

THE HUNS

Volume 1



LEV GUMILEV

BERSERKER

BOOKS



HUNS

Lev Nikolayevich Gumilëv

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A LINES THE

I

Born in St. Petersburg in 1912 and died in 1992, Russian historian and ethnologist Lev Nikolayevich Gumilëv's "Huns" was published in Russia in 1960, and a second book titled "Huns in China" was published in 1974.

After Gumilëv's death, the "Gumilëv World Foundation", founded in Moscow in 1993, republished all of the author's works and articles under the title of "All Gumilëv" series. The Foundation's editors have also included articles on the Huns, which were previously published in various journals, at the end of both volumes under the title "Appendices". Among them, S.I. Rudenko, G.Y. Grumm-Grjimaýlo, R.Yu. Vipper, N.N. Kradin, I.P. Zasetskaya, B.V. Lunin, V.A. Korenàko, A.P. Savitskiy are also included at the end of the work. However, we did not find it appropriate to include them here, since we plan to publish the author's scientific articles and those that directly or indirectly concern Turkish history in one or two volumes separately. In fact, some of the articles included as an appendix at the end of the work do not belong to the author himself. Brief biographical information about the author can be found on the back cover of the book; more detailed information can be found in the chapter titled "Gumilëv and His Time" at the beginning of the work titled "In the Footsteps of the Imaginary Sovereignty".

As in the translation of Eski Türkler (Old Turks), which we have previously published, some difficulties and hesitations have been experienced in the transcription of geographical terms in addition to the old Hun names, Chinese dynastic and personal names. The reason for this is, firstly, the Russians' use of foreign words, perhaps due to the unsuitability of their alphabet.

secondly, lack of a fixed international transcription of Turkish and Chinese names. As a matter of fact, when we review the works published in Western languages on the same subject, we do not see any uniformity in transcription. The English write what is correct according to themselves, and the French and Germans write what is correct according to themselves. For example, the same Chinese dynasty is written as Ch'in by the English and Ts'in by the French. Another example: The French write Ngan Lou-chan; the English write An Lu-shan. The Russians write T'an-shih-huai, the ruler of Siyenpi, only as Tanshihay. We, unfortunately, take any of these as a basis and present them to the Turkish reader in this way. Since the works translated from foreign languages on Turkish history are translated from foreign languages, the transcription of that language is used, of course, these may confuse the minds of the readers. The Turkish academics who are engaged in this field have not yet reached a definite path in this regard. In short, everyone writes what is correct according to his own opinion. However, in this translation, since the English transcription has been gaining weight in recent years, we have mostly preferred it, and the sinologist W. Eberhard's *History of China* and *China's Neighbours to the South* and the first *Hiung-nu rulers on Chinese soil: Liu Yüan and Liu Ts'ung*, Prof. Dr. Bahaeddin Ögel's *History of the Huns*, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Taşağıl's *The Gok-Turks* and David Christian's *A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*. However, if any transcription errors that we have overlooked are reported to us by interested readers, they will be taken into account in later editions of the book. Since the only original sources on the history of the Asiatic Huns are in Chinese and these were translated into Western languages by Orientalists, we have almost no way of determining the correct spelling of the ancient Turkic names. Because, as Gumilëv says, it is a fact that the Chinese, while writing Turkish names, added suffixes with the meanings of praise and disparagement to them, or wrote those that did not follow the rules of hieroglyphics according to their taste. For example, the Turkish name *Shapola*, which should be *Shapola*, is shown as *Shapolio* in Chinese sources. However, the suffix *lio* at the end of this is an insulting suffix in the sense of plunderer. If you pay attention to the names of Hun yabgu in your work, all of them written according to the Chinese hieroglyphic system: *Hu-yen-ti*, *Hu-hu-êrh Shih-tao Kao jo-ti yabgu*, *Fu-chü-lei*, etc. We do not know whether the Huns actually used these names. For example, one

The name of the Hun prince in Chinese sources is T'ien-lan. Here T'ien means sky, great and god. Lan means orchid, lily and iris. Therefore, it is possible to understand it as the supreme orchid or the orchid given by God. But, with which words did the Huns express this phrase or name in their own language? This, in our opinion, is the most intractable issue. However, since the only source on the history of the Asian Huns is the Chinese annals, we seem to have no other choice for the time being.

II

Although L.N. Gumilëv is regarded as a master and a school among the recent historians on the history of the Central Asian Huns (Hyung-nu) and Turks, it is not possible to agree with all the views he puts forward in this work, in *Ancient Turks* and in *Ethno-genesis and A Thousand Years in the Caspian Region*. In fact, to date, there is no historian, philosopher or thinker whose views are unanimously accepted.

It is inevitable that in a historiography that does not have sufficient written historical sources and cannot get rid of the influence of the Chinese chroniclers' unreasonable perspectives, some mistakes, misguidance or misdirection are inevitable. However, in terms of presenting the Turkish history from the pre-millennium to the Xth century, when the author's Huns and Old Turks are read as a continuation of each other, general and to a certain point detailed information about the Central Asian Turkish history can be obtained. The history of the Western Huns, on the other hand, is not included in the work, as it is entirely a part of the history of Europe. Only at the end of the second volume, an overview of the history of the Eastern and Western Huns in terms of ethno-history and ethnogenesis is given.

Another issue that should be briefly emphasised is the existence of a widespread tendency in our country, perhaps especially in anti-communist circles, to be cautious and prejudiced towards Russian history and historiography. Many believe that the Soviet government forced scholars to distort history under pressure. However, observations have shown that the authorities do not interfere with scholars as long as they do not criticise the regime, do not interfere in state affairs, do not curse Marx or Lenin; but if the author insists on distorting Turkish history, they are indifferent to him. In spite of this, we have been able to show that not only in the Union of Soviet Union, but also in other Western countries, Arab

and Persian works on Turkish history should be approached with caution, and the views put forward should be viewed with a "what if?". Moreover, some of the so-called historians in Turkey, while trying to get rid of the influence of Chinese chronicles, could not get rid of the Western mentality and the Marxist view of Turkish history and historiography. Since K. Marx and Lenin mean everything to them, looking at an issue through their eyes is another disease they cannot give up. Nevertheless, as the author says in one part of the present work, "all kinds of prejudgements are dangerous", it is wrong to approach Turkish history with prejudgements. In fact, this prejudgement and implicit enmity against the Russians was inherited from our Ottoman ancestors, just as the Persian enmity of the Gokturks was inherited by their descendants and the Khazars.

However, after the collapse of the Golden Horde Khanate, the Russians' expansionist policy towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which had been known as the Turkish homeland since time immemorial, and the persecution and persecution of the Turks in Asia both during the Tsarist period and during the Bolsheviks, it is not unfair that people in our country have a "prejudiced" approach to Russian historiography. For example, V. Minorsky and B. Nikit wrote false things on Kurdish history and caused a great trouble for Turkey with their own opinions.

One of the theses of Russian and Western historians, which has not yet been scientifically proven and unanimously accepted as true, is that the Aryans invaded Asia and therefore the non-Mongoloid Turkic peoples were transformed into the European type as a result of fusion with them. Some Russian historians and sociologists, such as W. Grigoryeff,

A.A. Semiunoff, Krukoff argued that it was a natural law that the non-Russian indigenous population of Central Asia would be destroyed and the remaining ones would be assimilated into Russianness; they publicly wrote that the Russians would destroy the Turks today, just as the Turks had destroyed and assimilated the Aryans in the past; Markoff Vtoroy did not hesitate to say "Kazakh-Kyrgyz are the descendants of Chingiz and Te- mür. Therefore, he did not hesitate to say that we treat the Kazakh-Kyrgyz in the same way as the American Indians were treated" (A.Z.Velidi Togan, *Turkestan*, p. 304- 305). Although some conscientious people such as Remüzoff, Yadrintseff, Potanin and Barthold argued that it would not be right to exterminate the indigenous people of Central Asia just like the Indians.

However, they argued that "nomadic peoples were not inferior and incapable of adopting civilisation" and therefore it would be better to "assimilate" them, i.e. to Russify them. Grumm-Grijmaylo G.Y., in his three-volume work titled "Western Mo- ğolistan and the Uraňa Countries", defended the same view and stated that these lands were once the property of the Aryans, so there is nothing anomalous about the Russians returning to their ancestral lands. This is the general opinion of W. Radloff, F. Hirth, Franke, Denison Ross, David Christian, the above-mentioned persons and other Russian and European historians. These and Gumilëv, the author of the present work, argue that in Central and Asia, the European race prevailed over the Mongoloid race, leading to the Europeanisation of the majority of the Turks. This is a typical theory of Eurasianists and has no merit other than chauvinism. Because they have accepted the Turks as a Mongoloid race from the beginning, they could not reach the period in the 90s when the scientific thesis that Turks are of the Ural-Altaic race was accepted unanimously. Although, even if they had, there would have been no change in their ideas. Because they considered themselves authorities, they would not listen to any other opinion. As a matter of fact, in our country, Halil Berktaý and others like him have repeated the views of Western and Russian turkologists verbatim and did not even see the need to correct their wrong views in the subsequent editions of their works.

L.N. Gumilëv is to some extent an exception. In our opinion, the reason for this is that his father was shot by the Bolsheviki, all doors were closed to him because he was the son of an anti-ko-munist father and a Tatar mother, all doors were closed to him, his education was often interrupted, he was repeatedly arrested and spent his ordeal in exile camps. In one of his poems, he himself once expressed his anger by saying, "How can I love such a country and regime that makes me live a life of imprisonment in my country?". I do not think that the author had a Turkish consciousness on his mother's side. Probably, even his mother Anna Ahmetova did not have this consciousness. Perhaps the whole problem of the Gumilëv family was that they were at odds with the Bolsheviki.

In conclusion, we are of the opinion that the present work will be useful on the subject of the Huns if one does not approach it with prejudgement. For the ethno-sociological concepts such as passionary energy, passionary impulse, chi- mera, symbiosis, akmatic phase etc. mentioned especially in the last parts of the book, the author's *Ethnogenesis* and *A Thousand Years Around the Caspian* can be used. Furthermore, Russian historians and some Western writers divide the Asian Huns into two groups by labelling them as Hyung-nu and the Western Huns as "Huns". Without considering this distinction, we have used the words Hyung-nu and Hun interchangeably in this book.

D. A. BATUR

FIRST BOOK

INTRODUCTION

We learnt about the existence of Hyung-nu (Huns) thanks to Chinese historical sources. Probably this name survived until much later than the people themselves. Although the peoples using this name disappeared from the stage of history one thousand five hundred years ago, we know the Huns better today. However, many neighbouring peoples, who were the contemporaries of the Huns, are known only by specialised historians. Because Hyung-nus left deep traces in the world history. They travelled from Asia to the West, where they mingled with the Ugors around the Ural, and soon mingled with them and as a new nation, which the Europeans called *the Huns* [Kun/Gun]. To this day, the word *Hun* has often appeared to us as a synonym for a savage predator, and this is no coincidence. For for millennia the Huns have not only been a state-building people, but also a state-destroying nation in general. *Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis*.¹

However, our concern here is not to praise or criticise a nation that has long since disappeared from the stage of history. On the contrary, we want to know how a nomadic people with a small population, which on the one hand was not subjected to a crushing defeat and on the other hand was not completely exterminated, was able to create an example of organisation and culture that allowed it to maintain its independence and way of life for hundreds of years. Where did this people draw their strength from and where was it lost? How did their neighbours see them and who were their descendants? In seeking the answers to these questions, we will be able to establish exactly who the Huns were in the history of mankind.

* * *

¹ Times are changing and we are changing with them.

The first scientific interest in the Huns, their history and ethno-geographical peculiarities appeared in China. The genius writer Sih-ma Ch'ien, who lived in the II century BC and wrote *the Historical Memoirs*, should be considered as the founder of *Hunnology*. Sih-ma not only kept the diaries of the Han Empire's wars against the Huns also asked the following question: Why couldn't the Chinese weapons (army), which were victorious everywhere, eliminate the nomadic barbarians? He gave an extremely clever answer to this question according to his time: Since the geographical settlement, climate and reliefs of China and the geographical conditions of Central Asia are different, the Chinese cannot live in the Hun steppes. Huns also cannot live in China. Therefore, people cannot conquer countries with different landscapes and peoples that do not conform to their way of life.²

The core of Sih-ma Ch'ien's rational analysis was the search for objective factors of the historical process, but it that reality did not conform to geographical methods at all: The Huns had weakened in the first century BC, while the Han Empire had become the ruler of Central Asia.

Pan-ku, the successor of Sih-ma Ch'ien, was a gifted historian with Confucianist tendencies. He wrote the *History of the First Han Dynasty*, but because he became a disreputable official among his friends, he was unable to complete his work; he was imprisoned and died there in 92 BC.

Pan-ku considered the subjugation of the Huns as a useful idea, but he was of the opinion that the presence of a people with a foreign culture within the empire would be harmful for China. According to him, the Huns were so far away from Chinese culture that it was not even possible to assimilate them, and therefore the Sino-Hun border had to be tightly closed even in times of peace.³ It can also be thought that the views expressed by a historian in his own corpus played a role in the escalation of Sino-Hun wars.

A third book, in which we found interesting information, was South Chinese master Fan Hua in the V century AD.

2 Bichurin N.Ya. (Yakinf). *Sobraniye svedeniy o narodax obitavshix v Srednei Azii v drevnie vremena*. M.-L., 1950, I/ 51, 55, 57. Hereinafter Bichurin, *Sobraniye*. Sih-ma Ch'ien was the son of Sih-ma Tan, a court official. He served at the court of Emperor Wu-ti in the late second and early first centuries B.C. and wrote the "Shih-chi" - *Historical Notes*, which became an example for later chroniclers.

3 Age., p. 93-96.

History of the Han dynasty. The material he utilised is not suitable for our study. Because, according to our author, he "thought logically." ⁴ However, his corpus is full of dry information and claims devoid of logic. However, Fan Hua was later beheaded for his participation in an anti-state conspiracy, although he was later promoted to high positions thanks to this work.

These three works the basic information about the history of the East Asian Hyung-nus. As for the Western Huns⁵, who were named in a completely different way from their Eastern ancestors, the work of Ammianus Marcellinus⁶ will undoubtedly occupy the first place in this regard.

Like the Chinese historians, A. Marcellinus, in his *Soldier and Greek*, pointed out that the Huns did not resemble any people he knew, including the nomadic Alans. However, although it is known that he hated this new people and wrote his work in a ^{biased}⁷ style, since his views are in line with the observations of Chinese writers, they can be considered as important information for research. As a result, these sources help us to obtain general information about the appearance of an ancient people.

Since the history of the European Huns does not fall within the boundaries of either the chronological or the regional framework, the information provided by these authors is only sufficient for the first period of Hunnology.

The second period of Hunnology begins in the XVIII century with the French studies.

In the eighteenth century, French missionaries became interested not only in the Chinese but also in the peoples living north of their dominions. Gaubil, Mailla and others, fluent in Chinese and Manchurian, were the first to introduce Europeans to the history of oriental nomads.

4 Age., p. 18

5 Inostrantsev K.A. *Hunnu i gunn* L1926 hereinafter: Inostrantsev *Hunnu*.

6 Ammian Martsellin. *Istoriya* III kt. XXXI. Kiev, 1906. this: Ammian, *Istoria*.

7 Compare Priscus Panius' descriptions of the Hun encampment with those of A. Marcellinus. Priscus encountered the descendants of the Asiatic Hyung-nus; Marcelli- nus mistook them for Ugors and other Eastern European peoples. "*Skaza- niya Priska Paniyskogo*" (Uçeniye zapiski Rossiyykoy akademii nauk. Kt. VII. Bl.I. SPb, 1861).

They made quite original translations. Deguignes, one of the professors of Sorbon, utilised these translations and by making a comparison of Sino-Byzantine data, he produced his major work on the peoples of the East.⁸ However, this work has lost its importance today.

The information in the sources on the history of the Near East was collected and revised by Vivien de St. Martin.⁹ Among the masters who followed the path opened by the French school in the eighteenth century, A. Ramusat, who made valuable studies in the nineteenth century, and Klaproth J. von with his history-geography atlas *Tableaux historiques de l'Asie*, which is considered a very important work for its time, can be mentioned. New scholarly and historical works shedding light on obscure issues related to the history of Central-Asia

In the late XIXth and early XXth centuries, it again manifested itself in France. This is the period when European orientalism reached its peak. The general and special studies of historians such as E. Chavannes, P. Pelliot, H. Cordier and R. Grousset clarified many issues and provided the opportunity to process a series of materials piled up after . Among German scholars, the monumental works of De Groot¹⁰ and Franke¹¹ should also be noted. However, they, too, did not go beyond repeating the researches of the French and Russians in general. As for the works of F. Hirth¹² on the Huns, unfortunately, they have lost their value to a great extent by failing to withstand the innovations of the time.

The researches of British and American historians are of particular importance. Parker's *Thousand years of the Tartare* (Shanghai, 1895) is beautifully written but does not provide the reader with the sources that would enable him to analyse the author's surprising revelations. A. Stein's monograph providing valuable information on the valleys of the Tarim Basin and Terrart's chronological studies are undisputedly important scientific works. Touching lightly on our subject-

8 Deguignes J. *Histoire des Huns, des Mongols et des autres Tartars occidentaux avant et depuis J. C. jusqu'à present*. P., 1756-1758.

9 Saint-Martin V. (de). *Les Huns blancs ou Ephtalites des historiens bisantins*. P., 1849- *Kritiku Vivodov Vivyena de Sent-Martena*. See Gumilëv L.G. *Eftaliti i ix sosedi v IV v.* (VDI, 1959. No.1)

10 S.S.M. de Groot. *Chinesische Urkunden zur Geschichte Asiens. Die Hunnen der vorchristlichen Zeit*. Berlin-Leipzig, 1921.

11 Franke Otto. *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*. Berlin, 1930.

12 Hirth Fridrich. *Über Wolga- Hunnen und Hiung-nu*. München, 1900. For a criticism of this book see Inostrantsev, *Hunnu*, p. 126-131.

O. Lattimore's researches, however, cannot be ignored. However, all these works are only auxiliary sources on "Hunnology" and only McGovern¹³ and Otto Maenchen Helfen¹⁴ articles are directly related to the Huns. McGovern is under the influence of Chinese historical sources and uses their information without any criticism. In fact, our author explains the contents of the chronicles of Chinese dynasties very well in the English language. Since his work is a source that can be easily utilised, it has also been used by me to follow the translation of Chinese texts.

O. M. Helfen, by denying that the European Huns were a branch of the Asiatic Hyung-nular, has been placed on the list of sceptics by Russian scholars. Although his work and the arguments he put forward are the product of serious study and correspond to some facts they still carry a negative connotation.

As can be seen, many people have dealt with the subject we are dealing with, but Russian scholars have been the standard-bearers in the study of the ancient history of Central Asia for a century.

The first Russian scholar who succeeded in studying Central Asia at a higher scientific level than that of contemporary Europe was N. Ya. Bichurin, or Yakin in his priestly title. Thanks to his thorough knowledge of the Chinese language and inexhaustible energy, he translated almost all Chinese sources on the ancient history of Central Asia. His works of the second quarter of the XIXth century are the cornerstones of the history of nomads in general, and of the Huns in particular. Likewise, his works on the geography of China and neighbouring countries are also very important. Unfortunately, these works, which could not be published during his lifetime, could meet with the readers only in the Soviet period.

The Chinese sources published by Bichurin, although his views and arguments were not fully accepted (for example, according to him, the Huns were Mongols), led to the opening of a bright era in Russian orientalism.

13 McGovern W. *The early empires of Central Asia*. L., 1939.

14 Maenchen-Helfen O. *The Huns and the Hsiung-nu* (Byzantium. Vol. XXII, 1945); *The legend of origine of the Huns* (Byzantium, Vol. XVII, 1945).

V. V. Grigoryeff, who not only knew Arabic and Persian very well, but also studied Greco-Roman history in depth, was the first to collect materials on Western and Eastern history in general. Making use of Bichurin's translations for comparison with Near Eastern historical sources, Grigoryeff produced his famous work *China or Eastern Turkistan*, which was both a favourite work of the time and a source that has not lost its scholarly value even today.

Not only desk-based studies have produced valuable works on the serious study of the history of ancient Asia, but also travelling and the activities of the Geographical Society contributed greatly to this. For example, N. M. Prjevalski y explored and exposed countries about which until then there was only hearsay information. One of his followers P. K. Kozloff and V. I. Roborovski completed his and finalised the discovery and description of the places where the Hun nation appeared and disappeared. They were followed by M. V. Pevtsoff, M. Y. and G. Y. Grumm-Grjimaýlo brothers, G. N. Potanin, V. A. Obrucheff and our contemporary E. M. Murzayeff. The valuable works, beautifully printed treatises and diaries available to the reader maps of the vast steppes, mountain ranges with clear rivers flowing between rocks and into sandy deserts, snowstorms and flowery spring days of Asia. Pages depicting hunting scenes describe the animals hunted by the Huns in ancient times. The discovery of archaeological artefacts brings us directly into contact with the cultural material of ancient times. Ethnographic researches, which allow us to classify not only the peoples that exist today, but also the peoples that have been lost in the depths of history, provide information at least as valuable as these.

In 1896 N. A. Aristoff published a not very long article in the journal *Jivaya starina*. This article, entitled *Notes on the Ethnic Structure and East of the Turkic Tribes*, dealt with the formation of ancient peoples as a species in certain regions. The famous traveller G. Y. Grumm-Grjimaýlo picked up where he left off, detailed information about the Central Asians living in *Western Mongolia and the Urànhà* region. In this important study, the author gathers together all the works of Russian and European historians and geographers, and presents his own analyses.

di was a critical review of all hypotheses and views prevailing in his time. Grjimaýlo's work became the under-pillow book of all historians of Central Asia. Of course, the author could not reveal the issues and chronological problems that all historiographers, historiographers and paleoethnographers were curious about the history of Inner Asia. This deficiency was to be filled by K. A. Inostrantseff with his work *Hyung-nular and Huns*, which, although not very voluminous, is considered to be quite important. The summary of these researches is summarised in the book under the following subtitle: "An overview of the theories on the emergence of the Hyung-nus according to Chinese chronicles, the birth of the European Huns and the relations between these two peoples". It is safe to say that none of the existing concepts was overlooked by the author or ignored in his comprehensive study. The works of Grjimaýlo and Inostrantseff are an excellent summary of all known information on the Huns.

A. N. Bernchtam's *An Essay on the History of the Huns* was a step backwards in this regard. Not only did Bernchtam fail to provide a perspective on the complex events and changes in Hun society, but the criticisms of his work did not support his conclusions in any way.¹⁵ Moreover, this partial failure was completely refuted by the successful work of archaeologists. We need not dwell on some finds and studies, since they force us to completely reject certain views of the ancient wild nomadic groups. Such issues have already been raised by S. IRudenko in his special study *Material Cultures of the Huns*. Of course, it is impossible not to refer to the monumental work of S. V. Kiseleff, *Ancient History of Southern Siberia* and A. P. Okladnikoff's *Ne-olite and Bronze Periods of the Trans-Baikal region*, which reveal the richness of the Sayan-Altaic cultures. Because it was only thanks to these studies that it was possible to learn the history of the Hun people, to determine its northern borders precisely and therefore to reveal the role of the Huns in history. The Huns were not only rivals of the Han Empire, which took refuge behind the Great Wall of China, but also of other tribes and peoples in the region. The history of the Huns put an end to being a prisoner of Chinese history.¹⁶

15 See *Sovetskaya arxeologiya*. T.XVII. 1963, p. 320-326.

16 The present work is especially devoted to the Asian Huns. Information on the history of the Eastern European branch of the Huns can be found in the following works: Artamonoff
M. I. *History of Khazar* (Istoriya Khazar). L., 1960 and Altheim Franz. *Geschichte der Hunnen*. Berlin, 1959.

This work clarifies all aspects of the identity of the Huns, who, though not culturally gifted, went down in world history as the builders of independence. In this context, the relations of the Huns with the Chinese people and the Han dynasty will be discussed; however, we are also interested in their relations with the neighbouring nomadic steppe tribes, as well as their relations with the Western Huns, although there is no direct information in the historical sources, as understood by comparing the available materials. As in every valuable work, this book will make use of the latest information available to science.

PART I

IN THE CELEBRATION OF CHILDREN'S CLAIMS

In ancient China

In ancient China, few things were like they are today. The land was covered with huge forests and swamps watered by rivers. There were also fields of crops, vast lakes and endless . Pastures and steppes were scattered only in the mountainous regions.

In the east, the lower courses of the Huang-ho (Yellow River) and the Yang-tse were covered with a strip of drifted land. The present province of Ho-pei consisted of a great delta, which means "North River". Far from the seacoast, vast lakes and marshes lay, while the I [Yih] and Huai rivers flowed into the marshy valley downstream of the Yang-tse. "The **Wei-ho** river basin was covered with lush vegetation; in addition to huge oak trees, there were also various cypress and pine trees. In the forests roamed tigers, black leopards, yellow leopards, bears, buffaloes, wild boars and the indispensable friends of the forest, jackals and wolves. "¹

Fighting with rivers has always played an important role in the life of Chinese people. These rivers receded during periods of drought, but when they were fed by rainwater from the mountains, they surged and overflowed their beds; when they lost their speed, they covered their surroundings with alluvium. Some of the inhabitants of northern China fled the floods from the mountains and migrated to areas where they could survive by hunting, while others preferred to fight river floods, and these were the ancestors of the Chinese. Undaunted by hard labour, Chinese farmers have since time immemorial been able to provide for themselves

1 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Mojno li schitat kitaytsev avtoxtonomi basseynov sredne- go i nijnego teçeniy Jeltoy reki?* (Izvestiya Gosudarstvennogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, 1933. Separate p. 29-30)

They built embankments to protect their fields from flooding. "Since time immemorial, tribes with different cultures and descended from different ancestors had been living in the territory of China. Each tribe had developed its own culture by struggling with the forces of nature in the lands where it lived."² And these tribes often fought each other. According to Chinese historical tradition, even during the time of the semi-mythical first Chinese dynasty of Hsia, wars ought with other tribes that had migrated to China in the third millennium BC. These tribes were called the Jungs and the "Ti" [Di]. They had settled in the forested mountains that the ancestors of the Chinese had abandoned by retreating into the hollow regions. Further north, in the dry steppes, lived the *Hun-yü* tribes. According to legend, in 2600 BC the "Yellow Emperor" organised a campaign against them. But the real enemies of Hsia were not them, but the Jungs and the "Ti". Even in Chinese folklore the echoes of the battles of the ancestors of the Chinese, the "blackheads", with the "yellow-haired demons" have been preserved.³ The Chinese won the millennium wars and drove the "barbarians" into the mountains, steppes and southern jungles. But, as we shall see later, this was not a final victory. Despite its successes, the Hsian kingdom could only dominate the Ho-nan region and the south-western part of Shan-si, where the nucleus of the future Chinese people was to be laid.

In 1764 BC,⁴ as a result of a coup d'état in China, the Hsia dynasty was replaced by the Shang dynasty; during its reign, the roots of the ancient Chinese civilisation were consolidated and the ancient Chinese people took shape.⁵

The first of the real historical Chinese dynasties is Shang-yin. Because the emergence of the first Chinese state is attributed to him. Many findings have been found to draw its cultural map, but its political history is somewhat obscure. True; Shang, as the successor of the previous rulers and aristocracy, was indeed a state based on the system of slavery. The most prominent feature of this period was the invention of hieroglyphic writing, which was to play a very important role in later Chinese history. Ti-

2 Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya ot pervobitno-obščinnogo stroya po obrazovaniya tsentralizovannogo feodalnogo gosudartva*. M., 1958, p. 36.

3 Grumm-Grжимaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongolia i Urànxayski kray*. T.II. Bl. I. L., 1926.

4 However, after initial calculations this date was changed to 1586 (see *Očerki istorii Drevne- go Vostoka*. L., 1956, p. 229) or 1562(?) (see Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 45). For legendary information about Hsia, see Lattimore O. *Inner Asian frontier of China*. New York, 1940, p. 286.

5 Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 38-66.

trade was not limited to the inhabitants of Ho-pei north of Huang-ho. On the contrary, trade relations were established as far as Baikal and the Angara coast through Northeast China. Of course, it was not only the goods of the Chinese who exchanged with the intertribes that were on display here. They supplied Siberia with metals such as tin and bronze, from which they received green and white nephrite, valuable furs and possibly slaves,⁶ thus developing the Far Eastern cultural network.

Birth of the Huns

In the XVIII century BC, two events occurred that left important repercussions in North China. In 1797, Kung-liu, a Chinese statesman, fell out of favour and fled westwards to Junglar, and a small group of his followers went with him. Thus, he established a small city for himself here and declared his independence against the Chinese Hsia sovereignty. However, according to historical sources, Kung-liu was "surrounded to the west by the Jong." ⁷ Nevertheless, for 300 years the Chinese immigrants did not fully fuse with the Jong, and in 1327, when their descendants were expelled by the Jong with their prince Shan-fu at their head, they returned to their former homeland and settled north of Shen-si on the outskirts of Ch'i-shan [Ts'i-shan].⁸ Thus, as a result of the reunification of the tribes, the Chou dynasty came into being.⁹ The Chou, which was still a small principality, fought against the Jungs, and in 1140-1130 B.C. Prince Ch'ang drove the Jungs north from King and Luo (in Kan-su province).¹⁰

The Joghs had been subjects of the Chou for some time, but in the X century BC "the obedience of the steppe peoples ended and bloody battles began". The Joghs wanted to regain their lost territories, and the fact that China was divided into many principalities made their task easier.

Around the same time, in the steppes, at the southern extremities of the Gobi, a new people came to the surface: Huns. There had long been *H'yenyun*

⁶ Okladnikov A.P. *Neolith i bronzoviy vek Pribykalya*. C. III. M.-L., 1955, p. 200-202.

⁷ Bichurin. *Sobraniye*, I/40.

⁸ Age., III/67.

⁹ Age., I/41.

¹⁰ Agy.

and *Hun-yü* tribes were nomadic. However, both of them could not be considered as Hyung-nus.¹¹ Because, at that time, Hyung-nus did not exist yet. As soon as the Hsia dynasty collapsed, Shung Wei, the last son of the ruler Tse-kui, who had died in exile, migrated to the northern steppes with his family and subjects.¹² According to classical Chinese historical sources, Shung Wei is considered to be the ancestor of the Hyung-nus. According to this historical tradition, the Hyung-nus were derived from a mixture of Chinese immigrants and steppe nomadic tribes. Of course, this legendary information is almost completely refuted by historical facts. Even so, the search for a rational truth in these legends cannot be entirely rejected. the existence of the Hsia dynasty is denied in the Shang period chronicles because it is based on these legends, septic researchers of ancient Chinese history such as Kuo Mo-jo and even Lattimore, who accepts that the stories about Hsia are just legends, accept the existence of such a ^{dynasty}¹³ and argue that the word "Hsia" meant "China" in ancient times.¹⁴ According to them, the history of the Hsia dynasty coincides with the history of the Neolithic black ceramic culture.¹⁵ Moreover, Lattimore, who assumes that there are obvious differences between the Hsia and Shang cultures, argues that their periods partially coincide synchronically.¹⁶ In any case, it is necessary to accept that two tribes clashed in the past and one of them emerged victorious from this war. For, as a consequence of such a defeat, some of the vanquished fled from the borders of their homeland, which had been conquered by their enemies, and sought refuge in neighbouring tribes.

But who were these mysterious H'yenyun and Hun-yü tribes with whom Shung Wei's comrades-in-arms mixed and mingled? In ancient times, the Chinese called the extreme parts of the Gobi "Sandy Sha-sai Land "¹⁷ and considered them as the land of the Ting-ling. According to anthropological data, at that time there were dolichocephalic Euro-

11 See Grumm-Grjimaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongolia*, p. 80. Grumm-Grimaylo completely refutes the views of Chavannes and Shiratory.

12 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/40.

13 Lattimore O. *Inner Asian*..p. 286.

14 Age. p. 300; Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 135.

15 Lattimore O. *Inner Asian*..p. 302.Fan Wan-lan that the Hsia period coincides with the Lung-shang culture. (Fan Wan-lan. *Drevna- ya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 43-44)

16 Lattimore O. *Inner Asian*, p. 300.

17 Grumm-Grjimaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 11.

paï types and the long-faced Mongoloids, i.e. the Chinese, had mixed with each other.¹⁸ In the same period, the broad-faced Mongoloids had made the northern part of the Gobi their homeland.

It can be concluded that the H'yenyun and Hun-yü tribes were the descendants of the North Chinese natives who had been squeezed out by the ancestors of the Chinese, the "black bears", in the steppes in the third millennium BC. As a result of the mixing and fusion of the Chinese who came with the Shung Wei with these tribes, the proto-Huns were formed as the first ethnic element; and later, with their retreat to the sandy deserts, the Hyung-nus emerged in later periods. In other, new fusion took place in the plains of Halha, and as a result, the historical Hyung-nus came to the surface. Until that time, they were called "Hu", i.e. steppe nomads. Thus, the Hyung-nus became the first nation to dominate the desert, which required strength, power and endurance.

Natural Structure of the Eastern Steppes

Central Asia is surrounded on all sides by mountains. The Sayan-Altai mountain range in the north-west separates it from Siberia, which is covered with cold and damp forests. The Gobi Desert, stretching like a sea, divides Central Asia in two. It is not without reason that the Chinese called this desert the Han-hai Sea. Prjevalski y describes Gobi as follows: "For a whole week, you cannot see anything but desert. The only thing you will see are endless valleys here and there, and on them, apart from the dry and shiny vegetation that has turned yellow a year ago, sometimes thick rocks, sometimes sloping hills. Above these hills, sometimes you can see the silhouettes of antelopes running very fast." ¹⁹ In addition to antelopes, the Gobi Desert was home to wild camels and large numbers of rodents, which continued to exist until the XIXth century. For the ancient Chinese, this desert was not a place to live.

On the south-eastern borders of Central Asia, the Yin-shan mountain range (meridional extensions of the Great Kingan) extends and joins the Liao-hsi Mountains. The foothills of these mountains have never been without lush forests, abundant game, hoofed and winged animals. The northern parts of Yin-shan merge into the steppe.

18 Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*. M.-L., 1948, p. 82.

19 Berg L.S. *Puteshestviya N.M. Prjevalskogo*. M.-L., 1952, p. 13.

The Alashan Desert stretches westwards from the Huang-ho bend. Prje- valskiy writes: "Every ten or even a hundred kilometres you come across bare, shifting sands, ready to suffocate the traveller with their heat or swallow him up in heaps of sand. There is not a drop of water among these hills. You will not a wild animal or a bird. Only the terrible spirit of a dead desert awaits you, ready to devour those who accidentally cross its path. "²⁰ From the south of the desert, the high hills of the Nanshan mountain range . To the west the rich Tun-huang Valley and then the caravan route to the Hami Valley. This road is extremely dangerous. Prjivals- kiy describes it in a striking style: "Along the endless road you come across the bones of horses, mules and camels. is a layer of foggy, soggy atmosphere over the red-hot ground. Frequent sandstorms scatter fine grains of sand far away. You see mirages all around you. During the day, the heat is unbearable. From sunrise to sunset, everything is almost scorched. The heat of the hot earth reaches up to 63°. It is not lower than 35° in the shade. There is no extreme cold at night, but it is best to travel at night and early in the morning. "²¹ The Chinese called the Alashan Desert "gulf" or "Sand Sea Bay" (Gobi). This sea of sand had been an impassable barrier between East and West for centuries, but this did not intimidate the Huns.

Jungs and Hyung-nus

This first period, like the second period of Hyung-nu history between 1200 BC and 214 AD, has not been satisfactorily treated in Chinese historical sources. The reason for this is obvious to us. The mountainous Jong were the link of communication between the steppe and civilised China. The vast foothills stretching from Hami in the west²² to Kingan [Hingan] in the east were under their dominion. Their populous tribes "scattered over the mountainous valleys, forming their own states, with lords at their head; they seldom mingled with the more numerous tribes, but they could not unite with them. "²³ It is most likely that the steppe Huns sometimes

²⁰ Age., p. 20.

²¹ Age., p. 45-46.

²² Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, III/57.

²³ Age., I/43.

They participated in the campaigns of their neighbours and thus the Chinese were aware of their existence. This is the reason why the information about the ancient Hyung-nus in Chinese history books is fragmentary. In later periods, they were sometimes identified with the H'ienyun and Hun-yü,²⁴ and sometimes with the Shan-jung-lar²⁵ based on some hypotheses, without taking into account that the Hyung-nus were not mountainous but steppe people.

In all the narratives, the enigmatic ethonym Jung is concealed. All of Sih- ma Ch'ien's slips of the pen or descriptions were attempts to identify the Jung with the Hyung- nular.²⁶ However, in all historical sources the Jung are mentioned together with the "Ti" ²⁷ and perhaps this is why Bichurin preferred to present them as a single nation, the "Jung-ti". Moreover, according to one legend, the Ch'i-ti (pronounced Çi-di) and the Ch'üan-jung descended from a single ancestor.²⁸ In fact, the Jung and the "Ti" are so similar that even the Chinese have named some of the "Ti" tribes as the Western Jung for this reason.²⁹ Likewise, their tribe living in the foothills of Kin- gan [Hingan] and Yin-shan called the Shan-jung or mountainous Jung. Some of the mountainous Jung, who had previously broken away from their main mass, merged with the eastern Mongols, the Tung-hus,³⁰ and some with the Hyung-nus. They merged not only with the Chinese³¹ but also with the Tibetans in the west to a lesser extent. In the worst case, they are the tribes that make up today's Tankut people. As can be seen, the question of the existence of individual tribes in China is an enigma. Even in the past, when the Tankuts a not-so-large ethnic group around Lake Kuku- nor, they had larger territories than they do now.

The above-mentioned view is supported by European and American historians.

²⁴ Age, I/39.

²⁵ Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 85; Chavannes Ed. *Les mémoires historiques de Sse-ma Th'ien*. P., 1899, p. 31; Wylie. *History of the Hiung-noo in their relations with China* (Journal of the Anthropol. Institute of Gr. Bri- tan and Ireland. 1874. N°9), p. 401.

²⁶ Bichurin, I/39; compare bl. 97 of "Chin-shu", where the borders between the Huns (Hyung-nular) and the six Jung tribes are shown (Bernchtam A.N. *Ocherki istorii gunnov*. L., 1951, p. 219. Opublikovanniy tekst.)

²⁷ Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 45.

²⁸ Age., p. 15.

²⁹ Age., p. 45.

³⁰ Age., p. 85.

³¹ Age., p. 45-46. -Ssilka na st.; Vasilyev W.P. *Ob otnošeníyax kitayskogo yazıka k sredneaziatskim* (Jurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosvěsheniya. 1872. Sentabr); Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 136.

The views put forward by McGovern are incompatible with those of the Huns. McGovern generally accepts the Jung and "Ti"s as Huns³², but is puzzled by the fact that only the ethnic characteristics of the two groups do not correspond to each other. Lattimore, who thinks that the Jung and "Ti"s were settled within the borders of China; that they were sedentary, not nomadic, highlanders, i.e. definitely not related to the Hyung-nular³³ adopts the same view, but prefers to remain silent on the racial origin of these tribes.

N.N. Cheboksaroff³⁴, who ignores the fact that the correct solution of the problem must be sought in Chinese ethnogenesis, certainly eliminates the Jung problem. However, "Chin-shu" (bl. 97) clarifies the issue by stating that the Hyung-nular bordered six Jung tribes in the west,³⁵ i.e. underlines that these peoples were not related to each other.

Although our contemporaries saw the matter clearly by analysing the course of historical events, these writers had difficulty in seeing the separation of the Jung and "Ti" from the Chinese within the borders of China and from the Hyung-nus outside China. Grumm-Grжимaylo's "Ting-ling" theory provides a final solution to the problem. In fact, the problem stemmed from the fact that some Chinese writers did not see the "Jung" as a racial element to be emphasised.³⁶

The Choular Victory and its Consequences

The Chou principality was established on the territory of present-day Shen-si, and its warriors not only many Jogs, but also a number of border raiders against the Chinese. Around the same time, the Ahey had destroyed Tru-va, the Hyung-nu had conquered the Gobi, and the Chou ruler Wen-wang had "completed the conquest of the area between the sea and the Tibetan highlands with blond-haired (and even black-haired) barbarians"³⁷ and had his son a large force of warriors "with the hearts of tigers and wolves" to conquer the Shang-Yin state.³⁸

32 McGovern W. *The early empires of Central Asia*. L., 1939. p. 87, etc.

33 Lattimore O. *Inner Asian*, p. 340-349.

34 Cheboksarov N.N. *K voprosu o proisxojdenii kitaytsev*//*Sovetskaya ethnografiya*. 1947. No.I, p.30-70.

35 Bernchtam A.N. *Ocherki istorii gunnov*, p. 219 (Opublikovanny tekst "Chin-shu")

36 See Grumm-Grжимaylo G.Y. *1915-1991*, p. 111.

37 Grumm-Grжимaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 69.

38 Age., p. 16.

Wu-wang, who took action on his father's orders, had armed himself and reached as far as the Huang-ho River, but was defeated. Two years later, in 1027 BC,³⁹ he launched a new attack, but this time he was successful and the Shang-Yin state was destroyed. The defeated, many of whom had been made slaves, were left to the mercy of Chou commanders and statesmen, who pardoned an entire tribe. Most of the slaves were eastern "I" [Yih] and southern "Man", neighbours of Shang-Yin. The Chou ruler had completely conquered the coast between the great Huang-ho and Yang- tse rivers.

There are three views on the fall of the Shang dynasty, which are not strictly consistent. According to European historians, the Shang dynasty collapsed as a result of the attacks of the Chou tribes that swept into the Huang-ho Valley from the west. Feudal Chinese historical sources assume that the Shang dynasty had become degenerate and that the coup d'état that brought the Chou dynasty to power in 1066 was a step forward. And finally, Kuo Mo-jo, who argues that the Chou took advantage of internal disturbances to seize power by force, emphasises that this coup d'état only led to the disintegration and destruction of China.⁴⁰ The Chou state had been established in 1855 by independent vassal principalities that accepted the sovereign's rule only nominally.

Some historians recognise this period as the beginning of Chinese feudalism.⁴¹

Was the division of the country into several principalities unpopular with the people because the petty princes organised land reclamation and the damming of rivers? Property had certainly come to an end.

Moreover, the ideology had also changed: "The Chou, who had "put into obscurity the ideas about Shang-ti, the supreme of the gods, the ruler of the world, introduced a new naturalistic religion and the cult of heroes "⁴² and abolished the custom of sacrificing human beings to the gods.

39 According to the revised chronology in 1066. (See Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya is- toriya Kitaya*, p. 72)

40 Go Mojo. *Epoxa rabovladelcheskogo stroya* M., 1956.

41 Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 64; Tökei F. *Sur le term nong-fou dans le Che-king* (Asta Orientalia. 1955. Vol. V), p. 123-141.

42 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 35; De Harles. *Les religions de la Chine* (Le Muséon. 1891. Vol. X).

.⁴³ This led to ethnic fusion, which resulted in the appearance of beak-noses and bushy beards among the Chinese.⁴⁴

The capable and industrious Chinese people longed for an orderly and quiet life, but it was impossible to realise this with such a fragmented society. The imperial administration was helpless in the face of it. The principalities gradually began to expand at the expense of their neighbours. During the reign of Ch'un-ch'ü ("Spring and Autumn", 722-480) there were only 124 large principalities. In the later CChan-kuo ("Combatant Ruler",) period, only seven major and three minor principalities remained. This period is illustrated in the geographical work "Yü-kung", which analyses the classical division of the "Shang- s shu". The descriptions of "Yü-kung" belong to the period of "Spring and Autumn", when the North Chinese government was in contact with the contemporary Sih-ch'uan (pronounced "Sichuan") region, where, as it is mentioned in the work, iron ore was processed.⁴

According to the "Yü-kung", China is divided into nine , covering the area between the middle streams of the Huang-ho and Yang-tse and the coast from the mouth of the Yang-tse southwards, including Kuang-tung. The author calls the south Annam, but gives no information about Tibet, Ch'ing-hai, Hsi-ang, Kan-su, Yünnan and KKui-chou (pronounced Guycav) in the western b regions. "Having conquered mountains, forests and deserts, the strong and courageous bar-bars - this is how the author of "Yü-kung" describes them - "had long and decisively separated the culture of the central east from that of the western Mediterranean and south India."

But who were these barbarians who separated East from West? They could not have been the Hyung-nus, who at that time lived far to the north, in the direction of the caravan routes.

The historians of the ancient West, and Ptole- mm aeus in particular, shed some light on this complex question.⁴⁶ Ptolemaeus, in his

43 Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 100.

44 G. Grjimaýlo points out that most of the Chinese emperors were depicted with a falcon profile and bushy beard. In the "Troyetsartviye" many heroes are depicted in the same way, but only the yellow-bearded Sun Tsüan uses the title "ma- vi eyed lad" (Lo Huan-chung). (See *Troyetsartviye*. T. I. M., 1954, p. 369)

45 See Zaychikov W.T. *Vajneyshiye geograficheskie trudi drevnego Kitaya*// *Izvestiya Akademii nauk SSSR. Seriya geograficheskaya*. 1955. No. 3.

46 Tomson Dj. O. *Istoriya drevnei geografii*. M., 1953, p. 437-439.

in the age when China settled two distinct peoples on its territory: "Hsin" and "Ser". The capital of the "Hsin", south of the "Ser", was Tina, and Kattigar was located in the interior of the harbour.

Ptolemy's map is more or less accurate, unless the geographical depiction of a very remote region, which was very difficult to reach at that time, is considered imaginary. However, something else entirely concerns us here: The "Hsin" are certainly extensions of the Chinese of the Ch'in period and cannot be identified with the "Ser" who supplied the Parthian and Roman empires with Seric silk. The "Ser" are mentioned elsewhere before the "Hsin". For example, the Greco-Bactrian ruler Eutydemus, in about 200 B.C., had extended his dominion to the east, "where the Fa- unas and the Ser" were.⁴⁷ Bila-here, when the silk trade was established on the great caravan route, the word "Ser" came to be used not for the Chinese, but for those who sent silk to the Tarim Basin.⁴⁸

More importantly, the information about the "Ser" ⁴⁹, which Thompson characterises as "nonsense" ⁴⁹, is based on the narratives of Ceylonese envoys. According to them, the Ser are blue-eyed people with bushy and blond hair. They live in "Yemod", that is, in the Himalayas. Yule rejects this information as baseless and untrue. However, Pseudo-Arrian (Pericles, Sea of Erythraia, § 39, 49, 64) mentions a route from the country of the Ser- ers to Bactria and from there to the Indian savannas.⁵⁰ Therefore, it is not surprising that the Ceylonese encountered the Ser- ers. According to Tomson's reports, the territory of "Serika" stretched from Kashkar to Ku- olive China, north of the "Bautlar", i.e. Tibetan-Bots-⁵² This region was inhabited by the Ti ka- biles, whom we can identify with the Sers in terms of both geographical and physical characteristics.

47 Age., p. 253. The fauna mentioned here are the Ch'iangs, a Tibetan tribe living nomadically in the Yarkend-Darya basin. See Maenchen-Helfen O. *Pseudohuns*//*Central asiatic journal*. Vol. I. N°2, p. 102-103.; Tarn W.W. *The Greeks in Bactria and India*. Cambridge, 1950, p. 84-85; Gumilëv L.N. *Terrakotoviye figuri obezhan iz Xotana*//*Kratkie soobščeniya Gosudarstvennogo Ermita- ja*. L., 1959. No. 16.

48 Gumilëv L.N. *Terrakotoviye figuri*; see also Soothill. *China and West*. L., 1925; Yule-Cordier. *Cathay and Way Thither*. L., 1915.

49 Tomson Dj. O. *Istoriya drevney geografii* 427.

50 Yule-Cordier. *Cathay*, p. 200.

51 Tomson Dj. O. *Istoriya drevney geografii* 428.

52 Age., p. 431.

PART II

PLOUGHED INTO THE STEPPES

Prehistoric Huns

While reviewing the ancient historical periods of the Hyung-nu [Huns], the issue of analysing the ancient peoples living in and around Siberia will unexpectedly come to the fore. As it will be emphasised later on, we see that Chinese historical sources first mention the Hyung-nu in 1764 BC, and then again in 822 and 304 BC. This period of one thousand five hundred years of Hyung-nu history is quite dark. In order to illuminate this dark period, we have to turn to Siberian archaeology.

In the second millennium BC, we find two independent simultaneous cultures in Siberian archaeology: Glazkovo in the east and Andronovo in the west. "The territory around Baikal was inhabited by related tribes, which we can probably recognise as the ancestors of today's Evenks, Evens and Yukagirs. Their cultures were very close to those of the inhabitants of the Amur, Northern Manchuria and even the upper parts of Mongo-Listan, extending to the Great Wall of China and the Ordos. The peoples of this region were culturally related hunting and fishing tribes of the Neolithic and early Bronze Age. Moreover, they probably spoke languages close to each other."¹ Later, in the southern part of these tribes belonging to the Glazkovo culture, some of the ancestors of the Hyung-nus appeared and mixed with them.² From 1700 to 1200 BC, the Andronovo culture prevailed in the western half of Southern Siberia and Kazakhstan extending to the Ural. The inhabitants belonged to the white race and lived there from 1700 BC to 1200 BC. Settling in the Minusinsk Basin in the XVIII century, they gradually merged with the people of the Glazkovo cultural circle along the Yenisei.

1 Okladnikov A.P. *Neolith i bronzoviy vek Pribaykalya*. C. III. M.L., 1955, p. 8.

2 Age., p. 9-10.

lar.³ Andronovos were sedentary people engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry.⁴ They knew how to work bronze from metals. As a matter of fact, decorated clay pots and pans were found in their graves. Andronovo culture is related to the West. "Many similarities have been found between the ancient artefacts of the Andronovo cultural environment and axes from the Lower Volga, Don and Donetsk steppes."⁵ However, it was neither the Andronovos nor the Glazkovos who played a leading role in Southern Siberia in the second millennium BC.

We have already mentioned that the Ting-ling lived in the "Land of the Sandy Sha-sai", i.e. in the Gobi extremes.⁶ They also inhabited the Sayan-Altai foothills, the Minu-sinsk Basin and Tuva. They were people of "medium height, sometimes tall, hard and robust, with long faces, white skin, red cheeks, blond hair, often with hawk and beak noses and bright eyes".⁷ These descriptions in historical sources were confirmed by later archeological findings. The Sayan Altai region was the homeland of the Afanasyevo culture of about 2000 BC. Anthropological Afanasyevo a racial type. They have "narrow nose, narrow face, sunken eyes and wide forehead. These features show that they European. Afanasyevos are distinctly differentiated from today's Europeans by their wider foreheads. In this respect, they have the upper-paleolithic skull structure of Western Europe, that is, they belong to the chromanion type in the broad sense of the word."⁸

The heirs of the Afanasyevo were the Tagar tribes, who survived until the III century BC.⁹ This leads us to believe that the Afanasyevo-Ting- lings preserved their culture for centuries, despite the invasions of foreign tribes.

Around 1200, in the Minusinsk steppes, the Andronovo culture was replaced by the new Karasuk culture, which had been transported from the south of Northern China¹⁰, i.e. from the peoples of the Yellow River coast. Thus, for the first time, the Chinese style appeared in Western Siberia, but this was not the first time that the Chinese style had appeared in Western Siberia.

3 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yujnoy Sibiri*. M., 1951.

4 Gräznov M.P. *Pamätniki karasukskogo etapa v Tsentralnom Kazaxstane* //Sovets- kaya arxeologiya. 1952. T. XVI.

5 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya*, p. 100.

6 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/11.

7 Age., p. 34-35.

8 Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*. M.-L.,1948, p. 65.

9 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya*, p. 311; Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya*, p. 128.

10 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya*, p. 114-116.

is not imitated culture as it is thought to be. Because with this new culture, a new racial type is found in the graves. This type is a cross between Mongoloids and Europeans, although Europeans are brachycephalic and Mongoloids are narrow-faced and belong to the "Far East Asian type".¹¹ During the Yang-shao period, such a race was formed in North China. Their outward appearance was reminiscent of the Uzbeks of today, a mixture of European and Mongoloid elements. In the course of time these elements mingled with each other, but what is particularly important for us is our conclusion that "a mixed people had already settled in Southern Siberia; the European brachycephals, which are included in the system, but to which type is not certain, were mixed with the dary-faced southern Mongoloids "¹².

It seems reasonable to attribute this unknown brachycephalic European element from China to the "Ti"s, but the existence of different types of the European element in Siberia and leads us to the following conclusion: "Ti" and "Ting-ling" are a branch of the European race, but they are different racial types. The similarities are not idyllic.¹³

Grumm-Grjimaýlo, who identified the "Ti" with the "Ting-ling", was of the following opinion: "I do not think that the dolichocephalous race that settled in Southern Siberia in the Neolithic era had any genetic ties with the "Ti" tribes, that is, with the "Ting-ling" (?) who lived in the Yellow River basin in unknown periods. It is more probable to regard those who still exist in Far East Asia today as their remnants (Aynis - L. N.). "¹⁴ However, the Chinese called the "Ting-ling" the typical representative of this dolichocephalic race, and the Sayan highlanders as "Ting-ling".¹⁵ The "Ting-ling" disappeared from the stage of history in the middle of the II century, but Ti-le (Di-li), the steppe branch of the "Ti", appeared in the IV century. It should be noted that the Yenisey Kyrgyz were closely connected not with the southern descendants of the "Ti", but with the Siberian "Ting-ling". The southern branch of the "Ting-ling" migrated southwards from the Sayan Mountains and fused with the ancestors of the Huns. It may be that the Chinese, due to the differences in the appearance of the Huns, considered them beak-nosed.

11 Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*, p. 63.

12 Agy.

13 Gumilev L.N. *Dinirskaya problema* // *MVGBOT*. 0195199.591. No.1.

14 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 15.

15 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/107.

as the Huns of the Huns. When Shih Min ordered the slaughter of all Huns to the last man in 350, "many beak-nosed Chinese were killed with them."¹⁶

This means that the "Ting-ling" were a people who had fused with the ancestors of the Huns from the south.

Chinese history mentions the life of the "Hu"¹⁷, the ancestors of the Huns, before Christ. But the most remarkable thing is that in these descriptions it is revealed that the "Hu" resembled the Hyung-nus historically in terms of social structure, but more in terms of lifestyle.

I think, in ancient times, there was no state organisation in Hyung-nus. Some families migrated to the steppes with their herds. Their herds consisted of horses, large and small hoofed animals, some camels and donkeys.

However, this nomadic life in the steppes was certainly not an irregular and haphazard one. In spring, the nomads would go to the plateaus between the mountains, which were equipped with water and pastures essential for the herds; in autumn, they would retreat to the regions with relatively little snowfall, where the herds could find forage without much difficulty. The pastures and winter pastures were strictly divided among nomads and they were considered as the personal property of tribes or families. This was also the case with the Huns.

Here, however, we must bear in mind that Sih-ma Ch'ien¹⁸ includes in his descriptions of Hun life some familiar old lines and takes the view that the situation could not have been otherwise. Sih-ma Ch'ien, presumably starting from the view that nomadic animal husbandry played an important part in the economy of the "Hu", finds it implausible, without any justification, that the steppe peoples of Inner Mongolia could have also animal husbandry to a large extent in the Neolithic period. In fact, the issue is to what this animal husbandry was practised in a nomadic manner.

A more important feature of this period of Hun history is the following description: "Those with powerful bows were all armoured (!) cavalry.

¹⁶ Grumm-Grжимaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 15.

¹⁷ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/40.

¹⁸ the introduction.

Everyone was practising battle drills in order to be successful in attacks... The strong ate fatty and better food; the old were content with their leftovers. The young and strong were held in high esteem; the old and weak were less respected. They usually gave each other names, but did not use (tribal - L.N.) titles and nicknames. "19

This quotation reveals how weak tribal ties were and how dominant physical power was in customs and traditions. Historical sources record that tribal epithets did not exist, especially in the period when the tribal structure was dominant, whereas in later periods, inter-tribal relations took centre stage. (See further.) From what has been told so far, we can say that there was not a period when the ancestors of the Huns were bound to each other in terms of common origin, but they were bound together in terms of sharing the common historical destiny.

There must have been some reasons for the weakness of tribal ties, but we can certainly see from the above arguments the existence of customs and institutions related to the tribal structure. For example, polygamy was common instead of one-woman marriage, and women were passed on to others as if they were insignificant inheritance property: The stepmother was inherited by the son and the daughter-in-law by the brother, which is typical of the patriarchal tribal structure. It is not correct to perceive this situation as a humiliation of women. Because this kind of marriage was generally intended to save the woman from being miserable the event of widowhood. Moreover, the new husband was obliged to allocate a place for her in the tent, to feed her and not to leave her to the arms of fate. All these indicate that the events mentioned above were most probably historical processes that took place during the period when the Huns lived in the interior of China.


Let us try to confirm this with archaeological data.

1927 and 1937, an Isch archaeological team working in Mongolia uncovered a late neolithic culture "dating to about 2000, if not later "20 . This culture differs markedly from the North Chinese neolithic period "in that it is only a precursor of contact "21 .

19 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/40.

20 Okladnikov A.P. *Noviye danniiye po drevneysey istorii vnutrenney Mongolii* // *VEDI* 1951, p. 473. 173.

21 Age., p. 172.



This conclusion is plausible. The culture of the Neolithic period belongs to the steppe hunting clans, to which the defeated "Ti" fleeing from China, and later the defeated "Ti", and later the defeated Hsia supporters took refuge. The fact that "many artefacts of North Chinese Neolithic culture are found everywhere" confirms this conclusion. Studies on the lifestyles of the Neolithic peoples lead us to the conclusion that these peoples lived on the banks of rivers and lakes and were engaged in hunting, fishing and gathering.

Thus, according to historical material and rumours, the ancient "Hu", including two groups who fled from China, were extremely primitive peoples who lacked any state organisation and did not even feel the need for such a thing. Just as their contemporaries, the Phoenicians, invented navigation and discovered Europe, their only contribution to culture was the development of nomadic animal husbandry and the crossing of the desert, the sand sea of the Gobi, in other words, the discovery of Siberia. Both discoveries were important for the course of history, and it is not easy to determine which of them is more remarkable. Since archaeology reinforces the data of the Chinese chronicles, we are obliged to take this information into account, even though much of it is not supported by archaeological findings, namely the information on marriage customs and respect for the elderly. The available charts record the absence of a family tradition. From this point of view, we can conclude that the living conditions were obviously bad and the weak were considered to be condemned to death. But the greatest calamity to which the ancestors of the Huns were subjected was that, as they devoted all their energies to the maintenance of their physical existence, the traditions disappeared along with the old people.

Formation of the Huns

We have no information about the wars between the "Hu" nomads and the Shang-Yin state. However, archaeological materials indicate that there were close relations between China and the steppe people during this period. Considering, on the one hand, that the "barbarians" were still weak in terms of organisation and, on the other hand, that the Principality of Chou, their common enemy and the common enemy of others, was growing stronger, the occurrence of fierce battles between them is not an exception.

I think that for the steppe peoples, as well as for the Chinese, the foundation of the Chou Wengdom was an event that led to the separation of their histories. Even before its foundation, the Chou principality had been a barrier between China and the northern provinces. In ca. 1158, Wen-wang attacked H'enyun and "gave them a warning." ²² Through incessant fighting, Wu-wang subjugated the northern "barbarians", the Jungs, and probably squeezed out the steppe "Hu". In this situation, the only place they could go away from the Chinese border was to the north.

It must be borne in mind that the Huns clearly diverged from their ancestors in the VII century BC. Deguignes, based on Sih-ma Ch'ien, states that "we have to accept that the Hun State was founded around 1200 BC". ²³ Cordier also accepts this date. ²⁴ At that time, the Huns were living in the region extending from Ho-pei to Bargöl [Bar-kul/Bars-göl] and had organised some attacks on China. From the descriptions of their life style and state organisation, it is understood that they had made some progress in this direction: "They had no houses; they did not plough the land, but lived in tents. They respected the elders and gathered at a certain time of the year to organise their affairs." ²⁵ Therefore, it is not surprising that they came from the desert and gained an advantage over the people of Glazkovo and Andronovo culture.

Discovery of Siberia

According to archaeological data, the second period of early Hun history begins around 1200 BC. As already seen, by this time the first march of the southern nomads across the Gobi had been completed, the desert had become a viable route, and the Huns had made both sides of the desert their home. ²⁶

First of all, it is necessary to ask why it was possible to cross the "sea of sand" at that time. Probably, Hun nomadic animal husbandry was highly developed and the Huns

22 McGovern W. *The early empires of Central Asia*. L., 1939, p. 91.

23 Deguignes Y. *Histoire des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols et des autres Tartares occidentaux avant et depuis J. C. jusqu'à présent*. Vol. I. P., 1758, p. 216.

24 Cordier H. *Histoire générale de la Chine*. Vol. I. P., 1920, p. 205.

25 Quoted from the same work by H. Cordier.

26 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya*, p. 147.

the north in search of pastures. Besides, these animals they raised also carried their cargo. As a matter of fact, the paintings on the rocks depict a "ship" like image on which the ancestors of the Huns crossed the "sea of sand". In fact, this is a picture of a wheeled, enclosed chariot drawn by horses. The drawing of the image of the bey- gir indicates that such a chariot would have been too heavy for riding horses.²⁷ This is a convincing, if not adequate, depiction. It cannot be concluded that such climatic changes in the second millennium B.C. led to significant changes in land- shafts. It is possible that a period of cooling and humidification began in this period, which ended precisely in the middle of the first millennium BC. Since the zerothermic arid period began to be replaced by subatlantic humidity, this change should have been directed towards the borders of the Gobi Desert. During this period, the number of lakes (arid climate and the formation of lakes is a geographical phenomenon interconnected with each other), which were scattered in a climatic zone starting from Lower Povolje and following Kazakhstan and Mogolis- tan to Kingan [Hingan], should have increased.²⁸ Thus, with the proliferation of lakes, the "Taiga sea" began to expand to the south; forest-steps turned into virgin forests, which made the economic situation of Siberian people difficult. However, this situation favoured the southern nomads who were able to exploit these forests. Although written historical sources have not preserved the traces of the struggle against forests for a thousand years, by the III century BC, the Huns were the owners of the entire steppes from the Gobi Desert to the Siberian taiga. On the banks of the Yenisei and the Aba-Kan, in addition to log dwellings, round nomadic dwellings had sprung up. Along with the cultural development, the mixing of races also took place. Because, in the graves belonging to this period called Karasuk period, the northern Chinese narrow-faced Mongoloid²⁹ type and the southern origin brachycephalic European types began to be encountered.

However, if the Huns had an influence on the South Siberian natives, they had at least as much influence on the Huns. "In the vicinity of Angara and Upper Lena, the end of the Stone Age and the beginning of the Bronze Age, the neolithic stage of subsistence fishing was not everywhere as quiet and peaceful as before.

²⁷ Age., p. 161.

²⁸ Murzayev E. *Severo-vostochny Kitay*. M., 1955, p. 83,113.

²⁹ Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*, p. 83.

As is well known, in the conditions of tribal life, conflicts between tribes and clans are never absent. ³⁰ "The purpose of the wars was to acquire slaves in order to relieve the master and his wife from heavy household chores and to show the 'wealth' of the family. But this 'wealth' was not wealth as we know it. Because these 'valuable things' meant nothing in daily life. They were the pride of the masters, but they were kept in chests like dead treasure. In general, they were items such as worked pieces of nephrite, shells of marine animals and mother-of-pearl, which were pleasing to the eye, but did not provide any real benefit. ³¹ The cultural ties of the ancient peoples living in the vicinity of Baikal extend from southern Manchuria to north-eastern China.³² The most noteworthy point here is that the main raw material of the nephrite jewellery (discs, rings, oval ornaments) and beads, which are the means of cultural exchange, as well as jewellery made of beads and shellfish, is metal. However, on the basis of new archaeological findings, we can conclude that an independent cultural complex existed in the territory stretching from Angara to Ussuri in the second millennium BC.

A. P. Okladnikoff's collection of archaeological material on the life of the tribes around Baikal in the second and early first millennium BC reveals a patriarchal tribal structure with slavery. Slaves, acquired as a result of warfare or by purchase, were not only used for hard and unpleasant work, but were also used for bloody sacrifices.³³ From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the Huns were the indigenous primitives of the Halha, so that the neighbouring peoples had to borrow many things from their culture. Indeed, in the III century BC, we find in the Huns a patriarchal-tribal structure and a system of slavery. Okladnikoff proposes the same features for the tribes belonging to the Glazkovo culture.

Although, with very few exceptions, the history of the Huns between 1200-214 B.C. has not been illuminated by written historical documents, this does not mean that there were insignificant events in the intervening 1000-year period. Therefore, we cannot pass over this period in silence. What we can do in this regard to put forward some proposals and estimates by making some comparisons,

³⁰ Okladnikov A.P. *Neolith*, p. 261.

³¹ Age., p. 244, 247.

³² Age., Bl. IV.

³³ Age., p. 231 et seq.

but they may shed some light, if not on the history of the Huns, then on their ethnography.

Archaeological researches have revealed that in the Bronze Age throughout Southern Siberia, there was a custom of burying deceased women or chambermaids in the grave of the husband.³⁴ In fact, the bodies of sacrificed men have also been found in the graves.³⁵ This can be explained by the ancient custom of "tuom", the ceremony of summoning the spirit of the warrior through bloodshed. Because this tradition existed among the Lower Lena tribes and its memories have been preserved to this day.³⁶

However, we have a remarkable similarity belonging to a more recent period. According to a custom practised among the Kultans, when going to war against an enemy country, they would bring a "sacrifice of atonement" for the souls of their sinful ancestors and "shoot them with a thousand arrows". After the end of the war, they would bring one of the enemies and sacrifice his soul. But this defaki, "sacrifice of thanksgiving"³⁷ In the II century BC, the same custom existed among the Huns.³⁸ It is known that the representatives of the southern branch of the Glazkovo culture were in close contact with the Kantans. The Huns, on the other hand, had close relations with the Glazkovo since 1200 BC. However, the question of the relations of the Lower Lena tribes belonging to the circumpolar culture, which retreated from the vicinity of Southern Baikal to the "taiga sea", with the Huns has not yet been clarified.

In this case, we can say that the sacrifices were probably dedicated not to the god of war Ilbis³⁹ but to the spirit of the ancestors who were not satisfied with blood.

The following observation of A. P. is particularly important: During the Glazkovo culture "a new form of burial emerged on the basis of the belief that there was a world under the earth, through which the river of the dead was believed to flow, and this belief replaced the old form of burial, which consisted in the presentation of different altars for the life of the deceased in the afterlife."⁴⁰

34 Okladnikov A.P. *Neolith*, p. 233, 237; Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya*, p. 24, 113; Salnikov K.W. *Drevneyšie pamätniki istorii Urala*. Sverdlovsk, 1952, p. 68, 69.

35 Okladnikov A.P. *Neolit*, p. 259.

36 Okladnikov A.P. *Istoricheskiye rasskazy i legendy nizney Leni* (Сборник МАЭ, 1949, No.11). p. 82, rasskaz 9.

37 Plath J.H. *Geschichte des östlichen Asiens*. Göttingen, 1830, p. 105; Okladnikov A.P. *Neolith*, p. 261.

38 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/76.

39 Okladnikov A.P. *Neolit*, p. 259.

40 Age., p. 328.

This change in worldview took place at the same time as the transition of the tribal structure from a matriarchal to a patriarchal system. In fact, this view completely changed the understanding of life, in particular, it completely rejected the cult of ancestors. "According to the view of this period, the custom of killing those who were unfortunate and subjected to disasters was abandoned. Previously, however, this custom had regarded the killing of those caught in the whirlpool of life as something inevitable."⁴¹ According to this view, the concept of offering sacrifices of "atonement" and "thanksgiving" for the spirits of the ancestors was perceived as a compensation for their non-involvement in worldly life.

In connection with this worldview, a dualistic system emerges. Accordingly, the sky is the ancestor and represents goodness, while the earth is the mother and represents death. The sun cult, which finds its expression in discs and necklaces made of white nephrite, also originated from here.

In conclusion, according to Okladnikoff's very interesting recent research and findings, the two burials of the Glazkovo period are interpreted as shamanism.⁴² However, it must be recognised that shamanism, which consists in contact with spirits, sometimes through sexual ecstasy, has absolutely no connection with the worldview described above. If it is accepted that the burial method described is indeed related to shamanism, it would be more correct to conclude that it appeared at a later period, i.e. after 1200 BC, or even at the same time as southern shamanism, which had already existed in China and from there had been carried to Siberia with the Huns. Such a view neither Okladnikoff's conception nor the compiled material. Because Okladnikoff compares the spoons made from the bones of the deceased found in the vicinity of ancient Anasovo with the bronze-age spoons found in Ordos.⁴³ The view that shamanism emerged in Siberia on its own, on the basis of evolution rather than ancient beliefs, has not been proved and probably cannot be proved. On the contrary, since the Bronze Age, Siberia and the Far East have been linked by cultural ties.

The culture and social structure of the fishing tribes around Baikal, although of secondary interest to us, are important. Huns absorbed and processed this culture for a thousand years; Chinese culture

41 Age., p. 334.

42 Age., p. 339 et seq.

43 Age., p. 347.

They developed an independent Hun culture which was quite different from and even contrary to it, and there are traces of this phenomenon. Almost all of the above-mentioned de- fin customs can be found with some changes in the Hyung-nu State of the II century BC. In short, Oklad- nikoff's analyses and determinations are of special importance in terms of indicating that the formation of the Hyung-nu State and nomadic culture was the second stage of a self-shaping process.

Hyung-nu's northward march

Okladnikoff argues that the second stage of the Shiver culture consisted of the fusion of the ancient Hyung- nular with the ancient Tunguz. This stage is markedly differentiated from the earlier Glazkovo culture by its advanced metallurgical technology and "astonishing similarity between primitive Celtic axes and ancient Chinese Yin (or Shang) dynasty axes "44 . The spearheads are a ne- vi repetition of the Yin culture, but the daggers and blades resemble the ancient forms of the straight Karasuk daggers.

Following the course of events, we can conclusively date the beginning of this culture to the early first millennium BC. After all, the Hyung-nus the enemies of the Chou, and therefore the friends of the Shang/Yin.⁴⁵ Since the expulsion from Wu-wang China in the late XIIth century had already brought the forms and lifestyles borrowed from the Chinese to Siberia, the items found in Siberia that are similar to the Anyang objects must date directly from the period leading up to the fall of the later Shang/Yin dynasty. However, this similarity is not ideological, for there has always been a difference between the immigrant way of life and the Chinese way of life.

44 Okladnikov A.P. *Shiverskiy kulturno-istoricheskiy etap* (rukopis).

45 It is surprising to note that the Huns preserved the traditional Shang art until the V century AD and carried it to Western Europe. For example, a bronze handle of a sacrificial vessel found in the square of Katalaun has been identified as belonging to the Huns, and similar finds have been found Silesia in Hungary, in southern Russia, in the Altai Mountains around Lake Töles, in Mongolia and in Ordos. Although they belong to the Old Han period, i.e. the III-Ith centuries B.C.E., in style they resemble the shapes of the 'Shang-Yin' period, at which time such vessels were called 'Yu'. [See Takáts Z. *Catalaunischen Hunnenfund und sein ostasiatischen Verbindungen*//*Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*. T. V. Budapest, 1955, pp. 143-173)

Thus, we can say that the Shiver culture around Baikal and the Karasuk culture belong to the same period, but they emerged for various reasons. Only the fates of these cultures were different.

The Western Hyung-nu troops, who had reached the Sayan foothills, were probably besieged by the Ting-ling and cut off from their main kin masses. There were certainly skirmishes there, but the Ting-ling were victorious.⁴⁶

The powerful Tagar culture, in turn, drew a veil over the indigenous Karasuk traditions, which suppressed the earlier cultures. According to recent measurements, the skulls of the Karasuk culture most closely resemble Uzbek and Tajik skulls (according to V.P. Aleksiyeff). This means that the Mongoloid element in Central Asia had also succumbed to the European element.

The Karasuk culture was spread over a much wider area than the area where the anthropological types belonging to it were found.⁴⁷ This culture borrowed many things from the preceding Andronovo culture and left traces on the Tagar culture after it. From this we can conclude the following: Those who mingled with the people from the south quickly entered into peaceful relations with the natives, fertilised their culture with their own and spread it to the masses.

In the east, the situation was different. When the less organised tribes around Baikal, who were related to the Hyung-nus by blood, accepted their rule, the whole of Central Mongolia and the steppes beyond Baikal became the main homeland of the Hyung-nus in the third century BC. Apparently, the battles for the vast steppes continued for about three hundred years, during which time there is no record of the Hyung-nus in China. During these three hundred years, a new people was shaped by the fusion with the natives and developed its own culture (e.g. bronze-working technique); during the same period, the Chou dynasty, which had completed its life in China, was on the verge of collapse. But the Hyung-nus had many neighbours besides the Chinese.

Neighbours of the Ancient Huns

The Jungs occupied a fairly unified and monolithic territory. In the north-west, in Turfan, the Indo-European Ch'e-

46 Artamonov M.IK *voprosu o proishozhdenii skifov*// БДИИ 11925,0s.. 1426.S. 46.

47 Găzov ML *Istoriya drevnix plenenn verney Obi* / ММА. Т84,81915965,6, p383-84-141.

The Shihs (pronounced Cheshi) were scattered over the Hami Oasis⁴⁸ where they were neighbours; in the south-west they conquered the shores of Lake Lob-nor, the Çerçen Derya, which flows into Khoten [or Khotan], and the Golden-tag mountains, where the Tibetans, the Jo-ch'iangs (or Er-ch'iangs), were nomadic inhabitants. The foothills of the Say-dam also belonged to the Jong, but their relatives, the "Ti", lived in northern Sih-ch'uan. The main tribes of the Joghhs, however, were concentrated in Ku-olive China. In the Ho-pei region, the following tribes lived: P'ei-junġ (these were also Shan-junġs), Chia-shih (a branch of Ch'i-ti tribes), Hsian-lü, Fei, K'u (a branch of Pai-ti tribes) and Wu-chunġs. Their common name was P'ei-ti. In the west lived the tribes commonly called the Junġ-ti. They lived the Chinese peoples, but without mixing with them, in the following cities: Shen-si: T'a-Junġ, Li-Junġ, Ch'üan-junġs; in Kan-su: Hsiao-junġs; in Ho-nan and Shan-si: Mu-Junġs, Pai-tis, Ch'i-tis, Tsian-ch'iu-junġs, Lu-hsiular, Lu-shihs, and Tuo-ch'engs.⁴⁹ The nomadic Lou-fang and Bayan [Pa-yang] tribes were also among the Junġ tribes. The Lou-fangs were originally settled in Shan-si (today's T'ai-yüan)⁵⁰, but we find them later in Ordos. They were probably within sight of Ptolemaeus, who mentions the Hsin, the Ser, who lived in neighbourhood with the Chinese.

The easternmost of the Junġ tribes were the Shan-junġs of South Kingan, neighbours of the Tung-hu and Hyung-nu-s. The territory formerly inhabited by the Hyung-nu is fully described in chapter 97⁵¹ of the "Chin-shu". Accordingly, the Hyung-nu territory bordered the principalities of Yang and Chao (today's Ho-pei and Shan-si provinces) in the south. In the north, it abutted Sha-mo; in the east, it was bounded by the northern "Yih"; and in the west, it to the territories of the six Jung tribes, i.e. the territory formerly inhabited by the Huns was the same as the borders of present-day Inner Mongolia, with the exception of Barga. In other words, the territory of the Hyung-nular had shrunk, considering that the steppes extending eastwards from Kingan were inhabited by the Tung-hus, more precisely by the Hor, a Mongoloid race. It should be noted here that the Northern Chinese type is quite far from the Mongoloid type. Because the Chinese are narrow-faced, slender and graceful. Mongoloids, on the other hand, are short and stocky with wide cheekbones. In the steppe we meet two types: Tung-hu

48 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, III/57.

49 Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, p. 137-138.

50 Chavannes Ed. *Les mémoires historiques de Sse-ma Ts'ien*. P., 1899. p. 71, 89.

51 Bernchtam A.N. *Ocherk istorii gunnov*. L., 1951, p. 219.

i.e. the pure Mongol-Chinese, the so-called eastern Hu's, and the narrow-faced Chinese, such as the beak-nose we find among the Hu-Huns, who bear the obvious characteristics of the Ting-ling type.⁵² It can be said that the Huns and the Tung-hu, the Hor, mixed with each other for centuries, and that this mixture determined the Huns' distinctive grizzly characteristic. In other words, Ting-ling impregnability mixed with Chinese systematicity and Mongol endurance.

To the north of the Huns lived the Ting-ling. They were scattered in the foothills of the Sayan mountain range from the Yenisei to the Selenge. Along the Yenisei, they mingled with the Kyrgyz people (Ch'i-ku in Chinese), who had emerged from the mixture of the Ting-ling with the unknown Kien-Kun tribes. To the west of them, to the north of the Altai foothills, lived the Kipchaks called "Yüeh-shieh" (pronounced Yüeshiye) in Chinese, who resembled the Ting-ling in appearance and were perhaps their relatives.

In the Chinese chronicles from the V century BC onwards, we find information about the nomadic Yuechis living in Ho-hsi (Hosi oku- nur), that is, in the steppes west of Ordos. Their territory extended "from Tun-huang in the north, the Great Walls around Ordos to Hami in north".⁵³ However, this region could not have been the homeland of the populous Yuechi people. Because the Chinese geographical sources of that period confuse the Wu-suns with the Ch'i-ti, the Uighurs. Chinese sources do not mention the Yuechis until the V century BC. If they had lived in this region very close to the Chinese border, it would have been unthinkable for the Chinese to remain ignorant of them. Therefore, the Yuechis had captured Ho-hsi, which they used as a base of attack for themselves in the V century BC. Such a base could only be Cungarya. Because the central parts of Mongolia were occupied by the Hyung-nus and the western part by the Kip-chaks and Kien-Kuns.⁵⁴

52 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 15.

53 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, III/57.

54 For this historical subject see Grumm-Grjimaýlo's *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, pp. 91-94. The territories inhabited by the Yuechis can be identified by such a comparison. In the period preceding the conquest of the Asian steppes by the Huns, the borders of the two states in Altai were intertwined: K'ang-chü in the west and Yüechi in the east. According to S.P. Tolstoff, the K'ang-chü were settled in eastern Kazakhstan, and there is little information about their conquest of the mountainous Altai valleys. The Yü-echi territory, according to Chinese sources, was between Alashan and Hami. The more fertile southern part, occupied by the Wu-suns, was conquered by the Yuechis around the IV century BC. In order to fully understand the information provided by the Chinese, i.e. the coexistence of two great peoples in a desert-like terrain...

Last but not least, let us turn to the Bomalar, the blond-haired northerners, whose identity has never been resolved in history. They lived in the northern parts of the Sayan-Altai foothills.⁵⁵ The information we found about them is as follows: "They live nomadically. They like to live among the mountains covered with coniferous forests. They breed horses. Their horses are spotted. The name Boma (spotted horse) given to their country comes from here. The northern part of their country extends to the sea. They occasionally fight with Khakas, who are very similar to them in appearance, but their languages are different and they do not understand each other. Their houses are made of wood. They cover the floor of their wooden houses with bark. They are in small clans and they do not have a chief to whom they are all united."⁵⁶ In Bichurin's translation, we come across slightly different information. For example, their horses are grey in colour.

It must be admitted that this region had been conquered by the Yuechis from the west, but since the surrounding areas were inhabited by the Tochars and the territory of Mogolia was under the control of the Huns, only Altai and Cungarya reaching to T'ien-shan remained. The Yuechis had been squeezed out from there by the Huns in 165 BC. to the identification of the Pazyryukids with the Yuechis, the following arguments are put forward:

1° Chinese artefacts, and in particular mirrors from the Ch'in principality, are closely associated with the Yuechis.

2° The Yüeci their heads; the corpses found at Pazırık also to this.

3° The profile with precise lines, recovered from the Pazyryk excavations and aesthetically corrected, is similar to the profile found on Kushan coins.

4° The approximate dates between the VIIIth and VIII century BC correspond to those of the Yuechis. The K'ang-chular, on the other hand, lived 500 years longer. Although not related to the Ch'in period, the Ch'in mirrors found in the Altai with other artefacts could only have been carried by the Yuechi.

5° Most of the Pazyryk-type stone corgans found in the eastern regions belong to Mongolia and Jungarya in terms of landshaft, but they have absolutely nothing to do with the Karaganda steppe and Baraba. The similarity of Pazyryk artefacts to Scythian artefacts can only be explained by the fusion of these two peoples and cultural exchange. Moreover, this exchange took place through the Alans, relatives of the Scythians.

The literature on the Yüeci is quite abundant. The most recent of these are: Pel- liot P. *Les couthenes et les tokhariens*//*Journal asiatique*. 1934; Haloun G. *Zur Ue-tsi Frage*// *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*. 1937; Umnàkov I.I. *Toxarskaya problema*// БОИ 1940. S.P. Tolstoff identifies the Yuechis with the Massagets on the basis of the similarity of names in the proposed forms. (see Tolstov S.P., *Drevniy Khorezm*. M., 1938). However, this view is not accepted by all the masters.

55 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. Zapadnaya Mongoliya, p. 51, 59.

56 Chavannes E. *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (turcs) occidentaux*// Sbornik trudov Orxonskoy ekspeditsiy. T.VI, SPb., 1903, p. 29, note. 4.

They differ from the Upper Boma only in that they feed horses for their milk. The number of Boma warriors is 30,000.⁵⁷

As we can see, by Siberian standards, this is a large people. However, in the Chinese chronicles we also find their names as Bi-tsi or Bike and O-lo-ci.⁵⁸ This shows that the word Boma is only a nickname and the identification of the Siberian Bomas with the Ganasuys is unfounded. Moreover, even the hieroglyphics of the Ganasuys are different.⁵⁹ Their ethnonym corresponds to the Bikeler, one of the ancient tribes mentioned in Rashid al-din, and to the Alakchins, about whom Abu'l Ghazi says "all their horses are spotted and their hearths are golden". Abu'l Ghazi places the land of the Alakchins on the banks of the Angara River.⁶⁰ Thus, we cannot place the Bomalar among either the Tilites or the Ting-ling.

In order to place the Alakchins somewhere, we must return once more to the anthropology of the Baikal region. It seems that in the Neolithic Age we encounter three types that are close to each other: 1) Eskimoids In the middle currents of Angara, where there are no European traces. 2) Pale-siberians: Upstream of the Angara and Lena. 3) Europeans who came from the Sayan-Altai and mixed with the natives. The southern parts of the Baikal region, where this type is spread, are surrounded by islets of steppe or chernozooma from the Minusinsk region to the Kansk steppe, approximately along the present railway.⁶¹ We find a similar situation in the Krasnoyarsk region.⁶²

Thus, the existence of the northern Bomas, more precisely Alakchins and Bikins, is confirmed. In spite of their racial similarities, the ethnic differences from the Ting-ling us puzzled. The territory over which they are scattered is considered to be quite extensive: The region stretching from Altai to Baikal is inhabited by many other Siberian tribal groups

57 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/350.

58 Agy.

59 Grumm-Grjimaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 13.

60 Age., p. 353-354.

61 Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*, p. 58-61.

62 Age., p. 52.

PART III

" OF SAND" ON THE BEACHES OF

Huns' First Attack on China

Early IXth century. In China, the Chou wangs had already lost their power and Wang Hsüan became concerned about the discontent of his subjects, who were preparing to revolt.

In the same period, the Huns first a stand in favour of peace. Chinese poets characterised them as "the great proud"; ordinary literary fragments as "angry slaves".

The first works of poetry about the Huns, renewed but at the same time more violent, date from 822 BC. In one of the "Song Books" we find the following lines about the attacks of the Huns¹ on China:

In the sixth month;² excitement!
Armoured cars are waiting, ready.
Four noble steeds, each arrow armed,
ready to pounce as usual. The Huns
attacked with raging fury We had no
choice but to oppose, At least to save the
capital!
The sovereign³ has given the
order: Forward! We defeated
the Huns, but with unrivalled
courage. The Huns had bad
plans to Ch'yao and Hu,

1 The Chinese use the old language Syun-yün, not Syung-nu.

2 July

3 Hsüan-wang of the Chou dynasty.

Capturing Hao and ^{Fen4}, they
 reached as far as northern Ch'in
 Our flags decorated with bird embroidery
 Separated by white ribbons
 Featured ten armoured cars
 And now we have defeated the
 Huns. The victory of tens of
 thousands has come at last!⁵

The Huns' march is too poorly known to be properly assessed. For it is by no means clear whether this was a successful campaign of persecution or a serious battle for territory. The first possibility seems more plausible, but in this case it seems to be a more extensive attack and the mobilisation of large masses. For in order to repel the enemy, it is necessary to mobilise mobile troops, and such battles cannot be considered small skirmishes.

But what is more strange is that there is no mention of the Huns for five hundred years after this event. Probably the Chinese drove the Huns north of the Jung-lar.⁶

JUNG-China War

The power of the Chou wangs depended on "sharp spears" and this situation could not continue forever. In 842 BC, when the people of the capital revolted against Li-wang and attacked the palace, Li-wang fled. Chou-kung and Chao-kung, two state officials, over the government at the request of the people. Their regency period, which lasted between 842-827, called the "General Consensus" (K'un-ho) years. This period was characterised by the restoration of power, but despite the successful repulsion of the Huns and the against the Seu in South-East China, the state still lacked the strength to rebuild.

Although the number of feudal and suyurkal polities was quite large in China, their territories were not very large; therefore, the ruler an advantage over all the princes.

4 It refers to the capital of the Chou reign.

5 Avdiyev W. *Istoriya drevnego Vostoka*. M., 1953, p. 655.

6 The word Hyung-nu originated in China during the reign of Chan-k'o (IV-III century BC). (See Ch'en Yung. *Oboronitelnye voyny protiv xunnov v epoxu Han*. Shan-xai, 1955 (*Referativny sbornik*. 1956, No. 15, p.95)

However, as the independent princes grew in power, the wang had to deal with them. But of course this was not always possible. Personal interests and ambitions, often mixed up in political calculations, led to the ruin of the wangs. For example, when Yü-wang fell in love with Pao-Sih's beauty, he began to neglect his ni-kah wife, the daughter of Prince Sheng, whereupon Prince Sheng attempted to avenge the death of his daughter. As a result, a civil war broke out among the fe-odals. Those who were able to flee from the state officials took refuge in the neighbouring "barbarian" tribes, but from there the Jong and the "Ti" a counter-attack. In 771 the Huan-jungs, finding themselves in the midst of feudal warfare, entered China; Yü-wang died in the fighting and the Huan-jungs settled in China. Occupying the lands between the King and Wei rivers, they "continued to squeeze the Central Chinese State. "7 P'ing-wang of the Chou dynasty, unable to hold out against the enemy's attacks, retreated to Lo-yang in the east, but Prince Hsiang defeated the Huan-jungs in 770 BC. Thus, from this date onwards, the Chou Principality began to collapse.

After a while, the Shan-jungs mobilised in the east and in 706 they confronted the principalities of Yen and Ch'i, defeating the Ch'i prince in front of the walls of his capital city. It was only 44 years later that Huan-kung, the prince of the Ch'i principality, succeeded in driving them out of the borders of China.⁸ However, as the previous civil wars had made it impossible for the Chinese to unite their forces, in 644 the Jungs defeated the prince of the Chin principality, who was the leader of the imperial alliance. In 642 they assisted the prince of the Ch'i principality, who had raised the flag of rebellion against one of their old enemies, and launched an attack that dealt a fatal blow to the Wei principality.

The Jungs achieved their greatest success in 636 BC. Hsiang-wang, the eldest of the princes, married a Jung princess. But the young princess became involved in a conspiracy against her husband by a faction in the palace. The conspirators summoned their supporters and the princess's friends opened the palace gates to them. Faced with this situation, the great prince forced to flee. For four years the Jungs plundered China, which was left unprotected. Finally, the prince of Ch'in, Wen-kung Seu-ma Im-

7 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/42.

8 Confucius would say: "If this is not a victory, we shall probably have to accept the rule a foreign tribe, buttoning our clothes on the left side, without paying any attention to anything." (See Fan Wan-lan. *Drevnaya istoriya Kitaya*, I/120)

After receiving the approval of the Empire, he expelled the Junglar and attempted to restore order. In 632 he succeeded in expelling the Jong from the capital, punished the traitors and had the usurper, the prince of T'ai, beheaded. Mu-kung of Ch'in (659-621), on the other hand, eliminated the 12 Jung fortifications in the west and regained Chou territory to China.

However, not completely defeated, the Jong continued to fight until 659 and concluded a peace treaty with the Chin prince.⁹ By the Vth century, the Chinese had gained the upper hand. Chao-wang, the prince of the Chin country, conquered the Jung's Chao dominions in Shen-si and East Kan-su, Wu-Ling, also a Chao prince, defeated Lou-fang and Ling-hu in Ordos, and Ch'in K'ai, the commander-in-chief of the Yen principality, "defeated Tung-hu in an unexpected attack."¹⁰

The Chinese were truly astonished by these unexpected successes. The Jong held vast territories and were divided into many tribes, large and small. "Each of these scattered tribes living in the mountainous valleys its own state and ruler. Rarely they were gathered into very large tribes, but they could not achieve unity."¹¹ Since China was also dominated by large and small feudals until that time, the Jongs had partial successes; however, when the power was consolidated and the princes became emperors, the armies attached to the centralised administration had scattered the heroic Jongs. Those who fled from the front or survived preferred stone castles rather than mountain passes for shelter. Although the I-ch'ü Jung tried to resist the Chinese and built a series of fortresses, the Chinese, who developed new siege techniques, easily captured the Jung's castles. On the other hand, we do not know what kind of mutual relations the Jung and Hyung-nus had. I do not think that they were friends. For if this were the case, the situation the Jongs would have been tragic. Sandwiched between the Chinese and the Great Steppe, the Jongs found no support behind them. The mountainous valleys, where they tried to hide against a possible enemy attack, were like traps with no exit or escape, and these places became the graves of the Jongs.

After five centuries of fighting, the Jongs were divided into two groups: The main group was driven westwards to the mountainous Lake Kukunor,

9 Bichurin, Sobraniye, I/43-44.

10 Age., p. 45.

11 Age., p. 43.

The second group had retreated eastwards to the Kingan [Hingan] Mountains, where they mingled with the eastern "Hu" ¹² who were hostile to the Chinese. Thus, the tribes belonging to the Tung-hu alliance, which had taken over the eastern part of the Great Steppe in the III century BC, mixed and mingled with each other. However, in the same period, the peoples on the western side of the Great Steppe also revived and started to play an active role on the stage of history.

In 250 BC, the Parthians, at the head of the liberation movement in Iran, expelled the Macedonian conquerors from Media, while their relatives, the Sarmatians, subjugated the Scythians in the steppes along the Black Sea coast.¹³

In the middle of the III century BC, the steppe peoples were subjected to such strong impulses.

Stone Grave Culture

Meanwhile, while the Chinese and the Huns were annihilating each other in wars of extermination, an original culture was taking shape in the steppes of Central Mongolia and South Baikal-beyond, embracing a great future. We call it the "culture of the stone tomb", but in fact it was the early period of independent Hun culture. G. I. Borovka ¹⁴ and G. P. Sosnevskiy ¹⁵ investigated this culture, but it A. P. Okladnikoff ¹⁶ who gave it a thorough . These tombs, extending in a series from south to north, are magnificent examples of bronze workmanship. Since the authors named earlier have described them in detail, I will not dwell on this subject, but I will try to make some comments on the basis of A. P. Okladnikoff's work on stone tomb cultures.

According to available evidence, the main occupation of the people buried in stone graves was animal husbandry. They were also very advanced in metal casting technology. The tombs were filled with metal from the Indian Ocean.

12 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/85.

13 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yujnoy Sibiri*, p. 321.

14 Borovka G.I. *Arxeologicheskoye obsledovaniye srednego teçeniya reki Toli/Severnaya Mongolia*, T.II., L., 1927.

15 Sosnevskiy G.P. *Ranniye kochevniki Zabaykalya*. (КСИИИМК. Т. VIII. М.-Л, 1940; Плиточные могилы Забайкалья//труды отдела истории первовытной культуры Гос. Эрмитажа. Т. I, л., 1941.)

16 Okladnikov A.P. *Drevneye naseleniy Sibiri i yego kultura* (Rukopis).

shell-kauris, cylindrical white beads made of pyrophyllite, and fragments of Chinese-style three-legged pots and utensils were found. All these indicate the existence of a wide cultural relationship extending from China to Altai, Minusinsk Basin and Central Asia. Of course, there are layers that have not yet been reached, but "the graves recovered indicate the existence of general tribal relations."¹⁷ This does not mean that there were no rich and poor families. For within the framework of patriarchal clans, which were essentially aristocratic in nature, there were rich and poor alike. Since commanders and beys constitute the upper group among the soldiers of the reward system, their graves must be different and separate from the graves of other tribesmen. In this type of graves, "deer stones", i.e. slabs decorated with deer patterns, sun discs and weapon symbols, were found. These were carefully prepared and made with a lot of labour so that the dead of a family would not be disturbed. It seems to have become a tradition.¹⁸ The anthropological type remained unchanged throughout the first millennium B.C.E. and, in fact, it is during this period that the characteristic features of the Paleosiberian type of the Huns emerged and took shape.¹⁹

What were the differences between the Sintash cultures²⁰ and the later Hun cultures, which were directly dependent on it? Above all

17 Agy.

18 Agy.

19 Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*, p. 121.

20 I.I. Goxman, who is sceptical about the conclusions drawn from the study of the skulls of families in stone tombs of the IV-II century BC, argues against the identification of the stone tomb cultures with the early Hun period (Гохман И.И. Антропологические материалы длинных могил Забайкалья// Сборник МАЭ. Т. XVIII. М.-Л., 1958, с. 428, 437)

Goxman's studies of Mongoloid skulls, which cannot possibly be Euroid, are characteristic of the Huns. However, the author forgets that the Huns, like all great nations, were not a monolithic race. It is clear that the results of analysing a few skull fragments cannot be applied to the racial composition of all the peoples found in the stone tombs, nor can they lead to the conclusion that the lands they inhabited in the III century B.C. belonged to the Huns. In all probability, this Mongoloid type was one of the constituent elements of the Hun people who finally coalesced in the north, not in the south, of the Gobi. The changes in burial patterns in the second century B.C. do not indicate the settlement of a new people in the region, but only a change in cult. Indeed, the Huns experienced a stormy period of cultural change in the II century BC, which turned everything upside down. As a matter of fact, the stone monuments found in the south of the Gobi show that the burial patterns do not belong to a single local tribe. On the contrary, they bear the monocultural traces of the multi-tribal ethnic formation in Central Asia of the first millennium BC.

Firstly, the Huns used iron to a great extent, as is often seen in their tombs. This in itself is a subject worth emphasising. The early steppe dwellers obtained iron from the Tibetan-Ch'iangs of the south.²¹ They fused with the Tibetan-Ch'iangs around 205 BC, after which large quantities of iron were transported to the steppe.²² On the other hand, tombs of rulers are found among the Huns. However, as far as it is understood, this event is valid for the period after the unification of the tribes and the establishment of a central administration in 209 BC. Because, before this date, Huns were an ordinary tribal confederation. This means that the tomb of the ruler is the first stage of the history of a people. Since the other features coincide with each other, the main line mentioned above belongs to the early period of the Huns, more precisely, to the IX-IV centuries BC. In the IVth century the Huns grew considerably stronger and returned to the South Gobi.²³ The Chinese, who had barely won victory over the "P'ei-ti", had to defend themselves against their new enemies. Therefore, they closely followed his peculiar style and unconventional warfare tactics. The Great Wall and the stone tombs in Inner Mongolia are reminders of these battles.²⁴

On the Language of the Huns

Although the language spoken by the Huns occupied an important place in the literature in the past, it has almost lost its importance today.²⁵ Shiratori y proved that the words we know as Hunnic are in Turkish and a surviving Hunnic sentence is in the same language.²⁶ Finnish researchers approached the Hun language from a different angle. Castrén²⁷ and Ramstedt²⁸

21 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/172.

22 Yakinf. *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora*. SPb., 1833, p. 17.

23 In 317 the Huns, together with five Chinese principalities, attacked Ts'in, but were defeated. (Фань Вэнь-лань. Древняя история Китая, vol. 235)

24 Okladnikov A.P. *Novyye dannyye po drevneyshy istorii vnutrenney Mongo-* ~~Восточной Азии~~ *Восточной Азии*, c.163

25 See Inostrantsev K. *AXunnu i gunny*. L., 1926.

26 Shiratori K. *Über die Sprache der Hiungnu der der Tanghu-Stämme*. St. Pb., 1902; Bulletin de l'Academie Imperiale des Sciences de S.-Petersburg. V. Serie. Bd. XVII. N°2 (Separate edition)

27 Castrén M.A. *Ethnologische Vorlesungen über die altaischen Völker*. St.-Pb., 1857, pp. 35-36.

28 M.G.S. Ramstedt. *Über der Ursprung der türkischen Sprache*. Helsinki, 1937, pp. 81-89.

They argued that it was the common language of the ancestors of the Turks and Mongols. Pelliot, on the other hand, notes that the Hun language contains elements belonging to the languages of the older strata of the people.²⁹ As for , he clarifies the issue of the Hun language a little more and argues that the Hunnic word meaning "boot, socket" corresponds to the word "rightdak" in the Chinese transcription and that there is no analogue of it in either the Turkic or the Mongolian language. However, the author's suggestion that this word should be replaced by the Ket word "segdi" does not satisfy even himself.³⁰

However, the same word may have a direct connection with the Old Russian word "sagaydak", i.e. sadak. This word, of course, is of Turkic-Mongolian origin and was in use in the XVI-XVII century. It is obvious that "Sa- gaydak" is related to the Hun word "Sagdak". Because the Huns used to put the arrows that did not fit in the quiver³¹ into the boot shaft, and later the Russians also a knife into the boot shaft. In other words, the word "rightdak" is a Turko-Mongolian word with a slightly different pronunciation in the first millennium BC. This word, which is used jointly in Turkish and Mongolian, can also be an example of cultural exchanges between peoples sharing the same historical destiny. Based on the above-mentioned views, it can be concluded that the doubts about the Huns being a Turkish-speaking people are unfounded; in the same way, based on the point that a word cannot be used in two different senses, it is clearly stated in historical sources that the Hun and Töles³² , that is, Uyghur languages close to each other. Ligeti himself notes that doubts about the Huns being a Turkish-speaking people were based on a special analysis of the word "culture". However, if it is taken into consideration that the Huns were in constant and close relations with their neighbours, it is not surprising that they borrowed some words from them.

29 Pelliot P. *L'édition collective des oeuvres de Wang Kouo-wei* (T'oung Pao. Vol. XXVI), p. 167.

30 Ligeti L. *Mots de civilisation de Haute Asie en transcription chinoise*// Acta Orientalia. 1950. p. 141-149.

31 Up to thirty arrows could fit in a quiver (См: Иностранцев К.А. Сасанидские этюды. Спб., 1909).

32 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/214.

PART IV

THE GREAT WALL

Hun-Chao War

The victory of the Chinese over the hostile tribes (Jong, Ch'iang, Man, Yüeh, etc.) that had surrounded their ancestors did not bring them much relief, but it was also very costly. On the other hand, as the Chinese territory was swept away by Jung principality and its affiliated tribes, which were directly bordering the sovereignty, and which eventually formed well-established feudal principalities, the Chinese began to feel as if they were living on an island surrounded by hostile elements in their own country.

In Ch'ü Yüan's poem "Cries of Souls", this subject is depicted quite successfully.¹ It is interesting to note the geographical aspects:

Don't trust the eastern side There
live huge predators Soul and man
are their food
Nine suns circulate in its skies, and mines
and stones melt there
But there are people there who are used to everything.

Notice that there is no word about the sea. During the reign of Ch'ü Yüan, the eastern Yües - "giant predators" - conquered Chien-nang and were more hostile to the Chinese than those who could not swim in the sea. For the southern part, we find the following couplets:

Don't go south! They cover their
foreheads with patterns.

¹ Ch'ü Yüan. *Stixi*. M. 1954, p. 128-129.

They grind their bones for bread
 Poisonous snakes swarm all around you
 Forest giants swarm there The land of the
 nine-headed bull snakes They swarm
 everywhere like ants
 And they devour people with great appetite!

There is some truth in this frightening depiction. For Lo Kuan-chung states that the Manes living in the southern forests made it a custom to eat human flesh.² But if there are some fantastic animal depictions in Ch'ü Yüan's description, they are insignificant compared to what has been written about ba- ti:

As for the filth of the West, listen:
 There are shifting sands there, everywhere,
 howling like thunder in the void
 You will be burnt, scorched and destroyed
 every moment! If you escape from his hand,
 as it happens, don't rejoice too much; the
 Sahara awaits you next, which is all soggy
 ants eating elephants There, people wait for
 the storm like herds, even the earth burns and
 scorches like a cake.
 You want water! Is it that easy? Don't wait for
 someone to help you.
 This is the desert; the endless, irreversible road, serapa!...

What is described here is not the Takla Makan Desert, as it may first come to mind. Because the Chinese had not travelled that far in the III century BC. This is, at most, the dry steppe around the Nan-shan mountains and Edzin-Gol [Echin-Kul]. The description of steppe storms is completely true. As for the north, the Chinese poet wrote as follows:

Don't even think of going north, The
 foothills there are covered with ice,
 Blizzards drag you hundreds of metres...

Even darker are the descriptions of bedside and footside. For the desire to get away from such a "terrible world" is entirely natural. However, the tribes who were the neighbours of the Chinese did not let them forget themselves. Their historical records are full of stories about the attacks of the Jungs.

2 Luo Kuan-chung. *Troyetsartviye*. T.II., 1954, p. 274.

The history is full of victories. From the VIII to the III century B.C.E., the battles between the two sides continued with alternating victories.³ It was only in 214 B.C.E. that the united Chinese armies were able to deal a final blow to the Jungs.

, the victory of the Chinese against the Huns brought them more harm than good. Because this defeat led them to get closer to the steppe Huns. The Huns, on the other hand, seemed to be much more dangerous and formidable enemies. Already in 307, Wu Ling, the great prince of the Chao dynasty, who had destroyed the Ling-hu and Lou-fang tribes, was compelled to build the Yai-men frontier fortress and the defensive walls surrounding the Yin-shan mountain range against the cavalry of the Hun region. Later, Ch'in-K'ai, the commander-in-chief of the Principality of Yen, followed Wu-ling's example by building a defensive line to protect Liao-hsi and Liao-tung against Tung-hu attacks.⁴ However, these partial peace efforts failed to stop the Hun attacks; moreover, it was deemed more rational to tolerate the plundering attacks of their neighbours instead of armament, which did not bring the hoped-for results and was very costly. For this reason, the princes preferred to organise light cavalry units against the Hun attacks, and wars fought in this way were considered less costly.⁵

In the III century BC, the Huns' attacks on China intensified. Sih-ma Ch'ien records that Li Mu, the commander-in-chief of the Chao Principality in Shan-si, stopped the constant attacks of the Huns.⁶ Li Mu had retreated to a defensive position. "If the Huns enter the borders of our state and begin to plunder," he ordered his soldiers, "immediately return to your barracks and retreat to the defensive line; anyone who tries to take prisoners will be executed!"

The commander-in-chief had not suffered any casualties with this tactic, but it had naturally caused the wang's displeasure. Because the wang had asked him to either change this tactic or resign. Li Mu had opted for the second option, but his successor had suffered such heavy losses in frontal combat with the enemy that was unable to defend even the frontiers. Faced with this situation, Li was reinstated with full authority.

3 Bichurin N.Y. (Yakinf). *Sobraniye svedeniy o narodax obitavshix v sredney Azii v drevniye vremena*. M.-L., 1/42-45; Maspro H. *La Chine antique*, P., 1927, p. 383-386.

4 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/45.

5 Age., p. 107.

6 Sih-ma Ch'ien. *Izbrannoe*. M., 1956, p. 170-171.

was called to the head of the mission. Huns were organising raids in small groups, but with lightning speed. The Huns, who organised such attacks on all border regions, soon encountered the counter-attacks of the Chinese garrisons stationed there. Huns, who wanted to protect themselves against such threats, increased the number of their attack troops this time and started mass attacks exactly as Li Mu wanted. In the end, it came to the point that the Hun yabgu [shan-yü] attacked the well-trained Chinese army "at the head of his troops crowded like locusts". Li Mu's army consisted of 1300 armoured chariots, 13,000 cavalry, 50,000 "hundred gold warriors",⁷ 100,000 elite archers. These figures should not be accepted as one hundred per cent accurate. Because, the first two figures are close to the truth, but the other two are only to indicate a large number and only show that the archers constituted the main power of Li Mu. Li Mu had organised "closing wings" to encircle the enemy ranks. It appears that the "large army" of the Huns outnumbered that of the Chinese. Li Mu, having strengthened his fortifications, narrowed the room for manoeuvre of his enemies, forcing them to accept the battle, and in the end Huns were defeated with great losses. Tan-liang tribe was destroyed, Tung-hus were put to the sword and Ling-hu tribe. From the available information, it is understood that the Huns a tribal union, lost their dominance in the steppe after this defeat and had to seek refuge with their eastern neighbours, the Tung-hus.

But before the Principality of Chao could reap the fruits of this victory, it was conquered by Ch'in in 226 BC, and Ch'in united the whole of China within five years.

Construction of the Great Wall

Previously, the Principality of Ch'in had been one of the countries at war with the Jung's. After the 12 Jung tribes, the principality included them within its borders and adopted their customs to a large extent. It was the first time that those fleeing the Shang-Yin reign

7 Some commentators argue that the captives of enemy army commanders were given such a name because they were considered the strongest soldiers and were rewarded with 100 gold pieces. Some sources, on the other hand, are of the opinion that these were warriors from rich families who were recruited for 100 gold pieces. (Сыма Цянь., с. 344. комментарий Л.И. Думана).

Ch'in, which also incorporated the Principality of P'u (in Shen-si), which it had founded, adopted the Shang line of Chinese culture, not the Chou culture. These two lines made Ch'in far away from the other principalities. Because they considered Ch'in to be under the rule of Jung and did not want it to participate in the general Chinese alliances and meetings.⁸ However, when the victories in the south and west brought the princes of Ch'in large territories with warlike peoples, this dynasty became the most powerful principality of China.

In the north, the Ch'in came into contact with the Yuechi nomads. The Yuechi cloth and mirrors from the Ch'in princes. These items were preserved in the kurgans in the Altai mountains and have survived to the present day.⁹ The Ch'in, on the other hand, abandoned their armoured chariots, which could not move very fast, and bought very valuable horses from the Yuechis.¹⁰ It should be noted parenthetically that the Iranians and Indians became aware of the existence of the Chinese state in the east through the Yuechis. Even today, Iranians and Indians use the words "China" and "Machin" (Great Ch'in)-¹¹

The Ch'in dynasty achieved great power through its military reforms and won victories against the rulers of eastern China without any difficulty. The founder of the Ch'in Dynasty was a high-ranking bureaucrat named Shang Yang, who carried out a series of reforms. In addition to building irrigation canals throughout the country, Yang dismantled the old tribal aristocracy and centralised Ch'in to unite all of China. The East Chinese fiercely resisted this move and fought for 200 years. So much so that this period went down in Chinese history as the "era of belligerent suzerainty". Ch'in diplomats skilfully pitted the eastern wangs against each other and prepared the ground for them to quarrel among themselves, and at a time when they were exhausted, Ch'in armies moved to the east and dealt a heavy blow to the wangs. Finally, Prince Ying Cheng dealt the final blow to the eastern sovereignty and took the title of Ch'in Shih-huang-ti, which signified that he was the ruler of the whole China. But he was not satisfied with this, he marched on the Yüeler in the south and bound them to himself. He then attacked Ordos and

8 Фань Вэнь-лань. Древняя история Китая от первобытно-общинного строя до образования централизованного феодального государства. М.-Л., 1953, pp. 120-121.

9 Rudenko S.I. *Kultura naseleniya Gornogo Altaya v skifskoye vremya*. М.; Л., 1953, p. 356-357.

10 Maspero H. *La Chine antique*, p. 385.

11 Age, p. 384.

He expelled the Hyung-nus from Yin-shan. Shih-huang-ti, who had acquired great material resources, decided to build the Great Wall separating China from the Eurasian steppes in order to secure its northern borders. In fact, the purpose of these walls was to create a uniform and strong unity behind them. Although the construction was in full swing day and night, when it became clear that the labourers were insufficient, prisoners of war and prisoners were brought into the picture. The working conditions were extremely harsh and many workers perished at the foot of the rising walls and were buried there. But eventually the construction of the walls was completed. It was 4,000 kilometres long. It was ten metres high and there were watchtowers every 60-100 metres. However, when the work was completely finished, it became clear that there were not enough Chinese soldiers to defend the entire fortification. Moreover, if a small number of soldiers were placed in each observation and defence tower, the enemy would easily eliminate them, as before, and the neighbours would become stronger. The troops were concentrated in certain towers, the enemy would penetrate through the empty towers in between and advance into the interior of the country. When a castle could not be defended, it ceased to be a castle. In fact, many of the Chinese statesmen had opposed the construction of these fortifications. In the year II A.D., Yang Yü wrote in his report as follows: "Ch'in Shih-huang-ti, without bothering and without pitying the labour of the people, built the great wall of ten thousand li in length. Food was now brought in from across the sea to supply the labourers¹². But only the frontiers could be secured, and the Central Oasis State attacked from within, putting an end to the of the Ch'in dynasty." Indeed, the fortifications failed to stop the Hun attacks and the Han dynasty was forced to return to manoeuvring wars.

It is not correct, however, to regard the construction of the Great Wall as entirely absurd. For, if the Chinese state had sufficient troops to guard the garrisons, the Hun cavalry would have found it difficult to overcome them. But the Ch'in administration could not be entirely blamed for the protection of the fortifications. For example, Hou Ying, a senior official, reported that tribes along the frontiers were being expelled by Chinese officials, and that slaves, criminals and politically motivated families were fleeing, claiming that "life was easier under the Huns".¹³ In the vast Asian steppes, people who could not take a single step without a horse were unable to do so without the protection of fortifications.

¹² Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/107.

¹³ Age., p. 93

over the Chinese territory was not possible. The nomads therefore attacked in small bands and could only reach the settled Chinese areas. Sometimes convicted criminals were assigned to the defence of the fortifications, sometimes with life sentences pardoned, but these, too, did not offer much hope, as they frequently deserted. Sometimes peasants, who had been made compulsory guardians of the fortifications, were placed along the walls, but they lacked fighting skills, they could not be of much use. Finally, nomadic clans, the descendants of the Jung's and the remnants of the Hu tribes, were settled along the borders. However, they, too, plundered the Chinese from time to time and sometimes betrayed them and sided with the Huns. In fact, these tribes themselves were in need of protection.

Hun-Ch'in War

After the fragmentary brief information given above, there is no information about the Huns in Chinese historical sources until the end of the III century BC. Probably during this period the Huns had lost their supremacy to a great extent in the west, where the Yuechi-s had carried out successful attacks, and in the east, where the former Mongols, the Tung-hus, had seized hegemony. The Huns' dependence on the Tung-hus consisted only of paying taxes. Because they had a ruler who acted independently and they were completely free in their foreign affairs. To tell the truth, Tung-hus were more than a state, they had a federation of tribes and the leader of each tribe could not act without consulting his fellow tribesmen, both in material and political terms. In the same period, the Huns were headed by a shan-yü (yabgu), who, although not a monarchist, was the commander-in-chief of the people for life. As a natural consequence of their presence in the Tung-hu domain, the Huns suffered serious setbacks and were at war with the Yüeci or Sa-yan Ting-ling, since they had to be in constant opposition to their eastern neighbours. This situation, as will be emphasised later on, not only narrowed the Huns' sphere of influence, but also caused social changes within themselves.

The strengthening of China had a very negative effect on the Huns.

had been created. In 214, Ch'in Shih-huang-ti, under General Meng T'ien, sent an army of one hundred thousand men to the north.¹⁴ Meng T'ien captured Ordos and established 44 towns and garrisons on the banks of the Yellow River, where he housed prison inmates. The mountains along the border were used as fortresses. The foothills were fortified and nomads were prevented from travelling there. Finally, Meng T'ien's armies came to the Yellow River and occupied the foothills of the mountains around Yin-shan. In the mountains, the Huns had lost their best lands, "full of game birds and wild animals, forests and pastures with plenty of water". Moreover, they could easily organise raids¹⁵ and find trees from which they could make bows and arrows. The losses of the Huns were not limited to this. The Ordos steppes inhabited by the Tunguz Lou-fang and Bayan [Pa-yang] tribes, which were under their sovereignty, were also plundered from their hands. Having lost all his support, Teoman (T'u-man), the Hun suzerain (shan-yü), gathered his tribes and retreated to Halha in order to escape the spears of the Chinese infantry wandering in the vast Sha-mo [Shê-mo] deserts. But in order to live comfortably here, he had to send his eldest son Me-te [Mo-te] as a hostage to the neighbouring Yüecis. It seemed that the Huns had been dealt with and their neighbours had divided the steppes belonging to the Huns among themselves. But history was to decide otherwise! By now, anyone who knows something about the Yuechi and the Tung-hus will know the name Hun very well.

Fall of the Ch'in Reign

Ch'in Shih-huang-ti died in 210 BC. He had two sons. The elder, Fu Su, was at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief Meng T'ien in Ordos, where the main part of the army was located. The chief vizier Li Sih (pronounced Li Sı), who ruled by law, and the chamberlain Chao Kao, who pulled the strings of the palace cliques, favoured the emperor's younger son Hu Hai because they were afraid of Fu Su. Hu Hai was not an intelligent man. He was weak-willed and under the influence of Chao Kao. Chao Kao, who wanted to get rid of the heir-apparent, supposedly signed an edict that his father, the emperor, should end his eldest son's life by committing suicide.

14 This figure must have been exaggerated. It should be understood as "with a large army." (See Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/45)

15 Age., p. 94.

to Fu Su. Despite Meng T'ien's attempts to persuade him, the prince decided to fulfil his sonship duty according to Chinese custom and cut his own throat. Thus, the younger brother Hu Hai, who took the title of Erh-Shih, meaning the second line of the emperor, ascended the throne.¹⁶ Chao Kao, using the young monarchist as a pawn to get rid of his enemies and rivals, seized all the . Soon after, Meng T'ien and Li Sih were beheaded.¹⁷ Chao Kao was, in the eyes of the masses, the most unpopular figure in the Ch'in administration. Relying on his armoured cavalry units and chariots, Chao, who did not engage in any ideological practices¹⁸ to justify his regime, began to openly persecute his people. Soon, however, his despotism public outrage. First Ch'eng Sheng and Wu Huan . Although the rebellion was suppressed by the regular armies, the country had turned into a powder keg. Rebellions broke out one after another in all provinces. The most violent of these was the Ho-pei rebellion led by Hsien Yü. Hsien Yü came from an ordinary family, but his biography shows that he had been a dreamer of fortune and dreamed of the throne since childhood. In the days of turmoil, he had a good of the elements he would seize. He argued that the former independent and happy days of the Principality of Ch'oo should be revived. He sought out the sheep-herding descendants of the former princes and found Huai-wang among them and put him in charge. Liu Pang (pronounced Lü Ban), who would later found the Han dynasty, was chosen as his deputy.

The Ch'in leadership thought it appropriate to retreat to defence. When the new commander-in-chief Wang Chien attacked the Chao Principality in Shan-si, Ch'oo warriors came to Chao's aid, and Hsien Yü engaged Wang Chien in a fierce struggle. Meanwhile, Liu Pang attacked the Ch'in capital of Hsien-yang and took the city, taking advantage of the fact that most of the army was at the front. In the course of the battles, the court cliques, hated by the people, were destroyed, and with them the Ch'in dynasty disappeared (206th year). Liu Pang dominated the city

16 Sih-ma Ch'ien. *Izbrannoe*, pp. 226-231.

17 Shortly after Meng T'ien was killed, the Huns to Yin-shan without encountering any resistance. (McGovern W. *The early empires of Cent- ral Asia*. L., 1939, p. 116)

18 There were six ideological systems in China at that time: Ing-yan school, Confucianists, monistsnominalistslegists and Daoists who favoured Lao-tse.

См: Сыма., с. 35

but when Hsien Yu came to the city, he ordered him to be eliminated. Faced with this situation, Liu Pang bowed to him and consented to be given the province of the vast Sih-ch'uan and took the title of Han-wang there. Hsien Yü, on the other hand, took the title of Pa-wang as the ruler of the whole China.

Hsien Yü was not a skilful commander and a brave man. Besides, as he was not a politically far-sighted person, he could not realise any reform to satisfy the people. This situation Liu Pang. He started to gather around him the supporters of the regime opponents who wanted to see him in power in the secluded Sih-ch'uan. Chang Liang, one of these opponents, prepared a political programme for him. While Hsiao Ho, a skilled administrator, organised the administration, Han Hsin, the commander-in-chief, won some military successes. When the dignitaries around Liu Pang made it clear that they were not afraid of Hsien Yü, he to attack Sih-ch'uan. For the purpose of defence, Liu Pang had all the bridges on the mountain roads demolished and turned his territory into a fortress with no entrance or exit. Thus, Hsien Yü's state of vigilance was neutralised. Around the same time, however, the Han armies took over the united mountain kingdom under the command of Han Hsin. Han Hsin first captured Ch'ang Seng in successful campaigns and subdued Chin in Shan-si and Ch'i (Ts'i) in Shan-tung. Then he proclaimed the Han dynasty and his political programme. Accordingly, taxes were reduced and some strict laws were changed. Changes were made in judicial procedures. Masters and philosophers, representatives of all schools and sects, were given freedom. The Han army expanded and strengthened to such an extent that in the end, while Hsien Yü's army melted away, all the neighbouring peoples united under the Han banner. Liu Pang, following in the footsteps of Han Hsin, attacked Hsien Yü's troops on the banks of the Hai-shui River. But Hsien Yü forced the Han armies to retreat and threw them across the river. Liu Pang, who managed to escape, regrouped his army and besieged Hsien Yü. Hsien Yü, who had given up on the war, committed suicide and thus the Han dynasty took over the whole of China.

Ancient Chinese Method in History Writing

Although Liu Pang won victories and seized power in 202 BC, traditional Chinese historiography places the founding of the Han dynasty in 206 BC. The reason for this is that the last Ch'in dynasty emperor

rator surrendered to Liu Pang at the end of 207. Just as the exaggeration of the number of armies or the arrival of envoys from distant countries as "voluntary subjects" of these countries cannot be accepted, the accuracy of this chronological determination cannot be accepted. There is only an incompletely understood system of expression here. Therefore, before proceeding to the next parts of the events, we need to emphasise some features of the Chinese historical materials which constitute our main source of information.

Explaining the development of Chinese historical science is not the problem of the author of these lines. On the contrary, the issue that interests us is to determine whether the parts of the Chinese chronicles, especially those giving information about the history of the Huns, are reliable or not.

Historiography was a respected profession in China. The preservation of historical monuments was made a national issue, and those who wrote historical chronicles were given a special title from the imperial court. The rulers cherished their own historians for fear of occupying a bad place in the eyes of future generations.

According to tradition, dynastic chronicles were published only after the end of the dynasty's period. Since historiography was regarded as an important work in the eyes of the state, there is no doubt that biographies were written out of sympathy for certain individuals. From all these, we can conclude that Chinese historiography was performed at the request of the palace; therefore, there cannot be any other source that expresses an opinion contrary to the history written on order. In this case, the determination of how accurately the narratives reflect the facts is one of the most fundamental problems. Since the glorification and promotion of China and exaggeration of its victories was the primary task of the historian, he was extremely careful when recording information about any lineage. On the other hand, since the apparent failures or defeats suffered by the Chinese were minimised, they must be believed conditionally. The numbers of both their own and enemy troops, almost always exaggerated, are usually given in round figures: 100,000, 300,000, 400,000, 1,000,000; of course, these are not real figures and must be regarded as ordinary "dark sides" of the past period.

It is not accidental that the figures in Chinese historical sources are constantly exaggerated. Because this is its own basis, law, and therefore explanation. First of all, it should be noted that

that figures up to 10,000 are recorded in a way that reflects reality without exaggeration. This is because, according to the ancient Chinese, the number 10,000 is not just a number and is therefore used as a plural expression for things that are too many to count. Of course, this concept of "uncountable" was a "vague subject" for our ancestors, but for modern mathematicians it is an "infinite" number. And the Chinese approximate figures above 10,000, since it is possible to measure or count numbers that do not exceed this limit. Such figures are often utilised, but not in comparison with a range of up to 10,000 people, but in a rounded way by comparing the things that make up these figures among themselves. For example, suppose the number of army A is 13,000. In this case, it should be determined as follows: $10\ 000 + X = 2 \times 10\ 000 = 20\ 000$. If army B is four stronger than army A, this means that army B is about 80 000. In later periods, in the days of the T'ang dynasty, the accuracy of such a calculation system was checked and it was deemed appropriate to determine the approximate average by multiplying it by a certain coefficient, which was 9. As can be seen, there is no disconnect in the traditional historical science of that period; it is only obvious that the old real figures are multiplied by multiples. It is not over yet.

The Chinese are a people highly skilled in abstract thinking. When they give the number of an army, they draw a figure according to its strength. But this figure never reflects the real number. Because the fighting capability of each military unit is different. Let's take an example: If army A has 30 knights on horseback, each equal to 100 infantry soldiers, the figure should be calculated as follows: 30 people = 3000 real fighting units and each unit is considered to have one soldier with the weakest fighting power. So, for example, if army A has 8000 soldiers, this figure should be calculated as follows: $8000 + 30 \times 100 = 10\ 000 + X = 20\ 000$. As can be seen, this figure is given for the real 8030 people or 11000 soldiers with fighting strength.

To this must be added, on the one hand, pride, which compels the historian to exaggerate the capability of his own war soldiers, and on the other hand, fear, which compels him to exaggerate the number and nobility of the Huns. As a result, Chinese historians exaggerate the numbers of both their own armies and their enemies. It can be said that the precise figures given are far from the truth, and therefore not only are they far from the truth, but the proportion is also maintained. Therefore, we have to use the historical

Although we do not have the possibility of analysing the information in the sources, we can determine a certainty close to real measures by looking at the course of events.

On the other hand, since the amount of spoils taken in battles was reported by the chief commanders' reporters, the actual amount was always underestimated. Because these figures were to be checked by the civilian civil servants who accepted them, they were often deliberately understated in order to allow the commander-in-chief to pocket some of the spoils for himself. Civil servants who noted that the booty list was incomplete and inaccurate were either eliminated or killed.

The information on nomadic peoples was obtained by Chinese historians from their own expeditions. This information is not precise and, unfortunately, consists of only a few sentences, mostly because the expeditions concentrated on information about the military fighting power. The information about the religion, culture and tastes of the nomads is asparagus.

The original documents, some detailed, some brief, on the government council, state correspondence and financial accounts provide more interesting information. However, as a rule, the historian takes this report from a source he personally trusts, but only briefly mentions the of the opponents. Nevertheless, this does not prevent him from making observations on his own assessment of the events.

Information on the history of the Huns must also be reviewed. Because, although the Chinese devote a great deal of space to their relations with them, they give very brief information about the wars of the Huns in the west and north, as they are of little interest to Chinese historians.

Attempts at analyses of events are often too clumsy. They are mostly in such a way as to show the character and will of the historical person, but the role of the masses of people is ignored. Here the historian describes the behaviour of the nomadic leaders as if he were describing the behaviour of Chinese dignitaries.

These errors are so widespread that they have even afflicted the multicultural European schools. The ancient Chinese cannot be expected to have materialist methods, but when reading their corpus, it is impossible to set aside the course and logic of events and to analyse historical events.

It is necessary to look for the reasons. In fact, in almost all our researches, we have not been able to find comparative texts that would allow us to establish analytical links between events in accordance with the only method of historical criticism. This is a difficult aspect, but it is the only way; but the information given by the Greco-Roman historical sources on the issues that concern us, besides being scanty and fragmentary, is less credible than the information given by the Chinese, since the steppe peoples have not left any documents about their past. Folklore cannot be trusted in such a matter either. For we do not know, nor are we in a position to speculate, that the Turkish epics we know, like the events based on unverifiable oral narratives, have a very long history.

As we have seen, Chinese historical sources, although they have some undoubted virtues such as chronological accuracy, providing satisfactory information and avoiding fantastic approaches, must be subjected to a critical filter and only in this case, the errors in historical sources cannot lead us to mistakes.

SECTION V

ARROWS WHISTLING

Yabgu Me-te and the Birth of the Hun State

Yabgu Teoman had two sons by two different wives. Teoman [T'u-man], in order to give the throne to his younger son whom he liked more, decided to sacrifice Me-te and as a hostage to the Yuechis. Then, with the intention of having Me-te killed, he captured Me-te and attacked the Yuechis. But Me-te, being a determined man, managed to escape and reach his father by capturing a horse of one of the Yuechis. But in the meantime, he learnt about his father's treachery. Teoman, appreciating his son's valour, not only did not kill him, but also gave 10,000 tents of subjects under his command. Me-te, who immediately subjected his own cavalry to military training, taught them how to shoot arrows by whistling.¹ He ordered everyone to shoot only as far as his whistling arrow would go, and those who did not fulfil this order would be beheaded. To test the discipline of his warriors, he shot a whistling arrow at his own steed and ordered the beheading of those who did not shoot arrows at this valuable horse. After a while Me-te shot an arrow, this time at his own beautiful wife. When some of his close friends threw their bows aside, saying that they could not shoot an arrow at a defenceless young woman, Me-te immediately beheaded them. Another day, while hunting, he turned his arrow on his father's steed and saw that all his warriors did the same. Seeing that his warriors were now perfectly ready, Me-te followed his father on the hunt and shot his arrow directly at him. Yabgu Teoman (T'u-man) said goodbye to the world life with the arrow blows he received. Taking advantage of the confusion, Me-te killed his stepmother, brother and beys who did not want to obey him because they saw him as a patricide and usurper of the throne, and declared himself as yabgu.

¹ On whistling arrows see Köhalmi K. U. *Über die pfeifenden Pfeile der innerasiatischen Reiternomaden*/Acta Orientalia. Budapest, 1953, T. III. pp. 45-70.

(209 BC). However, the Tung-hus, who learnt that there was a disturbance in Huns, took advantage of the opportunity and asked for a very valuable horse, which they regarded as sacred, and Me-te's wife to be given to them. Although the beys rejected these requests, Me-te said, "What is it for people who live as neighbours to ask for a horse or a woman from each other?" and fulfilled the Tung-hus' requests. This time the Tung-hus asked for a piece of desert to the south-west of Kalgan, which was not suitable for livestock and living. In fact, the requested land belonged to no one. Even the border outposts were at its extremities and it fell to the west of the Huns and east of the Tung-hus. This time the beys that it was useless even to have a discussion about "to be given or not to be given?" for a piece of land which was of no use to anyone. But Me-te said, "Land is the foundation of a state, how can we give it away?" and had all those who were in favour of giving it away beheaded. Then he launched a campaign against the Tung-hus. Not expecting an attack, the Tung-hus were defeated. Of course, all their lands, herds and assets also captured by the victors. Those who managed to escape from the Tung-hus retreated to the Wu-huan mountain and were known as "Wu-huans" in their history. The whole of the steppes of upper and lower Manchuria fell into Me-te's hands. Me-te, who had not disbanded his army after returning from the war with the Tung-hus, marched against the Yu-echis in the west and drove them further westwards. From this date onwards, prolonged battles between Huns and Yuecis started. We do not have information about the details of these battles. Around 205-204 Me-te subjugated the Lou-fang and Bayan [Pa-yang] tribes in Ordos and made his first incursion into China at a time when the Ch'in dynasty had just collapsed and the country was riven by civil wars. Me-te's army had reached 300,000 men. We find such details of the establishment of a Hun State in Sih-ma Ch'ien's work.² It is possible to take a lot of information from other historical sources and add it here, but what is certain is that Me-te, by uniting 24 Hun tribes, established a somewhat stronger state compared to the comparison made by the Chinese with the Middle Chinese Empires.

First Hun-Han War

In 203-202, Me-te organised expeditions to the northern region

² Bichurin N.Y. (Yakinf). *Sobraniye*, I/560-561.

tribes under their subjugation: Hun-yular, relatives of the Huns; Yüeh-shieh, the Kipchaks, a Ting-ling tribe north of Altai; their eastern neighbours, the Ting-lings, who lived in the northern parts of the Sayan foothills from the Upper Yenisei to the Angara; Ko-k'un, the Kyrgyz, who occupied the territory of Western Mongolia around Lake ^{Kyrgyz-nor}³; and the unknown Ch'ai-li people. Thus, having secured his rear, Me-te turned his attention to China. The civil war that broke out in China in 202 had ended with the victory of Liu Pang, the founder of the Han dynasty, who went down in the history of this country as Kao-tsu. However, the country was not spared from destruction and the Huns started to invade from the north. The Huns besieged Ma-i castle; Prince Han Hsin, the castle commander, was forced to surrender. According to Chinese tradition, surrender was tantamount to treason and meant accepting the vassalage of the victorious side. No excuse could make the surrenderer innocent, and the best thing he could do was to commit suicide and end his life. Han Hsin did not do this, but continued his treachery and became a loyal servant of his new master, the Huns, since all avenues of return were blocked.⁴ Hurrying southwards, the Huns reached the Ho-wu-chü mountain range in the winter of the year 200 and arrived at Chin-yang, the capital of Northern Shan-si. Kao-tsu immediately sent an army against them, but during the long march nearly a third of the warriors froze their hands.

Me-te also changed the usual nomadic battle tactics: He faked a retreat, besieged the most striking forces of the Chinese army, and besieged the Chinese vanguard with the emperor at the ancient Pai-teng, close to the city of P'ing-ch'eng (pronounced Pincheng). Even more interesting is the fact that Me-te divided his troops into four small units and gave each of them a different coloured bay horse: black, white, grey, grey and red. The Chinese held out for seven days without food or sleep to stop the successive Hun attacks. At last Chinese spies contacted Me-te's wife and persuaded her husband, with valuable gifts, to come to terms with Kao-tsu (pronounced Gaozu), "a man of genius"⁵. Me-te's wife told her husband that even if he conquered China, the Huns would not live there in any case. In addition to such considerations, Prince Han Hsin was at that time

3 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yujnoy Sibiri*, p. 560-561.

4 See Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/50-51. This event is omitted in the biography of Khan Hsin. См: Сыма Цянь. Избранное, М., 1956.

5 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/51.

scepticism that he was yet really strong in comparison with the Huns forced Me-te to abandon the idea of continuing the war any longer, and Me-te ordered the siege to be lifted to allow Kao-tsu's army to march out. The Chinese army thus joined the central forces, emerging in fear from the corridor opened by the Huns, but with their arrows aimed at the enemy soldiers. Me-te also returned. This was one of the greatest campaigns ever undertaken by the Huns, but a careful study of the map shows that they did not advance far into China. The whole movement was confined to Shan-si. The cities of Ma-i and P'ing-ch'eng were located 90 and 40 kilometres from the border. Chin-yang (now T'ai-yü-an) was 250 kilometres inland. The entire military campaign and build-up took place in the former ^{Pai-teng}⁶ via P'ing-ch'eng. Sih-ma Ch'ien, on the other hand, puts the Chinese army at 320,000 warriors (which is an accurate figure, since it includes the eastern armies, which constituted half to four-fifths of the whole army, and also the sha-mil rear services) and the Huns at 400,000 cavalry, which is a gross exaggeration. For, if it is taken into account that the Huns had no spare horses, and that each horseman required 30 m² of space, 400 thousand horsemen would require an area of 30x40 km, to which must be added a piece of land for the Chinese soldiers in the centre of the Hun army, which occupied less space. As can be seen, this is complete nonsense, and Sih-ma Ch'ien probably overestimated the size of the Hun army by a factor of 10-20. If we take Me-te's military strength to be between 20 and 40 thousand, assuming that this figure is multiplied by a factor, then it will be understood why he agreed to peace. Because the main Chinese army was 600 kilometres away, and even if Me-te had destroyed the Chinese vanguard, it is clear that the remaining forces were stronger than his own. Thus Kao-tsu and Me-te signed a treaty of "peace and brotherhood" (in diplomatic language a kind of capitulation).

According to the agreement reached, the Chinese court was to send one of the princesses to a foreign sovereign [the Huns] and also to give a gift every year in the amount specified in the agreement. In essence, this was a kind of implicit tax. Me-te received the princess and the tribute, he continued to support Han Hsin and other refugee rebels. Therefore, the war was de facto continuing. Han Hsin and his followers ravaged the northern regions of China. In 197, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Chao and T'ai

6 Agy.

Ch'en-hsi, who was the chief of the Huns, sided with Han Hsin and concluded an alliance treaty with the Huns. However, Empress Lü Hou brought Han Hsin to the capital by a trick and had his castle cut down there.⁷

Although the Chinese army under the command of Fang K'u-ai suppressed the rebellion after a two-year struggle, it could not carry out its work to the end due to a new rebellion in the Principality of Yang (Ho-pei province). Liu Huang, the leader of the rebels, took refuge with the Huns and the attacks shifted to the eastern regions of China. The commanders in the Chinese army started to commit treason frequently. Unable to bear the torment of his failures, Kao-tsu died in 195. Empress Lü Hou took over the regency of the infant heir, and in her days internal conflicts increased.⁸ In 192 Me-te proposed marriage directly to the empress. She hoped that the empire would be given to her husband as a dowry and he would thus become the ruler of all China. Enraged by this proposal, the empress first thought of killing the envoys and declaring war, but was advised not to be angry with the "barbarians", but to give a polite reply that the bride-to-be was an old man. The reply, which the Chinese viziers feared, was, for some reason, accepted as reasonable by the Huns, and although no strong armies were sent to support the weak Chinese rebels, who were on the point of exhaustion, small-scale attacks by groups of Huns continued. The songs sung by the Chinese included verses such as "Throughout the city of P'-hin-ch'eng there was nothing but sorrow; for seven days they ate nothing, and they did not even have the strength for a bow".⁹ The seven years that followed were not calm at all. The strength of the young empire

7 Sih-ma Ch'ien. *Izbrannoe*, p. 280.

8 Empress Lü Hou was extremely energetic and ambitious for power. She was also very active in politics even in her husband's lifetime. Huey-ti, the successor of Kao-tsu (Liu Pang), was the puppet of the empress and her relatives Liu Ch'ang and Liu Lu. These two, who took the title of Wang, wanted to strengthen their dynasty by killing the heir apparent in 184. However, since the number of those in favour of the Han dynasty's programme was very high, no one dared to ask for a return to the laws of Ch'in Shih-hu-ang-ti. When the Empress died in 180, her successor Wen-ti eliminated the wangs of Yü, their families and their followers. However, these measures did not prevent conflicts. The princes of Hsing Ch'ui in 177, Wu (U), Ch'u, Chao, etc. rebelled in 154. Nevertheless, the Han government continued its policy of protecting the peasants and favouring aristocratic doctrines. Following the restriction of the imperial administration the wangs, the privileges granted to the wangs were completely cancelled and the consequences were seen. During the reigns of Wen-ti (179-156) and Ching-ti (156-140), China was reshaped into a world state.

9 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/53.

The army was not enough to stop the attacks of external enemies, but Me-te knew this and did not start a new war. The reason for this was certainly not his pacifism. Because a relentless war with the Yuechis (the details of which are not yet described in historical sources) had begun on the western borders. As easily as Me-te Khan had won victories against the Tung-hus and the Sayan-Altaic tribes, he found it difficult in his wars with the nomads on the western borders. It was here that the fate of Asia was decided, and the battles between the Yuechis and the Huns, which had been going on for 2 thousand years, brought the dominance of the Mongol element to the fore, which would shape the ethnogenesis and genealogy of the Eurasian steppes.

Me-te, who did not want to disperse his forces, left China alone. Thus, the Shang dynasty, which had the opportunity to grow stronger, began to settle accounts with the rebellious overlords along the borders, and as a result, while most of the rebels lost their lives in the battles, those who had lost all hope fled to North-West Korea. The importance of peace the East for the Huns can be explained as follows: In 177, one of the Hun border princes attacked China. Emperor Wen-ti sent an army of 85 thousand cavalry and armoured chariots against the enemy, but the Huns did not enter the battle and retreated. Weng-ti wanted to carry the war to the steppes, but the rebellion of Hsin ^{Kui}¹⁰, one of the border voivods, forced him to abandon this sudden attack. In the meantime, the Huns sent an envoy to China, apologised and that the prince who had made the attack had been taken from the border and sent to the west. The same prince made up for his mistake by winning a against the Yuechis there. The Chinese government, realising the extent of the power of the Huns, accepted the apology and after a while started peace negotiations with the Huns. According to the agreement reached, the Hun State was recognised as equal to the Chinese Empire and the rulers of both countries declared each other as brothers. This was a great success for the Huns. Because until that day, no nomadic prince had been considered equal to the Chinese emperor. From the letter sent by the Hun yabgu, we understand that the Hun army defeated the Yuechis with all its might in 177.

The results of this victory were spectacular: The Huns conquered all Eastern Turkis- tan, the Wu-sun principalities and the Ch'iang lands.

¹⁰ Age., p. 54.

Tibetan Nomadic Ch'iangs

On the western borders of China, neighbouring the Ch'in principality, lived the Jong (ancestors of the Tankuts) and the Ch'iang, Tibetans who had survived the genocidal wars. Ch'in Shih-huang-ti had settled accounts with the Junġs after completing the conquest of eastern China. In 225, Meng T'ien, Shih-huang-ti's commander-in-chief, probably drove the Junġs to the mountainous Saydam steppes.¹¹ Because in later periods, the Tankuts, who were not loyal to the Chinese, lived there. Having got rid of their ancient enemies, the Junġlar, the Chinese now clashed with the nomadic Tibetan Ch'iangs living in the reaches of the Yellow River.

At that time, the Ch'iangs were too few in number and too poor a people to take the risk of attacking a great empire. Due to the collapse of the Ch'in dynasty, the Chinese had lost the opportunity to dominate these captured territories, while the Huns had subjugated the Tibetans and occupied the western borders of China. Keeping the upper mountainous parts of the Yellow River under control was very important for both the Huns and the Chinese, but in the meantime the Ch'iangs had entered a period of rapid development and, moreover, they, like their neighbours the Wu-suns, were allies of the Huns.¹²

Wu-suns

The question of the Wu-suns is rather complicated. According to the Chinese traveller Chang Ch'ien, the ancient Wu-sun territory lay between Tun-huang and Ch'in-yang-shan, but the Yuechi also lived in the same area. Shiratori was astonished to discover that two separate peoples with independent governments inhabited one territory.¹³ Although their territory extended as far as the Lob-nor in the west and the lower reaches of the Edzin-Lake¹⁴ in the north-east, these desert-like lands could not support two peoples with large populations.¹⁵ Apparently, these two peoples possessed the aforementioned territories in turn. This is also inferred from the information in the "Shih-ch'i" texts. Because the "Shih-chi" were from the Kua-chou region, which constitutes the western part of today's Kan-su province.

11 Yakinf. *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora*. Dn. 11 - T. I. Cn6., 1833, c. 17.

12 I am obliged to admit that McGovern, who assumes that Tibet "was not subject to both Chinese and Hun rule", has overlooked this fact.

13 Shiratori K. *Über den Wu-sun Stamm in Centralasien*.

14 Richthofen F. *China*. Berlin, 1877. pp. 49, 447.

15 Grumm-Grjimaŷlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/99.

He also records that the territory up to Tun-huang was inhabited "from the Ch'in to the Han dynasty, first by the Wu-sun, then by the Yüeci and finally by the Huns, who expelled them".¹⁶ It is clear that there was a blending of peoples here. According to V. Uspenski's hypothesis, the ancient inhabitants of the region were the Hsi-jungs, ancestors of the Tibetans. During the Chang-kuo period, the Wu-suns drove them into the mountains.¹⁷ Uspenski seems to be right, although he contradicts Bichurin, who argues that the Ch'iangs (Tibetans) occupied all of present-day Huhunor¹⁸ during this period. The reason for this difference of opinion is that Uspenski considers the Joghs to be Tibetans, although a different people, and the Wu-suns to be a people descended from the Joghs.¹⁹ Thus, not only does the migration hypothesis lose its certainty, but it is also clear that "Shih-chi's" words "the former Wu-sun lands" refer to the foothills of present-day Shan-shan (pronounced Shan-shan).

In the late III century, the Wu-suns fled from the Tang-ho River valley. It was probably the Yuechis who caused them to flee.²⁰ According to Grumm-Grжимaylo, the Wu-suns fled to Western Hulhu²¹ where they fought with the armies of Yabgu Me-te and their ruler was killed during these battles.²² But the Huns, out of pity for the defeated Wu-suns, neither massacred nor expelled them from their lands. The son of the slain ruler was raised by Me-te to the rank of K'un-mo and placed at the head of his people.²³ The Wu-suns were also entrusted with the protection of "the frontiers around the western wall".²⁴ By the term "western wall" Grжимaylo means the Kao-kui-yeh-sai gorge in the north-western summit of Ordos, which at that time had no definite boundary because it was inhabited by the Lou-fang and Bayan tribes, the loyal subjects of Me-te. It is very likely that the Huns' western borders were inhabited by the Wu-suns' enemies, the Yuechis. This situation

16 Uspenskiy V. *Strana Kuke-nor ili Tsin-xay*, iz "Zapiski IGRO po otdeleniyu etnografii". Спб., (Отдельный оттиск), с. 51

17 Age., p. 52.

18 Yakinf. *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora*. I/5.

19 Gumilëv L.N. *Dinlinskaya problema*. // 1959. № 1.

20 Lévi S. *Notes sur les Indo-Scythes* // Journal Asiatique. 1897. IX serie. Vol. IX. P. 13.

21 Grumm-Grжимaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 100.

22 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/155.

23 Age., p. 52.

24 Grumm-Grжимaylo G.Y., *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 100.

As well as clarifying the facts (based on several hypotheses)²⁵ about the arrival of the Wu-suns in western Jungarya and Yedisu, it agrees with the version in the biography of Chang Ch'ien, who records that Yabgu Me-te allowed the young k'un-moos to recover from his defeat and that he crossed the Ili river and drove the Yuechis westwards. Thus the Wu-suns became vassals of the Huns under Me-te.²⁶

Hun State Structure

At the highest level of primitive societies, clan systems and tribal associations never constitute very high forms of social organisation. They are distinguished from class societies. In fact, the whole community, not a particular group, participates in productive activity. "We see the dominance of tradition, authority, respect and power enjoyed by the elders. But nowhere do we see, as we do today, individual groups of people grouping together for the purpose of having always coercive and oppressive organisations for the sake of the interests and aims of systematic governments, which have armed military units, prisons and other means to rule others and force their will in their direction."²⁷

The Huns were ruled by tribal elders who depended not on military units but on the support of the people. The Yabgu (shan-yü), the other ruler.

25 Age., p. 100-101; Vernadsky G.V. *Ancient Russia*. New Haven, 1952. Vernadsky also meets the Wu-sun ethnonym with the following words: Asians, Asis, Aslar, Yaslar (Oslar)-Alans, and from this point of view, our author considers the Wu-suns as Areas subjugated by the Yüeci-s.

26 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongolia*, p. 101.-Grjimaýlo distrusts this last piece of information on the grounds that the author has confused the events by claiming that k'un-mo's father was killed by the Yuechi and not by the Huns. In my opinion, this error is not very important and does not change the truth. Because the Wu-suns were enemies of the Yuechis and subjects of the Huns. At the time of Chang Ch'ien's journey, k'un-mo was already quite old. He had ten sons and many grandchildren (Bichurin N.Ya. *Sobraniye svedenii*, T. II. p. 191). Since he was born in 208 (Bichurin, age., p. 155), he was 70 years old in 139, which means that the information about his age is consistent. In addition, in 139 the Wu-suns were the original inhabitants of Yedi-su, now fused with the Sakas in the territory of the Yuechis, but this information reached China only through Chang Ch'ien. The language of the Wu-suns is not known for certain. G. Grjimaýlo places them among the Turkic tribes; McGovern considers them to be Iranian. But there is no conclusive evidence for either.

27 http://www.gosudarstvennayabiblioteka.ru/eng/14444_1120434737.

either out of the necessity to maintain order within the tribe. This kind of organisation can only be realised by some trusted members of the community. This nucleus of state power is much older than the institution of the state, which is based on the domination of one group against other groups. As a matter of fact, Engels also points to the existence of different powers in primitive classless and classed societies: "In all societies of this kind, there are, first of all, obvious general interests at stake. The protection of these interests, though under general control, is entrusted to certain individuals. The adjudication of disputes, the prevention of violations of individual law, the irrigation of the land ... and certain religious functions performed by these individuals. Similar obligations are always found in primitive societies. They are endowed with certain powers and constitute the nucleus of state power. What is important for us to establish here is that political sovereignty is based on social law and functions... and that political sovereignty survives only as long as it is social and fulfils social functions."³²

The views of the theorists of Marxism on the social characteristics of the phases of tribal and tribal structures are fully consistent with the situation of the Huns of the III century BC. In 209 B.C. the Huns had consolidated their own 24 tribes; however, subsequent events placed the confederation of 24 Hun tribes on the highest stage of social development, whereby the alliance of tribes was transformed into a "state".

The political system, social structure and culture of the Huns under Me-te and his successors differ markedly from their earlier way of life. We are therefore entitled to the view that Hun society had travelled a long way in the direction of social development before reaching the point which brought them the stage of history. At the same time, it must be remembered that Me-te's founding of the Hun State was delayed in relation to the development of the Hun people and society. All that Me-te did was to reinforce the existing structure and mould it into a slightly new mould.

It is common to regard nomadic states as a federation of tribes subject to war discipline or as armies formed by a number of people. However, this view is not correct for the Huns and the like.

32 Engels F. *Anti-Dühring*, M., 1936, p. 185-186.

Because the Huns were a single tribe divided into various tribes, they were different from other tribal federations. They even had intra-tribal organisations which made it impossible for them to be accepted as a single tribe. The political structure of the Huns is complex. In order to analyse this subject with the rigour of a historian, let us try to explain the system structure of Hun society.

Yabgu

The Hun State was headed by a yabgu (shan-yü), which means "the greatest"³³. From the same meaning it is clear that yabgu does not mean a ruler with subjects at his disposal. However, he was the most prominent person among the other 24 beys. The power of the yabgu was great, but not absolute. It was limited by the aristocrats of the clans, i.e. the lords, each of whom had an armed force ranging from 2,000 cavalry to 10,000 cavalry.³⁴ The first yabgu were probably elected (this is possible because the Chinese have difficulty in identifying the succession of yabgu up to Me-te). In the election of the later ones, the procedure of enthronement (kotarma) was also applied. Some of them, however, were rarely deposed. For example, in 102, "... the Huns placed the younger uncle of the yabgu on the throne because his son was a minor."³⁵ Similar events between 85-60, when the princes convened assemblies for the election of a new yabgu.³⁶ But the institution of deposition came into play only in the presence of certain conditions. The procedure of inheritance of the throne to a successor was applied much later. Although the yabgu usually left the throne to his son, this transfer of power became widespread. Here we witness a gradual change in the custom of leaving the election tradition entirely to the free will of the yabgu. Besides being the commander-in-chief and at the same time the person who had the final say in diplomatic relations, the yabgu also officiated at religious ceremonies. In other words, he presided over the sacrifice ceremony held once a year in front of the Yabgu's otaku, and twice a day he officially performed the duty of bowing to the sun or the moon.

33 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/46.

34 The figure of 10 thousand is theoretical.

35 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/71.

Important tribes

During the Me-te period, the number of important tribes was three: *Kuyan* [Hu-yen], *Lan* and *Su-pu*.³⁷ *Kuyan* is a Turkish word meaning "rabbit". *Su-pu* is also Turkish and means "province, country, homeland". *Lan*, on the other hand, is a Chinese word and means "orchid" (the national flower of China in ancient times).³⁸ In the composition of these tribes, we find traces of the Huns' descent. These traces extend from Shung Wei to Lan. *Ku-yan* and *Su-pu* appear as the descendants of the ancient "Hu". The Chinese do not call the head of the *Kuyan* tribe a prince (k'un), but a ruler (wang)³⁹ and these representatives of the tribe constitute the most important part of the kinsmen of the *Yabgun*. The clan to which the *yabgun* belonged was called *Hsi Lü-an-ti*.⁴⁰ Power was in the hands of the above-mentioned families. In addition, the wives of the *yabgun* could only be from these clans, and the high level offices of the state were also passed on by inheritance, in other words, especially principalities were inherited. For example, the state judges were always chosen from the *Su-pu* tribe.⁴¹ Apart from these favourite tribes, there were also tribes of secondary importance, but their administration was in the hands of princes from these tribes. They could not be called beys. Because they came to power not through elections but through inheritance. Sometimes there were attempts to act independently, but the oligarchy successfully suppressed such separatist movements. However, since each prince and bey had a sufficient number of armed forces at his disposal to protect himself against the central government and to defend the interests of his tribe, these tribes limited the sphere of power of the *yabgun*.

36 Age., p. 84.

37 Age., p. 49.

* The word *Kuyan* is still used in Turkestan today. (transl.)

38 Ch'ui Yüan, *Stixi*, p. 29-40.

39 The nuances of the meaning of the word *Wang* have changed. Initially, it sometimes meant the supreme ruler of very small kingdoms. During the Han period, it became a title given to princes under the emperor.

40 S.S.M. De Groot. *Chinesische Urkunden zur Geschichte Asiens*. Teil I. "Die Hunnen der vorchristlichen Zeit". Berlin; Leipzig, 1921, p. 57; Pritsak O. *Stammensnamen und Titulaturen der Altaischen Völker*// Ural-Altaischen Jahrbücher. Bd. XXIV. Heft 1-2. Wiesbaden, 1952, p. 53.

41 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/49, tkr.

Civil Service Hierarchy

The administration system of the Huns was quite extensive and complex. We can divide the civil servants or, more accurately, the officials of the state into two groups: eastern and western. Firstly, the term "eastern" [left] and "western" [right] means "big" and "small". Those in the first group were called *Chu-ki-princes*. The word *Chu-ki* [t'u-ki] means "wise". The heirs had to be from *the Eastern Chu-ki princes* [left sage èlig]. However, this right was often violated. The second group was *Lu-li-prince* [right-wise èlig]; the third group was *ulu-chief*; the fourth group was *ulu-t'u-yü* and the fifth group was *ulu-tang-hu*. These highest-ranking officials were always members of the clan to which the yabga belonged. They had no inherited estates, but they acquired estates along with the important posts they held. In the event of a rise in rank, the rank and dowry of the clan changed along with the yabgu. The princes descended from the lineage of the Yabgu an exceptional aristocratic rank. This rank was not always given according to ability and age. Therefore, besides the aristocrats from the yabgu family, there were aristocrats who were not relatives of the yabgu and who were capable of acting as lords. They were called *ku-tu-hou* (Guduhav oku- nur). They were the "assistants" of the top-ranking beys and they did all the work in the administration. Like the senior beys, they were not linked to separate tribes, but rather to a centralised system of administration. All beys had their own armies, which could number at least a few thousand and up to ten thousand men. Besides the 24 beys, there were also boy beys. These were the princes who had close ties with the tribes and were a kind of clan chiefs. Such as *Hü- chui* and *Hun-shieh* princes living as nomads in the Alashan foothills and *Hsi-ju* (read Siju), *Ku-hsi* (read Gusi) etc. clan princes living in the eastern border tribes. They were of no importance during the Me-te period, but later, when the central power collapsed, they came to the fore. They will be discussed in the future.

Thus, the Hun aristocracy can be divided into three groups: Princes by birth, aristocrats in service and tribal lords. The Yabgu had to answer to such a powerful class, and they could not do without him. The beys and tribal elders relied not only on tradition but also on their armed forces, and the yabgu could not do anything against the wishes of the princes. This, of course, not only tied the hands of the administration for the most part, but also limited the power of the yabgu and prevented them from turning into despots.

letter. From the available documents, it is understood that the Hun State was essentially an oligarchic administration brought about by the conditions of patriarchal structure.

Laws

The aristocratic Hunnic society its own unique system, which the Chinese described as "without complicated laws and easy to use" ⁴². Serious offences and armed wounding were punishable by death; in the case of theft, not only the thief's property was confiscated, but also all the family's possessions. For minor offences, the offender's face was scratched. The trial lasted a maximum of ten days; the number of detainees could not exceed several tens at a time. In addition to the customary law, from the reign of Me-te onwards certain state laws were introduced which imposed the death penalty against those who disrupted the discipline of war and disobeyed military orders. These special laws not only played an important role in the consolidation of the Huns, but also enabled them to become the most powerful state in Asia. In Hun public law, we find the property law that we find in most other nomadic systems: "Each of them owns a certain amount of land and can migrate from one place to another according to the availability of water and pasture." ⁴³ However, we cannot conclude from the content of the text that the landowner was a tribe belonging to a prince or family. In a second hypothesis, an analogical formula applied to the Turks in the VI-VII centuries is mentioned ⁴⁴. The text reads as follows: "In these countries (the lands where the Turks lived.-L.G.) ... there were wide pastures and abundant watery lands. Why did the Turks disperse in quarrels?" ⁴⁵ However, it is not an exceptional possibility that each of the 24 tribes had its own piece of land in the time of the Huns, and there are some evidences confirming this view. The fact that the tribes played the main role in all civil wars up to the middle of the first century AD is indirect evidence that the conflicts were caused by their ownership of pasture lands. Ownership of the mountainous forests was probably common. Because the issue of holding the forest-covered mountain ranges along the Chinese border

⁴² Age., p. 56.

⁴³ Age., p. 49.

⁴⁴ Age., p. 230.

⁴⁵ Age., p. 262. See also Marks K. *Formi, predšestvuyuşie kapitalističeskomu proizvodstvu*, p. 26.

The land had always troubled the yabgu, but the beneficiaries were "princes of secondary rank", i.e. the tribes subordinate to them.⁴⁶ The ownership of deserts and unused lands belonged to the whole Hun people. "Land is the foundation of the state"⁴⁷ said Me-te. This statement became the basic principle of the state throughout the Hun history. Slavery also existed among the Huns, but it was not in the form of long-term subjugation. This rather the case in the Near East. In general, prisoners of war and captives were used as slaves, but as far as is known, they were also employed in production.⁴⁸ Although the Huns had a great need for slaves and even brought many people with them to the steppes at the end of the wars against China, we do not find any indication that slave trade existed throughout the entire Hun history.

Wars

Thanks to Me-te's reforms, the Huns, who were patriarchal tribes, were transformed into a warrior Hun State. Every Hun was a warrior; he had a commander at his head and had to obey his orders strictly. However, the old clan system was intact and each war unit was headed by princes and clan lords who were related only to the yabgu, not by commanders from the lower strata, as was the case with the Mongols in the later Chingis-khan period. The division of power between yabgus and beys did not allow this or that person to become a partner to the throne. Among the reforms made by Me-te were the introduction of absolute obedience to the commander in battle as a military obligation and the establishment a civil service hierarchy. However, more importantly, the land was regarded as the foundation of the state, which prevented the deterioration of the clan structure and ensured the consolidation of the tribes, as it ensured the preservation of the state for centuries.

An ordinary Hun, born a warrior, had to be a warrior only. Although this annoyed some of the visionaries, the warrior could not let himself be let down by his stature, and his status was weakened.

⁴⁶ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/99.

⁴⁷ Age., p. 47.

⁴⁸ Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yujnoy Sibiri*, p. 324; Deguignes J. *Histoire des Huns*. Vol. I. Part 2. P. 25; Цзи. Оборонительные войны против хуннов в период Чжоу. *История Китая*. 1956. 15, 155, 96.

He had obtained a number of guarantees to prevent him from being deprived of his wealth. The spoils were his only means of acquiring wealth, as they were his private property, which could not be reclaimed from him. In peacetime, the ordinary Hun was occupied with migrating from place to place (2-4 times a year), practising warfare and resting in spring and autumn. The Chinese minister's statement that the Hun warriors "lived in comfort", based on the accounts of slaves along the frontiers, was not accidental. And that is why the Chinese often fled and sought refuge with the Huns.

Army

The Chinese put the number of the entire Hun army at 300 thousand. This seems to be a somewhat exaggerated figure. Even if we accept that all men were warriors (although we know that warriors only made up about 20 per cent of the general population), there have been 1.5 million people living in the Mongolian territory at that time, twice as many as today. This most likely an exaggeration, which is customary in ancient Chinese chronicles.

The chief weapon of the Hun light cavalry was the bow. This cavalry could not engage in hand-to-hand combat either with infantry or with mounted warriors armed with heavy weapons, but it was superior to them in mobile movement.

The Huns' tactics consisted of wearing down the enemy. For example, off the coast of the city, the Huns besieged the Chinese vanguard. The Hun troops outnumbered the Chinese. The Chinese soldiers froze in the bitter cold unaccustomed to the southern people, and hunger broke out in the army as they were deprived of their weight. Despite this, the Huns did not attack. It was not, of course, because they were cowardly or too cautious. On the contrary, the Huns did not need an all-out fight. They were intending to take advantage of the enemy's state of lethargic alertness to exhaust them and finish them off completely. Because this state of exhaustion and alarm would knock the weapon out of the enemy's hands and the enemy would not think of fighting back, but only of escaping and saving his life.

The Huns had successfully employed such manoeuvres, which did not require much skill, in previous small skirmishes. They had ambushed the enemy by feigning retreat, and they had

and besieged their yav. But if the yav attacked decisively, the Hun cavalry would disperse "like a flock of birds" to regroup and launch new attacks. The Huns were easy to disperse, difficult to defeat and impossible to destroy.

Military service was an obligation for every Hun, but he was not promised any reward. A warrior who killed a cub was rewarded with "a cup of wine and the whole of the booty". Spoils captured without a battle were divided (duvan), with the yabgun's share also set aside. Otherwise, the quotation is difficult to explain. Wars did not leave the Huns with a small income at all, and at the same time they were also a hassle-free booty. Because the only thing the Hun warrior did was to shoot arrows at the enemy from a certain distance, torture him until he was scared out of his wits, then bind his hands and arms and bring him home like a slave.

The Huns were a nomadic people. Animal crops were abundant, but they were in dire need of land crops and cloth. Chinese and Sogdians deceived the nomads who were not very skilful in this business with border trade. However, the nomads compensated for these losses with their raids, and thus the right was fulfilled. The Huns' successes in wars paved the way for the development of nomadic animal husbandry. On the other hand, the unification of the tribes reduced the internal conflicts and prevented the constant plundering of the maverick tribes.

Revenues

In order to survive, the Yabgu and beys had to have revenues that could not be collected from the people. A patriarchal society is alien to the concept of salık (tax); a free warrior would not be willing to give anything to anyone, as he believed that any payment he would make would overshadow his freedom. In other words, the tribute had to be collected as a tax from the non-free, i.e. subjugated tribes, and as war booty from the enemy. The defeated Tung-hus paid their tribute in oxen, horses and sheep skins.⁴⁹ The rich farmers of the rich valleys of East Turkestan paid the most.⁵⁰ The proud Tankuts, who lived around Lake Lob-nor in the principalities of Jo-ch'iang and Lou-lan (Shan-shan), had to pay the tribute in the form of tribute.

49 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/144.

50 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/170.

The iron weapons he prepared also came to the Huns from there.⁵¹ Furs probably came from the Kipchaks, Ting-ling and Khakas living on the northern borders. However, the most important source of income for the yabg was from the tribes who had been subjected to tribalisation in China. Although the Chinese, because they could not swallow their pride, supposedly did not pay direct taxes and accepted what they gave as a kind of savga (gift), but in fact these savgas were an implicit tax. For example, in 176, Me-te sent a modest gift, a camel, two steeds and two groups of four horses each, with his envoy to China; in return, the following gifts were presented to him with the counter envoy: A lined and ornamented caftan, a long silvery caftan, a crown made of gold, a belt embroidered with gold, a belt buckle made of rhinoceros horn, ten balls of dark red and green embroidered silk cloth.⁵²

Hun Society Structure

At the highest level of barbarism, tribal lords are usually separated from warlords.⁵³ This was the case with the Iroquois, where the two institutions did not interfere with each other. This was also the case with the Alamans, where the war commanders, the ger-sores (dukes), expelled the clan lords, the ko-nungers, after large population migrations. We witness a similar struggle at the site of Isparta. There the commander-kings were subordinate to the assembly of the citizens, but both were also subordinate to the decisions of the popular assemblies. In Athens, on the other hand, we see that the popular assemblies were above the council of elders-arhonts, and the basilevs, i.e. the king-commanders, were abolished everywhere. This means that different forms of clan structure were mixed with the strong warrior state structure. I wonder, how the Huns had dealt with this issue? At the time of Me-te, the Hun tribe was patriarchal. That is, children belonged to the father's lineage, not the mother's. The widow of the elder brother would go to the younger brother, who had to respect her as much as his own beloved wife.⁵⁴ The circular security provided to the clan members necessarily entailed certain obligations. The offence committed by any member of the family was to be regarded as the joint responsibility of all family members.

⁵¹ Age., p. 172.

⁵² Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/55-56.

⁵³ Engels F. *Proisxo'denie sem*; i, p. 148.

⁵⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/40.

⁵⁵ These general lines prove that the clan a solid structure and was not fragmented in any way. Exogamous relationships are always present in patriarchal clans. When it is considered that women could be taken from foreign tribes exceptionally and especially the yabguns made such marriages, it becomes clear that such a thing also existed in the Huns.

In order to clarify the issue of who were actually the princes of the clans, we have to turn to ethnographic research. The communal way of life in large families with patriarchal rule preserved among the South Slavavians (Zadura) until the XIX century. The leadership of the family was exercised by the domachin, "who was not to be an elderly person".⁵⁶ In Roman patriarchal families, the concept of "familia" meant all the slaves, i.e. all the property belonging to one person.⁵⁷ A similar family structure is depicted in the patriarchal Jewish society, for example in the book of Avraham's "Life". All of these forms are not completely in the Hun clan structure, but the clan structure in the Huns, although much more developed, cannot be considered as a form dominated by the alpine line. The prince of the tribe in the Huns was a person who looked after the interests of his tribe and in return secured the full support of the tribe. In later periods, we also find such a system in the Mongols, but only in those tribes that were not affected by the war reforms of Chingis-khan, who broke down the clan ties and replaced them with a war hierarchy. From this we can determine the extent to which the yabgu clan benefited from absolute power in a large state. This power was not based on the violation of social law, but on the primitive authority provided by the size of the tribe. As regards the attitude towards the subjugated peoples, the yabgu had the right to be more or less strict, but he had to be somewhat favourable towards his own people on the ancestral side.

Having established the existence of the clan structure in the Huns, it is now necessary to dwell on the issue of the proportion of military commanders. First of all, it should be noted that the proportion of commanders in the Huns was not determined according to the clan system.

⁵⁵ Age., p. 50.

⁵⁶ Engels F. Происхождение семьи, с. 59.

⁵⁷ Там 'е, p. 58.

They were called "ku-tu-hou" [major general]. Starting from the lowest military hierarchy, they were subordinate to the tribe lords. Although A.N. Bernchtam, in his work *Ocherki is-torii gunnov* (*Studies on the History of the Huns*), argues that the yabgu usurped the rights of the tribes⁵⁸, it is seen that this view stems from a lack of careful examination of the historical records. First of all, both the yabgu and the beys with high oruns were the representatives of the clan, as they were members of the clan. Just as the head of a family represents the whole family in his own person and speaks on its behalf. The structure introduced by Me-te and his successors not only preserved the system of clan ties, but also alptocracy, that is, the power of the elders within the clan. It can be said that during the development of the clan system, there was no room for personal advancement in a self-contained system in which a new-born child could be recognised as an "elder" among the older elders. The clan lord, who had seized total power, participated in the public kenges on behalf of the clan princes. However, if it is taken into consideration that the clan princes and lords assembled regularly twice a year, it is seen that in the history of the Huns, the people's kengeşs were never held.⁵⁹ Although it is right to present the Hun State as a kind of tribal empire, it is seen that the consolidation of the clan lords was not realised at a very high level. However, it was not easy to establish such a robust and original system, for the founder of this system not only had to come from a high-ranking family, but also had to have exceptional warrior skills. Me-te, who, while respecting the old war discipline, was able to overcome the rivalry among his kinsmen by improving his strength, all these qualities. As we have seen above, he had just taken over the government, he had attempted to eliminate the forces of his father and brother only after he was convinced that his urukdas were on his side. Again, as we have seen above, when he came into conflict with those who broke discipline and tried to oppose the ruler of the people, the first thing he did was to behead those who displeased him. It seems that the first basic lesson was respect, because only after that there were no attempts to break discipline.

The year 209 B.C. was a fateful year in which the fate of the whole Hun nation was decided. For, if it had not been for the intelligence and energy of Me-te, the Huns, like the Celts, would have fought in tribal wars or against the Germans and

⁵⁸ Bernchtam A.N. *Ocherk istorii gunnov*, L. 1951, p. 54.

⁵⁹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/49.

Like the Samnites, they would have expended all their strength in mercenary skirmishes, or, like the Scandinavians and Iroquoisin wars of plunder and persecution their neighbours. In any case, they could not be classed among the semi-savage nomadic tribes who violated the laws and showed the short-sightedness of self-destruction. But when we look at the general course of historical development of nomadic tribes, we realise that this course of events could not be disturbed. The Huns, who disappeared from history, were sometimes replaced by the eastern Mongol-Tung-hus, sometimes by the southern Tibetans, i.e. Ch'iangs, sometimes by the western Aryans, i.e. Yüecis, and sometimes by the Kuzeyli Ugors, the ancestors of the Nenetzes. The only changes in the course of events were in cultural development and ethnic composition. However, in all these secondary periods, the Huns did not have a hard life. Therefore, the reforms brought by Me-te were of great importance for them. Not only the general laws of human development, but they themselves are important for historians who redraw the map of the real past.

It can be said that Me-te created a state out of nothing. The consolidation of nomadic tribes due to the development of the animal husbandry industry has been observed in all historical processes. Nevertheless, Me-te's activities and capabilities can only be identified through careful research. His whistling arrows were followed not only by skilful hunters but also by warriors who trusted their commanders and obeyed them by realising their duty. Me-te died in 174, having attained a great position that he himself had not dreamed of at the beginning of his life. Although none of his descendants could match him in terms of ability, the state he founded survived for 300 years.

SECTION VI

DOMINATION THE PEOPLES

Western Border

Me-te's son Chi-yü, who ascended the throne with the title of Lao-shang-yabgu, inherited not only a great state but also some complex problems. The problems he inherited had to be solved without delay. The foremost and most important of these was the protection of the western borders. The Yuechis in these conquered territories had been squeezed out, but they had managed to hold on in the steppes north of T'ien-shan [God Mountains]. A small part of the Yuechis broke away from the main mass and remained in Nan-shan under the name of "Little Yuechis", but the greater part stubbornly defiant. The ruler of the Yuechis, ^{Ki-to-lo}1 [Ch'i-to-lu], finally went to war with the Huns. But Ki-to-lo was killed; his corpse fell into the hands of the enemy, and Lao-shang yabgu had a wine-bowl made from his skull. Although it is not possible to determine the exact date of the Yüeci siege, it can be said that it took place approximately between 174-165 BC. Because Ki-to-lo's successor, taking his remaining people with him in 165, came to the ^{Serbian-Derya}2 tegras and fought with the Bactrian Greeks, the remnants of the Macedonian Iskender Empire, on the shores of the Amudarya. The fa- tih "silvery phalangs and invincible peltasts,"³ who had dominated the world for 150 years, had lost their superiority in battle. The Yuechis had conquered Bactria⁴ without much difficulty and no longer interested in fighting with the Huns, with whom they had suffered greatly.

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/266.

2 Grumm-Grjimaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/100; Lévi S. *Notes sur les Indo-Scythes*// *Journal Asiatique*. 1897. IX serie. Vol. IX, p. 13.

3 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/164.

4 In 160 BC, Sogdiana broke away from Greco-Bactria with the help of the Yuechis. Bactria fell in 129 BC (see Saint-Martin V. *Frag- ment d'une histoire des Arsacides*. Vol. II. P. 68). In other words, the Bactrian war continued for thirty years.

The lands vacated by the Yuechis -Yedisu- were occupied by the Wu-suns, who merged with the Sakas and the remnants of the Yuechis.⁵ The Wu-sun ruler, who was growing stronger and stronger, came to the conclusion that "after the death of the yabg "6 it would be possible to break away from the Huns. Attempts of the Huns to reassert their sovereignty over the Wu-suns did not yield any results. But when did this event take place? This event could have taken place only after the Wu-suns, acting together with the Huns, defeated the Yuechis, i.e. after 165. Therefore, it must be understood that Lao-shang is meant by the phrase "upon the death of the Yabgu". Since the Yabgu died in 161, the disobedience of the Wu-sun- lar took place in the fifties of the second century B.C., approximately between 158 and 154, when the Huns were deprived of the strength to wage a second war in the west because of their war with the Chinese.

The Wu-suns were far from a social structure that enabled the Huns to gain strength. Later events also show this. The Wu-suns had 630 thousand people living in 120 thousand tents, each tent containing a little more than five people. This was not a clan, but a group of two families. A woman was regarded as the private property of the man who had the right to give her to whomever he wished. For example, a Wu-sun chieftain gave a Chinese queen as a gift to his grandson, while another chieftain gave his wife to his uncle. There was absolutely no equality of ownership among the Wu-suns. For example, the sources mention rich people with herds of four thousand horses.

The political structure of the Wu-suns clearly resembled that of the Huns. At the head of the people was a chieftain bearing the title of k'un-mo. According to Chinese sources, the number of commanders in the Wu-suns was 16 and the army 188 800. This was quite a great power. Nevertheless, the Wu-suns lived in peace with the Huns at that time. Perhaps the enmity between them and their western neighbours forced them to such an alliance.

To the west of the Wu-suns lived the K'ang-chü, settled in the Mirzachöl steppe. The K'ang-chü tribe was twice as weak as the Wu-suns and as a buffer zone between the Huns and the Wu-suns. It appears that the Huns had a stronghold on the K'ang-chü

5 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/191.

6 Age., p.155.

Their dominance was symbolic, but as they formed their western frontier, the Huns could easily turn eastwards. Sogdiana, further south of Wu-sun and K'ang- chü, was not under the suzerainty of the Huns, but it did not pose a danger, as it was not united among itself (for Sogdiana was divided into 70 independent principalities). For this reason, Lao-shang yabgu, who had destroyed the Yuechis, secured his western borders completely; he was able to capture the principality of the "Western tip" (the territory called Sinkiang=Hsi-yü by the Chinese at that time). This principality had the means to play a very important role in the economic organisation of a fledgling empire.

Policy

"You can build an empire on horseback, but you cannot rule it from horseback," once said Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, an influential ruler of the Chingis-khan period. Yabgu Me-te, the founder of the Hun Empire, understood this very well. Towards the end of his reign, he took into his service many Chinese who had sought refuge in China and made extensive use of them in diplomatic relations between the Chinese court and the Hun state. His son Lao-shang yabgu, who succeeded him, also followed in his footsteps and when Chung Hang Yüeh, who was sent to him from China as an envoy by force, wanted to cross over to the Hun side, he welcomed this offer with joy and showered him with compliments. "Yüeh taught those who were in the Yabgu's entourage to record the number of subjects, livestock and possessions in a ledger. "⁷ The acceptance of this the internal affairs of Hun society. The taxes imposed on the Yabgu and his relatives (all of whom were his relatives) set the Yabgu tribe apart from the other smaller tribes and gave Me-te an opportunity he could never have dreamt of. The greatest opportunity provided by this the granting of the title of "the son of heaven and earth, the great Hun Yabgusu brought forth by the sun and the moon "⁸ to the yabgu. Here we see that the right to power was determined "by the favour of the gods"; therefore, the tribesmen obliged to obey the person who came to power and not to oppose him. Thus, the privileges granted to the yabga were so contrary to the old system that the masses of the people were expected to revolt and take up arms.

⁷ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/56.

⁸ Agy.

but none of this happened. On the contrary, the power of the yabgu was endowed with unprecedented powers. In fact, the Huns had inevitably lost their former freedom and would probably have to pay a great price to regain it. From now on, all the war booty and taxes collected from the defeated tribes and peoples went directly to the treasury of the suzerain. Although a considerable part of these spoils remained in the hands of the warriors, and Hun women exchanged their sheepskin clothes for silk handicrafts. Now, besides koumiss and kashar, Chinese wines, bread and sweets were also served on Hun tables. Historical records record that a period of unprecedented prosperity and luxury began in the Hun society, while customs deteriorated.

The far-sighted Yüeh, devoted to the service of his new master, pointed out the dangers of such changes. "The population of the Huns," said Yüeh Lao-shang to the Yüeh, "is not even equal to the population of a Chinese city.⁹ But they are strong because they are not dependent on the Chinese for their different dress and food and drink. Now, O yabgu, you are changing your customs, you like Chinese things. If China is willing to sell a tenth of its possessions, all the Huns one by one will come to the side of the Han dynasty. You take silk fabrics from China, take off the clothes of the people and dress them. Then release them among thorny plants and show that they are no substitute for furs and leather garments. Buy foodstuffs from China, but by not using them, show that kashar and milk are superior to them."¹⁰

The programme prepared by Yüeh was not heeded. Yabgu was responsible not only for the breakdown of traditions, but also a change in the economy and way of life. The "glamour of things" led the Huns to consume and more and, as a result, their way of life changed. But it would not be long before the results of such changes would be seen. After two or three generations (50-75 years) they had all been pushed almost to the brink of degeneration. The favourite products of the Huns were flowing in from China.

9 Around 170 B.C. the Hun army consisted of 60,000 cavalry, presumably soldiers recruited from other peoples. See Haloun G. *Zur Uetsi-Frage/Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*. 1937. S. 306, nje I; cf. *Byzantion*. Vol. XVII, 1945, pp. 224-225. On the other hand, adult males, who normally constituted 20 per cent of the population, were conscripted into the army, from which it may be inferred that the Hun population 300,000 or less, but never more.

10 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/57-58.

Naturally, demands for further expansion of this canal began to be raised. During the reigns of Me-te and Lao-shang, the Chinese continued to send these gifts in small batches, and the Yabgu distributed them to his people. Yabgu tried to regulate the border trade with China in order to fulfil these necessary demands, he mostly faced the objections of the Chinese administration.

In China, the Han dynasty developed a new tax system aimed at collecting as much produce as possible from the population in order to meet the needs of the army and state officials. Accordingly, barter trade at the frontier came under the direct control of the state in order to collect the necessary revenue. This system irritated, firstly, the Chinese subjects who paid the tribute and, secondly, the Huns who could procure less cloth and bread than they needed. Both sides wanted to buy and sell without intermediaries, but this did not suit the Chinese administration, which was accustomed to transferring more provisions from the subjects to the coffers of the state. Apparently, this thorny issue could only be resolved through war, and war did not like to be kept waiting too long.

Free Trade War

When Lao-shang yabgu finished off the Yuechis and freedom of action, he marched on China. In 166 he entered north-west China with a cavalry army of 140,000 men, "captured a large number of captives, herds and goods" and burnt the emperor's summer palace. The Hunnic cavalry organised a rapid raid, approaching within 43 km of the capital Ch'ang-an. Declaring mobilisation, the emperor ordered the preparation of a thousand armoured chariots, 100,000 cavalry¹¹ and three auxiliary corps, but by the time they were assembled, the Huns had returned home with their captured olga without a single casualty.¹² For the next four years, the Huns continued their raids, plundering all the border regions (especially around Liao-tung). The main blow was struck in the western region, recently conquered by the Huns and inhabited by non-Chinese peoples. The military campaign was particularly effective in P'ei-ti (East Kan-su). This was the homeland of the I-ch'ü Jungs and had only been conquered in the third century B.C.¹³ Here the Huns had been able to settle.

11 Figures that Sih-ma Ch'ien appreciated.

12 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/59.

13 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, III/13.

We should recall that they were saved from defeat in Central China thanks to the help of the Chinese peoples. Although this march yielded few favourable results, the Chinese cavalry was pushed to the west; at the same time the Huns plundered the entire eastern frontiers, starting from Yin-shan.

Finally, in 162, Emperor Wen-ti asked Lao-shang Yabgu for a peace treaty. In reply, the Yabgu sent a tang-hu (low-ranking official) to give an air of insignificance. The tang-hu two horses as a gift, which the Chinese chroniclers do not even consider worth mentioning. Nevertheless, Wen-ti was not offended and accepted the gifts and concluded a peace treaty. The treaty was very heavy and embarrassing for China. Accordingly, China and the Huns were to be regarded as two equal states, and China, taking into account the difficulties of the cold climate in its neighbour's country, was to send "considerable quantities of millet, white rice, silvery ku-mash, silk, cotton cloth and other miscellaneous articles" every year.¹⁴ This was a kind of veiled tribute. According to the treaty, old refugees would not be deported, but new refugees would be returned on condition that the death penalty would not be imposed. Although the treaty was a clear indication of the Huns' apparent superiority over the Chinese, there was no provision for free border trade.

Lao-shang yabgu died in 161, leaving the throne to his son Kün-çin, without settling the issue of border trade between China and the Huns. Although Kun-chin honoured the agreement reached without making any changes, he launched an offensive against China in 158. Two Hun troops, each consisting of 30 thousand men (?!), crossed the borders of China from the north and west and started to plunder and pillage. In spite of the special alarm system placed on the borders, which signalled looting by fire, the Chinese armies were unable to recover and when the Chinese finally approached the borders, the Huns were already far away. The Huns carried out successful attacks in the following year. When Wen-ti died in 157, Ching-ti took the throne in 156. Violent factional conflicts arose within the empire. While the defeated were waiting to be exterminated, they regrouped and asked for help from the Huns. However, the new administration succeeded in suppressing internal problems, and in 154 the rebels were completely crushed because the Huns did not help them. Of course, the Huns were rewarded for not interfering in the internal affairs of the Chinese, and so in 152 the border markets were opened and the exchange trade was revived. Moreover, a Chinese princess was sent as a bride to the Hun suzerain along with great gifts.

Year 152 the peak of Hun power.

¹⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/60.

Eastern Border

The Hunnic suzerain had complete control of the eastern and north-eastern frontiers. The subjugated Tung-hus were apparently in no position to rebel in 209, and from then on they became the loyal subjects of their new master with the decidedly non-powerful armies remaining. For one thing, the word "Tung-hu" had disappeared and their descendants were known as Wu-huans. The Wu-huans lived in the steppe countryside of southern Manchuria, bordering the Chinese. To the north of them, in western Manchuria and Barga, lived their relatives the Siyenpi [Hsien-p'i], and on the Argun coast east of Baikal, the braided-haired T'o-pas (pronounced Toba). These were all Mongol tribes.

The reader should not be confused by the fact that tribes are called by various names. All the peoples of Eurasia changed their names frequently; sometimes they were called by the name of the ruler, sometimes by the name of the place where they lived, sometimes by nicknames. The tribal structure, which formed the backbone of the Hun State, was less developed to the east of Kingan [Hingan]. The Wu-hu- an lived in the form of tribes, i.e. individual *families*. However, later on, for the sake of security of life, these tribes united into communities by forming tents ranging from 100 to 1000.¹⁵ They were led by tribal aksakals and the name of these aksakals was also used as the name of the community. In order to become a tribal aksakal, one had to be "brave, strong and wise".¹⁶ Here we find a different form of development, perhaps also valid for the Huns. The ancient Mongols were not composed of tribes and clans, but of armies. Because there was the highest form of democracy. The word "orda" meant a number of people living together, forming a distinct organisation. Even though orda- s were composed of people of different blood, religion, language and traditions, they to have certain conditions in terms of organisation. At the head of the army the khan (taken from the Siyenpi language)¹⁷ ; however, the khan could be elected or nominated by the assembly of the fully empowered members of the army. In the ancient Mongols, the principle of democracy prevailed instead of the principle of aristocratism, the clan structure of the Huns. It can be argued that it cannot be as strong as the boy state. Because,

15 In order to distinguish the Wu-huan society, the term "bu-aymak", meaning regional group, was used, not "sin", meaning clan (Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/142).

16 Agy.

17 Age., p. 167.

With skilful and energetic commanders, armies would make great leaps in a short time; without such commanders, they would quickly collapse. However, thanks to the principle of democracy, its potential was remarkably high. As a result, the orda as a state system seems to be a political organisation with the best chance of survival in nomadic life. However, while the Mongolian orda structure manifested itself only in form in the II century BC, the Huns were able to rule the dispersed former Mongolian communities without any difficulty. The Huns took sheepskins from the Mongols as a favour and took away the wives and children of those who could not pay. In order to clarify what kind of people the ancient Mongols were, we should dwell on some of their ethnographic characteristics. Wu-huans and Siyenpis did not know what housework was. "From the tribal elders to the ordinary shepherd, everyone herded his own flock and guarded his own property."¹⁸ And the principle of democracy also prevailed in family life. Women were respected and beating them was forbidden. The young girl was entitled to the man she loved and she was the owner of the dowry. Apart from fighting, all work belonged to women. Their religion was different from that of the Huns, where human sacrifice was forbidden. Their laws were not strict: The death penalty was imposed only on those who disobeyed in war; in cases of theft and murder, the offender's herds were sold. Criminals were sometimes exiled and no one could claim them. In short, we observe that the Mongols had not only a humane way of life, but also a very primitive people with great opportunities; despite their low level of culture, they were morally very high and creative. The Chinese did not take this people very seriously.

Since the Chinese did not recognise the forest tribes living around Manchuria and Amur, they had no information about them. It seems that the Hun rule had not reached the masses living in the forests.

Northern Border

In 205-204 BC, the steppes in front of and behind Baikal were within the borders of the Hyung-nu (Hun) State.¹⁹ Me-te had subjugated some tribes living in Southern Siberia. These tribes-

¹⁸ Age., 143.

¹⁹ McGovern W. *The early empires of Central Asia*. L., 1939, p. 120.

They had already passed the bronze age and entered the iron age (Tagar culture in the third last stage of the Iron Age).²⁰ They were engaged in agriculture and settled animal husbandry. Judging by the abundance of weapons recovered from the excavations of the kurgans, they were warlike peoples. Their grave complexes indicate that their social structure was based on clan structure, perhaps because they were neighbours of the Huns. However, they did not have a developed organisation and state structure. Based on the similarity of their artistic styles with Altai and Scythian styles, we can say that they belonged to the western cultural complex, but we cannot claim that they belonged to the provincial culture area. "The powerful Minusinsk cultural milieu influenced most of Western Siberia and possibly even Eastern Europe (Ananin culture)."²¹ Although archaeology will reveal the facts, the discoveries are very slow. Let us now turn to palaeoanthropology, which will allow us to draw the following conclusions:

1. "The main type was dolicocephalous and European, linguistically related to Proto-European." Descendants of the Ting-ling.

2. "Apart from this, the origin of the European brachycephalic type is unclear." "Ti"s may fall into this group.

3. "In general, it can be confused with Mongoloid brachycephals of the Siberian branch, a small percentage of which have an Asian body structure." There are only two skull types; the contribution may be coincidental.

4. "The traces that appeared in the Minusinsk region may have been preserved in the period of the Karasuk culture, representative of the Far-Eastern race."²²

Thus, with the exception of two cases (two Mongolian skulls), all the peoples inhabiting the Minusinsk Basin are formed from the components of a thousand years ago. The difference is that they were able to coalesce into a single people emerging from the same cultural environment. The bronze works of the Tagar period contain rich subjects with elegant lines and zoological subjects.

Unfortunately, we do not have precise information about the way of life developed by the Ting-ling in connection with the Hun conquests. Fa-

20 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnoy Sibiri*, p. 183-313; Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*, p. 124.

21 Debets G.F. *Paleoanthropologiya SSSR*, p. 124.

22 Age., p. 134.

It is certain that they had an intensive cultural exchange with the Huns. As a result of this cultural exchange, a new culture with a predominant Asian element, namely Tashtik culture, was born.²³ This issue will be discussed later.

Socio-economic life in Hun State

The similarity of archaeological finds dating from the VIII century BC found during excavations in the territory stretching from Yin-shan to the Sayan-Altai shows us the borders of the Huns' expansion at that time.²⁴

From the archaeological point of view, this culture is also called "stone tomb" culture because it reflects the traces of the bronze age with "wild animal figures" in art.²⁵ In the tombs belonging to the end of this period, pieces of iron, the processing of which the Huns learned from the Western Junds, are also found.²⁶ hunting and animal husbandry, the Huns were also engaged in agriculture in primitive manner. Grain-grinding implements found both in Northern Mongolia and in the Great Wall region point to this.²⁷

In this period the Huns bear little resemblance to their ancestors mentioned above. Now they are a completely different people. During 800 years, such fusions took place at the Siberian edges that eventually A new anthropological type of Huns has emerged, which G. F. D e b e t s calls "Paleosiberian". Archaeology shows that the Huns had developed copper foundry and that there were foundry masters among them.²⁸ It is likely that the Huns, who were collectors, had amassed considerable wealth in this way.

²³ Agy.

²⁴ Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnoj Sibiri*, p. 317; see also Rostovseyev M. *Sredinnaya Aziya, Rossiya, Kitay i zverniy stil*. Prague, 1929; Salmony A. *Sino-Siberian art*. P., 1933; *Inner Mongolia and region of the Great Wall*// Archaeologia Orientalis. D-séries. Vol.I. Tokio-Kioto, 1934; Ianse O. *L'empire des steppes*. Revue des arts asiatiques. Vol. IX, 1935.

²⁵ Sosneskiy G. P. *Ranniye kochevniki Zabaykalya*// КСИИМК. Т. VIII; Плиточные могилы Забайкалья//труды отдела истории первовытной культуры Гос. Эрмитажа. Т. I, 1841.)

²⁶ See Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/ 172.

²⁷ Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnoj Sibiri*, p. 318; Borseka G. *Arxeologicheskiye obsledovaniye srednego teçeniya reki Toly*// Северная Монголия. Т. II, ., 1927.

²⁸ Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnoj Sibiri*, p. 323.

They seem to have hoarded them. Indeed, Deguignes, referring to Sih-ma Ch'ien's account, states that "prisoners of war were the basis of the wealth of the Huns and they used them as pets." ²⁹

We have already seen that patriarchal slavery had developed among the first Huns, the Glazkovo. Slaves performed heavy domestic labour, gathered wood and carried water. They were not allowed to do the work of adult householders: They could not hunt, graze the herd or participate in wars. In other words, they could not participate in production. In short, their presence did not disturb the patriarchal clan structure.

The Hun economy was built on the basis of utilising the features of forest-step land. Therefore, they needed not only green areas but also mountainous areas covered with forest. Mountain forests were necessary for the construction of yurts and chariots.³⁰ Mountain trees were also more useful for arrow-making, and the eagles that lived there had "the fibres of the eagles, suitable for making arrow feathers." ³¹ Shelters in the forest were very convenient for the shelter of herds during storms, and shepherds could easily transport the wood they cut for their hearths on sledges in winter. The Huns had to fight the Chinese for the foothills of Yin-shan and Ch'in-ling-shan, and the Yuechis for the Mongolian Altai and T'ien-shan, as they really needed the forest-covered mountains.

In general, when we compare ancient cultures among themselves, we see that their level of development according to the material remains such as weapons, written materials, works of art, etc. found. This method is inadequate, as it is forced to be contented only with surviving memorabilia, i.e. stone weapons and metal artefacts. The first shortcoming of the system stems from the fact that monuments in countries with arid climates are incomparably better preserved than those in humid regions. On the other hand, considering that people built houses not for archaeologists to find them thousands of years later, but to live in, it be accepted that houses made of wood are not worse than stone houses. Therefore, it is a second mistake to conclude that those who do not build stone houses have a lower level of culture. In the same way

²⁹ Age., p. 324.

³⁰ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/99.

³¹ Age., p. 98.

In the same way, since only the metallic parts of the clothes do not deteriorate and these are criteria that do not apply to all peoples, it is not possible for them to be considered as beautiful and valuable. Let us suppose the taste for ornamentation of people A has reached a very high level, and that people B have mastered the making of very crude stone amulets, which are bought and used by people A. In this case, the taste of the people of A does not constitute a whole in itself, but the original style of the people of B is recognised. The same is the case with literacy: There are nations with large libraries of translations, narrations and compilations, but they have very few original works of their own, as, for example, the Mongols and the Manchus. Incidentally, there are also uncultured peoples who have produced such masterpieces of art as the "Iliad" and the "Kalevala".

In short, the comparison of ancient cultures is not only possible but also necessary; but for this purpose, the original lines of development of the peoples under study first be reviewed and established. Moreover, the different material remains that have survived to the present day should not be an obstacle to this.

The main reaches of the Hun frontiers were the areas of the Mongolian steppes. In early times the Great Steppe was divided, like a sea, by the inhabited forest-steppe stripes of southern Siberia and northern China. The inhabitants of both stripes - farmers, sedentary farmers and forest hunters - could not turn to the steppes. For steppe vegetation was of no use to them. The Huns had produced horses in sufficient quantities, they had tamed oxen, which were shot at hamut, and they had built huts - wheeled carts. They were the first nomads and organised hunts in order to meet the meat requirements of their daily life. In the III century BC, they even learnt to hunt with falcons.

Their huts - tents on wheels - were very convenient for use. First of all, compared to the freezing earth and stone walls, these tents were extremely protective against wind and cold. It was also possible to dismantle the encampment and move it to a warmer place. Secondly, like the Huns, the hut on wheels was more secure in order not to lose the existing possessions to the enemy.

Leather clothes were durable, light and useful. Since they had large herds, they had more than enough meat and milk for food.

They had a strong sense of self-will. The fact that they did not engage in heavy labour and were constantly engaged in hunting developed their physical strength, and the military campaigns they frequently organised strengthened their manhood and willpower.

Besides, military expeditions played an important role in the Hun economy. In the early stages of historical development, primitive tribes had developed the habit of obtaining foodstuffs, which they lacked in sufficient quantities, by constantly plundering their neighbours. This was a dangerous, but wise way of earning income. Because the booty was sufficient to meet the needs of the people. Like many peoples, Huns also passed through this stage. However, in the period of the first yabgu, the main revenues of the Huns were the tributes paid by the subjugated peoples.

However, it should be noted that at the beginning of their formative period the Huns were not much different from, for example, the Franks, Goths, Arabs, Slavs and ancient Greeks.

Huns' behaviour towards prisoners of war and refugees was also very humane. Therefore, the Chinese state was not only afraid of the successive Hun attacks, but also of the revenues that their own people regularly carried to the steppe.

The involvement of women in politics is evidence that they are not at all humiliated as in China, India and Iran.

The most obvious evidence that the Huns did not have a developed special culture is that they could not read and write, and that evidence of this has been found to date. It may be thought that the Huns knew how to read and write, and that it is not always possible that the things written on leather, bark or paper have survived to the present day. However, this view and even preconceived judgements are refuted by new information. For example, it is recorded in the "History of the Three Sovereigns" that ambassadors travelled back and forth between China and the former Cambodian sovereign Fu-nan. The Chinese envoy stayed in Cambodia between 245-250, and Kang T'ai, who accompanied him, gave information about Fu-nan after his return to his country and said, "have books; they keep them in archives. Their writing style is similar to that of the Huns".³² Fu-nanids were using the Indian writing style. This

32 Hall D.G.E. *A history of South-East Asia*. L., 1955, p. 25-26.

The explanation is extremely important. Because the Chinese diplomat mentions the Hun script and his opinion on a matter he knows for sure by comparing and explaining it with something else. Even more importantly, he states that the Hun writing style originated from the Indian alphabet, thus the Hun State had connections with the West. Perhaps the reason why the Han-era Chinese accused the Huns of savagery was that the only cultural sources they had were those of their own country. Unfortunately, the folklore of the Huns³³ and other information about their spiritual culture has been irretrievably lost. Nevertheless, information on the level of Hun culture, and in particular on the great arts of their contemporaries living in the Sayan-Altai region, will emerge as a result of archaeological excavations in Mongolia and Ordos.

Religion of the Huns

When the question of religion comes up, two questions are immediately asked: What do you believe and how do you believe? The Huns sacrificed once every year in the spring to "their ancestors, the sky, the earth and the spirits". Yabgu, on the other hand, homage to the rising sun in the morning and to the moon in the evening, twice a day. Measures were taken "according to the state of the moon and stars".³⁴

Since the Huns had idols depicting the cosmos in the form of human beings, if we examine the titul of the Hun yabgu as "Born in the sky and the earth, born in the sun and the moon", it becomes clear that one of the objects of his veneration was the cosmos. We have detailed information about cosmic gods. For example, in Greek mythology, Uranus is the father of Saturn; the oldest of the Indian gods is Varuna, and the ancient Scandinavian peoples Odin. From this point of view, we can say that the cult of putting the cosmos in the form of a human being was transmitted to the Huns from their western neighbours, the Ting-ling or Yüeqi. For the East Asian Mongoloids did not have such a cult, but they were polypiritualists. Polyspiritualism in the East was limited to the worship of the spirits of ancestors and nature. Ancestral and nature spirits could be summoned and exorcised.

33 Only in "Ch'ien Han-shu" is there a brief reminder that the Huns, having lost the Yen-chi-shan and Ch'ilan-shan mountain ranges, reflected these catastrophic events in poetry. (См. Фэн Цзя-шэн. Руническая надпись из восточной Монголии//Советская этнография. 1959, № 1, с.5)

34 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/49-50.

They were believed to be able to know, to be angry or to be kind. To the Chinese or Tibetan, these spirits had absolutely no divine aspect; they were alive and had a nature different from that of human beings. They were powerful, but their power was not unlimited; by their very nature, they could neither be good nor evil. In short, their relationship with spirits had no religious aspect. Huns' belief in spirits was also like this. They believed in the hereafter and saw the afterlife as a continuation of this worldly life. For this reason, the deceased was buried in a double coffin so that he would not be cold in the next world; he was wrapped in silvery fabrics and fancy furs; a few hundred of his friends and chambermaids were sacrificed to serve him in the next world. However, this custom was applied only for yabgu and high-ranking beys; human sacrifices were not made for every deceased. As for the "warrior sacrifice"³⁵, brave prisoners of war were chosen and it was believed that the spirits demanded the sacrifice from the magician. It is clear from this that human sacrifice had links with the Siberian Hun religious movement, which was closely related to ancient Chinese shamanism and possibly the Tibetan Mitra [Bhon/Bon] religion. This religious belief system was not monotheistic, and a certain amount of respect was paid to the evil demons that inhabited a limited area. Although Confucianism and Buddhism, which respect ancestors, and later Christianity and Islam fought against this belief system, it managed to hold on in Tibet until the twentieth century and in a slightly different form among the Tungus in Eastern Siberia. Although human sacrifice was common in this belief system at the beginning, it was later abandoned.³⁶

What seems strange at first glance that the worship of the demon and the belief in the sanctity of have coexisted despite the differences in their origin and adoption. However, if the place of these two beliefs in the world view of the Huns is taken into consideration, it will be understood that they are two different things; they constitute two separate belief systems that do not mix with each other. The belief in the deification of light was so widespread that the demon was not allowed to enter this sphere and demons had their own affairs which did not concern the affairs of the world. This worldview was widespread among the Si- birya peoples and even in Povolje until recently. So much so that the Maris wondered why the Russian god did not live side by side with Keremet, why candles were lit to one and sacrifices to the other at the same time.

³⁵ Age., p. 76.

³⁶ Okladnikov A.P. *Drevneye naseleniye Sibiri ve yego kultura* (rukopis) Bl. VII.

They are unable to understand what it means. Another interesting point is the following: The Huns took the cultural views of the East and the West and moulded them into their own unique moulds. Moreover, they also borrowed from distant Indian beliefs. For example, the golden idol and many teachings smashed by the Chinese are considered to be Buddhist beliefs carried from the valleys of the Western end.³⁷

Although there is no certainty that there were Buddhists among the Huns, it is important to note that they knew about Buddhism and were interested in it. This is a broad horizon incompatible with even the lowest level of cultural development. In the face of all this, can we still regard them as savages? Moreover, if we add to this robust system the administrative mechanism and the way of living humanely, which attracts even a cultured Chinese, the issue of the Huns being "savages" in the III-Ith centuries B.C. must disappear by itself.

37 McGovern W. *The early empires*, p.139; Chavannes Ed. *Memoires historiques de Sse-ma Ts'ien*. Vol.LXVII. P., 1899; Franke H. *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*. Bd. I. Berlin, 1930, p. 343; Дэн Чжи-чэн. История Китая на протяжении двух тысяч лет. Shanghai, 1954// Реферативный сборник. 1956. № 13, с. 152.

SECTION VII

THE DRAGON'S MOVE

Resumption of the Sino-Hun War

China entered a new era; the Han dynasty administration was different from its predecessor Ch'in administration. The end of civil wars, the abandonment of high-cost projects such as the Great Wall of China led to positive developments in agriculture and arts; trade revived and the population started to increase. Despite the Hun and Tankut attacks, the country continued to prosper not day by day, but hour by hour, and China gained unlimited opportunities. The Chinese had become a skilful people who could not be ignored, and they began to look to the future with confident eyes. Wu-ti, who ascended the throne in 140 BC, realised what his people needed. The Chinese were surrounded by enemies and the Huns were at the forefront of them. Emperor Wu-ti did not immediately dare to break a humiliating peace treaty that had made China and the Huns equal to each other; on the contrary, he added a free trade clause to the treaty, risking some economic losses. At the same time, however, he was slowly preparing for war. The following year, he sent his closest man Chang Ch'ien to find the Yuechis and persuade them to attack the Huns at the same time with the Chinese. But before Wu-ti could even wait for Chang Ch'ien to fulfil his mission, he took action himself.

Another spy Hieh-I, originally from the city of Ma-i, came to the Huns with a number of gifts, supposedly by secret order of the emperor, and having gained the of the yabgu, offered to plunder his own city. The kogu, whose appetite was whetted by Ma-i's wealth, took the spy's word for it and marched into the Chinese borders with an army of 100 thousand men in 133.

This was what the Chinese wanted: An army of 300,000 ready for battle, hidden behind the ridges of Ma-i, so that the Huns could enter the city

and he was waiting for them to start gathering and he wanted to besiege them with a sudden attack and destroy them completely.

The Huns were marching in a forced march, so as not to give the enemy a chance to recover. In a pasture 100 li (about 40 km) off Ma-i city, they came across a large herd. There was no shepherd at the head of the herd. Probably having learnt that the Chinese army was waiting for the Huns to approach in ambush, the people had left their possessions and were in a hurry to save their lives. But the yabgu suspected that since none of the Chinese had the strength to resist the Hun horsemen, no one would be able to warn the shepherds of the Huns' arrival and suspected that the inhabitants of the city were nowhere to be seen.

Sometimes very trivial things can change the course of events. When a Chinese commander (yü-shih) wandering along the frontier attempted to defend his fortifications, the Hun cavalry laid siege to him. The weak yü-shih was forced to retreat to his watchtower, but when the Huns, with their long spears, overwhelmed the Chinese clustered round the tower,¹ he had no choice but to come down and surrender. He was brought to the Yabgu's headquarters and thus became the first spoil of war. The Yabgu, who was already suspicious of the situation, interrogated him carefully. In order to save his life, the captive sang like a nightingale and told about the trap set by the Chinese army. Ordering an immediate return, the yabgu, upon reaching the border, said, "I owe my salvation to Sema [God] who sent me this yüshi". Then he released the only prisoner of war he had. But since he knew that they would kill him if he returned to his country, he kept him with him and gave him the title of "Prince of Sky" [T'ien-wang].

The Chinese commanders stood still, expecting the Huns to attack Ma-i. Enraged, Wu-ti put General Wang K'ai (pronounced Wan Gay) on trial, but the commander-in-chief, fearing to be put under the executioner's sword, killed himself. China was faced with a heavy and hopeless war. In spite of the general's suicide, the Chinese army had the opportunity to break through the Hun territory, but did not do so. How can we explain this strange, but at the same time saving the Huns? In 131 BC the Huang-ho river changed its bed, destroying the dam near the village of Hu-ch'ê (in Shan-tung province). We found the following stanza describing this event:²

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/62.

2 Li H. *Die Geschichte des Wasserbaues in China*// Beiträge zur Geschichte der Technik und Industrie. Bd. I Berlin, 1931-1932, pp. 59-73.

Oh, how cruel Ho-pei was³ The waves
 swallowed thousands
 He swallowed Sang-fu⁴ and pressed him down
 on Huai He never returned to his birthplace!

The emperor sent 100,000 men to close the great breach⁵ They must have included soldiers waiting at the frontier, for the Huns breathed a sigh of relief.

Losses of the Huns

After these events, there could no longer be any talk of peace. For the first four years, however, neither side undertook any major operations. The Hunnic raiding parties carried out plundering expeditions into the various cities of northern China, while the Chinese preferred to remain on the defensive. Interestingly, however, although there was extensive trade in the markets established in the steppe along the Chinese border, the Huns never harassed the Chinese merchants who supplied them with silk and sweets. Neither side touched the traders. But in 129, the Chinese government, deciding to prevent the national crops from falling into the hands of the enemy, deemed it appropriate to ban free trade. When four corps of ten thousand cavalry each were sent to the region to put this decision into practice, the Huns stood up against them.

The skilful Chinese commander Wei, Ch'ing cunningly trapped the enemy and captured 700 at Lung-ch'eng (pronounced Lunçen). The chronicles do not give any information whether these captives were Huns or Chinese merchants. Another commander, although he did not get anything, came back without any casualties. The third commander lost 7,000 of the 10,000 under his command and retreated with the rest. The fourth was captured by the Huns, but later managed to escape and returned to his country. The last two commanders were put on trial, but this made no difference to the situation at the front.

Enthusiastic with their success, the Huns increased their attacks. The following year, in 128, 20,000 Hun horsemen entered the city of Liao-hsi (pronounced Layo- si), killed the soldiers there, and marched west of Beijing.

³ River god.

⁴ River name

⁵ *Iz istorii nauki i tekhniki Kitay.M.*, 1955, p. 21.


They came to Yai-men (pronounced Yaymin), which is also located in Yai-men. Here they plundered and took three thousand people as prisoners of war. In order to respond to this attack of the Huns, an army under the command of Wei Ch'ing was dispatched and the Chinese returned with several thousand captives.

Wei Ch'ing then entered Ordos and plundered the Lou-fang and Bayan (Pa-yang) tribes living there. He took many captives and herds as booty. In order to strengthen Ordos, the Chinese fortified the old fortress on the banks of the Sa-ri River and built a new fortress named Shuo-fang (pronounced Shofan). The Huns responded to these attacks by capturing the town of Chao-yang in the eastern part of the Great Wall.

In the winter of the 126th year, Me-te's grandson, the yabgu Kun-chin, died. Kun-ch'en had not only not reduced the borders of the state established by his grandfather, but had also fought six wars against an enemy far more powerful than himself. The loss of Ordos was not a heavy loss for the Huns. Because the inhabitants there were already Tankut-lar who were foreign to the Huns. However, in return, the Huns' borders in Yin-shan expanded, trade, towns on the Chinese border were destroyed and the Chinese army became an easy prey for the Huns during the wars. However, Emperor Wu-ti was stubborn and kept on fighting.

The death of Yabgu Kun-chin civil wars among the Huns. His brother, the Eastern Lu-li-prince I-ch'ih-hsieh (pronounced Ich'ih-hsieh), had "proclaimed himself as yabgu" and inflicted a heavy defeat on Kun-chin's son Yü-pi (pronounced Yübi).⁶ Yü-pi fled to China, where he was favourably received and complimented, but soon died. The clashes between the princes ended within a few days and fortunately had no unfavourable consequences for the Huns. I-chih-hsieh continued the war against the Chinese with great vigour. In the summer and autumn of 126, the north-eastern towns of China (present-day Ho-pei, Li-ao-hsi and Liao-tung) were ravaged by the Huns, who had chosen the forested regions of Yin-shan as their base. The western part of the country was also unsettled. In 125 the Chu-ki-prince of the West entered Ordos, sacked Shuo-fang and carried off many officials and inhabitants as prisoners.

6 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/66.



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Faced with this situation, Emperor Wu-ti decided to give a new shape to the disgraced and demoralised army, and this was to prove beneficial after all. In order to fight the enemy's cavalry, light cavalry regiments were organised, taking only food and drink with them. These regiments were to take the fight to the Hun steppes. But their preparation was difficult and expensive. Moreover, these regiments were not only inadequate for defence, but also incapable of defending the country against the attacks of an enraged enemy. But it must be recognised that this was the best that could be done at the time.⁷

Wei Ch'ing was again put in charge of the mounted assault troops. In the spring of the 124th year the Chinese army, moving from Ordos with an army of 100,000 ^{men}⁸, attacked the Hun nomads in the west and took them by surprise. The people in the headquarters of the western Chu-ki-prince were intoxicated and were having fun. The Chinese army, however, marched 700 li (about 300 kilometres) in a forced march and besieged the headquarters one night. Chu-ki-prince managed to save his own life, but 15,000 people, including ten low-ranking princes, were captured.

In the autumn of the same year, the Huns responded with a counter-attack, destroying T'ai-kung west of Ho-pei, slaughtering Chinese border troops and taking about a thousand prisoners of war with them.

In 123 Wei Ch'ing launched two attacks on the nomads in the east, but this time he was less successful than he had hoped and suffered many casualties. One of his troops was even besieged by the Huns and to surrender. The commander of this troop was a low-ranking Hun prince named Chao Hsin, who had fled to China during the recent fratricide. Instead of taking revenge on him, Yabgu I-ch'ih-hsieh married him to his sister and made him his counsellor in matters concerning China. Chao Hsin advised the suzerain to move his headquarters to the north to avoid an unannounced raid by the Chinese army. Thus, Yabgu lead the Chinese army deeper into the steppe and then attack and conquer the exhausted enemy. Yabgu considered Chao's advice reasonable and decided to move his headquarters north.

7 Age., p. 107.

8 This is of course an exaggerated figure and should be considered "too much".

moved his headquarters to the north. In the meantime, the war with China continued, but the attack in 122 was not very fruitful.

By this time Emperor Wu-ti had completed the reorganisation of his army and in the spring of 121 the Chinese resumed their attacks. Commander-in-Chief Huo Ch'ü-ping (Hogübin oku- nur) attacked the western nomadic Huns with ten thousand cavalry, slaughtered them and took away the golden idol, which the Huns offered as a sacrifice, along with many prisoners. In the summer of the same year, Huo Ch'ü-ping attacked the nomadic Huns in the foothills of the God Mountains (T'ien-shan) and captured 30,000 people, including about 70 princes and commanders of minor rank.

Having suffered heavy blows in the west, the Huns concentrated their attacks the east. Although they surrounded four Chinese troops (4 thousand people) who opposed them and slaughtered half of them, the rest of them managed to save their heads with the support of other armies coming to their aid immediately.

The war grew hotter and hotter, and in 120 the Huns destroyed Yü-pei-ping (pronounced Yubaybin) and Ting-hsiang (pronounced Dinsiyan) in Shan-si and many captives. By now the flames of war had spread everywhere.

But I-ch'ih-hsieh yabgu made a great mistake. Enraged by the failures on the western front, he held the princes of the Hsü-chui and Hun-shieh tribes responsible and ordered them to be beheaded, regardless of whether they were right or wrong. Realising that his situation was hopeless, the Hun-shieh prince preferred treachery to death. He killed the panic-stricken Hsü-chui prince and took his tribe and his own and crossed over to the Chinese side. The number of those who took refuge in China was 120 thousand.⁹ Hun-shieh prince's betrayal led to a complete change in the situation at the front. The Huns' attacks on Northwest China (Hohsi) began to decrease gradually. This enabled Emperor Wu-ti to withdraw half of his well-trained army from the north-western frontier and replace them with poor peasants with little combat experience.¹⁰ well-trained army was necessary for the emperor, who had plans for more attacks.

⁹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/66.

¹⁰ Besides the large masses of farmers in China, there were also many peasants who did not own land. The Han government gave them land along the borders and made it conditional on their participation in the war if necessary. (См. Че Цзи-юань. Краткий очерк истории Цинь Хань// Реферативный сборник. 1956. № 17, с. 162.)

Wei Ch'ing's War with the Huns

Wu-ti had decided to deal a fatal blow to the Hun king. For this purpose a large cavalry army (100,000?!), one and a half times as many reserve horses (140,000) and more than enough provisions were prepared. All that mattered was that this army should be able to cross the Gobi and reach the yabgu's post, which was blocked by the headquarters of the Alashan princes.

In fact, the Hun nomads travelled very slowly in ox-drawn carts, and as enemy cavalry could easily overtake them, such a difficulty was not insurmountable. On the other hand, all the wealth of the Huns was their sheep herds; their large herds of horned cattle and horses were of secondary importance to them. It was impossible to drive the sheep herds out of the way of the enemy cavalry. Therefore, the Chinese, having reached the steppes of Halha, thought that they could draw the Huns into a pitched battle and finish them off with one blow. If they could not do this, the Chinese army, which had moved away from the frontier, would have no hope of salvation. For this reason, everything was thought and prepared to the finest detail.

Wu-ti had already spent enough money the armament, subsistence and uniforms of the army to "supply the food needs of the entire Central Oasis Empire"¹¹, but his calculation was that he could cover all these expenses with the spoils. In 119, the Chinese army mobilised in two columns under the command of Wei Ch'ing and Huo Ch'ü-ping, but they were unable to keep it secret.

Even before the Chinese army reached the sandy deserts of the Gobi, yabgu I- ch'ih-hsieh sent the tents of his nomads and his tent far away and started to wait for the enemy at the northern edges of the desert with his most elite army. Encountering him, Wei Ch'ing accepted the battle and fought all day, but neither side achieved any result. Towards evening, a sandstorm broke out, so strong that it blinded the eyes. It was not possible to use arrows in such weather. Because the arrow shot was going in another direction. The Huns were extremely skilful in shooting arrows, but this time they were deprived of their weight and this gave the Chinese a good opportunity. They narrowed the ranks and put the Huns under siege. A neck-to-neck struggle ensued. No arrows had hit the Yabga. A few hundred brave yi-

¹¹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/197.

He made a breakthrough with his troops and, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, managed to get out of the circle.

The storm and the darkness intimidated both sides. Hun warriors were mixed among the Chinese soldiers; a blind fight was going on in the darkness of the night. Most of the Hun army had gone after the eunuch, but it was not possible to rally the army and get it back into battle formation. According to Sih-ma Ch'ien, the losses of the Huns totalled 19,000 men. This, of course, cannot be an exact figure. Did you sit down and count them, man!

Wei Ch'ing tried to continue the attacks and advanced as far as Chao-hsin-ch'eng, a town founded by the Chinese who had fled with Chao Hsin. Although historical sources do not mention the capture of this town, the retreat of the Chinese army started from here. Although the Chinese historian states that the Chinese lost 100 thousand horses, he did not dare to mention how many soldiers they lost in his official history. Wei Ch'ing had won a victory, but it was an inflated victory. For Huo Ch'ü-ping, operating in the east, had achieved some important results; he had defeated the Eastern Chu-ki-prince and, since he had taken 70,000 prisoners of war, had probably also captured his stronghold. After this the Huns left Yin-shan and retreated to the sandy deserts of Halha.

Wu-huans left the sovereignty of Huns and settled along the Chinese border (in Manchuria). The Chinese government hastily resettled 60 thousand war volunteers in the region. The settlers opened irrigation canals and expelled the local nomads in order to have more fertile lands. While the freed peasants came and settled in the region, the soldiers and state officials took on the task of controlling the obedient steppe people and their clan notables. Thus, the Gobi Desert became the border between China and the Huns.

Achievements of the Chinese Army

The events of 119 exhausted both sides; neither the Huns nor the Chinese had the strength to continue the war. Although Yabgu I-ch'ih-hsieh made attempts to initiate peace negotiations, the Chinese continued to regard him as a vassal neighbour. Taking this as a form of insult, the Hunnic suzerain received the Chinese envoy.

put him in his place. Emperor Wu-ti, too, detained the Hun envoy and started to gather troops and horses again. But these soldiers and horses were going to be needed for another purpose. Because on the western borders of China, around Lake Kukunor, Tibetans had become stronger. The capture of Alashan and Nan-shan foothills by the Chinese army was not good for both and Huns. The Chinese, who wanted to retain supremacy at any cost, immediately set about fortifying the conquered area "to prevent the Huns' relations with the Ch'iangs".¹² When the Tibetans entered the war unexpectedly, Wu-ti was forced to send against them the army he had gathered in 117 mainly to settle accounts with the Huns. The Huns, on the other hand, after 12 years of rest, were now in a position to settle accounts with the Chinese.

Between 112-111 the Chinese succeeded in driving the Tibetans beyond the Yellow River and its tributary, the Huang-shu. However, this event paved the way for the three major Tibetan tribes to end their enmity and unite, and subsequently to come into contact with the Huns, and thus a counter-offensive began. The Chinese needed larger armies to stop these attacks, but it was not possible to subdue the highlanders. The mountaineers moved westwards and set up their headquarters in the vicinity of Lake Kukunor. Thus, a branch of the South Nan-shan mountain range was recognised as the border between the two sides¹³ and the war ended in 107.

Emperor Wu-ti, with enormous forces, succeeded in separating the northern and southern nomads, but this was more of a strategic achievement. Because the conquered lands were already uninhabited and were to be allocated to Chinese war volunteers, but these measures were not completed.

Yabgu I-ch'died in 114 and was succeeded by his son Wu-wei. Apparently, Wu-wei was a self-sufficient person who did not like to fight. Having put an end to the headaches in the north, Wu-ti turned his gaze southwards. In the south of China there were two Yüeh principalities, one in Kuang-tung and the other in Indochina. Wu-ti conquered these two principalities in 113 and imprisoned the head of the Yüeh principality of Indochina in a cell at the north gate of the imperial palace.¹⁴ Expeditions to the Sui and K'un-ming (Birma) countries were less successful.

¹² Age., p. 69.

¹³ Yakinf. *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora*. T.I. SPb., 1833, p. 18.

¹⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/68.

and the warrior peoples living in the jungles had stopped the advance of the Chinese armies.

His victory over the Yüehs had enthused Wu-ti and he immediately sent two armies to Hal- ha. But both armies returned back without encountering Huns.

In 110 the emperor to give the northern army a formal parade. At the fortress of Shuo-fang, 180,000 cavalry were assembled. It was supposed to be a military show of force, but Wu-ti suddenly had the idea of intimidating the yabgu into becoming a vassal. However, the khagan could not even bear to listen to the Chinese offer, and during a performance for the Chinese envoy at the autagogue he had the master of ceremonies beheaded. Nevertheless, the Huns did not attack, and while resting their horses, they were busy with hunting. This was the calm before the storm. But this time, Wu-ti also did not dare to act against the Huns. Because a new and complicated situation had emerged in the east and it become the most important problem for the emperor to deal with. Difficulties had arisen with the North Korean Ch'ao-hsien (pronounced Çaosyen) State, which not only accepted Chinese immigrants but also tried to win them over to its side.¹⁵

In 109, Wu-ti sent an army and fleet against Ch'ao-hsien. Having defeated the Chinese on land and sea, the Koreans sought honourable peace treaty with China. The Korean envoy sent to China was also the heir apparent of the country. When he arrived in China, he was treacherously killed. The following year, the war started again. Although the Chinese army, supported by reinforcements¹⁶, besieged Ch'ao-hsien's capital by land and sea, the operation was not successful due to the disagreement between the general and the admiral. In the end, the Chinese managed to buy off some Korean officers and with their help the prince of Ch'ao-hsien was treacherously murdered. Thus Ch'ao-hsien recognised Chinese sovereignty and the war ended in 108. However, despite this successful end, the Chinese army and its officers failed to perform in battle, some commanders had to be beheaded and the army had to be reorganised; therefore, it was not thought that a serious war against the Huns could be waged at all.

¹⁵ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/15.

¹⁶ The army ranks were filled with criminals whose death sentences were pardoned on condition of enlisting (Gilbert. L. *Dictionnaire historique et géographique de Mandchourie*. Hongkong, 1934, p. 867).

This is how the Sino-Tibetan war ended in 107, and in 105, the "docile" Wu-wei, the Hun yabg, died, leaving the throne to his young and warlike son Wu-shih-lu (pronounced Ushiliti).

Discovery of Europe

The discoveries of China's historical-geographers are both complex and interesting. The world was explored not only from the west but also from the east. The name of the traveller Chang Ch'ien should be mentioned along with Herodotus and Strabo.

Until the Han dynasty was established and took over, the country called China had a very limited territory. Starting from the Tibetan mountains to the Yellow River, China's territory stretched across the Gobi Desert and steppes, southwards along the Yang-tse River and into Korea. Of course, at that time the Chinese considered their country to be the centre of the world.

The foreign policy of the country was dominated by the impulse to gain new territories. In order to continue the war against the Hyung-nu (Huns), the Chinese government had to look for allies. The eyes were turned to the Yüeci and Chang Ch'ien was sent to them as an envoy. Chang off with a slave named T'a-yang-yi, but was captured by the Huns while still at the border. Chang Ch'ien stayed among the Huns for ten years, and finally managed to escape westwards to Davan (Fergana). As rumours about China's wealth and power had reached Central Asia, Chang was received there with respect. With the help of a guide, he travelled through Sogdiana to the territory of the Yuechis. But he was not successful in his diplomatic mission. Because the Yuechis were not ready to start a war against the Huns. Although Chang Ch'ien fell into the hands of the Huns again on his way back, he managed to escape and returned to China in 120 BC.

Chang Ch'ien's narratives opened the eyes of the Chinese to a world they did not know. Just as in Europe there was an interest in the world after Colombe's voyage of discovery, so in China there was an extreme interest in the western countries after Chang's travels. Chang showed them the mountainous Wu-suns, who were engaged in tsarvari cultivation, the nomadic state of K'ang-chü in the steppes of Mirzachol, the North Sea (Caspian), and the geography of the North Sea (Caspian).

He mentioned the Yang-ts'ai [An-ts'ai]s,¹⁷ who were scattered along the niche coast, and the large, populous and settled Parthian state of An-hsi. Chang also told what he had heard about the country of the wealthy western Teao-chis living on the shores of the Western Sea (in Mesopotamia), and about the wonderlands of Shen-t'u [Sheh-tu] and Ying-t'u (India).

Fascinated by the stories he heard, the emperor rewarded the traveller Chang handsomely. The wealth of the west meant great opportunities for Chinese trade, but the emperor was more attracted by the courage of the people of this country, as he could use them as an ally against the Huns.

Immediately envoys were sent to An-hsi (Parthia), Yang-ts'ai (Sarmatia), Teao-chi (Mesopotamia), Shen-t'u (India) and Li-kan [Tach'in/Roma]. The historian Lucius A. F., who lived in the second century B.C.E., mentions in his famous *"History"*¹⁸ an embassy delegation sent by the Persians to Augustus, who already intended to conquer these peoples.¹⁹ The largest embassies sent to a foreign state consisted of several hundred people, the smallest of them of at least a hundred. The Chinese court, on the other hand, sent delegations of ten, five or six people to some foreign nations, and it took years for them to return.²⁰

the Huns, Tibetans and southern Manes plundered the travellers, the journey of the envoys was fraught with danger. In order to make their journey less dangerous, military patrols had to be organised and fortresses had to be built along the caravan routes, which was a very costly affair. Nevertheless, the Chinese decided to recognise the southern caravan route, Nan-liu. This road passed in front of Lake Kukunor and probably through the valleys of the Bukharyn Gol and the Tang-ho rivers to reach Hoten and Yarkend.²¹ The southern route curved further west, travelling through Ch'ung-ling, to the Great Yuechi (Bactrian) country and An-hsi (Parthia).²²

17 G.W. Vernadsky derives the word "Yang-ts'ai" from the Tochar word "ant" meaning valley (Vernadsky G.W. *Ancient Russia*. New Haven, 1952, p. 82).

18 Lütsiy Annei Flor. *Istoriya*. M., 1792, II/ 34; IV/12.

19 Tomson Dj. O. *Istoriya drevney geografii*. M., 1953, p. 427.

20 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/156.

21 Age., p. 166.

22 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, T.III, map note I.

What is this Ch'ung-ling? The translator of the map texts, N.V. Kùner, translates this word mot-a-mot as "Elbow Mountains" and concludes that it refers to "Pa- mir".²³ However, according to this description, it is more appropriate to understand the Altai mountain range from the phrase "Elbow Mountains". For the northern route, starting from Kashkar [Su-le], leads to Fergana, "travelling also through Ch'ung-ling".²⁴ The southern route is known to have started from Kashkar and travelled to Tashkurgan and Gilgit, and from there to Srinagar and present-day Tajikistan.²⁵ The northern route is known to have started from Kashkar, travelled through the Fergana Valley (Davan) via low passes, and from there to K'ang-chü (present-day Kazakhstan) and Yang-ts'ai (Caspian steppes).²⁶

The northern route deteriorated in time and after a while the southern route was used, after which the defeated Huns retreated to the sandy Shamo desert and the Chinese settled in Hami and Ch'e-shih (Kiu-še/Turfan basin). The road to Kashkar follows the southern slopes of T'ien-shan, which is covered with many valleys compared to the south. Although the southern route also lost its importance and functioning over time, it remained a reliable route. Since the Chinese were unable to overcome the resistance of the Burmese, the attempt to establish a south-eastern route to India via Annam and Birma ended in failure. However, later, thanks to the Chinese development of the sea route, it was possible to reach Hindis- tan by travelling beyond Malacca.²⁷

For 150 years, ambassadors were sent to the west and they harassed the western countries. Although feeding the crowded Chinese caravans became a heavy burden for the vassal countries, they left the envoys without food. In fact, "the starvation of the embassy caravans had reached such a point that the matter had reached the point where swords were drawn",²⁸ but the disorganisation of the western end always worked in favour of the Chinese.

23 Agy. (this is the general opinion, but it is not true).

24 Tomson Dj. O. *Istoriya drevney geografii* 259fig. 15.

25 Agy.

26 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/166.

27 Stein W.M. *Iz istorii snoženiy mejdu Kitayem i Indiei*// Sovetskoe vostokovede- nie. 1957. 1. 6. s. 65-73.

28 Age., p. 159.

Western Ends

The diplomatic voyages, which enriched China with information, enabled the Chinese masters to draw a historical map of the Western frontier. This information can be found in N.Ya. Bichurin's *Sobraniye Svediniy o narôdax, obitavşix v Sredney Azii v drevniye vremena* (A Collection of Information on the Peoples of Central Asia in Ancient Times), but A.N. Bernchtam has given these maps a ridiculous interpretation. Each map consists of two parts: The eastern one shows the area from the Edzin-göl river and Lake Kukunor (100th meridian) to the middle of T'ien-shan and Tarba-gatay (84th meridian); the western one shows the area from 84th to 68th meridians to Tashkent. In the map, mountains are shown with pictures and rivers are shown with double lines in a very accurate way. Of course, there are some ludicrous mistakes in the scales: The angle to the south-east is wide, but the scale is reduced as you move away from it. But this error is perspective. Because the places shown appear to be closer. In the southeast angle, part of the middle stream of Edzin-Lake and the intersection of the Su-le-ho and Tang-ho rivers are shown as flowing into Lake Haranur. To the south lie the Nan-shan and Altintag mountain ranges; to the north are the intersection of Pei-shan and T'ien-shan, which became Ch'ilan-shan. Two large lakes, Lob-nor and Bagrackul, are shown, and the Tarim and the Confederacy are depicted as flowing into them. Even more interesting is the fact that these rivers, which are now dried up, are depicted as flowing with a gurgling flow.

Indeed, in ancient times, when the climate of Central Asia was more humid, this region was able to feed a large population. The rivers flowing constantly in the wastelands were not able to satisfy the discontent of the peoples living on their banks. In the foothills of Alashan and Nan-shan there were many lakes, but most of them, although covered with reeds, provided water for animals. These lakes were fed by mountain rivers and streams such as Edzin-Göl, Su-le-ho and Tang-ho. Hunting and hunting were developed here. These were not too arduous occupations and provided those engaged in them with a sufficient amount of meat.

Most of the western end (Hsi-yü) was occupied by the Takla-Makan Desert and the region was divided into two parts: Southern and northern parts.

The mountains are dotted with a chain of green oases fed by the waters flowing from the mountain ranges. Among the larger of these plains, Khoten, Tash-Kurgan and Yarkend were in the south; Hami, Turfan, Karashar, Kucha, Kurla, Aksu and Kash-Kar in the north. To the west of Yarkend there was a pass to Central Asia, leading to the fertile Fergana Valley; the high mountain pass from Tash-Kurgan led to the Vahan Valley and Afghanistan. But this road was very difficult. It was rarely used, as it was travelled by mountain paths and bridges built over cliffs. The most favourable road to the west was the one passing through the Jungar Gate in the northern part of T'ien-shan. It was this Jungar Gate that connected Asia Kazakhstan and Central Asia, that is, to the western world.

When the rainfall in Central decreased to 100-150 mm, the steppe lakes dried up and the rivers receded under the sandy and gravelly terrain of the Takla-Makan Desert. When the plant layer in the Alashan steppes was attacked by oxide, the surviving wild animals scattered here and there, and even people became uninhabitable. The ruins of fortresses and temples were buried under the burning sands carried by the storms, and even those who examined the region could not believe that there was once a lively life here.

Today the sandy Takla-Makan desert is one of the most terrible places on earth. The scorching sunlight has completely destroyed the vegetation here. Storms lift clouds of dust into the air and rain it down on the vegetation, leaving very few habitable places.

The most enigmatic place of this astonishing region is the Lukchun Pit, which is lower than the sea level and contains the Turfan Valley. This pit was unearthed by two delegations, one led by M.V. Pevtsoff and the other by Grumm-Grjimaýlo brothers. One of these delegations wrote the following about the Lukchun Pit: "There is no other lodge in Central Asia more burning than the Turfan region. The study of the region from the point of view of mountain science also gives this conclusion. Around T'ien-shan, there are two types of air currents: The northwest current is suffocating in summer and winter; the northeast current is effective in autumn and winter. The Turfan Valley is protected from the former by the thick layer of snow of the Boğ-do-ola; the latter roams freely in the denser parts of T'ien-shan. In summer the heat here is considerably increased by the sun's rays, which scorch the Salt and Kush-tav Mountains with all their power, so that there is never a place to find shade.

and the air is extremely dry even at high altitudes. "29 Here, the pressure difference between July and January is about 30 mm, which is the highest pressure difference on Earth. The average in July is very close to that of the Sahara. Water is so scarce that there are only four poor streams in the whole depression.

It is obvious that no culture could develop in this unfortunate valley. But there was a fortress here, representative of the eastern variant of Central Asian culture. Grumm-Grjimaýlo has proved that the first known inhabitants of the Turfan valley were eastern Iranians,³⁰ more precisely, Sogdians. These people were well acquainted with special irrigation methods and the way of living in the desert climate. The Chinese reached Turfan only in the second century BC, where they encountered a small but independent people called Ch'e-shih (pronounced Cheshi). The Ch'e-shih and their descendants built important cities and temples, which archaeologists have uncovered today. But I think they could not hold on in the Turfan valley if the present climate prevailed there. They disappeared into the depths of history, just as the ruins of Buddhist monasteries lie on the banks of dry river beds.³¹ Grumm-Grjimaýlo also discovered a series of reed fields south of the road between Hami and Pichan, apparently connected to each other.³² It can be said that climate played a much more active role in the conditions of the Asian Continent than on the European coast.

The agriculturalists here cultivated small oases, such as Arka Ch'e-shih in the foothills of T'ien-shan, Pu-lei in the vicinity of Lake Bargol [Bars-gol/Bar-kul], etc. Eastern Jungarya is covered with wild and uninhabitable sand dunes.

Chinese geographers were familiar with Jungarya and Yedisu. On the aforementioned Chinese map, Hsi-yü (western end) is shown accurately and completely. In Jungarya, north of T'ien-shan, the Manas and Urungu rivers are shown, but the Mongolian Altai is not indicated. Bargöl [Bars-göl] is in its exact location. In the left half of the map, the tributaries of the Tarim River such as Khotenderya, Yarkendderya, Kashkarderya etc. are shown in their exact places. Mountain clusters are shown instead of Pamir; the same

29 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Opisaniye putesthestviya Zapadny Kitay*. T.II. M., 1948, p. 208.

30 Age., p. 212.

31 Age., p. 218.

32 Age., p. 219.

Large river tributaries such as Pence are also indicated, but their extensions are not shown. In the south of Pamir, the Indus River is clearly shown, but its location could not be determined. The Chinese did not recognise western Tibet. Ch'ung-ling mountain range is mentioned twice. By drawing a wide angle, the location of Alay Mountains is also shown in the Ch'ung-ling mountain range. While the Fergana Valley (Davan) is mentioned, the Sirderya is not mentioned for some reason. The Chu River is shown as flowing from Issyk-Kul. Today this river flows into sandy lands; on the map, a large lake is indicated in the same place. Ili River is shown as flowing into Balhash, which is one hundred per cent correct. These are the information left to us by Chinese cartography.

What did western geographers know about this region? In his "Geography", Ptolemaeus mentions "Skif lands", "Serika" and "Saka Yur- du", which were probably the same lands mentioned by the Chinese under the name of Hsi-yü.³³ Like the Chinese cartographer, Ptolemaeus made a mistake and showed the Yaksart (Sirderya) as originating from the Pamir (Komed Mountain); therefore, he recorded the Yaksart tributaries as flowing southwards, while the Pamir was heading westwards. As a result, there is a disconnect between the Pamir and the Hima- laya Mountains, which divide the eastern half of Central Asia from the west.³⁴ This is the only difference between his map and the maps of today. Although there are differences between the nomenclature of Greek and Chinese ethnographers and geographers, they can be identified. Grigoryeff, for example, has successfully compared these names: Hata/Hoten, Saha/So-kui (Yarkend), Hasa/Kashkar (although this Chinese nomenclature only in the VII century AD) and Auksay/Aksu. On the basis of these identifications, Grigoryeff determined that the city of Issedon in Serler corresponds to Yutian, i.e. Khotan, and that the Scythian Issedon corresponds to Kucha, while Dman corresponds to Karashar. He also determined that the Fruns mentioned in Strabo and Dionysios Periegettes and the Frur mentioned in Pliny are the same people as the Tibetan-Ch'iangs, but that Ifagurs refers to the Tochars.³⁵ It seems that the most accurate identification of the Koneed people is with the Wu-suns, who were settled north of Mount Auksay (T'ien-shan).

33 Grigoryev W.W. *Vostochny ili Kitayskiy Turkestan*. SPb., 1873. P. 57-78
(См. Приложена карта Птолемея)

34 Age., p. 61-63.

35 Age., p. 70-72.

Wu-ti and his dilemmas

We have already seen that the reaction against the centralist policy of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti helped the Han dynasty to come to power. The first representatives of this dynasty had satisfied the wishes of their followers. Huang Lao as the official ideology, es-

39 Wishnevskiy B.N. *K antropologii drevnego naseleniya Vostochnogo Turkestan* // Казанский музеевский вестник. 1999. № 42. p.99.

The teachings that they had a mission were also not very favourable to the administration. Therefore, Wu-ti not only banned all philosophical views other than Confucianism, but also started a struggle against old religious traditions. He increased taxes, recruited more soldiers to collect taxes and enacted many laws. The situation of the people suddenly worsened. The rate of offences committed by the so-called "young insubordinates", who were recruited into the army, increased dramatically.

Instead of astrology, the science of history began to develop. The acquisition of old books, the filling of libraries and the preparation of large catalogues about them were followed by the examination and analysis of texts by subjecting them to criticism. History was the cornerstone of Confucianism as it fostered national pride and nationalism. they started to talk about returning to backward systems and taxing the rich, Wu-ti did not allow these views to survive. Meanwhile, a more drastic turn to foreign policy and the art of warfare had begun. This will be discussed later.

Although there were some who defended Wu-ti's edict of 141 B.C. that "the poor have the right to serve in the state service" ⁴³, they wanted the edict to be revised and made enforceable. "Around the II-I century BC, San Hun-yang came to power with his followers, and laws on new organisations were enacted during this period. ⁴⁴ The Yang group took advantage of the old economic views of "Hu- ang-tse". Accordingly, all taxes levied on the people were to be abolished and the state was to monopolise the salt and iron industries.⁴⁵ However, this move drew the reaction of the Confucianist orthodox followers. Even after Wu-ti's death, debates on the issue of "retaining the exploitation of salt and iron" started and these debates ended only in 81 BC after causing a major economic crisis.

The victory over the Huns was a harbinger of the strengthening of Chinese politics and ^{economy}⁴⁶ and for this purpose, all means were mobilised and money was collected.

⁴³ Fung Yu-lan. *A short history of Chinese philosophy*. New York, 1948. p. 213.

⁴⁴ Stein W.M. *Politika-ekonomicheskiiy traktat drevnego Kitaya "Guan-tszu"* // VDI .
БМН. 1957. № 52-52

⁴⁵ Age., p. 61.

⁴⁶ Contemporary Chinese historians have differed in their assessment of Wu-ti's actions. Tse Young, for example, argues that all the wars against the Huns that it was in self-defence. Реферативный сборник. 1956. № 15. Teng Chi Ch'eng records that Wu-ti began a series of offensive battles.

Реферативный сборник. 1956. № 13, с. 146.

Wu-ti's foreign policy was thought to "respond to the interests of slave owners and lead to increased production of goods" ⁴⁷. Chinese scholars Kuo Mo-jo and Fan Wen-lan deny the existence of a slave system in the Han period, but admit that there were many slaves owned by both the state and private individuals. These slaves were employed as servants. Slaves were more expensive than prisoners of war, but cheaper than horses. ⁴⁸ Kuo Mo-jo records that the slave markets were filled by wretched peasants who sold their own children to merchants, moneylenders and big landlords. ⁴⁹ Of course, Chinese slaves, there were also prisoners of war, such as the Huns, but the reports on military successes do not give precise information about these captured persons. For, as difficult as it was to subdue the self-ruling shepherds, it was just as easy to crush the silent slaves. Kuo Mo-jo mentions that Hun slaves were as expensive to acquire as servants, who were forbidden to be ill-treated and sentenced to death. ⁵⁰

In analysing the wars waged by Emperor Wu-ti, we assume that they were the result of political turmoil caused by China's deteriorating economic prospects. For if the forces accumulated within China had not been directed in various directions, they could have disturbed the peace within the country. Separatist motives are always present in countries with a natural economy. Different philosophical systems, i.e., world views, have fuelled enmity, and the visionaries have used these opportunities to their own advantage. If Wu-ti had not taken refuge in foreign wars, these wars would have been internal; if the "young rebels" had not been sent on distant marches, they would have committed crimes in their own country. The movements of conquest were also explained by the chain of events which had previously refuted Huang Lao's pacifist views. Wu-ti, who was of the opinion that his country had great potential, was not wrong, but whether he was right or wrong in underestimating his rivals will be shown by future events.

47 Simonovskaya L.W., Erenburg G.B., Yüryev M.F. *Ocherki istorii Kitaya*. M., 1956, p. 28.

48 Go Mo-jo. *Epoxi rabovladelcheskogo stroya*. M., 1956.

49 Age., p. 91.

50 Age., p. 86.

SECTION VIII

HORSES WITH WINGS

China's Orientation to the West

Despite the military successes both in the south (Indochina) and in the east (Korea), Wu-ti had to admit that his main problem, the Hun issue, had never been solved. Huge resources had been invested in building a field army, which had won victories, taken prisoners and conquered territories, but the Hun state could not be destroyed. Moreover, this state could launch a counter-attack at any moment. There were different reasons for this failure and one of them was the military technology used by the Chinese army. Wu-ti had organised a large cavalry army for field warfare, but the Chinese horses, which were short, weak, weak, could not run fast and could not withstand the load, could not be compared with the hardy Hun horses.

In the first century BC was a real revolution in the tactics of warfare. In the west, the Parthians and Sarmatians used armoured cavalry. The body of the cavalryman and the horse were covered with scale armour, while the head was protected by high, pointed helmets. The cavalry was armed with a heavy and long spear and a double-hilted sword. Armed in this way, the warriors, in ranks, rushed into the enemy armed with light weapons. The Sarmatians easily dealt with the Scythians on the Black Sea steppes the Parthians drove Roman legions from Tigros to the Euphrates, halting the enemy's advance. To have a warrior army of this calibre, first and foremost, horses were required to fulfil the needs.

Chang Ch'ien had told Emperor Wu-ti that in Davan (Fergana) there were "noble horses (argamak) derived from winged horses and sweating blood". The following story is told about the derivation of these horses: "There are high mountains in the land of Davan. Caught in these mountains-

impossible to mate with. Therefore, they select spotted mares and release them at the foot of the mountain to mate with the mountain horses. Blood sweating foals are born from these mares. These horses are called stallions, descendants of winged horses. "¹ After hearing this story, Wu-ti ordered that Fergana stallions should be procured at all costs and "winged horses" should be brought to China.

But the Davanids also valued the argamaks very highly and did not want to give them to China, which had no reason to fear them. They were suspicious of China's excessive interest in the countries of the Western frontier. The first Chinese embassy delegation was composed of high-ranking officials, but later on "common people" sent, offering expensive gifts.² However, they were not received in a friendly manner by the local population.³ Hun raiding parties often attacked the embassy, and China lost much-needed prestige.

Chang Ch'ien presented the emperor with a very clever plan for the struggle against the Huns. Accordingly, the Wu-suns were to be lured to the Chinese side, and on their basis "Bactria and other countries in the west were to be forced to become subjects" and thereby "cut off the right arm of the Huns. "⁴ Although the Wu-suns were inclined towards the Huns, the Sogdian rulers had received the Hun envoy better than the Chinese. To put pressure on them it was necessary to demonstrate the power of China, but for this it was necessary to have the "winged horses" of Davan. A fascistic circle had taken shape.

In 105, the Chinese envoy Ch'e Ling tried to buy some horses in exchange for gold and silver, but his request was rejected. Enraged, the envoy cursed the Davan elders and left, "leaving the golden horse". The Davanese, in the anger of having been wronged, attacked the Chinese envoy's caravan, tore the envoy to pieces and seized the goods in the caravan. Faced with this situation, Wu-ti to end the matter once and for all.

After the departure of the Hun-shieh prince, the steppes between Ordos and Lob-nor remained empty. Although the Chinese were in control, they did not have the means to hold the territory, and this

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/149.

2 Age., p. 156.

3 Age., p. 159.

4 Age., p. 156.

Therefore, they did not object to the Tankuts having a say there. Semi-independent of the Huns in the region, the Tankuts held the principality of Shan-shan, not far from the south-eastern shores of Lake Lob-nor. Shan-shan was a small state. Cannon ball

There were 14,100 inhabitants, of whom 2912 were warriors. The inhabitants, however, regarded the shooting of caravans as a natural source of income. When the Chinese elsi Wang K'ai was plundered by the Shan-Shans, Wu-ti was forced to take serious measures against them. In 108, Chinese General Po-nu, on his way to fight against the K'u-shihs (Ch'e-shihs) with the cavalry of their subordinate sovereignty, stopped at Shan-shan with 700 light cavalry and conquered the principality. The prince of Shan-shan protested against the Chinese rule, but agreed to pay tribute by leaving his son as a hostage. When the Huns learnt of the situation, they set up a garrison in Shan-shan and took another son of the prince as hostage. Wu-ti summoned the enraged prince to his presence for an explanation. The prince said to the emperor: "A small state caught between two powerful enemies cannot find peace if it does not get along well with both sides." Wu-ti laughed at this answer and released the prince, concluding that Shan-shan was not even worth conquering.

The Principality of K'u-shih was situated in a fertile valley and had close economic relations with the Huns. The Huns bought their necessary art and agricultural products from here and regarded K'u-shih as their most reliable point of support in Sinki-ang. After the sack of K'u-shih, General Po-nu changed the name of the country to Ch'e-shih. Presumably, this also meant a change of the ruling dynasty. However, the Chinese could not keep these conquered lands in their hands. Because they had only one goal: To increase their prestige and to intimidate Wu-sun and Da-van.⁵ After the military peace negotiations, Wu-ti went on the diplomatic offensive and sent the old fox Chang Ch'ien as an envoy to the Wu-suns. The emperor sent a message to k'un-mo (titular ruler of the Wu-sun) asking him to marry a Chinese princess in return for his turning his back on the Huns and declaring his country a vassal state of China. K'un-mo agreed to marry the princess, but refused on principle to leave the lush T'ien-shan and migrate to the shady Alashan steppe. As for Chang Ch'ien Wu-suns, the bey-

⁵ Age., p. 159.

he realised that there was no unity and discipline among them. K'un-mo's middle son T'a-lü hated his nephew and heir apparent. The old K'un-mo had given each of them an army of ten thousand cavalrymen. Of course, this disturbed the peace in the country, but they did not start a civil war because the old k'un-mo was still alive.

The land of Wu-sun was strategically important for both the Chinese and the Huns. In 107, the Chinese envoy brought to k'un-mo with armoured chariots, toilet suits, eunuchs, high-ranking officials and aunts a Chinese girl, who was given the title of princess as a gift. On the same days, the daughter of the Hun eunuch was also sent to Wu-sun with otag, flocks of sheep, eunuchs and maids of honour. Wu-sun k'un-mo accepted all of them and took the daughter of the Hun eunuch as a great lady and the Chinese princess as a young lady. The Chinese princess saw her husband once in three months. Because k'un-mo had attended the feast given by the princess, accepted the gifts, but did not pay any attention to her. Finally he gave her to his grandson as a wife. The princess was furious, but a message was sent to her from China telling her to respect the customs of her country. The princess later gave birth to a son for her new husband and died of homesickness. However, a pro-China group had formed in the country and this group supported Wu-ti's western policy. As a goodwill gesture, a fortress named Yü-men Huan (at the western end of the Great Wall) was built.

Yabgu Wu-shih-lü

The Yabgu Wu-shih-lu, who ascended the throne in 105, was "young but madly warlike." ⁶ While Wu-ti sent an envoy to the new Yabgu to express his condolences on the death of his father, he also sent another envoy to the prince Chu-ki in the west "with the intention of sowing discord" among the Hun princes. However, when the young eunuch learnt that the second envoy had acted to sow discord, he flew into a rage and had the envoys arrested. His action was essentially an act of war, but the Chinese were busy in the west and the Huns were weakened by the severe winter and the hooves of their horses were frozen. Some of the lords favourable to an alliance with China, intending to take advantage of the arrest of the envoys, said that they had a weakness for Chinese luxury goods.

6 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/71.

that the looted goods should be divided and that they longed for Chinese wine, sweets and fragrances.

The pro-Chinese group was led by Ulu T'u-yü of the East. Ulu T'u-yü sent a spy to China, informing that he wanted to kill the yabgu and cross over to the Chinese side; however, in order to overcome this task, he needed to send auxiliary forces to him.

When Wu-ti was convinced of this plan, he immediately had a fortress built on the steppe, She-wu-hsiang-ch'eng. His intention was to this fortress as a base for the plan.¹⁰³ In 103, General Po-nu travelled from Ordos with an army of 20,000 men and arrived at the Hsün-k'i mountain near Pei-shan (pronounced Beyshan) to meet the Great T'u-yü of the East. But he was late. The plan of treachery had been discovered and T'u-yü had been beheaded. The Huns the Chinese battalion under siege. General Po-nu, who had left the camp at night in search of water, was captured by Hun patrols. The Huns attacked the demoralised and headless Chinese army and forced it to surrender. Then Yabgu Wu-shih-lü launched a counter-attack. A part of his army besieged She-wu-hsiang-ch'eng, but when he could not take the fortress, he immediately lifted the siege. Another wing of the army attacked and plundered the border regions of China, and then returned unmolested. The days of Me-te and Lao-Shang seemed to have returned. As Wu-shih-lü was preparing to besiege and capture She-wu-hsiang-ch'eng fortress again, he suddenly fell ill and died, leaving behind a young son. Faced with this situation, the Huns elected Wu-shih-lü's uncle Hü-li-hu⁷, who, like his nephews, was a fierce enemy of China, as their yabgu⁷.

First Expedition to Davan

Wu-ti was a stubborn man. Even during the period when the Huns continued their expansionist activities, he did not cease to be preoccupied with the affairs of the western end and Sogdiana. The murder of his envoy could not go unanswered and he had to have winged horses. According to the Chinese, the fighting power of the Sogdians was extremely low. In a report to the emperor by one of those who had previously been sent there as envoys, it was noted that "a Chinese army of three thousand men, equipped with automatic spear catapults, were sent, Davan could be conquered."⁸

⁷ Agy.

⁸ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/162.

Since it was firmly believed that the enemy was weak, even the preparations for war were cursory. One of the emperor's most trusted relatives, Li Huang-li, was appointed to lead the army. The whole army consisted of 6 thousand mounted border guards from various tribes and a few tens of thousands of Chinese "young rebels". Part of the army was made up of criminals with no combat training and no experience of military campaigns. Even the question of the army's sustenance was not taken seriously, as it was believed that the "Young Rebels" could find their own food. The goal was to capture Erh-shih (Oratepe) in the Fergana valley and take the argamaks there as booty. The misfortune started even during the departure from the border. Because a swarm of locusts in the spring of the 104th year had destroyed the green vegetation of the land stretching from Shan-si to Tun-huang. There was no hope of finding fodder for the animals, and the horses began to starve at the beginning of the journey.

Faced with this situation, the Chinese army rushed to the borders of independent cities. However, the inhabitants of these cities closed their castle gates and refused to hand over their wheat stocks and grapes to feed the "young rebels". The starving Chinese army burned down one city after another, but in order to seize the food stores it had to overcome the furious resistance of the inhabitants. The inhabitants, whose cities had not yet been captured, fled to the mountains when they learnt of the enemy's approach, leaving the enemy with empty *mazankis**. Disease and hunger thinned the ranks of the Chinese army. By the time Li Huang-li reached the city of Yü (Ozgen), where the Chinese envoy had been killed, he had only a few thousand men left to fight. They had captured Yü by organising attack after attack and slaughtering most of the inhabitants, but there was no possibility of advancing further, and such a thing was not even in the commander's mind. The return was not so easy, and when the Tun-huang valley was reached, only one-fifth of the army was still alive, but even that was exhausted by fatigue and hunger. This march lasted two years (104-103 BC).

The Second Expedition to Davan

The failure of the western campaign had Wu-ti. Any soldier who dared to return to Yü-men (i.e. the borders of China)

* Mazanki: Adobe house.

ordered his head to be shot. Although the viziers advised that the Davan expedition should be put aside and all means should be used against the Huns, Wu-ti made the matter a matter of prestige and asked for a new expedition to be prepared.

First, he pardoned the soldiers who had returned and were waiting for new orders under the castle walls, and then he took his viziers to court for advising him to abandon the expedition. Then he sent the mounted border troops and "young rebels" to Tun-huang. A year later, an army of 60,000 men was mobilised. But this time the army was well supplied and well armed. As reserves, 100,000 oxen, 30,000 horses and 10,000 donkeys had been purchased.⁹ In addition, the army was provided with skilled siege masters and grooms to look after the stallions. Two fortresses were built to protect the army against the attacks of Hun raiders, and the garrisons stationed there began to move around the steppes between Ordos and Lob-nor. Thus an army of 180 thousand men operated against the Huns and immobilised them.

Yabgu Hü-li-hu was of course aware of the Chinese emperor's attempts to seize Sogdiana, which had hitherto been under Hun sovereignty. He could not remain a bystander and set out to prevent a second Western campaign.¹⁰ Wu-ti, anticipating the plans of his enemy, made his preparations in time. According to a palace decree, a thousand-li (about 500 kilometres) long security strip was established in the steppes. This strip consisted of earthen bastions reinforced with forts and fortresses, and also towers were set up to light signal fires.

But in spite of all these precautions, in the autumn of the 101st year, the Huns broke through the Chinese frontier, plundered and ravaged the cities in their way. Besides taking thousands of captives, destroyed all the fortresses and guard huts built by the Chinese on their return. Thus all the Chinese expenditure wasted, but the Huns, too busy in destroying the safety-line, were deprived of the opportunity of preventing the imperial march westwards. In winter, when they attacked again and besieged She-wu- hsiang-ch'eng, Yabgu Hü-li-hu fell ill and died, leaving the Hun army without a head.

⁹ Age., p. 164.

¹⁰ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/72.

Siege of Kui-shan

Mu-kuo, the ruler of Davan, and those around him also underestimated China's power and energy. "China is far away from us," they said among themselves, "and in the north they have to fend off the Huns' attacks; the south there is not enough pasture and water. Moreover, there are so few people along the way that they will be short of food. If the Chinese envoy had already suffered from starvation on the roads with a few hundred men, such a large army would certainly starve. How will such a large army reach here?"¹¹ Li Huang-li, who had gained experience from the previous expedition, divided his army into two parts to march on the northern and southern roads. The southern route led to Khoten and Yarkend via Lake Lob-nor, and from there to Fergana. But this road was quite arduous: On the left side it was cut off by the stretches of the Altyn-tag, and on the right by sandy wastelands of the Takla-Makan Desert. There were few villages along the way, and grass was extremely scarce. But as the Huns could not penetrate it, it was not dangerous. The northern route led from Hami through Karashar and Kucha to Kashkar, following the southern slopes of T'ien-shan. Here the valleys were rich and the Sekene were numerous, but there was always the danger of Hun attack.

The chimera principalities on the routes of the armies were so shaken that they could not afford to fight and had to accept to supply the Chinese army with food. Only Lun-tu (Bügür, 680 li west of Karashar) attempted to resist. But it too was conquered in one fell swoop and all the inhabitants were put to the sword.

After this event, the Chinese army reached Davan unhindered. Accepting to fight with the Chinese army, Davanids were defeated and retreated behind the walls of the capital city, which the Chinese called Kui-shan¹² (Kushan). Li Huang-li immediately laid siege to the city. When Chinese engineers cut off the water supply, the Sogdians began to suffer from thirst. After a forty-day siege, the Chinese broke through the outer walls and entered the city. Most of the commanders of Davan were killed or captured during the battles. Mu-kuo was also among the captives. The rest of them retreated to the fortress and started negotiations with the Chinese. They offered to give the argamaks and meet the food needs of the Chinese army on condition that the Chinese would leave, otherwise they would kill the argamaks.

¹¹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/162.

* Lun-tu : Minorsky records Lun-tu in *Hudûd al-Âlam* as Lun-t'ai, Urumqi, and its old name as Bügür. (Translation.)

¹² Age., p. 149.

and that they would wait for help from K'ang-chü and risk a fight to the death.

Indeed, the K'ang-chü vanguard had already begun to circumnavigate the Chinese military camps, and it was not wise to take things too far. Moreover, Li Huang-li had heard that there were Ta-chin (Roman and Gresian) engineers in the city who could drill wells. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, the Chinese accepted the terms of the other side, and after taking a few ten argamaks and 300 mares, they appointed a man named Mo-ch'ai as the ruler of Davan and returned back.

The second army was less successful. Arriving at the city of Yü, where the Chinese had a long-standing grievance, Major Wang Shen-sheng sent word and the unconditional surrender of the city. In the twilight of the morning, the people of the city attacked the Chinese and put all the troops to the sword. The few survivors of the massacre took refuge in Li Huang-li. Li immediately sent his reprisal detachments there and captured the city of Yü. The city ruler fled to K'ang-chü, but was handed over to the Chinese and beheaded. K'ang-chü refrained from engaging in hostilities and thus the prestige of the Chinese army was restored. The of all the small principalities on the route of the Chinese army were taken to China as hostages. Wu-sun k'un-mosu did not dare to enter the battle, although he had prepared a cavalry army of two thousand men. China was celebrating its victory, and ten embassies were sent out to announce it to the world. Li Huang-li, who was elevated to the rank of prince, was also given the title of "General of Erh-shih" and the march ended in 101 BC. Interestingly, in 101 B.C. Hellas and China, which had had previous contacts with each other, came face to face for the first time. We do not know who were the Ta-chin engineers who dug wells during the siege of Ku-shan. Most likely, they were Greek citizens who came face to face with the Chinese in a place far away from the Western world and meddled everywhere.

Burden of War

The Davan expedition was very costly for China. In 102, out of the army of 60 thousand men who participated in the expedition, only 10 thousand had returned in 101, and out of thirty thousand horses, only one thousand were left alive. Nevertheless, the army was perfectly supplied and no major casualties were suffered in the battles. The commanders and state officials showed no mercy to the army.

They did not even pay attention when people were dying in front of their eyes during the march.¹³ Bureaucrats' oppression of the people, taking bribes and extortion began to undermine the Han dynasty. Despite the lavish expenditure of the administration, the success at the end of the war was extremely modest. As soon as the Chinese army had left Davan, Mo-ch'ai, who had succeeded him, was killed "in accordance with a collective decision" and replaced by Ch'ang Feng, brother of the murdered Mu-kuo. The Chinese agreed to treat with this new ruler and to recognise him officially.¹⁴ The rulers of the Ba-tian tip, who had been intimidated by Li Huang-li's military expedition, accepted Chinese vassalage; Chinese commanders and officials were sent to Bügür and Kui-li¹⁵ but still the northern route could not be controlled. Because the Huns had squeezed them out in a short time, and the Chinese were left with the southern route, which no one frequented.

China's only gain was strategic. For the security strip had cut off the Huns from the Ch'iangs and the Lesser Yüeçi.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the result was nothing compared to the losses incurred.¹⁷ The Huns were still China's greatest enemy. Although China's open field armies had defeated the Huns and driven them away from the border areas, the enemy was still a formidable force and its deadly offensives had not ceased. On the other hand, there was unrest within China. Because of the huge expenditure on the army, the obligations and taxes imposed on the population had increased enormously. The entire burden of the war had fallen on the peasants. The peasants, on the other hand, began to shout and shout in anger; there was a great increase in the number of crimes committed. "This was followed by years of famine; gangs sprang up and roads became unsafe."¹⁸ As mentioned earlier, the army ranks were filled with criminals, which disrupted discipline in the army and also reduced its fighting capacity. Chinese politicians began to accuse Wu-ti of failure, pointing out that, despite all the power expended, the empire was unable to win decisive victories and put an end to vicious wars.¹⁹ Meanwhile, of course, the Huns had regained their strength and were preparing to strike a counter blow.

13 Age., p. 167.

14 Agy.

15 Age. p. 171.

16 Aegean., p. 213.

17 Many years later Li P'o described it in his poem "The Moon Rising over the Mountain Outpost".

18 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/214.

19 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/107.

PART IX

LIFE AND DEATH BATTLE

A Failed Conspiracy

At a time when Wu-ti was exhausting all his strength in the wars in the south, east and west, the Hun commanders were preparing for a new war. They knew that the main aim of the Chinese emperor was to destroy the power of the Huns. The capable and energetic Yabgu Hū-li-hu had died unexpectedly, and the throne seemed to have fallen to a young boy in his own right. But the times demanded an energetic leader, and the Hun statesmen resorted to the old electoral system; in 101 a natural-born prince, Chū-t'e-hou, the younger brother of T'u-yü, the Great T'u-yü of the East, was elected yabgu.

As soon as Chū-t'e-hou (pronounced Kūdihav) became yabgu, he tried to resume peace negotiations with Wu-ti. First, he released the imprisoned ambassadors who had been asked to be sent back. Thereupon, Wu-ti sent an envoy with rich gifts and announced that he would accept the yabgu as a vassal. However, when the Chinese envoy arrived at the seat of the yabgu, he saw that there was not even a mention of accepting the vassalage in the welcoming ceremony. On the contrary, the Chinese envoy only wanted to make a treaty of "peace and friendship". Negotiations broke down. The Chinese embassy members blamed the failure of the negotiations on Wei Liu, the chief vizier of the yab-gu Chū-t'e-hou administration. Wei Liu was a Hun who had been raised and educated in China. As a member of the diplomatic delegation sent from China to the Huns, he had come to the court of the foreign ruler, but his blood ties prevailed and he had returned to his own people by severing his relations with China. he was well acquainted with China and was well educated compared to his fellow tribesmen, he soon rose in rank and remained as the chief vizier of the Hun state until his death. It is believed that he did not agree to a peace treaty because the provisions of the treaty included the extradition of the defectors from China.

Having thus failed in the peace negotiations, the Chinese embassy delegation tried to create mischief among the Hun lords. According to the plan, Wei Liu was to be killed and the khan's wife was to be taken into captivity and through her the Chinese conditions were to be pressurised to be accepted by the khan. However, when the conspiracy was uncovered, the Yugu, enraged, had all those directly involved beheaded. The members of the Chinese embassy delegation, on the other hand, agreed on condition that they would become Hun subjects and voluntarily sever their relations with China. This offer was accepted by all except Hsü Wu, the head of the delegation. Because of this behaviour, Wu's name will be mentioned in Chinese literature in later years as an example of loyalty and chivalry. However, the Huns gave up killing him and exiled him to a remote corner of Siberia. Wu, who spent 19 years there in misery, could not send any news to China, where it was believed that he was dead. According to the rumour, he tied a message to the wing of a duck and flew it to China and this duck was shot by Chinese hunters. When the letter reached the palace, the emperor was informed that his envoys had been captured.

The failure of the embassy mission enraged Wu-ti, and the war resumed.¹

Li Ling's Unconditional Surrender

In 99, General Li Huang-li a campaign with a cavalry army of 30,000 men. On the eastern outskirts of T'ien-shan, near Lake Bargol, he attacked Ba-ti Chu-ki-prince's camp and captured many old men, women and children. he was besieged by the Hun army on his way back, he found it convenient to leave all the spoils he had taken in order to break through the circle. However, he lost 7 thousand men in the battles that took place and he himself barely escaped with his life. Huang-li's expedition cannot be considered successful. Another general, who came to the Steppes, returned empty-handed because he could not find Hun nomads. But a third, Li Ling, with an elite infantry army of five thousand men, reached Sung-ki, but was besieged. The yabgu himself attacked Li Ling's camp with an army of thirty thousand archer-cavalry. In hand-to-hand combat, Li Ling's "young rebels" were very successful and the Huns were to retreat. When Yabgu returned with fresh forces, Li Ling began to retreat to the south. Chinese

1 McGovern W. *The early empires of Central Asia*. L., 1939. P. 154-155.

as they rode across the thirsty steppes, the Hun horsemen managed to catch up with them. The whistling feathered arrows flew in the sunlight and found new victims. When the Chinese collected the arrows shot by the Huns and used them against the enemy again, many Hun horses the steppes with empty saddles. The battles continued for several days, but in the meantime the Chinese were gradually approaching the borders of China, which would be their salvation.

Seeing that the Chinese were up to the task, the yabgu was about to conclude that his enemies intended to trap him when a captured Chinese officer confessed to him that Li Ling's troop was alone. Thereupon the Huns attacked again. The Chinese arrows were exhausted. Seeing that he could no longer resist, Li Ling ordered "every man himself" and to the Huns, or perhaps the Huns captured him because he was unarmed.²

Yabgu Chü-t'e-hou, showing himself to be not only a shrewd politician and brave commander, but also a noble man, did not kill Li Ling. On the contrary, he gave him one of his daughters, allocated a certain region and Khakass tribe to his command, and rewarded him with the title of Western Chu-ki prince.³ Li Ling started to serve his new master with loyalty and honesty. Already death awaited him in his homeland and he was sentenced to death in absentia according to Chinese law, which equated captivity with treason. In the following years, the descendants of Li Ling and the Hun princess would rule the Khakassians for generations. From that day on, black-haired and black-eyed people began to breed among the Khakas, and the Khakas recognised themselves as the descendants of Li Ling. Li Ling's palace was unearthed by our archaeologists in the city of Minusinsk. It is a small palace built according to the Chinese architectural style. The door handles, decorated with fine artistic ornaments, were engraved with devil's horns.⁴

This surrender caused great sadness in China. The emperor decided to seek out the culprits and punish them. It looked as if the whole blame for the incident would fall on the commander-in-chief, Erh-shih Li Huang-li, but Huang-li, thanks to his good relations with the court, managed to put the blame on Li Ling's mother.⁵ However, the master Sih-

2 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/111.

3 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/73, 351.

4 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnoy Sibiri*, p. 479.

5 Go Mojo. *Izbrannye sochineniya* M.1955.

ma Ch'ien backed the old woman and attempted to prove her son's innocence. But when he found himself in a difficult position and was accused of slandering Li Huang-li, Sih-ma Ch'ien the following defence: "His Majesty the emperor, who thought that I wanted to discuss the career of the Er-shih general and that I was trying to be Li Ling's intercessor, did not understand me. As a result, they put me on trial and concluded that I had lied to the emperor".⁶ As a result, the historian was castrated and imprisoned. This incident took place in January 98.

However, Sih-ma Ch'ien was not only released two months later, but was also appointed as a chung-shou-lin, an adviser authorised to report directly to the emperor at any time. This was, of course, an important promotion. It should not be assumed that Sih-ma Ch'ien's release was motivated solely by his personal merits. It seems that there was a group in the court that favoured him and was hostile to Li Huang-li. In every court, there has always been a struggle between groups who wanted to create an element of oppression, and the Chinese court was no exception. After analysing the situation in detail, we can come to the following conclusion: There were ideological conflicts between the followers of Confucius and those who defended the views of Lao-tse. Sih-ma Ch'ien also engaged in an active literary struggle with the Confucianists. He sometimes said, "Confucianism is very broad doctrine, but it is not clear enough. Even if you make a great effort to understand it, you will not achieve much"⁷; at other times, he confronted the Confucianists with Lao-tse's views, saying, "The Dao is obscure and obscure, dark and dark; yet it illuminates everything under the firmament with its light. Moreover, not every event needs to be given a name"⁸ or, "They (Daoists-L.G.) do not have a prescription for every matter of life; they try to explain matters from a single point of view; but they take a stand according to the course of events. Therefore, they achieve great success without much effort"⁹. In fact, both the supporters of Sih-ma Ch'ien and Li's enemies had achieved great success. The emperor was accompanied by Sih-ma Ch'ien, who participated in the sacrifices to the sky god and the earth spirit on Mount T'ai-shan. Reports to the emperor and reports from there

6 Sih-ma Ch'ien. *Izbrannoye* M.1926p13.

7 Age., p. 37.

8 Age., p. 43.

9 Age., p. 36.

The edicts issued from the Confucian side were under his control. Confucius' followers, on the other hand, were only busy preparing for a new military campaign, as they were determined to fight to the end. They concentrated all their energies in this direction, for only a victory could close the door of power in his face and have an impact on the imperial power, which was looking forward to a rematch. But the same victory meant defeat and exile for Sih-ma Ch'ien and his followers.

As we shall see later, Li's family, all of China in defence of the old woman, and the angry master will pay a very heavy price.

Innovation in the Hun Heirship System

In 97 Li Huang-li moved from Ordos and directly for the ku- ze in an attempt to strike a blow at the central Hun nomads. The Yabgu managed to rally his warriors, sending women and children to the rear. The battles on the banks of the Selenge River had stopped the Chinese and neither side was victorious or defeated, but the Chinese began to retreat. The Huns pursued the enemy to the Chinese border, inflicting such damage that the army had to be reorganised.¹⁰

Although Li Huang-li had great support in the palace, as his sister was one of the emperor's favourite chambermaids, he did not seek a reconquest. Since his most bitter enemies were in the field, a victory was doubly favourable to him. His hope rearmed cavalry. Nevertheless, he refrained from rash action, preferring to wait until the winged horses had foals that would enable him to crush the enemy. The Emperor liked his plan, and so war was halted to be resumed with a new force.

Meanwhile, Li's enemies were not idle: The Huns had rallied their allies; the enemies of Confucianism had more influential. At such a tense and troubled moment, the eunuch Chü-t'e-hou died. He had two sons. The elder had the title of Chu-ki-prince of the East, i.e. heir apparent. The younger was the commander of the left flank forces, which meant fifth place in the official hierarchy. When the Chu-ki prince did not attend the funeral under any pretext,

¹⁰ McGovern W. *The early empires*, p., 161.

The widow of the Yabgu was offended by him and brought the younger brother to the throne. Since the younger brother could not rule and had no right to do so, he left the throne to his elder brother, who was the legal heir and came to power under the name of Yabgu Huluku. Thus, he himself was declared as the heir and received the title of the prince of Eastern Chu-ki. It seems that these two brothers, like the people around them, realised the danger to their people and sensed that they would perish in the event of a war.

The younger brother died before the elder. Faced with this situation, Huluku felt that he had to fulfil his fraternal duty and gave his nephew the title of Jih-chuo Prince, the last rank in the official hierarchy, and declared his own son as the heir.¹¹ It seems that the new dynasty did not feel obliged to care about the ancient tribal relations and introduced a new system of succession to the throne. Since it was a critical time, no one raised a voice for the time being, but this new system would have unexpected consequences in the future.

Battle of Yen-jan

For seven years Wu-ti had prepared for the new war, and for seven years he had ploughed the empire with heavy military expenditure. Finally, in 90, the reorganised army set out across the border. The main army moved from Shuo-fang (Ordos) and headed north to strike at the centre of the migratory Hun State. This army, consisting of seventy thousand mounted warriors, was again placed under the command of Li Huang-li. He was followed by an infantry force of 100,000 men, probably including rearguards, artillery and quartermaster troops, i.e. forces without much fighting character. From Yai-men fortress, east of the Great Wall, 30,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry also set out. From the Chü-ch'üan region (a city between Ordos and Lob-nor), 40,000 cavalry moved towards T'ien-shan. This was a general attack, which would decide who would emerge victorious. Yabgu Huluku had learnt about the enemy's preparations through his ca- sus. Ka-

11 Bichurin gives a slightly different account of the event, stating that Huluku immediately sent his son away (*Sobranie svedeni*, I/74), and later that he sent him away "in spite of his young age" (p. 77), which also somewhat ambiguous. I give the events according to "Ts'i-chi Tun-siang" (book 8, tsuang 22). The gap here has been filled by V.A. Velgus in his translation. I thank him here.

He sent back women and children and asked the vassal tribes living from the Sayan Mountains to the steppes beyond Baikal to send support for a life-and-death struggle.

The Yenisei Ting-Lings, yellow-bearded giants armed with trees, appeared with their "sharpest" weapons.¹² They were led by the Chinese refugee Wei Liu, one of the closest counsellors of the former Chü-t'e-hou yabg. Li Ling appeared at the head of the Khakas, who were tattooed from their knees to their heads and distinguished themselves by this marking.¹³ From the harsh steppes beyond Baikal, from the Shil-k'i and Arguni hills, the braided-haired T'o-pas, with "weapons sharper and horses faster than those of the Huns"¹⁴; from the foothills of Hingan [Kingan] came the Sienpi warriors with long horn bows and decorated arrows¹⁵. In the west, Ch'e-shih (Turfan), which until some time before had been defended by the Huns against the attacks of the Shan-shan Chinese, had raised the flag of revolt. Now, again Chinese allies from the western extremities (Shan-shan, Halga-aman, Cha-gantungiye, etc.) attacked Ch'e-shih. Thus, East Asia was divided into two camps; only the Wu-suns did not take sides in this war, in which the Chinese and Huns fought fiercely.

total mobilisation, the Hun army outnumbered the Chinese army. Against a Chinese army of 40,000 in the west, the Hun Hu-chi-prince and the great chief of Yen-chü could muster only 20,000 horsemen and 3750 Ch'e-shih infantry. Against 30,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry on the eastern front, the Hun commander was able to muster 30,000 warriors, including Li Ling's reserves. On the central front the situation was even worse. Against Erh-shih Li Huang-li, the Yabgu could muster only 50,000 Hun and Ting-ling warriors. But these outnumbered warriors possessed the spirit of the supreme warrior nomad, and neither the "young ruffians" of the Chinese army nor the bureaucratic lords, who were directing the war from their silk tents, could compete with them. The Chinese General Mang Tung headed towards Cungarya from the west, but the Hun army refused to fight. When the great commander Yen-chü, who was far behind, led his army to the front, the Chinese army's blow in vain. Meanwhile Shan-

¹² Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/352.

¹³ Rudenko S.I. *Kultura naseleniya Gornogo Altaya v skifskoye vremya*. M.;L., 1953, p. 136-1420 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/351; Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 354.

¹⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/3512

¹⁵ Age., p. 149.

shan and other Chinese allies laid siege to Ch'e-shih. Mang Tung returned and joined the allies besieging Ch'e-shih. Ch'e-shih was in a hopeless situation as the ruler had unconditionally surrendered to China and accepted its vassalage. Thus, the western army was neutralised, but the result was not even worth the expense.

The eastern army, on the other hand, retreated to the steppe and mountain ranges and "disappeared from sight." ¹⁶ The food was exhausted, the soldiers were bored and the Chinese army was on its way back. At this very moment, the Huns and Khakassians attacked. The Chinese fought for nine days without rest or sleep, although they lost their troops and weights. At last, on the banks of the Pu-nu(?) River, the last Hun attack was repulsed, but the Huns also stopped the exhausted Chinese army, which was eager to return to China. This time, too, there was no victor and no vanquished. Besides, flanking attacks were never destined to decide the fate of a battle, nor did they have the power to do so.

Against the main army, the Yugu sent the Western Great T'u-yü and Wei Liu with a force of five thousand Ting-ling. The Chinese border cavalry defeated the Ting-ling, and the Chinese army hastily pursued the enemy to the Selenge coast. At such a delicate moment, the army received news that Li Huang-li's family had been arrested on charges of practising witchcraft. Li Huang-li realised what this meant. There were not only soldiers in his army, but also officers acting on behalf of the Chinese court. One of them told the general that if he returned to China now, he would never see the northern countries again, so he had no choice but to surrender to the Huns.

The general realised that the officer was telling the truth, but he did not think of treachery. Convinced that he could buy the palace's favour by enticing some people with money, he marched in defiance. At the Chi-chü (Tola?) River, he encountered a Hun army of 20,000 and repelled them with the advantage of superior numbers. However, the whole army leadership knew that this was a temporary victory. Because the Chinese army was exhausted even though the Yugu had received reinforcements. Some members of the military council wanted to arrest him, thinking that "the general wanted to throw the army into the lap of danger" ¹⁷.

¹⁶ Age., p. 75.

¹⁷ Age., p. 76.

Realising this, Erh-shih beheaded the conspirators and began to retreat. At that very moment, the Hun army of 50 thousand Huns, under the command of the yabgun himself, besieged the Chinese army at the Yen-jan mountain range in Hangay.¹⁸ Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, the Huns dug a trench up to the front line of the Chinese army and attacked from the rear in the morning. Panic broke out among the Chinese and Li Huang-li surrendered first. Following this, the whole army was put to the sword. China was unable to move after this blow. It could no longer gather an army from anywhere. Having closed the war with China, Huns became the ruler of East Asia again.

The Yen-jan defeat had, to a certain extent, dulled the Chinese's prudence. As a matter of fact, the great Chinese poet Li P'o,¹⁹ in his poem written many years later, would express that the disaster China suffered in 1990 should be a lesson for today. I give the translation of this poem by A.Ahmetova with partial corrections:

Moon over the Border Mountains

The moon is shining on Yin-shan²⁰ and
clouds are all around.

The wind drove thousands of
Chinese from Yü-men outposts to
Po-teng

The enemy is digging pits in Ch'ing-hai
and no one is left on the battlefields. No
one has ever returned home alive. The
soldier has his eyes on the border and
wants to go home.

Women are crying for that night
No hope, breath; only sadness

The interpretation of this poem²¹ is not surprising. The commentator identifies the mountain Po-teng-ning-li²² (pronounced Bodininli) in the Altai as the mountain of Shan-teng-ning-li²² (pronounced Bodininli), where Me-te besieged Liu Pang's vanguard in 200 BC.

18 Grumm-Grjimaýlo, G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/112.

19 Li Po was a poet of the T'ang period (701-762).

20 It is written as T'ien-shan in the text, which is incorrect. Because the moon rising in T'ien-shan cannot be seen from China.

21 Ogonek. 1955. No. 23, p. 9.

22 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/231.

with the ancient Pai-teng mountain in Si. The commentator has also overlooked the fact that all the soldiers who travelled from Pai-teng returned without any casualties and that when the war was over the warriors could return home. The Yü-men outposts, on the other hand, were established in 111 BC, when the Huns were driven north from Hoshi.²³ The poem commentary was made 90 years later...

After the war, China was paralysed and lost all its power. Neither their winged horses nor their spear-throwing catapults were of any use. Chinese borders were open to Hun attacks; but Huns did not want to utilise this opportunity. Huluku-yabgu had proved how strong-willed and good a ruler he was during the life-and-death war. Instead of senseless attacks which would have increased the tension even more, he sent a letter to the emperor, suggesting that "the borders should be made more favourable "²⁴ or, in other words, that a treaty of "friendship and peace" should be concluded by creating opportunities for free trade, and asked for one of the princesses to be sent to him as a lady-in-waiting, and for 10 dan of the finest wine, 50,000 hu of rice and 10,000 balls of silk cloth to be given to him annually.

Although it is not known what the emperor replied, no new war broke out. With half of its army already broken, China was in no condition to fight. Emperor Wu-ti, the initiator of the war, died in 87. As for the Huns, they fell into such a turmoil that they started to strangle each other in a manner unworthy of the honour of their noble ancestors.

²³ Grumm-Grimaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 105.

²⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/76.

SECTION X

DIFFICULT DAYS OF THE HUN

Fight for the Throne

The death of Chü-t'e-hou-yabgu brought with it a number of obvious problems. The nervous tension caused by the attacks of the Chinese army exhausted the Huns. New people had appeared around the new yabgu Huluku. These were not warriors. On the contrary, some of them were skilful dignitaries, some of them were influential men and women started to interfere in everything. The seat of the Hun sav- gus favoured the easterners more in power.

It seems that the first victim of the new system was to be the famous captive Erh-shih Li Huang-li. Huluku-yabgu showed due respect to the Chinese general, who had voluntarily surrendered, by receiving him into his presence, according to the old Hun custom. Knowing that Li-Huang's family had been massacred, he not only gave him his daughter in marriage, but also him more than other former Chinese refugees. Among the former Chinese refugees was Wei Liu, who had lost his position and reputation after being defeated by Li Huang. Wei Liu, who knew the Hun customs well, found a way to get rid of his rivals. Taking advantage of the illness of the Yabgu's mother (the titular name of the Yabgu's wives is Yen-chi*), he wanted to prepare a conspiracy through the sorcerer who was treating her. During his "trance state", the sorcerer reported that the "deceased Yabgu" wanted Li Huang to be sacrificed for the dead warriors. Li Huang-li was immediately captured. Before he was beheaded, he shouted, "My death will destroy the Hun State!" and then he was beheaded and his blood was poured over the graves of the heroic Huns.

* It is pronounced Yen-chi (Yen-ki), from which the word yenge must have come. (trans.)

Immediately after the execution, the animals starved because of the heavy snowfall that began immediately after the execution; the epidemic disease that spread among the nomadic Huns caused the death of people and warriors; and famine broke out because the animals were not well fed due to the cold summer season. Of course, these were ordinary coincidences, but according to the psychology of the primitive Hun people, they were ominous signs. Horrified, the Yugu "built a temple in honour of the sacrificed Li Huang. "1 He did not even think of attacking China and thus war activities were suspended for fifteen years.

In 85 Huluku-yabgu fell ill. Before his death, he did not find his son Eastern Chu-ki-prince, who was the canonical and lord-liaht, as a ruler, so he gave up the throne and preferred Western Lu-li-prince instead. However, this request was not to be fulfilled.

A fierce competition for the vacant throne started between four princes. The first of these was the son of the deceased yabg. The court group led by his mother included Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi, Wei Liu and other contenders. However, since his father had said before his death that "my son could not rule the state because he was too young", it was impossible for the first candidate to take the throne.²

The second candidate was more serious than the Eastern Chu-ki-prince. According to tradition, this title always belonged to the crown prince, but he had no strong supporters.

The most dangerous of all the palace cliques was that of the mother-brother of the Yugun and at the same time of the Great T'u-yü of the East. He was a "pure-hearted man" and was popular among the chieftains. Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi was saved from him by the help of a katilein.

According to the will of the Yabgu, the Western Lu-li-prince should have succeeded to the throne, but the clique in the palace concealed this will and "lying in his (the Yabgu's) name", made a deal with the chieftains and brought Hu-yen-ti, the young son of the Eastern Lu-li-prince, to the throne, whom they could play like a puppet in their fingers. The custom of obeying and respecting the clan to which the Yabgu belonged also helped the conspirators in this endeavour, and in 85 Hu-yen-ti was officially proclaimed Yabgu.

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/76.

2 Age., p. 77.

It is impossible to keep a lie secret when many people are involved. The first two rivals, the prince of Eastern Chu-ki and the prince of Western Lu-li, realised that they were unlucky opponents. Therefore, without any justification, fearing to lose their heads, they decided to migrate southwards and cross over to the Chinese side. However, since they had to do it without attracting the attention of the Yugun, they tried to take the prince of the Hü-chui tribe as a head. The Hü-chui lived in the southern part of Jungarya, neighbouring the Wu-suns. Both princes approached the Hü-chui prince and offered him to provoke the Wu-suns to attack. Their aim was to take advantage of the turmoil to migrate south-east of the Chinese border. It is interesting to note that this betrayal was discovered by high-ranking princes themselves.

Hü-chui-prince was an aristocrat of the second rank, i.e. a tribal chief. The clan lords had not yet been corrupted. Therefore, Hu-chui-prince faithfully approached the eunuch and told him about the treacherous plans of Chu-ki and Lu-li princes. The matter led to many revelations, including the disclosure of the secrets of the collaborators who had taken an active part in the election of the new eunuch. This, of course, "did not go down well with the tribal chiefs." ³ The Yabgu immediately launched an investigation. However, the mischief-makers, who had their own armies and followers, blamed the Hu-chui prince for all the events. Thus, it was deemed appropriate to discontinue the investigation.

However, the traces of the events could not be erased. The princes Chu-ki and Lu-li did not attend the sacrificial ceremony at Lung-ch'eng, the annual gathering place. Thus the unity of Hun society broken for a time. Of course, this incident resulted in the deaths of some of the collaborating princes, who were replaced by princes of the same blood as the kings (for example, Hu-yen-ti's younger brother became the prince of Eastern Chu-ki). ⁴ However, the reputation of the kingship had been damaged, and the incident would not be forgotten even a generation later, 25 years later.

Now, let us dwell a little on the causes that led to the collapse.

³ Agy.

⁴ Age., p. 82.

Hun Society on the Eve of Collapse

During the period of Me-te and Lao-shang, Huns were engaged in nomadic farming. They were buying the land crops and especially wheat from China. Initially, these were received as tribute under the name of gifts. But later wheat started to be sold in the border markets. Since the period of Kun-chin-yabgu, when wars started between China and the Huns, the border markets disappeared. Thus, the Huns started farming in order to fulfil their extreme need for bread. Indeed, historical sources record that the Huns mainly cultivated corn.⁵

This event explains us why the Huns captured people from China and acquired slaves. It was not possible to utilise slaves to a large extent in cattle herding. Because the more or less strong ones of the cattle herding slaves found a way to escape. In farming, on the other hand, there was a great need for slave labour; but the , who was on foot and tired, could not run far away even if he wanted to. In addition to slaves, refugees from China were also used in agriculture, and they more numerous than we can imagine. These were Chinese officers and soldiers who had been captured and stayed with the Huns; their families who had travelled across the border because of their miserable situation in their own country; male and female slaves who lived along the borders and escaped from China in the belief that life was easier with the Huns; and bandits, thieves and other criminals who found freedom and safety in the northern steppes. In addition, there were those who fled from neighbouring countries during the Han Empire, which came under the rule of the Han Empire in 119, saying that they were "tired of the oppression of Chinese officials and cerraries who had made it their custom to take away people's herds, property, women and children and oppress them".⁶

Since, according to Chinese law, those who fled the country were liable to the death penalty and were declared enemies of the empire, these people willingly sought refuge with the Huns. However, the Hun khagan overlooked the other side of the coin. Among the people who took refuge with them, there were also many demoralised people. During their close contact with the Huns, they had a negative influence on them.

⁵ Age., p. 76,78.

⁶ Age., p. 95.

The consequences of this only apparent as the generations changed, i.e. in the middle of the first century BC. Indeed, the political influence of the asylum seekers was manifested in many cases without exception.

In addition to such people who took refuge in the steppe, there were also naturalised people, popularly called Ch'in men and women. These were the descendants of Chinese political refugees fleeing the reforms of Ch'in Shih-Huang-ti (III century BC). For 150 years they were not assimilated, but they were nevertheless trusted and treated in a friendly manner by the Huns.⁷

As soon as Wei Liu realised that he was not very popular with the country's leadership, he wanted to rely on these Chinese Ch'in. He proposed to Hu-yen-ti-yab-guy to have wells dug, fortresses built and two-storey wheat storage warehouses built inside, and the Chinese Ch'ins to guard them.

When the project was just beginning to be implemented, it met with fierce opposition from the older Huns. These were the tribal princes who had been Chü-t'e-hou-yabg's comrades-in-arms. According to them, it was absurd to do so, since the Huns could not afford to guard the fortresses, and the Chinese could come and seize the stocks without much effort on their part. Faced with this situation, Wei Liu found it appropriate to take a step back. The opposition of the clan princes grew. It was necessary to win the consent of Yen-chi-ana in order to restore the honour of the Yabga. Having lost her support, Wei Liu suggested to the Yugu to make peace with China and release the prisoners of war who wanted to return to their country. But the Hun princes did not believe Wei Liu and did not agree to such a thing, this plan could not be implemented. When Wei Liu died in 80, the Old Huns group took over the government and a new war with China started.

However, as a result of the activities of the group of dignitaries who had long been active at the seat of power, the state was "gradually weakened."⁸ The Wu-huans in the east, and the Wu-suns and Sogdians in the west, had left the rule of the Huns.

Old Huns Group

Let us now review the actions of the group of Old Huns who took over the Hun State in 1980. These were the old Huns.

⁷ Age., p. 78.

⁸ Agy.

were the middle powerful people. At the top were the princes, descended from the yabgu family and relying on the strength of their comrades-in-arms; at the bottom were ordinary Huns and refugees.

The old Huns had adopted the traditions of the deceased kings: To seek truth through warfare on horseback and to establish dominion over peoples.⁹

Hu-yen-ti-yabgu, the dim descendants of the great ancestor, and his unrelenting clan had become playthings in the hands of Li-fu, K'u-hsi, Hū-chui, Hu-chie, Yü-kien, Ho-su and other princes who relied on the support of their own clans. Thanks to their 100 years of remarkably sound economic structure, all the Hun tribes had become stronger and more numerous, and as a result the estates of the tribal lords had become more important. As long as the interests of the tribes coincided with the interests of the throne, the word of the yab-gus and the victory he achieved could keep these lords around the throne. This coherence would eventually be broken and the interests of the clan would be preferred to the interests of the state. Otherwise, the clan might have disintegrated. In tribe states, the optimal balance of forces depends on the strength of the tribes that constitute the state. As these forces weaken, the state also weakens; when the tribes become stronger, the state disintegrates like an overheated earthen pot on fire. This is what happened to the Huns.

In the 70s of the first century BC, the time of disintegration had yet come. Because the Hun society had aside the reckoning with the aristocrats, since it had concentrated all its power against external enemies. Lu-li-prince of the West, the younger brother of the Yabgu, had begun to talk of peace with China, and in 79 had attempted to open negotiations, but mysteriously died soon afterwards.

In fact, the Chinese did not seem to favour peace negotiations either. Although Chao-ti, the successor of the warrior Wu-ti, was not very popular, the Chinese leadership realised that the Huns did not care about China's security. The group of old Huns was in favour of the return of all the lands belonging to the former kings. Because Wu-sun, Sogdiana, Wu-huan, Ordos, Lob-nor and especially Yin-shan were the Huns' base of attack and ideal places for hunting. "After the Huns lost the Yin-shan mountain range, they could not hold back their tears when passing through there."¹⁰

Such a programme of the Huns was bound to meet with fierce opposition. And while the Huns were implementing it, their failure to do so was

⁹ Age., p.88.

¹⁰ Age., p. 94.

They had to realise that their state would collapse in the future, but they took the risk anyway.

War with China

When the Huns prepared to attack China, they naturally assumed that it was economically exhausted. Indeed, Wu-ti had already sought resources to sustain the war; he had imposed a tax on salt and wine, and had even introduced a compulsory exchange rate.¹¹ But the expense was not worthwhile. The protection of the borders was no better than it had been up to then. In fact, the borders were entrusted to the protection not of the Chinese but of the nomads living along the borders such as Ch'iang, Wu-huan and Hun refugees. Because the war troops formed from them were not at all inferior to the Huns on the battlefield. As a matter of fact, when the Huns attacked China with 20 thousand men in 180, they were defeated and fled with 9 thousand dead and captives.¹²

But this did not discourage the Huns. The following year, in 79, they besieged the fortress of She-wu- hsiang-ch'eng on their frontier, which had become an eyesore. Unable to take the fortress, the nomads turned the siege into a blockade, but to no avail. In 78 a force of 4,000 Huns, under the command of the princes Chu-ki and Lu-li, entered Ho-hsi, but this time the expedition met the Han governor, who was preparing for the campaign, and the Huns were again defeated.¹³ The raid on Ordos in 77 was comparatively successful, but only three thousand men took part in it.

As the figures show, the Hun fighting potential had fallen rapidly, and this of course led to failures. Signalling towers on the Chinese frontiers warned the people and soldiers of the impending danger of emigration, so that they were not, as before, easy prey for the Huns, who would triumph in a sudden attack. From now on, along the Chinese borders, planned and organised large-scale attacks disappeared and were replaced by personal looting incidents.

Meanwhile, the Wu-huans concluded that it was time to ask the Huns to account for the blow dealt to their ancestors under Me-te-yabgu.

11 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/214.

12 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/78.

13 The battle took place in the town of Chanie, between Heng-chou and Lan-chou. The main blow to the Huns was struck by the I-ch'ü-jung's in the Chinese army.

They did not dare to attack the Huns openly. But they did not dare to attack the Huns openly, so they plundered and pillaged the tombs of the Hun khughus. The Huns, whose sacred things were touched, immediately jumped out and marched on the Wu-huans and brought them back under their subordination. The Chinese wanted to prevent them, and for this purpose they attacked northwards from Liao-tung, but in the meantime the Huns had turned back. Thereupon the Chinese attacked the Wu-huans and put them to the sword, not because of their past plundering, but rather because they had accepted the subjection of the Huns. In the end, of course, the Wu-huans accepted the subjection of the Huns and this was recognised as a real achievement of the Old Huns group.

When Emperor Chao-ti died in 74, he was succeeded by the apparently much more energetic Hsüan-ti, and a new chapter of warfare was opened.

Wu-suns

Wu-suns suffered a lot from Huns. Although China was far away from them, it had a great influence on Wu-suns. This was sometimes carried out through women. The first Chinese princess, who was given to a Wu-sun as a wife, had a bad fate; the poor woman, weeping and crying, finally left the world out of sorrow. But the second princess, K'ai Yü, who was sent to the Wu-sun k'un-mos, was very energetic. She immediately warmed to the customs of that country, inherited the k'un-mon's succession, gave birth to children and led a group of pro-Chinese movements in the Wu-sun country. She accomplished much more than Er-Shih Li had done with thousands of troops. One of her sons became the governor of Yarkend, and she gave her daughter as a bride to the governor of Kucha. Now the Wu-suns were not only masters of their own mountains, but also of the valleys to the west. K'un-mo Wung-Chü-mi obeyed his khatu- nu.

But there was a danger: The son of the Hun princess was crown prince, and the pro-Hun faction among the Wu-suns had considerable power. Fortunately, the crown prince was still a child, and the princess K'ai Yü was still influential enough to meddle in foreign policy. The bone of contention between the Wu-suns and the Huns was the principality of Ch'e-shih. Ch'e-shih, a small principality in the Turfan Valley, had close relations with the Huns. Ch'e-shih was their only window on the world, especially after the Wu-suns had separated the Huns from K'ang-chü and Sogdiana. During Er-shih Li's campaign, Ch'e-shih was recognised by the Chinese

but when the Huns expelled the Chinese garrison in 86, Ch'e-shih again became an economic and strategic base for the Huns' westward expansion.

Ch'e-shih was on the caravan route. The inhabitants were engaged in trade and had become willing allies of the Huns in order to compete with Kucha and Yarkend, which had their backs to the Wu-suns. In 1980, when the Old Huns came to power, the people of Ch'e-shih joined forces with the Huns to attack the Wu-suns "in order to expel them from their land"¹⁴ and eventually won a victory and took many prisoners. Not satisfied with this, they even asked the Wu-suns to send back the princess and break off their relations with China. The princess and her husband went to China as envoys in 73 and offered an alliance attack the Huns together. The new Emperor Hsüan-ti accepted this offer cheerfully and began to prepare for the wars that would re-energise China.

Defeat of the Huns

China quietly prepared for war and organised a 160,000-strong light cavalry army. In 72, this army moved across the border in five columns from Ho-hsi and Ordos, and at the same time the Wu-sun army of 50 thousand men attacked the Huns from the west.

China's war preparations were not a secret for the Huns. They therefore migrated in good time, thus all the efforts of the Chinese general. The number of Huns killed was a ridiculous figure of between 19 and 700. Two generals were therefore put on trial for falsifying the figures to make the expedition appear overly successful, and they ended their lives by committing suicide.¹⁵ In fact, only the Wu-suns had achieved real success. They razed the Western Lu-li-prince's encampment to the ground, captured 39,000 soldiers in addition to the eunuch's father-in-law, daughter-in-law, princes and majors, and captured 700,000 hungry cattle.¹⁶ Meanwhile, in their hasty flight, the Huns had lost many cattle and especially their sheep, which could not withstand the rapid march and died of exhaustion. On the other hand, the Chinese garrison again captured

¹⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/193, 207.

¹⁵ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/81,82.

¹⁶ These figures cannot be accepted as completely accurate, since only the Chinese counted the spoils they obtained and transferred to their coffers and did not take into account those of the Wu-suns.

and had to abandon Ch'e-shih. The Wu-huans' is- side was the icing on the cake. The old Huns were caught in a hailstorm.

The situation was extremely critical. Gathering all their forces together, the Huns first struck a blow to their most dangerous enemy, the Wu-suns. In the winter of 72/71, raided Wu-sun nomadic tribes and slaughtered the old and children there. Only the able-bodied managed to escape to the mountains. As the Huns were returning, a heavy snow began. This was followed by frost and the whole area was covered with white snow. The unshod horses of the Huns could not make it to the grassy fields because their hooves had been torn by the blows of the crescents, and they were starved. The horsemen died with them of cold and exhaustion. Almost the whole army perished.

In the summer of 71, the Wu-suns from the west, the Wu-huans from the east, and the rebellious Ting-ling from the north, broke through the Hun borders and without difficulty put the weakened and demoralised Huns to the sword. A second blow was probably dealt to the Huns by famine, with animals starving and crops failing because the fields could not be sown. The Huns had lost a third of their population.


The worst of the disasters was that, with the exception of the governor¹⁷ who rebelled against Ch'e-shih, who had switched to the Chinese side, all the governors loyal to the government, and even favoured Hun tribes such as the Hsi-ju,¹⁸ broke away from the Huns. The Huns were so weakened that, in 70, a Chinese cavalry force of three thousand men swept across the steppe and carried off herds and people, which 160,000 had not been able to do before.

Clique Collisions in the Huns

Despite such heavy losses, the Huns still had not lost hope of victory. The original Hun territory had not been captured by the enemy, and a few tens of thousands of warriors with strong horses stood firm in their saddles. As victory in war is a relative thing, luck might have favoured them too. But there was another danger that the Hun commanders could not see: The already existing internal strife had reached a new stage.

¹⁷ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/207.

¹⁸ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/83, note.



M.Ö. 71-61 Arası Hunların Parçalanması

In 68 Hu-yen-ti-yabgu, who had become a plaything in the hands of two warring factions, died, and power passed, according to tradition, to Hū-lū Ch'üan-ch'ü, prince of Eastern Chu-ki-. Hū-lū Ch'üan-ch'ü, who inherited the throne from Hu-yen-ti-yabgu along with his wife Chuan-ch'ü, expelled his original common-law wife, although she aroused the anger and hatred of the Old Huns group. Because he did not want to the same table and pillow with her. However, she was the daughter of the Great Chief of the West. However, Ch'üan-ch'ü still dismissed her. By this act, he not only insulted the greatest holder of the crown, but also insulted his entire clan. Ch'üan-ch'ü also expelled Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi. His father the Great Chü-ch'ü of the East, the highest position in the Hunnic official hierarchy. The enemies were powerful men, but still no match for the new yabgu and his right-hand man, Hsin-wei-yen, the prince of Ho-su and at the same time the overlord.

If we consider the quarrel between the yabgu tribe and the boy beys as a simple quarrel, we may have made a great mistake. Because they were in two different groups. The tribe to which the yabgu belonged had grown considerably, and even though an additional Jih-chuo princely titular office had been created during the reign of Huluku-yabgu, the high positions were not sufficient to be distributed to all members of the tribe. As a result, those from the yabgu clan who did not receive the titul were offended and joined the warring factions.

In fact, as their tribal princes grew in size and power, they sought greater independence. Initially they broke the war discipline of the Old Huns and supported the dzādegān group in order to take advantage of its weak power gain greater independence. In addition, personal feelings and ties - quarrels, disagreements and desires for self-rule, as well as , sympathy and mutual aid - determined the attitude of each Hun in relation to the warring parties. The "friends of the family chieftains", the brave cavalrymen and the greedy plunderers, favoured the military faction and its leader, Hsin-wei-yen. The lovers of luxury, the and those who enjoyed hunting parties favoured Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi and were saddened by his defeat. Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi was highly esteemed as the warrior band was defeated in battle, but there came a time when the Huns, having been defeated in battle, wanted more victory.

Crisis

Yabgu had learnt through his spies in China that the enemy, which was in an economic downturn, was having difficulties in financing the border guards. He that the time was ripe for making peace with China in order to settle scores with other minor enemies. This did not go down well with the previously defeated Eastern Great Chü-ch'ü. This not because he was against making peace with China, but because he did not want to give an opportunity to his rivals by making such a treaty himself. For this reason, he approached the Chinese border to organise a raid under the pretext of going on a hunting expedition with the prince of Hulu. However, three horsemen from Chü-ch'ü army came to China and about his intention. When the Chinese immediately sent 5 thousand cavalry to the battlefield, 20 thousand Huns retreated without fighting. It is difficult to explain why the three horsemen fled and took refuge in China. Probably it was because demoralisation had spread to the lower strata, or perhaps the great Chü-ch'ü, who no longer wanted to fight everywhere and favoured peace negotiations, sent these three horsemen himself.

Now the yabgu could muster 20,000 strong warriors to repel a Chinese counter-attack. The economic situation deteriorated again; in ⁶⁸19 famine again decimated the Hun herds and nomads. The new administration was doomed to failure at the outset. In the autumn-spring of 68, the yabgu decided to subdue the separatist Hun Hsi-ju tribe living on the eastern frontier. Learning of this, the Hsi-ju lords gathered their herds and possessions, fought with the border guards and surrendered to China.

In the west, the situation was worse. Two Chinese officers, Cheng K'i and Sih-ma Hi, with 1.5,000 criminals who had escaped punishment and 10,000 allies from the inhabitants of the western end of the province, attacked Ch'e-shih and the capital of the principality of Chuoha-huo-ta.²⁰ Lack of sufficient food the Chinese to return; but the following autumn, after they had gathered their crops, they set out again. This time, the Ch'e-shih chieftain appealed to the Huns for help, but he did not receive the help he had hoped for. Desperate, he decided to surrender to China; however, he first destroyed the small province of Pulei (Bargöl) to show his resentment against the Huns.

¹⁹ Age., p. 83.

²⁰ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/208.

Some of the Ch'e-shih remained loyal to the Huns. However, the Huns' attempt to eliminate the Chinese and Chinese supporters did not yield any results. In this situation, the yabgu took the Ch'e-shih who had taken refuge and settled them in the east; however, the Ch'e-shih valley continued to be the scene of war activities.²¹

The loss of Ch'e-shih was a bitter blow to the Huns. For an immediate shortage of bread among the population. In 66 the Huns tried agriculture in a part of southern Jungarya in order to "squeeze the Wusuns and the western end"²²; but this time, 64, 12,000 Huns attacked the Chinese garrison at Ch'e-shih. The Chinese were trapped in the fortress of Chuo-ha-huo-ta. The Hun commander who arrived in the city the Chinese to leave; but the yabgu ordered that the Chinese should not be released for the purpose of utilising the land of Ch'e-shih for cultivation, and began to besiege the fortress. In the meantime, however, the Huns were to lift the siege and give the Chinese garrison a breathing space by a blow from the Alashan steppes. The rest of the Ch'e-shih were relocated to Kui-li. Thus, in 62, this previously rosy valley entered a period of yellowing and withering.

The battles in the north were a greater to the Huns. In 71 the Ye-nisey Ting-ling, who had overthrown the chief Hun governor in 63, attacked. The three subordinate tribes defeated the Hun troops and ravaged the territory they had captured. The Huns had lost their rear support.

In 62, the yabgu wanted to attack China, but a traitor warned the Chinese. When the Huns saw 40 thousand cavalry coming to meet them, they turned back without fighting. There was no response from the Chinese emperor to the peace treaty offer of the Yabgu.

²¹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/83.
²² *Age.*, p. 84.

SECTION XI

BROTHER TO BROTHER

Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi's Coup

While the warring faction suffered defeats on every front, Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi waited patiently for his time to come. Having previously been rejected by the Ch'üan-ch'ü of the Hü-lu, he went to the Eastern Chu-ki prince T'u-ch'i-t'ang. T'u-ch'i-t'ang was a descendant of the Chu-ki-prince, the grandson of the Wu-wei-yabg, i.e. the highest aristocratic class. He, his mistress and his younger brother T'u-lung-ki were descended from a father who had received the titular title of the Great Chü-ch'ü of the East and enemies of the opposing faction. Politically, they were in favour of making peace with China; but before that, they were trying to change the system of succession to the throne by pushing the clan lords to the background and monopolising all titles and state positions in the hands of their relatives, namely the yabgu clan.

In fact, the direct inheritance of the princely title from father to son was a mistake of the old system, which ensured that the positions were inherited in the same order. Due to this failure of succession, different groups were formed within the same tribe, thus the structure of the tribe was damaged. The Hun state was also based on the principle of clan, this crack eventually led to the disintegration of the clan. But why was this matter of concern to the self-aggrandising Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi, his vicious brother T'u-lung-ki and the vengeful T'u-ch'i-t'ang? Having been removed from power, these three thought only of their wounded pride. Therefore, with unshakable stoicism, they patiently searched for a way to crush their enemies and finally found such opportunity.

returning from an unsuccessful expedition to China, Yabgu Hü-lü Ch'üan-ch'ü fell ill. All the princes were required to visit Lung-

It was the spring season when they prepared to go to perform the sacrificial ceremony organised at ch'eng. T'u-ch'i-t'ang also prepared. But Chuan-ch'ü told him not to go, and that it would be best to sit and wait for the of the suzerain.¹ Indeed, a few days later the suzerain died. It was highly suspicious that Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi had prior knowledge of this death, especially the suzerain did not even have a wife.

Prince Hsin-wei-yen had sent messengers to all the great princes to inform them of the death of the suzerain, but Chuan-ch'ü and T'u- lung-ki preceded him and proclaimed T'u-ch'i-t'ang as suzerain under the name of Wu-yen-ch'ü-te. This was a real coup d'état. It was successful because the failures had discouraged the Old Huns, discredited them the people and them of the support of their masses. The Huns did not object, perhaps in the hope that the new ruler would be better.

Wu-yen-ch'ü-te, who came to the throne, the policy actually pursued. First, he sent his brother to China with some gifts to a peace treaty. Then he had Hsin-wei-yen and all the state officials who were close to the deceased yab- guya beheaded. Subsequently, he removed all the relatives of the deceased yabg who were in charge of the state and brought in people from his own tribe. While Chi-huo-shan, the son of the deceased suzerain, fled to the small kingdom of Wu-shan-mu, which lay between Wu-sun and K'ang-ch'ü and was allied with the Huns, the new chief of the warrior band, Jih-chu-prince Hsien-hsien-ch'eng, surrendered to China with his army. There he given a Chinese title. His two brothers, who did not come with him, killed in early 59. Now Chuan-ch'ü Yen-chi could be sure of victory.

The Huns felt so exhausted that even the did not move the masses. But this inertia would last until the heads of the state officials were cut off. When the terror started to touch the tribes, the Hun warrior spirit reawakened and turned into a powder keg ready to explode.

At the end of 59, when the prince of the Yü-kien [Yü-kan] tribe died, the Yugu replaced him his own son, who was a child. But the Yü-kien did not recognise him, and taking the son of the deceased prince as their head, they migrated eastwards. It was a rebellion. In order to pacify them, Yabgu sent his back-

¹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/84.

War

As soon as Hu-han-yeh was seated on the throne, he ordered the death of the Chu-ki-prince of the West, to whom, it must be said, he owed his victory. Learning of the situation, Chu-ki-prince united with T'u-lung-ki, brother of Ch'üan-ch'ü, and the new Jih-chu-prince Po-hsü-t'ang (pronounced Bosüdan). Among the nomads of the Western Huns

² Age., p. 85.

3 Age., p. 88.

Finding support, the princes gathered several tens of thousands of troops, proclaimed Po-hsü-t'ang as Chu-ki-prince, and marched against Hu-han-yeh and the Eastern Huns. Having lost the battle, Hu-han-yeh fled to the east.

In the autumn Chu-ki-yabgu Po-hsü-t'ang sent 40 thousand warriors, half of them from the Yü-kien tribe and the other half from those who had fled to China and returned because they hated Wu-yen-chü-te, against Hu-han-yeh. Meanwhile, the prince of the Hü-chie tribe, neighbouring the Khakassians on the north-western border, came to the Yabgu. Together with his counsellor Wei-li-Tang-hu, he plotted a plot and the Western Chu-ki-prince. Believing the slander, Yabgu killed Chu-ki-prince together with his son. But later on, when the slander was somehow revealed, the enraged yabgu had Wei-li-Tang-hu killed this time. The Hu-chie prince managed to escape to his own tribe and declared himself as Hu-chie-yabgu there. When this news soon spread in the steppes, other princes tried to imitate him, so that the prince of the Yu-ti tribe proclaimed himself Ch'e-li-yabgu, while another T'u-yü (officer rank) proclaimed himself Wu-chi-yabgu. All of them belonged to the clan of the Yabgu and apparently favour until they were beheaded. The clan lords began to struggle for power. It would be unreasonable to accept these fights as the development of the clan structure. Because, as later events will clearly show, the clan structure in the Hun society manifested itself due to these fights. In fact, the renegade yabgu had chosen not the Hun lands, but a part of Jungar-ya, Saur and Tarbagatay foothills across the border as their bases. Their supporters were concentrated in the less populous countries, which is a major evidence the rebels were not supported by all their tribesmen.

Chu-ki-yabgu marched against the rebels. Naturally, his action his opponents to unite due to the danger of death. Wu-chi and Hu-chie discarded their titles and offered obedience to Ch'e-li-yabgu. The rebels able to gather an army of 40 thousand men. The situation was further complicated by the mobilisation of Hu-han-yeh, who could launch a counterattack at any moment. After taking necessary measures against Hu-han-yeh, Chu-ki-yabgu destroyed the rebels with an offensive and drove them to the north-west of Khakassia.

Ch'e-li-yabgu had offered obedience to Hu-han-yeh, but he put the Khakass prince Wu-chi, son of Li Ling, on the throne as a rival candidate. However, the Huns, weary of the fighting, would not support the Khakass puppet, and Wu-chi was captured and beheaded. Hu-han-yeh seemed to have pulled all the strings, but were still those in the east who did not like him. The eastern sage elliġ, after gathering a few tens of thousands of his "own tribe"⁴, surrendered to China to avoid a pointless fratricidal quarrel. It was a great loss.

After Jen-ch'eng [Jun-ch'eng], Hu-han-yeh's brother Hu-tu-us rebelled and himself Chi-chi [Chih-chih] Ku-tu-k'u-yabgu of the eastern frontiers. Within two years the Huns had three yab-gus, but this could not continue. In late 54 Jen-ch'eng-yabgu, himself strong enough for an expedition to the east, first marched on Chi-chi, but was killed in battle and his army with the victorious side. Thus strengthened, Chi-chi, after attacking Hu-han-yeh and destroying his army, captured his headquarters at Hangav.⁵

4 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/87.

5 Grumm-Grijimaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/118.

War was one of the sole elements of their existence. For this reason, the aims and troubles of wars did not concern them much, because they believed in their kings who led them against external enemies. But in those days, fighting external enemies was not only impossible, but even destructive. Perhaps that is why the princes could easily use them in internal wars.

Yabgu Hu-han-yeh's situation was grave, and one of his comrades-in-arms, the prince of Eastern I-chi-ch'i- [I-chih-tsu], had advised him to come under the rule of China. Such a decision was extremely difficult for the son of the leader of the Old Huns party, who was accustomed to regard the Chinese emperor as an unholy enemy. Most interesting of all the discussion of this advice with Hu-han-yeh's supporters and the elders loyal to him.

*"It is impossible, - said the elders, - we are the best at fighting on horseback. That is why all nations fear us. We are not crushed in the battlefields. At this moment two brothers from the same clan are fighting for the throne; either the elder or the younger will sit on the throne. It is also an honour to die by their side. Our descendants will always rule over other peoples. China is not strong, and it is not in a position to rule over all Huns. Why should we spoil what our ancestors have done? To be a vassal of the Han dynasty to humiliate and disgrace our late yabgula... True, such advice will bring calm, but then we will no longer be able to exercise sovereignty the peoples."*⁶

This quotation reflects the views of the Old Huns party: Power-lust, fame-lust, pride and greed, which are riveted in the consciousness of every sane Hun. Having achieved success in the past thanks to some exceptional rulers, they could not see that they were now standing on the edge of the abyss and that the state was literally in ruins. I-chi-ch'i prince's reply was as if cold water had been poured their angry heads:

"-There is power and fame. Today the Han dynasty is in its prime. The Wu-suns and other sedentary kingdoms are its subjects. We Huns are looking back to the days of Chü-te-hou and now it is impossible to bring back that glorious period. No matter how much

6 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/88.

Everyone knew that I-chi-ch'i-prince was, and they could not disrupt his programme by shouting and screaming. In fact, this a clear capitulation to the ideology of the Old Huns group in this complex environment. Hu-han-yeh-yabgu expressed his agreement with the princes and thus Old Huns party ceased to exist, having renounced the principle of "subjugating peoples".

In 53 Hu-han-yeh his son to China, ostensibly serve at court, but in fact as a hostage. Chi-chi behaved in the same way. The inevitable reversal of the tide everyone by surprise. In 52, the yabgu himself travelled to China and entered the capital in good spirits. There he was received by Emperor Hsian-ti. The reception ceremony was solemn, and there the kogu announced that he had agreed to become a vassal of the emperor. After a few months he was allowed to return and settled the neighbourhood of She-wu-hsiang-ch'eng fortress. The Han government not only presented him with a number of personal gifts, but also sent the Huns, who had accepted the vassalage, large quantities of corn and rice.

In 50 the envoy sent by I-chi-ch'i arrived in China. But his envoy was seated lower than Hu-han-yeh's envoy. In 49, it was announced as a final decision that the Chinese government would only support Hu-han-yeh. It is not known what led to this decision. Most probably, Hu-han-yeh's second visit to the palace played a role here rather than diplomatic calculations. Perhaps he bought off some influential people in the palace or attracted them to his side. In the following days, we see Hu-han-yeh growing in power. the Huns had killed all birds and wild animals living along their borders, the Chinese were constantly sending them millet and rice. The "people of Yabgu Hu-han-yeh"⁸ began to multiply as a result of this peaceful life, but this increase was mainly due to those who fled from other princes and came to him. Finally, in 47, Hu-han-yeh was already out of danger from Chi-chi, to which fate had diverted him.

7 Agv.

8 Age., p. 91.

Division of Wu-sun and War with K'ang-chü

Leaving Hu-han-yeh and Chi-chi aside, let us look at what was on in the west. The regions extending from the T'ien-shan mountains were the western extremity for the Chinese and Huns. The Wu-suns lived there and the caravan route to the Fergana valley passed through these lands.

In 59, when Jih-chuo-prince took refuge in China, fearing Wu-yen-chü-te-yabgu's beheading, the Chinese occupied the northern caravan route as far as Yarkend and established a new gümeş- te there.⁹ But the gümeş- te was in trouble with the K'ang-chü and Wu-suns, who were then in serious .

Already in 64 Wung-chü-mi-Fou-wang, the true ally of China and enemy of the Huns, was finished. Before his death Wung-chü wished to strengthen his position by taking a Chinese princess to his eldest son, Yüan-chü-mi, and transferring the throne to him; but Wung-chü died while the in-laws were coming and going, and the chieftains, in accordance with a previous agreement, placed his nephew Ni-mi on the throne.

Ni-mi was born to a Hun princess and the number of Hun supporters among the Wu-suns was not small. They had pinned great hopes on Ni-mi. Soon, however, the Huns fell into a deplorable state in which it was not wise to rely on them. Ni-mi took the title of Kuan-wang and married the Chinese princess Huai-yü, bore him a son but was not popular with the other wives.

In 52, Chinese dignitaries Wei-hou-i and Jen Ch'ang were sent as envoys to the Wu-sunla- ra. The princess agreed with them to kill her husband by poisoning him. During the banquet a Chinese soldier struck Ni-mi with a sword, but the sword slipped to the side and the wounded prince managed to escape on a horse. Ni-mi's eldest son rallied the people against his traitorous stepmother and siege to the palace of the princess and Chinese diplomats in Ch'i-ku for several months. Only the reinforcements sent by the west-end government were able to rescue them. The Chinese court was not at all happy about these events, and soon the Chinese leadership realised that it was unreasonable to interfere in the internal affairs of the Wu-suns.

⁹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/171.

Meanwhile, Wu-ch'ü-t'u, Wung-chü-mi's son a Hun princess, led a rebellion in Wu-sun territory. When he announced that "the dynasty to which his mother belonged would soon send Hun warriors", the people around him.¹⁰ Apparently, the Chinese patronage had exhausted the Wu-suns. Wu-ch'ü-t'u attacked Ni-mi, killed him and seized the throne.

The situation of the Wu-suns, who were at war with K'ang-chü, became even more dire. Because K'ang-chü, which was located in the steppes between Lake Aral and Balkhash, was and would remain an ally of the Huns.

In the middle of the I century BC, K'ang-chü was the first to establish a 2000-li (about 900 km) long line starting from Davan, i.e. the Fergana Valley.

* Shoo: To put in chains.

10 Age., p. 196.

11 Age., p. 150.

was a nomadic sovereignty in a nomadic state. That is, K'ang-chü was located in the hilly steppes of eastern Kazakhstan, between Lake Balkhash and the Irtysh. It was separated from Central or Turan by the barren steppes of the Bet-Pak-Dala and Mujuñkum sand dunes. To the east it adjoined Tarbaga- tay, and to the west Yang-ts'ai, the Alan Dominion.¹² On the Chinese map of its western end, the boundaries of K'ang-chü are shown as follows: Alagöl to the east, the Kyrgyz Alatau mountain range to the south (according to historical information, the Talas valley is also shown as the tip of K'ang-chü), the Surisu River to the west, and Lake Tengiz to the north-west, where K'ang-chü was neighboured by Wu-i-bei-ko, the Northern Wu-i. From the name Wu-i (Uy) it is easy to see that this is the Ugor ethnonym. In fact, archaeological data show that Ugors lived there.¹³ *The History of the First Han Dynasty* explains that K'ang-chü had five vassal states. According to the map, they were settled on the northern banks of the Chu River. The distance between them is shown as 8555 li at most and 7525 li at least, i.e. about 500 km. from Yang-huan (a fortress near Tun-huang), which is also the distance of Chu from the Chu-Ili mountain range to the Serbia around the Red Army. The names used for these principalities on the Chinese map, such as Su-hsi-yeh, Fu-mu, Yü-ni and Chi Yüeh-kien,¹⁴ certainly do not correspond to the local nomenclature or the nomenclature in Strabo's book. These small principalities separated K'ang-chü from Sogdiana, Iran and Greco-Bactria, and later from the Kushans. Therefore, the Parthians and the K'ang-chü had to be direct neighbours on the left bank of the Serbia, where the ruins of ancient cities are found, and in the lower reaches of the Red Army.¹⁵ According to Strabo, the Ta-i's¹⁶, one of the largest tribes of the Parthians, lived on the eastern shores of the Aral Lake. However, the relationship between K'ang-chü and the Parthians is not known.

The relations between K'ang-chü and China were always hostile. During the campaign of Li of Erh-Shih, the K'ang-chü wanted to help the besieged Kui-shuan, but they were too late, and in the following days they received the Chinese envoy very badly.¹⁷ K'ang-

¹² Age., p. 229. (The word Yangsay was later changed to Alanya).

¹³ See *Po sledam drevnix kultur ot Volgi do Tixogo okeana*. M., 1954, p. 191.

¹⁴ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/186.

¹⁵ Tolstov S.P. *Po sledam drevnexorezmiskoy tsivilizatsii*. M.; L., 1948. Map.

¹⁶ Age., p. 124.

¹⁷ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/185.

At that time, K'ang-chü was an important state. It had 600 thousand inhabitants and a strong army of 120 thousand. According to the measurements of that time, these numbers were not small at all. They were almost equal to the Persians at the time of Cyrus and twice as numerous as the Greeks. It is important for us to determine the composition of the K'ang-chü people and their relations with their neighbours. *The History of the First Han dynasty* records that K'ang-chü's western neighbour Yang-ts'ai was independent;¹⁹ *the History of the Second Han dynasty* records that Yang-ts'ai and the northern neighbour Yang were not dependent on K'ang-chü;²⁰ K'these neighbours in the I-II century A.D.; however the K'ang-chü did not go beyond the Volga.

K'ang-chü was a fierce enemy of the Wu-suns. When the Wu-suns became subjects of China, the K'ang-chu's military intervention was prompted the fact that their disintegrated and demoralised neighbour was in no position to protect itself. But the K'ang-chus were not in a position to completely eliminate the Wu-suns without help from elsewhere, and therefore they were eagerly looking forward to the victory of the Huns. The Wu-suns, on the other hand, had the full support of China and were at neck and neck with the Huns. Even Wu-ch'ü-t'u, the son of the Hun princess, gave up his kinship in order to protect his throne.

On the whole, the Wu-suns were a weak and obscure kingdom compared to the Huns. The tension caused by maverick princes and their comrades-in-arms existed on both sides; but while the Huns found themselves in the middle of the murky sea, the Wu-suns fell into the murky lake. This was the most important difference between the two peoples, who were similar in origin, culture and lifestyle. The Wu-suns' subsequent lives characterised by petty internal conflicts, denunciations, betrayals, treacherous murders and quarrels over personal interests.

18 Age., p. 189.

19 Age., p. 186.

20 Age., p. 229.

Submission of the Huns to China

Let's go back to the Huns. The people had been divided into two parts, but this was not welcomed in the bivouacs of either yabg.

Most of the people were loyal to Chi-chi, but the wisest among them had lost their courage and were involved in some conspiracies with China. Those who sought peace gradually moving southwards to the side of Hu-han-yeh and filling his ranks. The only ones who stayed with Chi-chi were those who were "in over their heads" and encouraged him to adventures. Yabgu followed them, even though he knew this did bode well.

These warlike and never-satisfied elements in Hun society worried Hu-han-yeh. Fortunately, the leader of the dissatisfied elements, the younger brother of the deceased Chu-ki-yabg, had deserted him and fled to the western steppes, where he found a number of followers, gathered them around him and proclaimed himself a yabgulu under the name of I-li-mu²¹ Thus, was rid of a person who could constantly quarrel with him over the issue of the Chinese perennialism, while Chi-chi gained a new enemy. The new enemy, I-li-musoon tried to settle accounts with him, but in the first battle and hisbecame loyal to Chi-chi again.

Chi-chi, calculating that Hu-han-yeh received food aid from China but not military, did not return to the east in the face of his enemy's blows. He moved his post to Cungarya and sent an envoy to Wu-ch'ü-t'u, the k'un-mos of Wu-sun, for negotiations. But Wu-ch'ü-t'u had the envoy beheaded and presented him to the Chinese governor, and also sent an army of 8 thousand against the Huns. Chi-chi put Wu-suns to the sword and headed north and there subjugated Khakas (formerly Kien-ku-ni) and Ting- lings who had broken away from Huns in 56. Having secured his rear, he turned again to the Wu-suns and gave them a good thrashing.

In the meantime, Hu-han-yeh, having regained his courage, again travelled northwards to Eastern Halha. His supporters supported him to the end, and thus the number of his subjects increased.

In 48, Chi-chi asked for his son who was in China. The Chinese no reason to hold him. Just as they released Chi-chi's son,

²¹ It lies on the northern slopes of T'ien-shan, between Urumqi and Gülcen, and northwards towards the Urun- gu River.

The first Allied blow came as a shock the Wu-suns, who were not really prepared for an active war on the western front. Chi-chi was again defeated by the mu-

He proved to be an excellent commander and a master of Hun fighting power. In a succession of offensives, in 42 the Huns the Wu-sun capital Ch'i-ku, the Red Valley city upstream of the Naryn.²² The Wu-suns had no choice but to abandon the western region and retreat to the east, and in fact this behaviour saved them from being put to the sword altogether.

The Huns' second target of attack was the Fergana Valley, but Chi-chi apparently knew that his army could not succeed in sieging fortresses and contented himself with pillaging.²³

A safe place was needed to store the looted goods. So Chi-chi to build a fortress for himself and his warriors in the Talas River valley. 500 men worked on the construction for two years. The fortress surrounded by earthen bastions modelled on Roman fortifications and guard towers surrounded by picket fences. The garrisons of this fortress over a hundred infantry soldiers, known as Romans. They were presumably legionaries of Crassus who had surrendered to the Parthians and were sent to the eastern frontier to serve.²⁴ But what were they doing with Chi-chi?

According to the information given by Chinese spies about Chi-chi's activities, Chi-chi was plans to conquer the Yuechi and Parthian territories.²⁵ There seems to be some ambiguity in this information. For the Yuechis and Parthians were implacable enemies of each other. Chi-chi could only choose one of these two enemies as an ally. He seems to have chosen the Parthians as his ally, and to have recruited Roman legionaries to assist him in the establishment of a fortified military camp. This alliance probably caused a rupture between the Hun suzerain and the ruler of K'ang-chü. For in the following days, for unknown reasons, the K'ang-chü ruler Chi-chi, who killed his wife, the princess of K'ang-chü, and several hundred K'ang-chü lords with him, chopped their bodies into pieces and threw them into the river.

After this incident, the ruler of K'ang-chü was forced to send some small Hun troops

22 McGovern W. *The early empires of Central Asia*. L., 1939, p. 191.

23 Bichurin N.Y. *Tung-chien Gan-mu za 36 g.*/Rukopis: Arxiv Instituta Vostokovedenya AN SSSR F7Edxran. 1815.F. 7.

24 Debs G.G. *Voyennoye soprikosnoveniye mejdu rimlânami i kitaytsami*// VDI. 1946. 12. S. 45-50.

25 McGovern W. *The early empires*. p. 191.

his side. Of course, this situation the Chinese army to advance to the Talas Valley without any obstacles.

The Hun was caught unprepared. Unable to retreat, he attempted to enter into negotiations, but was given the choice of surrendering or being taken to the field of battle. When Chi-chi refused to be captured and taken to China, the siege began. The Huns and their allies attempted to repel the enemy from the fortress walls, whose towers were festooned with five-coloured flags. The two main gates were held by infantry lined up in "fish-scale formation", presumably Roman soldiers.²⁶ But the Chinese, aided by automatic machines, forced the enemy to retreat into the citadel. The intensity of the arrow fire the guards guarding the walls and towers. Even Chi-chi was wounded in the nose by the arrows and forced to rest in his palace; his absence panic. The first to be frightened the K'ang-chü soldiers; the last to be alarmed were the Hun women who were busy in defence behind the walls. The Chinese gathered brushwood and set fire to it in order to break through the fortifications around the fortress, that is, the double-layered picket fence. When the wooden stakes were burnt, this line could no longer be defended.²⁷ Attempts by the defenders to repel the enemy attack by firing arrows did not yield any results. The fate of the battle was also determined by the fact that the Chinese automatic arrow-shooting machines were out of the firing range of the Hun archers. The Huns abandoned the battlements at midnight and retreated to earthen bastions. Meanwhile, the Chinese had prepared mobile bridges and prepared for the main attack.

The night attack of the K'ang-chü cavalry on the Chinese military camp was also repulsed by the automatic arrow machines, so that the fighting began off the fortress. At dawn the Chinese attacked simultaneously on all fronts, accompanied by bugles and chariots. Although they succeeded in penetrating into the earthen bastions, the Huns did not sur, as the palace of the eunuch had not yet burnt down. This time the Chinese, amid smoke and flames, entered the palace where the wounded yabgun was lying and separated his head from his body. Then the castle guards laid down their weapons.²⁸ The war was over, the reckoning began.

²⁶ Ibidp194.

²⁷ See Rukopis N. Ya Bichurina// Arxiv Instvostokovedeniya AN SSSR7Ed. 3cran. 1815.

The Chinese did not even think of capturing K'ang-chü. Because Ch'en T'ang did not aim to gain territory. He only intended to improve his situation. As a matter of fact, when the head of the eunuch and the report of the commander reached the capital, different opinions began to emerge among the state officials. Some accused Ch'en T'ang of being a maverick adventurer and wanted both commanders to be punished; others argued that this was a successful initiative and that it raised China's prestige and advocated rewarding the governor and Ch'en T'ang instead of beheading the envoy. In the end, the second view prevailed and Ch'en T'ang regained his freedom.

Hu-han-yeh, who remained sole ruler of the Hun throne, was, of course the main beneficiary. China only gained in morale; in the western part of Central Asia the status that had existed until the arrival of the Huns was restored. In any case, China's prestige in the west was enhanced, and after Chi-chi's death the ruler of K'ang-chü sent an envoy to China and his son as a hostage. It was doubtful that the ruler of K'ang-chü really showed any loyalty. As a matter of fact, the governor of the western end, who was involved in the matter, would say in his report sent on this occasion, "Sending his son as a hostage is a cunning, the purpose of which is the resumption of trade".³⁰ However, the emperor preferred to close the book of the past and the commercial and diplomatic relations between K'ang-chü and China were re-established. Thus, the western borders were secured thanks to China's new sovereignty, while the Huns were deprived of a rearguard and lost a field of defence in case the situation became complicated.

29 *Vestnik drevnev istorii*, 1946, No.2, p. 50.

30 Vasilyev L.S. *Kulturniye i torgoviye svāzi Xanskogo Kitaya s narodami Tsentral'-noy i Sredney Azii* // *Vestnik istorii mirovoj kul'tury*. 1958. 15. S. 45- 46.

Muahhar Ting-lingler

The role of the Ting-ling in the calamity that befell Chi-chi cannot be underestimated. Their rebellion in 71 BC won them their . In 57, the Khakas, the southern neighbours of the Ting-ling, joined the civil war under the rule of Li Ling's son.³¹ Although Chi-chi brought the Ting-ling and Khakas back under his subordination, his retreat to the west, Hun rule in Western Mongolia and the Minusinsk Depression, them the opportunity to regain their independence. In the following days, these two peoples united and became a single people under the name of Yenisei Kyrgyz.³²

As to the identity of this people, whose name will be mentioned frequently in the following, we have to add some information obtained from the excavations.

According to Chinese sources, "the inhabitants [of the region] are generally tall, fair-haired, red-cheeked and blue-eyed. Those with black hair have no distinctive features, but they are considered to be the descendants of Li Ling due to their chestnut eyes."³³ This information is confirmed by the excavations. Unfortunately, there was a custom of cremation during the Tashtik culture period II BC - IV AD). However, funerals were also placed in graves with masks, which S.V. Kiselev calls portraits.³⁴ Kiselev divides these mask types into three groups:

1. Broad face with slightly prominent cheekbones; rather fleshy lips, hard-looking eyes, protruding chin and curved, thin, long nose.
2. Wide face; rather fleshy and wide lips, hard-looking eyes and upright nose.
3. Slender and elongated face with slightly prominent cheekbones; thin lips, hard gaze, modest chin and slightly slanted, miniaturised upright nose.

Of these, only the faces belonging to the last group are close to the masks found in Tagar kurgans and Oglah-type earthen Tashtik graves.³⁵ G.F. De-bets, who analysed these masks anthropologically, concludes: "In general, the Tashtik masks are more European and Mono-European, more reminiscent of the present-day Shors and Khakasses.

31 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/87.

32 Age., p. 350.

33 Age., p. 351.

34 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnoy Sibiri*, p. 446 et seq.

35 Age., p. 450.

Here we see that the written data do not coincide with the testimony of the material findings. Nevertheless, it be admitted that these masks are a product of art; that is, they are too expensive for poor people to afford. Moreover, not all of them were produced according to existing types. Let us recall that in the Pazyryk tombs chestnut-coloured Mongoloids with long beards were found. What we are talking about here is a kind of analogy under Mongoloidism. It is certain that the T'ing-ling lords imitated their Hun masters in dress, behaviour and taste, which should have been reflected in art in the first place. It should be added that these masks were adorned with extremely fine embroidery.³⁷ Moreover, painted faces were used in Hun ceremonies.³⁸ Therefore, there was probably a Hun influence on the T'ing-ling.

The most important thing is the change of funeral rites, i.e. the replacement of old corpses with burnt corpses. This means that there was a change of religion. Moreover, this change was passed on to the later Turks (Göktürks) through succession and remained valid until the IXth century. Unfortunately, the scarcity of the cult objects recovered does not allow us to make a judgement on the new religion's view on spirits, while the written documents provide information from the later period, i.e. the IXth century, when everything changed completely.

The Chinese influence on the Ting-Lings is certain; remains of ceremonial umbrellas have been found both in Uybat tombs and in No-in-ula, where the Hun corgans are most abundant. Probably the Ting-ling had become Chineseised together with their masters the Huns. The most remarkable find that provides information about this period is a Han-era Chinese house near the city of Abakan. L.A. Yevtukhova, who found this house, that it was a palace belonging to Li Ling and his descendants.³⁹ Along with new cultures, old Tingling traditions, such as tattooing on the hands of heroes, preserved.⁴⁰

36 Age., p. 456.

37 Age., Scheme, I and XIII.

38 Bichurin, *Sobranie*, I/68.

39 Yevtuhova L.A. i Levashova V.P. Raskopki kitayskogo doma bliz Abakana/KSI-IMK. T. XII; Yevkuhova L.A. Razvalini dvortsa v zemle Chyagas. KSI-IMK. T. XXI. Kiselev S.V. Drevnava istoriya Yuiinov Sibiri. c. 479-484.

40 Bichurin, *Sobranie*, I/351.

Archaeological findings were unearthed in the second Pazyryk kurgan. In the Tashtik period, the Ting-ling culture was a mixed culture and existed until the II century AD.

The Ting-ling level of life was also developed: Primitive agricultural methods, sedentary farming and hunting formed the basis of social life. In addition to leather clothes, they also wore clothes made of Chinese silk fabrics. There was also progress in metalworking: Gold was used and iron production had begun,⁴¹ but bronze was still in its infancy.

The social structure rapidly during this period. Weapons and valuables were not placed in ordinary graves, but they are found in abundance in the graves of the rich. S.V. Kiselev surmises that the aristocracy was well established in this period and that "the funeral rites of the warrior cavalymen differed from those of their ordinary tribesmen; their tombs included the sacrifice of their servants, probably slaves, who had no legal status and were believed to accompany the deceased in the afterlife."⁴² Indeed, Chinese sources the existence of slavery among the Kyrgyz.⁴³ Perhaps slavery is an institution inherited from the Hun period. According to S.V. Kiselev, who analysed the graves of rich people, the similarities in terms of clan aristocracy were also very high.⁴⁴ It must be admitted that the influence of the Eastern Huns began to be seen in the Ting-ling from the I century A.D., but the elements of Western culture also continued to exist in a relict form.

41 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnay Sibiri*; Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/352.

42 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya Yüjnay Sibiri*, p. 475.

43 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/354.

44 Kiselev S.W. *Drevnaya istoriya*..p. 476.

SECTION XII

FREEDOM

Khan's Politics through the Eyes of His Contemporaries

By the end of the first century BC, the Chinese Empire had reached the borders that were only replaced 2,000 years later by the Manchurian Empire. Let us now take a look at how contemporary Chinese at that time assessed the situation.

"The endeavours to dominate the Huns in the time of Wu-ti turned into unrest when they annexed the western regions to their borders and allied with the Tankuts in the south. But when the Chinese built four towns to possess Ordos, built Yü-men Huan, cut off the Huns' right arm, and opened roads to the western end to cut off their relations with the Tankuts and Yuechis in the south, the yabgu, without reinforcements, retreated (northwards from the Great Wall). Moreover, there were as yet no principalities in the southern parts of the sandy steppes. For five generations from Emperor Wen-ti [179-157] the people were at peace. The empire was rich and the army was large and powerful. So when they saw rhinos and tortoises, they explored a total of seven regions, such as Chu-ya and so on. Envyng orange juice and bamboo walking sticks, they discovered Chang-k'o and Yü-yeh-sui; learning about winged horses and grapes, they reached Davan and An-hsi. Thereafter the palaces of the monarch were filled with lustrous pearls, ornate tortoise heads, transparent rhinoceros horns, and the feathers of the ma- vi raven of the south. The palace stables were stocked with the finest horses from foreign countries, large elephants, lions and greyhounds that ran as fast as the wind. Most of the birds and wild animals were hunted and fed. Foreigners began to come from all over the world. So they expanded Shang-ling-Yüan and dug Lake K'un-ming. They uncovered (?) the palace of Ch'ien-men wang-hu-kung. They raised the sacred Shen-ming-t'ai tower. The Emperor, adorned with pearls and precious stones piled up like a mountain

They built the palaces of Chia I and the like. The Son of Heaven, standing under splendid shields, dressed in splendid robes and seated on a throne decorated with nephrite, opened the wine taps and the forest of meat (a hall decorated with trees in which roasted meat was placed - L.G.) to feast the foreign guests. The music, the various oocus-pocuses and the toy beasts of prey captured the eyes of the spectators. A mountain of money was needed for gifts to foreign guests, to hold distant countries and to send armies on campaign. When money was not enough, they levied a tax on the sale of wine, salt and iron; they poured silver coins and borrowed for their fur needs. Not enough; they imposed a toll tax on carriages, a navigation tax on boats, and taxes on all domestic animals. They robbed the people, but spent the state revenues. When the years of famine followed, riots broke out everywhere; it became impossible to walk on the roads... "1

Here, it should be recognised that Bichurin based this quotation on the historian Pan Ku. Because he has perfectly described the rise and fall of the Han dynasty and revealed many reasons for this rise and fall. Furthermore, as a natural dialectician, he proved that this or that event first led to the rise and then to the fall. Of course, not only external problems led to the decline, but also the tedious measures of the Han emperors played an important role, while internal economic and social problems accelerated the decline. We shall therefore turn to other Chinese authors.²

Against the monopoly systems on salt, iron and wine, a work entitled "Discussions on the Exploitation of Salt and Iron("Yen-te Lun") was written. I think this work was produced around the II-Ith century BC.³ It is noted in the work that the monopoly system and exorbitant prices disrupted agriculture, drove many people off the land, forced them to become herdsmen and led them to despise farming; it is also that great revenues would be obtained from trade with foreigners: "It is possible to buy several times as much gold from the Huns for one ball of common Chinese silk and thus exhaust the enemy's resources. Mules, donkeys and camels are brought to our borders and constantly supplied to us.

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/213-214.

2 It is a real work on the Huns. Because the information about the Chinese is given in general and the information about the Huns is explained as much as necessary.

3 Че. Краткий очерк истории Цинь Хань// Реферативный сборник. 1956. № 17, с. 161.

to the army. All the peoples were putting their horses and other species at our disposal. Sable, marten, fox and parsik furs, bright and patterned carpets fill our treasuries; jade, precious stones, corals and crystals constitute the capital of our principality. If these riches are not lost to other kingdoms, the needs of the people will be more than met. "⁴ Obviously, the author advises the government to make the peasants a shareholder of the state revenues, to reduce the prices of salt and iron, and to increase the prices of agricultural crops; he argues that the peasants, whose situation improves, can take their crops to the foreign market and this will increase the level of welfare. However, it was not possible for Wu-ti, who cut off the border trade with the Huns even though he was in dire need of money, to share these views.

"Yen-te-lun" certainly judges the exploitation of the labour of slaves and criminals. In China, slaves and criminals were used for state work, including iron production. According to "Yen-te lun", slaves did not work efficiently. The roads and mines were filthy. "Poor people were breaking their hands to pull logs. "⁵ But did Wu-ti care about this? He only needed "horses with wings".

Pan Ku also includes the accusatory views of Tung Chung-shu, one of the great scholars of Confucianism:

"During the reign of the Ch'in dynasty, the reforms of Shang Yang were modified; the systems of the former emperors were discarded, and the method of the half-cultivators' fields was abandoned.⁶ The people became able to buy and sell land. While the lands of the rich were constantly expanding and growing, the poor people were unable to sew their own clothes. In addition, the wealthy benefited from the lakes and rivers, and enjoyed the riches of the mountains and forests, how the poor people not worry? Military service and labour obligations increased 30 times more than before. Land and head tax, salt and iron duties have increased 20 times compared to the past. Some of them work as labourers in the fields with brute force. That is why poor people constantly wear animal skins and eat dog and banana meat. This not only weakens them, but also makes them vulnerable to greedy and

4 Цит. по кн. Хрестоматия по истории древнего мира. Т. I, М., 1950. С. 318.

5 Там.

6 Land for sharecroppers: A system in which state land is divided and distributed to certain farmers, who then give a portion of their income to the state.

narrow government officials conspire against them and kill them. Fleeing persecution with no support, the people retreat into the forests and mountains to become bandits. Half-naked people are caught halfway and thrown into prison. Within a year their number will reach thousands and tens of thousands. When the Han dynasty came to power, they kept the situation the same. Even if the old system of half-farmers' fields cannot be introduced immediately, it is necessary to return to a form somewhat close to the old one. Unlimited land ownership must be abolished and the rich must be equalised with those who do not own enough land. It is necessary to put an end to the seizure of land and to supply the people with salt and iron. The system of slavery must be abolished and the killing of slaves forbidden. In order to improve the condition of the people, taxes must be reduced and obligations limited. Only then can ... be governed well. "7

Wu-ti did not get along with the Confucianist master either, but his successors began to look for ways out of these difficult internal problems. At the end of the first century, the slaves working in the mines revolted. The Chinese economy and social life were paralysed for the sake of vanity. Senior officials named K'un Huang and Ho Wu appealed to Emperor P'ing- ti (1-5 AD) with a report stating their demands: "...princes, officials and commoners should not own more than 300 mou (one mou is 6 hectares-L.G.) of land; princes should not own more than 200 slaves, officials and commoners more than 30. A law must be valid for three years..."8 But Han manorschism did not find it appropriate to take responsibility for such a thing. Thereupon, in the year VIII AD, the prime minister Wang Mang usurped the throne.

Anyway, let us leave China aside for now and to the Huns.

Huns under Chinese Patronage

Yabgu Hu-han-yeh died in 31 BC, leaving behind many children. He willed that his eldest son by his second wife should succeed to the throne and his younger brother should succeed him. This will of his became the force of law in later years.

7 История первой династии Хань Бань Бяо, Бань Гу и Бань Чжао//Двадцать пять лет династических историй. Т. 1., 1935. Пер. Л.Д. Позднеевской; см. Хрестоматия по истории древнего мира. С. 320.

8 Хрестоматия по истории древнего мира. С. 325.

The crown prince ascended the throne with the title Fu-chu-lei-jo-ti-yabgu. The epithet "Jo- ti" meant "honourable" (emulation of the emperor) and implied a refusal of suzerainty. In 25 he came to the palace and offered his allegiance, in return for which he was presented with a large quantity of silk and paper wadding. But he died in 20, leaving the throne to his brother, who took the title Su-hsia-jo-ti-yab- gu. Su-hsia sent his son to serve the Chinese court. When he died in 12, his uncle Ch'e-ya-jo-ti-yabgu succeeded to the throne. But in 8 he also died and this time his younger brother Wu-chu-liu-jo-ti became yabgu. All of these yabgu sent their eldest sons as hostages to serve the Chinese court, which they respected. Political supremacy in the steppe was definitely in the hands of the Chinese. However, it is not possible to think that the thirty years of peaceful life did not affect the Hun society. Indeed, Hun society had come under the influence of Chinese culture. The embrace of civilisation had led them away from the wild life and the charm of this civilisation had more or less influenced the imagination of nomads. Thus, a new era opened in the steppe tradition. Although many people had lost their lives with Chi-chi, the intervening 30 years had compensated for these losses. As a matter of fact, the events that took place in 5 BC made it clear that this was of little importance. A Wu-sun prince, following in the footsteps of his ancestors, had attempted to attack the Hun nomads in an attempt to seize wealth and fame; at first he had some success, capturing some olga, but Wu-chu-liu-yabgu came with his army and dealt the prince such a blow that not only did he recover the olga and prisoners of war, but the prince sent his sons as hostages to the Hun encampment and repented of ever attacking this dangerous neighbour again.⁹

Immediately Wu-chu-liu's accession to the throne and the improvement of the situation, the Chinese government decided to trim the Hun lands. The envoy sent a proposal to the Yugu to surrender a small piece of land to China. This land was covered with forest. Its trees were suitable for making arrows and the eagles' fibres were perfect for arrow backs. Yab- gu rejected this offer and gave a warning to the emperor. The emperor replied that the envoy had overstepped his bounds and made such an offer, and that he would be beheaded, but later he pardoned the envoy and exiled him to the south. In 1 BC, the yabgu visited the Chinese court and received gifts that were much larger than those of his predecessors. Han rule

* Jo-ti is translated in some sources as "connection to ancestral land." (trans.)

9 McGovern W. *The early empires of Central Asia*. L., 1939. P. 154-155.

He was diligently trying to keep the peace. But in I B.C. Ai-ti died and the young P'ing-ti succeeded to the throne. Although it was announced that the empress grandmother would rule the throne by proxyreal rule was in the hands of Wang Mang, her lover. Wang Mang considered himself very powerful. Therefore, he attempted to make decisive changes in China's domestic and foreign policy.

In 4 the Chinese regional governor¹⁰ forbade the Wu-huans to pay taxes to the Huns. When the tax collector arrived, the Wu-huans refused to pay. Thereupon the collector hanged a Wu-huan aksakal by his legs. Armed relatives of the aksakal, who were very angry at the incident, killed the collector. This time the yabgu the Eastern Chu-ki-prince to take revenge. Having no chance, the Wu-huans fled for their lives to the mountains, leaving their homes and families behind. The Huns captured about a thousand women and children and refused to return them for ransom.¹¹ Wang Mang could not help the Wu-huans in any way.

Meanwhile, the Wu-huans were divided among themselves. Since the children of the younger k'un-mo Wu-ch'ü-t'u died during the internal conflicts, the throne was given to a new prince by the Chinese. When the elder k'un-mo Ch'i-li-mi started to implement the Chinese administrative system in his country and prevented his clansmen from grazing their flocks in their own pastures, they got angry and killed K'un-mo. The Chinese reacted violently and beheaded many people, guilty and innocent;¹² thereupon, one of the princes took 80 thousand Wu-suns to K'ang-chü in 11 BC. This prince asked for military help from K'ang-chü against own country, but it seems that he did not receive this help and tried to make a treaty with the Chinese; however, he was besieged and killed by the Chinese troops who attacked suddenly.


After this event, the Wu-suns are almost never mentioned. It is only recorded that in 436, as a result of the pressure of the Jujans, the Wu-suns left their nomadic lands and migrated to the "Lukoviye Mountains" ¹³, i.e. the western foothills of T'ien-shan. It is stated that at that time the Wu-suns did not attract anyone's attention due to their small population. Probably their remnants were assimilated among the Tajiks.

10 A high-ranking official in charge of dealing with the affairs of the subjugated tribes and looking after China's interests thereregional commissioner.

11 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/103.

12 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/197.

13 Age., p. 258.



Chang Ch'ien'e Göre M.Ö. 135 Yılı Civarında İç Asya

The rulers of the western end were absolutely dissatisfied with being under the domination of China, but they could not do anything about it. However, they exhibited negative behaviour towards China. For example, the ruler of Kucha brought Chinese clothes and customs to his palace, but those who were outraged by this said: "A donkey is not a donkey; a horse is not a horse. It would probably be more accurate to call it a mule."¹⁴ But still, they could not even think of throwing off the Chinese yoke. Because there was a huge difference in the balance of forces.

Sometimes things happen in life that are so small that they lead to big events. In 3, a senior Chinese official arrested K'u-chü-ya, the magistrate of Arka Ch'e-shi- h. K'u-chü-ya tried to save himself by bribery, but to no avail. Realising that the fate awaiting him was imprisonment and death, the judge fled to the Huns, risking all kinds of risks. Together with him, a Chinese officer of Hun origin named T'ang-t'u also took refuge with the Huns. T'ang-t'u was afraid of Wang Mang, with whom he was an accomplice due to some personal accounts. Yabgu them as refugees, but under pressure from Wang he had to hand them over to the Chinese envoy. He still asked for the pardon of K'u-chü-ya and T'ang-t'u, but Wang Mang had them both beheaded.¹⁵ The relations between Yabgu and the Chinese regional governor were not good. Nevertheless, the old treaty was in force between the two parties, which included the following clauses: "From today Han and Hyung-nu will become one dynasty. The parties shall not deceive or attack each other. In case of theft, the parties shall inform each other; the offender shall be executed and the informer shall be rewarded. In case of any attack, the parties shall help each other militarily. Whoever breaks this treaty first, let Heaven punish him, and let his descendants and his descendants' descendants be punished with chains."¹⁶ A clause now added to this treaty that the Huns could not accept refugees from China, Wu-sun, the inhabitants of the western end and the Wu-huans.¹⁷ Furthermore, since Wang Mang had banned double names in China, the yabgu was offered to take a single name. Wu-chu-liu-yabgu did not object and changed his personal name Nang-chi Ya-sih to Ch'i.

14 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/204.

15 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/101; II/210.

16 Age., p. 92.

17 Age., p. 102.

These were still small matters. For when Wang Mang ascended to the throne, he would want much more - unlimited power - inside and outside China. Such power had never been granted to anyone before him. Because even Chinese emperors were accountable before the law.

Wang Mang Power and Reforms

After his accession to the throne, Wang Mang, inspired by Confucianist ideas, declared that the Han dynasty favoured the strong and oppressed the weak, that people lived off the backs of others, and that "the human being is more sacred than anything else".¹⁸ He started with the relations with farmers. The decree he issued briefly as follows: "As of today, I am making the following changes: All lands belonging to the empire shall be called the land of the sovereign; male and female slaves shall be partially dependent. All of them [lands and slaves] shall not be sold or bought. If the number of men is less than eight and the area of the land is more than the area of the state's half-fields, this excess land may be sold to their ninth cousins, neighbours or fellow-countrymen. All those who do not have land will receive a certain amount of land according to the law from today onwards. Those who deliberately disrupt the system of state-owned land for the state, who harm people in violation of the law, will be sent to the frontiers to defend the country against the demons of the mountains." ¹⁹

Wang Mang also changed the old coin minting system. According to the old system, anyone could mint coins made of copper and pewter, provided that they paid the patent tax. Since the coin values of the coins were not subject to income tax at the time of minting, this procedure led to the emergence of counterfeit coins. In the second century BC, the inconsistency of this system was demonstrated, but it was still popular.²⁰ Wang Mang issued an edict forbidding the minting of coins: "Whoever dares to engage in the unlawful minting of coins ... shall have all his property confiscated, and he, together with four of his neighbours who know of the crime but do not report it, shall become slaves of the state." ²¹ Since it is not possible to prevent one's neighbour from committing a crime not uncommon to hold one's neighbours responsible.

18 Хрестоматия по истории древнего мира. С. 326.

19 Там же. С. 326-327.

20 Там. С. 319.

21 Там же. С. 326-327.

would have led to the death of an innocent person. Coin minting had been a valid profession for two hundred years, and this was the only means of livelihood for those who did it, as they could not do anything else. In order not to die of starvation, they began to mint coins, and of course the following severe punishment awaited them: "Among the people who violated the law of minting money, five families were arrested and all their property was confiscated and they became slaves of the state. There were about a hundred thousand of them. They were handed over to government officials looking for illegal money... Six or seven out of every ten died from the heat and torture..."²²

There was also strict control in trade: "Middle-ranking officials used to come to the markets at all times during the year and set the highest, middle and lowest prices for goods according to their own tastes. Each of these officials, without interfering in the territory of the other, would charge inconsistent prices in his own market. If the demand for the five kinds of wheat, flax cloth, silk cloth, yarn, and other goods was high, then they would be kept unsold; the constables or officials would not allow the prices to be lowered, but would determine the actual value of the goods and allow them to be sold at the original price. If the price of a commodity was found to be even one ch'ieng too high, then it was sold to the public at the middle price. If the price of the commodity fell below the middle price, then those who had previously bought the commodity at the higher price would bring it back and exchange it or receive the difference."²³ Of course, this law was explained in the following way: Wang Mang wanted to limit the concentration of money in certain hands and thus increase state revenues.

The results of the laws were immediately recognised: "...farmers and merchants began to sit idle. Producers and goods withdrew from the market. The people lamented the state of the markets and the roads. It was not possible to count the number of those convicted among the zâdegâns, officials, ordinary people whose only offence was to sell their fields, slaves and money changers..."

The large number of slaves allowed Wang Mang to build palaces and houses of worship, but this time there were not enough slaves to work in construction. "Wang Mang gathered artists and painters from all over the country...In each temple, many halls, towers

22 Tam.

23 Tam.

and the main pillars. The main pillars were covered with fine copper, gold, silver and carved ornaments according to the skill of the craftsmen. Millions were spent. Several thousand slaves and prisoners died... "24

Wang Mang's reforms provoked violent reactions, so that a few years later was forced to amend the law prohibiting the sale and purchase of land and slaves. At the end of the 12th year, he issued a decree stating that "the sovereign's plantations and partly free slaves, which have been granted for the purpose of providing sustenance, may be bought and sold without restriction. "25 This law was enacted to protect the interests of landowners, slave traders and, it seems, civil servants who had become wealthy while holding government office, as well as the *zâdegâns* who had unlimited land holdings. The law that had originally been enacted for peasants and slaves was shelved. Senior officials and officers were so necessary to Wang Mang that he eventually agreed to share the state's revenues with them. But he was unwilling to share the throne with anyone. He disregarded the masses of the people and relied on soldiers chosen from among those who had broken their ropes, criminals sentenced to death, runaway slaves and vagabonds to maintain his prestige.²⁶ China had never witnessed such a rigid and powerful ruler. These were the results of the Confucianist doctrines practised.²⁷

The break of the Huns from China

Wang Mang began to be as strict in his dealings with the Huns as he had been in his own country. After he was well convinced of the power of his sovereignty, he thought that he would include the Hun yabg among the vassal principalities. For this purpose, it was necessary to change the state seal used by the yabg.

On the seal given to Hu-han-yeh-yabgu in 47 B.C. the words "Hyung- nu shan-yü hsi", i.e. "State Seal of the Hun Yabga", were engraved. Wang Mang ordered another seal to be engraved and the words "Hsin Hyung-nu shan-yü chang" - "New Sign of the Hun Yabg-

24 Там.

25 Там.

26 Там.

27 "Wang Mang's utopian Confucianist projects were neither able to abolish land as such, nor to abolish slavery." (Симоновская Л. В. Очерки истории Китая. М., 1956. С.32).

to be inscribed on the seals. In China, such seals were given to princes and high-ranking state officials. After accepting this seal, Yabgu would have lost his status as an independent ruler.²⁸

In the ninth year of A.D., a Chinese envoy came to the yabgu and told him about the change of dynasty in his country and asked him to give the old seal and take a new one. Although Eastern Ku-hsi-prince Su advised the kogu to take the new seal after checking it, the kogu, convinced by the intervention of the envoy, gave the old seal and took the new one without looking at it. Then a banquet was organised which continued until midnight. The envoy, fearing that the khagan would demand the return of the old seal, broke it. Indeed, the Huns came in the morning and demanded the old seal because the translators had broken the new one. But the envoy was stern and said that the change of the seal was the order of the new emperor and the yabgun was obliged to accept the new title. Realising that the situation would not change, the yabgu accepted the gifts and gave the impression that he agreed with everything. Encouraged by his success, the envoy demanded that the Wu-huan refugees, whom he saw in the otba of the Yabgu, be handed over to him. Yabgu not only accepted this request, but also sent 10 thousand cavalry to the border under the pretext of capturing the new refugees. The Hun cavalry set off and settled in Shuo-fang fortress.

In the tenth year the Chinese high commissioner T'ao-hu had the prince of Arka Ch'e- shih beheaded. Thereupon the prince's brother gathered his people and sought refuge with the Huns. The prince, who was well received, with the help of a cavalry force of 2,000 men, attacked the Chinese garrison at the western end. T'ao-hu was ill and left the defence to his aides. They, however, "fearing to be put to the sword altogether, seeing that the western end was drawing nearer to rebellion and the Huns were preparing for a great invasion "²⁹ killed their commander and took the side of the Huns. Yabgu welcomed them with respect and gave positions to each of them. Of course, this situation was considered as a cause for war. Thereupon the commander of the southern wing and the prince of Western I-chi-ch'i attacked the garrison at the western end, although they achieved nothing. Wang Mang was furious. Accustomed to buying Chinese officials and commanders with money, he tried to do the same with the Huns. Hu-han-yeh invited the princes, who were relatives of the kinsman to a banquet. His intention was to choose fifteen of them to be

28 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/103.

29 Age., p. 105; II/211.

to divide the power of the Huns by replacing them. But these efforts did not yield any results. Because the Hun princes were unwilling to betray. The Chinese were able to attract only the prince of Hien (Kien) to their side. As he did not suspect anything, he went to the banquet with his two sons. His intention was to be feasted and receive gifts. But the Chinese captured him and "forcibly made him a yabgu" in 11 AD.³⁰

Learning of what had happened, yabgu Wu-chu-liu immediately remembered that Wang Mang was not Hsüan-ti's grandson and declared that he would not obey a usurper. The war began. The Hun cavalry crossing the Chinese border captured large numbers of prisoners and herds of cattle. Regions that had not seen an enemy for eighty years were empty within a year.

Enraged, Wang Mang ordered an army of 300,000 men to mobilise and "drive the Huns to Ting-ling", i.e. to the Sayan Mountains.³¹ They tried in vain to explain to him that they lacked adequate organisation, arguing that a large army could not find support in the steppes and that the transport of special weights would pose significant problems. The skilful commanders to continue the war with mobile troops, slaughtering the Hun nomads and capturing their herds, which were the material support of the enemy. But Wang Mang heeded none of this, and preparations for war continued. "While the Empire was preparing for war"³² the Huns attacked and looted everywhere, making the march impossible.

Wang Mang, endeavouring to turn the Huns against each other, sent the prince of Hien, to whom he had given a new seal, to be the yabgu. But this last, instead of carrying out the emperor's instructions, went straight to the legitimate suzerain and told him that he had been proclaimed suzerain by force. Wu-chu-liu did not kill him. On the contrary, he sent him to fight against the Chinese with the rank of Yü-su-chi Chi-hou, the lowest rank in the Huns.

When the news spread in China, Wang Mang killed Hien's son. His other son had already died of disease. But this had no effect on the front. Since such a large army could not be mustered and mobilised, morale was low and the long march impractical. In the meantime...

30 Age., p. 106.

31 Age., p. 107.

32 Age., p. 109.

All the bases along the borders were destroyed by the Huns and the border regions were turned into a desert.

Fortunately for Wang Mang, his enemy Wu-chu-liu yabgu died in 13 AD.

Noin-ula

Wu-chu-liu yabgu was given a magnificent funeral and lay in his tomb in the kurgan for 1911 years. In 1924 this kurgan was opened by P.K. Kozloff's team. Now its finds are stored in the Hermitage Museum. The date of the kurgan can be precisely determined thanks to the note on the lacquered Chinese cup: "September, 5th year. Made in Ch'ien-ning, Wan-t'an-ching. The decorator is the painter Huo. The other maker I, the controller P'i-yen-wu." This date corresponds to 2 BC. Below the finca the inscription "Shan-lin". This is the name of a palace park near Ch'ang-an. It was there that Yabgu Wu-chu-liu was received by the emperor in 1 BC and presented with valuable gifts.³³

6 No. kurgan (Noin-ula) collection exhibits items used by the Huns. The most important place is occupied by Chinese, Bactrian and locally made fabrics. The available items show that the Huns were influenced by the Scythian "wild animal" styles. A silver ferahi is engraved with an ox with an anthropomorphic head. The face of the head has a Mongoloid character; the long hair, flowing downwards, is combed right from the dividing line. This was probably the hair-combing fashion of the Huns in the first century. The ox is on the mountains, schematically represented against two graceful pine trees. The most striking thing is the hair. They are thrown back above the right ear with a prominent hairpin, somewhat coquettishly. A very vivid detail. Such hairpins were also found in other kurgans belonging to the Noin-ula group. They were woven from horse mane and kept in a casing.

A.N. Bernchtam surmises that "it was put there by those who were under the rule of the Huns "³⁴, but on the ferahi we see hair thrown back from the top of the ear.

³³ Bernchtam A. N. *Ocherki istorii gunnov*, p. 37-38.

³⁴ Age., p. 46-47.

ruz. This means that they form part of the carefully combed hair. The wavy hair does not harmonise at all with the face, which has a Mongoloid character. The hairpin, on the other hand, forces us to recall the more Mongoloid Tashtik masks and perhaps the face beneath it. I think that a Mongoloid face with Sienpi hair, and the Far Eastern countenance in general, made the Huns of the first century more beautiful than the westerners. As a matter of fact, today's big-eyed, beak-nosed Telengites are considered ugly.

This means that the ideal Far Eastern beauty of the first century BC was influenced by Western elements, which are still preserved in the traditional (Scythian "wild beast" style objects) plastic arts.³⁵ The high skill and good taste of the Hun craftsmen, who knew and sometimes imitated Chinese art of the first century BC, show that art and culture were highly developed.³⁶ Other archaeological finds from the period between the first century BC and the first century AD also attest to this. Foremost among these findings are the remains of ancient sedentary peoples of the Han period, which show that the Huns gradually became sedentary.³⁷ Comparison of these findings with memories of famine and locust swarms destroying corn crops us to conclude that the Huns were engaged in agriculture as well as animal husbandry.³⁸

In the first century, the same thing was observed among the Wu-suns. Archaeologists have also found Wu-sun ceramics among charred grain and millstones.³⁹ With our present knowledge we are not in a position to decide whether agriculture among nomads was influenced by Chinese influence,⁴⁰ or whether it developed on its own due to the need for bread. The abundance of Chinese artefacts in the western regions the first possibility. For example, mirrors from the Han period were found on the banks of the Volga.

35 The Noin-ula finds and other recovered artefacts described in detail. See Teplov S. A. *Raskopki kurganov v gorax Noin-ula*. L., 1925; Kozlov P. K. Современная Монголия - Ноин-улинские памятники. JL., 1925; Trever S.V. Excavations in north-ern Mongolia. L., 1932; Бернштам А.Н. Гунский могильник Ноин-ула // Известия отделения общественных наук. 1937. № 4 и путеводители по Государственному Эрмитажу.

36 Vasilyev L.S. *Kulturniye i torgoviyya svyazi Xanskogo Kitaya s narodami Tsentralnoy i Sredney Azii* // ВИАМ. 1958. № 5. С. 37-38.

37 Over two hundred villages and towns. See Valishev S. V. *Drevniye groda Mongolii* // Сов. Археология. 1957. № 2. С. 91-101; Перлээ. К истории древних городов и поселении в Монголии // Сов. Археология. 1957. № 3. Р. 43-53.

38 Vasilyev L.S. *Kulturniye i torgoviye svyazi*, p. 42.

39 Rudenko S.I. *Kultura naseleniya Gornogo Altaya v skifskoye vremya* p. 10.

40 Vasilyev L.S. *Kulturniye i torgovya svyazi*, p. 42.

The Chinese were not to be found in the Roman Empire.⁴¹ Exquisite Chinese lacquerware has been found in Wu-sun tombs.⁴² Although there were no Chinese in the Roman Empire, there was an abundance of Chinese silk. In the "Stone Tower" near Kashkar, Sogdian merchants collected Chinese goods and took them to Bactria (Balkh), where they were sold to the Parthians, who in turn sent them to the Romans.⁴³ Due to these imports, the Roman budget had a deficit of 20 million sesterces every year. This money, paid in gold, was, of course, going into the pockets of the Sogdians and Parthians, not the Chinese.⁴⁴

However, Chinese culture did not spread only through gifts. The Chinese had travelled to the steppe on various occasions and lived in the neighbourhood of the Hun lands. For example, the biggest migration took place in BC.

Ts'in (Ch'in) dynasty in the III century.⁴⁵ In times of war, Chinese slaves formed the resident Hun subjects of the eunuch.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Chinese women and their aunts, sent to the eunuch and princes as wives, brought Chinese tastes and culture, while large numbers of refugees, recruited into service and proving their careers (e.g. Wei Liu and Li Ling), taught the Huns the finer points of diplomacy and the art of war. There was certainly a strong Chinese influence on Hun culture, but it would not be correct to recognise this as a modification of Hun art and ideology. Because daily life revealed that perfection had to be stronger than examples and influences. It may be thought that the avoidance of importing bread wheat from China accelerated the development of Hun and Wu-sun agriculture. According to this view, the alliance with China during the reign of Hu-han-yeh and his successors halted the Huns' transition to sedentism; the abundant wheat given as a gift to the yabgus drove the nomads away from opening fields and , and encouraged them to engage in tsarvac to meet the demand for leather, which was much needed in the Chinese domestic market. Indeed, the Huns' subservience to China allowed them to remain a nomadic society engaged in tsarvari. This difference was also reflected in their policies when the Huns found themselves in the centre of a maelstrom of events.

41 Rudenko S.I. *Kultura naseleniya Gornogo...* p10.

42 Всеволодский М.В., Грязнов М.П. Усунские могильники, с. 168.

43 Herman A. *Die Seidenstrassen vom alten China nach dem Römischen Reich/Mitteilungen der Geographische Gesellschaft in Wien.* Bd. 58, 1915, p. 482.

44 Vasilyev L.S. *Kulturnye i torgovyye svyazi*, 0. 48.

45 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/78.

46 Davidov A.W. Ivolginskoye gorodisha (k voprosu o gunnskikh poseleniyax v Zabaykalye) // Сов. Археология. 1956. № 25. С. 268-273 и 295-300.

Dynasty Change

already noted, there was no unanimity of opinion on fundamental political issues among the Huns. Wu-chu-liu's iron fist had pushed the people to the path of war; but after his death those in favour of peace began to make their voices heard. And they were probably guided by the imperial Su- pu-t'ang. From his name it is clear that he was one of the lords of the Su-pu tribe who held the court. Hu-han-yeh had married the daughter of the Chinese Wang Chao-ch'un, who had been given to the yabga as a wife in 33 ^{BC}⁴⁷ and had a son by him. After the death of her first husband, she married his successor Fu-chu-lei, by whom she had two daughters⁴⁸; one of these daughters was married to Su-pu-t'ang. Later, in order to end the war with China, she replaced her brother-in-law with Hien, who had previously favoured Wang Mang.

Hien the title of Wu-liu-jo-ti-yabgu to Hien, his younger brother, one of the most prominent commanders of the warrior party, the title of Eastern Lu-li-prince, and Su-t'u-hu-pien, son of Wu-chu-liu, the title of Eastern Chu-ki-prince. In fact, Hien hated Wu-chu-liu, who had once put him in an embarrassing situation. Therefore, he dismissed Su-t'u-hu-pien from his post and made him regent of his son with the title of Hu-wu, "Your Highness". But Su-t'u-hu-pien soon disappeared. There is no definite information about his murder or death. Hien's brother Yü thus became the Chu-ki-prince of the East.

In 14 AD, Hien sent an emissary to China to inform the emperor that the new foreigner wished to initiate peace negotiations. Wang Mang offered Hien to hand over the traitors of Ch'e-shih in exchange for his son. In fact he had deceived the Huns by claiming that his son was alive. When Hien handed over 27 refugees, Wang Mang burnt them all in the square. After this incident, Wang Mang considered the war as over, withdrew his army and left the security of the borders to Hun and Wu-huan mercenaries. Hien, who was waiting for the return of his son, was at the same time preventing his subjects from continuing the war with all his might. But in May of the 15th year, the body of his son and the captive Hun lords who witnessed the execution were sent. The Chinese tried to appease the Yabgu with gifts. The Yabgu the gifts, but

47 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/93.

48 Age., p. 97.

The war in the steppes ceased to interfere with the war in the steppes, and so the war resumed with a new vigour.

The Wu-huans whom Wang Mang brought into the Chinese army by taking their families as hostages. The chiefs of the rebels agreed with the Huns and took their tribes away.⁴⁹ The Hun princes, who no longer supported the yabgu, violated the Chinese border. Wang Mang, who had demobilised his army, started to recruit troops again.

Meanwhile, Karashar at the western end rebelled and surrendered to the Huns. One of the Chinese troops, which came to suppress the rebellion, was besieged and put to the sword the soldiers who scattered and fled were completely destroyed. The other troop, which managed to enter Ka-rashar and kill a few people, was able to retreat back to China safely. The governor, who hid in Kucha, was also killed when no help came from China.⁵⁰ The Huns captured the whole western end. Only Yarkend retained its loyalty to China.⁵¹

In 18, when Hien died, his brother Yü, who took the title of Hu-tu-êrh Shih-tao-kao-jo-ti-yabgu, succeeded to the throne. Yü tried to come to terms with Wang Mang, but the latter again turned to his plan of dismembering the Huns from within. Although he declared his suzerainty by attracting Su-pu-t'ang, who came to negotiate with him, to his side, when Su-pu-t'ang fell ill and died soon after, Wang Mang lost the opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of the Huns.

The Rebellion of the "Redcaps" and the Death of Wang Mang

In 17 AD, what happened to the Huns and Wu-suns happened to the Chinese: Civil war!

The form of the conflicts in the three countries was different: In the Huns, between tribes; in the Wu-suns, between princes who turned their backs on their favoured Chinese or K'ang-chü troops; in China, between the people and the state. The main reason for the popular revolt was that Wang Mang's reforms, although not endorsed by his aides, had made life unbearable. In addition, the number of people who started banditry increased due to the famine caused by the famine. The leaders of these bandits were not well-known people.

⁴⁹ Age., p. 145.

⁵⁰ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/212.

⁵¹ Age., p. 330.

but they were brave and energetic: Wang Kuang and Wang Feng of Hu-pei and Fan Ch'ung of Shan-tung. "When Wang Mang sent an army against them, they painted their eyebrows red to distinguish their warriors from Wang Mang's soldiers. "⁵²

revolting people directed their anger not at the old cadre newly elected officials. The aim of the rebels was to restore the Han dynasty empire. They had even installed Liu Peng-tse as emperor. Those who hated the rebels the most were the officials of the hated gâ- sîb.

It is interesting to note that the Huns, meanwhile, also came into the realm of legitimisation and refused to obey Wang Mang because he was not from the Han dynasty. Wang Mang relied only on his purchased supporters, which determined the course of the battles. Some time after the peasant revolts, conspiracy preparations began among the soldiers. "Ma Shih-ch'ü of Wu-zü-liu, in concert with his fellow soldiers, decided to revolt the soldiers in Yen and Chao and behead Wang Mang." But on a tip-off the conspirators were caught and beheaded. "Now Wang Mang's luck was reversed. The people were continually firing at him..."⁵³

In 21, in the "Green Forests" of South China, more than ten thousand people revolted. When they were pressed by the armies of the state, they retreated to the mouth of the Yang-tse. That's why they were called "Lower River Rebels". The rebels in the regions with rivers and lakes elected a man named Prince Fan as their leader. Members of the Liu tribe, to which the Han dynasty belonged, also joined Prince Fan. "The bandits initially rebelled out of hunger and misery. They thought they could return to their villages after harvesting the crops. But their numbers grew and reached tens of thousands. They could not attack the cities and plundered food from morning till night. As the overlords and commanders in the towns perished in fights with each other, the bandits were unable to kill them. Wang Mang, however, did not understand it in this way. "⁵⁴ In order to fight the rebels, he raised an army of freed slaves and pardoned criminals, which he called the "Wild Boar Attack". In the meantime, all of eastern China had been captured by the insurgents, and the northern borders had been

52 Хрестоматия по истории древнего мира. Т. I. С. 328.

53 Там. С. 329.

54 Там. С. 330.

It was plundered by the Huns. A locust infestation added to the disasters caused by the wars.

At first the "Wild Boars" were successful, but when they met the main forces of the "Red-brows" they suffered a heavy defeat.

In the winter of 23, the former state officials took Prince Liu Hsiu of the Han dynasty as their leader and revolted. The supporters of Liu Hsiu set up their own war organisation and began to issue edicts. Allied with the "Kyzylkash", but not united with them, they organised their own rule.

Enraged, Wang Mang ordered the formation of a new army called "Tiger's Teeth", but this army was also defeated by Liu Hsiu. Only a few thousand of the "Tiger's Teeth" were able to return to the capital. The Han army's offensive turned into a triumphal march. Han's grandson (Liu Hsüan) was proclaimed emperor under the name of Heng-shih. Wang Mang's soldiers and officers vied with each other to show their loyalty to the Han dynasty emperor.

When military movements broke out in Shen-si and Shan-si, Wang , who had been overwhelmed by the Huns, withdrew the army on the northern frontiers and led it against the insurgents, but the masses of the people continued their fraternal resistance to the hated regime. Small bands of insurgents, risking all kinds of dangers, stormed the gates of the capital, Ch'ang-an. Their only thought was to be the first to enter the city.

Faced with this situation, Wang Mang released the criminals in the prisons and drove them against the rebels; but the criminals scattered and fled in all directions. The insurgents opened the tombs of the Wang Mang family and burned the bodies. They also destroyed nine temples, palaces and imperial schools. Smoke filled the city, and in the meantime the criminals entered through the northern gates.

Even though the usurper's supporters realised very well that they had lost the game, they refused to surrender. As the circle around them narrowed, the street fighting continued until the Wang Mang supporters resorted to arrows. Wang Mang was the only one who did not understand what was going on around him. When he saw the smoke of fire enveloping the huge Chien-t'ai ha- vuz, realised that the ranks of those fighting on his side were thinning, and heard the cries of his enemies, he said only this: "This

or will he allow the Han soldiers to harm me?"⁵⁵ Finally, the insurgents entered the palace and, in hand-to-hand combat, overthrew the last of the guards. When the harem's favourite showed where Wang Mang was hiding, the crowd turned to that shelf and the usurper was killed on the spot.

The supporters of Wang Mang surrendered unconditionally, "recognising that the reign belonged to the Han dynasty forever". But the bloodshed continued.

Re-establishment of the Han Dynasty

The feudal lords and peasants had joined hands and overthrown the government, but their interests were different. Under the leadership of Liu Peng-tse, the "Redcaps" started a civil war against the overlords in 25.⁵⁶

The Hun lord supported the "Kyzylkash". Thanks to the support of the Huns, the leader of the insurgents Liu Peng-tse and his commander Fan Ch'ung won a complete victory. In 27, the capital again fell into the hands of the rebels and Emperor Heng-shih was killed, but his uncle's cousin Liu Hsiu led his comrades-in-arms and defeated Liu Peng-tse, thus establishing the new Eastern (or Muahhar, or Lesser) Han dynasty after taking the title of Kuang Wu-ti.

Thus, these civil wars in the first century AD shook the Chinese imperial system to its foundations. "The people ate each other out of hunger; the number of those killed reached several hundred thousand and the capital city turned into a ruin."⁵⁷ However, China was still standing. And another state that grew stronger in this period was the Hun State.

The Huns emerged from the wars stronger, and Yabgu Yü re-established the powerful Me-te empire. When the envoy sent by the new emperor proposed to the Yabgu to renew the treaty signed by Hu-han-yeh in 47 BC, the Yabgu replied:

-Times have changed. At that time Huns were weak and China was strong. Now the Huns occupied all the border tribes and returned to their former state in the first yabgu period.

55 Там. С. 335.

56 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/113.

57 Хрестоматия по истории древнего мира. Т. I. С. 335.

In Wang Mang's death the yabgu had already played a confounding role and accordingly refused in principle to renew the treaty. A war between the steppe and the city was inevitable and its consequences would lead to the beginning of a new era.

Both sides began to mobilise all their resources to prepare for a new war: Long spears, automatic arrow-shooting vehicles, sharp-tongued diplomats, and masses of silk cloth spent on the purchase of lords. At the same time, however, the fate of the war seemed to be determined by the processes of ethnogenesis that the economic and cultural developments of the Far East would unleash.

SECTION XIII

DISINTEGRATION

Victories of the Huns

Yabgu Yü was strong-willed and open-minded. He did not help in the overthrow of Wang Mang so that the powerful Han Empire could be restored. He therefore refused to support the new Emperor Heng-shih (read Hengshi) and made an alliance with the "Red-heads" to destroy him. When Liu Hsiu, the brother of the deceased emperor, finished off Liu Peng-tse, whom the "red-brows" had proclaimed emperor, the yabgu put forward a new rival, Liu Fang. Liu Fang was apparently a talented adventurer. He had led a small group of border nomads who had rebelled against Wang Mang and had obeyed the Huns with them. He remained among the Huns for some years, pretending to be a prince of the clan to which the imperial dynasty belonged. The defeat of the "Kyzylkash" had prompted the yabgu to look for a new pawn to interfere in China's internal affairs. Apparently, no one better than Liu Fang could be found. When Liu Fang agreed to ascend to the throne as the rightful claimant, the eugu found people in China to support him, and General Li Hin with Liu Fang. Thus, Liu Fang soon seized an important territory in North China with the help of Hun cavalry.

30 In that year the Emperor Kuang Wu-ti (Liu Hsiu) again tried to come to terms with the yabgu, but the yabgu, being prejudiced, rejected his offer and proposed that the Hun Empire should be recognised as equal to the Chinese Empire. Negotiations continued that year and the next, while war raged on.

In 33, the Chinese army marched against the Huns, but suffered a heavy defeat. Thereupon, the Huns gradually increased the dosage of attacks. In 37, they crossed the Chinese borders and forced the Chinese armies into fortresses.

to the Huns' former territories. When the Chinese government, unable to repel the attacks, drove its citizens along the borders into the interior, the Huns their old lands which had been vacated. Even Hun nomads started to appear in the interior of China. The Chinese a limited line of defence by building signal towers and outposts.

In 40, the Chinese, trying to find a peace opportunity, promised to give the "Green Mountains" to Liu Fang. Accepting this offer, yabgu sent Liu Fang to China, but he could not achieve anything. Liu Fang, who was captured in China and sentenced to death, managed to escape and returned to Huns again.

In the sources, these historical events are mentioned briefly in order not to be understood. The most important point to be known here is that the wars did not stop, on the contrary, they increased their speed. Although the Hun raids extended into the interior of China, the Huns were able to capture only the border tribes. In 44-45, it had become certain that the Chinese had lost the war and only a miracle could save them. And such miracle happened! And the Huns had their victories cancelled out by their own hands.

war in the Huns

Yabgu Yü was old. During his long life, he had laboured to restore the Hun State to its former glory.

Although Yü usurped the throne from his yabgu brother, no one laid claim to his throne. According to tradition, the rightful heirs were I- t'u- Chia-sih, the son of Hu-han-yeh, the oldest of the clan, and P'i, the son of Wu-chu-liu. The system of succession had changed in the Huns. In the II century BC Me-te and his grandsons left the throne to their eldest son, supported by princes and aksakals. Again in 101 B.C., Chü-t'e-hou came to power through elections and from that time on a new succession system was introduced. Accordingly, the throne passed from elder brother to younger brother, from younger uncle to elder nephew. This change was established as a result of the weakening of the yabgu tribe and the strengthening of the tribe's aksakals who considered themselves right to appoint their candidates as the head of the state.

As mentioned earlier, the confrontation between these two groups resulted in the Hun state officials being divided into a pro-Chinese "Zâdegân Party" and a pro-Chinese "Zâdegân Party".

into the anti-Hun "Warrior Party". This rivalry, which manifested itself from the first century BC, remained as a red stain throughout the Hun history. The "Zâdegân Party" was extremely aggressive in the period of the first yabus, especially in the relations with China. Since the opposition was not yet fully formed, the country was in a monolithic state to some extent in the II century BC. The defeats they had suffered had forced the "Party of Zâdegâns" to make peace with China in the first century BC, even without major concessions, which led to the strengthening of the opposition within the "Warrior Party", which was "in favour of domination over the peoples". The "Warrior Party" was victorious in the internal war, but they were defeated on external fronts and had to be annexed to China in 47 BC. It seems that the descendants of Me-te were removed from the government posts occupied by the descendants of Chü-t'e-hou. Hien [Kien] and Yü were among the disgruntled officials. The Chinese supporters had put Hien in charge to revitalise the policy of the "Party of the Zâdegâns". Although he tried in vain to equate himself with Me-te, Yü revived his aggressive policy and changed the system of succession by reintroducing the custom of enthroning the eldest son. The mother of Hu-han-yeh's son I-t'u- Chia-sih was a Chinese woman. In 47 she had been presented to Hu-han-yeh as a gift to cement the treaty, and when her husband died her eldest son Fu-chu-lo inherited the throne. Yü had not attempted to conquer China by war simply to leave a half-Chinese person of his own in China. But he could not retreat, and he had no intention of doing so. I-t'u-Chia-sih was killed, but Wu-ta-t'e-hou, Yü's son, was announced as the successor. The "Warriors' Party" had found a new alternative: Either to eliminate the usurper or to change the principles and ally with China.

Division of State

Chia-sih's death could not be hidden. P'i, the son of Yabgu Wu-chu-liu, felt it his duty to report the incident. After all, since Chia-sih was Wu-chu-liu's successor both in rank and in the favour of the lords, he saw himself as Wu-chu-liu's direct successor. Pi's rank was not very remarkable: Yü-ki-en-jih-chuo-prince, i.e., the Yü-kien [Yü-kan] clan's na-ibi. He could not possibly oppose the Yabgai and was not favoured by him.

so as not to disturb P'i and his army. His behaviour aroused the suspicion of the eunuch, who assigned two ku-tu-hou to spy on P'i and his army.

In 46 Yabgu Yü died. Soon afterwards his successor Wu-ta-t'e-hou also died, and the throne passed to Yü's son P'u-nu. Three disasters had struck the Hun lands during these years: Drought, locust infestation and pestilence. Famine and pestilence had taken away more Huns than had died during the twenty years of war.

In order to put an end to the ongoing war with China, the new yabgu sent an envoy to China for a treaty of "friendship and peace". P'i, who was on a treacherous path, first sent some Hun farmers to China with the intention of utilising this opportunity. Then he himself came to the emperor's regent and declared that he wanted to become a subject of the Han Emperor. This behaviour of his did not escape the attention of the ku-tu-hou who were watching him. They immediately reported Prince P'i's treachery to the khagan and advised him to be killed before the incident caused a panic in the state.

P'i managed to save his life thanks to the steppe informers who had made a habit of journalism. Because these informers spread they heard by word of mouth to all sides.

When P'i's brother, who was living as a nomad close to the camp, heard of the danger that awaited him, he went to his brother and told him about the situation. P'i then gathered his comrades-in-arms and waited for the two ku-tu-hou with the intention of killing them. However, on their way back home, they learnt about the trap and managed to reach the Yabgu. Faced with this situation, Yabgu P'u-nu sent a force of 10 thousand men at a time when P'i had gathered 40 thousand soldiers. Although the army of the Yabgu found P'i, it returned without entering the battle.

In 48, ten lords of the southern tribes migrated to China, proclaiming P'i as Hu-han-yeh II yabgu. The name Hu-han-yeh was not chosen by chance. P'i signed a treaty with the Chinese Emperor Kuang Wu-ti, pledging to protect China the Huns' attacks. In essence This treaty, concluded in 48 AD, was a ne- vi repetition of the treaty concluded in 47 BC.¹

With the accession of this new vassal, the Chinese leadership realised once and for all that the way back was completely blocked. Thus China and the Han dynasty were saved.

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/116-117.

Weakening of the Huns

The defection of a part of the Huns to the Chinese side was a time-break of the war period. Moreover, it seemed to be the initial impetus for the collapse of the Hun State after its rebirth. Until 46, the Wu-huans and Syenpis had actually fought on the side of the Huns and inflicted great losses on China. In 47, with P'i's betrayal, the Wu-huans revolted and drove the Huns northwards from their territory, "clearing them from the sandy desert to the south."²

P'i was militarily mobilised in 48. His brother Muo, the eastern sage-eligy, the bivouacs of the northern yabg and the eastern yab- gu sage-eligy of the Northern Huns.³ This frightened the Yü-kien tribe, which had not previously run under P'i's banner. Political fears outweighed the weakened clan ties and led to the disintegration of the clans among themselves. The northern eunuch retreated to Halha, leaving all the lands conquered by his father to his rival.

The news of the victory of the Southern Huns had reached to the east. Hearing these news, Wu-huans and some Siyenpis declared that they wanted to help China. The Sienpi chief P'an-ho started to fight with the Northern Huns. In 49 the Yin-yü tribe was put to the sword; in 54 two more chieftains went over to the Chinese side and finally P'an-ho defeated his rival who was in favour of the Huns. And in 58 the Huns had lost Manchuria.

In the meantime, P'i, the southern suzerain, was faced with an extremely difficult and insurmountable situation. As a vassal of the Chinese Emperor, according to the customs of this country, he had to receive the emperor's edict by bending down to the ground. This was not only offensive to the yabga. It would also reduce his prestige among his followers to zero. In order to avoid this dilemma, Yabgu welcomed the envoy outside and accepted the edict by bowing outside the otog and with teary eyes asked the envoy not to put him in a difficult situation among his subjects.⁴

However, the fact that he bowed to the ground and accepted the edict could not be concealed, and the Huns' honour was in tatters.

2 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/146.

3 The Southern Khawgs organised their hierarchical system in parallel with that of the Northern Huns. From then on, the number of state officials was doubled.

4 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/118.

had been taken. The five ku-tu-hou, together with their comrades-in-arms, rebelled against this situation, released the north-eastern sage èlig whom they were holding captive, and travelled to Halha. However, as they had no definite goal, a dispute arose on the way. All the commanders of the rebels were killed in the conflict. Their sons were "besieged by their own warriors" who took no side. The northern and southern kings sent armies against them. In 50/51 the two armies met and the conflict resulted in the defeat and disintegration of the Southern Huns. This forced Yabgu P'i to abandon his dreams of independence and to seek military assistance from China, which further lowered his prestige among his subjects.

In 52, the Northern Yabgusu P'u-nu turned to China with a proposal to negotiate peace. But this time the Chinese sidestepped. Because they believed neither the northerners nor the southerners and had already sown the seeds of enmity between the two.

In 55, Yabgu P'i died. His successors were the brothers Muo (55-56) and Han (56-59), the sons of T'i (59-63) and Chang (63-85) and the son-in-law of Su (63). All of these were very obscure figures. It is not known what was going on within the Northern Huns at that time, but the war continued in any case. It is worth mentioning that during this period the Northern Huns organised partial campaigns against the Southern Huns and the Southern Huns against the Northern Huns. These wars continued for thirty years and changed as a generation. The Huns, who determined the course of the war in the beginning, took part in one side to attack the other side.

The war activities between 55-85 were rather uneventful. In 64 the Northern Huns succeeded getting the Chinese government to open the frontier markets, but the new Emperor Ming-ti favoured Hun raiders then terrorised the people of North China for ten years. In 73 the Chinese organised a counter-attack on Halha, but the Huns refused to accept war and withdrew. Tension was slowly giving way to stability.

In 76, Chang-ti ascended the throne in China and thus a new era in Sino-Hun relations began.

Revolt of the Ch'iangs

In addition to the wars with the Huns following the rebellion of the "Kyzylkash", the turmoil in China, the Tibetan nomadic Ch'iang

(Tankut) recapture their territory around Lake Kukunor and regain neighbourhood with the western part of China. In c. 33, the Liang-chou region was populated half by Chinese and half by Ch'iangs. The situation of the Ch'iangs within the Chinese Empire was extremely deplorable, as the Chinese living along the frontier consisted of notorious criminals and corrupt government officials. These Chinese were pressurising the highlanders, who had no choice but to rebel in order to protect themselves.⁵ However, it was difficult for the Ch'iangs, who had become divided and hostile to each other, to succeed in an armed revolt.

Since the Ch'iangs' territory was strategically important, it was constantly under the Chinese government's scrutiny. In fact, the Kukunor Ch'iangs controlled the oases as far as the foothills of Nan-shan, and thus had the road to the western end in their hands. Moreover, a union of the Ch'iangs with their natural allies, the Huns, could have caused great harm to China. In spite of the Chinese unwillingness to support the tribal lords both militarily and by selling silk, and in spite of the great imbalance between the forces of the two sides, these tribes nevertheless achieved considerable success.

The uprisings of the Ch'iangs between 34-36 were suppressed by the border troops, but soon the Shao-t'ang clan rebelled, defeated their rivals and started a war against the Chinese central state officials. The founder and first chief of the tribe was T'ien-lan. After him, his successor took over the chieftaincy. T'ien-wu, son of T'ien-lan, became the head of the united Ch'iang tribes and openly war against China in 56. First battles ended in T'ien-wu's victory due to Chinese mistakes. But then General Li-pao launched a campaign of persecution against all the Ch'iangs and put T'ien-wu's rivals, the weaker Ch'iangs, to the sword. In response, all Ch'iangs joined the rebellion. In 57, T'ien-wu entered Lung-hsi (present-day Shen-si province) with a cavalry army of 5,000 men and put the Chinese armies to the sword twice. In the following year 58 the Ch'iang slaughtered all Chinese troops in the two provinces, but towards the end of the same year a regular army of 40,000 men was prepared against them. In the battles that took place at Hsi-k'ang, the Chinese probably took advantage of their numerical superiority and

5 Yakinf. *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora* 1/22.

The Ch'iangs were routed. T'ien-wu retreated to the mountains, but in 59 he declared his obedience and the rebellion ended.

The Emperor ordered an investigation into the reasons that led the Ch'iangs to war. The investigation revealed that malicious state officials had caused these events. All of them were put on trial and beheaded. His governorship in the Ch'iang region of China was also cancelled and T'ien-wu was put in charge of his own people. The Ch'iangs had achieved their goal.

In 76, a second uprising broke out. The incident that led to this rebellion is quite romantic from a historical point of view: A Chinese official had kidnapped the wife of one of the Ch'iangs. One day the jealous husband killed his rival who had kidnapped his wife and escaped. The head of the officials chased after the jealous husband. But the jealous husband's relatives also chased him and killed him. Upon this incident, a repelling force was sent to the Ch'iang region, and when a few hundred people were put to the sword, the second rebellion broke out. This time the rebels were led by Mi-wu, the younger son of the deceased T'ien-wu. In 77, the rebels defeated the Chinese border guard troops in the battle off Li-k'u and about 2 thousand people. The Tankuts also joined the rebels. The following year the rebels attacked Lung-hsi, but were unable to hold out against the regular armies and "surrendered."⁶ Considering that Mi-wu remained at the head of his tribes and no punitive action was taken, it can be assumed that this surrender was merely a formality. In fact, this rebellion had actually given the Ch'iangs their independence.

Events at the West End

Wang Mang's foolish policy made it easier for the principalities of the western end to throw off the Chinese yoke. In 16 the whole of the western end revolted and allied with the Huns.⁷ The Chinese governor of the region was killed, and the rebellion of the "Kyzylkashlars" prevented the empire from exacting revenge on the inhabitants. Nevertheless, the ruler of Yarkend maintained his pro-Chinese attitude. Since Yarkend was far to the west of the Chinese zone of dominance, the governor of the region was less well known in the region, and therefore personal feuds between the people and Chinese military officials were not uncommon.

⁶ Age., p. 28.

⁷ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/216.

did not occur much. Yang, the ruler of Yarkend, had lived in China for a long time and therefore he liked Chinese customs. As a result of his alliance with China, he had closed his borders to Chinese governors' family outbursts and refugees.

But when Yang's son K'ang succeeded to the throne in 18 and 25, he adopted a pro-Hunnic attitude. He was a neighbour of several neighbouring principalities. In 29 he came into contact with the newly established Han dynasty, and in return the Chinese appointed him ruler of the entire western end.⁸ Meanwhile the Huns imposed heavy taxes on their allies. As a result, the population of the western end adopted an anti-Hun attitude,⁹ which strengthened the position of the Yarkend principality.

In 33 K'ang died. He succeeded by his brother Kien [Hien], who had an energetic and ambitious personality. Kien annexed the two principalities of Chü-mi and Hsi- yeh around Kashkar.¹⁰ In 38 he went to China and asked for confirmation of his title as governor of the western end in order to have influence over his neighbours. However, the Chinese rejected his request as they considered the strengthening of Yarkend against their interests. However, Kien did not lose hope and declared himself as a yabgul in 41 by pretending that China recognised him and was behind him, and suppressed those who opposed him by force. He intended to establish a powerful state like Hun or China at the western end. Thus, a triple war started at the western end. Kien's lie was exposed in 45 when 18 princes, who had been harboured by him, came to China and asked for a change of regional governor. The emperor consoled them all and gave them valuable gifts, but there was no possibility to send an army to the western end as the situation at the front had become too heavy. When Kien learnt of this situation, he plundered Shan- shan and captured Kucha in 46. Thereupon Shan- shan and Ch'e-shih asked for help from Huns. Taking them as an example, the people of Kucha rebelled, killed the governor of Yarkend and entered under the protection of the Huns. Nevertheless, the Huns could only dominate the north-eastern part of the western end. In the western part, Kien again dominated the situation. Kien had captured Davan (Fergana Valley), but could not hold it because of K'ang- chü's opposition. However, he was able to compensate for this loss by capturing Khotan in 57.

8 Age., p. 230.

9 Age., p. 216.

10 Age., p. 230 (today Yülerék)

However, this new state could not survive for a long time. Kien's despotic behaviour led uprisings in Khoten. Yarkendians were slaughtered not only in Khoten but also in Hsi-yü. Although Kien marched against the rebels twice, he was defeated both times and had to retreat to Yarkend fortress. However, Kien was able to save his head thanks to the trouble caused by the death of the commander of the rebels. The Huns besieged Yarkend after the Khotenians, but they were repulsed. However, Kien's cruelty and ill-treatment had eventually exhausted the Yarkendians as well. As a result, the Qurans of Yarkend allied with each other and called on the Khotenese for help. When Kien was arrested by his enemies after leaving the castle for negotiations on the sly advice of his relatives, the traitors surrendered the castle to the Khotenians. Kien was taken to Khoten, where he was killed a year later.

The strengthening of Khoten was not in favour of the Huns. Therefore, they sent an army of 30 thousand people gathered from Kucha, Karashar, Hami and other dominions against Khoten. The defeated Khotenians agreed to give "leather and cloth every year" to the Huns.¹¹ The Huns, who took these goods from the western end, stubbornly and persistently refused to give them to China. The three-front battles at Hsi-yü resulted in a decisive victory for the Huns. The western end was not only an economically important base for the Huns, but also a region of strategic importance in the struggle against China. The ruins of Wu-huan had closed the eastern part of the Sino-Hun frontier; the centre of the region had fallen under the control of the Southern Huns, leaving only the western part open for attacks on China. Indeed, in 66-67, the Ch'e-shih, Shan-shan and Kuchans joined with the Northern Huns to attack China.

But the inhabitants of the western end lacked the ability to unite politically and ethnically among themselves. The oases, separated from each other by wide steppe belts and deserts, were the sources of livelihood for the inhabitants; but the iron-fisted Huns, who had brought order to the country, were invited to the region from time to time, even if they did not seem to be very popular with them, as the behaviour of the despot of Yarkend proved.

However, the attitude towards Hun domination was different.

11 Age., p. 233.

Since the Hun nomads were not far away from them, Ch'e-shih and Karashar paid taxes to the Huns and traded with them. Since the trade was profitable, they could compensate for the losses arising from their tax payments. Therefore, Ch'e-shih and Karashar were loyal allies of the Huns. Khoten, on the other hand, although paying taxes, had no income and this led to the emergence of a pro-Chinese tendency in the southern parts of the country.

The Chinese could not afford to lose the western end. In 73 they invaded Hami with a small Chinese army. There was a garrison there, called I-wu, and fields had been cleared to supply the need for bread.¹² Some small battles with the Huns and their allies ended in Chinese superiority. But the Huns were in control of the principalities, these small victories did not help them.

Among Chinese officers, there was one who single-handedly held up an entire army: Pan Ch'ao, the dashing younger brother of the historian Pan Ku. Because he had distinguished himself in the battles around Lake Bargol, he was allowed to enter Shan-shan with a small army and restore order there. Around the same time the Hun envoy also arrived in Shan-shan for this purpose. Pan Ch'ao, having learnt of the Hun envoy's whereabouts from the news brought by paid spies, made a night raid, set fire to the camp and put to the sword whoever he could find. This decisive action pushed the Shan-shanites away from the Huns and closer to China.¹³

At about the same time Huan-t'u, the ruler of Khoten, plundered Yarkend and gained some strength. Khoten was so dependent on the Huns that the Hun representative could intervene in everything. These two circumstances were enough for China to turn its attention in that direction. Pan Ch'ao headed for Khoten with his small army. The Khotenians greatly outnumbered the Chinese, but, alarmed by rumours of the Shan-shan massacre, Huan-t'u killed the Hun representative and crossed over to the Chinese side.¹⁴ The calculation was apparently simple: To relieve the Huns of the burden of the agreed cloth tax.

12 Age., p. 216.

13 Chavannes E. *Trois généraux chinois de la dynastie de Han Orientaux*/Pan Tch'ao T'oung Pao. Serie II. Vol. VIII. 1906. P. 218-232. Васильев Л.С. Бань Чао в Западном крае// Вестник древней истории. 1955. № 1, с. 108-125.

14 In the "History of the First Han Dynasty", the subjugation of Khoten is described in detail. Huan-t'ou between the Huns and China. The person who met with the Hul envoy was the highest cleric of Khoten. According to what the envoy heard, this spiritualist, calculating herefuse and this would be considered as a cause of war, sent Pan Ch'ao's black-eyed horse

But the Huns had achieved a similar success in Kucha. They supported Kien and enabled him to capture Kashkar, and Kien appointed a voivode from Kucha as ruler there. Thus the Huns made up for their losses in Shan-shan and Khoten.

Pan Ch'ao was not one to sit still. In 74 he entered Kashkar and, with the help of the Khoteni and disgruntled Kashkarites, captured the governor and replaced him with a native of Ch'ong. In the same year, the Anterior and Posterior Ch'e-shih their obedience to China; the regency of Hsi-yü was reorganised, and he was given the title of governor-general of the new province. But the Chinese in a hurry to rejoice. Because the Huns were not an enemy to be dealt with so easily. In 75, the ruler of Karashar attacked the governor-general's office and slaughtered all the Chinese he found in the headquarters. The Huns from the north, united with the Ch'e-shih insurgents, laid siege to the military headquarters of the governor-general of Ayelet, while the rulers of Kuça and Aksu (Kumo principality) held Pan Ch'ao at the fortress of P'an-t'u in the Kashkar district. After a long defence, Pan Ch'ao was forced to retreat to Khoten, leaving Kashkar to the Kuchans. Although the Kashkarians, fearing that they would be called to account for the past, were concerned, it is likely that this was not the case.

to be sacrificed. Pan Ch'ao to give his horse but to deliver it into the hands of the spiritualist himself. However, when the spiritualist arrived at Pan Ch'ao's headquarters, he was immediately beheaded, and a few lords were also captured and flogged. Apparently horrified by this incident, the ruler of Khoten had the Hun envoy beheaded and surrendered to China. [Васильев Л.С. Бань Чао в. крае, с. 112). It is impossible to accept this event without criticism. I do not think that the Khotenese were so cowardly as to turn a blind eye to the murder of their highest priest and the flogging and humiliation of their lord. The truth is not at all as described. For one thing, Pan Ch'ao had neither the time nor the money to set up an extensive intelligence network, and since such a thing was possible only after securing the support of a part of the population, this story about Pan Ch'ao contrary to the facts. these two points into account, we can conclude that the Chinese general took advantage of the internal antagonisms among the valley peoples, and did not rely on the strength of the people who were dissatisfied with the Huns' lordliness, but rather led them. It also possible that the ruler of Khoten made a tacit agreement theand deliberately sent the priest to his death. Because too slow to take any action after the murder of his right-hand man. It must be admitted that it is not a coincidence that such situations occurred wherever Pan Ch'ao. It is natural that this phenomenon was not reflected in "Hou Han-shu". Because it is inconceivable that Pan Ch'ao would belittle the services of his brother and sister-in-law to the intelligence unit he headed. Logic compels us to look for the explanation of this incident not only in the heroism of the general, but also in the socio-political situation in the valleys of the Western region.

nothing happened. Kien, who was content with being obeyed, thus won the favour of his new subjects. Therefore, in 76, when Pan Ch'ao again travelled from Ho-ten to Kashkar, he encountered fierce opposition from the Kashkarites. Pan Ch'ao could only achieve a victory there by trampling over 600 corpses of those who had previously allied with him and losing many of his soldiers. As a result, at great cost, Kashkar fell back into Chinese hands.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the ruler of the Chü-ch'üan region defeated the Ch'e-shih off Ch'i-huo-ha Huo-ta, and the situation on the front apparently calmed down.¹⁶ But these victories had cost China dearly in economic terms. The Huns had destroyed the military garrisons in the Hami Valley and their food had to be sent from China. The cost of getting food into the hands of the warriors was such that eventually the new Emperor Chang-ti was forced to end the war in 77 and withdraw the regular army back.¹⁷

Pan Ch'ao was isolated, but this able general and politician managed to secure strong support for himself and his small contingent. Uniting the pro-Chinese elements in the south of the country, he raised an army of ten thousand men and destroyed the principalities of Ku-mo and Sha-chou. It was impossible for him to hold on there without reinforcements. Because the strong military potential of Kucha was behind the Huns. Yarkend, which was hostile to Khoten, had joined Kucha and an anti-Chinese rebellion had started in Kashkar. However, at such a critical moment, a small reinforcement sent to Pan Ch'ao from China was enough to defuse the rebellion.

Despite all his successes, Pan Ch'ao could not realise that any failure would be his undoing. The Huns had cut off all contact with his country. Kucha and K'ang-chü were as hostile to him as they could be. The only supporters of Pan Ch'ao were those whose reputations had been ruined by the Huns and those who feared being called to account. In this situation it was necessary to find new allies, and Pan Ch'ao proposed to the emperor to renew the alliance with the Wu-suns. Chang-ti did not want to fight, but he was perfectly happy for others to fight in his place. He immediately sent an envoy to Wu-sun with some gifts. But during this time...

15 Chavannes, *Trois généraux chinois*, p. 218-230.

16 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/216.

17 Age., p. 217.

The Kuchans also launched a new attack on Kashkar, blocking the road the Wu-suns. When the Chinese envoy was captured in Kashkar in '83, the court, spoilt by its habits, wrote a harsh letter against Pan Ch'ao, accusing him of doing nothing and lying idle among his family. Although the courtiers did not believe this denunciation, they sent a reinforcement of 800 troops.¹⁸ Pan Ch'ao, who had gained some strength, attacked Yarkend, but in the meantime a rebellion broke out in Kashkar. The rebels were probably led by Ch'ong, whom Pan Ch'ao himself had put in charge. The insurgents left the city and travelled to the west, where they were joined by the K'ang-chü warriors. Fighting around Wu-tse, the centre of the rebellion continued for half a year, and only after diplomatic contacts by the Yuequis did the K'ang-chü soldiers leave the rebels to their fate and return home. Ch'ong and the most ardent nationalists defected to K'ang-chü, while the city of Wu-tse was forced to surrender. The Chinese burnt the city to the ground in such a way that even today its location is unknown.

Pan Ch'ao had triumphed once more, but his prospects were not bright. The desert south, where he was supported, was economically weak. The prosperous north, on the other hand, was prepared for war with the Wu-suns remaining neutral and the K'ang-chü and Huns providing support. The friendship of the Yuechis, i.e. the Kushans, could not be counted on too much, and China was too far away.

However, Pan Ch'ao's victory in the following 85 years would change the political map of the whole East Asia.

Development of the Southern Huns

The historian Fan Hua has left us a source for the political system of the Hyung-nus. His account differs from that of Sih-ma Ch'ien, and some points allow us to establish the overlap of this system with later periods. As far as we know, the Ku- zeyli Hyung-nu (Huns) were *terra incognita* for the Chinese in the first century AD. This is also evident when we analyse the written records concerning the Southern Hyung-nu. In fact, all documents this view. Let us now try to review the text.¹⁹

18 Vasilyev L. S. *Ban Chao v Zapadnom kraye*, p. 118.

19 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/119-120.

First of all, there were some changes in the civil service organisation, as reflected in the classification of social forces. The Chu-ki and Lu-li-princes have been left unchanged, only denoted by the phrase "four horns". But immediately after this phrase it is stated as follows: Eastern and Western jih-chuo-princes (jih-chuo means deputy), Weng-yü-ti-princes and Chan-hien-ti-princes-"6 horns". Tang-hu, T'u-yü, Chü-ch'ü were the lowest in the hierarchy; their superiors were ku-tu-hou and jih-chuo-ku-tu-hou, i.e. the lords of the yabgu clan.

Ku-tu-hou regulates the relations between the government and the people. It is fixed, but new titles appear to have emerged as a result of the weakening of the old state power. Probably the division of the Huns this. The old statesmen remained in the north, while the south they established a new civil service from their own supporters. It should be taken into consideration that the situation was the opposite in the Northern Huns, i.e. the importance of the serving state officials increased, but unfortunately the historian does not know this fact.

The second important change was the change in the system of succession to the throne. The ten tribes all belonged to "the brothers and sons of the kings, who in turn were entitled to sit on the throne of the kingship". This was a system that Chü-t'e-hou's descendants persistently tried to introduce and Me-te's first-generation descendants consistently rejected. is evident from the actual practice of succession, this system of succession was maintained with exceptional rigour.²⁰

As far as is known, in the Northern Huns, those who had the right of direct succession to the throne had gained a superiority. Another tribe was added to the Kuyan, Lan and Su-pu tribes, which had the first place in this regard: Ch'io-lin. The division of the Huns in 47 was also not according to clan symbols. For example, the representatives of the Kuyan tribe were representatives of both the Northern and Southern Huns. And finally was also a change of cult. In the first century BC, the sacrifice ceremony, which had previously been performed twice a year in the "dragon temple", was increased to three; the southern yabgu added a fourth in honour of the Chinese emperor.

All these changes did not develop spontaneously, but rather as a manifestation of the internal processes of social formation. Ethnographic comparisons show that in static societies institutions are fixed.

20 See the genealogical table of the Southern Hun kings.

that there is a need for reorganisation. The desire for reconstruction depends on and reflects the process of development. The study of events at the top level of a society allows us to draw conclusions about currents in the depths of society.

However, it is not possible to accept the Hun society as static. On the contrary, Hun society was in constant development and many historical sources point to this.

Despite the internal division, the Hun State was still a "Great State" even in the first century AD.²¹ However, internal processes had taken away the power of this state. Let us now review these processes and try to determine their consequences.

Me-te made good use of the general upswing of Hun society to destroy the separatist tendencies of the tribes and unite them into a monolithic state. However, the weakening of this resilience led to a decline in war power and the emergence of a clique around the yabgu, which in turn led to the diversion of clan lords and the occupation of vacant positions. The deterioration of the tribe structure started when some members of the tribe did not listen to the aksakalla and acted on their own and prepared their own destiny. In the inter-clan fights between 60-47 B.C., if the clans had sided with the masses of the people, a century later they would have split again; some of the people would have sided with P'i and some with P'u-nu. But this division was not accidental. The supporters of the "Warrior Party" sided the P'i. They were the defenders of the clan structure and the most conservative elements of Hun society. And they endured Chinese domination until China interfered in the internal life of the Huns.

However, the life within the clan was hard and not something look forward to for the younger members. Even if they possessed some personal merits, they could not make an impact, as the top positions were divided among the elders. In this situation, the only thing they could do among the Southern Huns was either to become the comrades-in-arms of the old princes or to become one of the postmen of the Chinese regional commissar. The strong-willed brave needed the state's largesse, the spoils of war and the recognition of his valour. For it was for this that he had travelled north and brandished a sword to "establish dominion over the peoples".

21 Bichurin, Sobraniye, I/121.

The northern yabgus valuable elements migrating according to summer and winter customs and large idle masses. Such a state did not need a tribal structure. Moreover, the yabgu did not want it. Some valiant men began to rule the tribes that had lost their mass traditions.

Thus, the clan state was rapidly transformed into an army, and fragmentation facilitated this process. The "elders and honourable branches", the traditionalists of the clan, went south.

What consequences did these have?

First of all, the Northern Huns transformed from a tribal state into a military democracy. On the other hand, the defenders of the tribal structure - the Southern Huns, the Wu-huans and the Syenpis - implacable enemies who did more harm to the Northern Huns than the Chinese. Thus, a between the two systems, namely the tribal structure and military democracy, came to the surface.

On the other hand, it was inevitable that among the braves who surrounded the northern yabgu, there would be some who fought for position and fame, as moral values had been lost along with the clan traditions. So much so that the echoes of this event reached the ears of Chinese historians, even though they were unable to obtain sufficient information about the details.

Thirdly, the masses wanted a peaceful life and did not willingly support the war adventures of their lords. Since they did not gain or lose anything by changing lords, it seemed pointless for them to follow the yabgu. Therefore, they abandoned their kings at the most critical moments and, as we shall see later, this would lead to the defeat of the Northern Huns in 93.

However, the warrior braves who constituted the striking force of the Northern Hyung-nu could be killed, but they could never be defeated. Eventually they could not be exterminated and they went to the West. Their descendants who reached Europe were known as "Huns", a synonym for tyranny and oppression.

SECTION XIV

DISINTEGRATING RING

Near Death

The Southern Huns grew bigger and stronger. The revival of trade with China and the encouragement of tsarvism was the biggest factor in this. An order had been established among the nomads and plundering and unpleasant incidents were no longer heard of; the population of the people was increasing gradually.

During ten years (73-83) the Northern Huns began to weaken due to changes which we can assume were caused by a number of indirect reasons. The chieftain Chi-lüs had defected to the Chinese side, taking 38,000 men and many herds with him. The rulers of the western end negotiated a military alliance with China against the Northern Huns; the Huns' relations with the Ting-lings were strained, and the Si-yenpis signed a final alliance treaty with China.

The need for silk forced the Northern Hun khagan in 84 to ask China to open the dice. Such a thing was out of the question. Because the Huns wanted to buy silk at any cost, they had made an agreement with the Chinese traders who had monopolised this business. When such an offer was made, they naturally wanted to take of the opportunity. While the Great Chü-ch'ü I-muo-chi was taking his princely cattle and horses to the market to sell them, the light cavalry of the Southern Huns cut the road and wiped out the herd. Of course, the trade to be carried out was undermined in this way.

Internally, the situation was even worse. "Having lost their sense of unity, the Huns were divided into factions among themselves." ¹ Internal conflicts led to migrations and in 85, seventy-three tribes fled to China, leaving a weak and powerless Northern Hun State.

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/126.

Hsüan, the Southern Hun suzerain, was certainly not a man of ability, but his nephew Shih-k'i (Shih-chih) was a capable commander. In 86 he attacked the Northern Hun nomads and inflicted heavy casualties.² Yü-lü, the Ku- zey suzerain, was surrounded by enemies. The Southern Huns, with troops recruited from their southern subjects, and the Syenpis from the east continued their aggressive attacks. In the east the Ting-lings had risen again, and the western frontier offered no reliable support for the Huns. Defeat seemed inevitable, disaster unavoidable, and yet Yü-lü fought on with stubborn valour.

Northern Huns' Disruption

The first blow came from the Syenpis. Attacking the eastern regions of the Huns in 87, the Syenpis dealt a heavy blow to the Yü-lü yabg. He was captured by his enemies and flayed.³ The Syenpis could not capitalise on this victory. After settling accounts with the enemy, they went away, but the panic spreading among the Huns soon bore fruit. 58 tribes, numbering two hundred thousand people and 8 thousand elite warriors, migrated south and surrendered to China. These figures show how heavy a defeat the Huns were subjected to. Among these two hundred thousand people, there must have been at least 40 thousand people holding weapons. In this case, I do not think that the Chinese historian exaggerated the number of refugees. Most probably, a significant part of this number were widows and orphans whom the Syenpis could not or did not want to take captive. The following year, nature also dealt a blow to the Huns. The warriors, who were already in a miserable condition because of the locust swarm coming from Halha, were completely starved.

In the meantime, the cautious Emperor Chang-ti had died in China and the throne was occupied by the young Ho-ti. Naturally, the administration was in the hands of the widowed empress.

There was also a change of administration in the Southern Huns and the deceased yabgu Hsüan was replaced by his uncle T'un-tu-ho. T'un-tu-ho agreed with the Chinese government to eliminate the Northern Huns, and the Chinese army set out in the spring of 89. Northern Huns ma-

² Age., p. 127.

³ Agy.

While they were still recovering from the heavy defeat and the famine they had suffered, they were faced with a new attack. Yü-lü's successor, whose name is not recorded in the history books, was defeated at Mount Yen- chan and fled.⁴ The Chinese (8 thousand soldiers) and the Southern Huns (30 thousand soldiers) took around 200 thousand prisoners. This may be an exaggerated figure, but the Chinese were certainly victorious. In 90, the war started again. This time Shih-k'i was at the head of the army that set out against the Northern Huns. With a total of 8 thousand cavalry and unknown number of Chinese reinforcements, Shih-k'i, with a total of 8 thousand cavalry and an unknown number of Chinese reinforcements, rushed into the enemy, organised a night raid on the lodge of the yab- guru and killed him. The Northern Huns accepted the war even though they were only a thousand men. Yabgu showed a great example of valour, lost his strength with the wounds he received and fell off his horse, but the loyal braves put him back on the saddle and broke through the circle. The enemies captured his family, treasure and nephrite seal.

In 91 the Chinese governor-general of the western frontier once more defeated the Hunnic suzerain, and there was no further news of the fleeing suzerain after this. His brother, the Western Lu-li-prince Yü-ch'u-kien, declared himself to be the suzerain and sent an envoy to China to ask for peace. Chinese General T'ou Hien also supported him in this matter. In his report to the palace, the general noted that the Northern Huns were necessary to maintain the balance of forces in the steppe and that they could support him. The Chinese government responded positively to the proposal of the eunuch and negotiations were started, but at that time T'ou Hien was unexpectedly arrested and murdered. Yü-ch'u-kien, worried about the loss of this support in the palace, migrated to the north. Chinese officials considered this migration as a rebellion in their report. Immediately an army of one thousand cavalry was sent. The Chinese commander told the yabgu that they had come to continue negotiations, captured and killed them, and put all their soldiers to the sword. (93 year)⁵

4 ²⁵ Chavannes Сборник трудов Орхонской. Т.ВИ. СПб, 1903, с. 35.
(H. Chavannes, *Orkhon inscriptions*, 1903, p. 35.)
and Hirth *Die Kunde von den Hunnen*, 1903, p. 113)
equate Mount Yen-Chan with the fortress Yen-Chan in the northern part of Shan-si. However, Grumm-Grjmaylo corrected this mistake by proving that Yen-Chan has nothing to do with the fortress in Shan-si (see *Western Mongolia*, pp. 112-113). However, this error of Chavannes and Hirth is also reflected in Franke (*Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*. Bd. I. 1930, p. 398). This error needs to be corrected as it completely changes the sequence of events.

5 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/129.

Yü-ch'u-kien the last Northern Hun yabgus descended from Me-te. Based on this point, Chinese historians show 93 as the end of the Hun State, and many European writers repeat this view of Chinese writers without any . However, the war was not over and the people did not lay down their arms. The only thing that had changed in the Northern Huns was the ruling dynasty, and this time it was in the hands of the chief of the Kuyan tribe. It is true that very few people remained in his hands. 100 thousand tents came under the rule of the Siyenpis and from that date onwards they were called "Siyenpis. "6 In 91, the Southern Huns had 34 thousand yurts, which corresponds to 237 300 people.⁷ Approximately as many slaves and refugees were added to this figure.⁸

Despite all the losses, there were many who refused to accept defeat and did not want to be dominated by another. Those who did not have the strength to fight against the Chinese, Syenpis and Ting-ling, who were the enemies of the multitude, had already formed a coalition in 90, and thus the Huns began to search for ways of retreat. "In the natural wall of Asia there are always breacheslarge gateways to the European shelf. At this point, where the high Altai Mountains give way to the higher T'ien-shan mountain range, are also mountains that are not too high and that provide passage. This region, which resembles a palm and is covered with valleys, is similar to the region of Asia opening to the west. The northern of these passes follows the route along the Irtysh between the Mongolian Altai and the Saur. The central pass is narrower and separates Urkashar from Cayra and Barlik. The pass in the south Mai-li, Barlik and Cungarya Alatau. "9 It was through these passes that the Huns left their homeland but saved their lives in the meantime.¹⁰ After fifteen years, the Huns, who fled and hid in the steppes of Baraba and Karakanda, would start the struggle for Asia again.

But so has happened in these fifteen years!

6 Age., p. 151.

7 Age., p. 128.

8 Age., p. 125-127.

9 Obruchev W.A. *Izbranniye raboty po geografii Azii*. T.I. M., 1951, p. 386.

10 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/259.

The Triumphs of Pan Ch'ao

While the Northern Huns were being decimated by the blows of the Syenpis, Pan Ch'ao was waiting to come on the scene. He had taken Kashkar as his base, and for him the most important danger was the Kashkar refugees who could not return to their homeland and had been driven out by the Chinese. In 87, Ch'ong and his followers, with the active support of K'ang-chü and Kucha, made some attempts to return to their homeland. However, the general situation suggested that the best thing to do at the time was to come to terms with the Chinese, and Ch'ong thought it appropriate to begin negotiations. However, Pan Ch'ao, who accepted him into his presence, beheaded him, and his supporters, who hoped for much from the negotiations, organised a sudden attack and put them to the sword. During the massacre, 700 people were killed, which was not a small number for that time. Thus, "the southern road was opened."¹¹

In 88, it was Yarkend's turn. Pan Ch'ao, with an army organised from Khoten, Shan-shan and Kashkar, stormed the walls of this stubborn city. When the princes of Kuça (Kui-ch'i) and Aksu (Ku-mo) came to Yarkend's aid, Pan Ch'ao did not dare to attack this united army. However, he resorted to a deceitful way, taking Kuchan captives in front of him and the impression that he was besieging the enemy from two sides, east and west. Then he released the captives. These captives who took refuge in their princes told what the Chinese commander's plan was. Believing what they were told, the princes immediately went to the desert and started to besiege the enemy. This was what Pan Ch'ao wanted anyway. With his warriors who had nowhere to flee, he attacked the Yarkendites and destroyed and captured the city. Although the allies attempted some military manoeuvres in order to take revenge, they had to endure the loss of Yarkend when they realised that they would not be of any use. Now the Chinese position in Hsi-yü was consolidated.¹²

Having closed his account with the west-end principalities, Pan Ch'ao took stock of the situation with an instinct for self-preservation. He could not tolerate any failure, as it would inevitably lead to the ruin of both himself and his comrades-in-arms. In '88, he embarked on a new and futile war, a course of action that was absolutely incompatible with this view, but correct from the point of view of his political aims.

11 Chavannes E. *Trois généraux chinois de la dinastie de Han Orientaux/Pan Tch'ao*
T'oung Pao. Serie II. Vol. VII. 1906. P. 230.

12 Ibid. P. 232.

In 78, in Kucha, the daring Kanishka ascended the throne, continuing the traditional warlike policy of his father and grandfather. The Kushans, i.e. the Yuechi-s, had concentrated all their attacks to the south and west. They fought against the Parthians and Sakas, conquered North India and firmly established themselves in Sogdi- yana. The Chinese did not object to these movements of the Kushans and the Kushans did not want to confront the Chinese. Naturally, the border between Central and Central Asia was a border of common interest for both sides. Therefore, both great states had friendly relations for about 100 years.

In 88, the Kushan ruler decided to engage in traditional alliance arbitration activities and sent an envoy to secure the support of the Chinese princes. However, Pan Ch'ao intercepted this envoy and forced him to return.

Why did Pan Ch'ao do this? Historical sources do not give any information about the reasons for this behaviour. However, Pan Ch'ao could not understand one thing: He had insulted the Kushan sovereign by this act, and he had undertaken an act that would lead to a war that even the Chinese emperor would refuse. Considering that he had suppressed the Kashkar rebellion only with the help of the Kuchans, this was outright insolence. But despite all this, he was not resting in peace. Perhaps he had justifiable reasons that we did not know. In the end, the war invitation of the Chinese commander was accepted by the Kushan ruler.

In 90, 70,000 Yuechi horsemen in armour, armed with long spears and sharp heavy swords, set out from the Fergana Valley (via the Ch'ung-ling, or Alay, not the Pamir, which was not a passable route for armoured cavalry) and the borders of the western end of the region. This figure is certainly exaggerated, but it can be inferred from it that the Yuechis were no more numerous than the Chinese.

Pan Ch'ao was prepared. His strategic plan is recorded in the history books as follows in the first person. Ch'ao said: "Even though the Yuechis are numerous, they are too far away from Ch'ung-ling and lack logistical support. Is it worth worrying about? Let us gather our crops and retreat to our trenches. The enemy will be hungry and thirsty and will surrender of their own accord, and in a few tens of days it will all be over." And so it happened. The fortress walls and the Chinese automatic arrow-shooting machines . The forts were filled to the brim with food stocks.

The Chinese were full and the Yuechis were starving. The Yuechi commander sent a hoe to Kucha to send food, but Pan Ch'ao thought of this, so he ambushed the road and had the hoe smashed to pieces. So the Yuechis went away without achieving anything.

In 190, Chinese regular armies expelled the Huns from the Hami Valley.¹³ Thus Pan Ch'ao was able to establish direct contact with China. Fearful, both Ch'e-shih princes sent their sons as hostages to the Chinese court. The northern valleys were isolated and there was no hope of any help. In 91, Kucha, Ak-su and Three-Turfan surrendered unconditionally. Pan Ch'ao merely replaced the ruler of Kucha and forced the subjugated cities to reinforce his army.

China's enemies were concentrated in the north-eastern part of the western end, at Bagrac- kul, Karashar (Yen-k'i), Pei-hsü, Pei-ti, Halgaman and Shan-kuo.¹⁴ In the autumn of 94 Pan Ch'ao led an allied army of 60,000 men, 400 of them Chinese, and moved towards Karashar. When Huang, the ruler of Karashar, had the mountain bridge destroyed to prevent the enemy's passage, Pan Ch'ao found another route and camped off Karashar. Although the people of Karashar were frightened and fled to the mountains, Yüan-meng, a state official, reported the situation to the Chinese. Pan Ch'ao, who immediately sent an army in pursuit of the fugitives, beheaded those of the Karashar people who surrendered on their word and appointed the traitor as the governor of Karashar. The conquest of the western end was thus completed.

After his military successes, Pan Ch'ao was convinced that he was now the undisputed ruler of the western end of the region, but he did not take into account that the Northern Huns would jump again.

The dynasty, which had been founded by Me-te, came to an end in 93 in the Northern Huns and passed into the hands of the Kuyan tribe. The new leader of the state was given the title wang (ruler), not k'un (prince). This was a higher position than that of the Chu-ki and Lu-li princes, the highest positions in the Hun civil service hierarchy. The Kuyans' first encampment was established at Pei-shan, and after their defeat by the Syenpis it was moved to the neighbourhood of Targabatay. Their spears had not yet been blunted.

¹³ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/217.

¹⁴ Age., p. 235, 237.

Concussion in the Southern Huns

Although the Southern Huns had increased their population considerably between 90-93, they were not yet strong and the state was weakened. The Northern Huns had a very different structure compared to the southern Huns, thanks to the captives and those who voluntarily obeyed and joined them. Since the Chinese conquerors had been extremely cruel to the Huns, raiding their camps and dragging their women and children by tying them to the tails of their horses, they had recently developed an extreme hatred towards them. The Northern Huns, on the other hand, had been forced to become loyal to the Southern Hun kingship because their homeland had been ravaged by the Syenpis and Ting-lings, and they had become supporters of the kingship without harbouring any hatred in their hearts against the conquerors who had defeated them. In fact, they especially resented the fact that after his victory over them, the Shih-k'i had taken the titular prince of the Western Lu-li, which led to the collapse of their state and their present miserable situation.

Shih-k'i used his popularity among the Southern Huns to become highly respected by the Chinese. He was brave. He was well-educated, determined, intelligent, and had performed many heroic deeds in battle. The Southern Huns wanted him to become yabgu, but the rightful heir was his uncle An-kuo, who was little known to the people and apparently not very capable. When T'un-tu- ho died in '93, An-kuo became kingship, and Shih-k'i obtained the eastern Chu-ki-princedom. An-kuo felt that the people had grown cold towards him after his accession and began to look for some support to lean on. There was one person who was generally unfriendly, both among his own people and among the re-subdued Northern Huns: Shih-k'i. Nevertheless, An-kuo found some support and supporters among his new subjects. Now the victors and the vanquished had swapped places. Realising that he was facing a life-threatening danger, Shih-k'i migrated to the Chinese borderland and pretended to be ill in order not to attend the general assembly.¹⁵ But the one who could have the final say was T'u Ch'ung, China's governor-general of the region. T'u Ch'ung, on the other hand, sided with Shih-k'i, prevented the reports about the kingship from reaching the palace, started to make denunciations against the kingship together with the dauphin, and started to spread news that An-kuo wanted to kill the dauphin and break away from China. This

¹⁵ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/129.

Faced with the situation, Emperor Ho-ti ordered an investigation into whether T'u Ch'ung's denunciations were true. In the spring of 94, T'u Ch'ung arrived at the seat of the suzerain with Chinese soldiers. An-kuo, realising that this investigation would not yield any good results for him, fled in the middle of the night and took refuge in the steppes. After a while, he marched on Shih-k'i with some of his supporters gathered around him in order to kill the informer. Shih-k'i managed to escape and hid in a Chinese fortress named Mang-hsiang-ch'eng.

T'u Ch'ung, though grim-faced, was overjoyed at his efforts to drown his enemy. Having wiped out the Southern Hun troops, he swooped down on An-kuo. An-kuo's supporters among the despairing Southern Huns decided to surrender his head in order to get rid of this persecution. Thus An-kuo was killed and Shih-k'i was put on the throne. However, it was not so easy to rule these subjugated people. As a matter of fact, one night they attacked Shih-k'i's bed and were thrown back by the Chinese guards. Nevertheless, the rebellion continued to spread, and towards the end of the year fifteen tribes - 200,000 people - proclaimed Feng-hou, son of the late T'un-tu-ho, as their eunuch "against his will" ¹⁶ and, after putting Chinese officials to the sword and destroying outpost towers and post points, packed up their tents and migrated north. The whole army - forty thousand soldiers - was mobilised against the rebels. These were mercenaries from the Syenpi, Wu-huan, Tan- kut and Southern Huns. In the winter of 94/95 Feng-hou yabgu managed to break through the ring and cross northwards, and "the Chinese army did not dare to pursue him." ¹⁷

Although official figures indicate that 17,000 Huns were killed in the fighting and the Huns were seemingly driven to the frontiers, the Chinese leadership realised that the Huns were the victors. T'u Ch'ung and his cohorts were put on trial for "disrupting the good relations between the Huns and China and offending them" and for failing to take necessary military measures. All of them later died in prison. Enraged, Shih-k'i began to search for the culprits, even though they had fled to the north. Finally, Feng-yü-ti-prince decided to torture Wu-ch'ü-chang, finding him guilty of supporting An-kuo. But

¹⁶ Age., p. 130.

¹⁷ Age., p. 131.

This action led to a new rebellion in 96. When Wu-ch'ü-chang took his followers and retreated to the valleys between the mountains, Chinese military assistance was needed again. However, Shih-k'i died in 98 and his brother T'han succeeded to the throne. Feng-hou's fate was rather sad. His people suffered from starvation and Syenpi attacks. Finally, in 117, the Syenpis defeated and dispersed Feng-hou's supporters; most of them took refuge with the Northern Huns, while Feng-hou himself returned in 118 and surrendered to the Chinese. However, the Chinese did not kill him and settled him in the interior of China.

Subjugation of the Ch'iangs

The Chinese attacked the Huns and their loyal allies, the Ch'iangs, at the same time. Fu-yü, the viceroy on the Tibetan border, "sent men to pacify the Ch'iangs",¹⁸ i.e. he wanted to quell the discontent. Fu-yü requested reinforcements from the capital in 1987 and attempted to suppress the rebellion. The Ch'iangs, apparently unwilling to enter into a conflict, had also migrated inland, but the self-aggrandising Fu-yü certainly did not want to settle the matter peacefully. Fu-yü pursued the nomads with three thousand cavalry, caught up with them, but was himself besieged. 300 Ch'iang warriors made a night raid on the Chinese camp and the Chinese soldiers fled in droves. Fu-yü resisted to the end but was killed during the fighting. After this incident, the Ch'iang commander Mi-wu responded with a counterattack, but was defeated and proposed negotiations. The governor-general of Lung-hsi province received the Ch'iang envoys and served them poisoned sha- rap, resulting in the deaths of 800 Ch'iang dignitaries, including Mi-wu. This was followed by the dispatch of an expeditionary force to the mountain valleys. There, 400 people were killed and 2000 rebels were captured. Mi-wu's son Mi-t'ang and his comrades-in-arms attacked Lung-hsi with the help of other Ch'iang tribes, but were driven back in the battles around Pai-shih (pronounced Bayshi). Nevertheless, the Ch'iangs did not stop their support for Mi-t'ang. The Chinese leadership realised that this war could not be won without greater expense. The governor-general of Lung-hsi was put on trial, but his deputy was arrested by the customary policy of seduction.

¹⁸ Yakinf. *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora* I/29.

to sow discord and weaken the resistance. The war continued, but partial successes against Mi-t'ang brought the Chinese very little. Faced with this situation, the Chinese tried to strike a deal and sent to Mi-t'ang the previously captured *de-dine* and five *tilmaj* [translator] people's representatives accompanying him. Mi-t'ang responded to betrayal with betrayal, and, after making the *tilmachs* "lie down on the ground and using their blood to secure a treaty of alliance between the tribes," resumed hostilities.¹⁹ In '92 a regular army was mobilised with a large number of mercenaries. With the help of the mercenaries, the Chinese succeeded in dispersing and weakening the Ch'iangs, while the regular army took 800 prisoners. More importantly, the crops that the Ch'iangs had not yet been able to gather were also captured by the Chinese army. Furthermore, the Chinese had built several fortresses on the banks of the Yellow River and landed a fleet on the river. In this situation, Mi-t'ang, who was squeezed tightly, retreated to the west. The year 93 was successful for the Chinese.

But Mi-t'ang soon recovered. In '96 an army of Yuechi and Chinese subjugated Ch'iangs was sent, but Mi-t'ang inflicted a heavy defeat on them and launched a counter-attack in autumn '97. After entering Lung-hsi and recruiting his own tribesmen living there, he put the local population to the sword. The Chinese government was again obliged to send regular armies against him, which, with the advantage of superior numbers, routed the Ch'iangs, but suffered too many casualties themselves to risk pursuing the enemy.

But the planned system of recruitment reduced Mi-t'ang's successes to zero. Seduced by money and silk, Chinese supporters multiplied to such an extent that Mi-t'ang had to ask for peace in the face of their pressure. He came to the palace with the intention of negotiating peace, but his tribesmen expressed their desire to live in Chinese territory "because of extreme hunger".²⁰ Peace seemed to have been achieved, but in 100 the Ch'iangs revolted again. The Ch'iangs were probably not to blame, as three senior Chinese officials were put on trial. It seems that mismanagement was more damaging to the Han dynasty because it drove the nomads to revolt. One way or another, the war had begun again. Mi-t'ang's first victim was probably one of the tribes that had accepted Chinese rule.

¹⁹ Age., p. 32.

²⁰ Age., p. 34.

this tribe was completely put to the sword. However, other tribes, who did not see any benefit in expanding the rebellion and entering into a revenge war, could not support Mi-t'ang. Mi-t'ang was defeated in the battle off the Yüan Ch'uan stream and fled upstream of the Yellow River with about a thousand of his surviving followers. In the following year 102, the last rebellious Ch'iang tribe was suppressed and the subjugation of all Ch'iangs was completed.

Rebirth of the Northern Huns

In 104, the Northern Huns sent an envoy to China with the aim of establishing a "treaty of peace and friendship". However, the envoy no reply.²¹ The second envoy, sent in 105 upon the death of Emperor Ho-ti, also received no reply. Immediately thereupon, a rebellion broke out at the western end and the Chinese in the region were expelled and replaced by the Northern Huns. There is certainly a connection between these two events.

In truth, the inhabitants of the western end had not lost much. Pan Ch'ao had conquered the region with their help, and the number of Chinese in the area was not significant. Pan Ch'ao's successor, Yang Shang, was besieged in Kashkar, but realising that he was not going to be victorious, he managed to break through the ring and return to China in 106.²² The new commanders, with an army of 8,000 men, took up positions around Ku-cha. General Liang Hin entered the fortress of Ku-cha with the permission of the , who had been installed by Pan Ch'ao, against the wishes of the troops and the people. A general revolt began against the Chinese and their supporters. Reinforcements arrived from Ku-mo (Aksu) and Wen-su (Three-Turfan) to fight invaders. But Liang Hin was not a weakling. He began to wear down the besiegers by making constant breakouts. Finally, when the besiegers lost their former enthusiasm, lifted the siege and started to return home, Liang followed them and about 10 thousand people. (It must be admitted that this figure is an exaggeration). With these successes Liang had consolidated his position in Kucha, but the Tun-hu-ang road was under the control of the rebels and partial successes meant nothing.

²¹ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/132.

²² Chavannes E. *Trois généraux chinois*, p. 256.

The Chinese leadership had realised that it was necessary to save its troops and had ordered the complete evacuation of the western end of the country.

This new territory captured by the Northern Huns stretched from Lake Bargöl to the "Western Sea", that is, the Caspian (Kaspi) or Lake Aral. The power was again in the hands of the Kuyan tribe. After the capture of the western end by the Huns in 107, the north-western regions of China were the scene of war games. The Northern Huns, on the other hand, were considerably strengthened by their conquest of Western Siberia, which was inhabited by the Ugors, but in the meantime a third partner had appeared on the scene: The Syenpis.

The Syenpis and Huns were common enemies of China, but there was also enmity between them. Although Chinese historians are silent about the Hun-Syenpid wars because they took place far from the Chinese borders, indirect evidence suggests that such battles did take place. The Syenpis had begun to strengthen considerably between 93-94, especially after 100 thousand Hun families "adopted the name of Syenpi". Their alliance with China was broken when the Syenpis destroyed Liao-tung in 97. "After this date, the Sienpis were sometimes defeated and sometimes defeated and sometimes fought with the Huns and sometimes with the Wu-huans. "²³

In order to follow the general course of the battles in detail, it is pointless to enumerate all the attacks and skirmishes. In 101, the attacks of the Sienpis were repelled; after the bloody battles in 110, the Wu-huans captured China, and the Sienpi made an agreement on the opening of the frontiers and sent hostages to the palace. However, when the Syenpis attacked the Chinese borders in 115 and renewed their attacks in 117, they were defeated by the Wu-huans who sided with China. In 118, some Sienpi troops attacked the Chinese borders again and this time they looted and set fire to the whole area. However, their attack in 119 was stopped by the regular Chinese army and the Syenpis were pushed back. There was no centralised administration among the Syenpis. Each of the 120 Syenpian tribes went to war on his own, taking risks. However, under the influence of the more civilised Huns, in 120 Prince Ch'i-chien succeeded in gathering around him a group of tribesmen willing to fight China. The results of this organisation were not yet substantial and the administration was weak.

23 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/151.

Even if he had been in favour, it spread rapidly in the surrounding area. From 121 to 126 Ch'i-chi-kien defeated the Chinese and the Huns; only in 127 did Chinese troops and the Southern Huns drive the Syenpians back. In 130 the Chinese government succeeded in attracting the Wu-huans to its side, who dealt a much heavier blow to the Sienpians than the Chinese. And in 134, with the death of Ch'i-chi-kien, the fighting ceased.

The Syenpis' battles against the Huns were apparently disorganised, but the Huns were too energetic to leave Halha to their enemies. As the Huns had to fight on four fronts, the North Sayan Ting-ling claimed Halha, while in Manchuria the aggressive Fu-yü state began to take shape. Meanwhile, their closest neighbours and relatives, the Wu-huans, had sided with the Chinese in 144, and this neighbourly squabbling saved the Si-yenpis from massacre and annihilation.

The situation of the Southern Huns was even worse. All the warriors and energetic men had gone away with Feng-hou, so that the Southern Hun eunuchs were left with only men incapable of defending themselves against the Syenpis. Shih-k'i's successors, T'han (98-124), Pa (124-128) and Hu-li (128-142), knew their opportunities and did not even think of opposing Chinese officials. The Hun tribal princes were more independent, and when they revolted against China in 140, they joined by the Wu-huans and Tankuts; the rebels routed by mercenaries under Ma-i and Güçen, and in 144 the rebellion was completely suppressed. Although Yabgu did not personally participate in this rebellion, China's regional governor began to pressure him to such an extent that Yabgu finally chose suicide. Since the Yabgu clan had been eliminated, the emperor appointed Tê-wu-lo-ch'u (143-147), who was originally a Hun but had become famous for being pro-Chinese, so that the throne would not remain vacant.

Ch'iang Rebellion

The loss of the western end was a heavy blow for China, but not a surprise. A new expedition was immediately organised to recapture the region, and this time it was deemed necessary to include light cavalry units from the subjugated Ch'iangs.

However, this movement would fail. The Ch'iangs, who had been recruited from here and there and had been made to take part in the expedition, had fled. Upon this incident, the repulse troops first tried to eliminate the villages of these fugitives. But the government forces suffered blow after blow. Only the spring of 108 was partially successful. In the battles off Yieh-lieh (pronounced Yieliye) near Hang-chou, the troops under General Liang Hin, who had broken away from the western end, were able to gain a victory over the rebels. However, when the rebellion of Wu-huan and the Southern Huns forced the Chinese government to recall this army to the east, the victory was in vain.

In the following years (109-111) a new rebellion broke out, but the Chinese army again suffered defeats. In the face of this disaster, adventurers on the Chinese borders also tried to rebel, but they were quickly suppressed by the regular armies. Those who managed to escape from them joined the Ch'iangs. At the same time, a larger sectarian war was going on in the west.

The loss of the western end was a heavy blow for China. China was unwilling to compromise with the western end, and five years, 112, the Chinese army attempted to drive the Huns out of the Hami Valley, but was heavily defeated by the Huns. This Chinese attempt soon led to a revolt by the Ch'iangs, which left north-west China open to Hun attacks. As a result, the Chinese border was pushed back to Tun-huang and only the more eastern Shan-shan remained under Chinese control.

China was saved from a very heavy defeat only by the Southern Ti tribes called "Pan-shung Man" or "Pa-ti / seven tribes" and called "God's warriors" ²⁴ because of their heroism. The Pa-ti, united with the Chinese army, stopped the march of the doomsayers. Later on, the Little Yuechis living in today's Hsi-ning region and some Ch'iangs, who probably came to their aid for money, joined the Chinese army. Thanks to their help, contact with the western end was re-established in 115. Now a new battle plan had to be drawn up. The Chinese infantry had lost discipline. Therefore, a considerable amount of ransom was demanded from those who wanted to leave, and with the money collected, a light cavalry army of ten thousand men was organised from the Southern Huns. In the end, it was the Chinese army that triumphed and the rebellious Ch'iangs were defeated.

24 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/16.

But the war did not end. Until 126, Chinese light cavalry units organised annual marches to subdue the scattered Ch'iang tribes. Although the rebellion was suppressed, these campaigns had cost the Han State a lot of money. "The costs of organising and feeding the army reached 24 million gü- müş lan" and the state treasury was completely empty. The fertile lands were ruined. They had to be replanted, fortresses had to be rebuilt and irrigation canals had to be opened. Although this war was very heavy for the Chinese, they did not delay in fighting the Huns, nor were they in a hurry to fight against the overflow of the Yellow River, for the mountains were the natural boundaries protecting the heart of the country.

Loss of the West End

In 123, the regional governor of Tun-huang brought to the palace a three-pronged plan for military activities in the western end:

- To raid and eliminate the Kuyan tribe prince's camp and to squeeze Ch'e-shih with the help of the Shan-Shanids.
- To set up outposts and to reinforce them with garrisons coming from China.
- Withdrawal from the West.

The second plan was not a wise one. The third was not only embarrassing but also ruinous, for if the Huns were to unite with the Ch'iangs it would threaten a return to the days of Me-te. The first plan was therefore favoured, to which Pan Yung, the son of Pan Ch'ao and a member of the state advisory council, abstained. He was thus entrusted with the task of reconquering control of the western end to China. The matter was presented as a simple matter, as if a military colony was to be established in the Lukchun Trench. However, in order for this plan to be implemented, the Western region had to be completely conquered and the Northern Huns had to be neutralised, and for this reason, it was blamed on Pan Yung.

Meanwhile, the situation at the western end centred on the following: Shan-shan remained loyal to China; Hami came under the control of the Huns; the northern valleys, especially Arka Ch'e-shih and Karashar, were de facto annexed to the Northern Huns.

while the south-west - Kashkar, Yarkend and Khotan - came under the Kushanids' guarantee.²⁵

Pan Yung, who set out with his troops in 124, came to Shan-shan and rewarded the city ruler for his loyalty. Upon Pan Yung's request, the rulers of Kucha, Aksu and Uc- Turfan sided with him and gave him an army of 10 thousand infantry and cavalry. Pan Yung entered Turfan with these troops and defeated the Hun Prince Yü-li in I-hou valley. In the face of this situation, Anterior Ch'e-shih offered obedience to Pan Yung and sent a volunteer aid troop of five thousand men. The Chinese government also appreciated the commander's achievements and sent a light cavalry unit of 6 thousand men from the border guards as a reinforcement for a serious war against the Huns.

In 125, Pan Yung defeated the prince of Arka Ch'e-shih and 8 thousand prisoners and more than 50 thousand head of cattle to feed his army. The prince and the Hun envoy were captured and beheaded in the meantime. In the summer of 126 Pan Yung subjugated all the small principalities around Bargol and Lake Ebi-Nor and in the winter he attacked the Kuyan prince's camp and destroyed it. Among the captives was a kinsman of the Hun ewe, and Pan Yung ordered the prince of Ch'e-shih to cut him to pieces in order that the incident might become a blood feud between the Huns and the Ch'e-shih. Indeed, the khagan attacked to avenge his kinsman's death, but was routed by the Chinese soldiers and thrown back. After this incident, the Kuyan yabgu was forced to move his seat to the banks of the Ha-wu, or Black Irtysh River.²⁶

In 127, it was the turn of Karashar, which was located in the mountainous region and had an anti-Chinese attitude. Pan Yung led an allied army of 40,000 men and Chang Liang, the governor of the Tun-huang region, marched on Karashar at the same time with a regular army of 3,000 men. The Karasharites had no hope and therefore decided to surrender without retaliation. Chang Liang, who had arrived in Karashar earlier, surrendered the city without preconditions and sent a report of his victory to the palace and noted that Pan Yung was too late. According to Chinese military law, the penalty for being late to the front was death. Thus, Pan Yung was arrested and imprisoned, but was pardoned by the emperor. Pan Yung devoted the next part of his life to writing his classic historical account of the Western frontier.

²⁵ See Sixna N. K. I Banerdji A. Ç. *ôstoriya. M.*, 1954, p. 81; Tolstov S. P. *Po sledam drevnexorezmiyskoy tsivilizatsii*. M-L., 1948, c. 152.

²⁶ Грүнѣм-Грѣймѣло G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 134-135.

After the fall of Karashar, Kashkar, Yarkend and Khoten accepted Chinese rule. However, the western end was easier to conquer than to hold. Although a military colony had been established in Hami, as early as 132 "the powerful Chinese court was somewhat shaken."²⁷

Due to this shake-up in the capital, Chinese officers started to exhibit arbitrary behaviour. For example, the governor of Khoten, who was appointed to replace Pan Yung, killed the princess on a tip-off. Upon this incident, the people revolted, besieged the tower where the Chinese were locked up and set fire to the tree sections. Then they entered the tower, killed the Chinese and put the governor's head on a spear and planted it in the middle of the square.²⁸ However, the rebels were not punished for these actions.

Around Ch'e-shih, battles between the Northern Huns and the Chinese continued. In 134 the Chinese and their allies unexpectedly besieged the Northern Huns' encampment and took many prisoners, but in 135 the Hun Kuyan clan prince Arka defeated the Chinese army at Ch'e-shih. The governor of Tun-huang sent troops to help the Ch'e-shihs, but they could do nothing.

In the summer of 137, the governor of Tun-huang with an army of 3,000 fought the Kuyan prince near Lake Bargol, but was defeated. The prince even erected a stone near the lake to commemorate this victory and recorded his victory on it.²⁹

The Bargol victory accelerated the collapse of Chinese rule in the western end for 14 years. In 151 the Kuyan prince sacked Hami. The Chinese army, chased by the Huns, was completely in the vicinity of Bargol, where it had been defeated earlier. After this the Kuyan continued the attack, destroying the Chinese military colony in the Hami Valley and retreating before being pinned down by reinforcements sent from Tun-huang.³⁰

In 153 the Ch'e-shihs also abolished the Chinese military colony and, like the Khotenese, were not punished in any way. They were no longer in China's power.

²⁷ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/220.

²⁸ Age., p. 223.

²⁹ Chavannes E. *Dix inscriptions chinoises de l'Asie Centrale*// Memoires présentés par divers savants. Académie des inscriptions et de belles-lettres. Série I. T. XI. Part 2. P., 1904. p. 209.

³⁰ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/238.

was not enough to hold the western end. So why was he in such a weakened state? One reason was the renewed revolt of the Ch'iangs in 134. This rebellion was even more important than the previous one in terms of the destruction it wrought. The first six years had been characterised by partisan warfare on the one hand and reprisals on the other, but such measures required the introduction of the entire Chinese light cavalry force, which could stabilise the western end. The two new governors appointed in 139 were given strict instructions to respect the customs of the indigenous population in order to reconcile the Ch'iang with China.

But this was not the case at all. Because both governors were "of a harsh nature, they ignored all instructions. "³¹ As a result of their excessive pressure, a general revolt broke out in 140. The new army dispatched to the region was also defeated and the commander of the army was killed in the fighting along with his two sons. The fields in the north-west of China were again turned into a bloodbath, villages were burnt down, peasants abandoned their fields and fled, and the tombs of the imperial family were desecrated (there were tombs of the Han dynasty in Shan-si).

In previous wars, the Ch'iangs had been as weak as the Chinese. The regular armies had pressurised them and driven them to the mountains, where they had starved to death trying to resist. In 145, the Ch'iangs had "begun to weaken. "³² But the suppression of these rebellions had cost China 8 million silver lanes.

In 148, the Yuechis, loyal allies of China, revolted. This rebellion was probably fuelled by the insolence and greed of government officials. In this case, the Manes in Pan-shung were again called upon for help, and they suppressed the rebels. The country emptied and "the fields were covered with the bones of the slain." However, this region had to be used as a base for attacks to the west.

However, the Huns could not succeed in re-establishing the sovereignty in the steppes by taking advantage of this weak moment of China. Because now the Huns had entered into a personal life, they had become a small but brave nation with their commanders and flags at their heads as before.

In 155, the first Sienpi state was established.

³¹ Yakinf. *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora*I/56.

³² Age., p. 59.

The last information about the western end dates from the second half of the second century. Its subsequent history is rather obscure. Although the borders of the region experienced a period of "cha- rity", some of the information obtained is remarkable.

After the defeat of the Northern Huns by the Syenpis, he became influential again on the Chinese Ba- tian frontier. In 158 he still held a commanding position in Kucha³³ because the valleys surrounded by the T'ien-shan Mountains were inaccessible to the Huns. This situation continued until an anti-Chinese coup took place in Kashkar in 168. In 170, 500 Chinese troops from Tun-huang and allied troops of Ch'e-shih, Karashar and Kuchans were dispatched to put down the rebellion. However, when nothing came of the siege, China had to swallow the loss of this place. There was no longer any point in holding the Ba- tian end, and the Chinese did not have the strength to do so.

The unruly Ch'iangs rebelled again in 159.³⁴ Although the chiefs of some Ch'iang tribes also sided with the Chinese side, the attacks and persecutions continued for 10 years and the Ch'iangs became the whipping boys of Chinese officials and officers. In the end, Chinese General Tuan Fan was able to end this tedious war only by changing the method of direct destruction of the enemy. Fan abandoned the costly extermination attacks and concentrated all his forces in Shen- si, whose inhabitants were as warlike as the Ch'iangs. "He weakened the tribes in the west and put an end to the destructive attacks in the east. "But no matter how many times you crush and crush the people, no matter how many skulls you fill the mountain tops with skulls and turn the members of a nation into lifeless rocks, still one or two out of every hundred people can hide in the gorges and among the grasses and escape your sharp arrows." China's victory too late and at great cost. And history would write: "It is true that the enemy was crushed a little, but it caused the throne of the Han dynasty to shake. "³⁵ Indeed, the Han dynasty did not reap the fruits of this victory. Only the rebellion of the "yellow turbans" was enough to shake China, and in Pei-ti and Han-chung the Ch'iang rebelled again, and the mountain guerrillas rekindled the flames of war. And the Ch'iang resistance outlived the Great Han Empire.

³³ Chavannes E. *Dix inscriptions*, p. 197.

³⁴ Yakinf. *Istoriye Tibeta i Xuxunora*/60.

³⁵ Age., p. 70.

SECTION XV

LAST PULSE

T'an-shih-huai

The Sienpis were indeed formidable warriors, but it would take a man of strong will to organise them a little. Such a person was found, but surprisingly, according to the unanimous historical sources, he was only 14 years old.

T'an-shih-huai (pronounced Tanshihay) was born in 141. After serving in the Hun army for three years, his father returned home to find that he had a son. When he asked his wife how it had happened, she replied that she had once heard a noise on the road, and when she looked up to the sky, a grain of hail had fallen into her mouth, which she had swallowed and from which this child was born. The husband, however, did not believe this story and did not even look at the face of the child, which his wife was busy nursing.¹ The lives of great personalities are always embellished with a legend, but there was another important aspect: T'an-shih-huai had been abandoned by his tribe and his achievements were all due to his own personal ability. Even the date of his birth is a matter of conjecture, but it is important to emphasise this point. Because of his courage and qualities, he was elected as the chief of the tribe in 156. Sienpi chieftains were chosen without regard to their ability as warriors, since their power was not important, but T'an-shih-huai seems to have been an exception. He had built a palace for himself, gathered many warriors around him and had all the other lesser Sienpi chieftains beheaded. Time was on his side: The Sienpis were the

1 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/154.

They began to realise that it was absolutely necessary, and it was up to the young commander to ensure this.²

This consolidation soon paid off. T'an-shih-huai "plundered the regions bordering (to China) in the south. In the north he stopped the Ting- lings; in the east he ravaged Fu-yü, in the west he defeated the Wu-suns, and from east to west he conquered all the territory formerly subject to the Huns, 14,000 li (about 6.5 thousand km.-L.W.) in length, with its mountains, rivers and shining lakes. "³ All these conquests were accomplished within a period from 155 to 166. It is also significant that Southern Siberia was conquered ^{between} 168-1734 , but we know very little about these conquests.

Even the scanty information available to us reveals that T'an-shih-huai dealt the last blow to the Northern Huns. The western borders of his state were 6.5 thousand kilometres long, stretching from Ussuri to the Volga or Ural. In other words, T'an-shih-huai had driven the Huns out of Cungar- ya beyond Targabatay, pushed the Ting-ling back behind the Sayan, and subjugated the Mongol elements in Halha and Chahar. This situation would remain unchanged for 400 years. The Ting-ling had suffered such a great blow that they would not be mentioned again from this date onwards. For the Huns, a new historical period had begun. The Huns, deprived of the agricultural lands at the western end, headed westwards in search of new lands and thus went through a phase of division among themselves again. The "weak Huns" remained in Yedisu, where they established a state called Yüeban, which lasted until the V century AD. The strongest of them crossed into Europe, where they defeated the Alans and Goths and travelled as far as Rome with their new allies, the Ugors and Caucasians. The heavy defeat of many European peoples by the Guns led to their being labelled as headhunters and heretics.⁵ However, in the same period China-

2 "Active personalities, by virtue of their intelligence and character, can change the course events and some of their consequences, but they cannot change orientations which, in general, depend on the power of others." (Plexanov G.V. *O roli lichnosti v istorii*. M., 1041. P. 31-32).

3 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/154.

4 Bichurin, *Zapiski o Mongolii*, Dnr. 4 - T. III, Киев с. 216 и сл.

5 In 160, Dionysus Periegee was the first to mention the Guns in South Russia, and after him the name "Guns" was not lost and was in Ptolemaeus in 175-182. This information confirms the fact that the Huns, fleeing from T'an-shih-huai, did not stop near Aral due to the fear of the Syenpis and came to Europe.

li writers referred to the Huns as the most cultured "barbarians".

Let's go back to the Syenpis.

It seems that T'an-shih-huai was not only a military commander but also an organiser. He divided the Syenpi state into three parts, the centre, the right wing and the left wing, and appointed one of his deputies to head each of them, leaving no trace of either Hun aristocracy or Syenpi separatism.

T'an-shih-hu- ai's system was a true military democracy modelled on the ancient alp-tocracy, the medieval order of Asia. It is surprising that T'an-shih-hu- ai received the yabgu titl and essentially no titl. He was simply a T'an-shih-huai, the leader of the steppe tribes, and in fact these tribes had rallied under his banner to fight against the Chinese bureaucracy they hated. Of course, the Han Empire had to fight again in order to survive.

T'an-shih-huai led the war with China quite successfully. From 158 onwards, the Syenpian raiders swept through North China and carried out the "great plunder". In 166, the Southern Huns and a large part of the Wu-huans sided with the Syenpis. When the Chinese realised that Hu-hu-erh, whom they had placed at the head of the Southern Huns, was incompetent, they arrested him, but things did not improve again at the front.⁶ In 167, the Chinese government, weary of the incessant attacks, offered T'an-shih-huai a "treaty of friendship and peace" and gave him the title of "wang". But T'an-shih-huai refused to start negotiations.⁷

Finally, the Chinese decided to eliminate the enemy on their own territory and sent an army of thirty thousand men. The Sienpis, like the Huns, never fled. They fought hand-to-hand with the Chinese and inflicted a heavy defeat on three battalions. In 177 they sacked Liao-hsi from top to bottom and in 178 they entered Ho-hsi. China could not recover from this blow for a long time. Already for four hundred years its borders had always been under the control of nomads.

but Maenchen-Helfen rejects it, arguing that it is a description of a copyist. (Sr. Inostrancev K.A. Xunnu i gunny. L.,

так: Аммиан Марцеллин.. Т. III. Киев. 1908. с. 236 и сл.

6 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/137.

7 Age., p. 155.

In 181 T'an-shih-huai died at the age of forty. But the state he had founded had reached the peak of its power and had proved itself. His son Ho-lien tried to continue his father's war policy, but to no avail. Half of his army refused to obey him "because he was stingy and led a debauched life".⁸ Finally, he was killed by an arrow shot by automatic machines during the battle of a Chinese fortress. As the son he left behind was a child, his brother took over the government, but then uncle and nephew quarreled, and the Sienpi state disintegrated for good in 235. But T'an-shih-huai's blow to China was too heavy. Therefore, the nomads who wanted to replace the cold steppes of Siberia with the warm climate of the coast of the Yellow River easily settled in Northern China. The southern part of China was already empty because of the rebellion of the "yellow turbans", which was very difficult to suppress.

Four Arms of the Huns

When Yabgu Hü-li died by suicide in 142, his successor was nominated from Chü-te-hou's clan. His , Tê-wu-lou-ch'u and Hu-hu-erh, became the court puppets of high-ranking officials rather than administrators. Since the Chinese government did not even recognise them as human beings, they had no authority among their subjects. For example, Hu-hu-erh was arrested and died in prison, and although his son served as a yabgul between 172 and 178, his name was not mentioned in the state records and therefore not recorded in history. His son Hu-cheng (178-179) was sentenced to death by a high-ranking Chinese official for law-breaking, and his successor, Kien-ch'ü, was killed by the Huns who feared that he would force them to fight against the Syenpis. Kien-ch'ü's son, Yü-fu-luo, fled from the rebels and took refuge in the capital Liao-yang, but was unable to return to his throne, although his kingship was confirmed. Around this time, the revolt of the "yellow turbans" and voivods had broken out. The Huns sided with the rebels, as they were then living under the suzerain Ts'ao Ts'ao, but they were not successful and "the southern army emptied." ⁹ The independent history of the Southern Huns officially came to a close in 215, when the suzerain Hu-ch'u- ch'üan was arrested and a governor was appointed to rule the Huns.¹⁰

8 Age., p. 159.

9 Age., p. 138.

10 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 140.

In this last period (142-215) two events attract our attention: The gradual return of some Huns to the north, and the Chineseisation of those who stayed put. Those who returned to the steppe were the remnants of the rebels. Many Huns joined T'an-shih-huai in 158, and in the following years the eunuch's army was completely on the run. This is understandable. Because all energetic people who did not want to change their accustomed way of life were fed up with the oppression of Chinese officials. The Sienpi nomads were closer to them and they were also their relatives, so the Huns had retreated to the north. This, of course, deprived the yabga of any support to fall back on, and he was forced to establish relations with the Chinese court. From Hu-hu- erh onwards, the system of succession to the throne also changed completely as a result of the influence of Chinese culture. Living side by side with the Chinese and exchanging daughters changed the physical appearance and psychology of the people in time, and by the III century A.D. the Hun people were divided into four main branches:

1. Northern Huns: These were mixed with the Siberian Ugors, unyielding and uninfluenced by centralised cultures.

2. Yüeban : Huns who were overly influenced by Sogdian culture.

3. Hunno-Syenpis: Intermarrying tribes in Halha and Chahar. The ethnic substrate that later gave rise to the early medieval Turkic and Mongolian-speaking tribes.

4. However, the Chinese Huns completed the process of assimilation, which ended in the V century AD.

The stage vacated by the Huns was filled by the Syenpis. They succeeded in defeating the Huns and even the Chinese, but this part of Central Asian history must be analysed separately.

For now, let us take a brief look at the events that happened to the Huns, known as Gunlar in Europe.

Hyung-nular and Gunlar

The western edge of the Great Steppe was inhabited by two peoples at that time: Alans in the Fore-Caucasus and Ugors in the Lower Volga and the Urals.¹¹ The steppe-forest strip of western Siberia was occupied by the Sabirs, belonging to the Ugor-Samoid¹² group, and the Aral region by the Hionites¹³ the remnants of the old European strata. The latter two peoples were apparently untouched by the wave of Huns that had passed further north, but when the Sabres in the Trans-Caucasus, their resemblance to the Huns attracted the attention of historians.¹⁴ However, it was not they, but the Ugors, who harboured the fugitives and enabled them to regain power. Indeed, since the Ugors constituted the original core of the striking force of the Guns, their westward march began from Ugor lands, and there is no reason to doubt that these two peoples mingled and fused into a new people called the Guns [Kuns].

The exact dates from 155, when the Northern Huns fled from the victorious Syenpis and came to the shores of the Volga, to 350, when the Guns fought to the death with the Alans, are not known.

Indeed, it is rather strange, but in view of the fact that an entire people fled without knowing where they were going, the case of the Hyung-nus marching west does not seem very convincing. However, if we that the Hyung-nus were aware of Western culture and deliberately headed for an inhospitable region, then we have doubts that such an exodus should have ended their power. The hypothetical para- doctrinal thesis on this issue is based on G. I. Borovka's analyses of the finds from the Noin-ula kurgan. According to Borovka, among the industrial products found there are items brought from abroad and even pieces of cloth that must have belonged to the Greeks.¹⁵ The fabrics found resemble the fabrics woven in the Greek colonies on the Black Sea coast in terms of raw material, dye, weaving technique and patterns. Probably they were woven for the Scythians and from there they were transferred to the Huns.¹⁶

11 Artamonov M.I. *Ocherki drevneysey istorii xazar*. L., 1936, p. 24.

12 Hajdu P. *Die ältesten Berührungen zwischen den Samoeden und die jenisseischen Völkern*// Acta Orientalia. T. III. Budapest., 1953. pp. 88-89, 99.

13 Gumilëv L.N. *Eftaliti ix sosedii v IV v.* ((БДИ. 1957, № 1). S. 134-135

14 Prikopiy Kesariyskiy. *Istoriya vojn rimlan s persami*. SPb. 1880 pp. 181-182.

15 Kratiye otcheti ekspeditsiy po issledovaniyu Severnoy Mongolii v svyazi s Mongolo-Tibetskoy ekspeditsiyey P. K. Kozlova. L., 1925, c. 26.

16 Age, pp. 30-31.

Considering that it is possible to learn from the abundant artefacts about the countries where they were made, we have no reason to suppose that the Huns did not know what awaited them in the West. On the contrary, it must be accepted that the Huns had thought and planned this march. Having been expelled from the borders of China and the western end of the country, they had to move to other frontiers where agricultural culture flourished, since they were isolated in an environment where misery and death awaited them.

It was very difficult to stand out from the masses of Ugor and Alan. For this reason, it is said that the physical appearance of the Guns who came to the West changed markedly. For 200 years the remnants of the Hun people underwent such changes that for a long time the researchers of the Huns could not decide to identify the Asian Huns with the European Guns. Eventually this issue was resolved favourably,¹⁷ but still the question of the dissimilarities between the two peoples remained unresolved.¹⁸

From 350 onwards, the Huns appear in European history books, but the two hundred years of ethnogenesis process in between is so remarkable that we cannot just dismiss this issue out of hand. Since we have no information about this period, we are forced to resort to the method of interpolation of historical sources, that is, to compare the information given by Ammianus Mercellinus and Jordanes [pronounced Yordan], European writers of the IVth century, with the sources mentioning the Asian Huns.¹⁹

A. Mercellinus places the Gunlar "in the back of the Maiotis marshes on the Le-dovit Ocean", which, in his opinion, was not far away, in other words, he confirms that they had made the Middle and Lower Volga coast their home. From the anthropological point of view, the author describes the Gunlar as beardless and stocky, but with a little bit of superficiality: "They were all tough-looking. They resembled beasts with their sturdy bodies, thick necks and rather horrible appearance. It was possible to liken them to bipedal predators or thick pontoons driven under bridges." Stockiness is a typical characteristic of the Mongoloid Eurasian peoples, and the Mongol-

17 Inostrantsev K. *AXunnu i gunny*.

18 Maenchen-Helfen O. *The Huns and the Hsiung-nu*.

19 Ammian Martsellin. *Istoriya.TIHKn. XXXI. C. 236-243; Iordanis. Romana et Getika. Berlin, 1882.*

Ugors had this characteristic more than the Mongoloids. It is noteworthy that the Roman author does not describe the prominent cheekbones and slanted eye lines of the pure Mongoloid type. Because it is impossible for these features, if they existed, not to attract attention. In other words, Ammianus Marcellinus did not see Mongoloids from the Far East, he only recognised Hunno-Ugor hybrids.

There are also data supporting these findings in linguistic researches. We can easily point to the Chuvash as the heirs of the Gun language.²⁰ B.A. Serebrennikoff poses a question about where to look for the sources of the Turkic language that was carried to the Chuvash lands and concludes the following based on the relations between the Chuvash-Mongolian and even Chuvash-Tungus languages: "One of the Turkic languages, which is the main source of today's Chuvash language, was apparently found somewhere in the Lake Baikal region, living in the neighbourhood of a Mongolian-speaking people."²¹ As a matter of fact, the Finnogur peoples were later influenced by Turkic-speaking immigrants.²²

According to B.A. Serebrennikoff, those who brought the Turkic language, which is the main source of today's Chuvash, "were strong-willed immigrants; they were pushed towards Europe and made the lower reaches of the Volga their home."²³ As a result, the Turkic-speaking peoples were divided into two linguistic groups: Bulgar and Khazar. The Khazars remained in the lower reaches of the Volga, while the Bulgarians split into two groups, one group moving towards the south and the other towards the north.²⁴ The only peculiar aspect of the author's hypothesis is that he the date of the event as the first half of the first millennium BC.²⁵ However, when we review the map, we see that it occurred in the first half of the first millennium AD, that is, during the period when the Huns continued their march and lived out their destiny in Eastern Europe.

As for the racial mixture from which the Guns eventually emerged, let us leave it to Jordanes: "Based on ancient knowledge, I have the following information about their descent: Philimer is the king of the Goths and

20 Barthold W.W. *12 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken mittelasiens*. Berlin, 1935. pp. 30-31.

21 Serebrennikov B.A. *Proisxojdeniye chuvash po dannym yazika//* O proisxojdenii chuvashskogo naroda. Sb. Statey. Cheboksari, 1957, c. 41. 3XO-

22 Age., p. 38.

23 Age., p. 42.

24 Age., p. 43.

25 Agy.

He was the son of Gandarich the Great, who was their fifth king until the Goths came to the Skandza (Scandinavian) Islands. Under his rule the Goths entered Scythian territory. Among his people [probably among the Scythians, for Philimer knew what was going on among them from his childhood] there were some witches, and Philimer called them Aliarum in his own language.

On his orders, these witches were expelled and forced to live in the steppes far away from the Goth military camps. Seeing these witches wandering miserably in the desert, evil spirits had sexual intercourse with them, and thus this barbarian people called Gunlar was born."

The detail that interests us in this explanation is "evil spirits", i.e. nomadic men seeking women among the local population.²⁶ The tendency to ascribe such an attribution is more convincing than other possibilities. It must be admitted that the Huns, who were separated from their war armies and probably lost their weight, could not have brought enough women with them from Targabatay. Therefore, the predominance of the Ugorian type over the Mongoloid and European faces in their descendants entirely understandable. This circumstance overcomes all objections based on the dissimilarities between ethnographic and anthropological indications; and it is in accordance with the political situation of Central Asia in the II-III century, based on the information provided by Eastern and Western historians. Moreover, this proposal allows us to conclude that some differences in culture and lifestyles had to emerge, as the historical sources indicate. Let us analyse this issue a little.

The Huns were engaged in nomadic farming in a highly organised way and each tribe had its own territory. The logs recovered during the excavations show that the Huns had built huts for wintering. However, we do not see such things among the Guns. A. Marcellinus describes their life style as follows: "They had absolutely no roof over their heads and lived in disgusting grave-like places which other people generally refused to use. They did not even have a reed-made tool. They wandered in the mountains and forests. They were tolerant of hunger, cold and thirst from the cradle. When they were abroad, if they did not have to, they lived in huts.

26 Cf. Maenchen-Helfen O. *The legend of origins of the Huns* //Bisanton. Vol. XVII. 1945. P. 244-252.

because they considered it dangerous to be under the roof." That's the height of exaggeration. So how did these Guns live in winter? The answer to our question was as follows: "All of them... if they were eternal dwellers, travelling from place to place in their wagons in which they spent their lives. In these carts, their women sewed coarse clothes, slept with their men, gave birth to children and fed them with what they found. No one can answer the question of where his [Gun's] homeland is: She is conceived in someone's womb in one place, given birth in a place far away from there, and fed in another place." ²⁷

Here we meet again the old Hyung-nu chariot, the ship that carried the Hyung-nu across the Gobi desert fifteen hundred years ago. This manoeuvre reminds us more of the fugitives of Shung-wei than of the organised state of Me-te. The subject of food is handled as simply as possible: "They had a very boring and deprived life. They were so savage that they could not light fires or cook food everywhere. They subsisted on roots of plants, grasses and meat, which they put under the horses' collars, pressed a little and softened." For three hundred years, however, the Huns had enjoyed a diet of Chinese sweets.²⁸ Their clothes were now made of linen or skins of forest mice. Yet in the Yüeban kurgans we find completely silk clothes and ceramics. The Guns did not know agriculture at all, as if their ancestors had never been engaged in ploughing the soil. Since iron was scarce in their country, they made spearheads out of bone. But the most important difference between the Huns and the Guns is that the Guns had lost the ability of organisation and the system of throne succession: On important matters, they held consultations "in the customary order (i.e. at the top level-L.G.). They were not subordinated to any ruler, but they would follow a brain chosen by chance among them and destroy everything in their path." It was only later that the system of succession to the throne was established in the Guns.

It is hard to believe that this people, like their contemporaries the Yuebans and the Huns of Ordos, were a single people, but this was the case. The military defeat they suffered set the Northern Huns back two thousand years, but their interbreeding with the Ugors changed their physical appearance and character. The harsh living conditions they encountered

²⁷ Ammian Martsellin. *Istoriya*. III/236-243.

²⁸ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/57.

They lost many of their cultural elements.²⁹ Only the military structure was preserved and this yielded brilliant results in the west as well as in the east.

Their neighbours the Alans, like the Yuechis and Parthians, used Sarmatian warfare tactics. A cavalryman dressed in scale or mane armour; in his hand a long spear, one end of which was attached to the horse's neck by a chain, and which could strike with all its might according to the direction of the animal. At the command of the commander, these cavalrymen would attack so fast that they would tear the infantry, armed with weak bows in the old way, to pieces.

With this new type of cavalry the Sarmatians had finished off the Scythians, but the Huns of Me-te and Lao-shang and the Guns of King Balaamir twice triumphed over the Sarmatians. The Guns used the Sarmatian striking tactics, but their striking style was far more perfect than that of their hated enemy. They did not engage in hand-to-hand combat, but they never left the battlefield, showering the enemy with arrows and lassoing and incapacitating him. On the other hand, they could not end battles in a few minutes because they "wanted to deliver a broad frontal death blow". It is normal for the heavily armed cavalryman to tire more quickly than the lightly armed cavalryman, and if he could not eliminate his enemy with a spear, he would certainly lasso him.

Jordanes records that "the Guns, fighting the Alans, defeated them after exhausting them with incessant attacks". (years 350-370). Probably the Hyung-nus used the same tactics against the Yuechis (208-161 BC).

After defeating and incorporating the Alans, the Guns became the rulers of a large federation of tribes in which they, the direct descendants of the Hyung-nu-lar, were a distinct minority. In the seventies of the IV century they came to the Don coast, where they defeated the Ostro-goths and began a new historical period, which we call the "Great Migrations of Peoples".

29 However, it should be taken into consideration that A. Marcellinus only describes the masses of the Guns, and perhaps a significant part of these evaluations he makes is related to the Ugors. Because Priskus, who describes Attila's palace, tells completely different things.

See Skazaniya Priska Panniyskogo v perevode Destunisa// Uçeniye zapiski 2-go otdela imperatorskoy Akademii nauk. Kn. 7, vip. I. Spb., 1861.

In this book, by filtering the sources, we have discussed the fate of the Huns and their birth as a new people in a new geography. Being renewed with the blood of tribes that were foreign to them until that moment, coming to a new geography, changing the course of time completely; starting as the spear cavalry of the Han Empire and continuing as the brave warriors of T'an-shih-huai...

We can now close the subject here. Because what follows is a new stage in the history of Europe.

TABLE

Yıl	China	İç Asya	İran, Hindistan vd.
M.Ö. XVI	The Hsia dynasty's yiki-lip and Shang-Yin dynasty the founding of the nedan (according to the new chronology).	Shang Wci's foray into the steppes. Glazkovo culture in the vicinity of Baikal.	The hexos' conquest of Egypt. The conquest of Babylon by the Het-iilcr.
XV		Andrönovo culture in Kaxakistan and Sayan-Altaisr.	The Mtsirlites captured Sunyc.
xiv	Chou prcnsliginin.şe-Inside.		Hetti and M'- in Sunye. the battle of the sirlis.
XIII		Chih-li to Bargöl Gö- The formation of the Hyung-nu State in the territory extending up to the t- raldar.	Assyrians on Urartu the rinc march.
XII	The defeat of the Shang-Yin dynasty and the establishment of the Chou kingdom lulu. Júnglarhn iiaäi aliina alinqi..	Hyung-nular expansion from the Gabi base. The emergence of Ka- r "suk culture in Sayan-At'taytar.	The Uraitu of the Asurts. A lot of Hetti kmllig.
XI			The emergence of the kingdom of Israel. The destruction of the Assyrians lışı.
X			/üdea and Isra'I's descent şü,
IX	The popular uprising against Li Wang, Chou Kung and the regency of Chaó l'Lung.	China of the Hyung-nular istilası.	The ascendant of the Assyrians.
VIII	Chou state dagt-lışı. Huan-junğ, Ang-junğ ve Shan-junğ-lar'ın Cin'i istilası.		Nubian Misirh Zaptt.

Yit	China	İç Asya	tran, India yd.
VII	Ch'in derbcylen ön-the dominance of the derebcy in the dederliga. The Junglar offensive.	Ta- in Sayan-Altai gar culture.	Mcdeia and Khaldeli-ler's destruction of Assyria. The disappearance of the Jewish language.
VI	Jung-Ts'in (Ch'inl barip agreement.(565)		Perr Devte- of Cyrus ti'ni kurması.
V	luno vc Tung-hul'ir subjugated. The beginning of the Mu-harip reign period.		Greco-Peisian wars,
IV	Shang-Yang reform-ri.	The Chinese san rla-the rlna.	Alexander the Great Perslcr'i inhir.aml. GrcWsnHindis-tzıdançkanlqv
III	The unification of China, The conquest of all of China by the Ts'in state. Imp. Ch'in Shih-Huang-ti.	Hunlar's Tung-hu - Under the influence of the lar-mcsi.	The establishment of the Parthian kingdom lulu
4	The Great Chinese Seddi in3aasi.	Ordos in Chinese fcthi.	Hannibal in Italy.
213		Tung-hus in the east. The Yuechilcr in the west. The decline of the Huns.	
211			Eutyd'mus in Bactria, The enthronement of Artaban in Parthia.
210	Ch'in Shih-Huang-ı_'s death.		
209	Chan Hiao's throne is elc the conquest. Ch'en Sheng and the suppression of the Wu-Huang rebellion.	Babasirti iildürçn Me-te's enthronement. Tung-hular inhiZa-mi. Wu-huan and Si-	Antioch III's Parihto ask the Medcians to invade Medcia and drive them to sleplcre.

Yıl	China	İç Asya	Iran, India etc.
gg	Hsiang-Yü ve Liu Parig's rebellion.	The Huns were the first alignment.	Antioch's Grcko-Bttk-defeat of the caterpillars.
207	The destruction of the Chin dynasty his departure. Hsiang Yü's ha- kimioti.		Antioch's Baktna fiucation.
206	The Liu Pang rebellion and The previous Khan Khan-ntn organisation.		Anlioeh-fiuthydemus
203	Civil war .	The Ordns of the Huns nanny. The in- hir.am of the Ch'iargs.	Euthydemus' Parada mixad, Dranhian and Arahosia.
202	Liu Pang's victory Declaration of the Khan Empire.	Huns to Numbers scfc-ri. Ting-ling, Kipchak, Kyrgyz, Huo-yii and Ta- lilcr(?) under subordination	
201	Chinese Prince Han The surrender of Hsin to the Huns.	Huns on China march .	Pun War II.
200	The Chinese army's former Pai-tcng'dc Hun the bird's nest .		
198		Hun-Han Treaty of Friendship and Peace.	
197	Rebellion of Han Hsin supporters in Chao and Ta-i {Ku- zey Shan-si).	Yi3cççilcr's battle with the Huns.	
196	Negotiations with Han Hsin and his to kill the imperial Liu Hou.		

Yıl	China	Central Asia	fran.India s'd.
195	In the principality of Yen is- Yan. The death of Liu Pang. Liu Hou's nai-	The principality of Yen is the princely state of Kuman- when Liu Huang, the dani Liu Huang, defected to the Hun side.	
192		Me-te's Imp- çe Liu The marriage proposal to Hou.	
191		The western end and Wu-sun- the subjugation of the lar.	The judgement of the Selawkids dnn Anliocho IH's destruction by the Romans. Establishment of the Er- mcn State.
187			The fall of the Maun Imp.
186			I'm sure that Dimitnus of Baktna Arahosia, Paradamisad and all the Indian valleys- ni zaptı.
184	Crown Prince Liu „killed when they realise-		
181	Liu Hou's death. Wen-ti's ascension to the throne and the execution of the Liu wangs	Hun-Yujchi mcyJan muharcbsi.	The Black Sea of the Spirals the arrival of fakes.
177	The K'iny Chü Rebellion.	Chu-ki Pmn's attack on China from Ho-hsi.	
176	Hun-Chinese treaty of supremacy and peace.	The Huns were the only ones who were able to drive the Yuechilcr hizami.	The palace coup d'état of the fiucratidcs in Bactria and the annexation of Greco-India.
174		The death of Mc-ic. Lao-Shang the throne.	
171			Mithridates in Parthia ř's ascent to Tah'a.

v I	Chiri	Asia	Ir "n;India et al.
166		The success of the Huns in China offence and war.	
16W		The decisive defeat of the Hunnic Huns by the Highchilcrs. The Yuppists to Western T'ieri- shan. Wu-suns to Ycdisu'.	
t62		Hün-@n equality deal-	
161		Lao-Shaog's death. İçün-çin's ascension to the throne-	The rebellion of the Yuechids against Kashîcar from Sakatar. Gitko-Bactria's war with Greco-India. Parthlar's invasion of Bactria from Margian. Sogdiyana's Gyeko-Bak {jjg!d rupture.
158		New Hun attacks against China.	
157	Wen-ti'nin ölümü.	Euthanumics to the Wu-sinlar veûlmcsi.	
156	Ching-ti's ascension to the throne "		
155			Eucratides' own son-by lu. mesi. Parthian Me-
154	this, Ch'u and Chao prenslerin isyanının press release.		
152	Hun-Chinese. free ticaret anlaşması.		

Year	China	Inner Asia	Iran, India etc.
141	Ching-ti's tilum.		Selcvkids of Parihlar eliminating them.
139	Chang Ch'tcn's scya-hatn çıkici.		
138	Financial reforms. Salt and demir ickeli. The closure of schools of philosophy other than Konfiçyayiiiiism, the war against religions.		Parili Hakumdari Mith the ilution of ridates.
133	War against Hunlai }.	C of the Huns, overcrinc scferi and its modelling and I'm afraid I'm going to have to go back.	
129		Market kôle to the steppes Chinese army, which came to remove the r- zuluççu.	Antioch IV Sidci's inhizam by the Parthians.
128	Wel Ch'in'in Or-from the dos to draw the Lou-fang and Bayan tribes.	C,in'c hticu-mu. China's card-carrying attack on the Huns.	Cjreko-Baktna's yiki-libi.
127	The Huang-ho coast is surrounded by dykes.		The first Saxon invasion of Parthia.
f 26	Chang Ch'ien's dön- "	I'm the son of a bitch. I- chih-hsieh proclaimed himself as yabgu.	
125		Huns Yil-men and Shuo-fang yerle bir ettiler. Çinli- The Chu-ki-princes captured Chu-ki-prince in T'ien-shan and the town of Chü- ch'üan there.	

veí	China	Inner Asia	Iran, India etc.
! 23		The Chinese army's offensive. mu and its utter destruction by the Huns.	Saka lar'in Mithndates The second de- ta Pàrihia in the reign of II.
122		The Hun lord's lodge In Hangay.	
12 i	Alashan'a Wu-wei ks-sabasinin board.	Hun giicebelennin AlaShan. ii. The Chinese called Peking ci- vannda inhizami.	
120		Alashan prince China'c tislirn cilu u.	
119		Chinese to Hangay sefsú.	
118	The warring farmers' fet- the northern foothills of Huang-ho'riiin, which is inhabited-	Yin-shan and Lob-nor. until the construction of the geosyncran road	
117	Tibctli Ch'iang lar'la war. Submission of the Wu-huans to China and their deportation to the interior of China.		
115	The Tibetan Ch'iang lar majlubtycú.		
114	Tibetan Ch'ian glar'dari Arl- teng province was established on the vacated lands. şu.	I-chih-hsieh's olu- mu. His son Wü-wci is on the throne temporarily.	Parihlar's Mcrv'i fcthi and the expulsion of the Sakas to the dojo.
113	Southern Yüehter's ita- at.alttna,aIjnşj.		
112	Establishment of the cities of Tun-huang and Chang- yeh.	The entry of Chinese armies into the steppe and the Huns' departure from Hamadan.	
y tg		The proposal of the Chinese clçisi vasiäl ólinasi to the yabga.	

Yıl	Chiii	Aaya	IranIndia etc.
	Chhao-hsien (North Korc) walk on it.		
108	Chao-hsien's in the middle Caldinliji and .	C, in Shan-shan and Shan-shan. K'u-shih'c iniikam seferi.	
107	Tibetan Ch'ianglar'la barış.		
106		The Wu-suns had three the division into principalities,	
t ₀₉	Eichi Che Ling's Da-killed in Van.	Wu-wei'nin ölümü. Wu-shih-lü ascended the throne. The Great Tu- yü's comp- lb to the yabguya.	
ly	Li Huang-li's generation of horses to Da- vnn sefeñ.	Tu-yü's conspiracy- and the emergence of the power conspirators	
tgg	China's southern caravan l' on my way.	Help for conspirators the delivery of the Chinese army to the Húnlar. You attacked China.	
102	On the steps @n kalelele-ñn's foundation. China's at scfn was a success.	Wu-shih-tü's euth-inü. Hu-li-hu's ascension to power. The destruction of the Chiri fortress by the Huns.	
J\$J	Li Huang-u's Erb-. shih Ğencrali	Hu-li-hu's , Cbü-t'e-hou's jabgu seçilişi.	
99	The Huns' dismantling of the pro-Chinese Shan-shan- lilann Ch'e-shih's religion.	Erh-shih's expedition to Tien-shan: The defeat of the Chinese and the unconditional surrender of the Li Ling army.	

Year	China	İç Asya	trari, India md,
gg	Sih-nia Ch'icti'in it - from the bar.		
\$7	Chin's attack on the Huns.	the Chinese army's perseverance.	
96		Chü-t "e-huu's dead- mu. Huluku'ru'run throne çıkışı.	
92			Ilk f'arth-Roma'ruza-
g	The unsuccessful expedition of Li Huang- ti against the Huns.	The Huns' organisation of the Chinese army. Say to Ho-hsi.	
89		China's relationship with the Huns the signing of the treaty stipulating that Li Huang-ti would be sacrificed. The sacrifice of Li Huang-ti.	
gg	Che-shih's .Chinhİcr- ce zapu.		
87	Wu-ti'nin ölümü. Chao-ti'nin tahta cülu- su.		Mithridates II's death- Oh.
86		Expulsion of the Chinese from Ch'c- ihih by the Huns.	Ermcniler had previously reclaimed their lost lands from the Parthians.
85		The death of Huluku and the reign of Hu-yön- ti. The beginning of inter-clan strife.	Milhudates of Sulli In iv. peace.
84			The conquest of Syria, Fiji and Cilicia by the Antilleans.

Year	China	İç Asya	IranIndia etc.
75			The Kanva dynasty replaced the Sunga dynasty in Hindislan. Mithridaids started a war with Rome.
74	Chao-ti's death. Chang-ti's call for the throne and his overthrow.		
73	Hsüan-ti's taha çtkı-şı. Alliance with the Wu-suns and war against the Huns.	ınlar'ın Ch'e-shih'i saltması ve Çinli-'in aynı bölgeyi iş-li.	
72	Success against the Huns without .	Wu-suns against tenkil hticumlan. Ch'e-shih's re-adhesion to the Huns. Unsuccessful offensives against Wu-sun and the Chinese. The decline of the Huns. Ting-lings' and Wu-huan-larhn's counter-insurgency against the Huns.	Pontus' Lucullus ta-conquest by the shelf.
69			kukullus' Ermcn is-The invasion of Ian and the fall of Tigrana-Kert.
68		Hu-yen-li's death. The reign of Hsü-lü-Kuan-ch'ü. Rebellion of Sih-ju tribe and surrender to China.	
67	Ch'e-shih Lamb of the Kao Ch'ang military guild.	Ch'e-shih't of the Huns divestment.	Milhridales' Ro-He defeated Lar and wanted Ponlus.
66		Huns' askcn tower in Southern Cun-garya kumia 'lcnemclerl.	Ponipci's M ithridates' ycn and Syria and F-İlisti-ni züpti. R'im:I-Pirth

Year	Chiri	İç Asya	fran, India et al.
65		Soon the growth of the rebellion of the Chinese akh- tan.	
64		The Huns were at Ch'e-shih were unsuccessful against the Chinese. The death of Wung-chü-mi with the Wu-suns. Ni-mi's laha jü-men and Chia-i-yii	
62	Ch'n's luring his citizens to Ch'c-shih and putting a prince in charge in the sun.	Unsuccessful campaign against China. Ting-ling- lei's attack on Hunsr.	
60	Hun1ar'tn ban ta1ebc-rctdi'. Ch'iang'iang'k-tucker.	Hsü-lu-kuanah! his death. The accession of Wu-yen-ch/ü- lc.	
59	The Chinese have all the kuzcy to find your way here.	The state officials were in disbelief. The rebellion of the Yü.-kan clan.	
58		The fall of Ku-hii-prince. Rebellion in favour of Hu-han-yeh. Wu-yen-chü-tc's suicide. Ku-hsi of the Wu-huans neck.	The destruction of the Sakas by Vicramathides.
57		The Huns of B4tl. i.sy.tn1 against han-yeh'c. Five yabgu	Phratres'ifi in Parthia fi.I4ürümcsi and throne k "v- j4ai:tr1 between the children- lnr: Mithri'lat "s and Orod.
56		Hu-han-yeh The gaining of superiority against the rûkplcrinc. The connection of len-ch'cng from the west to H"-hztn-yeh.	
55		The H.u- of Dogtla Ch'-chi. I an-yeh'c b:tşk:tl4irtı.	

Year	China	Asia	leave, India et al.
14		The victory of the Chvchn over Khzhmyeh and Jen-ch'eng.	I've been in contact with Rome Mithrîdâtes' aunt and was katedili.
53		Hu-han-yeh vq ji-çi their envoys are in China.	Battle of Carrhae Phrat- the death of zcs:
fi2		The Hu-han-yeh's submission to China. Dynasty in the Wu-suns savaşı. Çin'in diploma- tick out of the game.	Portht'cr's Sunye! lila
51		Chi-chi envoy alliance in China for the purpose. The Wu-suns of the Great (Chinese, pro-Chinese) and Great (Hunyw+s) oâ- rak ikiye bölünüşü.	
50		Arrival of both yabgu forces in China . Hu:han- yeh's plan of alliance with China.	Prince Pakor's rebellion against his father.
49	Hsüan-ti's death. Yüan-ii's accession to the throne.	@-chi's Wu-sunlar defeated and subjugated the Ugors and Ting-lings.	
48		Chi-chi killed the Chinese ambassador.	
47		Hu-hin.-yeh's Chinese his return to the village after signing the agreement and eating.	
46	Kao-ch'ang skan.	i-t'ang-chü sovereign He offered co-operation to the Huns against the Wu-Surilar. Chi-ji's offer of co-operation to K'ang-chü.	

Year	Çin	İç Asya	IranIndia etc.
45			Saeil Bass's report on the rebellion in Syria to Syria for help
42	Chiang!xinChin'rhü- oo mu was repelled.		
41			SunyeninPanh}wca the takeover.
40			Kwint Labicn gave aid to Part- hlat, but was defeated by Antony.
39			The Pararchs are in Hyndar. the corruption. orod ii's son Phratres ascended to the throne.
38			Phratres' father, his wife-slaughtered his brothers and many lords.
36	The Chinese against the Chi-chi seieri.	Ç1 I's defeat in Tatas- lupe and the victim.	Anhoch's expedition to Atropaten and the sack of the city edişi.
33	Hsüan-ti's death.		
32	Ch'eng-ti's accession and the arrival of the envoy from K'ang-ihü,		Phratres takes refuge with the <u>Snkas</u> . Tridatus ascends the throne.
3t		Hu-han-ych's death. Fü-chü-lei is the son of Jö-ti.	

Year	Çin	Asia	Iran, India Etc.
30			Phratres' Saka deste- and the return of Tridates to Rome. ÇİŞİ.
29			The unification of the climate in Ro- ma.
20		Fu-chü-ler lo-li his death. The accession of Su- hsie Jo- ti.	Armenia Panhlarca Returned to Rome. Roms-Parch wars
14	Iron ore mines riot in the rda.		
12		Su-hsic lo-ti's dead- mu. Ch'e-ya lo-ti's body.	
11		Great in the Wu-suns and a civil war between the Little Princes. And they were both killed.	
8		Ch'e-ya Jo-it's dead. mü. Wu-chu-liu Jo- ti's accession.	
7	Ch'cng-ti's tilt.		
6	Ai-li's ascent to the throne-		

Yl	China	Inner Asia)ran, Hirsdisian et al.
M.S. Wee d	The death of Ai-ti. The ascension of the child P'ing- ii to the throne: The succession of Wang Manghn as regent of the Nine Empresses.		
02	The Chinese are on Cungarya. The yûnî ku- zey caravans passing through the rînder opened my way.	Back. Ch'c-shih I Ialkî Wiped out by the Huns.	
03	The Chinese occupied the area around Lake Kukunor and built defence fortresses. lar.		
05	P'ing-ti. He was murdered.		
06	lu-tsc-ying was enthroned as a kukia by Mang.		
07	Ch'ianglar Chinese <i>asken</i> if they tried to attack the gamizons, they were thrown back.		
08	Usurper of the throne Wang Mang became emperor. The Huns were planned to be divided into 15 small princes. The Hun prince r.or)a yabgu, who was invited to China, announced	Wong Mang's cliché the seal of the yabgun to the world.	
10	Wang Mang's economic reforms.	The people of Ch'c-shih and the Chinese gxmi nnu were conquered.	Artabun III tkhta "tur- du.
11	W.im Mang fought to expel the Huns from Tine-linp.	The Hun-Cun war. The frontier was shattered.	Augustc hit Tibcrius.

YG	China	İç Asya	1r.an, ifindisfan et al.
12	Wang Mang cancelled some of his families.	Those whom Wang Mang declared as yabgu fled to Huns . Wang killed the hostages.	
13		Wu-chu-liu is dead. Tah-ta Hien late.	
14		ii1ub "t?fe-i" angel.	"" "" " ""
15		The Huns had no interest htlcumu. At the end. At the end. Çin aleyhtarı isyan. Karaşar'ın Çinlilerce burnt to the ground. The inhabitants of the west end (except Yar- künd) were forced to move to Huntzâr! biglanişı.	
17			The annexation Cappadocia to Ro- ma.
18	The rebellion of the Kizilkash-lar in Shan-iung!	Hien's death. Yü'nin ascension to the throne.	
19	Drought and k'tf k. Is-spreading sideways.		
21	The rebellion continued downstream of Yang-tsc.		
25	The Taharri army put down the rebellion.		
23	I don't think the old dignitaries rebellion. The throne of Heng-shih of the Han dynasty geçirilmesi.	The Ch'iangs! The Kan-the light of su:	

Ye ar	China	İç Aayâ	Iran, Eriadistan et al.
24	He and his army will not let the rebellion... tuşturmaya çalışan Mang is defeated.		
25	Heng-shih Baykent he's been through. Wang Mang was killed.	The Huns have come to Heng-shi They supported the Kizilbkajlar against the Huns. Yarkend is a cover for the Hun offensive.	
2b	Redstarts Ch'ang-an and killed Heng-shih. Liu Pang-tse took over. Liu Hsiu suppressed the K1- zttkaşlar'1 and took Kuang Wu-ti titul. Succession of the Great Han dynasty. Lu Fang rebellion.	Huns equality status They offered to barry to China on condition.	
28		LuFvgHunfi'fin dmtskaüm.	KumnhSkümd*üğnr gekilknışi.
30	Kuang Wu-tj Hun .yab- Yabgu offered renew the peace treaty. Yabgu the principle of equality.		
31		Successful success against China vaşlar	
32			Kadfidcs l'i Parth and Sakalar'la savaşı.
33	The Huns were defeated- you're an outlaw.		
34	The Ch'iangs have come to Slyti-si but were driven back and subjugated. lar.		Artaban 111 Ermcnis-tan, which was the centre of the Parthian invasion. The Parthians were driven out of Ermcnis- tan by the Georgians.

Year	China	İç Asya	IranIndia.
35			Rebellion among the Parthians.
16	The Sich-ch'uan revolutionaries. the subjugation of the nation.		I don't think Anaban III retreat. Ermc- nistan passed to Roman rule.
37		The Huns' jin star and border regions; Hun migrants in China.	
18	The envoy from the western frontier He demanded that they be restored and accepted as subjects.		Civil war in the Pariahs.
40	The surrendered Lu Fang has been forgiven.	The ruler of Ywkend declared himself the regent of the western end and took the yabgu title,	
42	Tonkin rebellion was suppressed. the mountain. Lu Fang told the Ituns He's back.		
44	The Huns are in the interior of China. sctdirdir.		
43	The Huns are heading attacked.		
46		Yü's death. Wu-ta- the accession of t'e-hou. Upon his death, P'u- nu ascended the throne. Kit-	

v I	Çin	İç Asya	Ursn, Hirtistan et al.
		epidemic, epidemic-disease: Huns demanded peace from China. The Wu-huans were defeated by the Chinese. The Wu-huin- side against the Huns. Hien destroyed Shuo-shan and captured Kucha. Sahan-shan surrendered to the Huns. Yarkind established sovereignty in Hsi- yü.	
47		Prince P'i China , who was removed from the throne, surrendered.	
48		Eight Hun tribes of China and P'i as yabgu: The Huns' centenary.	
49		Is Sienpilcr China a mu- zakercelere başladılar , Wu-huans offered obedience to China. Southern Hun- lin drove the Northern Huns to Halha.	
50		P'i told the Chin. The St- yenpis against the Huns isyan etti .	Alanlarhn's orientation towards Eastern Europe.
51		Northern Huntan's (in's) requests for peace were rejected.	
52			Georgian prince Radamist He captured Ermcnistan but was recaptured by the Parthians.

Yıl	China	İç Asya	IranIndia etc.
55		Northern Hun envoy It was China. Pi'riiii'n'n'e. Tahta kardeşİ Mo geç- ti...	
56	The Ch'tang larhn rebellion.	Mo died; his brother Han passed by.	
fi7	Kuang Wu-ti! u-	Khan captured Khoten- di.	The Khyrkanes to the Parthians rebellion against
58	Ming-li's ascension to the throne shi. Ch'iang's been raided.	Syenpies surrender to China they happened.	Roman Armenia's business- and the army has been overrun. Arişat was brought in with an offensive.
59		The death of the Khan. P'i's son T'i took the throne.	The of Tigranakert.
60		Riot in Hotcn. Hoten- The Indians then raided Yarkend by the Huns.	Parth-Roman war- the beginning of the
61		The Northern Huns His attack on China was repelled by the Southern Huns. Prince of Khoten, Yarkend! ——	
63		T'Ti's positive. Tahts Mri'nuzi son Su appeared. Conquest of Hotcn by the Huns. Su's death: Chang, brother of T'i, succeeded to the throne.	Ermenlstan Arshakid- Ier'c was delivered. Ro- rria-Partli banj.
64		The Northern Temperaments Sold to China.	
65	China has passed through Hamid.	SomeGaneyHzn pmzstûh : ü*North	

Yıl	China	Aayu	IranIndia etc.
		Attempts to cross over to the Hun side.	
66		The Hsi-yüer are one with the Huns. attacked Chin together. Hami changed provinces for the third time,	
67		Continuous attacks of the Northern Huns on China.	Vima Kadfises Grcko captured the Indian kingdom dc Yu- kan Ganga.
71			Judea's ruin.
73	China has recaptured Hami and passed through. Pan Ch'ao captured Shan-shin and Hotcn.	(of the Northern Huns attacked. Huns refused the war and retreated to the north.	
74	Ming-ti's death. Pan Ch'ao captured Kashkar.		
75		Karashar Kuça vc In Ch'e-shih against in-	
76		Turfanlilar Çınlılerce .	
77	Chinese Turfan and Ha- they tincised it.		
78	Ch'iang suppressed the rebellion.		Pakor Volo- in Parya the ges has revolted.

Yıl	Çiri	Inner Asia	Iran: Xindistan et al.
7P			K-anışka ascended the throne of Houşan and resumed the Indian wars.
82			Amaban IV Parthian iahti- the one who took over.
83		The Northern Hun beylcrin- from the Chi-Iris tribe Late.	
84		Some Northern Huns The princes' attempt to establish a military presence in China was prevented the southern Khurids:	
85		Among the Northern Huns- internal strife. Emigration to China. The death of Chang'in. Khan's son Hsüan took the throne. China's military against the Northern Huns. The Ting-ling attacked the Huns from the north and the Siempis from the east. They were resurrected. The Southern Huns also attacked the Kuñcyli. The Hsi-yü princes also attacked the Northern Huns from the west.	
86	Ch'iang rebellion. Pan Ch'ao captured Yarkend.	Guriay fuman Euzey Hunlan'na. tckrar sat- he resurrected it,	

Yıl	min	İç Asya	žran, Xindistan et al.
87		Siyetipiler Kiizey defeated the Huns with a crushing victory. Yü-lü-shan-yü was killed . 58 tribes renounced their allegiance to China.	
88	against the Northern Hunlari declaration of war	Hsüan died. Chang's brother Tun- t'u-hon. passed. The Northern Huns were in the grip of famine and civil war.	
89	Hottähtaçkv	Northern Huns Yr-lo- They were defeated from the Chinese and Guncy Human trarfin-in Shan.	
90	Chinese Ku- in Ham zey Hunlari'nı sıkıp çı- cards. Pan Ch'ao entered Kashkar and put the Yüççi-s to the sword.	Chinese and Guncy Human overpowered the northerners and took the family of the Yugu as captives. lar.	
91	K'u mo, Kucha and Weng-su were captured by Pan Ch'ap.	Northern yabgu: he died in the middle; his brother was appointed as yabgu..Banş.	
92		İtuzey Hunlari had a kısmı Cungar Kapı-sı'na çekildiler.	
		The northern sovereign was slaughtered. Siyempiler ku- They invaded the lop-raks of olive Hunlan. They mixed with the North Hunlan Siyenpiler and took the name Siyönpi. Siyenpi-s captured Harni.	

Year	China	İç Asya	Eran, India et al.
		The death of Tun-t'u-hon. Hsüan's brother An-k'u ascended the throne and decided to kill Shih-k'i, the leader of the Southern Huns.	
94	Pan Ch'ao is the only man and the Chinese were destroyed. 50 pmns recognised China's sovereignty.	The Syenpians and Wu-hu- moments were led by China. When they did, they suppressed the rebellion of the Northern Huns.	
95		ISyrians in the steppe They continued their resistance under the leadership of Feng-hou. Although some rebels gave up, the rebellion intensified due to the repression. However, the rebellion was suppressed. The rebellion in Arka Ch'e-shih was suppressed.	
97	The Sienps attacked and plundered Chin. Pan Ch'ao's envoy K'ang Yin reached the "Bsti Sea"(?).	The rebels are from Siyenpi- They surrendered to China to the last member out of fear of the Chinese.	
98		Death of Shih-k'i: Chang's son T'han succeeded to the throne.	
99		He travelled from içuşazı to Rome.	
	Pan Ch'ao's paddy wagon.		
10	Siyenpilsr's attack on China religion was repelled.		

Yıl	China	Asia	İrcnIndiaet al.
t0Z	Pan Ch'ao's death. The defeat of the Ch'iangs.		
104		The Northern Huns had a hand- one of them was detained in China.	
103	It's Ho-u's division. Hs-the Jews against China.	The second northern Hun ambassador and one of them was arrested in China.	Trajan's hıabatlar't obey under .
107	Aı-tı'nın cülusu. Ch'ianglar'ın Lung-hsi isyanı batıya doğru kaydı.	Northern Huns Hsi- They occupied Yü.	
109	The wu-hu who attacked @n-moments delivered by spoiling they happened.	The Northern Huns What Bar- to the lake!'din Balhash! ele geçirmeleri.	
I t.0	The Ch'iang apocalypse in the past few years. The Syenpi-s made an agreement with China on the opening of border markets.		
'1 t1	The Fu-yiliili to Liao-tung saldırdılar.		
2	Shan-shan. and Ch's- ,NhChinmWind*n fsfi dıKuxyHun- Ian tcmclclcd the Chinese from Ch'ü-shih)tr.		Dakyalılar'ın hezimetı.
114		Kuyan boy.	Between Roms and Partftlar- the beginning of the wars in the ması.

Yıl	Çin	İç Asya	İran, Hindistan vd.
115	The Ch'iargs have been raided. West. yplu reopened- d .	The Siensps attacked China.	
116	L1'langiâr's army drove L1'langiâr.	Xaşkar-.YiJcç1 . The Yuechi-Chinese war.	Trejan's se- sion to Parthia. Diaspnra rebellion.
117		Pcng-hou Syenpis by the Northern Huns. His army passed to the Northern Huns.	
118		Feng-hou, take refuge in China. di.	
120		China's attacks on Sycnpi- The speed of the Wu-huans was broken by the Wu-huans. Yc- ni Siyenpi hücumu ve China's defeat. Three attacks on China and hezimet, Siyenpi Çi- çi-hijrJin obedience.	
121		The attack of the combined armies of Chipi-hien was repelled.	
122		The Syenpians' head-on offensive against the Southern Huns.	
123	Pan Yung Ch'c-shih'i pteddi.	Successful Siecnpis' raids on the Citiney Huns.	The death of Kanishka. The fall of Kushan.
124	Ai-ti's elephant.	T'han'ın ölümü ve tah- ta kardeşi Pa'nın çıkışı. Güney Hunları'nın Si- yenpiler tarafından mağlup edilmesi.	

YI	China	İç Asya	tran, Hindist9n et al.
125	Shung-ti's accession. Ch'iang rebellion suppressed.	(Indians Rear Ch'e- they suppressed the shih.	
126		Kuyan Pan Yung defeated. Chipi-hi- cn's victorious attack on (in:	
127	Pan Yung captured Karashar, Kucha, Yaikend and Kashkar.	Chi-chi-khien the (in-Hun- Wu-huan armies.	
128		I'm going to die. Tâhta. his brother Hü-li passed.	
130		Hun-Wu-huan is a military He defeated Siyenpilcr.	
131		Chinese ckin to Hami introduced the sowing procedure- ler.	
132		Chinmer's attack on Styenpiér.	In Judea, Bar Itohba'nic is against Rornal
t3	Ch'tang satu and China's .	China and the North huntsri's inhizBm.	
ppp	BomWa'nWh ch'uen'daisyxnv	The Northern Huns! ccvabt sâtdtns. The collapse of the Chinese army and Arka Ch'e- shih's	
136		In Hsi-,yü, Chinese domination and the civil war in the princes' territory.	Bar Kphba's hczime- li.

va	China	Inner Asia	Irao, India et al.
î3'7	Bomalat's raid and war against the Ch'ianglar Saldin.		
138	The Cli'iangs had a tarmur edip with the Chinese		
1 "9	China's 'Ch'iangs' irt-hizarni.		
140	Ch'iang syani. .Shen-si'dcki T'â-chong-ku-the burning of the Ang fortress.	Yabgun htlaŋ na The mighty Hunlgn. Rebelled under Wu-shih. Wu-huan and The Tankuts were attached to the Huns. deserved. They were defeated in front of the rioters Ma-i.	
141		Wu-huans Chinese rñagtup was performed. The birth of T'an- ihih-huai.	
t'42	Ch'iang land ***" *"	Wu-shih king-chou He looted %lgcs.	
143		lou-wu-lo-chu's heir to the throne. Wu-shih was killed by hired soldiers.	
144		The inhizami of the Asilenn. The Wu-huans have fallen under Chinese rule,	
145	Ch'ung-ii's lattla' chi-kıŋı.		

Val	China	İç Asya	Iran, .
t46	Ch'i-it's ascension to the throne. Gen. Liang Hsi- yao's assassination.	T'uo-wu-lu-chu death. Ch'ü-Ch'ü-ch'ü-k'u- erh was proclaimed yabgu-	
147	Huang-tfn'n{ah1aç- winter and the acceptance of Buddhism. lū.		
148	Ch'iang ve Yüecüler'in rebellion broke out.		
149	Huang-i-i's Kunfüç- to start persecution against the Yankee and Laoise organisations.		
151			
153		On and Ana Ch'c-shih's Chinese contribution is- Besides. Ktyamc's The annexation of the Huns.	
155		Southern Hunlan is- was suppressed. The Wu-hu- an rebellion also failed. T'an-shih-huai was elected leader of the Sienpi.	
157		T'an-shih-huai to China attacked. T'an-shih-huai stopped the Ting-ling in the north, defeated Fu-yü'yil in the east, and destroyed Wu-sunlafl in the west.	

Y+1	China	İç Asya	Iran, India etc.
		then more and more He subjugated all the tribes which were in the despised state of Huns.	
158		Attack on China. Southern Hunlari rebelled and annexed to T'an-shih- huai 'tted them. Hún jabgu was captured by the Chinese.	
1ss	Ch'ianglar's offence was repelled.	The invasion of China and the great sack. For the first time, a European writer Dionysi- ni Reriegetés mentions the Huns.	
160			Parthian-Roman war. Ro Gloge orile of mal lar- rinde inhizamj.
162	Ch'iang attack.		Rome took over Artaşal. he did it.
163	Ch'ianglar' in hezimet.	T'an-shih-huai attacked the "independent Chinese province" in Liao-tung.	
164			Rorña took Selevkus to get Ctsiphon
'6s	Ch'iang attack again erupted.		Bank.
lñ6		T'an-shih-huai attacked the Chinese frontier. The Southern Huns and the Wu-huaris rebelled and claimed khan Shih- huai's favour.	

Year	Çin	İç Asya	train, India et al.
t67	Çm'tnT'sn-shih huM'a the peace motion was rejected,		
168		Kashkar's Chin! puşu.	
î69		T'an-shih-huarGiiney attacked Siberia.	
î71		The Chinese ally Ka- Ch'e-skih to Kashkar the offence was repulsed.	
t72		Hu-k'u-erh's flüm and his son took the throne.	
174		S'ycnptlcr's attack on Ch- and the nsi was made to be decorated.	
177		The Chinese attack on the Sienpls and their disintegration	
179		Hu-cheng's the declaration of The murder of the Chinese regional governor. The next governor was also killed for arbitrary behaviour.	
181		T'an-shih-huai's dead- and the greatness of the state. Iünnıcsi.	

THE SECOND ISP

INTRODUCTION

Steppe and China

East Asia is divided into two parts by the same climate: The first is hot, rainy and fertile, inhabited by populous settled peoples-Chinese. The second is cold, dry, desert-like. A small number of nomadic people live here. We call it *the Great Steppe*. At the beginning of the Gregorian era, Huns lived there.

For four centuries the Han dynasty tried to bring Asia under China's rule. Just as the *Pax Romana* had been established in the Mediterranean, *the Pax Sinica* was almost established in the Far East. The defence of the freedom of the peoples of the Great Steppe rested solely on the shoulders of the Huns. Their enemies outnumbered them 1/20, and not only were armies sent against them, but they were also attacked diplomatically, economically and culturally.

In the first century A.D., the Hun State disintegrated due to internal conflicts. While some of them accepted the sovereignty of China, some others retreated to the West and formed the nation called *Guns* by mixing with the *Ogur* [Ugor] and *Sarmatians*.¹

The Huns are recorded to have made a march only between 155 and 158.² A group of defeated Huns, leaving their weights and their wives, got rid of their pursuers and reached the Vol- ga-Ural rivers. It took 200 years for them to adapt to the region, after which they became the *Guns* (so called to distinguish them from the Asian *Hyung-nus*) with real power. However, this event was based on indigenous elements and the immigrants played no role in it.

1 Gumilëv L.N. *Nekotoriye voprosy istorii xunnov*//
1950, 1

Zhurnal drevney istorii, 1955. No. 4.

2 Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*. M., 1960, p. 237.

It is not worth dwelling on other tribal migrations from the steppes of western Kazakhstan. Because there nothing but sand in the infertile clay steppes there and therefore not many people could live there. Whereas the steppes around the Black Sea were fertile, water was abundant and people were warriors. Moreover, if the western nomads had scorched the eastern steppes with the flames of war, then the occupation of the lands stretching from the Don to the Ir- gız should have been expected. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the reasons for the displacement of peoples on the spot, and if historical science does not give a satisfactory result, it will be necessary to seek help from the related sciences of geography and palaeoethnography.

The steppe strip between the Dnieper and the Ural is surrounded by coniferous forests to the north, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea to the south, the Carpathians to the west and semi-desert lands to the east. This region has always been considered as a whole and the inhabitants of the region, as well as the cultures of the peoples, have been considered together with the natural conditions. However, in addition to the steppe landmass, there was also an azonal landmass with the wetland valleys of the Don, Terek and Volga. It was in these new geographical conditions that the Hyung-nus appeared on the scene as a new nation - the Guns. It should be noted that it was not the Chinese who defeated the Huns in Asia, but a people who do not exist on earth today and who were called *Hsien-p'i* [Siyen- pi] by the Chinese. This designation recalls *the Särbi, Sirbi* and *Sirvi* of ancient times.³

However, the name "Siyenpi" has entered the scientific literature as an ethnonym.

In the second half of the II century, the Syenpis stopped the Chinese aggression and pushed the Chinese beyond the Great Wall. From this date, as will be emphasised in this book, the Chinese decline began, which led to many events. And it was also from this time that the traditional conditions for collecting information changed. Chinese historians, if they had a scanty and few words of information on steppe migrations, then they devoted more space to the internal affairs of their own country, and more importantly, they entered into major episodes and episodes that prevented them from obtaining accurate information. Of course, in this case we do not get solid information, but a kaleidoscope system without shadows. Remember that it is not possible to translate all the information, nor is it even necessary to do so.

3 Pelliot P. *Tokharien et Koutcheen*// Journal Asiatique. 1934, I, p. 35.

let's put it this way. Because most of the facts narrated did not have any influence on the course of events. Therefore, it is necessary to select those facts that have a historical meaning and allow for generalisation. By the way, it should be noted that the Chinese, who wrote the history of the IVth century, combined 29 tribes into five groups by using the ethnological classification system. These are: Hyung-nular (Huns), *chieh-lu* (kullar), *Siyenpis*, *Tankut* (Ti) and Tibetan *Ch'iangs*.

But such a generalisation is not sufficient for our reader. Such tribal group nomenclature, familiar to the Chinese ear, has no connotation for European exotics. Therefore, in order to reveal the relationship between local and global processes, it is necessary to add the tragedy that took place in Northern China in the IV-Vth centuries to the history of the world at large. This is not difficult, because the solution is shallow. In fact, the essence of the events can be characterised by the great migrations of peoples in East Asia.⁴

Although the events described took place on the territory of present-day China and were almost entirely based on historical sources written in Chinese, it is wrong to attribute the history of the "five tribes and sixteen rulers" solely to syn-logy. If our subject was only the collapse of the ancient Chinese society or the review of the events in the *Central Oasis China*, called Huang-ho Basin at that time, then sinology alone could solve our problem. However, we are interested in the fact that during the past thousand years the Huns, the long-established inhabitants of the eastern part of *the Great Steppe*, have been replaced by the Tabgachs and *Turks*, and even that the new valleys along *the Green Ögüz*⁵ (Yellow River) have been conquered by nomads. In such a short excursion, the weight of great China is only a backdrop for our problems, but we will remain within the framework of nomadism.

There are views that Chinese and nomadic cultures cannot be compared with each other, that nomads were savages who had infiltrated into Chinese civilisation, that the *Great Steppe* was considered a suburb of China, and that therefore "the Hun issue should be treated as a Chinese issue"⁶. However, our knowledge about the history of *Central Asia* is not compatible with these views.

4 Grousset R. *L'Empire des steppes*. Paris, 1960, p.96. Ci-après: Grousset. *L'Empire*.

5 The name of Huang-ho in the Turkic language. See Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki*, M., 1967, p. 288 prim. Приведена литература вопроса.

6 Msl. see *Vestnik drevney istorii*. 1962, No. 3.

not only contradicts, but has never been challenged either. Why? As if only stagnation, barbarism and sometimes savagery prevailed in Central , we inherited from the XIXth century the assumption that only settled peoples made civilised progress. What is even worse is that this hypothesis, even though it is not true, is taken as if it is the uncritical final point reached by science. *All kinds of prejudgements are dangerous.*

In order to dissuade people from routine behaviour, strong arguments that cannot be disputed or ignored are essential. Preconceived judgements were also made about the artefacts found in the Altai⁷ and Mongolian⁸ kurgans, and attempts to claim that they belonged to Chinese, Iranian and Hellenic art were fruitless. The of the nomads of the first millennium B.C. was unique.⁹ It was also higher, even far superior to the culture of the nomads of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries, which has been analysed in detail by many ethnographers. In other words, just like European, Indian and Chinese cultures, the nomadic steppe culture experienced periods of rise and decline, that is, it evolved, but it did not undergo a period of stagnation, as some European scholars are silent about.¹⁰

Despite the robustness of the technical level and social lifestyle, nomadic art has changed considerably as a result of constant contact with nature.¹¹ The natural structure of the region in question is also very different. It depends on relief, humidity and environment. For example, in Mongolia, a regular anticyclone zone, in the regions of the forested Hen-tei and Hangay mountain ranges, it is beneficial to live nomadically all year round in search of pasture, but in Jungarya and Tarbagatay, where the winter cyclones bring abundant rainfall, every

7 Rudenko S.I. *Kultura naseleniya gornogo Altaya v skifskoye vremya*. M., 1953.

8 Rudenko S.I. *Kultura xunnov i noinulinskiye kurgan*. M.;L., 1962.

9 S.I. Rudenko defended the view that most of the Altai kurgans (Pazyryk) belonged to the Yuechis (*Culture of the Central Altai in the Scythian Period*, p. 175- 176, and argued that the designations sgwied-di or Sogdoi indicate Sogdians (Laufer B. *The Language of the Jue-chi or Indo-Scythians*. Chicago, 1917). Altai Jungarya and Ho-hsi were conquered by the Yuechis at a time when the Mitra-worshipping Turanians were fighting the Iranians who had accepted Zoroastrianism (Gumilev L. N. C.I. Rudenko i sovremennaya etnografiya aridnoy zoni Yevraziyskogo kontinenta//Etnografiya narodov SSSR. L., 1971, pp. 11-12).

10 Pritsak O. *Stammesnamen und Titulaturen der altaischen Völker*// Ural-altaische Jahrbücher. 1952, Bd. 24, H. I-2.

11 Gumilëv L.N. *Koçevoy bit: o rastsveti k ischeznoventiyu/Aziq i Afrika se-Asiyanın 1996. y. 2. bugünü. 1998 №2*

Since it is covered with snow, it is absolutely necessary to supply fodder, and nomadism here is vertical, i.e. from the steppe to the highlands. In the extremely arid Aral region, where there were no streams, annual nomadism also prevailed, but it was somewhat more lethargic compared to the rhythm of Mongolia.¹² Certainly the neighbourhood with China, which was striving to subdue the Steppe, contributed no less to the development of nomads than that of weak Persia or advanced Sogdiana, which remained on the defensive against their bedouin neighbours. Different living conditions forced nomads to choose different patterns of adaptation that distinguished them from the various peoples of the Great Steppe with their own distinctive way of life.

Rivers

Now, before entering into the historical issues involving the analysis and speculative interpretation of the events that divided the history of Central and East Asia into two dissimilar periods, let us take a bird's-eye view of the nature of the country in which this fragmentation took place. The first frame of our historical-geographical panorama is the Huang-ho river basin. The rest is just a background.

The tributaries of the Huang-ho are within Tibet. The first is a 200 km long river. It flows through wide valleys surrounded by mountains and almost devoid of vegetation. It then enters a tributary of the K'un-lun Mountains, turns into a violent stream and flows for 500 kilometres. It flows into a deep gorge with a length of up to 50 metres. Here the width of the river varies between 10 and 50 metres. However, after leaving the strait, it loses its speed or, as we call it, narrows: 50-70 metres at most and 300 metres only at a few points.

However, the fast flow of the Huang-ho makes it not an easy river to cross. Particularly during the freshets, it is difficult to cross the river over difficult passes, and the torrential currents of sand and silt account for 46 per cent of the river's floods. This is why the great Huang-ho bend, which surrounds the Ordos on three sides, looks like an island among the adjacent deserts. In mid-winter the river freezes. That is when Ordos is left unprotected against attacks and invasions from the *Great Steppe*.

12 Gumilëv L.N. *Etno-landshaftnyye regiony Yevrazii za istoricheskiy period* // Док- Доклады на ежегодных чтениях памяти Л.С. Берга, VIII-XIV, 1960-1966, т. 1, 1968, pp. 118-134.

In the lower course of the Huang-ho, a high embankment has been built, appears to "overlook" the surrounding valleys. At K'ai-feng, the lower course of the river is 5 metres higher than its surroundings, and partial flooding is the dreaded nightmare of the surrounding peoples.¹³

Rivers rarely have a limited coastline, for example if they run through a mountain range or a desert. This is why in ancient times the borders of China and Central Asia were marked by the Great Wall. In the west, the chain of oases in Kan-su, at the foot of Shan-shan, constitutes this boundary. The eastern bend of the Huang-ho heading northwards separates the Ordos steppe and plain from the alluvial valley of the Shen-si, then flows through the forested valley of the Shan-si across the steppe of what is now Inner Mongolia, and finally the agricultural Ho-pei'i serves as a barrier against attacks by the hunting peoples and nomads of the Liao-ho Basin. Thus, the borderland of the two major ethno-cultural regions was a combination of natural and anthropogenic elements of the relief, so that the borderland was not affected by climatic changes, especially in the period under consideration.

In the III century BC, the drought in the *Eurasian* steppe region had reached its peak. Therefore, the Saharan strip and the dry steppe from the south to the northern extremities of Shen-si and Shan-si. The once ploughed fields were replaced by sand dunes, and subsequently the nomads migrated out of the region with their herds when they were threatened by the desert from the north. The Great Wall of China could no longer serve as a defence. At that time, it looked just as it did in the XIXth century, the land was dry and the ploughed fields were surrounded by sand dunes.¹⁴ Uniform borders disappeared, and in their place a zone of ethnic contact emerged, where the Chinese and Huns lived in close proximity.

South China was therefore the only hope of defence against the nomads. The Ch'in-ling Mountain Range, separating Shen-si from Sih-ch'uan and covered with dense forests, blocked the way of any cavalry passing through the region. It should be noted that the deep Yang-tse river, which is 5 kilometres wide, was also an insurmountable obstacle. In order to ensure the security of South China, a small paddle fleet was lowered into the river.

13 Kuznetsov N.T. *Vody Tsentralnoy Azii*. M., 1968, p. 106-107; Nesteruk F.Ya. *Vodnoye khozaystvo Kitaya/Iz istorii nauki i tekhniki Kitaya*. M., 1955, p. 6-8.

14 Obruchev W.A. *Ot Kàhti do Kulci*. M., 1956, p. 89.

was enough. However, as one moves further forward, for example, the lakes in the centre - An-hui and Hu-peï- became a battle arena between the nomads and the Chinese, as they turned into swamps only in exceptional cases. The damp forests were more effective in stopping the Huns and Tabgachs than the long spears of the Chinese infantry.

But in the west, China's enemies felt at home among the mountain forests. The descendants of the ancient Jung, remembering the bloody confrontations of Ti, Chung and similar tribes with their ancestors, brought to the western extremities of China the same tension as in the north, where the landshaft was unable to protect the Chinese. In this region, however, there was no population migration, as the natives, frustrated by the Chinese aggression, retained their homeland. Only their chivalry and Chinese anger prevented the chaos exceptionally, which will be discussed later.

Water

It played a very important role in changing the humidity level¹⁵ of the steppe region, which sometimes turned into a dry desert.¹⁶

Poleontological research in Central Asia has shown that the period of drying of the steppe was the result of a reversal of the periods of humidification compared to periods not too far away.¹⁷ Historical science not only supports this conclusion, but also conclusively establishes the dates of the periods of humidification in question.

According to the evidence of travellers, the Mongolian steppe was extremely densely populated. In this regard, it should be remembered that the development of animal husbandry was limited by the availability of fresh water, i.e. the more herds of animals in a place, more springs were needed to water them. Where there were only puddles of water, there was a yurt and sheep were cared for. If kay-

15 Gumilëv L.N. *Opit klassifikatsii obščestvenno-političeskix sistem drevnix kočevnikov Yevrazii*//*Studien zur Geschichte und philosophie der Alterums*. Budapest, 1968.

16 Gumilëv L.N. *Istoki ritma kočevoy kulturi Sredinnoy Azii* (Opit istoriko-geografičeskogo sinteza) Народы Азии и Африки. 1966, № 4.

17 Murzayev E.M. *Narodnaya Respublika Mongolia*. M., 1959, p. 189.

If the water was dried up, either the herd would be left to die or the homeland would be abandoned. Because at that time, it was not possible to irrigate or provide water by utilising technological means.¹⁸

Therefore, a period of drought would force nomads to migrate from the centre to the edges of the steppe.

Such an event was observed in the II-III centuries AD. The Huns did not return to their homeland; the Tabgachs migrated from the Kerulen coast to the Hu- ang-ho tegras; the oases of *the western end* (Hsi-yü) turned yellow and withered; the Siyenpis, who held the steppe up to Tarbagatay, were scattered to the southern ends of the Gobi as far as Lake Ebi-Nor instead of being scattered there. All these facts need to be explained one by one, but the information we have is fragmentary, and our hands are tied by the lack of knowledge of chronological synchronicity and the non-repetition of the event. Even if all this is a coincidence, it is still all in accordance with the laws of nature.

Furthermore, from the first century BC onwards, the chronicles consistently record unusually cold winters and droughts.

There is no trace of the agriculture practised by the Huns. Probably, in this period, the shift towards an arid climate so far as to become a factor disrupting the primitive economy, both among the sedentary and the nomads. Therefore, we can explain the desolation of the northern steppes in the III century A.D. by the depletion of pasture lands, and we can also show the same century as the century in which the drought process reached its extreme.

In addition to the ethnic mosaic of the Great Steppe, there we observe the general lines common to all Eurasian nomads. For the only thing that concerned these nomads was primarily economy and life.¹⁹ This way of life was based on prudent relations with the rich nature, which limited population growth. Infant mortality and inter-tribal wars played a major role in this regard.

18 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Rost pustyn i gibel pastbishchnix ugodiý i kulturnix zemel v Tsentralnoy Azii za istoricheskiy period*//Всесоюзного географического общества (далее-ВГО). 1933. т. 65. вып. 5.

19 Rudenko S.IK *voprosu o formi skotovodcheskogo hozaystva i o koçevnikax*// Материалы по этнографии ВГО. Л., 1961.

To today's European, these and similar situations may seem extremely rigid and savage, but they have a logic and a convincing explanation. The natural economy that develops in a certain region can feed a certain number of people who complete the top link in the biocenosis. In the event of overpopulation, however, people seek new resources and, since there is no free space, the struggle to settle in one place to ruthless wars. Migrating to regions where other natural conditions prevail is more difficult for animals, especially since they cannot adapt to the conditions of the new region.²⁰ Therefore, we are left with only a limited population increase, which is easier to apply to newborns.

In winter they would throw the child under the snow, then swaddle it and wrap it tightly. If the child lived, he would become a good hero; if he died, a year later a new baby would take his place. When the child reached the age of manhood, they would send him on a raid against the neighbours. If he died during the raid, a new one was raised in his place; but if he returned victorious, he was a hero. Therefore, very few men lived to old age, generational change was rapid and the development of production relations was very slow.

The situation for girls was even more difficult. Less attention was paid to their care during childhood. If she did not die but survived, she was destined for slavery. Thus, a woman who became a mother became the mistress of her home, but if she became a widow, she went to brother-in-law as a wife, who had to respect her, ensure her comfort and, if necessary, even perform a symbolic wedding.

Leaving aside the criticism of such a way of life, it should be noted that the balance of the people living on natural resources did not deteriorate, the war power of the nomadic tribes was high, they strongly opposed the influence of culturally developed neighbouring peoples, and this prevented the nomads from degenerating, that is, they remained who they were. Due to the presence of warlike China right next to the steppe, it was especially necessary for the nomads to remain intact.

In societies where military democracy is dominant, the number of warriors is generally calculated as approximately 20 per cent of the population. III century B.C.

20 For more details see: Gumilëv L.N. *Izmeneniya klimata i migratsii kochevnikov*// Природа. 1972, № 4., с. 44-52.

There were about 60,000 Hun warrior cavalry in Mongolia in that year.²¹ In AD 304, the number of warriors of the Southern Huns living in Ordos and Shan-si alone was 50,000. In other words, the population of those who travelled westwards increased rapidly through normal reproduction based on the nomadic economy and the natural conditions of the land. In other words, the natural resources of the steppe were preserved as the population grew steadily. This certainly does not mean that the whole people were supposedly incapable of development. Because their ability to maintain their unique ethnic existence was not in the way we are used to, but in a way that responded to the lifestyle and demands of nomads.

The solid foundation of the nomads' relations with the landmass of the Great Steppe also led to the deepening of spiritual culture.²² Despite the sensitivity of nomads to the aesthetic and religious traditions of neighbouring peoples, they generally retained the worship of the demon, the cult of Mitra, loyalty to oaths, hatred of lying and deceit. The cult of Mitra was introduced to Central Asia by the Sogdians, the Yuechis, in the IV century BC.²³ This religion remained valid until the XVI century, when the eastern part of the Steppe came under the influence of Buddhism and the western part of the Steppe came under the influence of Islam. However, folk beliefs continued to survive after this date. In other words, the ancient ethnographic map of Central Asia was more mosaic than today.

From the 17th century onwards, only two groups of people managed to survive there: Turks and Mongols.

Mâzi

In addition to different economic systems and material cultures, ethnic diversity led to the emergence of a local original culture. The different variants of inter-tribal archaeological culture, which have appeared in the entire steppe region since ancient times, not only reveal one or another ethnic relationship, but also answer a question that has already been asked: Low level of technology

21 Haloun G. *Zur Uetsi-Frage*// Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1937, p. 306.

22 Gumilëv L.N. *Yedinstvo i raznoobraziye kočevoy kultury Yevrazii v Srednie ve-*
ki *Staryi Azii* *1969* *№3*.

23 Gumilëv L.N., Kuznetsov B.I. *Bhon//Doklady otdeleniy i komissiy VGO. L., 1970.*
fas. 15, p. 72-90; Gumilëv L.N. S.I. Rudenko i sovremennaya etnogeog-
aridnoy zony Yevropeyskogo kontinenta, p. 12.

and what kind of intensive development took place despite the scarcity of social structure variants? The available information leads us to the conclusion that the differences between the Eurasian nomadic cultures are due to the different economic and territorial adaptability of the individual tribes. The three thousand years of nomadic cultural history of the tribes sometimes emerged in different combinations, sometimes connected to remnant ethnos, and sometimes disappeared altogether as the people representing that culture melted into other tribes.²⁴ In the first case, a subjugated tribe was regarded as a tributary class; in the second, a social stagnation, which, to use a geographer's term, we call *ethnolanshaft* equilibrium, manifested itself; in the third, the incorporation of foreign tribes (incorporation) brought to the surface a new social structure (social *perestoroyka*), which we can call an alliance of tribes or a special form of military democracy in the nomadic society. In historical synthesis, social history and ethnography are not substitutes for each other, but they illuminate the subject from different angles.

Having established this principle, let us return to the Huns.

In order to clarify the situation and possibilities of the eastern branch of the Hun people, let us turn our gaze to the ancient history, which we have dealt with extensively in the first part of our book. For without a thorough review of the past we cannot move forward in peace of mind.

The transition of the Huns from a tribal to a state organisation seems to have taken place in the III century BC, when all the nomadic peoples of Eurasia were experiencing a strong upward trend. In the Huns, however, the clan structure remained intact and the formation of classes was not observed. Energetic and greedy chieftains did not want this system to change. Because the Hun ethnic world view and the behavioural stereotypes developed accordingly were in such a condition that leaving the clan was considered as the greatest misfortune. Therefore, the division of property could not be possible. The clan itself owned all the means of production, and the only thing that distinguished the Huns from one another was their personal possessions. However, some clansmen were keen to increase their wealth, and this gradually led to the rise of the heroes' clans.

24 Gumil'ev L.N. *Poiski vımıshlennogo tsartva*. M., 1970; *Drevniye Turki*, M., 1967; *Xunnu*. M., 1960.

and their importance within the society was increasing. Pride and fame were as powerful an impulse as greed. Thus, an intra-clan elite was formed, and with their help the yabgu were able to subdue the steppe stretching from Kingan to T'ien-shan. This was a stage of historical formation.

As military superiority developed successfully, the clan elite expanded and the Huns grew stronger. However, when China engaged in ruthless wars that continued throughout 133-97 BC, the Huns began to suffer many deaths and , and their nervous systems began to deteriorate. Because of the power they possessed, they fought at the forefront and occupied the most dangerous positions, and the active population was worn out more than the other masses. In the end, the unyielding Hun warriors defended the freedom of their countrymen, but those who had spent two generations on the battlefields no longer had energy to spare. Meanwhile, in the vast steppes of Halha, far from the onslaught of the Chinese cavalry, the Huns were multiplying steadily.

As we know from the political history, the historical existence of the Hun ethnos was relatively short. However, the reason for this was not the nomadic life, but rather the backwardness of the nomads in defending their life and freedom against the Chinese aggression. For this reason, yes, only for this reason, the historical decline phase of the Hun people developed much faster than other peoples living in better conditions.

In the first century, internal conflicts, executions, migrations, etc. led to the loss of the Hun sense of unity. Unity was only necessary for soldiers who wanted to "rule over the peoples", but the nomads on their own thought of nothing else but the peaceful grazing of their flocks in separate territories. Of course, the masses were in favour of a strong government because it ensured general security, but we have right to expect ignorant shepherds and their wives to think about the problems of the state and ways of solving them. The tribal Huns helped the government as much as they could, but it was not their fault that their means were limited.

China, the enemy of the Huns, was in completely different circumstances. First of all, they were extremely strong. Secondly, the Chinese had not expended their passionary powers to fill the ranks of their army. Of course, there were also "adventurers" there, from whom the country had to get rid of in one way or another. For China, the loss of one of its armies

It was a material loss, and the regular taxes collected for a maximum of thirty years would have been wasted.

What would have happened if the Hun society had continued its development and if the silks of the Chinese diplomats and the arrows of the Sienpi cavalry had not torn the Hun Empire apart and divided it into groups?

Such a question is not usually included in the historical corpus, perhaps because it is considered useful to ask such questions, but the ethnologist has to distinguish a fortuitous military victory (even if coincidence sometimes breaks the laws) from the laws of evolution. The ethnos passes through certain stages while climbing the steps of development, but in the meantime it is influenced by neighbouring ethnos and often these influences may lead to a catastrophe. Because external influences may not only disrupt the course of development, but may also cause unpleasant events and aborted foetuses, which the historian can never overlook. Most of the time, the researcher may be under the impression that these events developed in accordance with the law of progress. Let us try to clarify the issue by using ethnology as our touchstone.

The constant influence of powerful and aggressive China was always intended to de-forme-nise the Hun ethnos, but such influencing activities did not yield any results until they came under the temporary rule of China in the first century BC. However, sixty years of neighbourhood and mutual relations with China left deep traces on Hun life and psychology. In this case, it should not be overlooked that the Chinese and nomads were peoples with different ethnic dominants, and therefore the Chineseisation of nomads was always possible only through severe psychological destruction.

The reorganisation of the Hun State in the first century AD showed that the Hun culture had passed a test, but in 48, as a result of the habit of accepting enemy domination, a part of the Huns voluntarily became subjects of China. This was the beginning of a process of fusion of ethnic elements which ended with the military victories of the Syenpis in 93. From this date onwards, independent Hun history came to an end, but the process of ethnogenesis continued, i.e. the Huns submitted to the dictates of history and tied their fate to these peoples and cultures. This period should be analysed in a special way, but before that we have the right to ask a question: Did the Hun culture continue its progress on the path of development or not? In my opinion, it did.

The only danger for the Huns was Han aggression. Therefore, if the Han Empire had fallen 20 years earlier than the normal date of its collapse, and if the wise Chinese had not prematurely eliminated the tyrant Wang Mang, Hun culture would have been established on the steppe, Hun civilisation would have developed, or the period of historical existence would have been prolonged.²⁵ Indeed, this was a very fruitful process. At a time when passions reach a boiling point original cultures are formed, while a way of life separate from others, the ability for mutual relations, the development of world views, the ability to develop one's own thinking - beauty, truth, responsibility, etc. - also emerge. In the process of "being", when ambitions are extinguished, notions of art, philosophy, law and even luxury emerge. Some traces of this period remain for archaeology and antiquity. However, the Huns could not survive this process and passed into the period of obscurity (ignorance), i.e. the stage when traditions were forgotten and an aimless struggle for life was waged.

Of course, the Steppe could have produced poems more enthusiastic than "Iliad", myths more fantastic than "Eddies" and stories not worse than "Thousand and One Nights". If architecture could not develop in those climatic conditions, jewellery making and the art of application could have developed. We have grounds for thinking that literacy could not develop among nomads. On the contrary, literacy was highly developed among the Turks, Uighurs and Kyrgyz in the VIII-IXth centuries, and the Huns were no exception. If geniuses had not been exterminated by massacres while still in their mothers' wombs, philosophy, natural sciences and historiography would have developed as well.

The Huns had all kinds of prior knowledge to adapt to world life. Chinese immigrants brought agriculture to the Steppe, the Sogdians brought fine arts and other professions, and the Turfanis brought commerce.

Some time was probably necessary for these influences to bear fruit, but the Huns were not given this opportunity.

If we are to be truthful, we must shed a tear for the hour when the last Hunnic suzerain, wounded, fell from his horse, was put back in the saddle by his loyal comrades-in-arms, and rode off into the unknown. For he was fighting traitors (the Southern Huns), besiegers (the Chinese) and greedy savages (the Syenpis) for a civilisation that did not exist. And we have no grounds to accuse the Western Huns of the IVth century of savagery because of their brave ancestors.

Three hundred years of ignorance brought not blessings to East , but disasters to Hun activities.

An Istographical Excursion

Although it is a fact that the culture of any nation cannot be properly illuminated when viewed through the eyes of the enemy of that nation, the desire to reach the true history has drawn many historians into the vise of Chinese presentation and perspective. The illiteracy of Huns and other nomads has forced us to surrender to the mercy of Chinese historians. However, a historian armed with the weapon of ethnological methodology, by utilising the logic of events and knowledge of the structure of ethno-genetic processes, can stand strong against the intensive studies that have been passed down from centuries ago to the present day. In a closed system, in other words, the intense energy of a living organism in an ethnos seeks a way out. This energy breaks down the social barriers surrounding it, forcing the ethnos to come into contact with its neighbours, to spread into its environment and finally to take place in the balance of the environment in order to reach perfection, as a result of which the system itself disappears. This process of the formation of the Hun State was analysed in detail by us,²⁶ but the interpretation of the process was made according to the principles established only ten years later.²⁷ The most fundamental thing is that the sections on synthesis in these studies do not arouse anyone's suspicion.²⁸

For the ethnologist, the history of the Huns is of interest as an ineffable example and as a distorted variant of the process of ethnogenesis. For here we are dealing with a civilisation caught between both extreme obscurity and extreme ethnic (but certainly not physical and total) poles.

The issue of historical evolution in the period we have chosen to analyse is the most complex problem of ethnic contact. The Huns in North China were an ethnic minority, and even this minority was formed by the incorporation of servants from different tribes. The Huns were in contact not only with the Chinese, but also long before the Chinese with the Tibetans, Syenpis, Tabgachs and other tribes of North-West China.

26 Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*.

27 Gumilëv L.N. *Ethnogenesis i ethnosfera* Природа. 1970, № 1, 2.

28 Вестник древней истории (далее- ВДИ). 1962. 3, с. 202-210.

They came into contact with their own people; and as all these peoples were divided into various branches among themselves, they were mixed with the Huns in various parts. The importance of this issue will be understood from the description of the course of events and their results.

The first information was obtained from translations of Chinese chronicles. Even if these translations are extremely accurate, the chronicles themselves are full of extremely complex information. V.P. Vasilyeff says the following Chinese historical literature: "A cursory glance at all the Chinese historical compilations might lead one to think that everything has been done in this field and that it is worth learning Chinese in order to read the voluminous corpus and obtain some information from it, but this is not the case at all. Apart from the terrible difficulty of having to go through all the corpus one by one in order to have a complete knowledge of any event, the extremely complex arrangement of the subjects, and the constant tension of criticism, which can only allow you to reach the truth after scanning all the information from beginning to end, another difficulty awaiting the historian is that he often asks "what if" questions about the subjects that he cannot get out of, and that he is confronted with the fact that many events are hidden and omitted." ²⁹

In addition to this literary problem, in the following pages, we will be confronted with many problems of a historical-geographical, palaeoethnographic and social-historical character, in addition to those mentioned by Vasilyeff. Chinese writers, although they were forced to do so, not only did not like to write good things about an enemy country and its people, they were eager to slander it. But we have no justifiable reason to be so unjustly burdened. However, we have to investigate the causes of a great event, which the Chinese call the "Period of the Five Barbarian Tribes" (Wu-hu) and the French call "the great migrations of peoples in Asia", and present the results. The greatest difficulty is to use the kaleidoscope of facts and very detailed descriptions, but we will try to reach a conclusion by applying some unusual perspectives, that is, ethnological rules.

29 Rudenko S.IK *voprosu ob istoricheskoy sinteze*// Doklady po 'tnografii. Доклады по. вып. 1 (4). Л., 1965, с. 59-65.
65.

The Fall of Ancient China

Unlike the Hyung-nu State, Han China was not out of reach for external enemies. At the end of the second century, there were 50 million subsistence peasants in China. 400-year-old cultural traditions had been preserved by generations of Confucianists. Crafts flourished, the production of goods increased, the army ranks were filled with "young rebels", i.e. thugs who could not find a place for themselves in the organised system, and mercenary Hun, Qintan and Sienpi cavalry. The empire of the Central Oasis in the eastern part of the continent seemed to have become as unshakable as the city of Mengü in the west. And how deceptive it all was!

What really happened around the second and third centuries? Everything imaginable, but nobody can bring it to the surface. First of all, the threshold elders, who were members of the administration, got into disputes with the Confucianist masters and, of course, they finished them off; they even finished off their relatives and acquaintances. The surviving Daoists led peasant revolts in 184, but these were suppressed in 189; the rebels were drowned in a river of blood shed by the regular armies and latifundium goons. Later, the soldiers, the prime ministerial officials, eliminated the threshold lords, but when the volunteer militia besieging the invincible army at Ch'ang-an objected to their killing, the disgruntled soldiers killed their own commanders. But this time they themselves were put to the sword. Those who did not die in the fighting were also executed.

From 191 onwards, the aristocrats who had seized power in the provinces fought each other endlessly. Most of them were unprincipled hopefuls. The first to die were those who bought themselves unnecessary friends with money. They took their money, slept around, but when the other side paid a little more, they immediately joined the opposing camp. In 210 this process resulted in the formation of three monarchies, each with its own style of government and state structure.

In North-East China, the capable and unprincipled General Ts'ao Ts'ao, who had captured the last Han dynasty emperor and ruled the country on his behalf, rose to power. The motto of his reign was "Time and Heaven" or fate. This meant that people without courage and conscience could make a career and become rich in a short time. During these so-called democratisation years, the number of adventurers increased to such an extent that they filled and strengthened the ranks of the Ts'ao Ts'ao army. In 220, Ts'ao Ts'ao's son Ts'ao P'i seized the throne by force and founded his own Ts'ao-Wei dynasty.

In the south-east, General Sun Ch'üan had established the Wu monarchy. Its motto was "Land and Prosperity". In other words, it symbolised the favourable geographical position of the country between the tributaries of the great Yang-tse river. Sun Ch'üan and his successors called upon the Confucianist masters to serve them, but this policy proved fruitless due to the extreme conservatism of the system. When power inevitably fell into the hands of the ayyamists, a period of palace intrigue and taxation of the people for a life of luxury began.

The third reign of Shu-Han also made an unexpected appearance in Sih-ch'uan. The commanders of the troops that had suppressed the "Yellow" Daoist movement, realising full well that the victory of Ts'ao Ts'ao and Sun Ch'üan meant death for them, allied themselves with the condottier Liu Pei (pronounced Lubey) and his troops that had fought Ts'ao Ts'ao. initially based between the Han and Yang-tse rivers, when they were defeated there, they retreated to Sih-ch'uan, which, surrounded by mountains, was a virtual fortress, and elected Liu Pei, who had become a toy in the hands of the wise Chu-ko Liang, as their ruler. The founding principle of the state was very humanistic: Humanity and Friendship. But this principle was never to be implemented. The majority of the Sikh-ch'uan people were non-Chinese, who submitted to the power of the Daoists and condottiers but received no help from them in their aims and problems. Tragically, the war between these three states lasted until 264 and ended with the death of Chu-ko Liang and the invasion of Sih-ch'uan by the Ts'ao-Wei.

The Ts'ao-Wei reign elevated two social groups: Landlords, from whose ranks the dynasty founder emerged, and professional soldiers who joined the ruler for personal gain. As the wars continued, these two groups supported each other, but after the victory over Shu-Han, conflicts resumed, in which the soldiers prevailed over the aristocrats. In 265, Sih-ma Yen, the son and grandson of the victorious generals, deposed the last ruler of Ts'ao-Wei and became a military emperor, like the Roman emperors who wrested power from the senate. The new dynasty took the name Chin. In 280 Chin completed the unification of China by conquering the already fractured Wu dynasty without major conflict.

Chin was a military empire. The "Young Serkeshes" of the Khan period turned into talented brazen and seized power. III. Century-

By the end of the century, the potential of old China had been completely absorbed; all the passionate people of the Three Monarchs had given themselves up and gone away. One sacrificed himself for the "justice of the Yellow Sky", another for the "Red Han Empire", a third for loyalty to the commander, and a fourth group for the honourable future of the to-runs. After a terrible catastrophe, China was reduced to a heap of ashes made up of a tired people that even the most incompetent could rule. This is evidenced by the fact that the population of the country fell from 50 million to 7.5 million between 180-220. After half a century of peace, the population rose again to 16 million, but these were no longer the people of the old Han period. China had entered a period of obscurity, as later events would show.³⁰

It cannot be said that the Chin dynasty did nothing to strengthen its regime and country. Immediately after the conquest of the Wu dynasty in 280, Sih-ma Yen issued an edict declaring that all land in the country was the property of the state, while the people were only the tenants of the land. The peasants cultivated two-thirds of the land on their own behalf and paid taxes, while the revenue from one-third went directly to the state. The aim of this land reform was to develop agriculture in the villages and the control of the revenues was carried out by the ikta owners, who were directly accountable to the administration. Naturally, the heads of the "powerful families" gave their properties to the state, but in return they took part in the state mechanism that controlled the revenues of the lands distributed to the peasants according to their rank in society (15 households for each rank). In a way, this favourable behaviour can be regarded as the feudal institution of ikta.

However, this support did not benefit Sih-ma Yen. Since he did not want to give much space to salaried officials, he had to pay his officials by working. But they not only could not do it, but also did not want to do it. Because the old traditions of the Han period had been forgotten, behavioural stimulation had atrophied, but all had been replaced by egoism. After the reforms, which remained in force for about ten years, there was such an internal turmoil that it was considered to be the most severe years of the Three Reigns. The law was no longer that the right should be strong, but that the strong should be right.

30 Vasilyev W.P. *Svedeniya o monçurax v v vremena dinastij Yüan i Ming//Godichniy akt S.-Peterburgskogo üniversiteta za 1858 god*, p. 97.

PART I

LEAVES OF HAZEL

Ethnic Contact

Astronomers who observe a small meteorite passing close to a large planet are not surprised when the meteorite, unable to resist the force of gravity, falls on the planet or is captured by one of its satellites. Neither the planet, nor the meteorite, nor the laws of gravity are to blame here. Because there is no place for the concept of guilt in nature. But is it different when ethnic and super-ethnic groups, different in life and culture, come into contact with each other? The will and character of different peoples are formed according to the static laws of ethnogenesis, which even a little research shows to be different from the laws of nature. Encounters between nomads and farmers lead to violent clashes, but neither side is to blame for this. This was exactly the situation in North China in the III-Vth centuries. There were no criminals, but the number of the miserable considerable. Couldn't the Huns and Tabgachs, squeezed by the droughts ravaging their homeland steppe, move to other ends of the vast desert where there was water and pastures? 't the Tankuts, the descendants of the Jung's and "Ti"s, stay in the mountains against Chinese attacks? What about the Chinese... How should they behave when the barbarians burst through their borders and wanted to graze their animals in the fields where a year's labour of the farmers lay? The Chinese, with a population of 16 million¹ gathered as a whole under a single government, believed that they were too powerful and righteous to let savages roam under their skies. Moreover, they were up to 400,000 people, comprising different nomads such as Huns, Siyenpis and Wu-huans.² The half million Tibetan-speaking mountaineers settled on China's western borders were hostile to both the Chinese and the nomads,

1 Shan Yüeh. *Ocherki istorii Kitaya*. M., 1959, p. 128: *Ocherki*.

2 Age., p. 134.

and they were also foreigners. However, there was no unity among these three large groups. For one thing, the Chinese hated each other. Rich farmers were sucking the blood of the peasants; professional soldiers were plundering the big farm owners, but they could not get rich. State officials had died in the course of palace intrigues. The highlanders were divided into hostile tribes: Ch'iangs, "Ti" and Ch'üans. The Huns were allied with the kuls (chieh-lu), whose lifestyle and character differed from their own. The Syenpis, Mu-junġs (Mu-yun oku- nur) and Tabgachs, who were related to each other in language and descent, were enemies and did not even think of coming together. The historical destiny of this period had manifested itself as playing the role of the "Great Resentments" and had made a war inevitable in which no one was right and no one was guilty. Because in this period, making peace with the enemy could only mean putting oneself to death.

At first the nomads living on the Chinese frontiers only wanted peace. But the statesmen and large farm owners seized them and, in order to ridicule them by equating Hun and servant, took them to the distant markets of Shan-tung and sold them as slaves. Thus the sense of violence in their hearts grew rapidly, and contemporaries saw it for themselves. Chien Tung, a high-ranking government official, wrote in his report on the "migration of the Huns" that the tribesmen who migrated to China were people "whose souls were filled to the utmost with hatred".³ This was one of the reasons that destroyed ancient China and its great culture. However, neither the Chinese, nor the Huns, nor the Tabgachs could live together with each other. Therefore, while analysing this era, we are confronted with the problem of ethnic contact which never led to good and development. But although it was a catastrophe, it was inevitable. Because in the III century there were great changes in the Steppe.

Eastern Huns

In our previous book we analysed the history of the Great Steppe up to the III century, when two steppe peoples, the Huns and the Syenpis, clashed.⁴ The Syenpis were the victors of this conflict.

³ Age., p. 135.

⁴ Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*, p. 240-241.

but already in 235 their state had split into two. The defeated Huns were divided into four groups, and each group lived its own destiny. The most invincible of these had travelled across the steppes of present-day Kazakhstan to the Ural and Volga rivers in search of a new homeland.⁵ The second group, the "Weak Huns" stayed in Targabai, conquered Yedisu, and repeatedly astonished Asia with their heroism.⁶ The third group, the most vicious of the Huns, stayed in their homeland and mingled with the victors. After this event, many Turkish words entered the Sienpi language. And finally the fourth group settled all over the Great Steppe, in Shen-si, Ordos and Alashan. To tell the truth, it was this group that gave the Huns their former dignity, although their situation was extremely delicate. After they had been uprooted from their homeland by the Syenpis, they came under the wing of the Chinese government, which had never sympathised with them. Only the fall of the Han dynasty gave them a chance to regain their independence, but not immediately.

During the bloody conflicts that continued for ten years during the Three Reigns, the Huns never left the stage. They interfered in everything as if the turmoil engulfing the Chinese people was their own cause. At first they joined the "yellow" movement, but when it failed they obeyed Ts'ao Ts'ao and with their long spears made him take back his privileges. (203)⁷ But this behaviour saved them from annihilation. The Ts'ao-Wei divided the Huns into five branches and appointed a descendant of the Hun princes to head each of them. However, these princes were subordinate to a senior Chinese administrator called the regional high commissioner. At this time, the entire population of the Huns was around 30 thousand families, i.e. 150 thousand people, and although they were spread over a very large territory, they lived among the Chinese without mixing with them. In 265, twenty thousand families who had previously fled to the steppe returned and asked to be accepted as subjects. The Chinese government settled them in Ho-hsi. Only two incidents of rebellion have been recorded at the end of the III century. One was the "rebellion of yabgu Meng" in 271 at the northern seat of the Huns.⁸ But

5 Gumilëv L.N. *Nekotoryye voprosy istorii xunnov*// ВДН. 1961, № 4.

6 See Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki*.

7 Lo Guan-chün. *Troyetsarstviye*. I/419.

8 Bernchtam A.N. *Ocherki istorii gunnov*. L., 1950, p. 220. Since there was no yabgu in the Huns at this time, Meng probably declared himself a yabgu. *Chin-shu*, bl. 97; cf: Boodberg P. *Two Notes on the History of the Chinese Frontier* // Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1936. Vol. I. S. 293. Here-in after: P. Boodberg. *Two Notes*.

Meng was killed by sent assassins. The second was the rebellion of Kao-san in 291, but he too was captured by the Hun lords and the rebellion subsided. Thus the Huns began to live a quiet life and grow stronger, but this calm was the calm before the storm.

Another large tribe was the Chieh-lular, who lived on the banks of the Hei-shui river. This tribe was composed of Hun "slaves" who gained their independence between 25-85, when Hun society began to disintegrate. Their main occupation was animal husbandry and hunting. "They were not like the western tribes belonging to the Wei-p'i (Siyenpi) and they were not a single race. Among them were Tang-hus, Ting-ling and Ch'iang (Tibetans). As they had originally lived together with slaves, they were regarded as servants of the Huns. "⁹

The word "Chieh-lu" "servant" in the ancient language and "slave" in the present language. Yet in the VI-VIIIth centuries, this word had a completely different meaning: A person who belonged to another tribe or who came under the sovereignty of another state.¹⁰ In fact, this word was also in Wei-lüe in its old meaning, which did not include the meaning of someone's personal slave. When the Huns were at the peak of their power, they accepted immigrants from the Han Empire and among them were Chinese.¹¹ Although these people lived among them they were deprived of the rights enjoyed by other Huns because they were not Huns by birth. The general social situation and historical background had made the immigrants from different tribes more solidly monolithic than the unity of a people at its birth. The Kul spoke Khmer among themselves, but they had to preserve their ethnic language against the Huns. However, the Huns did not recognise them as one of their own, nor did the kuls belong to any of the Hun tribes, even by marriage. Politically, the kul-s were completely subordinate only to the Hun eu-god, and therefore they had absolutely no intention of returning to China. They went on campaigns together, and their neighbourliness had made them related to the Huns. As for the children of refugees who married among themselves, these were,

In the III century, the Chinese had an ethnic neighbourhood

9 Chavannes E. *Les pays d'Occident d'après Wei-lïo*. T'oung Pao. Ser. 2, vol. 7, 1905, p. 522-526.

10 Gumilëv L.N. *Drevniye türki*, p. 54-55.

11 Gumilëv L.N. *Xunnu*, p. 55.

They constituted a unity. Historically, all ethnos, which are formed from different substrates, have a unity. Even if any isolated people does not have a monolithic structure, it is like its predecessors at the stage of formation, i.e., at the stage of origin. If they crystallised as a whole, there is no basis for characterising the Hun servants as an ethnos.¹² The name given to them is just like the European ethnonyms of the Franks as freedmen, the Suebs as vagabonds, the Markomans as border guards, and the Alamans as crow-hoofers. On the other hand, the Hun servants, as an ethnos, only carried this name for a short time, but they played a very important role in the events of the IVth century.

In other words, we observe here a variant of ethnogenesis from the beginning to the end, which, when analysed in depth, will be seen to constitute a suburb of the Huns.

Tibetan Foothills

At the western edge of China, in the present-day provinces of Shen-si and Kan-su, two distinct peoples lived side by side: The Mongoloid shepherd Ch'iangs, who belonged to the Tibetan groups, and the farmer "Ti"s.¹³ These were two separate peoples who long ago belonged to the Tibet-Birman group and spoke different languages.¹⁴ Both were composed of several tribes, the most well-known of which are the following: T'ang-ch'anġ, Tang-hsiang, "Ti" or Boma, and the Pai-langs of Sih-ch'uan. These tribes, originating from Junġ-ti, later merged with each other to form the Tankuts of the Middle Ages.¹⁵ Although they reluctantly established relations with the Chinese, still retained their own princes and ways of life in the III century. Although most of them knew Chinese, they used the language of the "Ti" at home. Their dress and customs were partly Tibetan and partly Chinese. The Chinese sometimes called them Ting-ling in a figurative sense, but this was not an ethnonym.

12 Gumil'ev L.N. *O termine "ethnos"*// Доклады ВГО, вып. 3. Л., 1967.

13 Grumm-Grjimaŷlo G.Y. *Materiali po ethnologii Amdo i oblasti Kuku-nora*// SPb, 1903, p. 3 (hereinafter: *Materiali po ethnologii*); Gumil'ev L.N. *Veliĉiye i pa-*
toŷupnyĭ inarodnyĭ Mirotoġok, a Vostok, 1916-1919, t. 55.

14 1888, VII, p. 28-29. inois// Le Moseon.

15 Grumm-Grjimaŷlo G.Y. *Materiali po ethnologii*, p. 41, 43.

t was a name given to indicate that they were European because they had distinctly different physical characteristics. Because the real Ting-ling were a different people and they lived in Siberia, not in China.

Let us explain the above in a more concise manner: In ancient times, East Asia was inhabited by two European races of the second rank: Ting-ling and "Ti". The original Ting-ling had been living in Southern Siberia for a very long time and belonged to the chroman type in the broadest sense of the word.¹⁶ The Chinese used to call the Sienpi Mountains the Ting-ling Mountains to indicate a people they found strange.¹⁷

The "Ti" and their relatives the Jungs inhabited the area of China from the present-day Hami Oasis to Kingan [Hingan] and Sih-ch'uan.¹⁸ They were also European, but brachycephalic and close to the Pamir-o-Fergana race. The descendants of the "Ti" who mingled with the Mongoloid Tibetans are found among the Amdo nomads, who today are erroneously called Tankut.¹⁹

It should be noted that the ethnonym "Tankut" was the Mongolian name for the Mongolian Mi-negs, one of the "Ti" tribes in the Middle Ages. Today, however, they are mistakenly identified with a completely different people, the Tibetan nomads of the XXth century living in Amdo and Kama.²⁰ However, we are obliged to preserve and use the ethnonym "Tankut", although it needs to be corrected in the scientific literature.

Syenpis

The warlike Sienpi tribes, who captured Halha [Kalka], fled to that region and lost the state structure they had in the II century in the III century. Although they managed to survive in their homeland in the steppes of southern Manchuria, they, like the Southern Huns, were also dominated by Chinese culture.

16 Debets G.F. *Paleontologiya SSSR*. M., 1948, p. 65.

17 Gumilëv L.N. *Grigoriy Yefimovich Grumm-Grжимaylo kak istorik Tsentralnoy Azii*//ММатагтгирялалыргоо ~~mongol~~ ~~МОН.~~ ~~ЖЛ.~~, 1966 № 11. 1; *Din'skaya peche* ~~материалы~~ ~~МОН.~~ 1959. №1.

18 Lattimore O. *Inner Asian frontier of China*. N.Y., 1940, p. 340-349. Here-in af-sweat: Lattimore, *Inner*.

19 This error was identified and corrected by G. E. Grumm-Grжимaylo. See *Materiali po etnologii*.

20 Grumm-Grжимaylo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, II/26.

Chinese culture. Since the Huns at least retained their nomadic cultural tradition and the Syenpis remained primitive, the influence of Chinese culture on them greater. The wealth of China attracted the nomads, and in the III century the deputy prince Muo-huo-pa (pronounced Mohoba), the head of the Syenpi-s, migrated to Inner China and settled in the vicinity of Beijing. In imitation of the Chinese statesmen, he named his tribe Mu-junḡ, and thus his state went down in history under this name. In 281, Mu-junḡ She-kui [Mu-junḡ Ch'üi] (pronounced Mu- yun Sheguy) received from the emperor the titular title of great yabgu, but they soon fell out and the Syenpis started to attack China. However, the greatest opposition to She-kui came not from mighty China, but from the small but Principality of Yü- wen, an ally of the Chin Empire. She-kui's successor, Mu-junḡ Ho-i, after waging an active struggle against China from 285 to 289, took for himself the title of head of the great Sienpis and concluded peace. Of course, for this he had to quarrel with his northern neighbour Yü-wen, but in the end he signed a treaty of alliance with the Tuan State (see further on).

In 302 Mo-ho-i, the Yü-wen suzerain, besieged Mu-junḡ Ho-i at Chi-ch'eng (Manchuria) but was repulsed.²¹ In 307 Mu-junḡ Ho-i proclaimed himself the great suzerain of the Syenpis. Although this title was only a warning, not a real position, it is nevertheless possible to take 307 as the date of the founding of the Southern Siyenpi State. Three years later 700 Sienpi families migrated westwards and settled in the foothills of Saydam, establishing the Togon or T'u-yü-hun suzerainty on the shores of Lake Kukuror. The state was named after the name of the commander-in-chief, who was the brother of Mu-junḡ Ho-i.

It can be said that the lifestyle and customs of the Togon people are similar to those of the South Manchurian tribes of the Siyenpis. This is because the person who wrote their history noted that the two peoples were close to each other.²²

The Southern Syenpis were fixed-minded nomads. Because they had received goods, products and literary knowledge from the Chinese and even had cities.

21 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/160, 209. Gibert, on the other hand, records that the attacker was Mu-junḡ Ho-i himself. See Gibert L. *Dictionnaire historique et géographique de la Mandchourie*. Hong Kong, 1934, p. 629. Ci-après. Gibert L. *Dictionnaire*.

22 Bichurin, *Istoriya Tibeta i Xuxunora*/97Uspenskiy WStrana Kuke-nor ili Tsin- xay. SPb., 1880. pp. 57-58.

Although they were able to leave the yurt and tent life, they could not leave the yurt and tent life. Horse theft was the biggest offence and probably punishable by death. They would cover the offender's head with a cloth and stone him to death. For other offences, either a fine was imposed or the offender was put to the falaka. Administrative units were not organised into tribes, but into military districts. Units headed by a captain or major or a chief. There were no fixed taxes, but when money was needed, it was collected from wealthy families.

Their dress consisted of a fur coat, a gathered skirt and a felt hat. Women wore their hair in a belik braid and decorated their heads with pearls and gold sequins. Togon people weapons very much. They used bow, sharp sword, shield and armour as weapons. Spear is not mentioned in the sources. Therefore, hand-to-hand combat tactics had not yet become widespread.

Their marriage customs did not differ from those of the Huns, which had general characteristics for all Asiatic nomads. Among the Togons, besides the Mu-jungs, there was also the "white" Syenpi tribe.

Speaking about the Syenpis, it is necessary to note that they certainly do not have such concepts as clan, tribe, people, which are present in the ethnographic nomenclature. Instead, the existence of socio-political structures such as tribal alliance, state, etc. can be mentioned. They also had tribes and clans, but these either emerged rapidly and disappeared, or were limited to the remnants of a tribe that about to disappear, or to some families whose ethnic appearance had changed. Their language was distinct from that of the Huns. On the other hand, their language and culture differed from those of the Chinese, and again their language and customs from those of the Tibetans. However, have always been Hunno-Syenpi, Tibet-o-Syenpi and more or less Chineseised Syenpi structures in the Togons. This means that the Syenpi ethnos (this is the only name that can be given to them) were divided, as we have seen in the case of the Togon, and completely discarded their own tribal names. However, corporations formed by different tribes were not found everywhere. The reason for this was sometimes that they could not accept a foreign tribe into their organisation and sometimes they captured them and sold them to China where slaves fetched a good price. Although such ethnic organisations were constantly changing among the Syenpis, there was an extreme nationalism among them which seems to us rather strange. For example, when the menkub princes of the Mu-jung dynasty were forced to emigrate, they were welcomed for the sake of their rulers.

They surrendered to their neighbours, who opened their gates, but the ruler slaughtered them after a victory. Probably the Syenpis had such a principle of behaviour, which is contrary to us, but which they themselves knew well and strictly observed.

Likewise, the Siyenpi did not practise any form of government that we find in Europe. Theirs was not a state; therefore, the Syenpis were in the stage of military democracy with a primitive-society formation and there were no classes. However, the state of the Siyenpi was a clan-tribal alliance. Because there was a strong power and throne succession system based on the people-military. For this reason, both nomadic and sedentary defeated peoples would become subjects by promising to the ruling power.

This distinctive social structure adopted a nomadic lifestyle and the principle of mutual assistance. A Siyenpi could never be poor. Because if he lost his flock due to disease or enemy raiding, his neighbours would give him sheep, so that after a few years he would have a flock again. On the other hand, he himself might go to war and return home rich, or he might never return at all. Si-yenpi did not pursue wealth because he gave it to his wife or mother. The system he lived in and the idea of life forced him to obey the ruling power. Therefore, he does not value his own life or the life of a stranger.

In addition to all this, the Syenpis were a highly skilful and hospitable people. They easily adopted Chinese culture, imitated the Hun aristocratic customs, the Tunguz fashion of hair ornamentation without difficulty, and learnt the custom of preparing a quiver for an arrow, known only to the hunters, ancestors of the Nivehs of the Amur tributaries. In the Siyenpi ^{armies}²³ one could always observe a mixture of foreign customs of whatever nationality, which is the basis for our labelling them as "chimera ethnos". This gave the ancient Chinese historians the right to classify the Syenpis as a single group. Although the Syenpis used the Mongolian language, there was no linguistic unity among them, and the different dialects borrowed from Turkish and Chinese clearly disrupted this linguistic unity. Historical fate plays a very important role in ethnogenesis, but we cannot go into it here. Probably, after the Hunno-Syenpi history has been clarified, we will be able to discuss the so-...

23 Orda: Literally means the headquarters of the chief. For extensive information on orda as a sociological term see L.N.Gumilëv, *Ancient Turks*, pp. 56-63.

nunda will return to this subject. For now, let us review the other Syenpi ethnoses.

Yü-wen

They were a warrior tribe of the Tatabids, who had previously belonged to the Hun State. In the III century AD, they lived in the mountainous region in the east of the region extending from the upstream of Liao-ho to Sungari. Although they were independent, they were headed by Hun rulers. These rulers were appointed by election from among persons nominated by Yü-wen yabgu. "Their language was markedly different from that of the Sienpi." ²⁴ They had a permanent enmity against the Mu-jungš. In 302, their chief had received the title of yabgu. The Chinese government officially recognised Yü-wen and established kinship. Because Emperor P^{ing}-wen-ti²⁵ had given his daughter to the chief of Yü-wen. Probably, China wanted to use Yü-wen against the Syenpis who were pressurising them from the north. Among the Southern Syenpis, the Yü-wen were the least Chineseised. This is evidenced by the fact that they did not adopt Chinese customs such as growing their hair long and refrained from imitating foreign customs.

Yü-wen a Hunno-Syenpi chimera.

Tuan

On the shores of the Gulf of Liao-tung, the (Kuo) Tuan State was established. The founder of the state was a man named Jih-lu-ch'üan, originally a slave, but extremely determined and persevering. In the days of famine, he was sent to Liao-hsi by one of the state officials to find foodstuffs. Jih-lu-ch'üan "grew in power by gathering fugitives and traitors around him." ²⁶ His successors were his brother and his nephew Wu-mu-ch'en, who received the kung, or prince, and yabgu seal from the Chin dynasty. The Tuan people, composed of various tribes and mostly daltaban, had 30 thousand families. It was a small but powerful principality. It had adopted the Sienpi culture. Initially they were allies of the Chin dynasty and enemies of the Huns and Syenpis, but later they allied themselves with Mu-jung Ho-i.

Tuan was also a Sienpi-Chinese chimera.

24 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/209. They were probably using one of the Sienpi dialects.

25 Ts'ao P'i of the Wei dynasty (220-226).

26 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/210-211.

Korea

The earliest known North Korean monarchy, Ch'ao-hsien (Chinese) or Chosen [Cho-hsion] (Korean), was conquered by the Han Emperor Wu-ti in 107 BC. China retained South Manchuria and North Korea until 169 B.C.E., after which the Koguryo tribe reconquered Liao-tung and Korea in the north of the former Chosen, i.e. the territory stretching from the Ta-don-kang river to the T'u-man-kang river.²⁷ Korea was a federation of five tribes. Each tribe was headed by a chieftain and was subject to the joint rule of one tribe. However, this joint administration was so well organised that even the acceptance of an ambassador, for example, decided by the senior officials in charge. Slavery also existed among them and even guilty relatives sentenced to death were enslaved. Court decisions were taken by the highest council of civil servants.

Historical sources record that the Kuguragours were very warlike and physically strong people. The weapons they used were not inferior to those of the Chinese or Huns. These were bow, sword, spear- rak, armour and helmet. Their short horses were quite suitable for use in the mountains.

Their clothes especially valuable: They wore clothes made of silkglazed and silvery fabrics. Stone architectural works were highly developed. Tombs with stone foundations were surrounded by coniferous trees.²⁸

According to the very limited information we have, their dress and costume culture was higher than that of the Syenpis but slightly lower than that of the Chinese.

The weakening of China during the three-state period created favourable conditions for the political strengthening of Koguryo. After taking advantage of China's weakening and moving his capital to Pan-tou on the right bank of the Ya-lu River, the Koguryo ruler started to follow the developments in China carefully. Initially contacting the Wu dynasty in the hope that this would put pressure on the Wei dynasty, the Koguryolids, upon the arrival of an envoy from Wei, began to negotiate with their powerful neighbours.

27 *Opisaniye Korey*. SPb., 1900. H.. S. 5. In the Chinese sources the name Koguryo is mentioned as Kao- kui-li and Kao-li. (See Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/24, 37 and 50, 81).

28 Vorovyev M.W. *Drevnaya Koreya*. M., 1961.

They put aside their quarrel and beheaded the envoy sent by Wu. They assisted the Wei armies in the suppression of the rebellion started by the Liao-tung governor Kung-sun Yüan in 328. After a while, however, the peace was broken by the Goguryei, who attacked Liao-tung. In response to this attack, the Chinese government entered Koguryo territory with a strong army and captured the capital Pan-tou in 242 after a short siege.²⁹ However, the Chinese could not hold on to Koguryo territory for long and this situation continued until 265. Because from this date onwards, the Southern Sienpi tribes formed by the united Mu-jung dynasties started to gain strength in Western Manchuria.

Deprived of the opportunity to extend their power westwards, the Goghourians turned southwards to the Ko-re Peninsula, where tribal groups founded two states, Pækcha and Silla (Puo-chi and Hsin-lo in Chinese), in the early IVth century. However, both states accepted many refugees from China, and because of them, Chinese influence greater here than in Koguryo. In the IVth century, Buddhism was established here. Since Pækcha a naval fleet, it was able to hold Liao-hsi³⁰ and even T'ai-wan³¹ for a certain period of time. Pækçe, on the other hand, had only come into contact with Japan in the first century.³²

For Pækçe the neighbourhood with Kyugyo was a serious test. Two wars, one in the middle of the Vth century and the other in the beginning of the VIth century, gave this state a chance to gain its independence. It is thus self-evident why Koguryo played such an insignificant role in the general political history of Asia. Because all his power was dissolved in the wars with Pækçe, which gave the Sienpis the opportunity to act freely. But in any case, Kögüryo managed to keep the Syenpis away from his borders and his rivals.

Fu-yü

Koguryo's northern neighbour, a single-tribe located in the Ch'ang-po-shan mountain range and the middle course of the Sungari

29 Gibert L. *Dictionnaire*, p. 404.

30 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/41.

31 Age., p. 67.

32 *Opisaniye Korey*, p. 7.

Fu-yü was the least fortunate. The exact date of its foundation is not known, but in the first century AD it occupied all of eastern Manchuria from K'ai-yüan in the south to Ch'i-ch'i-kar in the north. The Fu-yü territory was covered with fields and pastures. For protection, the people their territory with picket fences. Chinese chronicles mention the existence of fortresses and fortresses in Fu-yü, which indicates that there were class conflicts among them. Fu-yü law was extremely strict and there was a tradition of collective responsibility for an offence. If a family was judged guilty, they were sold into slavery. In addition to the belief in the afterlife, there was also the cult of Sky (worship of the Sky). During the burial of the deceased, the custom of human sacrifice to be a companion for the deceased in the afterlife was also seen among them. According to Chinese authors, Fu-yü people had these primitive beliefs as well as a culture of collective life and labour.³³ Fu-yü's foreign policy was quite complex. It was able to maintain its independence during the periods when the Koguryo was weak and the Sienpi tribes were disorganised; it entered Liao-tung several times in the II century with the sole purpose of plundering, but when it was defeated by T'an-shih-huai, who managed to unite the Sienpi tribes, its pressure on China decreased. At the beginning of the III century, they even asked China to accept them as subjects since they were being squeezed by the Kogurians from the east and the Syenpis from the west.³⁴ But China was too busy with civil war to help anyone.

Nevertheless, an alliance treaty had been concluded and Fu-yü supported the Chinese in terms of food during the Chinese expedition to Koguryo in 246. Later, however, when the weakening of China lifted the pressure on the Southern Syenpis, Mu-jung Ho-i captured the Fu-yü capital in 285. The Fu-yü ruler ended his life by suicide, but his son fled eastwards to Wuo-chü.³⁵

But all was not over. The prince, who was supported by China, returned to his country and tried to seize the throne, but he could only hold on to his throne for a day in the face of the attack of the Siyenpis. But this time the Siyen-pis captured the whole population and sold them as slaves in the Chinese markets. When the Chinese emperor learnt about this sale, he did everything he could to save his allies who would spend the rest of their lives in China.

33 Gibert L. *Dictionnaire*, p. 179.

34 Ibidp178.

35 Ibidp957.

lu tried. After that, Fu-yü could not recover and the survivors took refuge in Koguryo and merged with them. What happened to them also to the eastern ethnic groups of the Wuo-chü and Wei tribes. The Wuo-chus migrated to the Ussuri coast and Primorye. During the conquest of Ch'ao-hsien in 108 B.C., their southern group came under Chinese rule, but after the weakening of the country during the three-state period, they were incorporated into Kyurogyo. We have no information about the fate of the northern branches of these tribes. Could not the Niveh (Gilyak) living in the Amur tribes be the descendants of the Wuo-chular?

Pri-Amurye

Two tribal groups lived in the northern part of Manchuria: Old Tungus and Old Mongols. The first is mentioned in Chinese sources under the name Yih-lo³⁶. They occupied the northern part of the Ussuri tributaries of the Sungari and Pri-amurye downstream. They lived by hunting and fishing.³⁷ They even had some kind of state organisation.³⁸ They did not engage in any activity during the events of the III-Vth century AD. The cultural materials of these peoples were analysed by A.P. Okladnikoff.³⁹ At the end of the V century, we find them in Chinese sources under the names of Wu-chi and Mo-ho⁴⁰. Their descendants were Churchens in the XII century and Manchus in the XVII century.

The western part of northern Manchuria, the Nonni River basin, was inhabited by a large number of Kantans. They were linguistically close to the Yü-wen

36 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/23, 24.

37 *Opisaniye Manchurii*/edited by D. Pozdneyev. SPb. 1987, 97T., t. I, Sc. 7.

38 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/23-24.

39 See Okladnikov A.P. *Ocherki po istorii Primorya*. Vladivostok, 1959.

40 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/69-70.

In the Chinese language we find the name of this people in several forms: Wu-gi (Wu-ch'i), Mo-ko and Mo-ho. These are different transcriptions of the same name, and they are reminiscent of "Mukri" (Gibert L., p. 646). Furthermore, all Mo-ho tribes to belong to the Tun-guz group. Some of them lived in the continental climate and we consider them as the ancestors of the Churchens. However, the Chinese called the Mo-ho group Tatars in the XIII century, and it is certain that they were Mongols (Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/375).

In this case, there are two possibilities: Either the Mo-hos included the Mongol tribes as well as the Tunguz in their tribal alliances, or the separation of the Mongols and Tunguz took place in the first millennium BC. In this case, however, there must have been some intermediate tribes that preserved the language and cultural elements of both peoples. Until new data are available, this issue will remain ambiguous.

northern peoples belonging to the ancient Tung-hu group.⁴¹ They clashed with the Chinese on their southern borders, around the Shara-Muren (Liao-ho in Chinese) River.

The Shih-wei tribe lived in the north of the Qantans. This enigmatic name given by the Chinese has been solved today and it is understood that it was the Thirty-Tatars. Their descendants were the rivals of Chingis-khan.⁴²

To the west of the Kantans and Shih-wei, that is, in Eastern Mongolia, on the banks of the Onon and Kerulen rivers, lived the Ti-tou-wu-kan tribe; to the north of them, and even in the Siberian forest strip, lived the Wu-lo-ho-wu tribes, whose ethnic affiliation is probably unknown.⁴³

Besides these, there were many primitive tribes that could not participate in the active political life of the Far East. In the Far East, we see the Southern Sienpis Mu-jungs and Northern Sienpis Tabgachs on the political scene from the III century onwards.

Siberia

It is the taiga region that surrounds the Great Steppe from the north and constituted the extreme part of the Hun State in ancient times, and later of the Siyenpis. Since there is almost no information about the Siberia of the III-Vth centuries in the Chinese literature, it is necessary to base the history of this region on the available archaeological information, which can approximately illuminate the history of this region and cannot be considered absolutely conclusive.

Archaeological findings in the Trans-Baikal region reveal the existence of a Hun culture: Ilmova^{Creek} cemetery, Does- tuy cemetery⁴⁵ and the town of Ivolgi.⁴⁶ The findings were found in the trans-Baikal sa-

41 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/7; Gibert L., *Dictionnaire*, p. 453. I do not enter into a polemic about their ethnic affiliation, because this issue has been resolved and has lost its importance.

42 Viktorova L.L. *K voprosu o ressenii mongolskix plemen na Dalnem Vostoke v IV veka n. e.* // *Ученые записки ИГУ* V.11995588.. № 276. С. 4411–4477.

43 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, II/79.

44 Talko-Grinovich Yu. D. *Sudjinskoye doistoricheskoye kladbishchee v Ilmovoypa-di* // *Труды ТТПроиицккоосаавкvos-kKоя-xKтихнтсиконрсokoотгдоелоатПдпреилаамуПрrcikoarmouorTsdкео лгеонияotde- 1ed. TEO. n. 2. 1898. p. 1088*
 45 Sosnovskiy G.P. *Denezskiy mogilnik* // *Prroobblleemmyistiosriti otkoikapidatoliksatiqiestbailxis- otibhşceessktivxa* (1991) 11-29.35. 11-2.

46 Davidova A.V. *The Ivolga Gorodishche. A monument of the Hiung-nu culture in the Trans-Baikal region* // *Acta Archaeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungari- cae*, 20. Budapest, 1968, p. 209-245

kins had a culture quite different from the Hun masses living in the south. First of all, the ceramics attract attention with their different structures. Pots and pans were heavy and easily breakable and therefore not for transport. Perhaps this is why nomads preferred metal, wood and leather (kyrba) pots and pans. Here, on the other hand, ceramic vessels indicate the transition to sedentarisation.

The animal bones that have survived to the present day show that horned animals such as oxen, sheep and goats were raised. No horse bones have been found, but the found bridles indicate that the peoples of the Trans-Baikal region had horses. Probably the horse was too valuable for them to be buried in a grave. The main occupations of the peoples of the Trans-Baikal region were farming (oxen, horses, sheep), hunting (roe deer, rabbits, birds), agriculture (corn) and fishing. These occupations made the Huns who came to the region related to the local people. It can be concluded from this that Siberia was a place of exile for antipathic types, including captives and asylum seekers, during the period of the Huns.

It is certain that the Hun culture had taken hold among the peoples of the Trans-Baikal region in the I-II centuries. There is even no doubt that these peoples were part of the Hun state, but were they born Huns? I think, no. They were probably the indigenous peoples of the region, and the Huns, who were exiled by China, and the Tabgach tribe of the Syenpis, who later became known in history as "T'o- pa"⁴⁷ and lived nomadically in the southern parts of Trans-Baikal in the first century BC, came and mingled with them.⁴⁸

The Tabgachs distinguished themselves from other Syenpis by braiding their hair. This was not a Mongol custom, but a Tunguz custom. Chinese historians, however, show the Tabgachs to have been definitely Syenpis. The Tabgachs spoke in the ancient Mongolian language⁴⁹ but were not part of the cultural

47 Although the word "T'o-pa" is included in the historical tradition, we will use the word "Tabgach", which is the real name of T'o-pa as a state but the people of the state, since the rulers of the state receive the titular "khan".

48 Grumm-Grjimaýlo G.Y. *Zapadnaya Mongoliya*, p. 167.

49 The debate on the Tabgach language has a long history and a vast literature. Today, two views on this issue remain valid. Those who argue that the Tabgachs spoke Turkish: Pelliot P. *L'origine de T'ou-kiue; nom chinoise des Turks*. *T'oung Pao*, 1915, p. 689; *Journal Asiatique*. 1925, No.1, p. 254-255; *T'oung Pao*, 1925-26, p. 79 et 93; Boodberg P. *The language of the T'o- pa Wei* // *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 2. 1936, p. 165-185; Clauson G. *Turk, Mongol, Tungus* // *Asia Major*, New Series (vol. VIII), pt. I. 1960, p. 117-

influenced the southern Syenpis. Their state was more developed than that of the Southern Siyenpis and they were ruled by khans. The first mention of the word Tabgach is found in the III century BC. And the Tabgach khanate was a Tunguz-Syenpi chimera.

During the great drought of the III century⁵⁰ some of the Tabgachs crossed the Gobi Desert and settled in the Eastern Ordos, where there were some springs that had not yet suffered the wrath of drought. Their attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese ended in disaster. The Chinese diplomats, through a number of intrigues, led to the murder of the prince, the death of the khan from grief and the division of the state into three independent administrations (295th year). One of these rulers, Han Yih-to (pronounced Ito) tried to break away from the Chinese class. It is recorded that he subjugated more than thirteen principalities living between the Selenge and Obi rivers in Western Siberia.⁵¹ However, historical sources are silent about the outcome of this adventure. In any case, a Tabgach khanate was not established in Western Siberia.

The most favourable view of the Tabgachs is that they were eager to head south, despite the fact that the Chin Empire was stronger not only than all other nomadic tribes, but also than those under its rule. But events would unfold in a way that no one could have foreseen.

118) and those who argue that they spoke Mongolian: Ligeti L. *Tabgach Language-Siyenpi* *Исторический журнал* 1916/1969, №1, 1 рс. 111166. In favour of the second view, not from linguistic view, but on the basis of historical findings.

- 50 For the drought in the III century, see Whitnikov *Izmenchivost obshchey uvlajlenosti materikov severnogo polushariya* // *Zapiski VGO*. T. XVI. M-L., 1957; *Istoriko-geograficheskiy korrektiv* cm: Gumilev L. N. *Geteroxronnost uvlajneniya Yevrazii v sredniye veka* // *Vestnik LGU*. 1966, no. 18, c. 81-90; *interpretatsiyu fenomena* cm: Gumilev L.N. *Les Fluctuations du niveau de la Mer Caspienne* // *Cahier du Monde Russe et Soviétique*. Vol. VI, 3. 1965. p. 333-366.
- 51 Remusat A. *Remarques de L'Empire Chinoise du côté de l'Occident* / *Mémoires sur plusieurs questions relatives à la géographie de l'Asie Centrale*. Paris, 1825, p. 107.

PART II

LIVILCIM

War of the Princes

China was apparently endeavouring to regain the points it had lost in gaining dominance in East Asia under the three states in the first place after the unification. Already in 270 envoys had arrived from Karashar and Fergana, and in 284 the envoy of the Roman Empire himself offended the echelon. In 286, K'ang-chü sent its envoy.¹ At that time, Hun rebellions were easily suppressed, Syen-pi attacks were repelled, and friendly relations were established with the southern neighbour, the Ch'am-pa monarchy. The population had grown from 7 million to 16 million in half a century.² Everything seemed to be going well, but in fact the imperial court had begun to crack at its foundations.

In 290 Prince Ch'ung (posthumously titled Huei-ti) the throne. Ch'ung was weak and cowardly; more importantly, he lacked the ability to rule such a vast territory. His wife, by contrast, was energetic and charming. When the mother-empress had her father, the grand vizier, slain along with three of his brothers, a new period of bloody conflicts began in the country (291st year).

The fate of one of the princes who dared to refuse opposition to the Empress had a tragic ending. This glamour woman continued her cruelties after signing his death warrant. She condemned the empress mother to death by starvation, and then poisoned the crown prince. (300th year But this was to be his last murder. Prince Sih-ma Lun of Chao incited the palace troops to revolt, captured the empress and sentenced her to death by starvation. The empress's retinue was completely slaughtered.

1 Cordier H. *Histoire générale de la Chine et de ses relations avec les pays étrangers*.

T. I, Paris, 1920, p. 302. Ci-après: Cordier, *Histoire*.

2 Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 126.

Thus, Sih-ma Lun had seized the throne, but she, too, ruled despotically and brought monarchism back to the country.³


Lun not only deposed the emperor, but also sent him into exile under the supervision of the palace guards. However, other princes of the Sih-ma family organised a conspiracy against this usurper. The conspirators overthrew and killed him, but this time the subdued the victors (year 300). The civil war lasted for two months and claimed many lives. After the end of the war, it was the turn of the victors to struggle for power. The first ruler had provoked the rebellion of other princes because of his proud behaviour and was killed. The second one was stubbornly soft-natured. The conspirators threw him into prison where he breathed his last breath. However, this time the murderers Sih-ma Ying and Sih-ma Yü started to eat each other.

The battles were not only taking place in the capital, of course. In Sih-ch'uan, the governor Ch'ao Hsin had revolted and the rebellion had grown to devastate the economy of the empire. This was nothing more. The commander who defeated Ch'ao Hsin captured Ch'eng-tu, the capital of Sikh-ch'uan, in 302 and declared himself the ruler of the I-chou region. This commander named the dynasty he founded Ch'en or Little Shu, and his dynasty continued in Sih-ch'uan until 347. In 296 the Tibetans and the Western Huns (i.e. the Huns in Ho-hsi) revolted, but the Tibetans soon lost the battles and their commander captured. This put an end to the great catastrophe for ten years, but there was no escape from it.

At the same time that princely squabbles and civil war were devouring the Chinese, another situation had emerged on the northern frontiers. In the east, in South-Eastern Manchuria, the powerful Southern Siyenpi Mu-jung State had emerged, openly aggressive and hostile towards a weakened China; the whole steppe was united by the more warlike Tabgach khans, who were eager to attack the south. However, the success of the Tabgachs was marred by the division of the army between Liu-Huan, Yih-to and Yih-Liu (pronounced I-to and I-lu) and the division of their power⁴ This situation would in time take the initiative away from the Tabgachs and place them at the disposal of the Huns.

3 Mailla J.A.M. *Histoire générale de la Chine*, ou annales de cet empire traduites du T'oung-Kien-Kang-Mou, père Joseph-Anne-Marie de Moriac de Mailla. Paris, 1777-1785. Si-après: Mailla, *Histoire générale*.

4 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/169.



Harita-1: Prensler Savası

Meanwhile the Huns were living with the Chinese and had undergone many changes. As the greater part of the people continued to herd their flocks and sleep in their dwellings, they regarded their Chinese neighbours as alien, unpleasant, cunning, powerful, but unconditionally hostile, while they felt closer to the Syenpis, whose shepherds and warriors were similar to their own. At the same time, the Huns, who were close to the emperor's court, were under the influence of Chinese culture, influenced by the pomp of the dignitaries, the splendid gardens and the magnificent banquets. Although the Hun princes had been in the palace service with the Chinese aristocracy for several generations, they had not severed their relations with their fellow nomads. Because they were aware of the fact that they were Huns, and the people welcomed them with understanding. Yüan-hai, who took the surname Liu from his grandmother, a Chinese princess, and who had an obscure personality, was a typical representative of the above-mentioned situation.⁵

Clash of Traditions

Liu Yüan-hai was the grandson several generations later of Yü-fu-luo, the Southern Hun eunuch who died in 195. Liu Yüan's father was the Prince of Eastern Chu-ki and had sent his son to serve at the emperor's court, where he would receive a better education and be trained as a warrior. The boy was talented and did well in his studies. He was also very strong and, when his height and strength permitted, he became a good warrior.⁶ His noble birth, his intelligence, his abilities and his close relations with the court led him to succeed his father, who died in 279, as chief of a people of five tribes, and in 290 he became commander-in-chief of all the Huns living in China. Liu Yüan's life story clearly reveals the process of Chineseisation of the Hun nobility. However, the tribal traditions of the Huns, to which they were attached with national feelings, were intact, and they would take advantage of the opportunity that came their way to rectify the situation again.

mentioned above, Prince Sih-ma Ying was engaged in a power struggle with Prince Sih-ma Yü, and both needed allies. Sih-ma Yü strengthened his power by raising up the Siyenpi and Wu-huans.

5 McGovern, *The early empires of Central Asia*. London, 1939, p. 315. Here-in after: McGovern, *The early*.

6 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/139.

and Sih-ma Ying, on the other hand, turned his back the Huns. In this situation, both of them left the interests of China aside in pursuit of personal success. Their only concern was to cut off each other's heads. They knew each other well, and in the event of a possible defeat, neither of them would spare his opponent. In this situation, the years of events had shown that the best way out for them was a slow death. Sih-ma Ying at loggerheads with her lords because of her prideful and cruel behaviour. This, of course, gave Sih-ma Yü the opportunity to assassinate his former rival and install a weaker and more foolish person as emperor. Sih-ma Ying's army captured the emperor, but this did him no good. In China in 304, instead of a legitimate government that had lost its respect, its people and its army, only military power had come to the fore. Therefore, Sih-ma Ying was obliged to secure the support of Liu Yüan in order to take advantage of the Huns, who were in a strong position compared to the Syenpis, who were on the side of his rival.

Liu Yüan was a nominal Hun administrator at the headquarters of Sih-ma, who clearly wanted to capitalise on the authority of his entourage among his comrades-in-arms but never trusted him. His attempt to obtain permission to attend the funeral of a relative had failed. However, Sih-ma T'eng and Wang Chün increased their hostile activities against Sih-ma Ying, forcing Sih-ma to accept the Hun prince's offer to behead his enemies. So he sent Liu Yüan with Liu Ts'ung's son among the nomads. The Huns welcomed the tribal chieftain with enthusiasm and installed him as "the great yabgu", and 20 days later an army of 50,⁰⁰⁰⁷ took its place on horseback to "reclaim their usurped rights by force of arms".⁸

Those gathered around Liu Yüan were not only jealous tribal chieftains and Chinese educated people. There were also those who were eager to establish their own state and who argued that the Huns were not inferior to the Chinese in nobility. Furthermore, the ordinary Huns and the kul (chieh-lu), who never tied their fate to the Hun kings, rallied round Liu Yüan.

7 Wieger L. *Textes historiques, Hien-Hien*, 1905-1907. T. II, p. 1047. Ci-après: Wieger, *Textes*.

8 Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/139.

The fact that Chinese officials favoured their own citizens in the courts, cheated the Huns in shopping, and finally sold them as slaves in the market, had turned the nomads into a ball of rage against the Chinese.⁹ It was not necessary to incite and provoke this army to war, on the contrary, it was impossible to restrain it. Fortunately for Liu Yüan, his maternal relative Liu Hsüan, who had not been a bad ruler in his time, had prepared the Huns for ideological mobilisation. Liu Hsüan, who had risen to prominence at court when he ruled Liu Yüan's realm, had seen much and had learnt to reason things out. In order to stir up the nationalist sentiments of his clansmen, he used to say: "Since the disappearance of the Han dynasty, our kings have been wearing titles that do not represent any real power. But we have an army of 20,000 men.¹⁰ Liu Yüan is wise and brave. If God did not want to honour us, he would not have sent such a man to earth. The empire is in decline. These days are reminiscent of the days of Hu-han-yeh¹¹ when our forefathers took advantage of favourable positions." Enthused by this fiery oration, the Hun chieftains unhesitatingly proclaimed Liu Yü-an as the great yabgu, but he was to surprise them beyond belief.

The first act of Liu Yüan, who had a large army behind him, was to declare war against the Syenpis who had plundered the Chinese people. Liu Yüan, despite the objections of the tribal chieftains claiming that the Sienpis were closer to them than the Chinese and even related to them, drove them out of the borders of China and declared that his aim was "not to fight against the Chinese people, but only against a foolish government".¹² This step of his was the first step of the Hun State to be formed in the future.

9 Shan Yüe. *Ocherki*, p. 135.

10 Since Lü Yüan mobilised with an army of 50,000 men, it means that Hsüan had fewer soldiers at that time.

11 For Hu-han-yeh Yabgu, volume I. It may be inferred from this that Lü Hsüan aimed at securing autonomy for the Huns and to distance them from Chinese domination. For he was endeavouring to form an alliance with the Si-yenpis, whom he regarded as brothers "in character and race". Liu Yüan, on the other hand, did not agree with his plans to establish a Chinese-style empire. Perhaps Liu Hsüan's intention was to flatter the dreams of the Huns who desired the establishment of an isolated state between China and the Great Steppe, but Liu Yüan was overly egoistic and his people were burning with the fire of revenge. The territory they were to plunder was open to them. can be said, we will emphasise later, that Hun history had taken an irreversible turn.

12 McGovern. *The early*, p. 318.

would also determine their fate. Because from this date onwards, Huns and Si- yenpis became each other's implacable enemies. Could there be a de facto support of the Chinese here? Absolutely not! Because the Chinese lords were loyal to the Sikh-ma family and could not in any way ally with an enemy dynasty. The masses of the people had fallen victim to the rebellious nomads, and this was worse than what had happened in the days of turmoil under the Chin. The demoralised people who entered the service of the Yabgun did more harm than good. They had not forgotten that they were Chinese and were happy to give the Huns a blow in the back whenever they could. As a result, Hun society seemed to be divided into two groups: Aristocrats and democrats. As for the consequences of this incident;

In 304, taking the titular title of the great yabgu wang, he named the dynasty he founded Han, being of Chinese descent on his mother's side and intending to revive the friendship that had existed between the Han and the Huns.¹³ He then abolished the old Hun clan system and replaced it with the Chinese system of government and attempted to implement it fully. Thus, the "right" and "left" clan princes became the first and second viziers.

Changes were also made in the organisation of the army, and looting and rude treatment of the people were forbidden. Even the demotion of the commander of a captured fortress and of a Hun ruler who had killed his wife for refusing to separate her bed from her husband's was an indication that this change would be vigorously enforced. Another incident was even more remarkable: On one occasion, when the Huns were about to squeeze the Chinese army and throw it into the river, Liu Yüan released the defeated commander, stating that he was not fighting the people but the administration.¹⁴

This humanistic policy was alien to the Huns and it was impossible to reconcile them with the Chinese. The war that started between the two sides, in accordance with the character and tendencies of the two ethnic groups, was becoming increasingly bitter and inevitable.

Among Liu Yüan's close comrades-in-arms, two were truly capable commanders: Liu Yao and Shih Lo. Liu Yao came from the yabgu lineage; he was well educated and had studied history, philosophy and literature. He was also strong, hardy and brave, but he was addicted to alcohol. He was feared and respected.

¹³ Bichurin, *Sobraniye*, I/139.

¹⁴ McGovern. *The early*, p. 319.

Shih Lo's ancestry is unclear, but his mother tongue was Hinglish. He had been a servant in his childhood and earned his bread as a labourer for Chinese farm owners. He was later captured by Prince Sih-ma T'eng and sold in the slave market in Shan-tung.¹⁵ However, one day, when he was insulted, he escaped and took refuge in a band of bandits; later he became their chief and joined the warriors of Sih-ma Ying, the enemy of his insulter.

In the civil war between the princes, the Sih-ma family was quite successful, but without a programme. To fight a life-and-death battle without a programme was considered rather strange. It is understandable that the princes were enemies of each other, but it is necessary to clarify why the warriors sacrificed their lives for the princes. Let us recall that the Sih-ma family headed professional soldiers, which was quite common in the Three States period. For all their stupidity, they managed to preserve the behavioural stereotypes that enabled them to retain the military commands that nurtured and protected them. On the other hand, all the princes of the Sih-ma family were military leaders of their respective regions. Therefore, the army followed the commanders without even thinking about the purpose of the war they were fighting, and the commanders paid their wages by plundering the population. As for the people, they did not even care about the wars between the princes and who would succeed them. But the Si-yenpis, who were in China for the purpose of plunder, and the Huns, whose anger against the Chinese and their injustice was the basis of their anger, were closely interested in politics. Since Sih-ma considered the promises and oaths made and his fondness for honour as the only guarantees of personal relations, he treated Liu Yüan very generously and hoped that the Huns would quietly follow their own kings just as the Chinese followed their princes. This the point where he was wrong. Because Huns kept their traditional tribal structure and only a person who could fulfil the needs of the people could rule them. Sih-ma Ying, on the other hand, was not someone the Huns needed.

Liu Yüan should have been given the post, for he had faithfully served the emperor, combining Chinese ethics with the Huns' programme of liberating the peoples. As Sih-ma Ying's comrade-in-arms, he expelled the pro-Shienpis of Sih-ma Yü from China, and as the Hun eunuch

¹⁵ Шан. Очерки. с. 135.

He had started a war against the opposition cliques in China. But his rivals were one step ahead of him. Sih-ma T'eng, son of Sih-ma Yü, and General Wang Chün defeated Sih-ma Ying's army, but Ying managed to escape captivity while the victors were busy looting.

The following year, 305, the supporters of Sih-ma Yü, with the support of the Syenpis, captured Ch'ang-an, the second capital of the empire. As retribution for the crimes committed by the opposing cliques, the Syenpis carried out an unprecedented massacre of the Chinese population of the city. The Chin dynasty was guilty of crimes against its own people for handing over the reins during the civil wars to the nomads fighting on both sides.

In 306, Sih-ma Ying was finally defeated and captured, and died in prison. The emperor, who was in Sih-ma Ying's camp at the time, was killed by being served poisoned pies; thus Sih-ma seized the empire and enthroned Prince Sih-ma Cho, who was posthumously titled Huai-ti. After this, during the two years of tranquillity, the Huns continued to organise and grow stronger.

Although the princes' group achieved a complete victory, China could not find peace. Sih-ma Ying's dispersed forces were gathered by Chi Sang, one of his commanders, who took it upon himself to win his favour. Shih Lo also joined him with the troops he had. In 307, the rebels besieged captured Yeh, a city famous for its wealth, and Sih-ma T'eng made it his headquarters. Shih Lo had a special quarrel with this prince, who had once illegally captured him and sold him on the slave market, and they were bitter enemies.

Sih-ma T'eng was terribly stingy. When he sensed the danger, he distributed some rice and cloth to his comrades-in-arms, but the amount was so small that the soldiers were angry at this miserly man and opened the city gates to the rebels.¹⁶ Thus, Sih-ma T'eng ended his life by living only one year longer than his slain rival Sih-ma Ying.

These events, which at first glance did not attract much attention, were time breaks in Chinese and Hun history. In the summer of 307 the war between the princes took the form of social conflicts between Chinese government groups. Because soldiers and officials wanted a share in the distribution of wealth, the murdered

16 Mailla, *Histoire générale*, IV/ 253; Wieger, *Textes*, p. 1049.

They demanded not only to avenge the general's death, but also to avenge the ill-treatment of their rivals. In fact, the Chinese warriors had ceased to be puppets of the princes, which prevented them from acting completely independently.

On the other hand, although hopes of reconciliation had not yet completely disappeared, social turmoil had brought inter-ethnic conflicts to an unavoidable point. The servants who made up Shih Lo's army spoke Khmer and the Chinese as much as the Huns. For them, the capitulation to powerful China meant a painful death, slavery under harsh conditions, and so they turned their backs to fight to the end.

It can be assumed that Sih-ma Yü, realising the seriousness of the rebellion, brought in his most elite troops to suppress it. Two months after the siege of Yeh, Chi Sang was defeated and killed while fleeing. The fugitives showed no mercy and the death toll reached 10,000. Only Shih Lo was able to lead his troops safely off the battlefield and reach the coast of Hu- ang-ho, within the Hun territory. Liu Yüan honoured this former bandit, recruited his troops into his army and gave him the mutant title of "the one who shattered the Chin dynasty". With this act, Liu Yüan once again proved that his struggle was only against bad governance. However, all of his people wanted to fight against the Chinese, with whom he had absolutely no political sympathy. Under these circumstances, which were more than complicated enough, Shih Lo wasted no time and started to fight only for the interests of his own troops.

Peoples' War

In 307, the battles that had gripped North China had reached a new and more serious stage. Until then, the people had been indiscriminately victimised by out-of-control soldiers. Now they had been joined by the ruthless Huns, eager for revenge. Ruthlessness was the only capital of those days.

On the fronts in the southern parts of Shan-si the situation was tense. In 308 the Huns captured Lo-yang, where the imperial palace was located.

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