



On the Indian and  
Traditional Psychology, or  
Rather Pneumatology

Ecce quomodo in cognitione sensitiva continatur occulte divina sapientia, et quam mira est contemplatio quinque sensuum spiritualium secundum conformitatem ad sensus corporales.<sup>1</sup>

St. Bonaventura, *De reductione artium ad theologiam* 10

Ὅστις αὐτὸ σῶμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ' αὐτόν θεραπεύει.<sup>2</sup>  
Plato, *I Alcibiades* 131B.

As Jadunath Sinha, in the only extensive work on Indian psychology (*bhūta-vidyā*), remarks, "There is no empirical psychology in India. Indian psychology is based on metaphysics."<sup>3</sup> The explanation of this is that

[Apparently written in 1943, this essay was rejected because of its length from the scholarly Festschrift to which it was contributed. Coomaraswamy seems to have made no further effort to publish this summary and extension of his late thought.—ED.]

<sup>1</sup> "Behold how the Divine Wisdom is secretly enclosed in sensitive perception, and how marvelous is the contemplation of the five spiritual senses in their conformity to the bodily senses." *Continatur occulte = guhā nihitam; sensus spirituales = jñānendriyani; sensus corporales = karmendriyani.*

<sup>2</sup> "One who serves the body, serves what is his, not what he is." In the same way, "One who only knows the body, knows what is the man's, but not the man himself" (*ibid.*, A).

<sup>3</sup> Jadunath Sinha, *Indian Psychology: Perception* (London, 1934), p. 16. See also C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology* (London, 1914); T. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism, and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (London, 1923); and R. N. Dandekar, *Der vedische Mensch* (Heidelberg, 1938) (esp. pp. 21–24). Rhys Davids' book is very informative, but must be read with some caution, having been written "in ignorance of the stock of current nomenclature of which the Nikāyas made use" (p. 18). For this reason, perhaps, the author sees a contradiction between the Upaniṣad doctrine of the *Ātman* as "only seer," etc., and the Buddhist pronouncement that the question "Who sees?" cannot properly be asked; not realizing that the question is improper just because the "only seer"

"all Indian systems of philosophy are at the same time doctrines of salvation."<sup>4</sup> In other words, Indian philosophers are not interested in the facts, or rather statistical probabilities, for their own sake, but primarily in a liberating truth.<sup>5</sup> The traditional and sacred psychology takes for granted that life (*bhava*, γέενσις) is a means to an end beyond itself, not to be lived at all costs. The traditional psychology is not, in fact, based on observation; it is a science of subjective experience. Its truth is not of the kind that is susceptible of statistical demonstration; it is one that can only be verified by the expert contemplative.<sup>6</sup> In other words, its truth can only be verified by those who adopt the procedure prescribed by its proponents, and that is called a "Way." In this respect it resembles the truth of facts, but with this difference, that the Way must be followed by every individual for himself; there can be no public "proof." By verification we mean, of course, an ascertainment and experience, and not such a persuasion as may result from a merely logical understanding. Hence there can be no "propaganda" on behalf of the sacred science. Our only endeavor in the present article will be to expound it. Essentially, the sacred science is one of qualities, and the profane a science of quantities. Between these sciences there can be no conflict but only a difference, however great. We can hardly describe this difference better than in Plato's words cited above, or than in those of Kauṣ. Up. III.8, "Action (*ḥarma*) is not what one should try to understand, what one should know is the Agent. Pleasure and pain are not what one should try to understand, what one should know is their Discriminant," and so on for the other factors of experience. We are careful not to say "of our experience," for it cannot by any means

never becomes anyone and is not any "who" or what. Seen in this light, the opposition of Brahmanical "realism" to Buddhist "nominalism" loses all its force (cf. n. 51).

<sup>4</sup> T. Stecherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (Leningrad, 1932), p. 195. In the same way, Plato's is a moral philosophy—*Bildung* rather than *Wissenschaft*, no "mere" theory, but also a way of life (cf. *Phaedo* 64 ff.), a *mārga* = ἔχουσις, as, e.g., in *Phaedrus* 253A.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Franklin Edgerton, "The Upaniṣads: What Do They Seek and Why?" *JAOI*, XLIX (1929), 102.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 65bc: "the Soul attains to Truth . . . best when none of these things, neither hearing nor seeing, nor pain nor any pleasure troubles it, and it is, as far as possible, all alone by itself (αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται)." Note that "all alone by oneself" is not a phrase to be taken lightly, whether in English or Greek; it implies the distinction of the two selves, and the companioning of self with Self, that "other who never absconds" and to whom if one resorts he is "never alone" (BU II.1.11); cf. Manu, VI.49, *ātmanaiḥ saḥāyena*; and A v.90, *ḥatyāna . . . saḥāya*.

be assumed with safety that *we* are the Agent and Discriminant, nor safely argued *cogito ergo sum*.

It may be objected that the application of both the empirical and the metaphysical psychologies is to a salvation; and this can be granted, in view of the fact that *salvation* imports a kind of health. But it does not follow that we must, on this ground alone, choose between them as a means to that end; for the simple reason that "salvation" means different things in the different contexts. The health envisaged by the empirical psychotherapy is a freedom from particular pathological conditions; that envisaged by the other is a freedom from all conditions and predicaments, a freedom from the infection of mortality and to be as, when and where we will (TU III.10.5; John 10:9, etc.). Furthermore, the pursuit of the greater freedom necessarily involves the attainment of the lesser; psychophysical health being a manifestation and consequence of spiritual well-being (Śvet. Up. II.12, 13). So whereas the empirical science is only concerned with the man himself "in search of a soul,"<sup>7</sup> the metaphysical science is concerned with this self's immortal Self, the Soul of the soul. This Self or Person is not a personality, and can never become an object of knowledge,<sup>8</sup> but is always its substance; it is the living, spirant principle in every psycho-hylic individuality "down to the ants" (AĀ 1.3.8) and, in fact, the "only transmigrant"<sup>9</sup> in all transmigrations and evolutions. Hence we call the traditional psychology a pneumatology rather than a science of the "soul." And because its Self "never became anyone" (KU II.18), the metaphysical science is fundamentally one of "self-naughting"; as in Mark 8:34, *si quis vult post me sequi, denegat seipsum*.<sup>10</sup> In what follows we shall take for granted the distinction of "soul" (ψυχή, *nephesh*,

<sup>7</sup> C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (London, 1933). Jung frankly admits, "I restrict myself to what can be psychically experienced, and repudiate the metaphysical" (R. Wilhelm and C. G. Jung, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, New York, 1931, p. 135). Such a "restricted" approach becomes a "Taoism without Tao" (cf. André Préau, *La Fleur d'or et le taoïsme sans Tao*, Paris, 1931) or Brahmanvāda without Brahma, and cannot be taken seriously as a scientific account of any traditional psychology.

<sup>8</sup> "Whereby (*ḥena*, by what, as whom) might one discriminate the Discriminator?" (BU II.4.14, IV.5.15).

<sup>9</sup> Śaṅkarācārya, BrSBh I.1.5, *neśvarād anyah samsārī*; i.e., Plato's Soul that "is co-extended (συντεταγμένη, cf. n. 75) now with one body, now with another" (*Laws* 903b), as in Śvet. Up. v.10, "whatever body he assumes, therewith is he united (*yuyate*)," and BG XIII.26, "whatsoever is born is from the conjunction (*samyogāt*) of the Knower of the Field with the Field."

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Coomaraswamy, "*Ākīmcāññū*; Self-naughting" [in this volume—ED.]

*śarīra ātman*) from "spirit" (πνεῦμα, ψυχῆς ψυχῆ, *ruah, āsarīra ātman*) implied in the customary printing of "self" with a small "s" and "Self" with the capital.

Our human self is an association (*sambhūtiḥ, συγγένεια, συνουσία, κοινωνία*) of breaths or spirations (*prāṇāḥ, αἰσθήσεις*, JUB IV.7.4, cf. II.4.5), or troop-of-elemental-beings (*bhūtagaṇa*); and as such an "elemental-self" (*bhūtātman*) to be distinguished logically but not really from "its immortal Self and Duke" (*netr*<sup>11</sup> = ἡγεμών), immanent Agent (*kartr*) and Giver-of-being (*prabhūḥ*, MU III.2, 3, IV.2, 3, VI.7), the "Inner Man of these elemental-beings" (*bhūtānām antaḥ puruṣaḥ*, AĀ III.2.4); these two selves being the passible and impassible natures of a single essence. The "elemental beings" (*bhūtāḥ, bhūtāni*) are so called with reference to the Being or Great Being (*mahābhūtāḥ*), Brahma, Self (*ātman*), Person (*puruṣaḥ*), or Breath (*prāṇaḥ*), Prajāpati, Agni or Indra, etc.,<sup>12</sup> from whom or which all these "our" powers of expression, perception, thought, and action<sup>13</sup> have come forth as spirations or "breaths" (*prāṇaḥ*) or "rays" = "reins" (*raśmayāḥ*), BU II.1.20, II.4.12, IV.5.11; MU VI.32, etc. The designation "Being" (*bhūtāḥ*, more literally "has-become")<sup>14</sup> is "because-of-the-coming-forth" (*udbhūtavāt*) of the One who makes himself many (MU

<sup>11</sup> From *nī*, to lead. *Prāṇaḥ* is properly from *pra-an*, to breathe forth, but is also connected hermeneutically with *pra-nī*, to lead forth, in a metaphor closely connected with irrigation, as in RV II.12.7, where Indra is *apām netr*, and in JUB I.58.4.

<sup>12</sup> The names of God are given, as repeatedly stated in Indian texts from RV onwards (as also in other theologies), according to the aspect under which he is considered, or power that he exerts; and because of his omniformity (as Viśvarūpaḥ) and universal creativity (as Viśvakarmā) there can be no end to the names. From RV onwards the procedure from aspect to aspect and function to function is a "becoming" (√ *bhū*); for example, "Thou, Agni, art Varuṇa in being born, and when kindled [born], becomest (*bhavaṣ*) Mitra," RV V.3.1. We retain the various names in their contexts; but the reader, from the present point of view, need only think of these names as those of "God" as the First Principle of all things.

<sup>13</sup> One, two, three, five, seven, nine, ten, or indefinitely numerous (cf. JUB II.6, etc.).

<sup>14</sup> This is the true sense of "I am" in Exod. 3:14, where *ehyé* = *bhavāmi* (cf. D. B. Macdonald, *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius*, Princeton, 1934, p. 18); similarly Egyptian *ḥhefr*. However, Macdonald (like C.A.F. Rhys Davids in *To Become or Not To Become*, London, 1937) does not see that becoming is not a contradiction of being but the epiphany of being, or that what can "become" represents only a part of the possibility inherent in the Being that "becomes." God becomes *what* he becomes "to mortal worshippers" (RV V.3.2), but in himself is "what?" (*ḥaḥ*), i.e., not any "what," and "where?" i.e., not "anywhere."

v.2).<sup>15</sup> The powers of the soul thus extended by the Prabhūḥ and Vibhūḥ are accordingly called "distributive essences (*vibhūṭayaḥ*)."<sup>16</sup> The operation of these powers in us is what we call our consciousness (*caitanyaṃ, saṃjñānam, vijñānam*), i.e., conscious life in terms of subject and object. This consciousness, with which all ethical responsibility is bound up, arises at our birth and ceases when "we" die (BU IV.4.12-14, Eccl. 9:5); but this consciousness and its correlated responsibility are only particular modes of being, not ends in themselves, but means to an end beyond themselves.<sup>17</sup> Our life, with all its powers, is a gift (AV II.17) or loan (*Mathnawī* 1.245).

So "He who giveth-selfhood (*ya ātmadā* = *prabhū*)<sup>18</sup> becometh sole king of the moving-world . . . becometh overlord of elemental-beings (*bhūtānām adhipatir babhūva*);<sup>19</sup> and when he takes up his stand

<sup>15</sup> *Udbhū*, to come forth, i.e., be manifested, is the opposite of *nirbhū*, to abscond, disappear; as *pravrt*, to extrovert (intrans.), is the contrary of *nivrt*, to introvert. *Udbhutatva* = *prapadana* is precisely, in the theological sense, "procession."

It is important to bear in mind that *bhūta* is not primarily (but sometimes by analogy) any such "being" as ourselves, who are not one being or power, but a composite of cooperative beings or powers, rather to be regarded as "Intelligencies" or "Angels" than as human beings. God is the "only seer, hearer, thinker, etc." in us (BU III.8.23, etc.); it is He that takes birth in every womb and that "indwelling the secret cave [of the 'heart'] looks round about through these elemental beings (*guhām pravīṣya bhūtebhir vyapaśyata*, KU IV.6)," of which "we" are a "troop"; we are his "lookouts." Our "being" is not our own, and not in fact a being, but a becoming (*bhava, yéveois*), as is admirably stated in strictly traditional terms by Plutarch, *Moralia* 392 (*guhām pravīṣya = occulte immanens*) and Plato, *Symposium* 207DE.

<sup>16</sup> In AĀ II.1.7 and BG X.40, described as "powers"; and in RV I.166.11, what amounts to the same thing (as will later appear), Maruts, *vibhvo vibhūṭayaḥ*.

It is by this distributive becoming (*vibhūṭva, vibhūti-yoga*) that the Self is omnipresent (*sarvagataḥ*, Śvet. Up. III.21, cf. Praśna Up. III.12, Íśā Up. IV) and by the same token omniscient (MU VI.7) or synoptic (*vimanā . . . samdṛḥ*, RV X.82.2; cf. *Nirukṣa* X.26), and providential (*prajñāḥ*) in that its whole experience is *ex tempore*, no more dated than it is placed. All this is the basis of the Indian and Platonic doctrines of Recollection and Providence, and inseparable from that of the Only Transmigrant.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, 1943, n. 249.

<sup>18</sup> "One as he is there, and many as he is in his children here" (ŚB X.5.2.16; cf. BG XIII.27, 30 and Plotinus, *Enneads* IV.4.2), i.e., "rays"; cf. n.25.

On the gift of selfhood see Coomaraswamy, "The Sunkiss," 1940, esp. p. 47, citing ŚB VII.3.2.12 (where it is because the Sun, Prajāpati, "kisses," i.e., breathes down upon, his children that each can say: "I am." So Dante, *Paradiso* XXIX.13-15, "perchè suo splendore potesse, risplendendo, dir: Subsisto"; and Rūmī, *Mathnawī* I.2197, "For this 'I-hood' comes to me from Him moment by moment.")

<sup>19</sup> The usual gnomic aorist; "has become" = "is become," *bhūtam*. The psychology that we called a *bhūta-vidyā* is the understanding of things, in the Buddhist phrase *yathā-bhūtam*, "as become" (M I.260, etc.).

(*atiṣṭhantam*),<sup>20</sup> all [these gods] equip (*abhūsan*) him; putting on the kingdom-the-power-and-the-glory (*śriyaṃ vasānah*), he proceeds (*carati*), self-illuminate. . . . Unto him, the great [Brahma-] Daimon (*yakṣam*)<sup>21</sup> in the midst of the world-of-being, the supports-of-the-realm bring tribute (*balim rāṣṭrabhṛto bharanti*).<sup>22</sup> . . . And even as his retainers attend upon a king when he arrives, even so all these elemental-beings (*sarvāṇi bhūtāni*) prepare for him, crying, 'Here comes Brahma!' and just as men surround a king when he is setting out on a journey, so, when the time has come, all these breaths (*prāṇāḥ*) gather about the Self (*ātmanam* . . . *abhisamayanti*) when This-one [Brahma] aspires"<sup>23</sup> (RV x.121.2; AV iv.2.1, 2; AV iv.8.1, 3; AV x.8.15; BU iv.3.37, 38).

The nature of this divine procession in Person,<sup>24</sup> the relation of the

<sup>20</sup> "Takes up his stand here" (*āsthā, adhi-sthā*), is the regular expression for the "mounting" of the bodily vehicle by its spiritual passenger (CU viii.12.1; Śvet. Up. iv.11; BG xv.9, etc.). When he takes up a stand here he is no longer *svasthaḥ* but now with a "support" (*pratiṣṭha, adhiṣṭhāna*), until he returns to himself.

<sup>21</sup> The Brahma-Yakṣa, proceeding as Person (Puruṣa), who lies (*śete*) in the heart as the Overlord of Beings (*bhūtādhipati*), and "to whom, as he lies (*śayanāye*), these deities bring tribute" (*balim haranti*, JUB iv.20.11-23.7 ff., with BU iv.4.22). See also Coomaraswamy, "The Yakṣa of the Vedas and Upaniṣads," 1938.

*Puruṣa* is interpreted by *pur* = πόλις combined with *ṣi* = κέμαι (√ *kei*, also in *castra* and *civis*), and denotes, accordingly, "the Citizen in every city" (BU ii.5.18; cf. AV x.2.28, 30, ŚB xiii.6.2.1). Our heart is the true "city of God" (*brahma-pura*, CU viii.1.1-5), which is the same as to say that "the kingdom of God is within you." This is essentially the Platonic doctrine of man as a city or body-politic (*Republic*, and *passim*), and Philo's, whose μόνος κυρίως ὁ θεὸς πολίτης ἐστί (*De cherubim* 121), is virtually a translation of *sa vā ayam puruṣaḥ sarvāsu pūrsu puruṣayah* (BU ii.5.18, as above); cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi* 142, where Adam (not "this man" but the Man) is called "the only citizen of the world" (μόνος κοσμοπολίτης). It is only on such a basis as this that a salutary civilization can be established or any sound political economy founded. "The city can never otherwise be happy unless it is drawn by those painters who follow the divine original" (*Republic* 500B).

<sup>22</sup> The delegated powers are, precisely, his "attributes" (*ābharanāni*) and "ornaments" (*bhūsanāni*), the original sense of both words being that of "equipment"; cf. Coomaraswamy, "Ornament" (in Vol. 1 of this edition—ED.). The king's retainers (*bhūtāḥ, vibhūtayah, prāṇāḥ*, etc.) are his "adornment" (*bhūsanam*, √ *bhū*), and that quite literally, not only a "wall" but also a "crown," namely of "glory," as we shall see in connection with the word *śri*—the glory that he "wears" (*śriyaṃ vasānah*), "he upon whose head the Aeons are a crown, darting forth rays" (*ἀκτίνας, Coptic Gnostic Treatise XI*), "who wears the cosmos as his crown" (Hermes, *Lib.* xiv.7; cf. n. 52).

<sup>23</sup> I.e., when "the Spirit returns to God who gave it" (Eccl. 12:7) and we "give up the ghost," the Holy Ghost.

<sup>24</sup> AĀ ii.2.1, *lokaṃ abhyārcat puruṣa-rūpeṇa . . . prāṇāḥ*; JUB iv.24.1, *puruṣam eva prapadanāya vṛṇīta*. Cf. n. 21.

One to the Many,<sup>25</sup> and the origination of our consciousness and mobility are nowhere more clearly formulated than in MU ii.6 ff. Here the intelligizing Person (*manomayah puruṣaḥ*,<sup>26</sup> cf. Muṇḍ. Up. ii.2.7), Prajāpati, the Progenitor (the Breath, AV xi.4.11), awakening as if from sleep, divides himself fivefold,<sup>27</sup> to awaken (*pratibodhanāya*) his lifeless offspring. "He, having still unattained ends (*akṛtārthāḥ*),<sup>28</sup> from within

<sup>25</sup> "One as he is there, and many as he is in his children here" (ŚB x.5.2.16, cf. BG xiii.27, 30 and Plotinus, *Enneads* iv.4.2), i.e., "rays," for the Sun's rays are his sons (JUB ii.9.10). Thus he is "bodiless in bodies" (KU ii.22), "undivided in his divisions . . . in elemental beings" (BG xviii.20, xiii.16): 'Ὁ ἀσώματος, οὗτος ὁ πολυσώματος, μᾶλλον δὲ πανσώματος (Hermes, *Lib.* v.10A).

<sup>26</sup> One and the same Person may be considered ontologically from more than one point of view or level of reference. In a threefold arrangement he is, (1) the Person in the eye, or heart, (2) the Person in the Sun, and (3) the Person in Lightning; these Persons assuming the "sheaths," respectively vegetative (*anna-maya*), intellectual (*manomaya*), and beatific (*ānanda-maya*), in accordance with which the personal Brahma is "existent-intelligent-beatific (*sac-cid-ānanda*)" and logically differentiated from the impersonal, "nonexistent (*asat*)" Brahma, though no real distinctions can be made in the Supreme Identity of "That One (*tad ekam*)" that is both "existent and nonexistent (*sad-asat*)." These two are Meister Eckhart's "God" and "Godhead," and, as he says, "you must know what God and Godhead are"; he uses the expression, "free as the Godhead in its nonexistence," and says that "where these two abysses hang, equally spirated, despirated, there is the Supreme Essence." It will be understood that our affirmative psychology (pneumatology) as such, like the affirmative theology with which it really coincides, is with reference to "God" as Being (*ens simpliciter*), while the negative psychology, which proceeds by way of remotion (*neti, neti; na me so attā*) to a residual but ineffable Self, is not thus limited as to its end but extends to the absolute unity (*ekatvam*) or aloneness (*kevalatvam*) that transcends the distinction of natures (KU iii.11; MU iv.6, vi.21; BG xv.16, 17; etc.).

<sup>27</sup> There are many ways in which the division is fivefold (cf. AĀ i.3.8; Śvet. Up. 1.5 ff.), among which the five senses or powers are here primarily intended; cf. BU iv.4.17, *Prāṇa Up.* iii.12. The *Ātmavādins* (autologists) maintain that the "Five Races" (*pañca-janāḥ*) are those of speech, hearing, sight, mind, and breath (of the nostrils) (BD vii.67), as must be the case in RV iii.37.9, where Indra's powers (*indriyāni*) are "in the Five Races" (cf. RV i.176.5, v.32.11, v.35.2). But this is not the only meaning of the terms, and speaking more generally, God divides himself indefinitely (BU ii.5.19, MU v.2) to fill these worlds, "with only a part of himself, as it were" (MU vi.26, BG xv.7): part "as it were," because the Spirit remains a total presence "undivided in the divided beings" (*avibhakṣam ca bhūteṣu . . . vibhakṣesu*, BG xiii.16, xviii.20); "no part of what is divine is cut off or separated, but only extends itself" (*ekreiverau [= uttanute]*, Philo, *Deterius* 90).

<sup>28</sup> It will be seen that unrealized potentialities are the occasion of the Self's embodiment and apparent bondage; when Prajāpati has entered into his children fondly, he cannot extricate himself without their help (TS v.5.2.1; ŚB i.6.3.35, 36)—a conception with this profound implication, that "our" liberation is also and more truly *his* liberation. With the state of the "bird in the net, or cage," self-fettered by its own desires (MU iii.2, S i.44; *Phaedo* 83a; *Mathnawī* i.1541), is to

the heart considered, 'Let me eat'<sup>29</sup> of sense objects (*arthān āsnāni*). Thereupon breaking through these apertures (*kṣhānimāni bhītivā*)<sup>30</sup> and

be contrasted the liberty of the Self "whose ends have been attained" (*ḥṛtārthah*, Svet. Up. II.14)—this is the state of the Marut, Brhadratha, who, "having done what there was to do" (*ḥṛtakṛtyah*, MU VI.30, AĀ II.5; equivalent to *ḥarma ḥṛtvā* in TS I.8.3.1, and to *ḥatakaraṇiyam* in the Buddhist Arhant formula), "goes home" (*astam praiti*, TS I.8.3.1); his state whose desires are attained, who has no desire (*akāmah*) and is self-sufficient (BU IV.4.6.7, IV.3.21, etc.), for whom there are no longer any ends to be attained by action (*naiva tasya ḥṛtenārthah*, BG III.18) and who can say, "there is nothing I needs must do" (BG III.22), and is thus liberated from all *necessitas coactionis, conditionata, ex fine*.

In all these contexts the "work to be done" (*ḥṛtya, ḥārya, ḥaraṇīya*) is always, of course, in some sense sacrificial (*ḥarma ḥṛ = operare = sacra facere*).

<sup>29</sup> "Food" (*anna, bhoga, āhāra*) must not be understood in any restricted sense, but is whatever nourishes any contingent existence; food is life's fuel, whether physical or mental (cf. MU VI.11, M I.260, and *Phaedrus* 246E ff.). Our life is a combustion. The Sun "rises up on food (*annena atī rohati*, RV X.90.2)," i.e., "comes eating and drinking" (Matt. II:19), and it is the same solar Fire that "eats food in the heart," within you (MU VI.1), by means of his "rays" (MU VI.12), so that "whoever eats (lives), it is by his ray that he eats" (JUB I.29.6). Of the two selves or natures, "one eats the sweet fruit of the tree" (*pippalam svādu atti*, RV I.164.20; Mund. Up. III.1, Svet. Up. IV.6), like Eve and Adam in Genesis, and suffers accordingly. In other words, of the conjoint pair (*sayujā saḥḥāyā*), so often represented in the iconography as one bird with two heads, one eats "poison" (*viṣam*), the other "ambrosia" (*amṛtam*, cf. the *Pañcatantra*, HOS, Vol. II, p. 127, and Anton Schiefner, tr., *Tibetan Tales*, London, 1924). In this connection it is significant that √ *viṣ*, to "set," "work," "serve," gives rise equally to *viṣam*, poison, and *viṣaya*, object of sense perception. On these considerations depends the theory of continence (again, in no restricted sense of the word); the withholding of their fuel from life's fires (MU VI.34.1, with its Buddhist equivalents, and as in Philo, *De specialibus legibus* IV.118, ὑφαίρων, καθάπερ ἕλην πυρός, σβέσειν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀπεργάζεται) being in order to conquer hunger (TS II.4.12.5), i.e., death (BU I.2.1), by fasting.

In this broader sense of the words, which includes, for example, "the love of fine colors and sounds" (*Republic* 476), the majority, even of those who lay claim to "culture," really "lives to eat," not realizing that, as was so well said by Eric Gill, "a good taste is a mortified taste"—not an appetite for all sorts of food. The kinds must be chosen according to the part of our soul that we propose to nourish most; cf. *Phaedrus* 246E.

<sup>30</sup> *Kṣhāmi*, the "doors of the senses" (*dvārāni*, BG VIII.12) = τὰ τῶν αἰσθησέων στόμα (Philo, *Deterius* 100) = πύλαι, of which νοῦς is the πύλωρος (Hermes, *Lib.* I.22, cf. v.6). *Kṣhāni*, pl. of *kṣhā* (also *kṣhā*), are such openings as connect one "space" with another, hence passages that lead from the within to the without, and collectively one *kṣhā* is "Varuṇa's Fount of Order" (*kṣhām ṛtasya*, RV II.28.5). From *kṣhā* derive *sukṣhā* and *duḥkṣhā*, weal and woe. *Rta* (cf. "rite") is κόσμος as Order: the Rivers pour out Order (*ṛtam arṣanti sindhavaḥ*, RV I.105.2) and are of the nature of Order, and acquainted with Order (*arṣanti ṛtauṛi*, RV IV.18.6, *ṛtajñāh*, IV.19.7; cf. *Enneads* III.8.10, "Imagine a spring that has no source outside itself; it gives itself to all the rivers, yet is never exhausted by what they take, but itself remains integrally what it always was; the tides that proceed from it are at one

going forth, with five rays (*raśmibhiḥ*)<sup>31</sup> he eats of sense objects (*viṣayān atti*): these cognitive powers (*buddhindriyāni = prajñāni, prajñā-mātrā, tan-mātrā*, intelligences) are his 'rays,' the organs of action (*ḥarmendriyāni*) are his steeds,<sup>32</sup> the body is his chariot, mind (*manas = νοῦς*) is their Governor (*niyantṛ*),<sup>33</sup> his nature (*prakṛti = φύσις*)<sup>34</sup> the whip; impelled by him as its only energizer, this body spins like the potter's wheel,<sup>35</sup> impelled by him alone is this body set up in a state-of-conscious-

within it before they run their several ways, yet all, in some sense, know beforehand down what channels they will pour their streams").

<sup>31</sup> These "rays," which are also the "reins" by which the steeds are yoked to the Mind, are those of St. Bonaventura's *lumen cognitionis sensitivae*, which acts in combination with the five corresponding elements, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch in ourselves (*De reductione artium ad theologiam* 3, based on St. Augustine, *De genesi ad litteram*, c. 4, n. 6), the distinction of *lux, lumen*, and *color* (as percipient, means, and object of perception) being taken for granted: "ipsa divina veritas est lux, et ipsius expressiones respecter rerum sunt quasi luminosae irradiationes, licet intrinsecae, qua determinata educunt et dirigunt in ad quod exprimitur" (St. Bonaventura, *De scientia Dei* 3c). Cf. Rūmī, *Mathnawī* 1.3268, 3273, 3275, "Through my beams thou hast come to life for a day or two. . . . The beams of the Spirit are speech and eye and ear. . . . The heart . . . has pulled the reins of the five senses"; Hermes, *Lib.* X.22B, θεοῦ καθάπερ ἄκτινες αἱ ἐνέργειαι; and Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.4.3, where οἶον βολάς (ἡλιοῦ) = καθάπερ ἄκτινες θεοῦ. Cf. n. 59.

<sup>32</sup> "Yoked are his thousand steeds" (RV VI.47.18), Indra's ten thousand steeds, rays of the Sun (JUB I.44.1-5); tens of thousands consubstantial with their source (BU II.5.19), who is at once the knower, means of knowing, and the known.

<sup>33</sup> Mind is the prism by which the Light of lights (RV I.113.1, etc.) is refracted, and in which, conversely, its spectra are reunited. The Mind is twofold, pure or impure according to whether or not it is affected by its perceptions, whence the necessity of a *ḥatharsis (suddha ḥaraṇa)* if we are to know the truth, as distinguished from opinion; on the two minds, and the sense of *μετάνοια*, see Coomaraswamy, "On Being in One's Right Mind," 1942.

Mind is the *niyantṛ* (coachman, √ *yam*, as in ἵμα), but is itself curbed by the ultimate Controller (*antaryāmin*, BU III.7; *niyantṛ*, MU VI.19, 30, cf. KU III.9). The Mind that has ends in view may be unable or unwilling to control the horses, which may or may not be unruly.

The ultimate Controller (*antaryāmin*), immanent deity, synteresis and "conscience," is the Socratic Daimon "that always holds me back from what I want to do" (Plato, *Apology* 31D): Socrates thinks it "very fine to be opposed thus," but the man whom his desires constrain is only "angered by the voice from the Acropolis that says 'Thou shalt not'" (*Republic* 440B, with *Timaeus* 70A); resents, in other words, his "inhibitions," and "kicks against the pricks."

<sup>34</sup> *Prakṛti* as the stimulant (not the "inspirer") of action, BG III.27, 33.

<sup>35</sup> *Sūryasya cakram*, RV V.29.10; *deva-cakram*, AB IV.15; *brahma-cakram*, Svet. Up. I.6; *samsāra-cakram*, MU VI.28; Pāli Buddhist *bhava-cakkaṃ = ὁ τροκός τῆς γενέσεως*, James 3:6 (the last more likely of Orphic than Indian origin).

Nichts ist, das dich bewegt, du selber bist das Rad,  
Das aus sich selben läuft, und keine Ruhe hat.

Angelus Silesius, *Cherubinische Wandersmann* 1.37.

ness (*cetanavat*), he only is its mover."<sup>36</sup> As a spectator (*prekṣakaḥ*, play-goer, on-looker) and as he is in himself (*svasthaḥ* = ἀπαθής, αὐτὸς, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστώς, Hermes, *Lib.* II.12A), he transmigrates (*carati*)<sup>37</sup> wholly unaffected (*alepyaḥ*)<sup>38</sup> by the fates in which his vehicles, whether aughty or naughty, are involved; but insofar as he thinks of himself as this man, So-and-so, insofar as he identifies himself with his experiences and passions, "he fetters himself by himself, like a bird in the net," and as "elemental-self (*bhūtātman*)" is overcome by causality, good and evil, and all the

<sup>36</sup> Ψυχὴ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῶν πάντα (Plato, *Laws* 898c); "questi nei cor mortali è permotore" (Dante, *Paradiso* I.116); "Sanctus Spiritus qui est principaliter movens . . . homines qui sunt quaedam organa ejus" (*Sum. Theol.* I-II 68.4 ad 1).

<sup>37</sup> As in AV IV.8.1; "multifariously born" (*carati bahudhā jāyamānaḥ*, Mund. Up. II.2.6; *carati garbhe antar adīśyamāno bahudhā vi jāyate*, AV X.8.13)—for, indeed, "this Breath (=Prajāpati, Ātman) hath entered into manifold wombs" (JUB III.2.13). Elsewhere, often *samsarati* = *samsarati*, "transmigrates."

<sup>38</sup> *Alepyaḥ*, "not adherent," not moistened, as the smooth surface of a lotus leaf is not moistened by the drops of water that may fall upon it; √ *lip*, to smear, etc., whence *lepam*, plaster, lime, bird-lime, glue. The "clean" Self, master of its own powers, and by no means their servant, is not contaminated as it acts (*kurvan na lipyate*, BG V.7); as the Sun is unaffected by evils under the sun, so our Inner Man is unaffected (*na lipyate*) by worldly evils, and remains aloof (KU V.11); the true Brahman is not (like a fly in honey) captivated by his desires (*na lippati kamesu*, Dh 401, cf. Sn 71, 547, 1042, etc.). We need hardly say that Rawson's objections to these notions (in *Kaṣha Upanishad*, Oxford, 1934, p. 180) are Patristic and Monophysite, and it is interesting to observe that in combatting an Indian doctrine he is forced to adopt a Christian heresy!

In the Indian and traditional psychology, all sense perception depends on contact (*sparśa*, cf. ἀντίρροπος, *Timaeus* 45c). He who does not touch (*na spriati*) sense objects is the true ascetic (MU VI.10). "All experiences are contact-born (*ye hi samsparsaja bhogaḥ*). . . . One whose Self is unattached (*asakta*, √ *saj*, to stick to, cf. "sticky" = sentimental) enjoys a happiness incorruptible" (BG V.21, 22). In fact, the powers of perception and action both "grasp" and are grasped by their objects as "super-graspers" (*atigraha*, BU III.2); and this is dramatized in the widely distributed "Stickfast" stories, of which S V.148-49, where the "monkey" (mind, consciousness, cf. S II.94) is held fast (*bajjhati*) by the "glue" (*lepam*) it "impinges upon," may be called an archetype; in a remarkable Spanish version the captive has baited his own trap (see W. Norman Brown, "The Stickfast Motif in the Tar-Baby Story," in *Twenty-fifth Anniversary Studies; Philadelphia Anthropological Society*, 1937, p. 4, and A. M. Espinosa in the *Journal of American Folklore*, LVI, 1943, 36).

The same impassibility is implied by the word *prekṣaka* (θεωρητικός), "looker-on," as if at a play, and the corresponding *upekṣā*, *uppekṣhā*, "impartiality" analogous to the Sun's, who "shines alike upon the just and the unjust." The Spectator is not affected by or involved in the fates of his psychophysical vehicles; the passible nature only is involved for so long as it does not "know its Self," who it is; cf. *Enneads* IV.7.9 ff.

"pairs" of contradictories.<sup>39</sup> The cure for this elemental Self is to be found in the dissipation of its "ignorance" (*avidyā*) by the recognition of "its own immortal Self and Duke," of which it is said elsewhere, in the most famous of the Aupaniṣada *lógoi*, that "That art thou."

Thus the immanent deity is the sole Fructuary (*bhoktr*, √ *bhrij*, to eat, use, enjoy, experience as, e.g., in JUB II.10) within the world and in individuals. "Self with sense-power yoked they term the 'Fructuary'" (KU II.4); "this Person within you is the only Fructuary and Nature is his usufruct (*bhojyam*, MU VI.10)," "taking up his stand on ear, eye, touch, taste, and smell, he is concerned with sense-objects (*viśayān upasevate*);" "enjoyments contact-born" (BG XV.7-9, V.22). That is, of course, in his passible nature, in which he literally sym-pathizes with "us," as experient (*bhoktr*) of both pleasures and pains (BG XIII.20, 22), the real and the unreal (MU VII.11.8) of which "our" life and development are the product (AĀ II.3.6), a mixture<sup>40</sup> of corruptible and incorruptible, seen and unseen (Śvet. Up. I.8). In "us," however, just because of its fruitional-nature (*bhoktrtvāt*) the self is bound and lordless and cannot be released from all its limitations (*sarva-pāśaiḥ*) or from its births in aughty or naughty wombs until it recognizes its own divine essence (Śvet. Up. I.7, 8; MU III.2 ff.; BG XIII.21); until, that is, "we" know who we are,<sup>41</sup> and become what we are, God in God and wide awake (*brahma-bhūtā, buddhā*).<sup>42</sup> To that

<sup>39</sup> It is precisely from the "pairs" of contraries that the Freedman (*mukṭah*, √ *muc* = λύω, ἐλευθερώω, *liberare*) is freed (*dvandvair vimukṭah*, BG XV.5, cf. V.3), in other words "from name-and-aspect" (*nāma-rūpāt*, Mund. Up. II.2.3), from the tyranny of all things definable in terms of what they are-and-are-not, such as big and small, pleasure and pain, good and evil and other "values." The coincidence of contraries—for example, of past and future, near and far—can only be in a now without duration ("other than past and future," KU II.14) and in a space that cannot be traversed. Hence the symbolism of the "strait gate," Wunderthor and Symplegades, met with all over the world from India to Alaska. Thus, "the Paradise in which God dwells is girt about with the coincidence of contraries, and that is its wall, of which the gate is guarded by the highest spirit of reason and cannot be passed until he is overcome; nor canst Thou be seen on the hither side of this coincidence of contraries, but only beyond them" (Nicholas of Cusa, *De visione Dei* IX), where as Meister Eckhart says, "neither vice nor virtue ever entered in." For the history of the "contraries" (*ἐναντία*) in Greek metaphysics, see E. R. Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," *Yale Classical Studies*, III (1932).

<sup>40</sup> Philo's σύγκριμα and φύραμα

<sup>41</sup> "Iam scio," inquit [Philosophia], "morbi tui aliam uel maximum causam; quid ipse sis, nosse desisti" (Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* I.6). "Quod autem de scientia magis necessarium est scire, hoc est ut [homo] sciat se ipsum" (Avencebrol, *Fons vitae* I.2). γνώθι σεαυτόν: not τὰ αὐτοῦ, but αὐτόν.

<sup>42</sup> S III.83, with many parallels.

end there is a Way and Royal Road<sup>43</sup> and a Rule dispositive to the eradication of all "otherness,"<sup>44</sup> means that are often called a medicine; it is literally for the "patient" (for such are all whose "ruling passions," good or evil, are their masters) to decide whether or not to follow the prescribed regimen, or if the end does not attract him, to go on "eating and drinking and being merry" with the οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζοντες εαυτῶν πάντα κτήματα.<sup>45</sup>

In the Vedic angelology (*devavidyā*), the Intelligences which are the constituents of our psychic personality, and of which we have spoken mainly as "elemental-beings," are called by many other names; we shall consider them accordingly as "Breaths" (*prāṇāḥ*), "Glories" (*śriyāḥ*), "Fires" (*agnayāḥ*), Faculties (*indriyāni*), Seers or Prophets (*ṛṣayāḥ*), "Storms" or "Gales" (*marutāḥ*), and as Gods or Angels (*devāḥ, devatāḥ*).

The immanent deity, solar Ātman, Brahma, Prajāpati, Agni, Indra, Vāyu, is continually called the "Breath" (*prāṇah, spiration*),<sup>46</sup> and his

<sup>43</sup> The Way is that of the Philosophia Perennis, both in theory and practice: a metaphysics that must not be confused with the empirical and systematic "philosophy" (τὰ ἐγκύκλια φιλοσοφήματα, *De caelo* 279a.30 = τὰ ἐξωτέρικα, and not at all the same as the "primary philosophy" or "theology" περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν, *Metaphysics* 1026a.22 ff.) that is now usually taught in our universities, or with the "philosophies" of individual "thinkers." The distinction of the traditional from modern "philosophies" is of fundamental importance, but cannot be further considered here. We do wish, however, to point out that a like distinction (which is really that of realism from nominalism) must be made in our interpretation of the word "naturalist" (ψυσικός) which, as applied to the early Ionian philosophers, and notably Thales, is much more nearly φιλόμυθος than to be equated with the modern "physicist"; cf. Philo, *De posteritate Caini* 7, where it is taken for granted that theirs was an "allegorical way." Φύσις, indeed, as *Natura naturans, Creatrix universalis, is Deus ordinans naturae omnium* (cf. AV viii.10; Philo, *De sacrificiis* 75, 98), and in this sense "natural history" coincides with theology. We need hardly point out that this "Mother Nature" is another than the natured world of which we ourselves are part.

<sup>44</sup> Nicholas of Cusa's *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis*, essential to *theosis*, St. Bernard's *a se tota deliquescere*, St. Paul's *divisio animae et spiritus*, Christ's *denegat se ipsum*, Islamic *janā al-janā*, etc.: "All scripture cries aloud for freedom from self" (Eckhart).

<sup>45</sup> "The rabble that imagines that all possessions are its 'own,'" those who talk of an "I and mine," the Buddhist "untaught manyfolk" who take their own inconstant and composite personality to be an essence, and all those who hold with Descartes, *cogito ergo sum*. These are also Aristotle's οἱ πολλοί, *les hommes moyens sensuels*, whose "good" is the life of pleasure (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.5.1).

<sup>46</sup> Breath (*prāṇah*, often rendered by "Life") has two senses, (1) as Spirit, Self, and Essence, and (2) as the breath-of-life (in the nostrils, and so, as one of the senses, smell). In the first sense, the Breath, stationed in the breath-of-life as its body, to which it is unknown, is your Self (Ātman), the Inner Controller, the

divisions and extensions are accordingly the "Breaths" (*prāṇāḥ*). All these Breaths are the activities or workings (*karmāṇi, ἐνέργειαι*) of vision, audition, etc., that Prajāpati unleashes; severally mortal, it is only of the median Breath that Death could not take possession; it is after him as their chief

Immortal (BU iii.7.16, cf. KU v.5); as for Philo, πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία (*De-terius* 81, *De specialibus legibus* iv.123). Accordingly, "Breath moves with breath, Breath giveth breath (*prāṇah prāṇena yāti, prāṇah, prāṇam dadāti*, CU vii.15.1)" corresponds exactly to "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7); as "in whose nostrils was the breath of life" (Gen. 7:22) does to Skr. *prāṇinah, prāṇabhrtah*, "breathing things," i.e., living beings. In *divinis* the Breath is the Gale (*vāyu*), and it is evident that, as an immanent principle (TS ii.1.11.3, ŚB 1.8.3.12, etc.), this "Air" corresponds to the ἐντὸς ἀήρ which Theophrastus describes as "the real agent of perception, being a tiny fragment of God within you" (*De sensibus* 42).

This whole doctrine as enunciated in the cited passages (cf. TU ii.3, *prāno hi bhūtānam āyus*; Kaus. Up. iii.2) might be described as that of the traditional animism or vitalism. It is not, however, a "theory of the origin of life" in any temporal sense, or as if life might have reached this planet from some other place; for the Self or Spirit or Breath does not merely initiate life, but as its principle, maintains it, and it "has not come from anywhere" (KU ii.18; John 3:8). The doctrine is also exclusive of any theory of an origin of life "by a fortuitous concurrence of atoms (!)," since it is a fundamental axiom of the Philosophia Perennis that "nothing in the world happens by chance" (St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* lxxxiii, q.24; Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* 1.6 and iv.6; Plutarch, *Moralia* 369); in Buddhism, the notion of an origination by chance is the *ahetu-vāda* heresy, the true doctrine being, "this being that becomes, and this not being that does not become." Sanskrit has no word importing "chance" in the modern, "random," connotation of the word and, in fact, "chance" itself, together with all the corresponding and equivalent words in other languages, imports no more than simply "what takes place," without any implied denial of causation.

One fundamental distinction between the metaphysical and the empirical approach to the problem of origins may be noted. The latter considers only mediate causes, all belonging to one and the same realm of compossibles; while for the former the problem is one of a first cause that would not be a *first* cause if it could be included in the category of any of its effects. Metaphysics, therefore, while not denying that life transmits life, can only consider an origin of life or being from what is neither "alive" nor "being" (τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν ζωὴν αἰτιον ζωῆς, *Enneads* iii.8.10); will predicate, in other words, a production *ex nihilo*.

All generation (origination, production) is from contraries (*Sum. Theol.* 1.46.1 ad 3). The Supreme Identity (*īad ekam*, RV) is a syzygy (*principium conjunctum*) of being and nonbeing, spiration and despiration, etc., one essence of two natures (RV x.129.2, MU vii.11.8). When these two natures are considered apart and as interacting, being takes birth from nonbeing, life from what is not alive, as from a father and a mother (RV x.72.2, *asataḥ sad aṣṛyata*; JUB iv.18.8, *yat prāṇena na prāṇiti yena prāṇah prāṇiyate*; Mund. Up. ii.1.2.3, *aprāno . . . tasmā jāyate prāṇah*). The doctrine is expressed also by Philo, ὁ ἀγέννητος φθάσει πᾶσαν γένεσιν, *De sacrificiis* 66, cf. 98; and by Plotinus, *Enneads* vi.7.17, "Form is in the shaped, the shaper is formless." It is in this sense that the world *ex nihilo fit* (*Sum. Theol.* 1.45.1, *emanatio totius esse est ex non ente, quod est nihil*).



(*śreṣṭhah*; literally, most glorious)<sup>47</sup> that the others are called "Breaths" (BU 1.5.21); they are not "our" powers, but only the names of his (Brahma's) activities (BU 1.4.7). In us these Breaths are so many unwhole "selves" (those of the seeing, hearing, thinking man, etc.), but they act unanimously for the Breath (or Life) whose "own" (*svāh*, etc.) they are, and whom they serve as his retainers serve a king (BU 1.4.7; Kauṣ. Up. III.2, IV.20)<sup>48</sup>; to whom, accordingly, they "bring tribute" (*balim haranti, bharanti, prayacchanti*, AV x.7.37, x.8.15, XI.4.19; JUB IV.24.9; Kauṣ. Up. II.1, etc.) and "resort" or "incline" (*śrayanti*, ŚB VI.1.1.4, etc.), and by whom they are in turn protected (AV x.2.27; BU IV.3.12). The operation of the Breaths is unanimous,<sup>49</sup> for the Mind (*manas* = *voûs*), to which they are "yoked," and by which they are directed, is their immediate dominant (TS IV.1.1, VI.1.4.5; ŚB x.5.7.1). The Mind cognizes what the other senses only report (BU 1.5.3); as *sensus communis* it "partakes of and enjoys their several ranges and pastures" (M 1.295).

At the same time, amongst all these powers, in which the Mind as "practical intellect" is included, the outstanding superiority of the Breath itself is emphasized in very many recensions of the myth of the contests of the Breaths amongst themselves: it proves invariably that the Breath is the best and only essential power, for the organism can survive if deprived of any of the others, but only the Breath can erect the body, which falls down when it departs (AĀ II.1.4; BU 1.5.21, VI.1.1-4; Kauṣ. Up. II.14, III.12, etc.). It is, in fact, the Breath that departs when we "give up the ghost"; and, in leaving, it tears up the Breaths by the roots and carries them away with it, in what is at once their death and ours (BU IV.4.2, VI.1.13; BG xv.8, etc.). Nothing of "us" remains when "we, who before our birth did not exist and who, in our combination with the body, are mixtures and have qualities, shall be no more, but shall be brought into the rebirth [*παλιγγενεσία*, resurrection] by which, becoming united to immaterial things, we shall become unmixed and without qualities" (Philo, *De cherubim* 114, 115).<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *śreṣṭhin* as the "head of a guild"; the guild being a *śreṇi*, group, series, and both words from  $\sqrt{\text{śri}}$ , as to which see below. The organization of a guild, like that of any other traditional society (*sāhitya*), "imitates" the cosmic order.

<sup>48</sup> All in the same sense that for Plato, Philo, and Hermes, *passim*, we are God's "possessions" (*κτήματα*) and "ministers" or "servants" (*ὑπηρέται*).

<sup>49</sup> They indeed, in their feeding, "conspire" (*samananti* AĀ II.1.2), and having thus conspired, aspire (*samānyo'dānan*, JUB IV.22.6).

<sup>50</sup> Philo's *palingenesis* is the "third birth" or resurrection of the "other self" that takes place at our death, the human personality of "this self" having already been

In the above account of the Breaths, the equally Indian and Platonic symbolism of the chariot (*ratha*, *ἄρμα*) is assumed. Self is the passenger to whom the vehicle belongs and who knows its destination, and Mind the driver (*samgrahitr, niyantr*) that holds the ray-reins (*raśmayah, ākrīves; ἡνία, \sqrt{yam}*) by which the sensitive steeds are curbed and guided. The horses may or may not have been well trained; while the Mind itself, because of its twofold quality, human and divine, clean and unclean, may either allow the horses to stray from the highway (*mārgā*) into pagan (*deśi*) fields, or may direct them on behalf of the Spirit.<sup>51</sup>

reborn in the man's descendants, by whom his functions will be carried on (AĀ II.5, cf. AV XI.8.33, ŚB XI.2.1.1-3, and JUB III.11.1-4). In the whole tradition that we are considering, there is no doctrine of the survival or "reincarnation" of personalities, but only of the Person, the only transmigrator; recognition of the composite and inconstant nature of the human personality and its consequent corruptibility leads to the whole problem of mortality, expressed in the questions, "In whom, when I depart, shall I be departing?" (Praśna Up. VI.3), and "By which self is the Brahma-world attainable?" (Sn 508), myself or the Self? The Christian and orthodox answer is, of course, that "No man hath ascended up to heaven, save he which came down from heaven, even the Son of Man, which is in heaven" (John 3:13), and therefore, "If any man would follow me, let him deny himself" (*ἀπαρνησάσθω ἑαυτόν*, Matt. 14:24). In the last citation, *ἀπαρτέομαι* is very strong, and might better have been rendered by "disown" or "utterly reject"; it is by no means a merely ethical "self-denial" that is intended, but a denial like St. Peter's of Christ (in which connection the same verb is used) and such as is implied by Meister Eckhart's "the soul must put itself to death." See further Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, 1943, p. 57.

The problem of immortality—to be or not to be, after death—obviously hinges upon the psychological analysis, in the sense that the answer must depend upon our view of what we are now, mortal or immortal; for, evidently, nothing composite or that has had a beginning can by any means become immortal. The Indian resurrection (*punar janma, abhisambhava*, etc.), sacrificially prefigured (AB II.3, etc.), and actually consequent upon the consummation of the last sacrifice in which the body is offered up on the funeral pyre (ŚA VII.7, JUB III.11.17, AV VIII.2.8, BU VI.2.14, ŚB II.2.4.8, RV x.14.8, etc.), is, indeed, "from ashes" (*Sum. Theol.* III.Supp.78.2, cf. ŚB VIII.1.1.9) and in a "whole and complete body," but it is not delayed, and is not a reconstitution of *this* body or personality, but of our "other Self," this self's "immortal Self," in an immortal body of "gold" (light, glory), wanting in nothing but wholly immaterial. The distinction of "saved" from "lost" is similarly immediate; the saved are those who have known their Self (St. Paul's *jam non ego, sed Christus in me*), the lost are those who have not known themselves and of whom, therefore, there is nothing to survive when the vehicle disintegrates and the Self departs.

<sup>51</sup> Typically in *Phaedrus* 246 ff., and in KU III.3 ff., but throughout both traditions, e.g., Philo, *De agricultura* 72 ff. In Buddhism, the chariot is the typical *exemplum* of the Ego fallacy: there was no chariot before it was constructed nor will there be when it finally falls to pieces, and so for the "soul"; both are conventional ex-



To the Self, as we said, as to their "chief" (*śreṣṭhaḥ*) or "none more glorious" (*niḥśreyasaḥ*), the Breaths "resort" or "incline" (*śrayanti*). In this sense they are at once its beams and glories (*śriyāḥ*) and, collectively, its "glory" (*śri*), it being the "head" (*śiras*, L. *caput*) to which they tend and on which they rest (*śritāḥ*) as their resort or shelter (*śarman*, *śaranam*); inasmuch as the Breaths are his tributaries, Brahma is "surrounded by glory" (*śriyā parivrdham*) which is both a wall and a crown.<sup>52</sup> This is a description at once of the cosmic and microcosmic household (*grha*, with its *grhāḥ* and *grhapati*) and of the domed house (*grha*, *dama*, *δóμος*) itself (this earthly body, in which "the two selves" dwell together); of which house the "beams" (in both senses of the word) or rafters both surround and support and are supported by the capital of its axial kingpost (*sthūna-rājā*, *śāla-vamśa*), just as in the cosmic home of which the roof is sup-

pressions for what is not an essence but only a causally determined process. This is the so-called Buddhist "nominalism": but it should be clear that to deny the reality of a pseudo universal is by no means to deny the reality of universals. For the equivalent picture, again Platonic and Indian, of man as an articulated puppet pulled this way and that by his passions, if not rectified by the "single golden cord" by which (in accordance with the "thread-spirit" doctrine) he is suspended from above, see Coomaraswamy, *Līlā* and "Play and Seriousness" [both in this volume—ED.]. See also Sankara on BU III.41 (the body and its functions are operated like a wooden puppet by the Self).

<sup>52</sup> ŚB VI.1.1.4, 7; JUB IV.24.11; AĀ II.1.4. Cf. RV I.59.9; IV.5.1; X.18.12. All the Skr. words in the sentence above are from √ *śri*, to tend towards, lean against, enter into, join with, of which √ *śri*, to shine or glow, is only a variant. With *śri* in the first sense may be compared ἀρμόζω, to join, and other forms of ἄρω, e.g., Lat. *ars*, and Skr. *ṛ* in *sam-ṛ*, to join together, infix (pp. *samarpita*); ἀρροῖα as the peak or keystone of a roof (Pausanias IX.38.3, cf. Hermes, *Lib.* I.14) may be specially noted.

We rendered *śrī*, above, p. 338, by "the kingdom-the-power-and-the-glory," for as a feminine "personification" *Śrī* is all these things (SB XI.4.3.1 ff., etc.), i.e., the characteristic Fortune or Success (τυχῆ) that accompanies the successful hero or protects a city, without which—or rather whom—the hero would be helpless or the city lost. The identification of *Śrī* with *Virāj* (lit. radiance, √ *raj*, to shine, and so to rule, cf. ŚB VIII.5.1.5, XI.4.3.10)—"governance," "administration," "supply" as an attribute of, or mythologically the "wife" of the Ruler (and esp. of the solar *Viṣṇu*)—will be easily understood. And also, just as the Ruler's "glories" considered together are his crowning "Glory," so in the case of Indra (king of the gods, *in divinis* and within you), his faculties (*indriyāni*) considered together are his "wife" *Indrāni*, and his abilities (*śacih*, √ *śak*, to be able, as in *Śakra* = Indra) are his "wife" *Śaci*; it is in just this sense that a king "espouses" his realm, "the lady of the land," and that the soul is the "bride" of the spirit. In the same way for Philo, the relation of *αἰσθησις* to *νοῦς* (i.e. *vāc* to *manas*) is that of Eve to Adam, the "woman" to the "man."

ported by the (invisible) Axis Mundi.<sup>53</sup> In the closely related symbolism of the Wheel and Circle (*caḥra*, *κύκλος*, *circus*, cycle),<sup>54</sup> the Breaths, our selves, and all things are fixed-together-in (*samarpitāḥ*) and supported by (*pratiṣṭhitāḥ*) the central Self and "Person to-be-known," as are the spokes in the hub of a wheel of radii in the center of a circle, from which they radiate to its circumference.<sup>55</sup>

It is in connection with the architectural symbolism that there can be found the explanation of the important term and concept *samādhi* (√ *sam-ā-dhā*, to put together, mend, heal, literally and etymologically "synthesis"), of which the opposite is *vyādhi* (√ *vi-ā-dhā*, to divide up, disintegrate), "analysis," a term that is only, and significantly, met with in the medical sense of "disorder."<sup>56</sup> For "just as all other beams are united (*samāhitāḥ*,

<sup>53</sup> RV I.10.1, *tvā . . . ud vamśam iva yemire*. See Coomaraswamy, "Pali *kaṇṇikā* = Circular Roof-Plate" and "The Symbolism of the Dome" [both in Vol. 1 of this edition—ED.]; "Eckstein," 1939; "The Sunkiss," 1940, n. 30. Cf. also "Vedic Exemplarism" [in this volume—ED.].

<sup>54</sup> Not unrelated to the notion of a "Cyclopean" architecture.

<sup>55</sup> RV I.33.15, I.149.19; AV X.8.34; TS VII.4.11.2; AB IV.15; BU II.5.15; CU VII.15.1; Kauś. Up. III.8; Pṛāśna Up. VI.6; Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.5.5, VI.8.18. The symbolisms of the round house and the wheel are very closely related; for a man is a moving house, and in the same way Skr. *ratha* and *vimāna* are equally "vehicle" and "building," while to "walk" is to "roll" (*ṛt*).

The construction of a wheel corresponds to that of a domed roof, or that of an umbrella (a moving roof); cf. Coomaraswamy, "Uṣṇīṣa and Chatra," 1938.

It will be noticed that our metaphysics makes continual use of analogies drawn from art. Such a procedure is intelligible in a traditional culture in which the arts are applications of first principles to contingent problems, i.e., "art imitates Nature in her manner of operation"; and where also, inasmuch as the artist is not a special kind of man, but every man a special kind of artist, the jargon of art is familiar. The technical terms of traditional thought are those of construction (ἀρροῖα, carpentry, as a working in a "wood," ἔλῃ, analogous to that in which He worked "through whom all things were made"; cf. *Timaeus* 41B). Under such conditions "manu-facture" provides for the needs of the soul and body at once, and accordingly every artifact can be used not only for immediate ends but also as a support of contemplation. Therefore, St. Bonaventura could rightly say, "The light of a mechanical art is the path to the illumination of scripture. There is nothing therein which does not bespeak true wisdom, and for this reason Holy Scripture makes constant use of such similes" (*De reductione artium ad theologiam* 14). And although this procedure is strange to us whose education is more in words than in things (a natural consequence of our nominalism), a student of the traditional philosophy must learn to think in its own terms. For example, the background of Classical Greek philosophy is better and more fully preserved in the forms of "geometric art" than it is in the literary "fragments."

<sup>56</sup> Inasmuch as it is in the "heart" (identified with Brahma, BU IV.1.7, and elsewhere) that man's various selves are unified (*samāhitāḥ*, *ekadhā bhavanti*), it will be seen that our words *schizophrenia* and *frenzy* are highly appropriate designations

pp. pl. of *sam-ā-dhā*) in the kingpost of the house, so are all the Powers in the Breath" (AĀ III.2.1); and just as all the rafters converge towards and are thus united in the roof-plate or peak of the house, so all virtues or skills (*ḥṣalā dhammā*) converge and tend towards their synthesis in the state of *samādhi* (Mil 38).<sup>57</sup>

Herein also is to be found the explanation of the term *hitāḥ* (pp. of *dhā*, and literally "things put," *posita*, with the secondary sense of "aids"), applied in the Upaniṣads<sup>58</sup> to the flowing Breaths and equivocally to their channels, vectors, or courses (*nādyah*)<sup>59</sup> which are similarly unified in

of what takes place in a state of "alienation," or estrangement from our Self.

On the other hand *vi-dhā*, to distribute, apportion, has no specifically pejorative connotation other than is implied in the very notion of "division." The constituents of the world are "distributed" in the primordial sacrifice, where it is asked, "how-many-fold (*ḥatidhā*) did they divide up (*vy adadhuh*) the Person?"—in effect, "into how many *hitāḥ*?" These divisions are alluded to in RV I.164.15, *vihitāni dhāmasah*; and are, in fact, of the primordial Waters (*āpo vy adadhāt*, AV x.2.11), i.e., their release. The answer to *ḥatidhā* is, of course, the *bahudhā* of many other contexts, cf. n. 37.

<sup>57</sup> *Samādhi* in its best known sense is, of course, the consummation of *yoga*, of which the three stages, *dharana* (consideration), *dhyāna* (contemplation), and *samādhi* (synthesis) correspond to the *consideratio*, and *raptus* or *excessus* (ἐκστασις) of Western contemplatives.

<sup>58</sup> For a collation of the references see the concordance published by G. Haas in Robert Ernst Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, 2nd ed. 1934, p. 521, and cf. n. 59.

<sup>59</sup> *Nādi* is a "tube" or "pipe," like that of a flute (RV x.135.7). Plato's special word *σπεινωτός* (*Timaeus* 70b) implies the extreme tenuity of these ducts, which is emphasized in the Upaniṣads by comparison to a hair. As was rightly observed by Haas, in *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 159, the *suṣumnā* (MU vi.21) by which the Spirit ascends from the heart—by way of the bregmatic fontanelle—to the Sun, is not a vein or artery. This is not a physiology but a psychology, and it would be futile to seek any of these ducts in the body (as futile as it would be to seek the soul by a dissection of the body), for only their analogies, our nerves and veins, can be seen.

All the Powers of the Soul are "extensions" (τεταμένα, *Republic* 462e, cf. Philo, *Legum allegoriarum* 1.30, 37) of an invisible principle; when it abandons any inveterated body, then just as a goldsmith "draws out for himself (*tanute*)" from the gold another shape (*rūpam*), so the Self (of all beings, not our 'self,' but the Only Transmigrant) "makes for itself" (*ḥurute*) another shape (*rūpam* = *tanus*, BU iv.4, cf. BG II.22). Our Breaths are the "threads" (*tantu*, *tantri*, *sūtra*) of which the solar Spider (KB XIX.3), our Self (RV I.115.1), spins his web (BU II.1.20) of seven rays (RV I.105.9), the "tissue" of the Universe; and in the last analysis, "one thread" (Brahma Up. I) on which all this universe is "strung" (BG VII.7, "on Me, like rows of gems on a thread"; *Dhyāna* Up. VIII, "all these elemental beings on the Self, as on a jewel thread," cf. BG II.17, IX.4, II, etc.). Accordingly, to know the extended thread (*sūtram* . . . *vitatam*) on which these offspring are woven, to know the "thread of the thread," is to know God (AV x.8.37). To the same pattern belong the life-lines spun by the Greek Fates, and by the Norns, and the life-ray and life-

the Brahma-heart from which they proceed and to which they return; for he is both "fontal and unflowing" (*ḥsaraścāḥsarah*), fontal (*ḥsarah*) as "all elemental-beings," and "unflowing" (*aḥsarah*) in his eminence (*ḥūta-sthah*, BG xv.16);<sup>60</sup> it is because the Winds and Waters ever return upon themselves that they flow without the possibility of exhaustion (JUB I.2.5 ff.). The *hitāḥ*, then, are just those Breaths which, as we have seen, are *sam-ā-hitāḥ* at the center of their circling. As the several "members" (*angāni*) of the Breath they are "externally divided up" (*parastāt prativihitāḥ*), and their relation to that Breath is that of *upa-hitāḥ* to *hitāḥ* (Kauṣ. Up. III.5; ŚB VI.1.2.14, 15). The immanent deity—Agni, Ātman, Prajāpati—is himself "deposited" (*nihitah*,<sup>61</sup> RV III.1.20; KU II.20; MU

threads of RV I.109.3 (*raśmi*) and II.28.5b (*tantu*).

We said "extensions" above with explicit reference to Skr. *tan*, to which the foregoing words beginning with "t" are referable. The basic senses of the root are those of tension, tenuity, and tone, all highly appropriate to the Breaths; and it is also noteworthy that Skr. *tan*, to "extend," and *stan*, to "sound, thunder," are as closely related as are *τείνω* and *στένω*, the latter present in Plato's *σπεινωτός*. The "paths" of the Powers of the Soul are thus much rather "directions" than concrete channels; and in fact, as a group of five, the microcosmic Breaths are precisely what the "five visible directions" (four quarters and zenith) are macrocosmically (ŚB XI.8.3.6, AĀ II.2.3, etc.).

The whole conception is a part of the well-known "thread-spirit" (*sūtrātman*) doctrine and of the symbolism of weaving and sewing (cf. Coomaraswamy, "Primitive Mentality," [in Vol. I of this edition—ED.]), according to which the Sun connects all things to himself by means of pneumatic "threads" which are "rays" that he extends. For some of the references, see "Primitive Mentality," "Literary Symbolism" [also in Vol. I], and W. B. Henning, "An Astronomical Chapter of the *Bandahishn*," JRAS, 1942, p. 232, n. 6, referring to "these indivisible and indestructible connecting lines . . . [or] pipe-lines, Coptic *lihme*." The pneumatic "threads" or "rays" are likewise the "wind-cords" of MU I.4 (cf. BU III.7.2) and Rūmī's "cords of causation" (*Mathnawī* 1.849). The *hitāḥ* and *nādyah* with which they coincide are essentially what we should now call "forces" and "lines of force." Cf. notes 31, 51, 67, 75.

<sup>60</sup> *Kūta-sthah* is rendered by "eminent" because the expression reverts to the architectural symbolism explained above, *ḥūta* being the ridge, peak, or "angle" of a building and equivalent to *ḥannikā* (see Coomaraswamy, "Pāli *ḥannikā*: Circular Roof-plate" [in Vol. I of this edition—ED.]).

That "all things flow" (as the *πέοντες* maintained) and that "the whole is stationary" (as the *στασιώται* maintained) no more involves a contradiction than are time and eternity contradictories, one true, the other false (cf. *Theaetetus* 181 ff.). Where all things turn about one center, one and the same whole moves and does not move; the mover (trans. or intrans.) remains unmoved—"One unshifting outgoes others running, though standing still," and is neither diminished by what it gives or increased by what it takes (Iśā Up. 4; BU IV.4.23, v.1; *Enneads* IV.8.2).

<sup>61</sup> Pp. of *ni-dhā*, to set down, implant, deposit, bury. This en-graving or housing is at the same time a bondage from which the Person cannot easily disentangle himself, whence the prayer "Release us that are bound," as it were in a net (*nidhā* = *pāsāḥ*, snares, AB III.19).

II.6c) in the "cave" (*guhā*)<sup>62</sup> of the heart, and so therefore are the Mind and the Breaths "deposits" (*nihitam, nihitāh*, RV 1.24.7; AV x.2.19; Muṇḍ. Up. II.1.8). Agni, again, is "sent forth" or "put forth" (*prahitāh*) as a messenger (*ἄγγελος*) (AV xviii.4.65)—it is one of his commonest epithets; and so are the powers of the soul, which are "Measures of Fire,"<sup>63</sup> put forth (*prahitāh*, AĀ II.1.5) and to be equated, as we shall see, with the Seven Ṛsis, our body-guard,<sup>64</sup> and with the Maruts who are similarly

<sup>62</sup> *Guhā*, "cave," with respect to the "mountain (*giriḥ* √ *gr*, swallow) of Brahma," our elemental soul, composite of eye, ear, mind, speech, and smell, in which Brahma is "swallowed up" (AĀ II.1.4). This conception is the same as that of the "entombment" of the soul in the body (*Phaedrus* 250c; *Enneads* IV.8.3; Philo, *De opificio mundi* 108, etc.), or macrocosmically in the "heart" of the world-mountain; in either sense the "cave" is the same as Plato's (*Republic*, ch. 7). The image of the "cave," moreover, in which the deity is "seated" or "deposited" (*niśīdan, nihitam*), and that he inhabits (*praviśya*) as his mansion (*brahma-sālā*), underlies the symbolism of buried treasure (*nidhi*) and that of mineral "deposits" (*dhātu*), delving, and mining (MU VI.28). Cf. René Guénon, "La Montagne et la caverne," *Études traditionnelles*, XLIII (1938). Again, because of the correspondence of "center" with "summit," there is an analogous interpretation of mountain climbing; the radiating powers of the soul are so many paths converging to the mountain top (*ad eminentiam mentis*, in the words of St. Bonaventura, who likewise assimilates *mons* to *mens*), by which paths the Comprehensor can reach their source (JUB 1.30.1)—climbing the "slope" (*ucchrāyam*, √ *ud-śri*, JUB 1.5.7; cf. *ucchrāyi*, a sloping plank, side of a triangle or pyramid) that corresponds to the Platonic and Hermetic *ánodos*. Of all the ways that lead to the summit of the mountain, those of the active life are on its outward slopes, and that of the contemplative is an inward and vertical ascent, while the point at which all meet is one and the same.

<sup>63</sup> See Coomaraswamy, "Measures of Fire" [in this volume—ED.]. The psychic faculties are "fires" (*prāṇāgnayah*, *Praśna* Up. IV.3; *indriyāgnayah*, BG IV.26); the Breaths "kindle" (*samindhate*, √ *idh*, as in *aiθḥp*) everything here (AB II.4), i.e. quicken, awaken all things to life. Agni himself is the Breath (*passim*), and "in that they bear him apart in many places, that is his form as the Universal Gods" (*viśve-dēvāh*, AB III.4), i.e., Breaths (TS V.6.4.1), speech, sight, hearing, mind, and all else (SB X.3.3) that this Great Being (*mahābhūta*) suspires (BU IV.5.11). *Noster Deus ignis consumens* (Heb. 12:29) is "the principle of every life" (Jacob Boehme, *Signatura rerum* XIV.29) and Heraclitus' "ever-living Fire, in measures being kindled and in measures dying out" (Fr. XX).

<sup>64</sup> The Seven Ṛsis are said to "guard" (*rakṣanti*) the body, VS *loc. cit.* This guardian function is also that of the Maruts in relation to Indra, whom they support in battle, and that of the Breaths to the Breath, as whose *svāh, svāpayah, φίλοι*, etc., they are a sort of regiment of the "King's Own," whose duty is to him and to the "house" in which all dwell together. This is just as it is also in the Greek sources, where the powers of perception and action (*αισθήσεις*) are the Janissaries (*δορυφόροι*) in attendance upon the Great King, Mind, or rational Soul, of which they are the allies (*σύμμαχοι*) and friends (*φίλοι*, Philo, *De specialibus legibus*, IV.122; *Deterius* 33) they "escort" (*δορυφορέω*) the Royal Reason to the perception of sense objects, which it would not otherwise have apprehended as such (*De opificio mundi* 139); and the

"sent forth" (*prahitāh*, VS xxxiv.55) and "placed" (*hitāh*, RV I.166.3). The deity himself, Viśvakarman (All-Worker; Indra, Agni) is at once Positor and Dispositor (*dhātṛ, vidhātṛ*, RV X.82.2, 3, where he is called "the one above the Seven Ṛsis"). That Vāyu "puts the in and out breaths" (*prāṇāpānu dadhāti*) into man (TS II.1.1.3, cf. ŚB I.8.3.12), i.e., "the deities, sight, hearing, mind, and speech" (AĀ II.3.3), or that Brahma "put" (*adadhāt*) these Breaths (AV X.2.13) *ipso facto* makes these Breaths *hitāh*.<sup>65</sup> In all these "dispositions," indeed, the Spirit is at the same time Agent and Subject, Sacrificer and Sacrifice, Divider and Dividend.

In their identification with their excavated channels (*nādyah* = *niśkḥātāh panthāh*, JUB IV.24.9; cf. AV X.7.15, CU VIII.6), the Breaths are thought of as streams or rivers (*nādyah, sindhavaḥ*) of light, sound, and life.<sup>66</sup> They are, in fact, the very waters and rivers that are released when Vṛtra is slain, and are called *nādyah* "because they sounded (*anadata*)" as they went their way (AV III.13.1; TS V.6.1.2); and in the same way "the Breath is a noise (*prāṇo vai nadaḥ*)," and when it sounds, all else resounds (*samnadati*, AĀ I.3.8).<sup>67</sup> Speech is a flowing (*ḥulyā*), originating in the pool (*hrada*)

heart is the "guard room" (*δορυφορικὴ οἰκησις*) of these sensitive powers, whence they take their orders (Plato, *Timaeus* 70B). The Royal Breath himself is the Guardian Angel of the whole organism, and in this guardianship his powers are his comrades. It is only when they, in the pursuit of their own private pleasures, neglect their duty or even lead their master astray, that "we" go wrong.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Philo's explanation of *αισθήσις* as *εἰσ-θέσις*, "a putting in" (*Immut.* 42). If, on the other hand, we connect *αισθήσις* with *αἰω* (Skr. *av; avere*), to "perceive," then it will be significant that *αἰω* (*Iliad* XV.252) also means to "breathe."

<sup>66</sup> Collectively, these are the flood or torrents of the qualities, etc. (*gun'oghāh*) by which the elemental self is swept away (MU II.2), the Buddhist "flood so hard to cross" (S 1.53), though Indra "stands upon these flowing streams at will" (AV II.13.4), cf. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, 1943, n. 269, and W. N. Brown, *Indian and Christian Miracles of Walking on the Water* (Chicago, 1928). This River of Life in which we may be swept away and drowned is Plato's "river" (*ποταμός*) of the six irrational motions of the senses (*αισθήσεις*), in which the soul is rolled along and tossed about (*Timaeus* 43), Philo's "river of the sense perceptions" (*ὁ τῶν αισθητῶν ποταμός, Legum allegoriae* III.18, cf. *Deterius* 100), and Hermes' "flood of ignorance that sweeps along with it the soul imprisoned in the body" (*Lib.* VII.11B). This is the sea that separates "this" from "yonder" shore, and that can only be crossed by the "Bridge" or in the "Ship," or on the Wings of a Bird, or by one who can "walk on the Water" as if it were dry land.

<sup>67</sup> That the Breaths "sound" in their "pipes" (*nādi* = *nāli*, flute, RV X.135.7) involves the symbolism of the body compared to an organ, as enunciated in Jacob Boehme, *Signatura rerum* XVI.3-7, "as an organ of divers and various sounds or notes is moved with only one air, so that each note, yea, every pipe, has its peculiar tune . . . and yet are only one in the divine, eternal speaking word, sound, or voice

of the Mind (JUB 1.58.1), and the Seven Rays of the Sun by which we see<sup>68</sup> and hear, etc., are also Seven Rivers (JUB 1.29.8, 9). The faculties (*indriyāni*), together with all else that the Person emanates, are "flowing streams" (*nadyah syandamānāḥ*), parts of him who is the Sea in which, when they go home, their distinctive names and aspects are lost (Praśna Up. vi.4, 5).<sup>69</sup> It is in just the same way that in the Greek sources, vision, speech, and other powers of the soul are "streams" (*ῥέος, vāma, Timaeus* 45B, 75E, etc.), as also in Chinese, vision is a "stream" (*yenpo*, 13,219 + 2336); and, indeed, we can still speak of eloquence as "fluency."

With this conception of the Breaths, and indeed of all manifested things, as streams or rivers, we can revert to the contexts in which the doors of the senses are opened, through which as if through sluices they rush forth, singing (BU 1.3). We saw that the Person, Svayambhū (*αὐτογενής*), pierced, or breached these openings (*ḥhāni vyatṛṇat ḥhāni bhivā*) and so looks out, etc., through them. Indra, Puruṣa, Svayambhū, Brahma, are, or rather is, the answer to the question of AV x.2.6.11, "Who pierced the seven apertures (*sapta ḥhāni vi tatarda*, √ *ṭṛ* as in *vyatṛṇat*) in the head, these ears, the nostrils, eyes and mouth . . . who divided up the Waters (*āpo vy-adadhāt*) for the flowing of the rivers (*sindhu-sṛtyāya*)

of God; for one only spirit rules them; each angelical prince is a property out of the voice of God, and bears the great name of God" (in which sense, also, as we shall see, the Breaths are Devas); and in Plutarch, *Moralia* 404, where the soul is God's organ. In a closely related image, the body is compared to a harp (*viṇā*, AĀ III.2.5, ŚA VIII.9.10; cf. *Phaedo* 84E ff.), which must be kept in tune if it is to be made to speak well. In Praśna Up. 11.2, the body, indwelt by the deities (*devāḥ*), is referred to as a *bāṇa* or *vāṇa*, either *vinā* as in AV x1.4, or flute, as in RV 1.85.10.

<sup>68</sup> "Whoever sees, it is by his ray that he sees," JUB 1.28.8; "in me there is another, by whom these eyes sparkle," Rūmī, *Divān*, Ode xxxvi. It is because he looks outward from within us that we do not see him; to see him who is the "only seer, himself unseen" (BU III.7.23), our eye must be turned round (*āvṛtta cakṣus*, KU IV.1). In other words, it is not with the eye of sense, but that of heart or mind that one must look for him. Rawson's attempt (KU, 1924, p. 149) to show that Plato held an opposite view is ridiculous; see *Symposium* 219, *Phaedo* 83b, and especially *Republic* 526E, where, in order to facilitate an apprehension of the Good, we should pursue "those studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region wherein dwells the most eudaimonic part of the Real, which I must needs see," and *Philebus* 61E, where vision is either of transitory things or of the immutable. Conversion (*μεταστροφή, āvṛtti*, turning round) is, in fact, "a philosophical term which Plato invented in order to describe the turning of the soul from the world of opinion and error to the principle of true being" (Werner Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology*, Milwaukee, 1943, notes 55, 58).

<sup>69</sup> Parallels abound in all traditions; cf. Coomaraswamy, "The 'E' at Delphi," n. 2 [in this volume—ED.], and Angelus Silesius, *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* II.25, Wenn du das Tröpflein wist im grossen Meere nennen, Den wist du meine Seel'im grossen Gott erkennen.

in this man?" (AV x.2.6.11).<sup>70</sup> "What Ṛṣi put man together? (*sama-dadhāt*, AV XI.8.14)." The answer is that Indra "with his bolt pierced the sluices of the streams" (*vajreṇa ḥhāni vyatṛṇat nadīnām*, RV II.15.3) and so let loose the "Seven Rivers" (RV *passim*) by which "we" see, hear, think, etc. (JUB 1.28, 29). This opening up of the *Fons vitae* (*utsam akṣitam*, RV 1.64.6, VIII.7.16, *utsa madhvas*, I.154.5, etc.) that had been restrained by the Vedic Dragon, Vṛtra, Varuṇa, the Vedic "Pharaoh,"<sup>71</sup> is the primordial and incessant act of creation and animation that is repeated in every generation and in every awakening from sleep. In "Grail"

<sup>70</sup> This is, almost word for word, Hermes, *Lib.* v.6, "Who is it that has traced the circles of the eyes, who pierced the openings of the nostrils and the ears, who opened up the mouth?" More shortly, "Who hath made man's mouth?" (Exod. 4:11).

There are no peculiarly Indian doctrines; all can be found elsewhere, and stated as nearly as possible in the same words, often in the same idioms. Compare, for instance, D II.144, "How, then, can this be possible—whereas anything whatever born, brought into being, and organized, contains within itself the inherent necessity of dissolution—that such an existence should not be dissolved? No such situation exists," with *Phaedo* 78c, "Is not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded?"; or BG II.22, "Even as a man, casting off worn-out garments, puts on other new ones, so the body-dweller (*dehin*, Inner Man, Self), doffing worn-out bodies, puts on other new ones," with *Phaedo* 87b, "Each soul wears out many bodies, especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing and being destroyed while the man still lives, and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then when the soul is released (*ἀπολλύοιτο, pratiyate*, "ab-solved"), it must needs have been wearing its last garment," and with Meister Eckhart's "Aught is suspended from the divine essence; its progression is matter, wherein the soul puts on new forms and puts off her old ones. The change from one into the other is her death, and the ones she dons she lives in" (Pfeiffer ed., p. 530). This is the true doctrine of "reincarnation," as it characterizes this present or any other contingent existence, of which the notion of the return of an "individual" to this earth after death is only a popular perversion.

In connection with all these parallels, which could be singly of relatively slight significance, but taken together and recognized as the parts of a consistent pattern are very impressive, let us say once and for all that it is by no means our intention to suggest any borrowings or influences, but rather a remote and common inheritance, just as in comparing Greek and Sanskrit words with common roots, it would not be meant that the former are of Sanskrit origin, but only that these are cognates. The parallels are etymological, idiomatic, and doctrinal, but the most that can be said is that if Greeks and Indians met in Alexandria, they could have understood one another very well, and far better than we, from our nominalist and empirical point of view, can understand either. The much argued question of Indian influence on Plotinus is beside the point; what we have to consider is the likeness of the whole Platonic to the whole Indian tradition, and what this means. It is more than a simple problem of literary history, and much rather one of a remote prehistory.

<sup>71</sup> "Pharaoh, king of Egypt, the great dragon that lieth in the midst of the waters, which hath said, my river is my own, and I have made it for myself" (Ezek. 29:3).

terms, the worlds-to-be are as yet unirrigated, unpeopled, and infertile, and Indra is the Great Hero (*mahāvira*), or as the Breath the “Only Hero (*ekāvira*, JUB II.5.1),” by whom their life is renewed and the Waste Land refreshed. When he “smote Ahi, sent forth the Seven Rivers, opened the doors that had been closed (*ahann ahim, arināt sapta-sindhūn, apa avṛnot apihitāni khāni*, RV IV.28.1),” then “he filled-full the waste-lands, and the thirsty fields (*dhanvāni ajrān aprṇak trṣānān*, RV IV.19.7),” i.e., “peopled” (*aprṇat*, √*pl* = *pr*, in “folk,” “people,” “plenty,” etc.) these worlds. The Breaths, as we have already seen, are also the Ṛṣis (√*rṣ*, rush, flow, shine cf. *rṣabha*, “bull,” and *ἄσρην*), Seers, Sages or Prophets (*vates*), and Sacrificers, usually referred to in a standard group (*gaṇa*) of seven. These Seers, expressly identified with the Breaths,<sup>72</sup> are notably “co-born” (*sajātāh, sākamjātāh*), modalities (*vikṛtayah*) or “members (*aṅgāni*) of one and the same [sevenfold] Person entered into many places,” composers of incantations (*mantrakṛt*) and “being-makers” (*bhūta-kṛt*), sacrificers and lovers of sacrifice (*priya-medhinah*), “born here again for the keeping of the Vedas”; they attend on “One beyond the Seven Ṛṣis” (Viśvakarman, solar Indra, Agni, Self, and “Only Ṛṣi”) whom they importune by labor, ardor, and sacrifice to reveal the *Janua Coeli*; they are visibly the seven lights of Ursa Major in the center of the sky and invisibly the powers of vision, hearing, breathing, and speaking in the head.<sup>73</sup> Implanted in the body (*śarīre prahitāh*), they protect it, and are these seven Breaths, the six

<sup>72</sup> ŚB VII.1.1.1, VIII.4.1.5 and 3.6, IX.1.1.21, IX.2.1.13; Sāyaṇa on RV x.82.2 and AV II.35.4; Uvavata and Mahīdhara on VS xxxiv.55; *Nirukta* x.26, *sapta-rṣimānindriyāni, ebhyaḥ para ātmā, tāni asminn ekaṃ bhavanti*; cf. also Śaṅkara on BU II.2.3. As Keith on AĀ II.2.1 points out, “the names of the seers of RV can be deduced from *prāṇa*’s actions.” Whitney, on AV x.8.9 = BU II.2.4, calls the identification of the Ṛṣis with the Breaths “extremely implausible,” but if there is one scholar whose opinions on any but purely grammatical questions are negligible, it is he. To me the identification is “extremely plausible,” but instead of merely saying so, I cite the authority of several texts and the five greatest of Indian Commentators.

<sup>73</sup> RV I.164.15, x.73.1, x.82.2; TS v.7.4.3; AV x.8.5.9, XI.12.19, XIX.41.1; ŚB II.1.2.4, VI.1.1.1 ff.; JUB I.45, I.46.1, 2, I.48.3, IV.14.5, 6, IV.26.2; BU II.2.4.

In JUB I.46.6, *gupṛyai* corresponds to AV x.8.9, *gopāh*. In JUB IV.14.6, *ava rurud hire* (“they beset”) corresponds to RV x.73.11, *upa seduh*, and AV XIX.41.1, *upa-ni-seduh*, being desirous of the Good (*bhādrām, ibid.*)—that of finding the *Janua Coeli*, or of entering-into (*apitvam*, AV x.8.5 = *apāyam*, AĀ II.2.3) Indra. These contexts throw light on the nature of the sacrificial sessions (*sattra*) in which all participate on their own behalf, and the reward is not a fee but the Self (*ātman*); “Upaniṣad” as a doctrine or mystery deriving from *upa-ni-sad* (*upa-sad*), in the sense of *avarudh*, “to lay siege to” the teacher as one who knows the Self, and as it were by pressure to make him reveal it. In the psychology of Indian education it is not so much the teacher that is expected to hand out the truth, as it is the pupil who is expected to get it from him.

*indriyāṇi* and *manas* (VS xxxiv.55 and Commentary). The formulation in BU II.2.3, 4 (cf. AV x.8.9; AĀ I.5.2)<sup>74</sup> is sufficiently explicit; the Seven Ṛṣis are the powers of hearing, seeing, breathing (smell), and eating, of which the seven openings are in the head; they surround the median Breath, and are the Breaths. This “median Breath” is, of course, the “One beyond the Seven Ṛṣis” of RV x.82.2, the “ultimate Self,” as Sāyaṇa says, and the “single-born” of RV I.164.15. To put this all in Philo’s words, “God extends (*τείναντος*) the power that proceeds from himself through the median Breath” (*Legum allegoriae* 1.37),<sup>75</sup> of which the seven most essential factors are set in the head, where are the seven apertures through which we see, hear, smell, and eat (*De opificio mundi* 119), while the “one beyond the Seven Ṛṣis” he speaks of astrologically as “a supercelestial Star, the fountain of the perceptible stars” (*De opificio mundi* 31). More generally, “our soul is divided into seven parts, five senses, speech, and generation, to say nothing of their invisible Duke” (*ἡγεμονικός, De opificio mundi* 117), a listing of the powers of the soul that often recurs in the Indian texts.

Philo’s astrological allusion brings us back to the identification of the Seven Ṛṣis with the stars of Ursa Major and to the “One beyond,” Indra, “the mover of the Ṛṣis” (*rṣi-codanaḥ*, RV VIII.51.3; cf. I.23.24, *indro . . . saha rṣibhiḥ*). Eisler cites *Testamentum Ruben*, c. 2, to the effect that “Seven spirits (*πνεύματα*) were given [to man] at the creation to do all his works . . . spirits of life, sight, hearing, smell, speech, taste, and generation, and as eighth the Spirit of Sleep,” and remarks that these are the “seven parts of the soul which, according to Stoic teaching, flow from the heart or the *ἡγεμονικόν* of the soul as air currents toward the appropriate intellectual functions, these seven parts consisting of the five senses, the power of generation and the ability to speak.”<sup>76</sup> However, I

<sup>74</sup> In AĀ I.5.2, the seven Breaths are “placed” (√*dhā*) in the head by a repetition of the seven verses of RV I.11. The Voice is separately mentioned and “not associated” (*an-anusaktā*) with the other Breaths. The logical reason for this is the well-known fact that while one can see, hear, smell, and breathe or eat at the same time, one cannot simultaneously speak and breathe, a fact that is often insisted upon (Kaus. Up. II.5, ŚA IV.5, etc.; cf. Coomaraswamy, “The Sunkiss,” 1940, p. 63), while the practical reason is to avoid the stuttering that would result if one tried to talk and breathe at once.

<sup>75</sup> Forming what Plato called “the community (of powers) extended (*τεταμένη*) throughout the body to the Soul for their single integration with its ruling part” (*Republic* 462e).

<sup>76</sup> “Orphisch-Dionysische Mysteriengedanken in der christlichen Antike,” *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, II (1922–1923), 87. Gk. *ἕννος* = Skr. *svapna*, hermeneutically a “coming into one’s own,” or “one’s Self” (*svam-apitvam*). The “Spirit

cannot but suspect that this most Indian psychology is of older than Stoic formulation, Ionian, and indirectly Babylonian. A remarkable parallel appears in the Iranian *Bundahishn*,<sup>77</sup> where Haftōreng (the Great Bear) is the General of the North, and Mēx-ī Gāh (Polaris), called also *Mēx-ī miyān āsmān* (the peg in the center of the sky), is the "General of Generals," and, further, "A tether [*rag, band*] ties each of the seven continents [= Skr. *sapta dvīpa* or *dhāma*] to the Great Bear, for the purpose of managing the continents during the period of the Mixture. That is why the Great Bear is called Haftōreng [*haft rag*]." Henning remarks in a note, "These seven tethers constitute the 'light' counterpart to the seven ties which connect the seven planets with the lower regions, and through which the planets exercise their influence upon terrestrial events." All these "ties" are what in Indian texts are called the cosmic "wind-cords" (*vāta-rajjuh*), mentioned in MU 1.4 in connection with the Pole Star (*dhruvah*; cf. *dhru-ti*, necessity, RV VII.86.6). But I do not know why Henning speaks of "planets," since he remarks elsewhere that the planets are "unknown" to his text, "with its nearly prehistoric views." The mention of "planets," however, introduces us to the fact that in some earlier (ŚB VI.7.1.17, VII.7.3.10 and BU III.7.2, where it is to the Sun, and not the Pole Star, that all things are tied by pneumatic threads) and some later texts (Hermes Trismegistos, and the traditional astrology generally), it is by the Planets which are themselves governed by the Sun and not by the Bears that terrestrial events are influenced. All this can best be explained by a transposition of symbols<sup>78</sup> to be connected with early migrations: the Axis Mundi from a "northern" point of view naturally extending from the North Pole to the Pole Star, but from an "equatorial" point of view from the "center of the earth," established sacrificially anywhere, to the Sun in the

of Sleep" thus corresponds to the Breath, or Self, into which the powers of the soul re-enter (*api-i*) in sleep or death. Man's *yea* is the gods' *nay* (AB I.16, etc.), and in this case what men call waking is for the gods a being asleep, and what men call sleep (or death) is for the gods a waking (cf. BG II.61; Phaedo 71c): a point of view that can be traced throughout the whole tradition, in which our all-too-human values are transvalued.

<sup>77</sup> See W. B. Henning, "Astronomical Chapter," pp. 229 ff.; our citations from pp. 230-34. In the same connection see also J. Pryzyluski, "Les Sept Puissances divines dans l'Inde et l'Iran," *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, XVI (1936), 500-507, and L. D. Barnett, "The Genius: a Study in Indo-European Psychology," *JRAS*, 1929, pp. 731-48 (*Fravashi* = *Purusa*; the *Amesha Spentas* correspond to the *Rsis*).

<sup>78</sup> Cf. René Guénon, "Les Portes solsticiales," *Études traditionnelles*, XLIII (1938), 180 ff.

zenith; so that in the one case the Polaris and in the other the noonday Sun is taken to be the "captain" of our soul, our "Indra."<sup>79</sup> The significance of all this will only appear when we come to a discussion of our "Fate" and its mastery.

One of the most remarkable accounts of the *Rsis* is to be found in ŚB VI.1.1.1 ff. In the beginning, they were "this non-existent" (*asat*). Men ask, "Who were those *Rsis*?" They were, indeed, the Breaths. The median Breath is Indra; he by his power (*indriya*) kindled those Breaths from the center, and they originated the "seven several Persons"; these they made into One Person (*purusa*), centering their virtue in his head, and that was the "sevenfold Person" of Prajāpati, the world's Progenitor. The emanation of the worlds is his disintegration, and the building up of the Fire (-altar) is at once his reintegration and the sacrificer's.

This is, as nearly as possible, also the story as told by Hermes, *Lib.* 1.9 ff. There the "second Mind made out of fire and water Seven Governors (*διοικήτορες*), i.e., the Seven Planets, and set agoing their revolutions. Man (*ἄνθρωπος* = *purusa*), the Son of God, having in himself the working (*ἐνέργεια*) of these Seven Governors and knowing their essence, looked down through the (solar) roofplate (*ἀρμονία*), broke through the cranium (*κύτος*)<sup>80</sup>, and loved and wedded the downward-tending Nature, who then gave birth to "seven men according to the natures of the Seven Governors," and of elemental constitution; in them the Man, from being Life and Light, became soul and mind, subjected to mortality and destiny because of the body, but still immortal in his essential form (*οὐσώδης* = *svarūpa*); so "let the man endowed with Mind recognize that he is immortal, and that the cause of death is carnal love." The text goes on to show how the Man in us can return by the way he came.

<sup>79</sup> A Sun that never really rises nor sets for the Comprehensor, for whom it is evermore high noon (CU III.11.1-3, cf. AB III.44; *Enneads* IV.4.7). So Meister Eckhart, "alse daz götlich licht der sēle unde des engels licht sich sliezent in daz götlich licht, daz heizet er den mitentac" (Pfeiffer ed., p. 123). Hence the various "miracles" in which the Sun "stands still" in the zenith for the Hero. The "Hero"—for, as Meister Eckhart says, "a perpendicular sun on one's head is a thing that few can survive" (Evans ed., I, 183).

<sup>80</sup> *Κύτος*, I think, as in *Timaeus* 45A, τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς κύτος, "the bowl of the head," and here with special reference to its top, since the entry is from above; as in AA II.4.3, where the One Self, "cleaving the hair-parting, entered by that door," i.e., by the bregmatic fontanelle, which corresponds to the macrocosmic Sundoor, the capstone (Hermes' *ἀρμονία*) of the Universe, through which the Spirit enters into and departs from it.



The Maruts, Vedic "Storm Gods" and, *entre nous*, our "stormy passions," are expressly identified with the Breaths (AB III.16, *prānā vai marutaḥ, svāpuyah prānāḥ*) or are the source of our Breaths (ŚB IX.3.1.7, *prānā vai mārutaḥ*). As Rudras they are the offspring of Rudra (Agni) and Pṛṣṇi (Earth), but win their "sacrificial names" by their cooperation with and "shouting around" Indra at the sacrifice of Vṛtra, and thus "free-willed (*svadhām anu*)"<sup>81</sup> obtained the rebirth" (RV 1.6.4, *punar garbhatvam erire*, with v.29.1 and VIII.53.5, 6), i.e., are regenerated from the sacrificial operation as gods (RV x.56.7, *karmanah . . . mahna . . . udajāyanta devāḥ*).<sup>82</sup> It need hardly be said that the gods, in their plurality, were originally mortal, and only obtained their immortality by "worth" (RV x.63.4; cf. ŚB II.2.2.8, XI.1.2.12, XI.2.3.6), or that for this very reason the sacrificial Breaths are "Perfectible Gods" (RV x.90.16, *sādhyāḥ santi devāḥ*, with reference to those first sacrificers whom Sāyaṇa rightly calls "Prajāpati's Breath-forms," *prajāpati-prāna-rūpā*;<sup>83</sup> ŚB x.2.2.3, *prānā vai sādhyāḥ devāḥ*, "the 'Perfectible Gods' are, indeed, the Breaths"). Indra ("impeller of the Ṛṣis," RV VIII.51.3) is "the Ṛṣi of the Maruts" (RV v.29.1); and they are notably "household sacrificers" (*grhamedhinah*, ŚB II.5.3.4) and participate in the sacrificial session (*sattra*)<sup>84</sup> as fellow initiates

<sup>81</sup> As *vi-dhā* (cf. n. 56) implies a dispersion of power, so *sva-dhā* is self-determination, self-placement (cf. *svasthah, αὐτόθετος*), authenticity, and in effect "free will (*kāmacāra, yathā vāsam carana*)," like that of the Gale that "bloweth as it listeth (*yathā vāsam carati*)."

<sup>82</sup> For "insofar as he does not sacrifice, one is still unborn" (JUB III.14.8; cf. JB I.17, born of the flesh, but not of the Spirit): the Man, himSelf, is born of the Sacrifice, the Fire in which "this man" sacrifices himself (ŚB III.9.4.23, VII.2.1.6, XI.9.1.1; KB xv.3), and so is redeemed from death (ŚB III.6.2.16); which sacrificial rebirth is the second birth (in the sense of John 3:6, 7), and prefigures the third birth or resurrection after death "when the time comes."

<sup>83</sup> Being only the names of his acts, the "forms" (*rūpāni*) that he assumes in his sacrificial operation (*karma*, BU 1.4.7, 1.5.21, 22); or in Indra's words addressed to the Ṛṣi Viśvāmitra, "I am the Breath, that art thou, that all elemental-beings (*bhūtāni*), and he that shines yonder (the Sun); it is in this form (*rūpa*) that I pervade all the airts (*sarvā diśo viṣṭo'smi*), thereof is my food" (AA II.2.3)—"my food," for "all the airts bring him tribute" (CU II.21.4), and it is thus that "he rises up on food" (*yad annena atirohati*, RV x.90.2).

<sup>84</sup> A sacrificial "session" (*sattra*), notably as performed by the *grhamedhinah* and *grhapati* of the human "household," i.e., mentally and meta-physically (*manasa, paroḥsam*), is conducted by priestly initiates on their own behalf; there is no patron (*yajamāna*) and therefore no pecuniary "reward" (*dakṣiṇā*), "only the Self is their reward, and it is because they obtain the Self as their reward that they reach heaven" (TS VII.4.9.1; cf. TS VII.2.10.2; KB xv.1; ŚB IX.5.2.12–16; cf. Coomaraswamy, *Ātmayajña* [in this volume—ED.] and *Hinduism and Buddhism*, 1943, p. 21).

of their Gṛhpati (Indra, Prajāpati, Agni, PB x.3.5,6, XIV.14.9)—the "house" being, of course, that of this body in which we live. It is in their capacity as sacrificers that the Maruts agree most of all with the Breaths, for "the gods, mind-born, mind-yoked, are the Breaths, in them one sacrifices immaterially" (*teṣu paroḥsam juhōti*, TS VI.1.4.4), and with a view to immortality, since it is only with incorporeal offerings that immortality can be won (AB II.14).

It will not surprise us to find that nearly everything that is said of the Breaths is also predicated of the Maruts. They are "Powers" (*vibhūṭayah*) and "appointees" (*hitāḥ*), besought to guard (*raḥsatā*) the sacrificer (RV I.166.3, 8, 11), and "ward the mortal" (*pānti martyam*, RV v.52.4); they are "fires" (*agnayah*, RV III.26.4), "rays" (*raśmayah*, PB XIV.12.9; ŚB IX.3.1.25), mingled with "glory" (*śriyā*, RV VII.56.6, cf. v.55.3); and like the Breaths they are compared to the spokes of a wheel (RV v.58.5, x.78.4). They are notably "co-born" (*sāḥam jātāḥ*, RV v.55.3 = *sāḥam-ukṣ*, VII.58.1), brothers of whom none is older or younger (v.59.5, 6. v.60.5).<sup>85</sup> As rain-gods they are very closely associated with (RV) and even identified with the Waters (AB VI.30), and it is either as winds or waters that they make the mountains "roar" (*nadayantu*, RV I.166.5), while, like the Seven Rivers, they are "acquainted with Order" (*rtajñāḥ*, RV v.58.8). Like the elemental-beings (MU VI.10.35), they are identified with Soma-stalks<sup>86</sup> (RV I.166.3; Sāyaṇa, *prānādi rūpeṇa śarire sthitāḥ*; TS VI.4.4.4, *prānā vai aṅśavah*). They are, like the Ṛṣis and Breaths, a troop (*gaṇa*), or troops of seven or sevens (ŚB II.5.1.13, v.4.3.17,<sup>87</sup> IX.3.1.1–25;<sup>88</sup> TS v.4.7.7, etc.), whose troop-leader (*gaṇānām gaṇapati*,<sup>89</sup> RV II.23.1, x.112.9; *sagaṇa*,

<sup>85</sup> See *akaniṣṭha* in Coomaraswamy, "Some Pāli Words" [in this volume—ED.].

The equality of the Maruts who, like the Breaths, are compared to the spokes of a wheel, of which spokes none is first or last in order, is like that of clansmen or guildsmen and gives its proper meaning to the phrase, "all men are born equal."

<sup>86</sup> For the implications of this, see *Ātmayajña*, p. 239 ff.

<sup>87</sup> An analysis of the "chariot" (cf. AA II.3.8; KU III.3; J v.1252) with its wooden body, four horses, driver, and royal passenger, "seven in all," like the "sevenfold Person" of ŚB VI.1.1.1 ff.

<sup>88</sup> Verses 4–6, beginning "and these worlds are the same as this head," correspond very closely to the description of the cosmic "head" in *Timaeus* 44D, 45B, 81D.

<sup>89</sup> The Maruts being also Rudras, their father, Rudra, is also called the "leader of hosts" (*gaṇānām gaṇapati*, VS XVI.17; ŚB IX.1.1.18). In the "later" mythology, in which Śiva (Rudra) is attended by troops (*gaṇa*) of spirits (*bhūta*), this leadership is exercised by his sons, intellectually by Gaṇapati (Gaṇeśa, the elephant-headed deity) and in the military sense by Kārttikeya (Senāpati), these two representing the Sacerdotium and the Regnum and corresponding to the Vedic Agni-Bṛhaspati and Indra.



III.47.4) is Brahmaṇaspati (the Sacerdotium)<sup>90</sup> or Indra (the Regnum)—Indra, “the impeller of the Ṛṣis” (RV VIII.51.3), “is their Ṛṣi” (v.29.1). In other words, they are the subjects, liegemen, yeomen, and militia of the dual government of Indrābṛhaspatī,<sup>91</sup> and the pattern of the “Commons” of the body politic, whether of the state or the human being, of which the health depends upon their loyalty to their head; as is explicit in TS v.4.7.7 and VI.1.5.2, 3, where the unanimity and loyalty of earthly peoples is a consequence of the attachment of the Maruts to the Regnum *in divinis*.

It is chiefly here, in their relation to Agni and Indra, to whom, indeed, the Maruts may be disloyal (RV I.165, VIII.7.30, 31, etc.) but whom they normally serve as allies in the battle with Vṛtra and the winning of the Rivers with which they are so closely connected, that their significance for our psychology mainly centers. Throughout the Vedic literature we find that in the battle with Vṛtra, “overweening (*abhimāti*)” Indra is forsaken by the terrified gods and fights alone, or rather with no other aid but that of his “good allies” (RV VIII.53.5, 6) the Maruts or Breaths, who by their participation in this sacrificial operation attain their divinity (RV I.87.5, VIII.96.7; AB III.16, 20, etc.).<sup>92</sup> It is as their leader, not when they are pursuing their own ends, that he is victorious; he is the Regnum, and the whole science of government is one of self-control (*Arthasāstra* I.6).

We have already seen, incidentally, that the powers of the soul, whether as Breaths or otherwise designated, are referred to as “gods” (*deva, devatā*), although it might be more intelligible here, inasmuch as these powers are the subjects of God and sent forth by him on His errands, to render by “angels”; for these are not the “many gods” of a “polytheism” (if such a thing ever or anywhere existed), but the delegations and extensions

<sup>90</sup> *Saptagu*, RV x.47.6 i.e., “seven-rayed”; cf. Grassmann, s.v. *gu* in senses 7, 8: as is explicit for Agni-Bṛhaspati in RV I.146.1 and VI.44.14.

<sup>91</sup> For the theory, see Coomaraswamy, *Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Theory of Government*, 1942. The application of the whole of this theory is as much with respect to self-control as with respect to the government of a State: this is, in other words, a psychology of government.

<sup>92</sup> In the Buddhist version of the same story, the Bodhisatta is in the same way deserted by the gods and left “alone”; but the cardinal virtues or powers that are “as it were his henchmen” (*parijāna*, cf. *paribṛhan* in AB VI.28, and *śrījā parivṛahan* in JUB IV.24.11) do not desert him and, using them as his shield, he overcomes Māra’s (Namuci’s, Vṛtra’s) army (J I.72 ff.). What this implies, equally for Indra and the Bodhisatta, is that they are victorious inasmuch as they are recollected, have collected themselves, are “in *samādhi*”: for “he is ‘deserted by the gods’ who knows them otherwise than in himself” (BU IV.5.7).

of the power of one God. With this reservation, however, we shall continue to employ the usual rendering of *deva* and *devatā* by “god” or “divinity.” By now we should be in a position to understand the statement of AV XI.8.18b, “having made him their mortal house, the gods [angels] inhabited man” (*grham kṛtvā martyam devāḥ puruṣam āviśan*), and that of JUB I.14.2, “all these gods are in me,” and ŚB IX.2.1.15 (cf. VS XVII.14), where they are neither in the sky nor on earth but in animated beings (*prāninaḥ*).<sup>93</sup> These gods as they are within you (*adhyātman*) are voice, sight, mind, hearing, but *in divinis* (*adhidevatam*) manifestly Fire, Sun, Moon, and the Quarters. “Whatever they give me not is not in my power” (AĀ II.1.5; cf. VS XVII.15). The latter enter into man according to their stations (*yathāyatanam = yathākarma*, BU I.5.21), at the command of the Self: Fire becoming Voice enters into the mouth; the Quarters becoming hearing enter the ears; the Sun the eyes; Plants becoming hairs, the skin; the Moon becoming mind in the heart; the Waters becoming seed, the penis. Hunger and thirst are apportioned to all these deities, as partners, sharing in all that they obtain (AĀ II.4.2).<sup>94</sup> It is precisely this hunger and thirst that distinguish the animal judgment (*abhiñāna*)<sup>95</sup> from that of the Person endowed with prescience (*prajñāna*), the former knowing only today, and the latter tomorrow (AĀ II.3.2).<sup>96</sup> contacts with the quantitative (*mātrā-sparśāḥ*) are the source of pleasure and pain (*sukha-duḥkha*), and only the Person whom these do not distract (*na vy-athayanti*, do not “burn apart,” obsolete √ *ath*), one who remains the

<sup>93</sup> The words *yadā tvaṣṭā vyatṛnat* in the first line of the verse show that this empsychosis or anima-tion is predicated as taking place when the doors of the senses are pierced, here by the divine Artifex (Tvaṣṭṛ = *δημιουργός*); the following verses show that these deities that enter into us at birth are the totality of all our powers, whether for good or evil.

<sup>94</sup> Hunger and thirst are at once the origin and the disease of our contingent existence, and a definition of our mortality. The natural man is insatiable (AĀ II.3.3): “Wer viel begehrt und will, der gibet zu verstehn, dass ihm noch mangelt viel” (Angelus Silesius, *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* v.156). All eating is a changing, and “all change is a dying.” To satisfy our hunger is impossible; the enemy can be overcome only by fasting. Those who choose “hunger and thirst” for the sake of the corresponding pleasures are rejecting the true Life of the spirit (Plato, *Philebus* 54, 55): our very Self is “the Self that sur-passes (*atyeti*) hunger and thirst, distress and delusion, old age and death” (BU II.5).

<sup>95</sup> The use of *abhiñāna* here for “estimative knowledge” is sarcastic, as Plato is when he speaks of those who are governed by pleasure and pain as *ἀκολασία σῶφρων* (*Phaedo* 68E).

<sup>96</sup> The definition of the very Person of a man in AĀ II.4.2 is very striking, and should be read in connection with the classic European definition of “Person” in Boethius, *Contra Eutychen*.

"same" under both conditions, is fitted to participate in immortality (*amṛtatvāya*, BG II.31 = ἀθανάθειν, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* x.7.1077b.31 = the *s'eternar* of Dante, *Inferno* xv.85), the goal to which the whole of our traditional psychology points and which is, therefore, as has been so well said, "the supreme aim of human education."<sup>97</sup>

Thus the instinctive life of the "gods within you," veritably fallen angels, is the passion of the Self for so long as it desires and pursues; and the purpose of Initiation or Consecration, *dīkṣā*, being precisely the destruction of ignorance and the recovery of the knowledge of the Self, we can readily understand the necessity for an initiatory<sup>98</sup> regeneration of the powers of the soul, if they are to be set free from their mortality. It will be clear that only he "is really initiated whose 'gods within him' are initiated," namely, mind, speech, breathing, sight, and hearing (collectively "man's constitution," *manuṣyasya sambhūti*), each by its own equivocal principle (KB VII.4; cf. ŚB III.1.3.18-22 and XIII.1.7), so that we by "setting free the Hearing of hearing, the Mind of the mind—that is, indeed, the Breath of breathing—and the Seeing of sight, may, when we leave this world, leave it as immortals" (JUB IV.18.2 = Kena Up. 1.2).<sup>99</sup> For whether we are saved

<sup>97</sup> Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology*, pp. 34-35 and notes 34-36.

<sup>98</sup> Initiation, or a being born again, is—no less from an Indian than a Platonic and Neoplatonic point of view—indispensable to ultimate liberation. Needless to say that Initiation implies a Master (*guru*) through whom the spiritual power is transmitted and by whose mediation the disciple is born again of God as father and of Sophia = Sāvitrī as mother. We cannot go into this at length here but only refer, for Plato, to *Phaedo* 69cd, where Socrates maintains that "whoever goes uninitiated and unperfected to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there cleansed and perfected will dwell with the gods," adding that the Bacchoi are the true philosophers and that he has ever striven to be one of them; and to *Theaetetus* 155e, where the "uninitiated" are described as "those who think that nothing is other than what they can grasp firmly with their hands, and who deny the existence of actions (*πράξεις* = *karma*) and of becomings (*γενέσεις* = *bhava*), and of all that is invisible"; and for Neoplatonism to Hermes Trismegistos, *Lib.* XIII.

Where all instruction is encyclical and there are no "mysteries," the traditional psychology can only be taught as a curiosity or, at best, can effect an intellectual preparation which may dispose the student to work out his own salvation, but cannot do it for him. Yet to have accepted, even in theory, that "I" and "mine" are baseless concepts, to have consented to "deny ourself" even though we have not been able to do so, is already a partial release and deliverance from the dominion of pleasure and pain.

<sup>99</sup> For some discussion of this, see Coomaraswamy, "*Prāṇā-citi*," 1943, p. 108. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII.9.4, "Thinking cannot be the highest good. Therefore Mind (*νοῦς* = *manas*), if it be the Master Mind that we are speaking of, thinks nothing but itself, and its thinking is the 'Thinking of thinking'; similarly Witelō, *Liber de intelligentiis* xxiv, xxvii, "Intelligentia semper intelligit . . . [sed] se ipsam

or lost depends entirely upon whether we have "known ourselves," Who we really are, and on the answer to the pregnant question, "In whom, when we depart, shall we be going forth?" (BU IV.4.13, 14, *Praśna Up.* VI.3), i.e., in our mortal selves or in the "self's immortal Self," the "Soul of the soul."<sup>100</sup>

This whole problem can as well be stated in terms of the mastery of Fate and the transcending of Necessity. Here we must revert to what was said above concerning the Seven Ṛṣis; for the conception of our constitution and consequent Destiny that was there implied is by no means uniquely Indian but, for example, identical with the Platonic doctrine set forth by Hermes Trismegistus (*Lib.* I.9.16, XVI.13 ff., *Excerpt XII*, and elsewhere). Here the creative (*δημιουργός*) solar Mind "made out of Fire and Spirit Seven Governors, who encompass in their orbits the sensible universe, and their Government (*διοίκησις*, literally housekeeping, economy) is called 'Destiny' (*εἰμαρμένη*)." These Governors are the Seven Planets (*ἀστέρα*, stars, lights) and they act upon us, or rather in us, through the corresponding Daimons<sup>101</sup> who take charge of us at birth, entering into the two irra-

cognoscendo non cognoscit alia" (Commentary, *per receptionem non intelligit, sicut anima*); BU IV.3.28 and IV.5.15, "For where there is a duality, as it were, there one thinks of another. But where everything has become just one's own Self (*yatra svasya sarvaṃ āmaivābhūt*), then how and of what would one 'think'?" So far is this, indeed, from *cogito ergo sum*, that that which "thinks" is precisely "not my Self!"

<sup>100</sup> The hoped-for answer to the question of *Praśna Up.* VI.3 is, of course, that of AĀ II.6, "departing hence with the Prescient Self (*prajñenātmanā*), he is reborn (*samabhavat*) immortal." In general, it is assumed that a full life here, sacramentally understood, must imply the full life there; and for this reason death is traditionally an occasion for rejoicing rather than for sorrow. For those who know their Self, there can be no fear of death (AV x.8.44). The display of grief at an Indian funeral (cremation) is exceptional; when such a display takes place, even a peasant will say, "poor man, he knows no better."

<sup>101</sup> Our speaking of the Indian psychology as a *bhūta-vidyā* was, in fact, as much as to say a "demonology." We must, of course, divest ourselves of the pejorative connotations with which Christianity has invested the word "*daimon*," which, like its Indian equivalent, *yaṅsa* and *bhūta*, refers to God or to beings of divine origin, though they may be either good (obedient) or evil (disobedient). The traditional demonology is at once an angelology and a psychology. We nowadays look back on all these things as "superstitions," and such indeed they are, in the literal sense of "survivals"; but that we now call the demons within us "instincts" changes nothing in the nature of the "ruling passions" to which we are subjected until we have learned to master them and use them for ourselves. An instinct is an impulse (*instinguere*, instigation) and we still rightly speak of our instincts as "*tendencies*" (because they pull us) and of wishful thinking as *tendentious*. Psychology is fundamentally a pathology, as

tional parts of the soul and pervading the body, wherein, being seated in its vessels<sup>102</sup> they pull us to and fro towards themselves (*ἀνθέλκουσι . . . εἰς ἑαυτοῦς*), thus governing our earthly life, using our bodies as their instruments. Most of us are led and driven by these Daimons because of our enjoyment of the activities in which, as Hermes says, their being consists. But "neither the gods [the aforesaid Seven Planetary Governors] nor the Daimons have any power against the One Light-Ray that is of God,"<sup>103</sup> and "there are some few<sup>104</sup> in the Reasonable Part<sup>105</sup> of whose soul there shines this Ray that comes from God by way of the Sun [the aforesaid Creative Mind]," and in these the working of the Daimons

Plato's *πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν* announces, and "every passion is an epileptic seizure" (*ἐπίληπτον*, being captivated, caught), Philo, *Legum allegoriae* iv.79. To "behave" according to our likes and dislikes is not a liberty, nor an act, but a subjection and a passion. The soul's sickness is its own self-will. By whatever name we call the "horses," the problem remains the same, to drive or to be driven by them.

We cannot discuss the etymology of "daimon" here, but would connect it with Skr.  $\sqrt{day}$  or *dā* and with *daitya* and *dānava*; and it is probably significant that Indra is said to overcome the Daityas and Dānavas in seven groups of seven in their respective stations (*yathāsthānam*, BD vii.51, 52), which seems to refer to a "victory over the powers of perception and action," such as in *Arthasāstra* 1.6 is called "the whole science of government."

<sup>102</sup> The aforesaid *nāḍyah*, *στενωποί*, etc. (see n. 59), and to be thought of as the "lines of force" by which our being is penetrated.

<sup>103</sup> Plato's "golden chain" (*Laws* 645) and Dante's "raggio dell'alta luce, che da sè è vera" (*Paradiso* xxxiii.53).

<sup>104</sup> "For, as they say with reference to the mysteries, 'Many are the thyrsus-bearers, but few the Bacchoi'; and these, I hold, are the only true philosophers" (*Phaedo* 69c). "To you it has been given to know the secrets of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it has not been given. . . . Seeing they do see, and hearing they do not hear, nor do they understand . . . lest they should perceive . . . and hear . . . and understand . . . and turn for me to heal them," Matt. 13:11-15. The last thing that the "modern man in search of a soul" desires is to be healed—"In the last days men shall be lovers of their own selves," II Tim. 3:1, 2.

<sup>105</sup> Although it is almost unavoidable to render *λόγος*, *λογισμός*, *λογιστικός* by "Reason" and "reasonable," the notion of an infallible Calculus is what is really implied, and it must be clearly understood that the Platonic "Reason" is by no means our "rationality," but much rather Aristotle's "Mind of the mind," the Mind that is "always right" (*De anima* iii.10, 33a.27), and the Scholastic *Synteresis*, *Intellectus vel Spiritus*, than it is our "mind" or "reasoning power" that forms opinions and acts accordingly. Already for Boethius, reason is a mortal faculty, and when he calls himself a "reasoning and mortal animal," Philosophia rejoins that he has forgotten Who he is. The greater part of what is nowadays called "knowledge" is based on nothing better than statistics, and its "facts" are only what we "make" of these; the greater part of modern education, therefore has little or nothing to do with man's last end, *s'eternar*.

(i.e., the pulls of the sensitive powers pursuing their natural objects) comes to naught. And so God rules the gods, and they the Daimons, their representatives in us; he works through both, and so makes all things for himself; and all things are members (*μέρια*)<sup>106</sup> of himself.

This profound psychology is all derived directly from Plato,<sup>107</sup> mainly from *Laws* 644E, 645A. Plato's doctrine of the irrational and mortal soul (with its better and worse parts) and its distinction from the rational and immortal Soul is, of course, identical with the Indian distinction of our passible self from "its immortal Self and Duke." These two dwell together in the house or city of the body, or ride in one and the same bodily vehicle, and the question arises as to which shall control it. In the figure of the puppet<sup>108</sup> Plato speaks of man as literally dis-tracted by his passions. He says that these affects in us (*ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν*) pull us to and fro (*ἀνθέλκουσι*), and being contrary to one another (*ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι*, as in Aristotle, *De anima* iii.10.433b5) do so in contrary directions, either to good or evil as the case may be.<sup>109</sup> But there is "one holy golden leading

<sup>106</sup> Closely related to *μοῖρα*, "share," and so "fate," as discussed below.

<sup>107</sup> Scott [cf. Hermes—ED.] calls the notion of *εἰμαρμένη* "Stoic," but it was Platonic before Stoic: cf. *Phaedo* 115A and *Gorgias* 512A. Equally Platonic is the doctrine of the Gods and Daimons, of whom Plato says that they are "our allies in battle, and we their properties" (*Laws* 90b, cf. *Phaedo* 62B and Philo, *De specialibus legibus* iv.122). All these things are "myths" of the Philosophia Perennis, and there is no more reason to stop short with the Stoics, or even to suppose that Plato invented them, than there is to suppose that they are of Indian origin in their Greek setting.

<sup>108</sup> For which there are many Indian parallels, Hindu and Buddhist. See Coomaraswamy, *Lilā* and "Play and Seriousness" [both in this volume—ED.]. A puppet is a "wonder" (*θαῦμα*) and, as Plato also says, "Wonder is the beginning of philosophy" (*Theaetetus* 155D). We need hardly say that the *gravamen* of all traditional "jugglery" is metaphysical.

<sup>109</sup> Contrary directions, whether ethical or aesthetic. It is precisely in a liberation from these alternatives, these "pairs of opposites," that freedom consists. The free-man's active conduct (cf. *συνάγω*, *ἀγωγή*, Skr. *samāḥ*, *samāḥa*,  $\sqrt{aj}$ , *āḡa*, Lat. *ago*, whence "act") is anything but an instinctive and passive behavior; (by one of the "coincidences" of Skr. etymology, *a-ja* means "unborn": and the Mover of all things is *aja* in both senses) to conduct oneself is to "be in act," to behave is to "be in *potentia*"; conduct is *con-sidered*, behavior inconsiderate—the former, that is to say, in agreement with the orderly motion of the stars, behavior eccentric. The distinction parallels that of *σύννοια* from *παράνοια*, and that of Skr. *svarāj* (autonomy) from *anyarāj* (heteronomy) as drawn in CU vii.25.2, cf. viii.1.5, 6.

In connection with "being in act," it is significant that Vedic *aja* (agent, agile, and hence also "goat") is a characteristic Vedic epithet of the Sun, Rudra, or Indra (troop leader of the Maruts), while the *ajāsah* (pl.) who "bring tribute" (*balim . . . jabruh*) to Indra (RV vii.18.19) are almost certainly the Maruts.

string of Reason, viz. the common Law of the body politic,<sup>110</sup> and this we should always hold on to and cooperate with, so that the golden kind within us may overcome the other kinds." Aristotle's doctrine is the same, although he does not use the "myth" of the puppet: motion always implies a choice of some kind, but the choice may be made either in accordance with the Reason (λογισμός) or determined by the Passions (ἐπιθυμία), in which last case (that of Plato's ἤττω ἐαυτοῦ, *Republic* 431B, 440B, etc.) the resulting motion will be irrational. The Mind (of the mind) is always right; but appetite and mental images (φαντασία, = *samkalpa* or *rūpa*) may be either right or wrong (*De anima* III.10. 433a.22 ff.).<sup>111</sup>

These summaries of the Platonic and Neoplatonic psychology introduce the problem of Fate and Free Will, fundamental in the present context, in which we are considering a science dispositive to Freedom in the fullest and every sense of the word. There is hardly any doctrine of the Philosophia Perennis that has been more misunderstood, and therefore more resented, than that of Fate; resented, because it has been supposed that Fate (implied in the notion of Providence) is, as it were, an arbitrary decree imposed upon us by an all-too-personal deity—nowadays also referred to by the new name of "economic determination." The traditional and orthodox doctrine is a recognition of the causal chain by which all events are linked in a phenomenal succession,<sup>112</sup> but of their intrinsic and not extrinsic operation. It can be stated in the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, "Fate lies in the created [i.e., mediate] causes themselves" (*Sum. Theol.* I.116.2), or those of Rūmī, "Endeavor is not a struggle with Destiny, because Destiny itself has laid this endeavor upon us" (*Mathnawī* 1.976); "Necessitarianism is to sleep amongst highwaymen" (*Mathnawī* 1.943); "You have feet; why do you make yourself out to be lame?"

<sup>110</sup> We cannot refrain from calling attention here to a serious error in R. G. Bury's version, Loeb Library edition, p. 69; the "golden chain" is not "the public law of the State" but "the common law of the (individual) body politic": "common law" (κοινὸς νόμος) because our own psychophysical constitution is a *κοινωνία* (*Republic* 462c), we are an "aggregate animal" (κοινὸν ζῷον, *Timaeus* 89d). It would have been against Plato's whole position to make an absolute of the law of any State; he is talking of a Law (Skr. *dharma*) on which all other laws are to be based.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi* 117 (where he reverts to the myth of the puppet); *Legum allegoriae* 30; *Quod Deus* 43.

<sup>112</sup> Buddhist *hetupaccaya*, "causal sequence"; St. Augustine's "series of causes" (*De civitate Dei* v.8). For Plato's mediate, or more literally "ministerial causes" (αἰτίαι ὑπερηθύνσαι), called also sons of God, young gods and gods of gods (θεοὶ θεῶν, cf. VS xvii.13, 14 and SB ix.2.1.14, 15, *devā devānām* = *prāṇāḥ*, a remarkable parallel), see *Timaeus* 41, 42, 68, 69, 70; *Republic* 617e; *Laws* 904.

(*Mathnawī* 1.930). Similarly in Buddhism, where the infallible operation of causes is insisted upon at least as strongly as it is by St. Thomas ("non-causation" [*ahetuvāda*] being a heresy), it is no less forcibly taught that there is an "ought-to-be-done" (*hiriya*) and that to plead a causal necessity by no means absolves a man from the responsibility of making a choice between the ought-to-be-done and the ought-not-to-be-done; and the fact that such a choice can be made is a predication of Free Will. The traditional doctrine is one of Fate and Free Will, and must be so, just because there are "two in us," one fatally determined and the other free. Of these two, to have become what we are is to have risen above our fate. The chain of fate can never be broken, but we can break away from it to become its spectator, no longer its victim.

The traditional conception of Fate involves no concept whatever of a possible injustice. Εἰμαρμένη or μοῖρα is literally an "allotment": the essential meaning of  $\sqrt{\text{mer}}$ , present in Latin *mereo* and English "merit," is simply to "receive one's portion, with the collateral notion of being one's due" (H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 8th ed., Oxford, 1897). Μοῖρα is sometimes simply "inheritance," and to be ἄμοιρος is to be deprived of one's due share, usually of something good, and in this case of "life"; κατὰ μοῖραν is the same as κατὰ φύσιν, "naturally" or "duly": to quarrel with our fate is to quarrel with our own nature, and to wish we had never been born. For how otherwise could we have been born than at a given time and place, and with given possibilities or "gifts"? Our Fate is only "what is coming to us," and "what we ask for"; "there are no special doors for calamity and happiness; they come as men themselves summon them" (*Thai-Shang*, SBE, XL, 235). "Nothing, whether good or bad, that has to do with the body, can happen apart from Destiny (εἰμαρμένη). It is moreover 'destined' that he who has done evil shall suffer evil; yea to this end he does it, that he may suffer the penalty of having done it. . . . And all men undergo what Destiny has appointed for them, but rational men (those of whom I said that they are led by Mind) do not suffer it in the same way as the irrational. . . . For the Mind there is nothing impossible, neither to exalt the soul of man over Destiny, nor, if the soul, as sometimes happens, give no heed, to subject it to Destiny" (Hermes, *Lib.* xii.1.5, cf. x.19, as well as Plato, *Phaedo* 83a, and MU iii.2).

The traditional doctrine predicates a First Cause which is directly the cause of our Being (by participation), but only indirectly, through the working of the second or mediate causes, with which it never interferes, the cause of our being what we are. We, in our idiosyncrasy, are, there-

fore, precisely the *heirs*<sup>113</sup> of things done (*ḥarma*). This “unseen” (*adr̥ṣṭa*) force of “our *ḥarma*,” although a weird that must be dreed, is nothing imposed upon us, but the law of our own nature. God, from the Indian point of view, is not an arbitrary appointer of fates, but simply the “overseer of *ḥarma*.” In other words, as Plato also says, all that is done by the cosmic Draughts Player, and that “is a wondrous easy task,” is “to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse to a worse, according to what belongs to each of them, thus apportioning an appropriate fate (*μοῖρα*). . . . For according to the trend of our desires, and the nature of our souls, each one of us usually becomes of like character<sup>114</sup> . . . the divinely virtuous being transported by a holy road to another and better place” (*Laws* 903, 904). So in Christian doctrine, similarly, “Fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God” (*Sum. Theol.* 1.116.4), “without which the world would have been deprived of the perfection of causality” (*Sum. Theol.* 1.103.7 ad 2).

We are, then, at the mercy of our own characteristic willing; when the sensitive powers are given free rein, whenever we are doing what we like or thinking wishfully, insofar as our whole behavior—whatever good or evil—is unprincipled, we are not free agents, but passive subjects of what are rightly called our “passions.” This is the only orthodox doctrine, namely, that man as he is in himself, “this man” who does not know what is true but only what he likes to think, who does not know what is right but only what he wants to do, and who knows nothing of art but only what he likes, is not a free man and makes no choices, but is pulled and driven by forces that are not his own because he has not mastered them. So St. Augustine asks, “Why, then, should miserable men venture to pride themselves on their ‘freewill’ before they are set free?” (*De spiritu et littera* 52); Boethius explains that “Everything is by so much the freer from Fate by how much it draweth nigh to the Pivot (*cardo*).<sup>115</sup> And if it

<sup>113</sup> References in Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, 1943, notes 211, 218, 221, 225.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. BU IV.4.5; MU VI.34.3c.

<sup>115</sup> *Cardo*, √ *ḥrad* as in *Καρδία*, Skr. *ḥrd*, “heart.” Meanings of *cardo* include pivot, pole (North Pole), and especially “hinge” (originally pivot) of a door. Cf. Meister Eckhart, “the door goes to and fro upon its hinge. Now I liken the swinging door itself to the Outer Man, and the hinge (*angel*, pole, pivot, hinge) to the Inner Man [*is qui intus est*, II Cor. 4:16; *antah puruṣaḥ* MU III.3; *antar-ātman*, KU VI.17, MU VI.1, BG VI.47]. As the door opens and shuts it swings out and in, but the hinge remains unmoved in one and the same place and never changes” (Pfeiffer ed., p. 489). *Cardo* as “Pole” = Skr. *ṣkambha*, *sthūna*, *vamsa*, and Islamic *qutb*, the “cardinal” principle on which all things “hinge.”

sticketh to the stability of the Supreme Mind, it transcends the necessity of Fate” (*De consolatione philosophiae* IV.6); and St. Thomas Aquinas says, “The will is free insofar as it obeys reason, not when we are doing ‘what we like’” (*Sum. Theol.* 1.26.1). “The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak” (Matt. 26:41); i.e., in terms of the classic symbols, the horses are untrained.

Thus Free Will is not ours by nature, but only potentially; our self-will is only a wanting, a hunger and a thirst, and anything but a Free Will. Yet there is a Free Will *in* us, which can be ours if we know Who we are, and can say to that Self, “Thy will be done”; but only by that consent can it be won, for “whoso hath not escaped from (self-)will, no (free-)will hath he” (Rūmī, *Divān*, Ode XII); nothing but the perfect practice of Islam (“resignation”) is perfect freedom.<sup>116</sup> Man is free only when the victory over pleasure has been won (*Laws* 840c); only “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (II Cor. 3:17); “if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the Law” (Gal. 5:18). “Other than that single, all-inclusive Life, all other life is darkness, petty, dim and poor” (Plotinus VI.7.15); “That (Brahma) is your Self; other than That all else is misery” (BU III.4.2). In other words, our Inner Man is in the world but not of it, in us but not of us, our Outer Man both in the world and of it, and must suffer accordingly.

The problem is one of internal conflict and its resolution, one of war and peace<sup>117</sup>: internal conflict because, as our whole tradition is agreed, there are “two in us,” soul and spirit, king and priest, female and male,

<sup>116</sup> On *jabar* (necessity) and *qadar* (freewill), see Nicholson’s notes on *Mathnawī* 1.470–73, 617–41.

<sup>117</sup> The private and public problems are inseparable, political wars being a projection of the civil war within us, and our “peace where there is no peace” such as it is because “everyone from the least even unto the greatest is given to covetousness” (Jer. 8:10, 11). “All wars arise for the sake of gaining money to serve the body, in which service we are slaves” (*Phaedo* 66c); “those who care for their bodies more than anything else . . . draw to them the produce of every region of the globe. . . . All these people are war-makers . . . to gain advantages pertaining to the body and outward things. But for the sake of culture and virtue, the ‘goods’ of the discriminating mind, the ruling part of us, no war whether foreign or civil has ever yet broken out” (Philo, *De posteritate caini* 116 ff.; cf. *Deterius* 34, “enjoying the privileges of subject peoples”). In its application to what Hesiod called “the best thing of all for a man,” viz. to be always at peace with himself, the traditional psychology proposes the one and only means of escape from the state of perpetual economic or political warfare in which civilization nowadays moves. No remedy can be effective but a change of heart. In this connection, cf. Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means* (London, 1937).

mortal and immortal,<sup>118</sup> and it is, as Plato says, a question "which shall rule, the better or the worse" (*Republic* 431ABC, *Laws* 644E, etc.).

This is the problem of self-mastery, for the sake of which the traditional psychology is taught, and to which Plato so often reverts. When the inward government is of the better by the worse part of the soul, i.e., of mind by the mob of the passions, then we say that a man is "subject to himself" (*ἡττω αὐτοῦ*) and so censure him, but when, conversely, the inward government is of the worse part by the better, then we say that he is "master of himself" (*κρείττω αὐτοῦ*), by way of praise; and the same applies to the right government of States (*Republic* 431; *Laws* 645B, 841C; *Protagoras* 358, etc.). In other words, "this man and wife, the reason and the flesh . . . are engaged in strife and altercation day and night" (Rūmī, *Mathnawī* 1.2617); "Self is at once self's only friend and only foe: Self is the friend of self in his case whose self has been vanquished by Self, but wages war as the foe of not-Self" (BG VI.5, 6). This is, mythically, the battle of the Gods and Titans, Devas and Asuras within you, where alone the Dragon can be killed, and ethically the psychomachy of the Virtues and the Vices.<sup>119</sup> The issue is literally one of victory or death, for, as our whole tradition assumes, there is a real division of the saved from the lost.<sup>120</sup>

How is the Victory to be won in this *jihād*? Our self, in its ignorance of and opposition to its immortal Self, is the enemy to be convinced. The Way is one of intellectual preparation, sacrifice, and contemplation, always presuming at the same time a guidance by forerunners. In other words, there is both a theory and a corresponding way of living which cannot be divided if either is to be effective. The intellectual preparation is philo-

<sup>118</sup> *Sum. Theol.* II-11.26.4, *Duo sunt in homine*, etc.; Meister Eckhart, "Know then, that . . . there are in everyone two men," Evans ed., I, 344; cf. *Republic* 604B, and Philo, *Deterius* 82.

<sup>119</sup> On the Psychomachy, cf. Emile Mâle, *Religious Art in France of the Thirteenth Century* (New York, 1913 [1956]), p. 98 ff.; and the Buddhist *Māradharaṇa*.

<sup>120</sup> "When death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part departs, unhurt and undestroyed" (*Phaedo* 106E), and the question is, "in whom [viz. in my mortal self, or in its immortal Self] shall I be departing, when I depart hence?" (*Praśna Up.* vi.3). "He whose Self has been found, whose Self is awake . . . , the (other-)world is his, indeed, he is that world. That Self may be found even here and now; if you have not found it, great is the destruction" (BU IV.4.13, 14). I do not know whether the empirical psychology has ever attempted to deal with man's natural fear of death; the traditional philosophy affirms that one who has known his own, immortal, and never-aging Self, cannot fear (AV x.8.44).

sophical, as "philosophy" was understood by the ancients. The proper object of this philosophy is stated in the words of the Delphic Oracle, "Know thy Self" (*γνώθι σεαυτόν*). That means also, of course, to distinguish Self from what is not-Self, the primary form of ignorance being a confusion of Self with what is not-Self.

The battle will have been won, in the Indian sense and Christian wording, when we can say with St. Paul, "I live, yet not I, but Christ in me" (*Gal.* 2:20); when, that is to say, "I" am dead, and there is none to depart, when body and soul disintegrate, but the immanent God. Philosophy is, then, the art of dying. "The true philosophers are practitioners of dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men . . . and being always very eager to release the Soul, the release and separation of the soul from the body is their main care" (*Phaedo* 67DE). Hence the injunction "Die before you die" (*Mathnawī* VI.723 ff., and Angelus Silesius, IV.77). For we must be "born again"; and a birth not preceded by a death is inconceivable (*Phaedo* 77C; BG II.27, etc.). This dying is to self. It is a matter both of a will, and of a method.

As regards the will, an intellectual preparation is all-important—*intellige ut credas*; and here we revert to our psychology. The whole force of this science is directed towards a destructive analysis of the animistic delusion that this man, So-and-so, who speaks of himself as "I," is an entity at all. The situation is nowhere better or more briefly stated than by Plutarch when he says, "Nobody remains one person, or is one person" (*Moralia* 392D). The argument can be followed in the European tradition from Heraclitus onwards: our "life" is a succession of instants of consciousness, everyone different from the last and from the next, and it is altogether illogical to say of anything that never stops to be, that it "is"; a thing can only be, if it never changes (*Symposium* 207D, *Phaedo* 78D ff., etc.). Our existence is not a being, but a becoming. The systematic demonstration is typically Buddhist: the personality is analyzed, generally as a composite of body, feeling, cognition, complexes, and discriminating awareness, and it is shown successively that each of these factors of the so-called "self" is inconstant, and that neither of any one nor of all together can it be said that "that is my Self." The traditional psychology is not "in search of a soul," but a demonstration of the unreality of all that "soul," "self" and "I" ordinarily mean. We cannot, indeed, know what we are, but we can become what we are by knowing what we are not; for what we *are* is the immanent God, and he himself cannot know *what* he is, because he is not

any what, nor ever became anyone.<sup>121</sup> Our end will have been attained when we are no longer anyone. That must not, of course, be confused with an annihilation; the end of all becoming is in *being*, or rather, the source of being, richer than any being. "The word 'I,' *ego*, is proper to none but God in his sameness" (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer ed., p. 261). The notion of an ego of "ours" is an infatuation or opinion (*abhimāna*, οἴησις, οἴημα) based on sensitive experience (MU VI.10; Philo, *ut infra*); as we have seen, it has no rational foundation—"Our senses, through ignorance of reality, falsely tell us that what appears to be, actually is" (Plutarch, *Moralia* 392D). And since the notion that "I am the doer" (*ahamkāra*, *kartōham iti*) is both the primary form of our ignorance and the cause of all suffering felt or inflicted, the whole complex of "I and mine" (*aham ca mama ca*) and the notion of an "I" than can survive the dissolution of the psycho-physical vehicle, are under constant attack. To think that it is our own mind that works is a "pierced and cloven doctrine"; nothing is more shameful than to suppose that "I think" or that "I perceive" (Philo, *Legum allegoriae* I.47, II.68, III.33). To infer from the accidents of my existence that "I am" (*upādāya asmi*) is ridiculous, because of the inconsistency of all experience (S III.105). "Were it not for the shackle, who would say 'I am I'?" (*Mathnawī* I.2449); Εἶθε, ὦ τέκνον, καὶ σὺ σεαυτὸν διεξελθὺν λύθεις (Hermes, *Lib.* XIII.4). There can be no greater sorrow than that the truly wise man can feel than to reflect that "he" still is "someone" (*Cloud of Unknowing*, ch. 44).

To have felt this sorrow (a very different thing from wishing one had never been born, or from any thought of suicide) completes the intellectual preparation. The time has come for action. Once convinced that the Ego is "not my Self" we shall be ready to look for our Self, and to make the sacrifices that the quest demands. We cannot take up the operation in its ritual aspect here (except, in passing, to stress the value of ritual), but only in its application to daily life, every part of which can be transformed and transubstantiated. Assuming that we are now "true philosophers," we shall inevitably begin to make a practice of dying. In other words, we shall mortify our tastes, "using the powers of the soul in our outward man no more than the five senses really need it" (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer ed.,

<sup>121</sup> Our self can be known, but not our Self: for "by what might one understand him by whom one understands?" (BU II.4.14). "How, then, do we ourselves come to be speaking of it? seeing that we cannot know it and may not grasp it. . . . We can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is; we are, indeed, speaking of it only in the light of its consequences; but although we are unable to define it, we can nevertheless possess it" (*Enneads* v.3.14).

p. 488); becoming less and less sentimental ("sticky"), and ever more and more fastidious; detaching ourselves from one thing after another. We shall feed the sensitive powers chiefly on those foods that nourish the Inner Man;<sup>122</sup> a process of "reducing" strictly analogous to the reduction of fleshly obesity, since in this philosophy it is precisely "weight" that drags our Self down, a notion that survives in the use of the word "gross" = sensual. Whoever would *s'eternar, transumanar*, must be "light-hearted."<sup>123</sup>

At the same time, if we are to act in agreement with our altered thinking (*Laws* 803c), our whole activity must be purified of all self-reference. We must—like Christ—"do nothing of ourselves"; must act without any personal motive, selfish or unselfish. For this is more than any simple "altruism," and harder; in Plato's phrasing, we are to become God's "toys" and "instruments," unmoved by any inclinations of our own, whether to evil or good. This is the Chinese Wu Wei, "do nothing, and all things will be done." That "inaction" is often, and often willfully, misunderstood by a generation whose only conception of leisure is that of a "leisure state" of idleness. The renunciation of works (*samnyāsa karmānām*, BG v.1), however, bears no such connotation; it means their assignment to another than ourselves (*brahmany ādhāya karmāni*, BG v.10, cf. JUB I.5.1-3); the harnessed man should think, "I am doing nothing," whatever it is that he may be doing (BG v.8). This "abandonment" and "yoking" (*yoga*) are one and the same, and neither is a doing nothing, but much rather "skillful operation" (BG VI.2, II.50). "Inaction" is not attained by undertaking nothing" (BG III.4): almost in these very words Philo says that "Moses does not give the name of 'rest' (*ἀνάπαυσις*) to a merely doing nothing (*ἀπραξία*, *De cherubim* 87)," and he adds, "The cause of all things is naturally active. . . . God's 'rest' is [not a doing nothing, but] rather a working with absolute ease, without toil or suffering. . . . A being free from weakness, even though he be making everything [as Viśvakarman], will never cease through all eternity to be 'at rest.'"

<sup>122</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 90BC; *Phaedrus* 246E ff.; *Phaedo* 64 ff., etc.; BG XVII.7-XVIII.39.

<sup>123</sup> In the Egyptian psychostasis, the heart of the deceased is weighed against a feather, representing the goddess Truth (Maat). See further Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, n. 269, on levitation.

We have not attempted to deal with the Egyptian psychology, but would say in passing that the whole conception of the Breath and Breaths, or Power from Above and "powers of the soul," is paralleled in that of the Egyptian *ka* and its attendant *kau*, the powers of life which the divine power "yokes." For details see A. Moret, *The Nile and Egyptian Civilization* (London, 1927), pp. 181-83 and 358-59; and H. Kees, *Totenglauben und Jenseitsvorstellungen der alten Ägypter* (Leipzig, 1926). There can be no doubt of the equation, *ka* = Ātman, Prāna.



So the injunction not to cease from working is categorical, and according to vocation. In the case of the soldier, he is told, "Surrendering all works to Me, do thou fight" (BG III.20); and more generally, "Even as the ignorant are busy because of their attachment to activity, so also should the Comprehensor work, but without attachment, with a view to the guarding of the world (*loka-samgraha*, BG III.25)." This is, precisely, the doctrine of guardianship enunciated in the Seventh Book of the *Republic*: the philosopher who has made the steep ascent and seen the light, though he may naturally wish to stand aloof, will not be governed by his inclinations, but will return to the Cave "to care for and to guard the other citizens," so that the city may be governed by "waking minds" and that those may hold office who are least eager to do so (*Republic* 519b ff.). This *κατάβασις* corresponds to the Indian *avatarana* and *avasthāna* of the All-worker, who is in the world but not of it. In Kṛṣṇa's words, "There is nothing in this whole universe that I needs must do, nothing attainable that I have not attained, nevertheless I am in act, for were I not, these worlds would be unsettled and I should be an agent of confusion of functions and a slayer of my children" (BG III.23, 24). We must not confuse this point of view with that of the philanthropist or "servant of society"; the Comprehensor is a servant of God, not of society. He is naturally impartial, not an adherent of any party or interest, and is never the passive subject of righteous indignation; knowing *Who* he is, he loves no one but himself, the Self of all others, none of whom he loves or hates as they are in themselves. It is not *what* he does, whatever it may be, but his *presence*—even in a monastery, which is as much a proper part of an ordered world as any farm or factory—that "cares for and protects" the other citizens.

The true ascetic (*sannyāsī*), then, is, as the words *ἀσκητής* and its Skr. equivalent *śramana*<sup>124</sup> alike imply, a "worker" but, unlike the ignorant laborer, one who "takes no thought for the morrow" (Matt. 6:34)<sup>125</sup>; "thy concern is with the action only [that it be correct], not

<sup>124</sup> The semantic development of the words *ἀσκητής* and *śramana* is the same: both are primarily "laborer," and secondarily in the modern religious sense "ascetic" and "wayfarer" or "hermit." In exactly the same way, *σοφία* and *kaśālyā* are primarily technical knowledge and skill, and secondarily "wisdom" and "virtue."

<sup>125</sup> These words, so easily misunderstood from the modern point of view, must not be understood to imply a commendation of any irrational aimlessness on the worker's part; that the work should be at the same time *pulcher et aptus* (as our whole tradition maintains) involves its utility, and this implies that very foresight that distinguishes a person from an animal (*purusa* from *paśu*). The phrase *μη*

with its fruits" (BG II.47). Thus the traditional psychology, however practical, is anything but pragmatic; the judgment is not of ends, but of the means. The results are beyond our control and therefore no responsibility of ours. One result, however, and that the best, follows inevitably on the use of the right means, and that is the worker's own perfecting. Man perfects himself by his devotion to his own tasks, determined by his own nature (BG XVIII.45, 47): and this is also Justice, *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, κατὰ φύσιν* (Plato, *Republic* 433). At the same time, "mentally renouncing all his activities, the ruling Body-dweller [Inner Man], rests happily in the nine-doored city of the body, neither acting nor compelling action" (BG V.13). In other words, "You must know that the outer man's employment can be such that all the time the Inner Man remains unaffected and unmoved" (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer ed., p. 489).

Such are the immediate fruits of the traditional psychology, understood and practiced. But at the same time that such a man is freed from the domination of his hopes and fears—and this is what it means to be the "master of one's fate"—he is becoming *Who* he is; and when he departs, and a successor takes his place, which is provided for in traditional societies by the inheritance and formal transmission of the ministerial functions, then, "having done what there was to be done," the psycho-physical personality will fall like a ripe fruit from the branch, to enter into other combinations, and this self's other and immortal Self will have been set free. And these are the two ends that the traditional psychology proposes for whoever will put its doctrine into practice: to be at peace with oneself whatever one may be doing, and to become the Spectator of all time and of all things.

Our primary purpose has been to describe the traditional psychology, as a contribution to the history of science. In doing so we have had in view both European and Indian, professional and lay, readers. We have wished, among other things, to show that it will be of the greatest possible advantage in all philosophical studies to consider the Greek and Sanskrit

*μεριμνήσητε* means "not being anxious about," "not distracted by hopes or fears for" the consequences of whatever has been done correctly. The Comprehensor is neither to be elated by success nor disappointed by failure, but always the same. The meaning "not to be anxious about" is well brought out by Terence's words, "*curae quae meam animam divorce trahunt*" (*The Lady of Andros* [LCL], 1.5.25), a reminiscence of Plato's puppet, pulled in opposite directions by its contrary passions (*Laws* 644E).

sources simultaneously, and also, of course, if one's competence admits, as mine does not, such other sources as the Arabic and Chinese. We have wished to emphasize that the doctrine of the *Philosophia Perennis*, in which our psychology is included, is stated in different areas and at different times not only in cognate words, but often in the same idioms and in terms of the same symbolism, e.g., that of the puppet or that of the chariot; the greater part of these symbols are of prehistoric, at any rate neolithic, if not greater antiquity. We have sometimes dwelt on etymologies with a view to showing that the doctrines referred to are implicit in the very structure of the sacred languages in which they are stated; and to remind the reader that the idioms, even of modern English, preserve the primary assumptions of the perennial philosophy, however little we may be conscious of, for instance, the doctrine *duo sunt in homine* when we speak of an "internal conflict" or of being "at peace with oneself," or aware of the metaphysics of light and generation when we "argue" with a view to "clarifying" our "concepts." In conclusion, let us emphasize again that the perennial psychology is not a science for its own sake, and can be of no use to anybody who will not practice it. The popular conception of the philosopher as one who "takes life philosophically" is perfectly correct; the philosopher of our tradition is one who not only has the habit of first principles, but also one who approaches all contingent problems in the light of these principles. And finally, that the philosopher is not a victim of his desires is as much as to say that his whole concern is with "the things that make for peace"; one who is at peace with himself will have no occasion to wage war on others. For him, power and the balance of power are matters of no interest whatever.



### *Mahā Puruṣa*: "Supreme Identity"

That the word *puruṣa*, of uncertain derivation, but probably from *pr*, "to fill," (cf. *puru*, "many") is properly rendered by and corresponds to "person" can be readily established by a confrontation of texts. In AĀ II.2.2-3, "the more clearly one knows the Essence (*ātman*), the more one is fully in being." Consciousness of the Essence is wanting in minerals, perceptible in plants and trees, more evident in animated things (*prānabhrī*), and "though there are sundry in whom no intelligence is apparent, [it is] most evident in a 'person' (*puruṣa*). For a 'person' is most endowed with understanding (*prajñā*), he speaks of what has been discriminated (*vijñāta*), he perceives distinctions (*vijñātam paśyati*), he comprehends (*veda*) the future, he comprehends what is and what is not mundane (*lokāloka*),<sup>1</sup> and is so endowed that by the mortal he seeks the immortal.<sup>2</sup> But as for the sundry, mere animals (*paśu*),<sup>3</sup> theirs is an estimative understanding (*abhivijñāna*) merely according to hunger and thirst, they do not speak what has been discriminated. . . . Their becoming is only so far, they have being (*sambhavāh = habent esse*) only in the measure of their understanding (*yathā prajñam hi*). The

{Coomaraswamy's translation of *ātman* as Essence indicates that this paper was written ca. 1935; the "experimental translation," as he called it, was proposed in "Two Vedāntic Hymns from the *Siddhāntamuṅgāvalī*," BSOS, VIII (1935), 91-99, and withdrawn in "Vedic Exemplarism," 1936 (see pp. 188-189 in this volume).

<sup>1</sup> Worldly and superworldly, i.e., what is in time and space, and what is apart from time and space.

<sup>2</sup> That is, he sees contingent things eternalwise, for him the world is a theophany, he can employ the *via analogia*, and can follow the *vestigium pedis, padam na gorapagūlham*, RV IV.5.3.

<sup>3</sup> *Paśu*, in the same sense of "human being that is no better than an animal," occurs in BU I.4.10, where he who worships any angel otherwise than as his own Essence (*ātman*) is called a "mere animal," and in *Siddhāntamuṅgāvalī*, verse xxxvi, where the author in the same way designates as "mere animals" those who refrain from the Essence that is man's last end (*puruṣārtha*). The distinction of *puruṣa* from *paśūn* (pl.) is like that between a "proper man," German *Mensch*, and "the herd."