cover so much *conatus* that it is difficult to see in the famous “striving (endeavor) to self-preservation” much that is new. Taken in its crudest form, the endeavor to continue to live—that is, somehow to survive—is of little systematic interest. And taken to imply a resistance to change, a striving to keep on just as one always has done, is clearly un-Spinozistic. The dynamic, interactionist view of the self makes it inevitable to interpret the principle as a striving for power, activeness, and self-causingness. This is more than the minimum undertaking: to survive. In its dynamic aspect it might simply be a general term for all of the eleven strivings we have already introduced and perhaps some more. We might connect it more specifically with the striving for perfection, for wholeness, completeness, and self-madeness, as suggested by the special use of the term in the *Ethics*. Thus, we may write:

SF17	$\text{PesO}(x) \sim \text{ESO}(x)$	“To strive for self-preservation mutually implies to strive for higher levels of being in oneself.”
------	-------------------------------------	---

The equivalences of ES, CS, and the other in-itself predicates result in corresponding theorems, for instance:

SF18	$\text{PesO}(x) \sim \text{LO}(x)$	From SF17 and SB14. “To strive for self-preservation mutually implies to strive for higher levels of freedom.”
------	------------------------------------	---

JOY

SF19	$\text{PesO}(x) \sim \text{PO}(x)$	Suggested by SD51. "To strive for self-preservation mutually implies to strive for an increase in power."
SF20	$\text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{P}_{\text{in}}(x)$	Suggested by SF19. "Increase in self-preservation mutually implies an increase in power."
SF21	$\text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{Per}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF20 and SF7. "Increase in self-preservation mutually implies an increase in perfection."
SF22	$\text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{Lae}(x)$	From SF21 and SF6. "Increase in self-preservation mutually implies a state of joy."
SF23	$\neg(\exists x) \text{Pes}_0(x)$	From SF21 and SF15. "There is nothing that has zero level of self-preservation." "Everything preserves itself to some degree."

The principle of self-preservation as exemplified and as defined by philosophers and biologists since the Stoics has a main component of defense against attack. It covers behavior and structures adapted to maintaining an equilibrium under threats from the environment. The organisms have mechanisms to counteract disturbances. Conceived in this way, the principle has acquired renewed importance through the ecology movement.

In Spinoza's *Ethics*, the term is not defined in this way, but from the contexts we can infer what he considers to be an increase or decrease in the level of self-preservation. Even if he sometimes writes things that suggest that self-preservation is an *aim* that uses power increases and increases in freedom as *means*, there is no indication how this comes to be.

A term that is somewhat more capable of carrying the burden Spinoza places on *self-preservation* is *self-realization*. The self "is to be realized." If the

term *self* refers to something capable of development to an expansion, self-realization is more than preservation and conservation.

It involves change from “within” by interaction with environment. The term suits Spinoza’s dynamism better than *self-preservation*. Its history is very long, going back to early Greek and Indian philosophy. Its latest bloom in the Indian tradition is Gandhi’s metaphysical notion of realizing the self, truth, and God. God is, in this metaphysics, *ātman*, not a transcendental entity. “God is not outside this earthly case of ours” (*Harijan* 13.6.1936; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 54). *Ātman* and the Self with capital *S* enjoy a kind of double manifestation, both as a universal Self and as a component (sometimes “witness” or “voice”) in individual selves.¹ It is therefore not far-fetched to link Spinoza and Gandhi at this point.

In conclusion, I propose that the predicate “increased (level of) self-preservation” is understood in the sense of “increased level of self-realization,” taking “self-realization” to be a process whereby the self or ego expands and gains in power. This process is here not conceived as something different from increasing one’s level of being in oneself. Thus, we introduce a predicate “level of self-realization” (*Sre*) and assert:

SF24	$Sre_{in}(x) \text{ ekv } ES_{in}(x)$	“An increase in self-realization is extensionally equivalent to an increase in being in oneself.”
------	---------------------------------------	---

Through this theorem, self-realization is connected with previous notions. Thus, we obtain:

SF25	$Sre_{in}(x) \sim Pes_{in}(x)$	Suggested by SF24 and SF17. “To increase in self-realization mutually implies to increase in self-preservation.”
SF26	$AdSre(x) \sim AdPes(x)$ $\sim ES(x)$	From SF25 and SF24. “To completely realize oneself, to completely preserve oneself and to be completely in oneself, mutually imply each other.”

JOY

To the opposite process of self-realization we give—not quite arbitrarily—the name “alienation.” An increase in alienation, of *in alio esse*, would then correspond to an increase in “being in something else”:

SF27 $\text{Alienation}_{in}(x) \text{ ekv } \text{EA}_{in}(x)$

But here the temptation to introduce additional terms should be curbed: *alienation* may be dropped from our structure since it points to only one of many interpretations of a heavily misused term.

Cheerfulness (Hilaritas)

[T]he emotions by which we are agitated daily are mostly related to some part of the body which is more strongly affected than others: this is why emotions mostly have an excess, and in such a way hold down the mind that it can only think of one subject and nothing else. . . . (IVP44Sch)

If strong, an emotion may impede the development of many parts of the mind and body. This is the case when it is concentrated in only one or a few parts.

Joy either affects all parts of mind and body equally, increasing the total power, or unequally, increasing the power of all parts, but unevenly. At least when intense, the unevenness directly impedes the development of the neglected parts. There may in that case be no increase in total power, understanding, or perfection.

Joy (*laetitia*) is accordingly of two kinds. Here we shall deal with the uniformly homogeneous joy affecting all parts of the person. Spinoza calls it *hilaritas*. We shall use the term *cheerfulness*.

SF28 $\text{Hil}(x) \sim (y) \text{P}_{in}(xy)$ “If somebody is in a state of (pervasive) cheerfulness then he is increasing his power in all relations, and vice versa.”

SF28 is suggested by IIP11Sch, IVP42, IVP42Dem, and IVP44Sch. The term *pervasive* is inserted because the cheerfulness must somehow permeate the whole person and all avenues of interaction with the world and oneself.

Hilaritas cannot exist when one is blocking the awareness of unpleasant, undigested difficulties. The state presumes the absence of repression in a psychoanalytical sense. Therefore, it is perhaps to be considered a “theoretical maximum concept” like that of an “ideal gas” or “*perpetuum mobile*,” but scarcely an *ens rationis*. It is not a mere construction used in thinking. While occurrences of *hilaritas* can be rare (*concupitur facilius, quam observatur*), Spinoza does not discount them. It is compatible with what is said in the parentheses to hold that most people often experience *hilaritas*. Obviously, to *observe* others’ or our own *hilaritas* is not so easy. One would have to make some assumptions, whereas the observation of someone jumping over a hedge can be made rather directly.

Increase in power is equivalent to increase in the other properties of the *in se* class. Using SF21, we may therefore write:

SF29	$Hil(x) \sim AdES_{in}(x)$	From SF28 and SD51a. “A state of (pervasive) cheerfulness mutually implies a state in which we increase our level of being in ourselves.”
SF30	$Hil(x) \sim CS_{in}(x)$	From SF29 and SA13. “A state of (pervasive) cheerfulness mutually implies a state of general increase of understandability of oneself through oneself.”
SF31	$Hil(x) \sim AdL_{in}(x)$	From SF30 and SB16. “A state of (pervasive) cheerfulness implies a state of increasing freedom in all relations, and vice versa.”

The cheerful person increases his level of activeness and the degree to which he causes his own reactions and states of mind:

SF32	$Hil(x) \sim AdD_{in}(xx)$	From SF31 and SC22. “A state of (pervasive) cheerfulness is one of increasing self-causation, and vice versa.”
------	----------------------------	---

JOY

SF33	$\text{Hil}(x) \sim \text{AdG}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF32 and SC37. “A state of (pervasive) cheerfulness implies an increasing level of activeness, and vice versa.”
SF34	$(y) \text{Per}_{\text{in}}(xy) \sim \text{Hil}(x)$	From SF12 and SF29. “A pervasive increase in perfection mutually implies a state of cheerfulness.”
SF35	$(y) \text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(xy) \sim \text{Hil}(x)$	From SF34 and SF21. “A pervasive increase in self-preservation mutually implies a state of cheerfulness.”

Pleasurable Excitement (Titillatio)

A joy may correspond to a universal increase in power and perfection, or a partial increase in power and perfection with no part decreasing, or a partial increase combined with a partial decrease. In the last case we have a species of mixed feeling, which we shall leave out here. In the second case, we have *titillatio* “pleasurable excitement.” Thus, we introduce a new predicate, Tit, and state:

SF36	$\text{Tit}(x) \sim (\exists y) \text{P}_{\text{in}}(xy)$ & $(\exists z) \neg \text{P}_{\text{in}}(xz)$ & $\neg (\exists t) \text{P}_{\text{de}}(xt)$	Suggested by IVP43Dem. “If somebody is in a state of pleasurable excitement, he increases in power in at least one, but not all, relations, and decreases in none, and vice versa.”
SF37	$\text{Tit}(x) \sim \text{InP}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF36 and SD65. “To be in pleasurable excitement mutually implies to increase partially in power.”
SF38	$\text{Tit}(x) \sim \text{InES}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF36, SD61, and SA13. “To be in pleasurable excitement

		mutually implies to increase, but only partially, one's level of being understandable by oneself."
SF39	$\text{Tit}(x) \sim \text{InL}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SF38 and SB16. "To be in a state of pleasurable excitement mutually implies a partial increase in freedom."

These theorems give too bright a picture of *titillatio*. According to IVP43Dem, an intense *titillatio* may completely block any major increase in freedom and hold its level back at a very low state. Considering the vast possibilities for human freedom, one can imagine how increasing *titillatio* might involve a decrease in freedom. These quantitative and complex considerations do not invalidate the above theorems, but instead highlight their limited value.

Sorrow, Melancholy, and Pain

Spinoza's theorems on *laetitia*, *bilaritas*, and *titillatio* make it obvious that there are no words in English that convey the differences. The same holds for the corresponding triplet *tristitia*, *melancholia*, and *dolor*. One should therefore primarily note the conceptual bonds, the structure, and not take the translations seriously. To find suitable (complex) designations in English constitutes a task requiring extensive semantical studies.

Sorrow (*tristitia*), the negative affect corresponding to the positive joy; *melancholia*, corresponding to cheerfulness (*bilaritas*); and pain (*dolor*), corresponding to pleasurable excitement, will be introduced in an analogous way.

SF40	$\text{Tri}(x) \sim \text{P}_{\text{de}}(x)$	From IIP59Dem and IIP11. "Sorrow is a state of decreasing power, and the state of decreasing power is also a state of sorrow." "Sorrow mutually implies reduc- tion of power."
------	--	---

JOY

SF41	$\text{Tri}(x) \sim (\exists y) P_{de}(xy)$	From SF40. “When sorrowful, a being decreases in power in at least one respect.”
SF42	$\text{Tri}(x) \sim (y) ES_{de}(xy)$ $\vee (\exists y) ES_{de}(xy)$ $\& (\exists z) -ES_{de}(xz)$	From SD61, SD67, and SF40. “To have sorrow mutually implies a loss in level, partial or total, of being in oneself.”
SF43	$\text{Tri}(x) \sim (y) L_{de}(xy)$ $\vee (\exists y) L_{de}(xy)$ $\& (\exists z) -L_{de}(xz)$	From SD63, SF67, and SF40. “To have sorrow mutually implies a loss of freedom, partial or total.”
SF44	$(x): H(x) \supset \text{TriNO}(x)$	Suggested by SE21 and SF40. “All humans strive to avoid sorrow.”
SF45	$\text{Tri}(x) \sim (y) \text{Per}_{de}(xy)$ $\vee (\exists y) \text{Per}_{de}(xy)$ $\& (\exists z) -\text{Per}_{de}(xz)$	Suggested by SF7 and SF40. “To have sorrow mutually implies a loss of perfection, partial or pervasive.”
SF46	$\text{Tri}(x) \sim (y) \text{Pes}_{de}(xy)$ $\vee (\exists y) \text{Pes}_{de}(xy)$ $\& (\exists z) -\text{Pes}_{de}(xz)$	Suggested by SF21 and SF45. “To have sorrow mutually implies a lowering of the level of self-preservation, partial or pervasive.”

From the above, it is seen that the predicate *tristitia* (sorrow) behaves exactly like *laetitia*—only, with negative implications. Mixed states of emotion are such that components of both joy and sorrow are present.

SF47	$\text{Mix}(x) \supset (\exists y) \text{Lae}(xy)$ $\& (\exists z) \text{Tri}(xz)$	“If a being is in a state of mixed emotion, both joy and sorrow are present to some degree.”
------	---	--

The joy may move practically all parts of the person, the sorrow only a very limited set. To get into such a state may represent an improvement in overall power, an increase in self-preservation, and so forth. We perform, to take an example, a joyful task, but it may involve physical pain.

There is, however, a state with no such consoling features: melancholy, the polar opposite of cheerfulness.

SF48	$\text{Mel}(x) \sim (y) P_{\text{de}}(xy)$	Suggested by IIP11Sch. “Melancholy is the state in which we decrease power in every relation, and vice versa.”
SF49	$\text{Mel}(x) \sim (y) G_{\text{de}}(xy)$	Suggested by SD60 and SF48. “A state of melancholy is one of total decrease in activeness, and vice versa.”
SF50	$\text{Mel}(x) \sim (y) CS_{\text{de}}(xy)$	From SF49 and SC38b. “Melancholy is such that there is a pervasive decrease in understanding of things through oneself, and vice versa.”
SF51	$\text{Mel}(x) \sim (y) \text{Pes}_{\text{de}}(xy)$	Suggested by SF48 and SF20. “A state of melancholy mutually implies a reduction of self-preservation in all relations.”

Last of all, the negative effect, “pain” (*dolor*), corresponds to the positive effect “pleasurable excitement.”

SF52	$\text{Dol}(x) \sim (\exists y) P_{\text{de}}(xy)$ & $(\exists z) \neg P_{\text{de}}(xz)$ & $\neg(\exists t) P_{\text{in}}(xt)$	Suggested by IVP43Dem. “To be in pain is to be in a state such that there is a decrease of power in at least one relation, a lack of decrease in power in at least one relation, and no relation in which power is increased.”
------	---	---

Pain experienced during pleasurable undertakings does not fall under SF41, because of the partial joy present. More importantly, discomfort and conditions that, during emotionally neutral or negative time intervals,

should be experienced as painful, are normally not thus experienced if the integrated undertaking as a totality is one of joy. If a person is about to carry the assembly toward his own conclusion on an important matter, he is unlikely to experience as painful the polluted air, hard chair, slight toothache, or moderate thirst. If there is a clearly dominant joyful relation, circumstances that are mostly experienced as heavily painful, distressing, or frustrating will not appear as such. All this seems implied in Spinoza's teaching, as conceived in the foregoing—with the addition of the superior efficacy of joy insofar as it increases the power of the person. Sorrow tends to have more sorrow as a feedback; joy has joy as feedback. This is part of the background for Spinoza's claim that *love* is more potent than *hate*.

SF53	$\text{Dol}(x) \sim \text{InP}_{\text{de}}(x)$	From SF52 and SD65. "To be in pain mutually implies to decrease partially in power."
------	--	--

The letters "In" here, as shorthand for "inadequate," may mislead. *Partial* is the term we need to symbolize. (But "P" is already used for "power"!)

The term *partial* suits both positively and negatively loaded predicates, *inadequate* only negative ones. In Spinoza's terminology, *partial* has a strong position because of his affinity to mechanistic or materialistic views. Inadequate conceptions are partial conceptions (never quite false!). In the expression "inadequate idea," however, it may be doubted whether *partial* is a good substitute. The inadequate idea is an unclear, vague, or loose one. The Cartesian conception of clarity and distinctness does not lend itself to the part/whole terminology.

There is also, however, important evidence here in favor of the possibility of an analysis of *inadequate* in terms of partiality (cf. pp. 32–33). The expression "clear and distinct" (*clare et distincte*) is indirectly connected by Spinoza in IIP30Sch with his part/whole terminology. There it is said that we do not obtain adequate conceptions of things when we take them as isolated. The conceptions are then confused and fragmentary (*confusa et mutilata cognitio*). But if we take notice of many things together (*res plures simul contemplatur*) with their likenesses and differences, we conceive things clearly and distinctly (*clare et distincte*). Spinoza is here able to explain inadequateness in terms of lack of clearness and distinctness and explain this lack in terms of isolation of one thing from others. That is, he shows the possi-

bility of defining inadequateness of conceptions, and therefore ideas, in terms of partiality. Clearness and distinctness will then be a property of a conception of a “whole” of interacting or interdependent parts.

“How large are these wholes?” one may ask. Ultimately, all of nature is a whole. A gradation of wholes like a gradation of *gestalts* seems warranted; if not, Spinoza would have to assert that man never has adequate conceptions because he can never “contemplate” nature as an (absolutely complete) whole.

SF54	$\text{Dol}(x) \sim \text{InCS}_{\text{de}}(x)$	From SF52, SD61, and SA13. “To be in pain mutually implies to decrease partially the level of understanding oneself through oneself.”
SF55	$\text{Dol}(x) \sim \text{InL}_{\text{de}}(x)$	From SF52 and SB16. “To be in pain is to undergo a partial loss of freedom, and vice versa.”

Pain may, under certain circumstances, be a good, and pleasure an evil, according to Spinoza. If the pleasure affects too narrow a range of “parts” too intensely, the adverse effects on other parts increase (geometrically?). This means that there is a “maximum field” for any pleasure. By an appropriate function this can, of course, also be put into symbols. For our present purposes, however, this would be pedantic, bordering even on the ridiculous.

In regard to pain, it may have a beneficial function in that in a more comprehensively conceived situation it represents an increase in power. Just as a partial joy (a pleasurable excitement) may indirectly be an obstacle to increased freedom, pain may be a positive stimulant. In short, joy is as such “good” and sorrow is as such “bad,” but under certain circumstances sorrow may help, that is, be “good,” and joy may be “bad.” This leads us to a consideration of the predicates good and bad.

VII

Good and Bad and Usefulness

The use of the terms *bonum* and *malum* in the *Ethics* suggests several, rather different, concepts. An adequate analysis would have to take into account more than two hundred occurrences with the possibility of widely different interpretations, all of them based on solid textual considerations.¹ Here we shall concentrate on an important subclass of the occurrences, in which “good” does not appear to mean something different from “useful,” when taken to include noninstrumental usefulness. That is, when asked to answer the question What is *x* useful for?, we can answer, “It is in itself useful; *x* is useful for *x*.” Thus employed, *both* intrinsic and extrinsic values may be called useful. An example of this is (IVP18Sch): “Secondly it follows that virtue is to be sought for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful for us. . . .”

Let us take as a point of departure something said in IVP18Sch:

Since Reason does not demand anything contrary to Nature, it demands that everyone love himself, look for what is useful, what really is useful, to himself, and that he strive to obtain all that really leads man to greater perfection. . . .

This occurrence—and many others—suggests that we may express one of the predicates intended by the designation “useful” as follows: *x* is useful if and only if it leads to increased perfection. At the same place in the *Ethics*, and clearer in IVP20Dem, the intimate relation between the useful and preservation of one’s being is expressed. Accordingly, we thus introduce usefulness:

SG1 $\text{Uti}(xy) \sim \text{D}(x(\text{Per}_{\text{in}}(yz)))$ “That something, *x*, is useful to *y*, mutually implies that it causes *y* to increase in perfection in some relations.”

The introduction of the term *cause* is problematic. The useful is primarily useful as a means, an instrument, a favorable condition for something else. Its role as cause scarcely extends much further. Or does it?

Spinoza makes a broader and more noble use of the term *useful* than we do in everyday life: friends are *most* useful. According to IVP18Sch, the useful “leads” man to higher degrees of perfection. Man is *led* by the useful. If Spinoza had developed a notion, “instrumental,” that clearly distinguished itself from the many notions of cause, we would introduce “useful” in terms of “instrumental.” But he does not. According to our plan, we introduce “good” by taking it to be synonymous with “useful” (in the selected sense):

SG2	Bon(xyz) $\underline{\text{Def}}$ Uti(xyz)	“ x is good for y in relation to z ” shall mean the same as “ x is useful for y in relation to z .”
-----	--	---

From this and previous theorems we now infer some new equivalences of interest.

SG3	(z) Uti(xyz) ~ (z) D($x(P_{in}(yz))$)	From SF12 and SG1. “That something is entirely useful for someone mutually implies that it causes an increase in power in all relations.”
SG4	(z) Bon(xyz) ~ (z) D($x(P_{in}(yz))$)	From SG2 and SG3. “That something is entirely good for someone mutually implies that it causes an increase in power in all relations.”
SG5	Bon(xy) ~ D($x(P_{in}(y))$)	From IVP8Dem, and also from SG4. “That something is good for someone implies that it increases his power, and vice versa.”

Spinoza does not often talk about the disuseful or harmful. We introduce *malum* (bad) by its direct connection to decrease of power:

SG6	$\text{Mal}(xy) \sim \text{D}(x(\text{P}_{\text{de}}(y)))$	From IVP8Dem. “That something is bad for someone implies that it decreases his power, and vice versa.”
SG7	$\text{Bon}(xy) \sim \text{D}(x(\text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(y)))$	From IVP8Dem, and also from SG5 and SF20. “That something is good for someone mutually implies that it increases his level of self-preservation.”
SG8	$(z) \text{Uti}(xyz)$ $\sim (z) \text{D}(x(\text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(yz)))$	From SF21 and SG1. “Something is entirely useful if and only if it increases the level of self-preservation in all relations.”
SG9	$(\exists z) \text{Bon}(xyz)$ $\sim (\exists z) \text{D}(x(\text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(yz)))$	From SG8 and SG2, and also from IVP8Dem. “Something is good if and only if it increases the level of self-preservation in some relations.”
SG10	$(z) \text{Bon}(xyz)$ $\sim (z) \text{D}(x(\text{ES}_{\text{in}}(yz)))$	From SE10 and SG11. “If something is entirely good, it causes a pervasive increase in the level of being in oneself, and vice versa.”
SG11	$(z) \text{Bon}(xyz)$ $\sim (z) \text{D}(x(\text{AdF}(yz)))$	From SG4 and SE4. “If something is entirely good for someone, it causes him to have a purely active emotion.”
SG12	$(z) \text{Bon}(xyz)$ $\sim (z) \text{D}(x(\text{AdD}_{\text{in}}(yz)))$	From SE12 and SG11. “If x is entirely good for y , it causes y to increase its level of adequateness as a cause in all relations.”

SG13	$(z) \text{Bon}(xyz)$ $\sim (z) \text{D}(x(\text{L}_{\text{in}}(yz)))$	From SE14 and SG11. “If x is entirely good for y , it causes y to increase its freedom in every relation.”
SG14	$(z) \text{Bon}(xyz)$ $\supset \text{D}(x(\text{Hil}(yz)))$	From SF31 and SG13. “If x is entirely good for y , it causes y to be cheerful.”

The foregoing theorems place “totally” or “entirely” and “useful” or “good” among the totally positive predicates. Symmetry requires the introduction of partial goodness and utility, $\text{InBon}(x)$ and $\text{InUti}(x)$, and of two sets of negative predicates, $\text{Mal}(x)$, $\text{InMal}(x)$, $\text{Inu}(x)$, and $\text{InInu}(x)$, where “Inu” represents inadequate utility. It is easily seen that we get a series of theorems corresponding to other sets of “partiality” or inadequacy theorems.

Since the useful or good is said to cause something, it is also endowed with activeness, freedom, and the other predicates we primarily—but not exclusively—attach to human beings. Thus, according to our present stipulation, we must accept $(\exists z) \text{Uti}(xyz) \supset (\exists t) \text{D}(xt)$, from which follows, $\text{L}_{>0}(x)$, $\text{ES}_{>0}(x)$, $\text{CS}_{>0}(x)$, and so on. These consequences are not serious, since we have already accepted that all particular things, as something through which God acts and as something that expresses God, have at least some rudimentary causal weight and therefore also some freedom. But what about the implications $(z) \text{Uti}(xyz) \supset (t) \text{D}(xt)$ and $(z) \text{Bon}(xyz) \supset (t) \text{D}(xt)$? Does the universally useful and good cause all things?

First, it must be noted that the implicate scarcely follows from the implications. We lack the necessary stipulations concerning the ranges of x , y , z , and t . But suppose the implication is made valid. It would raise x to the level of God: the eminently good and the eminently useful is God. Noting the role of perfection, we would have to say that if something is God, it causes gain in the perfection of all things. And if something causes perfection in all things, it is God.

Instead of accepting some or all of these consequences, we may modify or give up SG1, or accept it but make suitable stipulations concerning the ranges of x , y , z , and t . Spinoza’s text may help us make a wise decision, but he does not impose any definite one.

SG15	$Bon(xy) \sim D(x(Lae(y)))$	From IVP ₄₈ Dem, and also from SG ₅ and SF ₁ . "If something is good for someone, it causes him joy, and vice versa."
SG16	$Mal(xy) \sim D(x(Tri(y)))$	From IVP ₄₈ Dem, and also from SG ₆ and SF ₄₀ . "If something is bad for someone, it causes him sorrow, and vice versa."

Spinoza classifies sorrow (*tristitia*) itself as a bad thing (*malum*) in IVP₅₀Dem. Is this in accordance with the introduced notion, or does it exemplify a different notion? Through sorrow we make a transition to a lower level of perfection or power, says Spinoza. But he also says that sorrow *is* the transition. Sorrow scarcely causes the transition and therefore scarcely causes sorrow. My tentative answer is that when Spinoza calls sorrow bad, he uses the term in a way that I have not yet accounted for.

VIII

Virtue and Reason

Virtue

In IVD8, and many other places, Spinoza says that by “virtue and power” he understands “the same.” This formulation is too simple to convey his thought, but it will do no harm to use it as a bridge between the new notion and our old ones:

SH1	$\text{Vir}(x) \text{ ekv } P(x)$	From IVD8. “Virtue is power, and power is virtue.”
-----	-----------------------------------	---

The simple formulation above does not cover IVD8 in its totality, but is followed by a *hoc est*, a “that is,” introducing a considerably more complex formulation. This and IVP₂₃Dem suggest:

SH2	$\text{Vir}(xy) \sim \text{CS}(xy)$	“A person acts virtuously (<i>ex virtute agit</i>) in relation to something, if this something can be understood through himself, and vice versa.”
SH3	$\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim P_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SH1. “Increase in action according to virtuous action implies increase in power, and vice versa.”
SH4	$(y) \text{ Vir}(xy) \sim (y) P(xy)$	From SH3. “To act virtuously in all relations mutually implies to act powerfully in all relations.”

VIRTUE AND REASON

SH5	$\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{L}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SH3 and SD51. "Increase in virtuous action implies an increase in freedom, and vice versa."
SH6	$\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{CS}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SH2. "Increase in virtuous action implies an increase in level of understandability through one-self, and vice versa."
SH7	$\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{Pes}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SH3 and SF20. "An increase in level of virtue implies an increase in level of self-preservation, and vice versa."
SH8	$\neg(\exists x) \text{Vir}_o(x)$	From SH5 and SD40. "No being is without some virtue."
SH9	$(\exists x) \text{Vir} (x)$	From SH5, SB14, and SD11. "There is at least one thing that is absolutely virtuous."
SH10	$(x)(y): \text{Vir} (x) \& \text{Vir} (y) \supset x = y$	From SH5, SB14, and SD11a. "There is one and only one thing that is absolutely virtuous."

This implies that if two or more entities are absolutely virtuous, they are identical.

The last two theorems unambiguously point toward God or Substance or Nature as something absolutely virtuous. This might not be Spinoza's intention. But it is very difficult for him to avoid the implications. The clearly stated, intimate relations between virtue, freedom, and power are difficult to dissolve without undermining a score of theorems in the *Ethics*.

In the present reconstruction, the notion of God is a special kind of maximum concept, and the above theorems are perfectly digestible within the system.

SH11	$\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(x) \supset F(x)$	From SE16 and SH5. “To increase one’s level of virtue implies being in a state of emotion, and when one increases in virtue, one is in a state of emotion.”
SH12	$\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{Lae}(x)$	From SH3 and SH11. “The one who increases in virtue is in a state of joy, and the one who is in a state of joy increases in virtue.”
SH13	$(y) \text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(xy) \sim \text{Hil}(x)$	From SH3 and SF28. “The one who increases in virtue in all relations is in a state of cheerfulness, and vice versa.”
SH14	$(x): H(x) \supset \text{VirO}(x)$	From SH3 and SE21. “Man strives to raise his level of virtue.”
SH15	$\text{Bon}(xy) \sim D(x(\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(y)))$	From SH3 and SG5. “That something is good for someone implies that it increases his level of virtue.”
SH16	$\text{Uti}(xy) \sim D(x(\text{Vir}_{\text{in}}(y)))$	From SG2 and SH15. “That something is useful for someone mutually implies that it increases his level of virtue.”

Reason

According to IVP56Dem, “to act out of virtue [*ex virtute*] is nothing else than to act out of reason [*ex ductu rationis*].” In IVP24 and IVP36Dem the same point is made.

SH17	$\text{Vir}(x) \text{ ekv } \text{Rat}(x)$	From IVP56Dem. “To act virtuously is to act according to reason.”
------	--	--

VIRTUE AND REASON

We shall refrain from stating the sixteen theorems analogous to SH1 through SH16 that follow from SH17, by inserting “Rat” for “Vir.” We shall, however, make explicit the relation of rationality and emotion.

SH18	$\text{Rat}_{\text{in}}(x) \supset F(x)$	From SH11 and SH17. “When increasing one’s level of rationality, one is in a state of emotion.”
SH19	$\text{Rat}_{\text{de}}(x) \supset F(x)$	Suggested by SH17, SH1, and SF40. “When decreasing one’s level of rationality, one is in a state of emotion.”
SH20	$(y) \text{Rat}_{\text{in}}(xy) \sim \text{Hil}(x)$	From SH17 and SH13. “A pervasive increase in rationality mutually implies a state of cheerfulness.”
SH21	$-\text{Hil}(x) \supset -(y) \text{Rat}(xy)$ & $-(y) \text{Vir}(xy)$	Suggested by SH17 and SH20. “Absence of cheerfulness implies a complete absence of virtue and reasonableness.” “If someone acts without cheerfulness, he or she acts without complete virtue or reasonableness.”
SH22	$(y) \text{Rat}_{\text{de}}(xy) \sim \text{Mel}(x)$	Suggested by SH17, SH1, and SF48. “If a person decreases pervasively in rationality, he is in a state of melancholy, and vice versa.”

Accordingly, in every case of melancholy—as conceived by Spinoza—there is a pervasive decrease in rationality.

Spinoza stresses the close connection between “acting from reason” and freedom when he states, “The free man, that is, the man who lives only ac-

cording to what reason dictates . . .” (IVP57Dem) and “I say that he who is free only follows reason” (IVP58Dem).

SH23	$(x)(y) \text{ Rat}(xy)$ $\text{ekv } (y) \text{ L}(xy)$	Suggested by IVP58Dem. See also IVP67Dem and IVP4Sch. “The completely rational is the completely free.”
SH24	$\text{Rat}_{\text{in}}(x) \sim \text{L}_{\text{in}}(x)$	From SH23. “Increase in rationality and increase in freedom mutually imply each other.”

In IVP73, Spinoza makes a well-known statement (already quoted): “The rational man [*homo qui ratione ducitur*] is more free in society . . . than alone.” From this it may be inferred that a person can maintain a stable, high level of rationality while alone: only in such a case would Spinoza call him a rational person. But it may also be inferred that stability in level of rationality is consistent with variations in degrees of freedom: if a rational man can leave the state of loneliness and enter a society, he would change his level of freedom. The last conclusion is clearly against our theorem SH24. Various moves are open. One is to give up the mutual implications between freedom and rationality. This, however, conflicts with clear confirmations in the text of the implications (cf. IVP54Sch, IVP57Dem, IVP58Dem, IVP67Dem, IVP68Dem, and IVP72Dem). If we nevertheless gave up these implications, a number of others might also be considered highly vulnerable, and the hypothesis of structural simplicity would have to be reconsidered.

A second approach is more reasonable: to declare that what is said in IVP73 does not amount to more than the statement that “The man who has reached a high level of rationality will find the environment of a state better suited for maintaining the level and improving on it, than any other environment.” This tack amounts to accepting the hypothesis that the use of “more free” (*magis liber*) is somewhat loose in IVP73.

A third approach, closely related to the second, is simply to declare that the occurrence of “more free” in IVP73 does not belong to the occur-

rences of “free” that our reconstruction pretends to cover. This might seem self-defeating to some, but an interpretation that could be *shown* to be in harmony with *every* occurrence of the principal terms of the *Ethics* is out of reach. The best way to obtain a realistic view of what we can hope to attain is to go through lists of occurrences of such terms. Consistency is only reached through more or less free reconstructions and the acceptance of a series of more or less historically unsupportable semantical hypotheses. Authors who seem to hold implicitly that the set of their interpretative hypotheses is perfectly consistent with every occurrence of every term involved, may perhaps not have carried out any analysis at all. Would such work perhaps make Spinoza’s appreciators less enthusiastic about trying to apply his work or less sure the text can be of any help in life? The immense complications may repel them.

SH25 $\text{Rat}(xy) \sim \text{Vir}(xy)$
 $\sim \text{Pes}(xy)$

From IVP24.

“To behave rationally, to act virtuously, and to preserve one’s being in relation to something, all mutually imply each other.”

In IVP24, Spinoza equates “to act *absolutely* out of virtue” (*ex virtute absolute agere*) with the other two nonabsolute predicates, but such a dissymmetry would disturb the whole structure. The restless identification of the three on the level of connotation (*haec tria idem significant*) in the same proposition (IVP24) creates difficulties, to say the least.

The above comments are, I hope, well suited to make one realize that reconstructions cannot and should not follow *every* move in the thoughts and expressions of a great philosophic author.

IX

Self-Satisfaction

In what follows, a very tentative extension of the foregoing reconstruction is suggested. Love and self-satisfaction (*acquiescentia in se ipso*) are defined by Spinoza in relation to the “contemplation” of objects. He notes the causes of these emotions: “Love is joy accompanied with the idea of the external cause of the joy” (IIIAffD6); “Self-satisfaction is joy originating from man’s contemplation of himself and his power of action [*agendi potentia*]” (IIIAffD25). When trying to understand the latter notion, it is also profitable to inspect what Spinoza has to say about the opposite, humility (IIIAffD26, IVP53, and IVP53Dem).

Man’s power expresses itself in actions or activeness, in part unobservable by everyday means. What we may have as *latent* power does not concern us here. Accordingly, I take the emotion of self-satisfaction to refer to certain acts of reflection, that is, acts through which our activeness is “contemplated.”

I shall not assume that such meta-acts automatically follow acts as their shadows. Nor do I assume the possibility of an act being carried out without accompaniment of any act of reflection. Two quotations may be relevant here:

When the mind conceives itself and its power of activeness, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting (IIP53).

He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing (IIP43).

Spinoza seems to assert that when we adequately cause something, that is, when we adequately conceive something, we also automatically and adequately conceive that we adequately conceive. We conceive our own activeness, our own essence, and we are gladdened. This joy, however, is itself an

SELF-SATISFACTION

act (cf. SE5) and presumably perceived adequately. If we do not choose our words with care, we may end up postulating an endless series of acts that, unavoidably, are instigated by a single process of adequate causation or conception.

Introducing a predicate “ x is in the state of self-satisfaction through contemplation of y ,” we ask the following question: has this variable, y , already appeared in the previous reconstruction?

When a person causes something adequately, he manifests active power (*agendi potentia*); we may therefore write:

SJ1	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdD}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdD}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset \text{Acq}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>“If a person causes something adequately and contemplates (reflects on) this, he is in a state of self-satisfaction.”</p>
-----	---	--

This notation does not do justice to all the complexities of the idea of self-satisfaction but suffices to bring some essential features into our reconstruction. According to previous theorems, adequate causation is linked to other *in se* predicates. Are we willing to accept the implications?

SJ2	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdC}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdC}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset \text{Acq}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>From SJ1 and SC3. “If a person conceives something adequately, and contemplates this, he is in a state of self-satisfaction.”</p>
SJ3	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdG}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdG}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset \text{Acq}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>From SJ1 and SC37. “If a person is fully active in relation to something and contemplates this, he is in a state of self-satisfaction.”</p>
SJ4	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdP}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdP}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset \text{Acq}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>From SJ1 and SD58. “If someone has full power in relation to something and contemplates this, he is in a state of self-satisfaction.”</p>

This theorem may well suggest itself from the very definition of self-satisfaction, IIIAffD₂₅.

SJ ₅	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdL}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdL}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset \text{Acq}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>Suggested by SJ₄ and SD₅₁. “If a person is fully free in relation to something and he contemplates this, he is in a state of self-satisfaction.”</p>
-----------------	---	--

All these theorems suggest, but do not presuppose, that self-satisfaction requires “optimum processes,” such as adequate causation, complete freedom, and so on. But Spinoza distinguishes higher and lower satisfaction (VP₂₇) and also works in other ways with self-satisfaction as a graded predicate.

According to the definition of self-satisfaction, it is a kind of joy.

SJ ₆	$\text{Acq}(x) \supset \text{Lae}(x)$	<p>From IIIAffD₂₆. “When one is in a state of self-satisfaction, one is in a state of joy.”</p>
SJ ₇	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdD}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdD}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset \text{P}_{\text{in}}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>From SJ₁, SJ₆, and SF₁. “When one is an adequate cause of something and reflects on this, one increases in power.”</p>
SJ ₈	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdP}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdP}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset \text{P}_{\text{in}}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>“When one is adequately powerful in relation to something and reflects on this, one increases in power.”</p>

The increase in power is an increase in power in relation to something, *z*, and presumably in an adequate way:

SJ ₉	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdP}(xy) \\ &\quad \& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdP}(xy)) \\ &\quad \supset (\exists z) \text{AdP}(xz) \\ &\quad \& z \neq y \end{aligned}$	<p>“When one is adequately powerful in relation to something and reflects on this, one is adequately powerful in something else also.”</p>
-----------------	--	--

SELF-SATISFACTION

On contemplating the new power relation, we obtain joy and a new adequate power relation. There is, in principle, no limit here, but the exercise of higher-order reflection is presumably a very special case relating “only to a part of our body (and mind).” *Hilaritas* cannot be reached this way! By avoiding the theory of automatic reflection, we avoid the infinite series of meta-reflection. We may jump off when it suits us. The way to *bilaritas* is not blocked.

Mutual implications permit us to add a series of similar “chain reactions.” For instance:

SJ ₁₀	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdL}(xy) \\ &\& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdL}(xy)) \\ &\supset \text{AdL}(xz) \& z \neq y \end{aligned}$	<p>Suggested by SJ₉ and SD₆₃. “When adequately free in relation to something and reflecting on this, one is also adequately free in relation to something else.”</p>
------------------	--	---

This symbolization does not express that the new freedom is created through the old.

SJ ₁₁	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdRat}(xy) \\ &\& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdRat}(xy)) \\ &\supset \text{Acq}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>Suggested by SJ₁₀ and SH₂₃. “Contemplation of an adequately rational relation implies self-satisfaction.”</p>
SJ ₁₂	$\begin{aligned} &\text{AdVir}(xy) \\ &\& \text{Refl}(x, \text{AdVir}(xy)) \\ &\supset \text{Acq}(x) \end{aligned}$	<p>From SJ₁₁ and SH₁₇. “Contemplation of an adequately virtuous relation implies self-satisfaction.”</p>

With this terminates our systematic introduction of terms equivalent to the basic *in se* and *in alio* terms. Of *in se* terms not introduced, several should be mentioned:

“x is God”

“x is substance”

“x partakes of God’s nature”

“the essence of x involves the existence of x ”

“it belongs to the nature of x to exist”

“the definition of x implies the existence of x ”

“ x acts according to the laws of x ’s nature”

“ x is determined to exist and operate through x ”

In relation to all of these terms, sets of theorems may be asserted that are analogous to the sets formulated in the foregoing exposition. Some of them are firmly based on the text of the *Ethics*; others are inferred on the basis of the requirements of consistency. As an example, one may note that in IVP24Dem, to act virtuously is identified with action according to (or “out of,” *ex*) the laws of one’s own nature. By means of analogous references, the above terms or predicates can be integrated into our reconstruction.

A note on the ranges of predicates: At the end of our structural study of selected predicates, one might think we are in a better position to find out about their ranges—the class of values, their extension, the things of which the predicates can meaningfully be predicated. We have touched on the subject several times. The texts are silent, however, or are, at best, vague. Some of the terms studied, for instance, *self-preservation* and *power*, are applied not only to humans, but also to animals and perhaps all living things. The equivalences, if used without restriction, imply that all the terms can be applied meaningfully to all living beings. Spinoza is remarkably different from the Cartesians in applying the predicates: he tends toward very wide applications, whereas the Cartesians are influenced by the spirit/body dualism and view human beings and God as sole possessors of spirit.

We cannot doubt that animals have feelings (*sentire*), Spinoza says in IIP57Sch. They have emotions (*affectus*). But their joys (*gaudium*) are different from those of human beings. Their drives are different, and the differences are greater than those between humans. Here Spinoza not only talks about mammalia, but also about fish and insects.

The passive emotions are confused ideas (*idea confusa*) and the active emotions are clear ones (IIIAffGenD). Thus animals, having emotions, also have ideas and minds. When active, they not only have ideas, but consis-

SELF-SATISFACTION

tency demands that they also have ideas about ideas (cf. IIP58 and the theorems on self-satisfaction). There are, in short, no theorems in the *Ethics* to stop us in our attribution of all the introduced predicates to living beings “down” to insects or even further. The only qualification has to do with differences within each genus of entities. Living beings very different from us have correspondingly different joys, drives, and so on. How they are, Spinoza does not pretend to know. But, for his system, I think we must recognize that a very wide range of application of the predicates is essential.

All particular things are expressions of God; through all of them God acts. There is no hierarchy. There is no purpose, no final causes such that one can say that the “lower” exist for the sake of the higher. Every living being may, if the requisite power is there, use any other. There is an ontological democracy or equalitarianism—which, incidentally, greatly offended his contemporaries, but of which *ecology* makes us more tolerant today.

However generous in his attributions, the range of a predicate such as “virtuous” or “in harmony with what is rational” cannot be applied meaningfully to the beings of the mineral kingdom. I find it unfruitful, however, to draw a line at any particular place. With this rather negative conclusion, we shall leave the tantalizing question of the range of Spinozistic predicates. Perhaps we might permit Wordsworth to have the last word:

“To every Form of being is assigned,”
Thus calmly spake the venerable Sage,
“An *active* Principle: —howe’er removed
From sense and observation, it subsists
In all things, in all natures; in the stars. . . .”

From William Wordsworth, *The Excursion*, Book IX.

Appendix I

Approximate Signification of Single-Letter Symbols

A	something else (<i>alius</i>)
C	conceive, understand (<i>concipere, intelligere</i>)
D	cause (<i>causa</i>)
E	existence, being (<i>existentia</i> and <i>esse</i>)
F	affect (<i>affectus</i>)
G	act (<i>agere</i>)
H	person, human being, man, we (<i>homo, nos</i>)
L	free (<i>liber</i>)
N	not . . . (<i>non</i>)
O	striving (<i>conatus</i>)
P	possibility, ability (<i>posse</i>), power (<i>potentia</i>)
R	require something in order to something
S	itself (<i>se</i>)

Appendix II

Approximate Meaning of Multiple-Letter Symbols

The following list does not contain all combinations of symbols used in the text, but all that might not be understood from inspection of Appendix I.

Acq(x)	x is in a state of self-satisfaction (<i>acquiescentia in se ipso</i>)
Ad	adequate (<i>adequatus</i>)
Ali(x)	x is in a state of alienation
Bon(xyz)	x is good for y in relation to z (<i>bonum</i>)
C(xy)	y is conceived through x , adequately or inadequately, totally or partially
CA(x)	x is conceived through something else
CS(x)	x is conceived through itself
D(xy)	x causes y , partially or totally
de	decrease
Dol(x)	x is in a state of pain
E(xy)	y is in x
EA(x)	x is in something else
EANO(x)	x strives against an increase in its level of being in something else
ENPC(x)	existence of x belongs to that without which x cannot be conceived
NPC(xy)	x belongs to that without which y cannot be conceived

APPENDIX II

ES(x)	x is in itself
ESO(x)	x strives to increase its level of being in itself
F(x)	x is in the state of emotion (<i>affectus</i>)
G(xy)	x is active in relation to y , adequately or inadequately, partly or totally
H(x)	x is a person (<i>homo</i>)
Hil(x)	x is in a state of cheerfulness (<i>bilaritas</i>)
Id(xy)	x is identical to y
in	increase
In	inadequate (<i>inadequatus</i>)
Inu(xyz)	x is not useful to y in relation to z
L(x)	x is free (<i>liber</i>), partially or totally, adequately or inadequately
Lae(x)	x is in a state of joy (<i>laetitia</i>)
Mal(xyz)	x is bad for y in relation to z (<i>malum</i>)
Mel(x)	x is in a state of melancholy (<i>melancholia</i>)
Mix(x)	x is in a state of mixed emotions
... NO(x)	x strives against an increase in its level of ...
... O(x)	x strives to increase its level of ...
P(xy)	x has adequate or inadequate, in part or total, power in relation to y
PCNE(x)	it is possible to conceive x as nonexistent
Per(xy)	x is perfect in relation to y
Pes(xy)	x preserves itself in relation to y
Rat(xy)	x acts rationally in relation to y
RC(x)	x requires another concept in order to be conceived

APPENDIX II

RC(xy)	concept x is required by y in order to exist
RE(x)	x requires something else in order to exist
RE(xy)	x is required by y in order to exist, y requires x in order to be
Refl(xy)	x reflects upon or contemplates y (<i>contemplari</i>)
Sre(xy)	x realizes itself in relation to y
Tit(x)	x is in a state of pleasurable excitement (<i>titillatio</i>)
Tri (x)	x is in a state of sorrow (<i>tristitia</i>)
Uti(xy)	x is useful to y
Vir(xy)	x acts virtuously in relation to y (<i>virtus</i>)

Appendix III

Basic Equivalences

SA ₂	ES ekv -RE	SB ₁₄	L ekv ES
SA ₃	EA ekv RE	SB ₁₆	L ekv CS
SA ₇	CS ekv -RE	SB ₁₈	L ekv -RE
SA ₈	CA ekv RE	SB ₁₉	L ekv -RC
SA ₁₁	ES ekv -RE	SC ₁₀	AdD(xx) ~ ENPC(x)
SA ₁₂	EA ekv RE	SC ₁₁	AdC(xx) ~ ENPC(x)
SA ₁₃	ES ekv CS	SC ₂₂	AdD(xx) ~ AdL(x)
SA ₁₄	EA ekv CA	SC ₂₃	AdC(xx) ~ AdL(x)
SA ₁₅	CS ekv -RE	SC ₂₄	InD(xx) ~ -ENPC(x)
SA ₁₈	RE ekv RC	SC ₂₇	InD(xx) ~ EA(x)
SB ₂	-PCNE ekv ENPC	SC ₃₄	AdG(xy) ~ AdD(xy)
SB ₃	PCNE ekv -ENPC	SC ₃₆	AdC(xy) ~ AdG(xy)
SB _{3a}	ENPC ekv CS	SC ₄₁	InG(xy) ~ InD(xy)
SB ₄	PCNE ekv CA	SC ₄₂	InG(xy) ~ InC(xy)
SB ₅	-PCNE ekv CS	SD ₄₆	P _{<} (x) ~ PCNE(x)
SB ₆	PCNE ekv EA	SD ₄₇	P _{<} (x) ~ EA _{<} (x)
SB ₁₀	L ekv ENPC	SD ₄₈	P (x) ~ ES (x)
SB ₁₂	L ekv -PCNE	SD ₅₁	P _{<} (x) ~ InD(xx)

APPENDIX III

SD59	$P_e(x) \sim EA^-(x)$	SF24	$Sre_{in}(x) \text{ ekv } ES_{in}(x)$
SD62	$P(xy) \sim G(xy)$	SF27	$Ali_{in}(x) \text{ ekv } EA_{in}(x)$
SD65	$P_{in}(x) \sim G_{in}(x)$	SF28	$Hil(x) \sim (y) P_{in}(xy)$
SD66	$P_{in}(x) \sim ES_{in}(x)$	SF37	$Tit(x) \sim InP_{in}(x)$
SD68	$P_{in}(x) \sim L_{in}(x)$	SF40	$Tri(x) \sim P_{de}(x)$
SE1a	$F(x) \sim P_{in}(x) \vee P_{de}(x)$	SF48	$Mel(x) \sim (y) P_{de}(xy)$
SE4	$AdF(x) \sim P_{in}(x)$	SF53	$Dol(x) \sim InP_{de}(x)$
SE10	$AdF(x) \sim ES_{in}(x)$	SG1	$Uti(xy) \sim D(x(Per_{in}(yz)))$
SE14	$AdF(x) \sim L_{in}(x)$	SG2	$Bon(xyz) \text{ Def } Uti(xyz)$
SF1	$Lae(x) \sim P_{in}(x)$	SH1	$Vir(x) \text{ ekv } P(x)$
SF7	$Per_{in}(x) \sim P_{in}(x)$	SH2	$Vir(xy) \sim CS(xy)$
SF12a	$Per_{in}(x) \sim ES_{in}(x)$	SH17	$Vir(x) \text{ ekv } Rat(x)$
SF17	$PesO(x) \sim ESO(x)$	SH24	$Rat_{in}(x) \sim L_{in}(x)$
SF20	$Pes_{in}(x) \sim P_{in}(x)$		

Notes

Introduction

1. [*Editor's note:* A mimeographed, fairly comprehensive survey containing about 4,000 relations was prepared by the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Oslo (Naess and Fløistad 1963–64; issue 1 was produced by Naess and Fløistad in 1963, issues 2 and 3 by Fløistad alone in 1964).]

Chapter I: The Fundamental Dual Distinction: “In Itself” and “In Something Else”

1. Occurrences of *quatenus* referring to God are found among other places in IP23Dem (*quatenus absolute consideratur*); IP28Dem (*quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur* —reference to God or an attribute); IP28Dem (*quatenus affectum est modificatione*); IP28Dem (*quatenus modificatum est modificatione quae finita est*); IP29Sch (*Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur*); IP32Dem (*quatenus substantia absolute infinita*); IIP9 (*quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur*); IIP9Dem (*quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur*); and IIP12Dem (*quatenus naturam humanae Mentis constituit*). The use of *quatenus* is central to Spinoza's way of handling not only the general immanence of God, but also the participation of particular beings in the nature and essence of God.

Chapter III: Causation, Cognition, and Action

1. A detailed textual confrontation and test of a somewhat narrower hypothesis of parallelism with reference to different classes of x's and y's is given in Ragnar Naess (1969), an unpublished dissertation. Its largely positive conclusion has strengthened my confidence in my general hypothesis of parallelism stated above.
2. A set of different criteria of inadequate cognition is discussed in Naess and Wetlesen (1967: 11).
3. The complex families of terms connected with *percipere*, *concipere*, and *intelligere*, as well as the other terms of cognition, are surveyed and discussed in

the second part of Naess and Wetlesen (1967); see especially pp. 143, 156, and 188.

4. For systematic analysis of evidence, see R. Naess (1969). C1 and C2 together are designed to do justice to reconstruction Nos. 5 and 8, and C5 and C6 to Nos. 4 and 7 in Naess and Wetlesen (1967).
5. Concerning subclasses of causes, see Gueroult (1968: 245 ff.). Gueroult's work is outstanding in reliability and solidity. What I write I find in no case to be inconsistent with what he writes—but our goals are far apart. My goal is to help make Spinoza's work accessible to modern readers, not help them to work with Spinoza's own, enormously complex terminology.
6. For a discussion of Spinoza's finite God see Naess (1981 [in SWAN IX]).
7. Four references concerning immanence include:

Carl Gebhardt, "Der Zentralgedanke, aus dem heraus Spinoza die überkommenen Begriffe umgestaltet, ist der Gedanke der Immanenz" (1922: xvii).

Wilhelm Windelband: "God is Nature as the universal world-essence, he is the *natura naturans*; as sum-total of the individual things in which this essence exists modified, he is the *natura naturata*. If in this connection the *natura naturans* is called occasionally also the efficient cause of things, this creative force must not be thought as something distinct from its workings: this cause exists nowhere but in its workings" (Windelband 1926: 409). God *exists* modified, that is, as modes, particular things, not as anything else.

Harry A. Wolfson: "Spinoza's statement that God is the immanent cause of all things is thus not an assertion that God is identical with the aggregate totality of things, it is only a denial that God is the external and separable and hence immaterial cause of all things" (1961, vol. 1: 324). Wolfson quotes the *Short Treatise*, which says that the immanent cause is that in which "the effect remains united with its cause in such a way that together they constitute a whole" (Sec. Dial. §3). As regards "whole," Wolfson takes it in a strong sense suggested by Aristotle (Met. 5, 1023b, 27–33). "A whole means . . . that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity."

Evelyn Underhill (1930: 99 ff.) treats immanence from a point of view not completely foreign to Jewish philosophy. "'He is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live and move and have our being,' is the pure doctrine of Immanence: a doctrine whose teachers are drawn from amongst the souls which react more easily to the touch of the Divine than to the sense of alienation and of sin, and are naturally inclined to love rather than to awe." Spinoza was such a soul. We may put it this way: substance *is* but does not *exist* independently of modes. Accordingly, ES(x) reads, when we wish to be careful, "x is in itself," not "x *exists* in itself."

Chapter IV: Grading Basic Distinctions

1. The principle of grading of freedom is accepted by some Spinoza specialists, for instance Wolf (1966: 451) and Wetlesen (1969).
2. One of the reasons we avoid the term *mode* (*modus*) is that Spinoza lets affects such as *amor* be modes (IIA3). We need a notion of ‘particular thing’ that avoids properties. Affects are primarily properties. States of joy are properties of living beings, not particular beings “inside” the living ones.

Chapter VI: Joy

1. A few more quotations will show the context in which Gandhi uses the term *self-realization*: “What I want to achieve . . . is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain *moksha*.” For *God* one may here substitute *truth*, as Gandhi holds Truth to be God. *Moksha* (mokṣa) is total, not partial freedom and not completely realizable for any human being. “Life is an aspiration. Its mission is to strive after perfection, which is self-realization. . . . The silent cry daily goes out to Truth to help me . . .” (*Young India* 11.8.1927; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 46). It is the opinion of Gandhi that self-realization is the highest aim according to the great religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam (cf. the discussion in *Young India* 6.8.1941; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 76). The religious atmosphere of Gandhi is of course very different from that of Spinoza; Gandhi is no philosopher. But the source of their beliefs is not very different.

Chapter VII: Good and Bad and Usefulness

1. See Giancotti Boscherini (1970–71) regarding the lexical articles *bonum*, *bonus*, *malum*, and *malus*. A preliminary survey of occurrences and interpretations is found in Naess and Wetlesen (1967: 381 ff.).

References

Books or articles appearing in the *Selected Works of Arne Naess* are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Gebhardt, Carl, trans. and ed. 1922. *Kurze Abhandlung von Gott, dem Menschen und seinem Glück* (Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and Human Welfare). Leipzig: Meiner.

Giancotti Boscherini, Emilia. 1970–71. *Lexicon Spinozanum*. 2 vols. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Gueroult, Martial. 1968. *Spinoza*, vol. 1. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.

Naess, Arne. 1973. "The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement." *Inquiry* 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X)

———. 1981. "Spinoza's finite god." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 135: 120–26. (in SWAN IX)

Naess, Arne, and Guttorm Fløistad. 1963–64. *Spinoza's Etikk. Systematiske rekonstruksjoner*, 3 issues. Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo.

Naess, Arne, and Jon Wetlesen. 1967. *Conation and Cognition in Spinoza's Theory of Affects*. Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo.

Naess, Ragnar H. 1969. *Noen undersøkelser omkring forholdet mellom erkjennelse og kausalitet i Spinoza's filosofi*, Ph.D. diss. Oslo: University of Oslo.

Prabhu, R. K., and U. R. Rao, eds. 1967. *The Mind of Mahatma Gandbi*, with foreword by Vinoba Bhawe and S. Radhakrishnan. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.

Saw, Ruth L. 1969. "Personal identity in Spinoza." *Inquiry* 12: 1–14.

Underhill, E. 1930. *Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness*. London: Methuen.

Wetlesen, Jon. 1969. "Basic concepts in Spinoza's social psychology." *Inquiry* 12: 105–32.

REFERENCES

- Windelband, Wilhelm. 1926. *A History of Philosophy*, translated by James H. Tufts. New York: Macmillan.
- Wolf, A., trans. and ed. 1966. *The Correspondence of Spinoza*. New York: Russell and Russell.
- Wolfson, Harry A. 1961. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, vol. 1. New York: Meridian.

Index

- acquiescentia in se ipso* (self-satisfaction), 125–30
- active emotion, 83–86, 87, 88–91
- activeness and, 37, 88, 90
 - adequate causation and, 41, 84, 90
 - of animals, 129
 - being in oneself and, 84, 89, 97
 - freedom and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91
 - the good and, 115
 - power increase and, 83, 84, 86, 88, 95
 - symbol for, 87
 - understanding and, 84, 97
- See also* emotions (affects)
- activeness, 37–39, 46–48, 50–51
- active emotion and, 37, 88, 90
 - causation and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62
 - cheerfulness and, 105
 - of every particular thing, 50–51
 - freedom and, 37
 - of God, 51
 - of the good, 116
 - increase or decrease in, 80, 81
 - melancholy and, 109
 - partial, 39, 48
 - perfection and, 98
 - in personal relations, 38, 40
 - power and, 63, 64, 80, 125, 126
 - self-satisfaction and, 125–26
 - striving for, 101
 - symbols for, 42
 - understanding and, 2, 32, 37–38, 46, 47–48, 64
- See also* passivity
- active power (*agendi potentia*), 63, 125, 126
- adequate, symbol for, 41
- adequate causation
- active emotion and, 41, 84, 90
 - activeness and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62
 - conception and, 31–36, 40, 43–44, 61
 - by every particular thing, 50, 116
 - freedom and, 45, 62
 - grading of, 55–56, 64
 - by human beings, 40
 - part/whole terminology and, 110–11
 - self-satisfaction and, 125–26
 - through itself, 45
- See also* conception (cognition, understanding)
- adequate ideas, 40, 41
- adequate power, 80, 127–28
- affects. *See* emotions (affects)
- affectus*, 84, 87
- agendi potentia* (active power), 63, 125, 126
- agere*, 37
- alienation, 104
- alius*
- symbol for, 14
- See also* in something else (*in alio*)
- amor intellectualis Dei*, 84, 86
- animals, 129–30
- See also* living beings
- animism, 92–93, 96
- Aristotle
- Spinoza's ontology and, 27
 - "whole" defined by, 140n7
- âtman*, Gandhi on, 103
- existence and, 36, 44
- freedom and, 45, 46
- by God, 35, 39, 41
 - the good and, 115
 - by human beings, 35, 38–39, 40–41, 51, 62
 - of itself, 45, 46, 62, 78
 - power and, 63, 78, 80, 127
 - self-satisfaction and, 125–26, 127
 - of something else, 46–48, 80
- See also* causation
- adequate conception
- causation and, 31–36, 40, 41, 43–44, 61
 - by every particular thing, 51
 - freedom and, 45, 62
 - grading of, 55–56, 64
 - by human beings, 40
 - part/whole terminology and, 110–11
 - self-satisfaction and, 125–26
 - through itself, 45
- See also* conception (cognition, understanding)
- adequate ideas, 40, 41
- adequate power, 80, 127–28
- affects. *See* emotions (affects)
- affectus*, 84, 87
- agendi potentia* (active power), 63, 125, 126
- agere*, 37
- alienation, 104
- alius*
- symbol for, 14
- See also* in something else (*in alio*)
- amor intellectualis Dei*, 84, 86
- animals, 129–30
- See also* living beings
- animism, 92–93, 96
- Aristotle
- Spinoza's ontology and, 27
 - "whole" defined by, 140n7
- âtman*, Gandhi on, 103

INDEX

- ataraxia*, 84
- attributes, 2, 4, 6
 - extension and thought as, 15–16, 59
 - particular things and, 17
- aut*, 17, 19
- bad (*malum*), 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 141n1
- being (*esse*)
 - vs. existence, 9, 10, 23–24, 59, 63, 71, 140n7
 - symbol for, 14
 - See also* existence; particular beings
- being in itself. *See* in itself (*in se*)
- being in something else. *See* in something else (*in alio*)
- body
 - joy and, 95, 104
 - self-satisfaction and, 128
- bonum*. *See* good (*bonum*)
- Cartesian dualism, 129
- causation
 - activeness and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62
 - being in something else and, 17, 46
 - cognition and, 31–36, 42–44, 139n1
 - by human beings, 2, 38, 40, 41, 61, 62
 - essence and, 38–39, 125
 - existence and, 36, 44, 45–46
 - freedom and, 45, 46
 - by God, 35, 39, 41, 50, 63, 116, 140n7
 - the good and, 114–17
 - grading of, 68, 72, 100
 - power and, 63, 78, 80, 127
 - subclasses of causes, 35, 140n5
 - symbols for, 42
 - usefulness and, 113–14, 116–17
 - See also* adequate causation; inadequate (partial) causation
- cause of itself (*causa sui*)
 - adequate/inadequate, 45, 46, 62, 78
 - existence and, 25, 36, 44–45, 46
 - grading of, 72
 - joy and, 97
 - power and, 63
 - striving for, 101
 - understanding and, 36
- cheerfulness (*bilaritas*), 86, 104–06
 - the good and, 116
 - melancholia* and, 107
 - rationality and, 122
 - reflection and, 128
 - virtue and, 121, 122
- children, 41
- cognition. *See* conception (cognition, understanding)
- cognitive-causal parallelism. *See* causation, cognition and
- conatus*. *See* striving (*conatus*)
- conceived as nonexistent, 23, 24–29
 - adequate conception and, 45, 46
 - being in something else and, 77
 - grading of, 60, 61, 77
 - person as, 39, 49
 - power and, 77
 - striving and, 91
 - through existing things, 11
- conceived through itself, 1–5
 - adequately, 45
 - attributes as, 15
 - basic theorems about, 10–13, 18
 - causation and, 36, 44
 - cheerfulness and, 105
 - existence and, 23–24, 26, 44–45, 46
 - freedom and, 27, 45, 46, 54, 62
 - the good and, 116
 - grading of, 55–56, 58, 61, 62, 64
 - survey using symbols, 71–74, 77
 - melancholy and, 109
 - pain and, 111
 - power and, 78
 - striving for, 85, 91
 - substance as, 65
 - symbol for, 14, 15
 - virtue and, 119, 120
 - See also* conception (cognition, understanding); fundamental dual distinction; in itself (*in se*)
- conceived through something else, 1–5
 - activeness and, 38, 47–48, 51
 - basic theorems about, 10–14, 18
 - causation and, 31, 33–35, 38, 42–44, 139n1
 - existence and, 23, 26
 - freedom and, 27
 - grading of, 61, 62, 71–74, 78, 100
 - human beings as, 39, 49, 62
 - power and, 80
 - striving and, 91
 - symbols for, 15, 42
 - through God, 16, 26
 - See also* conception (cognition, understanding); fundamental dual distinction; in

- something else (*in alio*); require something in order to be/be conceived
- conception (cognition, understanding)
 - activeness and, 2, 32, 37–38, 46, 47–48, 64
 - causation and, 31–36, 42–44, 139n1
 - by human beings, 2, 38, 40, 41, 61, 62
 - emotion and, 84, 86, 87, 97
 - existence and, 23, 24–26, 44–46, 60, 77
 - grading of, 55–56, 57, 64
 - by nonhuman beings, 85, 93
 - power and, 64
 - striving for, 85
 - of substance, 11–12, 23
 - symbols for, 42
 - terminology for, 34, 139n3
 - See also* adequate conception; conceived as nonexistent; conceived through itself; conceived through something else; ideas; inadequate (partial) conception; knowledge
- concupere*, 2, 14, 34, 139n3
- contemplation, 126–28
- context
 - in grading predicates, 55
 - as third variable, 42–43
- decrease. *See* graded predicates, increase or decrease in
- deep ecology, 38
 - See also* ecology
- degrees, 55, 67
 - See also* graded predicates
- Democritus, 98
- Descartes, René, 59, 129
- dolor* (pain), 107, 108, 109–10, 111
- dual distinction. *See* fundamental dual distinction
- dualism, Cartesian, 129
- ecology
 - causation by humans and, 38
 - deep ecology, 38
 - equalitarianism and, 130
 - self-preservation and, 102
 - worldview and, 76
- ekv. *See* extensional equivalence
- emotions (affects)
 - of animals, 129
 - classes of, 85–86
 - cognition (understanding) and, 84, 86, 87, 97
 - defined by Spinoza, 84
 - freedom and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91
 - mixed states of, 86, 106, 108
 - modes and, 16, 140n2
 - power and, 62, 81, 83–84, 86, 87–90, 95
 - rationality and, 122
 - Spinoza's positive attitude toward, 6
 - symbol for state of, 87
 - virtue and, 121
 - See also* active emotion; joy (*laetitia*); love; pain (*dolor*); passive emotion; sorrow (*tristitia*)
- ens rationis*
 - freedom and, 64–65
 - God as, 59
 - bilaritas* and, 105
 - sensation as, 98
 - See also* reason (rationality)
- epistemology
 - in human situation, 97
 - lambanological-ontological parallelism, 1–5, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18
 - See also* conception (cognition, understanding); knowledge
- equivalences, 3, 6
 - table of, 137–38
 - See also* extensional equivalence
- esse*. *See* being (*esse*)
- essence
 - causation and, 38–39, 125
 - defined by Spinoza, 25–26
 - of every being, 100
 - existence and, 2, 25–26, 36, 65, 129
 - of God, 40, 50, 140n7
 - of substance, 65
- Ethics*
 - centrality of IP36, 50
 - hidden structures of, 27
 - reference format, xvii
 - terminological relations in, 1–7, 139n1
- Euclid, 24
- existence, 23–29
 - vs. being, 9, 10, 23–24, 59, 63, 71, 140n7
 - causation and, 25, 36, 44, 45–46
 - conception and, 23, 24–26, 44–46, 60, 77
 - essence and, 2, 25–26, 36, 65, 129
 - freedom and, 26–29, 61–62
 - of God, 25, 59, 128
 - of human beings, 49
 - of particular things, 59
 - power and, 63

INDEX

- existence (*continued*)
 - survey of, 24–28
 - using symbols, 28–29
 - See also* being (*esse*); conceived as nonexistent; require something in order to be/be conceived
- existential quantification, 19
- ex parte*, 32, 35
 - See also* part/whole distinction
- extension, as attribute, 15–16, 59
- extensional equivalence, 5–6, 7, 17
 - See also* equivalences
- Fløistad, Guttorm, 139n1
- formalization, 5
 - See also* symbolization
- freedom
 - active emotion and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91
 - activeness and, 37
 - of all particular things, 116
 - being in itself and, 27, 54, 64–65, 76
 - causation and, 45, 46
 - cheerfulness and, 105
 - of children, 41
 - conceiving and
 - adequate, 45, 62
 - through itself, 27, 45, 46, 54, 62
 - through something else, 27
 - existence and, 26–29, 61–62
 - fundamental dual distinction and, 6
 - Gandhi on, 141n1
 - of God, 77
 - the good and, 116
 - grading of, 53–55, 61–62, 63, 64–65, 140n1
 - increase, 80
 - partial increase or decrease, 81, 107
 - survey using symbols, 67, 68, 76–77, 81, 107
 - total, 49, 62, 76–77, 100
 - zero level, 100
 - joy and, 96, 107
 - pain and, 111
 - perfection and, 100
 - of a person, 49, 62, 76
 - Gandhi on, 141n1
 - pleasurable excitement and, 107
 - power and, 63, 79, 80
 - reason and, 53, 64–65, 122–24
 - reflection and, 128
 - self-preservation and, 101, 102
 - self-satisfaction and, 127
 - sorrow and, 108
 - striving and, 84, 85, 92, 101
 - virtue and, 54, 120
- free (*liber*)
 - Spinoza's usage, 26, 27, 123
 - symbol for, 28
- free will, 84
- fundamental dual distinction, 1–4, 5, 6
- existence and, 24
 - survey of, 9–14
 - using symbols, 14–21
 - See also* in itself (*in se*); in something else (*in alio*)
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 103, 141n1
- Gebhardt, Carl, 140n7
- Gestalt psychology, 98
- Giancotti Boscherini, Emilia, 141n1
- God
 - adequate conception of, 40
 - in Cartesian dualism, 129
 - causation by, 35, 39, 41, 50, 63, 116, 140n7
 - "conceived through" relation and, 16, 26, 100
 - emotions and, 90
 - essence of, 40, 50
 - existence of, 25, 59, 128
 - as expendable term, 3–4, 56
 - as finite, 140n6
 - freedom of, 77
 - fundamental dual distinction and, 10
 - Gandhi on, 103, 141n1
 - graded predicates and, 58–59, 68, 77
 - immanence of, 130, 140n7
 - activeness and, 51
 - causation and, 50, 63, 116, 140n7
 - dependence of God and, 41, 59
 - personal identity and, 86
 - power and, 63
 - quatenus* terminology and, 16, 56, 66, 139n1
 - "in something else" relation and, 13, 15–17
 - love for, 56, 84, 86
 - as maximum concept, 120
 - modes and, 16–17, 41, 51, 59, 140n7
 - nature of, 128
 - power of, 63, 64, 90
 - virtue of, 120
 - See also* substance
 - good (*bonum*), 113, 114–17, 141n1
 - virtue and, 121

INDEX

- graded predicates, 53–81
 vs. absolutist dichotomies, 49, 54–55, 58, 66
 “cause of,” 68, 72, 100
 “conceived adequately,” 55–56, 57, 64
 “conceived as nonexistent,” 60, 61, 77
 “conceived through itself,” 55–56, 58, 61, 62, 64
 survey using symbols, 71–74, 77
 “conceived through something else,” 61, 62, 100
 survey using symbols, 71–74, 78
 defined, 55
 dimensions of, 55–57, 64
 freedom as, 53–55, 61–62, 63, 64–65, 140n1
 increase, 80
 partial increase or decrease, 81, 107
 survey using symbols, 67, 68, 76–77, 81, 107
 total, 49, 62, 76–77, 100
 zero level, 100
 increase or decrease in, 64, 68
 in every relation, 88
 partial, 81, 110
 striving for, 87
 infinite level, 67, 68, 100
 “in itself,” 56, 57–62, 63–65, 66, 67–68, 69–71
 freedom and, 64–65, 76, 77
 partial increase or decrease, 81
 power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80
 zero level, 100
 “in something else,” 58, 61, 62, 69, 70–71
 decrease, 80
 power and, 77, 78, 79, 80
 symbols for, 66, 67
 justification of, 6, 58–60
 knowledge as, 57
 perfection as, 53, 57, 95, 99, 100
 power as, 54, 62–64, 68, 77–78, 79–81
 increase in every relation, 88
 increase or decrease, 68
 infinite level, 78, 79, 90
 partial increase or decrease, 81, 89
 zero level, 97, 100
 reason as, 55
 “require something in order to be,” 58, 61, 74–76
 self-preservation as, 56–57
 self-satisfaction as, 127
 substantiality as, 59–60, 65, 97
 symbols for, 65–68, 81
 three levels of, 54, 67–68
 zero level, 67, 100
See also predicates
 Gueroult, Martial, 140n5
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 38, 86
bilaritas. *See* cheerfulness (*bilaritas*)
 Hobbes, Thomas, 81
 human being (person)
 activeness of, 51
 adequate causation by, 35, 38–39, 40–41, 51, 62
 adequate conception by, 40
 vs. animal, 129
 child, 41
 conceivability of something through, 64
 conceived as nonexistent, 39, 49
 conceived through himself, 62, 72, 85
 conceived through something else, 39, 49, 62
 existence of, 49
 freedom of, 49, 62, 76
 Gandhi on, 141n1
 God and, 40, 68
 in itself, partially, 41, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86
 personal identity of, 40, 86–87
 power of, 39, 79, 96, 97
 requirements to exist or be conceived, 49
 situation of, Spinoza’s synthesis, 97
 in society vs. alone, 53, 123
 in something else, 39–41, 48, 62
 striving by, 84–85, 91–92
 to be joyous, 96
 to increase perfection, 101
 to increase virtue, 121
 toward being in itself, 85, 86
 symbol for, 41, 42
See also particular beings; particular things
 Hume, David, 86
 humility, 125
 Husserl, Edmund, 12
 idealism, 42
 ideas
 adequate, 40, 41
 of animals, 129–30
 clear and distinct
 part/whole terminology and, 110–11
 of substance, 12
 confused, 40, 129
 emotions as, 129

INDEX

- ideas (*continuu*)
 - inadequate, 110, 111
 - See also* conception (cognition, understanding); *ens rationis*
- inadequate, symbol for, 41
- inadequate ideas, 110, 111
- inadequate (partial) causation, 33, 35
 - activeness and, 39, 48
 - conception and, 43–44
 - emotion and, 84
 - existence and, 45–46
 - of itself, 45, 46, 78
 - power and, 78
- inadequate (partial) conception, 110–11
 - activeness and, 39, 48
 - causation and, 43–44
 - grading of, 55–56, 57
 - pain and, 111
 - of particular things, 32–33
- increase. *See* graded predicates, increase or decrease in
- indiget*, 14
- infinite being, 62–63
- infinite degree, 67, 68
- infinite perfection, 99
- infinite virtue, 120
- in itself (*in se*), 1–5
 - active emotion and, 84, 89, 97
 - adequately, 45
 - cheerfulness and, 105
 - conceived as nonexistent and, 26, 28
 - equivalences to, 6–7
 - not introduced, 128–29
 - freedom and, 27, 54, 64–65, 76
 - God as, 59
 - the good and, 115, 116
 - grading of, 56, 57–62, 63–65, 66, 67–68, 69–71
 - freedom and, 64–65, 76, 77
 - partial increase or decrease, 81
 - power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80
 - zero level, 100
 - human being as, 41, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86
 - joy and, 96
 - particular things as, 57–58, 69
 - perfection and, 99
 - personal identity and, 86
 - pleasurable excitement and, 106–07
 - power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80
 - self-preservation and, 56–57, 101, 103
 - self-realization and, 103
 - sorrow and, 108
 - striving for, 84–85, 87, 91, 92, 101
 - substantiality and, 97
 - symbol for, 14, 19
 - See also* conceived through itself; fundamental dual distinction
- in something else (*in alio*), 1–5
 - alienation and, 104
 - causation and, 17, 46
 - conceivability as nonexistent and, 77
 - freedom and, 27
 - in God, 13, 15–17
 - grading of, 58, 61, 62, 69, 70–71
 - decrease, 80
 - power and, 77, 78, 79, 80
 - symbols for, 66, 67
 - human beings as, 39–41, 48, 62
 - striving against, 87, 91
 - symbols for, 14, 15, 19, 42
 - two meanings of, 13, 15–16, 17
 - See also* conceived through something else; fundamental dual distinction
- intelligere*, 14, 34, 85, 139n3
 - See also* conception (cognition, understanding)
- “is”. *See* being (*esse*)
- joy (*laetitia*), 95–111
 - adverse effects of, 111
 - of animals, 129, 130
 - centrality in Spinoza’s vision, 95, 97
 - defined by Spinoza, 95
 - freedom and, 96, 107
 - the good and, 117
 - kinds of, 83, 104–07
 - love and, 125
 - as mode, 140n2
 - pain and, 109–10
 - perfection and, 57, 95, 97–98, 99, 106
 - power and, 95–96, 97, 106, 108, 110, 128
 - self-preservation and, 102, 108
 - self-satisfaction and, 125–26, 127, 128
 - sensation of, 98
 - sorrow and, 107, 108
 - virtue and, 121
 - See also* cheerfulness (*bilaritas*); pleasurable excitement (*titillatio*)
- knowledge, three kinds of
 - emotions and, 16
 - grading and, 57
 - particular things and, 58

INDEX

- second kind, as inadequate, 32
- third kind
 - fundamental dual distinction as, 19
 - increase in, 85
 - about particular beings, 87
- See also* conception (cognition, understanding); epistemology; ideas
- laetitia*. *See* joy (*laetitia*)
- lambanological-causal parallelism, 31
 - See also* causation, cognition and
- lambanological-ontological parallelism, 1–5, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 59
- liber*. *See* freedom; free (*liber*)
- living beings
 - activeness of, 37
 - conceiving by, 85, 93
 - joy and, 96
 - knowledge of, 58
 - range of predicates and, 58, 129–30
 - striving of, 85
 - See also* human being (person); particular beings
- logical formalization, 5
 - modal logic and, 10, 42
 - See also* symbolization
- logical symbols, 17, 18
 - See also* symbols
- love
 - defined by Spinoza, 125
 - for God, 56, 84, 86
 - hate and, 110
 - immanence of God and, 140n7
 - of self, 113
 - Spinoza's inclination to, 140n7
- malum* (bad), 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 141n1
- man. *See* human being (person)
- Marx, Karl, 38
- material implication, 17
- melancholia*, 107, 109, 122
- mind
 - in animals, 129
 - God expressed in, 56
 - joy and, 95
 - self-satisfaction and, 128
 - See also* thought
- modal logic, 10, 42
- modes
 - emotions and, 16, 140n2
 - as expendable term, 3–4, 6, 140n2
 - God and, 16–17, 41, 51, 59, 140n7
 - particular things and, 17, 140n2
 - persons as, 48
 - properties as, 140n2
 - substance and, 41, 51, 140n7
- mokṣa*, self-realization and, 141n1
- motion, 15–16
- mutual implication
 - vs. extensional equivalence, 5–6
 - symbol for, 17
- Naess, Arne
 - on deep ecology, 38
 - on Spinoza's terminology
 - bonum* and *malum*, 141n1
 - about cognition, 139n3
 - survey of relations, 139n1
 - on Spinoza's view of cognition
 - adequate, 139n4
 - emotion and, 87
 - inadequate, 139n2
 - terminology, 139n3
- Naess, Ragnar, 139n1, 139n4
- Nature
 - absolute virtue of, 120
 - as expendable term, 4
 - God as, 140n7
 - reason and, 113
- nature
 - cognition and, 32, 33, 111
 - of God, 128
 - of a thing
 - existence and, 25, 26, 129
 - virtuous action and, 129
- necessity
 - freedom and, 26, 54
 - fundamental dual distinction and, 10
- negation
 - of predicates, 58, 66
 - symbol for, 17
- nonexistence. *See* conceived as nonexistent; existence
- ontological-lambanological parallelism, 1–5, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18
- ontology
 - Aristotelian, 27
 - egalitarian, 130
 - in human situation, 97
- "or," exclusive and inclusive, 17, 19

INDEX

- pain (*dolor*), 107, 108, 109–10, 111
- partial activeness, 39, 48
- partial causation. *See* inadequate (partial) causation
- partial conception. *See* inadequate (partial) conception
- partial decrease or increase, 81, 110
- particular beings
- essence of, 100
 - God and, 86, 139n1
 - perfection level of, 100–101
 - striving of, 92–93, 100–101
 - See also* living beings
- particular things
- activeness of, 37, 50–51
 - adequate causation by, 50, 116
 - adequate conception by, 51
 - cannot be God, 68
 - causal relations between, 31, 139n1
 - caused by human beings, 38–39
 - conceived by human beings, 64
 - essence of, 38–39
 - existence of, 59
 - freedom of, 116
 - God expressed through, 50–51, 56, 66, 116, 130, 140n7
 - human beings as, 39–41
 - inadequate conception of, 32–33
 - “in itself” applied to, 57–58, 69
 - “in something else” applied to, 17
 - modes and, 17, 140n2
 - power of, 63
 - striving of, 92–93
 - See also* human being (person); particular beings
- part/whole distinction, 32, 35, 110–11
- passion, 84, 87
- passive emotion, 39, 41, 84
- of animals, 129
 - power and, 89
 - symbol for state of, 87
 - See also* emotions (affects)
- passivity, 37, 39, 40
- inadequate cognition and, 32
 - striving to avoid, 85
 - symbol for, 42
 - See also* activeness
- patri*, 37
- percipere*, 34, 139n3
- perfection (*perfectio*), 97–101
- cheerfulness and, 106
 - Gandhi on, 141n1
 - grading of, 53, 57, 95
 - complete, 99, 100
 - zero level, 100 - joy and, 57, 95, 97–98, 99, 106
 - kinds of, 83
 - Latin connotations of, 95, 98
 - power and, 95, 98, 99, 100
 - self-preservation and, 102
 - sorrow and, 108, 117
 - striving for, 85, 100–101, 141n1
 - usefulness and, 113–14
- person. *See* human being (person)
- personal identity, 40, 86–87
- pleasurable excitement (*titillatio*), 106–07
- pain and, 107, 109–10, 111
- posse*, 14, 63, 131
- possible to conceive as nonexistent. *See* conceived as nonexistent
- power (*potentia*)
- activeness and, 63, 64, 80, 125, 126
 - adequate, 80, 127–28
 - the bad and, 114–15
 - being in itself and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80
 - causation and, 63, 78, 80, 127
 - cheerfulness and, 104, 105
 - conceiving and, 64
 - emotions and, 62, 81, 83–84, 86, 87–90, 95
 - existence and, 63
 - freedom and, 63, 79, 80
 - of God, 63, 64, 90
 - grading of, 54, 62–64, 68, 77–78, 79–81
 - increase in every relation, 88
 - increase or decrease, 68
 - infinite level, 78, 79, 90
 - partial increase or decrease, 81, 89
 - zero level, 97, 100 - of human being, 39, 79, 96, 97
 - joy and, 95–96, 97, 106, 108, 110, 128
 - kinds of, 83
 - melancholy and, 109
 - pain and, 109–10, 111
 - perfection and, 95, 98, 99, 100
 - self-preservation and, 85, 102
 - self-realization and, 103
 - self-satisfaction and, 125, 126
 - sorrow and, 107–08, 117
 - striving for, 85, 92, 101, 102
 - symbols for, 68, 131
 - usefulness and, 114
 - virtue and, 119, 120

- Prabhu, R. K., 103
- predicates
 negation of, 58, 66
 ranges of, 19–20, 58, 129–30
 for usefulness, 116
 symbols for, 5, 131
See also graded predicates
- psychoanalysis, repression and, 105
- quantification, 19
- quatenus*, 16, 56–57, 66, 139n1
- ranges. *See* predicates, ranges of
- Rao, U. R., 103
- rationality. *See* reason (rationality)
- reality, perfection and, 57
- reason (rationality), 121–24
 freedom and, 53, 64–65, 122–24
 grading of, 55
 self-satisfaction and, 128
 usefulness and, 113
 virtue and, 55, 121–22, 124
See also ens rationis
- reflection, 126–28
- relationism, 40, 41
- require something in order to be/be conceived, 1,
 9, 11, 13–14
 freedom and, 27
 grading of, 58, 61, 74–76
 human being and, 49
 inadequate conception and, 46
 striving to reduce extent of, 91
 symbol for, 14, 15, 20
See also conceived through something else; in
 something else (*in alio*)
- res particularis*. *See* particular things
- Saw, Ruth, 40, 86
- se*
 symbol for, 14
See also in itself (*in se*)
- Self, Gandhi on, 103
- self-preservation, 84–85, 92, 101–04
 cheerfulness and, 106
 the good and, 115
 grading of, 56–57
 joy and, 102, 108
 melancholy and, 109
 rationality and, 124
 sorrow and, 108
 striving for, 101–02
- usefulness and, 113, 115
- virtue and, 120, 124
- self-realization, 102–03, 141n1
- self-satisfaction (*acquiescentia in se ipso*), 125–30
- sorrow (*tristitia*), 95, 97, 107–08, 110
 good or bad and, 111, 117
- Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch)
 animism of, 92–93, 96
 Cartesian dualism and, 129
 on cognitive-causal parallelism, 2, 31–35, 38,
 40, 41, 61
 deep ecology and, 38
 finite God of, 140n6
 on free will, 84
 fundamental dual distinction and, 6, 10, 11,
 12, 15, 49, 53
 Gandhi and, 103, 141n1
 on graded predicates, 6
 freedom, 54–55, 65, 68, 77, 140n1
 power, 64
 self-satisfaction, 127
 substantiality, 60
 on human beings, 39, 40, 41
 idealism and, 42
 on immanent God, 130, 140n7
 causation and, 50, 63, 116, 140n7
 dependence of God and, 41, 59
 personal identity and, 86
 power and, 63
quatenus and, 16, 56, 66, 139n1
 optimism of, 97
 on perfection, 100–101
 joy and, 57, 83, 95, 97–98
 self-preservation and, 85
 sorrow and, 117
 usefulness and, 114
 ranges of predicates and, 19–20, 58, 129–30
 on rationality, 53, 65, 122–23
 reconstructions of his views, 1, 86–87, 124
 terminology of, 1–7
 about activeness, 37
 affects as modes in, 140n2
 about causes, 35, 140n5
 about conception, 32, 34, 110–11
 about emotions, 84, 95, 107
 about existence, 19, 23–25, 59
bilaritas, 86, 104, 105, 107
liber, 26, 27, 123
perfectio, 95, 98
potentia, 62–63, 64, 95
quatenus, 16, 56–57, 66, 139n1

INDEX

- Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch) (*continued*)
 terminology of (*continued*)
 about self-preservation, 102
 about self-satisfaction, 125
 symbolization and, 18–21
 tristitia, 117
 about usefulness, 114
 vel, 17, 19
 about virtue, 119, 120
 on three kinds of knowledge, 16, 19, 32, 57, 58, 85, 87
- Stoics
 self-preservation and, 102
- Spinoza and, 84
- striving (*conatus*), 84–85, 87, 91–93
 for activeness, 101
 to avoid passivity, 85
 to avoid sorrow, 108
 for being in itself, 84–85, 87, 91, 92, 101
 to be joyous, 96–97
 freedom and, 84, 85, 92, 101
 Gandhi on, 141n1
 for perfection, 85, 100–101, 141n1
 for power, 85, 92, 101, 102
 relations between goals and, 96–97
 for self-preservation, 101–02
 for virtue, 121
- substance
 as adequate cause, 35, 39, 41
 conception of, 11–12, 23
 emotions and, 90
 as expendable term, 3–4, 6, 56, 128
 God as, 59
 gradation of, 59–60, 65, 97
 modes and, 41, 51, 140n7
 one and only one, 65
 in particular beings, 86
 virtue and, 120
 See also God
- Substance, absolute virtue of, 120
- substantiality, 59–60, 65, 97
- sunt*, 9, 19
- symbolization
 vs. formalization, 5
 value of, 20–21, 45, 66
- symbols
 for fundamental dual distinction, 14–15
 for graded predicates, 65–68, 81
 heuristic use of, 5, 18–19, 21
- logical, 17, 18
 for striving, 87
 tables of, 131, 133–35
- things. *See* particular things
- thought
 as attribute, 15, 16, 59
 See also ens rationis; ideas; mind
- titillatio*. *See* pleasurable excitement (*titillatio*)
- tristitia*. *See* sorrow (*tristitia*)
- truth
 Gandhi on, 103, 141n1
 self-satisfaction and, 125
- Underhill, Evelyn, 140n7
- understanding. *See* conception (cognition, understanding)
- universal quantification, 19
- usefulness, 113–14, 115, 116
 virtue and, 113, 121
- vel*, 17, 19
- virtue, 119–22
 as acting according to one's nature, 129
 freedom and, 54, 120
 reason and, 55, 121–22, 124
 self-satisfaction and, 128
 striving for, 121
 usefulness and, 113, 121
- Wetlesen, Jon, on Spinoza
 bonum and *malum*, 141n1
 cognition
 adequate, 139n4
 emotion and, 87
 inadequate, 139n2
 terms of, 139n3
 freedom, grading of, 140n1
 power, 62
- whole
 concept of, 59–60
 part/whole distinction, 32, 35, 110–11
- will, 84
- Windelband, Wilhelm, 140n7
- Wolf, A., 140n1
- Wolfson, Harry A., 59, 140n7
- Wordsworth, William, 130
- worldview, 76

Communication and Argument

The Selected Works of Arne Naess

Harold Glasser, Series Editor
Alan Drengson, Associate Editor

I

Interpretation and Preciseness
A Contribution to the Theory of Communication

II

Scepticism
Wonder and Joy of a Wandering Seeker

III

Which World Is the Real One?
Inquiry into Comprehensive Systems, Cultures, and Philosophies

IV

The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise
Rich Descriptions, Abundant Choices, and Open Futures

V

Gandhi and Group Conflict
Explorations of Nonviolent Resistance, *Satyāgraha*

VI

Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence
The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's *Ethics*

VII

Communication and Argument
Elements of Applied Semantics

VIII


Common Sense, Knowledge, and Truth
Open Inquiry in a Pluralistic World
Selected Papers

IX

Reason, Democracy, and Science
Understanding Among Conflicting Worldviews
Selected Papers

X

Deep Ecology of Wisdom
Explorations in Unities of Nature and Cultures
Selected Papers



The Selected Works of Arne Naess

Communication and Argument

Elements of Applied Semantics

VOLUME VII

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Series Editor's Introduction</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>Author's Introduction to the Series</i>	<i>lvii</i>
<i>Author's Preface to This Edition</i>	<i>lxiii</i>
<i>Author's Foreword to the First Edition</i>	<i>lxvii</i>
I. Interpretation	1
Grasping What Others Mean	1
Equivalence Between Expressions	9
When Are Expressions Equivalent?	12
Interpreting an Expression	16
Setting Forth Possible Interpretations	18
Reasonable Interpretations	19
Interpretation of Expressions Used as Terms	20
Depth of Intended Meaning	22
II. Precization and Definition	25
Language as an Instrument for Precization	25
Precization Defined	26
Prescriptive Definitions	31
Why Precize or Define?	37
How to Precize and Define	40
The Task and Pitfalls of Definition	41
Sources of Error in Precization	46
New Meanings for Old Terms	48
Fruitful Concepts and Appropriate Terms	50
Precizing Catchphrases and Metaphors	51
Deprecizing and Popularizing	53

CONTENTS

III. Analytic and Synthetic Sentences	55
The Distinction	55
Examples and Illustrations	58
Drawing Analytic Conclusions	61
IV. Agreement and Disagreement	63
A Theory of Two Common Misunderstandings	63
Applications of the Theory	69
Pseudo-Agreement in Argument	73
V. Surveys of Arguments for and Against a Standpoint	75
Psychological and Philosophical Background	75
<i>Pro et Contra</i> and <i>Pro aut Contra</i>	79
Issue Expressions	81
Argument Expressions	82
Tenability and Relevance of Arguments	84
VI. Effective Discussion	97
Introduction	97
Principle One: Avoid Tendentious References to Side Issues	98
Principle Two: Avoid Tendentious Renderings of Other People's Views	99
Principle Three: Avoid Tendentious Ambiguity	100
Principle Four: Avoid Tendentious Argument from Alleged Implication	102
Principle Five: Avoid Tendentious Firsthand Reports	105
Principle Six: Avoid Tendentious Use of Contexts	106
Review of Principles	106
Distinction Between Relevant Argument and Forms of Persuasion	108
<i>References</i>	<i>111</i>
<i>Index</i>	<i>113</i>

List of Figures

1. Relationships among expressions ("A"), statements ('C'), and states of affairs (B).	4
2. Logical relationship of the six forms of equivalence for expressions T and U .	10
3. Relationships between two expressions, T and U .	30
4. Forms of analytic and synthetic sentences.	57
5. Schematic of the structure of an argument.	84

Author's Introduction to the Series

At ninety-two it is a great honor to be still alive and to witness the publication of my selected works in English. Few philosophers have their work published in a series, fewer still receive this honor before they die. When I was originally approached with the idea of publishing my complete works, I was overwhelmed and overjoyed, but added that not all my books and articles were important enough to merit such an honor. Selected works? Yes, and I am extremely grateful for this initiative and the final result, which presents a representative selection of my work from the earliest to the most recent. [*The Selected Works of Arne Naess* are hereafter referred to as SWAN.]

My interest in philosophy began with Spinoza's *Ethics*, which as a seventeen-year-old I was fortunate to read in Latin. I appreciated Spinoza's grand vision and trusted him implicitly as a person. I accepted that human beings could, and should, have a general outlook with the grandeur of Spinoza's, but I recognized that our individual views on this grand scale will not be identical. Through the years I have realized that there is a splendid variety of interpretations of Spinoza (SWAN VI and IX). His texts are exceptionally rich. As the years have gone on, I have focused on how he leads us to realize we can increase our freedom and sense of connection with the world through strengthening and intensifying our *positive* emotions. For example, loving and caring for our place and others leads to an expansive sense of being part of a much larger world. Emphasizing hatred and anger, on the other hand, makes us feel smaller and isolated from the world. Spinoza, as I interpret him, would express this by saying that "We are as large as our love." Increasing our freedom as human beings leads us toward life in communities colored by friendship, sharing joy and sorrow.

Before I left gymnasium [the end of secondary education] the headmaster asked me, "What do you intend to be?" My immediate answer was "A philosopher." In fact, I had already conceived of myself as one. I viewed the

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

writings of many contemporary philosophers that I was familiar with, however, as vague and airy and certainly not as inspiring as Spinoza.

My doctoral thesis in philosophy of science was an effort to remind us that in science the content of a theory is not independent of research behavior—the activities of observing, confirming, disconfirming, and so on, and that these are set within a deep context of place, history, and culture. Later, as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California at Berkeley, I studied the behavior of experimental psychologists doing animal research.

In 1934 and 1935 I studied in Vienna and while there became a member of the famous Schlick seminar, the main discussion group of the Vienna Circle. Their quest for clarity and cordial cooperation in pursuit of knowledge led me to appreciate that “What do I mean?” is an open question. I concluded that we never intend to express anything extremely definite, even in mathematics or symbolic logic. I saw the importance of using empirical methods to find out how we actually use certain expressions and sentences. I developed and applied a wide variety of such methods, which became part of the core for the empirical semantics that runs through my work. I continued to do this type of research into the 1990s, my last project being one in which I questioned experts and policy makers about their ideas of values intrinsic to the natural world (in SWAN X).

In one of my earlier studies, I reviewed about 700 articles from philosophers concerning their use of the word *truth*. For the most part, I found these unconvincing and soon started on empirical studies of the use of *truth* among ordinary nonprofessional people and schoolchildren (in SWAN VIII). Many philosophers seemed to assume that ordinary people hold very naive views about these deep matters. I found through research that, on the contrary, the views articulated by these “ordinary” people were every bit as sophisticated as those held by professional philosophers. This reinforced my conviction that, generally, we greatly underestimate ourselves. Much academic philosophy was narrowly focused and abstract. Philosophers who elicited interest in wide-ranging issues of practical and global importance, such as nonviolence and social justice, have in my lifetime said things that were considered creative, but often too far out. In spite of consistent proclamations that science neither would nor could take over all the problems discussed by philosophers, I tried to argue in ways that reminded readers of science done as open inquiry, and I tried to emphasize that it is occasionally

necessary to perform empirical research to illuminate or support a philosophical viewpoint.

My empirical and historical research led me to realize that there are no certainties and that there is a great diversity in our spontaneous experience as well as endless ways to describe and appreciate the complexities and values of the world. Thus, I realized that I am one of those lifetime seekers that the ancient Greeks called a *zetetic* (see SWAN II and VIII). From my research on scepticism and the foundations of science and logic, it became clear to me that pluralism (every event has many descriptions and possible outcomes), possibilism (anything can happen), and a healthy scepticism (always seeking the truth but never claiming it) make up the most consistent approach to respecting the perspectives and experiences of others, human and nonhuman.

From my empirical studies of semantics, and from my knowledge of several languages, I came to appreciate the complexity of communication. Being committed to Gandhian nonviolent communication, I saw the importance of avoiding dogmatism and fanaticism. One of the most important discoveries coming from this research, leading to the publication of my major book, *Interpretation and Preciseness* (SWAN I), was the insight that we cannot avoid values in any field of endeavor or research. There are no value-free inquiries or theories. Even if we refuse to express our values, this is itself an expression and choice of values. We must, therefore, be clear about our value choices and try to make them explicit. The choices we make, as Spinoza pointed out, shape the quality of our lives, and values emphasizing positive emotions or feelings are expansive and lead to our growth. We must become ever more aware of our choices and the values involved. Even pure logic assumes certain norms. Empirical research can shed light on these matters. My colleagues in philosophy often found my empirical work perplexing. I, in turn, grew to underrate the necessity of visiting great centers of philosophy, as I preferred to be close to or in the mountains.

When I visited the United States, it was mostly to climb in the mountains or walk and camp in the desert. On one fortunate visit, I dropped in at the graduate students' discussion room at Harvard. Speaking with students who were writing their doctoral theses in philosophy, I understood that my knowledge of contemporary philosophy, and of recent important contributions in its various fields, was narrowly limited to special themes of lively personal interest. Even in later years, the tendency to take personal inclina-

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

tion very seriously colored my contribution to the philosophical literature. As can be seen, though, from the titles in these *Selected Works*, my strongly felt interests span a rich variety of fields, philosophical traditions, and movements.

Since childhood I have experienced an intense joy in being together with animals and plants and in contemplating the immense evolutionary development of life on earth over millions of years. From an early age I also developed an intense love for mountains and for being in them. Much of my creative philosophical work was done at Tvergastein, my mountain hut in Norway (see SWAN X). My devotion to outdoor life is in the Norwegian tradition called *friluftsliv* (literally, free-air-life). In many respects, I approached philosophical and cross-cultural studies as if I were a field ecologist or naturalist. It was against this background that my work from the 1960s onward focused with close attention on cultural diversity, biodiversity, sustainability, and the deep ecology movement.

My work since the Second World War has been increasingly within movements such as those furthering social justice, peace, and ecological responsibility. During the war, I engaged in anti-Nazi activism, and from that time also in promilitant Gandhianism, a nonviolence that is not pacifist in the usual sense but insists that if it is a bloody fight for justice against injustice, we seek "the center of the conflict" and, if necessary, cooperate with people who use arms. During the Cold War, I participated in the "third side," against both communism and extreme anticommunism, for example, as the scientific leader of a UNESCO project bringing Marxist and anti-Marxist politicians and political science researchers together in an unbiased discussion of the essence of democracy and freedom. Some of the relevant publications are included in SWAN IX.

The broad spectrum of books and articles included in the *Selected Works* represents, in many ways, a chronicle of my passions and influences. The *Selected Works* record, albeit in an inevitably fragmentary way, one possible expression of these. My dream and hope is that some readers will be inspired by their sheer variety, and that young philosophers will be encouraged to let strong personal motivations steer their studies.

Working habits vary. Some people write an article and go on to the next without looking back on the old one; others come back from time to time, radically revising and changing the old one. The latter is my way of working. Lecturing in many places about these subjects, I have found it

natural to revise the old manuscripts until sometimes very little is left of the original. Therefore, I have always viewed my writing as preliminary; a year, five years, ten years after publication of the first editions I have itched to revise, *thoroughly* revise them. When my first book was printed in 1936, I went to watch the hulking presses printing out one page at a time. I was terrified, thinking of mistakes or some awkward sentences being duplicated again and again.

When I was offered the opportunity to have a selected-works series published, I immediately thought I would like to review all my work and ask how, from today's perspective, I might answer the difficult questions I had earlier attempted to probe. Such a task would have been a particularly difficult proposition, because although many of my books and articles contain new ideas, the ideas are often not developed as well as I might have hoped. But alas, I am saved—at my age there is not time for me to accomplish such a comprehensive reevaluation of my work; I do not even have the capacity to do it now in any case.

Who could contemplate undertaking a publishing project of such ambitious proportions? Douglas Tompkins, mountaineer, entrepreneur, protector of wilderness in Chile and Argentina, and creator of the Foundation for Deep Ecology, is such a person. "Miracle Doug," as I call him, likes the idea that the deep ecology slogans and the deep ecology approach were introduced by a philosopher. I am grateful to him for his firm conviction, inspiration, and great generosity. My gratitude, however, extends well beyond my thanks to Doug, to others who have supported and championed this project.

Quincey Imhoff, when executive director of the Foundation for Deep Ecology, supported SWAN with generous grants and other contributions. SWAN has also benefited from faithful assistance and cooperation in the preparation and editing of the manuscripts. The late Professor Ingemund Gullvåg prepared the initial translation of *Which World Is the Real One?* (SWAN III). Professor Alastair Hannay translated the first edition of *Communication and Argument* (SWAN VII) and offered invaluable suggestions for improving the readability of the first editions of *Scepticism* (SWAN II), *The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise* (SWAN IV), and *Gandhi and Group Conflict* (SWAN V).

Most of all, however, I am grateful to Harold Glasser, the series editor, and his assistant, Kim Zetter, who oversaw all aspects of the project from design to production. Glasser's unique combination of intellectual tenacity,

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

attention to detail, mastery of my work, and cooperative spirit made him a natural to take on the monumental task of selecting and editing my works. Glasser not only labored to improve the English and clarity of each manuscript, but his keen ability to ferret out countless technical and pedagogical errors has resulted in substantial new editions of volumes II–VII that are both far more comprehensible and accessible than the originals. I thank him for his valiant work on this project, both during his stay in Norway as a visiting Fulbright professor, where we collaborated on a strategy for revising the previously existing material, and in the subsequent years it has taken to complete the project.

From the beginning of the SWAN Project in 1994, Alan Drengson has encouraged and helped to move this work forward in numerous ways. Especially in the last crucial stages of completing volumes I, VIII, IX, and X, his help and editorial oversight have been invaluable. Thanks for his devotion, good humor, and positive enthusiasm. Thanks to both Drengson and Tim Quick for their extensive bibliographic research. Thanks to Bill Devall for his support and encouragement and especially his help on the completion of volume X, *Deep Ecology of Wisdom*. Thanks to Anne Collins for her outstanding work as the copyeditor of the SWAN volumes. Thanks to George Sessions for his support and encouragement.

Last, but certainly not least, immeasurable thanks go to my wife, Kit-Fai Naess, who has worked beside me throughout the years to provide invaluable assistance, encouragement, and inspiration.

Arne Naess

2004

Author's Preface to This Edition

There are different philosophical traditions within higher education. When I became the full professor of philosophy at the University of Oslo in 1939, university regulations required teaching logic to all entering students. In my course I tried out propositional calculus with ample application to everyday problems. The students found the course amusing. I soon developed a course using a textbook that in translation is entitled *Communication and Argument*. About a hundred thousand students went through this course from 1941 to 1970, in small groups, ideally of fifteen students. Sometimes the groups degenerated into masses of more than twenty.

The aim of this highly practical course was to change nearly every university student's attitude toward communication and argument. The students came to feel that, strictly speaking, they never meant anything *very* definite when they were arguing, or when thinking in general. In everyday life it is unnecessary and even harmful to search for maximum preciseness. At the university level every student should know what it takes to be fairly precise. Sometimes a high level of *definiteness of intention* is required for some purposes.

Some colleagues and parents were highly critical of this course. One year, when a new university president was being elected, a professor announced that the election was a vote for or against my logic course.

When I read the text today, it is easy to understand the course's hidden dynamite: the teachers and students were supposed to use examples from the political, social, or ethical debates raging in the newspapers, or among faculty and students. The more emotional the subject was, the better. Each student was supposed to be confronted with his or her own confusions. This can be threatening to established thinking.

When asked whether he thought he meant something completely un-

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THIS EDITION

ambiguous and precise when he wrote or said that he had *proved* something, the world-famous mathematical logician Thoralf Skolem, after some hesitation, and to my disappointment, answered yes. As I understand it, there is uncertainty about what *exactly* means in the abysmal debate on the fundamentals of proof theory.

The English translation of *Communication and Argument* is somewhat watered down. The original Norwegian book—complete with exercises—is the only textbook that I regret was not used more extensively, say, by a thousand times as many students, that is, a hundred million.

The last chapter is an application of the ethics of nonviolence in discussions and controversies. The title “Effective Discussion” is somewhat misleading. It was only under pressure that I did not call the rules Gandhian. At every moment we have to treat an opponent in a debate as an inviolable, sovereign person. Whatever his or her behavior, misquotations, insinuations, attitude of contempt, one should remain unruffled and not deviate from the theme of the discussion. Against this it was objected that debates must be amusing or dramatic because, otherwise, very few are willing, or even able, to concentrate for more than a few moments. Actually, at public meetings the students following these rules did not win debates. They tended to be serene and dull, but that is *not* required. One can make jokes and do amusing things, but not in a way that might mislead and thereby influence the argumentation. This is very difficult! Training is, of course, necessary. They did not get that in my course. On at least one occasion the result was deplorable: A famous poet and actor attacked science in a most witty and brilliant way. The thousand listeners, all students who had taken the course, enjoyed the performance, but they felt and were helpless in the ensuing debate. Therefore, the actor “won.”

In the West there is talk about “the intelligentsia” as a special layer of a modern society. Through hundreds of years, the French were seen as leaders of intelligent spiritual communication. When I had the opportunity to *influence* all newly enrolled Norwegian university students through the required logic course, I decided to give a course in the *practice* of communication. It was given at a sufficiently high level to match the ideals of a minority, and so I focused on communication in social and spiritual *conflicts*. The text was meant to assist the students in discovering good examples of communication in situations of conflict. In conflicts it is normal to depict opponents as stupid and satanic, using all kinds of tricks. However, there

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THIS EDITION

are also misunderstandings due to vagueness, ambiguity, use of slogans as if they were arguments, and so on. This book (SWAN VII) outlines practical standards of goals for Gandhian communication. A new chapter outlines some topics of the hermeneutic movement.

The empirical semantics in this book is used in everything I write, and especially in articles on the deep ecology movement. This explains my good relations with theorists of social ecology and Third World authors, who feel that the West pressures them on ecological policies. North/South debates need the ethics of communication and argument described herein.

The *Times Literary Supplement* said of *Communication and Argument*: "Its main purpose is well defined: to teach people in a democratic society to think clearly, and above all, responsibly. Its six chapters are concerned with interpretation, precision and definition, analytic and synthetic sentences, agreement and disagreement, *pro-et-contra* and *pro-aut-contra* arguments and the factors contributing to effective discussion. Probably no philosopher or sociologist now living could peruse this simple manual without learning something from it."

Arne Naess

2004

Author's Foreword to the First Edition

Language is used in many different ways and for many different purposes. It may even be “used” without any purpose at all, as when we exclaim unintentionally or become delirious. Generally, people use language to communicate, but by no means always: they also sing for their enjoyment, utter incantations for rain, indulge in polite chatter, and stall for time. Even when language serves purposes of communication, it can, at the same time, have an expressive and evocative function. Nevertheless, the most common uses of language are those in which it serves a straightforward, practical function of communication: we ask for or give information, explain, advise, warn, argue, agree, promise, persuade, preach, or pray. In all such uses, its main feature is something that can be found in any function of language to some degree: a so-called cognitive content. In this book, the primary concern is with those uses of language in which the cognitive content of an expression takes the form of an assertion, that is, when something or another is stated to be the case. The kind of communication in which these uses are central is sometimes called cognitive discourse.

The most obvious case of cognitive discourse is a straightforward assertion about something we can or could perceive to be the case. Less obvious, but clearly also belonging to cognitive discourse, are instances when people engage in abstract and theoretical speculations and their views are aired for public discussion and argument. In fact, whenever we say something and are ready to say something else in support of it, we speak in the “cognitive vein.” Thus, when John Stuart Mill claims that happiness is desirable because—and for him it is a *reason*—men desire only happiness, his statement belongs to cognitive discourse.

The concern here is not with knowledge, truth, and validity as such—it is not with how we should analyze statements that someone knows (e.g., that gooseberries grow on bushes, that two and two are four, or that happi-

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION

ness is desirable), nor with what is meant by saying that such things are true or false. The concern is rather with the more immediate problem of identifying what people—including ourselves—mean when they say things that are in principle open to argument. The problem is a practical one of interpretation, dealing with difficulties arising from the fact that one word sequence can have more than one meaning and that a number of different word sequences can have the same meaning.

It may be helpful to note in passing that the question of interpretation does not arise only in regard to the cognitive content of expressions, as I have roughly defined it above; whenever words are uttered, another question of how to interpret what we hear may arise. When someone swears, is this a genuine reaction or is it only an affectation, or perhaps a rehearsal of some kind? In any use of language, there can arise the question of how (or even whether) a given utterance is meant; but this question of “how” differs from the question of “what.” When we ask ourselves, “What does he mean?” we are not wondering how we are to treat what he says but rather what precisely it is that he is saying, regardless of whether he says it sincerely, insincerely, or even unconsciously.

I

Interpretation

Grasping What Others Mean

In the normal course of daily life, and at least within our own group, we make ourselves more or less understood. This is evident from the way people behave and is an essential part of the normality of daily life. Even if the people we talk to have not shared some of our own experiences, they can understand us when we describe them. A student who exclaims “I can’t face the thought of the exams” can be quite sure that at least his friends will grasp fairly well what he means, whether or not they, too, feel — or have ever felt — the way he does about taking examinations.

That serious misunderstandings are usually avoided in everyday life is because language is rather like a set of games, which we come to learn in common with other players. However, it is also because fairly stable patterns of events constantly repeat themselves and so become recognizable occasions for using certain expressions. Since John Doe regularly comes on the eight o’clock train in the evening, when one of his friends says to another that he’ll be here shortly after eight o’clock, there’s little chance that the latter will be misled into thinking that John will arrive shortly after eight in the morning. In a whole host of similar cases in everyday life, strict accuracy is not required — but, of course, sometimes it is. Because we can so often get along without it, when exactness *is* called for, we are often too little prepared for it, and this is when misunderstandings often arise.

That the meaning of an expression is fairly clearly delimited on one occasion does not prevent that same expression from expressing something quite different in another context. An expression’s meaning always depends in part on its relationship to other expressions and events, in other words, on its context. When considering an expression’s context, we must include its *linguistic* context — the area or level of discourse, written or spoken — as

INTERPRETATION

well as its *nonlinguistic* context—the kind of situation in which it is used. A textbook, for example, is designed for a special context in that it has a certain standard of mental development and level of knowledge in view. The author knows his readers and tailors his expressions to their requirements. Outside the limits of this audience, his words must be expected to give rise to more frequent and more serious misunderstandings of his meaning.

Of course, the fact that the same words uttered in one context can have a different meaning in another does not itself generate misunderstanding. When this occurs in the form of simple ambiguity—a typical source of comic-strip humor—misunderstanding usually presents little practical difficulty. For example, someone says, “Stanislavsky made some interesting comments on the stage.” On being asked “What about?” he replies, “I told you—about the stage,” and this eliminates any confusion.

Unfortunately, ambiguities and difficulties of interpretation that have considerable theoretical and practical consequences can also occur. For example, ambiguities may arise because of subtle modifications in a situation—perhaps a sudden tension when someone enters the room, plainly felt but hard to describe—or difficulties may arise from attributing distinct meanings to the utterances of another person when he has nothing so distinct in mind. Similar problems arise in one’s own utterances, due perhaps to an inability to think about one thing consistently, or to think clearly enough in a situation that requires unusual sensibility or intelligence. One can think of many such cases of significant ambiguity.

When arguing logically, whether in open debate or in presenting a scientific thesis, we assume that our words have a well-delimited meaning and that any latent ambiguities are easily recognizable and harmless. Any application of logic can therefore be said to presuppose a *theory of interpretation*. The type of word sequences in which logic plays a special role are of the form in which one or more sentences can express a thought or an opinion. Such word sequences express something that can be true or false. Since we sometimes convey thoughts by expressions that are not grammatically proper sentences, it would be better to make use of the wider term *expression*. Instances of expressions include “The Earth is round,” “The Earth is flat,” “He who laughs last laughs longest,” and occasionally even single words. (When one man looks another straight in the face and says “Idiot!” he usually means “You are an idiot!”) We will use the term *statements* to refer to the *ideas* or *thought-content* an expression expresses. “The Earth is flat,”

“La terre est plat,” and “Jorden er flat” are three different expressions that express the same statement, the statement that the Earth is flat.

The question of what a statement “really is” leads to difficult philosophical problems that this introductory work will not consider. All that is needed here is to grasp the importance of the distinction between a word sequence such as “The Earth is flat” and what this word sequence expresses in terms of thought-content for speakers of English. That there is a distinction is obvious from the fact that different expressions can express the same statement and that the same expression can — according to context — express different statements.

A sentence that (sometimes or always) expresses a statement can be said to *function* as an assertion. Of course, the same expression can also have other, accompanying functions. The sentence “An anonymous phone call says there is a timebomb under this house set to go off at four o’clock” not only asserts something but also invites an immediate response. At one minute before four o’clock, it might be appropriate just to shout “Bomb!” Yet even this patently signal-oriented expression has an asserting function, although one that is less clearly defined. In fact, the signal effect that a word has depends on its functioning in some part as an assertion. Whether a signal function, an assertion function, or any other kind of function is operative depends on the listener’s grasp of the situation in which the expression occurs. An actor who discovers a fire behind the scenes of a stage play may shout “Fire!,” but if he is a comedian, the audience may only laugh and clap, the more so the greater his expressions of anxiety and despair. They do not grasp the intended function of the word *fire*.

Expressions are made from words or collections of words; this is not so for statements. A translation of a proverb from one language into another need not employ the same number or even the same grammatical kind of words as the original in order for the content — the idea expressed — to be the same. Although our purposes in this book do not require us to go further into this point, it is important for the reader to be aware that the connection between an idea and the words used to express that idea is a complicated one and less obvious than often assumed. For example, the expression “The Earth is round” is English, but the statement our English speaker conveys with it is not restricted to English or to any other language.

Besides the difficult and not altogether clear distinction between a statement and the words or phrases used to express it, we have to distinguish be-

INTERPRETATION




Figure 1. Relationships among expressions ("A"), statements ('C'), and states of affairs (B).

tween a statement and the state of affairs it refers to or its "reference." "The Earth is flat" expresses a statement that most of us deny. The proposition, we would say, is false. The state of affairs that the expression claims to exist *does not exist*; the facts contradict what is alleged, and the expression therefore fails to correspond with reality. The essential difference among an expression, a statement, and a state of affairs can be described briefly. We make and try to convey *statements* by means of *expressions*. (A recurring question throughout this book will be how to form expressions that best convey well-defined thoughts.) A statement can be true or false, tenable or untenable, valid or invalid, depending on the state of affairs it refers to. The threefold distinction among expression, statement, and state of affairs can be represented in the triangle above that shows the relationships among "A," B, and 'C' entities (figure 1).

Expressions, which are created with words, terms, or sentences, are referred to as "A" entities. They express something, namely 'C' entities, which refer to statements—thought-contents, ideas, or concepts. While words and terms *sometimes* express statements, expressions—in our use of the term—*always* express statements. The particular states of affairs that are referred to or suggested by expressions are B entities.

This book focuses on the distinction between "A" entities and 'C' entities; the main concern is to explore this distinction and develop a systematic terminology to account for it. The distinction between double and single quotation marks helps to distinguish expressions from the ideas of

concepts they refer to. The distinction itself is of great practical importance in all areas of communication and is essential to a grasp of semantics. To understand what people say or write, we must identify certain 'C' entities, but we can only do so on the basis of the expressions provided, that is, by means of the "A" entities made available to us. Let us now consider some implications of this.

Suppose you read an excerpt from an obituary that says, "Just recently he suffered much. He was chairman of the Philosophical Association. . . ." Taken separately, the two expressions have nothing particularly odd about them, but combined they suggest, curiously, that the second statement is intended to provide a causal explanation for the first statement. We tend to feel drawn toward interpreting the excerpt incorrectly as, "Just recently he has suffered much; you see, he was chairman. . . ." But usually when we read an expression in conjunction with other expressions, the tendency is not, as here, in the direction of misunderstanding. On the contrary, because such a conjunction of expressions fills in some of the context, it should lead to an increase of explicitness and hence a decrease in the risk of misinterpreting what we read or hear. If we are given the context in which an expression occurs, the expression acquires a more sharply delimited meaning than if we hear it in a complete contextual vacuum. We are much more liable to misunderstand *isolated* sentences, and this is naturally a contributing cause of considerable irrelevant discussion. However, unless each constituent expression of any conjunction of expressions has a sufficiently clear sense of its own, it is difficult to form or convey with such a word sequence any reasonably complex and definite meaning. Therefore, each sentence must on its own satisfy certain requirements of preciseness and unambiguity. After all, we have to read sentences one at a time; an author cannot expect us to wait until we have read the last page of his book before we understand the sentences on the first page. Each expression contributes to the whole of which it is a part and can do so only insofar as it is itself capable of having a clear sense. In what follows, we will be concerned mainly with the interpretation of isolated expressions.

The development of science and technology has made a number of new demands on our linguistic usage. Scientists spend a good deal of their time polishing the language that is their tool, both for precise thinking and for effective communication of their results. Thus, when people talk about

INTERPRETATION

“correct usage,” we must remember that, although the ordinary rules are fitted to everyday requirements for preciseness, they are not adequate when it comes to determining the precise meanings of expressions resulting from prolonged and careful reflection. Besides, growth in understanding and articulateness is linked with the ability of our expressions to acquire new meanings, to bring themselves under new rules.

Linguistic usage, then, must vary in ways that we can hardly expect even experts in usage to keep up with. Different people mean different things by the same expression or the same thing by different expressions, without doing any violence to the English language. Even such a simple sentence as “Mount Whitecap is higher than Mount Baretop” could have at least two distinct meanings: that expressed by “Mount Whitecap’s highest fixed point is higher than Mount Baretop” or that expressed by “Mount Whitecap’s highest point, snowcap, or rock is higher than Mount Baretop’s.” An English speaker, on hearing the expression “Mount Whitecap is higher than Mount Baretop,” might take it to mean either of these — or perhaps neither of them but some third possibility entirely. Even more likely, he may not have considered the possibility of a distinction between the two assertions, not having considered the subtle issues of measuring heights. In such a case, we certainly cannot determine the meaning by appealing to the correct use of the sentence concerned. Linguistic expressions, whether sentences, phrases, or words, are far too accommodating to permit any exact determinations of their “correct” usage. The openness in the rules mentioned above allows words and sentences to have perpetual variability in meaning, something that permits them to be both vehicles for advances in understanding and sensibility, and cloaks for ambivalence and ignorance. If we were to say that the use of correct English presupposed crystal-clear thinking, then we must make do with incorrect English, adopt some other language, or else give up speaking altogether.

The theory of interpretation is concerned first and foremost with clarifying how the same word sequence can express different meanings and how one and the same meaning can be expressed by different sequences of words. It is also concerned with drawing consequences from these clarifications and with evolving a suitable terminology for effective and precise discussion of these issues. As such, therefore, it is not directly concerned with whether an expression is used correctly or validly. Indirectly, however, the

truth or falsity of an assertion can play a significant part in determining interpretations. If someone says "I saw Eternity the other night," and I know he is neither mad nor a mystic, I would immediately reject one literal interpretation of the expression. Instead of assuming that someone is claiming he saw Eternity, as opposed to Temporality, I would probably assume that he is reciting the first line of Vaughan's poem or else would guess that "Eternity" is the title of a film. My own assumption as to what can be reasonably asserted to be true and the range of possible interpretations that I can envisage determine in part what I take to be the reasonable choice of interpretation.

When we suspect that an expression we use might not be understood as we intend it to be, we often resort to alternative expressions that mean the same or roughly the same, hoping that with these we can help the listener identify our meaning. Expressions that convey the same statement will be called "equivalent expressions."

If we want to describe something or present an argument, our expressions must be able to convey the relevant cognitive content. But this cognitive content can be conveyed, more or less effectively, by different expressions that, in a wider sense, cannot be said to have the same meaning. Thus, we must distinguish *cognitive* from other kinds of equivalence. An extreme case illustrates the distinction. When Shakespeare's Coriolanus addresses his mother as "honored mold, wherein this trunk was framed," the expression "honored mold" could conceivably have meant for him what most of us mean by the more conventional and handier "dear Mother." That is, insofar as both expressions can be intended to mean the same, or to perform the same role, we could say that they *can* have the same cognitive import. But clearly, in a wider sense of meaning, they would not strictly mean the same. The former version, apart from being at once more vivid and formal, has a broader and more elaborate conceptual content. In a way, it means more than is meant by a person using it to mean the same as "dear Mother," and it conveys this double meaning whether or not the author has this wider sense in mind. When we speak of cognitive equivalence, therefore, as opposed to a wider or *total* equivalence between expressions, we mean, roughly, that there is some central significance that expressions share and that, at least in some contexts, makes them interchangeable regardless of differences in suggestiveness, style, or sound.

INTERPRETATION

When dealing with expressions, I will speak generally of *statement equivalence* (or nonequivalence) as opposed to equivalence (or nonequivalence) of *cognitive meaning*. The former is a special case of the latter, since cognitive content appears in forms other than that of assertion. In what follows, "equivalence" means the same as "statement equivalence."

If we are called on to commit ourselves to the truth or falsity of an expression and we are not clear as to what the expression means, there are a number of steps we can take. Perhaps the best is to evaluate every one of the interpretations we are able to ascribe to the expression in the given context. To do this, we must interpret the original expression in all the different ways in which it could plausibly be rendered more precisely. I refer to this process of postulating more precise renderings as "precization." Some precizations of the original may be tenable, others not. It is thus especially important to be able to distinguish those interpretations we would agree with from those we would disagree with; otherwise we will never be sure whether agreement or disagreement exists, since to know this we must already know what it is we agreed or disagreed on.

In most cases, however, we have neither time nor opportunity to engage in this process of listing all the different interpretations. In such cases, we can resort to the expedient of qualifying our agreement or disagreement by stating how we interpret the expression in question. An example of such a qualification follows: "If, when he says 'Routine makes one stupid,' he is referring to the tendency of routine to make most of one's actions automatic, then I agree." This procedure saves time, but leaves a certain amount to individual knowledge or intuition if we are to be reasonably sure the interpretation we assess is also the speaker's.

A theory of interpretation has to account for our ordinary ideas of exactness, accuracy, and preciseness. If it does not, it is hopeless to try to put the theory into practice. The theory must therefore establish its explanatory concepts, first giving definite meanings to expressions such as "interpretation," "precization," and "real disagreement." In everyday language, these expressions have no clearly delimited meanings, but for the purposes of my theory, we must give them technical meanings. These, of course, will correspond only to a certain extent to the ways in which the expressions are used ordinarily. Since a grasp of the technical meanings of these expressions is essential to an understanding of what follows, we shall pay special attention to our terminology in the next three sections.

Equivalence Between Expressions

Many differences between expressions have little or nothing to do with the cognitive content the expressions may share. The words *automobile* and *car*, for example, express no cognitive distinction, although the words themselves are quite different. There are times, however, when it can be difficult to sift out differences that are purely verbal and not cognitive—as in the case of pure synonyms—from those that are cognitive as well as verbal. Furthermore, when there are cognitive differences, it is often difficult to specify the extent to which the cognitive contents of the given expressions differ.

Throughout this book, *T* and *U* will symbolize expressions, *P* a person or group of persons, and *S* a situation (or a situation type, i.e., a determinate pattern of events or state of affairs, including the linguistic and nonlinguistic context, which are not necessarily restricted to one occasion) for which *T* and *U* can be linguistically appropriate expressions.

Let us consider the ways in which just two expressions can be equivalent (statement equivalent). The following six cases of equivalence between *T* and *U* can be distinguished:

1. Whatever the situation, *T* and *U* express the same for anyone competent in the language.
2. For at least one situation, *T* and *U* express the same for everyone.
3. For each person, *T* and *U* express the same for at least one situation.
4. For some people, *T* and *U* express the same for all situations.
5. For each situation, *T* and *U* express the same for at least one person.
6. For at least one situation, *T* and *U* express the same for some people.

These six cases represent ways or degrees in which *T* and *U* can be regarded as expressing the same statement (being equivalent expressions). The logical relationships among 1 through 6 can be depicted in a diagram with arrows pointing to the respective logical consequences of each case (figure 2). The seventh case—in which *T* and *U* do not express the same thing for any situation—occurs only when there is no equivalence. A helpful exercise at this point is to try to state the six cases of nonequivalence of expressions corresponding to 1 through 6.

Here are some examples of the six ways in which expressions *can* be equivalent. The example “Mount Whitecap is higher than Mount Baretop”

INTERPRETATION




Figure 2. Logical relationship of the six forms of equivalence for expressions T and U .

(T) and “Mount Baretop is lower than Mount Whitecap” (U) can provide us with an instance of case 1. For all speakers of English, these two expressions probably amount to the same statement—but only probably, because whether or not they do can be decided only by a necessarily incomplete empirical investigation. Another significant factor here is that the way people use the word *same* is itself by no means clear and unambiguous. For example, do we say that T and U here express the same meaning, even though “is higher than” occurs in T and “is lower than” in U ? Instead, might we argue that they are different ways of saying the same thing, or perhaps that they express different but equivalent *statements*? Further reflections on this issue are left to the reader.

An instance of case 2, in which for at least one situation T and U represent equivalent expressions for everyone, can be provided by the pair of expressions “Baldy is higher than Snowy” and “Mount Baretop is higher than Mount Whitecap.” In some contexts, these expressions may mean the same: for example, in a discussion between two climbers who know the peaks in question and are familiar with the shorter names for them. But unless one is familiar with these “nicknames,” one will merely be baffled and probably assume that they express two quite different statements.

An example of case 4, in which two expressions express the same (whatever the situation) but not for everyone, might be: “He is twenty years old” and “He has reached his twentieth birthday, but not his twenty-first” (some

might assess a person's age by his nearest birthday). Examples of case 6, in which two expressions are equivalent for only some people and for at least one situation, are easy to find; for instance, "The election will be next month" and "The election of the chairperson will be next month."

These six cases of equivalence provide a basis for precisizing and explicating the following forms of expression: "by *T* is meant *U*," "in English, *T* means the same as *U*," "*T* or, in other words, *U*," and "strictly speaking, *T* does not mean the same as *U*." Not infrequently one comes across rash and imprecise pronouncements about which expressions do and do not mean the same thing. Unfortunately, this is often the case in literary discussions in which preciseness should be of the essence. This is exactly where one should ask the following questions: The same total meaning or the same cognitive meaning? The same for whom? In what situation? Correct according to whose standards?

Usually we find that the relatively less determinate notion of 'total meaning equivalence' serves only special interests and therefore concerns only some people in some situations. We should bear in mind how often we would replace unreflectively "When one says *T*, one means *U*" with "When I say *T*, I mean *U*." We presume all too commonly and rashly that what applies in our own case, or in that of some limited group, is also true generally.

When we say that two expressions, *T* and *U*, are equivalent for someone, it is not necessary to imply that some person has actually used *T* and *U*; it is sufficient that *T* and *U* would be shown to be equivalent if and when the occasion arose for that person's use of these expressions. If we have yet to hear him using them, we can still make reasonable inferences from his language habits and other factors about what his linguistic future might show us.

However, there is more involved here than merely asking a person, or ourselves, whether two given expressions are equivalent for that person or for us. What we need is a precise terminology and also an ability to compare the expressions from all possible angles. Without such instruments and techniques, the answers we give will tend to confuse the issue rather than clarify it. Consider, for example, the expressions "I ask of myself only what I ask of others" and "I ask of others only what I ask of myself." Can you say straight off, or conclusively, that they mean or do not mean the same to you?

When Are Expressions Equivalent?

We require suitable aids to improve our ability to be clear about what we want to express by some word sequence. Help is also needed in our search for a better way to express what we want to say. Some assistance may be provided by the criterion of *nonequivalence*, which is introduced in this section.

We can think of a person *P* who feels no difficulties in understanding *T* and *U* and for whom, so far, nothing has caused him to doubt what content they express. Nevertheless, the question of nonequivalence can always arise for *P* himself or for another person *Q* who wants to know exactly how *P* interprets *T* and *U*. Do these expressions, or do they not, express the same thought for *P* as he understands them in a specific situation *S*? Suppose we suspect they do. If *P* takes both what *T* expresses and what *U* expresses (for him in *S*) to be untenable, or takes both to be tenable, we may think this shows that *T* and *U* express the same assertion for him. Person *P* might come to the same conclusion. A decision on this basis, however, is unwarranted. The mere tenability of *T* and *U* cannot determine their equivalence. What we need is a concept of 'equivalence of expression' such that not all tenable assertions will be mutually equivalent. One way of obtaining this is to imagine a state of affairs in which we take *T* and *U*, in a particular situation *S*, to say something that contradicts what we believe them to say. By thinking of other possibilities and asking ourselves whether *T* and *U* in the imagined circumstances will still be tenable (or untenable), we provide ourselves with a better basis for judging whether the outlines of the content of the assertion we convey with *T* differ from those for *U*. If we find at least one possible state of affairs such that we will accept *T* as tenable and reject *U* as untenable, or vice versa, we will take this as indicating that *T* and *U* express different meaning-contents for us.

The criterion we want can be expressed as follows:

Definition of Nonequivalent Expressions. For *P* in any situation *S*, *T* and *U* are nonequivalent expressions if and only if a state of affairs can be envisaged such that *P* will accept *T* as tenable and reject *U* as untenable, or vice versa.

The states of affairs here are those that help shape what *T* and *U* express for *P* in *S*, not any states of affairs whatsoever. We examine the interpreta-

tion we have at the moment by looking for alternative expressions, not other possible interpretations of this expression considered *in abstracto*.

Let us consider a person *P* who, in a discussion about the heights of certain mountains, hears someone say, "Mount Whitecap is higher than Mount Baretop" (*T*) and another say, "Mount Whitecap is thirteen meters higher than Mount Baretop" (*U*). Perhaps *P* will think that both are true and thus 'truth-equivalent', but according to the criterion of nonequivalence, it is quite possible that *T* and *U* are nonequivalent for *P* in *S*. By envisaging changes in the heights of the mountains, *P* can come to realize that if, for example, Mount Whitecap is raised one hundred meters, *T* will be acceptable but *U* not so. In other words, *P* is able to envisage a state of affairs such that what one expression says will be true and what the other says, false. Hence, we conclude that however *T* and *U* occur in *S* (a discussion on the heights of these mountains), they will be nonequivalent for *P*.

Suppose now that someone had said, "Mount Baretop is lower than Mount Whitecap" (*V*). However one varies the mountains in one's imagination in this case, it is hard to hit upon a possible state of affairs that would make one take *V* differently from *T*—"Mount Whitecap is higher than Mount Baretop." The two expressions are, no doubt, equivalent for practically everyone in practically all situations.

As another example, take the sentences "Italians are dark" (*T*) and "All Italians are dark" (*U*). By thinking of all possible variations in the appearances of Italians, we can discover whether some appearances might be such that, if in fact Italians did look thus, we would then accept *T* and reject *U*, or vice versa. We "vary" the world and see in what possible worlds we would accept *T* and *U*. Thus, we may find we are prepared to accept *T* and reject *U* if 90 percent of Italians were dark and 10 percent fair. If this is our conclusion, then *T* asserts something less than *U*; *T* is not false even if there are some fair Italians, whereas *U* is only true if absolutely all Italians are dark. In that case, according to our criterion, *T* and *U* are nonequivalent. But one's understanding of *T* could be such that even if only 1 percent of Italians are dark, then *T* is false. Perhaps no possibility at all can be envisaged for accepting *T* and rejecting *U*; then *T* and *U* are not nonequivalent.

The importance of including in our criterion a reference to the situation *S* should be obvious, as should the reason why, when we use the criterion, we must envisage variations in the expression and its properties, not variations in the context in which the expression is given. We can mean dif-

INTERPRETATION

ferent things by the same utterance according to what kind of situation or context we express it in, even if, on some occasions, all meanings of *T* happen to be appropriate to the situation. But what we want to find by means of the criterion is the meaning (the equivalent expressions) for this particular situation, on this actual occasion of the expression's use.

Take another example:

$T \equiv$ Albumen coagulates in boiling water.

$U \equiv$ Albumen coagulates in water at 100°C .

At least for me, *T* and *U* would not express the same assertion in a scientific context. The statement that water boils at 100°C is true only if the atmospheric pressure is 760 mm of Hg. In cases in which the pressure varies, the assumption cannot hold. Consequently, I can think of possible reasons for denying what one expression says for me and affirming what the other says for me. This also applies to statements of the following form:

$T \equiv$ *X* is soluble in boiling water.

$U \equiv$ *X* is soluble in water at 100°C .

Water, we know, boils at temperatures well under 100°C if atmospheric pressure is low and well over if the pressure is high. Thus, the boiling point of water cannot be equated with any specific temperature such as 100°C . If *X* is something that dissolves in water at over 90°C , I will accept *U* but not *T*.

Of course, if *X* dissolves in boiling water whatever the temperature — for example, if *X* is surrounded by a film that bursts with the commotion stirred up by boiling water — then I would accept *T*. But it is conceivable to reject *U* at the same time, for example, if the water is heated to 120°C without boiling. If *T* occurs in a nonscientific context, however, I would not interpret it as above. I would take 760 mm of Hg to be implied by those who use expression *T*. In that case, *T* and *U* would be equivalent for me. In this example, therefore, I arrive at the following result: in situation S_1 (a scientific context), *T* and *U* are not equivalent for me, but in situation S_2 (a layman's context), they are equivalent for me.

Here is one more example:

$T \equiv X$ has a higher I.Q. than Y .

$U \equiv X$ is more intelligent than Y .

In some situations, for example, in a discussion among psychologists discussing intelligence quotients, I (P) would understand U as a *less technical form* of T . I cannot then think of denying T and accepting U , or vice versa. In other situations, however, I might regard U as a less technical statement and might very well affirm one and deny the other. The sentences would then be equivalent for me in some but not all situations.

I introduced the criterion of nonequivalence to help us identify both the content of an expression and the different expressions that might express this content. *Criterion* in this context means a distinguishing mark—moreover, one with a practical application in that it enables us to decide whether or not something *is the case*. However, it would be well to note here that a consistent use of the criterion does not necessarily require us to retain the ordinary senses of the word “nonequivalent.” There may very well be cases in which pairs of sentences are deemed equivalent according to the criterion but not according to accepted usage. For the sake of simplicity, however, we assume that the criterion is used consistently even when it leads to deviations from ordinary usage. In formulating this criterion, therefore, we are specifying a definition of nonequivalence. Such a definition is what we call a “prescriptive” definition (for a discussion of prescriptive definitions, see chapter 2, pages 31–37).

Definition of Nonequivalence. We will take “Expression T in situation S , for person P , is nonequivalent to expression U in S for P ” to mean the same as “ P can conceive the possibility in S of affirming what one of the expressions expresses for him and rejecting what the other expresses for him.”

If two expressions are not nonequivalent, can we therefore say that they are equivalent? Ordinary usage would no doubt require us to answer in the affirmative. But this is not directly warranted by the definition itself. Recall that we have previously referred to our criterion as a “criterion of nonequivalence.” An example should make it clearer why.

Let T stand for “It snows or it does not snow” and U for “Hitler is dead or Hitler is not dead.” Given a situation in which these expressions occur, it

INTERPRETATION

is inconceivable that I would not accept both as valid, no matter how I vary the states of affairs they seem to say something about.

Following our criterion, I would conclude that the expressions in question are not nonequivalent. But if I were to say that insofar as they are not nonequivalent they are equivalent, I would infringe on the conventions of ordinary usage, for would anyone say that T and U express identical assertions, that is, that they are equivalent in the sense of saying the same thing? T has to do with snowy weather, U with Hitler's death. Take another example: if T stands for "No geometric bodies have extension" and U for "Some rectangles have only three sides," our verdict in all probability would be that T and U are not nonequivalent, yet not thereby equivalent. Having duly noted this complication, I can now introduce a definition of "equivalence" for two expressions T and U , on the condition that at least one of them can be considered valid if certain states of affairs hold, and not valid if certain others hold. The definition is only meant to apply if this condition is fulfilled.

Definition of Equivalent Expression. We take "Expression T in situation S for person P is equivalent to expression U in S for P " to mean the same as "Expression T in situation S for person P is not nonequivalent to expression U in S for P , and at least one of the two expressions can be thought by P to be valid if certain states of affairs hold and not valid if certain others hold."

Interpreting an Expression

It is very hard to read a sentence in one's native language without immediately giving it some interpretation. When one reads something, it is difficult, if not impossible, to confine oneself to registering only the shapes of the letters or words. Without special training, we fasten immediately onto the meaning or rather onto what we feel we understand or know to be what the words ordinarily signify. But there is no way of immediately recognizing that we have a *clear* understanding of what a sentence means, nor any way of guaranteeing that the understanding we have is the common or so-called correct one.

The way that we understand a word or a sentence is normally called "an interpretation." The fact that we use this noun, however, does not mean

that ways of understanding are accessible to observation in the way natural objects such as stones and books are accessible. We cannot compare different understandings, thoughts, or assertions directly; we can only try to indicate the difference in words and word sequences. This is the case not only when we try to make others grasp something but also when we ourselves try to grasp something. We can only proceed in a roundabout way by using different sentences. Instead of there being two distinct kinds of operations—producing a word sequence and giving an account of its meaning—we have to be content with producing two word sequences, together with the claim that the sequences have the same meaning.

Because the rules for the correct use of language are not (and never can become) exact enough to fix precisely what an expression is to mean, it is always possible to doubt what a person *P* means to express when he utters *T* in a situation *S*. To try to find expressions that might be equivalent to *T* for *P* in *S*, we can go over all the assertions we think *P* might have meant to express by means of *T* in *S*. We can also do the same when we want to consider every assertion that could conceivably be thought to be expressed by *T*, irrespective of who utters *T* and of the circumstances in which it occurs. We can imagine a variety of contexts for which *T* might be apt in different situations and for different people.

Definition of Interpretation (D₁). To say that an expression *U* is an interpretation of a different expression *T* is to say that there can be at least one person *P* and a situation *S* such that *U* can express the same assertion as *T* for *P* in *S*. Note that this definition comes under the last of our six cases of equivalence (see page 9).

Let us consider some comments that may assist in the further precization of the term “interpretation.” For two expressions to be characterized as different, they need only have nonidentical words or word sequences. Furthermore, the word “can” in the definition signifies that *T* and *U* need not necessarily have occurred as equivalent expressions. The sense of the definition can therefore also be rendered by the following: “It is practically conceivable that at least one person means the same by *T* and *U* in some situation.” We do not need to be able to specify the person or the situation; it is the *possibility* that counts. Perhaps the concept would have been more immediately clear to the reader if I had used the phrase “possible alternative

INTERPRETATION

expression for” instead of “interpretation of.” The point is that what makes an expression a possible alternative is that it is equivalent to the original expression for at least one person in some situation, and the term “interpretation” is chosen simply because it is shorter. As long as we keep the wording of the definition in mind, no misunderstanding should arise.

From D_1 it follows that T is always an interpretation of T and that if U is an interpretation of T , then T is an interpretation of U . But it does not follow that if U is an interpretation of T and V is an interpretation of U , then V is necessarily an interpretation of T . Different interpretations of an expression need not be interpretations of one another, even if there are some situations in which they are.

Since there are cases in which T and V are interpretations of U but not of each other — that is, counterexamples to the statement that if U is an interpretation of T and V an interpretation of U , then V must be an interpretation of T or vice versa — we should describe the relationship of interpretation in logical terminology as *intransitive*. It is also *symmetrical*, since if T is an interpretation of U then U is an interpretation of T , and *reflexive*, since all interpretations are interpretations of themselves.

In the following, I use T_0 to symbolize an expression that is to be interpreted and T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n to symbolize possible interpretations.

Frequently, we fail to catch on to what someone says or writes. In such cases, although we are not in a position to answer yes or no, agreed or disagreed, we can still reply with conditional sentences of the following kind: “If by T_0 is meant T_1 , then T_0 is acceptable (true or valid). But if by T_0 is meant T_2 , then T_0 is unacceptable (false or invalid). If by T_0 is meant T_3 , then . . . and so on.” For example, take T_0 to be “The constitutional law of 1814 denied Jews entry into Norway.” If by T_0 is meant that the constitutional law of 1814 denied upholders of the Mosaic Law entry into Norway, then T_0 is acceptable; that is how the constitutional law is interpreted. If, however, by T_0 is meant that the constitutional law of 1814 denied every Jewish person entry into Norway, then T_0 is unacceptable; according to the interpretation of the law, *baptized* Jews still had entry into the country.

Setting Forth Possible Interpretations

If we take a situation S as constant, we can set about finding interpretations for a given expression T in S by thinking of various speakers and listeners in

S. Alternatively, we can think of the speakers and listeners as constants and vary the situation; or we can take both the people and the situation as constants and ask ourselves what expressions could convey the same as *T*. All three of these are ways of making interpretations in the sense introduced previously.

Simply from what D_1 says, one might think that it was comparatively easy to set up long lists of different interpretations of an expression. If *S* or *P* are taken as constants, however, it may not be so easy. The more fully one specifies a situation and a linguistic context, the fewer the possibilities of interpretation. Even so, there always seem to be some alternatives. For a given person in a given situation, there still seem to be a number of different ways of conveying one and the same assertion, that is, there usually exist a number of different, but equivalent, expressions.

When *P* is a close acquaintance and he is talking about something we have often heard him talk about, and the topic is also one in which misunderstanding can easily be detected, our interpretation emerges in part from our own special knowledge of *P*. As a special case, we can even suppose that we, ourselves, are *P*. But in the absence of such exceptional conditions, where no such special knowledge can be drawn on, our interpretations depend more on a common experience of the use of language. Even when we interpret an expression in a definite context we are drawing on our experience of many other contexts.

When trying to interpret a given expression *T*, we often have to consider *T* in a variety of contexts. What kind of discussion could *T* arise in? In a newspaper or in a technical or political journal, or some other source? What are the consequences of denying or accepting *T*? If two close friends of mine do not agree about *T*, what misunderstandings might exist that could explain this disagreement? If *T* occurs in a newspaper that leans toward one political party, how should we expect a newspaper that leans toward another party to interpret the expression? The examples are endless.

Reasonable Interpretations

When we have some information about the context in which an expression *T* occurs, we are able to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable interpretations of *T*. For example, the expression “*U* is a *reasonable interpretation* of *T* when *T* occurs in *S*” means the same as “When *T* occurs in *S*, *T*

INTERPRETATION

usually means the same as U ." The equivalence between T and U in S implies that U is an interpretation of T according to D_1 . In addition to this, U will be a 'common' interpretation, that is, the people or groups for whom T and U are equivalent will not be too few or too specialized.

By " T_1 is a correct interpretation of T_0 ," one often means that T_1 expresses the statement that T_0 serves to express in the context in which T_0 occurs. We must also note here that T_1 may well be given alternative interpretations by different people. Therefore, a better rendering, with the reference to the person made explicit, would be " T_1 , as I (P_1) interpret T_1 , is a correct interpretation of T_0 " and " T_1 expresses, according to my (P_1 's) interpretation, the same assertion as T_0 serves to express." It is easy to forget this reference to a person when using an expression of the kind " T_1 is a *correct interpretation* of T_0 ." One should remember, however, that quite different expressions T_2, T_3, \dots, T_n , that are also "correct" for P_2, P_3, \dots, P_n , and that these other expressions can be quite *incorrect* according to P_1 's understanding, that is, for him they do not mean at all the same as T_0 .

The expression " T_1 is a correct interpretation of T_0 " may be misleading in another way. " T_1 is a correct interpretation" might appear to be exchangeable with " T_1 expresses an acceptable assertion." However, T_1 can very well be a correct interpretation even though it does not express an acceptable assertion. For example, if T_0 is "Richmond Hill is higher than Mount Everest" and T_1 is "Richmond Hill, not counting the depth of snow that may lie on it, is higher than Mount Everest," T_1 will, for me, be a correct interpretation of T_0 even though I would not accept it. Conversely, a very unreasonable interpretation may express an assertion that one does accept.

Interpretation of Expressions Used as Terms

Examples of terms include "Caesar," "pencil," "Constitution," "to the west of," "the highest volcano in Denmark," and "being at a loss for words." "Constitution" denotes the constitution of, say, the United States or Great Britain; the constitution itself is not a term. "The highest volcano in Denmark" is a term that has no denotation since there are no volcanoes in Denmark, but the term still expresses something.

A term " a " is said to denote something if a exists. Otherwise it doesn't denote anything. Provided only that " a " has a sufficiently clear sense, " a " expresses something, whether or not a exists. "Perpetual motion," and "pri-

mordial language” are terms that probably denote nothing, but they can express things that we are able to think about even if they do not exist. If in fact there once existed an original language from which language as we now know it has evolved, then that language is what the term “primordial language” denotes. A term “*a*” can be said to denote something so long as *a* existed or will exist, even if *a* does not exist at the time we are using the term.

With regard to the parts of sentences that cannot themselves be construed as sentences, our interest here is mainly in terms. Logically, the crucial difference between a term and a sentence is that a term cannot by itself express a statement. To state something, you have to say something about something, and for this you need a sentence. Separately, the terms “Camembert” and “smells” do not express a statement, nor must they together since “Camembert smells” may still be only a term and not a sentence. Together, however, they can be construed as a sentence, although of course they need not be.

In examining the possible interpretations of an expression, there is usually a comparatively determinate part of it—one or more words—that suggests the most significant candidates for interpretations of the expression as a whole. In such cases, it may be helpful to examine separately the different meanings that this determinate part can have, first as part of different expressions and second as part of the expression in which it appears.

It is essential to be clear about our purposes: is it to interpret terms or expressions by themselves or as components in sentences? Many otherwise reasonable interpretations of a word can be ruled out immediately once we are given the rest of the sentence in which the word occurs. However, setting a word in a sentence may just as easily call to mind new interpretations. Note that when interpreting a sentence, it is a common mistake to interpret the parts of the sentence as though they were in fact separate.

In the following definition, the interpretation of terms occurring in expressions is restricted to the interpretation of them as they occur *in* expressions, that is, to the interpretation of the expressions themselves.

Definition of terms that are interpretations of each other (D₂). That one term “*a*” is an interpretation of another term “*b*” in an expression *T* means that there is an expression *U* that is an interpretation of *T* and which is made by substituting “*b*” for “*a*” in *T*. For example, “popular rule” can be an interpretation of “democracy” because the sentence “Our

INTERPRETATION

country has popular rule" is an interpretation of "Our country has a democracy."

Many terms can be given a wide range of meanings only if one thinks of them in isolation from context. The occurrence of a term in an expression limits its range of meanings and thus also the danger of confusion. If a term "*b*" does have a variety of meanings, it does not follow that the expressions for these will be different interpretations of "*b*" when "*b*" occurs in a given sentence. If someone says "He's a shark" or "Only a shark would do that," naturally we do not interpret "shark" in the zoological sense. Similarly, with the term "motive power" in the expression "Egoism is man's strongest motive power," we should not take it to mean the kind of power that is used to propel vehicles.

Depth of Intended Meaning

I have used the term "misunderstand" in rather a wide sense. Our understanding of someone's thoughts can be more or less deep. Still, it would be wrong to envisage a maximum depth that can be plumbed. Usually the best we can do is, by systematically questioning a person, to discover where the similarity between our own and his understanding begins and ends. In this way, we can at least discover various points at the boundaries between our respective understandings. Accuracy must remain a matter of approximation. In practice, we find that we are less concerned with establishing as exact an understanding as possible than with eliminating all the possible unfortunate misunderstandings we think may arise. Then again, because our mental capacities are partially dependent on memory, our desire to arrive at a full grasp of the significance of some statement is often frustrated by an inability to recall something. In school and in college, we are bombarded with a great number of expressions that our teachers assign much meaning to, but as students we may do little more than learn the sound of them. We make few attempts to understand their full significance, and even if we do try, perhaps our capacity to do so is still too weak. Possibly this is less the case in mathematics, where one manages to clarify what one hears by working out examples and "seeing" how they work, but in the less exact and more discursive sciences, we accumulate a great number of ab-

stract expressions that cannot be elucidated in the same way. Our understanding of these expressions often remains inadequate and superficial.

A sentence such as “The world is surrounded by a gravitational field” can mean very little or a great deal. What it means to a physicist, a high school student, and a seventy-year-old former university student will vary in comprehensiveness as well as in substance. The physicist may have reflected for years on the question of gravitational fields, and he will be at home in the whole complex of considerations that, at his level of understanding, go into this sentence. Variations in level of knowledge, interest, and intelligence inevitably result in variations in the depth and clarity of a person’s grasp of what he reads or hears.

To measure your own level of understanding a sentence, try the following test: simply read the following sentence without reflecting on it. “There was a 30 percent failure in the philosophy exam last summer.” Now answer the following series of questions: do you understand by T_0 the same as you understand by T_1 , that “There was a 30 percent failure in the philosophy exam last summer among those who signed up to take it”? If you can honestly answer either yes or no, then you can give yourself a point for depth of understanding. If your answer was yes, then you can go on to answer this question: do you count as failing those who signed up to take the exam but did not attend it? If you can honestly answer yes, then give yourself another point. In that case, however, your use of language must be regarded as extraordinary—not the least by those who might have been prevented by sickness from attending the exam and who would hardly care to be described as having failed. If you answered no, you also get another point, although here you will come up against some difficulties that we must leave aside for the present. Next, answer the following question: do you understand by T_0 what you also understand by T_2 , that “There was a 30 percent failure in the philosophy exam last summer among those who attended the exam”? If your answer is an honest yes or no, you get another point. If not, you get one deducted; by not being able to answer either yes or no, your understanding of T_0 must be regarded to that extent as imprecise or vague. (Of course, it could be that you considered T_0 to be ambiguous, but for simplicity’s sake, we shall avoid such complications for the moment.) If you answer yes to that question, then answer this one: Do you count as failures those who attended the exam but withdrew as soon as they saw the exam

INTERPRETATION

paper? Other examples can invite a far greater number of interesting possibilities for interpretation and a correspondingly longer list of questions. Here at least we get a firsthand glimpse of the distinction between higher and lower levels of understanding an expression.

Finally, consider the following short list of differences in interpretation:

$T_0 \equiv$ Male students perform better than female students on the philosophy exam.

$T_1 \equiv$ Male students, on average, get higher marks on the philosophy exam.

$T_2 \equiv$ A higher percentage of male students pass the philosophy exam.

$T_3 \equiv$ The percentage of female students who fail is greater than that of male students who fail.

$T_4 \equiv$ Men perform better than women on the philosophy exam.

II

Precization and Definition

Language as an Instrument for Precization

I have already mentioned that everyday language habits are in many ways inadequate when it comes to conveying every inflection and gradation of meaning. We find that just as special techniques are needed in other fields of technology, we also need special tools and training to facilitate clear thinking and efficient communication. The approach discussed in this book is based on ordinary language, but in important respects, we must go beyond everyday usage, even to the extent of importing whole systems of new words and, in some cases, new rules of grammar.

The technical language of chemistry, physics, and biology is integral to the development of these sciences. Indeed, modern science is intelligible only to those who have learned at least some of this special language—access is limited to those individuals whose use of terms presupposes a greater depth and clarity than is required in everyday life. An adequate scientific account contains only expressions with comparatively fixed and clearly defined meanings, which means that it tends to be understood in much the same way by anyone who understands it all, that is, by anyone conversant with the terminology and concepts in question.

The degree of preciseness we find in science is the product of hundreds of years of careful and consistent logical thought. Experiment, observation, and inventiveness are not enough for the building up of knowledge. Together with these go logic, conceptual analysis, and precization, an aptitude for which must be acquired by all who hope to understand and make use of the results of scientific progress.

Technical language has its own set purposes and is often useless in everyday life, even to its creators. Extreme accuracy in itself can be both an obstacle to daily discourse and a sheer waste of time. A nicely crafted scientific

PRECIZATION AND DEFINITION

statement can, if used unjudiciously, become ambiguous or vague, whereas colloquialisms, even inarticulate exclamations, can in certain settings be quite clear. Someone who has had no practice in photography may often get better pictures with a cheap apparatus than with the refined equipment of the expert simply because he does not know how to make the necessary fine adjustments. In any case, a snapshot may be all that is required. A person can act wisely even if he is not adept at giving verbal accounts of what he does and why he does it. Politicians and businessmen often exhibit a high degree of intelligence in their behavior, although their own accounts of what they do can be hopelessly jumbled or trite. Literal interpretation of the words of "important" people often results in fruitless discussion, for their importance is frequently unrelated to their ability to express themselves.

A clear understanding of language as a precise instrument for thought need not blunt our sense for the other functions of language. Indeed, our appreciation of language as a whole depends on learning to distinguish between its separate functions. Without an awareness of such distinctions, we may fail to appreciate the values peculiar to poetic or purely scientific utterances; we may be led to make inappropriate demands for precision in poetry and for stylistic considerations in science. Consideration of style alone, for example, might require a writer to vary the term used to denote the same thing, but in scientific accounts this can only lead to a lowering of the level of preciseness.

Precization Defined

In serious discussion, we want to eliminate all expressions that experience tells us are vulnerable to misinterpretation. We try to replace them with other expressions or else explicitly restrict our use of such expressions by giving them definitions that apply to the discussion at hand. In such a case, when we replace an expression T with another expression U without departing from the topic, we can generally assume that U is intended to be a more precise expression of the statement it expresses than T —that is, U is a precization of T .

Definition of Precization (D_3). That expression U is a precization of expression T means that all reasonable interpretations of U are reasonable interpretations of T and that there is at least one reasonable

interpretation of T that is *not* a reasonable interpretation of U . This definition can be expanded to include terms as well.

D_3 can also be formulated as follows: that expression U is a precization of expression T means that there is at least one reasonable interpretation of T that is not a reasonable interpretation of U and that there is no reasonable interpretation of U that is not also a reasonable interpretation of T .

We can now establish that the following four expressions mean the same in this book: “ U is more precise than T ,” “ U is a precization of T ,” “ T is less precise than U ,” and “ T is a deprecization of U .”

If U is a precization of T , then according to D_3 it follows (among other things) that every reasonable interpretation of U is a reasonable interpretation of T . In particular, it follows that if U is a reasonable interpretation of T , then U is a reasonable interpretation of T . However, we already know that ‘is an interpretation of’ is a reflexive relation, that is, that all expressions are interpretations of themselves. Consequently, U must be an interpretation of U and, in this case, also of T . Thus, we see that precization is a special case of interpretation.

Although precization is a form of interpretation, the formal structure of the relation of precization is quite different from that of the relation of interpretation. If we substitute U for T in D_3 , we see that U cannot be a precization of U . ‘Is a precization of’ is therefore a *nonreflexive* relation. Furthermore, if U is a precization of T , then T can never be a precization of U . Thus, ‘Is a precization of’ is an *asymmetrical* relation. Finally, if U is a precization of T and T is a precization of V , then U is always a precization of V . Thus, ‘is a precization of’ is a *transitive* relation as well. (Recall from chapter 1, pages 16–18 that ‘is an interpretation of,’ in contrast, is a *reflexive*, *symmetrical*, and *intransitive* relation.)

If we are to decide whether or not U is a precization of T , we must ask ourselves the following series of questions: (1) Is U a reasonable interpretation of T ? If the answer is no, U cannot be a precization of T because every precization of T , according to the above reasoning, must be an interpretation of T . If the answer is yes, we must go on to ask, (2) Is there some reasonable interpretation of T that is not a reasonable interpretation of U ? If the answer is no, U must be rejected as a possible precization. But if we believe we can point to such an interpretation, we must go on to ask, (3) Can we find a reasonable interpretation of U that is not a reasonable interpreta-

tion of T ? If we find such an interpretation, then U must be rejected as a possible precization. If we are unable to discover any reasonable interpretation of U that is not also a reasonable interpretation of T , then we can conclude that U is more precise than T , that is, U is a precization of T .

The term "precization" applies both to the expressions and terms we introduce as more precise than some other expression or term and also to the actual *process* of constructing these expressions. In everyday language, we can find many expressions, such as "clearer," "more transparent," "not so obscure," and "less misleading" that convey roughly what is meant here by "more precise."

We should note that the expression " T is *less precise* than U " is not exchangeable with " T is a *more general statement* than U ." Thus, although the sentence "All men are musical" is more general than "Only a few men are musical," it need not be less precise. To generalize a statement is to make it apply to all members of a class rather than to specific members of it. Rash general statements are often false, but they are no less precise for being more general; they are just more comprehensive. According to our technical sense of "precise," a pair of statements such as (1) "All positive whole numbers are divisible by 2" and (2) "All positive whole numbers over 1,000 are divisible by 2" are not comparable with regard to preciseness because they each have different reasonable interpretations. It would be hard to think of some reasonable interpretation that they had in common.

Consider another pair of statements: (3) "A characteristic of Ibsen's work is its rigorous formal structure" and (4) "A characteristic of Ibsen's greater works is their rigorous formal structure." The relationship between (3) and (4) is, as with the previous example, one of degree of comprehensiveness. Generality does not exclude preciseness; this is fortunate, for if it did, we would be unable to give concise and exact expression to even ordinary bits of knowledge.

We must also not confuse the degree of preciseness of an expression with its tenability. We would most likely admit that the expression "Mozart was musical" expresses a tenable assertion in whatever way we interpret the term "musical," but this does not necessarily indicate that the term "musical" is an especially precise one. On the contrary, it is only because we cannot conceive of any way in which Mozart could possibly *not* be described as musical that we do not ask here for a precization of *musical*. However, if

someone describes a small child as musical, we would almost certainly want to know whether the child in question was an infant prodigy or whether it was just that he smiled when he heard someone humming a tune. With “Mozart was musical,” however, one tends to subscribe straightaway to any unformulated assertion that can be a precization of it.

Yet another incorrect use of the technical term “precize” would be in contexts for which “specify” would be the more appropriate term. An expression U can be used to specify another expression T if U asserts what T asserts but at the same time asserts *something more* about the same subject matter. The warning about confusing “less general” with “more precise” also applies to “more specific.” Any difference between “less general” and “more specific” arises, *inter alia*, from the fact that a general statement is typically used to draw attention to the *similarities* among distinct objects while a “specification” draws attention to the special properties peculiar to distinct objects themselves. “Less general” does not imply “more specific.”

To illustrate the process of precizing, we can say that in answering the question as to whether T_1 is more precise than T_0 (in the list at the end of chapter 1, page 24) we should produce a reply such as the following: “There are many ways in which a person can be better than another. One of them is to get higher grades in school. An expression specifying that a person is better than another in this respect is more precise than one that does not mention any circumstances at all. It both gives more information and allows one to accept or reject the assertion on the basis of the information it provides.” Note that in the case of *specifying*, however, the added information does not serve to identify assertions in this way; it only adds more to an assertion that is already identified. We could put it like this: The fact that the expression “gets higher grades than” is a *precization* of “better than” does not depend on its being more *specific*, although it is obviously that, too. It depends on the added information having the potential to enable us to choose correctly one assertion from a whole list of unformulated ones, all of which are possible and distinct interpretations of T_0 .

Of course, an expression that is a precization of another expression for some people may for others be a specification or a generalization of the same expression. For example, for some people, the expression “He is going to Washington” (T) may be only a specification of the expression “He is going” (U), whereas for others who are more likely to interpret U as saying that

PRECIZATION AND DEFINITION




Figure 3. Relationships between two expressions, T and U .

someone is dying, T will be a precization of U . Although all interpretations of T will be possible interpretations of U , U has at least one interpretation that, in this context, T does not have.

The meaning of 'is more precise than' can be illustrated with the help of circle diagrams. If we represent all reasonable interpretations of T as contained within one circle and all reasonable interpretations of U as contained within another, we get four possible relationships between the circles (figure 3).

In case I in figure 3, there are no reasonable interpretations of U outside the domain of T ; all of them lie within T . This illustrates the case in which U is more precise than T . Case II illustrates the situation in which T and U allow exactly the same reasonable interpretations; there are no reasonable interpretations of T that are not also reasonable interpretations of U and no reasonable interpretations of U that are not also reasonable interpretations of T . In case III, T and U have some reasonable interpretations in common and some that are confined to each of them; according to D_3 , then, neither one can be more precise than the other. Because they cannot be similarly precise, they cannot generally be regarded as comparable with respect to preciseness. Case IV illustrates the most common situation: T and U are two randomly chosen expressions for which, as a rule, there are no reasonable interpretations in common. As in case III, they cannot be compared with respect to preciseness.

Two expressions, T and U , are incomparable with respect to preciseness if, and only if, each T and U have at least one reasonable interpretation that the other does not have. For two expressions to be incomparable with respect to preciseness, it is only necessary that each expression has at least one reasonable interpretation not shared by the other. If expression U is a precization of expression T , then T will have more reasonable interpretations than U , granted that U has a finite number of interpretations. According to D_3 , if U is a precization of T , each reasonable interpretation of U is also a

reasonable interpretation of *T*, and *T* has, in addition, at least *one* reasonable interpretation that is not a reasonable interpretation of *U*. To find merely that expression *T* allows a greater number of reasonable interpretations than expression *U* is not in itself sufficient evidence that *U* is a precisization of *T*. The necessary and sufficient condition is as given in *D*₃.

Finally, if, as often happens, one person judges *U* to be more precise than *T* in situation *S*, while in the same situation *S* another person judges *T* to be more precise than *U*, the only way to decide who is right is to make systematic observations of language customs in *S*.

Prescriptive Definitions

When we precize a term "*b*," we provide less ambiguous terms for something that "*b*" sometimes, but not always, expresses. Precizations do no more than describe a segment of already existing language habits; they introduce no proposals for changing these habits. This section considers a kind of statement that is concerned not with describing language usage but with altering it.

The difference between describing and prescribing is a familiar one. If we say that no one is to be considered an adult until he is sixteen years old, we are stating a rule. If one person at fifteen is, in fact, more "adult" than another at sixteen, this does not make the rule false or invalid, only silly. However, if one says that someone at sixteen years of age is, in fact, more adult than another person at fifteen, one purports to describe a state of affairs, and this claim could certainly be false.

There is an analogous difference between describing and prescribing language usage. When we say that term "*a*" often has the same meaning as term "*b*," we are *describing* a usage. But if we say that term "*a*" in a certain context is to mean the same as term "*b*," we are *prescribing* a usage. We make a rule our listeners must follow if they are to be clear about what we say. I will call such a rule a "prescriptive definition." The purposes of prescriptive definitions are discussed in more detail in the next section. Here it is enough to say, briefly, that their most common use is to replace long and complicated expressions with shorter and simpler ones.

The word "definition" comes from the Latin *definitio*. The verb is *definire*, which means to "set limits to" and hence to delimit the meaning of terms. Generally, the etymology of a word provides no reliable indication

of its use in contemporary speech, but in this case, the word's technical meaning represents both a deepening and a precization of the original Latin.

In this book, the word "definition" occurs both by itself and in compound expressions such as "prescriptive definition," "descriptive definition," and so on. When it occurs by itself, it is being used as an abbreviation for "prescriptive definition."

Definition of Prescriptive Definition (D_4). By "prescriptive definition," we mean a definition that requires an expression T in a certain specified context, or in all contexts, to be interpreted in the same way as another expression U .

Expression T is called the *definiendum* (that which is defined) and U the *definiens* (that which defines). We can formulate what we mean by *definition* in the following way: " $T =_D U$ in S " or " T , by definition, is to be synonymous with U in context S ."

With regard to D_4 , when a definition is proposed for only a particular context, its application is often restricted to specific chapters or works in which the term in question is used. Definitions can be proposed even though it is fully realized that they would be inadequate in other contexts.

In setting up a definition $T =_D U$, it is likely that U was already an interpretation of T even before it was called into service as a definition, but this is not always the case. A definition aims at limiting the use of the *definiendum* (T) to those cases for which the *definiens* (U) specifies our usage of the term, and it is quite possible for T to be defined by U without previously having been a possible interpretation of it, or without U already being an interpretation of T . Of course, if T is an entirely new expression, there is little likelihood of confusion and U may gradually become established in common usage as an interpretation of T . (Note in this context that it is not a prescriptive definition itself but rather a *definiens* that can be an interpretation of the *definiendum*.)

Whether the context is a scientific one or not, it is a common malpractice to introduce formally a prescriptive definition and then quickly forget it or fail to follow it consistently. After first stating that T in context S will always mean the same as U , one ends up by using T in some other way. This is a readily avoidable source of confusion. It can also happen that, having given a prescriptive definition and used it for a while, one finds that it is not

suitable. The thing to do then is to indicate one's decision to give up the prescriptive definition in the hope of eventually producing a new and better one.

To propose a definition of expression *T* is the same as to propose that *T* be interpreted as *U*, which according to D_1 implies that *T* and *U* shall be treated as cognitively equivalent expressions. In other words, one proposes that, in some linguistic context, *T* is to be replaced by *U* and that *U* can be substituted for *T* without change of meaning. To be sure that the expression *U* interprets expression *T* in accordance with one's intention, it is a good rule to strike out *T* in the text and substitute *U* to see if there is any change in meaning.

Two Examples of Prescriptive Definitions

My first example of a prescriptive definition is the expression D_4 . With this I clearly state that, in this book, the term "definition" is to be interpreted in the same way as the longer expression provided. This longer expression is probably a good deal more precise than the word "definition," but it is more convenient to use the simple word "definition," especially since it is already often used in much the same way as the longer expression.

A second example of a prescriptive definition is provided by the Norwegian law on labor disputes, which begins by defining some terms:

1. A worker—anyone who in return for money undertakes work of whatever kind for:
 - a. a private employer.
 - b. the state or municipality, provided he works by agreement or with a notice-of-termination period of fourteen days or less, and provided he is not to be considered a public servant.
2. An employer—anyone who employs one or more workers.

Here we are given a definition of the word "worker" in terms of a long expression. (According to this definition, the term "worker" probably covers more than the usual sense of the term. The head of a department, for example, would be a worker according to the definition, as long as he can give two weeks' notice.) The definition of the word "employer" makes use of the definition of "worker." The *definiens* in the definition of "employer" should

then read: “anyone who employs one or more persons, who in return for money. . . .” This in turn can come into the definition of “worker” (1a), and so we end up in a circle.

As mentioned earlier in this section, there are different kinds of definitions. An expression that is formulated as a definition, or is explicitly stated to be a definition, can often be interpreted as follows:

1. A description of the meaning of another expression or term.
2. A proposal (or sometimes a report of a proposal) about how an expression is to be interpreted in terms of another expression or term.
3. A combination of 1 and 2.
4. An assertion that some property is essential to or especially characteristic of this or that object.

A sentence of type 1 was characterized earlier as a descriptive definition. A sentence of type 2 was just characterized as a prescriptive definition. A sentence of type 4 is often called an “essential definition” or “real definition.” However, none of the uses of the term *definition* as indicated by 1, 3, and 4 coincide with that given by D_4 . Definition D_4 constitutes a precization of our usage in the way indicated by 2.

Example of Definition 1

Consider a quotation from political scientist James B. Bryce in his book *Modern Democracies*: “Democracy really means nothing more nor less than the rule of the whole people expressing their sovereign will by their votes” (Bryce 1921, vol. 1: vii). This assertion occurs in an analysis of the actual content of so-called democracies (before 1930) and gives to all intents and purposes a precization and description of the typical usage in professional literature on this subject.

Consider, too, the following: “During recent years such terms as economic democracy and industrial democracy have been used to describe a system under which the many would control business as well as politics” (Nearing 1945: 23). The first words in this description of usage delimit—though roughly—the area the definition is thought to cover.

In a psychology book we find the following: “Psychology means ‘learn-ing about the self.’ But what is the ‘self’? Some understand the self as a self-

sufficient essence, so fundamentally different from the body that after death it is able to lead its own life, independent of all that is corporeal.” The first sentence of this passage is probably intended as a precization of the word “psychology” for those not already acquainted with its use. The third sentence, however, seems to mention a property of the self (according to some), not a piece of information about some people’s usage, and we should therefore call it a real definition. If this accords with the author’s meaning, the following refinements and revisions are justified:

“Psychology” means the same as “learning about the self.” But what is the self? Some understand by the ‘self’ . . .

The use of double and single quotation marks allows us to indicate the fact that the first sentence covers the word “psychology,” while the second and third sentences cover the self and the concept ‘self,’ although the distinction is by no means a clear one. (See the threefold distinction illustrated in figure 1.)

Example of Definition 2

In *Human Knowledge*, Bertrand Russell (1948: 113) writes: “‘Belief,’ as I wish to use the word, denotes a state of mind or body, or both, in which an animal acts with reference to something not sensibly present.” Here Russell clearly indicates that however others use the term ‘belief,’ he is going to mean by it what he takes both himself and his readers to mean by “a state of mind or body, or both, in which an animal acts with reference to something not sensibly present,” a *definiens* that he then proceeds to clarify with examples: “When I go to the station in expectation of finding a train, my action expresses belief. So does the action of a dog excited by the smell of a fox . . .” and so forth.

Example of Definition 3

Under the heading “Price Index. 1. Definition” in a textbook of economics, we find the following definition that looks as if it were also a description: “By price index one means a common expression for the average height of the different goods’ prices in a land, measured in proportion to

prices in a given former year." The author describes what is meant by "price index," which means that he is concerned here with a description of usage. But the sentence occurs in a context that makes it probable that he also wants to make clear in this sentence what particular usage he intends to follow in his textbook. This indicates that it is an instance of the composite definition 3.

Example of Definition 4

The sentence "Democracy essentially means freedom of expression for every individual" may be meant to express something especially characteristic of democracies. In the same text, a definition of "democracy" may be offered in terms of a form of government. A shorter sentence, "Democracy means freedom of expression," may also, in certain contexts, plausibly be interpreted as an assertion that freedom of expression is essential or especially characteristic of a democracy.

It is important to be able to distinguish among definitions 1, 2, and 3. Often, however, the context gives little indication as to which of them is most reasonable in a given case. It is particularly important to separate real and prescriptive definitions 4 and 2, if only because when a prescriptive definition is required for an expression, real definitions are of no value, however profound they may be. The understanding of a real definition presupposes that the *definiendum* and *definiens* are interpreted in a fixed way. As long as words are vague and ambiguous and therefore in need of prescriptive definitions, real definitions are not suitable. It is not enough that the expressions have a fairly determinate meaning for the speaker if this meaning is not understood by the audience.

It is easy to envisage how a grasp of definition theory can prevent chaos and inconsequence in the course of discussion. Suppose someone proposes a prescriptive definition for the use of an expression in a discussion and then another person gets up and says the first is mistaken, that the definition is stupid and does not accord with the expression's real meaning, and that he himself has the "correct" definition. We might reasonably assume either that the second speaker has not understood that the first meant to give a prescriptive definition or that the distinction did not occur to him. If the objector, however, declares that the definition is inadequate or unserviceable, his objection might well be a pertinent one.

Debates often give rise to exchanges of the following pattern: P_1 asserts T_0 , and P_2 replies that it is a question of definition whether one accepts or rejects T_0 . Now, P_2 can reasonably be assumed to be asserting two things. First, T_0 , in the situation at hand, allows for at least two reasonable interpretations, T_1 and T_2 , and T_0 is tenable if interpreted as T_1 and untenable if interpreted as T_2 . Second, a discussion can proceed only after a decision, in the form of a prescriptive definition, is made that will allow us to determine whether T_0 is to be interpreted as T_1 or as T_2 .

If one wants to avoid a dispute about which prescriptive definition to apply, one can take a conditional position toward T_0 : "If P_1 by T_0 means T_1 , then I agree; if T_2 is meant, then I disagree." Let us observe an example of this:

We are told about a certain Valentin Sjerepanov that he "died, but is now alive." On March 3, 1944, at 2:41 P.M., his breathing had ceased, his heart had stopped beating, his reflexes had gone, and yet he undoubtedly came back to life again. Here we might plausibly say that it is simply a matter of definition whether one accepts the possibility that the expression is true. For certain prescriptive definitions of "dead" and "alive," the proposition will be analytically untenable; for others it will be synthetic (see chapter 3, pages 55–57, for a discussion of "analytic" and "synthetic" expressions). If the proposition is held to be self-contradictory on the basis of rules of language, it cannot be true—whatever may have actually happened to Sjerepanov.

Why Precize or Define?

In this book, I am focusing on the significance of the process of precizing in actual discussion. But precization is also relevant to the clear stating of problems and, indeed, to all thinking whatsoever. To take an obvious example, consider the question of so-called pseudo-problems, that is, problems that, when rephrased or precized, seem to express either some quite different problem or else a truism. We know that since the beginning of early Greek civilization, people have discussed whether the problems philosophy considers are pseudo-problems—and this question has even been raised in connection with the special sciences.

In *Essays in Pragmatism*, William James (1907) tells us of an elementary example of a pseudo-problem. It is mentioned here only to illustrate what a

PRECIZATION AND DEFINITION

pseudo-problem is, not because it is particularly profound or of any practical consequence.

Some years ago . . . I returned from a solitary ramble to find every one engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The *corpus* of the dispute was a squirrel — a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: *Does the man go round the squirrel or not?* . . . Every one had taken sides. . . . Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and found one, as follows: "Which party is right," I said, "depends on what you *practically mean* by 'going round' the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him. . . . But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite obvious that the man fails to go round him. . . . Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for further dispute." (James 1948: 141)

These two distinct precizations express two quite different assertions, both of which, in the case cited, the company apparently agreed to — apart from some obstinate dissenters who would have nothing of precization and other hairsplitting and maintained that the man either did or did not go around the squirrel.

Precization is also useful for bringing out the depths of an expression's meaning since it implies that there is a thought to precize. Mindless chatter cannot be precized. The attempt to render an expression precise may therefore be a way of finding out whether we mean anything at all when we use it. With practice, we can become better at distinguishing between an articulate and a superficial grasp of what an expression means. Such a skill enables us to appreciate the richness and subtlety of intelligent remarks, just as it equips us to see through the shallow glare of catchphrases and propaganda. Furthermore, precization can have thoroughly practical applications.

In recent years, opinion polls have come to play an increasing part in social life. Through interviews and questionnaires, one tries to get as accurate a picture as possible of the general public's attitude to certain questions

of social significance. The vast expenditure of time and energy devoted to these investigations could easily be wasted in view of the difficulties involved in predicting ambiguities in the questions put to the public. Systematic inquiries can, however, be conducted so as to discover the most important sources of misunderstanding in any given questionnaire, but difficulties must also be faced when interpreting the answers obtained. In spite of every safeguard, people still seem to answer questions other than those being asked, and as long as they are unaccustomed to formulating reasonably precise and complex expressions, they will be unlikely to give any reasonably precise answers.

The aim of definition is different from that of precization. If we discover that an expression can be interpreted in two ways and that serious misunderstandings occur every time speaker and listener interpret it differently, there can be no profitable discussion as long as that expression continues to be used. However, if a precization that does eliminate differences in interpretation is too complicated (e.g., uses ten to twenty times as many words as the original), it will likely be too clumsy. In that case, what we need is a definition. A definition can explicitly state that the original expression is to be used in the sense provided by one of the long precizations; once this is clear, we can safely keep to the original and more handy expression.

Even if the difference in complexity between *definiens* and *definiendum* is slight, a definition can still be appropriate. In train timetables, for example, instead of expressions such as "8 A.M." and "8 P.M.," some countries use "8:00 hours" and "20:00 hours." The number "8," because of its horological ambiguity, can give rise to much inconvenience, and so to avoid unnecessary confusion, definitions are made that treat "8 P.M." and "20:00 hours" as equivalent expressions, while "8:00" is to be regarded exclusively (in this context) as an interpretation of the expression "8 A.M."

Of course, adopting a definition does not thereby enable one to convey something that could not also be conveyed without it. The *definiendum* can always be substituted for the *definiens*; we subscribe to each of them as if both were one and the same. What a definition allows us to do is to express ourselves more effectively in discussion; it does not enable us to say something that we could not say previously. The special merit of a definition is not that it allows us to say more, but that because a *definiendum* is much shorter than a *definiens* and because the latter contains a high level of preciseness, once having stated a definition, we can express in a few lines what

would have required many volumes. The relevance of this shorthand to the exact sciences, which are largely made up of definitions, should be obvious.

How to Precize and Define

At times it is not immediately obvious that an expression may give rise to serious misunderstanding. One reason for this might be that, over time, an expression may come to lose its preciseness. It is tremendously difficult to keep the preciseness of an expression fixed over time. Language habits change, and then we need to revise our forms of expression.

When we are told, in logic and methodology, to make our expressions precise, this very imprecise expression itself does not suggest that we should precize every expression up to the hilt, but only that our expressions should be sufficiently precise for the purposes at hand, which is quite another matter.

Excessive precization is especially undesirable because that preciseness must be bought at the cost of other desirable features of expressions, notably conciseness. It is a practical question as to where in a given situation one should leave off, and largely a matter of exercise in finding out where further precization no longer pays. Let us look at some of the considerations that might serve to prevent misplaced zeal in precizing.

First, one should consider whether taking a position on *T* really depends on how *T* is interpreted. Perhaps all the arguments that can be adduced for or against *T* can be equally adduced for or against any interpretation of *T*. In that case, it would be unnecessary to distinguish between the different interpretations, especially if the distinctions in meaning are slight.

Second, one must consider the capacity and stamina of one's audience. Generally, the stronger the precization, the greater the length and complexity of the expressions and, correspondingly, the greater the demands on the audience. Detail in itself can be an obstacle to understanding. Therefore, if we have to decide between a comparatively simple but less precise expression and one that is longer, more detailed, and more complex in construction, we must have good reasons for choosing the latter. In this situation, our choice would largely depend on the competence we attribute to our audience.

Third, the choice we make depends on how serious and frequent any misunderstandings may be. As noted before, it is impossible to eliminate *all* misunderstanding; developments in language and our own limitations in seeing what an expression implies rule that out. Serious misinterpreta-

tions must naturally be avoided, but we can often rely on the probability that interpretations will correct themselves in the course of a discussion as the audience or participants gradually come to feel comfortable with the ideas being aired. Excessive precization at the outset can easily prevent people from arriving independently at an understanding of what is being said. A person who clarifies his expressions simply to guard against their being taken in any sense other than his own may betray an unwillingness, perhaps also an inability, to see what someone else might mean by them. In the extreme case in which an expression has become resistant to reinterpretation, it is no longer a vehicle for expression but just a formula. We should precize to exclude misunderstandings we have learned to expect, not to promote the cult of univocality for its own sake. It is a matter of making this or that point somewhat clearer in order to save confusion and annoyance. For instance, a statistician who asks people their ages would save an immense amount of bother if he specifies the method of calculation he wants: whether it be age at last birthday; at next birthday; at nearest birthday; or in years; years and months; years, months, and days; and so on. But if in casual conversation someone asks our age, we do not ask what system of calculation he wants us to use.

Finally, we should remember that, for different groups of people or for different areas of discussion, the same expression *T* can stand as a shortened form of a number of different precizations. An expression about theft, for example, will tend to be precized differently by lawyers and by psychologists. Different considerations are involved. But this can easily be overlooked when we move from one group to the other, and especially when many of the words used by either group are the same. A term or expression in one field may have a high degree of preciseness; in another field, it can mean something quite different or mean the same but be unseparated from a set of precizations that are attached to it in that field. Just consider everyday, scientific, and philosophical interpretations of the expression "substance" as a case in point.

The Task and Pitfalls of Definition

As an example, I will try to arrive at a definition designed for a fixed purpose: a definition of "Christian ethics" that can be used in a debate about which religion embraces the highest moral teaching.

Begging the Question—*Petitio Principii*

When arguing about different standpoints, it is important that we can identify them. To know what we are talking about, we need to agree on a definition for each. This presupposes prior agreement about the terminology to be used. Without agreement at these two stages, fruitful discussion cannot even begin, for it will be impossible to know whether the view one criticizes is, in fact, the view one's opponent is supporting. In the case in question, then, what we need is a short statement in an agreed terminology defining "Christian ethics" for the purposes of the discussion at hand. Before undertaking a debate about the relative merits of religions, the disputants must come to some common understanding of what they are discussing.

Any definition that presupposes the superiority of a given religious moral teaching over any other will be worthless. This mistake may seem obvious; nevertheless, it is one that is frequently made, especially when the disputants are themselves representatives of the standpoints under discussion. As long as we manage to keep the evaluative component out of our definitions, discussion can proceed profitably. In the present case, we might avoid the danger of begging the question by giving a definition of "Christian ethics" in terms of the moral code enunciated in the Sermon on the Mount, for here the code is specified, not evaluated. What we must avoid are any definitions such as: (1) "Christian ethics" is taken here to mean the same as "the moral teaching that demands most of men but gives them the means to achieve the greatest happiness"; or (2) Christian ethics assumes that man will always do good toward himself and his fellows, that he will not offend against the legal code, and that he clearly understands there to be only one God. It would be absurd to base a discussion on such statements when it is precisely the question of whether a Christian moral outlook is always good that is in question.

Evading the Issue—*Circulus Vitiosus*

Our motives for defining something are clear enough. We know from experience what happens when the terms of a discussion are used by the disputants in different ways. In typical, everyday discussions, the range of possibilities is very wide. Taking our example, the question of "Christian

ethics," people often put emphasis on the New Testament, but a quite different sense is given to the term if our definition of it is drawn, as it was frequently in the past, from the Old Testament. Similarly, one may think of Christian morality in terms of moral dogmas common to the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Greek Orthodox churches or in terms of Lutheranism, Methodism, Anglicanism, and so on. When we want to discuss Christian ethics, we must agree on a definition. But this may well involve us in discussions on altogether different topics, for disagreement can arise over what *is* an accurate or adequate definition of "Christian ethics."

Part of the difficulty in the present example resides in the term "ethics" and its cognates. Although we should reasonably expect a definition of the term "Christian ethics" to give some indication of how we should interpret the term "ethical," it would be worse than useless if that was *all* it gave us, as in "To live one's life as believers in Christ deem best." Certainly what is "ethical" for a Christian is what that person believes to be the best way of behaving, but even if this provides a clearer notion of what ethics is, we still have not arrived at a definition of "Christian ethics."

Consider another proposal: the Christian precepts for behavior as they are based on the example of Christ's own life. Two distinct concepts are involved here: the proposal implies that if some precept is (1) based on Christ's example but is not (2) a Christian precept, then it does not belong to Christian ethics. The proposer must accept this. However, he may not have intended this implication, and in such a case, he must withdraw his proposal. What he may have wanted to propose might be expressible as "those precepts that are based on Christ's example." In that case, the original proposal is no more than a *circular* definition, merely repeating in different words in the *definiens* what is already said or implied in the *definiendum*.

We should note that not every use of the expression "Christian" is automatically part of a circular definition. If our *definiens* is, for example, the expression "that which Mr. So-and-So calls Christian ethics," then we have at least made a step in the right direction. The presumption is that Mr. So-and-So has specified the behavior he calls Christian, that we are willing to accept his specification for the purposes of the ensuing discussion, and that the disputants are acquainted with the specification in question. By delimiting the topic, even if only indirectly, we are beginning to be specific. We may be hedging, but we are not just beating around the bush.

Muddying the Issue—Obscurum per Obscurius

Since the purpose of a definition is to improve clarity and avoid misunderstanding, it is natural that we should look for a *definiens* among the precizations of the expression in question. But if our *definiens* of “Christian ethics” can still be interpreted in all the different ways open to the various disputants, nothing will have been gained. The matter must be clarified still further.

Although one can never hope for absolute clarity, one can at least strive to avoid the worst misunderstandings. To do this requires imagination and memory and an ability to anticipate the kinds of misunderstanding and obscurity that can arise in any given discussion group. One must be prepared for cases, as in our present example, in which (1) *A* has some misgivings about some norm that he has included under Christian and *B* either replies that this norm comes from some obscure part of the Old Testament and therefore *need* not be included under Christian ethics or that it is a Catholic norm and that, as a subscriber to Christian ethics, he does not need to be held accountable for the special dogmas of every denomination; or else that (2) *A* is talking about what Christians practice and not what they preach, and so on.

What is needed is an indication of what the Christian representative in the discussion will, *in all cases*, feel bound to support—perhaps something like the commandment about loving one’s neighbor as oneself, or some fairly clear account of a liberal or orthodox variant of Protestant-Lutheran moral teaching. What we have to try to bring out are the essential differences between Christian and other moral teachings, and for this we need a representative view of Christian teaching as a whole, irrespective of doctrinal differences.

The need for clarity and simplicity implies that the words used for the definition must be simple, ordinary, and, as much as possible, concrete. If I say that Christian ethics is “a mode of living that stipulates understanding of, and identification with, the loftiest ideals inherent in the true Christian’s standpoint,” I can hardly be thought to be laying myself open to argument. In addition to the circularity involved in the expression “true Christian standpoint,” it is unclear what ideals we are to understand and subscribe to. A better definition for purposes of argument would be something like “the morality Christ preached, centering on the positive command-

ment to love." Here everything extraneous has been pruned away; all that is missing is a formulation of the commandment about love and a clearer idea of its relationship to the rest of Christ's teachings. Better still would be the provision of criteria for what is to count as Christ's teaching. The expression, "what Christ taught" may be precise for those educated in the Christian religion, but for others it may have no specific designation.

Consider the following proposal: by "ethics" I mean systems of rules for the conduct of the lives of a group of people (in this case adherents of the Christian faith). Using this proposal to precize our *definiendum*, "Christian ethics," we obtain the following:

$T_0 \equiv$ Christian ethics.

$T_1 \equiv$ Conduct of one's life in conformity with the Bible's
commandments.

In aligning Christian ethics with the Ten Commandments, I assume that the Commandments synthesize all of what people generally mean by "Christian ethics." In our discussion, therefore, I believe that most of the disputants will associate Christian ethics with the Ten Commandments.

Now, although it is true that many Christians associate Christian ethics with the Ten Commandments, many non-Christians contend that the Commandments actually synthesize the content of a number of moral systems in addition to the Christian one. For them the definition would be too wide.

Consider another proposal: Christian ethics is the morality based on the Ten Commandments as they are interpreted in the Lutheran catechism. I assume here that the participants in the discussion know the Ten Commandments and the Lutheran interpretation of them. I take this definition to be sufficiently neutral, and I think it covers fairly well most of what the participants, Christian and otherwise, understand by the expression "Christian ethics." But because I also hope to greatly limit the chances of conflicting interpretations of the expression "Christian ethics," my proposal is also a precization of this expression.

Here we may suppose that by "participants in the discussion" the proposer means "attending members of the class of contemporary British and American theologians"; but it could be that the participants have quite different backgrounds. If so, the reference to Luther could mean too severe a restriction of the subject matter, and the definition might thus be too nar-

row. However, if the proposer is thinking in terms of a debate among Lutherans, the outcome of the discussion is too obvious to be interesting. Otherwise, the definition is fairly satisfactory, although it should really have been formulated explicitly as a *prescriptive* definition.

Sources of Error in Precization

One often hears disparaging remarks directed at those who insist on precise expression. Indeed, it is only somewhat apologetically that one resorts to the philosophical rejoinder, "It depends on what you mean by. . . ." This opening tends immediately to label one as a bore intent only on deflating the richness and profundity of the discussion, or else it is taken to be indicative of a neurotic and unsociable tendency toward hairsplitting. No doubt there is some basis for this disparagement. Precization, after all, is a means to an end, and unless there is an end, or unless it succeeds as a means, it is a waste of time. Furthermore, it is a skill, something one has to learn to become proficient. Perhaps the most common cause of failure in precization is simply lack of training. It takes a good deal of practice to be able to arrive at just the precization that the situation demands. One's precizations can miscarry because they are too long-winded or couched in inappropriate terminology, and so on. Furthermore, precization tends to be an all-or-nothing affair: success that is only partial is tantamount to failure. This perhaps accounts in part for the negative associations with demands for preciseness. We succeed too rarely to find the appropriately precise expressions for what we mean.

There is another aspect to this. We precize whenever we come across misunderstanding, and this occurs most commonly in actual debate. Unfortunately, here the conditions for doing the job properly are poor; all we can usually hope for, in the flush and flurry of debate, is some fast repair work to keep the discussion going. The real work of precization must take place when there is time for longer reflection. However, when one sits alone and recalls the issues raised in a debate, one easily forgets that the words and expressions that impress themselves on one's memory may, for the disputants, have been mere catchwords and slogans, full of sound, fury, and perhaps *some* point, but signifying much less than was initially presumed. One also tends to forget that even if the contestants are already equipped with the appropriate precizations, in the interests of persuasion, they nevertheless often

distort the views of their opponents and present them in caricature. The most important part of open debate takes place behind the scenes. One's precizations are best arrived at before the event, in an atmosphere more conducive to the collecting and sifting of arguments and information.

In inconsequential and superficial discussion, we often make attempts at precizations that lead to the replacement of an ambiguous expression by a slightly less ambiguous one. We often call this "defining." However, it is not enough just to cast around in our minds for an expression, even if it may turn out to be more precise in some ways. What is needed is the ability to recognize the source of the misunderstanding that occasions the attempt. One should be able to recognize the interpretations that constitute the misunderstanding, which requires an ability to discriminate between different groups' uses of language. Otherwise "defining" is almost certain to be a hindrance rather than a help.

One often finds precizations that end up expressing nothing of what one's original expressions were intended to convey. For example, someone versed in town planning may accept a quantitative statement about overcrowding which says that overcrowding exists when there are more than two people to a room. I, however, may be thinking of overcrowding in more qualitative terms and find that much of what I have said has to be withdrawn if interpreted anew in light of the quantitative statement.

In addition, one often finds that successful precization leads to a compartmentalization of the discussion. Instead of talking vaguely about a set of similar but not identical topics, one aspect of the set is taken and discussed at the expense of the others, which must then be dealt with separately.

One source of error, not easy to eliminate, consists of having overestimated one's ability to remember special definitions of well-established expressions. There is a natural tendency to fall back on established meanings and to resurrect the misunderstanding one sought at least temporarily to allay. Perhaps then we tend to blame the idea of precization itself instead of looking for simpler definitions or fixing them in our minds by repeating them, or simply avoiding the awkward expression altogether.

Many people seem to suppose that proper discussions must be well-attended affairs—the more the merrier—as if the typical discussion were a kind of social gathering at which everyone should have something to say. Such "discussions" can be pleasant and diverting ways of passing the time,

PRECIZATION AND DEFINITION

but as such, they are no place for precization. In such a context, precization is not only unnecessary but should be avoided because it is deliberately intended to exclude that rich variety of interpretation on which the mind must feed as it flits from one topic to another. On such occasions it would clearly be an indiscretion to ask for definitions. Nevertheless, this must not detract from the status of precization as such, for precization is an important instrument, which is essential for certain purposes. There are, of course, many situations in which either no such purposes arise or those that do arise are not served by precization.

We should also bear in mind that what people say in an idle moment is often remembered later and recast in memory as their "opinion." The more precise we are able to be generally, the less demand we create for precization, but also the less likely we are to be misrepresented when our words are later recalled and quoted. Among the innumerable activities in which precization performs no primary function are preaching and propagandizing, even though the object is to convey something by means of words. In such cases, it is much more important to create the right atmosphere for making words as compelling as possible and for heightening the audience's suggestibility than it is to speak with clarity and precision. Here, too, the demand for clear and precise utterances would be indiscreet.

New Meanings for Old Terms

One sometimes comes across the claim that two different meanings must never be expressed by the same term or terms. However, it would be extremely awkward if we had to change the term or terms every time we wanted to change a meaning. Even in the exact sciences we find changes of meaning occurring without any concomitant relinquishing of the old form of expression. Awareness of this is an essential part of understanding how knowledge develops, and it is also a prerequisite for understanding the terminology current in a given science.

Take just one example of a change of content without a corresponding change in the form of expression. The term "element" originally came to be used in chemistry in accordance with the convention that assumes that elements cannot be broken down—an assumption that radioactivity has since refuted. Radioactivity so transforms the matter that was once assumed to

comprise elements that there is no possibility of finding elements in the accepted sense. Now, there would be no scientific point in retaining an empty *concept* 'element' to which nothing answered, even though retaining the term might have some historical justification. Yet we still need a word for the matter that has all the formerly assumed properties of elements except indivisibility. Furthermore, we need a common term for iron, potassium, oxygen, and so on since these have many important characteristics in common. Because nothing falls under the old meaning of the word "element," the term becomes available for new employment. Without changing its form, we can use it to express something different from its previous meaning. The obvious course, then, is surely to retain the word "element" as the generic term for iron, potassium, and so on, but at the same time give it a new meaning, insofar as it no longer implies that elements cannot be broken down. Thus, we continue to use the old expression "element" as a descriptive term, but we use it with a different descriptive force. This procedure depends on the word's acquiring new meanings that correspond to developments in chemistry and physics and lie within the relatively indeterminate scope of everyday use of the term. Otherwise, the new usage will tend to be misleading. But if we were to change terms with every change of meaning, we would not only overtax our memories but also lose sight of the continuity in the development of science. It is partially through those very points of similarity between old and new meanings of the same word that this continuity finds its expression.

Not changing a descriptive term can be taken as a sign of such a similarity. Nevertheless, we must be clear that it is not a simple matter of choice whether we create a new term or keep the old one. A variety of factors are involved, not the least of which are the ambition and vanity of scientists themselves. History provides many examples of people who, perhaps to emphasize the originality of their own views, have introduced new terms where the old ones could have done just as well and perhaps better. On the other hand, we also see examples of how terms in a highly developed field of science are carried over to another field that is much less exact and in which the terms are then used in new but often less precise senses. Consider the term "reaction" as it is used in psychology. Borrowed from chemistry and physics, "reaction" is used with all degrees of impreciseness within the new field of inquiry. Another example is the term "function" as it is used in sociology.

Fruitful Concepts and Appropriate Terms

Old concepts are forgotten or discarded because there is no longer any use for them, and new ones emerge. But time-honored concepts can be so completely a part of our conceptual system that it may take a long time for them to be displaced by new concepts, even if the latter are more suited to contemporary modes of investigation. Language customs seldom keep pace with scientific progress.

It is also important to remember that the existence of some concept term in no way guarantees that something falls under the concept, let alone that the concept is a useful one. To explain the existence of a certain concept term, it is enough to assume that particular people once *believed* that something had the characteristics specified by the concept and that the concept at that time — under assumptions that perhaps no longer apply — was of use or at least of significance. Concepts come to be reformed as knowledge increases and errors are corrected. For instance, for a long time the view of matter as either organic or inorganic was prominent in the natural sciences. An important property of organic matter was thought to be that it could not be produced through a synthesis of simple products. But in the past century, a great number of organic materials have been produced synthetically. At the same time, the distinction between organic and inorganic has become more fluid and theories in which the distinction plays a role less widespread. The concept of organic matter has become a less fruitful one. Of the new concepts that have partially replaced the old, we can mention carbon chemistry. So-called organic chemistry is now actually carbon chemistry, the old concept term being retained in spite of the transformation of the concept.

A necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition for concept *B* to be fruitful can be formulated as follows: those things, and only those things, that fall under *B* must, in addition to properties mentioned in the conceptual description, also have other common properties of fundamental interest. However, it is not enough that a concept be fruitful. It must also have a convenient linguistic expression so that it can be used. For example, instead of “numbers only divisible by themselves and by 1,” we can use the term “prime number.” In the first place, many mathematically interesting assertions can thereby be made about numbers divisible only by themselves and by 1 — that is, the concept ‘number divisible only by itself and by 1’ can be

a fruitful concept. Second, the former version is inconveniently long when constantly repeated. The same applies, if to a lesser extent, to numbers divisible by 2. For these, we have the more convenient expression “even numbers.”

It might seem that such abbreviations can hardly sustain the depth or richness of meaning necessary for our intellectual operations. But a moment's reflection makes it clear that the direction and scope of all our thinking is largely determined by what short concept terms are available. The relationship between concept terms and our thinking is in many ways similar to that between musical instruments and music. A composer develops his ability in accordance with the available possibilities for instrumentation. Thus, the broad outlines of his musical disposition are largely fixed for him, and these determine the paths taken both by creator and critic. A new instrument or a technical improvement of an old one (such as the introduction of the piano) has often opened the way to new possibilities. In the same way, the introduction of new concept terms opens the way to new possibilities for thought.

Our concept system is continually under development. To deepen our understanding of a science — whether philology, art history, mathematics, physics, or whatever — we must understand how the most important concepts in the relevant scientific discipline arose, recognize the aims they serve, and realize what changes they have undergone.

Precizing Catchphrases and Metaphors

The effect of an expression lies mainly in the thought it conveys. When someone says “It burnt to the ground” or “Democracy is outdated,” it is the alleged fact that we react to, assuming we take the expression as a genuine statement and not, as in this book, merely as an illustration of statements. It is the meaning that catches our attention — the form of the expression is ostensibly a matter of relative indifference. The force of an expression and its overall effect on an audience can, however, also depend on its form. This fact is exploited in various ways by preachers, politicians, poets, and indeed by anyone who wants to transmit something other than pure information, whether by a banal catchphrase or in the most illuminating of metaphors.

Both catchphrases and metaphors can be the products of high mental attainment. The former are usually designed specifically for their appeal

since the effect of catchphrases and slogans on their recipient's susceptibilities is a necessary part of their purpose, whether they are used in advertising or in propaganda. Metaphors, in contrast, usually arise from a person's heightened sensibility to the world of experience through language. However, as far as precization is concerned, catchphrases and metaphors both obey the same principles as do so-called literal forms of expression. Nevertheless, they are in some ways special. A metaphor can be a rich source for association and the play of fancy. An image can suggest many things to the mind, and a figurative expression can be used to convey a number of different thoughts. Metaphors, it can be said, do not *entail* impreciseness, but they invite it. It would, of course, be wrong to say that metaphorical expressions are by nature imprecise; on the contrary, a metaphorical expression may be far more precise than a "literal" one. This is again a matter of context.

However, the tendency of figurative language to foster impreciseness is something we must note. Just as we often approve of some opinion without careful consideration of our reasons, so may approval of a well-chosen metaphor stand in the way of a more exact understanding and appraisal of what is being said. A metaphor can be a means not so much of clarifying something—say, by putting some distinction in a new and telling way—but of covering up some obscurity or omission in one's thinking. Writings rich in imagery often suggest the presence of thought just below the surface, whereas the writer may not have actually progressed beyond the level of intuition in which his thoughts are still inchoate. The identification of catchphrases, slogans, and tendentious or bewildering imagery is thus essential for the prevention of uncritical and superficial thinking.

Consider the following analysis of a catchphrase. Suppose a student debating society discusses the slogan "The minority is always right" from Ibsen's *An Enemy of the People*. After much heated discussion, the ensuing division shows that the great majority are agreed that "the minority is always right." What can we propose in the way of a literal expression for a thought that can also be expressed more popularly, though less precisely, by "The minority is always right"? Here are a few possibilities:

$T_1 \equiv$ New thoughts that deserve acknowledgment generally arise
among the few and incur the opposition of the many.

- $T_2 \equiv$ In social debate, the position with the weaker numerical support is generally the more tenable one.
- $T_3 \equiv$ In social questions, it is generally the case that standpoints already prevalent among the plurality are less tenable than those prevalent among an especially qualified less numerous group that has as yet not succeeded in exerting its influence.
- $T_4 \equiv$ The majority is seldom right when it opposes a minority that, judged according to its education, must be presumed to be competent in the given field.

As long as the student "majority" accepts some such precization, the paradox of their majority view can be resolved.

Deprecizing and Popularizing

If T_1 is a precization of T_0 , we call T_0 a "deprecization" of T_1 and the activity of finding deprecizations of a given expression, "deprecizing." We call a presentation of a topic a "popularization" when, compared with a scientific (technical) presentation of the same topic, it requires less knowledge, a smaller vocabulary, less concentrated attention, and less depth of understanding. A popularization is not necessarily a deprecization of the technical presentation; whether it is or not depends on the circumstances. For example, if the technicalities with which a popularization is concerned are scarcely comprehensible to the public for which the popularization is made, the technical presentation can hardly be said to be less precise *for that public* than the popular version (although it might be for the initiated). In most cases, popularizations are so freely composed in relation to their corresponding technical presentations that they are generally incomparable with respect to preciseness.

For the exact study of a topic, the need for strict technical precization arises only when there is a demand for special concentration or depth of understanding. When applying the results of scientific study or presenting them to the lay public, the way the results are expressed must allow for an audience who may be unwilling or unable to concentrate for extended periods and who will probably be unfamiliar with most of the terminology. Because

of this constant shifting in our aims, we must be prepared to accommodate our presentations of a topic to the requirements of brevity in one case and technical accuracy in another. Our approach should depend on our objectives. We may have specific interpretations in mind that we are anxious to avoid, or we may be interested in producing a version suitable as a working manuscript in a research project.

When some subject matter is thought, from a technical standpoint, to be expressed satisfactorily by T_0 , the basis for this judgment lies, among other things, in the separate evaluations of several different sentences, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n , with regard to how many and how serious the possible misunderstandings may be. The choice of expression clearly depends on a twofold consideration: avoiding both serious misunderstanding and excessive complication. For the reader, it is important to understand whether or not the subject matter is a popularized version. If it is, then the reader must realize how much of the subject matter the author glosses over or how far they have resorted to simplifying pictures or models not strictly representative of the ideas in question.

Newspaper articles on complicated topics tend to be highly popularized versions of the corresponding technical presentations. Headlines, especially, are meant to be "eye-catchers"; they are designed to grab the reader's attention, arouse curiosity, or whet the appetite. A headline proclaiming "War cost \$1,384 billion" is designed to stop us in our tracks. The amount is sensational. Nevertheless, the statement is a severe deprecization of the article and of the sources the article draws on. Cost for *whom*? The allies? The Americans? The Axis powers and the allies? Does this include the Chinese War? Are both direct and indirect material destruction taken into account? More precise considerations will lead to difficult socioeconomic questions, which we need not delve into. A reading of the article shows us that the headline is to be understood as a deprecization of some expression such as "World War II (not including the war in China) cost \$1,384 billion in military preparations and damage to property." Of course, quite different expressions can be popularized into the same headline, just as the expressions "The ship's deadweight is 1,000 tons" and "The ship is 1,000 tons displacement" can have the same popularization: "The ship is a 1,000-tonner."

III

Analytic and Synthetic Sentences

The Distinction

We can to some extent understand the way we use words as being fixed by rules of usage. In fact, our willingness to conform to rules in many ways simplifies our present discussion. In this chapter, I consider how some sentences can have their truth or falsity determined solely by means of rules of usage. For example, if an author gives a prescriptive definition of “displacement tonnage” by saying, “By a ship’s displacement tonnage I mean the weight of the water that a ship displaces when it floats,” then the following sentence *T* is true: “The greater a ship’s displacement tonnage, the greater the weight of the water it displaces.” To put it more exactly, if *T* occurs in the author’s text (given certain generally accepted rules for the use of the word *greater*), one can establish the truth of *T* without looking further. For instance, there is no need to go to the expense and effort of weighing the ship to see if *T* is true.

If the author of a text incorporating a prescriptive definition of “psychology” establishes that he is using the word in the same way as he uses the expression “the science of the self,” we can reject without further ado the sentence “Psychology is *not* the science of the self” should it appear later in the text. More exactly, if we interpret the later expression exclusively in terms of the usage rules the author has introduced, the sentence will express a false statement. We can ascertain this without carrying out any investigation into psychology. Similarly, if one person asks another, “Is it raining or not?” and the second person answers yes, this answer interpreted in a certain way is absolutely correct. The rules usually applicable to negatives imply that pairs such as “It is raining” and “It is not raining” express contradictory (mutually opposed) assertions. This again implies that

if “It is raining” is true, then “It is not raining” must be false (and vice versa). The word “or” is used in connection with the rules of disjunction, or alternation, so that “ A or B ” is true if A but not B is true and also if B but not A is true. It follows that if the rules for the words “not” and “or” are accepted, one must accept T , “It is raining or it is not raining,” as true. Meteorological observations play no part whatsoever in the truth value of T . All we need are the rules. If we cannot assume that an author follows the usual rules for “or” and “not,” then his meaning must remain unclear.

We see that once we are committed to established rules of usage, such as those found in dictionaries, we can compile a whole volume of sentences expressing truths and another of sentences expressing falsehoods with the dictionary as our only authority. These sentences, however, convey no other information than that words are used in this way rather than another. Because dictionaries are thus able to generate statements that look like ordinary factual assertions, practical difficulties can arise when expressions are formulated in unclear and, especially, original terminology. What looks like a bold, interesting statement may often be nothing but an overdressed triviality. As we have seen, many a portentous utterance turns out to be mere circumlocution or tautology.

Definitions of Analytic and Synthetic Statements (D_5). By “ X is a positive analytic statement” we shall mean the same as: “ X is true” follows from rules of usage. By “ X is a negative analytic statement” we shall mean the same as: “ X is false” follows from rules of usage.

The term “analytic” is often used as an abbreviation for “positive analytic” and “contradictory” or “self-contradictory” for “negative analytic.” The predicate “analytic” (resolving something into its parts) denotes that a truth value (a statement’s truth or falsity) is determined by resolving its expression into its component parts. The antonym of analytic is synthetic. The expression “ X is a synthetic statement” will mean here the same as the expression “ X is neither positive analytic nor negative analytic.”

To find out the truth or falsity of a *synthetic* statement, it is not enough to analyze the separate constituent parts of its meaning. Such a statement’s truth value cannot be fully established by reference only to the fixed rules of usage that its use presupposes, unless it happens to be especially *about* these

Positive analytic	Negative analytic
True synthetic	False synthetic

Figure 4. Forms of analytic and synthetic sentences.

rules. Something more is required, an investigation of some kind, a test, or some sort of observation.

Statements are only analytic or synthetic in relation to established rules of usage. Unless we can presuppose or expressly formulate some such rules, we cannot determine whether an expression is analytic or synthetic. An expression can be analytic in relation to some rules but synthetic in relation to others. The sentence “The Middle Ages ended before 1550” is analytic on the basis of the rule that says that “Middle Ages” means the same as “the period from 500 to 1550.” However, it is synthetic on the basis of the rule that says “Middle Ages” means the same as “that time in European history when Catholicism was the only form of faith.” But what shall we say of a sentence such as “I both like and dislike him”? Rephrased as “I like him and do not like him” it is clearly negative analytic on the basis of familiar rules for the words “and” and “or.” But we would hardly expect someone to deliberately infringe these rules; when we interpret the expression, we would normally reject that possibility without hesitation. The more plausible interpretation would be, “I like him in some respects and dislike him in others,” which makes it a synthetic statement (on the basis of normal English usage). Sentences such as “*U* is a precisization of *T*” are synthetic expressions. They describe facts about the usage of language, facts that must be investigated when we want to test their validity. Prescriptive definitions, however, are neither analytic nor synthetic, nor are they true or false. They do not make claims about what is the case; they only propose or establish that certain pairs or groups of expressions are to be understood in the same way. Of course, insofar as prescriptive definitions *are* rules for usage, they can still be said to stand or fall as well-grounded and worthwhile prescriptions.

The different types of analytic and synthetic sentences can be illustrated as in figure 4.

Examples and Illustrations

Let us consider a few examples of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

1. *Human nature is always the same.* If we define the term "human nature" as "characteristics of humans that are always the same," we get a positive analytic statement. If we define "human nature" so that it refers to human instincts and drives, the sentence is synthetic, assuming that we do not define "instincts" and "drives" in such a way that "always the same" enters into our definition. To arrive at a reasonably clear picture of the content of the synthetic assertion, we should precize the two vague terms "instinct" and "drive."
2. *Pure water boils at 100° C, when the barometric pressure is 760 mm of Hg.* Because Celsius temperature is defined so that 100° C is the temperature at which pure water boils at a barometric pressure of 760 mm of Hg, the statement's truth can be determined by means of the definition. It is therefore positive analytic.
3. *A horse is a vertebrate.* If we take the word "horse" in the zoological sense, the concept "vertebrate" enters into the definition; the statement is therefore positive analytic. However, the fact that horses are members of the class of vertebrates is not part of the definition of vertebrates. Therefore, the sentence can be interpreted as expressing a synthetic statement conveying the information that the class of vertebrates includes horses.
4. *A horse is not a vertebrate.* This is negative analytic according to example 3. Again, however, if the sentence were construed as a statement about what the class of vertebrates does not include, it could be taken as false synthetic.
5. *All horses have four legs.* This is a synthetic statement. It is a sufficiently *invariable* property of horses that they have four legs, but since a horse may be so unfortunate as to lose a leg and yet remain a horse, we cannot say that the property is part of the description of all horses, although we would still affirm that it is part of the *definition* of "horse."

When people state some principle or assert some particularly general truth about human beings or life, they often make at least one of two as-

sumptions: (1) the utterance is an observation confirmable by experience or (2) the utterance is a positive analytic statement. Such utterances are easily confused, which often leads to their being used interchangeably. Consequently, we may feel that what someone says is undeniably true because the formal certainty of the positive analytic interpretation has become spuriously attached to what is, according to the synthetic interpretation, merely hypothetical. When asked to account for their views, defenders of such “quasi-synthetic,” “cryptoanalytic” assertions have a common tendency to retreat toward the analytic position, increasing the modesty of their assertion—and ultimately defending a mere triviality or truism. But as soon as pressure eases, they abandon caution and advance bravely in the direction of the synthetic again.

For the scientist, who is particularly concerned with making general statements that can stand up to rigorous evaluations, it is especially important to be able to recognize when a precisization of an expression approaches the analytic. Since it is one of the aims of science to arrive at hypotheses that are both as general as possible and as secure as possible from disconfirmation, it would seem all too easy to arrive at generality and security by treating the statements expressing the hypotheses as analytic and, hence, unscientific. This is not to say that scientists have no use for analytic statements. They may find such statements useful, even necessary, especially where the conceptual connections between a number of new technical expressions have to be made clear. In addition, the continual striving for conceptual clarity in one’s own scientific system of thought is naturally of prime importance to the scientific researcher. He, perhaps more than any other, must become adept at distinguishing hypotheses from truisms and at spotting inconsistencies and contradictions, which is by no means an easy assignment.

To take an example, the following expressions appeared in a newspaper: “Everyone knows that a platform speech is very different from a radio talk” (T_0) and “It is something not all speakers realize” (U_0). Let us try out the following two precisizations or specifications of U_0 .

$U_1 \equiv$ Not all speakers realize that everyone knows that there is a big difference between platform speeches and radio talks.

$U_2 \equiv$ Not everyone realizes that there is a big difference between platform speeches and radio talks.

T_0 and U_2 are contradictory according to the commonsense notion of contradiction, but not so T_0 and U_1 . The difference between “contradiction” in a looser and more imprecise sense and “contradiction” as a well-defined term in logic comes out clearly in the example. Technically, a contradiction between T_0 and U_1 exists only if we assume some such premise as “If everyone knows X , then all speakers know X ” (any speaker is a someone). If we accept this premise, the contradiction becomes explicit. Of course, when we use the expression “everyone knows,” we seldom mean *everyone* or even any especially large class of people. Usually we are referring to the same group in which we include ourselves as members, such as the group of “all educated and informed people.” If, as is probably the case, we are willing to concede that some speakers are not members of this group, then T_0 and U_1 are not contradictory, even from a commonsense point of view.

Expressions that approach the meaningless without actually reaching it, or that express something interesting only in a special context, play a large part in ordinary life. Take, for example, the expression “Real democracy is a just form of rule.” If we ask what definition of “real democracy” is assumed here, we will likely be told that democracy has to do with justice—in its system of voting or in the various kinds of opportunities open to individuals. In that case, we could reformulate the sentence as “Real democracy, which is a just form of rule, is a just form of rule,” which is pointless. But if all mention of justice is carefully excluded from the definition of “real democracy,” the expression may become interesting and arguable.

The same can be said for a sentence such as “It is always wrong to tell a lie.” If one person makes this claim and another brings up the case of doctors who give incorrect information to terminally ill patients, or other cases of white lies, the first person may try to oppose the objection by claiming that cases such as these are not really cases of lying: lying occurs only when one tells untruths against one’s better judgment to obtain some morally unwarranted advantage. By drawing on a special definition of “lying” that causes the original statement to convey nothing, it is possible to stand by what one has said without risk. As a further example, consider the sentence “Very high intelligence is a rare occurrence.” The expressions “high” and “low” are generally defined in relation to an average. If the apportioning of intelligence quotients follows the standard pattern for such distributions, it turns out that high intelligence *must* be rare. If an intelligence quotient of about 140 is common one year, then it will no longer be “very high” since

the average would then move in the direction of 140. Here again, whether the statement is analytic or synthetic depends on what definition one accepts when making it.

Drawing Analytic Conclusions

In this section only, I will use the word “analytic” to refer to the “drawing of conclusions” rather than the characterization of expressions. By “drawing a conclusion” I mean the transition from premises to conclusions—not the premises or conclusions themselves.

Premise P_1 : All human beings are mortal.

Premise P_2 : Smith is a human being.

Conclusion: Smith is mortal.

The conclusion emerges as a result, or product, of P_1 and P_2 .

Let us examine several additional cases.

1. Premise: The water has reached 100° C.
Conclusion: The water has reached the boiling point.
 2. Premise: Copernicus was born in 1473 and died in 1543.
Conclusion: Copernicus was born during and died after the Middle Ages.
 3. Premise: All sea serpents live in the sea.
Conclusion: There are sea serpents.
-
1. If we assume a normal definition of Celsius temperature, the conclusion is incontestable and valid.
 2. If the Middle Ages are defined as the period from 500 to 1500, this is an analytic conclusion.
 3. If we introduce a rule of usage for the word “all” such that the expression “all A ’s are B ” is only to be used if there exists at least one A , then this conclusion is also logically incontestable.

Corresponding to these three conclusions are the following three positive analytic statements (assuming the definitions already mentioned):

ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC SENTENCES

1. If water has reached 100°C , then it has reached the boiling point.
2. If Copernicus was born in 1473 and died in 1543, then he was born in and died after the Middle Ages.
3. If all sea serpents are in the sea, sea serpents are to be found.

Thus, the drawing of various conclusions can be formulated in conditional 'if . . . then' sentences in which the 'if' clause constitutes the premise and the 'then' clause the conclusion.

Definition of an Analytically Drawn Conclusion (D_6). The expression "X is an analytically drawn conclusion" here means the same as the expression "X is a conclusion that gives a positive analytic statement of the 'if . . . then' type with the premise as 'protasis' and the conclusion as 'apodosis'."

IV

Agreement and Disagreement

A Theory of Two Common Misunderstandings

In this chapter, I shall consider certain kinds of misunderstandings. They will probably seem rather trivial; indeed, most of them are so commonplace that it might seem that the time and space devoted to them could have been spared or better spent. However, since our purpose is to give the student a practical grasp of the theory of interpretation, we must do more than merely note and account for the various problems. The reader must become entirely familiar with them and also make the most of the opportunity to practice the techniques of avoiding misunderstandings.

When we claim to be in agreement with someone about something, our agreement is not about the expression but about what we take to be expressed. One person may say "Il neige," another "Es schneit," but if we agree that it is snowing, we agree with both of them. In that case, our agreement clearly depends on a prior, or implicit, agreement about how these different expressions are to be interpreted. We can declare our agreement when in fact no such agreement exists or when no such agreement is being expressed at the time. Although speaker and listener are verbally in agreement, they may not be at all agreed in substance. Often it is just that people *seem* to agree. The same goes for disagreement. These kinds of misunderstandings are no doubt very common. In any case, it is certain that a large part of our daily discourse, personal as well as political, is conducted without sufficient guarantees that the participants are really agreed or disagreed on what they believe they agree or disagree on.

Assume that person *A* utters the sentence T_0 and that by T_0 he wants to present some factual claim to person *B*. If *B* answers *A* affirmatively, we say that *A* and *B* are in *verbal agreement*; if negatively, then they are in *verbal disagreement*.

For example, consider the following dialogue:

1. *A*: The newspaper is thin today (T_0).
2. *B*: Do you think so? It doesn't seem thin to me.

This is a case of what we will call “verbal” disagreement. When we say that people are in verbal agreement or disagreement, we do not imply that we have determined whether they have in fact actually agreed or disagreed, i.e., whether whatever ostensible agreement or disagreement exists is real or pseudo. We must first find out what *A* is affirming and *B* denying. Imagine that the conversation continues as follows:

3. *A*: But it has only six pages (T_1).
4. *B*: Yes, I know.
5. *A*: I call that thin.
6. *B*: Oh! So do I, but I thought you meant it was thin in news today (T_2).
7. *A*: No, it's not *that*.

According to (4), it appears that *B* has misunderstood *A*. According to (3), (4), and (5), it seems that the verbal disagreement at (2) was not a reliable indication of *B*'s attitude to what *A* wished to express in (1) and that he precized in (3). Statement (4) shows that *A* and *B* are agreed in substance, despite *B*'s declaring his disagreement with *A*. We can now establish the following: speaker *A* utters T_0 and means by T_0 the same as he means by T_1 , T_1 being a precization of T_0 . Listener *B* declares himself in agreement with what he believes *A* means by T_1 . On the assumption that *A* and *B* interpret T_1 in the same way, there exists an agreement in substance. Thus, we see that the verbal disagreement in (2) is misleading.

Definitions of Pseudo-Agreement and Pseudo-Disagreement (D_7). Listener *B* is in *pseudo-agreement* with speaker *A* if *B* declares himself in agreement with *A* when *A* utters T_0 , but they are really in disagreement. Listener *B* is in *pseudo-disagreement* with *A* if *B* declares himself in disagreement with *A* when *A* utters T_0 but they are really in agreement. Here “really in agreement” means being agreed about the truth of the assertion that the speaker has meant to express.

The ways we have for deciding what a person means by an expression are far from adequate, especially when the person himself is not available. Thus, when asserting that real agreement occurs, we should add the qualification “in light of the available evidence.” Further investigation may always bring to light new evidence that can cause us to reverse an assumption of real agreement or disagreement.

Let us now return to our example. In (5) we still do not know what *B* thought *A* meant by T_0 . For this we need (6). Up to this point, *B* has taken T_0 to be tantamount to T_2 : “The newspaper is thin in news today.” Statements (1) through (7) show that *A* and *B* are agreed about T_1 , and the emphatic “*that*” in (7) seems to show that they are also agreed about T_2 . In other words, *A* and *B* are agreed not only about what was really at issue but also about what *B* thought was at issue. Now consider another case in which the agreement about what was really at issue is pseudo-agreement:

1. *A*: The newspaper is thin today (T_0).
2. *B*: Yes, it has only six pages (T_1).
3. *A*: I meant it was thin in news today (T_2).
4. *B*: What? It has three pages of sports.

In (2) we have a verbal agreement insofar as *B* answers affirmatively to what he believes *A* means. In (3), *A* precisizes his expression; then *B* does not agree with what he takes *A* to mean in this precisization. Assuming *A* and *B* interpret T_2 in the same way, there is only an apparent agreement in (2). In light of the available evidence, there is no ground for assuming anything else.

Let us suppose the dialogue continues thus:

5. *A*: I meant, it's thin in political news today.
6. *B*: There I quite agree with you.

In light of (1) through (6), it would seem that there was both verbal and real agreement about T_0 in (2). More information may possibly induce us to alter even this conclusion. For us to consider the conclusion adequate, the succeeding precisization must be both reasonable and strong, and such a precisization is not always easy to come by.

The connection between degree of precisization and risk of pseudo-agreement or pseudo-disagreement is very close. The more precise an expres-

sion is in relation to the speaker's language customs, the greater the possibility of an agreement or disagreement that is real and not only verbal. For example, when two amateurs discuss space rocketry and one of them precizes in technical terminology that would normally be used by a professional to make very precise utterances, the ensuing misunderstandings will likely be much worse than if they had kept to everyday language. In other words, the rule is that we should use a precization that is appropriate for the context at hand.

Examples of Pseudo-Agreement and Pseudo-Disagreement

1. A: The city library is bigger than the university library (T_0).
2. B: No, on the contrary.
3. A: The city library has more books than the university library (T_1).
4. B: Yes, of course, but as an architect, I am thinking about the building itself, not about the books. I thought you meant that the city library has more floor space than the university library (T_2).
5. A: But when talking about libraries, one should surely keep to the conventional way of talking about them. When talking of libraries, we naturally think in terms of books.
6. B: I think usage in this case is altogether too imprecise to permit such a decision.

Statement (4) shows there is spurious disagreement in (2) because

- a. A and B are in verbal disagreement about T_0 .
- b. By T_0 , A means T_1 and not T_2 .
- c. A and B are really agreed about T_0 .

But now consider the following exchange:

1. C: The city library is bigger than the university library (T_0).
2. D: Yes, the city library has more floor space than the university library (T_2), but it has fewer books.
3. C: There you're wrong; the city library has less floor space. I meant that the city library has more books than the university library (T_1).

Statement (2) is a case of verbal agreement, but from (3) it transpires that the agreement at (2) was actually a pseudo-agreement.

- a. *C* asserted T_1 with T_0 .
- b. *D* declared himself in agreement insofar as he interpreted T_0 as T_2 .
- c. *D* considers T_1 to be untenable.

In the following dialogue, we see an example (2) of how pseudo-agreement occurs:

1. *A*: Through Wergeland's action, Jews were allowed into Norway (T_0).
2. *B*: No, Norway has never had a law directed against Jewish people (T_1).

B's saying no shows that verbal disagreement occurs at (2). But *B*'s expression suggests that the verbal disagreement conceals real agreement. Note that *A* speaks of "Jews," and *B* of "Jewish people." The term "Jews" can be precized in a number of ways, among them the following:

- $a_0 \equiv$ Jews.
 $a_1 \equiv$ Upholders of the Mosaic Law.
 $a_2 \equiv$ Jewish people.

The precization offered by a_2 is rather weak because there are many ways to interpret the term "Jewish people"; for instance, in terms of descent or in terms of adherence to custom and law, as in a_1 . Person *B* seems to interpret *A* as saying:

- $T_1 \equiv$ Through Wergeland's action, Jewish people were allowed into Norway.

However, if *A* really means something like a_1 and not what T_1 expresses, the disagreement is actually pseudo-disagreement, assuming that *B* would accept the following:

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT

$T_2 \equiv$ Through Wergeland's action, upholders of the Mosaic Law were allowed into Norway.

If A and B are well schooled in history, then B will probably assume that by "Jews" A means "upholders of the Mosaic Law." Jewish people of the Evangelical Lutheran faith were allowed into Norway before Wergeland's action.

The following shows an example of confusion between a pseudo-agreement and a difference in interpretation:

1. A : Wergeland obtained entry into Norway for Jews.
2. B : I know.
3. A : By "Jews" I mean people of Jewish descent.
4. B : Oh! I understood you to mean upholders of the Mosaic Law.

Statements (3) and (4) show that A and B had different concepts of 'Jew' in mind. Of course, this is not enough to show that there is pseudo-agreement. For that, we need to know how B views A 's interpretation of (1).

Below is an example of conflation of pseudo-agreement and disagreement about something other than T_0 :

1. A : The United States deservedly beat England in New York yesterday.
2. B : Yes, the American center forward was dazzling.
3. A : No, I didn't mean that. The American team seemed to me better all around; no single player was particularly outstanding.
4. B : I don't agree.

Statements (1) through (4) are not susceptible to any precization that could result in a demonstration of pseudo-agreement. Statements (3) and (4) show that A and B are really disagreed about the American center forward, but this is not enough to enable us to decide whether it is also a case of pseudo-agreement about T_0 , contrary to what one might unreflectively suppose.

Our interpretations of one another's expressions tend to exhibit deviations that vary according to the uncertainties in our language. However, this in itself does not necessarily lead to pseudo-agreement or pseudo-disagreement. If we use an expression to assert something and the expres-

sion lends itself to several reasonable precisizations, we would often accept the truth of all or most of these precisizations. If by T_0 we only affirm the truth of T_1 , this does not exclude the possibility of our also affirming the truth of T_2 , T_3 , and so on.

Applications of the Theory

Pseudo-disagreement often arises when we are familiar with only *one* established authority and we have neglected to check our assertions with other authorities. Suppose *A* reads in a geology textbook that there were three Ice Ages in the Pleistocene epoch, whereas *B* reads in a similar work that there were eleven. Both *A* and *B* might reasonably conjecture that geologists are disagreed and that their disagreement is more than just verbal. However, they would in fact be wrong to assume that the term “Ice Age” stands for only one concept shared by all geologists. The number of Ice Ages tends to differ from one expert to another. The disagreement can be pseudo-disagreement. Some geologists argue that each Ice Age includes several “more or less significant forward thrusts and subsequent spasmodic withdrawals of ice.” Thus, it becomes only a question of words whether we count a forward thrust as an Ice Age in itself or only as a spasm in another Ice Age. This is chiefly what causes the number of Ice Ages to vary as much as it does among scientists. However, there is less disagreement about the facts, and it is generally agreed that there have been at least three major Ice Ages.

Nevertheless, one would think that there should be no real call for terminological disagreement among scientists. It should require little effort on their part to keep up to date with one another’s terminology. We do not expect scientists to maintain statements of the kind “There have been x Ice Ages,” in which x varies from three to eleven. Rather their claims are of the form “There have been x Ice Ages,” in which it is assumed that the term “Ice Age” means such and such (y). When y varies, x also varies. Once this is made clear, we can see where the disagreements lie.

Popularization of science, indeed any attempt to transmit scientific ideas beyond an immediate scientific circle, tends to invite pseudo-disagreement. The words used in popularizing some idea or concept must be borrowed largely from a vocabulary built on relatively chance associations — not one that has evolved rationally. The potential for attaining a high

depth of understanding of the ideas or concepts must inevitably be lower for the lay public than it is for trained specialists. From this, of course, we do not conclude that popularizing is an evil, but only that readers of popular versions should be aware of the special pitfalls.

It would be rash to assume generally that disputants have an unconditional desire to avoid pseudo-agreement and disagreement. On the contrary, other considerations may cut across the need for consistency and agreement, such as the requirements for persuasion. We say of two people who support one another in a debate that they are "on the same side." However, it is often necessary to present the standpoint of the side in such a way as to make it especially clear that its adherents are in fact on one side and in opposition to the standpoint of another side. Any differences among the supporters of one side must not be allowed to come into the open; the supporters of that side must seek a common platform and target.

The main considerations in social or political organizing are those of unification and activation of the group or side. As often as not, what is needed is deprecization of the expressions of the party aims because the points on which members of the supporting group differ among themselves will have to be omitted or transcended to avoid division or splits within the group itself. Here we can readily appreciate the usefulness of catchwords and slogans for those interested in maintaining party solidarity. The use of eulogisms and dyslogisms (expressions with strong positive and strong negative emotional emphasis, respectively) tends to affect the intelligibility of a standpoint, even among its own supporters—a fact that can be exploited to produce deliberately inculcated pseudo-agreement within the group. For purposes of unification, pseudo-agreement can be as effective as real agreement. A clever party organizer keeps a watchful eye on internal differences in order to repair the expressions of the party aims in such a way that they continue to gloss over such disagreement.

In addition to this, the party or side must confront its opposition with as powerful a position as it can muster. For this, the spokesperson or organizer tries to make the differences between the opposing sides or parties appear as deep as possible, thereby making the conflict more clear-cut. This most likely requires gross simplification of the opponent's view. Adolf Hitler argued that part of a great leader's genius is the ability to make opponents of very different kinds appear as if they belong to the same category. This principle applies in every sort of dispute, whether it is a politi-

cal or a family one: there must be no doubt which side you are on, hence you must avoid touching on any points on which the opposing groups may agree, and reinforce all those on which they are known to disagree. The end result is an extensive illusion of disagreement.

The exposure of spurious agreements becomes increasingly dangerous to a group when its members are unable to combine energetic action with a critical analytic attitude. In fact, if the group's members were better trained in these respects, there would be less need to achieve the group's aim by resorting to pseudo-agreement or pseudo-disagreement. Of course, conscious use of such methods is a form of deceit.

The French philosopher Le Bon (1931) conducted an investigation, directed mainly at politicians, that was designed to produce a clear survey of the different possible precisizations of "democracy." Some of the results he obtained can be used to illustrate several points in our discussion. Le Bon was not looking for evaluations of democracy, but for precisizations of the term "democracy." However, since politicians are leaders of groups or nations, and since they must be expected to further the interests of the people they represent, the answers they offer will probably reflect the aims of their constituency more than an arbitrary questioner's. The answers Le Bon received confirm this assumption.

Let us consider the answers given by Herriot (a democrat) and Mussolini (a fascist). Herriot said, "Democracy is the policy of government that tries to bring morality and politics closer to one another until they coincide" (translated from Le Bon 1931: 290–301). We can add to this another of Herriot's formulations to make his meaning clearer: "Democracy is the form of government which tries to establish that view of justice which comes not from nature, but from reason" (ibid.). Instead of describing a form of government, Herriot gives a distant *aim* that democrats try to realize with the help of the democratic form of government. The aim in question is one that most people, whether democratically or undemocratically inclined, will find almost impossible to reject. It then seems an obvious conclusion that one must also accept the stated *means* of acquiring the aim, that is, a democratic form of government, especially when one learns that "democracy" designates precisely the form of government that serves the accepted purpose. Thus, Herriot's way of expression is well suited to eliciting a positive attitude, not just to the word "democracy," but also to those who claim to be democrats. Furthermore, by bringing in the term "moral-

ity," Herriot manages to make it almost impossible to reject democracy, for people generally read into this term precisely the morality that they themselves subscribe to. Thus, two people holding different and to some extent incompatible moral norms may nevertheless justifiably claim to be democratic in Herriot's sense. However, what Herriot most likely meant to say was that democracy is that form of government that tries to bring politics into line with *his* own notion of morality (a variation of Christian and humanist morality). By slurring over this crucial detail in his specification of democracy, Herriot may attract support, but undoubtedly a great deal of it will consist of pseudo-agreement with his actual views.

Mussolini's answer to the question was, "Democracy is the form of government which gives, or tries to give, the people the illusion of their own sovereignty" (translated from *Le Bon* 1931: 291). As in Herriot's answer, this contains a statement of the alleged aims or desired effect of a system of government with no indication of what that system of government is, except that it is designed to promote those aims and have those effects. In general, the more neutral way of characterizing a form of government is to describe the way it functions, not what its proponents or opponents claim it will achieve. The important differences between political systems exist much less in the ultimate aims they profess than in the policies they form in pursuit of more immediate ends. By identifying ultimate aims and policies, we seem to impart to the former the disagreement that belongs more correctly to the latter. As a catchword, "democracy" can have either a strongly positive or a strongly negative emotional force depending on one's selection among the range of such notorious indeterminables as "ultimate" purposes and "real" motives. In either case, there is nearly always something plausible about the resulting description of democracy, so that one's attitude is, as required, easily swayed in one direction or the other. Whatever political viewpoint one holds, the view Mussolini calls "democracy" will generally be objectionable. By describing democracy in these pejorative terms and implying that they adequately characterize the view held by his opponents, he manages to create an effective political platform, but he does so by producing the illusion of disagreement.

In conclusion, the reader might consider whether he takes the following to be a fairly neutral definition of the democratic form of government: "It is a form of government in which the rule of the state is legally bound to the individual members of the body politic as a whole."

Pseudo-Agreement in Argument

Often a given expression can express a number of different assertions, some of them easy to argue for but uninteresting, and others that, if they were true, would be of considerable interest but which, in fact, cannot be argued for or justified (see chapter 5, pp. 84–95 on tenability and relevance in argument). It is then tempting to argue for the exciting but unconfirmable assertion by conflating it with the dull but confirmable one. We can argue for U by asserting T , and for V by asserting U , but either we obscure, or fail to see, that in the first stage of the argument we have given U the sense of U_1 and in the second stage we have given U the sense of U_2 , although T may not be a valid argument for U_2 , nor U_1 a valid argument for V . The falsity of such conclusions can be rendered schematically below:

1. U because T
 V because U
2. U_1 because T
 V because U_2

In (1) U is not precized, and we arrive at the conclusion V on the basis of T and U . In (2), however, U is precized and the two parts are seen to be logically disconnected.

The relationship between pseudo-agreement and this kind of mistake is especially clear when we consider the thoughts not of two people but of one. Instead of the thoughts and judgments of different people, A and B , we have simply the different thoughts or judgments, A and B , of one person, P . In judgment A , person P adopts the U_1 sense of expression U , while in judgment B , he adopts the U_2 sense. The resulting pseudo-agreement between judgments A and B is one that people commonly make, especially when arguing for a standpoint under certain explicit reservations. Those reservations may be made explicit by means of a precization, U_1 , but later on be forgotten or lost sight of and a conclusion arrived at from the unqualified U , which would not at all follow from the precization U_1 . We can illustrate this with a simple example:

$T \equiv$ Water has a specific gravity of 1.

$U \equiv$ The water in Oslo Fjord has a specific gravity of 1.

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT

$V \equiv$ Anything that has a specific gravity of more than 1 will sink in Oslo Fjord.

In U we have to assume that "water" means 'chemically pure' water; otherwise U cannot be justified by T , in which "water" does stand for 'chemically pure' water. We can then precize as follows:

$U_1 \equiv$ Chemically pure water in Oslo Fjord has a specific gravity of 1.

$U_2 \equiv$ Seawater in Oslo Fjord has a specific gravity of 1.

Of course, U_2 is invalid because the specific gravity of seawater is greater than 1; hence, some things will float in Oslo Fjord even if their specific gravity exceeds 1.

Imprecise pronouncements are often made with an air of great conviction, yet without the support of any argument. If those who make them are subjected to criticism, they frequently fall back on the face-saving tactic of saying that the criticism implies more in their original expression than they intended by it. They might argue, "There were qualifications that were assumed, of course; I would not be so bold as to claim. . . ." Imagine a situation in which A asserts T_0 , which can be sensibly precized in the direction of T_1 . Person B , taking A to mean T_1 , declares himself in disagreement and puts forward a counterargument. Then A says that B has misunderstood him and that they are probably only in apparent disagreement; he only meant T_2 . So the discussion ends.

In a case in which the strong but unjustifiable argument expressed in T_1 can be used by A to support his cause, A will probably, and wisely, prefer to use the less precise T_0 and keep the trivial but justifiable argument expressed in T_2 as a backup in case he meets a critic. If person A does encounter criticism, he then has no need to retract anything and can always claim to be less bold than the critic supposes.

V

Surveys of Arguments for and Against a Standpoint

Psychological and Philosophical Background

Before deciding on any difficult course of action, we normally weigh the various considerations that we take to be relevant and base our decision on an estimate of their relative importance. The same approach can be applied to any arguable issue. Arguments are appeals to rationality in light of the facts. In the following, I shall mean by “argument” the element of our expressions that carries the power to convince people in rational discussion, that is, their factual content and consequences.

One can weigh arguments for and against something immediately before coming to a conclusion by reviewing all the relevant considerations made up to that point. It is more common, however, for arguments to acquire their force or weight over a period of time. This is usually what happens, for instance, when people vote at elections. Few of us actually make a survey of the arguments that have led us to the opinions we hold when we cast our vote. If we are suddenly asked what arguments we have used to arrive at our present decision to vote for a certain party, the inadequacy of our answers will often surprise us. We may find that the feeling of certainty and confidence we have about the rightness of our opinions is not borne out by the arguments we are able to produce in their favor.

In this chapter, I will give examples of “surveys” of arguments for and against a standpoint or a decision. Sometimes because of the complexity of particular decision problems, it will be impossible to give a full survey of the relevant arguments. But remember, completeness in itself is not a necessity. If we already understand the background of a certain decision and the decision is one with which we disagree, we need only concentrate on those phases of the argument in which the differences arise. It is often sufficient to distinguish the main outlines of an argument without going into all the details.

We must first distinguish between reason (*ratio*) and motivation (*causa*), that is, between what speaks in favor of a standpoint (pro argument) and the psychological, sociological, and other causal factors that motivate a decision. Our reasons can be valid or invalid (cognitively adequate or inadequate), but our motivations merely *operate* on our actions or decisions. Generally, our motivations cannot be described as valid or invalid. A person may give as a reason for his leaving for Madrid in January that he wants to feel the warmth of the sun. As an argument, the reason is scarcely valid because in January it is usually rather cold in Madrid. But the reason given may not be identical with the motivation. What motivates the projected visit may be a strong inclination to travel, and this is something that is neither valid nor invalid.

Psychology teaches us that the motives of our actions are in varying degrees concealed from us, that many of our avowed motives are what the psychologist calls "rationalizations." In general, we will maintain that a belief in the validity of certain arguments is partially, if not wholly, the motive for our deciding as we do. But if there is no connection between our reasons and our motives, the justification we give is at best misleading. Many of the considerations that we believe arise from our own free will are seen in retrospect as attempts to find arguments in favor of a conclusion we have already reached. However conscious we are of our own motives, we must always allow for the psychological fact that in accepting a conclusion, well-grounded or not, we deprive ourselves to some extent of the capacity to entertain counter arguments. The security of a position, the pleasure even, of being convinced about something is sometimes bought at the expense of blindness to possible refutations. We should therefore try to spend more of our energies on pursuing counter arguments than on looking for fresh pro arguments for some previously arrived-at conclusion. We have to reverse the normal selective habits of our minds, a mental tendency that, in this case, weakens the rationality of our views and, hence, their acceptability in serious debate.

If we base an important action on a conclusion arrived at by argument and it is against our own interests to reject that conclusion, we may simply lose interest in counter arguments. But we may go further, to the point at which we are in danger of declaring that anyone who holds an opposing view must be intellectually, even morally, subnormal. This distressing tendency can be prevented if, in establishing our own conclusions, we always test our views according to the most qualified criteria available. An added

advantage of this procedure is that by evaluating possible objections to our own views, we are better prepared to criticize objections that might be brought against them.

Intellectual honesty can, of course, go against the grain of personal desires and interests. The more we acknowledge the force of counter arguments, the greater the perseverance, energy, and willpower needed to act according to reason rather than inclination or interests. Acknowledging the reasonableness of an objection to one's proposed course of action can easily lead to doubt and then to hesitancy. Whether one acts from principle or simply from inclination, the prompt and effective accomplishment of one's purposes may therefore depend on the ability to turn a blind eye to counter arguments.

The ability to envisage arguments for and against a course of action is often subject to mistrust. It is said that people who are always analyzing proposed courses of action dissipate their energy and find themselves paralyzed, insofar as they can always find as many reasons for not doing something as they can for doing it.

Perhaps reason *can* be a stultifier; certainly it is a ready source of excuses. Unless allied with our capacity to judge the relative merits of arguments for and against something, reason is easily misused. But that does not mean that we should avoid looking for arguments, and in particular for counter arguments. Yet someone who is completely convinced that his own plan of action is the only proper one may find it difficult to consider arguments for rejecting this plan when expediency urges him to act otherwise. In justifying this action, he must leave a great deal to chance.

Sensitivity to the reasons for actions is often felt to be incompatible with the effective fulfillment of responsibility and the single-minded devotion to one's ideals. Thus, intellectual clarity in the weighing of considerations comes to be looked on as a sign of cynicism and lack of conscience. Furthermore, every time a counter argument is ignored, the premises on which a decision to act is based become that much more simplified. Yet it should be clear that the more we are able to act consistently and unhesitatingly on the basis of complicated premises, the less need there is to distort these premises when it becomes necessary to justify our decisions.

Most of what I have discussed here also applies to taking positions on issues not directly related to choices of action. In understanding theoretical standpoints, it is also important to be able to detect counter arguments that

are superficially expressed or even completely hidden in order to see whether the path to the conclusion is as clear-cut and straight as the beguiling expressions suggest.

The habit of looking at a question from all possible angles and of reviewing all relevant pro and con arguments plays an important role in intelligent behavior. Since circumstances are liable to undergo significant changes, one must be on the lookout for corresponding shifts in emphasis and for the existence of new arguments. The less we review the considerations governing our decision making, the greater the risk that we will continue to act according to an earlier decision when some new fact makes it unintelligent for us to do so. Any self-confidence and effectiveness we may gain by selective vision and intellectually indefensible treatment of the counter arguments only makes matters worse whenever fresh considerations arise. Applying this principle to politics, for example, it seems that the acceptance of a position on the basis of a pro and con evaluation would serve to strengthen the tendency toward a peaceful wielding of power, whereas a reluctance to entertain counterarguments could reinforce an unconciliatory and vengeful frame of mind with all its grim consequences.

Pro et contra dicere (to speak for and against) can be understood as a special method of thinking. It is a method that falls exactly in line with the working principles of scientific research, and it characterizes the scientific attitude toward questions that cannot be definitely answered in the way that is possible in the exact sciences. In ancient Greece, there lived a great thinker, Carneades (c. 214–129 B.C.), who placed method at the center of his philosophy. Carneades accepted no standpoint as absolutely certain: one could always find something to say against a given position. So, too, with the alleged falsity of a given standpoint, one could always find *something* to say in its favor. Carneades was bold enough to argue for and against everything, despite the ill will he thereby drew upon himself. He also believed that one could act promptly and effectively, merely by considering some standpoint more *probable* than others. He considered absolute certainty to be as unnecessary as it was unattainable.

Whether or not Carneades was right, we can raise the objection, from a psychological standpoint, that with the limited resources of intelligence and effectiveness we are able to draw on, we do run a great risk of misusing the *pro* and *contra* method of arguing. We must therefore be attentive to the possible pitfalls.

One such pitfall occurs when, in reviewing a complicated string of arguments for and against the matter in question, we tend to normalize the weight attached to each argument so that when aggregating, the strong arguments grow weaker, and the weaker ones stronger. Even when a decision involves complex argumentation, it may be that only a few simple steps in the chain are the conclusive ones. The spreading of the load, then, can mean that we lose sight of the essentials. As I have remarked before, reason must be allied to a capacity to judge the relative merits of arguments for and against something. Practice is needed to sustain the alliance. One must accustom oneself to the thought that some arguments are more pertinent or more conclusive than others, while remembering that none are entirely without significance.

Pro et Contra and Pro aut Contra

Let us distinguish between two forms of surveying arguments: those that are *pro et contra* (for and against) and those that are *pro aut contra* (for or against).

A *pro et contra* survey is a straightforward survey of (1) the most important arguments that, in a given field of discussion, are or will most likely be adduced *in favor* of an assertion and (2) the most important arguments that, in the same area of discussion, are or will most likely be adduced *against* the same assertion. This type of survey contains no conclusion. The separate arguments are never weighed against one another. The object is merely to set out the arguments as though they were intended for an outside observer of the discussion. In practice, of course, there is usually too little time to ascertain all the arguments that have been or could be made both for and against an assertion; thus, fully satisfying requirements of (1) and (2) is usually impracticable. We must then be content with noting down whatever arguments we can remember or think of with regard to the discussion.

A *pro aut contra* survey is one with a conclusion. It consists of the most important arguments that, according to the surveyor or some person or group, have been or will likely be adduced for or against an assertion. A survey of this type ends in a conclusion and implies, accordingly, that the arguments have all been weighed against one another. We will assume here that the *pro aut contra* surveyor considers the conclusion to be adequately derived from the arguments in its favor.

SURVEYS OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A STANDPOINT

All *pro et* and *pro aut contra* surveys are preceded by a reasonably precise expression of the statement that is being argued. This is the expression of the issue, or the “issue expression,” which we will designate F_0 . Both types of surveys lay out the arguments themselves, but the *pro aut contra* survey also adds a conclusion.

A *pro aut contra* survey should contain no contradictions; in particular (1) no argument should arise both as a *pro* argument and as a *contra* argument, (2) all the arguments should be compatible with one another, and (3) no assertion should implicitly or explicitly be both accepted and rejected. Requirement (3) can be understood as a special case of requirement (2).

The following caricature of a *pro aut contra* survey illustrates the importance of compatibility. Suppose Mr. A's lawyer draws up a survey:

$F_0 \equiv$ A is bound to compensate B for the dog-eared book.

$C_1 \equiv$ A has never borrowed any book from B.

$C_2 \equiv$ The book belongs to A, not to B.

$C_3 \equiv$ A has already returned the book to B intact.

$C_4 \equiv$ The book was already dog-eared before A got it to B.

The various *contra* arguments here are not all compatible with one another. Statements C_1 and C_4 are incompatible, as are C_1 and C_3 , at least if we assume that A cannot have given the book back to B without having *borrowed* it (which is not necessarily the case). To accept C_1 thus means to reject C_3 and C_4 and vice versa. We can also note that C_1 and C_4 infringe requirement (3) that no assertion should implicitly or explicitly be both accepted and rejected, since the assertion that A has borrowed a book from B is explicitly rejected in C_1 and implicitly accepted in C_4 . This *pro aut contra* survey can therefore be rejected out of hand. However, there is nothing to prevent C_1 through C_4 from being included in a *pro et contra* survey. *Pro et contra* surveys are not restricted to one person; they can contain the actual or possible arguments of a number of different people, even over a long period of time. In a *pro et contra* survey, it is reasonable for the same assertion to be both accepted and rejected; an assertion and its negation can both appear as arguments.

Suppose some people support a reform because they consider that it will strengthen the country's economy, while others oppose it because they consider it will not. The argument “The reform will strengthen the coun-

try's economy" can occur as a pro argument and the argument "The reform will not strengthen the country's economy" as a contra argument. Even when a *pro et contra* survey contains the arguments of only one person, it may still contain contradictions, which are especially likely to arise when the arguments emerge at intervals over a long period of time. Naturally, however, our expectation for contradictions is lower for the single person case than for the multiple persons case.

In *pro et contra* surveys, one may also find arguments occurring both as pro and as contra arguments. Some people, for instance, have recommended that a university syllabus not include compulsory courses. One of the primary arguments is based on the assumption that not having to take certain classes makes it easier for students to work at places other than the university (T_0). Others, however, see it as an advantage for students to be required to attend the university. The latter then use T_0 as a contra argument. Here one must enter T_0 in both columns of a *pro et contra* list.

Issue Expressions

It is best if the statement of an issue being argued can be expressed in one sentence. If the issue expression consists of more than one sentence, we must be clear that together the sentences express one unified statement. If the claim can be divided into more than one statement, it is possible that the arguments can no longer be adequately classified as pro or contra since one and the same argument may be a pro argument in relation to one part of the claim and a contra argument (or even irrelevant) in relation to another. In the following, unless expressly stated otherwise, we assume that whatever is at issue can be expressed in one sentence, which is designated as F_0 .

When it is difficult to give an exact expression to an assertion in just one sentence, it may be expedient to make the issue expression as compendious as possible, even at the expense of preciseness. All that is necessary then is to add a comment to the issue expression indicating a strong precization of F_0 that is to be taken as meaning the same as F_0 throughout the subsequent discussion or survey. Further comments may also be needed; whether or not they are needed becomes clear as soon as a debate gets under way. The same goes for questions about how strongly F_0 should be precized. Here we can apply the rule that one's precizations should not be so strong as

to bring out shades and distinctions of meaning that have no bearing on the issue being raised and that do not affect the arguments in any way.

When trying to decide something, we seldom consider only one possible conclusion. We are normally prepared to consider a number of practical possibilities, such as when we are choosing a course to fulfill a school's language requirements. If the school requires two languages, we do not choose between French and not-French, but among French, Spanish, German, and so forth. Because the number of offerings is limited, there is no need to consider arguments that apply to all possible combinations as there would be if the choice were between any two or none at all. If we have already agreed to accept one of a range of alternatives, we can save time by mentioning what the possible alternatives to F_0 are.

Often a quick decision is needed. In that case, a comprehensive *pro et contra* survey is too time consuming to be useful, unless it has been prepared beforehand. It is, of course, a wise step as well as an exercise in intelligence to anticipate both the situations in which decisions are needed and the considerations that might bear on them. In this way, we prepare ourselves to act from prearranged dispositions to this or that decision in this or that kind of situation. When one then encounters an actual situation, one can ask oneself what set of matching conditions appropriate in this *sort* of situation are to apply in the present case. The good chess player, we all know, thinks a number of possible moves ahead.

Argument Expressions

It often pays to make a *pro et contra* survey before beginning a *pro aut contra* survey on the same issue. In a practical sense, the requirement of the first survey is to glean an all-around knowledge of the considerations adduced in the course of the discussion by adherents and opponents of the standpoint being contested. One should also include arguments that one considers to be untenable or irrelevant if these have been introduced in the discussion. Whether such arguments come into *pro et contra* surveys depends only on whether one of the disputants views it as a compelling argument. The requirement of the second survey is to evaluate the arguments critically and then arrive at a revised survey of the arguments that presents a particular position.

Arguments that directly bear out an issue expression are called *pro arguments of the first order*. These are numbered in the following way: $P_1, P_2,$

\dots, P_n . Similarly, contra arguments of the first order are designated C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n . Every argument should be formulated so that one can see clearly whether it is consistent with both the issue expression and the remaining arguments in the list.

It may happen that an argument of the first order can itself become an issue expression in a new survey. Such a survey can be grafted onto the original list in the way illustrated in figure 5. Arguments for and against an argument of the first order are called arguments of the second order relative to F_0 . Arguments that support a pro argument of the first order are called *pro-pro arguments*; those that rebut a pro argument of the first order are called *contra-pro arguments*. Any arguments of the higher order that become an issue must themselves be made the object of *pro et contra* surveys, and so on.

That one reaches a final link in the chain of arguments is because there is a stage when an issue comes to be treated, if not as “unquestionable” (in the sense of “conclusive”), then in a more restricted sense as “not questioned” in the scope of the given discussion. We must also make some qualifying statements about the questioner. He must be considered competent. But we should be cautious here; if a person’s competence is in question, it may be wise to include an assertion about this in the *pro et contra* list. It is unwise to succumb to the temptation of assuming that one’s opponent is ipso facto incompetent.

The most important condition for bringing a discussion or a survey to a conclusion is that it have a definite aim. There must be an accepted end to it; often a schematic review of the arguments will suffice to clear up the point discussed. The main consideration is that the survey give a clear and complete account of the crucial arguments relevant to the given discussion. It is a common mistake in the presentation of arguments of a higher order to include irrelevant arguments that tend to obscure the force of the relevant ones. Differences of opinion often appear to be complete, but closer analysis often shows that the different standpoints can be traced to controversies over minor and comparatively few points. The balance can often be accounted for by a disposition to aggressiveness and other forms of self-assertion, or perhaps simply to lack of knowledge of one’s opponent.

The structure of an argument can be set up in a number of ways. One of them is shown in figure 5. The argument symbols should be read from left to right. Thus, “ $P_1P_2C_1$ ” is to be read as “pro argument no. 1 for pro argument no. 2 for contra argument no. 1 (against F_0).”

SURVEYS OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A STANDPOINT




Figure 5. Schematic of the structure of an argument.

According to the kind and number of arguments of higher orders, one can find different ways of making satisfactory surveys. The following examples demonstrate a variety of organizing frameworks. The important thing is that a survey should show clearly how each sentence is related to the others in the pattern of the argumentation, which can sometimes be a very difficult thing to accomplish.

Tenability and Relevance of Arguments

To be able to use a *pro et contra* list to determine one's own position with respect to some F_0 , one must judge each argument, pro and con, separately and then weigh them against one another. We must first select from the *pro et contra* list those arguments that we consider to be the most important and organize them by how we think they are related to one another. In deciding whether some argument ought to be included in such a survey, it is no use demanding merely that it should have *either* some relevance *or* some tenability. Both characteristics are needed. Then we weigh pro arguments against contra arguments and eventually come to a conclusion. It is only then that we first get a complete *pro aut contra* list. The final assessment or conclusion should be expressed briefly and should contain no arguments itself.

We must pay attention to two things when weighing the pros and cons of an argument. First, we must ask ourselves how sure we can be that the

argument is a tenable assertion in itself. Second, we must ask ourselves how strongly the argument speaks for or against F_0 . In other words, how great is its proof potential or, simply, how relevant is it?

The greater an argument's relevance, the less certain we may be about its tenability as an assertion for it to be included in our list. For example, if there is a probability of only 1 in 1,000 that a thunderbolt will strike the place where I am standing within the next few minutes, I am still justified in including the assertion "A thunderbolt may strike here at any moment" among the contra arguments relative to the issue expression "We must stand here to get a good view." However, if an assertion has a high degree of probability in itself, we may be justified in noting it even if its relevance is slight.

When deciding whether an argument is tenable or not, it often pays to consider what we would have to do to find out whether or not it is true. It is likely the case that the necessary investigations have not been carried out for a great number of arguments.

The procedure for determining the degree of relevance of an argument is rather different. The decision is ultimately intuitive; one can only "feel" that the argument should or should not appear in a *pro aut contra* list. Appeal to intuition does not necessarily render the decision less certain. At a more advanced stage, one might be able to replace the intuitive decision with something less intuitive and more rational, something in the way of an explanation. However, it would be vain to suppose that we can avoid every appeal to intuition.

The demand for relevance varies according to whether the issue expression states that something *is* such and such (descriptive F_0) or that something *should be* such and such (normative F_0). For a descriptive F_0 , the relevance of T increases in step with our belief that the truth of argument T implies the truth of F_0 . For a normative F_0 , the relevance of P increases in step with the value of pro argument P (or the more beneficial it is that P be realized). This rule also applies when P is an assertion about what follows from accepting F_0 or from behaving as F_0 prescribes. For a normative F_0 , the relevance of C increases in step with the negative value of contra argument C (or the more unfortunate it would be if C were to be realized).

When evaluating the *tenability* of arguments in relation to a descriptive issue expression, one simply asks, "How likely is it that the assertions con-

stituting pro argument P_1 and contra argument C_1 are true?" In contrast, when evaluating the *relevance* of arguments, one asks, "How likely is it that if P_1 is true then F_0 is true, and how probable is it that if C_1 is true then not- F_0 is true (F_0 is false)?" When evaluating the tenability of arguments in relation to a normative issue, one must distinguish between arguments stating norms and arguments stating probable consequences. In the former case, one should ask, "Do I find this norm tenable?," or "Would I choose this rather than alternative norms?" In the latter case, one should ask, "Is it the case, as the argument states, that such and such consequences will result from my decision?" When evaluating the relevance of these arguments, in the former case, one should ask, "If I acknowledge the norm stated in the argument, does it then follow that I ought to do what is implied by F_0 ?" In the latter case, one should ask, "If I acknowledge that such and such will be the most probable consequences of my action, shall I then choose this action?" The following examples may enable the reader to grasp these rules and distinctions more readily.

The first two simple examples bring out the factors of validity and relevance.

Example 1

$F_0 \equiv$ It will rain tonight.

$P_1 \equiv$ The sky is covered with gray clouds.

$P_2 \equiv$ The swallows are flying low.

$C_1 \equiv$ The barometer is rising.

We may take all three arguments to have a relatively high degree of *validity*, especially P_1 and C_1 , because they are based on trustworthy observations. The relevance of P_1 and P_2 are of the same order as the probability of the hypothesis that, if the sky is covered with gray clouds and swallows fly low, it will rain in the night. The relevance of C_1 is of the same order as the probability of the hypothesis that, if the barometer rises, it will not rain in the night. If we intuitively accept the likelihood of the first hypothesis, we will accept the conclusion that it will rain tonight rather than its negation. But the *relevance* of the pro arguments, especially P_2 , seems so slight that we must consider the conclusion to be extremely uncertain.

Example 2

For a very simple example of a *pro aut contra* survey with a normative issue expression, consider this familiar kind of story. Peter was studying for his degree in mathematics. He was so interested in his work that he could not consider devoting his working hours to anything but pursuing his studies. But he enjoyed reading poetry, of the kind one cannot enjoyably read when one is tired. To clarify his problem, Peter set up a small *pro aut contra* list:

$F_0 \equiv$ As long as I study, I have to devote all my time to my subject.

Antithesis \equiv I must set aside some of my working hours for reading poetry.

$P_1 \equiv$ I will be earning a steady income a year earlier.

$C_1 \equiv$ I will not be a social success.

$P_2 \equiv$ I will be a useful member of society a year earlier.

$C_2 \equiv$ I will become one-sided.

Peter thinks that the degree of *validity* is the same for all four arguments. If anything is to tip the scales, it must be the difference in degree of *relevance*. The degree of relevance that Peter assigns to the various arguments is contingent on which higher norms (expressed or not) he accepts. As it happens, Peter believes that being a useful and prosperous citizen is preferable to being a person with a rich inner life but no money, and on this basis he accepts F_0 . We note that Peter assumes here that becoming more widely cultured will not lead to his becoming useful and prosperous, at least not as readily.

Example 3

Now we come to more complicated surveys. Let us take the example of students at an urban university in an occupied country during World War II who are discussing whether or not they should go on strike. A *pro et contra* list is made and used in the discussions. Most of the included arguments are of the kind one would already have heard from supporters and opponents of the scheme. (Note that the example given here does not altogether follow the rules just established. For instance, it infringes the rule for sepa-

SURVEYS OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A STANDPOINT

ration of levels of argument by adding, in pro argument P_7 , the phrase "this is a good thing.")

$F_0 \equiv$ Students should strike (at the specified time).

Antithesis \equiv The students should not strike.

Pro Arguments

$P_1 \equiv$ Last week's aggressive action against the university was so serious that a clear demonstration on the part of the students is called for. In this case, a strike would be the best course of action. (Precization of "clear demonstration": a demonstration that will be recognized as such by non-participants.)

$P_2 \equiv$ A strike would strengthen the home front.

$P_3 \equiv$ The reputations of students, and indirectly of all intellectuals, will suffer a blow if they fail to show solidarity in time of war.

$P_4 \equiv$ A strike represents a small but nonetheless significant contribution to the common war effort, insofar as the morale of the military forces depends a great deal on that of the home front.

$P_5 \equiv$ A strike would effectively obstruct the attempts by the government to maintain and widen its own prestige in the country and elsewhere.

$P_6 \equiv$ A strike would effectively obstruct enemy propaganda by showing that cultural institutions cannot be preserved in an occupied country.

$P_7 \equiv$ Recognition of their own responsibilities strengthens morale among students, and this is a good thing.

$P_8 \equiv$ Last week's strike attempt broke down. Unless they renew the attempt, students will have to recognize their own powerlessness, which will aggravate defeatism.

$P_9 \equiv$ A strike may provoke such threats that we will be justified in giving way, but the good consequences of the action (stated in P_1 through P_4) will not thereby be diminished, whereas all contra arguments, with one exception, will be weakened.

$P_{10} \equiv$ We still have the possibility of striking without serious consequences. However, we must expect such occasions to become increasingly rare. If the enemy adopts harsher methods, combined action will become impractical.

Contra Arguments

$C_1 \equiv$ It is to the enemy's advantage if we strike because they can then disperse the students, who, thus weakened, will be unable to voice their opinions effectively. In the city, students have better opportunities for keeping informed about the situation and for carrying out retaliatory activities.

$C_2 \equiv$ It is to our advantage to keep in close contact with those who waver in order to exercise influence on them.

$C_3 \equiv$ A strike affects different students to different degrees. Those who require technical apparatus will be especially hard hit.

$C_4 \equiv$ Students' economic positions will be adversely affected as a result of a strike. Some may be set back as many as two or three years, with a corresponding loss of income.

$C_5 \equiv$ Reprisals will follow upon strike action, which can be avoided by not striking. There may even be executions, perhaps of especially valuable people.

$C_6 \equiv$ If there is a strike, the enemy will take over all scientific institutions.

$C_7 \equiv$ The enemy will destroy important scientific apparatus and materials or use them in their war effort.

SURVEYS OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A STANDPOINT

- $C_8 \equiv$ At a given signal, students are able to mobilize armed groups, but only if they stay at the university.
- $C_9 \equiv$ If we attempt to undertake a strike and it is not effective, the operation will be a catastrophe. It is very likely that it will not be effective. (Precization of to be "effective": the strike [1] must not interrupt education and must let the waverers go on to take their exams and acquire positions; [2] must not give outsiders the impression of dissension, thus making it easier for the enemy to occupy the vacancies; and [3] must not interrupt education and split the university into its separate faculties, which might then stand in opposition to one another.)
- $C_{10} \equiv$ Having no work will undermine morale, so that many students will abandon their vocations.
- $C_{11} \equiv$ When the students are out of work, the enemy will have all the more excuse to recruit them for compulsory labor to their own benefit.
- $C_{12} \equiv$ It will be to our country's detriment to have a shortage of graduates when peace comes.

Contra-Contra Arguments

- $CC_1 \equiv$ a. If C_1 were true (arguments in support of F_0), then the National Assembly would already have closed the university last week.
 b. This relates to P_6 and P_7 (possibly also to P_4 and P_5).
- $CC_2 \equiv$ a. The waverers will find just as strong opposition to the enemy in their home districts.
 b. The distribution of news is just as good all over the country.
 c. Some students at the university have gone over to the government.
 d. For propaganda purposes, it is an advantage that active students be spread over a greater area.

e. Waverers are exposed to more effective enemy propaganda in the city than elsewhere.

$CC_3 \equiv$ A mitigating factor is that most students can, to some extent, continue their training outside the university by attending private courses and lectures. They can then take their exams as soon as possible after the return of peace. The delay will therefore be minimal.

$CC_4 \equiv$ Mitigating factors:

- a. For students from rural districts, it is cheaper to live at home than in the city.
- b. The food situation and conditions of life generally are much better in rural areas than in the city.
- c. If C_9 is correct, C_4 does not apply.

$CC_{6,7} \equiv$ If C_9 is correct, C_6 and C_7 do not apply.

$CC_8 \equiv$ It is easier to come militarily prepared from the rural districts if the occasion arises. Also, the occupation forces can more easily round up students in the city.

Example 4

A *pro et contra* survey for the following issue expression (see example 5 for an alternative survey):

$F_0 \equiv$ Our country should help underdeveloped countries.

SURVEY I

$T_0 = F_0$

$T_1 \equiv$ Our country should give technical and economic aid to some areas in Asia and Africa where the majority of people live at or below the subsistence level.

Pro Arguments

$P_1 \equiv$ Our citizens are morally obliged to accept F_0 .

SURVEYS OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A STANDPOINT

- $P_1P_1 \equiv$ Our standard of living is so much higher than that of other peoples.
- $P_2P_1 \equiv$ Our citizens honor the Christian code, in which love of one's neighbor is a basic principle.
- $P_2 \equiv$ Accepting T_1 is necessary for saving our own way of life.
- $P_1P_2 \equiv$ There is risk of war when so many are living below the subsistence level.
- $P_2P_2 \equiv$ Our country should create new markets in these areas. We can only do so if these underdeveloped countries attain the economic prosperity required to establish commercial ties.
- $P_3 \equiv$ Our country has special qualifications for contributing in this way.
- $P_1P_3 \equiv$ The people in question cannot misinterpret our action as inspired by imperialism.
- $P_2P_3 \equiv$ Our country is already well known for the humanitarian work of our missionaries in these countries.

*Contra Arguments, Pro-Contra Arguments, and
Contra-Pro-Contra Arguments*

- $C_1 \equiv$ No one is obliged to help these people.
- $P_1C_1 \equiv$ They have largely themselves to blame for their plight.
- $P_1P_1C_1 \equiv$ They are too lazy.
- $P_2P_1C_1 \equiv$ They will not give up their religious beliefs, which play a large part in preventing progress.
- $C_1P_1P_1C_1 \equiv$ Their laziness depends largely on weakness due to starvation, and in all probability it will disappear under improved economic conditions.
- $C_2 \equiv$ Our country cannot help.
- $P_1C_2 \equiv$ We have enough troubles of our own.
- $P_2C_2 \equiv$ The help we can give will make little difference.

$C_1P_1C_2 \equiv$ Unlike the situation in these other countries, there is no risk of starvation in this country.

$C_1P_2C_2 \equiv$ Even the smallest contribution helps.

Example 5

Second *pro et contra* survey for

$F_0 =$ Our country should help underdeveloped countries.

SURVEY II

$T_0 = F_0$

$T_1 \equiv$ Our government, with the voluntary economic support of the people, should help those countries in which more than two-thirds of the population live in hunger, sickness, and need. ("Economically underdeveloped countries" is the internationally recognized designation for these countries. We will refer to them here simply as *D*.)

Antithesis \equiv We should not help *D*.

Pro Arguments (with one example of a contra-pro argument)

$P_1 \equiv$ *D* are a threat to world peace.

$P_1P_1 \equiv$ The people in *D* see how Western countries have exploited them.

$P_2P_1 \equiv$ The people in *D* will come to rise up against the oppression that they see to be the cause of their misery.

$P_2 \equiv$ Humanitarian considerations compel us to help the people in *D*.

$P_1P_2 \equiv$ Human solidarity must be extended over the whole world.

$P_1P_1P_2 \equiv$ It is in accord with our democratic principles and outlook on life.

SURVEYS OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A STANDPOINT

$P_2P_2 \equiv$ On ethical grounds, one cannot concede that the majority of mankind should live in extreme need while we live in comfort.

$P_1P_2P_2 \equiv$ The high standard of living enjoyed by developed countries is not due to themselves alone. The raw materials they have taken from *D* have contributed to this standard.

$P_3 \equiv$ According to the UN Charter we are pledged to give technical and economic assistance.

$C_1P_3 \equiv$ This country is not pledged to give additional *voluntary* assistance. We have already contributed what we are committed to under the terms of the UN Charter.

Contra Arguments, Pro-Contra Arguments, and Contra-Contra Arguments

$C_1 \equiv$ We do not have the economic capacity to give such assistance.

$P_1C_1 \equiv$ Our budget has already exceeded its limits.

$P_2C_1 \equiv$ Our country has a deficit in its overseas trade.

$C_2 \equiv$ We should first help the partially underdeveloped areas in our own country.

$C_1C_2 \equiv$ *D* present problems of a quite different kind and scope.

$C_3 \equiv$ We should first solve domestic problems of our own (such as housing and roads) before considering how we can help others.

$C_4 \equiv$ What little we can contribute is so inconsiderable that one cannot seriously speak of it in terms of assistance.

$C_1C_4 \equiv$ The significance of our assistance is not in economic support itself; our action will show the way to other Western countries when they seriously come to look for a solution to the problems presented by *D*.

$C_5 \equiv$ Such help will lead to overpopulation in *D*, which will just present further problems for the West.

- $P_1C_5 \equiv$ Better living conditions mean a decrease in the death rate of infants and an increase in population. Production of foodstuffs often does not keep pace with the rising population. If this is the case, then the West will have to stake even more capital to promote higher productivity in D .
- $C_1C_5 \equiv$ If D is provided with technical and economic opportunities to improve its living conditions, the people in D will themselves find some solution to the problem of the birth rate.
- $C_2C_5 \equiv$ An increased standard of living means an increase in the average age, so that D will have the benefit of more men in their prime. This means that the people in D can themselves increase production and foodstuffs.

VI

Effective Discussion

Introduction

We depend on language as a means of conveying ideas from one person to another. Often the views conveyed are not shared; opinion is divided. Then the exchange of ideas can take the form of debate. We can view some of Plato's dialogues as systematic attempts to clarify difficult issues and as such they represent good illustrations of the basic functions of debate.

From the time of Aristotle, people have noted the distinction between the rhetoric practiced by, for example, politicians and preachers and discursive or rational argument that is exclusively concerned with the critical exchange of ideas. These two forms of rhetoric cannot replace one another. Speech designed to arouse people to action or to have a direct influence on their behavior differs in kind from speech used purely in the exchange of ideas. To combine the two functions defeats the aims of each, namely, commitment on the one hand and clarity of thought on the other.

This chapter presents what we can regard as principles of effective discussion, although it might be more accurate to describe them as forms of irrelevance in serious discussion. The aim of effective discussion is the exchange of cognitive contents in a manner that facilitates the greater consistency and proper understanding of those contents. The principles are determined by this aim. Where our aims are different, these same principles or standards cannot be relevant and they may be directly harmful. If we wish to influence people and not to convince them, suggestiveness, propaganda, and advertisement are generally more effective means than discussion.

We shall consider irrelevance under six main headings. The definition we adopt for "relevant" in this context is such that "a matter x is relevant" means the same as " x infringes on none of the six principles for relevant discussion."

The principles themselves are elementary. They provide no more than a minimal basis for competent discursive argument. Finally, we must assume when using them that our discussion, whatever it is, concerns some fixed topic, namely that which is presented in the issue expression.

Principle One: Avoid Tendentious References to Side Issues

Preliminary formulation of principle one: *one should keep to the point, even if one is aware that it harms one's own interests to do so.*

Precization of the preliminary formulation of principle one:

A proposition *T* in a serious discussion violates principle one if (a) *T*, taken as an argument, has little relevance; (b) *T*, taken as an expression for an isolated assertion, is not sufficiently tenable to be able to support or detract from a given viewpoint; or (c) *T*, taken as a precization of or a comment on some previous argument is not conducive to highlighting misunderstandings. Principle one is also violated if *T* aims to influence people in favor of a certain conclusion.

Suppose that the topic for discussion is given in an issue expression in a *pro et contra* survey. The question whether some matter is irrelevant or uncertain will tend to be answered differently according to one's position regarding the issue expression. The first principle must therefore be interpreted as requiring only that a given matter be sufficiently relevant and tenable from one's own particular point of view. I illustrate this point with a conversation between two people discussing the issue of "for or against competitive sports," in which both are guilty of producing irrelevant arguments.

1. *A*: Competitive sports destroy a person's intelligence and spirit of cooperation.
2. *B*: *A* can only say that because he isn't a sportsman himself.
3. *A*: The last remark doesn't affect my argument, it only shows that I was right in saying sports destroy a person's intelligence.
4. *B*: You are a typical culture snob carping at sports whenever you can.
5. *A*: As I said before, I've no quarrel with sports as such, only with their harmful effects.

Principle Two: Avoid Tendentious Renderings of Other People's Views

Here assertion (2) is a clear case of irrelevant argument. Person *B* tries to throw suspicion on his opponent to weaken the latter's argument. Person *A*'s gibe at *B* in (3) is another case of irrelevance, as is *B*'s attempt in (4) to ascribe to *A* an argument that *A* disowns in (5). In this example, we see instances of two kinds of irrelevance: attempts to throw an opponent's view into disrepute by saying something that has nothing to do with the view itself, and attempts to attack an opponent for holding views that he does not hold.

Another form of irrelevant argument occurs when unnecessary emphasis is placed on some generally accepted viewpoint that even one's opponent would agree to. It can reinforce one's own position to subscribe to some sentiment that no one would criticize you for but which does not contribute materially to the discussion. By ignoring such banalities, an opponent, by his very silence on the point, may appear to be opposing them; he loses credibility and the other gains through cheating. In this way, spurious disagreement can be generated.

Principle Two: Avoid Tendentious Renderings of Other People's Views

Preliminary formulation of principle two: *an utterance in serious discussion that aims at rendering a point of view should be neutral in relation to all points of view represented in the discussion.*

Consider as a case in point a public debate on a country's economic policy. A politician *A* says, "We should agree to do away with all customs duties and try to get other countries to follow suit." A journalist *B* reports on *A*'s utterance under the headline, "Mr. *A* makes himself spokesman for a total free-trade policy." On reading the written version, reader *C* will already be influenced without knowing what *A*'s position really is. It could well be that *A* also expressed other views, and *B* cannot assume that *C* will be uninterested in these. If *B* expects *C* to adopt a negative standpoint to *A*'s views on free trade and thus expects that *C* can be shuffled into a generally negative attitude toward *A*'s other views, then *B*'s report is tendentious and hence irrelevant in its very selectiveness.

A common bad habit is to generalize an opponent's view, substituting "all *x* are *y*" for *A*'s "this *x* is *y*" or "some *x* are *y*." For example, "Men are better suited than women to be priests" becomes "All men are better suited than any woman to be priests."

EFFECTIVE DISCUSSION

Precization of the preliminary formulation of principle two:

An utterance in serious discussion that purports to give an account of A's viewpoint should be such that if we let the report stand in place of the original as an issue expression in a *pro et contra* survey, then none of the argument's force (tenability and relevance from A's standpoint) is lost.

Occasionally a report has to be made shorter than the original. In this case, it must inevitably diverge from the original and consequently it may yield a number of reasonable interpretations. The divergence, however, should not be biased. Distorting quotations is a familiar phenomenon, and one to beware of in this context. To take some saying or even a whole section of a speech out of its context may mean that far more misleading sets of interpretations become "reasonable."

The less a public knows about some debated viewpoints, the less competent it is to take a stand of its own, and thus the need for neutral presentation of the points of view in question increases. A teacher should be *less* brief with beginners than with more advanced students. Only when he can count on the listeners to know the contra arguments against his views can the teacher get down to *pro aut contra* arguing with the students. Beginners have smaller reserves of mature knowledge and are therefore more open to suggestion. To prevent uncritical reception of what he teaches, a teacher should take care to convey the rationality of a view along with the view itself.

Principle Three: Avoid Tendentious Ambiguity

Preliminary formulation of principle three: *the matter should not be communicated in a manner that incurs a real risk of misunderstanding on the part of the listener.*

Suppose a general in the armed forces proposes a truce to the enemy. The enemy answers that they agree to a 30-day truce. The same night they make an attack and win an easy victory. Afterward, they say they only agreed to a daytime truce, not a nighttime one as well. Their agreement to a 30-day truce was intentionally ambiguous.

Precization of the preliminary formulation of principle three:

An utterance in serious discussion violates principle three if and only if (1) the utterance can be given different interpretations and

it is possible for the listener to interpret it in a way different from that intended by the utterer, and (2) the listener's interpretation strengthens the utterer's argument more than the utterer's own interpretation would.

We can clarify the application of this principle with an example:

1. A: I have nothing against sports, but according to the view we Christians hold, I must say that . . .
2. B: "We Christians," who are they?
3. A: People like me who actively subscribe to Christian beliefs.
4. B: But think of all the people who call themselves Christian, do you speak for all of them?
5. A: Of course not, actually I meant members of the Christian People's party.

Let us now analyze this fragment of discussion in terms of relevance. Consider the following interpretations:

$a_0 \equiv$ We Christians.

$a_1 \equiv$ We who actively subscribe to Christian beliefs.

$a_{1.1} \equiv$ We who actively subscribe to Christian beliefs in the political sphere as well.

$a_{1.2} \equiv$ We who actively subscribe to Christian beliefs politically or otherwise.

$a_2 \equiv$ We members of the Christian People's political party.

$a_3 \equiv$ We who adopted the Christian faith and morality.

Speaker A uses a_0 , $a_{1.1}$, and a_2 as cognitively equivalent — although the word "actually" in (5) can mean something else (see next paragraph). Probably $a_{1.2}$ and a_3 are reasonable interpretations, and A can be presumed to be aware of this. But A employs a special usage. If in this context, by a_0 he means a_2 , his listener will tend to confuse the reasonable interpretations that thus lead to a quantitative and evaluative overrating of the group that A represents. Members of the Christian People's political party make up only a small portion of those normally rated as Christians, in the sense un-

derstood by $a_{1,2}$ or a_3 . If A did represent the whole class, his standpoint would not be politically colored and would therefore acquire a greater authority. However, he would then succeed in arousing the opposition of Christians in senses other than $a_{1,2}$ and a_3 . By adopting sense a_0 , A might find it easier to influence his listeners into accepting his own standpoint. Thus, A 's use of a_0 is a sign of irrelevance.

This use of tendentious ambiguity can certainly be weakened by the listener's knowledge that the speaker is a member of the party in question and that its members normally interpret a_0 as a_2 . Assertion (4) to some extent supports the supposition that such knowledge holds in this case. Listener B 's remark implies that he interprets a_0 as $a_{1,1}$ rather than as $a_{1,2}$.

In regard to the relevance of A 's argument, it is also in A 's favor that in (5) he recognizes his special usage instead of attempting to cover it up with some irrelevant remark. If A had deliberately produced an irrelevant argument, there would be, psychologically, less likelihood of his uttering (5), since this utterance clearly confirms one's suspicion about irrelevance.

A tendency toward irrelevant argument can perhaps be detected at assertion (3). Quite likely A understands what B hints at when he utters assertion (2), but does not manage immediately to resist the temptation to offer the ambiguous expression a_1 instead of the more precise a_2 .

Assertion (2) is in the form of a question, but presumably B is aware that by a_0 A probably means a_2 and that A does not imagine all people subsumable under $a_{1,2}$ or a_3 are in favor of his own standpoint. Perhaps, too, B thinks the rest of his listeners are aware of this. Under these assumptions, B interrupts A with (2), insofar as (4) is a symptom of B 's irrelevant arguing. He draws the attention of possible opponents to A within group $a_{1,2}$, and at the same time deals A a blow. But according to the above assumptions, the interruption, because it is definitely misleading, cannot be justified as a technique in discussion.

We conclude that we have a sign of A 's, and possibly also of B 's, infringement of principle three.

Principle Four: Avoid Tendentious Argument from Alleged Implication

Principle two refers to nonneutral renderings of other people's views. Principle four refers to tendentious presentations of other people's views, which

Principle Four: Avoid Tendentious Argument from Alleged Implication

associate inductive or deductive consequences with *T* that do not directly follow from reports of previously formulated standpoints.

It is, of course, entirely acceptable to judge proposition *T*, not only on the basis of the assertions made by the proponents of *T* but also on the basis of propositions that one believes are deductive or inductive consequences of *T*, or which in some way give a fuller presentation of the viewpoint expressed by *T*. However, when giving an account of the view *T* states, it is tendentious to attribute to proponents of this view assertions that one assumes or considers to be inferred from *T*.

For example, someone argues as follows: "Opponents say that he accepts *T*. But from *T* follows *U*, and *U* is untenable. Therefore *T* is untenable." Here it is important to know whether an opponent does in fact accept that *U* follows from *T*. If he does not and yet we proceed under the assumption that he does, then we have broken an elementary rule for relevant discussion. In addition, it can be tendentious for us to introduce *U* at all before we have discussed whether *U* does or does not follow from *T*.

Another kind of tendentious imputation occurs when one says that certainly *A* says he accepts *T* but that he does not mean it; his real view is *U*. For example, "*A* says he honors the principle about equal rights for higher education whatever the financial circumstances, but in fact he thinks that this right ought to be confined to those who have the means to undertake a prolonged course of study."

In another case, someone asserts that *A* certainly means *T*, but also means *U*, which is inconsistent with *T*. For example, "*A* supports the greatest possible freedom. But freedom for whom? From all accounts, it seems he only wants freedom for people who share his viewpoint, which is that freedom can only be realized after a period of oppression."

There is, of course, nothing to prevent a person from saying one thing but meaning another. Indeed, the accounts people give of their views are often deliberately vague and misleading. Thus, imputations of the kind discussed here often prove to be justified. However, unless the imputation is clearly presented as a hypothesis, together with the grounds for accepting it, the account itself will be tendentious and misleading. Generally, fruitful exchanges of thought are impeded by hasty assertions that attribute a viewpoint to one's opponents that is either immaterial or inconsistent with what they say they mean. In the end, one creates a sort of personal isolation in the face of one's opponents that easily generates ill will and even violence.

Preliminary formulation of principle four: *one should give an account of another person's viewpoint (1) without saying whether the person in question is likely to accept the account or (2) without bringing up the arguments one has for attributing to someone a view he himself says he does not hold.*

Precization of the preliminary formulation of principle four:

An utterance in serious discussion violates principle four if, and only if, it attributes to a person (or group) a viewpoint (assertion, opinion, or argument) and the following three conditions are fulfilled: (1) *A* does not agree to *T*, and the speaker fails to produce arguments to show that *A* supports *T* or fails to mention the viewpoints that *A* has expressed; (2) the difference between the viewpoint that the public will probably attribute to *A*, if it believes the speaker, and the standpoint that the public would reasonably take *A* to hold if *A* had a chance to speak for himself, affects the issue's acceptability positively or negatively, or affects the combined strength of evidence in pro or in contra arguments; and (3) this difference strengthens the speaker's (or his group's) standpoint. The application of this principle can be clarified with an example:

A: The country's economy should continue to be run on the principles of a planned economy.

B: It seems from *A*'s standpoint that he does not mind recommending a policy that will lead to our country's ceasing to be a democracy and to our people's being deprived of their freedom as they were during the war. But freedom is such a valuable thing that there can be no question of exchanging it for some possible economic advantage.

Person *B*'s first sentence is designed to arouse in his listeners the idea that *A* accepts the consequences *B* extorts from *A*'s utterances. But there is no indication that *A* would in fact accept them. We must assume that *B* is aware of this and of the probable reaction of his listeners. Person *B* should first have given reasons for his view that *A*'s proposal will incur the consequences he, but hardly *A*, assumes it will. Only then should *B* go on to criticize *A*. If "freedom" and "democracy" are used with as much emotive value as *A*'s and *B*'s listeners normally derive from them, any views that are detrimental to freedom and democracy will arouse the public's antipathy. Speaker

Principle Five: Avoid Tendentious Firsthand Reports

B's words practically *compel* support for his own position in the debate, as he no doubt intends. We conclude that *B* is guilty of violating principle four.

Principle Five: Avoid Tendentious Firsthand Reports

Preliminary formulation of principle five: *an account (descriptive or theoretical) violates principle five if it leaves something out and lays emphasis on other things, or in some other way conveys a distorted impression to the listener, or else gives a directly false impression that serves the interests of the speaker.*

The application of principle five is illustrated by the following example:

A: We must go and catch the train now; it's just 9 o'clock.

B: No, I'll change my clothes first; it's only a quarter to.

In fact, *A*'s watch shows 8:55 and *B*'s 8:50.

Person *A* gives a false impression of what he has observed. So does *B*. Speaker *A*'s tendentious report of what he sees supports his wish to be getting on his way, while *B*'s account is designed to cater to his inclination to linger awhile.

An analysis of this kind becomes less sure the closer *A*'s and *B*'s accounts come to that of some independent witness and the less anything depends on the observations. A witness's account itself then becomes suspect if there is reason to believe that it is designed to prove irrelevance on the part of *A* or *B* or both.

Precization of principle five:

A proposition *T* in serious discussion violates principle five if, and only if, (1) *T* provides an account of observations (or of the relationship between observations) that is incorrect or incomplete or *T* holds back information that must be considered relevant in judging the validity or relevance of an argument, and (2) deviations that occur are intended to strengthen the speaker's position in the debate.

We can clarify the application of principle five with another example. Suppose a correspondent of a foreign newspaper reports the result of a parliamentary election in a telegram as "The *A* party increased its vote." *A*

EFFECTIVE DISCUSSION

more neutral and comprehensive account might show, however, that although the *A* party did indeed “increase” its vote, its proportion of the total votes cast decreased. The telegram presents party *A* in a favorable light at the cost of the others. We conclude that the correspondent has violated principle five.

Principle Six: Avoid Tendentious Use of Contexts

This principle concerns the context (or conditions) in which a matter is brought forward. In this category, we include in the context both noncognitive and cognitive components in, or as accessories to, the argument. This includes expressions of the following kind: “When a hypocrite such as Mr. H. starts saying what he feels, one knows straight off that. . . .” Any use of terminology of a scornful, abusive, or otherwise nonargumentative nature can come into what we call the “context” of the discussion. In addition, there are properties of the broader context in which the discussion is presented, such as the use of music, pageantry, serving of food and drink, and any other accessories of persuasion and suggestion. In the case of newspaper articles, for instance, it can be a question of the selection of type, photographs, and so on.

Preliminary formulation of principle six: *a matter should be presented in a neutral way in a neutral setting.*

Precization of the preliminary formulation of principle six:

An utterance in a serious discussion violates principle six if, and only if, the context in a wide as well as a narrow sense serves to strengthen the position of the speaker without its influence being attributable to the cognitive context of the matter.

Review of Principles

I will now briefly recapitulate the six principles for effective discussion.

Principle one concerns utterances (1) that are falsely presented as *arguments* for or against a position, or as precizations of arguments, or (2) that have a tendency to be so interpreted by the public.

Principle two concerns utterances (1) that are falsely presented as direct accounts or reports of previously presented viewpoints or (2) that have a

tendency to be so interpreted by the public. Principle two concerns a class of expressions that sometimes form part of an argument but that more properly belong to separate discussions of the status of the opponent's material and viewpoint in the discussion.

Principle three concerns the same utterances that principle one applies to, but refers specifically to the introduction of ambiguity to promote misunderstanding.

Principle four concerns expressions that assert something about the standpoints of others but that cannot lay claim to being direct accounts and that are not intended to be understood as direct accounts. Such expressions often occur in the form of conclusions drawn from one's opponent's own utterances ("If *A* means *T*, then he must also accept *U*").

Principle five concerns utterances that claim to belong to the *common pool of evidence* upon which any judgment of an argument's validity or relevance is to be based. Included among these utterances are reports of observations, the contents of textbooks, and works of reference that aim to represent our common knowledge.

Principle six concerns the relationship of utterances to the *wider context*, including the linguistic context in which they occur.

Common to all utterances that are open to violate these six principles is the precondition that they either actually occur in serious discussion or else are intended to be used in such with a view toward substantiating an argument's validity and relevance. A "serious discussion" is defined as any discussion in which the main aim is to increase one's understanding of some definite problem or in which one tries to clarify the issues involved in coming to a certain important decision. A further requirement of all utterances and other relevant factors liable to violate these principles is that they serve to strengthen, in the listener's mind, the standpoint that the speaker or spokesperson adopts in the discussion.

One of the main reasons for setting out in detail the rules for avoiding irrelevant arguing is that, by making the pitfalls explicit, one sees clearly how hard it is to justify any claim about irrelevant arguing. This chapter is not meant merely to improve the student's defenses, to put him on guard against irrelevant arguments directed at him; its primary purpose is to show the reader what he opens himself to when he makes accusations of irrelevant argumentation against others. One must be able to provide a satisfactory motivation for someone's violating a principle of relevance. When

an accusation of this kind comes up in a discussion that is itself not concerned with the relevance of arguments, it can often lead to a case of violation of principle one about tendentious references to side issues. *Accusations concerning the introduction of irrelevant arguments are one of the most common forms of irrelevant argument.*

If we suspect an opponent of making tendentious remarks, a grasp of the principles can help us judge whether our suspicions are well founded. But whatever our conclusions, the discussion itself will determine how well we can assure ourselves that the topic our opponent takes up is irrelevant to the subject of the discussion. If you think that you perceive a tendency in your opponent to try to win people over, say, by designedly ambiguous terms, you must be able to identify the ambiguities, at least to yourself. The first step toward testing such a belief is actually to formulate more precise expressions than those used by the opponent.

Distinction Between Relevant Argument and Forms of Persuasion

There is a great difference between a relevant or competent debate, on the one hand, and advertisements for goods or attitude conditioning through propaganda, on the other. It is important to realize that the various ways of influencing people's predispositions are not necessarily to be judged as though their aim was to promote competent discussion. Thus, the question of irrelevance only arises if such influencing appears in the guise of material for debate.

The slogan "truth in advertising" has served as an organizing principle for many attempts to combat the tendentiousness and inaccuracy of modern advertisers. But techniques in the art of public relations and advertising are various and subtle. So, too, with propaganda; despite all efforts, people are still unable to effectively combat the power and appeal of the skillful propagandizer, especially where sociological factors are at work.

One of the least debatable principles of the scientific approach is to realize as consistently as possible the distinction between relevant argument and forms of persuasion. The distinction has not always been appreciated. One comes across scientific works from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries containing a great deal of inconsequent material of a persuasive kind, sometimes including religious doctrines cited as undeniable premises in ar-

gument. In our own century, when scientists are especially concerned with sociological matters, it is particularly important to distinguish between pronouncements and propositions.

The connection between the principles of relevant discussion and the previous chapters of this book may seem a little unclear. The connection is this: the misuse of language, especially insufficient use of precization, paves the way for all the usual aspects of irrelevance discussed here. It is precisely in precization that one finds the instrument to combat incompetent discussion. The technique of precization, then, is of great importance.

According to the way the term "relevant" has been introduced in this chapter, the principles governing relevance are essentially independent of whether the issue expressions or arguments belong to some well-established science. "Relevant" does not mean the same as "technical" or "scientifically based." Indeed, one especially significant area of discussion in which these principles apply is when people argue, not about things, but about competing evaluations and when the issue expression is normative. We should note here that the acceptance of the democratic system, which most of us critically or uncritically subscribe to, itself presupposes a competent discussion on questions of value.

Political spokespeople and writers are often accused of employing irrelevant arguments when what they say seems to be entirely wrong or long since refuted. But it is clear from the principles presented here that *disagreement*, however deep, is not a sufficient reason for accusing the person one disagrees with of employing irrelevant arguments. A newspaper can be completely biased and yet validly claim that its opinions are not the outcome of irrelevant or immaterial argumentation. One may attack it for its one-sidedness but not for its irrelevance, however much one feels its views can only have been arrived at through tendentious selection and distortion of the facts.

For the same reasons, when people preach, we cannot accuse them of the sins enumerated in this chapter. On the contrary, as soon as we ourselves purport to represent an opponent's view—whether in a scientific, religious, ethical, or political context—our account can be incompetent in any of the ways described.

References

- Bryce, James B. 1921. *Modern Democracies*. New York: Macmillan.
- James, William. 1974. *Essays in Pragmatism*. Edited and with an introduction by Alburey Castell. New York: Hafner Publishing (1907).
- Le Bon, Gustave. 1931. *Bases scientifiques d'une Philosophie de l'histoire*. Madrid: M. Aguilar.
- Nearing, Scott. 1945. *Democracy Is Not Enough*. New York: Island Workshop Press.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1917. *Mysticism and Logic*, 2d ed. London: G. Allen and Unwin.
- . 1948. *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. New York: Simon and Schuster (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1948, 1966).
- Sinding, Thomas. 1949. *Pengevesen og Konjunkturer*. (Finance and the State of the Market). Oslo: Grøndahl.
- Schjelderup, Harald Krabbe. 1957. *Innføring i Psykologi*. (Introduction to Psychology). Oslo: Gyldendal.
- Wisniewski, Bohdan. 1970. *Karneades, Fragmente, Text und Kommentar*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolinskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

Index

- actions, reasons for, 76, 77, 78
 - advertising, 52, 97, 108
 - “A” entities, 4–5
 - agreement and disagreement
 - pseudo-, 63–69
 - examples, 66–72, 73–74
 - real, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68
 - verbal, 63–64, 65, 66, 67
 - alleged implication, 102–05, 107
 - alternation, 56
 - ambiguity, 2, 5, 47, 100–102, 107, 108
 - analytic conclusions, 61–62
 - analytic statements, 37, 55–61
 - defined, 56
 - apodosis, 62
 - arguments
 - defined, 75
 - meaning in, 2
 - pseudo-agreement in, 73–74
 - relative merits of, 79
 - relevance in
 - vs. persuasion, 97, 98, 106, 108–09
 - principles of, 97–109
 - in surveys, 83, 84–86, 87
 - surveys of, 79–84
 - completeness of, 75
 - examples, 86–95
 - issue expressions of, 80, 81–82, 83, 84, 85–86, 87, 98, 109
 - as method of thinking, 78
 - neutrality in, 100
 - pitfalls, 78–79
 - quick decisions and, 82
 - reasons vs. motives in, 76–78
 - relevance in, 83, 84–86, 87
 - tenability in, 84–86
 - See also* debate; persuasion
- Aristotle, 97
- assertion, 3, 8
 - asymmetrical relation, 27
 - begging the question, 42
 - B entities, 4
 - bias
 - vs. irrelevance, 109
 - in presenting opponent’s view, 99–100, 102–05, 106–07
 - Bryce, James B., 34
 - Carneades, 78
 - catchphrases, 38, 51–53, 70
 - causa* (motivation), 76–77
 - ‘C’ entities, 4–5
 - certainty, 78
 - circle diagrams of precization, 30
 - circular definition, 43–44
 - circulus vitiosus*, 42–43
 - clarity, 44–46
 - cognitive content, lxvii
 - effective discussion of, 97
 - of equivalent expressions, 7–8, 9, 11
 - in prescriptive definition, 33
 - statements as thought-content, 2–3, 4–5
 - cognitive equivalence, 7–8, 9, 11
 - in prescriptive definition, 33
 - communication, lxvii
 - concepts
 - fruitful, 50–51
 - statements as, 4–5
 - See also* ideas; statements
 - conclusions
 - analytically drawn, 61–62
 - from opponent’s views, 102–05, 107
 - of *pro aut contra* surveys, 79, 80, 84
 - conditional sentences, 62
 - consequences, in argument, 75, 86

INDEX

- context
 - of argument, 106, 107
 - of definition, 32
 - of expression
 - equivalence and, 9, 14–15
 - interpretation and, 19
 - meaning and, 1–2, 3, 5
 - precization and, 66
 - of term, 22
 - See also* situation; state of affairs
- contra arguments, 83
- contradiction, 60
- counterarguments, 76–78
- debate, 97
 - definitions in, 37
 - meaning in, 2
 - precization and, 46–47
 - See also* arguments; persuasion
- definiendum*, 32, 39
- definiens*, 32, 39
- definitions
 - circular, 43–44
 - kinds of, 32, 34
 - the word “definition,” 31–32
 - See also* descriptive definitions; prescriptive definitions; real definitions
- democracy
 - definitions of, 34, 36, 71–72
 - presupposes competent discussion, 109
- denotation
 - of expression, 4
 - of term, 20–21
- deprecization, 27, 53–54
 - in political organizing, 70
- depth of meaning, 22–24, 38
- descriptive definitions, 31, 34–35
 - combined with prescriptive, 31, 36
- descriptive issue expressions, 85–86
- disagreement. *See* agreement and disagreement
- discussion. *See* arguments
- disjunction, 56
- distortion of facts, 105–06, 107, 109
- dyslogisms, 70
- equivalent expressions, 9–11
 - cognitive equivalence, 7–8, 9, 11, 33
 - defined, 7, 16
 - interpretations as, 17
 - nonequivalence and, 12–16
 - statement equivalence, 8, 9
 - tenability and, 12
- essential definitions. *See* real definitions
- eulogisms, 70
- evading the issue, 42–43
- existence
 - denotation of terms and, 20–21
 - states of affairs and, 4
- expressions
 - context of
 - equivalence and, 9, 14–15
 - interpretation and, 19
 - meaning and, 1–2, 3, 5
 - precization and, 66
 - functions of, 3
 - vs. sentences, 2
 - sentences as, 3, 4
 - vs. statements, 2–3, 4–5
 - terms in, 4, 20–22, 27, 28
 - See also* equivalent expressions; interpretation; issue expressions; meaning; precization
- F_0 . *See* issue expressions
- facts
 - arguments and, 75, 78
 - distortion of, 105–06, 107, 109
 - first-order arguments, 82–83
- generalization
 - of opponent’s view, 99
 - vs. precization, 28, 29–30
- Herriot, Édouard, 71–72
- Hitler, Adolf, 15, 16, 70
- Ibsen, Henrik, 52
- ideas
 - argument about, 97
 - statements as, 2–3, 4–5
 - See also* concepts; statements
- implication
 - alleged, 102–05, 107
 - See also* conclusions
- influence. *See* persuasion
- interpretation, 16–18
 - ambiguous, 100–102
 - correct, 6–7, 20
 - defined, 17
 - depth of understanding and, 22–24
 - finding interpretations, 18–19
 - logical properties of, 18

INDEX

- practical need for, lxviii, 2
- precization as, 8, 26–31
- in prescriptive definition, 32, 33
- reasonable, 19–20, 26–28, 30–31
- of terms, 21–22
- intransitive relation, 18
- irrelevant arguments, 98–99, 102
 - accusations of, 108
 - vs. bias, 109
 - precization and, 109
 - in *pro et contra* surveys, 83, 98
 - See also* relevant arguments
- issue expressions (F_0), 80, 81–82, 83, 84, 85
 - descriptive, 85–86
 - normative, 85, 86, 87, 109
 - relevance and, 98, 109
- James, William, 37–38
- language
 - functions of, lxvii, 3, 26
 - usage
 - describing vs. prescribing, 31
 - truth and, 55–57
 - variations in, 5–6, 48–49
- Le Bon, Gustave, 71, 72
- logical argument, 2
- logical conclusions, 61–62
- meaning
 - changes in, 6, 48–49
 - cognitive vs. total, 7, 11
 - context of expression and, 1–2, 3, 5
 - context of term and, 22
 - depth of, 22–24, 38
 - descriptive definition and, 31, 34
 - equivalence and, 10, 11, 12
 - interpretation and, lxviii, 6–7, 16–17
 - precization and, 38
- metaphors, 51–52
- Mill, John Stuart, lxvii
- misunderstanding
 - ambiguity and, 2, 5, 47, 100–102, 107
 - definition and, 39, 44
 - in everyday life, 1
 - of opinion polls, 38–39
 - precization and, 40–41, 46–47
 - relevance and, 98
 - See also* pseudo-agreement; pseudo-disagreement; understanding
- motivation (*causa*), 76–77
- muddying the issue, 44–46
- Mussolini, Benito, 71, 72
- Nearing, Scott, 34
- negative analytic statements, 56, 57, 58
- neutrality. *See* bias
- nonequivalent expressions, 12–16
 - defined, 12, 15
- normative issue expressions, 85, 86, 87, 109
- “not,” 56
- obscurum per obscurius*, 44–46
- opinion polls, 38–39
- “or,” 56
- P. See* person
- person (*P*)
 - equivalent expressions and, 9–16
 - interpretation and, 17–20
- persuasion
 - cognitive content of, lxvii
 - distortion of opponent’s views in, 46–47
 - pseudo-agreement and, 70
 - vs. relevant argument, 97, 98, 106, 108–09
 - See also* arguments; debate; preaching; propaganda
- petitio principii*, 42
- Plato’s dialogues, 97
- popularization, 53–54, 69–70
- positive analytic statements, 56, 58, 59
- preaching, lxvii, 48, 97, 109
- preciseness
 - of isolated expressions, 5
 - in science, 5–6, 25–26
 - vs. tenability, 28–29
 - of two expressions compared, 30–31
- precization
 - aims of, 25, 37–39
 - of catchphrases, 51–53
 - circle diagrams of, 30
 - defined, 8, 26–31
 - vs. definition, 31, 39
 - degrees of, 25–26, 40–41
 - pseudo-agreement and, 65–66, 68–69, 73–74
 - deprecization, 27, 53–54, 70
 - describes existing usage, 31
 - for different groups, 41, 47, 60
 - of equivalence, 11
 - errors in, 46–48
 - formal structure of, 27

INDEX

- precization (*continued*)
 - vs. generalization, 28, 29–30
 - vs. interpretation, 27
 - of issue expressions, 81–82
 - of metaphors, 51–52
 - relevance and, 109
 - vs. specification, 29–30
 - of terms, 27, 28
 - See also* preciseness
- premises, 61–62
- prescriptive definitions, 31–33
 - aim of, 39–40
 - analytic statements and, 37, 57, 60–61
 - circular, 43–44
 - defined, 32, 34
 - vs. descriptive definitions, 31, 34
 - descriptive definitions combined with, 31, 36
 - examples, 33–34, 35–37
 - pitfalls, 41–46
 - vs. precization, 31, 39
 - vs. real definitions, 34, 36
 - truth and, 55, 57
- pro arguments, 76, 82–83
- pro aut contra* surveys, 79–80
 - after *pro et contra* surveys, 82, 84–85, 100
 - example, 87
 - relevance in, 87
 - See also* issue expressions
- pro et contra dicere*, 78
- pro et contra* surveys, 79–84
 - examples, 86, 87–95
 - quick decisions and, 82
 - relevance in, 83, 84–86
 - tenability in, 84–86
 - See also* issue expressions
- proof potential of argument, 85
- propaganda, 38, 48, 52, 97, 108
- protasis, 62
- pseudo-agreement, 63–69
 - in argument, 73–74
 - political examples, 70, 71–72
 - scientific example, 69–70
- pseudo-disagreement, 63–69
 - political examples, 70–71, 72
 - scientific example, 69
- pseudo-problems, 37–38
- rationalizations, 76
- ratio* (reason), 76, 77
- real definitions, 34, 35, 36
- reason (*ratio*), 76, 77
- reference
 - of statement, 4
 - of term, 20–21
- reflexive relations
 - interpretation is reflexive, 18
 - precization is nonreflexive, 27
- relevant arguments
 - vs. persuasion, 97, 98, 106, 108–09
 - principles of, 97–108
 - in surveys, 83, 84–86, 87
 - See also* irrelevant arguments
- rhetoric, two forms of, 97
- Russell, Bertrand, 35
- S. See* situation
- science
 - analytic statements in, 59
 - argument vs. persuasion in, 108–09
 - changing meanings in, 48–49
 - as context of expressions, 14–15
 - definitions in, 40
 - fruitful concepts in, 50–51
 - popularization of, 53–54, 69–70
 - preciseness in, 5–6, 25–26
 - pro and contra arguments in, 78
 - pseudo-agreement about, 69–70
 - pseudo-disagreement about, 69
- second-order arguments, 83
- sentences
 - as expressions, 3, 4
 - vs. expressions, 2
 - vs. terms, 21
- side issues, 98–99, 106, 108
- situation (*S*)
 - equivalence and, 9, 12–16
 - function of expression and, 3
 - interpretation and, 17, 18–20
 - See also* context; state of affairs
- slogans. *See* catchphrases
- specification, 29–30
- Stanislavsky, Konstantin, 2
- statement equivalence, 8, 9
 - See also* equivalent expressions
- statements
 - equivalent, 10
 - equivalent expressions and, 7, 8, 9
 - vs. expressions, 2–3, 4–5
 - vs. states of affairs, 4
 - terms and, 21

INDEX

- state of affairs, 4
 - equivalence and, 9, 12, 16
 - See also* context; situation
- surveys. *See* arguments, surveys of
- symmetrical relations
 - interpretation is symmetrical, 18
 - precization is asymmetrical, 27
- synonyms, 9
 - by definition, 32
- synthetic statements, 37, 56–61
 - defined, 56
- tautology, 56
- tenability
 - of arguments, 84–86, 98
 - of expressions
 - vs. equivalence, 12
 - vs. preciseness, 28–29
 - of statements, 4
 - See also* truth; validity
- terms, 4, 20–22
 - for concepts, 50–51
 - interpretation of, 21–22
 - precization of, 27, 28
- thought-content. *See* cognitive content
- transitive relations
 - interpretation is transitive, 18
 - precization is intransitive, 27
- truisms, 59–61
- truth
 - of analytic statements, 55–56
 - of arguments, 85
 - of expressions, 2, 7, 8
 - prescriptive definitions and, 55, 57
 - pseudo-agreement about, 64
 - of statements, 4
 - of synthetic statements, 56–57
 - See also* tenability; validity
- understanding
 - depth of, 22–24
 - in everyday life, 1
 - See also* misunderstanding
- validity
 - of arguments, 76, 86, 87
 - of conclusions, 61
 - of expressions, 6–7
 - of statements, 4
 - See also* tenability; truth
- verbal agreement or disagreement, 63–64, 65, 66, 67

BERSERKER

BOOKS

