

THE HUNS

Volume 2



LEV GUMILEV

BERSERKER

BOOKS



They tried to lay siege, but were pushed back by the regular armies and retreated disorganised to the north.

Liu Yüan, who was unperturbed even in this situation, proclaimed himself emperor of China, announced that he had chosen the city of P'ing-yang as the new capital of the empire, and launched a war of extermination against the Chin dynasty and the Sikh-ma family.

In 309 the Huns dealt several heavy blows to the Chinese, most notably on the banks of the Huang-ho. About 30,000 Chinese were thrown into the river and drowned. Following this, Prince Liu Ts'ung and voivode Shih Lo razed the Hu-kuan fortress to the ground. Encouraged by their success, the Huns besieged Lo-yang again, but in a night battle in front of the castle gate, one of the battalions that had laid siege was defeated, while Liu Ts'ung's troops managed to retreat in an orderly fashion. victory seemed to favour the Chinese, Liu Ts'ung sent a cavalry unit under Wang Mi to the south. This was a region under the Chin dynasty. However, the people, who had suffered so much during the "wars of the eight princes", revolted and killed their officials, and then submitted to the Hun commander, who had never been defeated in battle.¹⁷ Although the borders of the Han Empire founded by the Huns had extended to the Huai River the Yü-chou region in the north-east around Beijing remained loyal to the Chin dynasty. Wang Hsün, the governor of Yü-chou, had defeated Prince Liu Ts'ung's troops but did not dare to launch a counter-attack.

Liu Yüan ended his life at the age of 60, at a time when the level of success of his people was gradually rising. When he died, he left the throne to his incompetent, rude and flighty eldest son Liu Ho instead of his second son, the heroic Liu Ts'ung. Perhaps Chinese suggestions that the throne should in principle go to the eldest son played a role in this. Some mentors immediately surrounded Liu Ho and began to slander his younger brother, whom his father had appointed as the commander of the main forces because of his successes. Although Liu Ho wanted to get rid of his brother, who was very popular among the people, he could not secure the support of the soldiers in this regard. The impostors then gathered their troops and attacked Liu Ts'ung, but a heavy defeat. Liu Ts'ung, with his loyal army, stood at the gate of the palace and entered.

17 Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/258.

After he and his treacherous brother had entered the city and eliminated the slanderers, he ascended to his father's throne amidst the joyful demonstrations of the people.

A similar situation had occurred in Lo-yang. When the new Sih-ma Cho wanted to be his own man, incurred the displeasure of his vizier Sih-ma Yü, who was in a very powerful position and pulling the strings behind the scenes. In this situation, the emperor got closer to Kao Hsi, who was the enemy of Sih-ma Yü, and thus the palace intrigues spread all over China and caused many incidents to occur.

In 311, Sih-ma Yü armed his army to the teeth and offered the emperor the opportunity to finish off the Hun khagan. This was, of course, an offer the emperor was happy to accept.¹⁸ Sih-ma Yü mobilised his last organised army and marched on Shih Lo. But during the fighting, Sih-ma Yü's son was killed. Now the capital was left unprotected. Since Lo-yang, which supplied the city with food, was in the hands of Huns, starvation broke out in the capital and night looting started. In this situation Kao Hsi blamed the retreating Sih-ma Yü for all these events.

The emperor hated Sih-ma Yü, so he gave Kao Hsi full authority. He also had two of the vizier's best men arrested and beheaded. When Sih-ma Yü learnt of this betrayal and betrayal, he handed over the command to his historian friend Wang Yang and died of grief. How could a historian be a general?! Yang wanted to refuse the post, thinking that it was not for him, but could not find a suitable person and ordered the army to return to bury Sih-ma Yü in her birthplace.

As soon as Shih Lo learnt about the incident, he attacked the spot where the body was to be buried with his whole army. He besieged the rival army, which was stronger than him, and showered them with arrows. The enemy had no chance to escape, and in the end Wang Yang and 48 princes of the Sih-ma family were captured by his slaves. Shih Lo had them all beheaded and Sih-ma Yü's body burnt.

When the news of this disaster reached the capital, Kao Hsi informed the emperor that he was unable to defend the city and that the best thing to do was to flee. But it was too late. What a carriage in the palace,

¹⁸ Wieger, *Textes*, p. 1053-1054.

and there were no horses left. Moreover, people were looting and killing each other because of hunger. 27 thousand Hun horsemen came to Lo-yang by gathering the Chinese soldiers they met on the way. Huns captured the city without any loss and burnt all criminals as the first thing. Then they entered the palace, killed the crown prince and started a terrible massacre. About 30 thousand Chinese were killed. The emperor had managed to get out of the palace in disguise and travelled away from the city, but the traitors informed the Huns which way he had gone. The Hun cavalry immediately set out and caught him fleeing on foot alone.¹⁹ It was the first time in history that a Chinese emperor had been captured alive by a foreign enemy.

Kao Hsi, the main culprit in the defeat, fled to the south-east and soon set up a new government. The Huns did not even bother to pursue this ghost the old government, but turned towards the rich Ch'ang-an, the second chief city of the empire. The governor of Ch'ang-an, Sih-ma Mu, sent the city's army to hold the Ho-nan pass at Shen-si, but the commander at the head of the army, a Chin dynasty hater, sided with the Huns and guided them to the capital. The besieged city had neither weapons nor food. With no hope of help from anywhere, Sih-ma Mu surrendered and was killed. Hun swords and starvation had turned the Wei River valley, once the jewel in the crown of North , into a vast cemetery.²⁰

After the conquest of Ch'ang-an, Shih Lo sent an army downstream of the Huai River and eliminated Kao Hsi and his rule. For this achievement, he was given the title of "Great General of the Han Empire". The conquered lands were de facto, if not de jure, left under his rule.

The more pronounced consolidation of Chinese forces in the south of the country prevented the revolt of the Kan-su fugitives, who had been forced by the government to return, although actual military activity was carried out there in 310-311. The hapless fugitives refused to submit to the emperor, recognising their enemies, the Huns, as less dangerous than their own dynasty, even though they knew they were going to their deaths.²¹ The rebellion was suppressed only in 311. While revealing the incompetence of the Chin dynasty commanders, this rebellion tipped the balance in favour of the Huns.

19 Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/265.

20 Wieger, *Textes*, p. 1056.

21 Dn. 21 - Юе. Очерки, с.130.

in favour of the Huns. After the defeat of the rebels, the Chinese marched their army to Ch'ang-an in 312 and succeeded in expelling Liu Yao's Hun warriors from the city. The victory and the recapture of one of the capitals encouraged the Chinese to crown a new emperor. After all, a legitimate monarchist was still alive.

According to the mentality of that period, the imperial title was eternal. The issue of what should be done in the event of the absence of the emperor and at the same time his capture by foreign enemies was not specified in the laws. Because such a thing was inconceivable. However, when such a thing happened and the need for a new emperor increased gradually, a new emperor was elected until the death of the previous emperor, which was also a foregone conclusion, due to "the necessity that the post should not remain vacant". As a matter of fact, this crowning took place at the invitation of the Huns. After this event, the war took a new phase.

The effects of the fall of the capitals were more than expected. Even the hearts of the Sogdians, who had constant trade relations with China at that time, were deeply troubled. A Sogdian named Nanoi-vandak, in a letter to his "sovereign", narrated the strange events described by the people he met in the interior of China as follows: "It is said that the emperor fled from Saraga (Lo-yang) because of starvation, and his palace and fortress consumed by fire. Saraga no longer exists, and Ngapa (K'ai-Yü- an in Ho-nan) has disappeared from the map. And the emperor was captured by the Huns. And they captured Humdan (Ch'ang-an) and plundered the country as far as Nanima (?). It was the Ngapu (Huns) who had been subjects of the emperor until yesterday. In this case, Your Majesty, we do not know whether the Chinese remnants will be able to expel the Huns from Humdan or whether the Huns will be able to conquer the rest of the country. "²² The following parts of the letter are in fragments. However, it seems that the Sogdians did not view the Huns sympathetically. But this is understandable: It was not easy to see hungry people around that beautiful capital begging for mercy, tens of thousands of defenceless people being driven out, as Liu Yao did in 312 when he left Ch'ang-an. The massacre of Shih Hu, Shih Lo's bloodthirsty brother, when he captured the city of Yeh in autumn 313 outraged even the Huns.²³

²² Henning W.B. *The Date of the Sogdian ancient Letters* //Reprinted from the BSO-AS, 1948, XII (3 and 4), p. 605-607.

²³ Ibidp608-613.

But the people who had such a savage sense of hatred must have been very offended and oppressed! What was even worse was that the atonement for the atrocities and rapes committed by the Chin state officials was paid for by poor unprotected women and children, peasants and townspeople, who were left to die.

Tribal War

In order to get a good grasp of the events to be described here, let us go back two years and take a walk around Northern Shan-si and its territories bordering the Great Steppe. In the frontier fortresses on the site of the present Ch'eng-ting-fu, there were regular Chinese armies, which did not take part in wars between princes and were not generally associated with the Chin Empire. Their commander was Li Kun, who was loyal to his duty and homeland, intelligent and rational. Further south of these fortresses were scattered peoples belonging to one of the five tribes of the Huns. At the head of these was Prince Liu Ming, who did not take part in the wars and chose Chung-shan (in Northern Shan-si, south of the Great Wall) as his place of residence. After his death, his son Liu Hu united with the "white" Sienpi tribes and accepted the vassalage of Liu Ts'ung, thus separating Li Kun's army from the rest of China.

Li Kun realised that he could not hold on to his own power alone, so he asked for help from the Tabgachs, who lived nomadically in the steppes of the Great Steppe close to North China. The Tabgach chieftain Yih-liu, on the other hand, was extremely pleased to be able to hold a part of the Chinese territory with the help of the Chinese themselves. He sent his nephew Yü-Liu on an expedition with a force of twenty thousand men. Li Kun joined this army as a guide and vanguard with his own troops. In 311 Liu Hu was defeated and his allies, the "white" Sienpis, discarded their Hun banners and retreated westwards from the blood-soaked Shan-si to the pasture-covered foothills around Lake Kukur. We shall meet them once more in our account of later events. As for Li Kun, his victory over the Huns had cost him dearly. Because the Tabgach chief demanded from the Chinese commander to be bound to him together with all the lands under his protection.

Li Kun was forced to compromise. He approached the governor-general of the province and demanded that his ally be granted the title of the Great Yabgu and the ancient title of the Great Wall of China to the south.

He demanded to be officially recognised as the prince of the Tai Principality, which was inhabited by the Chinese. However, the Tai Principality was not under Li Kun, but under Wang Hsün, the governor of Yü-chou (the area around Beijing today). They opposed the sale of Chinese territory, believing that it was better to be plundered by enemies than by friends. However, the principality was defeated in the war and Yih-liu captured some Chinese land, which was uninhabited because its inhabitants had emigrated. After this the Chin refused to ask Yih-liu for help again and politely asked him to withdraw. The Chinese thought that with the forces of their loyal vassal Tuan, with whom they hoped they would be more easily co-operated, they would be able to deal with the Huns. Thus, in 311 a Tu- an army of 50,000 besieged the army of the Hun commander Shih Lo at the fortress of Hsiang-kuo.²⁴

In 312, Shih Lo made a raid and the Tuan prince Mo-po. Shih Lo resorted to an old Hun custom and released his captive after treating him with honour and hospitality at a banquet. Mo-po, who was very much touched by this behaviour, lifted the siege and returned home. In this situation, the poor Chinese had no choice but to knock on the door of the Tabgachs again.

T'o-pa Yih-liu did not refuse the requested assistance and in 312 a Tabgach army of 200,000 (?) men set out.²⁵ The Hun commander Liu Yao was defeated and personally wounded in seven places. The retreating Huns took advantage of the darkness of the night and sought refuge in the forested foothills to escape the pursuit of the enemy. But the Tabgachs pursued them and caught them in a narrow mountain valley and forced them to accept the war. Of course, the result was a for the Huns and as they retreated, the roads along 100 li (about 45 km.) were filled with Hun corpses.

Li Kun asked for a continuation of the attacks, but Yih-liu refused on the grounds that his cavalry and horses were tired. In fact, he did not want the Chinese to get stronger and the defeated Huns did not pose a danger to him. This situation was instrumental in the liberation of the Huns. In 315, Yih-liu defeated the Huns in the battle, but his son, who was deprived of the throne by his father and wanted to be killed, was killed.

²⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/211.

²⁵ Age., p. 170. 200,000 people is an exaggerated figure. Here, as in many other cases, it is necessary to calculate those who are able to fight.

He was slain by lu. But he too was killed by his uncle's son, and inter-khan strife halted the Tabgachs' movement. The new energetic khan Yü-Liu turned westwards in 318 and the "old Wu-sun lands" ²⁶ but was assassinated by conspirators in 321. Meanwhile, the resurgent Huns made up for lost territory in the north with conquests in the south.

This episode shows that as early as the beginning of the IVth century, the Chinese were incapable of defending their ancient territory. Shan-si had become a battleground for two nomadic tribes who had carried their long-standing rivalries into the new land, whose inhabitants they did not even recognise as human beings. The balance of forces depended not only on the cavalry archers and skilful commanders each side possessed, but also on the organisation of the Tabgach khan's and the Hun khagan's camps. The Tabgachs, who were too energetic, could not be said to have any order in their bivouac, and the commanders often faced opposition from the soldiers. However, the Huns, who had learnt to prioritise the interests of the society over their own, had learned enough lessons from history and therefore it was not difficult to rule them.

War of Empires

In the north, on the Ordos and Chahar steppes bordering the Gobi Desert, the Hun monarchist presented himself as the Great Yabgu, while in the south, in the conquered lands, he took advantage of a customary law to proclaim himself emperor of the Han dynasty. True, this last was more than a fantasy. No one denied the semi-fantastical emergence of Liu Yüan and Liu Ts'ung from the maternal side, and after all, there was no more Chin dynasty. Therefore, many Chinese, who certainly prioritised their own self-interest, filled Liu Ts'ung's ranks. The Huns, on the other hand, did not tolerate them. Because in 313 the Chinese had attacked from all fronts.

The loss of Ch'ang-an in 312 was no great loss to the Huns. This was because it narrowed the front line, which had spread far and wide, and made it easier for the Huns to manoeuvre with their strong horses. Liu Ts'ung, in his relations with the Tabgachs.

²⁶ The foothills from Nan-shan to Tun-huang. See Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*, pp. 69-70.

He realised that he had committed a great mistake by slaughtering the captive emperor who was suspected of being an emperor. Because with this action he had removed the obstacle in front of the southerners and they immediately declared a prince from the Sih-ma family as emperor with the title of Min-ti. According to the Confucian doctrine, just as there was only one sun shining in the sky, there could not be two emperors on earth at the same time. The wretched Min-ti was forced to establish his rule on the ruins of the beautiful city, overgrown with weeds and wild plants. Hundreds of surviving families settled in the ruined houses around the castle, which still survived. The civil servants and su-mans had no clothes to wear, no weapons and no seals. They subsisted on edible plant roots. But there were many people in China and soon the city was overflowing with them. Min-ti took courage and issued an edict for the immediate suppression of the Hun rebellion. But this edict also caused a new turmoil. For according to the edict, Wang Hsün was to move from Yü-chou and attack Lo-yang from the east, Prince Sih-ma Hu from the south, and the armies of the Liang Principality (western part of Kan-su) from the west²⁷; but when none of the commanders moved, the Huns found a legal pretext for new attacks.

In 313 Hunnic cavalry marched into Ch'ang-an one night and burned the city. The emperor immediately took refuge in the citadel besieged by the Huns, while the people fled hither and thither. But those brave cavalymen could not conquer the fortress and limited the siege. Meanwhile, the Chinese army was on its way to help the emperor. Liu Yao, who went out to meet them, charged with all his might and broke the Chinese. However, when he relaxed his vigilance due to his successes, a Chinese officer who managed to gather the dispersed army after the battle attacked the Hun camp. Such was the panic among the Huns that Liu Yao was eventually forced to break the siege and gather his scattered army. The Chin Empire was saved for a time. More interesting was the fact that Emperor Min-ti had recently released most of his subjects who had declared their obedience. Sih-ma Jui, who ruled the whole of southern China, was in deep trouble with his own people. The rebellion of the fugitives from North China and Sih-ch'uan, where tribes had revolted against the Chinese yoke, continued. The people had paid with their lives for the arbitrary behaviour of the rulers, but although they managed to escape from the barbarians, Mer-

²⁷ Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/276.

The people, deceived by this situation, rebelled and took up arms, and their rebellion still continues.²⁸ Sih-ma Jui had to abandon Ku- olive China and leave the emperor to the mercy of fate. The people who were deceived by this situation rebelled and took up arms, and their rebellion still continuing.²⁸ Sih-ma Jui had to sacrifice Ku- olive China and leave the emperor to the mercy of fate. His fate was already in the hands of the Huns.

Learning of the emperor's tragic situation, Wang Hsün, the governor of Yü-chou, decided to declare himself an independent ruler. Although he had slaughtered his comrades-in-arms who wanted to save the honour of the country and had raised the rank of unprincipled flatterers, he still did not feel secure. Learning that the Chinese governor was too sure of himself, Shih Lo wrote a letter of complaint to Wang Hsün, demanding the return of the possibly fictitious refugees who had fled the mythical principality. Wang Hsün sent one of his senior officials to the Hun commander for negotiations. However, when the latter offered to betray Wang Hsün, Shih Lo beheaded him and sent him to Yü-chou in order not to completely offend Wang Hsün about his intentions and to avoid suspicion. When a compromise was reached between the two sides, Shih Lo came to Wang Hsün and ordered the sentries to let him enter the city. When the guard saw that the Huns were few, he opened the gate. The Huns drove a large herd into the city as if they had brought a gift, and the soldiers behind the herd rushed into the city and captured it without a fight. Shih Lo confronted Wang Hsün about his treachery and beheaded him a few days later. Wang Hsün's trusted scoundrels bowed before their new master. Thus, in 314, the bridgehead of the Chin dynasty in north-east China was disqualified. The loyal soldiers of the imperial administration could only hold out in Liao-tung, and this was only possible thanks to the military support of the Tuan State.

Hearing of Shih Lo's successes, Liu Yao, remembering his earlier failure in front of Ch'ang-an, resolved to organise a decisive expedition to the Chinese fortress. But this time the Chinese went out to meet the Huns in order to fight with valour. The attack of the Hun cavalry was fruitless and the horsemen, caught in the midst of the Chinese infantry, were almost completely annihilated as they could not turn back. Now it was their turn to attack, the Chinese army pursued the Huns to the city of Pei-ti and captured a detachment moving away from the capital.

²⁸ Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/277; Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 130.

Liu Yao vowed to avenge this. He spent the next 315 years entirely in raising armies. This time the army he gathered was many times more than the previous one. In fact, since the number of Huns was not sufficient to fill the ranks of the army, the subjugated Chinese were also utilised. And these people, together with their collaborators, were going to fight against their own kinsmen! In fact, it seems to have been a case of subtle betrayal. For they did not regard it as a Hun-Chinese war, but only as a quarrel between the Liu-Han dynasty and the Chin dynasty.

Sih-ma Jui sent a large army, this time under the command of his son, to retake the capital. The Chinese defeated a Hun troop composed of North Chinese, but retreated without reaping the fruits of victory. This small flick did not stop the Hun attack, nor did it affect the overall course of the war. It is difficult to know what to attribute the responsibility for such criminal passivity to: The incompetence of the commanders, the lack of combat capability of the southern army, or some shrewd political calculation, i.e. an attempt to get rid of the legitimate emperor so that Sih-ma Jui could take office?

In the winter of 316 Liu Yao laid siege to Ch'ang-an again. The armies that had come from the south to occupy the garrison had not decided whether to attack the Huns, and so remained in isolation. Min-ti retreated back into the citadel, leaving the already devastated suburbs as spoil for the enemy. She was waiting for help, but was not to come. When starvation broke out in the besieged citadel, his guards abandoned him and fled. Only about a thousand Shan-shan highlanders manfully defended the walls. A Chinese general named So Ch'eng, one of the commanders of the auxiliary armies coming from the south, offered Liu Yao to go over to the Huns' side with the promise of facilitating the surrender of the fortress. Liu Yao beheaded the envoy and sent the following reply: "Rulers have to act with their responsibilities in mind. I, who have commanded this army for fifteen years, have never resorted to deceit and treachery. Protect yourself! For if I capture you, you will pay for your treachery with your life."²⁹ The general course of events had already been decided: The Huns did not believe in the sincerity of the Chinese soldiers who had joined their ranks, and they did not want the number of traitors among their ranks to increase.

²⁹ Wieger, *Textes*, p. 1065.

In short, the castle's situation was hopeless. Min-ti surrendered to save his starving and destitute people. Liu Yao sent her to P'ing- yang, where she was subjected to humiliating treatment by Liu Ts'ung. For example, he forced him to serve the guests at a banquet, but when the Chinese present at the banquet protested that it was not right to humiliate an emperor in this way, he had them all beheaded.

The Hun commanders were worried by the public stance in favour of the emperor. Although the crown prince Liu Ts'an recommended killing the captive, Liu Ts'ung was unwilling to make an angry decision. However, when two South Chinese commanders organised an attack on the Fen Valley with the intention of capturing the crown prince and exchanging him for the emperor, Liu Ts'ung ordered Min-ti to be slain.

The Huns had achieved a complete victory; even their enemies, the Southern Chinese, recognised this. The empire over which Sih-ma Jui presided at Nanjing is regarded by historians as the foundation of a new organisation, and the dynasty which replaced the extinct one is called the Eastern Chin. This subtlety of terminology has a real meaning: The lands that had been inhabited by the Chinese from time immemorial were not temporarily, but definitively and for a long time, in the hands of foreign enemies. Sih-ma Jui took for himself the Huang-ti ti-tulle, and he had no thought of returning to his homeland in North China. Many Chinese, both peasants and farmers, fled from the Hun yoke and settled in the sparsely inhabited lands south of the great Yang-tse river. In return for their victory, the Huns retained only a five-kilometre strip of the coast. The days of China as an independent state seemed to be over, and the Chinese needed time to reorganise, or more precisely to build up a new army, before they could oppose it.

The Inevitable End

Let us now go back and review the fourteen years (303-317) and see what happened. Because many things during this period of rebellions. First of all, there was no Great China anymore. Having lost its national frontiers, the cradle of its ancient culture, China become an uninspiring monarchy surrounded from the south and west by native armies that would not submit to the rule of Nanjing. In this regard, the Huns, who were few in number, did not know how-

the Chinese, who, during the three states, went toe-to-toe with the most useful part of their people and continued their actions until they drove the country into the abyss, played just as much of a role. But could they be blamed for this? As we have already seen, brutal civil wars had led to the disintegration of the state that had flourished in the heyday of the Han Empire. It was also inevitable that the princes of the Sih-ma family would quarrel. Because each prince had to protect himself from his rival, and naturally, this dispute would eat up some of the military resources at a time when culture and industry were not even taken into account.

The Huns, left over from tribal wars, persecution and resentment, become the masters of a vast country for which they had spilt blood. But could they be blamed for this? They were eager to settle scores with the Chinese dignitaries who had once insulted them in the course of their brutal wars. But once on the stage, they took revenge not only on their persecutors but also on the defenceless populace. The servants, who constituted the most warlike and important part of the Hun army, particularly extreme in this respect. The revenge they exacted on the Chinese people and the suffering they inflicted on them, fuelled by their victories, had reached such a point that it was impossible for the peoples living in the Central Oasis to forget the enmity between them, let alone to reunite. This situation was not the result of the furious will of the Hun commanders or the lack of wisdom of the short-sighted Chinese statesmen. Because the logic of events caused by the spark lit by one of the Hun tribes to start a revolt for freedom was enough to boil the cauldron of witchcraft involving some great peoples. In order to understand the tragic aspect of the battles that took place on the Huang-ho coast, let us recall a few theses from our "introduction" on ethnology.

The nomadic heirs of the Hyun-nu State - the Huns and the Syenpis - and the descendants of the founders of the Han Empire belonged to super-ethnic groups. One grew up in the unforgiving dry steppes and foothills of Central Asia, while the other in a temperate climate, amid bamboo trees and woodlands. Again, one was fed on meat, the other on vegetables. One was protecting his against his enemies, the other was protecting his state. These traits inherited from generation to generation placed the nomads and the Chinese at different poles; they did not resemble each other.

nd super-ethnos with different behavioural stereotypes and different thinking and comprehension abilities. Concepts such as honour, honour, friendship and gratitude meant one thing to the Huns and another to the Chinese. It is difficult to distinguish these nuances in individual cases, but in general, they express ethnic integrity and characteristics that we call ethno-psychology today.³⁰ These characteristics determine the fate of ethnos up to a certain point. We will elaborate on this later, but for now, let us note that although the Huns and the Chinese lived on different poles, each leading their own way of life, the wars between them were not so fierce, on the contrary, they often and for a long time made reciprocal gestures to each other.

However, in order to explain the magnitude of the victory achieved by the Huns, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the ethnological character. It would be wrong to think that in the IVth century a Chinese was a weaker warrior than a Hun. Often it was even the opposite. But the Hun ethnological system was more resilient than that of the Chinese, and this was the reason why the Huns were victorious. Here we are witnessing a conflict similar to F. Engels' observation that during Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt, two Mamelukes were superior to three French dragons, but a thousand Frenchmen together defeated fifteen hundred Mamelukes.³¹ Thus, after analysing the course of events in all its details, we can proudly say that even if there are some coincidences here, the historical fact is the main reason for the Huns' victory.

Was the victorious Hunnic Empire founded by Liu-Han really so great? ³² No, it resembled only a statue on two pedestals. Most of the state's subjects

30 КонISK *probleme nationalnogo* характера // ВВкнн. % ИИсттооринця ии прсиихооллоогииуяа (Сборник статей). М. 1971, с. 122-158.

31 Marx K. i Engels F. *Sochineniya* izd. 2. T. 20, c. 131; T. 14, c. 319.

32 Studies on China consider the history of the country as a single process, since the dynastic names are considered as determinates, and the measure of dynastic names is conceived as a discursive process. These determinates are the following: Ch'ien- Early or Early period, Hou- Second or Late period, P'ei- Middle, Han-South, Tung-East, Hsi-West, or according to clan names Liu-Han, T'o-pa Wei, etc. Thus, the halo of events is organised into a powerful system that responds to a high level of presentation of historical thought. For more details see Gumilev L. N. *Kitays- kaya xronograficheskaya terminologiya v trudax N. Ya. Bichurina na forme vse-mirnoy istorii* // V kn.: Bichurin N. Ya (Yakinf) *Sobraniye svedeniya po istori- cheskoj geografii Vostochnoy i Sredinnoy Azii*. Cheboksari, 1960, pp. 643-673; Gumilev L. N. *Ethnos i kategoriya vremeni* // Doklady VGO, vip. 15. L., 1970, pp. 143-157.

Apart from being composed of Chinese citizens, the Huns and their subjects were different ethnoses, although they spoke the same language. The Huns retained their clan structure, which their subjects certainly did not have. Moreover, the Huns were ruled by beys, while the kulaks were ruled by a number of capable individuals. Huns had ancient traditions, whereas servants did not and could not have traditions. Because they were only an ethnos composed of people belonging to different tribes bound together by historical fate. In this situation, there could be no mutual understanding and trust between the two ethnoses. In fact, the incompetent but brilliant Liu Ts'ung was also frightened by the victories of his favourite commander Shih ^{L033}, which overshadowed the failures of Liu Yao, who belonged to an important clan.

Finally, a fledgling empire could not survive without the services of well-educated Chinese, in particular Chin Chung, whose Liu had been a vizier in the Han Empire. In other words, the ruler of a defeated people became the ruler of those who had defeated him. And the consequences of such a distribution of power would be reflected in the course of history.

33 Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/286.

PART III

FLAME CIRCLE

The Extinction of Dynasties

After 317, luck turned away from the Huns. When they tried to move towards the southern reaches of the Yang-tse River, they encountered a fierce resistance from the South Chinese. A sudden Chinese attack on the headquarters of the Hun crown prince Liu Ts'an resulted in victory. During the night fighting, half of the Hun troops were killed, the other half fled, and the Chinese took large herds of horses and cattle as booty. It cannot be said that this fissure had a significant effect. For when the main force of the Huns arrived, the Chinese commander left the horses and cattle taken as trophies and led his army to the other side of Yang-tse. However, this episode proved that the Hun heir was incompetent and unreinforced.

In 318 the Hun dynasty suffered an even greater disaster. A fire broke out in one wing of the palace, killing 20 members of the Liu family. This was a great loss. Because it was very difficult to replace the unconditionally loyal and necessary people who died in the fire. Fortunately for the Hun people, the crown prince was not among the dead.¹

Not long after this Liu Ts'ung fell ill and died, leaving the throne to his incapable eldest son Liu Tsan. Knowing his son's incapacity, Liu Ts'ung appointed Liu Yao and General Shih Lo as vice-presidents, as well as his two younger sons and Chin Chung as quartermaster. After the funeral of the Yabg (and the emperor), the commanders returned to their troops, while Chin Chung remained as Liu Ts'an's sole counsellor. Chung took advantage of his position to free the new ruler from the tutelage and opinions of his brothers, who were soon to be beheaded for debauchery and neglect of duty. Power-

1 McGovern, *The early empires*, p. 331.

was effectively in the hands of Chin Chung. Chung was not an unprincipled hopeful. He was an extreme Chinese nationalist and in love with his own civilisation, which had enjoyed a golden age under the Chin dynasty compared to that of the Huns. Predicting the behaviour of people of another ethnicity and its consequences in all areas of ethnic contact is an impossibility.

The ethnic difference between the Huns and the Chinese was such that the customs of one would cause physical disgust in the other. The vast majority of Huns living in the steppes had the custom of inheriting a wife. The widow of the elder brother became the wife of the younger brother, who was obliged to treat her with the same respect as his beloved wives.² Sometimes the father's wife (not his own mother, of course) was inherited by his son on the same terms. In a harsh climate and in the midst of inter-tribal warfare, this custom was part of life when the protection of women was necessary. In a way, it even a kind of "social insurance" that the woman found among her relatives in return for her labour. Thanks to this custom, the woman was saved from the miserable situation of being a widow under the patriarchal clan system and the conditions of exogamy. As a result of the Huns' absorption into Chinese society, this custom lost its meaning, but it continued to exist as a relic.

So when Liu Ts'an began to enter and leave the rooms of his father's young chambermaids, the Huns recognised this as a kind of right and duty. But to the Chinese, such behaviour was abhorrent. Chin Chung, in pursuit of his national and sacred aims, seized the opportunity and filled the palace with Chinese servants who were opposed to the barbarian who lived with their "own mothers". Because all the Chinese wives of the father also fell into this category. In fact, this behaviour of the Dauphin was the last drop in a pot already filled with anger and hatred.

No excuse could persuade Chinese nationalists to submit to the domination of the "barbarians", but it was pointless to keep waiting for their southern relatives to come to their rescue. It was best to rely on one's own strength and find new forces to fight with. And Chin Chung, like Conrad Wallenrod³ in his Chinese role, had found a way out. After a glittering career and a good reputation in the eyes of the incompetent monarchist, Chin Chung found a way out.

² Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/40.

³ The hero of Mitskevich's poem of the same name.


Having become a good ruler in religion, he decided to play all the cards and take the gamble of his life by staging a coup d'état. With a handful of conspirators, he entered Liu Ts'an's bedchamber and had the emperor (and the yabgu), who had trusted him so much, torn to pieces.

After this incident, a terrible reckoning began. All of Liu Ts'ung's relatives were slaughtered in the market squares without distinction between great and small; the bodies of Liu Yüan and Liu Ts'ung were exhumed and beheaded, and the ancestral temple of the Liu family was burnt. After this massacre, Chin Chung received the titular wang (Han-wang)⁴ as a sign of his acceptance of the southern emperor from the Chin dynasty as his favourite. Then he seized the seal seized by the Huns at Lo- yang and said: "From today onwards the Chinese will not answer to the nomads. Here is the seal they seized. I return them all to the legitimate ruler Chin imperial family." Then he sent a letter to the south, stating that his action was aimed at ridding the country of foreigners who were "unworthy of respect", and to obtain the honour of the two emperors they had slain, and he also sent the ashes of the two emperors along with the letter.⁵

It seems that Chin Chung did not regard himself as a traitor and murderer, but rather as a hero, but his behaviour was not understood by the Huns and the Chinese as the inheritance of widows. The people abandoned the capital and fled to the areas under the control of Shih Lo, who moved towards P'ing-yang with an army of 50,000 men. In the west of the empire, Liu Yao himself emperor as soon as he learnt of the tragic event and ordered the death of all those known to be associated with the usurper. The frightened Chin Chung tried to negotiate with Shih Lo, but the latter arrested the envoy and sent him to Liu Yao.

4 In ancient China, Huang-ti was regarded as the supreme ruler of the whole world, and this title was used to mean emperor. The title of "wang" used by the rulers of various regions of China was considered second in rank to the emperor. The equivalent of this title was yabgu in Huns, han in Syenpis and king (after IXth century) or tsar in Europe. In this case, a ruler who received the wang title accepted the sovereignty of a higher emperor than himself.

5 Mailla, *Histoire*, IV/297.



221! برفیقم ب ارع دای ایر الا ارکا

After Liu Yao honoured and released the imprisoned envoy, he asked him to convey to Chin Chung that his position would be restored to him if he surrendered. Chung was too cunning to believe the promises, but in the end his allies killed him and put his son Chin Ming on the throne, who offered his obedience to Liu Yao. But this provoked the intervention of Shih Lo, and when Lo attacked P'ing-yang to avenge the slaughter of the Hun princes, Ming and his followers fled the city and sought refuge with Liu Yao. He had both Ming and his followers massacred. In the meantime, Shih Lo occupied the capital and set fire to the palace, which was polluted with murders, and rebuilt the tombs of Liu Yü-an and Liu Ts'ung. Thus ended the Chinese retaliatory trials that had lasted for three inauspicious months in 318.

The tendencies of the Chinese of the IVth century, the basis of which was treachery in relations with the "barbarians", were no more constructive than the Hun tendencies, in which brutality was combined with naivety. Worse, perhaps, was the juxtaposition of these two tendencies. A Hun with a Chinese education was more dangerous than a cobra. Such was Liu Yao, who, in the words of the vanquished, "knew nothing of cunning and treachery", but always reneged on his business promises. He had seized the throne "on the basis of aristocratic law". When the rule of the Hun dynasty was completely abolished, he named the new dynasty ^{Chao}⁶ and moved its capital to Ch'ang-an. Shih Lo received the title of "Grand Marshal" and was given the administration of the eastern regions of the country. However, the situation would change completely the following year.

How else could it be? After a century and a half of living side by side with the Chinese, the Huns were unable to preserve their tribal traditions, which were preserved only by their relatives living in the steppes of the Ordos. In the 20s of the IV century the Huns were no longer united. The Huns had defeated the Chinese but had failed to remain Huns.

The name of a nation usually itself. For example, the Bi-Zantine Greeks and Anatolians still called themselves Rum in the XVth century. With the Huns there was certainly no such complexity. The existing traditions were sufficient for rebellion and victory, but

6 Established during the Warrior Monarchy period (V-III centuries BC), Chao's rule had expanded in the territories captured by the Huns in 307-317. Since Chao had never fought the Huns, it was deemed appropriate to use an old name as a compliment to the Chinese people.

was not enough to retain power. The new empire was organised entirely according to Chinese traditions: Lifestyle, entertainment, court life, titles and ceremonies were all imitations of Han monarchism, but certainly not the patriarchal traditions of the yabgu court. The Huns had become "civilised barbarians", in whose lives the high moral values and centuries of spiritual culture typical of primitive life had no place. The dualism and egoism of the commanders and the unprincipled behaviour of the professional soldiers, who constituted a real force, were the factors that ended the rebirth of Hun independence.

Broken Unity

The easy victory of the two armies organised by the deceased yabgu against the rebellious vizier proved that they had no rivals. But they were divided among themselves and neither of them was bound by true traditions.

Liu Yao, a prince by birth and brought up in Chinese culture, could get along with the Hun chieftains. Shih Lo, formerly the chief of the bandits, turned his back on the masses of poor servants and the so-called Chinese who had allied themselves with him. Both groups were likewise alien to the Hunnic clan structure but, while opposed to Chinese rule, they could not tolerate each other, making a conflict between the two inevitable.

In early 319, Shih Lo an envoy to Liu Yao to congratulate him on his accession to the throne. As a gesture, Yao gave him the title of "Ruler of Chao". However, one of the members of the embassy delegation whispered in Liu Yao's ear that his master had been assigned to shake the power of the imperial army. It was not difficult to crush the disorganised army with a sudden attack. Liu Yao, who was enraged and believed the informer, beheaded the envoy according to Chinese custom.⁷

Enraged, Shih Lo severed all relations with Liu Yao in accordance with nomadic custom. Thus, a nascent state came to the brink of disintegration when two former comrades-in-arms engaged in a deadly war.

⁷ Wieger L. *Textes*, p. 1074.

No, it could not be said that either party was more "Chinese-ised" than the other, but the effects of civilisation on both were different.

The New Hun State was called the Next ^{Chao}⁸ and absorbed Chinese culture like a sponge. Shih Lo was ignorant, but he respected knowledge. He gathered Confucianist philosophers and poets around him and opened schools.⁹ However, he preserved the warrior tradition he inherited from the Huns as a sacred relic and this responded to the interests of the subjects.

Liu Yao had chosen Ch'ang-an as his capital. There he first demolished the Chinese Ancestral Temple and built in its place a sacred kurgan dedicated to the gods of the earth and plants, that is, to the gods of heaven and earth, which was thought to reflect Yabgu Me-te.¹⁰ The Hun statesmen respected the cultural traditions of their own people, but in practice, although they opposed this irrepressible trend with all their might, they were unable to break out of Chinese patterns of behaviour. They were driven to this by the "logic of events". But this bipolarity would soon be reflected in the affairs of the state.

In 320 Liu Yao received a tip-off that two dignitaries were preparing a rebellion and were collaborating with some officers from the "Pa country", that is, the "Ti" or Tankuts. The organisers were immediately beheaded, while the others, the Tankuts, were imprisoned. Liu Yao ordered them to be killed as well, but Yü Ch'i-yüan, one of the special officers, intervened and asked his master to pardon the innocent conspirators, stating that according to the law, collaborators could not be sentenced to death. Liu Yao was enraged and had the officer who had given this unpleasant advice arrested, and ordered the massacre of the previous 50 prisoners. In response to this decision, relatives of the prisoners came forward and, with the help of Tibetans and Tabgachs across the border, started a revolt against the tyranny. According to accounts, the rebels numbered 300,000.

⁸ A clear follow-up of the Hun tradition during dynastic changes.

⁹ McGovern, *The early empires*, p. 337.

¹⁰ Wieger L. *Textes*, p. 1074; Mailla, *Histoire*, IV/305. Mailla the historical source differently: Liu Yao had a new building erected for the ceremonies to the honour of the ancestors, with Me-te at the head. But the Huns neither a cult of ancestors nor idols dedicated to them. (Gumilëv L.N. *Hunnu*, pp. 99-101) It seems that Mailla's translation of the Manchurian text is based on the Manchurian translator's translation in accordance with the Chinese views of the XVII-XVIII century.

in the capital. This is an exaggerated figure, of course, but one way or another, there was a state of war in the capital and the city gates were closed even during the day.

Yü Ch'i-yüan, who favoured fairness, applied again to convince Liu Yao, but this time he wanted to settle the matter by letter. Liu Yao tore the letter and ordered the slaughter of the person who wrote it. However, the Huns in the palace were sure of Yü Ch'i-yüan's loyalty to the palace and thought that he had the right to give such a warning to the ruler, so they did not fulfil the order.

Now a question: Which ruler? In China, the emperor was autonomous; in the Huns, the tribal lords limited the powers of the suzerain.¹¹ At one point Liu Yao proclaimed himself emperor of the Chao dynasty, but he was still a suzerain in the eyes of the Huns and was subject to intervention if he acted arbitrarily. In the face of pressure from the dignitaries, Yao not only released Yü Ch'i-yüan, but also followed his advice to pardon the imprisoned rebels. In fact, the advice given was extremely wise. Because the other prisoners, except for the Tibetans and Tabgachs, had arrived immediately after their release and declared their loyalty to the palace. Yao gave them material favours and settled them all in the vicinity of Ch'ang-an as reinforcements.¹² As a result, the peaceful policy of the Hun state towards the nomads produced many favourable results and Yü Ch'i-yüan was promoted and appointed chief vizier and head of the court (today's minister of justice).¹³

Shih Lo was not very successful in the first years of his independent rule. In 313 he was exhausted by conquests in general, but not by the subjugated peoples of the south-eastern province, where Chü Te, the able general of the former Yü-chou region, was active. After obtaining permission from Sih-ma Jui and a quantity of uni-format cloth, Chü Te took charge of some volunteer troops and assumed full responsibility for returning lost territory to the Chinese. As he treated the people well, his army soon grew; in 317 he defeated Shih Hu, the Huns' favourite warlord, at Ho-nan, and in 319, taking advantage of factions among the nomads, he organised an attack on the north. Fortunately, Chin

11 Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*, p. 75-77.

12 Wieger L. *Textes*, p. 1079.

13 Mailla, *Histoire*, IV/305.

He was offended when his court sent an inspector to supervise the general's activities, thus ending the successes of the Chinese armies (year 321).

During these bloody conflicts, Shih Lo exhibited a number of acts of kindness that would make the tribes under his rule sympathise with the Huns. For example, when he learnt that the Chinese in the territories occupied by the Huns regretted that they had no opportunity to pay homage to their ancestors, he immediately rebuilt the tombs, had the surroundings cleaned and set up guards to protect them. On another occasion he beheaded a Chinese officer who had taken refuge with him and sent his head to Chü Te, emphasising that he absolutely hated traitors.¹⁴ But he also put to the sword several times in the same regions the Chinese population, whom he regarded as a danger to him at that time.

In short, Shih Lo and Liu Yao were as opposite in character as their adherents, the traditionalist Huns and the servants of no particular lineage. The unity of the peoples, fostered by their anger against the Chinese, had broken down, and by 319 they had ceased to be allies and had become bitter enemies between whom there was no possibility of reconciliation.

The Huns' falling out had saved South China, but the same unfortunate situation prevailed there. In 322 the Ti tribes of the Shen-si and Sih- ch'uan tribes broke away from China because of rebellions and unrest and established the Wu-t'u suzerainty, then applied for vassalage to Liu Yao.¹⁵ In addition, from 322 to 324 South China was shaken by the rebellion of General Wang T'un¹⁶ and Shih Lo took advantage of the turmoil to Chin-chou.¹⁷

In the Tabgach khanate, the rulers of the state were slaughtered one after another, the people were fragmented, and thus China lost an ally which had lost its war potential for a while. The day dawned for the Huns, but unfortunately they missed this opportunity by engaging in internal conflicts.

¹⁴ Ibidp. 310.

¹⁵ Bichurin N.Y. *Istoriya Tibetap*101.

¹⁶ Cordier H. *Histoire générale*, p. 312.

¹⁷ In Ho-peï.

The End of Aristocracy

In 323, Shih Lo, who had declared war against both the Chin and Chao empires at the same time, had become quite powerful in the territories under his rule.¹⁸ Thus, the Chinese and the Huns seemed to have become allies in an unexpected way. However, the Southern Chinese Empire, which had been badly damaged by the rebellion of General Wang T'un, was not in a position to protect the northern provinces, which Chū Te had declared as liberated areas and taken under his control due to his good treatment of the people. Shih Sheng and Shih Hu, two of Shih Lo's commanders, seized the northern parts of the Huai and Shan-tung valleys without any difficulty and ended the conflict in 325.

The most serious operation took place off Lo-yang. When the Huns besieged Shih Sheng's troops, Shih Hu came to their aid and dealt a heavy blow to the besiegers. During the fighting, the Hun commanders were killed and their army disintegrated. This event made Liu Yao ill with extreme grief, and for three years (325 to 328) the Huns were unable to launch a new counter-attack. In the meantime the Chin Empire had been greatly weakened by a new rebellion and was no longer a threat to Shih Lo's state. In this situation, Shih Lo sent a commander who was Shih Hu's blood brother against Liu Yao with an army of 40 thousand men. But Liu Yao met the enemy at the Huang-ho bend and forced them to retreat, and even chased the fleeing army for more than 200 li (80 km.).

The Huns took no prisoners. The corpses were too numerous to count and the ground was littered with stinking corpses. Liu Yao besieged the enemy's second army in Lo-yang fortress and flooded it with canals from the Lo river.

Faced with this serious situation, old Shih Lo took the command himself. He his relatives, "Although it is said that no one can stand against Liu Yao's anger, let it be known that Liu Yao is old and his soldiers are weak," and he mobilised all his resources.

When Liu Yao learnt from the captives that Shih Lo was on his way against him, he lifted the siege and retreated west of the Lo river. Shih Lo entered Lo-yang, which had been evacuated by the Huns, and thanked Heaven for saving the city. Then, relying on his previous successes, he marched on Liu Yao.¹⁹

¹⁸ Wieger L. *Textes*, p. 1082.

¹⁹ Ibidp. 1092.

I think Shih Lo was right. Because Liu Yao lacked sufficient logistical support, he was not ready for a final confrontation. Nevertheless, in order to anticipate the enemy's steps, he indulged himself with his favourites at his lodge and forbade any unpleasant news to be brought to him for fear of death. But he was faced with an unforeseen position: He was surrounded by the river and his troops were in the open. Shih Hu headed for the centre of the Hun army, which was surrounded by cavalry and infantry units tasked with slowing the pace of Liu Yao's counter-attack.

At the most critical moment of the battle, when Liu Yao could no longer recover, Shih Lo's army of elite soldiers, himself clad in armour, marched out of Lo-yang and rushed at the enemy at full speed. Liu Yao was drunk. When Shih Lo's army of 40 thousand men broke the enemy's left flank, the Hun cavalry, dodging a massive blow, retreated. The Hun commander was thrown from his horse and captured. This situation also determined the fate of the war. Finding it unnecessary to shed more blood, Shih Lo forbade the pursuit of the fleeing enemy. He satisfied himself by suggesting that his captive write a letter to his sons advising them to cease further fratricidal fighting. This was a very clever proposal that Liu Yao did not like at all. On the contrary, Liu Yao wrote a letter to his sons advising them to continue fighting until victory without worrying about the fate of their father. Of course, because of such an adverse attitude, he also ended his life.

In fact, Liu Yao's stubbornness was of little use. Because there was no one in his own state who supported him except a small number of Hun veterans who gathered around him a number of vigilantes and traitors. However, the Chinese citizens of Shen-si could not be regarded as traitors. For they had only made a fateful alliance with a despot who had conquered their country. But these people, who had emptied their villages and cities for fear of war, raised the flag of rebellion against the victors and recognised the rule of the victors.²⁰ In 329, Shih Sheng entered Ch'ang-an and Shih Hu defeated Liu Yao's sons who tried to take over the city.

After this defeat, panic set in among the Huns and they dispersed, unable to resist the enemy. Liu Yao's son, Liu Hsi, was given the honour

²⁰ Ibidp. 1094.

The last remaining army of three thousand men had also taken refuge in the favour of the victors. All the prisoners were beheaded. North China was reunited. In 330, Shih Lo was proclaimed emperor of Next Chao and the former and bandit's concubine empress. Of course, her sons became crown prince and marshal, and Shih Hu's blood brother, who at least wanted to be a marshal, minister of justice to avoid offence. But the strange thing is that Chinese historical sources speak of Shih Lo with obvious sympathy.²¹ Is this fairness or partiality?

Shih Lo was undoubtedly talented, or rather charming, but he was hardly innocent. His abuse of the Chinese people was ignored, and his good deeds were given too much credit. This cannot be a coincidence. Chinese histories show a reverse behaviour from Liu Yao onwards, and herein lies the enigma.

The ethnic characteristics of the Huns, hated by the Chinese, were natural to the steppe aristocrats, even if a little Chinese spirit was mixed in. Nevertheless, although the members of the Liu family had changed their Turkish names to Chinese ones, they remained Huns and were foreigners in the eyes of the Chinese. However, the absence of Hun traditions in the Chao Empire led to the gradual degeneration of their followers into a North Chinese people who had lost their traditions. They were socially close to each other and this closeness was more important than the difference in language between the Chinese and the kulaks. Over time they mingled and began to understand each other's language, and Shih Lo's indifference to his subjects' tastes and appearances made them tolerant of power. In fact, Shih Lo was an even better ruler than the rude emperors and savage contemporaries of the Chin dynasty. The order he had established was therefore solid foundations, but even this would only save the situation for twenty years.

The End of Democracy

The glory of Shih Lo, the democratic leader of the Huns and servants, lasted only four years. During this time he was only able to build a luxurious palace in Yeh which he had chosen as his capital. When he fell seriously ill in 333, Shih Lo took over the command of the palace guard.

²¹ Ibidp. 1095.

Hu did not allow anyone, including the vizier and his relatives, to enter the patient's room. Shih Hung and Shih K'ang, the sons of the dynasty's founder, were in command of the provincial armies. Shih Hu, who did not even want to wait for his master and blood brother to breathe their last breath, took advantage of this opportunity to arrest the dying emperor's loyal viziers and all senior officials. Realising that it was all over, the crown prince abdicated, but Shih Hu refused to accept his voluntary abdication and announced that he had been deposed as "unworthy of the throne".

After burying Shih Lo's ashes in an ordinary tomb that he had originally built for himself in another valley, Shih Hu, who held all the supreme powers, dismissed all the late emperor's comrades-in-arms and brought in his own relatives. The Empress asked her son Shih K'ang what awaited him and his son. He answered only "death!" and asked his mother to allow him to rebel. However, they could do nothing as they were captured and beheaded. In the face of this brutality and tyranny, Prince Shih Sheng rebelled in Ch'ang-an and Prince Shih Liang rebelled in Lo-yang. Shih Hu defeated Shih Liang and beheaded him. The good-hearted Shih Sheng was slaughtered by his own soldiers who presented his head to Shih Hu. Lacking tradition, these soldiers accepted the legal heir as their commander in chief. For the concept of law had been replaced by the categories of power and interest.

After Prince Shih Hung, who had been deposed, was soon assassinated, Shih Hu proclaimed himself first as interim ruler,²² and then as emperor of the Next Chao. The army was the sole and only support for his throne. Aristocracy and military democracy had fallen into the hands of brutal, vicious and unprincipled despots. However, the situation in the subordinate units of Shih Hu's army was not favourable. For half of the Hun cavalry, the backbone of the country's army, had died during the civil war, so that the empty ranks had to be filled with Chinese soldiers. These latter were by no means cowards and were less willing than anyone else to sacrifice their lives for the Hun conquerors. From this it can be concluded that the fighting ability of the army was nil. The ruler of North China was unable to conquer not only South China but also the small principality of Liang in the present-day Kan-su province. The Tabgach khanate (as well as patricide and fratricide) were also to his fate.

²² Ibidp. 1096.

bi) was going through a period of khan murderers, and moreover, the princes who were able to save their lives from these murders were looking to the Next Chao for help and deliverance. Therefore, Shih Hu was not worried about the northern frontiers, but on the eastern frontiers the Mu-jung's were strong and fighting them was not a simple task. At the court of the Eastern Chin Empire, preparations were under way for the reconquest of territory seized by the Huns. In 334, soon after Shih Hu's coup d'état, the South Chinese army launched an attack on Next Chao. However, the looting by the South Chinese army of the foreign southern peoples other than the native Chinese, such as the Man (Tai group peoples), Yüeh (Malay group peoples), Lo-lo (Burmese group peoples), etc., enraged the people of the liberated areas. Unable to gain the support of the peoples, the Chinese army was defeated off the coast of Güçen (Hu-pei) in 339 and pushed south.²³

However, Shih Hu was no match for another Chinese neighbour, the Principality of Liang, which had formed at Kan-su in 313. Moreover, he had to keep more troops at court for security reasons, and this had to be dealt with somehow.

Shih Hu had found a way out. Chinese tradition speaks of the mobilisation of girls to serve in the emperor's court. The more pompous the palace, the more girls would leave their homes and rush to the palace, where they did essentially nothing. Shih Hu collected ten thousand girls in this situation. He selected a thousand of them, taught them to shoot arrows on foot and on horseback, and dressed them in special silk and velvet uniforms. Thus, a special amazon regiment of them formed the ruler's personal troop.²⁴ There was no doubt about the *sada-kata* of the female personal troop, but the Chinese were shocked by such an event. To them, such a thing was an affront to Heaven, that is, a disruption of the natural order of things, and so they regarded the drought that ravaged northern China as an act of Heaven's anger.

The people began to murmur, but Shih Hu paid no attention. Three-fifths of all peasant men were mobilised to rebuild the lavish palaces in the capitals and reinforce the army. Each mobilised man also had to bring 15 hu of rice and 10 balls of silk. The Hun army entertained its commanders.

²³ Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 144.

²⁴ Wiegner L. *Textes*, p. 1097.

fields, vineyards and pastures were turned into hunting grounds and the Chinese were forbidden to hunt in these areas and the death penalty was imposed for those who violated the ban. The cruelty of the judges was rampant. "If a civil servant asked a citizen for a beautiful girl or an ox or a horse and the citizen failed to fulfil the request, he was immediately charged with violating the hunting ban. No one was sure of his own life or that of his relatives." ²⁵

Yes, just as the Huns were fed up with the Chinese rule in their time, now the Chinese were fed up with the Hun rule. It seems that since these peoples were quite different from each other in terms of ethnic characteristics, it was best for them to live far away from each other. But the situation that the Huns brought to China led to tragic events that developed at the initiative of the Chinese for 300 years. ²⁶

However, the two groups of Huns who had penetrated into China and were able to hold on there victoriously did not seem to be able to survive for long. It is difficult to accept that this was a mere coincidence. Even if the death of the Hun aristocracy can be considered as a result of military defeats, the circumstances were already developing in that direction. Stranger still, the victorious Hun servants had a natural fear of war which deterred millions of Chinese from coming to terms with them. This, of course, necessitated their constant readiness to face an unknown danger which could not be taken lightly. Only in the palace of the sovereign was there no anxiety, but as we have seen, it was not very secure either. In short, the victory did not bring happiness to the Huns.

However, Huns who had not crossed the Chinese border had migrated to the borders of Next Chao in Ordos. During the reign of Liu Yüan, these Huns had participated in the war of liberation, and it is estimated that Kao Sheng-yüan, the founder of this principality, like Liu Hsüan, was a friend and adviser of Liu Yüan. ²⁷ They retained their nomadic traditions and natural qualities. It was no wonder that the Chinese said of them that "they were all strong, brave and rebellious" ²⁸ . However, as it is seen, the ethnic characteristics of the Huns, who left their homeland, the steppes, had changed after only two generations.

²⁵ Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 141.

²⁶ Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*, p. 203.

²⁷ Boodberg P. *Two notes*, p. 298-299.

²⁸ "Цзиньши" (цит. по Вернштам А.Н. Очерки истории гунннов, с. 222).

Before analysing the real causes of ethnic metamorphosis, let us take a look at the riches of the Shih Hu period, which began so bloodily. Then we will have enough data at our disposal and the question raised by today's interest in the subject will be thoroughly summarised.

Who is the Winner?

It is unprecedented for everyone to be on the losing side in a very ambitious game. Events that had important consequences not only for the Huns but also for all cultures of the Far East can be explained in this way. In Shih Hu's reign, it was the Buddhist community that emerged victorious.²⁹

According to Buddhist doctrine, people are divided into two character groups: Buddhist monastic [bahshi] society and others. Monks are considered the salt of the earth because they have set themselves on the "path" that leads from the world of turmoil (samsara) to eternal peace (nirvana). Monks are not obliged to engage in activity. Because activity is the product of fear and leads to sin. Feeding, clothing, and protecting the monks is the duty of the worldlings who will in the future earn the reward that helps them to "tenasuh" themselves, to become monks, and to set out on the "path". However, the excessive growth of the priestly community was contrary to their own interests. For if everyone a monk, then there would be no one to feed them. But there was such danger for Chinese Buddhists. Neither the masters, proud of their work and the privileges they enjoyed, nor the princes, proud of the luxuries, soldiers and prestige they had acquired, nor the peasants who looked after their families and tilled their land, were willing to throw away their work for the sake of the "nonsense" for which the monks had to aspire. Unable to find a place for themselves in worldly life, they entered the Buddhist community. After they became Buddhists, they turned away from the life that upset them, from the deceptive fears. In order to publicise their activities, they tried to prove their power by engaging in some violent behaviour.³⁰

Buddhist bahshis first in China at the end of the first century. They shaved their heads and walked barefoot.

²⁹ Grousset R. *L'Empire*, p. 98.

³⁰ Gumil'ev L.N. *Legenda i deystvitel'nost' v drevney istorii Tibeta*// Вестник истории мировой культуры. 1960, № 3, с. 103-114.

not a single word about the hereafter, nirvana and self-perfection. For such concepts were alien to the realistic and rational Chinese. Therefore, at the beginning, the propaganda of Buddhism was not successful at all.³¹ However, Buddhist bahshis actually and confidently continued their activities. They attracted disillusioned people, victims of fate, and especially women, whose situation in ancient China was not favourable. More ardent and talented young people, capable of embracing the new views, were turning to Buddhism to fill the ranks of civil servants.

The preaching, duties and reputations of Confucianist preachers paled in comparison to the fantasies of the rampaging Buddhists. When the Confucianists realised, after centuries of struggle, that they could not stand against Buddhism and could not argue with it, they sought help from the ruling government. Even during their weakening (146-167), the Buddhists could not play an important role in the political life of the state, although Emperor Huang-ti also accepted Buddhism.

Under the next Chao, the situation changed radically. Buddhism was on its way to becoming a high culture without even seeking refuge in the patronage of the Chinese. Indian and Sogdian bahshis-buddhists were not at all inferior to the Chinese in terms of culture, and in the eyes of the "barbarians" they were not defeated enemies, but honoured guests. The Indian monk Budda Janga, for example, was highly respected at the court of Shih Hu and had obtained certain privileges in the establishment of monasteries, as well as an edict for the free propagation of Buddhism among the subjects of the Chao Empire.

The Confucianists tried to protest, but Shih Hu sided with the Buddhists. Many Chinese youths filled the Buddhist monasteries that had been set up all over the country in order to serve and pay taxes.³² Budda Janga's reputation was enhanced when, simultaneously vizier, he saved the emperor's life from a plot hatched by the crown prince. After this event the Huns tied their fate to the Buddhist community, which was to be instrumental in their entering a period of development. However, when the Hun star began to fade, the Buddhist bishops were able to reach Tun-huang, where they reached the pinnacle of their further development.

31 Cf. Catterdji S. i Datta D. *Vvedeniye v indiyaskuyu filosofiyu*. M., 1955, p. 114.

32 McGovern, *The early empires*, p. 340.

and took refuge in their caves. Nevertheless, the Buddhist community itself managed to survive in China for another 1500 years. They were able to do so thanks to Shih Hu's edict that he was tolerant of other faiths in order to protect himself from danger.³³

Fathers and Sons

Shih Hu was not only a warrior, but also a lover of beauty. He was enamoured of Chinese art. He decorated the Yeh fortress in the capital with bells of the Ch'in [Ts'in] period, paintings depicting the Han Empire, and giant bronze statues of Ts'ao Wei reflecting the heyday of China and its victories the nomads. Of course, he had forgotten, or perhaps did not know, that the emperors at the head of these dynasties were implacable enemies of their own people.³⁴ On the former site of the sprawling city of Lo-yang, he had a city for soldiers and another for civilian citizens built. The Chinese flocking to the service of the state. Shih Hu had even adopted the talented Jan Min, who was surnamed Shih, and recognised him as a prince by birth. However, Chinese culture had inoculated the Huns very badly. Indeed, the dramatic imperial family feuds, the effects of which were visible on the whole of the Next Chao, can only be explained by this.

Since the Chao people meant "demos" and there was no concept of "ethnos", they could only be called "sekene", not "people". All the Hun servants had become rulers of clans, since they were not independent tribes speaking Khmer. As the emerging ethnos became a branch of the Huns, those who lived among the Huns left their previous characteristics aside and part of the Huns. The dominant caste (not ethnos) was joined by the Ch'iangs and "Ti", who served in the army and were recognised as special regular troops. The Chinese and other inhabitants of the country who were recruited into the army, with the exception of those who proved their merit at court and rose higher in the social hierarchy than the Hun conquerors, became at the same time the oppressed ethnos and clan.

33 "Though I was born in a barbarian country, I have the master of China by virtue of my humility. If the people of Ch'ao wish to serve Fo (Buddhism), let them know that I permit it." (Wieger L. *Textes*, p. 1100) This was a direct counter-move against the national traditions of the Chinese, who were eager to weaken their enemies by pitting them against intelligent and energetic rivals.

34 McGovern, *The early empires*, p. 340; Wieger L. *Textes*, p. 1097.

in the centre of the country. The situation was not at all stable both ethnically and socially, but politically it was quite strong. Because there were no forces in the country that could oppose the strong military tyranny established by Shih Lo and Shih Hu. However, at the super-ethnic level, one could speak of disturbed moods at the contact levels.

As the harem was full, Shih Hu had many children. The crown prince Shih Sui surpassed his father in cruelty. His greatest pastime was to invite his chambermaid to a banquet he organised. Her task was to play with a cannibal or dance like a monkey in front of the guests. Afterwards, her decorated head was separated from her body and her flesh was served to the guests.³⁵

Shih Hu, like a businessman, gave his son certain tasks, he was constantly spoiling everything. For this, his father even beat him with a belt (yes, a belt). This was repeated at least three times every month.

Once, after the customary beating, Shih Sui told his servants: "It is not too tempting to take a ministry; the best thing is to do like Me-te" (i.e. to kill his father).³⁶ His servants bowed their heads in silence, signalling their agreement with his words. One day the prince falsely fell ill in the belief that his father would come to visit him. His father did indeed to visit him, but Budda Janga, the Buddhist bahshi who had been inspired and perhaps informed, advised his master not to enter his son's room alone. At first Shih Hu did not give much credence to the words of the Buddhist bahshi, but on the way he remembered them and sent one of his amazons in his place to enquire about his son's well-being. The crown prince was extremely angry at the discovery of his conspiracy and had the person beheaded. Of course, in this case, the matter was exposed. Shih Hu first had thirty members of the prince's entourage, 26 of his wives and children, and finally himself slaughtered. The corpses of the slaughtered were cut into pieces and buried en masse in a special cemetery. Shih Hsüan was proclaimed crown prince.³⁷ Fortunately, in the meantime, the aforementioned cannibal, who was fortunate for the beautiful Chinese girls, died before it was too late in 337.³⁸

³⁵ McGovern, *The early empires*, p. 348-350.

³⁶ Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*, p. 63-64.

³⁷ Wieger L. *Textes*, p. 1098.

³⁸ Mailla, *Histoire*, IV/352.

Principles, ideals, patriotism and concern for the well-being of the country had absolutely no place in this dirty history. Instead, there was egoism and a heap of thoughtless deeds. This is what the descendants of the people who saved their people had become.

Shih Hsüan remained crown prince for ten years, during which time he did nothing to show that he was capable. Finally, Shih Hu decided to make another son crown prince in his place. The dauphin, who was somehow aware of this decision, hired two assassins to kill the future crown prince. He himself was to kill his father at the same time. In the spring of 347 the conspirators killed the prince and waited by his corpse for his father to appear. However, the emperor managed to avoid his son's dagger by refusing to go to a place where a trap was prepared for him.

However, the murder was soon discovered. Shih Hsüan was tortured and sentenced to be burned in the presence of the emperor along with nine members of his family. The emperor's favourite little grandson lined up on his grandfather's belt and demanded that he too be killed. His grandfather covered his face with his hands and began to cry, but he did not change his decision. When the emperor's sash was broken, they threw the child into the fire. Afterwards, the ashes of those burnt were scattered in front of the entrance gate of the castle, under the feet of passers-by.³⁹

Such was the life of the privileged section of the society formed by the Hun servants with the help of Chinese converts. The walls of the luxurious palaces were decorated with reliefs and polished skulls. Golden bells decorated with garlands hung from the ceiling, the pillars were covered with silver plates, but no one was for a minute sure of his life.

Nothing was similar to the tents of the steppe Huns and even the Chinese did not live in such a hell. Because both the Huns and the Chinese had a sense of morality, honour, loyalty and devotion to duty. Again, Huns and Chinese had certain behavioural patterns despite their ethnic differences. However, their fusion with each other destroyed these values; national sentiments disappeared and feelings of pity, which both victors and vanquished benefited from, were wiped out. The mighty and vast Next Chao Empire, together with its enemies, had its own qua...

39 Wiegier L. *Textes*, p. 1003-1113.

had become a savage chimera, feeding on the corpses of its rangers. Even the powerful Emperor Stone ^{Tiger}⁴⁰ could not control himself in the face of the cries of his burning grandson; he fell ill with nervous breakdowns. After all, he was a human being as well as an emperor. And his humanity was revealed when his grandson was being burnt in front of his eyes!

40 Hu: Tiger; Shih: Stone, rock.

PART IV

FIRE

Meanings of Metaphor

The reader should not think that we have named this chapter because we like it. The generalised events of the IVth century are essentially reminiscent of wind-blown tongues of flame turning into fires. Thus, in the east, a typhoon carried the Sienpi cavalry into the valley of the Central Oasis; in the south-west, in the forest-covered gorges of Shen-si and Sih-ch'uan, the uragan of the Ti tribes of the Tankuts flared up; The storm in the Amdo mountains drove the Tibetan cavalry in front of the Ting-ling spears; on the vast steppe the braided-haired Tabgachs raged; and in the heart of the Chao Empire the whirlwind of Chinese nationalism, fuelled by hatred and resentment of all foreigners, began to whirl rapidly. The winds fuelled the Huns' fire, and the tongues of flame swept across the land, burning everything that could burn from Liao-tung to Kukuror. Nevertheless, new grasses and flowers slowly began to grow on the unfortunate land covered with ashes. The Old Age had passed into the Middle Ages. However, this event would be described in "academic" language as follows: "One after another, some from the north, some from the north-east, and some from the west, entered China; thus the great victors of yesterday became the victims of new conquerors. The victories won by some brought new and bloody conflicts, but in the end they were all buried in the land tilled by generations of Chinese. "¹ Of course, this necessarily brief description does not answer a number of questions. Why did the flames cause real death? Why did the Chinese people endure them? On what basis did powerful states become spoils of war for small tribes?

¹ Simonovskaya L.V., Erenburg G.B., Yuryev M.F. *Ocherki istorii Kitaya*. M., 1956, p. 43.

In any case, all these issues need to be clarified. Crown.

Once Upon a Time

While Shih Hu and his followers were swimming in luxury and bathing in blood, the world surrounding the empire was slowly changing. These changes were initially in favour of the Next Chao, but later they began to work against him, and only against him. But here we will not go backwards, but only forwards, in order to understand what changes befell the Sienpi tribes in the second terrible quarter of the IVth century.

We had left the Tabgach state in the days when turmoil was ravaging it, leading brothers to kill each other. The energetic khan Yü-lü was murdered by conspirators, and the khan's widow hid her baby in her shalwar and said, "If Heaven protects you, you will not weep." Indeed, the child was silent for a long time and survived. ²

The usurper was not well known there and lived in a remote area with his rivals. His younger brother fled to the Yu-wen in 329, and the throne was restored to the legitimate heir, but not for long. With the help of the Yu-wen, the usurper seized the throne in 335, but the legitimate khan, who had fled to Shih Hu, was restored to the throne in 337 with his help.

It is not surprising that during this period of turmoil the Tabgachs lost their conquering power, sent hostages to their neighbours and even accepted to become vassals of the Mu-jungš. She-i Kien Khan (an Evenkish word meaning freshwater perch), who could not get out of the influence of his mother's shalwar, consolidated his position by marrying Mu-jung Huang's sister because of these relations. In 340, the Tabgachs had penetrated the Great Wall and settled in Inner China, retaining only their nomadic lifestyle.³ Shih Hu should have been an obstacle, but his eastern neighbours, the Mu-jungš, blocked his way.

Since then, the Southern Sienpis had done much. Surrounded by related tribes (Tuan, Yü-wen and Kantans) who were warlike like themselves, the Mu-jungš had won decisive victories against them.

² Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/171.

³ Age., p. 172.

They were able to maintain their power. However, the Chinese in Liao-tung, the Koreans living along the Ya-lu River and even internal conflicts among themselves prevented their strengthening. But their commander-in-chief Mu-junġ Ho-i was a resilient man. First, in 311, he extended his power by subjugating the Su-hi and Mu-wan tribes of the Syenpis, who had been the animal-keeping tribes of the Syenpis; in 313, he seized a part of the Tuan suzerainty; and in 318, the Chin court recognised him as the Great Yabgu.⁴ In this period of bloody tyranny and disorder, only Mu-junġ's reign maintained order, and well-educated Chinese sought refuge and protection from him. This situation allowed the new state to organise itself on the one hand, while on the other hand it led to the Chineseisation of the Syenpis.

However, the Chin government definitely did not want the Mu-jungs to get stronger. But since it lacked the power to wage war, it decided to settle the matter diplomatically. In 319, a coalition was formed against the Mu-junġs, consisting of Koguryo, Tuan, Yü-wen and the Chinese governorate of Liao-tung. The allies besieged Mu-junġ Ho-i at Hi-ch'eng (around present-day Muklen), but they soon fell out. Mu-junġ Ho-i sent cattle and wine to the Yu-wen; the Tuans, who heard about this, thought that they had made a secret alliance with the Mu-junġs and returned home for fear of being betrayed. However, the deceived Yü-wen continued the war and Hi-ch'eng. However, since the Yü-wen army was dispersed, Sih-tou Huai provided Mu-junġ Khan, Mu-junġ Ho-i's beloved son, with an opportunity for a breakthrough. Mu-jung Khan besieged the Yü-wen troops, slaughtered them without leaving a single living soul, and then reached the Yü-wen headquarters and razed it to the ground. Having suffered great losses, the Yu-wen dispersed in panic.

The Chinese governor of Liao-tung fled to Koguryo, leaving his country to its fate. Mu-jung Ho-i, who invaded Liao-tung with his armies, informed the Chin government of his action. There was nothing left to do but to accept the situation and send Mu-junġ Ho-i the seal of Liao-tung governorship. Thus, when Mu-junġ Ho-i died in 333, his son Mu-junġ Huang succeeded to the throne.

Mu-jung Huang received a good Chinese education and gathered Chinese people with a high level of culture around him; however, this culture was not enough to prevent him from using it in his actions.

4 Age., p. 160-161.

from his subjects, who did not understand the purpose and were rather rigid.

The commanders of the opposition to Mu-junġ Huang were his own brothers, the brave warriors Mu-junġ Jen and Mu-junġ Khan. In addition to the many supporters they had gathered around them, they also received support from the Tuan. The Qiyamists and Tuanese Mu-junġ Huang in 334. As the Tuanese were preparing to pursue the enemy, Mu-junġ Khan withdrew his army out of national sentiments, depriving the Tuanese of further victory. Of course, this led to the liberation of Mu-junġ Huang.

However, his situation was dangerous and he had to find allies. therefore gladly accepted the terms of the Chinese adventurer Kao Hu, who was holding out at the fortress of Yung P'ing-fu on the coast of the Gulf of Liao-tung. Kao Hu, fearing his neighbours, the Tuan and the Tabgach, came to Mu-junġ Huang's rescue as if he were going to help the son of the governor of Liao-tung, who was supported by the Chin Emperor. Thus the Sienpi armies, combined with the power of the Chinese impostors, consolidated the shaky Sienpi throne, enabling him to claim his own suzerainty in 336.

Meanwhile Mu-junġ Jen had consolidated his position at the fortress of P'ing-k'u (now K'ai-p'ing on the shores of the Gulf of Liao-tung) on the eastern edge of the country.⁵ In 336 Mu-junġ Huang arrived at the mouth of the Gulf of Liao-tung and made a sudden attack on the enemy. The fortress was left to the mercy of the conquerors, but the defeated were completely slaughtered. After having his brother's comrades slaughtered in front of him, Mu-junġ Huang "allowed Mu-junġ Jen to be slaughtered as well. "⁶

The victory of the Chinese had led to the awarding of the titular "wang" to the yabga. Thus the dynasty was given the Chinese name Yen⁷.(337) Now it was time to finish Tuan's work.

The Sienpis of Tuan were no less warlike than the Mu-junġs, but they faced trouble from both sides: After Mu-junġ Huang concluded an alliance with Shih Hu, in 338, Next Chao's huge war fleet and the Hun army of 70,000 attacked Tuan from the south; at the same time, Mu-junġ Huang attacked from the north. Northern neighbour-

⁵ Gibert L. *Dictionnaire historique*, p. 630.

⁶ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/163.

⁷ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1107.

When the Tuan army was defeated, Shih Hu occupied the southern half of the country, captured all the small fortresses in Ho-pei and also subjugated the Chin emperor. When the defeated Tuan retreated into the forests with their ruler, their guest Mu-jung Khan fled to the Yü-wen.

Shih Hu's decision to declare himself the protector of the Chinese people saved the lives of the Tuan sword remnants, and the Siyenpi-s in Tuan benefited from this benevolence, as they had merged with the Chinese. This, however, war with Mu-jung Huang, who favoured negotiations on the division of captured territories, inevitable. When the next Chao's large , which had suffered no casualties in the battles, turned towards Manchuria, 36 fortresses opened their gates without a fight.

Like many despots, Mu-jung Huang was not a brave man. He wanted to flee to the north, but his commanders were strongly opposed. The Chao troops had reached Mu-jung's capital and laid siege to the city, but on the tenth day of the siege, the huge army of Huns and Chinese had to retreat due to lack of sufficient supplies. The Syenpis took advantage of the opportunity and started to pursue the retreating army. In the battles that took place, 30 thousand Huns lost their lives. While those who survived escaped, all those who surrendered were beheaded. The only commander who managed to save his troops was Jan Min.

At this moment, the ruler of Tuan, who had retreated to the forests, came out and asked both enemies to obey him. sides accepted his offer and sent armies to help him. In this situation, it was necessary to favour one of the parties, which also meant the surrender of the other. The Sienpis surrendered the Huns. When the Chaolus advanced without taking any precautionary measures, they were defeated by a sudden attack of the Sienpis. The Tuan khan Mu- jung Huang, who did not move a muscle during these events, was accused of some intrigues and beheaded.

In 340 a large Hun army and river fleet Syenpi territory.⁸ Ho-pei was chosen as the battlefield. Mu-jung Huang led the

⁸ The figure of 500,000 land army and 10,000 ships is probably exaggerated. Above all, it is certain that a large part of this army was composed of Chinese who did not willingly fight for the Hun ruler, which reveals the weakness of the Second Ch'ao Empire.


refusing to accept, the sun went round the Huns' backs and struck a blow from the west at the city of Hi-chou, where the food and supplies of the attacking army were located. With all their stores on fire, the Huns were forced to make a hasty retreat. The tactics employed by both armies show that the Sienpi retained the steppe method of warfare, based on the activity of mobile troops, while the Huns switched to the Chinese method, involving large armies, tightly disciplined and reinforced by logistical support. In other words, the Chao Empire was becoming more and more Chinese rather than Hun-ised.

A victory allowed Mu-jung Huang to move his capital further south to the city of Lung-ch'eng (today's Chao-yang-hsien in Ho-pei)⁹ and in 341 the Ch'in emperor recognised Mu-jung Huang as wang of the Yen Reign. This, of course, strengthened the position of the Mu-jungs in the south-west and allowed them to shift their offensive eastwards.

In 342, two Sienpi armies entered Koguryo. One of the armies drew the Kō-gūryo army against it, while the other, travelling through difficult mountain passes, defeated the enemy in skirmishes and captured the capital after a short siege. The ruler of Koguryo fled, leaving his country to be plundered by the enemy. Mu-jung Huang did not even see the need to occupy the devastated lands. He considered the obedience of the ruler of Koguryo sufficient and to return with huge booty. Thus, Koguryo was weakened and no longer a danger to the Syen-pis.

Now it the turn of the Yu-wen. Prince Mu-jung Han, who had travelled there from Tuan, had not won the trust of the Yu-wen. In the face of this situation, he pretended to be insane, and according to the local customs, he was considered to be mentally ill and released, and thus he travelled all over the country and examined everything thoroughly. After finishing his work, he conveyed the necessary information to his brother Mu-jung Huang on condition that he would accept him after conquering the country. This action of his may be regarded as a kind of betrayal or even nationalism, but in our opinion, it shows that Mu-jung did not abandon his brother, that he sympathised with his country and had an inexhaustible energy for the rise of his own country.

9 Gibert L. *Dictionnaire historique*, p. 631.



Mu-junġ Huang accepted his brother and gave him the rank of general and vizier. Mu-junġ Khan, who commanded the vanguard of one of the armies during the campaign to Koguryo, attacked Yü-wen in 344,¹⁰ who had recruited soldiers fleeing the defeat at Koguryo. At the head of Yü-wen's army was a capable and brave Korean commander. Mu-junġ Khan challenged him to hand-to-hand combat, and although he himself was severely wounded, he killed his opponent. This duel also determined the course of the following battles: The defeated Yu-wen surrendered their capital. Thus, as a state breathed its last breath, its people filled the ranks of the victorious side.¹¹

The honour for all these victories belonged to Mu-jung Khan, who was ill for a long time after the duel. However, Mu-jung Huang, jealous of his fame and worried, accused his brother of being involved in a conspiracy and ordered him to end his life by suicide.

Mu-jung Huang died in 348, leaving his son Mu-jung Ch'un a throne, a well-organised state, a strong army and a broad programme for future conquests. Like Han, he dreamed of conquering China and establishing an empire. In order to achieve his goal, he was relentless, trampled over the corpses of his two brothers, discarded the old traditions, and slaughtered those of his subjects and captives who were not loyal to him without blinking an eye. The biggest obstacle on the Mu-junġs' road to dominance was the Hun Chao State, against which the Mu-junġ viziers recommended a war of containment.¹² The coming years would show who would emerge victorious: Chineseised Huns or Chineseised Sienpis?

However, the course of Chineseisation in the Later Chao and the Mu-junġ State was different in principle. The Mu-junġs lived in their own country and the Liao-tung Chinese were an insignificant minority among them. Likewise, they had adopted the Chinese style of administration, education system, techniques and arts. They welcomed well-educated Chinese and benefited from their valuable ideas and expertise. The Chinese who lived in very good conditions in Mu-junġ State had also travelled to the Yen Kingdom with the Chinese living in the south.

10 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/166, 210. On page 210 Bichurin mistakenly dates the battle 333. year. See Grumm-Grjimaġlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoli- ya*, p. 164; Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1120.

11 Gibert L. *Dictionnaire historique*, p. 632.

12 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1137.

They had served the Chin Empire as willingly as they had served the Mu-jungs conquered the whole of Manchuria and reinforced their armies with the power of defeated peoples close to them in nationality and culture. In the later Chao Empire, everything was the opposite. Even the richness of the country and the abundance of its people, instead of strengthening the power of Shih Hu, who was once the commander of the Huns' vassals, had collapsed. Nevertheless, events unfolded in unexpected ways for both sides.

Tornado Storm

The Chinese are a tolerant people. But to what end? The extravagant luxury of the palace, the unsuccessful wars, the running of wild beasts through the cultivated fields and the suppression of the Buddhist community - all this cost a lot of money, and the heavy price was borne by the hard-working Chinese. However, this hard life seemed better than a torturous death for most of the population. The Chinese people of the next Chao had to choose between the two. So there was a deceptive silence in the Shih Hu Empire. And only in 345 would the wind begin to blow from the side.

The Chinese had settled in the fertile valleys in the foothills of Nanshan since the Hun period. Initially, they were invincible and hardy Chinese warriors from Shen-si, former subjects of the Ch'in reign (IV-III centuries BC). Their children and grandchildren, brought up in the limited peaceful environment, developed the warrior qualities of their ancestors and retained their courage. The Hun conquests had separated them from the metropolitan country, but the Huns did not even attempt to capture the fortresses of western Kan-su. It should be noted that the Chinese of Shan-shan did not want to be victims of Hun arrows, so they recognised themselves as subjects of the Han (from 313 onwards) and then of the later Chao.

If Shih Hu's sons-in-law hadn't put the last straw, perhaps the situation would have remained as it was. In 345, when he decided to build a great palace in Liao-tung (400 thousand people were working on the construction), he ordered the hunting grounds around the palace to be destroyed and those who would hunt there to be killed. He also increased his private army consisting of girls to 30 thousand and forbade them to marry. He declared himself as the ruler of Shan-Shan

to recognise that the time was ripe. He separated his territory from the Next Chao and proclaimed Eastern Chin as the regent of the Li- ang ruler, probably for show.

Shih Hu not hesitate to put down the rebellion with an army of 80,000 men. But this was not the Hun army: The officers and soldiers he chose were made up of local people, and they fought as they pleased and as they pleased. So they were bad fighters. The commander-in-chief Ma Chü, who had captured several fortresses in 347, was defeated and retreated, losing half of his army in the process. The Liangs pursued and defeated the Chaolu (they certainly could not be called Huns) for the second time, and the reinforcements sent by Shih Hu did not help. And Shih Hu would assess this last campaign with these words: "It is through this country that we have entered China; it is through it that the calamity that will ruin us will come." ¹³

And I think he was right. In 349 Liang Tou, the military commander of the region upstream of the Han river (Shen-si'de), had started a similar rebellion. He did not have well-fed armies like those that filled the Liang reign, but he was helped by Shih Hu himself. Having razed Tuan to the ground in 338, Shih Hu ordered the captives to be "relocated along the Han river to northern China." ¹⁴ He calculated to use them to form warrior reinforcements to reinforce his weak army, but he had no regard for order in his own country. The mobilised Tuanese were so disgusted by the cynical behaviour of the governor of Yung-chou (at the junction of Shen-si and Kan-su) that Liang Tou was able to strike a deal with Hsieh T'u-cheng to start a rebellion. ¹⁵ Strengthened by the support he received from the Syenpis, Liang Tou captured Ch'ang-an, defeated Prince Shih Pao's army at Hsin-ang (Ho-nan) and attacked Lo-yang. The rebellion was joined by peasants, whose Chinese historians have been in the habit of exaggerating as "a hundred thousand warriors". In the battle that took place in front of the walls of Lo-yang, Liang Tou won another victory and headed towards the capital. Shih Hu's throne began to shake.

The expected help came from the west, and the "Ti" and Ch'iangs rushed to break the Siyenpi-Chinese siege. The old Tibetan commander Yao I-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1127.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p1109.

¹⁵ Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 145.

chung came to Yeh with a cavalry army of eight thousand men and begged the emperor to receive him. Shih Hu received the Tibetan commander with great courtesy and listened attentively to his advice on the administration of the country, which was being mismanaged by the princes. It was possible to tolerate a tyrant only by envying him. At the conclusion of the consultation, Shih Hu presented Yao I-chung with weapons and horses. Without even thanking him, Yao mounted his horse and took command of the remnants of the defeated army and defeated Liang Tou's army off Lo-yang. Liang Tou was killed and his army of "one hundred thousand men" was dispersed.

It was Shih Hu's last victory. He fell gravely ill, writhing in agony. The question of succession was again on the agenda. As usual, there were different opinions: Either the emperor would name one of his eldest sons, the "wise" Shih Ch'un, who had an army at his disposal, or the strong and powerful Shih P'ing, or, in deference to his own lineage, hisson Shih Ch'i (pronounced Shi Chi), a child.

The Huns, as usual, attached great importance to aristocratism. When Liu Yao's daughter was captured, Shih Hu took her as his wife, made her his favourite at court, and by her a son was born, whom General Chang Ch'ai proposed as crown prince. Prince Shih P'ing, a rival of Chang Ch'ai and Shih Shih, won the sympathy of the officers under his command. These officers entered the bedchamber of the sick emperor and demanded that the state seal be given to their commander, the most capable of Shih Hu's sons. Chang Ch'ai did not relent. He declared that Shih P'ing was intoxicated, and while men were being sent to find him and bring him back to the emperor, he himself had already disthe murderers. At about the same time, almost without intervention, Shih Hu ended his life. In the end, it the "aristocratic party" that won: Shih Ch'i as emperor, his mother as regent, and Chang Ch'ai as de facto ruler of the empire. Shih Ch'un, who managed to take advantage of this opportunity to save his life, left the capital around the same time.

In regimes of military despotism, and especially in the regimes established by the likes of Shih Lo and Shih Hu, the military is not subordinate to the government, but the government to the military. The "wise" Prince Shih Ch'un returned to his army immediately after his safe escape from the palace, and Yao I-chung and Shih Min (Jan

Min) also sided with him. Entering the city, the army arrested the leading leadership and placed Shih Ch'un on the throne. Chang Ch'ai was killed immediately, while Shih Ch'i and his mother were slain after a ceremony "befitting their glory and honour"¹⁶. Shih Ch'un then appointed Shih Min (Jan Min) as commander-in-chief in recognition of his services.

We will now lift the curtain on the real tragedies. The events that took place before are only an introduction to the details. In fact, rebellion, assassination, fratricide and conspiracies are very common in China, but the reasons that lead to them are not so marvellous. Let us first dwell in detail on our hero, General Jan Min: He was a Chinese mercenary who supported Shih Hu, strengthened his power, and in return was honoured by the emperor by being given his family name. He was skilful, especially in combat and court intrigue, but as we shall see, he never forgot his own origins. Living among a Hun family and commanding Hun troops, he was eager to rise to power to avenge himself on the savages who had conquered his country and his people. As soon as he became commander-in-chief, he proposed to the emperor that he should declare himself crown prince as a spiritual son. Shih Ch'un not only rejected this offer, but also ordered his general to be brought to court for his insolent behaviour. However, Jan Min had spies who conveyed the emperor's intentions to him. As soon as he received this news, he put on his armour, went to the palace, killed the emperor and the dauphin and declared another prince emperor. Of course, he was given the rank of marshal.¹⁷ While all this was going on, those around him did not even bat an eyelid! How could this have happened?

The same scenario was repeated 103 days later for the new emperor Shih Chien. But Jan Min did not kill him, but merely threw him in the dungeon. Soon after, he issued a short but meaningful declaration: "Those in favour of me, come here. To hell with those who are against me!"¹⁸ In the face of this situation, the Chinese rushed to the capital, while the Huns left the city in a hurry.

A little explanation here. Jan Min had the sympathetic support of a defeated but unyielding people. As he was assisted by Chinese dignitaries and court officials.

¹⁶ Shih Ch'i ruled only 36 days.

¹⁷ Shih Ch'un reigned 183 days.

¹⁸ Wiegier L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1135.

They were able to overthrow emperors. In fact, there was no need for them to be involved in assassinations, clandestine activities and seduction. All they had to do was to give the Huns a little fireworks. When the power of national indignation put Jan Min on the throne, he immediately ordered massacre of all Huns in his country in accordance with the will of the people. This edict was carried out with such fervour that "many beak-nosed Chinese also died in the massacres." ¹⁹ In short, it was a genocide, but the horrors of the Huns were child's play in comparison. The Huns killed many people, but at first they did so for their own liberty and justice, later for the well-being of the state they had founded, and finally to restore state order in rebellious cities. All these movements were made in the name of self-protection and were out of necessity. The Chinese, on the other hand, killed foreigners, i.e. people who did not look like them in 350 just to kill them. This was more than racism and seemed to be the dominant event that would lead to consequences that Jan Min's dazzled followers could not foresee.

Against the Wind

Although the number of Huns killed within the walls of the capital was more than 200,000 and the exact number of those slaughtered in the whole country is unknown, the Huns managed not only to survive but also to organise themselves to resist. Shih Ch'i, Shih K'un, etc., led the Hun communities in revolt against the usurper. Jan Min responded to this movement by slaughtering 28 members of the Shih family, who had taken in a poor orphan, raised him and brought him to high positions. He now rejected his lifelong surname and proclaimed himself the founder of the Wei dynasty, within whose borders "barbarians" could only find a place in the grave. On the same days, Jan Min sent an envoy to South China: "The Hu tribes have rebelled in the Middle Va- ha; if you see fit to send troops, we will now punish them and bring them into submission together." ²⁰

19 Bichurin N.Ya. *Statističeskoye opisanije Kitayskoy imperii*. СПб., 1853, с.74-75. Ср.: Грумм-Гржимайло Г.Е. Западная монголия, с. 15, 140; eger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1135.

Wi-

20 Shan Yüe. *Očerki*, p. 146.

It is conceivable that the Eastern Chin leadership agreed to co-operate against the "barbarians". However, General Yin Hao, who was busy establishing a military colony in Chien-si at the time, found more than enough excuses for delay, Jan Min without reinforcements. In the meantime, the Hun general Shih Ch'i had taken refuge in the fortress of Hsiang-kuo and sought help from Mu-jung Ch'un. The old Tibetan commander Yao I-chung, trusting the Tibetan cavalry led by his brave and capable son Yao Hsien, also sided with him. Fu Hung, the commander of Ti at the western edge of the empire, also mobilised his own tribe to protect the hereditary dynasty. (350th year)

However, all these troops were outnumbered and disorganised against the 300,000-strong army of Jan Min, who took advantage of the good sense of the Chinese population in the country and held fortresses full of supplies. Desperation and despair drove the Huns, the only survivors, to fight back.

The first blow came from the Huns. Attacking the capital Yeh, the Huns suffered a complete defeat. Buoyed by his victory, Jan Min besieged Hsiang-kuo in 351. Shih Ch'i Mu-jung was able to send someone to Ch'un and promised to give him the imperial seal in return for the liberation of the fortress. (The delivery of the seal meant unconditional obedience).

Mu-jung Ch'un and his advisors had already been following the developments in North China for a long time. Already in 348, the issue of preparing preventive armies against the Next Chao had been raised at the court of the great yabgu, and the events of 349-350 had reinforced the correctness of this view. Following the events carefully, Mu-jung Ch'un made an alliance agreement with the Liang ruler in 349 and prepared a well-trained and disciplined army of 200 thousand men. In 350, the army occupied the city of Hi-ch'eng (Beijing) and made it a base for further attacks. Mu-jung Ch'un moved his capital from Lung-ch'eng to Hi-ch'eng in order to follow the course of events more closely. Thus, in 351, the Sienpi troops set out to help the Hsiang-kuo fortress.

However, while the Mu-jungs lingered on the roads, the old Tibetan commander Yao I-chung had already taken the initiative. I-chung sent his son Yao Hsien with the troops of the Hun commander Shih K'un, telling him to lift the siege at Hsiang-kuo and to "recognise the

He ordered him to bring the head of Jan Min, who had extinguished the hearth, who was "inhuman, unscrupulous and men- fur "21 . His view was, of course, completely contrary to that of the Chinese, who regarded Jan Min as a hero. Neither view, however, was well-founded, representing not the law of history, but rather the tension of fear, a natural consequence of the course of events, and two separate logics that gave rise to each other. Jan Min, who had adopted the principle of genocide as his motto in order to seize power had ignited such a fire of hatred even he could not extinguish it.

Tayfun

Jan Min, having received timely news of the attack by the Tibetan and Hun troops, sent his closing columns of mixed forces against them. Although one of his commanders advised him not to lift the siege of Hsien-ho, but to withdraw to a defensive position and wait for the opportune moment to strike the final blow, he himself decided to go to the front. This decision was caused the fortune telling of the palace astrologer: "Venus (the star of slaughter) has entered the Pleyad group, which means that it is time to finish off the Huns. "22 However, as often happened, the position of the stars could produce unexpected results. Jan Min's armies caught up with the enemy before they could close ranks and entered battle formation just as dust signals appeared on the horizon, indicating that the Sienpi army was advancing towards the battlefield. There could be no better morale booster than this to cause panic in the Chinese army. The combined triple attack of Tibet, Syenpi and Huns had done the job. Jan Min managed to escape and, accompanied by a few cavalymen, the city of Yeh. A third of the entire had died on the battlefield. A well-educated Chinese, looking not at the sky but at his surroundings, could well realise that the star Venus had completed its mission with Pleyad.

As soon as the news of Jan Min's defeat was heard in the country, the foreigners who had been exiled to various settlements of the empire out for their homes. These people, who did not have enough food, plundered the city and killed the people they found. The Chinese who tried to protect themselves also killed them, but in the end...

21 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1138.

22 *Ibid*, p. 1139.

and the country became a desolate wasteland. Hunger raged, epidemics ravaged, and no one even thought of cultivating their fields. A sam wind had passed over North China.

However, Jan Min, who had lost none of his energy, organised a new army from the remnants of the previous soldiers. When the Hun commander Liu Hsi-en appeared in front of the capital walls, Jan Min dealt him such a heavy blow that the bodies of 30,000 Huns remained on the battlefield. Liu Hsien began negotiations with Jan Min, promising to negotiate with Shih Ch'i for his obedience, but when he failed to do so, he killed Shih Ch'i and took the throne at Hsien-ho. The following year, 352, Jan Min captured Hsiang-kuo. He had Liu Hsien slain and the last Hun capital razed to the ground and the survivors taken to Yeh to punish him for killing the ruler and betraying him. He then travelled eastwards to settle accounts with the Syenpis. However, Mu-jung K'o managed to seize the initiative and occupied Hsiang-kuo.

Jan Min tried to retreat to Ch'ang-an, but the Syenpis him. When the excellent Chinese infantry could not outflank the light nomadic cavalry, the Chinese cavalry, using classical nomadic tactics and thus able to neutralise the superior strength of the enemy, accepted the battle by exchanging places with the infantry. Since the tactic of spreading over the terrain was used here instead of disguising the attack, the forces of the sides were equal in other respects.

Surrounded by the Syenpis, Jan Min's army took up a more favourable position at Liang-tai and launched ten attacks in succession, unnerving the enemy to the point that he entered the battle in full fury. Although there was some murmuring in Mu-jung's ranks, most of them remained on the battlefield to finish off the Chinese army. Faced with this situation, Mu-jung K'o changed his war strategy, which was customary among nomads. He withdrew the main force of his army and allowed Jan Min to retreat. He kept a cavalry force of five thousand cavalry ready only to harass the enemy. As soon as the Chinese came out of their trenches, the Sienpi archers hunted them like partridges. Jan Min lined up his cavalry to protect his infantry, but even this did not prevent the Syenpis from renewing their attacks and making it easier for the battalions to manoeuvre. When the Chinese army reached the plain, Mu-jung prepared to meet K'o's army and the battle began.²³

23 Mailla, *Histoire*, IV/394-395.

Jan Min showed unprecedented heroism in this battle. With axe in his right hand and ukruk in his left, he rushed onto the battlefield and tried to break through the ranks of the charging enemy. Mu-jung K'o ordered his elite cavalry troops to capture Jan Min by throwing the steel cage on him.²⁴ Although Jan Min escaped by smashing the cage, he himself was captured when his wounded horse collapsed. He was brought before the Great Yabgu Mu-jung Ch'un and his head was separated from his body.

Immediately after the victory, the Sienpi troops rushed to the capital city of Yeh and found that it was already prepared for defence. Seeing the city under siege, some commanders and governors of some cities realised that resistance was futile and surrendered unconditionally.²⁵ However, hunger broke out in the city and people began to eat each other's flesh. First the women in Shih Hu's harem were eaten, then other women and children were consumed. The city surrendered just as the Siyenpis were preparing to launch an all-out attack. The Syenpian commander showed great magnanimity and appointed the self-surrendered commander as the city's ruler. After a decisive and brilliant victory, Mu-jung Ch'un took an emperor's crown and said to the envoy sent by the Chin Empire from Nanjing: "On your return, inform the Son of Heaven that the Central Oasis State has chosen me as emperor for lack of a better man."²⁶

The new empire, named Yen²⁷, was also half-Chinese. From 357 onwards, the city of Yeh became its capital.

Conclusion

A historical period, which had begun in 304, came to an end in 352. The ethnos of Hun servants, who had first won victories for the aristocratic class at its head and then settled scores with it, was wiped off the stage of life. From 353 onwards, the struggle for dominance over the Central Oasis drove a wedge between the Syenpis and the Tibetans, who had previously been close friends. Having eliminated the Huns, the Chinese had gained nothing. Even the efforts of the south to free the country from the foreign yoke did not bring any results. In Chien-si, waiting for the outcome of events

²⁴ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1141.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/167.

Yin Hao did not even flinch as he watched Jan Min perish. He held out at Shou-ch'ung with an army of 70,000 until 353, but was then by Yao Hsien's Tibetan cavalry. The Chin Empire lost the Huang-ho Valley forever.

But can it be said that this half-century of history, which ended with the same disastrous results for the Huns and the Chinese, was prepared by the distribution of forces which the course of events revealed? Was it the ordinary mistakes of commanders and generals that led to the utter ruin of one branch of the Huns and the enslavement of two-thirds of the Chinese people? Or was it simple coincidental events that led to the senseless massacres²⁸ of millions of people without any other choice? There are different views on this matter, and the researcher may rely on a view that seems more realistic to him.

Let us recall the conversation of the Hun leader Liu Hsüan with the honourable prince Liu Yüan, who had returned to his nomadic homeland in 304. Both recognised that war was necessary, but for what and against whom? Liu Yüan wanted to establish a dynasty and he had achieved this both by fighting the nomads and by making peace with the Chinese. From that day onwards, that is, after Liu Yüan had set out, there could be no turning back therefore no salvation. The close relations between the two ethnos, the Huns and the Chinese, were so unlike each other that they were built on a foundation of constant distrust, both for the societies and for the individuals who made up the society, because of the unpleasant steps taken.

This "dissimilarity" was manifested as nuances of behaviour even in very small matters. But the life of a person, the fate of an ethnos, and to some extent even the fate of a state, is determined by unconscious reactions, so-called behavioural patterns, emerge in difficult moments. Jan Min, for example, killed the princes of the Shih family in the name of Greater China, and all Chinese still remember him with gratitude.²⁹ And here is Yao I-chung: Jan Min's action was not a nationalist an unwise act of treason.

²⁷ Established between IV and III centuries B.C., the Yen Dynasty had conquered the former Yang lands and spread to the extremes of North-East China. In order to justify themselves in the eyes of the Chinese people, the Mu-jungs also took an old Chinese name.

²⁸ Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 146.

He ordered his victorious son Yao Hsien to be beaten with a hundred sticks for failing to bring the head of Jan Min, who had managed to escape.³⁰ Because according to his ethical understanding, killing a traitor was much more important than defeating the enemy army.

In the war between Shih Lo and Liu Yao, there was no mercy! All Liu Yao's sons were killed. And his captured daughter was not killed, but became Shih Hu's favourite woman. Because in Hun migrations, women were not touched in such cases. In Chinese palaces, on the other hand, women were thrown into the dungeon and killed either by starvation or torture.

Many such examples could be given, but what must be known is that the clash between two different stereotypes of ethical behaviour produces a chimera-society that is absolutely incapable of survival. Therefore, the responsibility for the destruction of Northern China and the ruin of the Southern Huns must be laid at the feet of Liu Yüan, who, not knowing what he was trying to create, was carried away by humanist illusions.

Perhaps Liu Yüan was quite right in thinking that, by allying with the Sienpians, he could seize the territory of the Southern Huns in China and there set an example of a Hun state that was obedient to the Han Empire. This was indeed what the princes of the Ordos Huns, the last representatives of Hun culture after 350, when the death gong had not yet sounded.

What about his successors? The Syenpis, the Mu-jungs, remained a nomadic people, gathering around them the remnants of the Yüeban Tatabis, Kistanis and Tuan Wu-huans who were their relatives. They carefully attracted the Chinese to themselves and benefited from their experience, but they never submitted to them. The territory captured from the Chinese was not very large, and there was plenty of pasture in Inner China, mainly because it had been abandoned during the wars. The population of the Mu-jung Yen Empire was 2 460 thousand families³¹ This was 45 per cent of Chin Empire before its collapse. At this time, most the nomadic subjects of the Yen Empire lived in Manchuria and had little intermixture with the Chinese. Nomadic tribes

29 Agy.

30 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1138-39.

31 *Ibid*, p. 1156.

The Chinese were assigned other heavy physical labour duties, and even the princes lived in fear for their lives, as fratricide still continued among the Mu-jungs. In short, this programme did not bring happiness to the people; the masses showed a vague interest in political intrigue and military strife.

It can be said that the people of the Central Oasis dreamed of a government that would treat both the Chinese and other peoples equally justly, with firmness and goodwill. It is not strange that such a variant materialised, even if its consequences were unpredictable.

SECTION V

TENSION

Breezes of the Past

Mu-jung Ch'un and his advisers were prudent politicians. Although it was announced that the whole of China would be conquered, they invaded as much territory as they could hold without making any special effort, especially Shan-si and Shan-tung. Although the South Chinese were defeated and managed to recapture Ho-nan, a new suzerainty emerged in Shen-si. To understand how this happened, let us go back a few years.

First of all, it should be noted that the alluvial valley of the forested plateau welcomes the traveller with hills and mountains. Since the forest is slowly eroded, the valleys filled with rivers and streams have entered 200-500 metres into the plateau. The who live near the water there consider these hills as mountains. It can be said that this mountainous relief is sinking in the opposite direction, i.e. into the soil.

In addition, there are mountain ranges in Shen-si, which rise as if piercing the sky. To the south lie the Ch'in-ling ranges covered with broad-leaved forests.¹ This region, which presents a typical local appearance from the dense forests, through the steppe, to the Ordos Sahara, exceptionally forms different landscapes that intertwine in such a way as to play a role in the fate of the peoples living there.²

In the IVth century, the indigenous people of this beautiful country had not yet been swallowed by the Chinese. this people, whom we call Tankut, is not considered a great people, it has preserved its ancient traditions and has a unique ha...

1 Petrov M.P. *Po stepàm i pustynàm Tsentralnogo Kitaya*// Природа. 1959, № 11, с. 75-77.


2 Gumilëv L.N. *Po povodu "yedinoy" geography* (Landshaft i ethnos) Вестник ЛГУ. 1967, № 6, с. 125-128.
128.

in the past few years. In 3123 they were joined by many Tibetans, who exchanged the mountainous regions of Amdo for the lively banks of the river Wei. Later, during the time of the Hun rule, many nomadic Huns and Syenpis came and settled in this region.

These latter, while mistreating the sedentary Chinese, did not display antipathetic behaviour towards the sedentary Tankuts. When Shih Hu lost his popularity, military prestige and the Liang region, they thought of themselves first and foremost, and soon joined the Tankut leader P'u Hung, filling his not very large ranks.

Recall that Liang Tou's mixed Sino-Syenpian revolt was dispersed by Yao I-Chung's Tibetan troops. The latter aided by Tankut (Ti) P'u Hung, who preferred the Hun despot to the "freedom" offered by the Chinese. Shih Hu had appointed P'u Hung as governor of the Wei Valley (in Shen-si) because of his performance against the rebels. Jan Min, who wanted to get rid of foreign commanders, invited P'u Hung to the castle, but he realised that he was being set up and raised the flag of rebellion. After defeating Yao Hsien, the Tibetan commander sent by the Shih dynasty, and announcing that he sided with the Chin dynasty, P'u Hung received a dual title: yabgu for the nomads and ruler of the Ch'in dynasty for the sedentary mevali. This dynastic name was chosen after careful consideration, since the real Chinese considered the former Ch'in rulers to be half-Junglu and generally "barbaric". To follow such an example meant a right of supremacy in the eyes of the Tan- kuts and the possibility to continue the tradition of the former Ch'in dynasty, but it was very unpleasant for the Chinese. But if the old Ch'in dynasty had united China in the III century BC, then there was a concise meaning and an executable purpose in this nomenclature. Taking advantage of the fact that Shen-si was filled to the brim with warlike and determined people, the Tankuts had set themselves a goal: To mobilise all the peoples towards the conquest of China and the Great Steppe and the creation of a state that could unite all peoples under one roof, since the principle of racism had lost its popularity during the Jan Min period. In other words, the Tan- kuts took on the task of organising North China and achieved this difficult goal within forty years.

3 Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibet* 120.



Harita 4- Geçmişin Esintileri

On the advice of the sorcerer, P'u Hung changed his boy name to Fu, but this did not save him from disaster. Ma Chü, a former commander of the next Chao, poisoned Fu Hung when he was demoted for his failure in the war with Liang, but he was assassinated by his son, who ascended the throne in 351 as Fu Chien I.

Fu Chien I, taking advantage of the fall of the next Chao, seized Ch'ang-an and declared this famous city the new capital of the empire. However, since the Chinese, who believed that there could only be one emperor under the firmament, considered his action as an act of war, he would have to fight them.

The Liang Kingdom on the outskirts of Nan-shan was not a threat to the Tankuts, as it was shaken by the then customary murder of the throne-holder⁴. In 354, however, a powerful army arrived from South China, greeted with enthusiasm by the Chinese population in Shen-si. However, food shortages on the one hand and the aggressiveness of the Tankuts, who were holed up in the fortress of Ch'ang-an on the other, forced the Chinese commander Huan Wen to retreat.⁵ The Tankut army began to pursue the retreating Chinese troops, but during the retreat the crown prince, Fu Chien's brave and commanding son, was killed. It was a costly price for the victory achieved. The middle son, Fu Sheng, was born blind in one eye. Because of this disability, he was extremely cruel and fond of alcohol. His grandfather and father had never liked him; perhaps that is why, when he ascended the throne in 356, he took out his anger on their relatives and had five hundred of his father's retainers and officials slaughtered.⁶ His brothers were saved only by a counter-attack from the enemy with whom they were at war. They had a better chance of survival on the battlefield than in the palace.

This time, however, it was the Tibetans who opposed the Tankuts. When the old hero Yao I-chung died in 352, he left his son Yao Hsien in his place and advised him to obey the Chin Empire as he had done. However, Hsien did not get along with the Chinese and sided with Mu-jung Ch'un, who appointed him governor of Ho-nan, but he did not stay there for long, as his enemy Huan Wen, commander-in-chief of the South Chinese army, attacked northwards in 356. The Tibetans were defeated off I-shui (near Lo-yang).

4 Four monarchs ascended the throne in three years. See Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1142.

5 Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 146-147; Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1143.

6 Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibetap*117.

When he left the front and fled north-west, Huan Wen captured Lo-yang. There he rebuilt the tombs of the Chin emperors and returned home, leaving a strong garrison. The Syenpis had retreated behind the embankments of the Huang-ho river. This was a great source of honour for the Chinese army. Because of this, Huan Wen hoped that Yao Hsien would capture Shen-si, which he was heading towards with an army of 50 thousand men consisting of "Huns, Ch'iang (Tibetans) and Chinese "⁷

But he didn't get what he hoped for. Prince Fu Chien defeated his lethargic army and captured and killed him. His brother Yao Ch'ang obeyed the prince of Tankut and participated in the marches, obtaining a princely dignity; the people given to him were settled in Shen-si.

The prince was victorious, and the emperor, having robbed his inner circle of their face jewellery, retreated to the capital. But when the Tankuts fought for freedom in the IVth century, they did not think of silently enduring the ruin of a vindictive cripple. In 357, Princes Fu Fa and Fu Chien were warned by Fu Sheng's favourite that they would be assassinated the next day. On the night they received the warning, they came to the palace, accompanied by armed guards, and together they butchered Fu Sheng, whom they found deadly drunk.⁸

The loyal Fu Fa abdicated in favour of his younger brother, who took the title Fu Chien II. However, Fu Chien II had his own brother assassinated in order to honour the old Ch'in traditions. After this event, the foundation of a new empire, which pursued the policy of conquest of China and was fuelled by this dream, was completed. Dissatisfied with the situation, the princes of Tankut attempted a protest in 367, but they were not successful and paid for it with their lives.⁹ After this, Fu Chien II became not only emperor but also a maverick.

How could this new state be viewed? The Chinese regarded it as a barbarian state, but Fu Chien and those around him naturally took a contrary view. In 360, when the Siempi and Wu-huan armies informed Fu Chien that they wished to obey Fu Chien on condition that he would allow them to settle in his territory, the Ch'in counsellors told the ruler that "nomads have human faces, but animal hearts". They had no sense of humanity and culture.

⁷ Age., p. 121.

⁸ Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1146.

⁹ *Ibid* 1146-47.

Nothing could be done.¹⁰ Faced with pressure from his relatives, who considered themselves cultured people, Fu Chien settled his guests on the northern borders of the Great Wall, or rather its ruins. While this was not important for the Ch'in Empire, it would have important consequences for all its neighbours. The best way to realise old ideals is to deceive oneself, not one's surroundings. The Chinese inhabitants of Shen-si did not consider themselves Tankuts in any case, and the steppe people were surprised that Fu Chien was not their friend. Having lost their allied potential, the Tankuts had only their military prowess left, and they spoke of the "balance of forces", just as the soldiers of the Ch'in reign had once done.

The Tankuts were extremely pleased that their most dangerous rival, the Siyenpi Yen Empire, was forced to seek an alliance with Ch'in. In 360 Mu-jung Ch'un had died, leaving the throne to his son Mu-jung Wei (pronounced Vey). Wei had a wise vizier named Mu-jung K'o. K'o had taken the right decision, arguing the necessity of uniting with the Tankuts against South China. In 362, the Sienpis came to the Huang-ho plain surrounded by rivers, but the Chinese commander Huan Wen forced them to retreat.¹¹

Since the South Chinese were heavily fortified in the vicinity of Huang-ho and the Ho-pei people had assisted them in expelling the barbarians from the Central Oasis, the situation of the Sienpi Empire was grave. Therefore, they were only able to recapture Lo-yang in 365 with all their forces.

Encouraged by his victory, the Mu-jung Ch'ui cavalry cleared Shantung of Ch'in forces and advanced as far as the Huai River in 366. In 369 Huan Wen attempted a counter-attack, but off Fan-tou (at Ho-nan) the Chinese were defeated by the Sienpis. Following this, the Tankuts appeared and dealt another blow to the retreating South Chinese. Enraged, Huan Wen burned the fleet that would take them to the Huai River and hurried. Thus the Huai River again became the border between the "barbarians" and the Chinese nationalists.

¹⁰ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibet* 118.

¹¹ Wiegner, *Textes historiques*, p. 1147-49; Шан. Очерки. с. 147.

However, although Fu Chien solved the southern problem with the advantage of being allied with the Mu-jungs, an altogether more complicated situation had emerged in the north. In fact, the situation there was easier on the one hand and more complicated on the other.

Spring Rains

To the north of Shen-si lies Ordos, inhabited in the IVth century by Huns who did not take part in the conquest of China on Liu Yüan's side, and were therefore not destroyed by Jan Min. These Huns were ruled by another branch of the tribe of the old yabgu, who had separated from the main branch, which had become Chineseised as early as the III century. Unlike their kinsmen, the Huns of Ordos were related to the Tabgachs, and by the IVth century the blood of their princes was heavily infused with Tabgach blood, while, to be fair, the Tabgachs had just as much Hun blood injected into their veins.¹²

It seems that these Huns were so little Chineseised that when they rebelled and were defeated twice at the end of the III century, they became "relatives of the deceased" in Chinese eyes, but this was not taken into account in subsequent contacts, according to the tribal structure.

Ethnologically, we see a different variant of ethnos development in the Ordos Huns. This variant is the same as the one we saw when Liu Hsüan, who was proposed to establish an independent state, delegated this task to Prince Liu Yüan. They retained most of their nomadic traditions, established friendly relations with their neighbours the Tabgachs and the Tan- kuts, and preserved their autonomy and culture, although they were legally bound to the latter. The Ordos Huns and their ancestors during the development period of the state had a nomadic life style and clan system in full force. Historical sources¹³ mention 19 tribes "living independently and not mixing with each other". The important families are: Hu-yen, Pu (Su-pu), Lan and Ch'yao (-Ch'io-ling). They were the first to hold the ancient Hun posts within the clan boundaries and to bequeath them to the next generation. The Su-pu tribe became the jih-chuo, the Lan tribe the chü-ch'ü, the Ch'yao tribe the tang-hu, as well as the new posts of t'u-hou and ch'o-

12 Boodberg P. *Two notes*, p. 292-297.

13 Chin-shu. With reference to Bernshtam A. N. *Ocherki istorii gunnov*, pp. 221-222; cf. Gumilev L. N. *Xunnu*, pp. 71-83.

They held the positions of the Hu-yen tribe. Although we do not have information about the status of the Hu-yen tribe, we know that the mobilising force of this tribe migrated to the west only in 93. Therefore, the Hu-yen tribe could not take place in the hierarchical order among the Southern Huns.

The similarities end there, but the dissimilarities are no less striking. The yabgu is probably chosen, as an exception, from the Tu-ku tribe, which is mentioned in the list among the "ordinary" tribes. The highest positions are necessarily dual-titled, in accordance with ancient custom: Eastern and Western Hsien-wang, Eastern and Western Yih-li Wang (the titles include the Chinese word wang); other princes also use double titles: Yü-lü, Chien-shang Shou-fang, T'u-lu, Hsien- pu, An-lo, and a total of 16 high-ranking officials. All posts were divided among the relatives of the yabgun, meaning that power was de facto monopolised by the Tu- ku tribe. Thus, in addition to the existence of the old and new officials of the state, we see that the clan alliance was replaced by a single clan dominance. Apart from this dual-titled erkan-ı devlet system, we come across other lower-level positions, which can also be called the civil servant class. It is necessary to accept that the old state officials were removed [retired] from the administration by being given some titles. Otherwise, it would not have been possible to find positions for many new officials.

The territory under the rule of the Huns did not consist only of Ordos. The Shan-si Valleys to the east and the foothills of the Alashan Range to the west were also under their control. In the period that interests us the most, the Huns had two rulers: Liu Wei- ch'en in Ordos and his uncle Liu Ku-jen in Shan-si, who was close friends with him. As for the people, they were "a strong, powerful and rebellious people."¹⁴

In any case, the social structure of the Ordos Huns was based on extremely flimsy foundations, and although they held a geographically large territory (because the wars had shifted further south), they did not appear as a serious power for a long time. During the drought that prevailed in the II-III centuries, the Ordos plains, despite the proximity of rivers, could barely support a negligible proportion of the nomads. They were dependent on the rains that fell further south and saturated the forests of Shen-si with water.¹⁵ Only in the IVth century

14 Bernchtam A.N. *Ocherki istorii gunnov*, p. 221-222.

15 Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibeti*/113.

By the middle of the century, the situation had changed. The mu-sones from the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic cyclones, had changed their route.¹⁶ Now these winds carried the rain-laden clouds that had previously supplied the Siberian forests and the raging tributaries of the Huang-ho River to the vast lands of the Great Steppe.¹⁷ The water-starved land responded swiftly to this bounty. As the dry steppe was being replenished throughout, tamarisk trees began to bind the sand dunes together, lambs were fattened with fresh spring grasses, and horses began to recover from their feebleness. The Huns, favoured by heaven, felt themselves a powerful people again. In 361 Liu Wei-ch'en, who had received the Sienpi and Wu-huans fleeing from Fu Chien, broke his alliance with the Tankuts and allied himself with the Tabgach khan She-i Kien.

But the Tabgachs, separated from the Huns only by the Huang-ho river, were no less economically advanced. If until the middle of the IVth century these brave warriors had barely survived the cold winter months and the scorching heat of summer, they were now strengthened by the fact that Shê Kien Han recognised himself as Liu Wei-ch'en's master, not his ally. The latter, not getting on well with his semi-savage master, rebelled in 365, and he marched against him in 367. As the Huang-ho river, which was the border between the two sides, had not yet completely frozen over in autumn, Liu Wei-ch'en felt as secure as if he were in a castle in Ordos. She-i Kien ordered large tethers of reeds to be prepared and left in the current. The chunks of ice that hit them soon froze again. So the Sienpis crossed the Huang-ho as if they were crossing over a bridge. Liu Wei-ch'en, who had not counted on the enemy crossing the river, fled to the Tankuts and Ordos fell to the Tabgachs. If he had not turned his attention to the events at the southern extremities of the empire until 369, Fu Chien would certainly have turned to the northern frontiers in response. She-i Kien Khan had some respite but could not capitalise on the opportunity, having lost rear support. At a time when drought was scorching the Orkhon and Selenge coasts and the Sahara was digging its yellow fingers into Hangay and Hen-tei, the Tabgach khan considered himself the ruler of these empty lands. But the fertile rains turned the field into a rose-bedecked grey

16 For more details see: Gumilëv L.N. *Izmèneniya klimata i migratsii kočevnikov* (Changes in climate and migrations of nomads). Moscow, 1997, 2 vols. 444—552.

17 See Gumilëv L.N. *Geteroxronnost uvlajneniya Yevrazii v Sredniye veka* (Landshaft i ethnos). V. Вестник ЛГУ. 1966, № 18, с. 85; Открытые, с. 64.

He turned to the countryside and strong and capable people who did not want to submit to a foreign khan began to roam there, and these were the Ju-jans.

When we broaden our perspective and take a look, we come across what we call a people (ethnos), a group of people connected to each other in terms of lineage or origin, language and culture, very rarely indeed. During the emergence of an ethnos, these characteristics are not usually encountered, but later on, as a result of the close contact between the masses belonging to different tribes and different languages, the people who are derived through births begin to speak the same language, share the same traditions and finally carry the same cultural elements. For example, according to legend, the Romans, who did not yet exist until Romulus, and according to historical data, the Ottoman Turks and Sikhs emerged in this way. We are not always able to follow the process of ethnogenesis of this or that people until its emergence, but when we have the opportunity to follow this process, we are confronted with the fact that ethnic unity emerges as a result of historical events.

Ju-jan (Cucen, Juan-juan) is a people who literally appeared before the eyes of the historians of Central Asia. For they are the product of the mixture of the Siyen-pi and Hun tribes with the Tabgachs. The lucky people, who managed to escape from the ruthless enemy, found a shelter in the valleys of the vast Mongolia, then gradually fused among themselves, organised into an army towards the end of the IVth century and turned into an independent.¹⁸

It is accepted that the founder of the Ju-jan army was a person named Yü-chü-lü who managed to escape from the Chinese army. Yü-chü-lü gathered around him about a hundred fugitives like himself; these people belonging to different tribes and languages, brought together by the same historical fate, formed a group that constituted a central unity.

In 30 years they changed five rulers¹⁹ but by 390 the Ju-jan army had conquered the whole of Halha to challenge the powerful Tabgach state.²⁰

18 Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki*, p. 11-13.

19 "Pei-shih" records that these rulers were each other's sons. When subjected to criticism according to contemporary data, it will be seen that this is a blatant historical error. See Bichurin N.Ya. *Sobranie*, I/185. However, this error is not repeated in "Tung-chien Kang-mu". See Bichurin, age, p. 186.

20 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/186.

A little later, in the second half of the IV century, the Ti-li or T'ie-le (Teleuts) tribes, descendants of the "Red Ti" (Chi-di), began to appear on the steppe. Until then, the T'ie-le, living in the foothills of Nan-shan, had endured the mistreatment of the Chinese governors of the Liang Reign. It seemed that they had nowhere to turn. But after the serial killings that began in ³⁶³²¹ and the conflicts they caused, they gradually began to disperse northwards across the Gobi Desert, retaining their tribal-clan structure. In the Great Steppe there were great opportunities for tsarvism, and by the end of the IVth century the T'ie-les had multiplied to such an extent that by the end of the IVth century they had spread into all the regions of the desert conquered by the rains. The only danger to them was the Ju-jan.

The T'ie-le tribes were extremely necessary to the Jujans, but the Ju-jan army was not at all necessary to the T'ie-le. The Ju-jans were made up of people who shunned hard labour. Their children preferred tax collection to hard labour. The T'ie-les were used to hard labour. All they wanted was to be at the head of their herds and pay nothing to anyone.

These tendencies formed the political systems of both peoples: The Ju-jans were united in the army, relying on military power to overcome the neighbouring tribes; the Teleuts²² were bound together by the weak bonds of the tribal confederation and tried to maintain their independence with all their might. The Tabgachs left the northern steppes of their homeland to these two peoples and were forced to retreat to the east, to the south, but there they encountered the Tankuts.

Uragan

In 367 so radical changes took place in all three states scattered on the shores of the Huang-ho that we may call that year a lapse of time. When the Huns fell out with the Tabgachs, Liu Wei-ch'en recognised Fu Chien's sovereignty and increased the number of foreigners in the Chin suzerainty. Against the ruler's policy

²¹ Agy.

²² Only one of the Tie-le tribes is known by this name. It is made from the root "tie-le" and the Mongolian plural suffix +üt. In order not to confuse the ethnonym "tie-le" with the Turkish word "tölös" meaning "east wing army", we to use Teleüt instead of this root word. See L.N. Gumilëv, *Ancient Turks*, p. 13.

After the massacre of the emerging Tankut princes, the Tankut element in the Ch'in Empire diminished considerably, while in the Siyen- pi Yen Empire, Mu-junġ K'o, the "able and wise regent of the sovereign", or the patron of the able general Prince Mu-junġ Ch'ui, as well as the head of the administration, died. He was replaced by the jealous and short-sighted Mu-junġ P'ing as "regent", but the empress mother, who hated Mu-junġ Ch'ui, decided to get rid of her best general in co-operation with her vizier. Mu-junġ Ch'ui fled to Fu Chien II, who, to tell the truth, welcomed him with enthusiasm, thanks to some loyal friends who informed him in time of the plot against him.

It was a great loss for the Mu-jungs, but it also caused jealousy, anger and bitterness in the person in power at the time. The law of the course of events began to show its power. Like an avalanche rolling down from above, it grew stronger and stronger, crushing everything in its path, before it reached the people and creatures in the bosom of the valley who had lost the impulse to inertia, sometimes due to ignorance, sometimes due to shortsightedness - for an avalanche it does not matter what is in its path.

The Ch'in armies, under the command of the able General Wang Meng, had captured Lo-yang in an offensive. In early 370, in a night raid, they destroyed the Syenpis' fortified camp and burned their warehouses with all their military ammunition. The Yen Emperor Mu-jung Wei, after distributing the wealth of his "vizier" among his troops, led the army against the Tankuts. But alas, Tankut nationalist fervour was greatly enhanced by material rewards. The Si- yenpis were able to stop the Tankut offensive, but Mu-junġ P'ing abandoned the battlefield and fled alone to Yeh fortress, which was soon to be occupied by the Tankuts. The Tankut armies were so tightly disciplined and so eager to plunder that the nine million Chinese inhabitants of Ho-pei²³ were forced to return to their peaceful pursuits, leaving the Sienpis to their fate.

Mu-jung Wei and Mu-jung P'ing left the fortress and fled to their homes in the valley. Fu Chien, who came to Yeh, took the royal palace, his relatives

23 The figure is approximate. Because the entire population of the Yen Empire was 9 990 thousand people, some whom were Siyense (Wieger*Textes historiques*1156)

to Mu-jung Ch'ui, who was never abandoned by his people. Thus he was over. Unable to find the support he had hoped for in the valley, Mu-jung Wei had to rescue his clan from the headhunters, and this was only possible after he had been taken prisoner by the Tankuts. Fu Chien treated his young captive with compassion and settled him in the not-yet-fully-established Ch'ang-an together with other Si-yenpi slaves who served their benevolent conqueror. After this mutant victory, the Liang Kingdom and Togon also agreed to become vassals of the Ch'in Empire.²⁴

The capture of the Siyenpi tiger near Tibet had greatly pleased the Chinese dragon-horse, but the invincible pangolin had again managed to escape. In the meantime, Huang Wen, who wanted to move his army rapidly northwards, took action in 370, and in 371 he organised a coup d'état in which he replaced the emperor and made himself regent, a position he held until his death in 373. During these three years, Fu Chien reorganised his army, which was filled with Siyenpi soldiers, and started to attack the Chinese.

In 373, the Tankuts crossed the Ch'in-ling Mountains and captured Sih-ch'uan. Thus, they also secured their southern borders. In 376, the Liang Kingdom, which had penetrated into the territory of Tankut from the west, by an offensive. In the same year, She-i Kien, the brave khan of the Tabgachs, was assassinated by his out-of-wedlock son who killed all his brothers one by one. Only She-i Kien's infant grandson Kui survived this brutal massacre. Liu Wei-ch'en Tankut, taking advantage of the turmoil in the Tabgach court, attacked with his army and both finished off the murderer and ended the independence of the Tabgach khanate. Thus the steppe was divided into eastern (from Ordos) and western (Ordos and Alashan) parts, the administration of which was left to the Hun princes. Liu Ku-jen ruled the east and Liu Wei-ch'en the west from these Hun princes, who were loyal allies of the Tankut ruler or the Chin emperor. The successes of Tankut's army aroused such fear among his contemporaries that even Korean sovereigns such as Kōgūryo and Silla²⁵ sent envoys to Ch'ang-an with gifts, which, according to Chinese ceremonial, were regarded as a kind of tribute. The unification of North China, considered to be the homeland of Chinese nationalism, ended with the organisation of a foreign sovereignty.

²⁴ Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1157.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p1162.

Open Air

During these twenty years, during which the armies of Tankut raced from victory to victory on all frontiers, peace reigned throughout the country and cultural life flourished. Both situations, however, were accompanied by a growing of disasters, perhaps caused by the vast expansion of the Ch'in Empire's borders. In fact, as we shall see, both processes were interconnected and had a single meaning.

At that time, the Tankuts, who had taken the initiative for unity and stability in China and the Great Steppe south of the Gobi Desert, were in fact an absolute minority among the peoples of the region. At the time of the Tankuts' conquest of Shen-si alone, at the time of the empire's first establishment, the Chinese population in the region was no less than that of people belonging to foreign tribes. The foreign tribes, other than the "Ti", consisted of Tibetans who had migrated from the mountainous Amdo, and Huns who had mixed with the Syenpis in Ordos and Alashan. This interbreeding worried the commanders of Tankut. For these people were little suited to be used as soldiers and were foreigners who were not very sympathetic to them. However, the opposition of the Tankut princes in 367 and their incorporation into the Chin empire in North-East China, where the Syenpis represented a minority and the Chinese a majority, made the Ti tribes (the Tankuts) less important, even though they constituted the ruling minority. The Tankuts could not remain silent in this situation. Here we leave it to the science of the unseen, which we now call futurology.

At that time, diagnoses were based on prophecies; for this, astrology or dream interpretations were relied upon. We leave aside our opinion as to how accurate these methods were, but it should be noted that the judgements made on the basis of them were considered very realistic: According to the sorcerers, the danger would come from the Siyenpis, who had to be exterminated in advance.

Such discussions began in 373, more or less immediately after the conquest of the Yen Empire. When the prophets' prediction the Chin Empire would be wiped out by the Siyenpis did not prove to be correct, an unknown person shouted in the palace: "The fish and sheep are devouring people - disaster!"²⁶ Even the same

²⁶ According to the hieroglyphic writing, the word "Siyenpi" fish and sheep.
See Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1159.

The person also precisely determined the dates of the events that were to occur, even though they were later recorded by chroniclers.

Fu Chien II replied to those around him in his liberal humanist mood: "Chinese and barbarians, they are all my children. We will get along well with them and there will be no evil."²⁷ This was not just a casual remark, but a policy would prove to be correct. In the same year 373, the Tankuts captured the fortress of P'u- ch'eng in the Han river valley, and the commander of the fortress was captured. The commander responded to Fu Chien's offer of a commission by accusing the Tankut government of barbarism and likening the court to a herd of dogs and cattle. The enraged Tankuts demanded that the sovereign allow him to be slaughtered, but Fu Chien continued to treat him well.²⁸ He even treated the Sienpi prince Mu-jung Ch'ui, the Hun princes Liu Wei-ch'en and Liu Ku-jen, and the Tibetan commander Yao Ch'ang, who had been captured during the war and saved his life by declaring his obedience. Isn't it a bit strange that a man who had his own brothers slaughtered and showed no mercy in dealing with his own relatives would act in such a humanistic manner?

Indeed, if we look at what happened, Fu Chien II's behaviour shows not only his character but also his political calculations. It also shows his ideological orientation. Fu Chien II, an ardent Buddhist in the past, Confucianism, but in 375 he banned Daoism for fear of death, and the first thing he did was to have the director of the archives beheaded for reading Daoist books.²⁹ The explanation for such an inclination is quite simple. The Confucianists constituted the most active section of the Chinese ruling class, and therefore anyone wishing to conquer China have to get on well with them.³⁰ The Daoists, on the other hand, were usually the ga-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.1159.

²⁸ It should be noted here that this commander surrendered the fortress in order to save his mother, who had been captured by the Tankuts. In our opinion, his act a kind of treason, but according to Confucianist philosophy, concern for the parent is to concern for the state. The commander himself with this philosophy and showed his loyalty to his homeland by behaving badly towards the conquerors.

²⁹ Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1160.

³⁰ In 379, for example, a traitor opened the gates of San-yen, a fortress on the lower reaches of the Han River, to the Tankuts. Fu Chien had the traitor put to death, and Chu Hsü, the fort's valiant commander, was given a high military position (Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1163-64).

they monopolised the business of divination, which we call foretelling. The edict of 375 even protected the Ch'in emperor against unpleasant prophecies. It seems that the rulers had little compassion.

Here, we can see that the hospitality shown to members of foreign tribes -In other words, national policy can be thought to be based on such a calculation. The new subjects within the Ch'in Empire the majority, and after each victory it became more and more difficult to hold in check. It was therefore necessary to bind them to power with favourable treatment and material benefits. The ethnically mosaic-like Ch'in Empire could only survive in this way. In the first moments, this policy proved to be beneficial: In 381, all the tribes living within China and 62 small oasis chieftains in the Tarim river basin requested that foreigners be admitted as subjects of the great Ch'in Empire, where they lived in favourable conditions.³¹

But were things really good in the Ch'in Empire? Of course, the defeated Sienpi armies quietly obeyed, and the mountainous Sikh-ch'uan tribes favoured their kin the Tankuts over the Chinese. It was only South China that stubbornly resisted. Togon retained its independence, but it was only in 382 that Turfan and the Shan-shan principality appealed for help against their neighbours, who had renounced contact with the Tankuts.

Fu Chien II promptly sent a strong army westwards under the able commander-in-chief Lū Huang, who crossed the desert in 383 and camped in front of the walls of Tankut. Tankut surrendered, but the ruler of Kucha, who bore the title of "bay", rallied his forces and launched a seven-fold offensive against Lū Huang's large army, but suffered a heavy defeat in 384..When Lū Huang, who occupied Kucha, saw that it was a small copy of Ch'ang-an, he treated its people so well that his reputation spread to other oases. This humanitarian behaviour based on force apparently favoured an alliance with the Ch'in Empire. Meanwhile, Lū Huang's news from China encouraged him to make Kucha the capital of his new independent principality, but for unknown reasons he abandoned this project and returned to Hang-chou in 386, plundering the captured territories.

³¹ *Ibid* p1162.

expelled the Chinese governor there and conquered the former Liang Principality in his own name.³²

The answer to the question of how and why such an energetic general, who could not be labelled a traitor, became his own master can be found in a review of events in China. For in the intervening three years, Lü Huang had consolidated Tankut's rule on the outskirts of T'ien-shan, while the Ch'in Empire had breathed its last.

Hurricane

In 379 the Tankut armies carried out planned raids upstream of Yang-tse. For one thing, the Ch'in dynasty's authority there was weak. It held the territory by intimidating the local population with fear and a series of fortresses fortified with strong garrisons. The Tankuts had conquered fortress after fortress, but they had spent a lot of time and effort in vain, as the results were not significant.

Fu Chien a blow to the south-east in 379. The Tankut armies had reached the Huai River and approached the centre of South China. Fu Chien more or less felt that the last days of the Ch'in Empire were approaching. Relying on his 970,000-strong army (this figure is left to the conscience of the chronicler), he thought he could easily conquer South China.

His viziers, however, were less optimistic. They therefore advised their sovereign to abandon these expeditions, which were unnecessary and dangerous for the state. A greater danger, in their view, was the possibility of the subjugated peoples breaking away from them in the chaos of war.³³ Despite all the advice and suggestions that conquest was the wrong thing to undertake, Fu Chien II ordered the mobilisation of 10 per cent of the population in 383. According to the Chinese theoretical calculation system, 700,000 infantry and 270,000 cavalry were gathered. Leaving aside the issue of what the actual figure was, we can say that in any case a large army was gathered.

³² *Ibid*p1168.

³³ *Ibid*p1165.

Before the vanguard troops of the former Liang Principality had reached the Wei River, the advanced detachments had already reached the banks of the Huai River. It was decided to deploy them at Sih-ch'uan, and the most important front-line tasks were assigned to the Sienpi cavalry under Mu-jung Ch'ui and the elite Chinese infantry of Chu Hsü, until recently a prisoner of war. The command of the vanguard was left to the capable and stubborn prince Fu Jung.

The Ch'in army was vastly superior in numbers to the 80,000-strong South Chinese army, but the warriors were not chess pawns and the battlefield was not a blackboard. The Ch'in army was made up almost entirely of tribesmen who, like the Si-yenpis, had been subjugated at gunpoint some time before, and prisoners of war, mostly small Chinese units. They were not Tankut and had obeyed the Tankut ruler but had not become Tankutised. This was the fact that Fu Chi-en II did not want to see and understand. According to him, ethnic distinction was not important, favours done to such people were important. Therefore, he showered foreigners with kindness and fully believed that they would repay the favours. But he did not even think that the strong could suppress his personal feelings and personal interests.

Ch'in attacks spread on all fronts from Ho-pei in the west to Shou-ch'un in the east. Having captured Shou-ch'un, Fu Jung halted the advance of the South Chinese army. Fu Chien, buoyed by his easy victories, left some of his infantry in Hsiang-ch'en (Ho-nan) and marched to Shou-ch'un with 80,000 light cavalry. It was supposedly no big deal to crush an enemy weighing five crats.

But here treachery would again play its part. Chu Hsü warned the Ch'in commanders Hsie Shih and Hsie Hsüan (pronounced Sie Hsü-an) about the positions of their armies and advised them to stop the Tankuts before the enemy armies could meet each other. Hsie Shih immediately organised an elite cavalry force of five thousand men, marched through the passes and appeared in the rear of the Ch'in army, and, in an evening attack at Lo-chien, devastated the Tankuts and their forces. This unexpected blow a warning to Fu Chien to withdraw his army to the east. Thus the northern and southern armies met at Shou-yang and camped on the banks of the Fei River.

And it was there that a strange incident of treachery and stupidity would occur. Following Chu Hsü's advice, the Chinese commander Hsie Shih proposed to Fu Chien that Chinese troops be allowed to land on the banks of the Fei River and engage in a decisive battle. Although it was not common practice to enter into negotiations with the enemy before the battle, Fu Chien gladly accepted the offer and ordered his army to retreat, confident that his armoured cavalry could sweep the enemy into the river.

However, instead of retreating, the army began to desert, not because of the enemy, but because of a failed administration. The soldiers, who started to desert in a few minutes, were not in a position to make an orderly retreat, let alone protect themselves. Faced with this situation, the Chinese went to the shore with open arms and slaughtered the deserters they caught. Fu Jung, who was trying to gather the dispersed army, was captured as a result of the fall of his horse and his head was separated from his body. As for Fu Chien, he managed to escape thanks to the protection of the 30 thousand-strong Syenpi army under the command of Mu-jung Ch'ui, who did not enter the battle but kept his discipline. Meanwhile, Chu Hsü, formerly the ruler of Li-ang, and many other Chinese threw away their Tankut flags and returned home. The victors captured Fu Chien's dragon-crowned armoured chariot and many other weapons. It was a crushing and final defeat. China was saved.

When the messenger brought the news of victory to Chien-k'ang (today's Nankin), the vizier was playing chess with a friend. After reading the card, he left it on the divan and finished the game. To his friend's question, "What's up?" he simply replied, "important; our boys have finished off the hay-berries." ³⁴ Just like that! So what was this? Self-control or indifference? In view the avalanche of events that were to follow, was really not yet a big deal.

The Fall of the Empire

At the end of the day, only a thousand Tankut soldiers accompanying the ruler and 30,000 Syenpi under Mu-jung Ch'ui remained from the powerful Ch'in army. Fu Chien, fearing pursuit, joined forces with Mu-jung Ch'ui's forces and took advantage of the opportunity.

³⁴ *Ibid* p1175.

The Sienpi lords and Ch'ui's son Mu-jung Pao, who wanted to avenge the conquest of their state, demanded that he allow them to do so. Mu-jung Ch'ui, however, not only refused to allow such a thing, but in order to justify the salt he had eaten, he also saved Fu Chien's life and made sure that he reached the city of Lo-yang safely, where the loyal Tankut garrison was located. The deserters who had survived the war and up a tenth of his army had also arrived here.³⁵

If the Chinese had shown more resilience and initiative in 383, they could have saved a significant part, if not all, of North China. But since they contented themselves with some limited raids on Shan-tung and the recapture of a number of fortresses, Fu Chien was able to catch his breath, while the people of Ho-nan suffered yet another disappointment under the Ch'in dynasty.³⁶

Mu-jung Ch'ui, who had brought Fu Chien to the Shen-si frontier, asked him to allow him to go as far as his country suppress the disturbances that might arise after the defeat. Fu Chien, confident of the Sienpi prince's loyalty, granted the requested licence. In the meantime, the Tankut lords tried in vain to persuade Fu Chien kill or arrest Mu-jung Ch'ui, who was extremely popular among his tribe, but Fu Chien stated that he could not go back on his promise, and so Mu-jung Ch'ui returned to his country. Unbeknownst to Fu Chien, assassins pursued Ch'ui to kill him, trapped him on the Huang-ho bridge and showered him with arrows, but Mu-jung Ch'ui managed to escape by shielding the boat and reached his country safely.

In the meantime, a destructive hurricane had spread from the banks of the Fei to the southern tributaries of the Hu-ang-ho, and the Sienpis, who had been settled in the upper reaches of the Fei by the decision of Fu Chien himself, revolted. After his defeat, Fu Chien sent a Sienpi-born officer named Ch'i-fu Hou-jan against the rebels, regardless of the fact that he was related to them by blood. However, after uniting with his own tribesmen and clearing the region of the Tankuts, Hou-jan declared himself an independent ruler.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1176; Shan Yü. *Ocherki*, p. 148. The number of deserters is given as 100,000. If this figure is correct, Fu Chien would be in control of the situation after all. However, as we have seen, the exaggeration of the exact number of the army is also evident here.

³⁶ Shan Yü. *Ocherki*, p. 146.

In the east, a Ting-ling named Ti P'ing had gathered some of the deserters around him and laid siege to Lo-yang. The Mu-jung princes were also inciting their clansmen and Wu-huan relatives to break the yoke of Tankut. Only the city fortresses were under the control of the Chin army, and Mu-jung Ch'ui, who had travelled to Yeh, the capital of the Syenpi under the former Yen Empire, was denied entry when he wanted to visit his ancestral tomb. The situation had turned into a two-way conundrum. The princes of Tankut were grateful to Mu-jung Ch'ui for rescuing Fu Chien, but they recognised him as a traitor and hesitated whether he should be killed. Mu-jung Ch'ui again wanted to show his loyalty, but his clansmen insisted that he avenge the defeat of 370 by putting him in charge of the rebellion in 384. Let us not go into the details. When the Tankuts made an unsuccessful attempt to kill the Sienpi prince, Mu-jung Ch'ui declared that he no longer owed any loyalty and united with Ti P'ing. Lo-yang held out against the rebel offensives, but this did not discourage Mu-jung Ch'ui. With 20 thousand Sienpi warriors he gathered around him, he crossed to the north bank of the Huang-ho River and declared that he had re-established the Yen Empire. Fu Chien was in no position to do anything to prevent this situation as the rebellions spread all over the country.

Another man, Mu-jung Nung, had meanwhile revolted the Wu-huans; armed with maces and slingshots, the rebels routed the regular Tankut troops. Mu-jung Nung had also revolted the Sienpi soldiers camped on the borders of Shan-si and Shen-si. Fu Chien sent a Tankut army of 50 thousand men under the command of his son, Yao I-chung's grandson Yao Ch'ang, with the Tibetan cavalry. The rebels retreated to the north to hide in the steppes. The Tankuts who caught up with them, acting contrary to Yao Ch'ang's advice "do not hold the mouse by the tail so that it does not bite", forced the enemy to fight and were defeated. When the prince was killed during the battles, Yao Ch'ang conveyed the situation to Fu Chien. Fu Chien's killing of the messenger, who was infuriated by the news he received, led even Yao Ch'ang, who was loyal to him, to revolt. By , Fu Chien was left with only the Tankuts.

In 385, Mu-jung counter-attacked and besieged the Tan- kut garrison in Ch'ui Yeh fortress. However, as the Tankuts fought hard, a corridor was opened and they were allowed to leave.

was taken. Mu-jung Ch'ui, who captured the capital, re-established the imperial organisation and pardoned civil servants and others. Thus, the newly established empire took the name of Next Yen.

Meanwhile, when Prince Mu-jung gathered an army from among his clansmen in Ch'ung Shen-si and began to ravage the Wei River valley, the frightened people fled from one side to the other. Fu Chien, who had retreated to Ch'ang-an, obeyed the sorcerer's advice to leave the city and retreated to the Wu-ts'iang-shan mountains, where he took his chambermaid and son and to gather followers. Mu-jung Ch'ung, who captured the abandoned capital garrison, allowed his troops to sack the city. Meanwhile, Yao Ch'ang, who learnt Fu Chien's whereabouts, came with his troops in 385, captured the emperor and strangled him to death. After this incident, Lü Huang gave up returning to China and decided to establish his own state in Hang-chou.

The fate of Fu Chien II is a real tragedy. One might even call it a tragic ending, if it does not contradict a strict historical analysis. In fact, an idea can only succeed if it is realistic. Attempting to perpetuate an unrealistic view, if there those who follow it, can only bring severe consequences. Fu Chien had received an education that was valid at the time, but not a professional education. In other , he was superficially knowledgeable. He should have taken logical approaches, not irrational actions, but he convinced himself that ethnicity was not an important problem for his fledgling state. According to him, people who were patronised and put under gratitude would repay the favours they received. In trivial matters this was true, but the Chinese saw Fu Chien as a Ti barbarian, the Siens as half-Chinese, the Tibetans as a representative of foreign tribes, and the Huns as a useful man. But that was all. However, one way or another, even if they were remorseful, people - Mu-jung Ch'ui, for example - had betrayed him. They could not have behaved otherwise. For they regarded service to the Ch'in emperor as obedience to the Tankut ruler who had deprived them of freedom and independence. This was a subconscious feeling, but even more powerful was the imperative of ethnic behaviour (ethologia) that drove the peoples of northern China to fight against the Tankut yoke, no matter how slight. This is why, after Fu Chien's death, there was not one big state on the Huang-ho coast, but rather eight small and hostile regional ethnic entities.

unity will emerge. Indeed, ethnic animosities had so shattered the iron ring of Ch'in despotism that Northern China was engulfed in disasters far greater than those we have described. This was not the result of the angry will of this or that people, but of uncontrollable historical laws.

SECTION VI

RUNNING AWAY FROM THE RAIN

Who is against whom?

After the death of Fu Chien II, the battles between the tribes, or rather ethnic groups, turned into an open war. But this was not a war in which everyone was waving swords against each other. Along with their sympathies and antipathies, the behaviour that liberated ethnic groups from the yoke of Tankut was gathered in a relatively strong system. Let us try to get to the bottom of the matter.

After the death of Fu Chien II, the Tankuts did not lay down their arms. Although the Great Ch'in Empire had disintegrated, the dashing and defeatist Ti tribes survived under the rule of the deceased emperor's son Fu P'ei (Fu Bey). The most important enemy of the Tankuts was Yao Ch'ang, the commander of their immediate neighbours, the Tibetans, who proclaimed himself emperor of the later Ch'in dynasty, thus continuing the tradition of the former dynasty.

The allegiance of the Siyenpi tribes, who represented the disorganised military fate of the whole of North China, to the Tankuts was clearly in a negative direction. They did not come together to fight the enemy, but rather tried to exploit the existing disorganisation as much as possible. The Siyenpi group living in the valleys of the Tao-ho and Wei-ho rivers had the best conditions. In 386 the leader of this group, Ch'i-fu Kou-jan, attempting to continue the traditions inherited from the former rulers, announced his invasion of the Shen-si region of the Western Ch'in Empire. However, this Siyenpi group also did not get on well with the Tibetans and could not help Yao Ch'ang in the wars with the descendants of Fu Chien. Because Ch'i-fu Kou-jan preferred to wait while maintaining military neutrality.

The fate of another group of Siyenpi who captured Ch'ang-an under Mu-jung Ch'ung unexpectedly turned out to be quite complicated.

had become a state of affairs. Mu-jung Ch'ung proclaimed himself ruler of Western Yen, but in 386 he was killed by the dagger of a bandit named T'u-an Su-ya, about whom we have no information except that he was defeated and slain by other princes of the Mu-jung family.¹ However, these avenged Syenpis left the sacked Ch'ang-an, marched along the Huang-ho and settled in Shan-si, where Western Yen Empire. The fate of this state, which had 400,000 inhabitants of Sienpi origin, was also bleak: For ten years, it had seven rulers who slaughtered each other without mercy. In 394, the last ruler, Mu-jung Ch'ui, the founder of the later Yen dynasty, the former head of the Mu-jung State, ruler of North-East China, was eliminated. His rule, however, did not extend to Northern Shan-si, which was conquered in 386 by the Tabgachs, who, having thrown off the yoke of Tankut, elected T'o-pa, the young and energetic grandson of Shê-i Kien, as khan. T'o-pa first changed the Chinese name of his state from Tai to Wei.² His aim was to conquer all of China. Because although Tai was a small principality, Wei had been a powerful monarchy 800 years earlier.


In the end, the South Chinese continued to be hostile to the Tankuts, although they had little hope of regaining their ancient territory on the Huang-ho coast and expelling the "barbarians" from Chinese territory. Having missed their opportunity after the battles around the Fei River, they were now looking for ways to make up for what they had lost.

But the Tankuts were not alone. The Huns of Ordos and the Jujans were their most ardent supporters. The Jujans had important enough political reasons for their deep sympathy for the Tankuts.

By the middle of the IVth century, the political situation had become so complex and tense that the Ju-jan army could not breathe without a protector. In order to avoid any conflict with the Tabgach khans, the Jujans favoured the victors. The Tankuts were far away and so they could pay them little or nothing. The Tankut Emperor Liu Wei-ch'en, on the other hand, needed the Jujans as an ally against the defeated but not completely disintegrated Tabgachs. These were essentially trivial matters, but the wreckage of the collapsed Tankut Chin Empire

1 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1186.

2 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/173.



HARİTA 5- Tibetliler Tankutlar'a Karşı

was disrupting. The population of the Western Jujans had increased thanks to the Teleut (T'ie- le) tribes driven north of the Gobi Desert by the Jujans and south by the Tankut rulers of the Liang region.

They had fallen into the favour of the Hun prince Liu Wei-ch'en, ruler of Ordos at the time of the split of the T'o-pa State in 377. However, Wei-ch'en was a friend of their only enemy, the Jujans, who were constantly raiding the Teleut tribes. Therefore, when T'o-pa became strong again, the Teleuts immediately joined T'o-pa. Thus strengthened, T'o-pa entered into an alliance with Mu-junġ Ch'ui, and in 386 the two powerful Sienpi kings eliminated the Hun principality in Northern Shan-si, ruled by Liu Ku-jen, son of Liu Hsien. All that remained of the Huns was Ordos, surrounded by the rushing rivers of summer and protected from the Tabgach invasion of later years.

Tibetans versus Tankuts

Failure on the battlefield seemed to be the fate of the Tankuts. Soon after the Syenpis left Ch'ang-an in 386, the Tankut army, led by Fu P'ei, Fu Chien's son, dealt a blow to their remnants, driving them out of the valley on the Huang-ho branch of the Fen River.³ Yao Ch'ang, meanwhile, occupied Ch'ang-an and announced that he had made it the capital of his empire.⁴ P'ei, with his battered army, entered the hollowed-out old capital of Lo-yang, which he intended to use as a base for attacks against the Syenpi and Tibetans, but there he received a blow in the back from the South Chinese. During the battles at Lo-yang he was killed and his son was captured and taken to Chien-k'ang, where he was imprisoned until his death.

It is understood that all kinds of violence and unprincipled behaviour were displayed in these battles. The Sienpi commander Mu-junġ Yün wanted to take Fu P'ei's captured widow into his marriage out of pity, but when the poor woman clung to the sword in self-defence, she was beaten to death. the Sienpis had previously permitted rape during warfare, they treated captured women a little more gently. Probably the fact that they had been living in China for half a century had made them far removed from their former customs.

³ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1188.

⁴ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibetap*121.

but could not stimulate the impulse to imitate Chinese civilisation. The issue of ethno-cultural contact had acquired such a character in the IVth century that neither contemporaries nor descendants could appreciate it. And this was probably not accidental. The extent to which the Tibetans of Yao Ch'ang's allegiance were inappropriate will be dealt with later. A change in the details of the behavioural stereotype always leads to a restructuring of the whole stereotype and even of the ethical principles of the eth- nos. For this reason, it would be wrong to determine the details of history by looking at this view, which at first glance seems to be very insignificant.

The valiant Tankuts had not laid down their arms. Fu Chien II's grandson Fu T'eng gathered an army of 50,000 volunteers in Shen-si and dealt Yao Ch'ang a heavy blow. The war between the Tibetans and the Tankuts was tense for both peoples for three years. In 389, the Tibetans succeeded in overpowering Fu T'eng by trapping him in a military camp with Tankut women. Fu T'eng's wife joined the fight on the back of her horse, bow and arrow in hand, until she was captured. They first attempted to rape her and then brutally murdered her.

The fire of Fu T'eng's comrades-in-arms was extinguished in 394, but he outlived his enemy Yao Ch'ang by a year. Yao Hsing, who succeeded him on the throne of the next Ch'in state, killed Fu T'eng and then his son in battle, putting an end to the independent existence of the Ti people. The remnants of this heroic people mingled with the victorious Tibetans and later became part of the medieval Tankuts or Tang-hsiangs.⁵ But now we need to be more concerned with the situation and circumstances of the victorious state of Next Ch'in. For this state, with a significant number of indigenous inhabitants, had become a Tibetan-Tankut-Chinese chimera, besieged from the east, west and north by the Syenpis, with whom the Ordos Huns who had taken refuge in Shen-si had attempted to test the Tabgach weapons.

Huns versus Tabgachs

The strengthening of the Tabgach khanate posed an equal threat to the Hun prince Liu Wei-ch'en and the Ju-jan khan Wen Ho-ti, who had lost the support of Tankut.⁶ Therefore, both rulers decided that the Syenpis

5 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 368.

6 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/185.

They began to endeavour to conclude an alliance with Yao Hsing, who would be unable to co-operate against their enemies. However, T'o-pa Kui khan, taking advantage of the Ti-bet's war with the Tankuts, began to pull the strings of this inevitable war.

T'o-pa Kui against the Ju-jans in 391. However, the Ju-jans, who refused to accept the war and retreated to the north, were forced to fight in the middle of the Gobi Desert, but they were defeated. The Tabgachs pursued them even though they ran out of food. Kui ordered their horses to be slaughtered and the enemy to be pursued. Eventually the fugitives had to surrender. Some of the Kuman- dan were beheaded, some of them were slaughtered, and the people were taken to China and settled in the Yün-Chung region (between the south of Nan-shan and the east of Ordos).⁷ In all probability, these nomads were necessary for T'o-pa to fill the cavalry ranks.

Recognising the impending danger, Liu Wei-ch'en charged T'o-pa'en from the south with all his armies, while the main forces of the Tabgachs pursued the defeated Ju-jans. However, T'o-pa, with his choicest cavalry units, disrupted Liu Wei-ch'en's army and returned triumphantly to Ordos. During the panic, Liu Wei-ch'en was killed by his own subjects, his eldest son was captured, and his younger son Ho-lien P'o-p'o managed to escape and took refuge in the next Ch'in.

Somehow the Huns were no match for the intrepid steppe nomads. The booty captured at Ordos was considerable, and it was "distributed in the state of T'o-pa with great favour. "⁸

But the Huns did not bow to the victors. From 391 to 394 they travelled in South China "carrying herds of cattle, sheep, carts, mules and countless household goods. They numbered thirty thousand in all, and were well treated wherever they went. "⁹

It must be admitted that the number of Huns travelling westwards to Ho-hsi, where they soon reappeared on the scene, was not small. The hour of final victory for the Tabgachs had not yet arrived, while the Jujans and Huns still found the strength in their hearts to resist the victors.

7 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, III/80.

8 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/174.

9 Bernchtam A.N. *Ocherki istorii gunnov*, p. 221.

It did not seem wise to the Jujans to die in a war with the Chinese for the honour of a foreign khan. On the other hand, the common fate they had encountered in the intervening half-century had been sufficient for them to become better united in language and origin than the T'ie-leler. They revolted in 394. Shê-lun, their ataman, was "clever, fierce and cunning".¹⁰ He intimidated his commanders into his service and kept them in line. After several unsuccessful attempts, he succeeded in leading his people to the sandy steppe at Halha, where he the scattered Teleut tribes and became "more powerful and dangerous".¹¹ His borders were Korea to the east and Karashar to the west.

The great victories of the Tabgachs seemed to be time-breaks. For after four years it became clear that the Great Steppe had not only been lost, but had become a land of constant danger for the Tabgach nomads in Yin-shan. It was better to leave Ordos, which had become isolated. Because the existing military forces were not sufficient to wage life-and-death battles against their own tribesmen, the Mu-jungſ, let alone against foreigners, let alone conquest movements.

Tabgachs against Mu-jungs

The most powerful ruler on the Huang-ho coast was Mu-jung Ch'ui. But this did not favour the Tabgach khan T'o-pa Kui, nor those around him. The powerful energy boiling in their blood pushed them to build an empire more powerful than the Chao empire of the Huns, the Ch'in empire of the Tankuts and the Yen empire of the Syenpis. Unfortunately, T'o-pa Kui's title of Wei-wang him to second rank. In this situation, all his counsellors insisted on their appointment as senior lords in the emperor's court; they made no demands for themselves for the sake of the people's exaltation.

The Persians had a proverb that "two swords cannot fit in one henna". There could not be two emperors in North China either. Therefore, a conflict between the Mu-jungs and the Tabgachs was inevitable. T'o-pa Kui himself facilitated such a clash when he broke the alliance with the Mu-jungſ by sweeping through the Kintan and Hi (Tatabis) tribes in Central Manchuria. While they were busy with the Tabgach in Ordos, the Mu-jungſ-

¹⁰ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/186.

¹¹ Age., p. 186-187.

As the Koreans were also engaged in stopping the attacks of the Koreans at Liao-tung in 385, the relations between the two states became more tense, but did not reach the point of civil war. However, after the Koreans were defeated, the time had come to attack T'o-pa.

T'o-pa Kui, who had maintained a nominal vassal allegiance until 395, attacked the Mu-junġ border region in July 395.

Mu-junġ Ch'ui sent his regent Mu-junġ Pao against him with an army of 80,000 men. Initially retreating tactically, T'o-pa Kui crossed to Huang-ho, leaving the country to be plundered by the enemy.

Although the Mu-junġs captured many spoils, they did not go beyond Huang-ho. In the meantime, however, a 70,000-strong army of Tabgach cavalry moved behind Mu-junġ Pao and cut off his connection with the centre. However, Mu-junġ Pao broke the siege and attempted to return home. Now that the ice had thawed, T'o-pa Kui did not expect to be able to cross the river and land a back blow. In early December, however, there was suddenly a strong frost and the Huang-ho was completely covered with ice. 20,000 of the most elite Tabgach cavalry, commanded by the khan himself, crossed the river and began pursuing the enemy. "Sooner or later they would catch up."¹²

The Mu-jung army, convinced that the enemy was far away from them, did not take the necessary measures. Moreover, the commander of the rearguard, Mu-jung Ling, had left his troops free to hunt. In the sloping Sen-ho-p'u valley, Mu-junġ's army was caught in a severe snowstorm and "the weather turned as harsh as a knife".¹³ In the meantime, of course, enemy reconnaissance units had discovered the location of the rearguard.

T'o-pa Kui ordered the horses' heads to be tied and the soldiers to gag their mouths. The whole army climbed the mountain in silence all night long. At dawn, with the first rays of the sun, it was seen that "the enemy camp was asleep" below. At the commander's command, the Tabgach army poured like a flood on the sleeping Mu-junġs. The enemy fled in panic, leaving behind ten thousand dead. But even fleeing could not save them and they fell into the ambush waiting for them. Although they tried to escape by throwing away their weapons, they lost fifty thousand prisoners. Only Mu-junġ Pao managed to escape.

¹² Age., p. 175.

¹³ Agy.

This was followed by a terrible scene. T'o-pa Kui ordered the beheading of all prisoners in order to weaken the enemy. Fifteen thousand were put to the sword and their bodies thrown into the valley. The Tabgachs had won an important victory, but all was not yet lost. In April 396 Mu-jung Ch'ui himself, although ill, took charge of his army. He crossed the "stony hills" of the Ch'in-ling mountain range and appeared behind T'o-pa Kui.

Prince T'o-pa Kien, who had been guarding the capital, was killed on the battlefield and his entire hermitage fell into the hands of Mu-jung Ch'ui.

Panic broke out in the Tabgach army. Thinking that everything was over, T'o-pa Kui prepared to flee, but at the fateful moment of the battle Mu-jung Ch'ui fell ill again. Thus, deprived of its commander-in-chief, the army returned home without the success it had hoped for, and Mu-jung Ch'ui died soon after.

Mu-jung Ch'ui's illness is believed to have been caused by psychological trauma. While travelling through the Sen-ho-p'u valley, he saw thousands of human skeletons being nibbled by birds and gnawed by wolves, and he supposedly vomited blood out of shame and sorrow and fell ill. But the historian is not interested in this, but in another matter: How could a general's illness have such an effect on the army that it could lead the Mu-jungs to lose a victory they were so close to? How corrupt must a people be before a monarchist can find no one to whom he can entrust the command, and only the will of a strong commander is sufficient for the army to serve? The Syenpis were always weak in organisation, and civilisation had apparently failed to overcome the egoistic instincts of the steppe people. However, in the period of the Huns' ascendancy, there were certainly capable commanders who were able to see the job through to the end if the commander-in-chief fell ill. On the contrary, elemental emotions ruled the Sienpi soldiers. They took captives, plundered and wanted to take all the spoils home. Ti-pik landsknecht or condotyer psychology. This is what the Syenpis learnt in China!

Neither were the Tabgachs any better, who emerged in fratricidal strife for personal gain and ended their internal conflicts thanks to the iron fist of an energetic khan. The Chineseised Huns serving in both rival armies, and the Chinese themselves, were even worse. They were half

They differed from the civilised Siempis only in that they had lost the will to fight, and for this reason alone they could not object to their rule. T'o-pa Kui, perfectly aware of the characteristics of his opponents, relied exceptionally on cultured Confucianists to administer the conquered territories.¹⁴ This was a wise step, since the inevitable conflicts between nomads and settled farmers could now be amortised to some extent by a layer of bureaucracy that was sufficiently elastic to establish a *modus vivendi*.

Mu-jungs Against Tabgachs

The loss of a skilful commander and the loss of a battle is of course a severe consequence, but neither the loss of a battle the loss of a skilful commander means the complete ruin of a brave nation and a strong state. The Mu-jungs had sufficient reserves to resist T'o-pa Kui's attacks. In 396, T'o-pa Kui set out with an army of 400,000 Tab-gachs for the Mu-jung headquarters in northern Shan-si (Ma-i), and within a month he reached Chin-yang (at P'ing-chou).

Mu-jung Pao, who succeeded Mu-jung Ch'ui, was not in a position to organise resistance to such an attack, as he had already proved incapable in the Sen-ho-p'u valley. Indeed, the army sent against the Tabgachs was defeated and fled, and the Chinese inhabitants of the cities closed the gates and refused to let the deserters in. The last days of Mu-jung's regime seemed to be approaching.

With his successes, Cashion T'o-pa Kui dispersed his large cavalry army to the south-east, along all the old and new roads, where there was virtually no resistance. Only the three Mu-jung garrisons held out, but even they, despite their valiant resistance, eventually have to surrender the fortress of Yeh to the Tabgachs in tears. T'o-pa Kui had given up the siege of Chung-shan, the Mu-jung capital, because his conquest had cost him too many men. Because a lot of supplies were needed to continue the siege. T'o-pa Kui, on the other hand, could not spare both his soldiers and supplies, so he left the castle behind and headed towards Beijing and captured Hsin-t'u castle there.

¹⁴ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1199.

di. Mu-junḡ Pao made his final decision and, taking with him an army of professional killers, left the throne and the treasure from the sale of the harem to be plundered by the enemy. They met the enemy on the banks of the Hut-ho river. The murderous soldiers went round the rear of the Tabgach army and caused confusion by setting fire to the camp. But at the most critical moment of the fighting, a massacre suddenly broke out among the Mu-junḡ soldiers. It seems that the bandit army found themselves in the middle of the battle before they could adapt to their surroundings. Seeing this, T'o- pa Kui "put his army on high alert" and, in order to demoralise the enemy, had many fires lit outside the camp and charged at the enemy with all his lines. The Mu-junḡs scattered. Only 20,000 well-trained, battle-hardened troops remained with Mu-junḡ Pao, but as they retreated, they were caught in a severe snowstorm, a very rare occurrence in the Great Steppe in March and later.¹⁵ "Many of the soldiers were killed by severe frosts "¹⁶ and those who remained were no longer in a fighting condition. Realising that resistance had become impossible, Mu-junḡ Pao fled eastwards the city of Lung-ch'eng on the Ta-ling-ho river near the Li- ao-tung gulf. There he regrouped a sufficient number of Mu-junḡ troops and defeated the brave but insufficiently resilient Tabgach soldiers who had pursued him at Hsia-ch'in-chai.¹⁷

A fighting chance here might have restored their statehood to the Mu-junḡs, but they missed the victory by their own hand. The demoted Mu-junḡ Hu-ei rebelled and killed a few of his brothers, but he survived and was beheaded. Of course, this turmoil enabled T'o-pa Kui to gather new forces, defeat Prince Mu-junḡ Ling and capture Chung-shan in 397. Thus Kui became the ruler of all the vast valleys in the Lower Huang-ho.

Mu-junḡ's army was split in two. On the advice of the defeated Mu-junḡ Ling, who had fled to him, Mu-junḡ T'o, who commanded the Yeh garrison, left the Chinese inhabitants of the area to their fate, abandoned the city, and in 398 brought 40,000 Syenpis with their families to Shan-tung. There, away from the enemy and the central government, he felt

15 Just like the blizzard observed by I.HOvdienko on 14 August 1945. This storm lasted for two hours, but did not cause any casualties because the weather was warm. But of course the temperature is lower in March. See Ov- denko I.XVnutrennaya Mongolia. M., 1954, p. 25, 30.

16 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/176.

17 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1202.

declared himself the independent ruler of South Yen and subjugated all of Shan-tung.

Mu-jung Pao, who had lost his popularity after the defeat and was therefore wanted to be killed by his own officers, was in a difficult situation. He also fled to Shan-tung but was not accepted by Mu-jung T'o. The poor emperor could not find a place under the firmament. After many adventures, the rebels captured and killed him in Lung-ch'eng. His son Mu-jung Sheng suppressed the rebellion, but this time he had to fight with the Koguryols in the east. Mu-jung Sheng died in 401. His successor, Mu-jung Hsi, became a despot, provoked a popular revolt and was forced to flee. He was killed by Pao's son Mu-jung Yün in 407, but two years later he too ended his life during a popular revolt demanding a commander who could lead the struggle against the Tabgachs. Thus the powerful Yen Empire was divided into two weak sovereignties, although it retained its independence against the Tabgach khan, who in 398 took the title of Emperor of Wei (T'o-pa Wei or Northern Wei).

However, this mutant titulus did not allow T'o-pa Kui to complete his campaign, as the Ju-jans mobilised behind him and the year 399 was spent entirely in steppe warfare. Although the Tabgachs emerged victorious from the battles, the Ju-jans retreated north of the Gobi, and many captured Teleuts filled the ranks of the imperial cavalry, all these forces were to be devoted not to the battles against the Mu-jungs but to the defence of the south-west, where important changes had taken place during this time.

Chinese and Tibetans

It seems that after the Fei River victory, the South Chinese finally able to launch a large-scale offensive to the north. Moreover, the quarrel between the Tabgachs and the Mu-jungs helped them to reclaim the territories that had been overrun by the "bar-bars". However, there was no unity in the Eastern Chin Empire either: As early as the beginning of the IVth century, the empire was torn apart by rivalry between northern aristocrats, who had fled south in the face of the victorious Huns, and the native southern statesmen. On the other hand, the peasants, guided by dashing Daoist commanders, were divided into warring factions.

were opposed to both of them. The tradition of "yellow turbans" in the south had not yet disappeared. Therefore, the Chinese did not use this respite to increase their power, but rather to eliminate internal conflicts in their country.

We find it useful to draw the reader's attention to the rebellion and turmoil that led to the fall of the Chin dynasty within the framework of an acceptable research. First of all, it should be noted that in 385, power in the Chin Empire had passed into the hands of Sih-ma Tao-tse, a relative of Emperor Hsiao Wu-ti, who ruled South China as a conquered country. Persecutions, tortures and executions led to the revolt of the whole population; in 396 Hsiao Wu-ti was strangled to death by one of his wives, and against his son An-ti, who ascended the throne in 397, the local armed forces under Wang Kung¹⁸ on the one hand, and the peasants under Sung Tai, one of the followers of the doctrine of Taosism, the "fifth t'ous of rice", revolted on the other. After Sung Tai's death in 398, the rebels were led by his nephew Sung Ong. Sung Ong was officially labelled as a "pirate" by Chinese historians because he hid in the islands near the coast for a while.

We will not go into the details of these three years of bloody wars, which concerned only Chinese history and had nothing to do with the nomads. Suffice it to note that until 404 China was in no position to launch a counter-attack or to intervene itself. Of course, it was the Tibetan Yao Hsing who took advantage of this situation, occupying Lo-yang and the entire territory up to the Huai river.¹⁹ Although he did, in fact, resurrect the empire of his ancestors Shih Hu and Fu Chien II, he suffered the same fate as them.

The Tibetans did not attract the attention of the powerful khan T'o-pa Kui until they appeared in Shen-si, but when the two empires faced each other it was necessary to normalise relations. T'o-pa Kui offered Yao Hsing to marry his daughter to the Tabgach khan (i.e. himself). Yao Hsing replied that since the empress was a princess from the Mu-jung family, his daughter only become a chambermaid there, and that this offer would jeopardise him and his reign, as well as the customs of the time.

¹⁸ Wang's family to the aristocratic class of South China. See Shan Yüe. *Oçer-ki*, p. 151.

¹⁹ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1209-1210.

T'o-pa Kui's request was rejected, realising that he intended to make him accept the domination of the other side. Eventually, in 402, a war broke between the Tabgachs and the Tibetans, in which the latter were defeated.²⁰ The Tabgachs were unable to see it through to the end, as the Ju-jan- s, who had entered into an alliance with Yao Hsing, reappeared on the scene. Although T'o-pa Kui dispatched his army to the north and defeated the Ju-jans, he lost the initiative in the southern battles. This, of course, saved the Tibetan Ch'in Empire.

The shrewd Yao Hsing, realising that the state could not be strengthened by subjugating vast territories, ceded twenty provinces to South China in 405, along with their Chinese inhabitants.²¹ He also decided to eliminate the danger from the north by taking advantage of the Huns, the surviving mortal enemies of the Tabgachs.

Western Rivers

The region of oases between the Nan-shan mountain range and the plains at the elbow of Huang-ho officially constitutes the territory of the next Liang reign²² and is designated by the Chinese geographical division Ho-hsi, meaning "west side of the river" (Huang-ho). The inhabitants of this region included elements from all the populous tribes then inhabiting the Yellow River valley.

The Siempis, who belonged to the Mu-jung state and had fled westwards from the wild Tankuts, with braided hair, stocky build, narrow faces and beards; the Ch'iangs (Tibetan nomads), with short stature and protruding cheekbones; and the blue-eyed "Ti" of Shen-si, were wandering in this region, but in the early V century Huns of a particularly diverse ethnic composition had appeared. After Jan Min's treacherous attempt and Liu Wei-ch'en's defeat by T'o-pa Kui, most of the surviving Huns had fled to Ho-hsi, where they were rescued and gathered around their clansman Meng Sun. To the west of Ho-hsi lay Shan-shan and to the north-west Kao-ch'ang, colonies of the warlike Chinese who had settled in the Turfan valley since the Han dynasty.

²⁰ Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/525-527.

²¹ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibet* 122.

²² Or the re-erection of Muahhar Liang, founded by Tankut Liu Huang in 386.

The ethnic mosaic referred to here was created by immigrants from northern China, where living with constant warfare was considered the lesser of two evils. The refugees thought they could breathe a sigh of relief under the strict rule of Lü Huang, but they were deceived. The old general, growing senile, began to believe the word of informers and in 397 had a popular and respected Hun commander beheaded for no good reason. The Huns were not a people to sit and lament the grief of their relatives. Meng Sun, the nephew of the executed commander, summoned his tribesmen and offered to avenge the black mark on the deceased's family and to restore "Hun honour".²³ Thus armed, the Huns proclaimed Meng Sun ruler of the Northern Liang. A year later, the Tankuts were pushed far to the west from Hang-chou, which had been captured by the Huns.

In the same period, in 397, the Siyenpi Tu-fa tribes (tributaries of the Tabgachs), scattered along the shores of the northern tributaries of the Upper Huang-ho, broke away from Lü Huang. In 394, when the victorious Lü Huang even told the khan of the Tu-fa that the Tu-fa should receive a mutant title from his own hand, the khan refused, stating that neither he nor anyone else owed anything to his fellow tribesmen, since according to the customs of the time such a thing implied a kind of vassalage. However, when the same khan found an opportunity, he invaded the south-eastern part of the Ho-hsi and the upper reaches of the Huang-ho, subjugated the Tibetans, Tankuts and Chinese living there, and even conquered the territory extending to the borders of the Siyenpi-s Ch'i-fu Kuo-jan, the Western Ch'in principality. This Siyenpi principality was named Southern Liang and Lo-t'u near Hsi-ning became its capital.

When Lü Huang, demoralised by his failures, abdicated in favour of his son and died in 399, a struggle for the throne soon broke out. Instead of protecting the country, the princes and lords of Tankut started to kill each other with treacherous behaviour. Chinese Li Hao, the former governor of Tun-huang, who wanted to take advantage of this turmoil, broke away from the Tankuts and established his own independent Western Liang Principality. In 401 the Tibetans of the Later Ch'in Empire made an expedition to Ho-hsi the prince of Tankut, who was accused of many murders, took him to Ch'ang-an and condemned him to death. The Hun commander Meng Sun, who had conquered the territory of the next Li-ang, also captured Ho-

23 Wiegner L. *Textes historiques*, p.1207.

He founded a new Hun State in Hsi and ruled his country under the title of Chü-ch'ü. In Buddhist teachings, this state is to as the "Diamond of the Northern Region" because the Huns honoured knowledge from generation to generation. The founder of the dynasty, Meng Sun, left such profound traces in history and astronomy that his contemporaries gave him the nickname "genius" because of his extreme intelligence. Liang-chou, the capital of Ho-hsi, was able to compete in culture with Chien-k'ang (today's Nanjing), the capital of South China. It should not be forgotten that Meng Sun was a descendant of the "barbarians" ruled for 650 years by the yabgu of his father, the ka- tili Me-te. Under Meng Sun, the Huns had gained the military splendour that enabled them to resist the wild and brave Tabgachs with their dreadlocks.

In the Vth century, the ideological fate of East was decided and Buddhism entered the region. Everywhere this teaching was met with fierce opposition. In China, the long-standing gnashing of teeth against the Buddhist heralds, the Confucianists and Daoists together. At the western end, the Buddhists were opposed by the Manichaeans, while in Tibet Bhon (Bon/Mit- raism) was declared the state religion. T'o-pa Kui the Daoists²⁴ and opposed Buddhism. Therefore, the monks with shaved heads found refuge and support in the Chü-ch'ü and Tibetan Ch'in rulers²⁵. At the court of the Huns, Chinese, Indian and steppe cultures had almost formed a canonisation.

Meanwhile, it should not be forgotten that the Huns of the early V century were not at all similar to Meng Sun's comrades-in-arms. Because they had utilised the time well and had spoken out loud the words that would change the course of history.

Last Sparks

After the massacre of the followers of T'o-pa Kui at Ordos in 391, there seemed to be no hope for the revival of Hun independence. Liu Wei-ch'en's only son Ho-lien P'o-p'o, who had not perished under the Tabgach sword, sought refuge with Yao Hsing. He was intelligent and skilful. He was tall and well-built. Therefore, he was resilient and determined against suffering. In fact, the people gathered around him were brave and fi-

²⁴ *Ibid*p1209.

²⁵ *Ibid*p1225.

They were strong people. But even though Ho-lien P'o-p'o did not learn anything while fighting and saving his life, he was not left in a difficult situation because of his ignorance. He proved to be a good warrior and a not bad governor. Yao Hsing liked him very much, sought his advice and, despite his brother's warnings not to trust foreigners, gave him a high official position.

Ho-lien P'o-p'o, who did not consider his situation to be secure at all, left Yao Hsing's palace and came to the left bank of the Huang-ho, where he joined by 20,000 of his compatriots.²⁶ This is all that the historical sources tell us, but we should note that this information is fragmentary. It is difficult to know whether this was a planned move or a twist of fate. One way or another, however, in 407 a Hun state was established on the western shore of the Huang-ho, formed by volunteers who were determined to reclaim their ancestral lands and live there on their own, unencumbered by foreign rulers. This programme found its expression in the choice of the dynastic name, the Chinese custom adopted by all the foreign tribes then living in China. Ho-lien P'o-p'o, taking into account that the Huns recognised themselves as the descendants of Shung Wei, the last prince of the dynasty, who had been expelled from China to the steppe in the XVIII century BC, named his state Hsia, as if to show his rejection of the Chinese convention.²⁷

Even though the founder of the dynasty, the first emperor of China, was recognised as the Great Yü, the name Hsia was synonymous with savagery, vagrancy, vagabondism, vagabondism and rampant licentiousness, both for the Chinese and for the Tankuts (Ti) and Tibetans. However, even if Ho-lien P'o-p'o and his comrades-in-arms only received evil from their neighbours because of this wild choice, they themselves did not expect any mercy from anyone. They broke the alliance with the Tibetans, subjugated the Syen-pi nomads in the Southern Ordos, and drove the Tibetans to the Great Wall. The subjugated Siempis filled the Hun military ranks with ten thousand soldiers.

Unlike other leaders who were eager to build fortresses, organise a gentry class and enjoy the luxury of China, Ho-lien P'o-p'o said: "If we remain confined to any city, we will perish. We will blow over the enemy's head like a steppe wind. If the enemy will turn his head with his tail....

²⁶ Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/546.

²⁷ Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*, p. 12-14.

if he hides amongst them, we'll step on his tail and bring his head out. We'll tire them out and beat them up. And in ten years the whole north will be ours. Yao Hsing is dying. His son an idiot. When he dies, I will take Ch'ang-an. "²⁸

But it was not until Yao Hsing died that Ho-lien P'o-p'o organised a campaign against the Southern Liang prince Tu-fa Ju-t'an, who refused to give his daughter to the Hun commander. It is probable that the prince's refusal was only a pretext, and that Ho-lien P'o-p'o was actually thinking of expanding his borders. With an army of 20,000 cavalry against 70,000 Sienpi cavalry, he achieved a complete victory and had a *ku-le* built from the slain enemy heads. This, of course, terrified almost all his neighbours.

In the meantime, Yao Hsing, taking advantage of the fact that the Huns were at war with the Sienpians, intended to subjugate both sides. In 408 he sent two separate armies of 30,000 men each against Ju-t'an and Ho-lien P'o-p'o, but both were defeated.²⁹

Continuing his struggle against the Tibetans, Ho-lien P'o-p'o made several successful attacks along the Great Wall in 411, strengthening his ranks with the troops of the defeated Ch'in commanders. This result was very important for him. Because the number of warriors was sufficient, but this time his soldiers themselves had taken possession of the wealth that he had to pay as salary to his army. Going further south was both unnecessary and dangerous. Because the Ch'in Empire was still strong enough. Ho-lien P'o-p'o therefore contented himself with occupying eastern Ordos and re-establishing the state of his father Liu Wei-ch'en.

Fortune was also smiling on him: In 409, the powerful and sober Wei Emperor T'o-pa Kui had been assassinated by his son, and the country was in turmoil, with murders and executions depriving the Tabgachs of the means to confront the Huns. When T'o-pa Kui's successor, the khan-emperor T'o-pa Sseu, restored order in the country, it was too late to prepare for war. Because Ho-lien P'o-p'o was already ready for war.

Thus, two separate Hunnic states were established at almost the same time, but they were nothing alike! The Ho-hsi had for centuries been characterised by being sensitive, sensitive and unrepeatable to foreign mentality.

²⁸ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1228.

²⁹ Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/548.

A cultural accumulation, not far from the old traditions, had crystallised. In Ordos, on the other hand, there was a culture based on brute force and savagery, rejected even by the old traditions and contrary to any intellectual thought. Ho-lien P'o-p'o was not original either. The state he established was a copy of the Ju-jan khanate and gathered a variety of adventurous ethnic elements ready to serve under the banner of a successful appointee like him. But whereas the Ju-jans encompassed not only the vast expanses of the Great Steppe but also the Gobi desert, the Huns were trapped within the narrow confines of Ordos and had to destroy their neighbours before their neighbours destroyed them. We shall soon see whether this dream was realised.

From an Ethnological Perspective

Now, before proceeding to the next course of events, we must find the answer to the following question: What is the wisdom in telling the stories of countless murderers, tyrants, deceivers and traitors who became strong against the defenceless and fugitives against those who could defend themselves? If all the bloody events on the map of the IVth century always end in sad endings and all the historical figures we narrate have disappeared "without leaving anything positive for the centuries, without displaying a genius of labour", is it worth drawing the attention of the historian so much?

It is worth it; very much. Because the dark centuries of history, like the lights of culture, are extremely regular and are the golden autumns of civilisation. Sometimes it is a sick body, sometimes a violent crisis spasm, sometimes a contradictory fusion of different ethnic elements. We do not call the latter, which we encounter in particular, ethno-cultural chimeras for the sake of brevity when analysing the course of the "barbarian states" in China and the Great Steppe. Because while they were still in the incubation stage, the necessity of living side by side with each other stimulated the power in the last link of the chain; however, when they entered the wide arena of history, the military success achieved united more ethnic elements formed from different tribes around a single goal. This system continued to evolve as the initiative passed to the next one after the disappearance of the first link that initiated the unity. Just like this, the attempt of the Hun yabgu to unite the Huns, servants and Chinese under the rule of Liu-Han (304-328) Empire Chin

Chung's conspiracy and civil war caused by Shih Lo and Shih Hu's struggle for the throne. The Chao Empire fell victim to a genocide initiated by the Chinese Jan Min, who grew up in the Shih family; Fu Chien, who tried to win the hearts of his defeated rivals by extending the wings of mercy and compassion to them, was betrayed and killed by them. After the death of Mu-jung Ch'ui, who was struggling to give his people a taste of freedom, his clansmen started beheading each other instead of defending the state against the enemy, which led to the division of the state into two. The Huns, who had received protection against the Tabgachs in the next Ch'in Empire of Tibet, always waited for a favourable moment to leave their friends who had harboured them.

Finally, the small Liang principality founded by the Tankuts was divided into the self-governing Sienpi, Hun and Chinese states; The victorious Tabgach Khanate, which had become the Northern Wei Empire, had lost the whole steppe those whose ancestors to China and had barely held Or-doswhile Ho-pei and Shan-si it was able to retain the territories it had wrested from the Mu-jungs, of course only because there was no other power in the region to compete with it at that time.

This was the case, but wasn't this difference a line drawn by the guiding process? It was. Indeed, the succession of empires was no coincidence! This succession was a strict application of the observed ethnic principle. The tribes, which historical fate had thrown into foreign lands, were constantly, albeit spontaneously, separated from each other. Unable to live within their chimera system, these tribes broke away from each other, destroying their own and foreigners' lives. In 410, in the Huang-ho valley and the foothills of Nan-shan, ^{thirteen} small and weak tribal states emerged, sharing among themselves dominion over the densely populated Chinese population, but unfortunately unable to protect their own freedom. This was the situation in South China at the time when the aristocrats of the north were struggling with the southerners and the Taoists were driving the peasants of the mountain villages against the Confucianist officials. More interestingly, each ethnic group in itself the strength to defend itself against a stronger enemy. The only exception was

30 These are as follows from west to east: Hsi Liang, Pei Liang, Nan Liang, To-gon, Hsia, Hsi Chin, Hou Chin, Pei Wei, Pei Yen, Nan Yen. The eleventh is the Ju-jan khanate established in the steppe, but it is another variant that we have discussed in detail in our work *"Ancient Turks"*.

It was the Tankuts who were destroyed in 394. But this was a justifiable exception, which, as we shall see later, others would follow.

It may seem strange at first sight that many ethnic issues are not emphasised and that cultural phases are hardly mentioned, but this cannot be regarded as a coincidence, since social developments are of little interest to us. For a society to achieve a remarkable cultural development, a period longer than the lifespan of a generation is needed. However, all the states of the IVth century were short-lived. The comrades-in-arms of the founders of Liu-Han, the earlier and later Chao, the Great Chin, the later Ch'in and the later Yen states, let alone the small principalities, at best did not die a death so natural as to bequeath to their children (or even to their descendants) a more or less painful anxiety. Therefore, almost all of them, without exception, could only think of preserving the remnants of their own tribal traditions, and could only manage to employ Chinese bureaucratic administrative systems and Chinese officials in the administration of the peoples they conquered. Therefore, Chinese intellectuals had to live in deplorable living conditions, changing the tastes, customs and world views of the Chinese as well as those of the gentry, living side by side with them, but preserving their own cultural traditions.

We should note that an analogous process of displacement of the struck occurred in South China. There the Chinese were the rulers and the indigenous people belonging to Tibetan-o-Burman, Tai and even Malay groups were the ruled, but this did not prevent them from fusing with each other. As a result, the ancient Han ethnos split into two, marking the beginning of the northern and southern Chinese ethnos. This process lasted more than a hundred years. Therefore, we will not go any further, assuming that a different intensification made itself felt in the events of the V century.

Thus, the absence of an analysis of the development of social relations in the IV century does not require us to approach the subject with caution. On the contrary, from this point of view, we are not witnessing a single social process, but a number of fragmentary processes that are genetically unconnected with each other.

However, it is certainly not correct to consider the epic narrated here as a chain of coincidences. As we mentioned above

clinging to antagonistic contrasts may appear to be a kind of ethnic principle, but it does not bind all the inhabitants of the Huang-ho valley and the Nan-shan foothills into a single entity that can be perceived as a super-ethnos. In fact, this is the old eastern Eurasian steppe culture, which had been driven southwards by the arid climate over time. In the past, this culture in the Great Steppe also contained many ethnic elements. However, it was politically organised by the Huns before the II century, and then continued its natural course and reached Ku-olive China. Since tribes were the centre of power here, states were weakened. This may seem like a paradoxical thesis, but this is the general mechanism of the process.

The power of political systems (state, orda, tribal alliance) can be likened to the rapid physical movements of the human body. As it is known, speed is not only generated by the activation of this or that force, but also by their identical directions (vectors). Therefore, the activation of many (in our case ten) forces directed in different directions leads to mutual inactivation of each other, thus slowing down the movement. Conversely, the reduction of the forces activated leads to acceleration, since many obstacles are removed. In other words, as we have observed in the matter under consideration, the dimensions of the energy activated and the effect of the movement achieved are not always in direct proportion.

In the natural and nomadic way of life the strength of the system is determined by the number of loyal and brave warriors. But as we have already seen, the situation also deteriorated because of loyalty. Because no one would willingly lay down his life for a foreign master. If forced to do so, he would betray and flee. The ten states were a product of the highest level of this process. Because further disintegration was inevitable. Now heroism rises again to the first place; it is necessary to initiate a process of integration at the expense of the brave enemies who have been eliminated and the rivals who have reluctantly committed themselves, preferring obedience to death, which, as we shall see, has happened.

Therefore, I think that if we can comprehend the law of historical formation and ethnogenesis variant by subjecting simple and coincidental events to a rigorous comparison, we have laboured in vain. Moreover, the explanation of the mechanism of ethnogenesis in the ethnic contact zone in an atypical form,

In fact, it may be possible in analogical situations that occur in any historical period, i.e. every five thousand years. Therefore, it is worthwhile to follow the course of events, including natural ones, even at the expense of using unfamiliar geographical concepts and unpronounceable names.³¹

31 The Huns and Syenpis used their own Turkish and Mongolian names. For example Liu Wei-ch'eng- deer-ici, "guest" or "foreigner"; Liu Hsien-subar, "chubar-li" (horse underwear). In addition, predator names were on both sides. Unfortunately, the sweet pronunciation of these Chinese names reminds us of contemporary phonetics, not the events of the day. However, since in this work we focus on ethno-logical issues and do not deal with philological issues, we are not interested in whether the transcription is correct or not.

SECTION VII

COLOURS OF THE

Extinguishing

It is known that fire at its hottest point produces a white flame. But as the temperature drops, we can distinguish the colour of the spectrum: Dark red fire, reddish pale yellow and blue flames on the sides. Let us now use this example to illustrate the subject we have to analyse.

Without haste, let us establish the main direction of the process by utilising the details. In the Huang-ho valley there were eight sovereigns in 386, ten in 400, seven in 415, three in 425, and by 440 there were only two empires left, the Northern and the Southern Empires, which cut China in two.¹ True, within this narrow angle we must add the Principality of the Huns, which was far to the west, close to T'ien-shan. For, in spite of its borders, it too was the fruit of the same process of weakening or extinction, or rather of the "extinguished" state. This process was certainly not the consolidation of tribes into a people. The disappearance of its independent existence, so to speak, was due to the massacre of men and the sale of women and children as slaves. Despite the sophisticated extermination techniques of the time, some managed to escape the sword of the victors. Even if they did not find the sweet days of old, they came under the rule of another master and the process continued in many variants. Because everyone was given the unfair right to exercise the right to death.

To simplify the matter, let us try to use marking colours as the ancient Chinese did. The red colour indicates fire and reflects the Han traditions preserved in South China. Yellow, Earth

¹ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1186.

colour. It was chosen by T'o-pa Kui as the colour of the new Wei Empire founded by the Tabgachs in northern China.² Blue,³ indicating plants, was the permanent colour of the Turkic-speaking Hun tribes at the time of our interest. These survived, while the others disappeared. See also.

Destruction of the Mu-jungs

The situation of the northern branch of the Mu-jungs was not enviable. A small area around the Liao-tung Gulf, consisting of the cities of Hi (Beijing) and Lung-ch'eng (the royal capital), was under their control. The steppe part of western Manchuria was under the rule of the Ju-jan- lar, and Liao-tung was under the rule of the Korean kingdom of Kurguryo. Worst of all, however, the state was headed by the most foolish of fools, Mu-jung Hsi, who was the love captive of his wife. In 404, in order to please his wife, he organised a great hunt in the mountains, during which some five thousand soldiers (chasers), who had no clothes to wear and no food to eat, were killed.⁴


Similar "entertainments" were also organised by his most prominent public figures, one of whom was the Chinese adventurer Feng Pa, a constant companion of the monarch. When the queen died in 407, Mu-jung Hsi followed the funeral procession on foot to the cemetery 20 li away. While the funeral was still in progress, Feng Pa provoked the people of the capital city and brought Kao Yung, the successor of Mu-jungs, to the throne. Mu-jung Hsi, who had returned from the funeral, was not left in peace, but was captured and killed. Thus, Feng Pa took charge of the army; in 409, two of the palace guards killed Kao Yung for unknown reasons. Feng Pa had these two guards beheaded, ascended the throne himself and announced that he named his reign as Northern Yen. In 412, Northern Wei entered into an alliance with the Ju-jan dynasty⁵ and the Chin Empire, which promised to help him against the Tabgach Empire. Meanwhile, the Tabgachs were at war with the Huns and Ju-jans in the west and north. This situation provided the new Chinese sovereignty with 20 years of tranquillity.

2 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/177.

3 More precisely greenish blue. Because in Turkish the word "root" is used for both sky and plant colour.

4 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1225. Wieger records that most of the dead were mauled by tigers and wolves.

5 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1239.



Thus Feng Pa achieved what Chin Chung and Jan Min had failed to do. With his own forces he was able to save the Chinese people in Ho-pei from the "barbarians". Of course, the recklessness and disorder on the right wing of the Mu-jungs, who were frustrated by the irresponsible behaviour of the last ruler, played a major role in this. Perhaps it was not necessary to blame the troops of General Mu-jung T'o, who sat in Shan-tung, unwilling to take any interest in his northern tribesmen. Surely he too knew his relatives well!

However, not only was the Southern Yen suzerainty left on its own, but Mu-jung T'o's nephew and successor Mu-jung Ch'ao, who died in 405, was left unprotected against neighbouring Southern China, whose commander-in-chief Liu Yü had received a firm imperial directive to reclaim Shan-tung for China. A fleet of light ships carrying supplies for the Chinese army sailed out of the mouth of Yang-tse, entered the Huai river and managed to anchor at Shan-tung. In the mountainous part of the peninsula, the Chinese encountered 40 thousand Sienpi cavalry, but no result was obtained from the battles. In the face of this situation, the Chinese travelled behind the Sienpis with the news that a new army was coming to besiege the sea coast. Despairing of victory, the Syenpis dispersed in panic. Of course, the Chinese slaughtered the fleeing Si-yenpi soldiers with pleasure. Mu-jung Ch'ao was besieged in the fortress of his capital city, where a severe famine was raging. Headless, the besieged opened the gates to the Chinese in the hope that they would be forgiven, but they were disappointed. Liu Yu ordered the beheading of all those who defended the fortress - three thousand Sienpi soldiers, lords and ordinary ^{citizens}⁶. Mu-jung Ch'ao was sent in chains to Chien-k'ang beheaded by emperor's decree in 410. There were no more Mu-jungs.

The End of Southern Liang

The new rebellions in the south paved the way for further Chinese advances northwards. At the time when the victorious Liu Yü was appointed governor of the liberated Shan-tung, a rebellion had started around Chien-k'ang with the aim of overthrowing the Chin dynasty, which had harassed the South Chinese. Liu Yu, with his army of veterans

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 1239.

managed to return. The rebellion was suppressed⁷ but the offensive against the "barbarians" lost momentum. The other rebellion was suppressed in 412.⁸ The Chin administration had to contend with guards and commanders who tried to keep their northern neighbour alive. However, these sectarians were able to find enough respite for the struggle for independence.

The small Southern Liang kingdom contained many Syenpi armies composed of different tribes. the Syenpi-s spoke a single language, they could not become a single ethnos, as clan-tribal ties played a more important role than linguistic similarities. In 414, some ordas revolted against the Tu-fa tribe rulers. The ruler of Southern Liang left the capital under the protection of his son and marched against the rebels with a cavalry force of 7 thousand men. Chi-p'an, the leader of the Sienpis under the rule of Ba- ti Ch'in, thought to take advantage of this opportunity and captured the capital of Southern Liang with a cavalry army of 20 thousand men. Only the ruler's nephew Fan Ni managed to escape from the city and told his uncle what had happened. But there was nothing to be done now. The ruler disbanded his army and surrendered to Chi-p'an. Chi- p'an treated him with respect, but poisoned him a year later. Fan Ni, on the other hand, gathered his tribesmen and took refuge in the west with Meng Sun, Prince of Huns, where they were treated very well.⁹

Who benefited this tragedy? Probably no one! The victors merely collected booty and mocked the captives, but those who had acquired land would not be able to enjoy it because of its small population. The rebellious tribes did not gain their freedom, but they gained even more powerful and masters than before. It was inevitable that someone rebel against Chi-pang. The Huns thought of strengthening their ranks with the Sienpis who had taken refuge with them, but they realised that adding foreigners to their own sparsely populated people would not be beneficial. In any case, the members of the refugee Tu-fa tribe clung tightly to each other in the hope of finding a place for themselves under the firmament.

7 The captain of the rebels escaped in a sailing ship and the ship sankbody was separated from his head and sent to the capital to be shown to the public.

8 Liu I, the ringleader of the rebels who tried to hide in a Buddhist monastery, was caught and executed when the monks chased him away.

9 Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibet*125.

It seems that Togon, separated from the Southern Liang by the Nan-shan hills, was the only beneficiary. This small sovereignty lived in constant fear of an attack from the north. For it held the land vacated by its neighbour. Prince A-ch'ai of Togon, who ascended to the throne in 417, had already begun to conquer the small Ch'iang and Ti dominions in the lifetime of his elder brother Shu-lo-k'ang.¹⁰ Togon had annexed the "Kum-lu country" (Sha-chou) north of Kukunor (today's Kao-tai)¹¹ in order to use it as a defence base rather than expanding its borders. This last situation was to play its part in due course.

It does not take a clairvoyant to understand the reasons for the downfall of the mighty Southern Liang. In 407-408 the Tu-fa tribe repelled Hun and Tibetan attacks but lost many experienced warriors in the fighting. The young soldiers who filled the ranks of the army were apparently not very hardy and fell at the first sign of failure. The bravest of them rallied around Prince Fan Ni, but even their numbers were not enough to sustain the war. For this reason, they produced many children who played an important role in history. We will talk about them later, but for now let's talk about other events that, although few in number, are actually quite important.

Next Chin's End

In early 416, news reached Chien-k'ang, the capital of South China, that Yao Hsing, the brilliant and capable Tibetan ruler, had abdicated, leaving his incompetent son Yao Hung on the throne. Liu Yü, who was rightly convinced that public order in his country had been restored, decided that it was time to reclaim the old capitals of Lo-yang and Ch'ang-an to China and expel the "barbarians" from Chinese territory. Liu Yu also found himself a suitable partner. The Principality of Ti Wu-t'u, settled in southern Shen-si¹² and fully allied with the Tibetans, had switched to the Chinese side in 396, and in 416 had begun to show favouritism towards the next Ch'in reign.

¹⁰ Age., p. 78.

¹¹ Grumm Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Opisaniye puteshestviya v Zapadny Kitay*. M., 1948, p. 384-385.

¹² The centre of this kingdom was on the outskirts of Ch'e-wu-ch'i (present-day Lung-men-shan). south to Ch'in-chou and Ch'i-shan (present-day Feng-hsiang-fu), east to Han-chung-fu and south to Lian-chou. (See Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongolia*, II/191.)

¹³ It should be noted that he had done this before he had embarked on an expedition with the Chinese army. The Chinese dealt the main blow to Lo-yang first through the Huai river valley and then through the Lo valley. Attacks were also organised from the coast to support the fleet sent from the river, and the fleet was floated to Huang-ho from the shallowest part of the river.

The commander of Lo-yang asked Ch'ang-an for help, but when the Chinese met and defeated the Tibetan armies on the road, Lo-yang surrendered without a fight. Four thousand of the captives were released and many were taken into the imperial army.¹⁴ This event shows that the Tibetan dynasty was losing popularity more rapidly than the Tankut dynasty. With the conquest of Lo-yang, the campaigns of 416 came to an end. While Wu-t'u mobilised and occupied Ch'i-shan and recruited forces deemed suitable for the protection of the western frontiers, the Tibetans did not launch any counter-attack.

In 417, the Chinese resumed their offensive and arrived in the Wei (Shen-si) valley the Tun-huang pass. The three Tibetan armies that tried to stop them defeated one after another. Meanwhile, Liu Yü's battle fleet, which, according to his plans, should have crossed the Huang-ho River and reached Ch'ang-an at the mouth of the Wei River, had arrived. Although the Huang-ho coast was under the control of T'o-pa Wei, Liu Yü sent an envoy to the Tabgach khan T'o-pa Sseu, asking him to allow the fleet to pass through Tabgach territorial waters. However, the Chinese envoy to the Tabgachs in the presence of T'o-pa Sseu a Tibetan envoy who had come to ask for help against China. The advice of the Tabgach ruler's viziers was in favour of the Tibetans, who were related to the khan by blood. Therefore, T'o-pa Sseu not only refused the Chinese envoy's request, but also sent a battalion of 30,000 cavalry to control the Huang-ho coast, followed the tracks of the Chinese fleet and reached the steppe joining the river. When the waves threw the sailing ship to the northern coast, the Tabgachs killed the oarsmen, looted the cargo on board and retreated to the steppes again when the Chinese prepared to fight. In the face of this situation, Liu Yü ordered a mobile fortress to be built on the northern coast to secure the fleet's navigation; 2 thousand automatic arrows were fired at the mobile fortress, which was loaded onto wagons under the cover of night.

¹³ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibetap*102.

¹⁴ Wiegler L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1238; Mailla, *Histoire générale*, p. IV/579.

(crossbowmen) and catapults, which were not very large, were placed. The Tabgachs attacked this harbour in the morning and not only suffered a severe defeat, but also lost their commander in chief. After that, the Chinese fleet fearlessly entered the mouth of the Wei River and sailed towards Ch'ang-an, where the land forces had already reached.

Yao Hung attacked the Chinese land army with the last remaining forces, suffered a heavy defeat, fled to Ch'ang-an and managed to break the Chinese siege off the city. Liu Yü ordered the ropes to be cut after the landing and the ships began to drift with the current. The soldiers, who were deprived of food and clothing, were offered either to capture the city and live in prosperity or to starve to death. Because there was no third alternative.¹⁵

Realising that there was no other way out, the Chinese soldiers attacked the enemy with such ferocity that the Tibetan soldiers were forced to retreat, scattering along the roads leading to the city. When the victors entered the city, Yao Hung decided to surrender. Although the eleven-year-old son of the Khan begged his father not to beg for mercy from the enemy and to die in battle, Yao Hung ignored the encouraging words of his viziers and surrendered to the Chinese with his harem and children. The only one of his children who did not surrender was his eleven-year-old son, who begged his father not to surrender. This boy immediately went to the terrace of the palace and fought the enemy until he died. However, his cowardice did not save Yao Hung. In a manner befitting a ruler, he was sent to Chien-k'ang, where, like a renegade, his head was severed from his body.

The South Chinese soldiers rewarded themselves generously for the arduous expedition. Not only the palace but the whole city was looted from top to bottom. Of course, the Tibetans and local Chinese who were in the city at the same time were subjected to the same cruelty. Thus the latter's hopes for freedom from Tibetan subjugation were replaced by fear. But in the meantime, something that had always happened repeated itself and Liu Yü's army lost its fighting capability. When Liu Yü stated that Shen-si also be conquered, his officers shouted "no!". Because they were all rich from the war and wanted to return home with what they had looted. Moreover, in the meantime, Liu Yü had to conquer Chien-si to protect the interests of the state.

¹⁵ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1251; Mailla, *Histoire générale*, p. IV/583.

The only trusted friend he had left in his place in Ch'ang'an was also dead. Liu Yu was therefore forced to end the war and withdraw his army, leaving a strong garrison in Ch'ang'an. The part of the city that had previously belonged to the Tibetan sovereignty was abandoned to its fate. Liu Yü was convinced that the Tibetan suzerainty could never be revived, and he was probably right. But what he did not take into account was that he had left the command of the invading army in the hands of his son Liu I-cheng, who lacked the wisdom and the ability to deal with problems.

Blue and Red

Sitting in the safety of Ordos, the Hun commander Ho-lien P'o- p'o watched in silence as the Tibetan state fell to ruin. He knew that it was easier to conquer than to hold. On the one hand, he was moving his nomads from the Great Wall to the northern tributaries of the river Wei, and on the other, he was gathering horses and soldiers. Knowing what the political insecurity of the Chinese would cost, he did not reject Liu Yü's offer of a treaty of friendship, but he never believed in the promises made. As soon as Liu Yü retreated south, he held the passes to Shen-si and sent his son Ho-lien Kui with 20,000 cavalry against the Ch'ang-an garrison. Entering the rugged terrain of the Wei river valley in 418, the Hun cavalry were welcomed as saviours by the inhabitants. This can be attributed both to the desire of the inhabitants for a life of tranquillity and to the effect of the Chinese army's treatment of the local population in the liberated lands.

In Ch'ang-an, the situation was not at all favourable. The old enmity between the "northerners", the descendants of the North Chinese immigrants, and the "southerners", the South Chinese natives, was such that two peoples could no longer fight back to back against any enemy. Once one of the generals smiled at another general without any ulterior motive, and he took it as an insult and killed his friend. Of course, Liu I-cheng, who had the murderer executed, was left without an assistant. The southerners put one of the loyal northern counsellors in chains; Liu I-cheng killed him too. Thereupon the northerners withdrew, leaving the defence of the city to the southerners, while the local population completely sided with the Huns. Although they were not accustomed to living with nomads, the Chinese had a mass of

their laws had stirred up their hatred. And it was under such circumstances that Ho-lien P'o- p'o besieged Ch'ang-an.

As soon as Liu Yu heard what had happened, he sent a messenger to his son, ordering him to leave a small garrison in Ch'ang-an, to move quickly eastwards towards Ho-nan and to keep his hands off the booty. But his son once more plundered the population, piled as much booty as he could into carts and loaded the boys and girls who had been recruited for his amusement into the same carts. He also sent home all the heavy weights and instructed the last loyal officers to watch his back. The weights, of course, slowed down the chariots, and so the Huns easily overpowered them. Having first eliminated the closing columns, and captured the surviving soldiers, the Huns moved on to the main part of the caravan.

Liu I-cheng managed to escape from the battlefield, or rather the field of destruction, by entering a roadside thicket and hiding there under the rump of a Chinese horseman. The Huns had built a pyramid from the heads of the dead Chinese.

As soon as news of the destruction of the invading army reached Ch'ang-an, the people revolted and drove the Chinese garrison out of the city, burning the king's palace on the way out. But the Huns caught up with the retreating Chinese soldiers and put them to the sword.

After his victorious entry into Ch'ang-an, Ho-lien P'o-p'o organised a feast for his soldiers and declared himself emperor. However, being a nomad from the prairies, he could not like city life and returned to Ordos, where he was born and raised, appointing one of his sons as regent in his place.

The loss of Ch'ang-an caused great discontent against the government in South China.¹⁶ After strangling Emperor An-ti to death, they put his brother on the throne, but he abdicated in favour of Liu Yü for fear of his life. Thus Liu Yü, who was already in de facto power, ascended the throne and named the new dynasty Sung, which he founded in 420 to avoid the antipathy of those who disliked the name Liu-Sung.

Probably the responsibility for the disaster should not be laid on the emperor sitting in his palace, but on a general who deserted his army.

¹⁶ Cordier H. *Histoire générale*, p.325.

But the people knew the truth. Let us recall the conflict between the northerners who recognised the Sih-ma family as their leaders and the southerners loyal to Liu Yü. The latter declared that the northerners, who had thrown aside the banner and scattered here and there in fear of the army commander Liu I-cheng, if not actually responsible for the executions he was forced to carry out, were responsible for the disaster. However, they did not directly accuse the general for fear that the outcome would damage the dynasty's reputation. On the contrary, Liu Yü succeeded by shamelessly accusing the general of organising an assassination, denying the fact that the last Chin emperor Hung-ti had been killed for him. The general, who was thus dismissed from his post, lived for only one year.

End of the Western Liang

Before analysing the events that led to the fall of the Chin dynasty, let us take a look at the foothills of Nan-shan, i.e. the west, where a simple, albeit small-scale, process took place. The ruler of Northern Liang, chü-ch'ü (former Hun title) Meng Sun, took advantage of the calamity that befell Southern Liang and organised an expedition to the east to expand his power and expelled the Syenpis from the Southern Liang lands they had occupied. Meanwhile, the Chinese Li Hsin, the ruler of Western Liang (capital Su-chou), wanted to take advantage of his absence. His mother and viziers tried in vain to dissuade him, reminding him that the Hyung-nu prince had done nothing bad to him. South China was thirsty for a victory. In 420, Li Hsin, who headed west with an army of 30 thousand men, was defeated by Meng Sun returning from the eastern campaign and died on the battlefield. Thus, Meng Sun, who entered Chü-ch'üan (today Su-chou), forbade his army to sack the city and annexed it to his borders. As the good treatment of the defeated gained the sympathy of the local Chinese, Meng Sun also freed the mother of the dead ruler and gave his sister to his son Mu-kien.¹⁷

Thanks to his wise policy, Meng Sun established such an authority that even the Chinese military colony stationed in Kao-ch'ang, the Turfan valley, submitted to him without a fight.¹⁸ Thus, Meng Sun, who dominated the entire Nan-shan foothills, became the ruler.

¹⁷ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p. 1260-61.

¹⁸ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/249.

he gave his lordship a new name: Ho-hsi. This toponym (Mongolianised form of Hashin) survived until the XIII century. In short, Meng Sun managed to create a state with natural borders and original culture. This state was indeed viable, but more that later.

In fact, it is an astonishing contrast. The Chinese population of Shen-si and Ho-hsi had gladly submitted to the Huns, who had freed them from the yoke of the south from which they had dreamed for 110 years. Thanks to this unexpected change in the sympathies of the Chinese population, Ho-lien P'o-po and Meng Sun became the rulers of territories which had never in the past been Chinese outposts against their ancestors, and it was perhaps for this reason alone that they were able to achieve such easy victories over the vast Chinese armies. What was the essence of the matter?

First of all, the initiator of the attempt to reclaim North China was the Chin dynasty, which possessed, if not the vibrant traditions of ancient Chinese culture, then, in the truest sense of the word, its inertia. The inhabitants of Ch'ang-an were essentially waiting for him, but instead Liu Yü, a southerner, a foreigner and a man without bitterness, arrived. The northern Chinese could not recognise him or his soldiers as their tribesmen, and the ruthless plundering by the southerners added insult to injury. When the conflicts between the "Southerners" and the "Kuzeyers" forced the latter to withdraw from the scene, the fugitives became the agitators of the search for alliances against South China, which was ruthlessly persecuting the indigenous population. On the other hand, the Chinese in the Huang-ho valley had for a whole century established close relations with the nomads, the only people they could live with. Therefore, they could share the same thoughts with the Huns rather than the South Chinese in case of mingling. In fact, in the IVth centuries, instead of a single ancient Chinese ethnos, two new (or rather medieval) ethnos were formed, which did not resemble the previous one in terms of prototype. This last extinction has been the basis of Chinese historiography, which regards the year 420 as a break in time separating the ages. Chinese historians call the new era the Southern and Northern Courts, which in today's language would be the separation of North and South China by borders. This was even reflected in Persian geographers, who called South China not China, but Machin, which means the mixture of the ancient Chinese with the southern foreigners - the Mans.

They called it Man China.

From this date onwards, the wars of the nomads with China took a completely different form and expression, which is not immediately recognisable in the events of that time.

Yellow and Red

Liu Yü was fortunate not only in life but also in death and died just when he was supposed to die. The 17-year-old heir Liu I-cheng, who ascended the throne in 422, was faced with a serious foreign policy problem, namely the Ho-nan war. His victorious father, who invaded Lo-yang and came so close to the border of the Tabgachs, who could not rest easy, had actually brought this problem upon his head. In 422-23, both sides had made allies. The Sung Empire had been joined by Wu- t'u¹⁹ and Togon,²⁰ the T'o-pa Wei Empire by the foreign tribes living in western Ch'in and Sih- ch'uan.²¹ The Tabgachs, who had a strong army, held the initiative in battles. In order to repel the Ju-jans, who constantly violated the northern borders of the Tabgach State, garrisons supported by the Great Wall of China were established, and subsequently, in the winter of 423, T'o-pa Sseu headed south with an army of 30 thousand men under the command of the skilful commander Hsi Ching.

Again, the feelings of the local population would be the final word on the matter. For the military strength of the rivals was almost equal. And this time, too, the natives took the side of the northerners with more determination than they had previously shown at Shen-si. The last prince of the Sih-ma family aligned himself with the Wei Emperor, who gave him a very high military title. Was this a betrayal? Yes, it was. What else was left to do? Was he going to sit and be killed like all his relatives who had been killed in Chien- k'ang, just because he belonged to a famous family? This prince had chosen the right to life offered to him by the Tabgachs.

The southerners made heroic defences of their fortresses, but the new army of 50,000 men under T'o-pa Sseu Han captured Lo-yang and then took the whole of Ho-nan and Shan-tung. The fruits of Liu Yü's victories were wasted.

¹⁹ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibet* 102.

²⁰ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1263.

²¹ *Ibid*, p1266.

The South was saved by the heroic defence of the garrisons in the fortresses besieged by Hsi Ching, but in the end all of them fell, and the invaders paid a heavy price as the Tabgach attacks were halted. This defeat gave the South Chinese leadership the opportunity to accuse the young emperor of imprudence and then to put him on trial and kill him. Thus, Liu I-Lung, the younger brother of the murdered emperor, who would remain in power until 453, was put on the throne. In the same 423, T'o-pa Sseu also abdicated, leaving the throne to his son T'o-pa Tao.

In 430 we witness the Sung Empire's attempt to retake Ho-nan. The Sung Emperor Wen-ti, having concluded an alliance with the Huns of Ordos, who were bent on ^{partitioning}²² northern China, sent an ultimatum to T'o-pa Tao, demanding the return of the Chinese territories in southern Huang-ho. The Han preferred to wait, as it would be difficult for horses to cross the Huang-ho River in summer. The Sung army occupied Lo-yang and all Ho-nan fortresses without encountering any resistance. However, in winter, when the Huang-ho was frozen, the Tabgach troops crossing the river defeated the southerners in a pitched battle and recaptured all the fortresses. The southerners fled leaving their heavy weapons and sailing boats. The Tabgach cavalry slaughtered all the southern reserves with gusto, and the southern army, which had fled in defeat after this, began to starve. The Sung general T'an Tao-chi, however, managed to regroup the survivors of the dispersed army and lead them back to the land of Sa-limen, after having spread false information to dissuade the Tabgachs from pursuing them. Only his support and resistance saved the Sung Empire from total annihilation by the Tabgach khan. But as a "price for his heroism" he was arrested in 436 and beheaded along with all his relatives, the victim of the malice of the vizier who had plotted against a warrior general. In fact, this execution was greeted with joy in T'o-pa Wei, who no longer had any reason to fear his southern neighbour.

T'o-pa Tao interpreted his victory completely differently, organised banquets for his subjects, and exempted the soldiers who participated in the war from taxation for 10 years and the people for one year. After these festivities, rewards and enthusiasm, it would be said in the streets of T'o-pa Wei: "To serve the Chinese emperor, you must have the heart of a dog and wag your tail like a dog."

²² *Ibid*, p.1276.

It is essential. "23 Not only the nomads, but even the defeated Tibetans, Tankuts and Chinese preferred the mercy of the Tabgach khan to the tyranny of the southern Chinese officials. The fate of North and South China would be completely separated within a year and a half from this date.

Subsequent events also did not favour the Sung dynasty. In 433-34 a coup d'état took place in the Principality of Wu-t'u, and Wu-t'u T'o-pa entered into an alliance with the Wei and began to fight South China for Han-chung in the Shen-si region south of the Ch'in-ling mountain range. The area was completely evacuated. The "Ti" warriors wore rhinoceros-skin armour that was impervious to spears. Therefore, the Chinese started to use axe-armoured warriors, and in hand-to-hand combat they inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and succeeded in driving Wu-t'u's troops north.²⁴ After this defeat, Wu-t'u stopped paying taxes to both emperors and withdrew from the battlefield.

R. Grousset likens this period to the situation in Europe after the great migrations of peoples. According to him, Southern China assumed the role of Byzantium. The Tabgachs and Huns did what the Franks, Langobards and Goths did.²⁵ If we accept this descriptive comparison, we can liken Liu Yü to Justinian. For Justinian, too, had brought disaster to Byzantium with his conquests while he was still alive, and after him, the barbarians made the West, which had defended itself against the East, more independent. Indeed, the Romanisation of the Franks and Goths turned them into the French and the Spanishte Chineseisation of the Tabgachs into the North Chinese ethnos. The turning point of this process in North China was the year 431. Because on this date, the Tabgach tribes and the Chinese people of Ho-pei realised that their common interests and historical destinies were the same. Because this period was full of years of severe trials and, in our opinion, especially important was the Huns' standing in the way of the Tabgachs.

Yellow and Blue

The Hsia, founded by the Huns, was no less dangerous than the T'o-pa Wei. It was made up of nomads who had grown up in the bosom of Ordos.

²³ *Ibid*p.1229

²⁴ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibet*ap103-104.

²⁵ Grousset R. *L'empire des steppes*, p. 103.

clay had a strong army and well supplied from the Wei river valley, where the inhabitants of North-West China today.²⁶ Ho-lien P'o-p'o, the founder of the state, was a man of talent. Chinese historians spewed their hatred by describing him as "a barbarian who carried his sword, bow and arrow with him". He supposedly gouged out the eyes of those who dared to look at his face, cut off the lips of those who smiled in his presence, beheaded those who argued with him, etc.²⁷ In reality, he was an extremely capable person who resurrected a dying state thanks to the help of the people who had become accustomed to him. In any case, as long as he was alive, the Tabgachs could not even set foot in Ordos. And Ho-lien P'o-p'o died in 425.

The Tabgach khans were of course uncomfortable being close neighbours of the warlike Hun state. Nevertheless, T'o-p'a Sseu had conquered the south, and T'o-pa Tao had repelled an attack by the Ju-jans in the west, who burnt down T'o-pa Wei's chief city of P'ing Ch'eng in 424, even before he ascended the throne. T'o-pa Tao repelled the Ju-jans and in 425 launched a counter-attack on the Great Steppe, driving them into the Hamar-Daban mountains. Tao had made his state so secure against dangers from the south, north and east that the Northern Yen had allied itself with both China and the Ju-jans, and was probably acting as a mediator between the two sides. In this situation the Ju-jans would not have dared to take any action against T'o-pa-Wei. The following year the Tabgach wolf organised a campaign against the Huns. This attack was unexpected, as the Huns had not done anything to provide a pretext for war. But, after all, isn't it the one who has the upper hand?

In early 426 the Tabgach cavalry crossed the Huang-ho across the ice to Tung-wan. This was the headquarters of the Hun eunuch, who had organised a feast even before the start of the war. Although the Huns repelled the attack, the Tabgachs plundered, set fire to the whole Tung-wan region and took 10 thousand prisoners. Around the same time, General Hsi Ching, the hero of the wars against the Sung, captured Ch'ang-an and brought the Tibetans and Tankuts living there under T'o-pa-Wei. The Tibetan T'ang-ch'ang tribe²⁸ and the Ho-hsi Principality, hearing of the Tabgachs' successes, remained loyal to their alliance with T'o-pa Tao.²⁹ Hsia

26 Ovdenco I.XKitay. M., 1959, p. 267.

27 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1255.

28 Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibetap*111.

29 Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1272.

It seemed that his reign was being held captive by enemies.

In the following year, 427, the Huns mustered all their forces and launched a counter-attack. Prince Ho-lien Ting besieged Ch'ang-an and drove Hsi Ching back. T'o-pa Tao, calculating that the main strength of the Huns was concentrated in the south, organised a second attack on Tung-wan without infantry, but with a cavalry battalion of 30,000 men. During this attack he relied on the suddenness of the charge, the imprudence of the Hun commanders, and his cavalry with braided hair, which had not yet lost the characteristics of steppe warriors. After deploying his choicest warriors around the city, T'o-pa Tao came to the city walls with a small force and retreated after a brief intervention, leaving his most trusted men behind. These surrendered to the Huns and reported that the khan was on a campaign with a small army. Ho-lien P'o-p'o would not have fallen into such a trap, but Ho-lien Ch'ang immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men to pursue the enemy. When T'o-pa Tao came to the position where the enemy soldiers had retreated to the pu- su, he took the battlefield and fought with equal forces. During the pitched battle, the horse under the khan was killed and he himself was almost captured by the Huns, but he managed to escape despite being wounded. In hand-to-hand combat, no one could cope with the Tabgachs. The Huns were scattered. Ho-lien Ch'ang left the capital and fled south to the Wei river valley, where he hoped to get help from Ho-lien Ting. After bloody battles T'o-pa Tao succeeded in entering the city, but the Hun defenders closed in the fortress, which the Tabgach khan could not easily capture. However, the Tabgach warriors managed to reach the walls with ke- ment and spears, and after twenty-four hours of street fighting the Hun warriors were forced to surrender.

T'o-pa Tao was so pleased with the material and moral defeat of his rival that he divided the huge booty of cattle and men among his warriors. As soon as Ho-lien Ting heard of the fall of Tung-wan, he lifted the siege of Ch'ang-an and out to join Ho-lien Ch'ang. T'o-pa Tao instructed Hsi-Ching to finish off the Huns and returned to the capital P'ing-ch'eng to have his wounds treated.

In 428, Ho-lien Ch'ang launched a new attack, pinning down Hsi Ching's army upstream of the Chin River. The Huns shot arrows

They kept pawing at the enemy and prevented the Tabgachs from obtaining sufficient supplies, which often led to mutterings among the enemy soldiers against their commanders.

Upon this situation, one of Hsi Ching's officers selected two hundred of the horses that had not yet been slaughtered and gave them to the most distinguished warriors. These appeared behind the Huns in a sudden raid, captured Ho-lien Ch'ang and returned to their headquarters with the prisoners. But this did not make much change in the situation of the besieged Tabgachs. The Hun army was commanded by the skilful commander Ho-lien Ting, who ambushed Hsi Ching and seven thousand Tabgach soldiers. Hsi Ching was captured by the Huns.

Having achieved a complete victory, Ho-lien Ting recaptured Ch'ang-an and cleared the whole Wei valley of enemies. T'o-pa Tao, who had lost his best soldiers during the battles, was now confronted again by the war-moralised Huns, who had no shortage of food. Enraged, the khan had Ho-lien Ch'ang beheaded, but this did him no good. On the contrary, Ho-lien Ting made an offensive treaty with the Sung Empire against T'o-pa Wei on the condition of dividing North China into two parts. After this agreement, the Sung army organised an unsuccessful expedition to North China in 430. In return, T'o-pa Tao made a treaty with the prince of Ho-hsi, a next-door neighbour of the Huns, and the Western Ch'in Siempiles, promising to cede the territory of the Hsian suzerainty to them in return for their help. The Jujans, of course, were eager to strike the Tabgachs in the rear, but they too had been troubled by the Yüeban³⁰ offensive in 429, and the Tabgachs breathed a sigh of relief, since a considerable part of their forces were in Jungarya. Finally, Feng Pa, the energetic khan of the Northern Yen dynasty, died in 430. His brother Feng Hugn, who was burning with ambition for power, killed legitimate heir to the throne - his nephew - and more than a hundred of his relatives. As mentioned above, such a power shake-up deprived Ku-zey Yen of the opportunity to implement an active policy. After all, while T'o-pa Tao was busy claiming victory in Ho-nan, Ho-lien Ting was busy in Shen-si grappling with the Western Ch'in ruler Ch'i-fu Mu-mo.

30 Yüeban : Hun state founded in Yedisu and Tarbagatay in the II century when the Huns moved westwards.

The End of Western Ch'in

In 430, with T'o-pa Tao holding the initiative, the Tabgach offensive against their neighbours reached its peak. While continuing the war with the south, Tao intensified his offensive against the Ju-jan- lar in the north, and a massive Tabgach army, huge by steppe standards, landed on the Great Steppe. The Ju-jans abandoned their defence and retreated to the mountain slopes, while Da-tan Khan, who had fled to the west, was never heard from again. The Teleut nomads wandering in the southern parts of the Gobi Desert surrendered to the Tabgachs and their revenge on the fleeing Ju-jans. Meanwhile, Da-tan's son Wu-ti T'o-pa agreed to pay tribute to the Wei Empire.³¹

In the autumn of the same year, the Tabgachs turned all their forces against the "mountainous Huns".³² The Tabgach army, under the personal command of the khan (and the emperor), surrounded the commander of the mountainous Huns, who bore the Chinese title of Pai-lung (White Dragon), and in the ensuing battles completely slaughtered the Huns. All these operations of the Tabgachs were successful because the main force of the Huns was occupied with the Western Sienpis, who were attacking Ho-lien Ting from the south.

The situation in western Ch'in became more and more precarious with each passing year. In fact, it was a military camp teeming with foreigners and enemies of the Sienpis. Tibetans, Tankuts, Huns and To-gonians had come to this country to fulfil their need for silk cloth and were a thorn in the side of Western Ch'in. However, it was not easy to remove this thorn because they fought heroically against the Sienpis. In the intervening 40 years (from 386 to 426) a generation of warriors had changed, but there was still no trace of peace...Finally, Ch'i-fu Mu-mo decided to leave the upper reaches of the Huang-ho and go with his people to the steppes closer to his tribemates, the Tabgachs. Thus, in 430, after burning his camp and destroying his immovable property, he took 15,000 families with him and headed north through the Wei valley.

³¹ Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki*, p. 15.

³² The identity of the "Mountain Huns" is not clearly stated in the historical sources (Wi- eger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1290-91). They were probably part of the Huns who retreated to the foothills of Alashan or Yin-shan after the defeat of Ho-lien Ch'ang in 428 and remained within sight of T'o- pa Tao, who was active in the northern steppes of Ordos. We have found nothing in the chronologies or geography to contradict this assumption.

The Hun prince Meng Sun in Ho-hsi claimed the rich lands of the former Western Ch'in. But Mu-kui, khan of To-gon, had been more agile and had succeeded in annexing these territories to his sovereignty.³³ In such a situation, a diplomatic shuttle was inevitable: To-gon was an ally of South China³⁴ and therefore Ho-lien Ting hoped that only a victory would enable him to gain possession of the confiscated lands. Since Ho-hsi was genealogically allied with the T'o-pa Wei, Meng Sun thought that he would receive help from the Tabgachs against the Togons.³⁵ All kinds of diplomatic cunning were on display for a real victory, but in the end victory would favour neither Ho-lien Ting nor Ch'i-fu Mu-mo.

In 431 the Huns halted the Sienpians' march northwards, blockaded the enemy and starvation broke out in the camp. Ch'i-fu Mu-mo calmly awaited help from his ally. However, the Tabgach army, which had occupied Northern Shen-si, was barely self-sufficient. Faced with this situation, Ch'i-fu Mu-mo surrendered to Ho-lien Ting and the already starving Sienpians were slaughtered by the enraged Huns. One less ethnoses.

The End of Hsia

Although he had won a magnificent victory, Ho-lien Ting was neither satisfied nor convinced that he had won the war. His allies had been defeated, their lands had fallen to the Tabgachs, but his own army was exhausted by the marches. He saw salvation in a westward march, as the ancient Huns had done. Knowing that Meng Sun was in contact with T'o-pa Tao, and that Mu-kui remained an ally of the Huns, Ho-lien Ting brought his people upstream of the Huang-ho, intending to go round the back of the Togon and reach the western steppes. Mu-kui, however, was more concerned about his own interests than loyalty to the treaty. When the Huns were passing through a narrow pass in the ford of a stream joining the Huang-ho, they were suddenly attacked by a Togon army of 30,000 men, and almost all of them were captured before they could resist, owing to the unthinkable treachery of the fugitives. Mu-kui, who had committed this treacherous act, was forced to cede the captured lands to the Togons.

³³ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1277.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p1263.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p1263.

to make sure that he was put down, and he fell down in front of T'o-pa Tao.

Wu-t'u, who had captured the city of Shan-Yin, which Ho-lien Ting had abandoned, also wanted a share of the Hun inheritance.³⁶ But T'o-pa Tao had intention of dividing the inheritance with anyone. The army he sent in 431 was enough to spoil Wu-t'u's appetite. He handed over Mu-Kui Ho-lien Ting, who had avoided conflict with the Tabgachs, but in return for his treachery he received only a peyza confirming the title of ruler of Togon, which he had previously been deprived of. Mu-Kui T'o-pa displayed an unprecedented display of impudence by sending an envoy to Tao: "Your Highness! I captured the impostor and sent him to your palace, and although you recognised my merit, you did not give me even an inch of land. You polished the wheels of my chariot and honoured my procession, but you did not reward me even with a treasure. I request that these matters be reviewed once more."³⁷ However, the viziers of the Tabgach khan rejected this request, stating that not all the captives had been handed over the service rendered sufficient. Faced with this situation, Mu-Kui reluctantly decided an ally of the Sung Empire and started to wait for when Tabgach arms would be at his throat.

The fall of the Hsia dynasty could not be reflected in the relations between the T'o-pa Wei and the Ho-hsi Huns. Because Meng Sun's powerful and warlike state in Ordos was an obstacle between the two sides as long as he considered the continuation his relations with the Tabgach khan to be beneficial and in his interests. the borders of the two states converged and the territory of Ch'in slipped from Meng Sun's grasp, Sun realised that he could no longer look sympathetically at his neighbour. T'o-pa Tao, who was almost of the same mind, suddenly remembered that Meng Sun was a fanatical Buddhist, while he respected the teachings of the Tao. In 432, T'o-pa Tao asked Meng Sun to send back his sister, who had never thought of approaching a Hun prince. For a Buddhist ra-hip who could charm demons and charm people's hearts with magic had once come to Meng Sung to ask for his sister. God knows, maybe his sister's heart was with someone else. The demand was both insolent and disgraceful. Enraged, Meng Sun ordered that the envoy be slaughtered, and the foam between the two was removed.

³⁶ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibetap*104.

³⁷ Age., p. 80.

and perhaps even provoked a war.³⁸ This was exactly what T'o-pa Tao wanted. He had been following the news that Meng Sun had done unthinkable things out of anger and had lost support among the people, while his legitimate successor was quite young.

Fate, however, was kind to the Huns. In 433, when Meng Sun fell seriously ill, the Hun lords invited his illegitimate but capable son Mu-kien to succeed him. While Mu-kien was waiting for his father to die, news came suddenly that the Tabgach khan had apologised, which did not require preparation for war. However, T'o-pa Tao was enraged by events on his country's eastern borders that made military action inevitable.

The End of North Yen

The victory over the Huns had cost the Tabgachs dearly than the others. T'o-pa Tao now set his sights on Northern Yen, the last independent state in the Huang-ho valley. Feng Hung, the fratricide and usurper who ruled there, had only the Sung Empire to turn to for help. But it was out of the question for him to get such help. Because the small pressure of the Tabgachs on the small country of Sung had blocked the way, North Yen had to knock on the door of the Koreans for help.

When the Tabgach armies entered Northern Yen in 436, the Koreans sent a small army. However, this army did not come to protect the country of their allies, but only to remove the ruler's private treasury, as it was easier for them. Feng Hung abandoned the capital Lung-ch'eng to the enemy, plundered the country and burnt the huts, leaving his people behind and taking refuge under the protection of the Koreans. Those who survived only breathe a sigh of relief by accepting the rule of the T'o-pa Wei emperor. They were Chinese and Feng was not their khan.

In 438, Feng Hung, who lived in Korea, received an embassy delegation sent by the Sung Empire. The Korean ruler, who was aware of the situation, considered this as a betrayal and had Feng Hung slaughtered together with his sons and grandsons. Thus, the unification of the whole valley, except Togon, which was held on the tributaries of the Huang-ho river

³⁸ Wieger L. *Textes historiques*, p.1279-80,

was completed. This process lasted thirty years, and the unification of the countries was carried out by a generation of Tabgachs. True, three khans had changed during this time, but the young men who had participated in T'o-pa Kui's last campaigns had become the commanders of their own children in the marches against the Huns, Chinese and Ju-jans. The steppe traditions of generosity and loyalty remained unbroken. This inertia of the steppe culture had brought victories to T'o-pa Tao and later khans, but in the meantime, the T'o- pa Wei empire was experiencing a period of decline due to the proliferation of Chinese people in the conquered territories and the cultural dominance of foreign tribes. This event would usher in a new historical period that would take on an unexpected colour.

SECTION VIII

REDLIGHT

The Shaping of the Caucuses

The inherent danger posed by the rapid strengthening of the Tabgachs led the Hyung-nu and Ju-jans to form coalitions. T'o-pa Kui, preoccupied with the eastern battles, had temporarily put aside his western concerns, but as early as 436 "the rulers of Kucha, Kashkar, Wusun, Yüeban, Shan-shan, Karashar, Ch'e-shih and Sogdia sent gifts and envoys to the Northern Court for the first time."¹ This meant that the established principalities of the western end had chosen to align themselves with the North Chinese Empire. But against whom? Against the nomads, the Ju-jans, of course.

Even more important than this event was the coup d'état in the Chinese city of Kao-ch'ang, which was part of the Turfan dominion. The Chinese K'an Shu-ang, who had seized control of the city, refused to obey the Ho-hsi prince and sought to establish a direct relationship with T'o-pa Tao, but the Ju-jans captured and detained the Tabgach embassy delegation and, after lengthy negotiations, the prisoners to return home.² A second Tabgach embassy delegation, which out in 437, managed to reach Central Asia via the Tarim valley. The embassy was well received in Fergana and Chach (Tashkent). The settled principalities in the oases had expressed their intention to trade with China.³ For them not important whether the dynasty was nomadic or not, but whether the trade was profitable. T'o-pa Tao also wanted to establish relations with the West. The only reason for this was that at that time Ho-hsi, Togon and Ju-jans had concluded an alliance against T'o-pa Wei expansionism.

¹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/241.

² Age., p. 250.

³ Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1291-1292.

The first and main goal of the Ju-jan khan and his chü'ch'ü was to disrupt the relations between the T'o-pa Wei and the Western border principalities. This was easy for them to do, since the envoys could not bypass their territory. And so they did. Thus the pretext for the war that broke out in 439 was found.

It is not necessary to be an astrologer to guess the reasons of these wars. As it is known, the passion for looting was in the blood of both the Jujans and Tabgachs and they could not survive without plundering. The more cultured inhabitants of the western end oases and the Huns, who could live without fighting, certainly did not want to be the pocket money of the barbarian commanders. So they found it appropriate to retreat to defence. But they too had different interests: The Huns had allied themselves with the enemy of their enemy because they were threatened by the Ju-jans, the plaited-haired inhabitants of the oasis. The division of forces was exceptionally determined by political conjunctures.

Battle of Ho-hsi

T'o-pa Tao started the war by attacking his most powerful enemy, the Ju-jans. However, since the Ju-jans had succeeded in their exodus, the Tabgaçs travelled as far as the east of T'ien-shan, but had to return empty-handed because they could not find any enemy. As a result, they lost half of their expeditionary force and the world's horses.⁴

But this was not yet nothing. Fifteen detachments of the eastern Tabgach army were slaughtered by the Ju-jans, and the emperor's brother P'i, the commander in chief of the army, was captured.⁵

In order to encourage the western principalities to break their alliance with T'o-pa Wei, Chü-ch'ü Mu-kien spread the news that his allies had defeated the enemy, but before this propaganda could bear fruit, the Tabgach army entered the borders of Ho-hsi.

The emperor's viziers had warned the emperor that there was no water in the desert surrounding Hang-chou and that the expeditionary battalion would perish of thirst if the defenders blocked the canals watering the oasis.

4 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/191-192; Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongolia*, p. 184.

5 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/242.

war preparations had been meticulously maintained due to their razazes.⁶ These reports were frightening. In addition, Ho-hsi had for many years enjoyed the favour of heaven on a large scale and had sufficient pastures to feed his flocks and a people who were constantly engaged in shepherding. The objections of the strong septic majority of the imperial viziers were at odds with the khan's intentions, and in the spring of 439 the Tabgach army arrived in front of Hang-chou. The Siyenpi tribes, who had at various times been subjugated by the Huns, immediately sided with their tribesmen. Thus, after two months of siege, the city had to take refuge at the mercy of the victors. The Hun prince was treated very well. T'o-pa Tao gave him his sister and was also given the honour of becoming a Hun son-in-law. However, a year later the unfortunate bride would become a widow. The real reason for this was that the Tabgach khan and emperor had not achieved complete victory. Mu-kien's brothers Wu-ho-i and An-chou retreated to Tun-hu-ang and continued their resistance. The Ju-jan khan Wu-ti, endeavouring to rescue his ally, launched a diversionary attack from behind the outpost on Yin-shan mountain, then approached Ta-tunf and caused panic in the capital. However, the slaughter of the Ju-jan reserves by Tabgach border troops north of Yin-shan⁷ forced the khan to make a hasty retreat. The emperor took out his anger on the defenceless Hun captive son-in-law whom he had slaughtered.

After defeating the Tao Ju-jans, T'o-pa Tao had the opportunity to extend his free hand to the west and south-west, but this time Togon was on the scene.


The ruling dynasty in Togon belonged to the Mu-jung family. Since Togon had been allied with the Huns for a long time, its ruler Mu-lien had taken a decidedly anti-Taggach stance.

With Togon's support, Wu-ho-i and An-chou fought a bloody battle for Tun-huang, recaptured Chü-ch'üan (Su-chou) and reached the Edzin-Göl [Echin-kul] river, but the Huns were defeated off Hang-chou. After the defeat of the Huns, the Tabgachs recaptured Su-chou, which had to surrender due to ^{starvation}⁸ and in 441 Wu-ho-i T'o-pa had to accept Tao's offer to become the pigeon of Liang-chou with a prince's crown.

6 Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1281.

7 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/192.

8 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 187.



HARİTA 7- Kvalisyonların Şekillenışı

The reason for the emperor's docility was that after a while he decided to send his elite army, led by Prince Na, the most heroic of the Ju-jan soldiers, on a campaign against Togon. Mu-lien, however, refused to accept the war and fled via Saydam; in 445 the Togonese, arriving as far as Khoten, captured the city, killed the governor and "allowed blood to flow in the city."⁹ However, their appearance on the scene and such brutal behaviour armed the Principality of Lo-p'ⁱⁿ¹⁰ against them, which the army used as a base from which to attack the enemy. We have no information about the course of the war, but it is known that the Togonese were unable to hold Khoten and returned to the coast of Kukunor after a year.

Although the collapse of the Hun State in Ho-hsi marked the end of an occasional suzerainty, it also marked the beginning of two new powerful ethnogenesis. Among Mu-kien's followers there were people who, for various reasons, did not want to come under the rule of the Tabgach khan. One of them was Ashina (A-shih-na), who, with 500 families, sought refuge with his ally the Ju-jans and obtained from them permission to settle in the foothills of Altai, from whom the ancient Turks derived.¹¹ Another was the former Southern Liang prince Tu-fa Fan Ni. He, too, led his troops to Tibet and became the founder of the Tibetan ruling dynasty that spread Buddhism there.¹² Although the Tu-fa tribe originated as a branch of the Tab-gach people, Fan Ni suffered a heavy fate in his exile march forced by the dominant related tribes. We do not know what motivated him, but it is certain that religion had a more important influence than clan-tribalism at the time.

In 440 T'o-pa Tao declared himself an implacable enemy of Buddhism and succeeded in changing the indifference of his viziers to his questions about the intolerable neophyte. Although Fan Ni did not live in the Buddhist country for many years, his descendants continued to fight for the religion with all their might. It is conceivable that they brought their sympathy for Buddhism to Tibet from Ho-hsi. But Inner Asia, which falls within our chronological sphere of knowledge.

9 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/247; *Istoriya Tibetap.* 82.

10 N.Ya. Bichurin lists Badakhshan as Lo-p'in, but it could be any principality in the Amur region.

11 Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki*, p. 22-24.

12 Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye Dzungi* (Тибетская империя в VII-VIII вв.), М., МГУ, 1969, с. 71-72.

can help us understand the development of the later historical destinies of their peoples.

It seems useful, then, to follow the sequence of events by such a method. We shall therefore return once more to political history in order to understand why Prince Na refused to be conquered by Togon. For this refusal prolonged the life of this remnant of the great migrations of peoples in Asia for another 200 years and allowed it to outlive the T'o-pa Wei.

Wu-t'u War

T'o-pa Tao, who had embarked on a westward campaign, had also taken the necessary measures to secure the southern borders. The Sung Empire, ravaged by civil wars, did not pose a threat to T'o-pa Wei, but it was constantly plotting against the buffer state of Wu-t'u. This last ancient principality of Tankut had geographical advantages that allowed it to control northern Shen-si and northern Sih-ch'uan. For this reason, both northerners and southerners had always sympathised with the Ti princes. In 439, a Ti prince was adopted into sonship by T'o-pa Tao and given the title of ruler. In 441 the same prince organised an attack on Sih-ch'uan to expel Sung troops, but in 442 reinforcements sent from China defeated the Tankut- lar. From then on, the principality was occupied by the Chinese and their territory became a region where another pro-Chinese Tankut prince was put in power.

In 443 the Tabgach army drove the Chinese out of Wu-t'u, and the prince, who had been the ruler of China, fled the country. His successor, the Tabgach gesesht, returned with the northern armies and tried to break away from the T'o-pa Wei Emperor under pressure from his tribesmen, but the Tabgach general summoned the prince to his presence and killed him. When the people responded to this behaviour with rebellion, it was necessary to ask for help from the metropolis to protect the Tabgach surveying company from Ti aggression. The rebels received military assistance from South China, but the Tabgachs defeated the Sung Empire army in a pitched battle. The Tankuts, who continued their resistance against the Tabgachs 448, were finally defeated; their ku- mandans, who fled to South China, were held responsible for the defeat and stripped of their princely title and lands. Some of the Tankuts reconciled with the Tabgachs.

and in 450, when the pro-Chinese prince returned to restore his people to independence, he met with such resistance that his Chinese masters beheaded him for his failure. As a result, the Wu-t'u remained divided into two factions, most of them loyal to T'o-pa Wei.¹³

The fact that this apparently unnamed war drained the strength of the Tabgach army, which had to hold the mountainous region around Lake Kukunor, allowed Togon to escape from a real exhaustion and its people to lead a peaceful life. The new internal problems that arose slowed down the Tabgach offensive. Meanwhile, the Togons were supported by their diplomatic relations with South China and were able to protect their country from the evil ambitions of the North. Here is a good example of how a small people can maintain its independence when it really wants to.

Battle of the West End

At that time Wu-ho-i, who refused to accept defeat, was making plans to re-establish an independent Hun state. He was caught between the Tabgachs, who held Ho-hsi in Tun-huang, and Shan-shan. Seeing the impossibility of regaining his inherited lands, he tried to seize Shan-shan and use it as a base for his struggle against T'o-pa Wei. He gathered an army of five thousand cavalry and sent them to conquer Shan-shan under the command of his brother An-chou. The Shan-shanites resisted for a while, but when they realised it was useless to continue the war, they packed up and migrated westwards to the Ku-mo oasis, bordering the Chalcenderian plains.¹⁴ T'o-pa Tao, who was closely following the situation, became concerned and sent an army under General Wang T'u-kui to Shan-shan to bring about a final solution to the problem of Hun independence. Wu-ho-i did not even think of defending Tun-huang and went with his followers to his brother in the west, but as it was impossible to hold Shan-shan, which had turned into a bloodbath, the Huns crossed the eastern part of it to the Takla-Makan desert at its narrowest point, and after a period of respite in the hospitality of Karashar, they went to the Turfan Pit, where the political situation would enable them to intervene.

¹³ Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibetap*105-107.

¹⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/245; Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 130.

At that time, the Turfan region was perhaps more fertile than in the XXth century.¹⁵ Because at that time, the rivers flowed surrounded by trees, but as a result of the rotational watering and the cutting down of the reeds for firewood, ecological erosion occurred. In the Vth century, the valley was divided between the inhabitants of the Ch'e-shih Principality and the K'an Shu-ang Chinese who lived in the Kao-ch'ang fortress. Because of the enmity between them, the inhabitants of Ch'e-shih sought help from the Principality of Hami and K'an Shu-ang from Wu-ho-i, which led to the destruction of Turfan.

In 442, having defeated Wu-ho-i Ch'e-shih and the Hamilis without difficulty, and having single-handedly expelled K'an Shu-ang, he seized Kao-ch'ang and founded the new Hun principality. After a while he was joined by An-chou, who left a regent in Shan-shan. Although the Ju-jans, the rulers of the desert, were allies of the Huns, Turfan was a good refuge for Wu-ho-i.

One might have thought that the rulers of the western end would look forward to the arrival of the Tabgach army in pursuit of the nomads. However, within a few years of meeting T'o-pa Wei, their political sympathies towards the Tabgachs changed. Perhaps the political statements of the Ju-jan envoy, who held the initiative until 439, to the inhabitants of the valley that "Wei had become weak, that the Ju-jan khan had become the strongest with the help of Heaven" and that he forbade the arrival of any envoys from Ku-olive China played a certain role in this change of attitude. It was normal that many people believed these words, but one way or another, the Western end did not want the Tabgachs to enter its borders. Wang T'u-kui therefore had two aims: To finish off the Huns and to make the inhabitants of the valley respectful to the Wei emperor. T'o-pa Tao had already begun to deal with the Ju-jan issue himself and would be occupied with the steppe wars until 444.

Wang T'u-kui, who had captured Tun-huang, left his weights there and entered Shan-shan with a light cavalry army of 5,000 men. The Shan-Shans, who had sided with the Huns, fled and hid in fear of their allies. The governor, whom Wu-ho-i had left as regent, was to ensure that the innocent people were treated with mercy.

¹⁵ On the anthropological structuring of the Central Asian Sahara, see Murzayev E.M. *Priroda Sintszyana i formirovaniye pustyn Tsentralnoy Azii*. M., 1966, p. 279-280; Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Rost pustyn i gibel pastbishchnix ugodiy i kulturny zemel v Tsentralnoy Azii za istoricheskiy period*// *Izvestiya VGO*. 1933. T. 65. vyp.5.

in the hope that the Huns might come to him via the Black Sea. Wang T'u-kui sent the prisoner to the capital P'ing-ch'eng and, leaving a garrison at Shan-shan, set out for Lob-nor, hoping to contact the Huns via Kara-şar.

At that time, Karashar was a principality consisting of nine valleys. The city ruler used the title "lung". The Karasharians were true Buddhists, even though they robbed the Chinese envoy with relish. The appearance of an implacable enemy of Buddhism could have cost them dearly. So they decided to fight back. First Wang T'u-kui conquered Chuo-ho and Halga-aman fortresses and laid siege to Yüan-ch'ü. In Karashar, lung Kü-hubina gathered an army of fifty thousand men (certainly an exaggerated figure) and tried to establish a line of defence. Wang T'u-kui wanted to strike a frontal blow, and indeed the Tabgach warriors a complete victory. While the Karasharians fled left and right and the chief city surrendered, lung Kü-hubina managed to escape to Kuça, where his son-in-law Wu-chie Mu-ti, who carried the bay titular, was the ruler. Wu-chie Mu-ti marched against the invaders with an army of three thousand men (probably a realistic figure). Wang T'u-kui had only a thousand cavalry. It seems that the Karashar victory was not cheap. Nevertheless, Wang T'u-kui went out to meet the Kuchans and "forced them to flee until there were 200 of them left." ¹⁶

Of course, it was out of the question for him to march on Kucha, and Wang T'u-kui could not even hold Karashar, since Kucha served as a base for counterattacks. Because there was nowhere for the Syenpis to get help. In fact, Wang T'u-kui would have been grateful if he had been able to hold Karashar in conjunction with Tun-huang and Shan-shan, but Chinese historians would have labelled it as the conquest of the western end of T'o-pa Tao. ¹⁷

Thus the Hun principality in Turfan survived, while the war with Ju-jan and the South Chinese forced T'o-pa Tao to leave the western end alone.

In 444 Wu-ho-i died, leaving his re-established principality to his brother and comrade-in-arms An-chou, who was to rule until 460 (for he was a contemporary of Attila). But if you will listen to me, let us save some of our narrative for later chapters.

¹⁶ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/257.

¹⁷ Bichurin N.Ya. *Zapiski o Mongolii*, Dn. 17 - T. III. Cn6., 1828, c. 1783; Grumm-Grjmaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 189.

PART IX

FLICKERING FIRE

Victory Fruits

There can be no doubt that the Tabgachs, who defeated all their rivals within half a century, were indomitable braves. Towards the middle of the V century, the Huang-ho valley burned so fiercely that everything that came in its path was burnt to the ground. Tongues of drought stretched out everywhere, and a heat like fire spread. Let us look, however cursorily, at the state of the new-born empire, which experienced a series of conflicts with difficulties and responsibilities not inferior to the fiercest battles.

Despite the great victories, the situation of both the T'o-pa Tao and the people with braided hair as a whole was very complicated and difficult. First of all, it must be borne in mind that the Syenpis, the T'o-pa (Tabgach), were not very numerous, while the other tribes enemies of the Wei Empire. Some of these tribes kinship ties with the disintegrating Mu-jungs. Some of them, such as the Kytans and the Hi (Tatab), were unbridled people and constituted the cavalry that participated in the empire's pleasure hunts. The third group, the Ju-jans, had not only ceased to be subjects, but had also become the fiercest enemies of the fledgling empire. The loss of Halha the Tabgach leadership of the opportunity to replenish its military ranks with new warriors from the nomadic world. Therefore, one of T'o-pa Wei's most important problems was to recruit some of the Teleuts, who had not migrated north but had settled in the northern parts of Yin-shan.¹ The Chinese problem was even more important. The Chinese people were conspicuously numerous among the foreign tribes and were only incompetent in warfare.

1 Grumm-Grjimmylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 199-200.

However, it seems that the most dangerous enemy for the empire was Buddhism. For this system of ideologies encouraged ardent warriors to become ascetic and worldly. Therefore, Buddhist propaganda many Siempi warriors, who were absolutely necessary for military service, from the ranks. In the Vth century, Buddhist propaganda was particularly active in Central and East Asia. T'o-pa Tao, on the other hand, pursued a policy of "neither do nor oppose". The Wei Empire was thus thrust into a bitter war on three fronts and needed special forces to survive.²

Feudal Structures in the Wei Empire

T'o-pa Kui's victory in the south and defeat in the north presented the Tabgach army with an unusual situation. The nomads had lost the steppes, but in return they had become masters of countries inhabited by populous farming peoples. It was necessary to adapt to the new conditions, and in such situations one feature always came to the fore: The institution of feudalism.³

For one thing, the Tabgachs had to experiment with ways of preparing their army for the lordship of a cultured country, which would force them to be more able to defend their traditions against nomadic customs. This process was reflected in the reforms of T'o-pa Kui.⁴

Already in 394, until the victory over the Mu-jungš, T'o-pa Kui had organised a soldier-farmer people who had regularly learned to grow corn from the Chinese. They learnt farming under the supervision of the dozen tribal inspectors among whom the Tabgachs were distributed. And Tabgach farmers were rewarded or slaughtered according to the condition of the crops.

After the defeat of the Mu-jungš in 396 and the acquisition of rich lands, the Tabgach khan was faced with the problem of how to utilise these lands. In 398, T'o-pa Kui distributed land and cows to the "new people" in an attempt to create a non-combatant farming stratum in the conquered lands. Of course, this productive stratum

2 Grousset R. et Regnault-Gatier S. *L'Extrême-Orient// Histoire Universelle*, I. Paris, 1965, p. 1655.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Duman L. *IK istorii gosudarstv Toba Vey i Lyao i ix svyazy s Kitayem// Uchenye Zapiski Vostokovedeniya* (1951) 51, 15

but at that time even the Tabgach nomads were just learning to submit to the state, and it was difficult for him to allow the freed peasants to establish a feudal structure in the fortresses. This attempt had not yielded any results, as evidenced by the fact that in 410 T'o-pa Kui tried to settle the Chinese, who had previously lived under the nomads' rule and had now returned to their homes, on the vacant ikta lands. This was the first step towards the establishment of friendly contacts between the nomadic armies and the settled Chinese population. Of course, this attempt saved the Tabgachs from dealing with the land. According to the financial laws enacted in 413, every 60 households were to pay one good breed horse as tax. In 421, one good breed horse was to be given for every 100 hoofed animals. This information shows that the Tabgachs returned to their usual occupation of farming (animal husbandry).⁵ However, T'o-pa Kui's idea of establishing a farming army from the warrior population was not successful.

However, in order to organise Tabgach land ownership, the T'o-pa Kui imposed the Chinese land tax law and the production tax on the Chinese mevali. This enabled his successor to retain a large part of the tribes as a military force for life. Can such a thing be considered feudalism? Absolutely not! On the contrary, it was nothing more than an attempt to stabilise a barbarian army, which, like any attempt to put the historical process in place, was perhaps doomed to failure. The Tabgach cavalry were not yet feudal, but the Chinese peasants cannot be regarded as fortress tributaries who paid taxes to the state in order to feed the army.

At the time of the proclamation of the empire in 398, T'o-pa Kui sent 100,000 families, including many artisans, from various regions (a figure that is notorious but seems close to the truth) to the capital at Shan-si.

5 In 421, I do not think it would be correct to assume that the law was intended to increase the tax collected. First of all, the first law had remained valid, the same system would not have been fixed by another law, which was not at all necessary. On the other hand, in 413 the Tabgachs were fighting a war on three fronts, and in 421 they had achieved a complete victory. In such a situation it is strange to double the tax on horses of good breeds. Thirdly, at that time the Chinese taxation system was applied to the settled mevali. If we assume that the law of 413 was still in force, it would mean that the Tabgach mevali paid twice as much tax as the Chinese, which would be an exception. On the basis of this argument, it can be concluded that the 421 law was a modification, not a supplement, of the 413 law.

P'ing-ch'eng. These artists were sentenced to death and private individuals were forbidden to acquire artisans-slaves. In case of violation of this law, the guilty head of the neck was beheaded. The children of the artisans were obliged to learn and continue the profession of their fathers.

Could these artists be considered state slaves? According to the European concept of the word *slave*, no! These were people who were obliged to work in a certain place and were forbidden by law to be bought and sold. A nomadic form of dependence. Such craftsmen were to be found 200 years later among the Turks (Turkut). They called such people "kul", which cannot be translated as "slave".⁶

The real slaves of the Tabgachs were prisoners of war and criminals. Moreover, slavery existed for a long time. Slaves were initially used in domestic service and later in agricultural work, mainly because slaves were given for the purpose of cultivating the land just like freed peasants. In other words, there was no slave acquisition in the Tabgachs. Therefore, slave trade based on slave acquisition was not developed.

One of the very important laws of T'o-pa Kui was related to the crown prince. The position of women was very high in all Syenpi tribes. The khan often intervened in state affairs, and his relatives were appointed to important positions in the administration. Therefore, there were constant power struggles between khan relatives and khansha relatives. When T'o-pa Kui, in order to put an end to this competition for the khan's office, passed a law that the khansha who gave birth to the crown prince should be killed immediately, the Tabgach beys refrained from sending their daughters to their deaths. As a result, the khan started to fill his harem with women or concubines brought from foreign countries. This situation caused the khan, who was now the emperor, to gradually distance himself from his own aristocrats and drew a definite line to the Chineseisation of the high-ranking Tabgachs. Because now the palace was filled with Chinese dignitaries who were relatives of the empress.

However, khans could not do without their own beys and did not want to rule the state without them. The Chinese had introduced a civil service system for the khan based on the Chinese administrative system. The only difference of this system from that of the Chinese was that the duties and titles were left to the next generation.

6 Gumilev L.N. *Drevniye türki*, p. 54-55.

to the feudal institution. This was certainly not a feudal institution, but it was a decisive step in that direction. Taksim was realised in 404.

The first four ranks, bearing the Chinese titles *wang*, *kung*, *hou* and *ch'i*, belonged to the aristocratic class by birth.

Wangs (10 people) : They had obtained the right to rule the great circle. Kungs (22 people) : They had acquired the right to rule the small circle.

Hoular (79 inhabitants) : They were given the right to administer the big accidents. Ch'i (103 inhabitants) : They also administered the small towns.

The next class, shared by the *zâdegân*, soldiers and civil servants, was organised under the senior state officials. It is estimated that 200 wanga, 100 50 kunga, 25 houya and 12 ch'i were subordinate to senior officials. This system was initially applied only in the newly conquered territories, and in 417 it was extended to the Tabgach nomads. Since the tribal aksakals also received the kung titular, the "administration of the six tribal aksakals" was organised.

Although this style of administration was a copy of the bureaucratic system of the Chin Empire, the succession of positions gave the system a character that enabled its gradual transition to a feudal structure. In the early periods, *zâdegân* was considered as a gateway to material income, but not to wealth. However, in time, the state officials engaged in land acquisition activities that turned into *latifundium*.

Attempts were also made to establish a fief system. After the defeat of Ho-hsi, the *chü-ch'ü* Wu-ho-i was granted the right to administer his territory at the western end, including the present-day cities of Kan-su and Su-chou, subject to the centre. The same system was applied to Prince Wu-t'u and Yang Pao Chung, to whom Wu-ho-i's country and a high military rank were granted in 439.⁷ T'o-pa Tao wanted to organise the administration of the conquered frontier territories with those among his advisers who possessed this characteristic, and it is well known that this was the fief system, which was a must for feudalism to acquire its legal meaning.

However, this system, which had established itself so well in Western Europe, seemed to be stillborn in Northern China. The tribal chiefs, whom the administration of the T'o-pa Wei Empire was desperate to turn into overlords, did not understand what was being asked of them. The former princes were again

⁷ Bichurin N.Y. *Istoriya Tibetap*105.

They remained members of tribes with interests perceived as imperative. They could not give their tribesmen to someone else. Because otherwise they themselves would have been transferred along with them. They could not realise that it was possible to dispose of only their own environment and the environment to which they were related by blood. Because for them, this environment was like the air that a living creature ends its life when it is deprived of it. It was also not possible to buy them. Because they had silk and gold that they could sell at the desired price. Thus, after the clothing needs of the khan's wives were met, the remaining silk was distributed to the wives of high dignitaries, commanders and, if there was still a surplus, to the wives of other soldiers. But what kind of a principality was a principality that had to look after the interests of foreign conquerors at the expense of its own subjects?

There was another issue: If the governor-general's subjects were Chinese, a special bureaucracy was applied for the administration of these Chinese subjects among the population. Senior officials, who were appointed and frequently dismissed from their posts, prevented the administrative and judicial mechanisms from functioning, and the vacant positions were inherited not by the next in line, but by the favoured ones.

Thus, a legal feudalism did not develop in the Wei Empire during the reign of T'o-pa Tao, but this did not prevent the existence of economic forms of feudal investment. The apparent promotion of social development, on the other hand, can be explained by an upheaval that led to religious intolerance on the part of T'o-pa Tao and his followers.

Warrior Daoism

Initially, three ideologies were in competition with each other in China, and Daoism was the least favoured party in this division. Confucianists occupied the first place in the bureaucratic system of the Chin and Sung empires. Buddhists found favour in the courts of the Tibetan, Tankut and Hun rulers, while Daoists found adherents among the rebellious peasants and perished with them. The ideology of Daoism, however, had not disappeared and would eventually find a powerful patron.

T'o-pa Kui respected religious beliefs and was essentially religious himself. When he conquered Shan-si, he did not pursue the Daoists who had fled there, but surrounded it with Confucianists. He was a very good Bu-

The Daoists should have been grateful, considering that even the Dysts had no pity for them. Even in Chin Tankut and Tibet, those who read Daoist books were sentenced to death. Who could they benefit by hiding for life?

Ts'ung Kao, the cultured and intelligent chancellor of T'o-pa Sseu Khan, could tolerate neither Daoists nor Buddhists. Especially the latter. "Why should we Chinese honour the gods of barbarians?" he would say.⁸ This blatant chauvinism, as well as the chief vizier's bluntness, prompted the Tabgach lords to overthrow him. The vizier, who was in a deplorable situation first became interested in Daoism. Around the same time, the T'o-pa Wei emperor received Kuo-wu Ch'ien-chi, "the master sent from the sky palace" from the secret Dao sect. Now that the T'o-pa Tao also sympathised with the Daoist doctrine, the vizier-in-chief, who had taken the incoming master under his wing, was thus saved from being overthrown. The last situation is understandable: Everyone finds something interesting to learn. To be able to live without eating or drinking, to know the future, etc. Thus, the alliance of fanatics and trinitarians succeeded in making Daoism one of the free beliefs within the T'o-pa Wei Empire and in gaining the patronage of the ruler (423rd year).

Since the Confucianists of southern China, the Buddhist Huns of Ho-hsi and the heathen - pagan - Ju-jans were enemies of the T'o-pa Tao, the Daoist ideology, which spread everywhere except the Tabgach capitals, became the Tabgach khan's sole domestic and foreign political support. It would have been foolish for the Daoists not to have taken greater advantage of the favour of the most powerful metropolitan. The unity of the throne and the altar, which grew stronger with each victory, finally began to bear the fruits of religious intolerance fifteen years later.

The most dangerous opponents for the Daoists were the Buddhists, and therefore they were the first to be persecuted. In 438, T'o-pa Tao, who was preparing to conquer Ho-hsi, had won the hearts of Buddhist monks younger than 50 years old by issuing an edict in order to win his supporters among the warriors.⁹ However, this state of peace halted the spread of Buddhism. In 440, under the influence of Kuo-wu Ch'ien-chi, T'o-pa Tao organised a new committee of chroniclers, officially declared his entry into the Dao community and took the title of "guardian ruler of the highest peace".¹⁰

⁸ Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1267.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1313.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

The first steps Daoism took on the stage were harmless. Because a high tower was ordered to be built for those in favour of the imperial view. Around this tower there was to be nothing to be seen except the barking of dogs and the sound of roosters. Although the foundation of the tower was laid, its construction was not completed. The next step was even stranger: They began to massacre those who were engaged in the bureaucracy and even those who talked about it. According to an edict issued in 444, everyone from princes to the common man in the street was obliged to report unregistered Buddhist monks and magicians to the state authorities. The penalty for violating the edict was that the offender and his family members were to be slaughtered. Another edict required education in public schools and prohibited private schools.¹¹ In short, state policy was under the control of the Daoist community.

Now it was the turn of the infidels. The Tabgachs in China continued to worship their old gods, but had also adopted the local cults of heaven, earth, ancestors and gods. In 444, the worship of the old gods was banned and all Tabgachs were ordered to worship only Chinese gods.¹²

Extreme practices soon began. Already in 446 T'o-pa Tao had a Buddhist monastery established in Ch'ang-an, where he had incidentally built a women's house with a storehouse for weapons and wine. This was, of course, contrary to Buddhist doctrine, but the massacre of all the monks was accepted as a *fait accompli*. This was the first sign of the new policy, but two years later, in 448, an edict was issued to break all Buddhist statues and icons, burn all Indian books, and kill all monks without explanation. Anyone who worshipped foreign gods or made silver or copper idols was sentenced to death, along with all their relatives. The author of the edict was, of course, none other than Ts'ung Kao.¹³ Such was the cost of the ruler's mercy.

The edict astonished everyone, especially the Tabgach lords. Many dignitaries and princes were familiar with Buddhist teachings, and even if they had no sympathy for Buddhism, it probably attracted their attention at worst. Others were under the influence of Buddhism. Among them was the sincere and brave prince T'o-pa Huang. Hu-

¹¹ *Ibid*p1315.

¹² *Ibid*p1316.

¹³ *Ibid*p1317.

ang wanted to prevent the edict from spreading, and then, by informing everyone about its content, he ensured that many priests were hidden and books and icons were saved. However, all the sanemes were broken.

An interesting polemic has also entered the historical literature on this edict. For example, one of the famous writers justified the slaughter of the monks by arguing that although they lived in China, they were not conscripted into the army thanks to a law enacted for foreigners, but despite this, they persuaded children to become *târik-i-worldly* and separated them from their parents, they took parents away from their children by pretending to be wise, they disgusted people from their own selves, and they were mercy hunters, that is, they lived off the backs of others without working. This is what it means to see everyone as an unforgivable criminal.

Another author, of course, objects to ours. According to him, if the ruler loves all his wise subjects, he should also have compassion for the non-wise, enlighten them, but not slaughter them, since it is not possible to put everyone on an equal footing. Therefore, monks should not be slaughtered without warning them of the dangers of Buddhist doctrine, without giving them the opportunity to reconsider their beliefs...

The matter of defending defenceless dreamers thus provoked protests not only from the Tabgachs, but even from Chinese officials who were fundamentally opposed to Buddhism, but who also upheld the law. However, T'o- pa Tao was not one to tolerate opposition. He therefore decided to deal a final blow to Confucianism as well as to Buddhism. The southern campaign had already been decided long before.

It is important to note that the religious reform mostly hit the supporters and friends of the Tabgach khan. Among the foreign gods forbidden to be worshipped were the clan spirits-protectors of the Tabgachs. Cosmopolitan Buddhism, on the other hand, fell victim to the ideological distortion of the Chinese, who disliked foreign conquerors above all. This movement can also be compared to that of the political adventurers Chin Chung and Jan Min. The only difference is that this time there were those who took advantage of the emperor's fanatical blindness and his confess Zionist principle. In fact, Daoi-ism was quite suitable to be the systematic worldview of nomads. To tell the truth, according to the conditions of that day, Daoi-ism was a very good choice for the systematic worldview of the nomads.

osizism was an invention of the Chinese, eager to expel foreigners from the intellectual milieu. According to the foolish logic of the course of events, the victim of this chauvinist movement had to be the Chinese Confucianists, whom T'o-pa Tao had beaten to death with the last remaining military forces in 450.

Expedition to the South

It seems that by the autumn of 450 T'o-pa Tao was convinced that, thanks to the forced consensus, his state was strong enough to finish off the Southern Empire. The Wei and Sung forces were incomparably different, let alone equal, and the southerners did not think they could survive. Governors in the border region were instructed to retreat inland with the population if they were unable to stop any attack by the Tabgachs. However, the attacks were so sudden that no one had time to implement this instruction. But the first surprise was to come. The small fortress of Huan Pao, which had a small garrison of around a thousand people, had repulsed all the attacks of the enemy with large armies and forced the Tabgach khan to break the siege. No one expected such resistance.

more. Southern Chinese detachments had travelled through the Han river valley, entered the Wei river valley and dealt a heavy blow to the Tabgach stronghold of Hsia, at the entrance to Ho-nan from Shen-si. The Chinese, who had been servants of the Northern Empire and were now captives, were in a very difficult position, to fight against their own countrymen. The Huns, Tibetans and other foreign tribes living in the valley of the Wei river were unhesitatingly enlisted in the service of the southern Chinese commander, and although the northerners made several major incursions to the east and even occupied Shan-tung, the southern Chinese troops managed to cross to the south without being trapped at Shen-si.¹⁴

This march was in itself nothing more than an episode, but it showed how much the Tabgach leadership had lost its popularity in recent years. We shall see later to what extent the Tabgach army, which had not suffered a proper defeat, had also lost its fighting power.

¹⁴ *Ibid* p1317-19.

T'o-pa Tao diverted his attention from the western end and a five-pronged attack on the Hu-ai river valley. This time Huan Pao was taken and the southern route was opened. Half of the South Chinese army perished in the fighting and was by the Tabgach cavalry. But the Hui fortress on the Huai River had not opened its gates to the enemy, and T'o-pa Tao had to encircle the fortress and take it to the rear in order not to reduce the tempo of the attack. His army destroyed everything in its path and the people of South China fled, leaving their possessions behind. The army of T'o-pa Tao, advancing through the depopulated territory, was starving, but the khan sent the army as far as Yang-tse and set up a camp on the south bank of the river against Chien-k'ang. Panic broke out in the southern Chinese capital, both among the administration and the population, but only the waves of the river protected the city. From the towers of the capital fortress, the enemy camp could be seen like the palm of the hand. The emperor, who had turned pale, began to weep with sorrow and remorse.

But T'o-pa Tao was not in a good position either. The army had run out of supplies and the nomads were unable to build boats, making it impossible to cross to the opposite coast. Utterly discouraged, the emperor agreed to a treaty and sent his most luxurious gifts. After a splendid celebration (it is difficult to know what he was celebrating), T'o-pa Tao marched his army northwards and tried to recapture the Hui fortress on the way. Shouting to the besiegers "kill them if you can; you will be doing me a service by reducing the number of infidels in my country"¹⁵, he left the fortress in the hands of Teleut, Hun, Tankut and Tibetans. Thirty days of fighting had exhausted the fortress and the boats that would bring reinforcements and supplies through the Huai River were awaited. T'o-pa Tao burnt the siege equipment and returned to his country. The South Chinese commanders could not decide to follow him.

Death of a Dictator

451 war, when compared with the Fu Chien II period, showed that both the north and the south had lost the passionate energy that had propelled them in the IVth century to a breakthrough that did not seem possible in the middle of the Vth century. I wonder if Liu Yao and the Shih Lo Huns, or the Yao Hun Tibetans, were able to realise that in the interests of their state.

¹⁵ *Ibid*p1306.

that they died for their state? Yes, indeed, they did not waste a single minute for their state. For they died for their own interests, for the interests of the tribes and for their own honour, but they did not lift a finger to satisfy the whims of the despots at their head. In the Vth century, their descendants began to fear "their own corporal's whip more than the enemy's spear". Power changed accordingly. T'o-pa Kui was a Tabgach khan, T'o-pa Sseu was a khan and emperor, but T'o-pa Tao became the emperor of Wei and did not fulfil the duties of a khan, although at that time he also used the titular title of khan. Instead of consolidating the steppe tribes of the Huang-ho valley, he had established an empire according to Chinese ideology, in which all steppe people, including the Tabgachs, had no rights other than to obey their ruler. The only winners in this situation were the Chinese, who enjoyed the monarchist's favour and exploited his trust for their own nefarious purposes. The enemy of Crown Prince T'o-pa Huang, his personal officer Chung Ai, was one of these Chinese.

By saving many Buddhists from his father's atrocities, the crown prince had proved to be a strong-willed and kind-hearted man. One might think that Chung Ai hated the prince because he was a Daoist, but that was not the case at all: Chung Ai was a scoundrel in every sense of the word. When T'o-pa Tao returned from his campaign and looked for someone to take his boredom away, Chung Ai accused the dauphin and his friends of treason. The dignitaries had been slaughtered for no fault of their own, and the prince, his "character damaged", ended his life by suicide.

Chung Ai did not expect it to come to this. Eventually it became a scandal that drew the attention of the court and the monarch. It was easy to find someone to slander, but Chung Ai, taking advantage of his position in the palace special forces, strangled the monarch with the help of some of his henchmen.¹⁶

The khan is dead, long live the new khan! The Tabgach lords immediately installed Prince T'o-pa Hang on the throne, but Chung Ai managed to make a tacit agreement with Prince T'o-pa Yü, a drunkard, a terrible hunter and a mischief-maker. Sa-ray armed his eunuchs and came to the palace where the viziers were and beheaded anyone who came out. In collusion with his fellow conspirators, Chung Ai beheaded T'o-pa Hang himself, and thus

¹⁶ *Ibid*p1310.

T'o-pa Yü on the throne and was himself given the title of field marshal. Again a Chinese conspirator had seized power in the so-called "barbarian" kingdom, which was supposedly a system.

The khan's friendship with this fellow conspirator, however, was not to last long. By the end of 452 they were at loggerheads and Chung Ai ordered the court eunuch to kill the khan, he gladly carried out. This time, however, another officer of honour, Liu Ni, intervened, announced to the people that the khan had been slain, and put the legitimate crown prince, T'o-pa Hsün, on the . The people supported the new khan and the captured murderers were killed after severe torture. As we have described so far, the same scenario was repeated, with some exceptions only in the details.

This time, however, something important happened: As soon as T'o-pa Hsün ascended the throne, he cancelled his grandfather's edict and lifted the ban on Buddhism. He even decreed the establishment of pagodas, even though the monasteries in each town were too small to accommodate more than 40-50 monks.¹⁷ Buddhists were no longer killed, and even the monarch shaved his head to show respect for the "Doctrine".

Nevertheless, T'o-pa Tao's religious reform still left its mark on the people. Those who had been brought up in the traditions brought by the Tabgachs did not rebel. Of course, the Tabgachs had not turned into Chinese enemies of Daoism, but after six years they had abandoned the worship of their clan's guardian spirits and filled the psychological void with alcoholism. This shame did more harm to the Tabgachs, who found no reason to rebel against their own khan and did not want to embrace a foreign idea. Drinking became so widespread that finally in 458 T'o-pa Hsün voluntarily imposed the death penalty on wine drinkers. But when he tried to change this law in 465, it was too late.¹⁸

However, it should be noted that the killing of two rulers in the early period had brought a vigour to the T'o-pa Wei empire. After the death of T'o- pa Tao, the military reputation of the Tabgachs was revived, having dealt a good blow to the attacking Sung Empire. In 452, the South Chinese army entered Wei territory and besieged the fortress of Hao-nai; the defenders of the castle made a breakthrough and broke through between the invaders.

¹⁷ Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/80.

¹⁸ Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p.1319.

and committed such a massacre that the Chinese immediately broke the beam.¹⁹

They were even more successful in diplomacy. When Mu-li Yen, the enemy of the Tabgachs, died in Togon in 452, his successor Shê Yin T'o-pa concluded an alliance with the Wei Empire. The abolition of the persecution of Buddhism was welcomed, and the North Chinese Empire's relations with the West-end principalities improved; in 456 the Tabgachs even effortlessly conquered the Hami valley took control of the Great Silk Road, through which caravans carrying silk travelled to the West.

It was the Bu-dists, however, who had the most to gain from T'o-pa Tao's reforms. Since an unpopular ruler had waged war against this conception, then Tibet, Tankut and the small principalities of the Huns, even the Chinese of the South as well as of the North, must join him. The "Golden Doctrine" had given a little water to the hearts of the disenchanted people, and did not demand from the neophyte any opposition to conventional views. The number of images, idols and icons increased to such an extent that eventually almost every Southern Sung governor became bored with the circulation of expensive metals and silks. Even more dangerous was the influence of priests on the wives of famous families. In 458 an edict was issued in the Sung Empire forbidding priests from holding audiences with the emperor's wives, and in 462 the old cult of the "Five Monarchs" was revived in an attempt to substitute Confucianism, which had been weakened by Buddhist propaganda. However, since no one believed in these "sovereigns" anymore, the return to the old ways was only ridiculed.²⁰

The cold glow of the golden doctrine had gradually and gradually drowned out the yellow flame of the North and the red flame of South China. Only the blue Hunnic flame still shone in the Turfan valley, but it too would soon be extinguished.

The Huns' Downfall

T'o-pa Tao's last real achievement was the defeat of the Ju-jan Khanate, although he did not conquer it. The conquest of the Ju-jans

¹⁹ *Ibid*p1338.

²⁰ *Ibid*p1334-35.

They could not have done so in the first place. For they had spread the war across the terrain, retreating to the gorges of the Hen-tei and the Mongolian Altai, where they waited for the battered enemy to retreat so that they could regroup later. Each defeat, however, reduced the number of their warriors a little more, and natural population growth could not fill the vacancies left by the slain. In 445 Wu-ti Khan, the Tabgachs' intrepid enemy, died, and his successor, T'u-ho-ch'en, had to content himself with remaining on the defensive or carrying out plundering expeditions to obtain silk. In 448, T'o-pa Tao received an envoy from the Principality of Yüeban, the Central Asian branch of the Huns then living in Tarbagatay and Ba- ti Cungarya. The negotiations recorded in history imply an alliance whose sole purpose was to wage war against the Jujans. If the Yuebans squeezed the Jujans from the west, the latter would have no means of defence. True, we have no concrete evidence of the Jungarian wars, but the course of events allows us to conclude that there was no peace in that document and that the Ju-jans were trapped.

How could the Hun principality of Prince An-chou react in this situation? An-chou was an ally of the Jujans, but he was also a relative of the Juebans. He had few warriors and, moreover, the inhabitants of the Turfan Pit were gnashing their teeth at him. He tried to manoeuvre, deceive and evade, but it all came to an end. In 460, when the Jujans besieged An-chou's stronghold, the Huns surrendered and were summarily slaughtered.

Is it not a little strange that the Western Huns, whom it is appropriate to call the Guns, to distinguish the ethnic modification resulting from the change of habitat and the intense fusion with the Ugors and Alans, came to a tragic end in the same years? ²¹ For the powerful Gun state was not only destroyed, but disappeared without a trace.

Just as it is difficult to claim that it is a coincidence that the Asian Huns and the European Guns perished at the same chronological dates, it is equally difficult to record that historical law is at work here. However, it is important to note the following: If Attila sealed the fate of the Roman Empire in 451, in 454 his son and successor Ellak died heroically in the river Ne- daohis brothers Dengizik and Irnek

21 Inostrantsev K.A. *Xunnu i gunny*. L., 1926.

They tried in vain to hold on in the steppes around the Black Sea. The Gunlar's moribund existence continued until 469, when Dengizik's head was planted on the walls of Constantinople; this moribund existence was probably further complicated by the events taking place in Central Asia, equidistant from Turfan and the Black Sea.

Here, we would like to leave aside the direct navigation through the glosses of historical sources. This is because the events that took place are both quite large and have been dealt with separately in a series of narrowly-framed studies conducted by us.²²

However, in order to connect the history of the Asian Huns to the history of the world in general, it is necessary to take a bird's eye view of the events in Central Asia in the V. century.

In the middle of the V century, to the south of the Yü- eban Huns living on the outskirts of Saur and Tarbagatay, there lived the Abar tribes, called the "True Avars" to distinguish them from the "Pseudo-Avar" or "Var" tribes living on the banks of the Yayik and Emba rivers. Around 460, the Ephthalites organised an expedition to the north and struck such fear into the Abars that they fled for their lives and attacked the Sabir²³ tribes living on the border of the forest and steppe in Western Siberia.²⁴ These latter, turning westwards, defeated the Hun tribe of the Akassirs in 463 and displaced the Saragur, Onogur and Ugor tribes, which deprived the Western Huns of their rear support and led to their defeat. Since the subsequent history of these tribes has been analysed by M.I. Artamonoff²⁵, we are more interested in the events in Central Asia.

- 22 On this subject see the following works of L.N. Gumilëv. *Eftaliti i ih sosedi v IV v.* (The Eftalites and their Neighbours in the IVth Century) // VDI, 1959, N° 1; *Nekotorye voprosy istorii hunnov* (Some Problems of Hun History) // VDI, 1960, N° 4; *Tri izcheznuvshix narodov*. (Three Disappearing Nations) in the book *Eastern Countries and Peoples*, II. M., 1961; *Eftaliti-gortsy ili stepnaki* (Are the Eftalites Mountainous or Steppe?) // VDI, 1967, N° 3; Artamonoff M.I.'s *Istoriya Khazar* (Khazar History), L., 1962, 13. bl. pp. 106-107; *Drevniye Türki*, (Ancient Turks), p. 35; *Irano-efthalitskaya voyna v V v.* (Iranian-Ephthalite War in the V. Century) and Altheim F. and Stiehl R.'s *Die Araber in der Alten Welt*. Bd. V., 2. Berlin, 1969.
- 23 Samoid tribe. See Hajdu P. *Die ältesten Berührungen zwischen den Samoje-den und die jennisseischen Völkern/Acta Orientalia*, t. III, pp. 88-89.
- 24 It is presumed that the "Abars" who fought with the Sabirs were Ju-jans, the reader can see that in 460 the Ju-jans were in a state not even worth mentioning, and that they were not on the border with the Siberian peoples, since Yüeban was in the way.
- 25 Artamonov M. *Istoriya Xazar*. L., 1962, p.61.

Taking advantage of the weakening of the Abar tribes, the Yueban Huns spread throughout Yedisu, where the Abars returned as a tribe that had lost its independence. Here they found it convenient to mingle with the Mukris, a Sienpi tribe that had already migrated in the II century to the foothills of T'ien-shan, where it maintained its independent existence for some time under the name of the Western Sienpi Army. It was these people who merged in the VIth century and formed the Turgesh people. The Yüebans continued their existence only until the late 80s of the V century. It the Teleuts who put an end to their independence from the Jujans in 487. However, the happiness of the Teleuts did not last long either: They were subjugated by the Eftalites in 495-9, then defeated by the Jujans and finally subjugated by the Turks (Tür- küt) in 547. But the descendants of the Central Asian Huns survived and formed four tribes, the Chu-yu, the Chumi, the Chumugun and the Chuban, who played a very important role during the reign of the Great Turkic Khanate. In the later period, although there was no doubt that they were descendants of the Huns, they could no longer be called Huns.

But here we are faced with one of the most important questions of ethnology: What is this ethnos? Every nation has ancestors dating back to the Palaeolithic period. Many peoples, even though they have disappeared from history, leave descendants behind. Hun ethnogenesis is just a part of ethnic human history. As in many cases, in their history, too, there are partial blurs in the totality of the subject, where it is not possible to see one as a member of the other. Leaving aside the imposition on the reader of our own particular views on the nature of ethnos and the rhythm of ethnogenesis, let us try to find the answer to the following question: Was the destruction of the Huns a coincidence or a necessity of historical law?

In the second half of the V century, the Hun ethnos disappeared in four regions, which were dissimilar not only in terms of people and culture, but also in terms of natural conditions. More precisely, four peoples, in which the Huns continued to exist as a necessary and absolute component, disappeared from history. In other words, Huns were the emb- rion of these peoples. But this does mean that the same members of the Hun ethnos were not people worthy of consideration. Only after they lost their ethnic unity did they find a place for themselves within the framework of other ethnic unities. For example, the Akassirs were Saragur-

The Kan-su Huns merged with the Huns to form the ancient Bulgarians, the Kan-su Huns part of the Turkic army of Ashina, the Chu-yu tribes ensured the growth of the Ba- tian Turkic Khanate, and the Sha-t'o (pronounced Sha-to) Turks, who dominated China again in the Xth century, descended from them. Finally, the Huns who remained in Ordos, Shen-si and Shan-si merged with the Tabgachs and pulled the fate of the T'o-pa Wei Empire this way that, so that we need to return to the history of the ethnic contact zone in order to trace a people whose chronological existence ended due to the loss of political independence.

P. Boodberg concludes from the Huns' blood ties with the Tabgachs that they maintained their last independent existence until 525-526, when their commander Liu Li-shen received the khan titular title.²⁶

True, these tribes were not called Hyung-nu (Huns), but Shih-Hu or elsewhere Mountain Hu, which makes us doubt their geo- neology, but there is no doubt about their ethno-cultural belonging to the Hun culture. They were probably a remnant of the Wei Empire hidden in the northern extremities until the VI century. This is the last recorded information about the Huns as a separate people. The sum total of all the narratives about this people gives us the right to review the last pause in the history of ethnic contact in an age when tribal collusion gave way to social conflicts.

²⁶ Boodberg P. *Two notes*, p. 297-n. 55.

SECTION X

LEFT-OVER CANDOUR

King-Priest

T'o-pa Hsün spent twelve years of his reign exclusively fighting alcoholism. He demonstrated a blatantly passive rule, tolerating both Daoists and Buddhists in equal measure, yet he allowed the Buddhists to spread their ideas the country. The Daoists were enough for everyone - the Chinese and even the "barbarians" - but nobody said anything to the Buddhists. Anyway, they were giving everyone a piece of their minds to make people feel at peace. Who wouldn't want to have peace!

In 465, T'o-pa Hung [Hong] I ascended the throne. He was an ardent and devout Buddhist. He filled his country not with palaces and parks with pavilions for his concubines, but with huge statues of Buddha, for the making of which mountains of copper and gold were used. Incidentally, his extreme religiosity never prevented him from dealing successfully with his country's external problems. Having defeated the South Chinese between 466-69, the Tabgachs occupied Shan-tung and extended their borders to the Huai River. In 470, they crushed the Togon and Ju-jans, forcing both of them to stop plundering the Wei lands. T'o-pa Hung [Hong], who abdicated in 471 in favour of his infant son, retired to a Buddhist temple to purify his soul, but continued to direct politics at the cost of alienating his wives and the reigning Empress ^{Feng}¹. In 475, this king-priest issued an edict forbidding the sacrifice of all live animals, on the grounds that they might possess human souls through tenasuh. Another edict, contrary to the practice in China, ordered that only the offender himself, not his relatives, should be slain. However, some of the first rogue zâdegâns whom he himself slaughtered were probably the Empress.

1 The mythical phoenix bird. See Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1355.

Feng's collaborators. This energetic woman soon overpowered her husband and complete power in 476. Nevertheless, there was no change in political practices.

T'o-pa Hung [Hong] I, at the helm of Buddhist monks, increased the pressure on his Chinese subjects. In 465, a law regulating the utilisation of land and slavery was drafted. Although it is not known whether this law came into force or not, it is certain that the same mentality was thinking about many issues. Because according to the law, 80 acres would be allocated to men and 40 acres to women for cultivation, and when the man reached the age of 66, the land would be transferred to the state treasury. It should be taken account that this land reform did not apply to all citizens of the empire, but only to the Tabgach warriors, and the introduction of the old age limit was based on the view that the old man was not fit for service. In this case, the allocated piece of land can be regarded as an *ikta* of the early feudal period. The same law also imposed some restrictions on the system of slavery. Accordingly, free people (i.e. warrior soldiers) and low-level officials could own a maximum of 60 slaves, while the officials of the state could own between 100 and 300 slaves.² Leaving aside the issue of whether this reform was implemented or not, we see that it was prepared against the Chinese aristocratic landowners. Indeed, at that time, large *latifundiums* had developed in the northern regions of China, training the bureaucrats of dynasties such as Yüan or Ma and absorbing the generals of the frontier tribes. In the cultivation of these lands, peasants were sometimes employed, who could be easily procured by powerful state officials on any pretext, and sometimes slaves acquired from among the prisoners of war. The treatment of slaves was extremely strict. For example, once when a male slave fell in love with one of the female slaves, his master wanted to kill them, but as an example for other would-be lovers, he took pity on them and had them each receive forty strokes of the cane.³

It seems that the Tabgachs who conquered North China eliminated the Chinese farming aristocrats and created the fund of the treasury from the *latifundiums*. In the early days nomads lived on the income from their herds and the spoils of war. War fed the warrior, but this could not continue for long, and internal resources had to be found to feed a standing army. So T'o-pa Hung [Hong] I's land reform was a response to conquest movements.

2 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnoj Sibiri*, p. 486.

3 Lu Guan-çjun. *Troyetsarstviye*, I/304.

In other words, it a mixture of feudalism and slavery, which put an end to the wars of plunder and provided a foothold for the cultivation of the conquered lands. Such a system resembled neither the system of the Chinese (i.e. the Chineseisation of the Tabgachs was only in appearance) nor the system of the Jujans, where the land was considered the property of the tribes. This system was based solely on the principle of "there", i.e. on the "bar-bar" patterns of military democracy and on the necessity of the soldier to feed himself, which did not allow him to abandon his military labour and return to his peacetime occupations. Since money was replaced by natural exchange in China from the III century onwards, there was no possibility to buy and sell land. Grain and cloth were used instead of money, and leather and cattle replaced them in nomads. Cattle was of no use to anyone without land.⁴

However, the Tabgach dignitaries were dissatisfied with these reforms, as the limited ownership did not touch the ichthas held officials. Furthermore, they were prohibited from acquiring more than 600 to 1500 mou* (36.15 to 93.6 ha) land according to their rank. On the other hand, slave owners could acquire land according to the number of slaves in their possession, and thus colonies of slaves were established. It was known who could own slaves: Warriors who could take prisoners of war and voivods, i.e. Tabgachs, but certainly not Chinese subjects of the empire. From these details it is possible to conclude that, since there were few horses for ploughing in North China under the rule of the braided hair, the land was distributed to people who were able to cultivate it. However, in this regard, people who were not favourable to the government, i.e. the Chinese gentry, were exempted. The Tabgach government certainly did not want to take any attitude against the big landowners. For example, it allocated a large amount of land to Buddhist monasteries, but it wanted to levy a tax per acre⁵ and its aim was to enable the Sienpi warriors to utilise the power of slaves in the cultivation of the land⁶, in other words to make them large farm owners. Unquestionably, this is a kind of feudal system. The worst part is that such a thing could not be implemented.

4 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yitjnoj Sibiri*, p. 490.

I *mou is exactly 600 m² (transl.)

5 A land tax was levied on infantrymen; taxes were also levied on mulberry trees and hemp production.

6 It was reckoned that a warrior could acquire 60 slaves during the war. It was probably a way of encouraging warriorship.

we don't know whether it was put in place or not. Therefore, it is obvious that this system will not last long.

Fashionista Queen

During the rule of the husband-killer regent, some important events took place that deserve to be emphasised. On the southern frontiers, however, it was a complete failure. The rotten Sung dynasty was succeeded by the new Ch'i dynasty in 479, which drew the Wu-t'u Principality to its side, repelled two attacks from the north in 480 and 481, and thus saw an improvement in the northern borders. In 479, the Qantans began to appear on the political scene. This ancient Mongol tribe, living in north-west Manchuria, had voluntarily become a vassal of the Wei Empire after being subjected to the attacks of Kögür- yo and had agreed to pay tribute,⁷ but had refused to contribute soldiers to the Wei army ranks. In 480, when the Tabgachs, the descendants of the Yü-wen, refused the offer of settlement within the borders of the empire, they were accepted as subjects.⁸ The Ju-jans, on the other hand, were weakened because the Teleuts were separated from them. The Teleuts, who migrated to the west, established their own state and started to look for ways to ally with the Wei Empire. And finally, To- gon, the natural enemy of Wei, gave up his pawing of the western regions of the empire because he had engaged in minor skirmishes with the T'ang- ch'angs, a Tibetan tribe living nomadically in the Amdo mountains.¹⁰ But all these events took place almost without any involvement of the Empress Feng, who was more preoccupied with the internal problems of her own state.

The government palace in P'ing-ch'eng was slowly but emerging from its nomadic identity, the city was becoming a familiar Chinese capital, and the fashion for reconstruction made itself felt in the zâdegân circle.

As for the economic development of the country, it should immediately be noted that on the one hand, the wealth accumulated, on the other hand, rapidly multiplied.

7 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/74.

8 Age., p. 73.

9 Bichurin N.Ya. *Istoriya Tibet* 63.

10 King Fu-lien-chou's attempt to break relations with the Wei and restore their borders was frustrated in 492. See Age, p. 84.

was being squandered. Empress Feng had introduced Chinese fashion into the palace. For the dignitaries belonging to different strata, eye-catching epaulettes, medallions and ribbons were introduced to denote rank and rank, and the nomadic robes were replaced by elegant red jackets. A magnificent and extravagant throne hall was built inside the palace, and a school for the children of the wealthy dignitaries was opened, staffed by Chinese teachers.¹¹ However, the strict Sienpi customs, which the mother of the crown prince had wished to destroy so as not to influence the future king, remained in force.¹² While the Tabgach state was being Chineseised on the one hand, by the end of the Vth century it was undergoing a painful renaissance and had become a nomadic-Chinese chimera.

Having lost its influence on the "barbarian" sect of the Wei Empire and lost the initiative to Buddhism Daoism lost its last position at court when it was pushed aside by Confucianism. In 482, the young emperor T'o-pa Hung [Hong] II performed the ancestor-worship ceremony in the Confucianist manner for the first time.¹³ Had this been the end of the matter, the Daoists would not have been too worried, but in 485 a new edict was issued against sorcery and fortune-telling, that is, against Daoist priests in the narrow sense. The reason for the prohibition, according to the later classical books, was that the work was contrary to science, and in particular, divining the destiny of the people was strongly prohibited. The prohibition of fortune-telling books was decreed, and the study of them was considered a criminal offence.¹⁴ The edict blocked the Daoists' path to ascendancy, but the decision that dealt them the real blow and led to their official non-recognition was taken after the death of Empress Feng in 491. The famous Lao-tse altar built by T'o-pa Tao was dismantled, the old Tabgach ways of worship were banned, and in 492 the customary Chinese cult of the "five rulers", that is Confucianism, was replaced by a new cult - the cult of sun and moon worship.¹⁵

The reform of cults and the change of customs can be regarded as a kind of indication of a change in political orientation. Empress Feng clearly favoured the Chinese subjects over the Tabgachs. A new tax reform was introduced in 484 as a result of friendly contacts with the Chinese sece- nity. Until then, the tax was levied on only 3-10 families.

11 Wiger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1366.

12 *Ibid*, p. 1363.

13 *Ibid*.

14 *Ibid* p1364-65.

15 *Ibid* p1368-70.

This consisted of 2 balls of cloth, 2 funt (819 g) of yarn, one funt of silk thread and 200 quintals of grain, which were paid to the treasury. In addition, a ball of cloth, or often a little more, was paid as a separate tax for the local administration. Local administrators used to set aside the amount they wanted from the collected taxes and send the rest to the treasury. However, thanks to the new reforms, greedy officials had their day and taxes were reduced: 2 rolls of cloth and 29 measures of grain to the treasury and 2 rolls of cloth to the tax officials. Those who violated the law or abused their duties were sentenced to death.¹⁶

This reform eased the burden of the Chinese peasantry, but at the expense of the Tabgach dignitaries, who lost all the fruits of their victory. The assets of the children of the conquerors were fixed, and this was clearly only the beginning of the process.

The situation of the city dwellers serving the palace and its environs had already been improved. The edict of 471, issued soon after the removal of the king-priest T'o-pa Hung [Hong] I, removed the restriction on the acquisition of slaves, which limited the economic power of the Tabgach dignitaries. Restrictions on craftsmen among the city dwellers were also lifted. From now on, artisans could decide where to live, travel and practice their art as they wished.¹⁷

As in medieval Europe, the throne was besieged by the citizens during the war against the feudals.

The reform also touched the administration.

Civil servants in towns and districts received requests from the population to be apportioned according to the proportion of population.¹⁸ In this case, the Tabgach feudals would be removed from the administration, and all authoritative authorities would fall into the hands of the Chinese.¹⁹

A new system of independent administration of villages was introduced. In other words, the institution of "three aksakals" (*san-chang*) was established. Accordingly, every 5 households were considered as the neighbouring community of the aksakal quarter; every 5 of these communities were considered as a village community; and every 5 village communities were considered as a town. The duty of the aksakal was to conduct a census,

¹⁶ *Ibid* p1364.

¹⁷ Duman L.I. *IK istorii gosudartstva Toba-Vey i Lyao i ix svàzey s Kitayem* 12.

¹⁸ *Age.*, p. 13.

¹⁹ Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 200.

The Tabgachs were responsible for determining the amount of taxes and obligations per household, making annual land allocations and monitoring the loyalty of the citizens to the existing regime. The Tabgachs, who had not melted away among the Chinese masses, were no longer allowed to live.

Betraying the Past

Empress Feng had abdicated in 490, and the young T'o-pa Hung [Hong] II had taken full power. He inherited the energy of Tabgaç ancestors from his father and Chinese elegance from his mother. Therefore, with the passion bequeathed by his father, he continued his mother's work, namely the Chineseisation of the Tabgachs. He first secured the back of the empire. With a successful march, the Jujans were disrupted, but of course they could not be conquered. Because, as they always did, they retreated to the gorges of Hangay and Hen-tei mountains and disappeared from sight. With a second march in 491, the Togons were subjugated, and the emperor took pity on the prisoners of war and released them. In 493, T'o-pa Hung [Hong] II organised an expedition against South China, but to rains and lack of food, he was forced to interrupt the expedition and stop at Lo-yang.

This ramshackle Chinese city made such an on T'o-pa Hung II that the emperor decided to move the capital of the state there, which he did in 494. His calculation was to achieve an easy victory over the Ch'i Empire by using Lo-yang, which was close to the battlefield, as a base, but the northern offensive proved fruitless. This prompted T'o-pa Hun II to reconsider the organisation of his country.

After 40 years of peace, the Tabgachs had lost many steppe traditions and adopted many Chinese customs. This, of course, could not destroy the warrior spirit of the young Tabgachs. Because they were only novices who had not seen war. But T'o-pa Hung II considered this a sufficient reason to be disillusioned about his people. In 495 he issued an edict banning the features that had distinguished the Tabgachs in the past, namely the Sienpi language, Sienpi dress and hairstyles. The Chinese language, dress and hairstyle were made compulsory and strict rules were imposed for those who did not comply. The Tabgachs were forbidden to marry their own tribesmen, and existing Sienpi names were to be replaced by Chinese ones. Even the ancestral home of the dead

They were even forbidden to be buried in the steppes. T'o-pa Hung II even changed the name of the dynasty from T'o-pa to Yüan in order to see it through to the end.²⁰

It seems that an anti-reform opposition had formed among the Tabgach lords, and at the head of this alliance was the crown prince. He only wanted to return to his native P'ing-ch'eng and live according to the old ways, but on the way he was arrested and slaughtered along with his dignitaries. Feudalism was fuelled by the police-bureaucracy system inherited from Han China.

The reforms of 495-97 had turned an outpost of the nomadic world into an ordinary Chinese monarchy. During the reigns of the later emperors, the palace was in complete decadence. Hypocrisy, dishonesty and nepotism were rampant. Skirts full of money were spent to build Buddhist temples and to support the Indian *bahshis*, who numbered 3,000 in Lo-yang alone. While new taxes were levied to meet the expenses of the palace, the army, which remained out of the limelight, was rapidly becoming Chineseised.

Let us now return to our main problem, namely the question of ethnogenesis of the peoples in the contact zones, taking into account their historical fate. The unification of the tribes under the rule of the Tabgach khan led to the strengthening and consolidation of the ties between them. Even if they did not fully fuse with each other, the traditions of the tribes living in the cities and expanding through intermarriage were lost. In the half-century or so after T'o-pa Tao's death, descendants of the Hun, Tibetli, and some of the Sienpi tribes mingled with the Tabgach ethnoses, but all of them resisted Chineseisation. T'o-pa Hung [Hong] II's model of radical Chineseisation changed the situation. Preserving ancestral traditions was now regarded as disloyalty to power. T'o-pa Hung II had already become emperor, leaving the khanate aside. The compulsory change in language, dress and hairstyle was only an accessory. Because the most important thing was to change people's behavioural stereotypes. Confucius taught: The Chinese who lives among the barbarians according to their customs is a "barbarian"; the Chinese who changes his shape and form among the Chinese is a "barbarian".

²⁰ T'o-pa was known to derive from the (of course mythical) Huang-ti, which in turn had the fantastic etymology of an ethnonym meaning earth, and could therefore be translated into Chinese as "yellow colour". See Mailla, *Histoire générale*, V/185.

living "barbarian" is the Chinese. The behavioural stereotype is the basis of ethnic traditions; its deterioration means the change of ethnoses. The Tabgachs and all the tribes that joined them had indeed undergone such a process.

Moreover, the transformation of the Tabgach khanate into a Chinese-type empire, initially in name and later in fact, created a need not for strong-willed and sincere people, but for cultured and cunning officials. Thus, the upper and middle ranks were filled with Chinese who were inclined to Confucianism, while the lower ranks and palace servants were made up of Buddhist Chinese. Because the empress and the emperor's favourites supported Buddhists. Those who were Tabgach by nature were either conscripted into military service or wandered about in Northern Shan-si and Ho-hsi, where they watched their nation's star slipping away. In spite of such a dire situation, the Tabgach ethnoses lasted for forty years.

Victory Inertia

It is worth mentioning that T'o-pa Hung [Hong] II, while changing the face of his people, also endeavoured to keep the enthusiasm of the victors in high spirits. He had some political calculations and he was not wrong in these calculations. Securing the favour of the Chinese subjects in order to gain victory against the Tabgachs, the sworn enemy of South China, was a trump card that the Wei administration had not been able to reach until then. It was an abomination that the people of South China preferred foreign-born emperors from the Liu-Sung and Ch'i dynasties to the despotism of their own rulers. Even the covert or overt murder of ruling dynastic leaders did little to galvanise the masses of the people, who rightly feared an invasion by "barbarians". The peasant revolts of 469 and 485 were short-lived, but they reminded the rulers that there was a limit to the patience of the people and led to the beheading of tyrannical officials. Besides, agriculture in the country villages had improved. Shen-si and Ho-nan peasants who fled from the Huns brought the deep ploughing method to the south, and they also applied the irrigation technique and radically changed the agricultural method of the south. Thanks to the dams built, floods prevented; thus, this vast but sparsely populated region was transformed into fertile, rich and populous land. In the same way, the arts and especially the technique of iron smelting, which was essential for the armament of the army, developed.

had been established. Since the caravan route was under the control of the Wei Empire, especially the maritime trade was very active.

In short, South China was a formidable foe for the North and, moreover, behind the latter lay an unsubdued steppe. The war between the two empires seemed to stop once in a while, but it was never over.

The Principality of Wu-t'u, formerly a vassal of the Yüan-Wei Empire, had fallen to the Ch'i Empire in 497. T'o-pa Hung [Hong] II had to mobilise a large army capable of victory in a pitched battle, but he was able to do so only after the conquest of Hang-chung in 405, which had been a Chinese province since time immemorial, the breaking of the last resistance of the brave Tanguts (Ti), and the incorporation of their principality as a province of the Yüan-Wei Empire in 506.

T'o-pa Hung II had no little trouble in the north, where the Tartars, settled along the imperial , in 496 but were soon exterminated. By this time the Yüan-Wei Empire had lost the position it had once held at the western end of the T'o-pa Wei. The Eftalites had subdued Khoten and Karashar, and the inhabitants of Central Asia Kao-ch'ang rendered to the Jujans. But it was the Yin-shan Teleuts, who refused to become khans, who most annoyed the emperor. In 498, he wanted to involve them in the campaign against South China, but the Teleuts raised the flag of rebellion, fled to the Ju-jans, the enemy of the empire, and preferred to serve the steppe people to serve the Chinese government. This being the case, the Chinese intelligence network again stepped in and told the emperor that the nomads were "disregarding" the laws of the state (presumably the new laws by the Chinese); that they regarded the conditions of social life (the new regulations, of course, as they had previously been loyal to the state) as foolishness; They stated that their submission to the state by resorting to violence would only lead to chaos; that it was possible to rule them, but for this purpose, a person who would gain their trust should be put in charge of them and that a person who would rule them justly could do a lot".²¹

21 Although Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. gives the date of this rebellion as 487-493 on the basis of D. Pozdneyeff's "Studies on Uighur History" (see *Western Mo-ğolistan*, pp. 199-200), the most favourable date is that given by Wieger (*Textes Historiques*, p. 1377), since the march began in 498.

This document shows the extent to which T'o-pa Hung II's reforms were embraced by the nomads who had brought his dynasty to the throne of China. T'o-pa Hung [Hong] now had to issue an edict to satisfy the nomads, who, having lowered their sails and received assurances that they would not be scattered among the Chinese, returned and sent a delegation to Lo-yang to declare their allegiance.

Nevertheless, T'o-pa Hung II halted his expedition to Ho-nan, where he captured the city of Yüan, and completed his march northwards. There he executed one of the ringleaders of the rebels and made a treaty of peace and co-operation with the rest.

North-South Conflict

T'o-pa Hung [Hong] II fell ill during his march north and returned to the capital. On his way through the city to the palace, he was surprised to see people wearing hats and short dresses in the streets. So his reforms were being opposed. When he came to the palace, he learnt that his beloved wife, who was also the stepmother of the dauphin, was not loyal to him. All this upset him so much that he died soon after. His successor, Yüan Kuo, obeying his uncle's last words, had his stepmother beheaded to avenge his murdered mother (499).

Then the war with South China was resumed, which was brutal and pointless for both sides. The Chinese population had reduced the proportion of Tabgachs in the Wei Empire, which only weakened the state. Since the unification of China was an ethico-political imperative for the Yüan- Wei ruling class, it could not even be discussed. The war might have been heavy, it might even have failed, but a real ally had been found among the northerners: Hsiao Pao-huan, emperor of the Ch'i dynasty. This idiot had calculated that his people would welcome the treaty and had his viziers slaughtered when they pointed out that it would complicate the situation. The life not only of the courtiers but also of the entire population of the capital turned into a nightmare; everyone expected to be killed at any moment by imperial stooges, and not necessarily for any crime or sin, but simply because he looked wrong in the eyes of a tyrant. Even the nationalist Chinese voivods had lost patience. Huai river-

The commander of the sailing fleet gathered his officers and explained to them that the emperor was a ferocious predator and that it was necessary to save the country from him. The officers, endorsing his view, marched to the capital and laid siege to the palace, but were put to the sword by the soldiers of Prince Hsiao I, who came to the aid of the monarch. After this unsuccessful rebellion, the northern armies were able to occupy some areas between the Huai and Yang-tse rivers in 500 without encountering any obstacles. This was the comfort that the Yüan-Wei Empire would see.

Hsiao Pao-huan, who was extremely confident, immediately poisoned his successor. However, as soon as the news of his murder spread in the neighbourhood, Hsiao Yen, the brother of the poisoned prince and the governor of Hsien-yang city, rebelled and marched on the capital. When his soldiers, who were already gnashing their teeth against him, fled, the inhabitants of the city, who were loyal to the government, surrendered. But Hsiao Pao-huan still did not realise the seriousness of the situation. Having been besieged in the capital before, he continued to resist. Finally, in 501, when one of his most trusted agents opened the saray gate, those he called his trusted mountains off the head of the emperor, who was calmly playing the flute. Hsiao Yen, who ascended to the throne, slaughtered the dictator's chambermaids and favourites and declared a general amnesty. The murdered prince's brother, Hsiao Pao-jung, was the legitimate heir to the throne, but since he abdicated, he was rewarded with the title of prince of the first rank. This did not save him, however, and a few days later he was offered to commit suicide. The boy (who was only 15 years old) expressed his desire to drink wine to his heart's content and drank to his heart's content...Then silence.

Seated on the throne, Hsiao Yen proclaimed the beginning of a new Liang dynasty. He remained on the throne until 549 and showed exceptional respect for Buddhism.

This tragedy ensured the future success of the Yüan-Wei Empire, but not that of the Tabgach people, who had become a marginalised ethnic minority in their own country caught between the angry masses they could never subdue and a government that betrayed its own people. The empire of the victorious mass lacked the ability to survive, but the collapse was gradual, and a new generation was born that did not know what fate awaited it.

As can be seen, the culture of the Syenpis was dominated by a completely special situation, which could not be regarded as at least common between China and the steppe. More precisely, it was the third pillar of a tower built on three legs. They also contributed to the power that kept this tower standing, but since they could not be favourable neither to the Great Steppe nor to Great China, this led to the ruin of their empire. The Syenpis, possessing an unrepeatable culture, perhaps possessed a personal power that had cooled down. However, their old nobility, resisting fate, also brought a sad and terrible end to the Wei Empire.

SECTION XI

AND THE REMAINING ASH

Stinking Feudalism

The fifteen-year reign of Emperor Yüan Kuo [Kiao] was an extremely happy time. The word "extremely" implies that this happiness was a lie. The external political situation favoured the Yüan- Wei Empire; in the south, between the Huai-Yang-tse rivers, the northerners won victories over the southerners. Although these victories were inconclusive, they led to the strengthening of the anti-Taggach element in the imperial structure in the Chinese-inhabited areas and encouraged the self-admiring emperor and his court. In the north, the Ju-jans, who had been engaged in a civil war with the Teleuts, had weakened and ceased to be a danger. The Eftalites, who had recently usurped the western end, had turned to India, where the native population had fiercely resisted them and in 510 had routed the Eftalite army. In Yüan Kuo's palace, one would linger over what one had inherited from one's ancestors, in other words, one would visit the harem whenever there was free time. This is exactly what he did.

There was a traditional hatred of barbarians at court, even if they were peace-loving and loyal. Now the power of Kao's favourite wife came into play against the remaining traditions of the Tabgachs. With her denunciation, the emperor authorised the assassination of his "advisor", who had raised him as a fatherly ruler, and power passed from the Tabgachs to Kao Chao, the Chinese brother of the favourite.

The next step was taken by another woman named Hu. She became pregnant in 510 and declared that she was ready to sacrifice her life to give the emperor father a son. This fe- dacity of hers left such good impression on the people around her that they did not kill her after she gave birth to the child. Probably the rulers at that time

The Chinese, who had seized power, did not want to shed blood in vain. But five years later the emperor Yüan Kuo died. The four-year-old Hsü-an Hsü was put on the throne and his mother began to rule the country behind the scenes, as the Tabgachs had not yet learnt to respect a woman. The khan's mother had immunity for the Tabgachs.

Taking advantage of the favour shown by the court and a significant part of the beys, Hu Khatun set about settling scores with the Kaos. In 515, the chief vizier Kao Chao was murdered, and his sister was beheaded and detained in a monastery for three years before she too was killed. However, Hu Khatun had forgotten that she was dependent on the Tabgach dynasty. In order to get rid of the Tabgach commanders, she dispatched them to South China, where they captured the city of Hsü-shih in 516; she herself, in order to atone for her sins, abandoned her favouritism and officially declared Buddhism the state religion of North China in 518. In fact, he was not the first to take this step. For a year earlier, the same religious reform had been carried out by Emperor Wu-ti of the Liang dynasty and the Ju-jan Khan Che-wu-nu. The *de facto* sovereignty of the whole of East Asia had been handed over to those from the priestly world. This led to increased pressure on taxation and complaints from the imperial dignitaries. Because the state revenues were spent on the erection of sanemes and the delegations sent to the western end and India to transcribe religious texts, which were quite expensive for that period. The irresponsible meddling of the dignitaries, who benefited from the powerful patronage of the Buddhist community, resulted in the destruction of even valuable ancient Chinese monuments. In 518, in the hospitable city of Lo-yang, 46 marble slabs from the time of the Han emperor Ling-ti (167-189), decorated with images of former rulers, were smashed to pieces. Marble was needed for the construction of pagodas, but instead of roasting and bringing in slabs, they preferred to smash those decorated with exquisite artistic ornaments. Although an edict was issued after some cultured dignitaries urged the administration to repair and restore the dismantled slabs, no one listened to the edict.¹

Faced with the absurd behaviour of the rulers and their lack of dedication to the affairs of the state, Prince T'o-pa I was able to persuade Liu Teng, the commander of the special troops, to stage a palace coup. In 520, the conspirators stormed the palace with troops and arrested the regent.

1 Mailla, *Histoire générale*, V/242-43.

After slaughtering his favourite, they also beheaded the eleven-year-old emperor Yüan Hsü, the grandson of T'o-pa Hung II. As for the emperor's mother, Hu, for some reason they did not kill her, but imprisoned her in a secluded room of the palace and fed her enough food to keep her from starving to death, but the young emperor did not even know where his mother was.

The fate of the new ruler, T'o-pa I, was to be even worse than that of Hu Khatun and her lovers. In 523 there was a bloody popular uprising, but the usurper managed to stay in power until 525. One day, while he was absent from the palace, Hu-khatun emerged from her dark cell to meet the emperor's son and with tearful eyes asked him to take revenge on those who had persecuted her mother. Since his son was, after all, a Tabgach, he was moved by his mother's tears and declared him regent. After this, the salahdâr* closed the palace gates to T'o-pa I, who returned home. It was all over for the usurper. His whole family was killed and his property was confiscated. In a last favour, he was given the chance to end his life by committing suicide.

The dutiful son soon realised that he had been wrong about his mother. Hu immediately set about making up for the days spent in prison. She handed over power to her lover, who shared the same room with her, put her son under strict surveillance, began to hide the affairs of state from him and to keep his favourite people away from him. After a while, she began to hate her beloved son as much as she could. But in the meantime, historical events continued to unfold and the country was approaching the brink of the abyss.

The military forces of the Yüan-Wei Empire were unable to explain the palace coups, the consequent fall from power, the persecution of honoured families, intrigues, etc. to the military forces of the Yüan-Wei Empire. For ten years (from 516 to 526) the supremacy in East Asia was lost; the Liang Empire in South China took the initiative in the wars and captured fifty cities in the Huai river basin. The heaviest loss for the northerners was the loss of the fortress of Shou-yang in 526, and all the labours of not only T'o-pa Hung II but also of T'o-pa Kuo were wasted.

In 525, Togon broke away from the empire. This small, freedom-loving people managed to remain outside the general process of ethnic deformation taking place in the Great Steppe and the valleys of Inner Asia. In the VIth century

* Salahdâr : Sergeant responsible for the security of palace or castle gates.

The Togon had become a relic of the period of population migrations, but thanks to the preservation of migration traditions, this people was able to maintain its independence for a century.

North China had lost its dominance at the western end. Because the Eftalites, who had taken control of the Silk Road by controlling Ho-ten, Kashkar and Kucha, had blocked the Wei Empire's route to India and Central Asia after entering into negotiations with the Liang Empire² in 516 and concluding an alliance.

In the north, the Ju-jans, who had defeated the Western Teleutians in 524, had strengthened. By the middle of the VI century, Anahuan Khan, attempting to rebuild his own nomadic state, wrested from the Yüan-Wei Empire the dominion that his ancestors had once lost to the T'o-pa-Wei Empire. It seems that this crisis, which marked the boundary between the cold ashes of the past and the passionate lush shoots of Middle Ages, led a change in the main process framework. Nevertheless, before we try to draw a line in the sand with academic rigour or literary softness, let us take a look at the events of the last decade of the Wei Empire, both as the Tabgach (T'o-pa) as the Chineseised Yüan.

Deformation of Himeras

Let us go back a little. The T'o-pa Wei Empire, which united all the tribes of the Central Oasis under one flag in the Vth century, had melted them into a melting pot and set them against the monolithic Chinese population of the country. T'o-pa Hung (Hong) II put an end to this confrontation with his reform in 495 and the Yüan-Wei, that is, the Tabgach-Chinese chimera. The people living in this country did not see themselves as Tabgach or Chinese, but only as subjects of the empire. Of course, these contemporaries could not simply forget their old customs and norms of behaviour, but their children, born around 490, grew up only in a position where these customs were abolished, but also in an environment where all customs were outright banned. When they reached the age of maturity in the 20s of the VI century, they remembered that their parents were Tabgach or Chinese, but they themselves were neither Tabgach nor Chinese. The conscious period of their lives was characterised by a strict rule based on the principle of suppression of the people by brute force.

² Grousset R. *L'empire des steppes*, p. 111.

min oppression. As an ideological consolation, they had been recommended Buddhism, which held that suffering and happiness were illusions and that peace was a blessing to be cherished. But taxes were no illusion, nor were the obligations that had to be fulfilled a joke, as they struggled with ideals every minute. As the burdens of life increased, the ruling administration was steadily hemorrhaging blood, and eventually the children of both the Tabgach and the Chinese turned their backs on the degenerating dynasty. Between 423-26, popular revolts shook the whole of northern China.

However, if the ethnic traditions had been lost, their inertia still persisted. All the rebellions were centred in the north of Huang-ho and were supported by the children of the nomads. In places like Ho-nan and Shan-tung, which were inhabited exclusively by Chinese, complete silence reigned, even though the Liang armies had marched northwards and liberated the region from the "barbarians". But they were too late to rescue, and the others were tired of waiting and hoping to be rescued.

In 523 the inhabitants of six northern towns in the eastern part of Ch'in and Lung (Eastern Kan-su) and the northern part of Ts'i and P'ing (Northern Shan-si) revolted.³ The rebellion was fuelled by the transgressive actions of the usurper ruler T'o-pa I's retainers. Most of the inhabitants were Teleuts from the South, but Chinese people also joined the rebels. At the head of the insurgents was a man named Po-lu Han Pa-ling, who, judging from the first words of his name, was probably Ju-jan. After a sudden raid, the dignitaries were put to the sword, but the three armies sent to suppress the rebellion in 424 quickly arrived at the scene of the rebellion and intervened, but they were broken up by the insurgents. In the face of this situation, the Wei government asked the Ju-jans for help, and Anahuan, who arrived with his steppe warriors, immediately took command of the situation and won a crushing victory, and in return plundered North China.

However, this foreign intervention was not enough to calm things down. In 525 there was another rebellion in Ho-hsi, where a man called Mo-ch'i Chuo-wu-nu proclaimed himself emperor.⁴ In Shan-si, the Huns called Shih-hu, who had been suppressed by the Jujans, appeared on the scene, and their commander Liu Li-sheng proclaimed himself khan.⁵ But the strongest rebellion was in Ho-pei

3 Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 169.

4 Grumm-Grjimaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 201.

5 Boodberg P. *Two Notes*, p. 297.

and at the head of them was the famous Tabgach general Ho Juñ, to whom the Chinese masses also rallied. In 526 Ho Juñ defeated the Wei expeditionary battalion, captured the city of Ying-chou (Ho-chien in Ho-peï) and proclaimed himself emperor of the Ch'i state. It is interesting to note that a Tabgach, who became the commander in chief of the Chinese, named the state he founded Ch'i, which had been a "barbarian" name since the time of all ancient Chinese rulers. As we have already expressed our opinion, this name had a political programme.

By 527 Ho Juñ had extended his rule over all of Ho-peï, northern Ho-nan and parts of Shan-si, and the military rulers were powerless against the rebels.

As much as the decline of the military's fighting power was a factor in the Wei army's failure in the battlefields, so was mismanagement of the court. For example, on one occasion the court appointed aides to a general sent against Ho Juñ, who were not at all friendly with him; the general asked to be allowed to entrust the command to any of them, but the young emperor ordered the task to be distributed equally to both aides, so that the two commanders, who were rivals, perished with the armies entrusted to them.⁶ This episode shows that the irresponsibility and unprincipled behaviour of the dignitaries turned into a national disaster. In the meantime, Ho Juñ, taking advantage of his enemy's weakness, besieged the city of Yeh.

It was at this time that Erh-chu Juñ, the last light, who was the representative of the era and who bore the title of "the spirit of the age", would appear on the stage of history. Erh-chu was a tribal chief from Shuo-hsien in Northern Shan-si, and was probably a Siyenpi.⁷ Erh-chu's tribe, like other famous Siyenpi tribes, held a large territory, and the previous elders were latifundium holders. Our protagonist, however, was not one for idleness, and in 527 he sold his land and used the proceeds to gather around him a group of unemployed wandering soldiers. Probably, he chose the ones with certain characteristics among many soldiers. Because the pa- ra he had was only enough to feed 7 thousand people. In 528, Erh-chu undertook the protection of the crown prince with these distinguished soldiers and Yeh explained-

⁶ Wiger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1416.

⁷ Cordier H. *Histoire*, p. 352; Wiger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1417; Shan Yüe (see *Ocherki*, p. 170) was mistakenly written Shen-si. See Bichurin N.Ya. *Sobraniye svedeniy po istoricheskoy geografii*, p. 61.

rdin attacked Ho Juñ's army of one hundred thousand men like a fireball. In a rare event in history, the rival army of peasants scattered like a flock of chickens under the impact of the powerful blow and fled, leaving their captured commanders in captivity. But Erh-chu did not bother to chase the fleeing enemy and contented himself with taking Ho Juñ to Lo-yang where he was to be slaughtered. Thus ended the popular uprising against the despotic rule of Empress Hu.⁸

Let us now try to put events through the filter of criticism. Ho Juñ headed the generation of the "children" of the masses of the people, and then marched on his peers, the officials. Erh-chu Juñ, on the other hand, had grown up in a remote corner of the empire and had turned towards the generation of his "ancestors", that is, he had remained a Siyenpi. However, when he recruited soldiers, he did not go for members of his own clan, but for "descendants", i.e. those who had become mongrelised, who knew nothing of home manners, customs and principles, and who did not even want to think about such things. In fact, his troops were a gang of professional killers and condottieri (opportunists). After all, during the Han dynasty, the Liu Pei kondotyer had also suppressed the peasant "yellow turbans" rebellion. But the saying that history repeats itself is true. Just as Liu Pei could not get along with Ts'ao Ts'ao, Erh-chu Juñ had to get along with Empress Hu and her cronies, whom he had saved from the wrath of the people. The breakdown of this friendship was inevitable, as the maverick empress had driven the country into bankruptcy and was too ap- tal to think that she had no military power to protect herself. Indeed, Erh-chu Juñ had her and her followers in the palm of his hand, and events were bound to escalate.

Unwanted Saviour of the Fatherland

The rule of Empress Hu was definitely not popular among the inhabitants of the country. Due to the inertia of the administration, the lack of consensus among the subjects, and the loss of old tribal ties, the danger posed by the peasant revolts disappeared, and the zâdegân and the palace circle had the opportunity to take advantage of this situation. When the only real military force of the country was dispatched against the insurgents, the greedy and the

8 Cordier, citing Mailla (p. 286-290), offers another version and notes that Ho Juñ was assassinated after a palace coup. But see Wi- eger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1422 and Shan Yüé, *Ocherki*, p. 170.

The rest were the troops of Erh-chu, who had been strengthened after winning a victory by driving out volunteers, adventurers and beggars. Among them, a Chinese of Kao Huan origin stood out. While serving as an aide to his commander, this man gained his sympathy and later became his counsellor. This man was asked to prepare a programme⁹ to get rid of the military dictatorship, and Erh-chu Juñ, who did not consider this programme dangerous for his life, agreed with some T'o-pa princes who would support him in this matter and even with the young emperor who was fed up with the subjugation of his mother's followers. Thus, Erh-chu Juñ marched to the capital in 528 with the aim of liberating the emperor from his mother's cronies. Although the Empress Hu immediately sent for her "beloved" son and proclaimed her three-year-old grandson emperor, this time she could not save her own head. Erh-chu entered Lo-yang without encountering any resistance, arrested the regent, her grandson and around two thousand dignitaries, and installed Prince T'o-pa Tse-yü [Chung-ti] the throne. Regent Hu and his to-run were thrown over the bridge into the raging waters of Huang-ho. The arrested dignitaries were put to the sword by Erh-chu's cavalry and a general amnesty was declared.

Neither the people nor the T'o-pa princes were satisfied with the coup d'état carried out by the mercenaries. When Erh-chu Juñ got drunk and collapsed at the table during the banquet organised for the coronation of the new emperor, the emperor ordered his men to behead him, but they did not dare to do so. Realising the dangerous situation he was in, Erh-chu attempted to defend himself with poison and dagger. Thanks to the titles of prime minister and field marshal, he chose the city of Chin-yang as his residence, entrusting his daughter, now empress, to watch over the emperor, but his situation was not favourable.

The dominant classes of Wei society - the "Lo-yangites and Honanites" and the children of other Tabgachs and Chinese - were quite satisfied with the situation. The change in the name of the imperial family from T'o-pa to Yüan, and the reforms that followed, had greatly pleased them. Of course, they did not like the misbehaviour of Naibe Hu's henchmen, but they welcomed the removal of the popularly unpopular government with equanimity. But the declustered youth that had gathered around Erh-chu Juñ posed a legitimate threat to them.

9 Wiger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1421.

like. Even the Erh-chu Juñ was a relic of the sordid past, when the ruthless knitted-haired men had once spilled the blood of the North Chinese. His soldiers, on the other hand, being men who had no traditions, no social relations, but who cared only for unlimited power and the fulfilment of their warlike whims, become a bourgeois class of dreamers who cared little for the future. The people were therefore afraid of becoming a conquered people again, and therefore sympathised with the Yüan dynasty regardless of its "barbarian" origin.

Thus, in 529, when T'o-pa Hao, one of the princes of the Yüan dynasty, opposed Erh-chu Juñ, he found considerable support both from within the country and from the border regions. T'o-pa Hao, who had already managed to save his head from the executioner's sword and who expected to be equalled by other dignitaries, fled to South China, where Emperor Wu-ti negotiated with him and gave him an army to overthrow the usurper T'o-pa Tse-yü [Chung-ti]. When this army easily captured the cities of Juñ-ch'en and Hsü-yang, T'o-pa Hao declared himself emperor and entered Lo-yang in a triumphant manner. T'o-pa Tse-yü managed to flee northwards to Erh-chu Juñ.

The inhabitants of Ho-nan had gladly obeyed their new master, but the Chin-chou garrison had been tempted to disobey T'o-pa Hao because he had brought the Liang army with him. He had to ask for reinforcements from the south to maintain his military superiority, but his advisers advised him that complete submission to the military might of an ally would not be the right course of action.¹⁰ Undecided what to do, T'o-pa Hao set about the conquest of Lo-yang with all his might.

Meanwhile, Erh-chu Juñ and T'o-pa Tse-yü gathered all their forces and headed south. Since T'o-pa Hao had ordered the bridge over the Huang-ho to be destroyed, he did not expect a blow. However, Erh-chu's army crossed the Huang-ho on rafts and attacked Lo-yang. The inhabitants immediately abandoned T'o-pa Hao, who managed to save his life and take refuge in Lin-ying, but was killed by the people. The South Chinese army was able to withdraw in an orderly fashion, but in the meantime all the territory it had captured was reclaimed by the Wei Empire.¹¹ Erh-chu Juñ had saved the homeland for the third time.

¹⁰ Mailla, *Histoire générale*, V/293-294.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

T'o-pa Tse-yü rewarded the soldiers and the commander-in-chief who had saved him as best he could. In 530, he lured Erh-chu to Lo'yang with the allegation that his daughter, the empress, had been caught cheating on her husband. Erh-chu, who came to Lo'yang with the joy of saving his daughter, was stabbed by the emperor in the throne hall.¹² The palace residents organised a magnificent banquet on this occasion. After all, they had got rid of a man who could triumph over enemies!

No, it was not only an insidious anger, but also an unprecedented display of disloyalty! This treachery could not have been committed if it had not been supported by a large mass of the society. What was happening to the society that it was eager to reach such a dishonourable end? Why had it become so cowardly, demoralised and short-sighted? In our opinion, the answers to these questions should be sought in the course of events.

Until the day when the Wei Empire became a Tabgach-Chinese chimera this society remained a solid body whose state cohesion was undermined by ethnic rivalries. Traditions and even ethnic traits had been burnt out but not lost. However, when assimilation took place, this chimera turned into a gigantic amoeba spreading from the capital to the borders. The ethnos no longer looked at each other with the wrong eye, but the principles on which they were based had disappeared. All tribes and classes mingled with each other and bloodshed was rife.

Life Struggle

It was too early to rejoice at being rid of someone who had protected them from internal and external enemies. Moreover, we cannot understand this event if we do not review the changes that gradually widened and altered the behavioural patterns and moods of the descendants of the Tabgachs and Chinese. The populous chief cities of the Northern Wei Empire, because the Buddhists had not fully taught them the meaning of tranquillity because they were not united by the sacrifice and self-sacrificing aims they had inherited from their ancestors, had acquired neither the traits of opposition to foreigners nor dreams of heroism and perfection. The only common subject on which they were united was the rich

12 Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1424.

was the comfortable and idyllic life of the cities: Markets, theatres, taverns full of courtesans, magnificent villas, and the belief that someone had to serve them, to be at their beck and call...The guide of the bourgeoisie, afflicted with such a disease of vanity, is always blind-eyed egoism. No Lo-yangite would risk his life for the emperor who symbolised his personal pomp and splendour. For them, the thought that there could be anyone to whom they would be responsible and obliged as more valuable than their own life meant nothing. But in Northern Shan-si there remained the Tabgachs, who saw life as a series of obligations to tribe, commander, family, and even to their own herd and yearling. Therefore, as soon as the news of Erh-chu Juñ's assassination reached Chin-yang, his brother Erh-chu Shih-lung attacked Lo-yang with about a thousand cavalymen and smashed the special forces blocking his way. On the one hand he demanded that his brother's body be handed over to him, and on the other he set out alone to capture the treacherous ruler. The burning of the bridge over the Huang-ho by a courageous officer of the army prevented reinforcements from coming to him and almost led to a fifth tragedy. But when the northern troops succeeded in crossing the river and reaching the capital, the special troops abandoned their posts and fled. The victors were busy looting the city and its inhabitants when T'o-pa Tse-yü, shackled like a rabbit in a trap, had a silk rope tied round his throat and was being squeezed.

But these people be shown mercy? Here is a characteristic example of behaviour of that period. The vizier of the captured emperor, leaving his benefactor to his misfortune, gathered his gold and his herd of horses and sought refuge with his friend far away from danger, but this friend beheaded him and brought him to Erh-chu Shih-lung and of course kept his fortune for himself. But that night the ghost of the deceased appeared to Erh-chu Shih-lung and informed him about the lost treasure. Shih-lung thereupon ordered the confiscated treasure to be brought back and the visiting cunning cunning man to be slaughtered along with his family.¹³ Such is the legend, but how did Erh-chu Shih-lung learn the fate of the imperial treasure? Probably a tip-off from the murderer's neighbours. Men dakka dukka world! But what could such a corrupt society expect? Only Erh-chu, a member of the Siyenpi clan.

¹³ *Ibid* p1425-26.

to be the victim of a military dictator put in charge by the likes of Kao Huan, the murderous Chinese commander who acted as a counsellor.

The coup plotters proclaimed T'o-pa Hua as the new ruler.

Although the main mass of the society remained silent and tolerated the events it seems that the nomadic Tö-^{les}¹⁴ tribe in Ho-hsi rebelled and began to ravage North China. Erh-chu Tao (Erh-chu Juñ and Shih-lung's brother), who had marched against them, broke down and had to ask for help from Kao Huan, who was the commander of the Chin-chou garrison at the time. Kao Huan put the nomads to the sword and drove them out of China. For this heroic deed, he was given the title of prince and the Hi-chou region, which was to become the base of his dreams of a future future, was left under his rule.

In 531, members of the Erh-chu family deposed T'o-pa Hua and replaced him with the deaf and dumb eight-year-old T'o-pa Kung [Tung Hai]. The new emperor made a pact with those who put him in power. He was probably a prince who managed to save his life in the luxurious palace, but he would not be mentioned much.

Kao Huan disliked the Syenpis in general and the Erh-chu family in particular. He took the opportunity to rebel and seized the city of Yeh, putting T'o-pa Lan on the throne and himself as chief vizier. Erh-chu Tao, who had mobilised against him, was defeated. Then in 532, Kao Huan captured Lo-yang and put T'o-pa Kung on the throne, then overthrew Prince T'o-pa Lan and put T'o-pa Hsü on the throne. Not content with this, Kao Huan had three former emperors killed in the name of the new emperor. A year later, he destroyed Erh-chu Tao and eliminated all members of the family. However, he would not be able to take the throne of China alone.

Hsü, the last energetic prince of the T'o-pa family, tried to escape from his desperate situation. In 534, fleeing from his own vizier, he managed to take refuge in Shen-si, where the provincial governor, Yü-wen T'ai, offered him his protection against his pursuers. Undaunted, Kao Huan was able to defeat one prince after another.

14 The title "fu", carried by the commander at the head of the rebelling Töles, meant "bey", indicating that they were a Turkish-speaking people. See Cordier H. *Histoire générale*, p. 253.

to the throne. Huan also married the new emperor to his own daughter and began to rule the country as a military dictator. His actions were not to the liking of the large landowners in Shan-tung, who were not yet within the sphere of influence.¹⁵ They followed their emperor to Shen-si and settled in the Kuan-chung and Lung-hsi ka-sabas. They mingled with the native Chinese in the region and formed the Kuan-lung group, which was to become famous in the last period.¹⁶ But they could do nothing in the face of Yü-wen T'ai's poisoning of the unfortunate T'o-pa Hsü, who wanted to put another prince on the throne with whom he could get along better. Thus, in 534 the North Chinese Empire was divided into Eastern and Western Wei, but both were now Chinese dominions. The southern part of the Great Wall was cleared of nomadic elements.

This does not mean that all the Syenpis, Huns and Tibetans who arrived in the valley of the Huang-ho river in the III century were completely wiped out without leaving descendants behind, even if many of them lost their heads. The ethnoses is not a mathematical number of a certain number of people, but a powerful dynamic system with original rhythms (in each individual case). In fact, these systems collapsed in the middle of the VI century when the country tumbled into the pit of chaos. The division of the Empire into two halves soon provoked war between East and West, and the famine of 536 took away about 80 per cent¹⁷ of the population; the wretched people were even forced to resort to cannibalism.

These disasters have also changed the face of the country. Unlike war, famine kills not the most active, but the weakest sections of the population. Those who had sold out their own commanders and those who were indifferent to treachery and murder were left without a leader. Kao Huan and Yü-wen T'ai fed only those who were necessary or close to them. the war raged on between the two, only the active supporters (or rather, those who had a chance to survive) survived on both sides. No one cared about the last members of the T'o-pa family. Kao Huan and Yü-wen T'ai supported them for a while in order to provide the necessary support for their own power, but soon

15 Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 170.

16 Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki*, p. 51.

17 Wieger, *Textes historiques*, p. 1428. (In Wiger's book the date is mistakenly written 526 instead of 536).

as an excess. Chinese anger was now unbridled. In 550, Kao Huan's successor not only proclaimed himself emperor of Northern Ch'i [Ts'i], but also had all the members of the T'o-pa family butchered piece by piece and their bodies thrown into the Huang-ho river, thus wiping out a dynasty. In 557, Yü-wen T'ai's successor did more or less the same thing. After forcing the last emperor to abdicate, he poisoned and killed him. Thus ended an era.

During these grim years the Liang Empire of South China suffered a fatal blow. After the death of Kao Huan in 547, Hou Ching, viceroy of Ho-nan, rebelled against the Eastern Wei and with Yü-wen T'ai. A month later, however, Yü-wen T'ai betrayed him too and installed the obedient Wu-ti, with whom he had conquered North China, on the throne of Liang. Wu-ti, who sincerely believed in the nationalism of the viceroy of Ho-nan and supported him, abandoned him as soon as he was defeated by the northern armies, changed his front again and attacked the southern capital Chien- k'ang. After six months of resistance, the city fell and was sacked from top to bottom by enemy troops. In 549 the ashes of Chien- k'ang joined those of Lo-yang.

Hou Ching was unable to replace the regime of the military dictators taking root in the North in South China and died in 552. But this would not bring peace to China. Everyone was fighting each other: Northerners against Southerners, princes of the Liang dynasty against each other, Qingtans and Ju-jans against the Chinese, landlords against rebellious peasants, etc. Unfortunately, we will not go into the details of these wars, since these events are completely related to Chinese history. Suffice it to say that during the suppression of the peasant revolt in Hang-chou in 557, the poor peasant Ch'en Pa-hsien, who had proved his character, overthrew the Liang dynasty and declared himself emperor of the Ch'en dynasty. In return, however, he, or rather his state, lost the disputed lands in the Huang-ho basin, which had fallen into the of the North Chinese monarchy. In this period of turmoil, the adherents of one of the princes of the Liang dynasty, not expecting any mercy from their rivals, stubbornly resisted, and in 554, with the military assistance of the Western Wei, they established a small state in Central China and named it Muahhar Liang.

Of the eastern kingdoms affected by the Great People's Migrations, only the nomadic peoples scattered across the Central Oasis were affected.

Far from the processes of ethnogenesis that led to its destruction, the Togon survived, retreating into its shell among the snowy foothills of the Shan-shan mountain range. Togon [T'u-yü-hun] had become an isolate. Although the dynamics of evolution were replaced by homeostasis, which preserved their traditions, economy and population growth, history records that they were in reciprocal relations with their neighbours. Those that stay away from such relations can survive for a long time.

There was no more ancient China. Just as the earth cannot be stopped when it is blown away by the wind or by a fountain, so no one could look sympathetically at the passing process. The logic of events is absolutely infallible.

The war continued for 220 years and the taxes on the people doubled. In an attempt to save their lives and their freedom, the weary commoners left their ruined homes and started to go door-to-door in search of a morsel of bread to fill their stomachs. For the rich families, who had acquired large lands as a price for their betrayal during the changes in power, these miserable people were a blessing in disguise. They immediately offered these hungry people to work for them as labourers or for the treasury, or to work as farmhands on their farms. Hundreds of these wretched people, eager to be favoured by the rich, crowded into one farm.¹⁸

When the rapid decline in the number of taxpayers forced the rulers to squeeze those who remained behind, they naturally began to flee. When the weakened administration was deprived of the spoils taken from their neighbours or the rebels, they started beheading the rich and confiscating their properties. However, this wealth obtained through plunder was only enough for the desperate *zādagān*, the lethargic, the ignorant and the *tufayl*, who knew how to burn and destroy but could not build. Even the most beautiful laws, which at other times were a source of happiness for people, sometimes could not save the country and the people from misery. Because not only are they ignored, but they also lose their power in the moment of public anger. In order to get out of this dilemma, it is no longer laws that are necessary, but people who are honourable, rational, brave and self-sacrificing, even for the sake of a dream. Since such people will not be born in abundance immediately, the country will fall into the abyss. But they will appear at the most unexpected moments and history will begin anew.


18 Zaxarov *Istorichecksoye obozreniye narodonaseleniya Kitaya* //

Труды членов Российской духовной миссии в Пекине.. СПб., 1852, с. 276-278.

Ages and People

Let us go back a little and take a look at what has been going on for three centuries. I wish that these events would not be depicted in an extremely depressing and dark manner. But was there no place for reason, sincerity, love and happiness during this long period? It is conceivable that there was not, but let us remember that this was a long and declining age and the only objective criterion we have is the graphical curve showing the population.¹⁹

As recorded by I. Zaharoff, the population of China during the Han dynasty (2nd year AD) was 59 594 978 inhabitants. This is probably the optimal number of people that could be spread over the landmass without disturbing the natural resources. The reforms of Wang Mang and the executions carried out in connection with them prepared the ground for the revolt of the "redcaps" and the massacres that led to the death of about 70 per cent of the population. However, as soon as order was restored, population growth compensated for this loss, and in 157 the Chinese population again reached 56 486 856 people. However, these were not the Chinese as we know them, but completely different people.



No matter how much the later Han Empire spent, no matter how many important victories were won by the diplom who succeeded in inciting the Syen-pis and Ting-ling against the Huns, the country's potential was constantly diminishing. This was because ruthless temperaments overpowered the prudence of the court, and every minute of the indulgence they were granted was utilised for personal enrichment. Disappointment had become the motto of this age. This was the case not only for cultured people and state officials, but also for the "tyrannies of the blue sky" instead of the tyrannies of the yellow sky".

¹⁹ Age., p. 270-274.

It tore at the heart even of the peasants who took refuge in the "justice of the land". There was bloodshed again.

After the period of turmoil of the Three Reigns, the population of China had fallen to 7 672 881, although the outlying parts of the country suffered less than the centre. This meant that, due to the weakening of the old cultures, the weight of tribes of foreign origin gradually increased. Although the population of Central China had reached 16 163 863 in 280, these people were tired, spiritually degraded, and incapable of defending themselves and their country against outsiders. The victories of the Huns, Tankuts and Siyenpis are proof of this.

Apparently, no census was taken during the period of successive bloody changes of government. Although not very convincing, according to a figure from 589, 1.5 million out of 11 million²⁰ people lived in South China. This means that the population had increased intensely within 30 years. Thus, during the extremely severe years between 534-554, the population of China fell to a level lower than that of the Three Reigns, but rose again in 606, reaching 46 million²¹, which is again the result of a natural increase due to the cultivation of the country in a temperate climate.

But can we, by reviewing the traditions, recognise this new population as a continuation of the old one, that is, of the Han period? For this, to put it gently, we have no basis other than the now outdated medieval historical knowledge. The Chinese people were Hun-Syenpi-Chinese, while South China was a people of Han and Mang hybrids. Essentially, these were new ethnos with new patterns of behaviour, new ideals, new characters, tastes and desires, although the landscape dictated to them economic forms reminiscent of the old. But the ethnic environment forced the Sui and T'ang emperors to orientate towards the Turks in much the same way as the Han rulers had orientated towards the Huns. Nevertheless, despite the limited natural compatibility, differences between ancient and medieval China could be felt, reflected in Asian histories and cultures.

²⁰ Age., p. 276-279.

"The End is a New Beginning"

History is the peer of humanity; therefore, as long as humanity exists, it has no beginning and no end. If this is so, it is not possible to learn it properly. Because learning is done by analysing and comparing the similarities and differences of the events that take place a certain framework and their internal relations with each other. If the event is unique, then we cannot compare it with anything else. We can list events endlessly, but our minds may not be able to comprehend them, and in fact such a thing is not possible.

Sih-ma Ch'ien, the great historian of ancient China, sensing this difficulty, found a way out by dividing his subject into chapters and assigning main headings in his thesis. For a moment, let us liken history to water flowing rapidly from a tap or wheat spilling out of a reaper's pipe. We know that each grain of wheat has a different shape, weight, bio-chemical-legal energy source and some unique characteristics, but in the mill it turns into flour like the others.

Sih-ma Ch'ien not only proposed to divide the theoretical periods of Chinese history (as he knew it) into periods, but also opened within these periods the real self-contents of historical periods.²² The links of the chain of events, which are connected to causalities, are not infinite. If they were, there would be no room for either coincidence or credibility. Sometimes an event that begins with an inconspicuous phenomenon grows like an avalanche that rolls down from above and flows on, preserving its energy and material remains by obeying the laws as long as it does not come across the gap of a strait or a wide valley. In this case, and only in this case, new processes begin which are not repetitive in their details and are not similar to each other in their outlines. This is how the epoch we have followed from beginning to end has passed.

The feature that definitely distinguishes the "chief barbarian tribal period" (Wu-hu) from the others is very close contact between the peoples pushed out of the Great Steppe by the drought in the III century and the natives of the Central Oasis, i.e. Northern China. Because until that period, the peoples of the Great Steppe and the other peoples were living in their own worlds and were at the stage of historical collapse.²³

²¹ Age., p. 281.

²² Konrad N. *Iz Zapad i Vostok*, 76-78.

²³ Gumil'ev L.N. *Ethnogenesis i ethnosfera*// Природа. 1970, № 2, с. 43-45.

For the development of the cultures, such a combination of two different super-ethnos could hardly have been fruitful. Indeed, with the exception of two small groups that managed to stay away from the incessant battlefields, all those who participated in the events disappeared. In 439, Tu-fa Fan Ni led a small group of his Sienpi tribesmen to Central Tibet, while another Sienpi, A-shih-na (Ashina/Achina), took "five hundred families" to Eastern Altai. These two groups of fugitives founded the Tibetan Empire and the Turkic Khanate, both powerful states of the Middle Ages.²⁴ One of them defied China from the mountain tops, the other from the sandy plains, and ensured life and freedom for their descendants.

But China, too, did not remain as it had been in the past. With the disappearance of the Erh-chu tribe, the valleys on both sides of the Huangho ceased to be ethnic territory. It became North China again, separated by the line of the Great Steppe bordering the ruins of the Great Wall. The ethnic isolation that stopped the course of events that had been going on for centuries began anew. After thirty terrible years in the VI century, the population of North China grew rapidly again. But this time there were neither nomadic tribes nor the old Chinese, heirs of the Han Empire, among the new-born. We theoretically call this new ethnos the Northern Chinese, while their contemporaries, out of habit, called them "Tabgachs". In fact, they neither Northern Chinese nor Tabgachs; they were only the culture of the T'ang and Sung periods, which was more brilliant and developed than the culture of the lost past. It was not the rhythms of actual ethnogenesis that produced this cultural heritage, but rather the hieroglyphic writing style, which played in China a role similar to that played by the dead Latin language in Europe. The medieval Chinese, the Europeans, often wanted to resurrect the lost past, but never succeeded.

Consequently, by following the ages, we reached a transitional period in which, on the one hand, ethnic enmity, which led to the ruin of its adherents, was tried to be mutually eliminated, and, on the other hand, rulers emerged who cocktail steppe and Chinese cultures. These rulers were not keen on bloodshed. They did not accumulate anything, they were only interested in spending the capital they gained with their spears, and without realising it, they cut the branch they were riding on. However, for ethnology, it is not important whether a period is a period of rise or fall, of civilisation or decline, of establishment or disintegration. Because both of them the multifaceted contrasts of the development process, which is the subject of historical research.

24 Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki; Veliçiyev ve padeniye drevnego Tibeta*.

HUNS ASIA AND EUROPE

(An from an Ethno-Historical Perspective)

Introduction

With the help of the links between humanitarian historiography and geographical history, the doctrine of ethnogenesis emerges, which deals with ethnos that have emerged and disappeared on earth, and with the processes that flowed in this or that different region in certain historical periods of time, that is, in periods of time that have passed with events recorded within the framework of cause-effect relationships.

Geographical history explanations for events which have not been interpreted before and which have often remained so because the role they played was not taken into account. Such is the fate of the "Hun" ethnos, which existed from the III century B.C. to the X century A.D., and since then remained as remnants within the Turko-Mongol ethnos.

This topic was not chosen at random. The law of mutual influence of ethnos and the landscape, especially in extremal conditions, has been analysed, and the conflicts of ethnos with different cultures and economies have also been considered. The centre of gravity of our study is the discovery of the links between the development of the nomadic Hun state and rare climatic changes in particular the great drought of the century, which turned the flowery steppe into desert.¹ The aim and result of these studies was the following: The Huns, the ancestors of the Turkic peoples, had a highly valued original culture and were allies of the ancient Slavs, the Ants. It is not wise to endeavour to degrade these cultures.

1 In addition to this two-volume work, detailed information on this subject is given in our articles "Landscape and Ethnos" published in the Bulletin of Leningrad University, Geography and Geology Series, 1964-1973. In addition, those who wish *Kole- baniya uvlajnenosti Aralo-Kaspiyskogo regiona v glotsene*. M., 1980, in the book entitled "Istoriya kolebaniy uravnev Kaspiya za 2000 let (IV v. do ne. po XIV v. n. e)".

Great Steppe

The Great Steppe is located in the central part of the Eurasian continent from the Ussuri to the Danube. This region is surrounded by Siberian forests from the north and mountain ranges from the south, and is further divided into two dissimilar parts. The eastern part is called Inner Asia. It includes Mongolia, Cungarya and East Turkistan. It is separated from Siberia by the Sa-yan Range, Hamar-Daban and Yablonov Mountains; from Tibet by K'un-lun and Nan-shan; from China Great Sahara, which lies between the dry steppe and the supro-pical steppes of Northern China; and from the Western part by Al-tay, Tarbagatay, Saur and Western T'ien-shan. The western part of the Great Steppe included not only present-day Kazakhstan, but also the Black Sea coast and even extended to the Hungarian plain at certain periods of history.

From the point of view of the XXth century geography, this steppe is a continuation of the eastern steppes. But in fact it is not so at all. Because when it is considered as an extension of the eastern steppes, it is not possible to analyse the characteristics of the air mass movement,² the atmospheric currents that bring rainy or snowy clouds. Cyclones from the Atlantic carry rain-laden clouds to the mountain barrier separating the eastern steppe from the western steppe. A large layer of anticyclone lies over Mongolia, blocking the humid winds of the west. However, since this layer is thin, the sun rays that heat the surface of the earth easily penetrate it. Therefore, the region has little snow, which makes it easier to find dry calorific vegetation for the animals to feed on. As the warm soils of spring erode the lower layer of air, the open areas are exposed to humid air from Siberia and the southern parts to the monsoon from the Atlantic Ocean. This humidity is sufficient for the steppe to flourish and to provide enough fodder for the whole year, so that both humans and animals can be fed easily. In the east of this steppe, Huns, Turks, Uighurs and Mongols established powerful states.

In the western part of the steppe, the snow thickness reaches 30 cm, but at the same time, when the weather starts to warm up, there are a lot of crevasses. As a result, cattle herds perish due to lack of fodder. Therefore, young shepherds take their herds to the mountains, i.e. to the highlands, and the old ones use the summer season, usually dry, to provide fodder for the winter.

2 Gumilëv L.N. *Rol klimatičeskix kolebaniy v istorii narodov stepnoy zoni Yevrazii*// История СССР. 1967, № 1.

they wait for the weather. Even the Poloves [Cumans] were not dependent on the Russian knights, as they had permanent winter quarters where they lived in a settled system. Because they were not obliged to wander in the steppe, they would not bend in the face of the attacks of regular armies. This is the reason why a different life and social structure was shaped in the west of the Great Steppe compared to the east³

Cyclones and anticyclones sometimes change their direction and discharge their load not on the steppes, but on the forested regions of the continent, and sometimes on the polar regions, i.e. on the tundra. In this case, the narrow stony bands of the Gobi Desert and the Bet-Pak-Dala deserts widen, pushing the flora and thus the fauna of the north towards Siberia and southwards towards China. What should have been beneficial ethnic contacts turned into tragic events, as people followed their animals "in search of water and pasture"⁴. During the last two millennia, the Great Steppe has experienced three major droughts: II-III centuries, X century and XVI century. Each time the steppe emptied; people either moved away or died. However, when the cyclones and monsoons returned to their normal routes and the hot lands were covered with vegetation, animals were able to feed and people were able to return to their previous lives.

Large-scale natural disasters do not affect social development, culture and ethnogenesis. They affect only the economy. These catastrophes affected the power level of nomadic states, weakened them economically and in terms of warfare, and they were able to rebuild only when the living conditions reached the optimal level. However, this does not mean that there was no state period in the Great Steppe. It is just that the peoples of that region led a less stormy life than the farming peoples of the Eastern and Western regions. Social developments were not at the European level, if not quite backward, but the scheme of ethnogenesis was taking its course all over the world. Nomads of the Great Steppe played no less a role in history and human culture than Europeans, Chinese, Egyptians, Persians, Aztecs and Incas. However, this role they played, as in every ethnos, was unique and original.

3 Gumil'ev L.N. *Etnolantshaftniye regiony Yevrazii za istoricheskiy* Hteniq
Чтения памяти академика Л.С. Берга, вып. VIII-IX. ., 1968.

4 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Rost pustyn i gibel pastbishchnix ugody i kulturnix zemel v Tsentral'noy Azii za istoricheskiy period* // ИИЗвзвеестрия BVVceccccc[ззнноогдоо
geografi- географического общества (ВГО). 1933. т. XV. вып. 6.

Mongolia until the Huns

There is no country whose inhabitants have not changed several times since the Palaeolithic era. Mongolia is no exception. During the glacial period, Mongolia was covered with lakes, lush bands of maquis and flower-strewn steppes. The ice-covered Hamar-Daban and Eastern Sayan rivers provided such an abundance of water that the Hen-tei and Mongolian Altai were covered with dense forests. Even today, while some periods of extreme drought in the steppe regions of the Eurasian continent have eliminated the lakes, some signs of the steppe climate still persist in Mongolistan.

Thus, the steppes in this region, covered with lakes and forests, were inhabited by herds of mammoths and hoofed animals, which provided the upper Palaeolithic people, who occupied the first rank, with the opportunity to live. These people left their descendants beautiful animal figures drawn on cave walls and rocks. The Great Steppe, stretching from the Huang-ho River to Antarctica, was inhabited by completely different tribes. The tall European chromans, the wide-faced, wide-eyed Mongoloids of the Far East, and even the Indians, who had probably travelled across the Bering Strait to the Minusinsk Trench, hunted mammoths there.⁵

This was the case for tens of thousands of years until the glaciers changed their golf-stream path and the warm cyclones from the Atlantic were deflected. As the glaciers expanded their western extent, they travelled from Taymir (18,000 years BC) to Finn-o-Scandinavia (12,000 years BC) and from there to the North Sea. The eastern part of the glaciers was open to the sun's rays, which caused anticyclones. Rivers were formed from the glaciers that started to melt under sunlight and these rivers formed steppes close to the glaciers. Thus, the glacier fragments remaining on these steppes led to the formation of valleys and lakes. These, in turn, paved the way for the emergence of a fertile climate and the development of the upper palaeolithic culture.


5 A. Karimullin proved that many Dakota and Turkish words are similar in pronunciation and meaning. Although traces of ancient Asian primitive Mongoloids have not been found in America, Indian skulls are found among the skeletons of the III-II century BC in Siberia. Therefore, the Turks did not cross to America, but the Indians crossed to Siberia. (См.: Вопросы географии США// Доклады Географического Общества СССР. Л., 1976, pp. 123-126.)

As the glaciers melted and the cyclones headed towards the low pressure troughs in the east, rain and snow began to fall. The increased humidity led to the emergence of forests separating the northern steppe, the tundra, from the southern Sahara. Mammoths and cattle could not obtain food under three metres of snow, and the steppes were replaced by forests. In the south, the surrounding area was covered by lakes, destroying the vegetation, and the stony Gobi Desert divided Mongolia into Outer and Mongolia. In the first millennium BC, this desert was still not vast, and ox-drawn carts could continue on their way by replacing broken tyres with round logs cut from the surrounding forests.

On the eve of the beginning of the historical period - II millennium BC - the tribes living in North Gobi had already passed from the Neolithic to the Bronze Age. These tribes had formed a number of different contemporary cultures, which were certainly influenced by each other. I think that the cultures in the Minusinsk Basin did not develop as a continuation of one another, but existed.⁶

According to historical data, the ancestors of the Huns migrated from the southern ends of the Gobi to the north not in the II century BC, but in the X century BC, which is also connected with the formation of the Chou, which founded ancient China as a result of Han aggression. Of course, at some point these major events can be compared with the beginning of Scythian ethnogenesis, which went through the stages described by Herodotus.⁷ Thus, the boundary of prehistoric periods and the boundary of historical epochs intersect in the X century BC.

Today, apart from the dates determined by the radiocarbon method, the names of some peoples, which were previously accepted conditionally, have been revealed as a result of researches. As a result of archaeological findings and examination of ancient Chinese hieroglyphic inscriptions of the first century B.C., which do not resemble the present ones, the places where these peoples lived have also been determined. According to this situation, "Yüeciler" should be called "Yüeciler" instead of "Pazırıklılar". Later it was proved that these signs also indicate "Sogdoi", i.e. Sogds. It was understood that the Tagars regained their historical name of Ting- lings, Syung-nu Hyung-nu [Hun], T'o-pa became Tabgach, Siyenpi became Sibir, Tü-ku became Turkut [Turks]. It was deemed appropriate to retain only the word Kitan.

6 Rudenko S.I. *Kultura bronzı Minusinskogo kraya i radiouglerodniye datirov-* 
Teoriya i issledovaniya 1968, № 1, стр. 55

7 Геродот. *Istoriya v devati knigax* TIM.1888p11.

is a Chinese name. Because its correct pronunciation, "Kitay", was a name given to the inhabitants of the Central Oasis, who were mistakenly called Chinese.

However, despite all these scientific achievements, the history of the peoples of the Great Steppe can be dated from the III century BC, when the Mongol tribes were united by the Huns and the Sarmatians replaced the Scythians, the semi-legendary people of the Black Sea region. Because at the same time the powerful state of Central Asia, the Parthians, emerged and China was united, the ethnic history of the Eurasian steppes can also be started from this date.

Nevertheless, given the necessity of doing historiography at the Western level, it would seem premature to pursue historical analyses and ethnological. That is to say, small differences do not matter when, for example, a broad perspective is required to elucidate the fate of an ethnos or super-ethnos (a system of several ethnos). The choice is made according to the problems at hand. What we need is the 1500-year time span of the Great Steppe and neighbouring countries. The latter are necessary for self-control and additional information.

Huns and the Rise of the Nomadic World

There has never been and cannot be any ethnos in the world derived from a single ancestor. Just as all human beings have a mother and a father, all ethnos have two or more ancestors. The ethnic substrates - the components of the living organisms of the biosphere that give rise to ethnos during energy fluctuations - mix with each other to form a single system, a new and original ethnos. This system is characterised by unity, consciousness and an original culture. The Hun ethnos emerged from the mixing of the H'yenyun and Hun-yü tribes with the indigenous peoples who had already passed from the southern ends of the Gobi Desert to the north and had already entered a stage of development and rich culture. Although the name of the ethnos that created the sintash culture⁸ decorated with carved images of deer, solar discs and weapons has not survived to the present day, it is certain that this ethnos, which came with the migrants from the south, was a component of the Hyung-nu or Hun ethnos belonging to the palaeoasi- birya type of the Mongoloid race.⁹

8 Sosnovskiy G.P. Ranniye kochevniki Zabaykalya / KKipatriki i ne cossocobun] eenniq Insti-
Ituntcapi nsyroanicitrompraitiermianle mojnudi kuuply 1990l 9410. T. 2. >□□ Akhtematr
Pindemgl Zabyka Tipydy coctakicqim qipozemnoy tynmoyыл koulc: qra
al'al. 19149541. T. 2.

9 Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*. M.; L., 1948, p. 121.

In the IV century BC, the Hyung-nus established a powerful state consisting of 24 tribes. At the head of this state there was an administrative hierarchy right tribal princes (western sage elites) and left tribal princes (eastern sage elites), with a person elected as president for life (shan-yü/ yabgu). Each new ethnos was richer and more powerful than the old ethnos that had founded it: A great future awaited the Huns.

Not only the Huns, but also their neighbours were within the zone of impulse of the IV-III centuries BC, but this time they were pushed into a vast area stretching from Manchuria to Sogdiana. The eastern nomads, the ancestors of the Syenpi (ancient Mongols), were subjugated by the Huns, but the Sogdians (Yuechis) from Central Asia to Ordos also paid tribute to the Huns. The south of the Central Oasis was united by Ch'in Shih-huang-ti, who squeezed the Huns out of Ordos in 214 BC, taking away their hunting grounds and pastures in the foothills of Yin-shan and on the Huang-ho coast. T'u-man (Teoman), the Hunnic suzerain, was prepared to accept any terms his neighbours might put forward, provided that they did not interfere with his getting rid of his eldest son Mo-tun (Me-te) and leaving the throne to his younger son.

T'u-man and his fellow Huns were of the older generation, the steppe bourgeoisie. Among the young Huns, however, a generation of talented, nationalistic and energetic possioners had emerged. One of these possioner people was Me-te. His father had sent him as a hostage to the Sogdians and had attacked them to kill him. However, Me-te, who managed to capture a horse from the enemy, managed to escape to his tribesmen, and T'u-man was forced by public pressure to leave his son in charge of a tribe of 10 thousand families. Me-te, who trained his soldiers with strict discipline, carried out a coup d'état and killed T'u-man, his wife and his younger brother (209 BC). After Me-te seized the throne, he devastated his eastern neighbours, whom the Chinese called "Tung-hu", and not only took Ordos from the Chinese, but also drove the Sogdians to the west and subjugated the Sayan Ting-ling and Kipchaks. Thus, the powerful Hun State with a population of 300 thousand was established.¹⁰

Meanwhile, three generations of civil wars were going on in China. These conflicts were fought by Liu Pang, the commander of the farmers.

¹⁰ The calculation is simple: 60 thousand cavalry means 20 per cent of the entire population. See Haloun G. *Zur Uetsi-Frage*// Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlänlichen Gesellschaft. 1937, p. 306.

The persecution continued until the establishment of the Han Empire in 202 BC.

Despite the human losses during the civil wars, China was superior to the Huns in population and military. Nevertheless, Me-te defeated Liu Pang in 200 BC and forced him to sign a "treaty of friendship and peace". Thus, the Chinese court sent a princess as a bride to the barbarian prince and started to pay a tax once a year under the name of gifts.

However, not only the high officials, but all Hun warriors were eager to obtain silk dresses for their wives, millet porridge, rice and other luxury Chinese goods. No matter how justified the constant attacks, it was easy enough to establish a border barter trade in which both Huns and Chinese could profit. But the Han rulers, realising that this would bring nothing into their coffers, forbade barter on the frontiers. Me-te's successors, the Hun yabgu, responded to this prohibition by resuming attacks and demanded that Chinese goods be sold to the Huns at dumped prices. But the insistence of civil and military officials on the payment of income tax led to a rise in prices, so that even a one-for-one exchange of all the wealth of the Great Steppe would not have been enough to cover the value of Chinese goods.

Tibetan nomads in Amdo province a similar situation.¹¹ Until the war, the western borders of the Han Empire were under the control of the mountain conquerors of Western Shen-si. However, the blows dealt by the rebels had a significant part of the defeatist army. The Great Wall of China also of little use in defence. Even if all the troops and food in China were gathered together, it would still not be enough to build enough military garrison towers and provide them with food. Therefore, the Han government saw fit to begin manoeuvring wars on the steppe, in order to inflict far more damage on the Hun nomads than the Huns and Tibetans had inflicted on the Chinese peasants.

But why? However, in the II-I century B.C.E. China was undergoing a very powerful process of economic, cultural and population growth.

¹¹ Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Materiali po ethnologii Amdo i oblasti Kukunora*// *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR, Seriya Khimicheskaya*. 1988, № 10. Also by the same author: *Pochemu kitaytsy risuyut demonov rjevolosimi*// "urnal Mi-JhniysptnearlsMtvnianiinsatgeordspvoagnoarprodonsovgeo i tprabm 98

As we stepped on the threshold of a new era, China's population had reached approximately 59.6 million.¹² Considering that the Huns numbered only 300,000, the balance of power between the two sides is self-evident. Chinese rulers and viziers also thought so. However, when the power of states was compared in terms of antiquity, not only the population ratios of the population, but also the stages of ethnogenesis and the age of the ethnos to the fore. China was experiencing a period of inertia. In other words, it was industrious but definitely did not have bourgeois ability. Because the process of ethnogenesis in China had only begun in the IXth century BC. Therefore, the army there to be made up of thugs (young rebels) and border tribes who regarded China as a bogeyman. Although there were capable commanders in China, the fighting power of the army was not at the desired level.

The Huns were in the period of ethnic organisation and passionate rise. The words "warrior" and "people" meant the same thing to them. This is the reason why, from 202 to 57 BC, despite their small population, the Huns were able to restrain Han aggression. The Han Empire was able to defeat and absorb them thanks to the efforts of Chinese diplomats, who succeeded in inciting the tribes to revolt against the Huns and even caused civil war among the Huns themselves.

An increase in the resistance of the driving force in the ethnic system is beneficial for a people only at certain stages. After the ascension phase, "overheating" comes into play when the residual energy disintegrates the ethnic system. The result is civil war and the emergence of two or three independent ethnos. Fragmentation is an ongoing process. This process started in the Huns in the middle of the first century BC and was completed in the middle of the second century BC. Despite ethnic unity, they lost a significant part of their culture and even their ancient homeland, the Mongolian steppe, which was invaded by the Syenpis (former Mongols) in the II century, and later by the Tabgachs and Jujans.

In this situation the Huns were divided into four branches. One branch accepted the sovereignty of the Syenpis; the second became a vassal of China; the third, "unyielding" group retreated warily to the banks of the Yayyk and Volga. The fourth, "weak" group initially settled in Tarbagatay and Saur mountains.

12 Захаров *Istoricheskoye obozreniye narodonaseleniya Kitaya* / Труды члленноовв
Российской академии наук, 1985. № 1. The
camps cannot be accepted as 100 per cent accurate figures, but a proportion should be
established.
it's probably true.

After hiding, they later captured Yedisu and Jungarya. Some of them merged with the Kipchaks in the Altai and formed a new ethnos of Kuman (Poloves), while others returned to China and established some sovereignties there, which continued to exist until the Xth century. These returnees were called "Sha-t'o Turks" and their descendants were called Öngüt, and they intermarried with the Mongols in the XIIIth century.

Although the automatic stage of ethnogenesis or the impulsive fervour of ethno-social systems sometimes saves the ethnos in critical moments, at other times it leads to its ruin, since all forces are concentrated on the solution of an external problem which could have been easily solved.

Possionary tension split the Hun ethnos into two. Important tribes, especially the more conservative part of the Hun community, travelled to the southern parts of the Great Wall. The Han government welcomed them as allies against the Northern Huns and settled them in Ordos and at the foot of the Yin-shan mountains. Since the Chinese did not interfere with the Hun life, they kept their clan structures and old customs. However, since all high positions were divided among the clan lords, this situation did not satisfy the younger generations, especially the later ones, who had no freedom of movement. The fiery braves nothing to do in southern , so they travelled to the vast steppes of the north in search of war booty.

As for the Northern Huns, after their defeat they took refuge in the foothills of Targabatay, Saur and Jungar Alatau and continued their struggle with alternating victories until 155. The fatal blow to the Northern Huns was dealt by the Siyenpi commander T'an-shih-huai, after which the Huns were again divided among themselves: The "weak" Huns, numbering about 200 thousand, retreated to the forested mountains and gorges of Targabatay and the Black Irtysh basin, and after living in peace for a while, they captured Yedisu. Here they founded the new Hun state of Yüeban at the end of the III century. The "disobedient" Huns moved westwards, reaching the Volga and the Lower Don around 158. The ancient geographer Dionysius Periegetes gave information about their life, but for the next 200 years there was no mention of these Huns.

It was mentioned above that the population of Huns was 300 thousand people in the first century BC. Since they were constantly fighting, their population did not increase much during the I-II century. It is true that nomads, servants and fugitives, especially during the reign of Wang Mang as a result of the persecution of those who wanted to overthrow him, came and joined them. In the III century AD, the Huns in China numbered around 30 thousand families, i.e. 150 thousand people. The "weak" ¹³ Huns in Central numbered about 200 thousand. How many of them could have travelled to the west? At best, 20-30,000 warriors, not including women, children, the elderly and those who could not stop and rest to retreat to a foreign land because the Syenpis were pursuing them and killing the Huns they captured.

This expedition of the Huns lasted exactly two years, until they were free from enemy pursuit and safe between the Volga and Ural rivers. During this time they travelled 2600 km. directly, and if we take into account the necessary zigzags, this distance is twice as long. With ox-drawn bullock carts and with that much weight, such a migration could not have been carried out in that time. Moreover, there must have been successive wars in which the surviving Hun families died. Of course, they did not have time to bury the dead. For on the roads travelled by the Huns, "the palaeosibir type has not been found anywhere except in the Altai." ¹⁴ Only the most hardy and passionate warriors went west between 155-158. Although psychologically everyone was left free to choose their own fate, this migration was a sort of culling process carried out under abnormal conditions. It was this process that divided the Hun ethnos into four branches.

In the II century there were two migrations to Eastern Europe. The first was the Goths: Around 155 they came from the "Scandinavian Islands" to the mouth of the Vistula, ¹⁵ and from there to the Black Sea ¹⁶. The other group was the Huns, who came from Central Asia between 155-158 ¹⁷. They came to the shores of the Volga and clashed with the Alans. In the steppes around the Caspian and Black Sea the situation changed radically for a long time. But the Roman-

¹³ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/ 256-259.

¹⁴ Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*, p. 123.

¹⁵ Jordan. *O proisxojdenii i deyanijax gotov*, M., 1960, p. 195.

¹⁶ The date of the arrival of the Goths on the Black Sea coast is given (purely approximate) as "Karakalla time" (years 211-217). See Veber G. *Vseobshchaya istoriya*.

T.IV. M., 1893, p. 449.

¹⁷ Gumil'ev L.N. *Nekotoriye voprosy istorii xunnov* // *Vestnik drevnej istorii* (Vednik drevnej istorii), 1960, №4.

While the history of the Goths, who were neighbours of the Huns, is known to some extent, the history of the Huns up to 158-350 is absolutely unknown. Perhaps it can only be argued that during these two hundred years they underwent some changes and became a new ethnos called "Gunlar".¹⁸

According to the postulate of ethnic historical overshadowing adopted by us, we are obliged to accept the middle of the II century as the period of the course of the ethnic historical process of the region, even in the case of ambiguous starting dates. The general course of events can be easily determined by the method of interpolation, as is now practised in recognised stages. And although the Guns are the focus of our attention, let us begin by analysing the surrounding Goths, Romans and early Christians who founded Byzantium in the IVth century.

The Roman Empire had been swimming in the blessings of the second century, but by the century it had become a country where murders and betrayals were rife, and by the fourth century it had even changed its official religion and its culture that had enlightened the ages. In other words, in 192-193 there a phase change in ethnogenesis, the old impulse was extinguished and the period of obscurity began. The Christian communities had grown and strengthened, multiplied and divided into groups. Such things only when the passionate impulse initiates a new process of ethnogenesis. Although the Christian attempt to galvanise the Western Roman Empire did not yield positive results, the peoples of the impulse zone, including the Goths, found new energy and entered a phase of passionate ascent. And what about the Guns?...

Who are these people called Guns and what is their relation with the Huns of Asia? Indeed, these two peoples were culturally distant from each other. However, K.A. Inostrantseff was right in essentialising them¹⁹, but he made another mistake by fixing the date of their in the IV century, not in the II century O.M. Helfen²⁰ doubted in vain that Huns and Guns were the same people. It is not known what the languages of the Huns and the Guns were.

18 Inostrantsev K.A. *История тюрко-монгольских племен и народов Азии*, т. I, с. 118-119. In order to avoid misunderstandings, Inostrantsev K.A. proposed to call the Western branch of the Huns the Guns.

19 Agy.

20 Maenchen-Helfen O. *The Huns and the Hsiung-nu/Byzantium*. American Series. III. T. XVII. 1925; Ejsud. *The Legend of the Origins of Huns*// Ibid.

The objection that the fact that they migrated from the Selenge to the Volga cannot be proved, that their art is not similar to each other, can be easily refuted by an impartial and thorough look at the conditions of the II-IV centuries.

Modern science presents us with problems, not conundrums: How is it possible for a nomadic people with a small population to create a very large state that collapsed after 90 years, and how is it for the same people, so robust, to remain only in name? ^{Ethnology}, a science in its own right,²¹ in co-operation with the classical phytography, will help us to solve this problem.

* *
*

Here is the first of the astonishing facts: The Huns were no more savage than the European barbarians in the synchronicity section. That is, the Germans, the Celts, the Cantabrians, the Lusitans, the IllyriansDaciansas well as a significant part of the Hellenes of EtholiaArcadia, ThessaliaEpirus (Ioanninashort, all Westerners except the Athenians, Corinthians and Romans. And why did the word "Gun" (Huns who settled in Europe) become synonymous with "raging savage"? Although a conscientious and enlightened historian, it would not be right to try to explain this with a biased explanation like that of Ammianus Marcellinus, the author of "The Soldier and the Greek" ²², the first account of the Guns. Besides, why choose only the Guns among a mass of barbarians? For example, he never uses such words about the Hionites, who were allies of the Persians against the Romans in Mesopotamia. However, Sih-ma Ch'ien, ^{Pan-ku}²³ and other Chinese historians speak of the Huns in a very respectful manner; they record that they had some traditions, the ability to adopt foreign cultures and that there were highly cultured people among them. Again, the Chinese put the Huns in a higher position compared to the Siyenpis, whom they characterise as a warrior people who protected their independence against China and the Huns, although they consider them primitive.²⁴

So who's telling the truth? Romans or Chinese? It is not possible for both sides to be wrong at the same time. Otherwise, both sides-

21 Gumil'ev L.N. *Ethnogenesis i biosfera Zemli*. L., 1989.

22 Ammian Martsellin. *Istoriya*. T. III. Kiev, 1908, p. 236-243.

23 The mentioned work of Bichurin N.Y., T. II. Bl. "Xunnu".

24 Age. Bl. Syanbi.

Would the question have to be asked in a different way for the shelf to be telling the truth? And even if it had been acquired from abroad, did the Huns possess a high culture of their own?

As a rule, no original art is formed in the first stage of ethnogenesis. A young ethnos accumulates so many problems to be solved that all its strength is spent on wars, the establishment of social structure and the development of the economy. Art, on the other hand, is borrowed from neighbours or ancestors who are the heirs of the culture of extinct ethnos. This is an important point. Excessive sympathy for a foreign culture because it is not yet one's own exists in the depths of the people's psyche, in the ethno-psycho-logical structure that distinguishes between positive and negative compliments.

The Huns had a choice of options at the time of their growth. In the East there was Han China, and in the West there were the remnants the defeated Scythians and the victorious Sarmats. Which one should he love sincerely, without pursuing any personal interest? The findings in the Noin-ula ruler's tomb, where the ashes of Yabgu Wu-chü-liu, who died in 18th century, were laid, revealed that the Huns acquired Chinese and Bactrian fabrics for their bodies, Han mirrors, millet porridge and white rice, and for their souls they used the "wild animal figured" items of the Scythians, although the western ones were slaughtered by the Sarmatians and the eastern ones were defeated and driven south to Iran and India.

That is to say, the destroyed Scythian or Saka ethnos left works of art that outlived their makers and were effectively passed on to their own killers, the Yüeci and their neighbours, the Huns. Since the items decorated with "wild animal figurines" have been described in detail²⁵, we would like to point out another aspect that has escaped attention before, and that is the relevance of a dead art to the ethnic history of Central Asia. Even if Hun and Yüeci (Sogdian) art is based on a single source and the same example, this art is certainly not idyllic. Indeed, the independent development of this art proves this. The "Andronovo" cultural stream, which was single in the II century BC, split into several branches and was never united. Moreover, when the steppe flourished again after the drought of the VI-II-Vth centuries B.C.E. and was teeming with people, the Huns and Sogdians had to graze with each other.

25 Rudenko S.I. *Kultura xunnov i Noinulinskiye kurgan*. M.;L., 1962; by the same author: *Iskustvo Altaya i Peredney Azii* (seredina I tisdo n.eM.1961.

and engaged in a struggle for power. The Huns were victorious in 165 BC, but although they were later defeated by the Syenpis and forced to retreat to the lower reaches of the Volga, in 155 BC they defeated the Sarmatian tribe of the Alans, "exhausted by endless battles".²⁶ Thus, regardless of their role in history, the Huns avenged the slaughter of the Is- kites by the Sarmatians in the III century BC.

The fates of the ancient Huns were so astonishingly intertwined that only artefacts (epics of ancient heroes carved on rocks or metals) allow us to understand the laws of ethnic history. It is only through the latter that we can understand the change of traditions, the meaning of ancient subjects and the aesthetic laws of vanished tribes. Ethnology and history are mutually fertilising cultures. Thus, if the Huns did not adopt the Chinese, Iranian and Helleno-Roman civilisations, this does not mean that they lacked the ability to do so. It is just that Scythian art was more to their liking. It must be admitted, however, that in ethnographic comparison the nomadic culture up to the III century was not at all inferior to that of the neighbouring ethnos, which belonged to the category of solid systems.

* *
*

Huns arriving in a new region could not enter into a conflict with the indigenous peoples there. Such encounters and conflicts at the ethnic level have generally attracted the attention of historians and have been included in their corpus. The date of the arrival of the Huns in the Caspian neighbourhood is given by the geographer Dionysios Periegetes as the 160th year and by Ptolemæus as 175-182. This small difference raises the suspicion that the annotator may have made some mistakes.²⁷ But such a suspicion is not without reason. For the VIth-century author Jordanes (pronounced Yordan), while referring to "ancient traditions", offers a version that clarifies the matter.²⁸

The Gothic king Philimer - during whose reign the Goths came to Vis- tula in the second century - led his people to a place called Oyum, surrounded by water.

²⁶ Iordan. *O proisxojdenii i deyaniyax gotov*, p.91.

²⁷ Maenchen-Helfen O. Op. cit. P. 244-252.

²⁸ Iordan. *O proisxojdenii i deyaniyax gotov*, p. 90,

He brought them to the country. Oyum is believed to be a country on the right bank of the Dnieper.²⁹ Philimer got angry with some sorceresses called "galiurun" in Gothic language and drove them to the desert. They encountered "evil spirits" in the desert and their descendants formed the Gun tribe. This is probably what happened. The Huns, who were saved from the swords and arrows of the Syenpis, were more or less left without women. A small number of women travelled on horseback for 1000 days without stopping. The hybridisation mentioned in the legend is of course a natural result of which the Huns were saved from being wiped out.

However, this hybridisation, combined with a new region, a new climate and ethnic environment, led to such a change in the appearance of the Huns that it was necessary to give them a new name "Guns as proposed by K.A. Inostrantseff in 1926.

This radical change in the way of life and culture is a natural phenomenon.³⁰ The Huns and the Guns are an analogical example of ethnic separation, but rather of a sad end. Separation is the result of migration, but those who come to a new place cannot help but come into contact with their neighbours, but in different ways.

The Alans, who lived between the Lower Volga and the Don, were not very friendly to the Huns. However, the Huns, who gradually became more and more Gun-ised in the II-III centuries, were too weak to fight the Alans, whose borders reached all the way to the frontiers of the Eastern Roman Empire. On the banks of the Danube they were called Roks-Alanlar, that is, "Shining ones" or "Shining Alans". In the lower reaches of the Sırderya (Ceyhun) river lived the settled (ca- tak) Hionites, whom the Chinese called "Huni", who had never mixed with the Huns. In fact, Huns and Hionites never met. Probably the clayey and barren valleys lying between the two peoples constituted natural barriers, which made ethnic contacts between these two unenthusiastic parties difficult.

The Huns' northern neighbours were the Finnogur and Ugor-Samoyed tribes living in the taiga and in the strip bordering the steppe-forest. Their descendants, the Mansa and Khants (Vogul and Ostàklar) are the weaker peoples of Sibir (or Sibir)³¹. The medieval Greeks read Sibir as Savir, the ancient Russians as Sever, Severàne, and even in the XVII century these peoples were called

²⁹ Age., p. 115.

³⁰ Gumilëv L.N. *Nekotoriye voprosy*, p. 120-125.

³¹ Artamonov M. *Istoriya Xazar*, p. 103-113.

They were called "Sevruki". We do not have direct information about Hun-Savir relations since there were no major wars between them. However, it can be indirectly thought that Savir-Hun (later Gun) relations were friendly.

* *
*

The inland regions of the vast Eurasian continent are fundamentally different from the humid coastal areas. In fact, Western Europe is a large peninsula and a constant climate because it is washed by sea water. Naturally, the humidity rises and falls here. These rises and falls are not of great magnitude. This is why Western Europeans are generally familiar with individual episodic droughts or floods in agriculture. The damages caused by these are compensated in time, but their consequences nevertheless chronicled. Following these processes, we can conclude following: Chroniclers, or chroniclers as we call them, always record rare and extraordinary events, but do include the ordinary, customary events of the period in question. Thus, rainy periods are explicitly recorded with their days and even months. It is especially important to learn about changes in the atmospheric fronts of high humidity, but cyclones constantly follow a complex route from south to north or from north to south. As it is known, this mixing is caused by the activity of the sun's rays, relations between the poles, invariance, movements, anticyclones. Low pressure troughs, which help cyclones and monsoons to carry ocean moisture to the continent, provide an optimal meteorological regime for forests, steppes or deserts.

If these irregularities take a pronounced form in the coastal areas, in the interior of the continent they lead to changes in the boundaries between climatic zones and vegetation zones. The vegetated zones are divided into zones inhabited by species and peoples. The agriculture of the peoples has always brought them into close contact with their environment.

Variations in the region's high humidity have also been noted in studies of the Caspian, which receives 80 per cent of its water from the Volga and forested areas, and the Aral, which is fed by desert water. These water levels present a heterogeneous complexity. In other words, while in the Caspian it flows from sea to land, in the Aral it recedes from land to sea or vice versa. There is a third variant: Cyclones are moving into the Arctic regions and the Vol-

As the water area of Ga shifts further north, the water level in both inland seas falls. In this case, the desert areas expand, the taiga retreats to the north and the humid steppe becomes arid. This is exactly what happened in the II century and especially in the III century, and ended only in the middle of the IV century.

Huns travelled to the West through the steppe. Because they could feed their horses only by travelling over the steppes. While in the south they were confined by the deserts, in the north they were attracted by the forest-steps. Again, there European bison, various deer and roe deer species in the forest openings. So they could eat meat. They could not venture into the interior of the north, for the damp forest grass was unfamiliar to the Hun horses, which were accustomed to dry grass, fed not on water but on sunshine. The indigenous people, the ancestors of the Vo-gul (Mansa)³², had retreated to the north, to the cheerful north, filled with animals familiar to them, lined with maple, aspen, cedar, fir and spruce trees, and dotted with clear rivers with plenty of fish. They did not have to fight the Huns for these blessings. On the contrary, they probably even loved each other. In any case, at the end of the Vth century and in the VIth century, when the Gun trophy ended and there was no longer any ethnos called the Guns, the Ugor peoples were referred to in Greek sources under the dual names of "Gunno-Sabirs", "Gunno-Utigurs", "Gunno-Kutigurs" and "Hunu-guru".³³

If the Ugors living in the vicinity of Altai did not mix with the Huns, this certainly indicates that they had contact with each other on the basis of symbiosis, but never as chimeras. And such contact enabled them to join forces in times of need.

Symbiosis: Two or more organisms living in close proximity to each other, each with its own ecological niche.

Chimera [Chimera]: Coexistence in a single ecological niche.

Relations between ethnos in chimera can be friendly or hostile. knows. Hybridisation is possible but not essential. The exchange of culture sometimes be intense, sometimes less so. But if tolerance is shown, it is possible to inter-

32 In fact, the ancestors of the Voguls (Mansas) did not possess large territories in the first centuries of Christ. The ethnonyms Mansa, Madyar and Mishar are just different pronunciations of the same word. (See Chernetsov V. N., Mochinskaya V.I. V poiskax drevney rodini ugarskix narodov // Po sledam drevnix kul'tur ot Volgi do Tixogo okeana. M., 1954, p. 190).

33 Skrijinskaya Y.Ch. *Kommentarii*. В кн.: укр соч., с. 222-223.

differences disappear. It all depends on the extent of the differences between the possession tensions generated by ethno-system contacts.

Sometimes the social structure has a character, but this was not the case in the region we are studying. The South Siberians and the Finnogurs of the Altai region their own organisation in the third century, which Chinese geographers called the Wu-i-Pei, or Northern Ugor State.³⁴ This state was established at the edge of the forested regions, approximately at present-day Omsk. The Huns, too, had military organisations and company commanders, which are absolutely necessary for an army to fight. But both ethnoses had a primitive clan structure which led to exceptional class conflicts between them. When, after two hundred years of neighbourhood, the long journey towards Europe began, not only the Huns and the Ugors set out, but also their descendants, the Guns, who became a separate ethnos, and the descendants of the others. The Huns formed the nucleus of this community, the Ugors the shell, but together they formed individual systems that emerged between East and West as a result of the same historical destiny guided by Hun possession.

Greater Sahara and North

The Huns could not have survived if nature had not intervened in the course of events. The steppe, which was a favourable economic zone for them, was not only empty valleys covered with grasses and herbs at the beginning of the millennium. Here and there clumps of maples, aspen forests and pine clumps. Countless herds of antelope had multiplied and foxes were chasing squirrels and moles. Fat larks and dazzling cranes were being attacked by steppe eagles and few but vicious bull snakes. The steppe could support predators as fierce as man. So why did the Finnogurs so easily give up these steppe blessings that belonged to them?

II. In the first century, the Atlantic cyclones changed their route. In the first century, they discharged rain-laden clouds over the southern steppes onto the Tarbagatay, Saur and T'ien-shan mountain ranges. From there these waters flowed into Balkhash and Aral. Thus the steppe gained optimal humidity during the winter months. It was the water that nourished the soil and provided

³⁴ Бихурин Н.О. Ук. соч. Т. 333. М.: Л., 1953. Прил. карта 3 (время Санъ-го).
34 Вичурин Н.Я. Ук. соч. м.-л., 1953. Прил. карта 3 (время Санъ-го).

snow began to fall regularly (over 259 mm per year), which was necessary for the vegetation to grow thick enough to feed the people. In the II century, the cyclones moving into the forested region the Aral waters to recede and the Caspian water level to rise by 3 metres³⁵. But hundreds of years later, drought returned with unprecedented fury. The barren northern steppe gave way to extremely saline deserts and turned southwards. The amount of sediment has fallen to 100 to 200 mm per year. Akpelins chased away the hairy grasses, kulans replaced antelopes and lizards replaced poisonous steppe bull snakes.

In the face of this situation, the Ugors, abandoning the nature that had betrayed them, headed northwards via the Obi, and the Samoyeds via the Yenisei.³⁶ The Samoyeds were more fortunate. They reached the northern mouth of the great steppe, the tundra, and tamed the northern reindeer and made these wild animals their homeland. The lands stretching from the coast of Hatanga and Dudipta all the way to the Kola Peninsula were filled with reindeer herds. Unfortunately, we, like other illiterate peoples, do not have any information about their fate. The Ugors travelling through Obi encountered a tribe, perhaps an entire people whose names are unknown to history. The archaeologists who discovered them called what they found "the culture of the hollow dwellers".³⁷ This name is derived from the Mansalar word "Siirtiya". Siirtiya means the disturbed spirit of the deceased who comes at night to take revenge on those who killed him.³⁸ The Manas believed that the last "Siirtiya" lurked in caves in the North Ural and New Yurt, and that they were very dangerous because they became invisible. Who knows, maybe they were.

In reality, the Ugors migrated northwards during or immediately after the terrible drought of the III century. The passion for such a large-scale ascendancy was necessary for the

35 Richter W.G. *Donnye otlojeniya Kara-Bogaz-Gola kak indikator kolebaniy urovnya Kaspiskogo morya*. М.: Издательство Академии Наук СССР, 1959.

36 Моисеев В.С. *Самоеды и их родство*. М.: Издательство Академии Наук СССР, 1961. вып. 1.

37 Hajdu P. *Die ältesten Berührungen zwischen Samojeden und die jenseitsischen Völkern/Acta Orientalia*. Budapest, 1953. T. III, p.88-89.

38 Chernetsov V.N., Mashchinskaya V.I. *Age*.

38 Siirtiya is a Samoyed word. It is used for the Zavaloska Chuds, who, according to legend, buried themselves in the earth when they saw the maple tree. The maple grows in sedimentary soils and is considered a Russian symbol (см.: Ефименко П.С. Чудь заволоцкая. Архангельск. 1869, с. 24, 42,86; Записки ПГО. 1864. № 2, с. 49)

The ancestors of the Ugors obtained it by interbreeding with the Huns, who had lost everything except the driving force. However, the hybridisation was always mutual. And as mentioned above, the Huns had already turned into the Gun- lar.

One question remains: How did an equestrian ethnos with herds manage to cross the wide barrier separating the southern steppe from the north, the tundra? The taiga is covered with thick snow in winter and swamps infested with clouds of flies in summer. The ancestors of the Yakuts crossed the Lena on rafts in the XI century, but they travelled across the stormy Yenisei, travelling through its shallows. The low-watered Obi was very dangerous. Furthermore, the Ugors and the Guns themselves crossed the Volga with its strong current and headed north. Despite the large number of northern peoples, Eastern Europe can be divided into two groups: Old Finnish and Ugor migrants. Mordvins (Mordvas): Erziya - Finns, Mokshas - Ugors. Meryas - Mountainous Chere- misler-Finns. Lugovs-Ugorans. "Akgöz Chuds"-Finns, "Chud Zavo- loskas"- Ugorians. (Chud Zavaloska or Great Perm-Scandinavian Bi- armiya epic).

The peoples of the South were probably Lo- pares who changed their old language into Finnish. Although language is one the constituent elements of society, illiterate peoples can change languages frequently and easily. Travelling from east to west across the tundra, the Kola Peninsula and northern Norway was not difficult at that time. As for the Chuvash, they are composed of two elements: Natives and Turks and even non-Ugors. Since the Chuvash language belongs more to the ancient Turkic language group, it can rightly be attributed to the Hun language group.³⁹

All the above-mentioned peoples lived on or near the Volga and its tributaries. Therefore, the route of the Ugors and Huns to the north is the Volga, which freezes in winters. The Obi and Yenisei also played a role in the route beyond the Urals. The Ugor-Samoyeds found their new homeland, replacing the peoples of the former Arctic region⁴⁰, of which the Kets were the only remnant. The exact date of the eyes in the III-IV centuries can only be estimated. The only way to do this is by deductive application. That is, analysing the whole climatic and ethnic history.

39 Serebrennikov B.A. *Proisxojdentye Chuvash po dannim yazıka//O proisxo'denii Ovdjindj Hgokny, 1961, s.119-121*

40 Hajdu P. Op. sit. p. 88-89; Archaeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 1961, N° 13, p. 309-319.

A suggestion can be made on the basis of the fact that the migrations were not visible until this date. In reality, neither the possibility nor the motives of such large-scale migrations were visible until this date.

Finally, the Finns and Ugors, together with the Huns, did not rebel against each other but lived in symbiosis. This, of course, reduced the inevitable inter-tribal wars. Only the unlucky "hollow dwellers" turned into evil spirits - siirtiya, and in other migration regions such misfortunes did not occur.

Greater Sahara and South-West

Scythians and the Sarmatians who replaced them lived a semi-nomadic life by carrying out agriculture and animal husbandry together. The dry grass needed by the herds was supplied from teberevka, which was hidden under the snow layer in the steppe covered with snow at a height of 30 cm. Therefore, the dry steppe did not appeal to them and they were afraid of the desert. Therefore, although the Sarmatians found oaks, aspens and maples a bit strange, they embraced meadows and forest steppes and was nothing else they could do. On a map, we can easily extend the Sarmatian steppe borders, where various cereals, grasses and herbs grew in the first century, from the Middle Danube in the west to the Yayik and even the Emba in the east.

However, the Trans-Ural Sarmatia was far from their territory. Because the Black Sea neighbourhood was within the limits of the extension of the meridional Black Sea air current, and at that time the Caspian was only at an absolute minus 36 m., and although the Uzboy flowed into the Caspian at that time, its northern shores were located at 45° 39' south parallel. The rather narrow misty ground was soft and did not noticeably affect the climate of the northern coast of the Caspian.

When a great drought occurred, the Sarmatians left the eastern steppe and the shores of the Sea of Ha- zar and travelled towards the Volga. Here they engaged in agriculture on a large scale and the Roman Empire was happy to buy cheap wheat from them. Thus the empty eastern reaches of the Volga were left to the Huns, who were accustomed in their homeland to steppes drier than the desolate stretches of the northern Caspian steppe.

However, when the desert extension extended from the south to the steppe, the pelines gave way to the saxifrages and wastelands. Thus, the present K-

The region encompassing Zilkum and Karakum encircled Lake Aral to the north, which today is a very dry oxide swamp.⁴¹ It was even worse in the third century. In addition to sandstorms, clay storms blew, no rain fell, and this caused the valley to flatten like a tray and the lake water to evaporate. The drought was not merciful to Balkhash either. The Balkhash dried up so much that its bottom with alluvial deposits and saline soils. After the drought, which ended in the IV century, the Balkhash was no longer saline.⁴² Thus, when the Wu-suns living around the lake migrated to the T'ien-shan mountains, the vacated lands were occupied by the descendants of the "weak" Huns, who changed their name to "Chu-yu tribes".

Greater Sahara and South

III. All the tribes living in the steppe were weak peoples. Only in the second half of the IVth century, when the atmosphere began to pour rain on the deserts of the Mainland, they were able to gain a political identity.

The peoples living around the Aral and Pamir concentrated all their forces on the wars between them and Iran.⁴³ In the middle of the century, Iran was very troubled in terms of foreign policy. War with the Roman Empire was not an ordinary thing. After the first success, which resulted in the captivity of Emperor Valerianus in 260, the Persians had decided to retreat to the defensive. The Romans counter-attacked in an organised manner, ending Persia's sovereignty over Armenia in 283 and forcing it to sign the Treaty of Nizip in 298 under harsh conditions. In the first half of his reign, Shah Shapur II had to devote all his money and power to stopping the attack of the Hionites. But in 356, the Hionites became allies of the Persians and their offensive led to the fall of Amid, the Roman outpost in Mesopotamia.

The restoration of calm on the eastern frontiers enabled the Persians to stop the attacks of Juli-anus in 361, and thus they again able to deal with the Armenian issue. At that time, Armenia-

41 Shnitnikov A.V. *Izmenchivost obshchey uvlajnenosti materikov severnogo polushariya* // *Записки МГУ* 1955, т. XXV, к. 2, 200

42 Berg L.S. *Beseda so studentami Moskovskogo universiteta* // *Voprosy geografii*, 1951, c. 68-69.

43 Altheim F., Steil B. *Die Araber in der Alten Welt*. Bd. V. Teil 2. Brl., 1969, p. 507-525.

There was a fierce struggle between the throne and the dignitaries in Tan. Shah Ar-shak, who, with the help of Ro-ma, had eliminated one of the leading tribes, called on the eastern nahrar to revolt, and those who had previously been in favour of Rome joined this rebellion. The Persians, wishing to take advantage of the unrest in Armenia, marched through the borders of the country, but met with fierce resistance from the Armenians. In 368 the Persians succeeded in capturing the Armenian fortress of Artagers, but in 369 Arshak's he-lefi Pan returned to Armenia with Roman troops and expelled the Persians. In 371 Shapur again tried to enter Armenia but was killed. After that, Persian pressure on the west weakened. Why?

It seems that Arshakid, the satrap of the eastern frontiers, who resided in Balkh between 368-74, had revolted. Between 375-78, when the Persians suffered a severe defeat, Shapur was forced to shift even the armies of the western frontiers to the east. The Huns, or Hionites, broke their treaty of alliance with Persia and supported the rebels. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the rebellion collapsed, but as soon as Arshakid attacked the Iranian armies, this time in 384, the Eftalites appeared on the scene as allies of Shahinšāh. This was not a fortuitous synchronicity. For one thing, Balkh was located in the mountainous region between the mountainous borders of Iran and the Pamir. The Iranian satrap was not on good terms with theneighbours and until the beginning of the rebellion the satrap constantly prevented them from uniting with each other. However, when the situation changed, instead of uniting among themselves and becoming allies of the Persian ruler, they came to an agreement with their enemies. The supporters of the rebellion were probably defeated, and from this date onwards their pressure on Iran ceased.

IV. From the middle of the century onwards, the Eftalitic rule formed a barrier between sedentary Iran and the nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppe, including the Huns of Central Asia. This may explain why Iran, while embarking on campaigns to fortify its Caucasian borders, was so concerned about its eastern borders, which were deprived of a natural barrier. The Eftalites were a warrior people, but they were not a fish. Their victories had made them one of the most prominent figures in the region. The fate of their powerful state is reminiscent of the history of Switzerland, which frightened Europe in the Middle Ages when France and Austria were in the process of collapse. The Eftalites successfully completed their murderous incursions into Hindis-tan, but their intervention in this country east of the Pamir and T'ien-shan is only an episode.

III. In the next century the Chinese lost their sovereignty over the principalities in the northern regions of the ridge. Tun-huang had become China's western frontier. The Ch'in dynasty succeeded in recapturing part of the territory outside the ridge, but precisely the lower reaches of the Edzin-göl river and the Turfan Chu- kuru, which became known as the Kao-ch'ang-Kün⁴⁴ region in 345. The administration of this conquered territory was very difficult for the Chinese administration and naturally remained within the sphere of influence of the Ho-hsi ruler. In the third century, other principalities in the region tended to unite and grow, and thus the Su-le (Kashkar) principality^{Yarkend}⁴⁵ in the south and T'ien-shan in the north-west. Khoten, on the other hand, the only state that continued to rely on China. However, this dependence was not political, but only a cultural rapprochement represented by the emissaries sent from Khoten to China.

In the north-west, on the northern slopes of T'ien-shan, the principality of "Ch'e-hih" was established, encompassing the territory from Bar- lake in the east to the upper reaches of the Ili river in the west. In the south, Shan-shan subjugated all principalities from the walls of Tun-huang to the coast of Lob-nor. In the centre of the region, he Karashar (Yen-ki) hegemony, which connected Kucha and its vassals Aksu and Osh in c. 280.⁴⁶ However, Karashar can be regarded as the capital of allied principalities, not a monolithic state. As a matter of fact, in the map of the western end of the Ch'in period, the borders of Kucha and Karashar are shown separately from each other, and in later periods, these two kingdoms had separate administrations, although they were in close relations with each other. The inhabitants of the region were calm people who avoided contact with foreigners.⁴⁷ The only source of wealth for the inhabitants of the western end was commercial brokerage. Because silk production in the region could only

IV. It started in Khoten in the second half of the second century, and from there it Sogdiana in the V century.⁴⁸ The ancient writers did not have first-hand information about the western end or "Serika". Because at that time the Parthians were preventing the establishment of direct relations between Rome and China.⁴⁹

44 Bichurin N.Ya (Yakinf). *Sobraniye*, II/249; III/19.

45 Bichurin N.Ya. *Sobraniye svedeniy po istoricheskoy geografii Vostochnoy Sibiri*. Cheloboksari, 1960, p. 365.

46 Age., p. 557-562.

47 Ammian Martsellin, *Istoriyap* 188-191.

48 Hannestad K. *Les relations de Byzance avec la Transcaucasie et l'Asie Centrale au V et VI siècles*// Byzantion. Bruxelles, 1957. T.XXXV-XXXVI-XXXVII. P. 450.

49 *Ibid*, p. 429.

As a result, the great drought of the III century weakened the Turanian peoples of the steppes to such an extent that they not only lost their wars with Iran⁵⁰ but also fell victim to their eastern neighbours, first the Huns and then the Turks

Civilisations in II-IV Centuries

Since the ancient historians described the events they had learnt about with pleasure and in detail, their information was quite adequate. But if no event took place, they did not write anything. The arrival of the Huns in the steppes around the Caspian was mentioned by two geographers who witnessed the event, but not a word about the next two hundred years. At the end of the IVth century we find a wealth of information and dubious details. This is because the Guns began to fight. If this is the case, it means that, although it is customary to speak of the Guns as raiders, they lived peacefully from 160 to 360.

III. The drought that scorched the desert in the first century protected the Guns from the evil of their southern neighbours. These were the literate Alans, the quarrelsome Hi-onites, the warlike Abars, the daring Goths and, most importantly, the Romans, who were in their obscur- yon phase. Military emperors were dependent on their legions and their entourage, but they put their own interests above those of the state, whatever their position. This is the reason why war never ended in the empire. Because the empire was sometimes at war with foreign tribes across the border, with its own people who were rebelling and whose rebellions were suppressed. But above all, the legions fought each other. The most dangerous aspect of this game is sub-passionality!

However, not all inhabitants of the Roman empire were sub-passionaries. Passionaries and hyper-activists became too in the third century, changing their behavioural stereotypes and breaking away from the Roman super-ethnos. These people, descended from different ancestors, not only severed their family traditions and cultural ties with their contemporaries, but to a certain extent they even disregarded the laws that they regarded as the ancient social order. For example, the Roman Republic

⁵⁰ For details see Gumilëv L.N. *Kolebaniya stepeni uvlajneniya i migratsii narodov v yugo-vostochnoy Yevrapo s II po IV v//* Actes du VIIe Congrès International des Sciences Préhistoriques . Prague, 1971, p. 951-955.

could only be prosecuted on the application of a Roman citizen. This new type of people, members of Christian, Mithraic and Manichean societies, considered betrayal to be the greatest sin that could be committed. The relationship of mutual interest became the imperative of Christian behaviour.

This was especially true for those who served as soldiers. Because, according to the custom, the new emperor rewarded soldiers with money to obtain intelligence against the infidel legionnaires in the army, so that the soldier would not be able to denounce his comrade-in-arms or commander. For this reason alone, a change of power would have been beneficial. However, the Mitraists, who had indeed formed secret groups within the army, categorically allowed their members to tell "lies to instil confidence". The Mitraists were initially favoured. The cult of the "Invincible Sun" was adopted by all military emperors, including Constantinus Magnus.

Since, according to the Manichaeans, knowledge, not faith, was essential, their teachings were both mystical and atheistic. Lying was permissible, and this provided a comfortable life for the Manicheists. In fact, for this reason alone, they were initially regarded as harmless loudmouths. Only Diocletian issued an edict for religious persecution, but Manicheism soon disappeared. But it was the Christians who suffered nine brutal persecutions. Nevertheless, their numbers increased and they formed the most warlike section of the disciplined and faithful soldiers in the legions. This led to the catastrophe of Christian legionaries refusing to fight against people who believed in the one God. In 286 Maximinus sent the 10th legion of Thebes to suppress the revolt of the Bagaudas in Gallia. But the soldiers refused to punish the Christians. Maximinus' order to execute two groups of ten did not help, and all the rest were killed.⁵¹

Therefore, the Christian legionaries saved their lives by bringing Constantine to power. Constantine not only granted freedom of belief to Christians with an edict issued in 313, but also abolished the infamous crucifixion penalty in 315 and ordered the burning of all Jews who incited the heathen to revolt against the Christians.⁵² Thus, two super-ethnos emerged from one super-ethnos in the Roman Empire. But this second one was still in a chimera state. Chimera, ambitious

⁵¹ Robertson Dj. *S. Istoriya xristianskoy tserkvi*. T. 2. SPb., 1890. P. 133.

⁵² Age., p. 170.

It has a structure, but it is not solid. It survives as long as it does not consume all the riches of the small ethnos living either separately or in symbiosis. The Italians, the Hellenes, the Gauls, the Iberians, the Puns had left such a legacy. This heritage lasted the Chimera for a century, but eventually it too was exhausted. It was necessary to defend the country against neighbours more passionate than the Romans. Romans generally did not want to fight, but rather enjoyed intrigues and spending time with useless things. For this reason, by the Vth century, the Roman army was composed of Germanic, Arab and Berber mercenaries. Some Roman officers who had good relations with the senate or who were in favour with the emperor were also serving in the army.

However, this army could not protect the country against internal enemies such as Mani- heists, Mitraists and Christians as well as against external enemies. These groups, who hated the Kaafirs, were engaged in a bitter fight among themselves. Especially the Christians! In the history of the Church, the phase of ethnic ascendancy is clearly visible. In Africa, ethnic ascendancy constitutes donatism. In Spain, the gnostic-epiphys- kop Pristsillian was burned in 304; in Egypt, the Arians quarreled with the Afanasievs. The Arians defeated the Germanic peoples and converted most of them to Christianity, and after the success of Catholicism in 381, Arianism became for them a symbol of opposition to the Romans.

In any case, in the east, first as a sub-ethnos, then as an ethnos and then as a super-ethnos-Byzantine, it was formed through a continuous process of establishment from confessional societies, thus creating a surplus of passionery. In the West, where this excess of passionery was not present due to economic, political and social conditions, the chimera was fragmented into pieces that rapidly destroyed the power of resistance. Indifference and apathy are caused by pathogenic factors rather than fanaticism, avanturism and belligerence. This is why Byzantium suffered many disasters, while the Western Empire collapsed.

Barbarians in the II-IV centuries

In these years of the collapse of civilisation, there was also an uprising north of Rome's Rhenish-Danube frontier. But this time with a different dominant. In the middle of the second century, the Goths crossed the Baltic Sea.

gi and drove the Vandals to the very mouth of the Danube. This was a typical possible impulse on an axis that extended as far south as Switzerland through the Carpathians to Asia Minor and Syria to Haifa [Aksum]. From the first century onwards, like waves of flame, the peoples caught in the grip of passionism were consumed in wars with the not-yet-degenerate Romans. The Dacians fought Rome twice, the Jews three times, the Marcomans once and the Quads once.

Only the Goths, who were late to the start, victorious from this brawl.

The process mechanism is simple: The Roman super-ethnic system was constantly but gradually decaying. Trajan and Hadrian, with their obedient and warriors, were victorious, while Marcus Aurelius could only defend his borders. Decius and Valerianus were defeated by the Goths in 151 and by the Persians in 160. Their victory was not due to their strength, but to the weakness of the Romans. Indeed, Odenathus, an Arab from Palmyra, succeeded in expelling the Persians from Syria, aroused by the passionist impulse. Until then, however, Syria had been one of the weakest parts of the empire, full of turmoil. But where did Odenathus get this power? Of course, from the heroic commanders and people under his command! Passion is a genetic trait that spreads genetically and therefore spreads over large territories.⁵³

III. In the middle of the century, the weak and unruly Germanic tribes living between the rivers Elbe and Rhen formed a military alliance. Thus, after successfully repelling three Varro legions in the Teutoburg forest, these formerly relicised tribes, incapable of even preventing Germanicus' Roman armies from penetrating the borders, formed new ethnic groups under new names: Franks - freedmen, Saxons - tradesmen, Alamans - crowd-cloggers and Suebs - vagabonds.⁵⁴ These were organisations which, while retaining their tribal structure, were exceptionally set up for war, that is, for military democracy. Because some tribes retained their tribal structure.

The lands that this impulse came into contact with were inhabited by the ancestors of the Slavavians, the Lugis and the Venedas.⁵⁵ These were Germanic-

53 *Kosmicheskaya antropoekologiya: tekhnika i metody issledovaniy*// Gumilëv L.N., Ivanov K.K. *Ethnosfera i kosmos*. L., 1984, p. 211.

54 Veber G. *Vseobshchaya istoriya*. T.IV. M., 1893, p. 447-451.

55 Artamonov M.I. *Spornye voprosy drevneyey istorii slavyan i Rusi*// *Kratkie so-*
obsheniya i razgovory (KRSI) IV, 94.07.1951, 55

not inferior to the Rosomon tribes, but sometimes even advanced. In a short time they conquered territories as far as the Black Sea, and in the following century they spread across the Balkan Peninsula, reaching as far as the Dnieper, where they encountered the Rosomon tribes.⁵⁶ Later on, the Eastern Slavavians and the Rosomons merged into the old Russian ethnos.⁵⁷ However, in the III-IV centuries they were only allies. For the Goths, who defeated the Romans and conquered the whole of Dacia in 271, were the common enemy of both. The bloodshed during the period of ethnic ascension was no less than the bloodshed during the phase of ossification.

Where in the world did peace prevail between 160-360? Which ethnos was spared from the conflicts that shook Europe, the Near East and Central Asia? These were the Huns, who are not mentioned in the sources of historians who, even if they were aware of their existence, have little recollection of this time period. One might think that the ancient geographers paid little attention to nomadic peoples, but this is far the truth. Josephus, Flavius, Lucianus and Ptolemaeus give information about the Alans. But only Ammianus Marcellinus gives detailed information about the Huns in some foreign words that were only valid in the late IVth century.

The Alans were one of the Sarmatian tribes. A. Marcellinus writes the following about them: "Gradually weakening them with partial victories over neighbouring tribes, they united them into a single tribe."⁵⁸ Chinese geographers of the Second Han period also mention them and call the state they founded "Alanya".⁵⁹ The Alan lands included the region between the North Caucasus and the Don and Volga rivers. Although agriculture and animal husbandry were popular, they did not make much progress in art and industry. Although the Sarmatians subjected the nomadic Scythians and the sedentary Scythians to genocide and left no trace of them, and few who took refuge in Crimea were later exterminated by the Goths, the culture of the Alans was a continuation of the Scythian culture.

56 Rybakov B.A. *Drevniye rusi*// Советская. 1959. Т. XVII, с. 23-104; Скржинская Е.Ч. Коммантерии. В кн.. О происхождении и деяниях готов. М., 1960, с. 279.

57 "Поляне, я же ныне рекомае русь". (Повести временник лет).

58 Skrijinskaya Y.C. *Kommentarii*, p. 274-279.

59 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/229.

The western Sarmatians, Roksalans and Yazigis fought with the Romans on the Danube coast,⁶⁰ while the eastern ones entered Armenia and Media through the Daryal Strait, also called the "Alan Gate".⁶¹ In short, since the Alans fought continuously for 200 years, they caused their neighbours the Gun- lar to be forgotten. This is not a coincidence, but rather a historical enigma.

Age and Time Change

The changes first themselves in the nature of the Great Steppe. IV. In the middle of the century, monsoons carried the rain-laden clouds of the Atlantic Ocean over the Gobi Desert, while cyclones brought the humid clouds of the Atlantic the Volga, the God Mountains and the Targabatay Mountains. The Ili river filled the Balkhash depression with fresh water, and the Sirder- ya lowered the water level of the Uxus swamp, turning it back into Lake Aral. In the south, the forest-steps turned into a sea of taiga, and the dry steppes, which had been inhabited by the Guns for about 200 years, were again covered with green vegetation, and their herds began to fatten. However, instead of the relations between the few newly arrived immigrants and the sparse natives of Western Siberia turning into conflicts, they soon formed a political alliance as a result of their friendly contacts. The fact that the Bolgar and Sabyr tribes carried the prefix "Gunno" for many years is the best evidence of this. At that time [IVth century] it was a matter of pride to consider oneself a member of the Guns.

However, it was the Alans who interpreted this change in a different way. In the II century they had abandoned the valleys around the Caspian, which had dried up before their eyes. Nevertheless, these were their lands. This was the only thing they remembered. However, when the steppes to the east were covered with green vegetation of the most vivid variety, the Alans had to show that those who had migrated from the Orkhon and Selenge rivers had no right to live on the banks of the Volga and Yayık. The Alans who fought the Guns were deceived by the ever-changing nature, which changes faster than the life of ethnos or social systems. Unfortunately, the information provided by historical sources is fragmentary. The Gun-Alan battles are dated according to old historical information in 350, but

60 From a brief description of the actions of Emperor Tacitus, it is clear that the Alans were allied with the Golars. (See Veber G., age., T. IV, c. 515)

61 Media Atropaten Azerbaijan Today. 515)

According to the most sceptical sources, it began in ³⁶⁰⁶² and ended in 370 with the victory of the Guns. Even though the Alans were much stronger than the Guns. The Guns, like the Yuechis (Sogdians) and Parthians, used Sarmatian tactics in close combat. The cavalry, clad in scale armour and armed with long spears with chains, one end of which was attached to the horse's neck, could deliver powerful blows according to the direction of the horse's speed, and they even crushed Roman legions, known as the best infantry of the III century.

Behind the Alans was the enormous Gothic kingdom founded by Germanarich of the Amal tribe. This kingdom stretched from the Baltic to the Sea of Azov, from the Tisza to the Danube.⁶³ The Ostrogoths were at the head of the state; the Visigoths, Gepids, Yazigids,⁶⁴ some of the Vandals⁶⁵ who remained in Dacia, Taifals, Carps, Heruls, their southern neighbours the Scythians, and the Rosomons, Venedas, Marden (Mordvin, Meren (Merya), Tudo (Chud, Vas (Ves) and in the north were subjects of the Goths. The Crimean steppes, the Black Sea coast and the North Caucasus also belonged to the Goths. Therefore, the Alans, who saw the Goths their only hope, believed that they had a solid back. On the other hand, the Alans had fortified fortresses and the Guns could not attack them. So how did the Guns defeat the Alans and Goths, achieving what the Romans and Persians could not?

The historical sources, i.e. the malahazas of the IVth century, do not explain anything clearly; they only establish some facts but leave the questions unanswered

To answer our question, let us turn to geography. Cyclones, which had moved towards the polar region in the III, shifted to barren areas in the middle of the IV century. As a result, as early as the beginning of the IVth century, it had expanded the areas covered with damp, that is, forest. Thus, regular annual precipitation and regular snowfalls in the winter months began. Of course, when these snows melted in the spring, flooding occurred, which was not to the liking of the peoples living in the forested areas. Therefore, the Goths, who had advanced towards the steppes on the Black Sea coast, were forced to move into the sunlit areas of Eastern .

⁶² Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 270.

⁶³ Veber G. Age., IV/593.

⁶⁴ Visigoths and Gepids: Western branches of the Goths. Yazigis: Sarmatian tribe in Pannonia.

⁶⁵ The other part of the Vandals on the side of the Romans settled in Bretania in 277 (Veber G. Age., IV/517).

The Bal- tik (Lithuanian) peoples spread to all the forested and rural areas along the Penza. The Venedas occupied the area between the Vistula and the Laba (Elbe). However, although these two peoples were under Gothic rule, they probably retained their autonomy. Because the unfavourable climatic conditions prevented them from having the strength to fight for independence.

Thus, Germanarich had established a mosaic empire as a result of the subordination of the tribes below this level by the Goths with a high level of passion. But what the Rugis, Rosomons and Antes who were not subjugated? This is a subject that needs to be dealt with separately.

...

Now let's start looking for convincing versions of what the Guns had in the IV-V century.

A. Marcellinus and Jordanes record that the Guns owed their defeat of the Alans to a special tactic of warfare. "Although the Alans had a long experience of warfare, the Guns, who differed from them in appearance, way of life and humanity, partially weakened the fighting power of their enemies and subjugated them."⁶⁷ Traditionally, this is an adequate explanation, but it is insufficient if you want to get to the bottom of the matter. By the way, why didn't the Alans adopt the Gun-lar's war tactics? They had exactly 200 years for that. Didn't the Guns, armed with long spears that prevented the enemy from approaching the horse and cavalry, also defeat the Goths? On the other hand, the Alans had fortresses where the warriors could rest and the Guns could not conquer them. No, this version is necessary but not satisfactory.

Let us compare the stages of ethnogenesis. Huns and Sarmatians are peers. Both peoples appeared on the stage of history in the III century BC. That is to say, at the end of a period of 700 years, both were at the breaking stage and

⁶⁶ Taifals A Germanic tribe of various origins who lived in Seret in the IVth century and were allies of the Goths. Carps: A tribe living around the Lower Danube, Prut and Seret. Probably Dacians. They were a tribe that fought the Romans as allies of the Ostrogoths in the III century. Heruls: "Skif" (i.e. Germanic) tribe. They lived on the coast of the Sea of Azov conquered by Germanarich. Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 251-254, 279.

⁶⁷ Iordan. *O proisxojudenii i deyaniyax gotov*, p. 91.

Moreover the Huns had to face such obstacles as external coups and ethnic divisions. At this stage many sub-passionaries arise who disrupt the ethno-social system and unnecessarily burden it. This is what happened with the Alans, but the Huns left the sub-passionates to the Syenpi-s. These Hun sub-passionaries quickly merged with the Syenpis, and that chimera ethnos arose in their place.

The new "unbending" passionary Huns - who lived in the western steppes - managed to get out of this rather heavy position. Instead of facing and defeating the enemy, they began to seek territory where they could find friends. The Guns, who in 360 began to fight the Goth-Alan alliance supported by Byzantium, had many friends who spoke their own language, shared their own faith and had their own tastes, but acted with the Guns and filled their ranks. This is what symbiosis can give you!

However, symbiosis can only be achieved through tolerance and mutual understanding. Sub-passionaries are generally tolerant because they are impulsive, but understanding is not found in all of them. Because they are egoistic. Sub-passionates therefore underestimate everyone and are just like

They hate their neighbours and speak ill of them, as A. Marcellinus did. It is necessary to have imagination and good will in order to create symbiosis. This is found at the population level, especially in the acausal stage of ethnogenesis, i.e. in young ethnos. The Guns are the part of the Huns that constituted their unrepeatable youth, but this youth period could last them only one century.

The Goths were also a young ethnos in the process of rising. Their state, however, was founded on the principle of force, which disregarded the customs of their neighbours outside the Roman Empire and sympathised with no one. The Goths had adopted Arianism, the religion of the descendants of Constantine Magnus, but they were at some point isolated because some Byzantine communities, the Romeis - Christians, had adopted Orthodoxy. The Mithraist Antes, Venetians and Sclavenes were apparently uncomfortable with the presence as ruling caste of descendants alien to them in blood and religion.

Among the tribes supposedly subdued by Germanarich, the Rugi and the Rosomons are particularly noteworthy. The former came from the Skandza Islands long before the Goths.

a tribe. The Goths had driven them to the Baltic coast and the islands across the Baltic. It is probably from them that these islands today derive their name Rügen. It was the Goths who drove the Rugis and their neighbours, the Vandals, as far south as the Danube coast, but we do not know whether they dominated the Rugis and whether they were able to maintain their independence by scattering from the Danube to Norik.

We are more interested in the Rugis than others, since the German chroniclers of the Xth century present the Kievan Princess Olga as the empress of Rugi [Ru- gor]. Therefore, according to them, the Russian people are a branch of the Rugi tribe. Jordanes calls the peoples living around the Middle Dnieper the Rosomons.⁶⁸ The Rosomons were undoubtedly the ^{ancestors} of the ancient Russians,⁶⁹ but what relation did they have to the historical Rugis who spread as far as Italy in the Vth century? It is tempting to place the Rosomons in the group of the Rugi who fled from the Goths together with other peoples living on the banks of the Dnieper and not with those living on the Danube, but this is difficult to prove. For the Rosomons are mentioned only once in Jordanes. However, the other figure is clear: The Rosomons, like the Rugi, Vandals and Antes, were not under the rule of the Goths. Jordanes labelled them as a "treacherous nation" and blamed them for the calamities that befell the Goths. Perhaps he was right.

In 370 it became clear that the Alans had lost the war with the Guns, but could not be completely conquered and subjugated. Mobile Gun cavalry units controlled the North Caucasus steppes from the Kaspi Sea to the Sea of Azov.⁷⁰ Only mountain fortresses were not captured, and the nomads generally failed to control the Danube, although they chose the tributaries to the steppes as their base.⁷¹ The Lower Danube Herul-

68 Age., p. 91.

69 Rybakov B.A. *Drevniye rusi*.

70 "the direction of Maiotis." (Ammian Martsellin, XXX, 2,1)

71 The Middle Don encircles three terraces like a ribbon. In its lower course the coasts are covered with forest (tukay). The middle stream is covered with coniferous pines and is a good refuge for the local population and military units. It should be recalled that the Don Cossacks were protected from the Nogai by hiding here from the XIII to the XVIII centuries. In order to defeat them, the Guns to be outnumbered. However, the rumours that the Guns had unarmoured troops are nothing fantasies of European historians. In reality, the Guns formed volunteer units in these wars and attacked with small troops. Their numbers were already quite small in 370. The situation changed later, of course.

Herul were under the control of the Heruls. The Heruls were a Scandinavian-looking but people who were later subjugated and Germanised by Germanarich. The people who conquered Italy in 476, led by their commander Odovakar, were called Heruls. They were extremely agile and unusually tall. They formed the light infantry units of the neighbouring peoples. We do not have any information about whether they fought with the Guns or not. The fact that the Guns did not attempt to conquer the Lower Danube tributaries shows this. Because the Guns had found another route for themselves.

According to Jordanes, in 371 a group of Gun cavalrymen pursued a stag they saw on the Ta-man Peninsula. At last they cornered the doe by the sea, but it suddenly plunged into the sea and swam blindly to Crimea.⁷² The hunters the deer and reached a watery place with passages underneath. They immediately call for their other gun mates. The Guns, who arrived like the wind, conquered the tribe living on this coast of Skifya, or North Crimea, in one breath.⁷³ It is not difficult to guess what happened next. The Guns infiltrated as far as Perekop, which was not yet fortified at that time, and appeared in the backyard of the Goths, who had sent their best warriors to defend the right bank of the Don against a Gun attack. No one could now prevent the Guns from seizing the valleys around Azov.

V. Eunapios, one of the century historians, states: "The defeated Scythians (Goths) were slaughtered by the Guns and most of them died. Some of them were captured and slaughtered together with their wives and daughters. Because there was no discrimination in the slaughter. Some of them gathered together and attempted to flee." ⁷⁴ There are, of course, some exaggerations here. However, in reality

72 Ablabius, cited by Jordanes, attributes the Heruls to the Scythians.
is. For this historical topic see Скржинская Е.Ч. Ук. соч., vol. 89, 266-267. Erul's
It is our hypothesis that Herul is shown to be identical.

73 Jordan. *O proisxojdenii i deyanijax gotov*, p. 90-91.

74 Skrzhinskaya, commenting on the "deer legend", agrees with the views of septsics such as Jordanes and Zosimus, who lived in the first half of the V century. Jordanes suggests that the tragic events that befell the Goths were perpetrated by evil spirits - the ancestors of the Guns - from across the sea, while Zosimus writes as follows: "According to the information I have obtained, they (the Guns) came on foot from Asia to Europe at a time when the waters of the Tanai-fed Cimmerian Gorge were receding." (Skrijinskaya Y. Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 271) I believe Zosimus. The reason is that in the IVth century cyclones, rushing from the poles to the steppe, swept through the forested area where the Volga, Don and Dnieper (Özü) were born.

Many Ostrogoths stayed with the Guns and fought on their side in the famous battle of Katalaun, and later fought against them on the Nedao river. However, another point is more important: Germanarich's state was not an alliance of tribes, but rather a "mosaic empire". Having defeated the Goths, the Guns allowed many tribes to become independent, and they were respected by foreign conquerors.

M.I. Artamonov notes that the "culture of the Chernyachovsk burial grounds" should be attributed to the Goths in all its aspects. However, the rule of the Goths lasted only two centuries, III and IV centuries. Therefore, if this culture is not a monolith, i.e., if it includes Goths, Sarmats and possibly Slavs (Antlar), then the IVth century, which coincides with the Gun invasion, must disappear.⁷⁵ Artamonov's conclusion is surprising, but there is another questionable situation: Chernyachovsk culture developed in the forest-step region, whereas the Guns were steppe-dwellers. Couldn't they have been helped by the indigenous Slavians, Lithuanians and Finno-Ogurs? On the other hand, the Hellenic city and Pantikap (Kerch), where the Bosporan kingdom had previously existed, also suffered from the Gun revolt. This region had retained its special place and independence in the days of Roman splendour, but in the IVth century it was again abandoned to its fate by the Romans. During the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, the cities on the southern coast were important trade centres. The Bosporans brought slaves and leather here, while the Romans gave wine and luxury goods in return.⁷⁶ In the III century, the Goths forced the Bosporans to use their country as a base for their attacks on Asia Minor and Grecia.⁷⁷ After this event, the Bosporans did not like the treacherous Romans who had abandoned them. However, when the Guns came to the North Caucasus, they destroyed all the cities of the former Bosporan kingdom.⁷⁸ So, if the Guns were unsuccessful in storming and capturing fortresses, why did the Hellenic fortresses surrender one by one? Why did even the Bosporans surrender unconditionally to the Guns?

They must have brought storms that moistened them. Soils washed away by the overflow of these rivers led to the formation of deltas on the Volga and shallows in the lower reaches of the Don, which were later broken up by the waves of the Sea of Azov, causing the Kerch Strait to become shallow.

75 Information of Ancient Authors about Scythians and Caucasus. T.I. *Grechiskiye pisate- li*, SPb., 1983, p. 726.

76 Artamonov M.I. *Istoriya xazar*, p. 46-51.

77 Mommzen T. *Istoriya Rima* V/272.

78 Age., p. 211.

under the protection of the Guns? This was because the Guns themselves had fully obeyed their commander Balamber and were strictly disciplined. Whereas the Greeks had ships and were surrounded on both sides by the sea. All it took was a little energy for them to perish or be saved!

This is the obscuration stage. At this stage it is easier to perish than to persevere. If there had been energetic Greek capable of survival, he would certainly have suffered the fate of Stilicho and Aetius.⁷⁹ For this is the static law of ethnogenesis. The Eastern Roman Empire, which had become the Byzantine Empire as a result of the massacres inflicted by the Huns on the Hellenic cities under the suzerainty of Sa- bik Bospor, also became an enemy of the Huns.

Arriving in Perekop, the Guns encountered peoples who were not in a period of ignorance, but on the contrary, in a stage of ascendancy. These peoples had more than enough energy, but they did not have the dominants to drive this energy in the western direction. Germanarich was already 110 years old and did not have the strength to get out of the dilemmas he faced, nor was he in a position to take a position according to the changing situations. He relied on the Visigoths. Because the kings of the Visigoths were "nominal"⁸⁰ rulers without title and power. It was the Gepids who maintained their independence with all their might, but the Venetians (Slavs) were the worst off. Germanarich his wife Rosomonka Sunilda tied to wild horses and torn to pieces for her treachery. But Rosomonka's brothers, Saros and Ammios, wounded the king.⁸¹ Germanarich was not dead, but he was not cured either, and as a senile old man he continued to muddle through his affairs.

Before this, however, Germanarich had already subdued the Venetians,⁸² who were very numerous and initially tried to resist; he had even subdued the Estes (Lithuanian Aistlars),⁸³ and had thus brought Ost-

79 In 336 Bosphorus still belonged to the Romans, but soon the Roman Empire withdrew, leaving the Greeks in Crimea to their fate.

80 Both were treacherously murdered by order of the emperors.

81 Veber G. Age., p. 593.

82 Iordan. *O proisxojdenii i deyaniyax gotov*, p.91-92.

83 "Even now (VI century.L.G.) they will attack from everywhere in a rage," Jordanes recorded, referring to the Venetians. Iordan. *O proisxoj- denii i deyaniyax gotov*, p. 90. The Venetians, and later the Saxons and Franks, thanks to an unbridled genetic possessionerism, will overtake the start and cross the finish line.

had gained another subject who hated the Goths. Unlike the Ostrogoths, however, the Guns were not looking for enemies but for friends, and therefore all tribes and peoples fleeing from the Goths came into contact with them. In 375, when Germanarich, realising that he was trapped, ended his life by shooting himself with a sword, some of the Ostrogoths accepted the rule of the Guns, while others took refuge with the Visigoths, who did not want to surrender easily. The Ostrogoths were ruled by the Balt tribe, which had long been in rivalry with the Amal tribe to which the ruler belonged. This ethnic division led to the division of a single ethnos into two separate peoples hostile to each other.

Meanwhile, the Guns continued their westward march. The Visigoths were waiting for them on the banks of the Dniester. Gun troops crossed the Dniester from an unguarded position and attacked the Visigoths from behind, causing panic. Most of the Goths fled to the Danube and sought refuge with the emperor Valentinus. By the emperor's decree, they settled on the other side of the Danube, converted to Christianity and adopted Arianism.⁸⁴ A small number of heretical Visigoths, led by Atanarich, hid in the coniferous forests of Gilee, between the Prut and the Danube. However, realising that he could no longer resist the Guns, Atanarich made a treaty with Emperor Theodosius in 378 and entered the emperor's service with his warriors as an allied commander with federate rights.

Things were even worse for the Ostrogoths. After the death of Germanarich, the Goths attempted to reclaim their independence and honour. Germanarich's successor Vinitarius "grudgingly accepted the rule of the Guns."⁸⁵ At the end of the IVth century he "marched his army to the borders of the Antes in order to prove his strength. He had lost the first battles, but he was cautious about the future. He had their ruler Boja crucified along with his sons and seventeen commanders."⁸⁶ How can we recognise this strange maverickism? I think Eunapios' account of the Guns' savagery is highly exaggerated. For one thing, it is unlikely that the Goths could have found so many troops after 376, when the Visigoths had withdrawn, taking some of the Ostrogoths with them, and the Gepids, though a Gothic tribe, had broken away from the Ostrogoths at the first opportunity of their weakening.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Valentinus with Arianism at the time.

⁸⁵ Jordan. *O proisxojdenii i deyanijax gotov*, p.115.

⁸⁶ Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 320.

⁸⁷ Age., p. 206-208.

The Ants were populous and powerful.⁸⁸ Fighting them was both difficult and could end in disaster. Probably this situation pushed the Gun- lar to ally with them. A year after the slaughter of King Boja, the Gun ruler Balamir [Balamber], in response to a call for help from the Ostrogoths who remained loyal to him, attacked Vinitarius and, after several unsuccessful attacks, finally killed him in a battle on the banks of the river Erak (Lower Dnieper). After this event, there was a long period of peace in the steppe.

At the beginning of the V century, the Guns advanced westwards without encountering any resistance. At first glance this may seem, but let us nevertheless take a look at the course of events and the historical geography of the ethnos of Pannonia. In Dacia, the Gepids, a Gothic tribe, had become quite powerful and their commander Ardarich was a personal friend of Attila. Their commanders Allatius and Safrach had taken their Ostrogoths to Pannonia and settled them on the banks of the Danube.⁸⁹ In 400 the Guns appeared on the banks of the same river. The rebellious Gothic leader foederati Gaina, having lost a battle with the peoples of Constantinople, fled to the banks of the Danube, where he was beheaded by the Guns.⁹⁰ At the same time, Aetius, the son of the Roman general Gauden- tius, was a hostage of the Guns and had become friendly with their contemporary Attila and his uncle Rugila, later king of the Guns. Thus the Guns invaded Pannonia without a fight, probably with the support of many tribes, including the Antes and the Rugis. That's the "bloody invasion of the Gun army"!

But the Guns also had enemies. Or rather, the enemies of the tribes allied with the Guns. For example, the Suebs were enemies of the Gepids, the Vandals were enemies of the Rugis, and the Burgundians and the angry Alans were enemies of the Guns themselves. These peoples had fled their country for fear of the Guns, and in 405 they forced their way through the borders of Italy. Radagais, at the head of them, vowed to sacrifice all the captured Roman senators to the gods, but he was himself captured by Stilicho's army.

⁸⁸ Perhaps this is the only uncontroversial point about the Ants. All put forward different views. I agree with the view that the Ants were the ancestors of the Slavs and Polonians.

⁸⁹ Iordan. *O proisxojdenii i deyaniyax gotov*, p.92.

⁹⁰ Age., p. 301.

from the Gun, he was captured and beheaded. This march alone shows the consequences of the Gun oppression on the peoples of Europe. In fact, the Great Migration of Peoples, which is in everyone's minds, started with the Markoman wars that took place in 169-170 with the exit of the Goths from "Skandza"⁹¹, but when the Guns appeared in the steppes beyond the Volga, no one was displaced from their homes.

V. By the beginning of the century the main military headquarters of the Guns had been established in the steppes along the Black Sea coast, and Bi-Zantine envoys travelled there until 412. Even so, the migration of the Guns to the Danube was continuous, and the Hungarian steppe became their homeland until it was abandoned by the Guns in the V century for reasons we know. After the period of drought that gripped the steppe region, some climatic fluctuations caused the Siberian forests and forest-steps to expand southwards, thus the dry steppes became narrower, or more precisely, the territory inhabited by the Guns became smaller. For intensive nomadic animal husbandry, large pastures, which were not much inhabited by people, were essential. Horses and herds of sheep, accustomed to the high-calorie vegetation of the steppe, cannot feed on moist grasses in forested areas, and it is also a matter of finding fodder in areas with abundant snowfall. It was necessary to mow the grass and stock up for the winter. However, the Guns did not know this. Therefore, they attempted to conquer other lands where they could exploit the labour of the indigenous people. However, the Guns had to take care of themselves because they were outnumbered, and they should not be deprived of the spoils of war better than nothing. The European pacifier barbarians realised that they could compensate for their territorial losses only from the Roman Empire, but since they were not well organised, they first failed completely and then semi-failed. The Romans left the Rhône valley to the Burgundians, Spain to the Vandals, Sueb and Alans, Aquitaine to the Visigoths and Gallia to the Franks. However, the remaining barbarians also wanted a share of this feast. As is well known, a wise ruler is one who always acts according to the wishes of the masses. Rugila was also a wise and careful commander. When the Guns reached the Rhen river in 430, he immediately set about improving diplomatic relations with Rome and had no objection to supplying the empire with his army to suppress the Bagauda rebellion in Gallia.

91 Veber G. Age., p. 310.

he did not see. Rugila died in 434, leaving the throne to his brother Muncuk's sons Attila and Bleda.

Attila, Aetius and the Phases of Ethnogenesis

The history of the European Guns has been written extensively, and where more detailed information is needed, only a side heading can be inserted. But no historian has taken it upon himself to expose the problem of the interrelationship of adult ethnos, that is, to analyse the relations of young, middle-aged and old ethnos from the point of view of the balance of forces and to illustrate the situation of a very talented person. However, in those fateful twenty years, when the fate, cultural development and situation of the peoples of Europe were being determined, the situation was in this centre.

In the Vth century, the Roman super-ethnos was in a phase of obscuration and was almost in a vegetative state. But Eastern Rome was strong. Because many inhabitants of Asia Minor, Syria and Armenia were in the active phase of ethnogenesis. The axis of passionary impulse ran through that region, and the Christian, Gnostic and Manichaean communities absorbed like sponges the young passionaries who hated the ennui of vulgarity. These communities wrestled with each other, propagated their doctrines to anyone willing to listen, and their cities against those who wished to remain heretics. The Ak-rans, unlike the Germans, had their own philosophical views and ethnic dominance, which they had acquired without paying any price. This philosophical view did not exist among the ancients, nor among the Hellenes, nor among the Jews, nor among the Egyptians. The first thing they did not pay a price for was Christos. However, for three centuries the sub-passionaries, who had benefited abundantly from the blessings and favours of the empire, had been blocking the path of these communities. These were not the lower echelons of society. Most of them had risen to senior positions or held middle-level civil servanthships. But wherever they were found, they devoured Roman civilisation like ravenous wolves, with no thought for the days to come and hence the bitter end.

Without getting involved in anything, let us listen to those who lived the events of that period. In 448, Priscos of Pannonia was at Attila's ottica when he met a Greek dressed in very expensive "Scythian" clothes. After a conversation between them, Priskos

He takes note of the following words spoken by his interlocutor: "The calamities that befall the Romans in these times of turmoil are worse than the hardships they endure in wars. Because the law is not applied equally to everyone. If the person who breaks the law is very rich, his injustices go unpunished, but those who cannot turn the wheel are forced to pay the bills imposed by the law." Priscos objected, arguing that the laws of Roma were very humane and that "capable slaves obtained their freedom". The answer given by his Greek interlocutor is as follows: "The laws are good, society is founded on sound principles, but they are corrupted by rulers who do not act as the ancients did." ⁹²

The Greek's point is that the variability of stereotypical behaviour is a life-giving factor for human beings. The culture that comes out of the hands of mankind is permanent, but the Roman super-ethnos has already entered its final phase. While they took out their handkerchiefs and wept over the culture that had slipped away, others were preparing to devour it. While the Goths diluted the ancient peoples of Macedonia, Thrace and Hellas to make some room for the Slavs until the IVth century, Byzantium was locked behind the walls, and when those walls fell, Ges- peria⁹³ was wiped off the map.

The Germans, like their peers the Byzantines, did not possess the characteristics and cultural traditions that could unite them into a super-ethnic unity. On the contrary, the passio-ner impulse, which had never crossed their lands before, had shattered the bonds that existed in the first centuries of Christ. In order to unite, they needed a leader, and they found one in the Guns. The Guns, their rivals the Alans and the Huns in northern China had undergone a phase of rupture, or the inevitable decline of the passio-ner tension of ethnic systems. The fact that they possessed certain personal characteristics also played a role. Since they had no eco-logical niche, they were obliged to obtain the food they needed through taxes or olca (booty). They had turned into birds of prey in wild lands. In order not to perish, they had to hunt their neighbours and benefit from the much-needed blessings offered by them, even if they did not look like them, even if they did not like them.

⁹² Destunis G.S. *Skazaniya Priska Poniyskogo*. SPb., 1861, pp. 55-58.

⁹³ Western Roman Empirethis was its name, which was no longer used in the VI century

Their Possionerism had begun to melt away as large numbers of Ugor-Finns merged into their ranks, compensating for their losses in battles. The Ugor-Finns were very brave, dashing and energetic. They were loyal to the Gun commanders, but their hearts beat differently. Because of their characteristics, they formed a Gunno-Ugor chimera. Until the Vth century, since one lived in the forest and the other in his own economic niche in the steppe, their mixing and fusion with each other did not create such a spirit of unity. By a twist of fate, when they came to the Danube valleys surrounded by mountains, they were joined by the Celtic-Bastarna, the Dacians-Karps, the Sarmatians-Kazigis and some Slavians. They had all changed, but certainly not for the better. At this stage, events would follow a completely complex course depending on the activities of Attila and Aetius.

Attila was of medium height, broad-shouldered, with dark hair and a flat nose. He did not have a bushy beard. The hawkish gaze of his small eyes frightened his opponents and showed how powerful he was. He was terrible in his anger, cruel to his enemies, but extremely compassionate towards his comrades in arms. The Guns were confident in his ability and courage. That is why all the tribes from the Volga to the Rhen were united under his banner. In addition to the Guns, Ostrogoths, Gepids, Türingis, Heruls, Turcilings, Rugis, Bulgarians and Akassirs (Aka- tir) fought under his banner, and many Romans and gladly served him.

Attila had initially shared the throne with his brother Bleda, but in 445 he killed him and monopolised power. With the Guns gathered around him, tribes that had originally joined him, he raided the Balkan Peninsula and stormed the walls of Constantinople. They ravaged 70 cities from Sirmi- um to Naissus. However, since the peninsula had been ravaged twice before, the spoils were not worth the trouble. In 447 Theodosius II signed a treaty with Attila on very bad terms, agreeing to pay annual tribute and to cede the southern Danube coast from Singidunum to Naissus. However, his successor, Markianos, broke this agreement in 450, noting that the gift was for friends and that he had weapons for enemies. Attila was not only a quick-tempered Asiatic, but also a good diplomat. Convinced that he could still achieve great success in the west, he marched his army to Gallia.

good reasons for this march. Princess Honoria wished to marry him and, more importantly, a French prince, expelled from his homeland, and the Vandal king Genzerich, who had captured Carfagen, the capital of the African province, wanted to ally themselves with him. The low and corrupt Romans had nothing to fear. But a march, even a well-planned one, could sometimes produce unexpected results. Attila's only enemy of strength and character was Aetius, a man of high passion.

Aetius was born to a Germanic father and a Roman woman. He was the representative of the new generation and the new passionary mass that would revive the wounded Byzantium. He was handsome and strong. He was good at riding a horse and shooting arrows. He was unrivalled in throwing into battle. The rebel legionaries had killed his father in front of his eyes. He was a man of honour and a glory seeker. He had been among the Guns twice before. Once as a hostage. The second time, exile. He was fluent in Germanic and Gun. He had learnt them from legionaries, including Italians. He quickly made a career, but pride and ambition for power him an enemy of Bonifacius, the viceroy of Africa. Bonifacius was honourable, kind-hearted and, as the historian Procopius⁹⁴ said, a representative of the "Last Romans". Aetius took him by the arm and to incite him to revolt; Bonifacius called the Vandals from Spain to his aid in 429, but they invaded the province for themselves as soon as they arrived. Returning to Rome, Bonifacius claimed that Aetius was responsible for the loss of Africa, and he marched on Rome with his army from Gallia. Bonifacius, the commander of the special troops, defeated Aetius, but he soon died in 432 from a spear wound. Fleeing to Gunlar, Aetius was received by the ruler Rugila, but upon Bonifacius' death he returned to his country and was elected consul for the second time in 437. In 446 he was consul for the third time. Until then, only emperors could be consuls repeatedly.⁹⁵ But Aetius was the only one who could force the barbarians for the Rome they hated.

94 Although the author characterises Aetius in this way, it is possible to agree with him. Aetius's character, his ebullience, his lack of nationalistic feelings and his adventurism belong to his Byzantine rather than his Roman days. He was unlucky enough to have been born on the banks of the Danube, not on the banks of the Tiberias or the Po; he did not love the Italians, nor did the Italians love him.

95 Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 302.

Both Attila and Aetius were the head of military-political guilds (certainly not federations of tribes) composed of peoples alien to them in blood, religion and even ethnicity. The eastern coalition of Germanic, Slavic and Ugor tribes was headed by the Guns, descendants of the ancient Turks, while the western coalition of Germanic-Celtic and Alanic tribes was headed by the Romans, descendants of invaders and slavers. At the beginning of the V century, all the barbarians who had invaded Gaul, namely Visigoths, Burgundians, Alans, Armoricans (Celts from Wallis, who first migrated to the mainland and later called the peninsula "Brittany"), Franks and Alamans, were pitted against each other by Aetius and then suppressed. The Bagaudas were subdued by Aetius with the help of the Gun troops sent to him by Attila. Attila also wanted to suppress the opposition of his subjects, the Akassirs - old warriors-96 provoked by Byzantine spies.⁹⁷

Attila and Aetius were childhood friends. There was no need for them to fight. But the rulers were as dependent on them as their subjects. However, the masses did not want to live in tranquillity during the period of ascension. The emerging possioner generation in Byzantium was at loggerheads with the ecclesiastical milieu. In the war into which the Guns and Rome were drawn, the main combatants were the Germans.

450-472 War and Ethnogenesis

Each historical event should be evaluated from different perspectives, not as mutually modifying events, but as complementary events at the social, cultural and administrative level. We are interested in the ethnic aspect of the subject. Let us first take a look at which ethnos fought under Attila's banner: Apart from the Guns, the Bashtarnae, the Skirs, the Gepids, the Heruls, the Rugi, the Alamans, the Franks, the Burgundians and some the Turingis.⁹⁸ Only the Germanic and Celtic peoples are mentioned here. Others are probably given under the name of the Guns, the Bittogurs or "Karagur" (Black Ugors)⁹⁹, the Antlar. Since they were loyal allies of the Guns, they could not participate in wars. Interdependent on each other

96 Artamonov M. *Istoriya xazar*, p. 56 fn.

97 Age., p. 55.

98 Veber G. Age., p. 670.

99 Yevropeus D. *Ob ugorskom narode, obitavshem v sredney i severnoy Rossi do pribytia tuda slavyan*. SPb., 1874, p. 3.

tribes, each with its own government and united only by political ties, certainly cannot be called a "federation of tribes". However, many people think it is so.

Likewise, the military units assembled by Aetius, namely the Visigoths, Alans, Armoricans, Saxons, some Franks and Burgundians, and some Lithuanians, Riparians, and Olibrions, were not "tribal troops".¹⁰⁰ However, a question may be asked here: Why did they go to war if their sovereigns did not push these people to war? This question cannot be answered without knowledge of ethnogenesis, but for ethnologists the answer is quite simple. The ethnic dominance of the decline phase and the rise phase are inversely proportional. We know that people usually want to sit at home and enjoy themselves, but their commanders come and drag to war. In the period of the rise of possessiveness, on the other hand, they force their rulers to go to war. In this sense, sub-pussaniores do the same thing, but only aimlessly and thoughtlessly.

On their way to Gallia, the Guns (more precisely, Attila's army, which was composed of different tribes) destroyed the Burgundians on their way to Gallia and abolished their sovereignty. Afterwards, they destroyed all the cities on their route and travelled as far as Orleans, from where they turned back. In 451, the Guns agreed to fight the army of Aetius coming towards them in the valley of Katalaun. Although the fighting was bloody, no one was able to achieve a decisive victory. When Attila retreated, Aetius did not follow him. In 452, Attila attacked again. But this time he entered Italy directly and captured the most fortified castle of Aquilea. If we recall that the Guns of the Steppes were unable to conquer fortresses, it is clear that this time the Ostrogoths and Gepids were brought into play, and the whole of the Po plain was sacked. The inhabitants of Mediolanum [Milan] and Pavia were saved from ruin by giving what they had. Because Aetius did not have enough troops to stop the Guns.

The Romans asked for peace and offered Attila a large ransom to leave Italy. Attila accepted the offer because of the epidemics in his army and so the Guns left Italy. In 453, Attila married a beautiful Burgund woman named Ildiko, but she died on the night of their wedding. A year later the Guns began to disband. On 24 October of the same year, Emperor Valentinian

100 Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 307.

During the initiation ceremony, he stabbed Aetius to death with his own hand. Sane Romans noted that the emperor had cut off his own right hand with his left. In 455 the Vandal ruler Genzerich captured Rome and gave his troops a fortnight's sack. The history of Italy after this is one of blood and fire, so that no longer a people, but the remnants of ethnos remain.

It is absolutely wrong to call Attila the "Whip of God". Attila was of course extremely intelligent, strong-willed and capable. But the ethnic tide was so strong that he had to throw himself into it in order to save himself and his people. In Pannonia, the Guns were surrounded by hostile subjects who did not like them. At the battle of Katalaun it was not the allies of the Guns who harassed Aetius, but the braves who had shown great valour in battle. A large part of the Guns had died of epidemics due to the unfamiliar climate in Italy. There were no soldiers to replace them. In any case, the Akassirs in the Northern Black Sea could not be trusted.

Attila's throne was a death trap for his heir sons and their relatives. Having saved his people from death and ruin for twenty years, Attila left an almost legendary name among the peoples of Europe. But the Great Migrations of peoples, which had begun before the Gun invasion, continued after their disappearance.

In the end, Attila and Aetius were personal heroes, ethnic catalysts and super-ethnic initiators of a great process. However, super-ethnic processes can and should be analysed like meteorological or seismographic phenomena. As for the Guns, they could only be saved by retreating to the mountains, but even that was unlikely to be of any benefit.

Three Defeats

Attila's death was a time-break in the history of Eastern Europe. After his funeral, his sons began to fight for the throne among themselves, and the Gepid king Ardarich revolted, claiming that he was not being treated with enough respect. Almost all the tribes that had obeyed Attila joined the conflict. The final battle took on the banks of the river Nedao (Nedava, a tributary of the Sava), which Jordanes very well: "... the Goth-

the Gedipites with spears, the Gedipites with blunt swords, the Rugis with harpoons that broke on his body (Y.Ç. Skrijinskaya thinks that the word "on his body" here refers to the Gedipites), the Suebs with effective maces, the Guns with arrows, the Alans ... with heavy weapons, the Heruls with light weapons. "¹⁰¹

Who sided with whom? This is not clear from Jordanes' text. It is certain that the Ostrogoths were on Gedipler's side. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Alans, i.e. the Yazigids, were also on the side of Gedipler. What about the Rugis and Suebs? Considering that they fought against the Goths on the Volga River after 469, it can be concluded that they sided with the Guns in this conflict.¹⁰² Considering that Odovakar captured some of the Rugis some time later, it is understood that Herullar, on whose back he relied, was the enemy of the Rugis and therefore the friend of Gedipler. In fact, Jordanes knew all these details, but he did not realise that the reader who did not know the details would not understand anything. In this battle, Atila's beloved son Ilek and 30 thousand Guns and allies lost their lives. The surviving Guns, together with Ilek's brothers Dengizik and Irnek, travelled downstream to the Dnieper and eastwards to the ancient homeland of the Goths. The Ostrogoths occupied the vacant Pan nonia, while the Rugi (except for those who found refuge in Byzantium) reached Norik.

The Guns continued to fight against the Goths, but this time a second trouble arose from the east. "In 463, an emissary from Saragur, Urog and Onogurs to Romei, that is, Byzantium, reported that they had left their homeland, from which they had been expelled by the Sabirs (Savirs) - the Sabirs were to be expelled by the Avars, who had fled from a people living on the shores of the Ocean - and that they had defeated the Akassirs and wanted to become allies of the empire in their place. "¹⁰³

The peoples mentioned here are recognised today.¹⁰⁴ Saragur, Onogur and Uroglar are Ugors, the ancestors of the ancient Bulgarians. The Savirs are a people belonging to the Samoyed group living on the edge of the Siberian taiga.¹⁰⁵ The Abars are a Jungarian tribe.¹⁰⁶ They defeated the Akassirs.

101 Iordan. *O proisxoždenii i deyanijax gotov*, p.118.

102 Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 341.

103 Destunis G.S. *Skazaniya*, p. 87.

104 Gumilev L.N. *Tri ischeznušix naroda* / Сопреаннулий народы. М.: Восток. II. 2. 2. М., 1986. 4 с. 104-109

185 Artamonov M. *Istoriya xazar*, p. 69-78.

186 Bichurin, *Sobraniye svedeniy po istričeskoj geografii Vostochnoy i Seređinnoy Azii*, p. 542, 549, 553.

The Bulgars eliminated the ridge of the Guns. The Savirs, who had spread into the forest-step region up to Des- na, stopped a branch of the Antlar, an ally of the Gunlar, to the east. The Ants were also among the allies of the Guns.

What can explain these sudden and frightening tribal migrations that can only be explained by the events in the south-east? And why could such a war break out? However, for 200 years there had been no conflict between the peoples of Siberia and their southern neighbours, as there was a strip of land between them.

IV. Let us remind again that the Atlantic cyclones changed their route in the middle of the century.¹⁰⁷ These cyclones shifted to the south and started to moisten the southern parts, not the taiga in the north. The dry desert became green and suitable for habitation. It was then that the echo of the events that started in Central Asia reached all the way to Eastern Europe.

Probably the increasing dampness of the Great Steppe was a good thing, but for the Savirs it was a disaster. A considerable number of the Savirs left their homeland and travelled to a place that was not so much a homeland for them. They were victorious, but they could not reap the fruits of this victory. The Savirs who came to Iran via the western shores of the Caspian Sea had to enter the service of either the Persian shahs or the Byzantine emperors in order to survive.¹⁰⁸ Although Northern Savirs were linguistically Slavicised, they fought with the Rosses and the Ants for a long time.¹⁰⁹

In other words, the fall of the natural conditions of the Great Steppe to the optimal level disastrous for the Savirs, Bulgars and Akassirs. When the cyclones over the forested region fed the Volga and its tributaries with rainwater, the water level of Lake Caspian rose by 3 metres and deltas were formed, suitable for the Khazars coming from the lower Te- rek to live in.¹¹⁰ The course will forever change geographical regions and the peoples living in them. Like uncontrollable natural systems, ethnos will emerge with a certain integrity and will disappear when the system loses its bonds. What about the people? They will be incorporated into other nations.

107 Gumil'ev L.N. *Istoki ritma kočevoy kultury Sredinnoy Azii* (Opit istoriko-geograficheskogo sinteza)// Народы Азии и Африки. 1966, № 4.

108 Artamonov M. *Istoriya xazar*, p. 60-78.

109 Shevchenko Yu. Yu. *Na rubeje dvux etnicheskix substratov Vostochnoy Yevropy*. L., 1977, p. 39-58.

110 Gumil'ev L.N. *Otkrytiye xazarii*. M., 1966, p. 63-64.

They will continue their lives by blending in with the rest of the world and gradually forget their lost past.

This is not to say that such changes are useless. Some individuals or persons will disappear, but the disappearance of the individual during the stages of ethnogenesis is an inevitable fact. There is nothing out of principle here. Like the life of an organism, the process of ethnogenesis has a beginning and an end.

Disaster

After the back blow dealt by the Bolgars - the defeat of the Assyrians - the situation of the Guns was hopeless. But they retained the old Turkic nobility and the trait of steadfast Ugor invincibility. Dengizik, the ruler of the Guns, continued to fight the Goths, having learnt from both ancestors not to be afraid to die in battle. He was supported by three Gun tribes - the Ultzinzur, Bittogur and Bardors - and the Germanic Angiskir tribe, an enemy of the Goths.¹¹¹ He was also supported by the Sadagis, also a Gun tribe, who survived in Pannonia after the battle off Nedao.¹¹² The Goths

V. In the 60th year of the century he attacked the Sadagis, but Dengizik also organised a raid on the city of Basian in southern Pannonia. The Goths were forced to leave the Sadagis alone and attack the Guns, but in the meantime the Guns, having achieved their desired success, retreated to the Pod-neprovo steppe.

After such a diversionary move, which tied the hands of not only the Goths but also their enemies the Guns and even Byzantium, Dengizik attempted to ally with the Constantinople court and to develop commercial relations, but received a sudden and unexpected rejection. While it was expected to establish friendly relations, war broke out. But why? The Goths were not only evil, but also the later pillars of the Roman Empire. For 90 years (378-468) they plundered the peoples of Italy and the Balkan Peninsula: The Macedonians, Thracians, most of the Hellenes and of the Illyrians had disappeared from the geographical map. In their place, however, a large number of Gothic warriors joined the mercenaries of the imperial private army.

111 Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommentarii*, p. 340.

112 Age., p. 333.

had joined. After the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the Goths, former Arians¹¹³, gladly slaughtered the nations in the mountains, where the populations supported the Catholic and monophysite priests to an unprecedented extent. The people, sacrificed to the barbarians by the rulers, could only weep.

Ritsimir of Sueb in the west and Aspar of Alan in the east, who commanded the Germanic special forces, prepared Rome and Constantinople for war against the barbarians. Ritsimir died of an epidemic, leaving Italy defenceless. The Italian people had already lost their former nobility (i.e. their passion). In the east, Leo I, whose capital had been captured by Gothic troops, was tired of paying annual tribute not only to the Goths but also to his Pannonian allies. In 463 Aspar the Great defeated Byzantium's sole ally Dengizik, beheaded him and sent him to Constantinople.

Official historical records show that the Guns organised successful raids against Byzantium. However, it must be borne in mind that the Guns were surrounded by the Goths from the west, the Bolgars from the east and the Savirs from the north. Where could a new war be fought there and for whom? It would have been in Aspar's interest to see the Guns destroyed, for he would have got a favour from the Goths. It is understandable why the Guns crossed the Danube. However, when Aspar was killed and his personal troops were defeated by the Sa- vir troops in 471 - which were under the command of the future emperor Zenon - it becomes clear that the Guns crossed the Danube not for the purpose of fighting, but for the purpose of becoming subjects of the empire. As a matter of fact, they were given land in Lesser Sikifia (Dobrudja)¹¹⁴. And thus, from this date onwards, the pages of the history of the Guns were lost. They were replaced by the ancient Bolgar tribes of Uturgurs and Kuturgurs and Ogors. In the VIth century, the steppes extending from the Don to the Black Sea coast will come under the rule of the Göktürks assisted by the Khazars.

¹¹³ Arianism was accidentally accepted by the Goths in 376 as part of the treaty with Emperor Valentinian later became the ethnic symbol of the East Germanic tribes and a symbol of opposition to the orthodox Nicene Orthodox, who were under the protection of Emperor Theodosius, the enemy of the Goths. Otherwise, the dogmatic issues discussed by the Arians were quite alien to the Goths. However, at critical stages of ethnogenesis, people are not interested in philosophy, but in the whereabouts of themselves and their enemies. In the course of ethnic contact, religious factors determine the favourable or unfavourable development of relations.

¹⁹⁴ Iordan. *O proisxojenii i deyaniyax gotov*, p.120; Skrijinskaya Y.Ç. *Kommen- tarii*, p. 336.

Time-Tradition Relationship

Ancient Chinese historical-geographical sources give some vague information about "the Hun dynasty that moved west from the western region (this was the ancient name of the Tarim basin)", which are, of course, some rumours they heard about Atila's state or Guns. According to the legend, the whole tribe was killed. Only a nine-year-old boy survived and his enemies cut off his hands and feet and threw him into a swamp. There a she-wolf became pregnant by him. Although his enemies find the child again and kill him, the she-wolf manages to escape and comes to Altai and takes shelter in a cave and gives birth to ten boys there. There is no record of whether there were any daughters. After several generations, A-hsien-shé (Arslan-shad) emerged from the cave and became a vassal of the Ju-jan khan. From then on, the normal historical course of the khanate follows. In addition to this complex legend, there are two other legends about the emergence of the Turks (ancient Turks). These are less romantic but more convincing, or rather realistic.

It may not be convincing to understand a legend in its entirety. But some of its preserved details are important. The boy was thrown into a swamp. This swamp is probably Lake Balaton, where the Guns suffered a heavy defeat. The Hungarian word "balaton" comes from the Slavic word "boloto" (pronounced balata), which is believed to be a translation made by the Guns.

The she-wolf who became pregnant by a crippled ten-year-old boy: This is a symbol just like the "cock" of the Welsh, the "English le- opar" of the Plantagenets or the "bear" of the Russians. The cave where the she-wolf's descendants are hidden is the central part of the Altai Mountain, which is naturally very suitable for hiding.

Finally, the word "A-shih-na", with which the Turkish kings psychologically integrated themselves the wolf, means "noble wolf", although the word is of Mongolian origin.

Although it is recorded in the Chinese chronicle as one of the versions of Turkic ethnogenesis, it is only a poem, not a history. Now let's think about it: We have only the fourth translation. The Gun ri- vayet was translated into the ancient Turkic language, from there into Chinese, and there into Western languages. It is obvious that every time a poetic text is translated, it loses something of its original value and aesthetics. Just as anyone can recognise the poetic aspects of the "Nibelunga Epic"

If one can take the successful parts of the Nibelunga Epic and weave a story out of it, this poem, like it, has turned into a flat narrative. The Nibelunga epic is not mentioned here by chance. Because this epic is an ac- sissa of the Gun tragedy, and the translation of the legend about the she-wolf and her descendants is merely a complete transposition of the Western version. Because parchment paper is more resistant to the deadly blow of Hronos than maple bark.

What can this weak narration give to knowledge? Is it worth paying attention to knowledge that is not worthy of trust? I think it is. Because it shows that the crumbs of the unity of political thought of the Huns and the Guns were preserved, that the ethnic tradition was intact, and finally that Istemi Khan's march to the west in 555 was related to the Hun migration in the II century in idea- het, that is, the 400 years between these two marches could not erase the ethnic memories, and that this march was considered as the correction of a historical injustice and that the Gepids and Saragurs betrayed the Turks and the Guns. The aesthetic perception of the past is the power that inspires a people to great deeds. The unforgettable actions of the Huns and the Guns inspired the Turks and provided them with this power.

Thus, two sets of narratives, one historical-geographical and the other ethnological, are integrated with each other. Moreover, the first reinforces the accuracy of the second.

TABLE

Yt	China	Contact Zone (Hünlsr and Sijenpiler)	İç Asya
190- 263	The destruction of the khan henada- lışı; Üç Devlet Döne- mi: Chao-Wei, Wu ve Shu.	The Southern Hqnlans under the Chao-Wei wish to strengthen the Chinese government.	The cha- bileteic division of the Siycnpı state. The Tab-Ghacs moved to Yin-shan.
265	The Ch'in dynasty's ku- ..the roll.	In Ltiao-hsi, the Tuan suzerainty was wiped out. That one. Hun1kr's own name- tcklerlc Biiyök. Birdan Çin içlerine göçü.	The history of the Tabgach dynasty. lışı.
266- Z81	The conquest of China. Suppression of the Hun rebellion.	Mu-junğ ve Yü-wen the formation of the principalities.	Yüeban Huns ¥Vu- I drove Surittar out of Yedisu. kardılar.
281- 29d	China's powers. Impa- ratorıçenin darbesi.	Mu-jung captured Ho-i Fu- yü and returned to China March war.	Karashar's forces. From Fergana, Aksu, Karashi and Rome came to China. Tabgaçlar'tır in the case of three tribes, div-
292- 301	Disputes between princes of the Ch'in dynasty.	Mu-junğ Ho-i conquered Hi'i in the vicinity of Beijing. Hun and Ch'iang rebellion was suppressed.	Tabgach ham Yih-tö'nur I've travelled as far as the Upper Irtysh. dreaming.
302	The foundation of the Cfi'cn (Hou- Shu) dynasty in Sih- ch'uan .	Mu-jung Ho-i, Yü- won, the ruler Mo- luo. China has recognised Yü-wen and Tuan —	
303	between Prince Sih- ma Yert and Sih-rfia Yü taht kavgaları.		
304	Shih-ma Yen'in. "inhi- zami.	Liu Yüan of the Huns under the leadership of the rebellion.	

Yıl	Çin	Contact Zone (Huns and Cynpies i.	İç Asya
305	Sih-n a in Ch'ang-an The organisation of a massacre by the half-way Si'ycnyi asker!cri texûf.	Liu Yüan kendini H "nwnngilvcui.	
306	Sih-oia Yü's irthi- x'tn v" tilüm. The poisoning of Emperor Hu-ti. Huiñ- ti ascended the throne.		
407	Chi Sang's rebellion: Ych chchrini. seized and Sih-ma Yü tarahnJan inhi'am.	Hun servants rebelled under the rule of Shih to- m. Self-proclaimed Great Si - yenpi Yabgusu Mu-jüing Ho- i's conquest of the city of Hi-ch'eng	The organisation of the Tabpaç tribes and their alliance with Mu- junj Ho-i.
3pg	I don't think the Koreans from the Liao-iung.	The Huns have come to Lo-yang offence. Liu Yüan declared himself Emperor of Han.	
309	The state underestimated the Hun attacks of the people against the mcm- yan cdi;i.	(Inli1er defeat at Huang-ho, Hun defeat at Lo-yang: Defeat at Lo-yang. Huns' invasion near Huai nchri.	
310	Emperor Huai-ti. Cntrikatan against Sih-mâYü. Against the Huns, the Tabgach Khan Yi- Liu ile ittifak.	The death of Liu Yüan. Liu Ts'ung, who killed his son Liu Ho, succeeded to the throne. Hunlar alliance with the White Si- yenpiler. Mu-jung Ho-i Su-hi and Mu-atar took the fiabile!crini under control.	
311	Sikh-ma Yü's subjugation of Shih Lo. The fall of Lo- yang. The rebellion of the chauns in South China was suppressed.	The victory of the Tabgachs over the Huns. Kukunor of the White Si-penps his escape to the lake. Shih- lo's expedition to the Huai River.	The arrival of the Tabgachs in the northern Shan-si'dok!l Ping-chot region to help against the Huns.

Year	China	Contact Zone (Huns and Syenpis I	İç Asya
312	The Chinities defeated the Huns. They're expelled from Ch'ang-an.	Iiun- The Shih Lo Tuan stopped the Shih Lo Tuan war and signed a peace treaty when they were broken by the Tabgachs.	The shape of the Togon khanate İcnişi
313	Min-il Ch'ang-an tHsi- ning to Liang-chou) The spread of the Liang prnship.	Mu-jung Ho-i-Ttlan defeated. Huns' attack on Ch'ang-an was repelled by the Chinese.	The Tnhgachs are trying to kill Cherie-lo. and marched into the Northern Shan-si.
314	Yü -chou magistrate Wang The overthrow of Hsün,	Shih-lo Yü-chou captured, Liu Yao Ch'ang'an was defeated.	Yi-lü Han Tai -wang ti-lulu adl.
315		Huntni's Ch'ang-an The attack was halted by the Southern (in) warriors.	
316	Sich-ma lu' Chien-took power in K'ang.	Liu Yao Ch'ang-an and captured the imparaton.	Yu-lu's son Liu Hsil killed his father. war. Yü-Lü became Khan.
1 17	The execution of Emperor Min-ti . Ch'ü Ti defeated Shih Hu at Ho-nan.	Huns are Tuan's subordinates they've seized part of it.	Tabgach hank Lob-nnr and seized the steppe stretching as far as north-west Manchuria.
	Establishment of the Eastern Ch'in dynasty in South China. Sih-ma JuI became emperor with the title of Yü- nn-ti.	The death of Liu Ts'ung. Ch'in Chung coup. Liu Yaa founded a dynasty called Chao. Mu-jung-Ch'in alliance.	
119	To Ch'ü Ti Shih Lo against enemy.	Conflict between Liu Yao and Shih Lo. Mu-jung defeated Ho-i Yü-wcn and invaded Liao-lung.	

Ye ar	China	Contact Zone (Huns and Syenpis)	Inner Asia
JJ _O	Mu-jung Kho-i's being appointed as the Great Yabgu.	Ti ler's assassination attempts and rebellions Liu Yao's general amnesty.	
321	Ch'ü TI is dead. Chinese- s attack on the Huns was stopped.	Liao-i-ung is officially <i>iVtu</i> - the jung passed to Ho-î.	He was killed by the Yü-lu conspirators. Ho nu was installed as khan.
122	Wu-t'u reign He broke away from China. Wang T's rebellion.		
323	Min-ti ascended to the throne.	Shih Lo officially declared war on the Ch'tn and Chao empires.	
324	Wang T's rebellion was suppressed.		
325	China Huai nehnn's ku- in the north.	Shih Hu Lo-yang open- defeated the army of Liu Yao.	Tabgach Khan Ho-nu was killed for treason against his people; his brother Ho- na was appointed to the throne.
326	Sikh-dna Yen ascend the throne- I. (My next titular Ch'eng-li)		The Tabgachs had taken out the northern grey alarm. lar.
328		liu Yao Shih Hu Although he was defeated at the battle of P'u-fang, he was defeated at the battle of Lo- yang and slaughtered to be captured.	
329		The defeat of the Muahhar Chao (Huns).	Ho-na Yü-wen abdicated and fled. Yti- lü's son I- huai was appointed to the throne.
330		Shih Lo said that he was Mu- ahhar Chao ru declared	

Yıl	Çin	Temas Bölgesi (Hunlar ve Siyenpiler)	İç Asya
333		Shih Lo öldü. Onun akraba ve arkadaşlarını katleden Shih Hu tahta çıktı. Mu-junğ Ho-i öldü. Mu-junğ Huang kendine karşı olan Tuanlarla ittifak akdeden kardeşi Mu-junğ Jen'in isyanıyla karşı karşıya kaldı.	
334	Doğu Ch'in Muahhar Chao'ya saldırdı.	Kıyamcılar başarılı olsalardı da Mu-junğ Huang'ı öldüremediler. Huan Tuan'ı bozarak Liao-tung'u ele geçirdi.	Ho-na tahtını tekrar ele geçirdi. İ-huai Shih-hu'ya kaçtı.
336		Mu-junğ Huang kardeşini mağlup ve katletti.	
337		Mu-junğ Huang Yen-wang ünvanı aldı.	Shih Hu, İ-Huai'ı Tabgaçlar'ın hanı olarak nasbetti.
338		Shih Hu ve Mu-junğ Huang Tuan'ı hezimeye uğrattılar.	İ-Huai Han öldü. Shē-i kien han halkı yatıştırdıktan sonra Cungarya (Güney Gobi) ve Kuzey Shan-si'ye kadar uzanan bozkırı ele geçirdi.
339	Ch'in generali Yü Liang Hu-pe'i'de Hunlar tarafından mağlub edildi.	Mu-junğ Huang Kore'ye başarılı bir sefer düzenledi.	
340		Shih Hu'nun Mu-junğ Huang'a karşı başarısız seferi.	Shē-i kien Çinli devlet memur kadrolarını dağıttı.

Year	China	Temzs Zone	İç Asya
341	Ch1n Yen 'Mu-jung) officially recognised his rule.		
142	Ch'eng-ti is dead.	The Mu-jungs defeated Korc.	
4'	Sih-ma Yü (K'ang-lc title) ascended the throne.	Protect the Mu-jungs sent a tax.	
	K'ang-te is dead.	Mu-jung Huartg Huartg Yü-	
345	The establishment of the early Liang That one. Sih-ma T'uo Mu-ti ascended to power.		
346		The battle of the Great Chuo against the Li- ang army.	
?47	TtpwnsiFuHung He gathered around him the immigrants who had migrated to Shen-si.		
?48		Mu-jung Huan died; Mu-jung Ch'ung took the throne.	
349	Liang-Mu-jung alliance. Fu Hung rebellion.	Liang T'uo's rebellion was crushed. Shih Hu was killed. Throne fights among the princes.	
350	The reign of the Chin Establishment. Yao Hsien's subjugation of Fu Hung. The conquest of Fu Hung by General Ma Ch'ü. Ch'ang-an was conquered by Fu Chien I.	Jan Min's coup. The expulsion of the Ivuns from Muahhar Chao. The subjugation of the Tu- understand by Mu- june Ch'ung.	

Year	Çin	Contact Zone (Nuns and Siyenpis)	İç Asya
351	Fu Chen I Chin Imp. he went up to his sarcophagus.	With the support of Mu'junğCh'ung, the Huns revolted against Jan Min. The Huns were defeated.	
152		3an Mln defeated and massacred. The establishment of the Siycnpi Yen Empire	
353			Hl- the onites worked with Irun.
354	Chin üxennc walking The Ch'in were repulsed.		
355	Chang Yao- lin was overthrown in Ltang . The throne was soon succeeded by Chsng Ch'uo, who was soon to be assassinated by Chang Huai-ch'in.		
35b	Fu Chen I is dead. Fu Sheng began to massacre state officials. Yau Hsi 'n's inhiza- tion by the Tanltut- s	The Mu-jungs have taken Lo-yang is removed from the hand.	War on the eastern borders Shapur II, who continued the war in strength, finished the war without any casualties.
357	Fu Sheng. Fu Chlen II by police.		
35b			Franco-Hlonitish peace.
			the shckt of the lu-jan proportion-

Year	China	Temas Balgeai (fäunlar se Siyenpis)	İç Asya
360	Wu-huantar and Siyeripifer surrendered to Fu Chên II, who settled them along the Great Wall.	Mu-jung Ch'ung is dead. Mu-jung Wei took the throne.	
361	Mu-ti is dead.		She-i kien Han's Liu It's allied with the Pei-"h'eng.
362	Sih-ma Pel ascended to the throne. (Posthumous titule-Ai-li)	An unsuccessful Mu-)ung attack on Lo- yang.	
563	In Liang, the ruler Ch'ang Huan-ch'in was deposed. Ch'ang Tien-hsi came to the throne.		
365	At-ti is dead.	The Mu-jungs have taken Lo-yang They've been occupied.	Liu Per-ch'eng's Tab-break away from the gach khanate- şu.
366	Sih-ma I was put on the throne. (Posthumous titular Ti I)	Mu-jungs Huai and They captured the Shan-tung valley.	
367	Fu of the princes of Tankut The rebellion against Chien II was suppressed and the princes were massacred.	Mu- jung K'o was the regent.	Liu Pei-ch'eng's Tab-gaçlarca inhizami.
369	The Ch'in attacked the Mu-jungs but were defeated.	Mu-jun; Ch'ui's Chinskağch. Fu Chi-en II's war against the Mu-jungs; conquest of Lo- yang.	
170		The conquest of Ch'in-yang Mn-jungl '!. maglu-biyeli. Yen Emperor-the end of the tug.	
37.1	Military in Eastern Ch'in darbc.		A successful assassination attempt against Shè-i kien Khan

Yıl	China	Contact Zone (Huns re Siyenpis)	İç Asya
372	I'll get you out of the hospital. Chien Wen-ti) and died.		With the help of the Hittler Arshakid who defeated Perster his governor's rebellion in Balkh.
373	Sich-ma Yan's throne Output (Title Hsiao Wu-li)		
375	Fu Chien II's publication of a decree against the Daoists.		
376	Chien II Liang'ı edip bozkırdaki fa- etlerini tamamladı bilesi Ch'in'e bağ- lı.		Shh-i kien Han komp- was killed by looters.
377	The Hun princes Fu Chi- they recognised II's sovereignty.	Easterners Liu Ku- ch'eng, while the Western Tabgachs obeyed Liu Pei-ch'eng.	The Tabgachs are going to Fu Chien they are connected.
378	Sang-yang jiwannda The Chin armies attacked the Ch'in.		Arshakid rebellion suppressed by the Eftalils
379	Sang-yang's fall and the Chin army reaches the Huai River.		
380	Military academy in Chin- milcrin organisation.		
381	Wildlife living in C.in. c' tribes came under the of Chin.		62 Ona Asian pronship Chin'e slçiler gındır- they went.
382	Fu Chien'in Ch'inlere preparations for war against		

Year	China	Contact Zone (Nuns and Giyenpis)	İç Asya
§§ 784	Fci-shui openings square muharcbesi	The rebellion of the Sienpids against the Tarikut- lar in the vicinity of the Wei River and the Western Chin rulers. {hmm kununu.	The Tölescr migrated again to the north of the steppe. Expedition to the Ban end of Tanku- lar. The capture of Kucha.
385	The death of Fu Chic-n II.		Edc-ssa (UrFa)'s ku- Efta- liths help Persler
386	The founding of the Muahhar Lang. The founding of Mokhar Chin. The Ch'in captured Lo- yang.	Mu-jung Wool West Li- He defeated F-u Pei, who captured the empty ka- lan Lri-yung.	T'o-pa Kui Wei-wang he ascended to the throne.
3ft7	Tankuts are Tibetans They walked ^_.	The defeat of Liu Hsincn by Mu-jung- <i>Inr</i> and the Tabgucs.	
388		Mu-jung of the Tabgachs Ch'ui'dan kopuju,	
389	Yao Ch'ang of Tibet defeated Tankut Fu T'eng.		
391		The assassination of Liu Pei-ch'eng by To- pa Ch'i. 30,000 Huns fled to South China.	T'o-pa marched against the Kui lu-jans. The subjugation of the Telcu- s the Tabgachs.
392		Mu-jung Ch'ui later eliminated the Ting-ling Ti Shao army in Western Ycn.	Pursued by T'o-pa Kur, the Kians fled north.
391	Yao Ch'ang is dead. Mu- Yao Hsin took the throne of Ahhur Chin.	10 thousand a day in China Hung is stronger.	Civil war in the lu-jan Khanate.

Year	Çin	Contact Certificate (Huns and Siempis)	İç Asya
393	Yao Hsng TankNNri as ahi magup eh. The end of the great ChinIn.	Another 15,000 Huns marched into southern China. Mu-junġ Ch'ui Batt invaded Liang.	the T'o-pa His rebellion against Wei'c.
395		T'o-pu Wei-Mu-junġ- Flesh suvash. Tobguc- the triumph of the lars.	the Gobiden of the lu- jans the northward march. SIJc- lun Khan's alliance with Yao Hsing.
396	Hsiao Wu-u has been removed. The throne is occupied by carrying Sih-ma Yi-to. It was used as a cavalry by the Ch'in Wu-t'u.	The Mu-jungs' inhiza- mi. T'o-pa Kui took Chinese bureaucrats into his service.	dl Huang himself Mu- ahhar Liang emperor declared.
397	An-ti's accession and Wang Kung's rebellion.	Tabgach attacks Mu- was stopped by the Junungs. Throne disputes in the Mu- jungs. T'o-pa the city of Kui Yeh.	The Huns of Ho-hsia separated from the Great Liang and established their own Northern Liang. The Tu-fa SiCnpis founded the Southern Liang.
398	Hsün Tat and Hstin Ong's Dao rebellion.	T'o-pa Kur Northern Wei as emperor of the Southern Yen. Mu- junġ T'o founded Southern Yen. Mu- junġ Shen Muahh r power in Yen.	
399	Yaa Hrtng captured Lo-yang and the Huang-ho basin.	T'o-pa Kui lu-janlar and defeated Tcleü t- ler'i itaat altuna aldi.	WuKu (GunsyLiang) captured the upper course of the Huang-ho and the neighbourhood of Hsi-nin{.
400			The founding of the Western Liang.
401			The removal of the Greater Lang and the conquest of the pop- racts by the Huns.

Year	China	Contact Zone (fganiar and Siyeûpis)	İç Asya
402	Despite the defeat of Hsün Ong, the rebellion continued. Huan Hsüan's rebellion against Sih-ma Tao-ch'i.	T'o-pa Kui Yao defeated Hsing.	
403	Huan Hsüan Ch'in lah- and usurped his honour.		She-lun Tibgachlaf a attacked and took the Teleut prisoners to Jungarya without any casualties.
404	Liu Yü, Huan Hsüan After defeating and completely eliminating his tribe, he actually seized power-	T'o-pa Wei'de arsehole levariis system was established.	
405	Yaa Hsing Gughey China's onihi provinces were divorced and their people were forced to convert to Buddhism. vet etti.	Mu- in South Ycn Jung To is dead. Mu-jung Chao took the throne.	
407	Feng Pa Muahhar seized the throne in Yen.	Ho-Iten P'n-p'o founded the Hun Hsia state.	The Huns defeated Giiriny Liang. lu-jan-.
408		Ho-fren P'o-p'o Yao Hsing defeated the Nrd-lubed it.	Ciün0y LlangYao Hsing sprayed.
409		Chinese F'eng Pa north He reestablished Ycn. T'0-pa Kui was killed. To-pa Sscu succeeded To-pa Wei.	
410	Liu Yü has sent to Clie-k'ang defeated the attacking iyanean-	Liu Yü was the first eliminated. The end of the Mu- jutigs. To-pa Sseu brought Chirilcn to the vacant lands and settled them.	the lu-jans have the T'o-palar was repelled. She-lun died. Hü-lü came to the throne.

Year	China	Tennessee Region {Hunter and Syenpis}	İç Asya
41 I	The peasant (Daoist) rebellion was suppressed.	Ho-lien P'o-p'o Shcn-entered Si'si, drove Yan Hsing's army into the sword and drove the army- part of the .	lu-jans Sayan and Barthey captured Ga.
412	Liu Yü Liu Yi (I) isyanam bast'rdt.		
413		The Chinese in T'o-pa-Wei-were subject to taxation.	
4t4			Hü-lü-Feng pa ittifakı. Güney Liang Batı Chin By Siycnpilcri <i>cla</i> was passed.
415	YaoHsingodü7Au YaoHung (Hong) gy-ti.	T'o-pa of lu-jan Wei'c offence.	Oa-tan lu-jan tahuni seized it.
416	Wu-c'u sovereignty MmöbuCMF'ssadr di.		
417	Liu Yu will capture Ch'ang-an. Muahhar He's got Chin in the middle.	Administration of bureaucracy in T'o-pa Wei. Six Oy-mak Disruptive sub-administration unit.	
418	Emperor An-ti was strangled to death. His brother Hung-ti (Hong-ti), but behind the scenes Liu Yu remained in power.	Ho-lien P'o-p'o captured Ch'ang-an and destroyed the South Chinese army.	lu-jan-Yueban war. The end of the Kltan rule.
419 420	Liu Yu'reign is actually to take over Ch'in ha-you've got to put an end to your conscience Founded the Sung dynasty- du.		Meng Sun took over the Western Liang and Kao-ch'ang. i@i.

Yit	Çin	Contact Zone' (Xuns and Syenpis)	Inner Asia
421	Hung-ti was choked to death,	The Tab- gachs in T'o-pa-Wei were subjected to the vérgime.	
422	Liu Yü is dead. Sung Wu-t'u'yu was tant- di resmen.		
423	Togon T'o-pa-Wci'e against the Sung. The Manes in Sih-ch'uan came under the rule of T'o-pa-Wci.	Ho-nan of the Tabgachs and his entry into Shan-i-ung. T'o-pa Sscu died. Teti- ta To-pa Tao passed away.	Bati Chiri T'o-pn-Wci's dominance.
424	Shao-li was deposed and . Liu I-lung.tWcn-'i) ascended the throne.	T "o-pa Wci'e TurFan (Ch'c Shih) from clçi gclcti.	The Ju-jans the T'o-pa-Wci Tiaykentini.
42 ₆	The Tang-ch'angs made an alliance with the T'o-pa Wct-s.	Ho-lien P'o-p'o died. Ho-lien Ch'ang on the throne. joc(ti:	In-jans Tabgachs ta-were driven to the jungle by the police.
426	Ch'ang-an Tabgachs by the cle- gççinl- di.	Tabgucs to Huns saidirarl is a very ugly name.	Kuzcy Liang:vc The Tang-charigs made an alliance with the T'n-pu Wei. fer.
427		Humar Ch'ang-an'dn They invaded the Tabgachs. The Tabgachs' defence of Hn-lien Ch'ztng's legacy led to the lifting of the Hunnic army. yol açtı.	Kidaritlor's Perslcrcc inhibition. Efialites too defeated by the Liinti.
é28		Ho-lien Ch'ang was taken prisoner. Ho-lien Ting, who had singled out Ch'ang-an, was forced to leave him.	

Year	China	Contact Centre {Huns and Siyenpis I	İç Asya
429'			Yüeban. The to-pa-Wei'ls ttti- fak contract against the Ju-janlar.
4Jfi	Sung entered Ho-rlan from the army of the Tabgachs. tti- defeated from the shelf-diler.	Ho-lyn Ting, North China's lksimi promises. rak Sung'la müttefik was the one who drove the Huns out of Ho-hsi. Y'c-pa Taa was Batt , who drove the Huns out of Ho-hsi. He allied himself with Chin. Dynastic coup in northern Yen. Bloody infighting after the death of Feng Pa.	Western Chin Syenpls Entering Shen-si, on Icr'ntoprakları also Tn-invasion from Yun. The Tabgachs' campaign against the Ju-jans and the escape of the Ju-jans. Da-tan khan died.
41t		Ho-train Ting 15 thousand Bari Chin, a Bari Chin man, swept the Si- yûnpi army. But was defeated and captured by To-gonians.	
432		Ho-lien Ting To-pa Tao was attacked and murdered.	lu-jan-T'o-pa-Wei peace.
433	Wu-t' and made an alliance with the T'o-pa-Wei. ji.		
434	The Chinese called the Wu-t'u They put it from Hang-chung.		
43'î			Treaty of friendship and military co-operation between the rulers of Wu-jan and T'o-pa-Wei. Meng Sun died. Mu-kien succeeded him.

Year	China	Temas Bölgesi (Hunlar ve Siyenpiler)	İç Asya
436		The Tabgachids captured Northern Ycn.	The Principality of Shan-shan concluded an alliance with T'o-pa-Wei.
437		Tabgach elyri in Inner Asia.	Kao-ch'ang broke away from Ho-hsi. pa-Wei's offence.
438		7 "o-pa Tao age fifty-Buddhist monks who are below the scr6estiyet	
439	Wu-t'u reign Obedience to T'o-pa-Wei ar-zetti.	T'o-pa Taa conquered Ho-hsi.	lu-janlxr Tabgaç released- nılarını püskürttüler.
440		T'o-pa Taa Daosism declared it the official state religion. The lujans organising attacks were destroyed.	Don't be in Tun-huang-the Huns sank Shan-shan.
441	Because of Sich-ch'uan War between Wu-i-'u and Sung.		Wu-ho-i's Ho-hsi'y Entry.
442 443	You subdue Sung Wu-t'u-he did. T'o-pa saved Wei Wu- t'u from imprisonment.	Executions in T'o-pa-Wci.	Wu-ho-e Kaomh'angh Then he captured Shan-shan and sacked Ch'c-sih.
444		T'o-pa Tao started religious persecution of Buddhists. War with Togon.	Tabgachs' campaign against the lu-jans. Wu-ho-i died, An-chou took the throne.
445			Ju-janhan Wu-u was killed. The Togons fled to the west, <i>captured Houden and</i> returned to their homeland.

Yİ	China	Temes.Biilgesi (Huns and Siyenpis)	İç Asya
446.		Budisl sanemlennin Lmlip fragmentation.	
447	Wu-fu's rebellion against J/o-pa- Wei was crushed.		Ho-hsi. the final conquest.
448			Yüebanlar T'o-pa- They sent a messenger to Wei.
449	Sung oidulan" wei hüeu-	The Tabgachs had Sung Im- paratorial territory - n big i	Tabgachs'tit J,u-jans on march.
451	The Sung held out at the Hu-i fortress and forced the Tabgachs to retreat.	Although the Tabgachs went as far as Yang-tse, they retreated.	The Persians have overrun the Ktdanilc.
452	Hao-nai kalesini ele geçiren Sunglar orada- that they destroyed the gamizon and came back.	T'o-pa Tao Chung Ai killed by T'o-pa Yü. O öa was killed by T'o-pa Yü, but captured and executed. T'o-pa Hsün came to power. The persecution of Buddhism became femiaru bikar k ltn,	Mu-tien in Togo9 Shih-lung, T'o-pa-Wüi's favourite, succeeded to the throne.
453	Wan-ü was killed. Wooden Liu Ch'ung (Hsiao Wu-ti) geçti.		
454			The Kidarites the Peisler.
455			Against Iran and Hindisian- Kidaril-Eflalil itifa- kıl.

Y+1	Chiri	Contact Area (Huns and Sienpis)	İç Asya
4'16			The Tabgachs invaded Khami. Eftaliiler They fled from India.
4'17			Eftalians dcs- They intervened in Iran in order to prevent the war.
45'	Buddhist monks limited .	Drinking alcohol is prohibited -dt.	Tabgachs' attack on lu-jans was inconclusive.
459			The Eftalites marched on the Abars of Yedisuda. yüşü.
460			Kao-ch'ang was destroyed by the Lu-jans. The end of the Huns.
461			The Abars pushed the Sabirs, and the Sabirs pushed the Saragurs, Ugors and Onogurs who were allied with Byzantium.
462			The Saragurs came under the rule of the Akassirs.
464			lu-jan hani T'u-ho-ch'en died. Yü-ch'eng took the throne.
465	Hsiao Wu-ti is dead. Your pretender to the throne, Liu Tse-ych was killed. This time Liu Yü (Min-ti) was put on the throne.	T'o-pa Hsün is dead. The decree on the ban on the purchase of arms man cancelled. T'o- pa Hung {Hong) I tnh- ta passed.	The Persians organised attacks against the Qudarites.

Year	China	Temas Bölgesi	Asia
466	During the reign of Wu-t'u, a successful against the Tab'gaçlar.	Having conquered the northern coast of the Hua River, the Tabgachs erected a giant statue of Bu-da.	The resistance of the Western Huns against Bol-gar , Byzantium and Gupid-lsr.
4fi6			The Huns' eventual inauguration. Persler Kida-ritler to India.
4b9	Che h nde dark	Tabgachlar Shin-turig = -' '=	
470		Tabgachs lu-jun and He defeated Togon-ler.	The Lujans are looting Hotcn. maladı.
471		the abdication of his son T'o-pa Hung II.	
472	Min-it died. Liu Yü (Ts'afü Wu-wang viyi Hōu Fei-li) has passed.		When the Eftalites found themselves destined for the Khazar Dcni-ri., they drove the Hionites out of Sogdiana and conquered Kurzy-bai Hindis-tan.
473 474	Wu-t'g T'ö-pa-Wci'c lcslim has died. Sung-fu-jan compliment.	Togon saJdtnlan. The attack of the lujans on Shan-xhan was repelled.	Ju-jan hani Yü-ch'eng paid tribute to T'o-pa-Wci.
475		Horse and cattle sacrifice was forbidden.	
476		T'o-px Hung I poison-and he died.	

Y+t	China	Contact Zone Hunfar and Si	IS Asia
477	Hou Fcl-ti was killed. BoardLiuCFung (Shuan-ti) has passed.	T'n-pa-Wei in Wu-t'u :ücyh+sniöyanbasrmt- di.	
479	The Sung dynasty and the foundation of the Ch'i tHsiao Taa-chen- Kao-ti dynasty.		KMan Khan T'o-pa- Wei's submission. this has happened.
480	Wu-t'u reign Ch'i domination. di.	The northern armies of Hu- his attack on the ai river valley was repulsed.	The Talabs are the T'o- pa-Wei'in They accepted the sovereignty and were settled.
481			Togon hani She-ying died. Tung-ho- wu. succeeded to the throne, but he died leaving his son Fu- lien-choi in his place.
482	Emperor Kao-ti is dead.	T'o-pa Hung (Hong) 11 for the first time to perform the ceremony ofancestors	
483	Hsiao Ch'ü (Wu-ti) ascended the throne.		Although the Tcleuts captured Kao-ch'ang, they were driven back by the locals.
484		Tax reform	Ephalillefi against Iran galcbesi. Piruz', dead- mü.
4il5	Ch'e-eh en and Ch'ien- peasant riots in Hsü.	XJasik was removed feiman on the issue of magic yxsddanm4sı because it falls against the books	Yii-ch'gng, Khan of Lu- jan died. To-wu-lun (Tou- lun) came to the throne.
486		Çin modasının saraya getirilişi.	Togonese Amdo Mountain- and the Tibelliers were attacked dırdılar.
487		Kuraklık, açlık ve sal- gın hastalıklar.	Teleuts subjugated Ju- jan, TeleüUer'ir migrated to the Black Urtish valley

Vol	Çizt	3'emss Zone (These and Eiyenpilér)	İç Asya
488			Teleuter Yüeban'i or- they have been removed from the tasting room.
4P0		Death of the empress regent. T'o-pa Hung (Hong) II seizes power.	Tcleütler to Ju-janiar LBzyi's attempts to establish an alliance with the Wei" proved fruitless.
491		Religious reforms. Dafi- iism was banned. You've landed in Ju- jan territory. The strengthening of Togon.	Tcleüts were divided into two groups, south and north.
492			lu-jan hani To-wu-lun was killed. Na- k'ai succeeded to the throne but died, leaving olu Fu- tu in his place.
493	Wu-tt died. Hsi- ao Chao-ya came to the throne. When he was killed, Hsiao Calao- wen succeeded. When he was killed, Hsiao Lung took the throne. (Min-ti) has passed.	Ch'i İmparatorluğu'na karşı savaş.	
494		The transfer of the capital to Lo-yang. Unsuccessful attempt to invade the Huai River valley and the	Eftalitic intervention in Iran their
495		The political language, clothing and hairstyle of the bmte. saklanması.	The Eftalites the Gunpy Tele- utes.
496		The strengthening of the Tatabi revolts. Change of the name of Khanđan to Yüan- W#i. The abolition of the veli- ahđin, which was against the reform.	Eftalitler Kuzsy Tgleüt to subjugate their- lar.

Year	China	Contact Area (Hunlir and Siyenpis J	İç Asys
497	Wei army Wu-t'u and defeated the Tankuts by marching on them.	The war against the Ch'i. I'm going to the valley of the Han River.	Eftalids captured Karashar to the Jujans. Kao-ch'ang surrendered to the Jujans.
498	Mín-ti fildü Tahta Hsiao Pao-huan geçti.	The victory of the Yüan ch- rinin in Hn-nan. The rebellion of the Yin-shan Tcletüi was suppressed.	
499	Hsiao Pao-huan'irl savages.	T'o-pa Hung II tildü. Throne T'o-pa (Yüan) HİJO gCÇİİ-	Boİgar-Bızans war nnin başlamau.
500	In the Ch't Empire Jeviet darbesi Palace siege.	The Ch'i empire The governor of the northern regions was transferred to the Wei]myaralnr Kingdom.	Kao-ch'ang lu-janlar to the end of the war.
501	Hú Ch'ah. Ch'ah neda- nının sonu.		
502	Establishment of the Liang dynasty. Hsiao Yang (Wu-ti).	The Wei army invaded the valley of the Huai River.	
g	Buddhism was declared the official religion.		
505		Hang-chung's fchl. Wu-t'u's conquest.	Ju-jan hant Fu-cu asked Yuan Wei for a bath.
506			
508			The Telsuff's the Ju-janlar. Fu-tu Hnn is dead.
009			Che-wu-nu came to the throne.


Year	China	Contact Bolgest	İç Asya
510			The Eftalians are from HIndian sa- and they've lost the tŞlanr l.
511			Ju-jan hani Che-wu-nu He accepted Buddhism.
515		Yüan tT'o-pa) Kuo country. Empress Hu Shih's regency.	
516	Liang army The Wci'lcr attack on the Ch'e-tung fortress was beaten off.	The Wei'lnr launched a successful attack to the south.	The lu-jans have harassed Tcclüfci.
517	Lîang Wu-ti Buddhism a decree in his favour was issued.		Eftalitlr to Liang the messenger has arrived.
518		Naibeh Hu Shih Budız- declared it the religion of the state.	Yüan Wei İmparatnrJu- his Kao-ch'ang prensli-rcsmen recognised.
520		What's going on? He was arrested by T'o-pa i.	In the Jujans, the giant dar- <i>besi</i> . Che-wu-nu was killed. Throne fights between Hantn's brothers.
521			The lu-jan- slaughtered by the Tcleuts took refuge with the Yüan-Wei.
523		Han Pa-ling rebellion in Northern Shan-si.	The Lu-jans fled to China. liif.
524		fu-jans Pa-ling .	lu-jans Tcleütler .

Yü	.China	Temss Region	İç Asya
525		Hu Shih regained power and T'o-pa He had I slaughtered. Daghi Khus became independent. Their commander took the title of khan.	
526	The Liangs recaptured Shuo-wu-yang from the Wei they did.		
527		Ho Juti Ho-peï'dc is-ymnctti.Erh-chuJuf I'm the one who defeated Ho Jun.	
528		Poisoning his son, Hu Shih took out his three-year-old son. Erh-chu Jun Lo-yang' ala-rnk threw Hu Shih into the river with his son. The lords of the Yüan Wei Empire were massacred. T'o-pa Tse-yü	
â29		Prince Yüan Hao the rebellion was printed.	
530		Erh-chu Jun is dead. His brother Erh-chu Shih-lung Lo-yang'i alıp ka-and T'o-pa Hua on the throne,	Two Botgar Khan's Bi-the invasion of Zanzibar.
531		Erli-en Shih-lung changed his rule. Kao Huan defeated Erh-chu Tão and put T'o-pa Lan on the throne.	

Year	China	'Temas Certificate (Tguns and Sij/enpis)	Inner Asia
532		Kan Huan seized Lo-yang and put T'o-pa Hsü on the throne.	
533		Having slaughtered all three Shabik rulers, Kao Huan ravaged the Eih-chu tribe.	Byzantine Bospofu again seized it.
534		T'o-pa Hsü Ch'ang-He fled to Yü-wen'T'ai in Yü-wen'T'ai, Kao Huan put T'o-pa Shan-chien on the throne. The empire was divided into Western and Eastern Wei. Yü-tren T'ai deposed To-pa Hsü and put T'o-pa Pao-chü-yeh on the throne.	lu-jan-Teleüt war.
536-537-538	Starvation killed 80 per cent of the population of North China.	Doju and Ban Wei s.a. the war.	Jü-jan-Teleüt respect.
541			Tclcutlcr's lu-jantar by the government of the United States:
542-545	Kao Huan Yü-wen T'ai'i back atu.	Ju-jan and Togon Kao I made an agreement with Huan.	Tclcutlcr's rebellion. Tclcutlcr's TurkIq€c itaa-ti.
546		The Turkish envoy is in Western Wei.	Eftalite ambassador Bsti Wei'de.
549	Hou Ch'in Liang was captured and Chien-k'ang burnt:		

Yiĭ	China	Tenia3 Biilgesi	İç Asya
550	PaiCFFmkuolçu. The massacre of members of the T'ö-pa family.		
551			Bumin Khanla 8atj Wci the relationship and inter-relationship between the two.
Jq ₂	Hou Chien's transformation: Liang in yeniden do-		
553	Pci-ch'i Kitanlar mağlup etti.	The Western Wei'c received an envoy from the Eftalites.	The Turks' against the Jujans was led by Bumin Har. The defeat of the In-jan Khanate.
ı54	Muahhar Liang hü- the founding of the Kulturidig and the establishment of the Western Wei.	The Western Wci armies Muahhar travelled to South China to support Liang.	Turk1cr's banda to Aral as high as can go.

Htm Yabgulanının Genealogyli Table




İej-nd

.....Wu-churn-ch'ü Yin-rhi

X -----The ones that will be cancelled

Güney Hun Yabguları Genealojik Tablosu


Wu-chu-liu



Lejand

Tart cc through varn-s
ik ti öara arrivals

Genealogical Table of Wu-sun
K'un-molzin



Lejand

- The crown prince
- ▽ Chinese
- ▼ prince Hun r-ensi

ABBREVIATIONS-СПИСОК СОКРАЩЕНИЙ

ВДИ	-Вестник древней истории.
ИВГО	-Известия Всесоюзного географического общества
ИРГО	-Известия Русского географического общества.
КСИИМК	-Краткие сообщения Института истории материальной культуры
МЭ	-Музей антропологии и этнографии
МИА	-Материалы исследований по археологии

SOURCEQA

Ааднеа В.Н *Исцрпіїз гревтер.о Востосв.* lvi , 1953

fisisiHan iviapuez*iin tcropiis. Kiiea, 1908

фграоопа М.Н *Исторія хаа р. jJ"* 19G0.

Артамопос М.Я. *к вопрос "у о проусѣ:ожления охнфов*W ВДН: i:950.

Артаоотіоа М.VI. *Оч'епктг гревн!еЯтсR іісроріііі. Л., 1936.*

Аруаіпouoа М.Рі .слоріііііе вопросы ,уревнеAіnefi іісзopіііu cзааēri іі Русіі f /
Краткііе сооДіеннт НиституТ,а истории оазерпапahoё хуна+уроі
tKCHHMK i, is'o Born vi

фєрг Л.С. беседа со !ег ргенгаон Мосеооаского уннверсп re gvl I
Вопрось географііи, i 95.

Бєрг J.C. *СІугетЫз!np Н М. Пржевльссого. W-Tt, 1952*

фєрнііта А.Н. тівергіі йсгорігі гуфіфов. II., 1951 tOn ydziikoaanіJMR
тепст,l

бп чурпн Н.Р. 'Иахпхфї бтат/фти-ієсхое опхсанне JфнуаRскоh
'имперннн.... t.u. CFib., 3853.

Впчурип Н.Р. (Нахикфj. *Собрание свелений о, обзавзкпх з Срепнех Азіан в -
рреепне времєв. Т. f-II-III. М.-/I., 1950*

Би і ури п Н.Я. 'ИахихфI Собранне св'єрєпия по ис?.оричессоR географннн'ВосзочноR
п Срвлнннпоh Азіті+. Чебоксвры, J 9Б0.

**Бичурин Н.Я. (Иакинф). Тун-цзянь Гань-му за 36 г./ / Рукопись.
Архив Института востоковедения АН СССР. Ф. 7. Ед. хран. 1-15.**

'бхиурих Н.Р.. fI4ахпнф'. Jan+гсхп о /ьfozгголяк.'Т. lil. .Cfl6., t828. бич.урпх

Н.Р: fIплахпнф'.Hc.гopсгя Tнбега'X "ухунора. СПб, 'B33.. Т. l-

**воросха Ф.Н. Археологическое обслєрoвание срєврнєго г,єчєния рекH
Толь/// Сєаєрпая МоHголия', Т II. ./IM.,1958.**

- Baciiaaea II H Sana Чао s Jaiia,gnoo храе/ f Вестііух дреанеп
псторпи. .3955. м і
- !Васпльев /I.FI, *Сяеленя о .маньчжурах во арёмена ряпасгяR Юань н МиH /
fФолчнbiR' ахт С. -Fетёрбургсхого ухпсєрситета за 1858.года.*
- Взспп'льев B.FI. *К.ульзурные и торговые сувзп Ханьского. КНгая ' Нарорамя
ЦєпральгfoR у .Cpe,aneh AJнл//Вестних хсторит'. мхроаоо9 хультурвз.
195B. V Гт,*
- Взсильев B.Ft. *Об,озноа ёнНях кягаһссоро языка к среанёазпагсксгн
фжурпал'-4ftгиистердтва пвро,гиого просаешехия.. '872. Сен.-*
- Ве0ер г. *Всеоба/ая zrcrop+re. T IV M., 1893.*
Весгннс,4реанев. \ 962.
- Вистор "оаа Л.Л. К вопросу о **расселения** ifioпгольссях ттлемен на
*Дальнем Восроfle а /У. до гг.з-X/i. rf.3. /' V iexue Записки ЛГУ. t958. N-
Z56.*
- BniueecxnR B.:H,m *appgroпo:погни превнего населения Восроctиorc
турхесгана//Кааапехифi siyaeAiion аестпна isz i " 1 -z.*
- Воеодсхик in.в...грязная m.n. Усyxz-ские мoгнллённих,.
- Воробьев M:В. *Древняяя Корея, M., 3961. Геродот.*
- 'Потопсгя а аевятH. M., 1886.
- То Г'-lo-ara, *Эпоха рабовлларельчfского.суроу,. M., \ 956.*
- EoxktaH I4.i't. *Ангропо "логическае магврпалы.плHгочных мотл За-
da/2халья///Сбортих МАЗ. T. XVIII, M -//I., :1958.*
- 'Тригорз-еа B.B. *8осгочлыh к.ня KитаRccнR Туркесган. CFI6., t873.*
- Грязнов 'M.FI. *klvzapia.оревник племен верхzrefil Оби/7MIA.. T. 48. 1936.*
- дря знов M.fl. flamorrinxii 'сарас ухссоро арапа в Ven трвьвом far- а
crenei i Coaетсхае археозогип. 195Z. T, XVI,*
- Грумм-Гржимайло Г.Е. Материалы по этнологии Амдо и области
Куку-нора // СПб., 1903.**
- .Ггумм-Фржимартя Т.Е. *Онп "санfiiё п}/теи/ёсгвня ё"налпыR KвpaR.
M., t948.*
- Грумм-гранмаРяо Т".б. *Pa.ст пусгынь н гнбель пастбпил "ных угоя- HНh
к хулбтурiгсах сёмень В Цєпгра "ьноR Арни. ва псropsfческп/t
период // HЗаеётптя Ёсосоюзного г "еогрвфнчёссого обиттёстеа.
1933. T. 65, вып. .у*

**Грум-Гржимайло Г.Е. Западная Монголия и Урянхайский край
Л., 1926. Т. I-II**

Гувь-чжуи /Ю. Н'с.г.оряя с "гран зарубежной Азии в в реальные асуа М., 1970.

Гуапа-чжун /Ю! ТроеиарсТв+ге. Т I-II. М., 1954-55 Тумплёв J1

Н. Дянлийная проблема и НВГО. 1.959. h- I Fumstlëa /t. Н.

Древние Тюрк. М., '967

ТумНяёв / "Н ЗфгалH rhi Н. Нх со "сеАн а IV'a. {ВДкл. 1959. N- t'

ГумНj ёВ Л. Н. 5@Yd*т76т-ГО,ДУbf ллff C7eПffЯКЯКЯ ?- /- / ВДИ, 1967, [тi 3.

Гумилёв /Л.Н. Гетеро.хронпооь уалажпения Еаразян а срепне Века
f/ Becmtivtu Jll "Y 1966. U 18

Гумплёв £.F1. FfinropuR Ефнмовн ч Гууумм-Гржнмаяло сак i4cropHh
Lenr.ральпод Азяп //ВГО. 1959. N- I.

Гумхлёв J1.Н."хя р,я гма сачевоа культуры Саннная А эну (Oпblz псзорпко-
геог,рафпчессог.о смпгеза "J // Народы Азппп п Афрпхп. 1966" Т 4.

Тумилёр J1.Н. Iзмеппня клима за н мнграиннн ковеал/гкоа ii
Грирода. 1972, IP4.

гумнлёв 31.Н. Кочевоя быг. от р асивеза к псчез/фоаелиJo /,.Аауя п Афрпха
сегодгя. 1968, k' 2.

Гумхлёв А.Н. /terenpa н ,seRcran геяьносуь в" .ppввплёя всг opttn Тибвгё //.
Вестп"к.историии мпросоя хуаьтуры. i 960, N- 3.

Тумпяёа.J1.Н. Некоторые вопросы псгорНя.уНноа //Вестпх дрё-
гndit псторип. 1960, N 4.

Гумилёв J1.Н. О уёрмпне -эгнос- // ,гохлады BFO. Bun. 3. II., 18G7

Гумллёв /Л.Н. Onс/т хлассхфмfxazfmsr .обu/eczsezina-mmoziii2Hвесхнх
crtc геы лревннх сочевннсов Евразин i i Studien zu
Geschichte und philosophie der Alterums. Budepest 19h8.

Тут-иНлёв /f.Н.. По псiao,qu -ерупоh- геог.рафНя tсаидшафт и амнос' Y1.
Вестнхх УГУ. i.937. n-6.

Гумпяёв /Л.Н. Понскн вымыгменного иарсгва. lii., 1970.

Гумилёв J1.Н. Роль сляма гнчесхх колебаний в НсгорНп народов
сгепноа зогфы Ев ргзппн 3/ Нсто.рпя СССР. 1967. Т I

Гуфi4п лёа II.Н. С.Н. Рурепсо п современная .szH.ография армрноРзолы.
ба@азхт2ского. колз:сiненегтгта /7.рафля кароJюв СССР' Л., 1971

Гумилев Л. Н. *Терракозовые фигуры 'обезьян' Хога на // kpa'te сообщения*
Государственного Зермита: а. а. II., 1959. Т.

Гумилев Л. Н. *Этно-ландшафтные регионы Евразии за исторический*
период // Доклады на ежегодных чтениях памяти Л. С. Берга
VIII-XIV, 1960-1966. Л., 1968.

Гумилев Л. Н. *Этногенез и биосфера Земли*. Л., 1989.

Гумилев Л. Н. *Земля и человек в истории культуры*. М., 1970. кн. 2

Гумилев Л. Н. *Земля и человек в истории культуры*. М., 1970.

Гумилев Л. Н. *Три неслучайных фараона*. В. Кн. Страны к востоку. II. М.,
1961.

Гумилев Л. Н. *Величие Нил, селитры и его. Тибет и а.* // Страны и паролы
Востока, VIII. М., 1969

Гумилев Л. Н. *Азия*. М., 1960.

Гумилев Л. Н., Кузнецов Б. И. *Восток*. Доклады отделения по истории
ВТО. Л., 1970. Т. 15.

Гумилев Л. Н., Szij, qe Ju Ff. *Египетская культура кочевников*
Евразийского средневека // Народы Азии и Африки. 1969, 33.
Давыдов А. В. *Кавказское горное хозяйство в древности*
поселения в Закавказье // Советская Археология. 1956: N'

Дебеи, У. Ф. *Палеонтологическая СССР*. М.-Л., 1948.

Дебеи Г. Г. *Восточное сопоставление между римлянами и кельтами*

Дестутиус Т. С. *Сина апостолы Присциллы и Никколо* Сиб, 1861.

Джордано Г. *География СССР*, М., 1976.

Думан Л. Н. *К истории государства Тоби 83 и Ляо чих связей с Китаем*
"е" // Ученые записки. Т. XI их таххихи сборник. М., 1931.

Дэн Чжип. *История Китая на протяжении двух тысяч лет*. Илан-
хафт, 1954/7 Реферативный сборник, 1956. N 13.

Ефимов Ф. С., буд. Архангельск. 1869

Европеус, Г. *Об угорской и паре, обгавилем с сферой Невроф России*
соприбытия гуа *славян*. Сиб, 1874

Евдокимов Л. А. х *лесникова В. Л. Ракон "хи"* кого. бак

Абакан / КСКИПИМ. Т. XII

Евтюхова Л. А. *Развалины дворца в земле Хягас* // КСИМ. Т. XXI

ЗаРчпхоа 8.Т.. Важзрели/уе геогґзафичестґсие труды дроалего унтая//
I4Зсестир Ахадеыии лаух СССР. Серия *географфвчесґвья*. 193,5.
й-3

Захарос. Нсторнческое *обозрение"олонаселёня К "нзая //*
Труды шленос РосснРсхоф' духоапоЯ мпсдии .в. It. Cns,

Finocmpaotiea K, A Cacaаa,decae агуна. CFi6 , 1909

Нносзратицев К А. зуагуу ii зунннґи. /I., I9ZG.

Норфан О *происхом,уеннн ii ,уеагуиух гогоа М., is60*

Киселеа С.В. *Дреанве горо,аа Монголннн//* Соаетская А рхсолргия.
t957. Ilg Z.

Киісезев С, В. *Древіряяя іісзория'поИ Сн0нрн. М., і 951.*

Кон кт.с. К проблеме *национального харахзера ii 8 хп..* Нсторпя: и
-психология fСборннх статейііі.IVt., t971

Ко п рад Н Н Н fla.vase ха гаАсхого ґуоаііи ага//Советское
востопоае,цеіоіе 1957. 33

К'онрал Н.І4. *Згвл Н Восток*

хузнеіоа Н Т. Воды УеитральнoR. kl" t968.

/ленуLt В.И О *государьсае/7Со "икёпкя. Т. 29. 4-е пэд.*

/Лигети /I. *ТабгггчссяЯ* язык-дкалехт сязтґбя4сколо // Народы Азнп
и Африки. 1969. № 1.

7По ґуап -ижун. *Троёиаргсвив. Т. II. М., I'954.* Луцрїі.Аппе9

флор, *Н.сг.орня. М., t92. Т. і-ІУ.*

Малов С.Е. Енн.свяхая *пясьмеипасґь ?юрхов. fi4,- А., i.952.*

Мархс К. Форм'ыг, *пре,fiшесесуауюм/не капкғали сґнчесхому пр'оиз "а-*

Mapsc K , *Зигеиьс 't'. Hz6paririwe пнскмэ. М., iR48.* MapKc

It , tn *геи ьс. Са пгіе!нна. Ноп Z T. Z0.*

Моммзех Т. *Нсгория Руіиа. II., \949.*

МурЗаеа З. Нарозт/ad *Рвопублнка I фонсолня. М., 1959.*

МурЗаеа З. Северо -восгочныя".*КнгаR. М., 1955.*

Нестер.ух "P.R. *Ворное'сгво К "Нзая//* Из псторпи 'науxp и технпхп
Кхтая. M f 955

Обрууёа В.А. *Йзбранные.ы'по.гвографян "Азну. М., 195 t*

Обр\$Чt2B В. А, *OF KRX ты до Ку.І7ЪД if.М., , 'I 956*

Охзazioiuoa А.Н. *Neoln и бронзов га век ПрiiСвАгалая Н III М -Л.*, 1955
'Охладпихоа А.fi. *Древнее населен'ие 'Сиб "п.рн "н ёго культура*

Окладников А.П. Исторические рассказы и легенды нижней Лены
ICборнпх МАЗ. t949. - I t'.

Окладпппкок З. FI. Ноявiе oazruёе по .дрёвzvzfefixied *neropnn* апутрёл-
/fe/t ?-folголг/к7/ВДИ'. lem . N' ',

Охjiадпикоа А,М, ОчеркН ло,сторхх *Приморья*. 8ла,gsiaостоx, i 959'

Охладпххов А.П.. *III "пверсснR -х--" хh- ---**R-чевкнR этап*
lpyzonuca)

опппсанне Корвн. CFtb., еоо.

Оппсанче Маньчжур нн ./ Под. Д Поа,gnееаа. СЯВ, 1807 Овдиенхо I-f,'X.
8нутрепняh Мтзпголия, М', t 354.

Петров М.П. По степям и пустыням Центрального Китая //
Природа, 1959, № 11.

flзеханов Т В О роли niiiипостн В, W." i 94 I

Flоадпееа Д HczopiiоескгА o'iepc yhr уров.

Пэрлээ Х. К истории древних городов и поселений в
Монголии // Советская Археология

Рог х тер 8.Т. *Дагиwые .о gйох'ення фара-богаа-Гоza &ах nn,анкв гор*
coneбаон R уроерiv Раслiiiiiczого торя, tI дшп нет е н и
Московского общества изучения природы (МОИП), отделение
геояогии. i 96i. Вбпп..N°1

Робертсон ,га. С. *Hczopня хрнсгяапскоR иёркан Т.И. CFIB.; I'890.*

Ростовцев М. Срединная Азия, Россия, Китай и звериный стиль.
Прага, 1929.

Руденко С. И. Культура населения Горного Алтая в скифское
время М.-Л., 1953.

Руде'ико СИ *Каолросу о фopсyoх ccоровo,gv'еского созв0с гввв coвееннквх./Z*
Матерiiазm по атиографии ВТО. II, 1961

Руден.хо С.Н. *К вопросу об пcropH -ieqсом cnHrese //* ,докладбi п.о этнографии. Вып.
1 (4j: /i., i.965.

Руденко С.И. Культура Центрального Алтая в скифское время. М.
Л. 1960.

Рудеххо С.Кт. *Культура хунннов л ноянулинские курганй.* М". Ъvi., 1962

Ро0а "ов б.А. *Древние руеы 7 t Советскас.* i 953.

С алз-п и х о а Х.В. *ДреанёРыне пвмя гнни си нсзорпп Хр'ала.* Свердловоаёк, 195Z.

Серебрренп Нхое 6 А *Про "нсхожлеНне вувази по лан/вымпронсхохтдеи'и и и уваiJJсхого наропта Сб. статёft. фебоксары 1937.*

.Скмоноская 31.В. Эрехбург F.b : Dpz-es M. @. 'горни Китая. М.,. t956.

Сунха Н.К. п. А.г. *Нстораяя fYxpg/и М., t954.*

Скржинская Е.Ч. Комментарии в кн. Иордана

'Сосноаскпп Г. fl. **Дэресгугскпiл** *могильнис* // Проблемы псторифi дохапиталпстичесхс -общесiа Ъrll ДО'. 1935 N- I -2.

С.основсхпЯ Т.П. *Плгочные могилы Jadagvalz-я//Трудбi отрела т4сторпп пераобвiтноРГос. Зрмхтаж. Т. I. /I., i 941*

СосносскпЯ Т.П *Раллие кавёалпхг 3.абаЯкалья iКСИИИМК Т. vlll. М.- Ъi., 1940'*

сосхоасхпЯ г.п. *Расхопси Нльуавой па,рн // Соаетсхая archeological, Ylll.*

Сыма Ътяпа. *Нсбpанное.* М., i 956.

Таяько Фринеаи ч.Д. *Суржянское. дон суорп"коарбпи/е в Нльмовоя паДи // Трудбi Троицхосоасхо.-Кяхтинского отдела Приайурского отделения РrO. Т. I. sbin. Z fl898j*

Теплоухос С.А. *Равкопкн с.урганог в горах Нонн-у.ла. Тl., i925.*

Тоастов С.ф. *ДревниниR. Ъfojоезм. М. {948.*

"Толстос С.Тl. 'fio' с'ле,дам.др"скоR иiтаи*пзаинп. М -ll 194t. карта.

Томсоп ,гж. О. *Нсгораяя рревнеR геогр.афННН. .W. "1953.*

умкяхов Н.Н. *Тохарская проблемах/ВДгI. i его.*

УспенсххЯ В *Сграна Кусэ-пор нло, из "Заплскп. НГГ?О по ОгДе.пт2НИЮЗуНОТргфНННН", Т. VI. СПб. , 1880 {ОУДеЛьных).*

Фан о Barii'-zaria *Древняяя 'тсгорня Китак ог перпоОьгнрго-оаiуинн-ного сгроя ,ао обраоаваннв иенгралнзованого феоdazariогс росу,4ар ТсТвэ. М ,1938.*

Фэн Лэя - из/ай. Рупи-гесга la,gris/c& wz' аосточно/т /Уонг°о'ли'йу/
'Советская этнография 1959: 'i

Хе Цзи -ювиь, 'ура гтил *очерк истории* Уинб АдНб//РеферативныИ
сборник 195а 317

Цзи Юн. Оборонительный войны против хуннов в эпоху

Ланб//РеферативныИ@ сборник. 1986. г. 5' Уюй

Данб. 'СгвнН. М., 1954.

**Чаттерджи С и Датта Д Введение в индийскую философию. М
1955.**

flehoхсароа Н Н Н S аорисоу о про'тсхо'г,4eit'io rri rdiuea / f Cosë+cnas
"тография. i 947.'N t.

Черхеус В.Н. , Мотуихская В.Н. *В п оя.снах рреанефii рорпнь угорских
паророа 7/ flo .сяедам дреапппх хультур от Волги до Ти'хого
охеага. М-, 1954.*

Шан: *Очеркfi.нсгорян Кпгая. М., 1959*

**Шевченко Ю.Ю. На рубеже двух этнических субстратов Восточной
'Ев "р.опы. /Л.: 1977**

**Шнитников А.В. Изменчивост общей увлажненности материков
сввврпого полу//гарпя // Запппси ВГО. Т.гYI. .М.-/Л., 1957.**

IJTeiix В'.М. *He нсгорйя снопёниR между Ёи Раем fi Ннянея//
соаетсхое: 1957. N G',*

tUmesh В.М *Полн гико-экономи иескуп трах га г г рревнего Ку!тав "г у
arib-pso "//ВДН. 1957, N 1 Этирезхс. d*

гигн-,Дсiрiiiiigg М., 1938

8н Ххп-цjun. *Древне-яга "Рсснф фгглософ Ааа-zfзи х его ученне. М. -
J1" 1950.*

WESTERN LANGUAGES

Altheim F. und Stiehl R. Die Araber in der Alten Welt. Bd V, 2. Berlin; 1969

Altheim Franz. Geschichte der Hunen. Berlin, 1939.

Barthold W.W. 12 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelsiens.
Berlin, 1935

Boodberg P. The **Innguögr of the T'o-pa** Wei? *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*,
2, 1936.

Boodberg P. Two Notes on the History of the Chinese *ramitr*? *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. 1936;

Castrén M.A. Efinicische Vorlesungen über die finnische 'md' er. St.-Pb., 1857.

Chavannes E. Di **irisc riyi ions** -finnois des de l'Asie Centrale/IVème
présentés par divers savants. Académie des. inscription et de belles-
lettres. Série 1. T.II. Part 2. P., 1904.

Chavannes E. Dürumcits **sur les T'nu-t'ue** frures}. Occidentaux// Öron Misyo-
do not leave it alone. S'ib" 1903. T.VI.

Chavannes E. Les finnois *teislör ii|ucs* des *See-ma.Tli'iet*. P., 1900. Chavannes E.

Les puy d'*Occidentii* d'jüis Wri-li". T'ung Pan. Ser. 2, vol,
VII. 1905

Chavannes E.. 7reis grüneria chinois de **to bin4stif' dr Hun.'Öirnt4rCt//Par**
Tch'au T'oung Paö. Serie II. Vol. VII. 1906.

Clauion G.. Turh, Mongol, T'ingus // Asia Major, New Series (vol. VII), pI. 1.
1960.

Cordier H. Histoire générale de la Chine et de ses relations avec les pays
étrangers.P., 1920.

- Coràier H. *Hisioire genrrale de l i Cbine. P.*, 1920.
- Davidova A.V. The Ivolg'i Gorodish h# A monumciii oJ the fjiung-nn cultura iti the Jr tris-Bniiinl region // *Acta Archaeologica Academiae Scièritia- rum Hungaricae*, 20. Budapest, 1968.
- De Harles. *Les rrlfgiuns dr lii ChinC (Le Musfon. 1891. vol:X).*
- Düguignes j: *Hisioire des Huns, des Turcs, dts M "ongols. rl {fes aut res Tortarcs oc'idmtaux amant. eï depuis}. 'C. jitsqu'è yrçsenf. P', 1758-1758'.*
- Duyvendali S.S.L. An illitstraicd battle-occounÎ in thr hislory uJ the Jurmci Hum *dinastfiM'oung Pro. Vol. XXXIV. 1.939.*
- Franke Otto. *Geschichte dcs chinesischen Rcicbcs*. Berlin. 1930.
- Fung Yu-lan. A shori liistory oJ Chinese *Philosophy*. New York, 1948.
- Giberi L. Diciionnaire historiqu cI .géognphique dP Mnndcliourie. Hongkong,
- Gtousset R. et Regnnult-tSatiêr S. *L'Extreme-O'rirnt // Hisioirê Universelle. 1 Paris, 1965.*
- Gröussct R. *Hisioi c univcrie ttc. T. 1. P., 1fi58. Grnusset*
- R. *L'empire des stçppcs. Pâris,]9b0.*
- Gumilev L.N. *Les Fluctuations du niveau de lu Mer Caspienne /f Cahier du Monde .Russe et Sovietiquè. Yol. VI, 3. 1965.*
- Häjdu' P. Oie èliesten Brûfirizngcx zwisrh'en den Samojeden und die jtnissisc- herr Völàrrrtf/Acta Ctrientalia. T. III. Budapest', 1953, Hall
- D.Ët. E. *R hislory oJ Souih-test Asia. L., 1955.*
- Haririestad K. *Lrs i.elai ions dc Byzance avec Ia Transraicausie et l'Asie Cent- ralh on V rl YJ site Ics.II Dyzzantion. Bruzelles, 1957. T. XXV-XXVI -*
- Hcnning \Ñ'tB. *The Oatc èj 'ille So\$dinn anriertr Leters J/ ReptitifcJ frurt the BSÔAS. 1948, XII (3 and 4,)*
- Herman A. Oie Seidensi rosscn vtim ritten *China* nech deur Romisrlcn Re- ich//Miiieilungeri der Geographische Gesellschaft in Wien. Bd. S8, 1915.
- Hitth Fritlrich. *Ûher \Volgo-H'i'nnîn un4 Hiii'i -nu. Munühen, IgL10,*

H'1lnun G. **Zur** Ue-tsi *Fi ufi, eli* Zeitschrift über!tex Mnrge ländischen Gesellschaft. 1937.
lanse O. L'r+npire *dcs* siepprs: Revue des arts asiatiques. Vol. IX, 1935. lördanis,
ftom'inii ri Cciiha. Berlîn, l C82.

Kohalmi K.U. t/bcr dic: pJciJenden PJrile drr .innerös'titis' lien Aritci tinmn- dm/f,4cta
Orierialia. budapest, 1953. t.111.

Lattimure O. Itnici Asian Jri'@ci uJ Uirin. New York, 199ti.

Lauffer B. *Tllr Inn\$un e o/* the l "iie-chi oï *Indo-Scylliuns*. Chicago. 1917. Lévi S.
Nuts sur les lnde-5cJthes//Journal asiatique. f897. I X. serie. Vc'1.IX.

Li H. O:e Ge*rljichte des Wnsscrhnucs in Cliin'f/Deitzüge éur Gesch iehie der
Teclnik urid'Industrie. Bd. I Berlin, 1931-32.

Ligeti L. Mufs de civilisation de Houle *Asie* en i ronscrijsti"n ri 'innisc //Acta
Örianfalia. 1930..

Maexchen-Helfen O.: *PsewdokonUi* Central Asiatis journal Vol. 1. Nö. 2. Maexchen-
Helfen O. *The Huns end the Hiiung-rin* (Byzantion. Vati. XXII.

1945)

Maenchen-Helferl O. The .legerict u} ot'iginrs *n* flic Huns//B}'SBt3tiof. Vrai,
¿VII. 194'3.

Mailla J.A.M. Histoire gridralc de lfi Chinr, ou: atinoles de cci *etriPirc* iräduiies
iu,T'oung-Xieü-want-lvtnu: *prirJoscph-Anne-Ivlarie* de *Muriac* dc *Marcia*
Paris, i 777-17B3.

Masperci H. La Ckine. P.,.1927.

McGovezn W. Plié.rorli cntpir:r' o/ Cēntrül Asie. L., 1939.

Pélliot P. L.'ëdif iun cfl/ecfivÉ .dcs. IUf4vf es dr Wen Koil'l-wci ,(T'oung Pao . Vt 1.
KXVI.)

Pélliot P. *L'Origine de T'ou-kiue; nom chinoise des Turks*. T'oung Pao. 1915.

Pélliot P. *Les coutchenes et les tokhariens*//Journal asiatique. 1934.

Plath J.H. *Geschichte des östlichen Asiens*. Göttingen, 1830.

Pritsak O. Stammensnoifim itnd *Tilulatui* en drr./İft4isÈ)ÎCn *Yulh&r/MrÂÎ-AÎta-*
J'chen jahrbüizher. Bd.XXIV. Heft. 1-2. Wiesbarİen. İg'ı4.

- Rärnstëdi Iví.G.S. .ther de r l? rsprung dei tariiisrlíen. *Spraih** . H êlsínki , 1957.
- ítämusai A. Acmarqítrs de l'Enip me Chíníiisr du c hit' de l'Orcídrnl ff Mémoirc.s
sur plusicurs questions relaiives ä In geeographié de l'Asie Cent rate.
Parts, 1825.
- Richthnfeñ F. Cliinö. Berliri, l'877.
- S.S.M. de Ci ronf. CíiíncŚisrhr Urkilnctc-n zui Grsr/dc/xr Asicris, Dir H""inn
dcr ver cíitislichrn Zcii. Berlin-'Leipzig, 1921.
- Saint- Máriin V. Prngine'nt d'unr *ItiŚiriire dcs* A isarideş, Via1. .11.
- Saint- Martin V. Lrs f4una Ślónrs nu.'Epñtúlitrs äcs ! islti"itns Wisctmñs. P. ,
- Sälmony.A. 'Śino-Siberian url. P', 1933
- Shirafnri K. ě/bar den \"Vu-suri *Siutnn* in **Crn'rôlosiclj**,
- Shiratori K.'brr *die Spraclie .dir* Hiungni' un4 dt:r *Ta "ñfi,W-Slammö*. St. Pö.
t902.
- Soothill. Chink end Wist. L., 1925.
- Takais Z. Cetnlauniscñien HiinnènJund und sein *oŚtasiai* i.scliefi Verbindiin-
ten//Acla Öorientalia Öcademiae Scieniiarum Hii.T.V. Buda-rest, 1955.
- Tarn W.W. Thr fi rrrhs in *Bacñria atid India* .Cambridge, I,
- Têtrien de Lacoupëriè. Les len;gues de la Chine *cram let* ch inure // Le Muse-
nn. 1888. V11,
- Tökei F. Sur le lermc *non!ç-Jon* dntis Íe Che-link (Acta Orientialia. 1965.
vol.V)
- Trev,er .C,v. Exc "vññions ilt :*nortliern Mortgnlict. Ł.*, 1032
- Vernadeky G.V. Ancient fiussid ,NeW Haveli, 1952.
- Wieger.L: *Texlcs* hisloriques, Hien-Hien, **1905- ĩ 907**.
- Wylie. Hi'stoiy o{ the Hiung-now in iliclr rrlctlíons witit China Ijnumal of .the
Anthropöl. Init. öf, Gr. Britain and Ireland. 1874, No. 9).
- Yule-Cordier. Cnihdş dnd Wóy *Th* iller. L., 1915.

DIEÍN

In this series, words such as Hyung-nu, Hun, Chinese, Chinese, Asyn, Central Asia, Central Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Asia are not frequently mentioned:

The parantei will be put inside:

H:	!Htn.
Ç:	Çin, Çinli,
J:	Ju-jan (Cucen)
R:	Rorria,-h
h:	hmn;2i.
T:	Tankiit,
To.	. Tabgach,
Ti.	- Tibit,
To.	Togon tT'u-yo-hun)

A

A-ch'ai (To. ptensi), 460
A*shih-na tAsina, Ačina), 483: 80fi, 540,
593
Ahaknn, 47,191
Abar-lar,. StH; 563, 360
Antius (Ro... Génersl), 578, 580, pp84-588'
Afaitasiev-ler, 508
Afanasyevo, 40
Afghanistan, i32
Africa, 368; 38
Ahey-ter, 3+
Ahmetova A., 17, 157
Ai-ti (Han imp.u), 198
AÉassit (Alcstir) \cr, 504. 305, 584, 586,
588, 589, 590, 591
Akdeniz, 36
Altgóz sud (Fín) "5ò l
Aksu (Ku-mo), 132, 134, 22tr, 227, 237;
23a, 244, 249, 5b1
'Aksum bkx. Habeiistzn

Akvitanya, 581

Akgól, 182
Alakchin-lei, 56
Alaman-lar, 97, 327, 5.69, SB6
Alan Kaps (Decyxl aogxxi), 37t
Aġan-lar, 33, 55; BY, 182, 25+, 259, 260,
26t, 503; SSĪ, '53s, 57I-574',
380, sBi, 383, 3s6, 3sY. 389, 3s2
Alanya (Alania), t570
Atasha", 3z, s', 9z, ii', ii', i2c, i3 i,
132,141, 172, 3Zs, 4i4, 419, 420:
473
Alatav, 182,. 550
See Regimental D.A.'s. Eh'ung-ling:
Aleksiyeff V.P., 52
Aliazum, 262
Allatius, SB0
Alman-lat, 57a
Altai-lar, 51, 54: 55, 96:, 81, 10s. I3O, i s7.
306. 4s3. s4O. i4i,
530.¥71.35B.889,393
Altın-tag, 53, 131, 135, 146

Ān sl, 5.72,: 579
 A mJu,: 3tđ7, 408, 120,. 3.10, SSH
 Arncńka, 3"l-í
 Amid, 363
 Amrniñfius MßrcĕllinU5, 33, zoo, zr i ,
 261, 553, ä70. 3Y3, 3Y4
 Ammios, 37i\
 Amur, 39', 10fi, 33'1, 336, 4H3
 Ari Lu-shan 12
 .lń-chou (kun.)" (II Prince.), 2i0, 2+.1, štt 1.
 4BS,. 4,ĕl7, 'i03
 An-h:st (Parihiu), 129, 193
 Anho . 309
 ßø-koo,bLz. An-čfiou
 Anní (iimp), Ė43, #6Ė
An-yang, 51
 Aria'lnlu see KñçûĽ Asia
Anahuan' (é-na-kut-j. Hanil. \$25, 526
 Ananin kul'iuru.1Ŏ9
Andrónovo, 39, 40, 46: 50. 52. 3'i+
 Angara, 20, 47, 48, 5â, tt 1
 Angishit-ler, 591
 Ānnam, t30
 Ant-'fâr (!Slävyanisi), 541, 373-375, 577,
 579, 580. SĖi7, 590
 Aniarkiika, 544 Aquĩlea,
 5B7
S*a| sòTs, iat" 245, 25+, 3'o7, sa7.
 i9, 560, i63; 36s: ie9, i7 1
 Arstĭ-lar, 113
 Atdsrich, SBO, 5flB
 Argun (nchir), 107
 Arguni (ÿer zdO, 155
 A rllt r I Ariiilar, Ariism I, 56B, 574, 392
 AritA ryanians, i00
 Atist9ft, N.A., 24
 Aika Ch'e-chih, U3, 200, Ž04, 226;
 148, 249, 250
 Arkadia, 5'i3 Armoricans,
 586, Š87
Arşak, 564
Arşakid, 564
Artagers (kale), 564

Ariamonofi M. I. , 537
 Aryàni tA ři)1cr. 15
 Aryañizrn, 579
Asian-lzr; ll7 Aslar,
 b7
 Aspar(ťihl, 3.92 Ashina
 see A -shih-n:i
 èianarich, 379
 Aiina, 9.7, 553
 Ailaruik, 942
 Atlas OĽyartusu,. 542, 571
 Attila, 58. 2G4,. 4R,7, 5tđ3. 382,.iBs-SH9
 Auguste. 1.29
 Augustus, 'S7 7
 Avar-fâr, 5ò9
Avraam, 98
 Eurasia: 7Ŭ, d4: 107. 254, 257, 2ò0,
 261, 269. 303, 306. 30B, 310, 31 I ,
 313, 327; 33 52,42, 54,57,.

564

A vrupa-li, 19, 45., T2H, 133, 231 ,
 236, 593, 469, 903, 540, 543, 553,
 557-561., 56.t, 569, 570, 572., SB1,
 5B2, 558, 590

European type, tAvrupaoid). 15, 40, 41,
 47, 3i: sê. 109, we, t90., 2s9.,
 2ò2, ?2B: 34'+

Australia, 56.4

The same 41

Azov Dentzi, 572', d.75, 57ti, 57 7

Aztec, 543

B

Badahşan 4g3

Bagrackul, 13t; 239, 567, 381, 586

Baktria .(Baktirya, Baktza), 37, '99..

ĭ39, 206., 208: 'š54.

Balamber (Balarttir);. 264, 578, 580, 593 Balaton
 "593

Bølha5. 134, 181, I, 5B9., 571

Bahan (-Yr.adnsi), 570, 584, 591

Bäli-lar, 379

anliilt (Litvari) hatklan, 573

Baltic Sea. 568, 570, 572, 579

Baröbn., 236

Bardor-lar 591

Barga. 53, 107

Bargfil (Bar-göl, Bars-göl, Barkul), 4fi,
133, 150, 225, 245, 236, 249, 250.
5t5

Oarlik, 23ft

Basiati, 591

Baštarna (Baštarna/Kelfl lat, 384, 5Rci aa i

Ch'in, 431, 445, 439, 4fiY, t72-473

Datt Chu-ki-prens, 1 42, 150, 151, 175

Ball 1-ehi-ch'i-prince, 204

Bath Liam, 445, 465

Batt Lu-li-prens, 160, 161, lb4, 167, 240

Bau ucii fHsi -ya), 1 l6, 130, 131, 133,
134, 139, 139, 140, 142, 143, 145,
13B.

t55. U6, 171, 172, 1 BO l£19, 193,
200, 204, y1O. 221-223, y33-239.
244, 2'16. 247, 248, 230, 231, 252,
251. 237, 239, 239, 260, 3t0. 4'f6,
479,

480, 48G, 487, 493, 499, 502, S1G,
321, 521, 333, 363

öatt Wri, 533

Batt Yen tdevlei), 432

Baut-lar bltZ. Boots

Mrs thabile), 53. 72, 80. B6, 120,

Bayköl, 25, 29, 39, 48, 49, 90, 9 2, 96.

61, 107, 108, 108, 155, 159. 2t11 ,
237,

33h Btlh.

108, 96"

lkrberf-ler, 96£1

Bering , 544

8ertichiam, A, N., 25, 99, 1 31, 206

Bet-pad-dala, 182, 1BS, 543 Bhnn

see Mitraism

Bi-wire, 56

Bichurin, N.Ya., 23, 2+, 33, 99, 13 I

Bike see Bi-rs

Birma, 13O

Burmese-It, 130, 37B

Bitiogur t ilzra Ugor) lar, 5tiö, 59 [Bitans,
359, 4ö9, Sß2, Sfi8, 'i74, 57g,

581, 583, 589, 5b6, ISO, 590, 59 I

Bleda, 3B2, 584

8ogdo-nip 1 32

Boja, 979, 5Bo

Bołgar (BulgarJ, 571, 590

Bnnia-far. öş, SG, 327

Bonifacius, 987

Boodbctg P.. 50öi

Borovkj. G.1., 6l, 159

Bospur, 577, 57b

Box-lat, 37

Drakiscfal type, 4l, 109

Brc tanya. 3B6

Brungildi see Chuan-ch'ñ Yen-chi

Buda, 507

Buuda Ranga (rahtpl, 3üt , 3a3

Buddhism/Buddhisf-ler, 1 t6, 1 lfi, t33, 3j2.

334, 380, 38t. 383, 395, +16459,

473, 183, 1B7, 494-497-490501,

502, 30Y, 30B. 509, 5! I. 5 11, 515,

518, 523, 516, 541

Buh "yn Gö!, i 29

Bulgar tBołgsr) 1ar, 3fi I, 3O6. 38t. 389

Burgund-lst, 580, 3ßi, 5Rfi, 'iti7 Bagür

(Lun-ltil, 148, 146

Bÿyûk Bozk'r, I) 2, 303. 30ş, 3t2, 324.

325, 395, 408,+ 15, 417, 420, 137,

441, 449, 482, 470, 473, 519, 524.

539, 540,, 548. 571.

Bñyûk Set tÇin Seddil, 1 11, 1 17, j 20,

142, 1s4, 193, 304, 30ft, 388, 412,

447, 14B, 463, 467. S31. 540. 3 lt.

530

C

C'hao-hsien hbz, Korean

Castrtn, fi3

Cayrs. 23tl

Ch'ai-II (tribe), b1

Ch'am-pa (hralliltl, 341

Ch'ans tC Prince), 29, 3d2 Ch'ang

Send, 74

Ch'ang-an, 105. 2tltt, 211. 319349,

383-377. 396, 402, 410, HO422.

- t2d, 131-134, 163, 4+u, 460, 462,
4h1, J65, 170-472, **496**
- Chaag-poshan. 334
- Ch'ao Hsin, 342 Ch'e
- Ling, t'+0
- Ch'c-lt-yabgu, 176, i 77
- Ch'e-shih (Turfan 1. 33, T 30, 133, NI ,t53,
I D6,1, 1h7, f7 I , \72,
?.09, 223, 223, 22't, 223, 227, 230,
21B,
25LI. 252. 1Y9. 4I36. 365
- Czi'c-ya-ja-t', i g7
- Ch'en (Kctuk 5hu- hancdan
an
d imp.lukuk), S33
- Ch'en Po-ltsien (Ch'cn htikamdan), 335
- Ch'en **T'sng**, l, 189
- Ch'eti-hei, H2
- Ch'eng Sheng, 73
- Ch'eng-ring-tu, 353
- Ch'eng-to, 342
- Ch'i (devlei, dynasty), S9, 74, 5IO, S13,
515-517. 327, 53S
- Ch'i (title of Wu-chu-liu), 200 Ch'i-
ch'i-kar, 333
- Ch'i-chi-kien, 24s, **146**
- Ch'i-fu Kou-jan (S. prince), 42fi, 43I I.h'i-
fa Mn-mo (Ban Ch'in hak.) 472,
473, 474
- Ch'i-huo-ha Huo-lu, 227 Ch'i-
ku (9th, 1d0, 18fi Ch'i-ku
bkx. Kirghiz
- Ch'i-li-mi fWu-sun k'un-mosul, 19B
- Ch'i-shan, 46 l
- Ch'i-ti (tribe), 33, 53. 54
- Ch'ianglar l Tibeiltr), 63, 63, s4, a6, 100,
126, 134, 148. 131, 1bS, 210,
221, 222. 242-247, 248, 252, 305,
32+, 326, 327, 396, 411, 444, 4fi0
- Ch'ien-men-wang-hp-kung. 193
- Ch'isn-shun. 114, 131
- Ch'in (itasaba), 5b, 526, 5t'S
- Ch'in (Ts'in/Han dynasty-dcvlet) I, 1-2, 37,
33. 60, 6I. 69, 70, 73, d0, b4, dE
117, 163, 20b, 3II2, 392, 395, 40H,
411, 412, 41S, 420-4 28, 431, 437,
444, 448
- Ch'in X'ai (Commander), 60
- Ch'in Shih- huang-ti (9th imp. up, 69, ?0,
72, 83. 85, 135, 163, 547
- Ch'in-K'ai tPrince), d7
- Ch'in-ling, 30B 407, 419, 439, 469
- Ch'in-ling-shan. 111
- Ch'in -il -cheti-Hsj-yu see B*t'i tip
- Ch'iu-yang-shan, 85
- Ch'ing-hai, 2fi, 197
- Ch'io-lin, 229
- Ch'o-yen f'H. titulii), 413 Ch'nng,
226, 237, 23d
- Ch'oo (principality),
73 Ch'u, d3
- Ch'un-ch'c, 36,
- Ch'ung (Huei ti, \$. imp.re), 341
- Ch'ung-ling tAlay dati), 129. 130. 134.
238
- Ch'a Yuan tS- sairl, 63, 6ò
- Ch'can-jung, 52, 33
- Ch'üan-lar, 324
- Ch'yto tChio-ting/H. hoyuJ, S7, 413 Chang
tH. prcnsiJ, 220
- Chang Ch'ai tGencral), 3'77, 39g
- Chang Ch'ien (scyyah), B3, 87. I t 7, 12B.
139, 140, 1+1
- Chang reng, 1+8
- Chzng Liang, 74, 2t9
- Chang-k'n, 19J
- Chang-kuo, 36, HP
- Chung-ti timy.), 21U, 227, 234
- Chanie, lüS
- Chao (Imy.lvk),, b7. 6ft, 73, d3,, 3'+I, 369,
376. 3B7, 137, 430
- Chao see. 5hun-si
- Chao Hsin (H. Principle. 122. 125
- Chao Kao, 72, 73
- Chan-hsin-rh'eng (town), 125
- Chan-l-ung, Sd
- Chao-ii. I f4,l6b
- C.hiio-wang, 60

Chao-yang tkasabal, 120
 Chao-yang-hsien see, Lung-ch'eng
 Chavannes, E., 22, 235
 Che-wu- nu U ham), 523
 Cheng K'i. 171
 Chi see Nang-chi -ya-sih Chi
 Song, 349, 350
 Chi Yach-kién, 1H2
 Chi-rh'erig hkz. Pelin
 Chi -chii (Tola?), 1 56
 Chi-huo-shan, 174, 1 75
 Chi-lus, 233
 Chi -P'ati 459
 Chi-yti see Luo-shang ynghu Chia t
 t t tmp.). 193,
 Chia-shih see Ch'i-ti
 Chieh-In (Kullar), 303, 324, 31n. 345
 Chien Tung. 324
 Chien-k'ant tNankinJ, 429, 434, 45B,
 46V. 402, 467, 499, 335
 Chien-nang, 63
Chleo-si. 400. A3
 Chien-"st, z1 2
 Chin (Hanédsn and imps.iuk), 'z9, 60, 74,
 320, 320, 32i , 329, 332, 339, 3't7,,
 3S† 333-335, 36I , 3fi6, 367, 374.
 376, 378, 389, 390. 395, 403-+09,
 40B. 410. 411, 417, 419, 420, 9 27,
 442. 432, 432, 456, 45B, 499, 465, 4fi6.
 493-495
 Chin (nchir), +71
 Chin Chuny, 3ñ'l, 3ñ5, 3ò6, 367, 369 .
 430, 63fi, 497
 Chin Ming, 3fi9
 Chin-choti tparnizon), 373, 530. 933
 Chin-shit ttarih kitabo, 53,
 Chin-yang. d1, 82, 440, 441, 529. fi32
 Ching-h8i. 36
 Ching-ti TC, imp.), fi3, 10fi
 Chin-tzu see Kucha
 Chen (dynasty, devlei I, 29. 34, 35, 49,
 4fi, 91. 52, S7, 58, 59, 69, 'i4ş
 Chrru -kung, 5fi

Chu Hsñ, 421, 414, 415
 Chu-ki tH. ñnvani), 92, 1*B. 112, 129, 1fi4
 Chu-ko Liang, 320
 Chu -ya, 193
 Cbu an-ch'ti Yen-chi (H Haiun), 160, 170,
 173, 174
 Chung (Huai-tit, 309
 Chuftß ÅI50050 I
 Chung-shan, 395, 440
 Chuo-ha-hue-ta (pre ttslih). 1 71 . 1 72
 Chuo-ho (castle), 4fi17
 Chü Te, 373, 37†
 Char-ch'ñ (H. iiiülù), 229, 413. 44fi
 Chti-ch'ñan (Su-chem, 133, 194, 227,
 465, 481
 CAú-mł (principality, 223
 Chü-t'c-hou (H. yabgusu), 149. I'2 I . 133,
 159, 163, 17ü, 21 b. 2iY, 229
 Colomhc, i 28
 Conrad Wall<nroü, 366 Conrtantinus
 Magnus, 567
 Cordirr, H., 22. 46
 Crassus, 1B6 Cungar
 Köpisi, 1 32
 Cungarya Alatavi 22b
 Cungaria, 94, S5, t17, 159, 133, 161,
 17fi, 184, 254, 254. 306, 472. 403, S42,
 550, 589

ç

Çaç see, Taşkcni Ça
 tntungiyé, 153
 Kahar. 251, 257, 337
 Chchoksvroff, N.N., 3†
 Frame **Derya.** 53, 48's
 ccmyachovsk, 577
 Ch'i-di see Ch'i-ii
 Ci-chî tChift-chih, H. yahgusu). 177, IY'2,
 I Æ0, t84-90, t97
 Cin Seddi hkz. Bcyük Sr'
 Cingis-han. '24, gB, Iü3, 317
 Cosrn hkz. Knre

Fon-lnu, 41 Z
 Fgn-wen-lan. 138
 Fen Ch'ung, lt t
 Fäng K'u-ai, B3
 Faun-lat.. i7
 Fei (tribe), 53
 rei tt chiifvadil, s8, i "1, +i4: 4is,
 42u, 432, t42
Fan tñchir), 134
 Meng {imp, çe) '§07, 508;, 510, 511, 5.3
 Fe*g Hung; t72. 476 Fezig
 Pa, 456, 458, 472
 Feng-hoü (H. yabgu), 241. 242, 246
rengyúti-pens "24j
Fcrgana (Dlvan), +3, t2B, t3O, t3z,
 ls4, 139, 140, i4l, 14a-14s, 18l,
 183, 186. 193, 223, 23G', 328; 341,
 479
Fırat, 139
 Jin-fer; 63, 5ò2, **565** Pin-
 Ogur tikz. Finnogur F-
 inn-o-Scandinavian, 544
 pinnogur-lar, 261, 977, 33S, 939
 Fl'avius, 570
 Ftanke, Cr. 22, 235
 F anklar, I l3, 317. 't6é, 569, 3Yg, 56l .
 386, 587
 F.ransiz. Z)8. 363, 't69, 4b+, 383
 Fzigya, l35
 Fzun-lar, 134
Fırr, 134
Fu Chien I, 410, 411, 413
 ru chien II, "4l I, 415, '-tĩ Y-42a, 43I , 'f34,
 433: W5., ISO, 499
 Fu Fa (T, prince), 411
 FuXÜng6u . FuÜung
 F*Jung (S. :LumAmdanfl, #24, 41S'
 FuFcıTipen4Üy3143t
 tu Sheng (ptens): 410, 4l I
 F-u Su, Yz,73.
 Eu T'eng (Ta. prcnsj); t35
 Fu-chu-lo, j17
 m- hu-lei-jo-ti, 197, 209

Pu-mu, 182
 Fu-nau (devlei). 113
 pq-ytj (Ç J1 va{i), 141
 Fu-yú (state), 246, 333. 336

G

Gaina, 580
 Gallla tGşlya); 567. 36B: 581, 584-587,
 593
 Oanasuy-lar; 96
 Gxxdartch, 262
 Gaubil. 33,
Gaudentius, 580
 :Gcnzeiich, 5B5, s8s
 Gepid-fer,. 57i, 978-380, 584. S86, 587,
 388;. 589; 594, 39
 Germsnatiih, \$72, 573, 5?4i 5.76, 577,
578, 579
 .Germaûicus, 589
 Getntcn-lcr, 99; 533: 56B,. 36.9; 582,
 5B1;. 5B6, 39t, 392
 Gilct Ormeni, 579"
 Glazkova',.39, f0, 96. 't'il: 4g., 50,51", t I t
 The Gnostics, 3f2
 Like, 30, 3i , 32, z', '3, 47, Gz, 13,
 124. 123, 128, 128, 310, 339. 337, 4l 7,
 420, t333. 436, 442. 449. 4Y3, 5s3,
 555, 55G, 571
 Gonno-Sabir 538
 Got-lzr, 118, 2\$4, 261, 262, 969, set-
 556, **570**, 372, 577, 583, Sfil, **389**,
 391, 592
 Goúrnan I.t., 62
 Gökiark-lir, 15, t9l, 592
 G rk-ler, 113, 134; 369. 378, 58-t
 Greltñ-8aktHa', 37, 99: 1D1:l8'2
 Grcko-Röma; 78
 .Grecia, 577
 Gngorye(f. V.V., 24, 134
 Groöt.de, S.S.H., 22
 "G'róussct" R., 22, t69
 cr "mm-Grjü"-yi , ".v., I I, i4, zs, i'. 'II.,
 R6, 132,. 133, 239

Gtimiřčv, L.N., 11, 12, 14, 17

Grtn-lar (Kun) (řati Huns'J, tg, 33, 23, 26, 231, 234, 234, 237-264, 303, s03, 30', 532, 353, 336, 36t, 3a6, 570-586. 58R-390, 591, 593. 39t

Gunno-Kutigur, 35R

Gønnn-Ugor. Sdn

Gunnf- U ttgur, 538

Giiçen, (Hu-per 1, lti4, 246, 370

Guney Liang, 443, 44tl, 459, 460., 4b3

Cüney Yen 4ä8

HH'yenyun,

29, 31, 33, 33, 33, 46, 546

Ha-wu see Kara l ttış Haberistnn

(Aksum), ř69 Hsdñanvr, 3fi9

Hai-shuif. 74

Khakas-lar, 33, 97 UI, i 35, t3ó, t76, 177, 185, 190, 191,

Holga-amsn. 133. 239, 4B7

Halha (nchír, plain), 3t, 33, 38, 72, 124.

129, 126, 155, 1d4, 219. 220, 24ß,

231. 237, 31'l, 32B, 4i6, +3Y, 489

Hamar-Daban. 470, 542, 544

Hami (Ha-mil, 32. 53, 3+, 130, t31, i53, 146. 224, 225, 227, Z39, 2-17, 248, 230, 32d. 4B6, 302

Hert EH. p cnsi}, 220

Han (hancdgn), 25. 3ó, 31, 70, 73, 74, 80, 81, 81, 83, 86, 104, 114, 117, 12ß.

135, t38, t48, i62. 165, 178, 1tt3,

t85, 194, 19b, 200, z0i, 207, 2t l,

2i 2, 2t3. 216, 21B, 2Z3, 2t3, 248,

25t, 252, 2i3, 253, 263, 303, 316,

3 i9, 321, 323, 323, 326, 333, 31ó,

347.

362, 370, 382, 394, 4q3, 414, 431,

4s5, 34, 3Z3. 328, s37, 338, s40,

6'f3, 34B, 349, 330, 354, 570

Ftan IH. PrincipalityJ, 331, 353. 357, 362, 362, 364, 393

Hxn (nehif), 396, 421, 498

Han Hsin, 74, H1, B2, 83

Han Yih-to, 339

Han-chung, 252

Hen-hni Oenizi see Gobi Colú

Hen-wang, 71

Hang-rhou, 247. 42 2, 426, 445, 445, 480, øß I, 535

Hang-chung, 516

Hangay. 157, 177,+ 1 5, 913

Hantlnr, 956

Hso. 58

Hao-nai (kalcl, 501

Haranur, 13 I Hxss

see Xaskar Hashin

blcz. Ho-ksi Hafa

blçz. Hoten

Hatanga, 360

Caspian (Sea), 12ü, 243, 30a, 3s I, 33S, 357. 5ó0, 362, i66, 3Yt, 590

Haia-lar, 261, 591

Hebcy see. Ha-pri

Hci-shu: tnehir1, 326

H-leti, 30ó, 553, sãa, sã6, 5ãi, â ä8, 5ß2, 591

Helfcn, O.M., 23, 25s, 5S2 HeHas, 147, 583

Hen-tei, 30fi, 415, S03, 913, 544

He rig-chou. 169

Hcng-shah, z13, 2i 3

Herodotus, t28, 5+5

Herul-lør, 372, 373. 57's, 384, 38ó, 589

Hi see Taiab

Hi-ch'eng 389

Hi-chou, 392, 533 Hich-

1 (Ch. spy). 117,

Hien (Kien-H. yabgusu) 205, 217 Hien see Wu-liu-jo-ti.

Himalaya, 37, 13'+

Indigo, t26, t39

India (Shřn-tu, Yin-t'u), i t3, i 29, 130, 236. 32t. 3Z3. 523, 534, 564

Hingan bW Kingan

Indian Ocean, fi]

Indian, 36, 37., 58, 113, 114, j t s, 1 35,
 306, 3H1. 496. 514
 I4jni-Avruṭla, I 3§
 Hiooit (Huni)ler, 23g. SS3, 336, Sh63,
 3ñ4, '66
 Hirth, F., 22, 23a Ho
 Wu, 19b
 He-t hien see Ying-chou
 He-hsi t Hesi), S4, 123, 1 98, 1 fi3. I f7,
 299, 306, 329, 342, 444-W8, SfG,
 472, 474, 479, 4b0, s81, 483, 4C3,
 493. 495. 5 I S, S26, 533, 9o5
 Principality of Ho-hsi470
 Ho-Juñ tTs. general), 5z7, §2B
 Ho-lien tS. kumandnn), 25ò Ho-
 lien Ch'ang, 471 472 473
 Ho-lien P'n-p'o (H. hiihûmdaro, 436,
446, 447, 448, 449, 463, 464, 466,
 470, 471
 Ho-tien Ting, 471, 472 473 974 475
 Ho- nan, 2d, ò3, 3s3, 396, 410, 415,
 426, 484, 467, 472, 49fl, 515, 517.
 526, 527., 535, **530**
 Ho-pei, 27. 29. 46, 93, 73, 83 119. t20,
 122, 308, 39 I. 392, 911, 918,
 424,450, 469. 326
 Ho-su tH. length) 164, 170
 He-ii tC. imp.), 234, 241, 2W
 Ho-wu-chs , 8 I
 Honoria, 585
 Hor-lar, S3, 54
 Hnten (Khotan. Hata, Yüüian), §3, 1 29.
 132, 139, 135,146, 223-227. 237,
 249, 250. 4B3. 516, 525
 Hotendeiya, 133
 Hon Ching, **533**
 Hon Ying, 70
 Histiyaṭi-ltk, 118, 367, **565**, 574, 579,
 582
 Htistos (Christs), 582, 594
 Hsi Ching (Gen,1, 467, 46B. 470, 472
 Hsi Lû-an-Li, gl
 Hst-ang, Zó
 Hs)u IH. boy), V2, I BR t7 I Hsjung
 (Ti. kahflesi), R6
 Hsi-k'ang, 211
 Hsi-ning, 247, +45
 Hsi-yeh (prcn.5lik), 723
 Hsi-yu see Bat-end
 Hsia (**böhe**)2ü2g30US4gü
 Hsz (H. dclmi) +47, +6g, 70
 Hsian-lu, 53
 Hsiang-eh'en, 424
 H i'"ø-kuo you), too, 'oz, İsa,
 Hsiang-wang, 39
 Hsiao Ho. 74
 Hsiao l (Ch'i prcnsi), SU
 Hsian Pao-huan tCh'i imp.u), 517, B1B
 Hsiao Pao-jung (Ch'i prcnsi), 5i 8 Hsiao
 Wu-ii (Ch, imp.), 443
 Hsiao Yen tCh'i hùk "mdan 1, 518
 Hsiao-jung, 93
 Hsie Hsüan lCh'in kumsndani), 424 Hsie
 Shih tCh'in kiimandanil, 424, 425
 Hsieh T'u-rhcng, 396
 Hsien Yii, 73, 74
 Hsien-hen-n-ch'eng, 174
 Hsien-ho (whir), 401, 402
 Hsien-to see Silla
 Hsirn-yang (şe hire, 73, B1H
 Hsin- Ch'ui (kuî), 83, 84
 Hsin-ang, 396
 Hsin-chien bki. Hsî-yñ
 Hsin-ler, 37, 52,
 Hsin-t'u (Male) 440
 Hsin-wei-yen, 170,174
 Hsing-mi, 181
Hsü Wu, 150
 Hsü-hsün I H. tribe), 177
 Hsü-shih, 523
 Hsît-yong town), 530
 Hsüan (GÖney H. yabgumJ, 231
 Hsüan Hsü, 5Z3
 Hsüan-i (Ç. insp.),1ób,167,179. 203,
 Hu (Imp.çe), 32a , '223, 'i28 İJu
 (town), 67, 399

Hu Hai; 72, 7J

Hu, (tribeJ, +2, +3, 'lô; 'îl,, 71

Hu-ch'è, 118

Hu-ci'ü-ch'üan EH. yabguJ, 256

Ha-cheng, iH. yabgti); 2B6

Hu-c, hî-prens, I äß

nu-'his (H, æ), isi. 176

Hu-chic-yabgu, I 7f

see hu-ei-li. Prince Ch'ung

Hu-hon-yèh (H. yabgu), 11, 173-1 BO, t84,
1B3. 189, 196, 103-205, 208,

2B0, 2I'3, ZI i, ZIf, 346

Hu- hu-erh (H. yabgu),. 1.2, 155; 296,
297

H*-kuan tkale'. 33l

Hu-In i H length), 171

Hti-pii, 211, 309, 378

Ня-in-erh shik-tao-km-jo-ti.bkx. Yu

Hu-in-us, I 77

Hu-yen (Küyan), 413, 414

Hu-yen-'Ti EH. yabgu), 12, i 60, i b1, 163,
164, 170

Hüai'(river), 27, 119, 351, 353, 3Y4,
4'IZ, 4Z3, 4Zñ, W3, 45ß, 46t, 'š07,
517, i 18, 521, 524

4uai-ri see Sih-m- Cko

Huai-wang, 73

Hull-yü, 180

Huan Pao tkcle), 49IJ. 499 Huan

Wees, 4t0, 4I. 4t2

Huan-jung-lar, 59

Huan-kung, 59

Huan-t'u t Khoten bey) , 223 Huang.

tKarashar hskimi)', 139 Husng Lao,
133 , 136,:138

Huang Wen, 419

Huang-ho, (Sn.ri River, i7, 29, 32, 35,
36, 40, 41, 72, 85, 1 I, 120, 1Z6,

1 2B, 243, 244, 244, 248i. 25.6, **305, 307,**
308, 330,, 362, 373" 4o4. 4t i"

4tI, 4t3, 4I7" +26'4Z8, +32, **434.**

437, 438, 441, 444, 445, 447, 450,
452, 455, 461, 466, 468, 470, 473,

474, 476, 4ü9. 500. 326, 529, 330,
332, 331, S/Æ, 3M: 347

Huang-shu, t26

Huang-.lIj.C.ilp.1.,t36, 38.1

Huañg-.ls (ranrl} '5t4

Huang-ft hkz. Sth-ma}ui

Huang-tse. 137

Huey-ti,.83

Huhunör see Itükünör

Htzi tkalel, 499

Hulhu,. 86

Huṭṭiku-yabgu, PSI, 158; 159, ióß. t7ß Humd "n

see Ch'ang-an

Ñnrñ-shieh (Hun-shc, H. tribe),. 92, 123,
140

Huø-yü, 28, 3ò, St, 33, 33. 80, 34ó.

Hung-ti (Thin ifny.u), 463

Huni (Hunni) bkz. Hionu

Hunno-Siyen jI, 257, 330, 3'31', 332,

Hun no-Ligor (Huna.-guru), .261

Hunu-guru, 538

Huo Ch!ü-ping Iğençtsl), 123, 12+, 125

Hut-hu f river, 441

Hu-chui (H. **boyuṭ**, 113, UI, Ifi4

Ha-éhui-prens, 91, lb1

Ha'-li (yøbgu) 246, 25

H'i-li-hu (H. yabgu) ,143,143,149

Hü-lü Ch'üan-ch'ü (H. yøbgu) l'7.0,. 173

1-1

Irgiz Tnehir), **304,**

Issik GöI, I34

I (kabilc); 35...t22

I fnehir,. 27, 33,

1-ch'i-chi ṭ1-ihihih-ten} -preos, 178, 179'

1-ch'ih-hsieh (**fatgu**). **120,** 122, 123,

12Á, 125, 12b

1-ch'a Junj, **60, 105.,1,55**

1-chou, H2

1-hou (valley), 249

1-li-mm, 184

i-lino-chi tUI- Chü-ch'ü); ž34

.øtøøø_ptøøøø 233

1-shui.(city), 4.10
 1-t'u-Chiä-shih, 21fi, 217 1-
 wu tgnrnizon), 22a lber-
 ter, 568
 ,lfagur bicz. Toharlir
 llbis ttam). 49
 lldiko, **587**
 llek: (Ellakl, 5B9
 Hi River, 87, 134, 182. S65, S71
 llirialilar. 353, ä91
 tlmóva Dctëst; 337
 tlynda, 1 IZ, 316
 Iridus, 13+
 English **393**
 Inka-lsr, 543
 Inosirsniseff, K.A., 33, 15, p52, p56
)pck Yolu, SOZ. S25
 Iron-I, 6i ., 1 I2', î 33, TB2" 30ó, 307,
 ss4, s5s, **563**, 5b4, 5b'i, **i90**
 lrñek "503, i89
 Iruquois tlrokez), 97, 100
 Irtysh; 182, Z36
 LiLLandinavian Islands 551
 Isltendér (Maředonynli) 99: 101
 lskit liiedonu 134
 liquids, 55, .61. 1O9, l'34, 139, 200,
 207 2Ş9, 262, 264, S45, S46, S54,
 555.,. 562, 570
 \\šlam, 312
 Ispanys, **368. 581. 585.**
 Spanish, 96Ô Isparta,
 97
 Issedon, 134
 lsiemi Khan, **594**
 Sweden, 45
 Switzerland, 6b+" 369
 Italyø; 57ò, 580, 588, S9 I
 Sta'yan-law, 568, 3BS, 987
 1volgi, 333
 lznik, 592

J

)an Miñ (Shih **Min**), **42; 3ü2**, 39ĩ , **397**,

399-105, 13. +44, 430, 438, 497

Jen Ch'ang, 180

jen-ch'cng.yabğú, 1 Z7

Jlh-chuo prince (H. Ti lãltl), 194, 170, 180,
413

Jih-chuo-ku-tu-hou tH. anvanil, 229

jth-lu-ch'uari, 332

Jn-ih'iang-lar, 53, 96

Jordaner, 241, Z64, 3W3, 373; 3T3, ä7ñ.,
688, 5B9

Josephius, 570

Ju-jan (jnan-juan, Cucen) far. 198. 41ò;
41 , 432, 43'1-437, 142; , 4d9,
436, '07, -Y0, 172, 473, 't,77, 479-
48a , 483.,487. 189; 495, 5.02, 504,
'Z05, 5Ö7 369 510, 3i 3.,. Sï6.,. 531"
123, 523.,. 526, 535, 549, 393

Ju-t'an (Tu-fa chief), 4'4b

{ulianus.(R. lrp.), 563

}an-ch'c (sctiri), 530

juo-ch'eng see Jcn Ch'efig

ung-lar, 28.,. 32, 34, 16, 5Z, 53, 59"

61, '63, 66, 67, 68, 69, Y1.. 85.,.

'I IO. 133, 309: 323, 3ž8

Jung-ti, 33, 33, 33, 327

Jiistiüarius, 4fi9

K

jç'äi-fcñg, JOB

X'ai-yrñ .tprćMeš}, lóó, 1Bĩ

K'ai-Yüan, 333, 33'f

X'an Shu-ang (Ch. vali) 479, 486.

K'kng tYarřtend'häkimiJ, 223

K'ang-ehû (Kazakištañ}, 3š.,. 55, JO3,

İÖ3; 128. 130, 130, 147, 166, 174, 1'B0-

183,183.-İ.B9, i98, 210, 223, 227.,.

22B, 237.,.3'i

X'u tkxbi\ J, 53

X'u-cha-yr, 200

ruhs (H. boy) J64

K'u-shih bW Ch'e-shih

K'un Huang, 196

K'un-lun' (Bögtit.), 307, 54i

Kunming (BömøX126

K'tn-ming Gólu, 193

K'un-mo (Wu-sun ututul.86. t02, t6G

K'ung-isc. 136

KadiLoy IKhalkedon), 592

hnfkasya-It, 154. 259. 564. 570, 5r2, ā73

Kalcv "la. 1 1 *

Kalyan B0

Kama, 32R

Kamboçya, 113

Kan-su, 19, 36, 53, 53, 60, 85, 100, 308,
327, 233.'28. 377, 395,, 306,

526

Kang T'ai, 1 1 3

Xanishka,

23R xansk, 56

yaotabir, 533

Xao Ch-o, 32a 323

Xao Hsi, 352, 233

Kno Hu, 390

Kao Husn, 3Z9. 33᠑ 3J.3

lçao Sheng-yñan. 3Y9

Xao-tai, 460

Kao Yung, 456,

Kao-ch'ang, 4'4, 4'26, 165, 479. 486.

316, 563

Itao-kui-yeh-sai, 86

Kao-san (H yabgu), 326

Kao-tsu tLiu Pang), 82, 83

Kara lrtis. 249. 350

Kar "deniz, 95, 61, 139, 2f9. 304, 40S,
542, 346, ss t. 562, 372. eg i. s88,

591

Karagur, 586

xarakall", 5āl

Karakanda, 33, 236

Xarakum. 563

xaæsusuk t küt'am}. '+0, 47, 3J, 32, POS

Karashar (Karashahr, Dman, Yen-kiJJJ,

132. 13+, 135.116, 2f0, 224, 223,

226, 239, 218., 230., 341.

437, t79, 4g3, 187, 616, 3fi3

Karfagen 9fi5

Karimiillin A., 544

Karp-lar, 572, 964

Kxrpat Daglari, 369

Kaspi Oenizi. Caspian W.

Kaşkar (ttsshyarJ. 37, 130, 132. 134,

205, 223, 226, 226, 227, 22b, 237, 23H,

244, 249, 250. 252, 479, S25

Kaikarderya, 133

Katalaun, SI , 577, 587, 58b Kaitigar,
37

Kazakhstan, 39. 47, 34, 130, 132, 182,
303, 325, 542

Keli- ler (Bachtatnalar), SI, 88, 99, 553.

30l , 6ü4, 5ü6

Kerch **tPantikap**), 577

Kezemcl. i i 3

Kctulen (Xcluren, Ku-chu), 173, 3 i0, J37

Kct-ler, 62

Xhaikedozt (KadJk6yl, 592

K'pqak-ta\ (Yceh, 'yc<h-shieh), s+, b\ .

97, 3+7, 330

Kirgiz-Is r. 41. 54, 81, 182, 190, 192,
316

Kirgiz-nor GÖlii, 81

Kitan-far, 49, 319, 336, 336, 337, **38tt, 405,**
437, 489, 910, **535, 545**

Red Army, 1Cl

Kuil Yadi, 186

Kixilderlliler, 13, 944

Kizilkaçtar (Kizi1kaçlilar), 210, 212, 213,
215. 220. 222, 937

Kiiilkum, 563

Ki-of **see** Lao-shang **yabgu**

Ki-to-lo, 101

Kien (ruler of Yarkend), 223, 221, 226,
227

KieD-ch*û {H, ysbgu}. 256

Kien-kun-lar, 54

Kiev, SYB

Cimmerian Bogeç',

376 King (nchir}, 2g,

69

Kingan t Hingan). 31 . 32, 31, 31, 47, 53,
 61, t07, 13S, 314, 328
 KiselelT, S.V., 25, 190, 192
 Kin-she see Chih-shih
 Klabroth. §. von, 22
 Ko-k'un see Ktrgiz
 Kola Yr. Adasl. 3ñ0. 3ñl
 KomeJ Day, 134
 KuriccJcryø, 13 l
 Køneed, 134
 Konffichianismf -ist), 1s, 137, 153, 195,
 196, 101, 203, 203, 319, 358, 371,
 381,
 12i , 440, 440, 446, 430, 4v4, t95,
 49Y,
 198, 302, 311
 Confucius, 13b, 152, 133, 5 l4. 3l5
 Koristoniinopol, SOA, **580, 9h4**, S92
 Konstzntinus Magnus, 374
 Kotistoniinopol. 591
 Kore-li, B4, 127, 127, 120, 139, 332. 334.
335, 336, 38S, 437, **438**, 45G, 47h
 Korenāko V.A. I l.
 Corinthians, S83
 Kozloff, P. K" 24, 206
 Kñgñryo (state and ltabile in Knre),
 333, 336, 333, 3B9, 392, 394, 4jq,
 442, 4'i6, 510
 Kradin N.N., I i
 Kcasnoyxrsk, s6
 Ku-hsi, 92, 173
 Km-li, l4B
 Ku-mo tAksu valley), M7, 244, 4li5
 Ku-iu-how (H. titilii), 218, 220
 Ku-tu-k'u-yabgu. 177
 Kua-chou, B3
 Kusn-chung, 334
 Kusn-lung, 534
 Kuang Wu-ti (Liu Hsiu), 213, 215 218,
 Kuang-'ung, 36,]26
 ħucb, 132, 134, 133, 146, l57, t6b,
 200, 210, 223-227, 237-239, 244,
 249, 252, 422, 479. 487, 525. 365
 Kui-ch'i see Kuça
 Kul-chou, 36,

xui-li tshchir1. 172
 Mini-shan see Ku5sn
 Kui-shu*n see Ku5an
 ft ukunor, 33, 126, 129, 131, 2 21, 329, 355,
 3tl7, ø60. 4b3, 48a

Kuman (Po | ots, SSD

Küner N. V., 130
 Xung Liu (dcvlct adar "i). 2?
 Kung-sun l'finn, 334 xuo
 hkz. Tuan.
 Kuo Mo-jo, 30. 33, l Is
 Kuo-wu Ch'ien-chi t Dan ondcrl), 495
 Kurla, 132
 Bird-rail 132
 Kusan. SS. 146. 147. 152, 22B. 23ß. 249
 Kutørgur 992
 Wake up I Hu-yen) IH. boyii). 9 I . 229.
 236, 239, 2+5, 248, 2'19, 230
 Xuzey Denizi (Høzar Denizi), 644
 Northern Liang, t43. 163.
 North Wei (Tabgoç Imp.), 45fi Kuz-y
 Yc=, +36. 470, 't76, 472
 Ku-habina, 487
 Kociik Asya lAnadolu), 369, 569,, 5fl2
 See Kñçtñh shu. Ch'cn
 Kaçúk Sikifya tDnbruca), 592 Kuçüİt
 Yueçi, 148
 Ktin-chin (Chiin-ch'eng) t H. Yabgu),
 106. 120, 162
 Kyros, lß3

L

Laba, ø73
 Lan (l-l. boyul, 9l, 229, 413
 Lan-chou, 163
 Langobsrd-lsr, 4b9
 Lao-shang (Ch'i-yu, Ki-ok) tH. Yabgu), 99,
 101, 102-106, 143, 162, 264.
 Luo-tse, 136, l 52, 511
 Lattimore, 0., 23, 30. 3+
 adovi' Okyanasu, 260 Lena,
 67, 49, 36, 3fi l

Lenin, 14
 Leo L., 592
 Li Fang, 215
 Li Hao iC. governor), 44d
Li Hin, 215
 Li **Hiin**, 4fi5
 L.. Huang-li, (Erh-shih'), 144, 19ò, 1 97- 1ò0
 Li Kun, 335, 356
 Łi Ling, i 30, 15t, 13.2, t33; 1.77,'69, 1
 9.ĩ, 3ò8
 Li Mn, 67
 Li P'ò tC. said), 14B, 157
 Li -i h (devlct Adam 1, 7Z', 73
 Lt-In (H. length), 164
 Li-jung. 93;
 Li-k'u (place name), 222
 Lt-kan bkž. Tã-thin, Roman
 Li-p'ik tprenslikJ, 483
 Li-fiãfig, 38
 Lizng tregion, 408
 Liang tState) , 35ã.,377.,378: 396, +00,
 010, *J7 4) 9, 421-425, 538, 5Tũ-
 526, 32ò, sh35
 Iv8Hin (Hng) tC. gcn) ; 244, 27
Liang Tou, 39b, 397..405
 Li "ng-chpu, 22, 446, t8t
 Lisrig-tai; 402
 Liaó-ko (Shara Mircn)', 308. 332, 337
 Lfas-hsĩ,, 67,\19,\20, 233.,,
 334
 Limo-tiirig, 67, 10d. 120: 1ò6, 245, 33.2-
 335, 35,9, 389, 390, 390, 3q4, 395: 4ib,
 441, 4S6
 Liam-yang, ž9fi
 Ligecl, L.,.
Lin-ying (city), 330
 Ling-hu, .60: 67
 Ling-tf (Han inip:u), 323
LivznQ*, 587 Liivans
 ,:577
 Liu tkabil J, 2t I
 Liu Ch'ang. 83a

Liu: Fang, 2l 6
 Liu Ho, 351
 Liu Hsi, 375
 Liu Hsien tH. kúmandāri), w02, 434
Liu Hsiu. 212, 213, 215.
 Lĩii **Hsúan** .(H, lideri); 34ö, 379, 404,
 413
 Liu Hu (preñsJ. 333
 Liu Huang, (Ş.,æsi lidêrJ; lš3
 Liu ltAsi leader), 4ş9
 Liu 1-cheng, 463, 464, 465: 4ñ. Liu I-lunğ,
 4ğ8
 LŁu Xu-jett (H, Prince), 4 I'd: 1t9, 411,
 434
 Liu Li-sheet tH. kumanũxni), 6;06, 526
 Liu Lu, ũ3
 Liu Ming , 353
 Liu' Ni (suŖay), 9001
 Liu Pxyg (Xao-rsu'J, 73, 7s, Y3, BI, Ş'47:
 5t8
 Liu Peng-ise, 21l, :2t3, 215
Liu.Pcy, 328
 Liu Teng. 333
 Liz Ts'an, 361, 36a, 366; 367
 Liu Ts'ung, 3+3', 3s.1., 333, 337, .3G1,
 363, 363, 367, 369
 Liu Wei-čh'cn tH. hğkamdär). 4l+, 4l5:
 41.Y., 5l.9, 421, 433-437, 1.¥1,
 44ö, t4B
 Liu Wei-ch'en (T.a. İtũkantdsril 432
 Liu Yao (H. commander,, 3's+, 336- 360,
 3ş4- 376, 397, 403
 Liu Yúan (-hai) (H. yabgusu), 3't4-34d;
 350. 33l; 357, 367, 367, 369, 370, i04,
 603, 4ĩ3
 'Liu Yú kkuui "ndsnJ , 458, 460, 46a;
 463-467, 1b9.
 Liu -Sung, see Sung.
 Liu Ts'ung, 343, 33l, 337; 361, 364.
 363, 369
 Ltu Yúan-hai bĞ, Liu Yfian Lo
 (kasäba, ñihir), 374, 461 Lo
 Kusn-chung, 66

Lo-chien (Ch'in commander. 424

Lo-lu-lar, 1Y8

Lö-t'u. (s'hir', ++3

LÖ-yang,. 59, 350-353, 35fI, 3Y5, 373:

377, 382, 396, 397, 4t2, 'f8, '126,

4z7, 434" H3, 460. 4Gt, 467, 't6n:

51'3" 5i4, 5î7, 323, 328, 329, 'ISE

Lcb-no , 53, 85: 97, 13 t. \4LI, 14I , 143,

146, 134, 164, 487, 565

Lopar-lar, 5bl

Lou-fang, 33., 60., fi7; 72, d.0, 86, 120

Lou-lan, see Shan-sian.

Lu-ksiülcr, 3'3

Lu-li prince, (H. title I) gI, t10 Lu-

shih-ler, 53,

Lucius A. F " 1 29

Lugilet.. 569

Lugov (Ugorl. 36.

Lukchun (Tulturi), 132, 248

Lukianus', 070

Lukoviye Mountains,

t9Â Lun-tu (.BugurJ,

146

Lung (town): 526

Lung-ch'cnğ, 119, \61, t7't, 392, 40D,

412, 436, 47h,

Lutig-hsi, 22t , 222, 242, 243, 243, 334'

Lunin B.V., t I

l.uo (river), 29

Luzitorijlat, 333

Lü Hôu timp.çe), 83

Lü Huang ta. .commander and ruler.

r). '4z., 4z3. +2s, 4+s

M

Ma (dynasty), 908

Ma: Chü (General), 39fi, 4 10

Me Shih-ch'i. 211

Ma-i, el, d2, 117, 11.8: i46, 4+0

Maûaristan, 9.1, 942, 581

Ms in, e9. -}6fi.

Mai-li 23h Mailla,

j.A.M, S3

Miutis, 26t)

Macedonian, Iti 583, 39t

Mal-kk t30

Malay, 378, 451

Man1a'. 3%.3J, 63.'66. 129, Z07, 578.

466

Manai, 133

Manchlrlflar t'Crurçen, Mu- lt'1, M o:ho),

33, 112

Myûçury, 39, 18, t'0., I n7. 10g, t 2s,

t93, 2t9, 24G, z3.1, 328, 33+., 333,

336, 342, 391, 3g3. 105. 43.7:

'436, 3 î0, 347

.Marig Tung (Ch. Genrrnl), 1'55

Mang-hsiang-eh'eng. 241

Mann heist, -ism), 44f. 567, Sâ8, 3H2

Mansa-lar, 55b, 360

Ivlarcus Aurelius, 'î6g Mârûeh

tMordvifiJ Ter, 472 March-

ler, 115

Marius, t36

Markianos, 384

Markomans; 327, 569

Marks X. , 14; 8g

Martin, Vivien de St., 22

Mpximinus, 5fi7

McGövern, \V., 23, 33

Iste:-te (Mo-le., Mo-Olun) (H. yabgu), 72,

79-83', b4- I'08, 120, 143, 'I SY,

162, 1fi5. 213: 216.: 217, 229, 220,

236, .239, 2+8, 263: 264, **370: 383,**

446, 547, 548

MtiJia, 6 i . 57 t Mediolanftm

(Mildnn), 3tJ7 Mexico, 8Â

Meml "k, 303

.Mtnğ-sun (H. hûkcmdart, ,yabguJ, 44'+,

+43, '46, 4s1, 4s3, 46n, ty", 'y3

Meng (yabgü), 32'f., 326,

Meng T'ien, 72. 73. fiI

kjtren (Meryâ) s, 472

Merya (Çcremis), 56 I

Mûsagetlet, **55**

M crnpotamy, 129, 5 "i.S, 'îç1.1

- M,s'r-li-lat, **363**, S4J, 5bÂ, 3ü2
 Mi-neg-ler. 32ü
 Mi-l'ang, 2+2, 243, 2W
 MI-wu (Ch'iang kumandsnł),. 222, 241
 Min-ii (Chis imp.J, 33d; 560, 3fi ł.
 Ming-it tC. imp),. 220
 Minoriky V., l's'
 M inusinsk. 39, 40" 5(i, fi1, 109, '1 a 1,
 190, 944, 5ø 5
 Mirzachnl tGolodnoy lozkinJ, 102, 1 *tl
 Mitra (8horvBon), 115, 3li. 44Ö, 5b7,
 5b8. 37+
 Mo-ch'oi, 147" 1 4S
 Mo-ch'i Chuo-wu-riu, 526
Mo-ho bkz. Çurçenler
 Mo ho-\\ (yabgu), 319
 Mo-tē see Me-te
 Met-tun, see **Me-te**.
 Mogol-lar, 23, 33, 54, 62. 71 . B+, 9.İ.
 98, IOO, 107, 105, J 1 2, 2S4, 237,
 260, 25 I, 3D6., 3 T 2, 328', 33.6, 3J8:
 SI'0, ā41, ō40., 550
 MOğOİİSian Altailan111,13323b503,
544
 Mogoİistan, 21. 39, '12, 47, 5 I., 32, 3'1,
 35, ø1, C1, 95, 110, 112. 1 14,190.
 306, 307, 3G8, 309, II 2, 337,. 4 İB.
 542, 544. i45. 949
 M9ktátUgor), ñò I
 Mongöloid 'type, }7, 31, 41, 41, 4.7, 3 2', 53,
 62, 109, 11a.'1 I" iÔ6, 2Ó7, 2s0,
 26Z, 3.\\6, ā27, }Zb'. W4, 34?
 Mördvin tMordva) tar, 561 Mu
 Kui 475
 M u-jung thancilan i:, 302, 394, 4d1
 M u -junk (tribe) 53, 32s. 329. 330,
 332, 334, 337, 37fi. 3B8, 389, 391,
395, 404, 405, 406, 413, 418, 427,
437-442, 450, 546, 458, 489, 490
Mu-jung Ch'ao, 458
 Mu-jp ng Ch'ui. 4 1 2, 4 1 b, 4 19, 42 I,
 '4*4-42d, 432. 434, 4 37, 43q, 45fi
 Mn-yong Ch'uoq,, s31, 492
 Mu-jung Ch'un, 394, 400, 403, 407,
 410: 912
 Mn -jung Hatt, 3fi9, 390, 391, 391, 392,
 364 Mu-jung Hoi-i, z32, 33a., 389
 Mu-Jung Hsi; **441, 456**
 Mn -jting Husng, 38B, 3ø2, 3s+
 Mtr-jungġ Hti-ei, 441.
 i'vlu-jting jeii, 390
 M u-j'ung K'o:ø, 402, 403. 411, 41d
 Mu-jung King; 43fi, 441
 ° J°^h **Nung**, 327
 Mn-junk, P'ing, 418
 lVlu-j uriġ Pão. 426, 440; 4-1 Ĩ, 442
 Mn-jung She Kui (She Ch'ui), 329 Mn-
 junk Sh'eng,. 442
 Mn-jurist T'o, 44a, 99B
 Mu-jung Wei, 412, 419
 Nlu-jung Yn, 454, 442
 M u-kiēri t H. yabgusuJ, 463, 47.ft, 4b0,
483
 :Mu-kut LTo. hani). qY4
 Mu-kunġ, 60
 Mu-'kuø ,146,t1g
 Mn-II 'Yen (Töham)481483502
 Mu-wan (kābile), 3d9
 Muahhar Hatt, 213
 Muahhar Liang,. S IS
 Combatant ġtup t.H. party), 173, 17d
 Mujuiikum" 182
 Muklen, 369
 Mukri (Mo-Şu, Churçcn), 336, ā03
 Muncuk, SB2
 Muu (H. ytens 1. 215, 220
 Muø-huo-pa (S. prince). 329
 MurznycIT, E.M., 2'+
 Musl0mānl't, 115
 Na (}. prensi), 453 4fi4
 Naissus, SC4
 Nan-liu, 12S
Nan-shan, 32, 66, 99,101, 126, 131,
221, 395, 410, 417, 436, 444, 450,
452, 460, 465, 542

Nang-chi Ya-sih' I Chi), .200

Nankin, 35I , 403

Nänöi-vändak, 3S4 Napoleon,
363

Nairn, 1.86

Nedao, äð3, 577,. 588.; 39J

Nénerzler, i00

Ngzpe6kz.K3i-Yusn

Ngayu (Huxlar), 334

Ninlma (?): **334**

Ni-mi, 180, 1Bt

Nibeŋunga Deŋeŋi, 593, 394

Ntkitin B., t5.

Nəveh t(ʃ)lāk) l'm. 33I. 33ñ

Niztp, 363

Nogay 5Y3

N.oiñ-uiá, 191, 206, 259, 35J

Nonni, 336

Norik, 373, 5B9

Nhrveç: 'iŋt

o.o

O-lö-ci, 56

:Obi, 339 , Süò, 3b I

Ləbruçeff, V:A, , 24

Odensihùs, 3ğ9 ödin,

I 14 Odôvakqr, 57a,

389 ogiaht, 19ö

Ogot tÜgor), 592

Okladnikoff, A, P., 2§, 4Î: 49, 50, 51,

G1, 336

Olga (prensas), 575

Olibiion-lar, 3R7

Omsk., 339

Onngur (Onnogur). 504, 9B9 Onöi:

337

Oratepe **bl;z**. Erh-shih

Ordni, 39, 50, \$1 , S3, 54, 50, S9, 72,

d0, a6, i 14, 1 zfi, i z2, 1 40: 1 43, i -

a, 1s3, 1 s4, io4, 165, 1 67, 193,

163, 307, 307, 30B, 312, 3i5, 139,

397.

3iiÖ. 379: 0i35, 407. 41 3-415, 419.

3ZO, i3i--i7, 4i6-4So, 4s3; 4s+,
Ä7B-470, 473, P.47, 550, 596

Orhon: 4.1 5, 57 I

Orléans, 987

Ona Oasis, 114, 305: 362', 387; 399,

403, i0ö, 41 2,. s25, s35, 539,

94fi, 54.7

Grt"-A sia: 1 4, 6;. 1 2s, i 32, 133. 1 i4,

182. 189, 23H, 257, .262, 479,

503;-5Ôs, 516, sz5;, 547, 551,

554" 5ö4, 570, 590

Oimänli, 41.b

Osiäk tHarit') lar, 5Sö

Ostropoph-lar. 264, 572, 373. 377. 579.

5äo, b4, SBM, San Oi,

569

Thirty Tatars see 'Shih-wii 'Ovdienko 1-
H., 44 I

My vote, 55'5

Cm Ch'e-shih, 22fi, 299.

Öngñt-ter, 590

Øzbek-let, 41, S2

Özü (Dinyeper), 576

P

P'-hin-ch'eng, B3

P'an-ho tS. :chieftain),

219 P'an-. i'ø.

(hz1el,...226

P'ei-juùg see, Shan-jung

P'ei-ti tkaliile); p3,: 10s

P'i I H. yabgu): 216, 217,. 21B; 219, 220,
230

P'l (Ta. prince); 4ö0

P'ing (kasnba) s2ö.

P'ing Ch'eng, B I , tl2, 470, 47 I " 487.

492, 3 Î0, 14

P'ing K'u see K'ai P'ing

P'ing-ti, 196, 158

P'in8'wanfi, 59

P'ing-wen-ti t tmp.); 332

P'ing-yang, 3S'l 4GI, 3n7, 3h9

P'u i Fri I Huùh I:T. leader I. 400. 40H. 410 P'u
(pienslik), fi9

P'u-ch'eng (kaleL 421
 P'u-nu (H. ysbgu), i 18, i20, 22d, Pa
 tH. yabgv), 246, 3Y0
 Pa-ti, 247
 Pa-sat g ttical), 74
 Pakçe (üev\ec'), 334,
 Pai-lang (kabilc), 327
 Pat-lung (H. kumandānū, 473
 Pai-shih, 242
 Pii-fcng, 8 l , 82, Ī 58
 Pai-ti f Baydi) see K'u
 Palcosibirya, 96. 546.
Palmira, 569
 ramir t Knmcd Dagi), 150, 133, 134;
 238, 328. 563
 f'an.'(Ermēni krālīJ, S.ōt
 Pan Ch'ao, 225, 226, 227", 228, 237,
 23B, 239, 2+8
 Pa n Ka, 20, 19.4, 19a, 2Z9. 593,
 Pan Yung; 24d, 249, 250
 Pā*-shiing, 15 "l 247
 Pan-tou tbehir), 323. 334
 Pānnnnya, 580, i82, 588, §S9, 591, 591
 Pynl iltap (Ketq), 577
 pio-sih, 59
 Parker, J" 22
 Parth-lar, '37, fi i" 139, 18G, 209, 238,
 2S-1, 5+6. 565, P72
 rarthya, 129
 Pasiir Orya "usu, 4l s
 Paviai Sd7
 Pait Rorrana, 136, 303
 Pip .sinica l 3o, ttts, 303
 Pzz i rik- lilar (Yue;ilet) , 9 J, 191,192,
 306, 543
 Pei-hsf, 239
 Pei-shan tBey\an), l Bl, l'f3, 239 rei-
 Li (Doku "Kansuj, 239. 232', 339
 Beijing (Chi-ch'en), | I g, 329; 331, 33ö,
 400,,140, 436
 Pelliói, P., 12, 62
 Pence, t 34
Penza, 573

Perekóp (Prekopius), 576, 578i 98S
 Pirs-fer., 1B3; 437, 46ò, 543" 553. **563**,
 564, 569: 372
 Peru, bJ3
 Pevisoisf, ni. v: 24, 13i
 Phil;imcr (cci Orrin), as i, US, s5s Piçan,
 133
 Planiaginei, 50i Pliny, 134
 Po, 585,'3tl7
 Pu- hsii-r'ang tH. yabgu), l'79, J 7fi.,
 Po-tu Han Pa-ling, 326
 Po-nu (Ç. general), L41 ,143

 Po-terig; l'i7.
 Po-lertg-ning-lī. l 37
 Podneprov, 59 l
 Poland. S8o
 Poloyes (KumanJ, 543.
 Potai in, G. N., 24 Povolje
 tPavolje), 47, l1s
 -Pòzdnryeff D. S l6
 Prince Fzn., 2'l.I
 Prince Hsiang, 39:
 Pri-Amurye, 336
 Primorye, 33c
 Piiskos, 2h4, 9ttl
 'Prisisillian, 5fiB
 Prjevalskiy, N.M., 29, 31, i2
 Proio-Avrupai, 109
 Prui. 573, 979
 Psedo-av*r, 504
 Ptolemaeus; 36, 37, 53, 134, S35, 570
 Pu ,tSu-pu- H. bnyuJ,4l3
 Pu -lei, 133', l7 i
 Pu-nu '(?) River, lso
 Pun-lsr: 96d
 Puð-ch'i, see Pzkpe.

Q

9uads, 569

R

Radagais, 580

Rarnstedt, M.G..5. , 65
 Ramusaı. A . Z2
 Reşü'û4-din, 36
 RTten, 568, 369, FBI, 5R1
 Rhon tvadısıl, 581
 Ripxr (Ripuar), 387
 Ritsimi r, 392
 Roburovskiy, V,1., 29
 Roks-Alanlar(Alnn), 571
 Roma- (Li-kan1 1', 37, 98, f29, 139,
 147, Ig6, 188, *08, 23'f, 26t, 320,
 341, 413, 503, 551, 332. 353, 533.
 536, 562-372, 374, 377, 5B0-384,
 386. 38g, 592
 Romei-ler, 374, 5B9
 Romulus, 415
 Rosnmon-lar. 372, 570, 573, 574, 575
 Ros monka Sonılda, 578
 Ross, 3g0
 Rudenko. 5. I., I t, z3
 Rugi tRugot) s, 369, 373, 574. 575.
5R0, 384, 586, 589
 Rugila, 580, 581, 581, 582, 585
 Rugor-lat, bLz. Rugi Rum,
 369
 Rus, 115, 543, 3Sö, 970, 575
 Rusys, 11, 51, 254

S

patience (Sabir) far, 259, 504, t71, 589
 Sadagi-s. 39t
 Saırach 3R0
 Saha see YarkenJ
 Szhara, 133
 Saka tSaL, Iskit, Çak) lar, 87. }02, t34.
135, 238
 Saks-laf, 378, 5B7
 Saxon, 569
 Szmnit, 100
 Samoyeds, 560, **589**
 San-Hun-yang, 137
 Sang-fu, I t9
 Sazaga bt'z Lo-yang

Sata, g, ur, 304, 50'i, 580, 39'f
 Sarbi bki Siyenpi
 San River bR. Huang-he
 Yellow Yellow, 252, 441, S2b
 Sarısu, lb2
 wrapping -lar fYazigiler 1. 61, 139, 2f 4,
 303, 946, 554, 599, 962, 570-573,
 577. 5H5
 Sarmays, 129, 130, 562
 Sarns. S7s
 Saturn, 11 4
 Ssut, 17b, 236. 504, 342, 31g, S3U
 Sava, 3BB
 Warrior Party, 2t7, 230
 Savır. 592
 Savitskiy, A.P., 11
 Sayan, 41, 52, 34. 7 I , 81, 159, 205, 246.
 234, 542, 544
 Sayan-Altaians, 25, 31, YO, 55, SIL ti4,
 110, 119
 Transparent (translucent, translucent). 53. s5,
 329, 4d3 Scipio, 136
 Selenge, 94, 153, 156, 156, 175, 339, 415,
 553, 571
 Sen-ho-p'u tvadi}, 439, t39, 440
 Ser-ler, 37, 33, I 29, 134
 SeTebrennittoff B.A., 261
 Seref, 5Y3
 Srika, 37, 134, '263
Seu (Prenslık). 58
 5eu-ma Imp.gu, 39
 Sever see Sibizya
 Sevetaite see 5ibiryali
 Sewuki bki. Siberian
 Scylan, 37
 Sha chou (principality. 217
 Sha-mo (She-mo), 53. 72, 130
 Sha-sai, 30, 40
 Sha-t'n, 506, 550
 Shan-fu, (Ch. prince),
 29 Shan-jung, 33, S3, 39
 Shan-huo. 239
 Shan-lin, **206**

- Shzn-shan, Bb, 141, 159, 123-22b, 237, 247, 248, **149, 308, 360, 395**, 422, 444, 479, 485-487, 536, 565
- Shan-si, lb, 53, b7, 73, 74, 81, B2, 123, 136, 141, 157, 212, 251, **308**, 311, 3H, } S5, 336, 407, 314, 4Z7, 432, 434, M, 4H, 4q1, 494, H6, 51S, 326, S 27, 532
- shan-iii ng, 1 lb, 324, 34C, 374, 407, 412, 426, 441. T'l2, 458, 498, 507, 926, 334
- Shang thanedan), 2S, 30, 34, 3S, 43, 51, 74, S8, fñ9, 84
- Shang Yang, 69, 1g5
- Shang-ling-Yuan, 193
- Shang-shu (history book), 36
- Shang-ii tinnro 3S
- Shang-yin see Sheng
- Shao-i'ang, 221
- 8hi Yin {Tu, h-nO. 302
- She-i Kien tTabgac hani) 3ßb, 415, 519, 432
- Shh-lun U hani}, 437
- She-wu-hsiang-ch'rng, l 43 143, 165, 179
- Shen-ming-t'ai, 193
- Shen-s i, 29, 34, S3, 60, 09, 212, 221, 252, 3oß, 325, 327, 353, 373, 37s, 387, 395, 395, 39b, 4ß7, 4OR, 410-414, 420, 426-42S, 451, 425, 493, 444, 460-4fi3, 466, 467, 467, 469, 474, 4ti4, 498, S06, S13, 533, 534, 948
- Shen-tu bkx. Hitndistan
- Sheng t preis), 59
- Shih Ch'iin, 397, 398
- Shih Ch'i tH. general), 397, 398, 39fi, 400, 402
- Shih Chien, 398
- Shih Hsttan, 3R3 38'
- Shih Hu, 334, 371-3Y8, 380. 1dl-381, 388-391, 395-398, 'f03, 40a. 't43, 450
- Shih Hung, 377
- shih K'ang, 377
- Shih K'un, (from kum8n), 399, 4o0
- Shih **Liang** (Ptens), 377
- Shih Lo (H. commander) 347-3S 2, 3S6, 359, 2fi4, 365, 3fi7, 3fi9-376, 383, 397, 405, 4S0
- Shih Min, see Jzn Min
- Shih P'ing, 397
- Shih Pan I prince), 396
- Shih Sheng, 375, 377
- Shih Sui (prcns), 3d3
- Shih-Hu tDagli Hu (Huns), 50G, 516
- Shih-hiang-ti bkt. Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, Shih-k'i tShih-chih-Ei southern Hun kuman-**from'**) 234, 23S, 240, Z4t, 242, **246**
- Shih-xvei totuz Tstars), 337
- Shit-k'i, 1S9
- Shiratory, K., o3, aß,
- Shou-ch'ung, 404, 424
- Shou-yszng (Dale), 'i24
- Shu-han, 320
- Shu-lo-k'atig (To. prcnsi), 460
- Shurig Wei, 30, 31, 91, 263, +47
- Shuo-fang (Sofaii), 120, 127, 154, 204
- Sitderya tYaitsart), 99, 101, 134, 1 B2, S36, 371
- Siberia-li, 25, 29, 31, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 51, 56, 10ß, 109, 111, 111, HS, I CO, 245, 296, 257, 259, 326, 337, 339, 419 404, 542, 543, **54s, 556**, S99, 571, 5ß1, **5d9, 590**
- Sih-ch'uan, 3ö, f3, 74, 308, 320, 327, 32s, 342, 373, 387, 419, 422, 424, 4ö7, 4d4
- Sih-ma Ch'icn. 19, 33, 42, 46, 67, d0, 82, 11, 123, 152, 153, 21ß, 539, S93
- Sih-ma Cho, 349, 352
- Sih-me Hi, t7t
- Sih-ma Hu, 358
- Sikh-majut, 338, 539, 360, 36t
- Sih-ma Lux, 341, 342
- Sih-ma Mu, 3S3
- Sih-ma T'eng. Z43. 34u, 34y

- Sih-ma Tao-tse, 443
 Sih-ma Yen320, 521
 Sih-ma Yīng, 342, 344, 345, 3'f9
 Sih-ma Yu, 2+2, 2ø4, 34'5, 34fl, 349,
 350, 352
 Sih-you Huaī, 389
 Siirīya, 360
 SiLh-ler, 1 lñ
 Silesia, 3t
 Silfa (deviet), 334, IU
 Singidunum, 584
 Sinkiang, 141
 Sinias Küliürii, fi 1, p46
 Sirbi see Siyenpi
 Sirmium, 384
 Sirvi, see Siyenpi
 Siyertpt t07, t08, I 66, 20Y, 214, 2t9, 23i,
 233. 23'.236, 237, 240, 24I,
 23t -Z39, 3t , 305, 3 i0. 3 t5-3ig,
 323-339, 341-362, 38Y-39Z. 396,
 40 I -405, 408. +I 1 . 412, 415. 416,
 4 18-428, 431-43a, 439, 440, 444,
 445, 447, 447, 44B. 450. 4S2, 459,
 465,
 472, 473, 481. 487, 45q, 490, 492,
 503, 509, 6 I I. 5i3, 3t4. 319, 327.
 328. 332-335, 337, 53B, 345, 3+7,
 549-353, 535, 536, 571
 Skandtnav, ā76
 Sksxđiriavlar, }00
 Skandza (Skandinavia), 262, 579, 481 Skif
 see Skit
 Skifjm, 376
Skir-ler, 572, 586
 Sklavenlct, 574
 Slavic (Ant)s, 9B, 113, 341, **559,**
 570, 577, 583, 584, 58G
 So Ch'cng, 360
 So-kui see Yarkend
 Sogdiyana-II (Sogdlu, Sogdsk, sogdoi',
 96, 99, 101, 103, 127, 1 z8, 133,
 140, It3, i4-3, 163, 164. I66, 182,
 1B9, 200, 238, 3C7, 312, 3t6, 354,
 3Bl, 479. 543. 317. 534. 365. 572
 Next Ch'in (Ti. hal'ar "dntligO, 431,
 439. 436, 445, 445, 446, 450, PSI, 4d0
 Next Char tH. State) 371, 372,
 3Yb-379, 381, 382, 381, 38B, 390-
 396. 't10, 451
 Next Khan, 337
 Somali Lixng (Ta. state) 44'f, 6'tš,
 450
 S"nrxki Yen, t2ü, +32, 43i
 SosnevsLiy G.P., n1
 SOv}'Cüür BITIIng. 14
 Srinagar, t30 Stein,
 A., 22, Slilichn, 'i
 78, 5i10
 Strabo, 12B, 134, 181
 Suyabgu, 104, 220
 Su-chou. 433, +63
 Su-hi (kabile), 389
 Su-hsi-yth, 182
 Sii-hsia-jo-ti-yabgu 197
 So-le tKashkar), 969
 Su-le-ho, 131
 So-pu (H. length), 91, 209. 229
 Su-pu-snog, 209, 210
 So-i'u-hu-pien, Z09
 Søeb-ler, 327, **569**, SBO, 581, 592
 Sui (dynasty and empire, 126, 838 Sun
 Ch'üan ts. gen.), 320
 Sun-tung 458
 Suns thanedan and devlci) 364, 457,
 467, 469, 470, 470, 472, s7S, 478, 484,
 495, 498, 501, 502, 510, 540
 Sung Ong ITao), 443 Sung
 Tai ITao Önüeri), 4't3
 Sung-ki , I TO
 Sungari, 332. 33+, 336
Suñy, 5D9. 581

§

 Shapur II, 563, 364
 Shsm Mûreri blcz. Liao-ho
 Shiver hmltum, 3 I, 52
 Sons, t90. 19i

T

T'a-jung, 33
 T'a-lü tWu-sun prince), 192
 T'a-yang-yi, 12B
 T'ai tprenslik), h0, B2
 T'ai-kung, 121
 T'ai-sh*n, 132
 T'ai-wnn, 3i4
 Tai-yaan bkc. Sh3n-st
 T'an Tao-c hi tsung gen.), 4fiH
 T'an-shih-huai, 12. 253, 294, 255. 256.
 257, 265, 335, 530
 T'ang tC dynasty and state). 76, 197, 53fl.
 540
 T'ang-rh'ang, 327, 470, 510
 T'ang-t'u, 200
 4'an-ho (river), IO6
 T'han, 242, 246
 T'i tH.prensil 220
 T'ie-le tTI-li, Di-li, Tóles,Telr")ler.
 +t7, 134, 437, 4+2
 T'icn-lan, 12, ZZ I
 T'irn -shan tTanrl DaglsnJ, 33, 99, 101,
 111, 123, 130-133, 141, 146, 130,
 154, 1B7. I. I fl4. 198, 236, 19*,
 314, 423, 499, 499, 480, **505**, 541,
 SSO.
 9fi3-565
 T'ien-wu, 221, 222
 T'n-pa- Wei, (Dynasty and its times, 105.
 107, 338, 432, 434, +3B, 450, 461.
 4fi7-470, 472. 473, 475-477, 479,
 480. 4B4-1ü6, t80, 490, 't93-4q5,
 49b, 900-502, 50fi, 510, 511, SI,
 323. 529, 333
 T'o-ça Hang, 300
 T'o-pa Hao (Yuan prince), 330
 T'o-pa Me, 533, 336
 T'o-ḡa Hsün, TOY
 T'o-pa Hua, 333
 T'o-ps Huang. 496, 500
 T'o-pa Hung I, 907, 508, S12
 T'o-pa Hung II, 5i , 513- 3tY, 324, °i23
 T'c-pa I, 323, 324. 326
 T'o-ps Xicn, +39

T'o-pa Km, 436-434, 446, 44b, q 56,
 477, 479, 490, 491, 491, 49a, 494, 400
 to-pa Kung tTung Hai), 533
T'o-pa t'oo see Yüan Kuo T'o-
 pa Lan, 333
 T'o-pa Sscu. **116**, lb I . 167, 1f8, 470,
 493. 500
 T'o-ya Ṭao, 16Lt. -170-677, -179- 1g7.
 s9, "u0, '93-495, 502 503, 49s- öG I ,
 S11, U4
 T'o-pa Tsr-yu tChung-ti), 329 330 531
 fl32
 T'o-pa Yih-liu see Yih-liu
 to-pa Yii, 500 ROI
 T'oLl Hicn (Ch... gen), 235
 T'u Ch'ung, 240, 241
 l'u-an Su-ya th dui}, 4S2
 T'u-ch'i-t'ang see Wu -yen-chu-fc
 T'u-ho-ch'en, 503
 T'u-hau UI. ttcüLüJ, 413
 In-lung-ki (H. prerts) , 173, 174, 175,
 177
 T'u-man-kang (n-hir), 333
 T'u-yu (H. nñtbesi), 92, US, 229
 7'u-jrc-hun tkabile) see Tojton
 7'uman see Teoman
 T'un-tu-ho (Guztey H. yabgusu), 23t, 2a0,
 2fi
7a-chin see Li-kan, Roman
Ta-clan-kang (nehit), 333
 Ta-i (kabilc). 182
 Ta-l^B-ho (river), 441
 Tabgach 432, +35-438, +10, ++2.
 'l46, 448, 430, 'l36, 46i , 162, 46g-
 476, 48t, 4ü3, 'l3, 486, 489-493,
 4g5-31ü, 32i-527, 329, 531 , 532,
 340, 349, **303**, 309, 310, 3 i7, 223,
 224, 337, 338, 339, 342, 353-337,
 37t, 372, 377, 3ü8. 390, 4i 3, 1t5-
 417, 432. 435-438, 440, 442, 444.
 446, 448, **450**, 456. CGI, 462, 469-
 47d, 481, 483. 4C5, 48fi, 489-993,
 495-51B. 521 S27, 529, 531 , 532,
540, 549

- Tajik-fer, 52, 198
Tajikistan 130
 Tagar tkültiriiJ, 4D, 52, 109, 190
 Tagars, 343
 Tai tprenslik), 336
 Tai see Wcl (devief/hancdan) Taifal - s. 57Z
 Takla Mskan, 06, 13 I, I32, Ili, +g3 Talss (valley), 182, I H6, IAH
 Taman Yr" 576
 Tzng-ho, dó. 129, 1 31,
 Tang-hsiang-lar, 327, +35
 Tnng-hu (Ulm Tang-hu: H. nshesi1, 92, 106, 229, 413, 547
 Tang-hu-lar, 226
 Tang-liang, 6d
 Tanktii tTangutJ. 33, tis, 97, 117. 120. 141, 193, 222, 241, 246. 303, 323, 32Y, 328, 371, 387, +07, 40B, +10-42R.
 Tsnkui 431, 4Z1, **434**, 433, **444**, 447, J50, 151, 4ü I, 16g, +Y0, 473, 481, 494. 495, 409. 502, 3.6, 33R
 Tanri Daglan (T'ien-shan), 571 Tao, 475
 Tan-ho tnehir). 931
 Taoisi, 450
 Tarhagaizy, 131 176,152,152,18a, 239. 254, 262, 306, 310. 325, 903, 504, 542, S49, **559**, 571
 Tanm. 22, 37, 131, 115, 422, 479, 593
 ToS-Kurgan, 132
 Tarkent, tÇaçJ,131, 479
 Tasuk kultut-u, 110,190,192. 207
 Books, 332, 409, 437, 489, 516
 Talar-lar, l8. 336
 Taymir 544
 TA-wu-lo-ch'u t H. yabgu), 246, 256
 Teao-chi(lviesopotamyait) s, 129
 Telenpits, 207
 Teleüt (T'ie-le, Oi-li, Ti -le, Tölcs) s, 489, +99, 505510, 51fi, 521, 525, **525**, **526**
 Tengiz GöIG, 182
 Teoman. 72. 79, 507
 Terck, 304, 390
 Terrart, 22.
 Tevtobursk, 5fi9
 Theodosios 11, 379, 584, 592
 Thessalia 553
 Thompson li.A., 37
 Ti PhngtTinR-#npkumandOn). 917
 Ti-(Di, Tsnkut), 2R, 33, 31. 37, LI . 15, 33, 3'?, 247, 309, 323, 324. 327, 128, 37n, 5Y3, 3B2, 3B7, 39fi. t7, 410. 128, -I31 , +33, 460. 'h-g, 4ft4
 Ti-li fTi-le, T'je-le, Telt, TnleS}, 41, Sfi, 154
 Ti-tou-wu-kan tkabile), 337 Tiberiar, 5d3
 Tiberio.e, 37Y
 Tibef-li, 33, 34, 36, 36, 53, b3. R5, Bb, 100, 109, I I3, 126, 128, 129, I34, 135, 220, 242, 242, 305, 307. 3t Y, 323, 32Y. 32fi, 302, 371, 371, 372. 367, 396, 39Y, 400. 'f0\, 403, 403, 40't, 408, GIO, 120, 42t . 427. 12B. 431, 434- 436. 413-445, 947, 450, 9b0- 463, 469. 470, 473, 483, 494, 495, 498, 499, 502, 510. p 14. 534. 540. 542. 54R
 Tibet-o-Birman, 327, 451
 Tibet-o-Slycnpi, 330
 Tigros, 139
 Tiria, 37,
 Ting-Hsiang, 123
 Ti ng- íng Daglari see Siyenpi D glari Ting-ling-İcr, 30, 34, 10, 4t , 52, SA, 3fi, **71**, **81**, **97**, **109**, **114**, **155**, **156**, 1b8, 17z, 164, 190, t9I,192, 203. 233, 234, 236, 236, 240, 2+6, 25t, 326, 327, 32B, 387. 537. P43. 547
 Tisza, 972
 Togon (T'uyuhun) 329, 330, 4HJ, t22, t6U, 467. t73-476. 479, 683-48s. 902. 907. 510. 513, pp24-52f

Tohar (Ifagiir llar, SS, 119, 134, t35
 ToIs'off, S.P., 94,3]
 Toe\$,533
 Tölcs Gols, 91
 Tmianiis, **569**
 Thrace, 3Q3, 591
 Troy, 34
 Ts'an P'i, 319
 Ts'ap Ts'ao (Ç general), 29fi, 319. 32S,
 328
 TS'ao-Wei 'haoedan), 3i 9, 320, 323, 3B2
 Ts'e-kvi, 30
 Ts'i (kpsaba) 326
 Ts'ian-ch'iu-jungicr, 53 Ts'in
 see Ch'in
 Ts'ung Kao, 495
 Tu-lo (S. kabitsi), 41'i. 448, 159, 460.
 483, 5'f0
 Tu-ku tH. length), 414
 Tuan tKuo), 319. 332. **356. 359. 359, 388,**
389, 390. 391. 392, 396, 405
 Tuan Fan tC. gen), 252
 Tim-huang. 54. B5. 80,144,145. 244.
 247-2SO, 252, 3d 1, Pla, 461, 481,
 4B5-487, 565
 Tuna. 3 '2. 362. 368. 569, 37\ , 572,
 373, 5Y6, 5Y9, 3B0, 38] , 56+, 5g3,
 392
 Tung ChtJng-shu, i93
 Tung-hu-lsr, 33, 53, 60, 6J , 67,, 7t,
 72, g0, 81, R8,96, 100, 107, 337
 Tung-wan 'f70 471
 Tunguz, 3t, 72, l 14, 33a, 338
 Tuo-ch'cng-fer, 33
 Tuzan-1t, BÜ. 182, 306
 Turfan (Cukuru), 422, 444, 405, 479,
 485-487, **502-505**
 Turfan-li, 52, 132, 133 13a, lb6, 249.
 3t6
 Tuva, 40,
 Tub Dan, 132
 TBdo (Ç.udl, 572

Turciling, 584
 Targei-ler, 505
 Türingi-fer, 584, 386
 Turkish Hakanligi, 540
 Terk-lcr,t7 62. 78, 93. t91. Z37, 26a ,
303, 312, 31b, 416. 483, 192, 303,
 506, 541, 545, 561, 506, 591 . 593,
 394
 Türkistan, b4, 9fi,

U-U

Ugor-Fin 584

Ugor-lar, 19, 33, 1D0, 1B2, 2+3, 234,
 237, 259, 260- 2f3, 303, 503, 504,
 538-562, 5B6, 591
 Ugor-Ssmold, 259, W6, 46t
 Ultzingur, 591
 Ulu i'v-yti, 143
 Ural, 19, 39, 203. 2'i4. 299. 3Q4, 325.
 551, 5b0-S62
 Urnl-Altai, 17
 Uranha-far, fY, 24
 Uranus, 114
 Urkatahr, 23fi
 Utog (UgorJ, 389
 Urumqi, t40,184
 Urungu, 133,1B1
 Uspcnki V., 86
 Ussuri, 48, 2s, 336, 542
 Uiurgur, 992
 Uxus, 571
 Uybat. 191
 Uighurs 54, 62, 542 Uzboy.
 502
 UrTfiWn (Wtnsu) , 139.244, 149

V

vahan (Valley), 132,
 Valentinlanus, 587, 592
Valentinos, 579
 Valerianus (Roman Imp.), 563, 509
 Yandsl-lar, 569, 572, 575, 980, 581 ,
 383, 5C8

see Abar

Varro, 569

Vsruna (Indian god), 114

Var t(Ves), sY2

Vasilyeft V.P., III

Venedn tSlavians, 969, 572, 572, 57s, 578

Vinitarius, 579, S8O

Vipper R.Yu. 11

Višnila, 95S. 573 Yivien

de Sl. *W ri'n*,

Yizigot-lzr573578 578579581986,
987

Vogul (Hant, Mansal lan, 356, 338

Volga, 4O. 183, 185, 185, 207, 254, 259, 260,
261, 303, 304, 323, 549-957, 961,
562, 570, 571, 377, 581, 984, 589,
590

W

Wzlw, 586

WangtEowhùn. 209

Wang Chien, 73

Wang Chün, 345, 349

Wang Feng. 211

Wang Hsúan, 57

Wsg Hsiün, 33t , 3'iò, 338. 339

Wang K'ai, j lB, UI Wan\$ kuang, 211

Wsg Kung. 143

Wang Mang, 196, 198, 200-206, 209-
2j 3. 222, 316, 537, 338, 3SI

Wang, 4t B

Wang **Mi (Lumandan), 33t**

Wang Sheng-sheti, j47

Wang T'u-kci (gon,), 485-487

wengtun {gcncæ1} , 373, 3Z

Wang Yang (Wu sun h'un-mosu), 352

Wei tvadi, river), 59, 353, 4Oß, 414.
42B, 461-463, 470-473, 498

Wei see T'o-pa Wei

Wei Ch'ing (E. itumandan). 119, 120,
122, i 24, 125

Wci Lio, T'i9. 130, I33, I 3ô, 15g, 160, 163

Wei Lû 20B

Wei-ho (nehirl, 27, 43t

Wei-hou-i, i80

Wei-p'i see. 8iyenpi

Wen Ha-ti f,Jttjan kan\), 433

Wen-su see Uç-Turf3n

Wen-li (Ch.). B3. I+I. 10ü, I3fi. 193

Wen-ti fsung Amp.u), 46B

Wen-wang (Chnu hiikämdari), 34, 4fi

Wen-yü-ti, 229

Wu tl ratlik). 83. 320, 321, 333, 334

Wu Ling, 67

Wu-ch'ñ-chang, 241 242

Wii -chi bkt. Eütçncler

Wu-chi-yabgu, U6, 177

Wu-chic hlu-ii (ruler of Kucha), 8fl7

Wu-chu-liu tjœii) yabfiii.197,198, 200, 205,
206, 209, 209, 216, 217, 5S4

We-chunk, 53,

Wii-ch'u-t'u (Wu-sun k'un-mosu), IH1 .
183,184,198

Wu-hO-i (H. prcnsi), 4R 1, **48a-4S7**,
493

Wu-huøn tdagJ,

Wu-huan-lat, 80, 10Y, 108, I23, I fi3, 164,
t63. I6ô, 168,i73, UB, 200,
284, 2D9, 2q0, 2I9, 224, 231, 241.
245, 24ô, 255, 323, 344. 405, 411,
415, 427

Wu-i (uy) .bkvUeo

wu-i see Ugor

Wu-i-bet-ko bR. Igor

Wu -i-Pcy (Xuzcy Ugorlart), 539

Wu-ling, b0

Wu-liu-jo-ti see Hiert

Wu-lo-ho-wu, 337

Wu-mu-ch'ett, 332

Wu-shan-mu (Klrallik), i74, 173,

Wu-shlh-lu tH. yabgusu), 128, i42, I43

Wu-sun (Usun) lar, 3'i, tI4-87, i02, 103,
1 2d, I 34, 140. 14 1, 142, 147,
1SS, 161. 163, 164, 1ôô, 167, 168,
172, 174, 17fi, 180- 187, i97, 100,

20,7, 208, .10, 217, 22;3, 2S4, 357,
479; 563
Wn -i'ti tdevletl, 373., 4b0, 4fil , 469,
+73, s84, 4Bs, 3 to, si s, 5i 7
Wn-ta-t'e-hou,.217', 21B
Wu-ti (Hin Imp.); 20. 1.1.1.7, 1.1 d. 120-
1.41.1.42, 143, 194', 145, 1DO, 130,
152, Is4.15fi, '1fi5..193.,199.,196.
529
w"-ii iJ h-"ij, 473, 481
Wu-ti (Liang hükümdarı) 523, 530, 535
Wh-ts',iang-shan (dag), 42B
¥Vu-tse, 22tl
Wu-w'ang .(prince), 35, 46, BI
Wu-wei (H. yabgu), 1.26,1 2H
Wu-yen-vhi-te (H . yabgU) , 1.74: 1.7S.,
1 7b, lB0
Wu-zu- liu, 211
Wung-Chii-mi, 1ö6: 1dl'
Wung-ch"-mi-Fon-wand, ido
Wuö-chu, 333; 336

Y

Yz-tu (river), 333, 3d9
Yablonnv Oaglan, 542
9h 5b7, 369, 5B2
Yai-men, 67, 12o, 13s,
Yakinf see Bichurin, N.Ya.
Yaksari see Sirdçrya
Yskut 5fi 1
Yang (Judge of Yarl'end), 2i3
Yang hkz. Hn-per
xanp run chuck, 49s
Yang:5hang. 244
Yang Yii, 7o
Yang-huan (h "I-), I Ba
Yang-shao, 4 i,
Yang-ts'ai tAn-ts'ài} See Ssrmatys
Yang-'se: 27, 35. 36, 126; 21.1., 30g,
320, 36 I, 365; 123, 418, 159, S.18:
321
Ioannina, see Epit
Yoc' Ch'lang isónraki Ch'in), 13.1


Yao Ch'ang: IT. kumendan}, 41.1. 4y j
42Y, 428, 43'l, +35
Yao Hsien (Ti. knmuidn), '00, 40'l.
aO5, 408. 1 t0. DI I
Yao Hsing tsonraki Ch'in h6kGmdari)
'1.3; 43a, '+3, , 44i'-44B, 4so.
Yao Hung (Ti. hükümdarı), 460, 462,
499
"Ynü l-Chung tT. kumandän}, 596, TOO,
60'l, 40g, 410, 127
Yarkend (Saha, So-kuiJ, i2g, 1'3J. 23+,
146, j6ö, l n7, lB9, l'83.,222-22d,
237, 24.9, 130
Yarkend, 565
"Yzrkendderja, 133 Yaslsr
(Oslar), tl7
Old Huns Ci mbu t63: 1 ffi; 1ö7, l 6d, l 7tl,
1.79, t 78, 179
Churn, 3Ö4., ij9; 5fi 2, 57 i
Yiziği tSatmar)s, 57.1. 5.7 2', shd4
Yedisu tSemireç" Alanyal , 87, 102, 1'33,
234, 325., 303, 5H
Ycli (city), fi49, 550. 354. 37ö, i82,
397, 406-40a, 4 I8, 427., 440, 441,
527, 533 Jewish,
Yeh-lû Ch'u-is'ai. 103
Yemo4, 37
Yen tFrcn4lif. vr haneJgûj. 59, 60. 67,
2.11. 390, 394.. 403, 405, 41.2, 420,
!427; 437
Yen 6kz. Ho-pei
Yén -chan. tDag), 235
Ye -chi ttun hatu" timing, is9
Yen-ehi-shan, 1.14
Yen-chu, i55
Yen-jan Dagi, 137
Yen-te-lun, 195.
New Y.utt, 360
Yenisei, 39, 4l, 47, 34:..81, 360., 56l
Yeçiİ. Öguz hkz. Hua'rtg-h;o
Yevtuhova .L.A.,. l9l
Y'eh-lieh. 247
Yih-liu, 312, 35'2, 35h; 3NY

Yih-lou 6ki Tungus Yih-
 io, 342
 Yiri bks. Shang-yin
 Yin Han tGeneyall, 400, 4Ö4
 Yin-shan 31, 33, b7, 69, 72, I Off, 1 I'0,
 1 11, 120, 125; '137: 164, t37, 473,
 479, 459, 3 Ifi, S17, S47, S5tl
 Year -wu-jo (H. prince), 175.
 Yin-yü..(H. briyu), 219
 Ying Cheng, 69
 Ying-chou (Ho-chienJ, 527
 Ying-t'u (Yin-tuol see India Yü-
 pci-ping, 123
 ?ü-ti tH. -hoyuJ, t76
 Yuksgir-lrr, 39:
 \ulc C., 37
 Greek (Grrk), I T4., \f7, lg3, 25V. 3'26.
558, 582, 583
 YzngPíngru (müe) , 3Ó0
 "lung-chou "39ö
 Yii (Hu-tu-erh-shi ti-tao-kaofl3. yabgu-
 su), 1 47, 209., 2 l3, 217', ,21B
 Ya (Özgcñ J., 144
 ¥ü Ch'i-commercial: 371, 372
 Yi-ch'ti-kien t8atı Lu-lí-prensi., yabgu 235;
 236
 Ya-choi, 3s1, 35ö, 358, 359, 37,2
 Ya-cha-l* (J. leader), 41G
 Yü-fu-mo tyahgu) 2Sfı, 344
 Yü-kan bW Ya-kien
 Yü-iten {Yü-kan I, Ifi4, 174, 179, 175,
 217. 219
 Yü-kien-jih-chuo-prins, 217
 \ü-kung .(geography kifıñbı), 36
 Yü-li (H. prince). 249
 Yu-Liu, \$35
 ¥a-tir tNorthern H. ysbgusu);
 234' Yu-lü .(Tdbgiç haem),. 38B
 Yü-men Hian.(fortress), 142, 193
 Yu-men, 144. 197, 14fi


Y"-ni, lB2
 Yü-pl.(H, prince), t.20,
 Yu-su-chi Chi-hau tH. rankbcst', z03
 'Yü-wang, 59
 Yü-wen (ltabile and state),. 329, 232,
 33; 388: 389, 391, 302, 3g4, 510
 Yü-wen T'ai, 533, 33t, 333
 Yü-yem-sui., 193.
 Yüan .t-wei), stu, st ,s "" 17, 17, ".
 521, 524, 330
 Yuan (martyr), 517
 Ytiari Ch'uan, 244
 YiianHsú.39 YunHuo (Kiao) tYunWcihuumda
ri), 517, 521, 523
 Yüan-ch'ü tshchir),. 487
 Ycsn-che-r "i, it 0, \n I
 Yüan-meng, 23g
 Yüeban: 254, 2'i7. 263: t0S". 472. 475,
 303, 303, 5's0
 Yüeci-l-t, 34. 33, 69, Y1, Y2. Yg, ü0. ü4-
 88, 99-10a, 111, 114, 117. .118,
 129, 1C6, 193, 22H, 23tt, 239, 243;
 247, 251, 264, 306, 31 2, **545**, '547,
 954, 972
 Yñeh (Y rse/tiipchak'J ter, 65, 126, 127.,
 378
 Yñeh-shieh, 54, 81
 Yün-Chung, 436
 Yiinncn, 3 i
 Yülian see Hofen


Z

Zadegan Pat.ti f Hun: political gr.ujJ., 11f,
 217
 Z "hatoff l., 337
 Zcnen, 592
 Zerdustism, 3óó
Zosimus, 376




“Hükümdar mezarları” denilen oda








Isy or meeri t "inuzi





BERSERKER

BOOKS

