

sources simultaneously, and also, of course, if one's competence admits, as mine does not, such other sources as the Arabic and Chinese. We have wished to emphasize that the doctrine of the *Philosophia Perennis*, in which our psychology is included, is stated in different areas and at different times not only in cognate words, but often in the same idioms and in terms of the same symbolism, e.g., that of the puppet or that of the chariot; the greater part of these symbols are of prehistoric, at any rate neolithic, if not greater antiquity. We have sometimes dwelt on etymologies with a view to showing that the doctrines referred to are implicit in the very structure of the sacred languages in which they are stated; and to remind the reader that the idioms, even of modern English, preserve the primary assumptions of the perennial philosophy, however little we may be conscious of, for instance, the doctrine *duo sunt in homine* when we speak of an "internal conflict" or of being "at peace with oneself," or aware of the metaphysics of light and generation when we "argue" with a view to "clarifying" our "concepts." In conclusion, let us emphasize again that the perennial psychology is not a science for its own sake, and can be of no use to anybody who will not practice it. The popular conception of the philosopher as one who "takes life philosophically" is perfectly correct; the philosopher of our tradition is one who not only has the habit of first principles, but also one who approaches all contingent problems in the light of these principles. And finally, that the philosopher is not a victim of his desires is as much as to say that his whole concern is with "the things that make for peace"; one who is at peace with himself will have no occasion to wage war on others. For him, power and the balance of power are matters of no interest whatever.



Mahā Puruṣa: "Supreme Identity"

That the word *puruṣa*, of uncertain derivation, but probably from *pr*, "to fill," (cf. *puru*, "many") is properly rendered by and corresponds to "person" can be readily established by a confrontation of texts. In AĀ II.2.2-3, "the more clearly one knows the Essence (*ātman*), the more one is fully in being." Consciousness of the Essence is wanting in minerals, perceptible in plants and trees, more evident in animated things (*prānabhrī*), and "though there are sundry in whom no intelligence is apparent, [it is] most evident in a 'person' (*puruṣa*). For a 'person' is most endowed with understanding (*prajñā*), he speaks of what has been discriminated (*vijñāta*), he perceives distinctions (*vijñātam paśyati*), he comprehends (*veda*) the future, he comprehends what is and what is not mundane (*lokāloka*),¹ and is so endowed that by the mortal he seeks the immortal.² But as for the sundry, mere animals (*paśu*),³ theirs is an estimative understanding (*abhivijñāna*) merely according to hunger and thirst, they do not speak what has been discriminated. . . . Their becoming is only so far, they have being (*sambhavāh = habent esse*) only in the measure of their understanding (*yathā prajñam hi*). The

{Coomaraswamy's translation of *ātman* as Essence indicates that this paper was written ca. 1935; the "experimental translation," as he called it, was proposed in "Two Vedāntic Hymns from the *Siddhāntamuṣṭāvalī*," BSOS, VIII (1935), 91-99, and withdrawn in "Vedic Exemplarism," 1936 (see pp. 188-189 in this volume).

¹ Worldly and superworldly, i.e., what is in time and space, and what is apart from time and space.

² That is, he sees contingent things eternalwise, for him the world is a theophany, he can employ the *via analogia*, and can follow the *vestigium pedis, padam na gorapagūlham*, RV IV.5.3.

³ *Paśu*, in the same sense of "human being that is no better than an animal," occurs in BU I.4.10, where he who worships any angel otherwise than as his own Essence (*ātman*) is called a "mere animal," and in *Siddhāntamuṣṭāvalī*, verse xxxvi, where the author in the same way designates as "mere animals" those who refrain from the Essence that is man's last end (*puruṣārtha*). The distinction of *puruṣa* from *paśūn* (pl.) is like that between a "proper man," German *Mensch*, and "the herd."

'person' thus defined (*sa eṣa puruṣaḥ*) is the sea, and transcends the whole universe (*sarvaṃ lokaṃ ati*).⁴

The use of "person" in the sense proper to *puruṣa*, above, can be cited in Boethius, *Contra Evtychen* II, "There is no person of a horse or ox or any other of the animals which, dumb and unreasoning, live a life of sense alone, but we say there is a person of a man, of God, or an Angel," as well as in his better known definition, *ibid.* III, "Person is an individual substance of a rational nature," and in St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I.39.1c, where Person is defined as referring to the divine Essence when regarded as subject, i.e., "concretely" and in relation to the world as object. St. Thomas also wrote, *Sum. Theol.* I.29.3 and *ad 2*, "Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence . . . forasmuch as His Essence contains every perfection, this name 'person' is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way . . . the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name 'person' preeminently belongs to God."

It is thus clear that the words *puruṣa* and "person" are as nearly as possible synonymous in reference. In the last passage, "more excellent" and "preeminently" exactly correspond to the designation *Mahā Puruṣa*, "Great Person," in AĀ III.2.3, where four *puruṣas* are distinguished as follows: (1) the corporeal (*śarīra-*), which is the "embodied essence" (*dehika ātmā*) and of which the principle (*rasa*) is the "comprehending Essence" (*prajñātma*); (2) the aggregate of syllables of which the principle is "A" (cf. II.3.6, "A is the whole Word"); (3) that by which one comprehends (*veda*) the Four Vedas, and of which the principle is the Brahman priest as being filled with the spiritual power (*brahman*); and (4) the *Mahā Puruṣa*, the Year (*samvatsara*), which "distinguishes some things and unifies others."⁵ And be it known that the incorporeal comprehending Essence and the Sun are one and the same, and thus it comes about that the Sun is present to every 'person' (*puruṣam puru-*

⁴ *Ati*, as denoting transcendence, is discussed below. The "sea" is of infinite possibility, cf. RV x.5.1 *eṣaḥ samudro dharuṇo rāyinām* (Agni), VIII.41.8 *samudro apicyaḥ* (Varuṇa), and for the idea, St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, "HE WHO IS (= *asti* in KU VI.12) is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance."

⁵ I.e., brings life to some and death to others, and is thus the author of the being of all beings, cf. x.121.2 (Hiranyagarbha, Prajāpati) *yasya chāyā amṛtam, yasya mṛtyuḥ*, "Whose overshadowing is of life, and likewise of death."

ṣam pratyāditya).⁶ The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, continuing, cites RV I.115.1, "The bright face of the Angels has arisen (*ud agāt*), the eye of Mitra, Varuṇa, and Agni. It hath filled (*āprā*, from √ *pr*) Heaven, Earth, and Midgard. The Sun is the Essence (*ātman*) of all that is motionless or mobile (*jagataḥ tasthuṣaḥ*)."

This evidently, and sentence for sentence, corresponds to RV x.90.4, where "With three-fourths the *Puruṣa* went upwards (*ūrdhva ud ait*).⁷ One-fourth of Him became recurrent (*abhavat punaḥ*) here.⁸ Thence He proceeded universally (*viśvam vy akramat*) unto what eats and does not eat (*sāśanāśane*)."⁹

⁶ The identity of the "person in the heart" with the "Golden Person in the Sun," is, of course, a fundamental doctrine in the Upaniṣads, e.g., MU VI.1, "He bears Himself twofold, as the breath of life (*prāna*) here, and as yonder Āditya . . . Yonder Āditya is verily the outer-Essence (*bahir-ātmā*), the breath of life the inner-Essence (*antar-ātmā*)." The form *pratyāditya* in *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* corresponds to *pratyagātman*, *passim*. *Pratyagātman* is almost literally "hypostasis," *ātman* is never "body."

⁷ As remarked by W. Norman Brown, "the verb *ud i* is almost exclusively a Sūrya word."

⁸ That is, as Agni Vaiśvānara, "Universal Man," and/or Soma, etc., who as the fire (or water) of life in the worlds takes on death (*nirrtim ā viveśa*, RV I.164.32), is subject to inveteration (*jujurvān*, II.4.5), and is born again and again (*muhur . . . ā bhūta, ibid.*; *janman janman nihitah*, III.1.20; *bhūrjanmā*, x.5.1; *jāyate punaḥ . . . navo navo bhavati jayamāna*, x.85.18-19); or as the Sun, the eighth Āditya, whom Aditi "bore hitherward unto repeated life and death" (*prajāyai mṛtyave punaḥ*, x.72.9), cf. II.5.2, "Agni, eighth in place." In the same way, Prajāpati is "stupified by eld" (*ṣiryā mūra*, PB xxv.17.3), Agni, Soma, and Varuṇa "sink down" (*cyavante*, x.124.4), Cyavana's youth and potency are lost, and must be renewed (RV, *passim*). Agni's mortalities and resurrections are both daily and aeviternal. It is with reference to the indefinite duration of aeviternity that Agni is commonly called "undying amongst those that die" (*amartyam marṣesu*, IV.1.1, etc.), that he is said to bestow upon the Angels their aeviternity (VI.7.4, cf. IV.54.2), and that the latter are themselves referred to as "aeviternal" (*amṛta, passim*). It does not appear that the *Rg Veda* anywhere attributes an absolute immortality to any manifested aspect of deity, but rather assumes that "God comes and goes, God passes away" (Eckhart). But expressions such as *amṛtattva uttama*, I.31.1, may refer to what Śaṅkara calls "absolute immortality" (*āyantiṅka amṛtattva*) conceived of as an end attainable by men or angels, and in any case the *Rg Veda*, in stressing the doctrine of resurrection, assumes an eternal principle underlying all its formal manifestations. That, for example, which surveys the past and future at once, cannot be thought of as itself belonging to the past or future; He who looks through the Sun, is not himself the Sun.

⁹ Adopting Sāyana's perfectly intelligible explanation of *sa-aśana* and *ana-aśana* as designating respectively "the intelligent animated and generated, that partakes of food," and "the motionless and unintelligent, such as a mountain"; which corresponds exactly to *jagataḥ tasthuṣaḥ* (motionless and moving), in RV I.115.1. In view of Sāyana's explanation (Monier Williams also gives "not eating" as the meaning of *anaśana*), I do not see how *sāśanāśane* can have come to be called "obscure." W. Norman Brown does not think it worthwhile even to mention Sāyana in the

The *Puruṣasūkta* affirms the transcendence of the *Puruṣa* in terms that can be closely paralleled in other hymns, as well as in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. That one-fourth of Him which, as we have seen, is the "Person in the Sun," "is all existences" (*viśva bhūtāni*), "this entire world (*evam sarvam*) both past and future (*bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam*)." The latter expression corresponds to "what has been done and shall be done" (*ṛtāni yā ca ṛtvā*) in 1.25.11: here Varuṇa is described as operating *ab extra*, in the Sun, as the expressions "far-seeing (*uru-caṅśasa*)," "diffusing a golden garb, wearing a glistening-robe (*vibhrd drāpiṃ hiranyam . . . vasta nirṇijam*),"¹⁰ "enthroned for universal empire (*ni sasāda . . . samraṅyāya*)," clearly show; and being seated thus, *ibid.* 11,¹¹ "thence He who knows all hidden things (*viśvā adbhutā cikṣivān*)"¹² surveys what has been done and shall be done (*ābhi paśyati ṛtāni yā ca ṛtvā*)." In x.88.13-14, this "ancient star, the Yakṣa's outlook, Agni Vaiśvānara," is said to have "exceeded Heaven and Earth in power (*mahimnā pari babhūva urvi*)," and called "an Angel here below and there beyond (*uta avastāt uta deva parastāt*)." Neglecting many other parallels that could be cited, this takes us back to the *Puruṣasūkta*, where in verses 2 and 3, we have "Great as is the power (*mahimā*) of the Lord of Aeviternity (*amṛtasya iśānah*, the Sun) when he rises up with food (*annena-ati rohati*), still more (*ḥyāyāś ca*) is the Person," as also in verses 1 and 5, it is said that He "transcends the ten-finger-space (*aty atisṭhad daśaṅgulam*),"¹³ and "surpasses Earth (*aty aricyata . . . bhūmim*)," where, as usual, "Earth" means the whole "ground" of existence. AĀ 11.3.3, where the *Puruṣa* transcends

present connection. Not that Sāyana is always right, but he is always worth considering, and here the confrontation of texts proves him right beyond doubt.

¹⁰ *Nirṇija* implies "washed white." Cf. RV viii.41.10, where Varuṇa, manifested as the Sun, is said to have "made, by his operation, the blacks to be glistening white (*śvetān adhi nirṇijaḥ cakre kṛṣṇān*)."

¹¹ In verse 6, the dual *venantā* implies Mitravaruṇa; calling them in effect, the "dual solar being," *ven* being typically a "sun word."

¹² *Adbhuta*, equivalent to *adrṣta*, "invisible," as in iv.2.12, where Agni is said to behold both what is evident and what is hidden (*drśyān agne etān . . . paśye adbhutān*). *Adbhuta* is often rendered by "marvelous," but the things past and future are here thought of as marvelous, not as being miraculous in themselves, but as being mysterious, unknown, and inaccessible to observation.

¹³ *Daśaṅgulam* has been much discussed. Here I merely adduce vi.44.24 *daśyantram utsam*, x.51.3 *daśantarūṣyāt*, and PB xxv.15.1, "the Year consists of tens and tens," to suggest that "ten" may have reference to the directions of space. [Also see Coomaraswamy, "RV x.90.1 *aty atisṭhad daśaṅgulam*," 1946—ed.].

the whole universe (*sarvam lokam-ati*), cited above, evidently depends on the foregoing texts, nor is there anything that the Upaniṣadic statements, though more detailed, can be said to add to this.

At this point a digression will be necessary, in order to speak of the two different ways in which a knowledge of the divine nature has been sought. The Upaniṣads employ these two ways, those of the *via analogia* (the technique of symbolism) and the *via remotionis* (the technique of abstraction) in precisely the same way as Christianity, which inherited the positive (*καταφατική*) and negative (*ἀποφατική*) methods from Neoplatonism through pseudo-Dionysius, who employed them in the *De divinis nominibus*. The positive method consists in the attribution to God, in a superlative and absolute manner, of all the perfections and beauties conceivable in existing things; these absolute perfections in Him, although distinguishable logically, are regarded as inexplicable in Him and as identical with His essence. Each of these attributions constitutes an "essential name," such essential names being as many as the perfections that can be enumerated. Examples of this method may be cited in the designation of God as Light, Love, Wisdom, Being, etc., and in the Brāhmaṇas' *sac-cid-ānanda*. On the other hand, the negative method proceeds to the definition of the divine nature by the way of abstraction and the assertion of transcendence with respect to antitheses. From this point of view, the highest understanding that we can have of God is expressed by a denial in Him of any of those attributes the notion of which is derived from things external to His superessential unity. According to this method, God may be spoken of as Nonbeing, No-thing, or Darkness, or as in the Upaniṣads by the famous expression *neti, neti*, "No, no," or as That "from which words turn back, together with the intellect, not finding Him" (TU 11.4), and "where high fantasy falls short of power" (Dante, *Paradiso* xxxiii.142). Eckhart follows this method when he says that "Nothing true can be said of God." Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely from all kinds of sources, Christian, Sūfī, Hindu, Taoist, and others. In Upaniṣadic metaphysics, no less than in Christian theology, "C'est la voie négative qui a la primauté sur l'autre, Dieu n'est pas un objet. Il est par delà tout ce qui est, donc par delà le connaissable, puisque la connaissance a l'être pour limite. A ce point de vue suréminent, Dieu n'est pas seulement au-dessus d'affirmations et de négations contradictoires, mais sa nature supersubstantielle est enveloppée de ténèbres"

(M. de Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 6th ed., Paris, 1934, p. 107). "He does not know what He Himself is, because He is not any thing. . . . Wherefore it is said that God is Essence, but more truly that He is not Essence" ("Deus itaque nescit se quid est, quia non est quid. . . . Essentia ergo dicitur Deus, sed proprie essentia non est"), Erigena, *De div. naturae*, II.13 and I.14; or putting this into Indian terms, "The Brahman is called *ātman*, but more properly *anātmya*." These reflections may prepare us to consider the nature of the *Puruṣa* in greater detail according to the Vedic and Upaniṣadic formulations, which seem strange only to those who are unfamiliar with the methodology of theology and metaphysics universally. The main point to be realized is that if, indeed, His nature transcends all logical antitheses, He cannot be found as He is in Himself by the seeker who regards only His being, that is, His "Face" or "Light," but only by the Comprehensor who sees also His "Back" or "Darkness." He is not only Love and Life but also Dread and Death, the omnipresent (*vyāpaka*) and uncharacterized (*alīnga*) Person (*puruṣa*), "by knowing Whom a man is liberated and attains eternity (*amṛtatvam*)."¹⁴

The similar list of concepts in KU III.10-13 interpolates "beyond the sense are their values or meanings (*arthā*),"¹⁵ substitutes *buddhi* for "pure

¹⁴ Here evidently not "aeviternity," but as also in KU IV.1, *āyantikam amṛtatvam*, "eternity."

¹⁵ R. E. Hume and J. N. Rawson render *arthā* by "sense objects," and the latter naturally finds a lesion in the logical sequence of thought—a characteristic result of want of "trust" (*śraddhā*) in the scriptural text. *Artha* means the value or significance that is attached to the sense-perceptions. From our empirical point of view, such values are introduced *post factum* and cannot be thought of as causal principles: but ontologically, *artha* as last end in this sense is the same as the *raison d'être* of the thing in its inception; cf. the Scholastic view that "the ultimate end of the work is ever the same as the real intention of the work's first cause" (Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 252), and similarly AĀ III.2.6, "What is the inception, that indeed is the fulfilment (*yo hy eva prabhavaḥ sa eva āpya yah*)."

We say, moreover, with Abelard that *nomen est vox significativa*, with BD II.117 that "the word which designates a thing is derived from its significance (*arthāt padam svābhīdheyam . . . -jam*)," with Nirukta II.1 that "names have their basis in subsistence (*sattva-pradhānāni nāmāni*)," and scarcely need to demonstrate that from the Vedic point of view, "names" are the immediate causes of the coming into being of things, viz. in virtue of their being the ideas or forms of things. It is the knower who projects the known beyond himself; and where *esse est percipi*, the significance of the thing is thus the formal cause of its becoming, as well as the final cause of its existence. Cf. Erigena, "Finis enim totius motus est principium sui" (*De div. naturae* v.3, c. 866). In this way, then, significance is logically prior to perception.

being of the intellect (*manasaḥ sattvam uttamam*)," affirms that there is "nothing whatever beyond the Person," and employs the expression "Essence at rest (*śānta ātman*)"¹⁶ as another designation of the superessential Person.

The series in TU II.6 begins with vegetative (*anna-maya*) essence (equivalent to "senses" above); beyond this is the pneumatic (*prāṇa-maya*) essence which is our life (*āyus*) and All-life (*sarvāyusa*); beyond this the *manō-maya* essence, consisting of the Vedas and exegesis; beyond this the discriminating (*viññāna-maya*) essence, identified with Eternal Law (*rta*) and Power or Glory (*mahas*), and corresponding to *buddhi* in KU III.10; beyond this the beatific (*ānanda-maya*) essence (the last four modalities of essence are said to be in the similitude of "person" [*puruṣa-vidhaḥ*]),¹⁷ as in AĀ III.2.3; and this is supported by the Brahman, whether as nonbeing (*asat*) or as being (*sat*).

An over-anxious scholarship seems to have made a needless mystery out of these only slightly varied formulations. That the vegetative manifestation of the sense-life depends immediately upon "food" is obvious. The pneumatic, or sometimes "fiery" (*tejo-maya*), essence is evidently represented in Agni Vaiśvānara, Universal Man (RV I.35.6 *ekāyus*, IV.28.2 *viśvāyus*, IV.58.11 *antaḥ ayuṣi*). The practical intellect (*manas*) and the pure or possible intellect (*manasaḥ sattvam*, *buddhi*, *viññāna-maya*) are distinguished, the latter being identified with the Great (*mahaḥ*, etc.) and consequently with the Sun (TU I.5.2, "Mahas, the Sun; the worlds are all empowered [*mahīyante*] by the Sun"). This is of particular importance for the understanding of KU VI.8, where "beyond the un-

¹⁶ The "end" of any motion is defined as that in which this motion is brought to rest; cf. AĀ I.5.3, "rest is full-support" (*śāntir vai pratiṣṭhā*), or as rendered inversely by Keith, "atonement is rest." Cf. Eckhart, "There no work is done at all."

¹⁷ It may appear strange to speak of "form" (*vidha*, *svarūpa*, etc.) in connection with the superessential and unmanifested Essence. But cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate* II.21, "Omne namque esse ex forma est," "All being is formal." The form that is predicated of the superessential Essence is not a form, but the principle of form, altogether simple and immutable in Itself, although the form of all things; cf. Boethius again, "esse ipsum, forma essendi," "Being in itself is the form of being," and Thierry of Chartres (*Der kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate*, ed. Wilhelm Jansen [attributed to Clarenbaldus of Arras, but more probably by Thierry of Chartres], Breslau, 1926, p. 108), "divinitas singulis rebus forma essendi est," "Godhood is the (exemplary) form of the being that is in singular things." This "Sovereign Form" (*rupamaivaram*) of the Most-Personal (*puruṣottama*) can only be apprehended in its multiplicity (*pravibhaktam anekadhā*), though one in Itself (*ekastham*), hence the nature of Arjuna's vision in BG XI (the terms cited are from verses 3 and 13).

shown" (*avyakta*)¹⁸ requires as logical antecedent "beyond the shown" (*vyakta*): for it is precisely the Great, the Person in the Sun, that as the light and eye of the divine understanding is the divine manifestation of all that can be manifested (*vyakta*). What the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, then, affirms is that the uncharacterized Person is "beyond" both the shown and the unshown, transcending their distinction, not to be thought of merely as one or the other, but rather as *vyaktāvyaakta*, "shown-unshown"; and thus interpreted, the Person "beyond whom there is naught whatever" coincides in reference with the Upaniṣadic superessential Essence (*paramātman*) and the Brahman as transcending the distinction of *satasat*, being and nonbeing alike.

¹⁸ That Rawson, KU, p. 21, renders *avyakta* by "matter" shows that he has in mind the customary renderings of the Sāṃkhyan *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* by "spirit and matter." But "spirit and matter" represents an antithesis unknown to Indian thought, which rather distinguishes essence from nature or substance, or act from potentiality, in the Supreme Identity. Indian *avyakta*, like the "unshown" of pure metaphysics in general, cannot be identified with Christian "primary matter," which is a "potentiality only with respect to the reception of natural forms" (*Sum. Theol.* 1.7.2 ad 3); *avyakta* embraces all possibilities, not only those of being, but also those which are not in any sense possibilities of manifestation. This metaphysically infinite possibility (*aditi*, *mūla-prakṛti*, etc.), as being the divine nature (*svabhāva*) and the matrix (*yoni*) of the divine essence, becomes the means whereby (*śakti*, *māyā*, *svadhā*, etc.) the latter operates, the distinction of essence from nature arising simultaneously with the divine act which presupposes it.



Bhakta Aspects of the Ātman Doctrine

But when the sun has set . . . moon has set . . . fire gone out,
and speech hushed, what light does a person here have?
Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.6

A sharp distinction is often drawn between the Way of Gnosis (*jñāna-mārga*) on the one hand and the Way of Dedication (*bhakti-mārga*) or Way of Love (*prema-mārga*) on the other, this distinction corresponding at the same time to that of the Contemplative Life (*sāṃkhya yoga* and *saṃnyāsa* of BG) from the Active Life (*ṛkarma yoga* of BG). The distinction, which is made as if the operations of the intellect and will could be isolated as clearly in the subject as they can be in logic, is one in any case of procedure and, under certain conditions, also one of ends; and such a distinction is certainly not without meaning insofar as it corresponds to one of mysticism from gnosticism, that is, of devotional faith and religious exercises from initiatory teaching and metaphysical practice, of a "deification" in the sense of assimilation with a perfect consent of will from a "deification" in which the distinction of knower from known is past.

On the other hand, whatever may be the facts about the devotional works generally attributed to Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, there can be no doubt that Indians whose thought and mode of being is traditional have never found any difficulty in thinking of this greatest and most intellectual exponent of nondualistic (*advaita*) metaphysics as having been at one and the same time a *bhakta* and a *jñānī*. Consider in this connection also the markedly devotional phraseology of certain hymns included in V. P. Bhaṭṭa's *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (J. R. Ballantyne, tr., Calcutta, 1851), where, for example, we find, addressed to the spirit (*ātman*), "Now that

[Internal evidence points only to a date after 1936 for the composition of this paper
—ED.]