

# ARCHAEO MODERNA



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**BOOKS**

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**Dugin A.G.**

# **Archaeomodern**

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*Dugin A.G. Archaeomodern - M., Arktogeia, 2011. - 142 pp.*

The book consists of articles and fragments of individual works describing from socio- logical, philosophical, political science and historical points of view the phenomenon referred to by the author as "archaeomodern". The problems of correlation between archaeomodernity and postmodernity are considered. For undergraduate and postgraduate students studying sociology, philosophy, history, cultural studies and political s c i e n c e .

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# Introduction

We have decided to publish this booklet in a separate edition in order to bring together in one place the articles, texts and lectures devoted by the author to the phenomenon of archaeomodernity. This phenomenon is fundamental to understanding the specificities of Russian society as a whole, and therefore requires the most careful and versatile study. These topics are discussed in more detail in the author's monographs and textbooks - "The Radical Subject and its Double"<sup>1</sup>, "Sociology of the Imagination"<sup>2</sup>, "Sociology of Russian Society"<sup>3</sup>, "Logos and Mythos"<sup>4</sup>, "Sociology of Russian Society"<sup>5</sup>, "Martin Heidegger: The Possibility of Russian Philosophy"<sup>6</sup>, "Ethnosociology"<sup>6</sup>, "Geopolitics"<sup>7</sup>, etc. However, for the convenience of readers and researchers, we considered it expedient to collect the main conceptual fragments explaining the essence of archaeomodernity in one place. In doing so, we could not avoid repetitions and a kind of conceptual pleonasm arising from the fact that we are talking about tests and lectures written and delivered at different times and in different contexts. Nevertheless, this synopsis seems useful, especially as we have often been approached with proposals to do something similar in the form of a synthesis.

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<sup>1</sup> *Dugin A.G. Radical subject and its double. Moscow: Eurasian Movement, 2009.*

<sup>2</sup> *Dugin A.G. Sociology of Imagination. Introduction to Structural Sociology. Moscow: Academic Project, 2010.*

<sup>3</sup> *Dugin A.G. Sociology of Russian Society. Moscow: Academic Project, 2011.*

<sup>4</sup> *Dugin A.G. Logos and Mythos. Sociology of Depths. Moscow: Academic Project, 2010.*

<sup>5</sup> *Dugin A.G. Martin Heidegger: the possibility of Russian philosophy. Moscow: Academic Project, 2011.*

<sup>6</sup> *Dugin A.G. Ethnosociology. M., 2011.*

<sup>7</sup> *Dugin A.G. Geopolitics. M., 2011.*

# Archaeomode rn (introduction of the concept)<sup>1</sup>

## *Archaeomodern as a heuristic term*

Today we are making sense of archaeomodernity. On the one hand, you probably haven't heard the term, because it doesn't exist. That's right. Even if you have some associations, I have a suggestion to temporarily put them aside. There are two similar terms that are immediately beyond the limits of our lecture, and they are "archaeo-avant-garde", which was coined by Girenoc and "archaeo-futurism", which was coined by Guillaume Faye. Both terms are vague but have nothing to do with our discourse.

Archaeomodernity is a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should be at the centre of contemporary philosophical historical political science discourse. Archaeomodernity is the most important thing we have at all. Now we are going to talk about the most important thing, but we are going to talk about it from a distance, not straight to the forehead.

I want to talk about the emergence of the term "archaeomodern". At a certain point, when I was thinking about the three paradigm shifts - premodern, modern and postmodern - I came to the conclusion that there was a gap between what we have in Russia today and what is very similar to Western postmodern or social modernity. I began to scrutinise this gap, because the ends did not fit together. In different constructions of paradigm shifts from premodern and traditional society to modernity, from modernity to postmodernity, everything is clear and precise, all this remains a valid and essential tool for our analyses, i.e. the paradigmatic method. But in Russia, something did not add up. When we look at what is happening in our lives, it is indeed very reminiscent of postmodernity: Tarantino, United Russia - this is from the same segment, that is, there is such a blatant, giggling and smirking "wrong" that is being sold to us precisely as a "copy without the original", and no one even makes a serious appearance. A world of simulacra - simulacra of youth movements, simulacra of ideas, simulacra of debates, simulacra of the media, simulacra of economic processes. On the one hand

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<sup>1</sup> The final lecture in the New University series, delivered on 28 February 2008.

on the one hand, all this is a sure sign of postmodernity, but none of you and all of us can understand what postmodernity is. Despite the fact that everything around us looks very much like postmodern, on the other hand, it can't be postmodern. Thinking about what is the point here, why what is around us looks like postmodern and cannot be postmodern, led me to the need to introduce such a concept as archaeomodernity.

*Archaeomodernity as a paradigmatic anomaly*

In fact, archaeomodernity is not a new paradigm, it is not something new added to premodernity, modernity and postmodernity, but it is something that - as a concept and as a concept - was born out of the comprehension of the inconsistency of Russian contemporary postmodern reality with the canons of postmodernity. It is very important that the paradigm of postmodernity, which we have discussed in some detail in our course on "postphilosophy," actually follows modernity. Notice the word behind. Behind modernity on three levels: logically (this is clear), historically (i.e., it corresponds to the historical process), and paradigmatically. In other words, postmodernity as a paradigm begins to emerge and make itself known in a state in which modernity has thinly or barely taken place. That is, one cannot imagine the arrival of postmodernity in a society where there was no modernity. Postmodern cannot come where there was no modernity. Postmodern necessarily follows modernity; it cannot coexist with it or precede it. In fact, the main task of postmodernity, if we look at its philosophical, political, and social programme, is to finish for modernity what modernity has not finished, that is, postmodernity is in solidarity with modernity in this matter, it says "yes" to modernity, but it says: "nothing can be done by modernity". This is what St Paul the Apostle said about the law when he was defining the new parameters of the existence of the world in the age of grace: "Nothing is perfect in the law". That is, the law was good, but it did not open the way to deification, and the patriarchs, even the righteous of the Old Testament, sat according to our Orthodox tradition in hell, waiting for the coming of the Saviour, which they could not even count on, they just sat in that part of hell where it was not bad, frankly speaking, but in hell. In the same way, postmodernity begins where the bearers of this modernity realise that "nothing modernity has done", that having started its programme, it has not been able to fulfil its intentions to the end, has not been able to implement them. In other words, postmodernists argue that there is too much premodernity in modernity, and the main criticism of modernity on the part of postmodernity is the discovery of archaic features in modernity.

*Modernity as an installation of the subject*

Now we have to explain what modernity is all about, and I am beginning to understand where many of the misunderstandings of the word modernisation and modernity that we have to deal with come from. We say that modernity is a washing machine, good roads, expensive European suits, shaved faces, glamour, quality make-up, i.e. a set of technical things that are neither the essence of modernity, nor even its obligatory properties. They are only epiphenomenological manifestations that may or may not be. We can imagine a society with ties, shaved faces, cars and washing machines, but it will not be a modern society. This is a matter of principle.

What then is modernity? Modernity is a concept that is associated with the emergence of the subject. Where there is a subject in its classical Cartesian sense, there is modernity. And where there is no subject, there is no modernity. What do we understand by the subject? By the subject we understand the classical definition of Western European philosophy - it is a volitional rationality. Where there is reason and where there is will, at the intersection of the line of will and the line of reason, there is a subject, whether Kantian, Cartesian, Fichtean - it does not matter, the main thing is that it is a subject. This is what modernity is. Where the subject appears as a rational-willed beginning - by the way, it is not yet clear whether it is individual or collective - where the philosophical subject endowed with reason and will is the subject, modernity begins. Postmodernity rests in its constructions on this subject, and despite the fact that postmodernists perform fundamental dizzying somersaults with this subject - with its properties, with its will, with its reason - the will (the Nietzschean will to power or Kant's moral categorical imperative) is gradually reduced to a machine of desire in Deleuze and Guattari, no matter how they divide his rationality from the individual to the individual, no matter how they speak of the death of the subject and the death of the author, like Barthes or Bernard-Henri Lévy, they continue to deal with the subject and beyond, building on it, constructing on it their constructions that shock our foolish imagination.

*There is no subject in Russia*

But here the following consideration arises: in order to deal with the subject, in order to assert its death, in order to divide it into divisibility or to assign subjective properties to divisible manifestations, in order to speak of a desire-machine or a rhizomatic postbody, one must first have



something with which to do all this - which, it turns out, is not such a simple thing. Moreover, it is precisely what we do not have, and perhaps never have had: reason multiplied by will, we do not have a subject. Without this, the discourse on postmodernity flies completely past the basis on which it should be based, albeit in a negative way. That is, it is impossible to speak of postmodernity in a society that does not have the main feature of modernity - the subject as a rational-willed beginning. The negation, affirmation, and development of the discourse on the subject in any direction will be completely deceptive. We will only seem to understand something, but we will understand nothing; not because we are stupid, but because we have no referential base, because we have no subject.

*Entzauberung as the genesis of the subject*

How did the subject emerge in modernity and become its basis? Do you know what a modern society is, a modern world, a modern society? This is where there is this subject, and everything else is not modern in its purest form. Where there is a subject, there is modernity; where there is no subject, there is no modernity in its pure form, and postmodernity, accordingly, cannot exist.

In Western European philosophy, the subject emerged as a result of the world's dissolution. That is, it is a consequence of the liberation of the world from the sacred-mythological beginning, the light dimension. The subject, the Cartesian subject, "cogito ergo sum", emerged when the process of systematic Cartesian doubt began. "Doubting everything", Western European humanity realised that we cannot doubt one thing alone. This thing is called the subject and has two properties: reason and will. This is the sign of modernity. Where and when this subject appears, there is modernisation, and modernisation is the incorporation of this subject in this particular environment. That's what modernisation is. With or without a washing machine, usually with a machine, sometimes perhaps without, sometimes there is a machine without a subject. Theoretically you can imagine a subject without a washing machine, a subject with a beard, without a tie, but if there is subjectivity (reason and will), it will be modernity. In some sects, in the Wahhabis or Protestants (our Old Believers) there is a subject, but no technological attributes of modernism. But even without the attributes, it will be a modern society. And where there are washing machines but no subject, that is where we come to the notion of archaeomodernity.

In order to describe such a situation, when the paradigm of modernity, logically following the premodern paradigm, is not really established and does not become dominant, prevailing, it was necessary to introduce a new term. Thus the conjecture of archaeomodernity arose. This is not some new paradigm, but a special situation when, instead of a diachronic transition from the premodern to modern paradigm, we deal with a synchronous superposition (superposition) of the modern paradigm on the premodern paradigm. This is what it is.

*Searching for Yuksta*

In a Russian text, in a translation of Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, some leftists, who fifteen years ago dared to reproach us that the discourse of the neoconservatives was not European enough, introduced such an interesting phrase as "Juxta's position". I am still convinced that the "Juxta position" is a very tempting and revelatory thing. In fact, it's how these idiots translated the common French word juxtaposition, i.e. "superposition", i.e. "superimposition of one thing on another". This "juxtaposition" is not only a very apt term for the superposition of one undigested thing on another unreflected thing, but it is also ideal for describing the essence of archaeomodernity. Because it is a critical and unconscious superimposition of two mutually exclusive conflicting matrices, two paradigms - modernity on archaism (on premodernity). But pay attention to the peculiarly Russian talented ingenuity at work here, when, not knowing the word "juxtaposition" (or being too lazy to look it up in the dictionary), the translators thought it was "juxta", probably a surname. Juxt, most likely a theorist of structural linguistics. With a simple and uncomplicated surname - Juxt.

The story of "juxtaposition" not only accurately describes what it is to superimpose the paradigm of modernity on that of premodernity, but also shows how the knowledge of archaeomodernity (in this case of the Russian translator) works. Archaeomodern takes the word "juxtaposition" as something integral (holistic) and intuitive. And if there is any logical inconsistency, then the hitherto unknown juxtaposition comes to the rescue. From a modernist (translator as subject) point of view, the word "juxtaposition" consists of two parts: the prefix "juxta", which means on, over, through, and the root "position", from the French "poser", Latin "ponere" "to put", which means "position", "position". If the modern subject does not know the word "po- sition" or the prefix "juxta", he goes to the dictionary, if he does not go to the dictionary or has a

he doesn't have a dictionary, he'll be honest: "I don't know what I'm dealing with", "a dark place". And that's what the archaeomodern translator does, he says, "Aha, I see, it's Yukst!" And instead of asking, "Mash, do you know who Yukst is?", the archaeomodernist says in his heart, "It's already clear to everyone, if I ask, they'll think I'm an idiot...". That is to say, "Yukst" does not emerge from the discourse of modernity. These people are also translating Anti Oedipus! Can you imagine? Can you imagine how the whole thing is translated, if they stumble not just on the simplest idea, on the simplest word...? What's the value of translating postmodern texts? "Anti Oedipus is a postmodern classic, and if the Russian translation starts with this wonderful Juxta..... This is how archaeomodernity works.

And it's not on purpose, it's not punk, it's not humour, it's just self written and then self read, self published and then self learned. At some point Juxt gets its own autonomous existence. Is that possible in my turf? No, because it is endowed with will and reason, it can lie, it can think of Yukst, but this is the work of will and reason, but for Yukst to appear on its own is no longer a subject, other wheels are at work here. This is where the deep archaic comes in, which sincerely does not understand the very existence of modernity. That is, it is an archaicism that, even when operating with modernity and postmodernity, does not, as a matter of principle, bother to verify any of its statements in the sphere of rational methodologies and leftist practices.

#### *Archaeomodern as a disruption*

Archaeomodern can be defined as the superposition, superposition, juxtaposition of two paradigms - modern and premodern - without their conceptual correlation, i.e. without building a clear logical transition between them, a certain bridge.

The point is that the modern man is not a man of tradition, and therefore the modern man defines himself and acts in a certain system of known sub-assumptions. The system of these known presuppositions, without which there is no modern man, rigidly corresponds to a system built on the negation of the pre-modern system. That is, modernisation and the emergence of the subject are fundamentally linked to the splitting of the world. The subject is born out of the disenchantment of the world; it is the result of the accomplished disenchantment of the world. The subject in this sense, as a fundamental bearer of rational-will strategies, does not exist before the world's disenchantment has not taken place.

Everything in the Russian consciousness resists this kind of definition: "How can it be? We have the world bewitched and we think, and we are subjects, and we have the will!...". This is precisely what "without conceptual correlation" means. If there is a modernity, it recognises itself as both modern and non-modern. There is no such thing as splitting and bewitching at the same time. There is either splitting and its product is the subject and modernity, or non-splitting and its product is non-subject and non-modernity (archaic).

*Philosophers of suspicion*

Reflecting on archaeomodernity and placing it at the centre of philosophical attention as a subject of reflection, of research, that is, thematising and problematising archaeomodernity, I came anew to the "philosophers of suspicion". Ricoeur, recently re-read, led me to the following thoughts on how all this relates to "philosophers of suspicion". The philosophers of suspicion are involved here in order to understand more clearly where modernity is valid and where modernity is invalid, where it represents this anomalous superposition that does not harmonise, does not align correctly with the preceding paradigm of the archaic and premodern.

Three "philosophers of suspicion" - Marx, Freud and Nietzsche - are usually mentioned. In the structuralist interpretation, their mission is to redefine the balance of the reflexive and irreflexive within the subject. We remember that, starting with Descartes (the creator, or at least the discoverer, of the subject), the senses are included in the rational sphere, i.e. there are many different floors in the sphere of reasoning. Apart from the rational-discursive floor proper (where consciousness is actual), there are also dark irreflexive sides (where consciousness is potential). At first, they were considered accidental, and up to a certain point, it seemed that the most interesting things were in the reflexive intellect, and everything else irrational or non-rational did not matter much - as a kind of background, noises. This was seen as a trace of "undigested premodernity", "undigested archaicism". It turned out that the intellect, the subject, was inertially affective by its origin, by its genealogy, archaic.

Before the "philosophers of suspicion", it was believed that it was not fundamental, the main processes are in the field of reason, there the main processes of comprehension and modernisation take place, and man walks cheerfully and cheerfully in his subjective direction.

The "philosophers of suspicion" said: "Friends, we have fundamentally underestimated the irreflexive side of the subject. But the "philosophers of suspicion" said: "Friends, we have fundamentally underestimated the irreflexive side of the subject; it is not just an atavism of archaic prejudices, vague stirrings of desire..... This side is so powerful that it often subjugates reason, makes it the expression of hidden and unconscious forces and regularities, so that often what we consider rational explanations and rational systems are the expression or distortion of a basis carefully hidden from the light of reflexion. For Marx it is the relations of production, that is, all philosophy, all ideology, for Marx, is a false consciousness that veils the reality of economic cycles. According to Nietzsche there is only the will to power, and everything else is superstructure, according to Freud there is only the unconscious and its impulses. Freud called the functioning of the unconscious "the work of visions", which is conducted on this irreflexive side of the subject and to a significant extent predetermines its overall strategy. In other words, the actual intellect contains only a small part of the potential intellect, this irreflexive side, which various "philosophers of suspicion" began to evaluate and describe in different ways.

*Structure as a generalisation of the irreflexive in the subject*

In structuralism, eventually, these schools almost converged. Then an attempt was made to create, on the basis of the "philosophers of suspicion" (Marxism, psychoanalysis and Nietzscheanism) and Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics, a generalised description of the sphere of the irreflexive in the subject. On the ethnological side, this was done by Claude Levi-Strauss, on the psycho-analytical side by Lacan, and on the philosophical side by Barthes, Foucault, Baudrillard, Derrida, Deleuze, and so on. This is how the philosophy of structuralism came into being. A new word for the generalised irreflexive side of the subject, the most important word for us, "structure", was found.

So, the structure is the generalised, meaningful, more or less studied content of the irreflexive side of the subject. According to Freud, it is the unconscious sphere; according to Marx, it is the economic background of culture and society; according to Nietzsche, it is the will to power as the basic instinct of life, which undergoes various transformations in the course of the rise to reasoning activity. Thus, we have a new independent concept of the irreflexive in the subject - structure.

Here, in order to build a clear methodological construct for analysing archaeomodernity, we can turn to Rudolf Bultmann, a Protestant theologian, who introduced a very important term for our analysis - kerygma. In Greek it means "proclamation." In the theological tradition, the term "kerygmatisation" is close to the term "evangelisation" and refers to teaching neophytes the basics of Christian doctrine, the fundamentals of Christian dogma. Bultmann interprets "kerygma" in his own way, as "Christian doctrine minus mythology". In his view, Christianity has a rational, reasoning part (the kerygma proper) and a huge overlay of irrational elements, which come from pre-Christian pagan traditions, mysticism (Jewish or Hellenic), etc. He includes all the irrational in the kerygma. He includes all the irrational in the concept of mythology. Mythology is a structure that, of course, penetrates any tradition and plays a huge, often decisive role in it.

The Christian tradition in its historical form - for example, the Russian Orthodoxy - includes many "mythological" elements. These include traditions, "Lives of the Saints", legends and miracles, tales of locally honoured saints, many customs, rituals and even prejudices that envelope the tradition's own dogmatic theological content. However, most people perceive such Christianity as a whole and indivisible, with kerygmatic elements inextricably intertwined with mythological ones. And, as a rule, no conscious theological work is done to extract strictly kerygmatic content (i.e. pure theology, dogmatic theology in its pure form - with rational assertions, with ideas about identity and non-identity, about differences, about forms of differences) from this totality of infinite data. The whole kerygmatic side, which forms the basis of theology or is simply identical to theology, is dissolved in a huge number of mythologies, fairy tales, gossip, emotions, stories, legends and various kinds of commentaries, sometimes quite far from the clear rationality of the basic doctrines of faith.

Bultmann expresses the idea - typically Protestant, i.e. heretical from the point of view of Orthodoxy - that the vast majority of the materials of the Christian tradition should be discarded "as inconsistent with the original teaching of Christ". In the spirit of Arianism and even the Ebionite heresies of the first centuries of Christianity, Bultmann argues that the person of Christ himself in the original

The purely kerygmatic version of Christianity was "insignificant", and its basis was the chiliastic ideas of the expectation of the Kingdom of God and the strictly monotheistic figure of God the Father. Bultmann has nothing left of Christianity at all, as do many Protestants, which is natural in principle. What is important for us, however, is not how Bultmann himself interprets the kerygma (he does so in the spirit of Protestant narrow rationalism), but that he proposes a term that becomes key to understanding the process of modernisation and to explaining its failure in archaeomodernity.

*The work of "Christian dreaming."*

Kerygma is the second term that is extremely important for us to analyse archaeomodernity. In the extended structuralist sense, kerygma can be defined as that which opposes structure, i.e. the rational content of the subject. The reflexive side of the subject is kerygma, and the irreflexive side is structure. There are various relations between them in different cultures, in different societies, and in different discourses. We are primarily interested in the very division of the subject's sphere into kerygma (the rational) and structure (the irrational). We will see how the kerygma is related to modernisation later on.

Let us note that the kerygmatic level can also exist in the premodern - in traditional society, in the premodern. In Christianity there is a structure (the work of "Christian dreams"): there are miracles, demons, devils, legends, legends, magic stories, an infinite number of various apocryphal semi-predictions, some of which follow from the Church's teaching, some of which do not follow at all and do not relate to it at all. The work of the "Christian dream" (structure) is so active and powerful, so affecting the kerygma, that it is sometimes very difficult to identify it. But it is there.

*Archaeomodernity as an anomalous coexistence of kerygma and structure*

Now let us turn again to archaeomodernity and define it in structuralist terms. Archaeomodern is the coexistence (coexistence) of kerygma and structure in a conflictual and disordered state. Note that the conflict here is of a different order than the conflict between paradigms, because the paradigm of modernity comes into the world of tradition as the "next" paradigm (the surname "Soros" means "next" in Hungarian). It comes as the "next" after Tradition, after it, instead of it, to replace it, beyond it, against it, as overcoming it, and begins its conflict dialogue with traditional society, begins its "next" dialogue with it.

Dugin A.

*Archaeomodern*

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dis-enchantment. And the modernity that has taken place is itself the result of this dis-  
witchcraft.

Here it is difficult to say what is primary (disenchantment or disenchantment). In any case, the second paradigm (modernity) is built on the negation of the first paradigm (premodernity). The kerygma banishes structure. In archaeomodernity it is different, the two paradigms do not supplant each other but overlap, that is, the kerygma does not expel structure.

*The onset of kerygma as a prerequisite for modernisation*

Many people think that modernity is at once atheism. It is nothing of the sort. Modernity is first Protestantism, then kerygmatic Protestantism, textual criticism, then the deism of Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Spinoza, and then Laplace, Thurgot, Feuerbach, and Nietzsche's "God is dead." This is extremely important. Soviet philosophers in the old days taught as if Descartes purposely, knowing that God does not exist, wrote that he supposedly did so that he would not be taken to prison. This is nonsense. Descartes wrote everything as he honestly thought it, and he was absolutely convinced that God existed. Moreover, God was one of the centres of his kerygmatic thought, but it was a radically different God from the God of the Middle Ages. It was the God of the autonomous kerygma, the kerygmatic God of rational-will discourse, which persists in Kant and in Western European philosophy in general. This is the "God of the philosophers", born by the subject in his rational-will discourse.

This is where the most interesting thing begins. When modernity comes, it sets itself the first task of abolishing structure, because structure is archaic in its purest form, and replaces it with a kerygma, so long as this kerygma is neither Christian nor anti-Christian, atheistic, ultra-rationalist or, say, Kantian. The kerygma can also be Christian. This is most important, modernity is where kerygma defeats structure, even Christian kerygma.

Initially, the modernist paradigm was not about leading to that kerygma, that autonomous atheistic rationality, as would happen later as the scientific picture of the world developed in the New Age. The first "modernists" were theologians who argued for purity of doctrine against "popular prejudices". This is the first dawn of modernity. As soon as our dear theologians began to disperse the skomorokhs, the bearers of pure dreaming, they brought modernisation in Russia closer - the schism and Peter. This was the way to the schism of the world.



When they touched the pathetic and helpless skomoroch, the oafenya, they touched the living nerve of the Russian structure. Guénon wrote that as soon as Western Europe abolished the jester processions, "saturnalia", "fools' days", when the pseudo-Pope rode a donkey backwards into churches, real modernisation began and sacral Catholicism came to an end. The structure was taken over by sorcerers and Satanists, who were desperately caught and tortured. Descartes and his "cogito" were just a stone's throw away.

When even the theological Christian kerygma says that there is no place for these pre-judgments, for "dream work", for structure, this is where the process of modernisation begins. It doesn't even matter which kerygma it is, it is the kerygma and not the structure that is important.

*The kerygma comes in modernity according to formal rules*

We have had a quick look at what kerygma is, how it fights structure, and how it wins in modernity. Now a few refinements to the description of this process. At the dawn of the New Age, the Western European kerygma sets itself a formal programme task: to illuminate with the "light of reason" all unreasonable things, to get rid of "prejudices" and "vestiges", i.e. it launches a conscious and systematic attack on structure. As such, the kerygma itself is constantly subjected to self-reflection, extracting from it what is maximally "reasonable". In this way, the subject is installed.

The structure (or rather its medieval-archaic expressions) against which the kerygma fights is in this case at the same level as the kerygma: it is constantly being analysed, carefully observed and systematically refuted. More precisely: it is not the structure itself that is decomposed and criticised, but its formalisation in the form of ideas, social organisations, political institutions, religious practices. In a sense, pure kerygma (based on systematic self-reflection and the isolation of the subject) is here contrasted with impure kerygma, essentially affected by the influences of the structure (subjectless and irreflexive).

The clash between modernity and traditional society in such a situation is strictly formalised. The kerygma of modernity postulates the expansion of democracy. Traditional society continues to be monarchical by inertia. Modernity seeks to make religion an individual matter. Tradition tends to favour

to see it as a universally binding - total - institution. Modernity puts forward the thesis of nation-states. Tradition continues to focus on the "Christian empire". A formal confrontation begins between the "new" and the "old". The initiative comes from modernity, which claims the universality of its kerygma, which is confirmed (in their eyes and for pro-paganda purposes) by pointing to the reflexive and self-reflexive nature of its own kerygma. Modernity endeavours to ensure that, in the limit, only one kerygma remains: the "realm of reason", which will be the product of a self-cleansing of the last traces of structure (and the remains of the "imperfect", too "irreflexive" kerygmata of the past).

This battle of modernity versus premodernity in New Age Europe is fought according to all the rules of the duel. A democrat, seeing a monarchist, criticises him and, if necessary, kills him. In defence, the monarchist does the same. This is a struggle and one-time direct dialogue, an open dialogue between kerygma and structure. Who wins in each particular case is always decided differently, but in the general course of Western European history, kerygma always wins fundamental victories, although from time to time the structure tries to take revenge and make a restoration.

The main process unfolds at the level of direct ideological declarations: the representative of the old Christian kerygma (relying on "popular structures") defends faith and the church, the atheist argues that "there is no God", and at this level they have a conversation (sometimes in bloody form). This is what happens throughout the modern era: the struggle between kerygma and structure is clothed in a formal confrontation between the consolidated reflexive kerygma of modernity and the remnants of the former medieval Catholic, class-monarchical kerygma, through which the European structure makes itself known.

*Postmodernity as the triumph of the kerygma*

But at a certain stage, modernity and its kerygma manage to gain a decisive advantage in this struggle. Conservative ideas, institutions and political systems finally recede. This happens in the twentieth century after the Second World War, when "world democracy" succeeds in irreversibly breaking the last flashes of conscious and "kerygmatically" framed desperate European conservatism. Parallel to the consolidation of a formal victory over the enemy, the kerygma of modernity shifts its attention to the "kerygma of modernity".

to a more careful and thorough self-analysis. Having defeated the enemy externally, she begins to look more closely at what is going on inside.

This is where the philosophy of suspicion comes in. The generalised message of this philosophy is this: the kerygma of modernity acted in the name of reason in its struggle against overtly "irrational" systems (theism, monarchy, empire, class, etc.), but in this struggle we have overlooked that the "reason" at the centre of this struggle is itself based on irrational, unreflected motives; in short, within modernity itself there are secret layers of unreflected archaicism - inside, not just outside!

Do you think that this is a "retreat to irrationalism", as the crazy Soviet teachers of ismat thought? Wrong! It is, on the contrary, an increase in the degree of rationalism and subjectivity! The moment when the subject of modernity can realise that it is still too infected with archaicism within itself, that the work of dreams is too strong in it - this is the supreme turning point of the victory of the true modernity, which copes with all formal (external, institutionalised) opponents and begins to deal with internal (more conspiratorial) ones. There are no more formal monarchists, they have been exterminated. And then the democrats who have won all over the world ask themselves: "Are we democrats so democratic? Are we not ourselves too much of the monarchism, totalitarianism, repressiveness of previous epochs? Is not the very principle of the individual, of humanism and of the centrality of the human being, with its reasoning, in turn a violence against more flexible realities - bodily impulses, non-human species, the environment, desires?"

This is the phase of postmodernity. Postmodernity is a state in which the kerygma of modernity turns inward and begins to clean out the Aby stables of its own subconsciousness, bringing its contents into the light of analytical reason, thus clarifying and clarifying the mechanisms of action of reason itself, mastering rationality (kerygma) from all that it still inertially contained from the irrational. Postmodernity is born not from the desire to affirm and strengthen these irreflexive aspects in the subject, but from the desire to cure the subject of these irreflexive aspects.

### *Freudianism as therapy of the subject*

This is why postmodernity is so closely aligned with both Freudianism and Freudian thera-

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by psychoanalytic practice. Freud says: "everyone is sick, there is no health, but one must go on to recovery; one must dive through the system of psychoanalytic counselling into the unconscious, and gradually dispel the fog of "dream work", interact with it openly, descend into it with consciousness, soberly assess how this consciousness draws its content from subconscious impulses, and gradually purge the subject of its irreflexive sides. This is the difficult (if not impossible) Freudian norm: a subject fully aware of the organisation and mechanisms of its own subconscious. Freud's disciple Jung called a similar process "individuation" - the transfer of the archetypes of the "collective unconscious" to the level of individual reasoning.

### *Marxist kerygma*

Marx describes a similar idea in terms of the balance of productive forces and relations of production. This balance predetermines the fundamental mechanisms of the functioning of the base, which are the basis of society. But the processes taking place at this level are normally hidden from human rationality and are expressed indirectly through "ideologies" (as forms of "false thinking"). This is why the philosophical systems and political regimes of the New Age almost always operate with false objects and false methodologies - they are designed to conceal some of the fundamental facts of non-justice and exploitation underlying the economic structure. Although bourgeois regimes (political modernity) are more sophisticated than slave-owning and feudal regimes, their strategic lies are more subtle. Marx proposes to fight the rationality of modernity (which he defines through a class approach as bourgeois rationality) by descending to an awareness of the base and building through this awareness a new kerygma, this time revolutionary and proletarian, communist.

Freudo-Marxists combined both approaches, considering that Marx and Freud were describing the same phenomenon - structure! - from different perspectives, criticising (also from different perspectives) the kerygma of modernity (a bourgeois political system and rationality not subjected to psychoanalytic practice).

### *Nietzsche: life as structure*

Nietzsche's philosophy can be typologically deciphered in a similar vein.

Nietzsche believes that modernity is dominated by "false values" that reveal their "nihilistic" content. The European mind has produced a theological kerygma that is crumbling before our eyes. ("God is dead"). For Nietzsche, atheism and rationalism (modernity) only reveal the fundamental crisis of human reason as such, the crisis of the subject. Desperately searching for something to rely on under such conditions, Nietzsche discovers such phenomena as the "will to power" and "life". This is the Nietzschean understanding of structure. He believes that European culture is based on a formal negation of life and the will to power, yet is completely - albeit blindly - governed by this will. Nietzsche proposes to descend to this reality of "life" in order to construct on its basis a new subject, purified from the thin kerygma of abstract conventions (morality). Nietzsche's norm of such a subject, who has said "yes" to the base (structure), is the superman, the direct embodiment of the will to power - the conscious and reflexed strategy of the subject. The superhuman builds his kerygma on the direct reflection of the vital structure.

This interpretation of Nietzsche explains why he took centre stage in the philosophy of the structuralists, who formed the core of Western Freudo-Marxism. However, Nietzsche's philosophy is so complex and multifarious that it can be interpreted in other ways.

#### *Archaeomodernity as a conflict of operating systems*

What, then, is the archaeomodern under such an analysis? Archaeomodern is a state in which there is much more structure than kerygma, and the kerygma itself is such that it does not grow out of the structure in any way (even in the most crooked way), having been brought in from outside and incorrectly established. It is a kerygma that has not been processed by the structure at all, being in acute but unconscious conflict with it.

Imagine the same Windows computer running a Macintosh operating system directly on Windows. Would it work? Maybe it will have some flickering in it, but technically the floppy disk is correct one, and the second one is also correct, and the installation disc works, and the correct activation codes for both programs are listed on the cover, but they don't go together on the same computer. What is happening on this computer? There is a zone of uncertainty where anything can happen. One system can defeat the other, the other one can interfere with the first one, they can perform

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some task, and may or may not do it. This is roughly what we have in archaeomodernity.

*Archaeomodern as delusion*

There is no central subject in archaeomodernity, which would be the pole of reason and will, there is no enchanted world in archaeomodernity, but, nevertheless, there is no enchanted world, and there is no slender expression of structure in the form of an (albeit archaic and irrational) personalisation of unconscious impulses.

It is a state of systematic (systematised) delirium. Actually, what is delirium, delirium? Delirium occurs when "dream work" penetrates into waking consciousness without censorship and mediating filtering operations. In this case, a very important element is missing - the element of awakening. This element of awakening is very important for us in the understanding of archaeomodernity. On a psychological level, what could we liken the change from the paradigm of tradition to the paradigm of modernity? An awakening. The paradigm of Tradition is active while we sleep, archetypes are at work there, the unconscious is active. When we wake up, the Modern paradigm begins. Imagine a sleepwalker: he is asleep, but he keeps walking, climbing on the roof, moving appliances on the kitchen table.... Or, on the contrary, a person seems to be awake, but half of his consciousness is dreaming. This is archaeomodern. It is also called a clinical state of severe delirium. We can say that this is the "Juxta-zition", the Juxta syndrome, the Juxta disease.

*The kerygma of advaita vedantism*

It is important to note the following: archaeomodernity cannot be categorised as a traditional society. Traditional society is a paradigm which, despite the fact that it has a very developed and powerful ("fleshy", "muzzled") structure, itself creates a kerygma corresponding to this power. This kerygma of traditional society has all the properties of a dream, like ancient cults, religions, archaic practices, but it also has some aspects of rationality. Traditional society - even among the most primitive peoples - is not a delusion, it is a particular rationality that is consistent in a particular structure.

Moreover, there are extremely advanced kerygmata that say univer-

The "yes" to almost any structure. An example is Hinduism, which deliberately puts non-divinity at the head of rationality, knowingly justifying a super-rational rationality (since it is the property of ordinary reason to operate with pairs of opposites). And this kerygmatic advaitism goes so far in its overcoming of opposites that it includes even dvaita-vedantism, i.e. its direct negation! Also, the Hindu kerygma included many non-Aryan structures (dreams) of the local population of Hindustan by simply expanding the pantheons of its gods, spirits and heroes. Moreover, the anti-Hindu reformer Buddha Gautama, a harsh critic of Hinduism and Vedanta, was recognised as the 9th avatara, i.e. the incarnation of the Supreme Principle, who specifically preached critical teachings to test the Hindus!

Hindus have no difference between dreaming and waking, but not because they are delusional, but because they have both the waking and dreaming worlds subordinated to the same system, where freely impulses from the desire and dreaming machine go up into theology, then come back down. In normal Hindus this is the case, and they live perfectly normal lives.

*Archaeomodern is torturing the structure*

In archaeomodernity, the traditional beginning, that is, the structure, lives in the shadows. This is a fundamental point. In archaeomodernity, the structure is in the shadows, in captivity, in a dungeon, in a cellar. It is a state of torture. The structure is suspended on a rack in the cellar, and the executioner of an alienated and crookedly installed rationality works tirelessly on it. Lead is poured down its throat with a certain rhythm, its bones are broken, its flesh is pounded with hot iron. The structure tries to shout, but since pseudo-rationality blocks the structure's ability to speak in archaeomodernity, the structure starts to bypass consciousness and begins to create pseudo-rational statements: for example, "I want to go to the South". It tries in vain to find something from the obviously unsuitable set of words and signs that would correspond to the workings of dreams, but it fails fatally because of the fundamental inconsistency of rational schemes.

In archaeomodernity, the kerygma is launched against the structure, in spite of it. But this does not happen overtly and openly, as in the West or in a duel, but secretly, trickily, under the carpet, in the Byzantine way. The torment of the structure is there, but there is no subject who would be the result of the world's unravelling and the bearer of mind and will. The world of archaeomo-

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he is bewitched, but he is bewitched in a silly way: cars talk here, some strange voices come out of the lift shaft, a man is drawn to the starry distances, "Gagarin is not dead, he has returned", the noosphere makes itself known, intergalactic contacts cannot be ruled out - and so on, the whole phenomenology of the late Soviet Union (and the early one, from Platonov and the noosphere to Raisa Gorbacheva).

### *Enchanted Technique*

All this lies in the realm of enchanted technology. Not enchanted people who live like Leskov's enchanted wanderer, a slightly confused man of traditional archaic society. But Platonov's enchanted proletarians, who talk to steam locomotives, who stroke the furnaces in blast furnaces, saying "well eaten, well eaten" - this is a completely different kind of phenomenon, a fascination with what is essentially the ultimate form of disillusionment.

In Russia, they took the rational Marxist model of unwitching the world, with proof that there is no God, and turned it into an instrument of new bewitching. In the 1920s, atheist propagandists travelled around the villages, spinning a device in which a spark would strike between two electrodes. They said: "You see, they lied to you that God makes thunderstorms! That Saint Elijah the Wonderful is riding across the sky in his chariot! That's just science!" The peasants answered: "Yes, we see it now..... If we had seen such things before, we would have understood everything at once". The lecturer demonstrates something that splits people's minds, but actually bewitches them even more. Imagine those nodding faces! This is even more bewitching, even more archaizing of the magic scientific device than the rather rational kerygma of Orthodoxy, which is built according to the refined skills of correct thinking and a high degree of abstraction.

Soviet modernisation was a typical celebration of the archaeomodern, where reason and the simultaneous slippage of meaning were inseparably intertwined - Platonov had a wonderful story in Chevengur that Dvanov was walking and suddenly saw huge, gigantic sculptures of women's feet, the remains of ancient statues smashed by the Bolsheviks, and there was some note about agricultural work. I quote: "All that was left in the paper was an article on the 'Tasks of the World Revolution' and half an article on 'Keep the snow in the fields - raise the productivity of the labour harvest'." The note in the middle went off the rails. "Plough the snow," it said, "and we won't be afraid of thousands of labour crops.



of Kronstadt." What "Kronstadt's arrogant"? This agitated and puzzled Dvanov." Note the phrase: "the note has lost its meaning" - this is a generalising action of the archaeomodern. The meaning is still guessed, but weaker and weaker. Only "excitement" and "puzzlement" remain. Platonov's character Dvanov thought for a long time about what this could mean and then, with the same indecision, felt how complex and beautiful the world is, and went on with his idiotic business. The proposal to modernise the previous paradigm only causes a new reinterpretation of it, but what a reinterpretation!

*Archaeomodernity as an intertwining of archaic and modernity*

After the baptism of Russia, we perceived a kind of "modernisation", received a new kerygma (not entirely and not fully comprehended, perhaps), a new Christian Orthodox rationality. Of course, the older pagan pre-Christian structure continued its work, manifesting itself in omens and rituals, new legends and reinterpretations of Christian subjects and saints in the Old Russian manner. And, at some point, the kerygma was in some ways distorted by Russian dreams. But with "Kotlovany" and "Chevengur", the archaeomodern blossomed in a terrible way: the atheistic modernist kerygma attacked the structure in an attempt to take it out, but the structure flooded into it from within, striking back. And all this without any formalisation, all under the carpet, in secrecy, pretending that nothing was happening or that something was happening that had nothing to do with what was actually happening.

If modernity had logically, historically and paradigmatically followed premodernity in Russia, displacing it step by step, we would have gradually eroded, lost our structure, our dreams would have cooled down, we would not have been so hot, "excited" and "puzzled", we would have sacrificed our beautiful Russian soul and become more like Westerners. But it was not so, we did not go this way, we went the way of accelerated modernisation, bypassing the stages of consistent and painstaking work of desacralisation.

Modernity has won in Russia, but it has won at the cost of ceasing to be modern. At the same time, we have also retained archaic, but it has been preserved at the cost of ceasing to be real archaic. The structure itself has surrendered itself to the alien kerygmatic Marxist consciousness, which in turn has itself become a prisoner of the structure. Archaeomodernity is a state in which

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archaic and modern take each other prisoner. In this case, no one commands, each tortures the other.

*Postmodern (Tarantino) and archaeomodern (Miike).*

As a rule, the phenomenon of archaeomodernity arises in those societies that have not grown modernity from themselves, to which it came from outside, as colonisation. For example, it is easy to understand that modern Japan is archaeomodern. We talked several times during the lectures about Quentin Tarantino and Takeshi Miike. I realised at some point that these figures are not identical, and that there is a huge gulf between Tarantino and Miike. If you watch Miike carefully - for example, *The Bird People in China*, or his other works, like *Rainy Dog* - it becomes clear that in Miike there is a layer of sincere suffering, a naive belief in the lost sacred and the distressed soulfulness of a man from a traditional society. Against this background, Tarantino's *Absolute Ice* looks qualitatively different. Although both directors are considered classics of the postmodern, one Japanese, the other American.

The fundamental difference between Tarantino and Miike is the difference between two completely different contexts. Tarantino is postmodern in its purest form, and it is an absolutely rational subject strategy, just like Rodriguez with his series *Children of Spies*, where the subject is broken down into separate, scattered and intricately composed post-subject, post-individual, divisional virtual particles. In Miike's film, we see an archaeomodern, suffering, experiencing, to which, in 1945, the American occupiers rigidly imposed an absolutely alien modernist technological kerygma, which it does not understand at all.

*Crime at the forbidden line*

At the intersection of kerygma and structure set obliquely against each other lives the heart of the criminal community. Because criminal circles are one of the most important manifestations of archaeomodernity. Miike's films are almost all yakuza films. And that's no accident. The criminal world is modern in relation to traditional society, because this circle has its own laws, which do not coincide with traditional ethics, ceremonialism, religious, caste or class dogma. But compared to the modern, "legal" and "civil" society, the thieves' worlds are pure archaic, irrational and full of prejudices.

Criminality is one of the most striking examples of archeo-modern expressions, where the legal consciousness that corresponds to modernity and the day-world does not penetrate deeply, and meets on the illegal line between day and night with the voice of dreams. In doing so, neither wins. The archaic and non-legal beginning in crime does not completely defeat the legal one. That is why members of an organised criminal community often come into contact with law-enforcement agencies and special services, and the corruption of both begins (since not only the state agencies cooperating with criminals are degenerating, but also the thieves' dream, the thieves' idea, is degenerating). Everything stops and hangs in this uncertain state. Criminal environments are the most phenomenologically vivid environments where archaeomodernity thrives and lives.

### *The geography of archaeomodernity*

The vast majority of mankind lives in the conditions of archaeomodernity today. These are the countries of the Third World, the East (even industrialised developed countries) and Russia. Europe is in transition from "high modernity" to postmodernity. In the United States, postmodern is already predominant. Moreover, the transition from modernity to postmodernity can be called the main civilisational and social trend of the West in the broadest sense of the word. Everyone else is living in archaeomodernity, and they are tormented by it.

The most unpleasant thing about archaeomodernity is that it is a state of profound but unacknowledged conflict. Archaeomodern is a conflict of opposites that are not removed in synthesis, not harmonised, but not even clearly opposed to each other. In archaeomodernity, archaic and modern are tied to each other with their backs to each other, and in this position they cannot look into each other's eyes, cannot realise what hurts them, what holds back and sabotages any of their endeavours. They are unable to put the enemy in front of them, to see him, to comprehend him. If this operation were possible, a war would break out (between the categorisations of modernity and the archaic structure), blood would flow, and happiness would begin, because nothing could be worse than the archaeomodern condition.

Archaeomodernity is an acute metaphysical, philosophical, paradigmatic disease, the most serious, the most frightening, the most dangerous, and aesthetically the most disgusting. At the same time, the disease is contagious. The disease

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can be strictly described, which will make it possible to uncover it everywhere as soon as we manage to identify its symptoms: it consists in the overlapping of the autochthonous irreflexive, i.e., the structure (the collective unconscious) and the pseudo-reflexive as an alien, externally imposed kerygma. At the same time, the structure is still strong but not strong, and the kerygma is weak but paranoid and cruel (although eloquent).

*The Kukui language and the morphology of delirium*

Archaeomodernity can be described through philology. The silence of structure and the eloquence of the kerygma, which is constantly blurred by the nocturnal (mute) associations of the unconscious, give rise to a special linguistic phenomenon - the specific language of the archaeomodern. Klyuev mentions the "Kukui language" in his poetry. I was very interested in it, what kind of language it was. It turns out that this is what the Russians called the German language, because Germans lived in the Kukui Sloboda in Moscow. But I think that the Kukui language is something much more interesting and meaningful. Apparently, in addition to German proper, which the Germans spoke incomprehensibly to the surrounding Russians, there was another special pseudo-German, Russian-German language, based on random associations of the Russian ear hearing German speech and "guessing" the meaning of words and sounds, or inventing it. This phenomenon is known in linguistics as "folk etymology". In the 19th century, there was an expression: "Why are you staring at your eyes?". By "glazenapy" was meant jokingly and pejoratively, "eyes". But that's too scientific an explanation. It is more correct to say that what was meant were "glazenaps", the eyeballs of a bewildered Russian man who was "excited" and "puzzled" (as Dvanov did after reading an article about snow ploughing). From a kerygma point of view, Glazenapp is a common surname among Russian Germans, etymologically having nothing to do with eyes. But the Russians heard it differently. (This again refers us back to Yukst). This, perhaps, is what the Kukui language is all about.

Another very good language of the late former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, in which nothing - neither cases, nor syntax, nor logical conjunctions (conjunctions of composition are used instead of subordination and vice versa) - agreed with cunning. The words in Chernomyrdin's speech did not agree not from inability, on the contrary, from too much skill, but a very peculiar one. This, too, is a clear example of Kukui language. Chernomyrdin wanted to say something, but at the same time he also wanted to hide something. He begins to speak, but before he has

finished the sentence, in the very

If he takes one more step, he will suddenly realise that he will become a victim, a slave of logical structures, and then he will not be able to escape. He will be forced to formulate some statement that will have the legal force of an irreversible syntagma. The essence of the kerygma of modernity (and of kerygma in general) is that for every utterance the speaker and the doer is absolutely personally responsible. But this is exactly what Chernomyrdin did not want to do under any circumstances. If he had remained silent and did not raise his voice at all, had not quacked, wheezed or imitated speech, he could have been mistaken for a speechless animal, for an object (a gas pipe, an object) and used against his will - for example, to move it like a bedside table. Accordingly, it had to show signs of philological life, but in such a way as to escape the responsibility of utterance. And solving this impossible, difficult task, Chernomyrdin's speech, having started with one thing, quickly "descends from its meaning", becomes entangled in contradictions, moves arbitrarily, carried by waves of random associations and emotions that help to get out of a difficult situation with the reliance on luck and natural ingenuity. That is why some of Chernomyrdin's statements did not end with anything at all, phrases were cut off at half a word (in psychiatry, a similar phenomenon is called schizophasia), empty resonance burst into speech, making the listener forget about logical connections and their absence in other parts of the statement. But this is not a patient, but a former prime minister of a huge country and a high-ranking statesman.

Chernomyrdin's Kukui language is the classic orthodox language of the archaeomodern, where everything is completely incomprehensible as a whole, but everything is understandable in parts. We intuitively guess what he wanted to say, grasp the meaning. Stop! Why do we grasp the meaning? Because we too belong to the Kukui people, to the conditions of archeomodernity, and we think and speak in the Kukui way. All of us, including all those present and all those living in Russia, and we cannot think in any other way. This means that we are, strictly speaking, in the scientific and medical sense, delusional. Everything that we consider to be dreaming or awake is neither of these, it is a common inseparable, continuous field of Russian delirium.

### *Slavophiles and Westerners discovered archaeomodernity*

A very important phenomenon in Russian philosophy (especially when considering the problems of archaeomodernity) is the dispute between Slavophiles and Westerners, which, incidentally, is about the same thing. During the heyday of the Enlightenment in the nineteenth century, we had the emergence of the Slavophiles and Westerners.

The first generations of unspoiled nobles began to argue heatedly about the specifics of Russian culture, Russian history, Russian tradition, Russian religion, and Russian society. These disputes took their most clear and complete form with the emergence of two intellectual camps, the Slavophiles and the Westerners. This dispute is born from the discovery of the archaeomodernist nature of Russian society.

*Chaadayev and radical Westernism*

Chaadayev is a disciple of de Mestre, one of the most conservative thinkers in Europe, the bearer of a rigid Catholic kerygma. In Russian conditions, the disciple of a Western ultraconservative becomes an ultramodernist. Here is a paradox: Chaadaev is a full-fledged true orthodox modernist and a follower of one of the most conservative, if you will, system-forming for European conservatism and traditionalism (it is not without reason that Guénon himself often refers to him). Joseph de Mestre is extremely right-wing by European standards, one might say archaic. But in Russia he becomes the inspiration for the extremely modernist Chaadayev. What is a stricture for kerygmatic Europe is an inaccessible kerygma for the unconscious dreamlike archaic Russia. This is archaeomodernity.

Chaadaev says: if we look at Russian culture, Russian history, Russian society, we will see there some complete nonsense. Everything: the state, law, ideology and religion are based on multistorey lies, imitation, parody, inadequacy, overdetermination, absurdity. Chaadayev is right, he is absolutely right. This is the way it is right up to our time. If we look at Russia from the point of view of the kerygma, we will find failures at every moment. Every decree, every legal and historical action, where it is high time for the subject to appear and formally suggesting that it has appeared, turns out to be a bluff. Modernity is introduced, but at the same time it passes by.

We start philosophising - we philosophise in such a way that the subject immediately turns into integrity, the world is "divided in two", as Skovoroda (the first Russian philosopher) had it, some archaic gnostic myths appear, Solovyov sees Sophia who comes to him in the form of a beautiful woman, cosmist Feodorov raises the dead and tries to control atmospheric phenomena. Not philosophy, but real weakly systematised nonsense. Thought imitation. That's how cats philosophise. This delusion is self-affirming and unfolds in the form of

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The same philosophers, such as Solovyov and Fedorov, or, on the contrary, wild drunkenness, debauchery and debauchery, as in other Silver Age philosophers (Philosophers, Merezhkovsky, Rozanov and Berdyaev). The extremes of exhaustion or, on the contrary, excitement of the flesh are necessarily manifested, all in order to keep this delirium going, so that the flesh and its vapours saturate the arbitrary and bizarrely functioning Russian consciousness.

Chaadaev was the first, and even before the emergence of Russian classical philosophy itself, to notice the inconsistency of Russian society and Russian thinking with the laws of the European kerygma and exclaimed: this is a nightmare! In order to do something about it, it is necessary either to move to the West or to move the West here. This is how Russian Westernism was born.

The further I go, the more I begin to realise that this is a responsible, intelligent, adequate direction, because these are people who understand that it is impossible to exist in archaeomodernity, it is disgusting, that it stifles, stifles any beginning, falsifies any thought, entropises any act, and that this conflict must be removed, resolved. But... But this is where our divergence begins: Westerners propose to remove it exclusively in favour of a kerygma, a kerygma that is modern and Western European, in favour of the kerygma of modernity. They argue that there is no other kerygma as strong and claiming to be universal, and if we had our own kerygma, we lost it long ago. We lost it with the beginning of Russia's modernisation, when archaeomodernity began. The origins of the disease go back to the epoch of the schism, i.e. to the XVII century.

*Slavophile strategy: digging up the structure*

But how did the Slavophiles solve the problem of archaeomodernity? The Slavophiles said: yes, our dear friend Chadaev is completely right in his diagnosis! We are indeed living in a complete delirium. But... It is not the structure (unconsciousness, people, dreams, tradition) that is to blame, but the bearers of the non-Russian kerygma, the reformers of the Petrine epoch, Peter himself and other 18th century Westerners, who drove the Russian structure underground and thus created archaeomodernity. And this is the recipe that the Slavophiles offer: let's dig up the structure! An even more beautiful conclusion! Some (Westerners) said: we must solve this ugly, disgusting, unacceptable compromise of archaeomodernity in favour of the West. I must say that they were good, they wanted to get well - to get well themselves and to cure everyone else. Others (the Slavophiles) said: let us turn to dreams and the other way round.



build, create a world of old Russian dream tales. They were even better, they wanted not just to recover and cure the others, but to defend the identity and dignity of our Russian ancestors, of our dreams. The call of the Slavophiles to "dig up the structure" was heard by Russian culture, Russian compositioners, Russian literature of the second half of the 20th century and created a treasure, what we call "classical examples of national culture". They listened to the voice of the structure, the spirit of the people, their music. They created and lived mainly within the Slavophile canon.

The vector of their endeavours was extremely correct, their orientation was correct, but their discourse itself bore the deep imprint of European culture and noble education. In their efforts to free themselves from the West, they carried the West within themselves, and therefore could neither fully overcome archaeomodernity nor realise the true masses of the problem it represented.

In the end, the Slavophiles only tried to defend the right of the Slavic states not to be Europe's backwater, its gendarme or backyard, but to be self-contained and distinctive participants in European history, full-fledged Orthodox powers full of dignity. They were not in solidarity with the fate of the West, but neither were they capable of clearly outlining the parameters of Russia's destiny.

The intuitions of the Slavophiles were taken up by the figures of the Russian Silver Age - poets A. Blok, A. Bely, V. Bryusov, M. Voloshin, S. Esenin, N. Klyuev, V. Khlebnikov and many others. In poetry, the Russian archaic beginning, freed from the narrow blinders of European education, emerged with a new unprecedented vigour.

The direction of thought that is usually called "Russian religious philosophy" (V. Solovyov, N. Fedorov, V. Rozanov) and, in particular, sophiology (P. Florensky, S. Bulgakov), where one can discern traces of movement towards the development of the Russian logos, stands apart.

The theories of the Russian Eurasians were also developed in the same vein. However, the October Revolution put an end to these quests, and the rise of Russian self-consciousness, the explosion of profound forces, was instrumentally used, tamed, and then mercilessly suppressed by the new political elite. Thus, the search for the Russian logos was postponed for almost another century. The Soviet Union soon turned into a new edition of archaeomodernity.

If we summarise all the attempts made in this direction, we can find a whole scattering of ingenious intuitions and insights. But in a coherent and systematic way.

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They do not add up to a matitised one. Moreover, taken together or separately, they do not provide a general picture of the Russian Beginning, nor do they offer a model with the help of which it would be possible to correctly decipher the available fragments.

*National homeopathic therapy*

The Slavophiles began an even more important and even more interesting process than simply taking the side of structure in the face of archaeomodernity. They did not simply defend the structure from the Western kerygma, they proposed a more radical way: let us treat archaeomodernity.

In fact, the Westerners' proposal to fight archaeomodernity was very logical, but it suggested killing the patient. At first glance, the disgusting appearance of the sick person, drooling, refusing to move around on his own, giggling stupidly, was an argument in their favour. Indeed, who would want a patient in such a state. The Westerners indirectly hoped that something more reasonable and full-fledged, built according to the laws of kerygma, would come to the morgue after the patient's deportation, after his ev-tanasia - the Americans built a successful state practically on nothing - without history, without traditions, without subconsciousness; only on the basis of the most primitive kerygma in many respects, and they succeeded. The Russian Westerners also had something similar in mind - if there was a subject, if there was reason, everything else would follow, they believed. And in this they were faithful to the strict logic of modernity and modernisation.

But the Slavophiles proposed a different scenario: let us still treat, but first let us realise whether this deplorable state of Russians is not the fault of foreign doctors, who, instead of curing archaeomodernity with their practices, only aggravate its condition and thus bear the main responsibility for archaeomodernity. In a milder form, the Slavophiles hinted at the following: let us kill not the sick person, but the doctors who brought him to such a state. They are wrong doctors, they have wrong medicines. They have some common sense in their assessment of the patient's condition, and they are right that something should be done, but what exactly - here we do not agree with them categorically. First of all, let's eliminate these woe-doctors, and then let's try to treat them, and not with the help of kerygmatic treatments, but with the help of autonomous forces of the structure, i.e. homeopathically. National homeopathic therapy.

The Slavophiles rolled up their sleeves and began to cure, as did their direct followers.

The Eurasians also treated the archeomodernity of the Russian people. This was the most adequate direction of Russian political-conservative philosophy - from Kireyevsky, Khomyakov and Aksakovs through Dostoevsky, Gogol, Samarin, Leontiev and Danilevsky to Trubetskoy, Savitsky, Alekseev and Gumilev. All of it is imbued with one main task: to cure Russians of archaeomodernity.

*The World Front of Eurasians against the Western European kerygma*

In the programme book "Europe and Humanity" and especially in Savitsky's review of this work, Eurasians noticed the most important thing: by curing Russians of archaeomodernity, we cure not only Russians. To be more precise, the idea of treating Russians is not only the idea of treating Russians, it is the idea of treating the whole world, because Japanese, Chinese, Albanians, Latin Americans, Africans, Indians need similar therapy. Maybe we just realised this disease more clearly, earlier and more acutely, we realised that archaeomodernity is a disease, and realising how unacceptable and disgusting it is to us, we began to deal with it seriously.

Developing the intuitions of the Slavophiles, the Eurasians came close to a systematic description of the problem. The West claims that the norms of modernity, which grew on its historical soil, are universal laws and universal criteria of development. Thus was born the kerygma of modernity, which claims to be a kerygma in general, the norm of universal rationality (the mathesis universalis of Descartes and Newton). The colonial spread of Western influences to all other countries, cultures and civilisations of the world everywhere gave rise to archaeomodernity. Local structures (i.e. cultures, religions, rituals, beliefs, traditions, social and political systems, economic forms, etc.) were driven underground, and an alien kerygma, understood or not understood at all, blocked their natural and harmonious exit. The whole world (with the exception of Europe and the West) began to speak the kukui language, and the souls of peoples began to suffer unbearably, to rot from the virus of the colonial prosthesis of self-consciousness.

Russia found itself in this position not through direct colonisation, as most countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but through cultural colonisation. This is what the Slavophiles called the "Romano-German yoke". Therefore, Russia theoretically has a chance to carry out a conservative revolution in favour of structure (the famous term "revolutionary conservatism" was first proposed by the Slavophile Y. Samarin), to throw off the Western kerygma and start the process of anti-colonialism.

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In the name of the Russian people, but also in the name of the identity of all cultures and peoples of the world. Not only in the name of Russians, but in the name of the identity of all cultures and peoples of the world. Thus, in political philosophy, the phenomena of structure and kerygma, the state of archeomodernity, find their direct embodiment.

*Archaeomodern in the Soviet way*

The heyday of archaeomodernity in Russia was the Soviet era. Having set themselves the task of realising their ultramodernist projects, of implementing the Marxist kerygma, the Bolsheviks both succeeded and failed. On the one hand, they succeeded, but ... at the expense of depriving Marxism of its rational content. This begs the question: what then did they introduce? If we introduce Marxism, and in order to introduce it, Marxism ceases to be Marxism and becomes something unknown, a dream, then what are we doing?

Up to a certain point, at the first stages, the rational bearers of Marxist discourse themselves understood what they were dealing with, where they compromised on the understanding (misunderstanding) of the basic dogmas of the masses, where they consciously adjusted for pragmatic purposes to "vestiges", where they faced formalised opposition. But gradually, in the 1930s, this reflexion was lost, erased, evaporated, and in the Stalinist era, understanding merged with misunderstanding. This is when the Soviet archaeomodern began to flourish. In the beginning, the Bolsheviks were strictly guided by the idea of introducing consciousness to unconscious people. There were the class-conscious, the proletariat, and the rest, the unconscious citizens. In the first period there was a real struggle: here were the "conscious" (the kerygma), and here were the "non-conscious" (the structure). They said, "You are unconscious" and shot them. In the first years, structure members were shot, re-educated, transformed, in a word, not left alone, and the criterion of consciousness and unconsciousness was obvious, quite rational and mathematically verified.

But at a certain point in Soviet history, one can see how this desire for real modernisation, the desire to impose the Marxist kerygma on the Russian structure at any cost, disappears. The tired communists seem to give up: well, all right, God be with them (to hell with them), with the unconscious. From that moment on, the structure began to catch up: aha, they stopped, and here I am! And it started: Stalin is our leader, our pharaoh, Lenin - in the mausoleum, Stalin too, man - in space! The Russian dream starts to work, the kerygma recedes, and by 91 there is nothing left of it at all!

For 70 years, the Marxists have been beating the unconscious citizens out of their unconsciousness, and again the people are completely unconscious, every last one of them. Everything has been forgotten, the bonfire of party tickets is quietly burning out in the public garden. All the formulas of communism, from the simplest to the most complex, are completely weathered. The structure votes simply "in favour": a bird flew by, a drunken man passed by, Boris Nikolayevich will be our tsar, there is no other - so he will be! The structure has completely destroyed the Marxist kerygma, but in its archaeomodernist underground it has also become rotten and spoiled.

### *Labour rest*

You can't say it's a traditional society. Where have you seen a traditional society that is in a state of permanent delirium? A traditional society has its order, its routine, and even, if you like, its kerygma. It certainly has moral and ethical standards, rational precepts and explanations.

Maybe at the family level something has been preserved? But the Soviet model has penetrated there too. The Soviet family, going to work, sprawling ethics, servant romances and weak-willed children. Feasts with songs about Cheburashka. The typical figure of the Soviet period is the alcoholic worker. But this is not a member of traditional society. The Soviet man works all the time, sober or drunk. And he feels he has to. He works even if he drinks vodka. With every drink there is a process. In one documentary film "Where I came from!" a former brute tells how he quit drinking and started to write author's songs (the most monstrous thing you can think of). Then he built himself a chicken coop and began to live in it. He tells the correspondent: "When I sing a song about my neighbours, about what is lying around, about how I worked at the factory, how I went to school, I feel that something is improving in the cosmos. I think that before the songs, when he was just souring, things were getting better, he just doesn't remember. When he clinked a glass, it improved, lines straightened, flowers bloomed.

In archaeomodernity, everyone is doing something, working hard, but this work most often does not produce any tangible traces, it is entropic by definition. Because it is the work of dreams. And as such it does not lead to orderliness, results, irreversible consequences. Everything builds and collapses like figures made of water or sand. Modernity hysterically craves irreversibility, results, accumulation, direct links between costs and profits,

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between what goes in and what comes out. Archaicism completely sabotages this thirst, mocks it again and again, enveloping the labour process in vapours of utter meaninglessness. Soviet man worked by doing nothing and did nothing by working. In retaliation, modernity prevents this archaic structure from feeling normal, tormenting it with imposed neuroses, disorders, jabs and jabs of residual fragmentary consciousness.

### *Pop mechanics*

Thus, by the 1980s, Soviet society had become blatantly, fundamentally, excessively, grotesquely archaeomodern. To such an extent that it made everyone sick. And then Chaadayev's heirs - Chubais and Gaidar - appeared. They were the right people, and Novodvorskaya was even more right than them. She looks so crazy because the country is crazy. She is the normal one, and we are abnormal. We think she's not normal at all, but in fact it's the other way round. She says to the people: "Friends, you are hindering the process of the kerygma, you should be exterminated, you just don't understand anything. She is absolutely right. The more reasonable a kerygmatic discourse is, the more stupid it seems in the conditions of archaeomodernity. Zhirinovsky is the man everyone laughs at. This man says absolutely rational things, all the time. They look ridiculous because it is not him who is ridiculous, but we ourselves.

Seryozha Kurekhin liked to do the same. But he was already consciously changing things around. When people came to him who were obviously giggling, he would tell them about the laws of thermodynamics - strictly according to the institute course, without any ironic deviations, but they would laugh on their own. And sometimes, on the contrary, he would talk absolute nonsense with a serious look and everyone would nod: "Yes, that's right, that's exactly right," agreed Alla Borisovna and the short nanotechnologist and hero of Putin's prizes, tailor Yudashkin. "Seryozha is not a silly man, he must have read a lot of books." And at the time he was telling them utter nonsense. Why? Because Kurekhin understood (or at least guessed) that in archaeomodernity there is no subject at all, with its verification models, the structures necessary to distinguish delirium from rational judgement; there is no reasoning and volition at all. There is reason or something similar, but without a subject. There is also will, but more a work of desire than will. Kurekhin could well prove this in a conversation with rock musicians (morons by definition) and with Academician Likhachev (a moron of status).

*The revolutionary potential of hyperconformism*

So, in the 1990s, a handful of Soviet Westerners, under the wing of A.N. Yakovlev, who intuitively reached for the mind but was deprived of its most peripheral areas, had a "fresh" idea: to give another fight to archaics, to strike a blow to the structure (preferably to finally destroy it), to open a new stage of kerygmatisation - this time in the form of liberal modernisation. Our liberals said: we must once again subject the structure to genocide. И... started to implement it. This is called "reforms" and "shock therapy". The Russian structure did not particularly resist (only a little in '93), but chose its favourite method, which it had become accustomed to in archaeomodernity: the revolutionary strategy of hyper-conformism. It switched on, saying: yes, Boris Nikolayevich, that's right, that's right, Chubais, let's canonise you for life, you will be the saintly Chubais the electrifier, and we will make Yeltsin and his court (family), as well as his guards, rulers of the Holy Democratic Russia for life. And started to do its usual business - to fake modernisation, to "confuse reforms from their meaning".

*Illiberals*

There was a moment in the early to mid-90s when the liberals had a chance. The vacuum was so great and the structure so stunned that its genocide seemed quite possible. But to do so, liberals would have to be liberals in the modernist sense, not in the archaeomodernist sense. More precisely, they should have become liberals, but... they didn't become liberals.

There is such a notion as "illiberal", spelt not separately in the sense of "not a liberal, but... someone else", but fused - just "illiberal", "not a liberal, but also not someone else"... Our Russian liberals are illiberals because to be a liberal you have to have a political philosophy based on the subject. To be a liberal, you have to have basic Western European characteristics, i.e. you have to be modern, responsible for discourse, ready to pay for both the disadvantages and advantages of an individually, consciously and voluntarily chosen position. We have only Novodvorskaya as such a subject. Chubais, apparently, sincerely and deeply sympathises with this subject, but he himself is constrained by the conformism of his Komsomol youth. He very much wanted to give a deadly fight to archaeomodernity (in its archaic part), but did not dare to cross any line. It cannot be ruled out that archaeomodernity turned out to be too strong in him. Or perhaps he simply gave up:

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"God with archaeomodernity, it's a giant swamp sucking us into nowhere, we can't drain it!...". The liberals turned out to be archaeomodernist effigies of liberals, that is, something fake again. And then came Chernomyrdin with his cuckoo language, and everything became clear. In the 1990s, after the real threat of modernisation loomed, archaeomodernity took over again.

*Putin as the embodiment of archaeomodernity*

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin came to us on the border of the millennium. Putin is undoubtedly a figure of delirium incarnate (remember how he, in a green jacket behind Sobchak, was cosily reading a newspaper in a photo that made the rounds of the Internet). From the point of view of his KGB practice, this was a necessary skill: people there were taught doublethink and split consciousness as a necessary quality of the profession. Putin fits the archaeomodern model perfectly. In every phrase he mixes, smiling with steel-grey eyes, the kerygmatic message, the elements of rationality, and the daringly spoken flap of subconsciousness and structure. I have seen him speak live several times, and I have noticed that he speaks in phrases, each of which necessarily contains two (at least) logically mutually exclusive theses. Once he spoke in the Kremlin and said roughly the following: "our task, Russia's task is to prevent the unipolar hegemony of the United States of America in any case, so we must be an open society and the most important partner for the West, strive to join NATO, the WTO and coordinate our positions with Washington, which is our best partner, and in general Bush is my friend, but at the same time we must not forget that the United States of America is the main threat to the existence of the modern world order and the processes of globalisation are leading to the sovereignty of states, and the answer to this threat we must make.



in a not-so-legal way." But you've heard something like that a million times yourself.

At first I thought maybe it was a compilation of several speechwriters with completely different ideas and assessments of the past, present and future, maybe one sentence was written by Jahan Polliyeva, another by Igor Sechin, a third by Surkov, a fourth by Dvorkovich, a fifth by Patrushev, a sixth by Sergei Ivanov. But nothing like this. It is all Putin's original and holistic, non-disjointed thought, which is split in two as soon as it is uttered. Before being widely circulated in the media, people in the Presidential Administration cut these discourses into *s e p a r a t e* fragments and send them partly to the West and partly to Channel One, in order to satisfy both internal and external demands and to meet the expectations of various social forces (both patriots and liberals). And the speech itself contains both. And it is very difficult to cut it out neatly, because there are also logical coherences: therefore, because, etc. Putin is the brightest embodiment of the archaeomodern, and his language is sharper and more coherent than Chernomyrdin's, but a dialect of the same Cui.

*The balance of Putin's archaeomodernity*

What's good about it? That it's not modern. Moreover, it is a mockery of modernity, of common sense, of the subject. It is a caricature of the rational-willed nature of the modern European personality. Putin makes no real attacks on the Russian structure; moreover, it is constantly visible in his unfortunate jokes and clauses from the crude school jargon - "piss in the latrine", "we'll cut it so small that it won't show", etc. The worst thing for the structure is when paranoiacs like Peter or Lenin, who have tasted the nature of the subject, come and subject the people to genocide with a red-hot iron. Putin does not have that.

On the other hand, this is bad. Because in such a programme there is also a determination to maintain modernity at the level of the stupidest but imitatively Western kerygma: liberalism, democracy, the Constitution, civil society, human rights, tolerance - all these are fetishes and themes that have no relation to reality, but they oppress the Russian structure seriously and effectively, preventing it from truly unfolding



by its internal logic. In relation to archaicism, archaeomodern is almost modern, and in relation to true modernity, it is almost archaic.

Putin, as an exemplary archaeomodernist, will not let the structure down, he intends to systematically destroy it. We think that something is about to happen, but no. It's not. We waited for the first 4 years, we thought that Voloshin was about to be taken down. Four years later, when the Russians howled (in their own way - in their own dumb way, like Gerasim in "Moo-moo"), Voloshin was removed, but again nothing changed. And nothing will, because this is archaeomodern. Putin does not recognise archaeomodernity as a disease. He is satisfied with it, if not enjoying it. And those who accept archaeomodernity as a norm, they are on the side of the disease.

### *Archaeomodernity as a political category*

Understood from this perspective, archaeomodernity is becoming, before our eyes, the most important political, political science and philosophical-political object, a phenomenon that provides answers to all the questions that arise in our society. This concept is the only main fundamental and central line of meaning from which we have to set the coordinate system when analysing what happens to us, what we want, what we choose, what we do. This is the awareness of ourselves, the awareness of the behavioural model of our power, the awareness of what is happening to us, and the awareness of our future choices.

### *The junior president and his "i's"*

Putin's model, Putin's Russia and Putin's course, Putin's plan ... Note, we voted for Putin's "plan" without knowing it. Then we were told that we didn't know him, but now he will tell it to us, while Putin continues to say what he has always said, his usual archaeomodernist koans.

President-elect Dmitry Medvedev explains in the same archaeomodernist manner that Putin's plan had four "i's" in mind: institutions, infrastructure, innovation and investment. We ask: "Is this the plan?" - "Yes, it is a plan" - "Then who are we?" - "Indeed, who are you? If you are like this, then you have a plan, look at yourselves - you don't deserve any other plan than these enigmatic and meaningless words beginning with "i", because who are you? - I...s." And rightly so! Status quo, "you to me, I to you", everything goes according to plan.

Today's status quo is archaeomodern. There are, of course, some processes going on in it, but they are processes that do not bring us closer to anything. What happens in archaeomodernity is a movement "as we go along". That is, it is not movement as such, it is an imitation of movement. You will say how similar it is to the simulacra of postmodernity. But no - the resemblance is deceptive. This is not postmodern. We need the very concept of archaeomodernity to explain why there is no postmodernity in Russia. The presence of imitation scarecrows instead of parties and institutions, the abundance of meaningless nonsense discourses where one part denies the other, the absence of any real movement in one or another logical direction - this is not postmodern, it is archaeomodern.

Postmodernity in Russia could be (or could be) if Chu-bais and Novodvorskaya win here, if Russians are genocided for real and not as a joke as in the 90s, if managers from the USA and Western Europe and labour from China and India are brought here and the United States of Russia is proclaimed. With a narrow foreign top and broad non-Russian layers of guest workers, who will be forbidden to have a structure on pain of deportation back to their impoverished homeland. And then, perhaps, something will work here: not machines will work, not tractors will work, not machines or computers, but a subject. Only after the subject has been introduced here and after sophisticated philosophical operations have been carried out with it can we seriously talk about the presence of postmodernity in Russia. Until this happens, there is no postmodernity in Russia. But outwardly, our current archaeomodernity is remarkably similar to the postmodern, but their sophistication is from intelligence, while ours is from stupidity.

Also, Miike reminds me of Tarantino. Tarantino recognises the importance of Miike and always says, "Watch Takeshi Miike, the Japanese Tarantino". But Miike is not Tarantino, Tarantino is a postmodern phenomenon, Miike is an archaeomodern phenomenon. What our authorities, our elite, our leaders are doing is archaeomodern.

The Russian elite, even if it imitates the Western elite, fundamentally does not understand what it is doing, and this is the most important thing. It does not pretend, it does not fool around, it does not lie, it really thinks so, if you will. That's much scarier. When you firmly know something, that A equals A, and you consciously say that it is not true, and A does not equal A, then you are lying. But it's a normal thing, it's a perfectly rational thing. It's a lie of the subject. But when you are not really sure that A equals A, that a wall is a wall, that the sky is above and the earth is below, then it is no longer a lie. You may be lying, but

you're lying from a referential base that's already blurred. It's no longer the subject's lie, but a disorder of consciousness. It is delirium, delirium. This is how the Russian authorities lie today: not because they hide the truth, but because they do not know it.

*Modernisation according to Khodorkovsky failed*

Is a cure for archaeomodernity possible? As soon as we begin to realise as sharply as the Slavophiles and Westerners that archaeomodernity is a deeply conflictual situation, that it is a disease and, if anything, an evil, then we ask with all seriousness: what can be done to eliminate or cure this disease?

Everything is clear with the elimination of the disease together with the patient. Since archaeomodernity is in its neglected stage, and there is very little Russian beginning in our non-Russian consciousness, only Novodvorskaya's plan is possible with the cure of archaeomodernity in the direction of modernity. It is a logically consistent plan, quite honest: it is difficult for the sick person - it is necessary to kill him. If you take the side of the doctors who are torturing him, I would agree with it. We should not take it too lightly, these are not villains and morons talking, these are responsible doctors who are responsible for the premises, for the beds, for the artificial oxygen, for the medicines.

I spoke to Khodorkovsky before he went to jail. He was almost openly suggesting that Russians should be quietly euthanised. He spoke along these lines: nobody will notice when we evict everyone into boxes, everything will be calm; we have created social funds to cushion the shock of the dismantling of national statehood. He understood that archaeomodernity was a disease, but he stood on the position of modernity, believing that modernisation was necessary. And for this it was necessary, well, not to kill the Russian-Soviet population outright, but to lead it gradually, preferably in comfortable conditions. He said roughly the following: "I am allocating several billion dollars to make it comfortable for the people to disappear".

This comfortable disappearance of structure, the exorcism of Russian structure, this programme of the liberal-modernists, was rejected by the archaeomodernist Putin. Putin said: "Archaeomodern is good, it is not a disease, it is the very norm, with a harmonica, a rocket and a tennis racket .... And everyone will be given a carrot or a head, well, it's as it turns out. And the archeo-

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modern, dream world mixed with annoying, ridiculously presented waking life in the form of WTO managers, RBC channel, marketing analysis.

# Sociology of the archaeomodern<sup>1</sup>

## 1. *The Structure of the Archaeomodern in Sociology*

### *Sociology of landfill*

The phenomenon of archaeomodernity reveals that a society may well live simultaneously in several epochs - at the level of the elite (representing either the colonial administration or its autochthonous analogue), linear time or modernist forms of Gurvich's social time may unfold, while the masses will be dominated by mythological time (eternal return, slowing down, permanence).

The archaeomodern social system moves simultaneously in two opposite directions, which produces shifts and splits, while some layers of the masses are involved in the linear time of the elites, and some of the elites are "irradiated" by the cyclical calm of the "eternal return" of the masses. Pitirim Sorokin called such a situation a "dump". Various symbols, archetypes, plots and myths pile up on top of each other without any order, and completely dissimilar things neighbour each other. Thus, in the dump, rusty pipes, rotten food, scraps of glossy magazines, fragments of furniture, empty boxes and bottles, piles of unidentifiable viscous substances, melted plastic, etc., lie side by side. This is the typical social landscape of the archaeomodern: a society living not just at different speeds but in different directions is losing its unity, its cohesion, its ability to unite different layers, strata and symbols into a common harmony. In this case, when the discord between logos and mythos reaches a critical point, the denominator begins to act as a destructive force, actively sabotaging any attempts of the progressive logos to modernise.

The sociological model of the "junkyard society" described by P. Sorokin is also applicable to the social phenomenology of the Postmodern, where Modernity loses its logical and progressive energy, but myth in the denominator also suffers quite seriously from attempts to modernise it, as a result of which not pure archaic archetypes but their pale remnants come to the surface,

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<sup>1</sup> Fragments from the book *Dugin A.G. Sociology of Imagination. Introduction to Structural Sociology.* Moscow: Academic Project, 2010.

"residui", which the modern sociologist Jean Baudrillard might well have called "simulacra."

*Archaeomodern in the Soviet way*

The Soviet system gave birth to a new version of the archaeomodern: the Marxist logos (proletarian consciousness, communist ideology) was superimposed on Russian native messianism, but the incoherence of these two plans, the contradictions between the Western structure of the social logos and the autochthonous Russian society made themselves felt. The "Russian folk dream", which initially supported the Bolsheviks (as exemplified by the poetry of Nikolai Klyuev, Alexander Blok, the early novels and novellas of Andrei Platonov, etc.), later blocked Marxism, which did not want to turn its face to the national unconscious, and began the subtle work of intellectual sabotage of the ruling rationality. For its part, orthodox Marxism tried to eradicate the Russian myth, and the Russian myth corroded the slenderness of Marxist rationality. By the 1960s, this led to stagnation, and in the 1980s it caused the collapse of the USSR and the entire world socialist system, which was largely based on the socio-economic, ideological and military power of the Soviet Union.

However, Communist China (also an agrarian country with a traditional society), which initially placed more emphasis on national traditions, managed to persist into the 1980s by reconstructing its ideology in an overtly nationalist spirit. By adapting the economy to the pragmatic needs of the time, adopting certain aspects of the market and capitalism, it preserved the state, the political power of the Communist Party and the social integrity of the country. Economics in Marxism was thus only a component of the myth, which, operating with economic models and economic structures, adapted them in theory and practice to its own needs as necessary. The end of the USSR was connected with the wear and tear of the myth. And what seemed to be a stage following the capitalist epoch turned out to be only a deviation on the way to the capitalist era

the unfolding of more general processes.

This is the case at the level of the social logos of the West. But at the level of the collective unconscious of the Russian people it was an unsuccessful attempt to bring the national myth into the social dimension of consciousness, i.e. a failed attempt at individuation.



## 2. *Anthropological aspects of archaeomodernity*

### *Human shot*

The human being in structural sociology can be visualised as a fraction "logos/mythos." Logos is the rational part; mythos is the irrational part. Logos corresponds to consciousness; mythos to the unconscious.

### **LOGOS**

### **MIFOS**

#### *The human schema in the two-dimensional topics of structural sociology*

In a normal society, the logos grows gradually and stagewise out of mythos as its matrix. The attention of man is first concentrated in the signifier, in the sphere of dreams, and only then awakens and rises to the numerator, acquiring the character of sober logical reasoning.

#### *Anthropological hybridity and the "abomination of desolation"*

Let us now consider the concept of man in societies of the archaeomodernist type. The predominant type in them is an anthropological hybrid.

The structure of the anthropological hybrid is justified by the fact that its mythological component (the "denominator" of the human fraction) is in complete disharmony with the logos (the "numerator"). The birth of the logos, its further purification from mythological traces and systematic struggle with its own myth provoke conflicts, splits, crises and revolutions even in those societies where this process is internal, endogenous. But in the case of archaeomodernity, everything takes on a particularly catastrophic character, since the dysfunctions between the "numerator" and the

The "denominator" unfolds not dialectically, systematically, gradually and meaningfully, but all at once and without any internal dynamics. Archaeomodern is a "society-dump", according to P. Sorokin.

The Bible has the term "abomination of desolation". Unlike the natural desolation of endogenously logos societies and the people of such societies, archaeomodernity does not turn into a dumping ground gradually, but is a dumping ground initially as an artificially organised dumping ground for the waste of more

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organic cultures.

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*The discrepancy between the sociological man and the psyche*

The anthropological hybrid of the junkyard society is split from the very beginning: the social logos here is not correlated with the structure of myth, because it is artificially superimposed on this myth from outside. Myth, defending itself, reinterprets the logos in its own way, clinging to any accidental associations. In doing so, the myth ruthlessly distorts the structure of the logos. The logos resists this and strikes back at the myth, unsuccessfully trying to strike it down. Myth decomposes the alien logos, logos ruthlessly rapes the autochthonous myth.

As a result, such a society is not just rigidly stratified (all societies are rigidly stratified), but generates a system of conflicting dyads. The elites try to adopt borrowed models of logos or represent, in the full sense of the word, a colonial administration. The masses retreat into unconsciousness, only formally accepting the model imposed from above.

In archaeomodernity there is a fundamental mismatch between social status (i.e. the sociological man) and the psyche, the dynamically conceptualised soul. In such a society, neither individuation nor effective initiation is possible (if it is preserved at all). The life-giving balance of the social and the psychic is blocked.

*Bottoms and tops of archaeomodern society*

The human being in archaeomodern society lives in a constant contradiction between social status and psychic process. No single status or set of statuses opens the way for the realisation of psychic archetypes. Such reconciliation is peculiar to both the higher strata and the lower strata. The lower strata of such a society have a myth, but they have no possibility to translate it into the zone of logos. And the upper strata have a logos, but are exsanguinated internally and suffer from mental deficiency (neurosis). Among the higher strata there are those who are completely identified with the exogenous social logos (status set), cease to perceive the surrounding society in its organic component and act as paranoid soulless mechanisms; and also those who carry links with the collective unconscious, although this unconscious is chaotic, disturbed and instead of the soul is represented mainly by "shadow" structures.

The major French sociologist Roger Bastide studied one such archaeomodern society, the Brazilian one. His research can serve as a basis for the study of all varieties of dump societies.

The study of Brazilian archaeomodernity, according to Bastide, is facilitated by the fact that all social strata are clearly labelled by race. The upper classes are the white Portuguese. Below them are the light mestizos (whites + Indians), even lower are the dark mulattos (whites + Negroes), and at the bottom are the Negroes. Social differentiation is marked by skin colour, and even its shades. White descendants of the Portuguese (and other Europeans) are rich, prestigious, powerful and highly educated. They set the official paradigm of the social logos, which is Euro-Pean, rationalist, Christian (Catholic). Political and social institutions are modelled on the Enlightenment. Brazil's façade is European.

At the opposite end are the Negroes - poor, ignorant, despised, subjugated, disempowered or unable to exercise their rights. They were imported as slaves, torn from the soil, stripped of all social status, myths, religion and turned into cattle. They were treated as objects by the Portuguese. Forced to abandon their myths and customs and to accept the imposed norms of the Portuguese masters, the Negroes nevertheless retained mythological ties and structures at an unconscious level, which led to the emergence of secret cults like Candomblé. African dreams continued to be broadcast - but in a distorted, fragmented form.

The regular cohabitation of white planters with Indian concubines and Negro slave women produced a huge mestizo and mulatto population that had neither the social logos of the direct descendants of the Portuguese nor the subconscious structure of the Negro or uncultured Indian. This stratum represents typical anthropological hybrids in which the logos structures are blurred and unfixed and the archetypes of the collective unconscious are disorganised. As a result, in Brazilians, Freemasonry coexists with archaic African sorceresses, spiritualism is practised in Catholic churches, and entire cities made of rubbish bins, boxes, cans and barrels - favelas and "pavelas" - have been built around the capital and major cities.

bidonvili. The dump serves as a model of architectural structures and a dwelling place for the general population.

Brazil is a society where individuation is by definition impossible because social patterns are fundamentally at odds with psychic structures. It is only in the recently formalised purely African centres of "black mothers" cults, worshipping "orisha spirits", that a certain restitution of initiatory procedures has begun. But these peripheral initiations cannot affect the social structure and, although they are no longer persecuted, remain within the boundaries of social marginality. To this must be added the infiltration of alien "Christian" elements, the fragmentation of the "orisha" cults (African spirits) themselves and the internal strife that leads to divisions among the "black mothers" and their followers.

The main Brazilian event is the annual Carnival, which incorporates features of the ancient Roman Saturnalia, the processions in honour of Dionysus, the medieval donkey festivals and the multicolours of the sects and heterogeneous cults of the Brazilian lower classes. During Carnival, the unconscious is brought to the surface in semi-ritual dances and simulated or real orgies.

The figures, themes, plots and actions of carnival - with their fragmentation, chaos, aimlessness, disorientation - do not represent a new synthesis, but the triumph of marginality, the outburst of anomie, i.e. the same dump, only seen in its "glorious" sparkling aspect.

*Russian society as archaeomodern: an unhappy society*

Russian society of the last three centuries belongs to the same type of archaeomodernity, when, in the course of Peter's modernisation and for some time before him, the rulers began to introduce structures of a social logos culled from the countries and societies of Europe, and the people withdrew into their ancient dreams. Unlike Brazil, there was no racial background, although the Romanov elite included a significant percentage of foreigners, and the native Russian aristocrats themselves, from a certain point onwards, preferred to speak Dutch, German and later French in the 18th and 19th centuries. Individuality becomes problematic already at the end of the seventeenth century (this is when the Russian split took place), and from the eighteenth century Russian society became a class example of pseudomorphosis (as O. Spengler wrote).

During the Soviet period, the same split into Russian mythos and imported so-

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The social logos (in the form of Marxism) persists. The liberal reforms of the 1990s not only do not correct the situation, but aggravate it with a new wave of borrowings from the West (which has already entered the Postmodern phase). So, with regard to contemporary Russia, we can make a sad diagnosis: we live in a society of dumping grounds.

Russian man in recent centuries has been bifurcated between his unconscious, which has no outlet, and alienated state structures and alien elites. This is the main problem of social anthropology of modern Russia. The axis of happiness in such a society is deliberately blocked. Therefore, it is a sociological unhappy society.



# The ellipse of archaeomodernity and Russian philosophy<sup>1</sup>

*Smerdyakov as a central figure of the archaeomodern (on "bathing sputum")*

The programme of Russian archaeomodernity is briefly and succinctly outlined by the hero of F.M. Dostoevsky's novel *The Brothers Karamazov*, Pavel Smerdyakov, the illegitimate son of Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov by the moronic beggar Lizaveta Smerdyaschaya. -

"I hate all Russia, Marya Kondratyevna. (...) In the twelfth year there was a great invasion of Russia by the Emperor Napoleon of France the first, and it would have been good if we had been conquered by these very Frenchmen then; a clever nation would have conquered a very stupid one and annexed it to itself. It would have been a completely different order "<sup>2</sup>.

And in the following dialogue with the same Maria Kondratyevna:

- If you were a young military junker or a young hussar, you would... would have taken out your sword and defended all Russia.

- Not only do I not wish to be a military hussar, Marya Kondratyevna, but I wish, on the contrary, the destruction of all soldiers.

- And when the enemy comes, who will defend us?

- You don't have to. In the twelfth year there was a great invasion of Russia by the Emperor Napoleon.... and it would have been good if we had been conquered then... "<sup>3</sup>.

This is not simple Westernism, although Pavel Smerdyakov is certainly a Westerner, as is evident from his admiration for all things European. He himself speaks of Europeans in this way:

"The one there [i.e. the foreigner] walks in patent boots, while our scoundrel stinks in his poverty "<sup>4</sup>.

Here it is significant that Smerdyakov partially criticises himself, his Russian nature. Judging by his pejorative nickname, his foolish mother is stinking, and he himself stinks from within, in keeping with his surname, but he tries to drown out the stench with perfume and disguise it with lacquered shoes. This is the image of a Russian lackey, a bastard, a social figure hovering between the barin and the common man, a being who is deeply ill, mangled, upset, but at the same time suffering and tormented, and tormenting others. This is the hybrid, the typical image that concentrates the main properties of the Russian archemodern. This



<sup>1</sup> Fragment from the book *Dugin A. Martin Heidegger: the possibility of Russian philosophy*. Moscow: Academic Project, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> *Dostoevsky F. M. Brothers Karamazov*. M.: Eksmo, 2009 P. 266.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* C. 266.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* C.266.

Dostoevsky's old servant Grigory, who raised Smerdyakov, points out the peculiarity of the Smerdyakov breed (the Russian servant, as a representative of traditional archaic Russian society, is opposed to the Russian lackey). Recognising the pathology of Russian lackeyism, of social Smerdyakovism as a metaphysical phenomenon of the archemodern, Grigory insisted, even as a child, that Smerdyakov should not be baptised:

"Because it's a... dragon. the mixing of nature has taken place"<sup>1</sup>.

This extremely important "mixing of nature" - a "mixing" that is pathological, unnatural, aesthetically repugnant and ethically repulsive (Smerdyakov turns out to be a patricide in the novel) - is the formula of Russian archaeomodernity, a disgusting hybrid of archaism and modernity, carried out to the detriment of both, leading to the perversion and degeneration of both. The old Russian servant suspects that the type of Russian lackey that will replace him carries a colossal anthropological threat. Developing the theme of the "dragon", the "mixing of nature", Grigory tells Smerdyakov to his face:

"Are you a human being? You're not a man, you're from the sputum of the bath, that's what you are".<sup>2</sup>

This is not just an irritated metaphor, but a crucial insight into the field of social anthropology. Smerdyakov (the Russian lackey and prototype of the Russian li-beral), in the view of a typical representative of archaic Russia, is "not human", "not pure", an evil demonic being born from "bath sputum" (the image of "bath" and "sputum" used here has an archaic structure and means something "unclean", "primordial", recalling the plot of the dispute between the devil and God in numerous Russian apocryphal legends about the creation of the world with obvious elements of either ancient Iranian dualism or medieval Bogomilism)<sup>3</sup>.

Most importantly, the degenerate Smerdyakov is an absolutely autochthonous Russian degenerate. His "Westernism" is not the cause of his degeneration; on the contrary, his degeneration, his own, deep degeneration, pushes him - out of awareness of his own pathology and disgust for his own and everything around him - to worship before

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. C.115.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. C.148.

<sup>3</sup> In these plots, Satanil seeks to compete with God, but he fails because he tries to create likenesses of God's creations out of unsuitable material. See Russian Mythology. Encyclopaedia. Moscow: Eksmo, 2006.



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The "other", in this case before Europe, which is elevated to an ideal. In Smerdyakov and the Russian archaeomodern, it is not love for the other, but hatred of the other that is central. This distinguishes Russian archaeomodern from its colonial and postcolonial counterparts.

In colonial India or slave-owning Brazil, the modernity embodied in the ruling class of the European colonisers was a disaster, a disaster of an external nature. Although colonisation gradually penetrated deep into the interior, giving birth to layers of collaborators, imitators and transgressors, it did not carry with it an underlying split in the consciousness of the people and their hatred of their identity. It was like a natural disaster and had no endogenous cultural roots.


The artificial modernisation of Russians and their Westernisation, starting with Peter the Great, gave rise to a sense of society's internal betrayal of itself, its roots, and the

It was impossible to explain the "defensive", "forced" nature of such modernisation, which may be rationally understandable to the elites, to the general masses. (All the more so, it was not clear why it was necessary to "throw the baby out with the water" - to sacrifice identity for the dubious benefits of technological development). What reached the masses was a Smerdyakov-esque dispositif of various strategies of self-alienation, split consciousness, inner hatred and squeamishness - first of all, towards themselves. Modernity was perceived not as such, but as a measure of humiliation - as something against which everything Russian was subjectively perceived by Russians themselves as "wretched", "insignificant", "shameful", "repulsive". Thanks to this understanding of "modernity" in archaeomodernity, its content, as well as the process of modernisation itself, is perceived deliberately wrong, distorted, loses its original, but does not acquire a positive and new content, turning into a meaningless and aggravating pathogenic core, a source of incessant <sup>resentiment</sup><sup>1</sup>.

At the same time, the archaic side of the figure of the Russian "dragon lackey" has significantly mutated, losing the calm self-identity of archaics, turning inside out, losing its internal structure - the structure of myth and custom, ritual and tradition.

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<sup>1</sup> *Scheler M. Resentiment in the Structure of Morals. SPb.: Nauka/University Book, 1999.*




*Scheme 1: Russian hermeneutic ellipse (archaeomodern)*

### *Hermeneutic ellipse*

Russian culture embarked on the path of archaeomodernity at the end of the seventeenth century, but the first signs of archaeomodernity appeared even earlier, in the first half of that century. It was then that fundamental changes in church practice became noticeable: the spread of polyphony and partial introduction of the partes in church singing, the influence of "Fryazh" writing - perspective - in icon painting (for example, in the Ushakov school and parsun painting), as well as the active imposition of European fashions and customs (theatres, tobacco smoking, new styles of dress, etc.). This tendency reached its culmination in the Church and then in Peter the Great's reforms and predetermined the structure of Russian society up to our time. Since the Petrine period, Russia has been living in the archaeomodern, and reference to this social model serves as a fundamental hermeneutical basis for the correct interpretation of major cultural, social, political, spiritual and economic events.

Archaeomodernity can be likened to the figure of an ellipse with two focuses - the Modern focus and the Archaic focus. At the level of the elite, the processes of modernisation (=Europeanisation) were unfolding, while the masses remained within the archaic paradigm, in the Rus of Moscow. In their nuclei, both social groups lived autonomously from each other, almost without crossing each other, as on two different planets, on two different social territories. Costumes, manners, even language differed: the elite of Romanov Russia after the seventeenth century spoke fluent Dutch, English, German, and later French, while the Russians could not even speak Russian.



*Scheme 2: Russian hermeneutic ellipse: vertical arrangement emphasising the hierarchical conjugation of focal points.*

to know, it was superfluous in the daily life of a nobleman. These two territories They represented two types of what Husserl called the "lifeworld" (Lebenswelt) - two distant horizons of existence and everyday life, structured in completely different ways. The core of the elite was made up of foreigners, who served as a standard for the Russian aristocracy proper: they were the bearers of a truly European Lebenswelt. The core of the common people were Old Believers and, partly, representatives of Russian sectarianism, who consciously endeavoured to have as little overlap as possible with the Russian state and "cadre" society (i.e. with Moscow)<sup>1</sup>). But although these worlds were completely separated, we are still dealing with one and the same society, albeit consisting of a superposition of two cultural territories. And this unity was formalised in the form-

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<sup>1</sup> Dugin A.G. Russian Thing. T. 1, M.: Arktogetia, 2000; Dugin A.G. Kadrovy/Dugin A.G. Russkaya veshi. Ibid. op. cit. p. 569-575.

The unity of the political, social and economic mechanisms that affect everyone in one way or another. Between these two poles, a gradually generalising figure crystallised, embodying archaeomodernity not as a composite, decomposable concept, but as an imageless, interiorised pseudo-synthesis. This is our Smerdyakov, the "lackey-dragon". He was the common thing that transformed two circles with different centres into a single Russian ellipse.

And it is precisely the Smerdyakovschina, which is easily recognisable in the Russian aristocracy (and in the heroes of Pushkin and Lermontov, and especially in the person of the real historical character Pyotr Chaadaev), that is the whole that constitutes the structure of the hermeneutic ellipse of the archaeomodern.

### *Westernised focus*

In the structure of the hermeneutic ellipse described above, we can note the pole that embodied modernisation (Modern) and represented a part of Western destiny. A Western person, even a Russian or an individual Russian (aristocrat) fully integrated into Western society (which is theoretically quite possible), is part of Western culture, Western sociality and, consequently, a moment in the logic of Western history. From a philosophical point of view (as Martin Heidegger clearly shows), this history has been the expression of different stages of philosophical thinking. Western society and the stages of its historical development up to modernity were a reflection of the development of Western philosophy. Modernity (the New Age) was therefore part of Western destiny, in a sense its goal, its "telos". Modernity matured in Western culture, was embodied in it, and spilled out of it in Europe's colonial rush to integrate the world under its rule (the age of the Great Geographical Discoveries).

The pole of modernity in Russia in its purest form may well be regarded as the extreme periphery of the West European hermeneutic circle, like the furious Spanish conquistador who got lost in the malarial swamps of the Amazon in search of El Dorado<sup>1</sup>. Nikolai Gumilev wrote about such a figure in a heartfelt manner:

*Deep in the unknown mountains, the  
old conquistador lost his way.*

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<sup>1</sup> Werner Herzog's film *Aguirre, The Wrath of God* subtly captures the existential condition of the European Romantic type.

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*Condors floated in the smoky sky, snowy  
hulks loomed overhead.  
Eight days he wandered without food, his  
horse died, but under a big ledge he  
found a cosy dwelling,  
That he might not be parted from his  
sweet corpse. There he dwelt in the shade  
of dry fig-trees, He sang songs of sunny  
Castile, He remembered battles and  
mistresses, He saw squeaks and  
mantillas.  
As always, he was bold and calm  
And knew neither terror nor anger,  
Death came, and offered her a warrior  
To play the broken bones.<sup>1</sup>*

It is clear that such a "conquistador" has no time for philosophy, but even in nonhuman conditions he remains the bearer of a Western European destiny that exposes Western man in his fundamental and irremovable loneliness in the face of the main interlocutor, death, in the structure of an aleatoric code linked to the accident of the European Dasein lost in the labyrinths of the growing nothingness. But this existential charge of the real (and not of the imitative and mimic Smerdyakovian, The modernisation as inclusion in the Western European process, in the Western European destiny, was extended to a very limited layer of the Russian political elite. Therefore, modernisation as inclusion in the Western European process, in the Western European destiny was extended to a very limited layer of the Russian political elite. As a representative of an Orthodox power, seeking (albeit for pragmatic reasons) to preserve its sovereignty in the face of other European powers ready to encroach on it at any moment, this elite was geopolitically oriented predominantly against the West, both on the periphery of Russian power in the West (the Baltics, Ukraine), in the South (the Crimea, the Caucasus) and in the East (Central Asia and, from a certain point onwards, the Far East).

These geopolitical circumstances did not favour the organic assimilation of the beginnings of Western philosophy even by the Russian aristocracy. The Russian elite developed the archetype of the brave Landsknecht in the service of a foreign country,

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<sup>1</sup> Gumilev N. Pearls. Poems. Scorpion Publishing House. M., 1910



It is not a country he does not understand and is not interested in, but tries to serve it to the best of his ability for a particular interest.

### *Schematisation of the hermeneutic ellipse*

The adoption of archaeomodernity as a basic model of interpretation of the peculiarities of Russian society's mentality of the last centuries brings us close to the problem of correctly deciphering what the attempts of Russian thinkers of the 19th century to build a "Russian philosophy" really were. The graphic representation of the hermeneutic ellipse of the Russian archemodern brings us close to the main problem of our research. Let us consider the following scheme.

On it we see several figures. The ellipse proper denotes Russian archaeomodern, which appears, on a superficial analysis, as something whole and unified, but in fact is organised around two rather distant (and, most importantly, qualitatively different) focal points.

### *Pole structure*

Focus B (scheme 1) is the focus of modernity. The whole secret is that it belongs to another really existing, real hermeneutic circle - the circle of Western European philosophy. That is, the discourse of modernisation in Russian society is a provincial and deaf reproduction of Western European culture, history and, accordingly, philosophy. Focus B itself (Scheme 1) has its core and its periphery. In the core are Europeans who have settled (permanently or temporarily) in Russia and who maintain an organic connection with the hermeneutic circle of Western culture.

First of all, these were either Russian tsars and tsaritsas who were related to European houses, or ethnic foreigners themselves. Naturally, they did not appear on the Russian throne alone, but brought with them from Europe a whole army of relatives, lovers and mistresses, maid of honour, jesters, doctors and a gigantic staff serving the imperial personages, who automatically got to the highest floor of power. All of them were carriers of Western European origin, which was reflected in the fact that they themselves were Orthodox or adopted Orthodoxy in Russia. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, only the form remained of Russian Orthodoxy, and the content was fundamentally perverted by various Western Christian influences (Catholicism, Christianity, Christianity, Christianity, theology, religion, and theology).

In the case of the New Believers, it was not only from within the New Believers' clergy<sup>1</sup>, but also from the secular nobility.

Foreigners laid the foundations of Russian academic science, first of all, within the framework of the Petrine Academy of Sciences, whose project was fully realised under Catherine the Great. Among them a whole pleiad of foreign scientists stands out: physicians L.L. Blumentrost, I.D. Schumacher, historians G.F. Miller, A.L. Schlezer, physicists D. and N. Bernoulli, U.T. Epinus, mathematician L. Euler, naturalist L.Epinus, mathematician L. Euler, natural scientist I.G. Gmelin, academic functionary I.A. Tauberg, philologist G.Z. Bayer, painter and art historian J. Stelin, etc. To this should be added foreigners who enlisted in the Russian service in search of ranks and honours. Together they created the content of Pole B (Scheme 1), being the true bearers of the fashion, albeit peripheral, colonial and "conquistador" one.

Around this nucleus, in the form of concentric small ellipses, clusters the Russian milieu of those who are caught up in the process of Europeanisation and modernisation. These are representatives of the Russian boyars and especially of the nobility, who, for purely practical reasons, strive to win the favour of their Imperial Majesties and are prepared to sacrifice old traditions and customs for this purpose. There is also a new pleiad of Russian scientists (sometimes of Dissenter origin - such as M.V. Lomonosov - but quickly rising to the elite) who adopt certain aspects of foreigners' thinking, forming the basis of the Russian intellectual class. In other words, concentric figures of Russian society, first of all aristocratic, are gradually forming around Pole B (Scheme 1).

At the same time, the further they move away from the foreign nucleus proper, the more the strictness of the structure of Western European thinking is erased in them, which is diluted by the attractive influences of the second focus (A) (Scheme 1), which represents the archaic pole. The erosion of the Western European nucleus is especially noticeable in the Russian Dissenters of the second half of the 19th century, who were close to the native masses, although not only in them, as the case of the Russian conservatives of the beginning of the same century - A. S. Shishkov, S. N. Glinka, M. L. Magnitsky, F. V. Rostopchin, A. S. Sturdza, S. S. Uvarov, and the Slavophiles - A. S. Kho-o-

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<sup>1</sup> The figures of such prominent figures of the Russian Orthodox Church as Theophan Prokopovich (1681-1736) and Stephen Yavorsky (1658-1722), both *Little Russians*, are indicative of the Petrine period. In their fierce polemics, these two church hierarchs essentially transferred European disputes between Protestants and Catholics to Russian soil: Prokopovich defended Protestant positions, while Yavorsky defended Catholic-Jesuit positions.

The Russian language is the most popular culture in the world. I. V. Kireyevsky, brothers K. S. and I. S. Aksakov, or A. S. Pushkin, who became interested in folk culture "from above", from the position of the aristocracy.

The circles forming around the pole B (scheme 1), gradually expanding, change their shape, turning into ellipses as the Russian Beginning, focus A, exerts more and more influence on them. Let us now consider this focus itself in more detail.

### *Archaic Focus*

Focus A (diagram 1) marks the archaic beginning in the hermeneutic ellipse. It can be regarded as the potential centre of that hypothetical hermeneutic circle (not an ellipse!) that could be called "Russian philosophy", the possibility of which this paper is devoted to. We have outlined this circle with a dotted line (Scheme 1) to emphasise its hypothetical character. As such, it does not exist. But whether there can be one, we will try to find out in the course of our research with reference to Martin Heidegger's philosophy. For now, what is important for us is that in the real structure of Russian society this focus is in a subordinate position and corresponds to the broad masses, the people, to what we can call the archetypal beginning of Russian society. In view of this hierarchical subordination, the hermeneutic ellipse of the Russian archaeomodern should be placed vertically.

The final hermeneutic ellipse is formed by the expansion of the process of modernisation and Europeanisation, which gradually includes ever wider layers of Russian people. Pole A (Scheme 2) - the focus of archaicism - is a kind of "extraneous attractor", whose influence modifies the overall structure of society and its logos and distorts its proportions, imitating (according to the modernisers' idea) the hermeneutic circle of Western European culture, science and philosophy. This can be seen particularly clearly in the 19th century as the project of "popular Enlightenment" spreads, when large segments of the ordinary Russian people fall under the influence of Westernised education.

# Archaeomodern in the sociological structure of Russian society<sup>1</sup>

## *Archaeomodern and pseudomorphosis*

"Pseudomorphosis" is a term coined by Oswald Spengler in his book "The Decline of Europe"<sup>2</sup>, where this image, borrowed from mineralogy, refers to the interference in the natural process of mineral crystallisation by some spontaneous and external phenomena, in particular volcanic eruptions. The quartz and granite structures of a rock are formed gradually over a very long period of time, but if a volcanic eruption occurs unexpectedly, the crystal formation pattern is disrupted. Extraordinary external factors force the crystal to develop differently than usual, and where direct bonds should have been formed, distortions, distortions and deformation occur. This is pseudomorphosis. The free development of the crystal lattice leads to the formation of a crystal. Pseudomorphosis occurs when the natural development of a crystal is disturbed by an external influence that slows down or distorts the process.

Spengler applies pseudomorphosis as a phenomenon analogous to the field of mineralogy to society. Accordingly, it means a situation in which the natural development of society is disrupted by the sudden invasion of alien elements that distort its internal structure, processes of formation, development and natural cycles.

Spengler's pseudomorphosis is a direct synonym for what we call "archaeomodernity". It is curious that Spengler, in *The Decline of Europe*, when giving an example of social pseudomorphosis, spoke precisely of Petrine Russia. It would be possible to limit ourselves to the notion of "pseudomorphosis", which, by the way, means "false form" ("μορφή" - "form", "ψευδος" - "false"). But, on the other hand, this notion is purely negative and does not allow us to conceptually grasp the phenomenon in question. Studying the phenomenon of pseudo-morphosis in the society, we assume a logically consistent development

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<sup>1</sup> Section from the book Dugin A. *Sociology of Russian Society*. Moscow: Academic Project, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Spengler O. *The Decline of Europe*. M., 1993.

We do not know what happened and how it happened, we simply record the fact of distortion of social systems and the cessation of their normal functioning. At the same time, we do not know what happened and how it happened, we simply record the fact of distortion of social systems and cessation of their normal functioning.

Archaeomodernity describes the same process, the same disruption, but in its deepest dimension, with increased attention to both the "archaic" and the "modernist" components. Archaeomodern is a form of such a social fraction, in the The "numerator" of which is modernity, and in the "denominator" archaic.

## Modern Archaic

### *Archaeomodern Scheme*

The teleology of West European history is based on the essential premise that modernity grows directly and directly out of the logic of the entire history of the West, that is, out of Western premodernity. It flows naturally from the structure of Western society and expresses the tendencies that previously constituted the essence of Western culture. The way to modernity was through overcoming and overcoming Europe's own archaicism, and there was a strictly antagonistic relationship between modernity and archaicism. Modernity was established at the expense of archaic, as it was defeated, as it was abolished. This was the meaning of the West: modernity took the place of archaic, displacing and destroying its paradigms, annihilating it. The birth of modernity can be likened to the birth of a butterfly from its cocoon: for the butterfly to be born, the caterpillar (premodern) must die. If the caterpillar does not die, the butterfly will not be born.

There is no room for archaicism in full-blown modernity.

Western New Age society in its normative state is not an archaeomodern society - this is a sociological and historical axiom.

### *Difficulties in understanding archaeomodernity*

So, the meaning of Western society is that its modernisation stems from itself, from its logic, from its internal structure, and modernity and technology are its destiny.

What then is archaeomodern or pseudomorphosis?

We have shown what modernity is for Western society. Archaeomodernity, as something qualitatively different, can be defined as a society whose destiny is not modernity, but at the same time it is embedded in this society, present in it, without changing or abolishing its archaic foundations. In archaeomodernity, modernisation does not emerge from the logic of the formation of society itself, from its beginnings (*αρχη*), from its cyclical regularities. This modernisation is imposed from the outside.

In the way the logic of Western European history is interpreted by Westerners themselves, the main point is the assertion of a sequence of historical periods. This sequence is conceived teleologically as the culmination of the entire historical process, as the development of the basic preconditions laid down in the origins of Western society (Greece and Rome). But other societies have developed in their own way, based on different premises and with a completely different periodisation. When these other foundations, which do not lead directly and naturally to modernisation, are overlaid with Western influence, the phenomenon of pseudomorphosis occurs.

The whole difficulty in understanding archaeomodernity is that Western civilisation is extremely aggressive culturally, ideologically, intellectually and technologically, and radiates the certainty that the fate of the West is the fate of all humanity, that there is and can be no other historical path than that of modernity, and that all other (non-Western) societies are just stuck somewhere in the previous stages of history. This radiation of European universalism is so strong and our society has been under its influence for so long that it is hard for us to imagine that it could be otherwise. Unless we break away from this hypnosis, we will not be able to take seriously the study of "Russian society" and its sociology. For if the fate of the West is universal and is to be repeated by all other peoples of the earth, then there is only one society - Western, and there is only one sociology - Western, and any deviation from the West is not something independent and distinctive, but only backwardness, procrastination, stubbornness and barbarism.

In order to understand the phenomenon of archaeomodernity, it is necessary to realise that the West's claim to universalism is a voluntaristic assertion refuted by scientific observations of the structures of non-Western societies, an unsubstantiated claim that attempts to erect a factor of power and technology.

superiority (which is undeniable) to the status of historical-philosophical, moral and civilisational norm.

The West and its civilisation is in many ways stronger and more effective than others. But strength and efficiency are not the highest values in all cultures. Here we can recall the statement of the holy prince Alexander Nevsky: "Brothers! God is not in power, but in truth!" The West endeavours to give the logic of its social development the status of "universal truth", but argues that it is based on actual strength and technical power. The fact that other civilisations do not make a cult of material power and technical development, i.e. do not go in their natural logic of development towards modernity, does not necessarily have to be interpreted as "backwardness" and "regression", as "uncivilisation" and "objective imperfection". It can be, and in most cases is, a matter of conscious choice.

Non-Western societies have a different destiny, different values, different orientations, different times, different goals. All of them are in line with their own archaics, with their beginnings, derive from these beginnings, and further develop according to the principle scenarios embedded in these beginnings. Different societies produce different values and move along the historical trajectory not only at different speeds but also sometimes in different directions. But this scientific truth, based on a multitude of phenomenological statements and evidences, is extremely difficult to recognise today because of the dominance of Western European universalism, which is a form of real "cultural racism".

Therefore, in order to understand archaeomodernity, it is necessary to recognise that different beginnings (archaic structures) may have different trajectories of historical formation. In this case, we can speak not of stages of societal development (meaning only Western society), nor of a sociology that is the same for all, but of different stages of development of different societies, of different sociologies describing the structures of these societies, based on criteria inherent in these societies themselves and derived from their own beginnings.

A "Russian sociology" or "sociology of Russian society" is possible only on the assumption of the plurality of civilisations, the plurality of human cultures, and the internal qualitative multipolarity of the world. And only from this position can we understand archaeomodernity as a violent and inorganic imposition on a society with one deep structure of the results of the development of another society with a different structure, as an attempt to impose a destiny on the people,

Dugin A.

*Archaeomodern*

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It is not its own destiny, it is not derived from its foundations, it does not express its historical will and it does not take into account its value orientations.

*The hermeneutic circle as a method*

Here we get into a vicious circle. In order to understand archaeomodernity, it is necessary to recognise the diversity of societies and their relative equality, and in our case, the "sociology of Russian society". But at the same time, in order to build a full-fledged sociology of Russian society, it is necessary to comprehend correctly the phenomenon of archaeomodernity, since it is this phenomenon that has defined the actual state of our Russian society in recent centuries. This is the main difficulty of our course. To get to the sociology of Russian society, we need to unlock archaeomodernity, but to unlock it, we need to operate with the tools of structural sociology. In principle, there is nothing insurmountable in this. Here, the method of the hermeneutic circle will be most convenient. The hermeneutic circle, discussed in the philosophy of Schleiermacher<sup>1</sup> and Dilthey<sup>2</sup>, implies the study of any object with a constant shift of attention from what this object represents in itself to what it is a part of. In this case, at the beginning both the part and the whole appear as something indeterminate, acquiring more rigorous outlines as the hermeneutic circular movement of the comprehending mind proceeds.

The sociology of Russian society is the whole that should make clear to us the structure of the archaeomodern and thereby subject it to disjunctive analysis. But the presence of the archaeomodern does not allow us to grasp this whole as it is, constantly diverting us from the main thing. Therefore, we are left to constantly juxtapose one phenomenon that has not been fully clarified with another phenomenon that has not been fully clarified either. On this way we will gradually come to the goal we are looking for.

*Colonial Archaeomodern*

Archaeomodern societies are societies in which the structures of modernity (philosophical, cultural, social, political, economic,

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<sup>1</sup> *Schleiermacher F.* Philosophische Sittenlehre. Berlin: Kirchmann, 1870.

<sup>2</sup> *Dilthey W.* Collected Works. Hermeneutics and Theory of Literature. Vol. IV. Moscow: House of Intellectual Book, 2001.



technological), are externally imposed and do not derive directly from the fundamental value bases of these societies themselves.

There are two fundamentally different versions of archaeomodernity - colonial and defence.

The colonial version of archaeomodernist societies was developed through the history of colonisation of non-European societies by European powers. The history of the American continent, the vast majority of Asian and African countries has more or less long periods of European colonisation. Europe's colonial era coincides with the Modern Age and is a social trend of modern society. This fact is often overlooked. Colonial policy is by no means a tribute to the Middle Ages and traditional society. Of course, the Middle Ages also saw the Crusades, the conquest of neighbouring countries, and the development of new territories inhabited by non-European peoples. But all these processes were not global: almost everywhere, Europeans were confronted with comparable technological forces and territorial conquests were carried out with variable success, as in other parts of the world.

Everything changed from the sixteenth century onwards, with the great geographical discoveries and the beginning of the technological re-equipping of European powers. In fact, it was the first chord of the New Age. Europe entered the zone of modernisation and did not fail to immediately demonstrate its advantages to all other nations. This demonstration was the seizure of territories where people had long lived, where diverse societies and cultures had existed, where religions, arts, philosophical and ethical systems, rituals and customs had flourished for thousands of years. All of this was labelled "barbarism" by Europe and to "empty space", to "white spots on the globe", which should have been "incorporated into the civilised world" - that is, conquered, conquered and mercilessly exploited.

Both ancient civilisations - China, India, Persia - and archaic societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America fell victim to European colonialism. All of them were equated with "savages" and on this basis were attached to European metropolises - London, Amsterdam, Madrid, Lisbon, Paris. The Europeans drained the colonies of all resources of interest to them, without much concern for the fate of the local population. It was only the service personnel and "collaborators" of local origin that the Europeans drew from the colonies.

In the early 1990s, the Russian Federation was included on one or another basis in the "modernisation" programme, received the rudiments of European education, and mastered European technologies.

In the same period, we encounter the phenomenon of slavery on a racial basis. Christianity, which spread in Europe from the beginning of the first millennium, gradually led to a rejection of slavery, which it did not oppose directly, but which was not very compatible with Christian ethics. Whatever the plight of the European Servians in the Middle Ages, they had certain rights. And now, after a millennium without slavery, it is in the New Age, at the dawn of modernisation, that Europe turns to this social practice. Slavery was justified by the supposed "savagery" and "underdevelopment" of the autochthonous peoples of Africa and their skin colour. Modern slavery led to the export to the Americas of millions of people forcibly torn from their land, culture, families and societies. In Antiquity, slaves became warriors of a defeated tribe or nation. In ancient times, slaves were warriors of a defeated tribe or nation. The calculating Modern Age put this process on a rational basis, and live goods were extracted on a different principle: the hunt for live goods became a perfectly organised large-scale production.

This is how colonies were formed, in which archaeomodernity gradually developed. Representatives of the colonial administration became the bearers of Art Nouveau,

"The majority of the population remained faithful to archaic customs, traditions and practices, i.e. they continued to live under the conditions of previous cultures. The majority of the population, however, remained faithful to archaic patterns, traditions and customs, i.e. they continued to live under the conditions of previous cultures. Neither the colonisers nor the enslaved masses set themselves the goal of reconciling the two sociological paradigms, and it was this discordance, asymmetry and cacophony that gave rise to pseudomorphosis (archaeomodernity).

#### *Types of colonial societies*

Among the colonial societies of the archaeomodern, we can distinguish, in turn, three varieties:

- ancient developed civilisations that came under the rule of Europeans (China, India);
- archaic agrarian and hunter-gatherer societies, which were sometimes cut by formally established colonial boundaries as part of the no-

The colonies of the Pacific zone and Africa are the most developed colonial territorial units (colonial countries of the Pacific zone, Africa);

- mixed societies, which emerged artificially in sparsely populated territories where the local population was destroyed and suppressed, while new settlers (including imported slaves) created new social models (USA, Canada, all Central and South American countries, Australia).

Archaeomodernity in these three cases was of different kinds. In the first case, ancient and highly differentiated societies kept their structures intact, only superficially adapting to the culture of the conquerors. In the second case, archaic tribes often fragmented, disappeared altogether and were only fragmentarily drawn into the processes of Europeanisation. In the third, new societies emerged in which racial stratification was duplicated by social hierarchy. In South and Central America, the local population, the Amerindians, formed a middle layer between whites and African slaves, while in North America they were almost completely wiped out and the remnants driven into reservations.

In all cases, we are dealing with a colonial version of archaeomodernity, which survived the process of decolonisation, when the remnants of the colonial elite mixed with local Europeanised layers.

The only exceptions in the history of colonial powers are the United States and Canada, where, through the almost total extermination of Indians and the deliberate practice of settling black slaves in isolation from their ethnic communities, modern society was created by Europeans from scratch, from scratch, in a laboratory. It is for this reason that North America represents the avant-garde of modern Western society and the highest moment of its historical expression.

### *Defence Archaeomodern*

Another version of archaeomodernity is the case when traditional non-European (non-European) societies superficially and at the level of ruling elites adopted certain aspects of Western society, not through actual colonisation, but voluntarily, in order to defend themselves against real or potential aggression from the rapidly modernising West. We can call this modernisation "defensive" and the resulting archaeomodern societies "defensive archaeomodern".

The final version of these processes was generally similar in structure to the colonial archaeomodern, with one difference: the defence archaeomodern societies retained sovereignty and independence in relation to the West, which was, in fact, the goal here. Everything else - except freedom - was a classic pseudomorphosis: a mismatch between the Europeanised culture of the elites and the Archaean culture of the masses, alienation from their own historical beginnings, the emergence of a "colonial" class, distortion and blocking of natural development processes, interruption of organic cycles. From a sociological point of view, the result was quite comparable to colonisation.

*Russian archaeomodernity as a product of defence modernisation*

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman and Russian Empires were such societies of defence archaeomodernity. The Russian Empire and its elites were more Europeanised than the Turks, although the efforts of the Ottoman sultans of the last two centuries of the Porte's existence cannot be underestimated.

Thanks to these clarifications, we have obtained an important conclusion. Russian archaeomodernity is a product of defence modernisation. This modernisation was imposed on us not through direct colonisation, but through the threat of colonisation, as the only way to avoid colonisation. And if we take into account the data of our history of the 18th and 20th centuries, the political elites who launched the modernisation processes invariably achieved their goal, and Russia's sovereignty as a power was preserved in the face of quite aggressive European powers (here we can remember Napoleon's campaigns, the Crimean War, the First World War and the Great Patriotic War, and conflicts with Asian powers, which Russia entered into not without European influence).

Russian archaeomodernity is a special kind of archaeomodernity. Russian Europeanised elites, for example, do not completely abandon Orthodoxy, but transform it in a Western Christian spirit. In Peter's era, this was embodied in the figures of two major church figures, Theophan Prokopovich, who gravitated towards Protestantism, and Stephen Yavorsky, who was influenced by Jesuit Catholics.

Peter attracts the new aristocracy, renews the nobility on a meritocratic basis, raises the prestige of the third estate (merchants and craftsmen), but retains the absolutist power of the autocracy.

Catherine II reads European enlighteners, but spends her time at the

a rather reactionary policy, divides Poland, strengthens the Russian power.

The Communists begin as preachers of progress, world brotherhood and internationalism, but end up creating a gigantic Eurasian power, opposed to the West, which, despite everything, retains certain features of traditional society under a Soviet shell.

And yet archaeomodernity is a fundamental feature of Russian society and Russian society in recent centuries, and so we must think again and again about the essence of this phenomenon.

### *Ambiguity*

We can now consider a few more differences between modern and archaeomodern societies.

Archaomodern society does not work hard to translate archaics into modernity, it does something in this respect, but always in a reversible way. In Western European society, on the contrary, we see a clear and rigid vector of getting rid of its own archaicism. Modernity muffles its own archaicism, it wears it out, overcomes it, overcomes it, "removes" it in the Hegelian way. In Western European society, the archaic beginning has been removed, overcome, it does not exist. But in archaeomodern society, of course, it is there. But not on the surface, but under the surface. It is behind the facade.

If Western European society is honest (even in its colonial pretensions to universalism), archaeomodern society is always deceitful, always lying. If the transition from archaic to modern is a kind of truth (of Western society), the existence of archaeomodern society rests on a lie. The basis of the lie is ambiguity. It is the assertion that something is where it is not, and where there is nothing, there is something.

This is the very structure of archaeomodernity. When modernity and archaism exist not in sequence, according to the model of disjunction - "either one or the other", but according to the model of conjunction - "both at the same time", then every social moment in archaeomodern society becomes twofold, acquires the possibility of a double (ambiguous) interpretation.

For example, power. In archaeomodern society, it can always be interpreted in two ways. At the level of modernity (facade), it is a corporate, class or class model, elective or dynastic, but always a legal structure strictly defined by rational parameters. And from the archaic point of view

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The same power in the archaic context will be interpreted according to the model of the "father metaphor". Power in the archaic context is a continuation of the family model, based on the complete omnipotence of the father in relation to the rest of the family (paternalism), but at the same time on the relationship of love and mutual support. The family is not based on law, but on custom, love, justice, truth.

On closer examination, power in an archaeomodern society, formally organised as a democratic parliament, may in fact turn out to be something quite different - authoritarianism, totalitarianism, feudalism etc. There may be such phenomena as a parliament in the complete absence of democracy - for example, a parliament without parties or parties without parliament.

At the end of the 19th century, Russian archaeomodern society had political parties but no parliament. In 1905, the First State Duma was convened. Women, students, people under 25, and some ethnic minorities were disenfranchised, and one vote of a landowner was equal to three votes of townspeople, fifteen votes of peasants, and forty-five votes of workers. At the same time, when the wrong people were elected, Nicholas II cancelled the elections and changed the election rules: new deputies were recruited that were easier for the authorities to deal with.

In 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin - in the spirit of "Bloody Sunday" - shot down the democratic parliament, promptly passed a new Constitution and assembled a new Duma with significantly restricted rights.

All these discrepancies between the formal side of things and the real content of political, cultural and social processes are not noticed by the archaic.

In our time there is also a parliament, but there are practically no full-fledged parties (not counting the CPRF). Again, our archaeomodern society does not pay much attention to this: from the point of view of modernity, there is a facade, i.e. there is a democratic system, but there is no democracy. There is a strict logic within modernity: either there is democracy or there is not, either there is A or there is not. Democracy is the boundary where one ends and the other begins.

In archaeomodern society, A and not A coexist. In it, criteria are blurred, confused, and everything is not where it should be according to formal logic and the norms of modernity.

But archaeomodernity undermines not only modernity, but archaic itself. The archaic framework has a structure; democracy - at least modern Western liberal democracy - does not belong to this structure, but there are others.

power and political archetypes that are organically connected with the root attitudes of "Russian society". However, even these attitudes are blocked, forged and turned into something indeterminate by archaeomodernity. There is no clarity not only about modernity and its models, but also about archaics and the meanings and values it contains.

*Archaeomodernity as a lie about itself*

The archaeomodern society lies about itself. Because it is built on lies and acts as a lie, it hides the fact that it is archaeomodern. The term never existed before, so it communicates the truth of the lie and names the lie

"lie." But the property of a lie is to lie. Accordingly, archaeomodern society will never openly admit that it is archaeomodern.

It will object, for example:

"We have a democracy and we continue to democratise. Where do you find ar haiku? Our society is structured rationally, we have an elected president, we respect the terms of office, we have freedom of parties, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly - we have everything. We are modern, and if we do not have something, it is because we are a little behind and catching up with the West. After all, Russia - a European country, and we have a common destiny with Europe and the West".

This is what the archaeomodern society says about itself and thus lies. There is no real content in such democracy in the European sense.

But the proponents of an archaic interpretation of modern Russia are also lying. They claim:

"We are preserving the identity of our people. Sovereignty is as strong as ever. "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality" have been and remain our slogans under different forms. Our President is the same Tsar, and by serving him personally, we serve the Anointed of God. Modern officials are the aristocracy, the new nobility. This too is a lie, because these are not values, but fakes, which no one believes in and which technically serve as a mechanism for controlling society.

Modernity lies by saying it is modern. Archaic also lies, saying that it is archaic.

People in our country changed three types of mutually exclusive ideologies in the twentieth century. At first, everyone was an Orthodox Christian, a monarchist, and went to parochial schools. Then, rather quickly, they renounced it, and they were suspicious of it.

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The same people who had abandoned churches, believed in Marx and Darwin, and the same people began to profess Marxism-Leninism in the most zealous manner. With perestroika they were instantly transformed into new democrats, and when the democratic intoxication ended with the arrival of Putin, they turned into Russian right-wing patriots, joining noble assemblies, visiting churches and buying family trees.

How is this possible? It is absolutely impossible in a society where modernisation is destiny. And it is perfectly natural and normal in an archaeomodern society. Pay attention - normal. Because this society is based on lies, where lies are the main and fundamental content of the whole process.

We use the notion of "lie" not in the sense of moral condemnation of the system, but in the sense of the laws of logic. When it is said that A and not A can exist at the same time, and A is not A, this is false from the point of view of classical logic. This statement is called a false statement. It is in this sense that all the statements of the archaeomodern are false, because they do not exclude each other, neither the law of identity, nor the principle of negation, nor the law of the excluded third works in them. The law of sufficient reason is even worse - how much is enough and how much is not enough is decided on a case-by-case and quite subjective basis.

*In archaeomodernity, modernity does not achieve archaicism*

We have seen that the fate of the West was a radical transition from archaic to modern. It took place sequentially, along the line of disjunction - "either-or". Either archaic or modern. And this is the truth of modernity. When a Western European finds archaicism in his world, he says: "Here, we have stumbled upon a fragment of the archaic, this phenomenon, this complex, this attitude is a relic and a prejudice.

Now, for example, in Australia there is the question of the Australian society's refusal to be subordinated to the English Queen. This subordination means nothing at all to Australians or to the English. It is a relic of the archaic. And sooner or later Australia will declare itself a Republic, independent of the English Queen, on whom it is in fact already completely independent. But the residual, harmless and completely energised elements of archaicism, left behind by inertia, are clearly fixed, comprehended and preserved just to have something to overcome.



In archaeomodern society, archaicism is not overcome, but on the contrary, it is mercilessly exploited. All modernisation processes are essentially aimed at blocking the archaic attitude and leaving it where it is, in the sphere of the unconscious; at not releasing the archaic structure, at not allowing it to grow into something independent. But at the same time, in order to make certain leaps, this same archaic energy is occasionally mobilised and pragmatically used by the political authorities to solve certain technical tasks, and after such mobilisation it is hardly ever driven back into the deep cellar for a long time.

In the archaeomodern society, the modernist beginning also fights seriously against art-haïka, but in such a way that it never defeats it. Whether it cannot or does not want to is an open question. At least, in fighting archaic, archaeo-modern never quite conquers it. And at some point, when it seems that its victory is close, modernity suddenly weakens and moves to the side of archaic, a new cycle begins and everything starts all over again. Modernity attacks archaism, prevents it from rising, but never kills it.

*In archaeomodernity, archaic does not rebel against modernity*

Now let us look at archaeomodernity from the archaic side. The strategy of the archaic beginning in relation to modernity is that archaic does not challenge it directly, but intertwines with it, and even gives the appearance of faithfully serving it. This service is very dubious, because the submission and docility to the demands of modernity is accompanied by a complete and deliberate disregard for its internal logic, a withdrawal of attention, interest and trust in the very system of social, cultural and political attitudes that modernity seeks to introduce. This, incidentally, is the irony so inherent in Russian society.

If modernity is in opposition to archaic without completely destroying it, then archaic appears in this case not as an opposite pole to modernity, but as a strange model of its euphemisation. Modernity pretends to be at war with archaic. In true modernity it is, but in archaeomodernity it is merely an imitation. But archaic imitates complete submission and suppleness, but in fact it is an imaginary submission and suppleness: modernity's arrows do not penetrate archaic, bouncing off its complete but ironic co-resistance.

Archaic - for example, in the religious vestures of pre-revolutionary Orthodoxy after the Bolshevik seizure of power - says:

"It's all right, now there will be communism, it's probably the right thing to do. Now we will live without God. Apparently, God wants it that way. We will live without a tsar, apparently Stalin wants it that way. We'll decide everything ourselves, apparently it's the Communist Party's wish. We are conscious now, and we know that life came from bacteria and in the beginning there was a monkey, not Adam and Eve - if the processors want it that way.

Everything says "yes" to everything, nothing says "no" to anything. But what does this mean in practice? That everything is indifferent, that this is not what matters, and that the archaic simply waves away any unambiguous solutions, refuses to respond truly to words and statements, slips away from any certainty.

I guess there's some higher meaning to it.

Once, in the 1990s, I found myself in the villa of a reputable Russian businessman. He had built himself a real European medieval castle, with tsarist armour on the walls, a fleet of Mercedes, and guards in black glasses. But here in the courtyard behind the fortress walls and moats sat his relatives: grandmothers in chintz dresses husked seeds, freckled children crawled right in the courtyard, except for playing the balalaika. A real archaeomodernist castle. Even our big business is in the archaeomodernist style - the money embezzled during privatisation to go to Europe and the Bahamas is combined with quite family-like, old Russian traditions.

The very phrase "new Russians" carries a certain irony. It is a synonym for archaeomodernity - "new Russians". The term itself is probably adopted by our society precisely because "new" means something non-Russian, Western, European, and when combined with "Russian" it acquires a comic effect.

In general, archaicism in archaeomodernity occupies a very complex position in relation to modernity. Unlike Islamic fundamentalism, which challenges modernity, archaicism in archaeomodernity chooses a different tactic: it impregnates it, penetrates it, grows through modernity like grass through asphalt and, in a certain sense, supports modernity, although it turns its content into ab-surd and meaninglessness.

How can we evaluate archaeomodernity from a sociological point of view? By recognising archaeomodernity as archaeomodernity, that is, by recognising this society as a society of lies, we affirm a sociological truth. We do not simply condemn this society.

We assert the truth and, consequently, build the scientific capacity to correctly study the phenomena occurring in such a society.

We do not say no to it. We do not limit ourselves to affirming the differences between archaeomodern and modern societies. We do not judge, but try to understand. And by recognising archaeomodern society as archaeomodern society, we are performing a crucial sociological operation: we are penetrating deep into a social structure which, by its very existence, is designed to conceal itself, misinforming observers about its own nature.

Archaeomodernist society itself never recognises itself as an archaeomodernist society, because this means truth. But this is the first offence against the basic law that governs this society - the law of lies. By describing this society as archaeomodern, we open its eyes to itself. And the moment a society recognises itself as archaeomodern, it will no longer link its own "quasi-fate" to further lies. As soon as we are able to bring archaeomodern society to the realisation that we are talking about archaeomodernity and to show it structurally how the mechanisms of archaeomodernity work and how they are organised, we will break its spell, and for the first time we will not have a crooked mirror in front of society.

An uncurved mirror is an inadmissible thing in the topicality of archaeomodernity, and it can help chart a practical way of transforming it. But for this mirror to be not crooked but straight and full-fledged, it is not enough to call archaeomodern "archaeomodern" and to recognise our society as archaeomodern. This is only preparatory work, a first touch, a methodological sketch. In order to create a real mirror, that is, to correctly describe the structure of Russian society as an archaeomodern society, it is necessary to study all its aspects in detail. Not just to name it, but to study and show in which cases, what and how it operates, how its structures are organised, what its nature is, how both levels of social and human fractions relate to each other.

*Emigration is not always the answer*

Is ultra-radical Westernism, a valid integration into the Western European context, possible in our current society?

Practically none.

When people start on this path, they sometimes flee from archaeo-modernity to the West. But the paradoxical thing is that in doing so, they fall back - and even deeper - into the same archaeo-modernity. They believe that in the West

It is "cosier to live there", that there is more variety of food, more entertainment, more opportunities, brighter neon lights at night, more attention to the individual, less state interference in his private life - in other words, they are fleeing for rather piggish reasons, looking for a place where it is easier, more comfortable, cosier, more peaceful. Not because of conviction, not because of Heraclitus, not because of Thomas Aquinas, they go there, just as, in general, Chaadayev could have gone there and the Russophobic poet Pecherin left. But they flee to a warm place, that is, for the same animal, simplest, archaic motivations from which they are supposedly fleeing. They run there, but they carry archaeomodernity, archaicism in themselves in full.

That's no way to modernise Russia. You'll run away and that's it, it won't do any good.

And then, look how many dissidents have returned. They fled from here to the West - writers Yuri Mamleyev, Eduard Limonov, philosophers Alexander Zinoviev, Tatiana Goricheva, artist Vladimir Kotlyarov. They went after the comfort, in a simple, completely Russian way, and realised that in the heavy machine of the Western European spirit from Heraclitus to Heidegger, they had no place left for them at all, just nothing. (Who, for example, was Limonov in the West? - A gaster-baiter, a limiter from Kharkov, an archaic). Naturally, after a certain period of time, they were all driven out of there and returned to their own country, where everything is clearer.

*The infinitesimal minority and the apostasy of the reformers*

There is another option: to start a new round of modernisation of Russia itself, to become a guide of the West. Our reformers of the 1990s claimed such a mission. At one point, it seemed that the former Komsomol members actually changed their faith overnight and turned into zealots of modernity, fanatics of Western European destiny. But it soon became clear that they were an overwhelming minority, and the majority were mere frauds. They privatised everything that was lying badly (and not so badly) and, free, settled down in their archaism, feeling no remorse and concerned only with one thing - preserving the stolen goods and avoiding historical responsibility in the face of a robbed people and a ruined state.

There were no real convinced Westerners among them. Their

The majority of them are gamblers and scoundrels. Mostly, however, they are cajolers and swindlers who calmly accept archaeomodernity as it is and simply want to belong to the "elite" that exists under the signboard of "modernity" and not to the lower stratum that has "archaic" stamped on its forehead.

The type of convinced Russian Westerners is probably one per cent even among the elite. It turns out that we hardly find any social tendency to break the archaeomodernist deadlock from above, from the side of modernity, in our society and our history. Maybe Valeria Novodvorskaya? For some reason, in Russia, the most rational things are said by a woman who looks as if she has just escaped from a psychiatric clinic.

Novodvorskaya's main thesis is that in order to establish a truly Western European logos in Russia, the local archaic mythos must be completely destroyed (perhaps together with the mass of the local population). Myth must be fought. And at the same time, both myth and modernity must be on the same level, clearly and distinctly opposed to each other.

Let's imagine a picture: on one side are the Westerners (not archaeomodernists, but real ones - there are only a hundred of them in the whole of Russia) led by the fearless Novodvorskaya, and on the other side is the rest of the population. But even if the majority simply turned their backs on the Westerners and started dancing or cowering, they, these archaic millions, would crush the Westerners in their masses and would not even notice it, because they would collide incomparable magnitudes - gigantic crowds of archaics with a microscopic number of real modernists.

But we have plenty of archaeomodernists - the ones who, when necessary, do. When necessary, they are willing to pretend to be modernists, and when not necessary, to be archaic. When necessary, they are ready to make any pretence necessary.

This is why society as a whole is in a state of closed, stable archaeomodernity. And the flow of archaeomodernist lies becomes, if you like, the surrogate of our social destiny. And if at the Western European pole the fate is the transition from archaic to modernity, the equivalent of this fate in archaeomodernity is the lie as the main engine of pseudomorphic stagnation.

Theoretically, it is possible to overcome archaeomodernity along the path of radical Westernisation. But in practice, this requires either a fanatical ideology (like the Bolsheviks) or the tyrannical will of a dictator who will not stop at any cost (like Peter). If such factors, or similar ones

Dugin A.

*Archaeomodern*

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There is no strength and volitional potential, then one can forget about overcoming archaeomodernity through integration into modernity, i.e. through modernisation.

*Overcoming archaeomodernity through archaism*

There is an equally difficult way of unravelling the archaeomodern - by focusing on the archaic. In essence, this means embarking on the path of studying "Russian society" as a transhistorical structure. If we were able to reliably establish a sociology of Russian society, we would thus have a crucial conceptual theoretical and practical tool for overcoming archaeomodernity in this way.

The main task here is to translate Russian archaic into Russian logos, to grow our own logos on the basis of our own archaic. This means to comprehend Russian destiny, starting from the denominator of the sociological fraction. After all, there was something in Western European destiny that it moved so powerfully towards modernity, making modernity its "telos," and this "something" was already contained in the European archaic.

The roots of the origins of Western European rationalism are explored by Martin Heidegger. He argues that Western rationalism, in its endeavour to transcend the irrational, has neglected to explore its pre-rational roots. And it is these roots that Heidegger explores in the pre-Socratics. The connection with the Beginning of European culture was clearly felt by Hegel and Nietzsche. With Heidegger it becomes the centre of his work. In Western European archaic itself, we should recognise the teleological orientation of the arrow of historical time, the origins of the destiny of Western European existence. This destiny did not arise in modernity; it was created in modernity. And in order for it to lead to modernity, something drawing it "towards" (lativ - as the case of direction to something in linguistics) had to be present at the very beginning, in the movement "from" (elative - as the case of direction from something in linguistics).

Here we, as researchers of Russian society, will need to make a difficult fundamental gesture: to plunge, to dive into the element of the archaic, to dive into its deepest layers and to understand whether in our autonomous Russian archaic lies the beginning of the destiny that will lead us to some as yet unclear goal, to the Russian "telos"? Maybe it does not lie there. Maybe, in fact, we have no historical path other than preservation, self-preservation of the perplexing construction of archaeomodernity that evades any history.

We do not know this. The point is that, strange as it may seem, such a sociological, philosophical, political science, cultural studies task has never been set before.

Or rather, it was raised, but never in those strict and clear forms, as required by the seriousness and scale of the problem.

### *Questioning archaeomodernity*

Why are we talking about this problem today? Because the historical moment is extremely favourable for raising the question of archaeomodernity. On the one hand, archaeomodernity is flourishing today. Russia of the 21st century is undoubtedly archaeo-modern. At the same time, this statement is not initially confronted by a form of totalitarian or authoritarian ideology that is ready to abruptly interrupt any questioning and dismiss the emerging issue with hasty and incomprehensible answers backed up by repressive measures or threats.

Of course, liberalism and Westernism are being imposed on us with the inertia of the 1990s, but the authorities themselves are not sure that they are doing everything right and that they should continue to move in the same direction in the future. Today, Russia has a somewhat questioning archaeomodernity, which is not sure of itself and its solvency. It is not ready to be questioned yet and seeks to suggest to the population that "everything is going according to a well-thought-out plan", but it is obvious that it does not believe in this "plan" itself. Archaeomodernity cannot have a plan, only confusion or a map of a labyrinth with no way out.

However, the political elites are clearly not ready to move further towards radical Westernism and carry out full-fledged modernisation. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine a more favourable situation for a calm and balanced analysis of the problem of archaeomodernity. Of course, after so many centuries of pressure and persecution, the position of the proponents of the Russian Beginning is now deplorable and weak - especially from an intellectual point of view. But given the importance of the topic at hand, one can expect that spiritual resources will be found in the people.

Westernised modernisation is unacceptable. Archaeomodernity is not sure that it has sufficient grounds for existence. The only thing that remains is to look in the direction in which the last three hundred years, political and scientific

Dugin A.

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The elites tried not to look, or if they did, then only glimpsed and with disgust, towards the Russian people in its root archaic attitudes.

The area of Russian myth may be dark, but it is only from there that the Russian logos can emerge. The prospect of resolving the archaeomodern is to enter the Russian logos, to break through to the Russian truth, to enter into the Russian destiny. This project is still open and uncertain, because there is nothing fully prepared that we can take as a plan and a reliable map. Everything has to be done anew, piece by piece, and build an intricate mosaic in order to access the depths of our society's being, its structure.

*The light of the common people*

The search for the Russian logos means offering our modern Russian society to build its socio-political model, its self-consciousness, its culture, its civilisational parameters in harmony with its own archaic structure. Today, however, it is not at its best. For the last centuries it has been living in confrontation with archaeomodernity and, of course, has suffered serious losses, disfigured and chaotic.

When we descend now into the depths of the Russian people, we see, on the one hand, the light of ordinary people. If you go a hundred kilometres away from Moscow, you will see the light appear in people. A shop assistant comes out from behind the counter. She has light in her eyes, she is living the Russian life. It is unmistakable, you just have to pay a little attention to people's faces and the expression of their eyes.

But at the same time, this light is associated with a fundamental, deep and serious universal darkness. Because archaism, while hiding its light, has acquired such a layer of protective darkness that the light is not so easy to reach.

*Archaeomodern nihilism*

The problematics of the Russian logos is not identical to the problematics of Russian modernity. Why is it impossible to put in place of the Russian logos (always assumed, always in question) the conventional notion of Russian modernity? Because it is quite possible that in the archaic strata of the Russian people "telos" and destiny will be formulated differently. Maybe we have been hiding from modernisation for so long, entering so deeply into a society of lies in order to convey through these lies the very subtle and long-suffering truth that modernity is not our destiny.



When we begin to look closely at archaeomodernity, recognised as what it is and not what it wants to appear, the more it itself - through its absurdity, morbidity, falsity, pathologism, idiocy and ambiguity - communicates to us knowledge of its nature, its structure, and, consequently, of the sub-linear meaning and content of the "numerator" and "denominator". The "numerator" is not of much interest to us, it is a question of Western European culture and philosophy, but the "denominator" and the "numerator" are of no interest to us.

The "denominator" is extremely interesting. By studying archaeomodernity with correct methods, we can increasingly identify the parameters of the "Russian structure", which turns out to be responsible for many paradoxes, failures and reversals of archaeomodernity, for its inadequacy, grotesque and ironic.

In archaeomodernity, through archaeomodernity, through it, Russian society persistently and consistently sabotages the Western European destiny, ridiculing or turning any processes of modernisation into parody and ugliness. Not because we do not understand it, but because we do not accept it. And if it is imposed on us rigidly, the "Russian structure" responds with nihilism - direct or veiled.

Archaeomodernity is precisely nihilism, because its ambiguity, which destroys the coherence and cohesion of European concepts, theories, technologies, institutions, interpreting any statement in the spirit of the absurd.

The "koans", where two or more mutually exclusive statements are peacefully present, bring something to nothingness, nullify meanings, abolish reason and order, nullify the vertical and give free rein to the total horizontal. When there is double identity, there is no identity.

Therefore, we can say that the philosophical basis of archaeomodernity is nihilism. It is no coincidence that this Latin word came into use at the end of the 19th century after Turgenev's Bazarov from *Fathers and Children*<sup>1</sup>. Western European sociologists and political scientists who have taken up the term "nihilism" refer to Turgenev and Russians in general when using the term "nihilism". First of all, of course, Nietzsche, who put the thesis of the nihilism of Western European civilisation at the heart of his philosophy. Nietzsche also questioned European modernity itself, but not in the way that archaeomodernity could.

*The Russian logos makes itself known*

But let us turn again to the archaic. If you look closely at the society of lies, at the

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<sup>1</sup> Turgenev I. S. *Fathers and Children*. Moscow: Nauka, 2008.

In this case, the nihilistic sabotage of Western destiny appears to be a conscious and rational decision. The nihilistic sabotage of Western destiny in this case appears to be a conscious and rational decision. It is quite possible that the rejection of Western destiny is connected with the conviction that this destiny is "wrong", "wrong", not our, not Russian destiny. And here one can clearly hear the voice of the Russian archaic, which, entering into a dialogue with the Western archaic that gave birth to modernity, understands that both the result of this destiny and the path and the beginning of the movement towards this destiny since the epoch of the pre-Socratics and the first Greek philosophers have already contained something radically unacceptable or inconsistent with the deep structures of this archaic<sup>1</sup>. And in this case, archaeomodernity as a phenomenon that we recognise in a balanced, creative way, without embellishments and moral assessments, will turn out to be the constructive sociological and philosophical model that will contain the basis for revealing the Russian logos.

The following points must be weighed.

The determination of the Western European archaic structure to follow the path to modernity is not an accident, but a fundamental movement of being itself (as Heidegger interprets it), a resonance of the most absolute instances imaginable. The nature of the Western European logos is thus rooted in and related to being.

Russian archaeomodernity refuses solidarity with this Western European path, refuses modernity as the telos of history, and refuses history itself. In the end, it refuses this logos itself.

As long as the Russian structure or the Russian archaic is responsible for the refusal embodied in archaeomodernity, we see in it a manifestation of pure nihilism. This nihilism, however, justifies archaeomodernity as a form of refusal of the logos.

But! Russian archaic refuses logos, i.e. enters into a certain relationship with it (albeit a purely negative one). But relations with logos cannot be extra-logical. If we assume that the Russian archaic (Russian structure) is driven not just by pure negation, but by a rejection of the Western European logos, then we can grasp what is the meaning of this negation, that is, we can approach the Russian logos as such.

Let's go through this spiral of the hermeneutic circle again.

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<sup>1</sup> For a detailed discussion of this see. *Dugin A.G. Martin Heidegger. The Possibility of Russian Philosophy*. Moscow: Academic Project, 2011.

At first glance, archaeomodernity may seem to be the result of archaic Russian society's misunderstanding of the content and orientation of Western modernity.

Looking a little deeper, we recognise in this lack of understanding an unwillingness to understand.

Even deeper: behind the reluctance to understand we see the will to deny the Western logos.

And, finally, this will to deny begins to reveal Russia's own logos, which, as it turns out, is hidden behind all this complex pile of confusing, paradoxical philosophical and sociological layers.

### *Survive the West*

Maybe for the last few centuries we Russians have been waiting for the cloud to pass over, for Western European civilisation to come to a happy end. And this end is clearly near, because the state to which this civilisation is now coming - where modernity reigns and the first step beyond it is already being taken, to postmodernity and to total European nihilism this time - cannot be called anything but an abyss, a nightmare and hell. Maybe it's just that we Russians have been "fooling around" all this time. Our society was constantly lying, pretending not to be what it is, so that the infernal train could pass us by and go to "nothing"?

This is where we're supposed to come out of our hiding place. But if we come out of our hiding place, we have to present something. Not just the fact that we are there and that we are happy that we are lucky enough not to have been completely taken over by nihilism. We have to show serious reasons why we sat for two and a half thousand years in a secret hole while the Europeans methodically followed the paths of their logos? What were we doing there and for what purpose? What's the point of us being saved? Okay, the West is dead, and it is indeed dying, but it has acted in a special, deliberate, heroic way in this drama of civilisational suicide, in the on this road to the "Sunset of Europe".

Dostoevsky in "Besakh" caricatured Turgenev as a character who said that if Western European civilisation collapsed, the noise would be like the fall of the Tower of Babel - the whole earth would shake. And if Russia collapses,

It's nothing, he says, everything will dissolve by itself, like in a swamp<sup>1</sup>. It will dissolve, and then it will rise back up.

And, indeed, he's right. We seem to have been destroyed more than once, and yet we still exist as if nothing had happened. We have not even understood what happened in 1917 and 1991. We feel almost normal, "sitting well".

And we will emerge at the moment when everything is over in the West... Unless, however, the West takes us with it, which cannot be ruled out either, because we have modernity to some extent: we have treaties, trade agreements on mutual supplies and so on, and modernity takes all this very seriously. In our country, a contract means almost nothing: you can sign anything you want, but everything is ultimately decided on the "arrow", on the basis of facts and concepts. You can sign any contract, it does not bind the parties to anything. But in the case of the West, we are dealing with people for whom the written word, the seal, debts, obligations ("you owe us so many tonnes", while we may not even have these tonnes or have long ago sold these tonnes to the Chinese) matter. And so the question of whether or not we will or will not be carried away if the West is destroyed before we come out of our hiding place remains open.

But even if we manage to survive the West, our historical existence will become meaningful only if we can present the Russian logos, if we can explore the archaic component of our archaeomodernity, continuing what the Slavophiles, religious philosophers, and poets have begun.

"Silver Age", Eurasians - all those who tried to consider the sociological problematics of modernity from the point of view of Russian archaics.

*Archaeomodern in its purity and visibility*

This is the right time to ask this question, because the communist ideology has disappeared and our society is a pure archaeomodern that speaks nonsense about itself. And since our society can't say anything intelligent about itself, it makes jokes. The phenomenon of the proliferation of humourists - especially unfunny ones - is a way of saying anything without responsibility. Up until a certain point, Zhirinovskiy took on the function of "stream of consciousness" in the Duma, but now.

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<sup>1</sup> *Dostoevsky F. M. Collected Works in 15 volumes. L.: Nauka. Leningrad Branch, 1990. T. 7. C. 348.*

There is already a whole army of humourists who broadcast complete nonsense on all channels and are gradually replacing the political consciousness of the people with it.

Our Russian society today is an archaeomodern, more open than ever before. And that is why it is a chance.

It used to be common for us to say, "We are 'Orthodox,' we are 'Russian,' we are 'monarchists', we are 'communists', we are 'democrats'". And now we say: "We're a mess", "we're a 'pure misunderstanding'". And we have everything double: one president or two. Everything is disintegrating into empty blocks of meaning, which are interchangeable. Now we don't even know who is ruling us - either this one, or that one, or both together. It's one but pretends it's this one. Or this one, but pretends to be this one. Or no one at all. Or it's someone third and from somewhere else...

The idea of obscurity rules. Like drunken people, one's eyes begin to double. This drunken time is also a sociological phenomenon of archaeomodernity, when there is no fixation, and a thing blurs into a complete fusion with another thing that should seem to be at a decent distance from it. The displacement of all distances and all proportions is our current "ideology".

When you ask whether we have an ideology, everyone says we do. But what kind of ideology - they all find it difficult to answer. We can say that there is none. Both answers are absolutely right. And, in general, no one would condemn either answer, except that people would wave their hands around too aggressively when answering, asserting or proving one or the other.

Today we must recognise that archaeomodernity has, in a sense, come into focus. Today's Russian society is an unconcealed archaeomodern. The last thing it has left is that it habitually lies about its lies, but it does so less and less successfully.

Of course, he doesn't want to be called "archaeomodern," because if he were called that, it would be the truth. But on the other hand, the great advantage is that it does not call itself anything else. Our society does not call itself anything at all and thus it is revealed as archaeomodern and, in fact, opens a thick veil of lies about itself, allowing us to tell the truth about it. As soon as we tell the truth about society, we remove the lie about the lie and see just a lie, a lie of the same order. We have only one step further to take and we touch the truth.

*Correcting Postmodernity. The End of the West*

We have already noted that modernity is the "telos" of Western European destiny, and this "telos" has been achieved, and now the history of the West is entering the next phase - the phase of posthistory. History in the West is over, fully accomplished and completed - the whole path has been travelled. What is next? The West has no answer to this, just a statement: posthistory, the end of history, the recycling of history. Postmodernity is the next stage.

But in postmodernity it is not easy to maintain control over the archaic, because postmodernity means relaxation, disorientation, loss of energy, atomisation of discourse, the end of grand narratives. Postmodernity is Quentin Tarantino, but the name of Quentin Tarantino can hardly be used to rule the world, a whole set of diverse and complex societies that, compared to the West, are immersed in a deep archaic.

If our pro-Western liberal elites took a closer look at the state of the West today, I think they would be horrified, because it would immediately become clear to them that the West will not continue to support them with its modernity. The West is finished with modernity and has put an end to this period.

*Conceptual apparatus for developing a sociology of Russian  
society*

Heidegger said that the West in the twentieth century is "going to sleep" and is about to close its eyes, and perhaps we will never see it again. There will be one giant empty space left. But this does not automatically provide us with a positive outlook either.

Nevertheless, the situation is extremely favourable for studying Russian sociology, the culture of Russian society, our civilisation and identity freely and without illusions. It is high time to develop and apply an appropriate conceptual apparatus for their study. Maybe we will no longer be influenced by Slavophile myths about the "brotherhood of all Slavs" or Tyutchev's fantasies about the capture of Constantinople. Maybe, after acquiring knowledge of the philosophy of language, structuralism, phenomenology, existentialism, we will take a critical view of the constructions of Russian religious philosophy. Maybe we will find the hopes of the pleiad of Russian poets of the "Silver Age" naive. Maybe we will substantially correct the views of the Eurasianists

1920s-30s and develop their geopolitical and ethno-sociological views.

At the same time, today we have in our hands a huge toolkit of critical rethinking of modernity in the twentieth century, which can be used in our analyses. This toolkit was not available to Eurasianists, Slavophiles, representatives of the revival of Russian religious philosophy, or the poets of the "Grey Age". And these things are sometimes extremely useful. But what has been done for us by generations of Russian people, thinkers, artists, creators, will find a worthy place in the future Russian logos.

So, Russian society today is archaeomodern in its purest form. The situation is such that researching archaeomodernity head-on, directly, is not only possible, but is probably the only way to obtain reliable sociological and philosophical knowledge about our society and our historical moment.

The study of Russian archaics and Russian archaeomodernity, with the prospect of reaching the Russian logos, requires from us a certain toolkit. It will, of course, correlate with Western European sociological tools, but in the context of understanding the differences between Western destiny and our destiny (destiny in question), we will develop new approaches, introduce new concepts and categories, and invent constructs appropriate to the difficult subject of study.

We must always remember that in archaeomodernity we are dealing with an elusive object of enquiry: you want to close a window, but it opens; you want to enter data into a computer, but even what was there disappears; you find something solid and reliable, but it immediately disintegrates into ashes; you encounter a disembodied chimera, but it turns out to be made of granite.

In order to correctly describe archaeomodernity, to delve into the structure of archaics as the most significant, most meaningful component of archaeomodernity, it is necessary to adapt the avant-garde sociological apparatus that analysed the problems of modern Western European society to the study of Russian society, using a wide range of innovative technologies developed in the course of the study itself.

*Partisan detachments of the Russian archaics*

Note that, in order to build a sociology of Russian society, Russian archaics

Dugin A.

*Archaeomodern*

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or Russian unconscious, Russian dreams are more meaningful, more important and broader than Russian political institutions. Russian political institutions are a cast of Western European political institutions. When we examine them, we can see how ugly they are, and that they all function differently than in the West. But this is the critical side of the question, it does not give us much. We need to understand why there are fundamental changes in the content of democracies in the transition from the West to Russian society. What influences this? We need not just to declare that something does not work, but to explain why it does not work. This question forces us to turn to the meaningful structure of archaics, which is not just a hindrance, but a conscious, organised, post-organised, partisan, grassroots resistance of the Russian soul to attempts to incorporate it into the Western European destiny. And this partisan movement has its own structure, its own logic, its own headquarters, its own goals and objectives, its own channels of information and its own methods of sabotage.

Where did we begin our consideration of archaeomodernity? At first we "dismantled" it, showed how ugly it is. Now we see it from the other side. We see that archaeomodernity is the result of the secret, clandestine activity of the archaic beginning, which methodically and consistently sabotages the inclusion of Russian society in the Western European destiny. So it is something else than a mere hindrance or a mere swamp. It is an invisible but consistent, persistent, strong-willed and structured resistance. Our task is to understand this resistance, to comprehend it, and to gradually transform these partisan units into the status of regular armies. Regular Russian armies. That is, we need to let the archaic up - along with what it has to say about our destiny - and give it the status of a social reality, not just a misunderstanding.

Now the archaic is signalling itself through misunderstandings, opening up, revealing itself through interference and disruption. If we go a level deeper, we see that this disruption has its own logic and its own systematicity. It is archaic Russian (ir)rationalism, and it exists, it is there, and it must be brought to the surface through a variety of sociological methods in order to finally get an idea of the Russian logos. This is the maximum task, the task of a generation - to raise the question of Russian logos and, consequently, of Russian society.

What is Russian society? When we usually use the expression "Russian society", we mean a subspecies of society as such. And what is "society



as such"? It is a Western European society, conceptualised as universal by the West itself and imposed as such on all others. But only people of the West believe in this universality: in fact, archaeomodernist models of societies, as we have shown in the example of Russian archaeomodernity, do not see this as their destiny, and only imitate this universality, or rather, the recognition of this universality. Therefore, we can start by saying that Russian society (if it is not Western European) does not exist as such, but in its place there is an archaeomodern something that, theoretically, can become Russian society, that is, it can open up as a Russian structure with its internal laws. But it may not open up, continuing to remain in the same passively sabotaging Western European fate.

When studying Russian society, can we say that we are dealing with a certain integral social system, the laws of which can be studied? No, of course not. We can study archaeomodernity correctly. But we can, if you like, predict, describe or even constitute Russian society - and ultimately create, plan, forecast and, as it were, extract from the possible, from the "future". Russian society as an object belongs to a possible Russian future - but only if the emergence of the Russian logos from the depths of the Russian archaic will take place.

This is why the title of our research - "The sociology of Russian society" - sounds a bit strange. We are studying an object that does not yet exist, that can only exist, that will probably exist, but that depends to some extent on those sociologists of the new wave who will correctly study archaeomodernity and draw correct, well-founded and truly scientific conclusions from their analyses.

# Archaeomodernity and the Russian "collective unconscious"<sup>1</sup>

## 1. *Methodological remarks: Jung's topics*

### *Jung and the "It"*

Carl Gustav Jung has the honour of discovering the "collective unconscious". He discovered this instance by conceptualising the fundamental nature of the instance "subconscious mind", which was in turn discovered by his teacher, the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud.

Freud, in the course of his psychological and psychiatric research, came to revolutionary conclusions: the human psyche is not defined by the layers of consciousness, where rational ideas dominate, but precisely by the subconscious, the dark, hidden instance where irrational forces reside. These irrational forces are so powerful that they often completely subjugate the human mind, which manifests itself in mental illness. But even in healthy people it is possible to discern the actions of these forces, with which the consciousness, secretly from itself, conducts an endless dialogue.

Freud called this instance "It" (German Es, Latin Id). The "It" operates in man from below, from the depths of inner darkness. Above this darkness hangs the individual "I", which is based on the principles of logical rationality and often conflicts with the "It". Above the "I" is the sphere of the "super-self", i.e. social normative ideas of society about how rationality should be organised (according to E. Durkheim, this is the "collective consciousness").

According to Freud, the "It" (Es, Id) consists of two fundamental principles - Eros and Thanatos, attraction and death. Freud considers attraction, desire, libido as the principle of activity, movement, life. Thanatos - the attraction to death, immobility, rest, is a directly opposite impulse. The play of these two principles predetermines the dialectics of the unconscious and influences the structures of consciousness and reason. The weaker the ego and the intellect, the more obvious this dialectic of the unconscious becomes.

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<sup>1</sup> Lecture in the Archaeomodern series, read on 11 May 2008.

Jung modified Freud's model. By replacing the subconscious, which Freud regarded as an individual instance, with the "collective unconscious", he postulated the existence of a transpersonal reality in which archetypes, whose nomenclature significantly exceeds Freud's Eros/Thanatos dichotomy, are centred.

Jung describes the layers of consciousness. The deepest is the "collective unconscious", followed by the "individual unconscious", then several eno-psychic layers (invasions, affects, subjective components of function and memory), and above them the "ego" turned outward in the form of the "persona".

In the structure of the ego, Jung identifies four main properties: reason, intuition, feelings and sensations. These constitute the cross of the conscious ego, which is linked to deeper layers of the psyche, up to the "collective unconscious". In this way, Jung's "It" takes on a larger, deeper and transpersonal dimension.

*Jung's variations on the boundaries of the collective unconscious (whether it is national or universal)*

Jung interpreted the scale and format of the "collective unconscious" in different ways at different periods. On the one hand, following the German anthropologist A. Bastian, who believed that all people have the same set of "elementary thoughts" (Elementargedanken), Jung insisted on the unity of the "collective unconscious" in all peoples. To test this hypothesis, he studied the dreams of blacks in the United States, interpreting them in the spirit of confirming his universalist hypotheses. However, many of Jung's remarks and texts, especially those he wrote in the 1930s, suggest that he was aware that the "collective unconscious" was organised in different ways in different ethnic groups. For example, his assessments of the "German collective unconscious" are well known, wrapped in the figure of Wotan and centred, according to Jung, in the figure of Adolf Hitler. Jung made various comments on the "collective unconscious" of other ethnic groups as well.

We can assume that the "collective unconscious" in turn has layers. The deepest layer is indeed universal and goes back to the unity of the human archetype. But above it are superstructured more superficial "floors", the structure of which may differ among different ethnic groups, societies and cultures.

*The content of the collective unconscious: archetypes*

The collective unconscious according to Jung consists of archetypes, "great dreams". They are inherent in the human soul as instincts are inherent in the animal. They are transmitted as a kind of psychic code.

Most often they occur in sleep, especially in deep sleep. It can also be encountered in other circumstances under certain circumstances.

The content of myths, legends, religions, culture, poetry, visions, psychic illnesses tells us about the geography and topology of the collective unconscious and reveals its archetypes.

Archetypes are in dialectical relations with each other, converging, diverging, intertwining, opposing. The saturation of the collective unconscious with various archetypes constitutes a rich field of symbols and myths.

*Depth psychology and traditionalism*

The attitude of traditionalists towards Jung was unequivocally negative. They believed that attributing symbols, myths and archetypes to the realm of the "unconscious" belittled their spiritual nature, which, according to traditionalists, is not subconscious but superconscious.

From the point of view of traditionalist philosophers, archetypes are spiritual entities belonging to the super-psychic sphere. And in the "collective unconscious" there are only psychic reflections, "psychic remains", residui. They were particularly indignant about the Jungian concept of "Numinosity" (borrowed by Jung from R. Otto). "Numinosity" for traditionalists is a property of the superhuman beginning. By placing "God" and "divinity" in the sphere immanent to the human psyche, Jung, in their opinion, commits an act of "Satanism" and abolishes transcendental measurement.

If we look closely at Jung, we can see that this criticism is still a stretch. Developing the line of R. Otto, Jung specifies that he does not speak of "God" but of the experience of the Divine, which by definition (like any experience) is immanent to man. This correction removes the sharpness of the criticism.

*The interest in the "collective unconscious" is born from the thematisation of the archaeomodern*

As the theme of archaeomodernity unfolded, there was a need to describe the denominator of the "human fraction" more clearly, which is why we are talking about Jung today.

Archaeomodern is a hermeneutic formula where the kerygma is in the numerator and the structure is in the denominator.

Structure can be described in Jungian terminology. Structure is "collective unconscious," the "It" (Es, Id).

A particular perspective on the problem of 'identity' can be offered here. The term "identity" is derived from the Latin *identitas*, which in turn is derived from "id" - "that", "the same". "Identity" is "identity". The presence of the meaning "that" indicates that in "identifying" oneself, one points to "that" (to the "other", not to "this"). Only if there is another can something be "identified" through the operation of pointing to this "other". It is this only through pointing to that. The "I", in order to be defined and expressed, must identify itself with something "other". When we say "I am Russian", "I am a man", "I am a professor", we are identifying ourselves with a Russianness, a masculinity, a scientific status that exists outside of us and independent of us. Even when we present ourselves: "I am Vanya", for all our individuality, we are referring to a certain quality that is necessarily inherent in other "I's". The identification "I am me" would be empty of meaning. Autoreferentiality excludes meaningfulness.

From the point of view of a psychoanalytic understanding of identity, this would be the identification of the self with the "unconscious", with Es, Id. We are our irrationality as other. And it defines us more than our rationality.

Another identification in the chain of synonyms of structure: Dasein can be placed in the denominator. Structure in the human fraction can be defined as Dasein.

But in the cycle of lectures on Heidegger (the fourth lecture), we derived the identity of the Russian people and Dasein2. Dasein is identical not to every nation, but to the Russian people. Dasein in the European man is located closer to the individual. It can be assumed that the European Dasein is the distant (from the ego) border of the personal unconscious. That is why Freudianism prevails over Jungianism in the West. Freudo-Marxism is there, but Jungo-Marxism is not. Jungo-Marxism is closer to us.

One more important remark. Jung gives a curious picture of what we call the subject. According to Jung, we should distinguish between personality (persona), ego (ich), individuation, soul (the projection of the unconscious in the figure anima/animus inverse to the anatomical sex of the individual), shadow (the boundary sphere of chaotic impulses rejected and displaced by consciousness), subject as a rational-philosophical hypothesis of the ego, and most importantly, Selbst. Selbst is a fundamental category. It is soi, self. The distinction of soi from moi, "jivatman" from "Atman", the supreme self.

"I" from the inferior is the basis of traditionalist anthropology<sup>3</sup>.

According to Jung, Selbst encompasses the totality of what we call the human being - from the collective unconscious as the basis to the ego including duplicates, deviations, shadows, anima/animus, etc.

The main process that takes place within Selbst is individuation - the translation of the contents of the collective unconscious into the realm of consciousness and the "ego". Individuation is the assimilation of the content of the collective unconscious and its archetypes, and the conscious encounter with it.

Human life is nothing but a continuous process of successful (or more often unsuccessful) individuation. There is no normality. Everyone's individuation is different, but most often it ends in failure. Only great prophets, saints, mystics, poets, artists and thinkers can truly give the collective unconscious a coherent and cohesive form.

Heidegger's Selbst is typologically similar to Jung's model, as well as to the topics of traditionalism). Heidegger speaks of the Selbst of authentic Dasein as the direct opposite of das Mann as the "I" of inauthentic Dasein<sup>3</sup>. Heidegger interprets the expression Selbst of authentic Dasein as "the capacity of beholding being to be", which should lead to Ereignis in terms of an ecstatic future.<sup>3</sup> Jung describes a similar process not ontologically, but psychologically and nationally. is called individuation.

Don't be frightened - there is no rational liberal individual yet. Individuation is only a process, and an open one at that: there is individuation, but no individual.

### *Individualisation as therapy*

Let us return to the human fraction. Individualisation is the derivation of the numerator from the denominator, that is, the construction of an ego rooted in the



the unconscious, harmoniously rising from it upwards to the light it creates for itself.

But isn't this what we called the main task of the Russian people on the way to overcoming archaeomodernity? Isn't this what we defined as the content of Erignis and the prospect of the future Conservative Revolution? And is it by chance that we have spoken of illness and the need for a cure in relation to archaeomodernity?

"You can't understand Russia with your mind." It's a diagnosis. Either the wrong mind or the wrong country. We believe that it is the wrong mind, that the mind is sick, that the problem is the ego, not the flashes of the inexorable collective unconscious.

This is why we diagnose archaeomodernity as an inadequate functioning of the consciousness that fails to master archetypes, i.e. a failure in the process of individuation.

And we start the treatment. For this we need Jung, who has spent a lifetime in the clinical practice of observing and treating the mentally ill.

*Main types of individuation failures (disease diagnosis)*

Psychiatrists divide all types of mental disorders into two main categories with many shades and nuances: neuroses and psychoses.

For Freud, "in neurosis the Ego, being dependent on reality, suppresses part of the Ono (part of the drives), while the same Ego in psychosis partially abandons reality in favour of the Ono. Thus, for neurosis the overriding influence of reality is decisive, while for psychosis the overriding influence of the Ono is decisive."

Jung explains their etymology and structure as follows: neurosis is the inability of the ego to cope with impulses coming from the unconscious (personal and collective), but with a developed and strong ego. One could say that in neurosis the ego turns against the unconscious and opposes it in every possible way, fights with it, refuses to reckon with it. In extreme cases, this leads to paranoia, the disease of an overly autonomised ego. In terms of the vector of repressiveness, the ego's attack on the unconscious, paranoia and neurosis are similar. The "I" establishes a total power over the "It", but in doing so, unnoticed, it becomes a blind instrument in the hands of the "It", which loses sight of itself and breaks through from the other side, acting through the "I", exhaustedly pretending that it does not exist. The devil's most successful trick is to make us believe that he does not exist.

Psychosis is also a failure of individuation, but it has a different structure - not too-



The ego is strong (as in nervousness and paranoia) but the ego is too weak. In psychosis (schizophrenia), the unconscious floods the ego, rendering it helpless. The chaotic (at first glance) content of the sub-ego level begins to overwhelm the person. The "It" becomes much more important than the "I". The person then becomes stupid, inadequate, delusional and low. He takes the side of the unconscious and solidarises with it in the destruction of the ego. From this, different types of schizophrenia develop. Psychoses are more serious, because they must be treated without relying on the patient's ego, which is the object of attack of the unconscious. The extreme expression of psychosis and schizophrenia is catatonic stupor, when even the capacity for physical-motor activity is paralysed and the person cannot cope with the simplest physical movements and gestures.

### *Neurosis and psychosis in archaeomodernity*

Applying the pair neurosis/psychosis to archaeomodernity, we can say: neurosis is a typical disease of the numerator, reason, kerygma, in the politics of the elite. And psychosis is a pathology of the denominator, i.e. the masses, the people, the structure.

The kerygma (mind) in archaeomodernity is of Western origin, and it is no coincidence that Freud argues that Western man has built a culture based on the neurosis. "The ego struggles with the unconscious.

J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, in a different context, define Western culture as "paranoid." Paranoia is an excessive and pathological fixation on the

"The ego, brutalising the unconscious (Es). Western man is paranoid. Psychosis (especially all kinds of schizophrenia) should logically be a property of non-Western cultures. This includes the Russian one. Russians tend to side with the unconscious in most cases, we suffer from ob- with a nationwide propensity for schizophrenic disorders.

## ***2. Diagnosis of the archaeomodern***

### *A psychoanalytic interpretation of archaeomodernity*

Taking into account all that has been said above, it becomes clear how to treat archaeomodernity. We can generalise the psychiatric picture of archaeomodernity as a disease.

Russia has been ruled for centuries by a neurotic and sometimes paranoid layer (the elite) that has turned against the collective unconscious, pressurising and raping it, but is unable to overcome it completely. It is

is not even theoretically possible, since neurosis, persisting in itself, cannot be cured - it only worsens. Paranoia is even more revealing: those policies that have tried to eradicate Russianness as much as possible have only increased its influence. By definition, "it" does not lend itself to direct attack.

The neurotic elite is the bearer of a "mind" that "does not understand Russia".

The denominator is a psychotic mass of schizoid type, controlled by the unconscious but unable to rise to the level of the conscious ego. The process of individuation in Russians constantly fails. The masses successfully sabotage any rational endeavour of the elite, interpreting it in their own archetypal dreamlike way.

Peter's ideology differed sharply from that of the Moscow period. But the masses also interpreted Peter as a "sacred ruler", just as the secular Volterian Catherine II was perceived by Buddhists as a "white Tara". In the nineteenth century, the masses "reinterpreted" almost the whole society in an archaic way, as if there had been no advanced eighteenth century. In the twentieth century, communism was retold in an archaic way. Now they are reinterpreting liberal democracy in their Russian-schizophrenic way.

The discord between elites and masses, the conflict of two diagnoses (paranoia and schizophrenia), their permanent systemic opposition within the same sociopolitical and sociocultural forms create archaeomodernity.

In such a situation of conflict of incompatible diagnoses, the Russian history of the last centuries is unfolding: the numerator is sick, but the denominator is also sick, and they are sick in different ways.

*The fractionalisation of the human in the West. The neurotic whole*

And how does the "fraction of humanity" feel in the West? There, the gap between the elites and the masses is smaller. The masses are generally in solidarity with the neurotic course of the elites, society is uniformly neurotic and falls ill or is treated together. Of course, there is a gap there as well. The irrationality of the structure somehow conflicts with the rationality of the kerygma (as P. Ricoeur wrote in "The Conflict of Interpretations"). But this discord within Western society is nothing compared to what takes place in Russian society. In the West, the collective intellect solves the problems of its own unconscious, and this unconscious seeks expression in its own

of his own reasoning. Dialogue is complex and contradictory, dialectical. But it is two poles of one system. The Western unconscious polemises with the Western consciousness. Together they are orientated in a common neurotic way, they form a whole orientated in a single direction.

Western culture is characterised by an extremely developed "numerator". The kerygma is so strong that it is not afraid to penetrate into the thickest parts of the "It", illuminating with its light the most secret and darkest corners of the subconscious.

Of course, in certain cases the exaltation of reason leads to paranoia, but this paranoia attacks its own shadow. It is most characteristic of non-men who drive rationalism to the point of absurdity.

Jung singled out Germany as a country with a collective psychic disorder, a strong collective unconscious, and a shattered individuation. But Germany and its psychic disorder are nothing compared to the archaeomodernity of Russia. In Russia, in recent centuries, the Russian unconscious has been in conflict with a completely alien non-Russian rationality.

#### *Archaic societies: the harmony of the unconscious*

Purely archaic societies could also be seen as the antithesis of Russia, but only from a different perspective. Their social structure and culture are directly influenced by the collective unconscious, which at its very source blocks the development of the autonomous ego. The rationality of archaic societies is completely subordinated to the influence of the archetypes of the unconscious. Social, cultural and political institutions, rites, rituals and customs directly express the psychic landscape of the "It".

In this case, the harmonisation between numerator and denominator is achieved at the expense of the strength and power of the denominator. This also produces a solidary society where elites and masses share common, this time typologically schizophrenic attitudes.

Again, this is not like Russia, where a strong subconscious is harnessed by an equally strong but sharply conflicting alien consciousness.

#### *The difference between Archaic and Tradition*

It may be recalled that René Guénon disliked archaicism and considered it a "degraded form of Tradition". This remark is relevant now. According to Guénon, a "normal" society is one in which the sacred is embodied in a kerygma. И

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though he speaks not of the unconscious, but of the superconscious, of the celestial "shruti", archetypes, by vector we guess that for him the embodiment of archetypes in rational theology was extremely important.

In other words, Tradition is not archaic, Tradition is a permanent Con-servative Revolution, where the sacred does not merely reside in the form of psychotic residues, but penetrates to the level of kerygma, where it receives a conscious and transparent expression.

For Guénon, there is bad rationality and good rationality. Good rationality is subordinated to superrational archetypes. Bad rationality, on the other hand, claims autonomy. Archaic is a projection of superrational archetypes over the subrational level of the psyche.

Traditional society, unlike archaic society, is an intellectual society endowed with sacred rationality. Archaic society, on the other hand, lacks rationality. By the way, Guénon considered it not a primary stage in the development of society, but a product of later degradation. For him, traditional society comes first, and only then archaic society, not vice versa.

### *The cure of archaeomodernity and traditionalism*

Traditionalism is a therapeutic practice applied to the people. To our particular people and their unfortunate illness.

Traditionalism presupposes the restoration of normative proportions. Sacrality is taken as the highest horizon of intellectual intuition, that is, as a super-rational beginning. Reason is brought into conformity with it. In this case, psychic reflections of super-rational ideas, located in the collective unconscious, cease to be a source of permanent mental, social, cultural and political disorders.

There is a harmonisation of three layers: the super-rational, the rational and the sub-rational (mental).

This is the complete scenario of cure.

### **3. *Russian layers***

#### *Orthodox stratum*

What layers does the Russian structure consist of?

Obviously, there is an Orthodox Christian layer to it. This is the most superficial of the layers. It was knocked out of the kerygmatic state (that is, out of the numerator relatively recently) only a few centuries, and finally only in the Soviet 70th anniversary. It is, of course, not pure collective unconsciousness; it is a "former kerygma" that found itself in the "It" zone only due to historical circumstances.

The nature of Orthodox theology is undoubtedly super-intelligent and represents sacred rationality. During the 10th-17th centuries, this form of rationality, in fact, dominated Russian society, predetermining rationality as such. From the 17th century it began its marginalisation and gradual shift to the sphere of implication. Since 1917, these processes have been accelerating. At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the first signs of the reverse process emerged: the rise of Orthodoxy from the folk depths to the level of theological reflection and kerygma.

The unconscious retains precisely those aspects of this Orthodox kerygma that are most deeply rooted in other, deeper layers of the unconscious.

### *Two "orthodoxies."*

Two words about the transformations of Russian Orthodoxy since the fifteenth century. After the fall of Byzantium, Russian self-consciousness sought a new kerygmatic identification. We were part of the Byzantine-Orthodox eikumene. The ecumene ended (both politically and ecclesiastically - the Unia). Now we have become a Russian whole. A specific Moscow religious-political self-consciousness emerges - the Third Rome. This is a kind of Russian "Zionism", the realisation of the divinely chosenness of Russians.

The second version is the Greek-Orthodox version, which insists, both after the Unia and the fall of Tsargrad (!), that Russia is just a part of the Orthodox world under the aegis of the Phanar patriarchs of Constantinople. It is also "patriotic" and "derzhavnaya", but more Westernised. It was influenced not only by Greeks, but also by Catholics and Uniates.

From the end of the 15th to the end of the 17th centuries, the Russian-Zionist Moscow line prevailed. After Nikon and especially the Council of 1666-1667, the Greek-Western line prevailed.

Since the late 17th century Russian-Moscow "Zionism", the Third Rome has been going mainstream,

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into the denominator, the unconscious. And stays there. The last rational carriers of it are the Old Believers (the only mentally healthy Russian people are the Old Believers). In the 19th century, this line tried to reinterpret secular monarchism and reaction (Slavophiles, Dostoevsky, Russian revival, culture). On the eve of 1917, it penetrates the intelligentsia, which was looking for a Russian Conservative Revolution and Ereignis. - Sophiologists, Klyuev, Scythianism, Merezhkovsky, Blok, etc.

In the 20s this line goes underground again and reinterprets communism and Stalinism in a National Bolshevik way.

This is the kind of orthodoxy that lives in the unconscious. It is a psychotic indigenous interpretation of Christianity in a folk way.

The Greek-Western interpretation remains at the level of kerygma in the White emigration and ROCOR (Meyendorf, Schmemmann, the late G. Florovsky. This is a Greekophilic neurosis. Such post-Soviet Orthodoxy is recognisable by the neuroticism of its carriers. It does not reach psychotic depths.

### *Monarchism and integrity*

The Russian collective unconscious is monarchical. It is imbued with a sense of primordial integrity, of indivisibility. Russian people are not divided and dream of a common body. This common body is sobornost. In the Church, we pray for the redemption of all, for a gathering.

The Russian is indistinguishable from other Russians in the collective unconscious: this is what Selbst says, what he says about himself. And the unconscious projects this intuition upwards - into the realm of the "numerator". This is how the figure of the sacred King appears. It is not the historical monarchy that inculcates the habit of self, but the need for the bodily union of all with all in the space of the great and unified Russianness that brings to life the image, the archetype of the Tsar.

In the Byzantine model of Orthodoxy this is perfectly expressed in the symphony of powers. Russian easily assimilates this.

### *Russian love*

Another aspect of integrity is Russian love.

At the beginning of perestroika, the Russian collective unconscious said from a TV telly in the mouth of a chaste Soviet girl: "There is no sex in the USSR. Sex is cleavage, separation. The neurotic enjoys this cleavage

and is tormented by it. The Russian man does not have this division, the Russian sex. Our unconscious is an ocean of psychotic love, where everything merges with everything, everything is dissolved in everything. This manifests itself both in marriage and in all other aspects of Russian existence. For the Russian, everything is marriage, everything is copulation, everything is unity. And the fruit of this continuous coitus of everything with everything is the Russian world, the Russian people, generating, tirelessly creating the Russian universe.

Christianity as a religion of love and ecclesiality as ecumenicity partly coincides with this layer of unconsciousness, and the one feeds the other.

### *State-family*

The archaic aspects of Russian (Moscow) Orthodoxy go much deeper than the fifteenth century and even the adoption of Christianity in the tenth century. They are related to the deep archetypes of the unconscious and are rooted in the most ancient patterns of family pat-riarchy as a kerygma on the upper layers of the structure combined with the matriarchal layer below. This matriarchal-archaic and patriarchal-rational family type is transferred to the whole nation, to Russia, to Russians.

It is important: the family is not recognised here as having been overcome by the tribal, then the tribal, then the social. The unconscious ignores the historical transformations of society - not always, of course, but when these transformations are taking place.

"crooked" and superficial and do not touch the essence of the people. And this is the case with us. Russians are patriarchal because, unlike Europeans, they have not invested in a deep experience of the process of social division, up to class division. This division was in the "numerator", in the "denominator" we lived and still live as a family. For the Russian unconscious, the state and the people are a family.

Similarly about power (father-president), about love, about unity.

This Moscow-Orthodox stratum is so stable precisely because it strictly corresponds to the more general geography of the Russian collective unconscious.

### *Pre-Christian religion: Iranian dualism*

Pre-Christian religious ideas are also preserved in the unconscious. However, it is difficult to speak about them reliably.

Russian legends, fairy tales, legends, folklore stories were greatly influenced by Aryan-Iranian dualism, possibly of Scythian-Sarmatian origin,

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and maybe even directly Iranian. And these plots are common for both Eastern Slavs and Finno-Ugrians.

With the instinct of a religious scholar, one can identify in the mass of Russian archaic myths and fairy tales the remains of the pre-Christian kerygmatic stratum.

It is indicative that the word "god" itself is taken from the Persian language, and this speaks volumes. In the expression "white-flammable stone Alatyř" is probably also a tracing from Iranian: "Alatyř" means strictly "white" and "flammable" there. The word "ho-rosho" is from "hvareno", etc. The Old Russian words "shchur" and "chur", which meant "white" and "flammable".

"spirit", "ancestor", comes from the Iranian "ahura". Just as "asuras" became demons in Hinduism, and Iranians were light "gods", so "chur" became our "chort".

Bohumilism and dual myths were clearly widespread. Light mysticism, the image of the narrow bridge, the Firebird, the Humpbacked Horse, the Goldfish and many other fairy-tale and folklore stories clearly point to the dualistic Iranian context. The story of the origin of "non-pure power" is Iranian in type - former angels fell from heaven after Satan and became spirits of the place where they landed: domovyami, leshimi, bannikov, watermen, etc.

A fuller study of ancient Iranian and Scytho-Sarmatian mythology may provide clues to the Russian unconscious.

### *Perfume*

Spirits, house spirits, leshy, ghouls, mermaids and bird-estraphiles are probably echoes of an even older, most likely pre-Iranian world-view, whose kerygmatic superstructure probably dates back to the middle of the first millennium, if not earlier. But many of these ideas turned out to be extremely persistent in the popular knowledge. In order to identify them and correctly interpret them, it is necessary to develop a full-fledged structural apparatus, which, along with historical and ethnographic data, would also take into account the psychological aspects that are fixed in the unconscious layers of modern Russians<sup>1</sup>.

Probably, the tales about "doctors" (Saint Nikola, etc.), which have already been mentioned and which reproduce shamanic rites of healing, have ancient roots. It is also worth mentioning the stories about the creation of the first animals, the duck and the naked dog to whom "Satan gave a fur coat".

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<sup>1</sup> The works of the outstanding Russian philologists-structuralists and linguists Vyach V. Ivanov and V.N. Toporov are extremely relevant.



It is also important to correctly decipher the instruction to look from under the ogoloba to see the leshchei; to throw axes over cattle to keep them from falling; to look backwards between one's legs when going down into the cellar to see the householder ("master"); to plough the village on naked women to prevent epidemics and crop failures, etc.

### *Hyperborean layer*

The last deepest layer of the Russian unconscious is the hyperborean dream<sup>1</sup>. This is the dream of the Arctic calendar, in which runic graphic plots unfold.

Probably, the Hyperborean dream is truly universal and does not constitute a unique feature of the Russian people alone. It is a common dream whose structure coincides with the primordial Tradition.

At the level of this dream we can find the key to all other peoples and unconsciousnesses, because this code is absolute. Modern linguists call it mother language or the "Borean" language that preceded the fall of the Tower of Babel. Here one can find points of contact with Bastian's "elemental thoughts" and Jung's belief in the universality of the "collective unconscious".

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<sup>1</sup> Dugin A. Signs of the Great Nord. M.:Veche, 2008.



## The Conservative Revolution and the struggle against archaeomodernity

### *Conservative Revolution Space*

Where is there conceptual philosophical space for an alternative treatment of archaeomodernity? For its treatment? If we, unlike the supporters of the status quo party, i.e. the majority, believe that archaeomodernity is a disease, if we believe that archaeomodernity can be cured without killing its host, i.e. without exorcism of structures, then we are left with a very small political-ideological and metaphysical space where we can only ask the question, what and how can be done in this situation? This space is called "Conservative Revolution". This is another special phenomenon, I have written a lot about it, we have talked about it many times in the framework of the "New University". Now I mean the Conservative Revolution not as a political ideology or political philosophy, but exclusively as a space, occupying which and on the basis of which it is possible to undertake the cure of archaeomodernity in the direction of structure. Here, of course, it is of utmost importance to understand who would act as the subject that sets itself such a task. The fact is that a sick person cannot cure himself. A person in a state of archaeomodernity is fundamentally unable to heal himself or to go beyond it. This is a vicious circle, because the structure here will be blocked by the kerygma, and the kerygma by the structure, there can be no overriding of either, and even to realise the cause of the disease and to go beyond it is impossible. the very fact of its existence within the status quo is fundamentally impossible.

The fact that archaeomodernity is a disease tells us that there is a specific instance that does not belong to archaeomodernity. It is crucial to clarify the metaphysical nature of this point. This point cannot be a subject in the classical sense of the subject within modernity. But it cannot be a structure either, it is something "else", something third, which does not exist in archaeomodernity.

### *A doctor, a liar and a thief*

Here arises the metaphysical concept of the physician. The word "doctor" is very ancient, and it resembles the words "liar" and "thief". When we say "physician", in archaeomodernity this concept is instantly dissolved into "liar" and "thief", because the physician is the one,

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who lie in order to steal, making diagnoses (wrong), making a living, selling overpriced drugs. Doctors of the archaeomodern are necessarily killer doctors. Under what we conservative revolutionaries call "the place of the doctor", in archaeomodernity the figure of the "liar" and "thief" is reserved. This is the department of ideology, which, in fact, should be engaged in the search for a possible therapy, but this place is tightly occupied by lying thieves.

There are thieves who do not lie, just thieves - these are law enforcers from the side of the structure. And there are lying thieves - this is another wing, another tower. As a matter of fact, there is a fundamental battle between them for where to get more and how to grab more, but all this is done under the aegis of healing. And the root of the words "steal", "lie" and "heal", and "vorozhba", "vorozhivat" - are similar. The very root "vr" ("ur") is very ancient, sacred and denotes everything together, like any sacral polysemic concept. From this ancient root, two meanings (lying and stealing) are activated in big politics, and healing serves as a cover for them. But this is not modernist thievery and theft, but archaeomodernist, because it is a patriotic form of theft and a sincere form of lying (i.e. it is not exactly the deception of others, it is also a fundamental deception of the self, because in archaeomodernity everything deceives itself and steals from itself; there is no figure of the "other" in archaeomodernity, because the capacity for distinction is blunted, knocked down).

*Structure in archaeomodernity is unable to save itself*

So, if archaeomodernity and its various editions are unable to cure themselves, there must be something else, but I think we have already tried everything we can. There is nothing to say about postmodernity - its task is to destroy even incomplete modernity, it is modernity itself that leads to distortion and the final evaporation of the remnants of structure. Archaic will not save us - in archaeomodernity it is captive, and if it could free itself, it would have done so long ago, but if it does not do so, if it has been obeying the aggressive modernist kerygma for three hundred years, then there is something wrong with it. The fact that this archaic does not throw off modernity by itself means that it is somewhat corrupted in itself, far from the slender structure of a full-fledged traditional society.

The Hindu archaeomodernity of modern India is much more stable in terms of structure. There is 1 per cent modernity and 99 per cent archaicism that exists normally through modernity. But as the Hindu political elite modernises, more and more of this disease is spreading, but as long as it is still in an acceptable-

The modernity of the art nouveau is not a matter of critical and uncritical proportions. However, even such a powerful and massive archaic cannot throw off the colonial blanket of modernity.

In Russian archaeomodernity, modernity is much more numerous, much more poisonous, and much more corrupted by our national archetypes. Our unconscious is fundamentally crippled by modernity, because it is one thing to believe in idols, another thing to believe in Christ, another thing to believe in steam engines, and another thing to believe in shopping, in Turkish resorts, in glamour and Ksenia Sobchak. Agree, belief in glamour and Boris Moiseyev is almost a verdict on our archaic society. Belief in Putin is still OK, but belief in Medvedev and his four "i's".... This is the key moment, and it is here that archaeomodernity reaches its critical phase, where archaic itself reveals itself in the most monstrous way, from the rear.

The conservative-revolutionary subject is born in the course of modernisation

The archaic itself is incapable of saving itself. So where is the point of the doctor? It is clear that it is not in the mainstream, it is clear that it is not in the broad demand of the masses (because there is no demand for it). Here we must turn to a similar situation in the European experience. When and under what circumstances did the Conservative Revolution arise in Germany? It arose when a rapidly modernising German society, which was the most archaic of European societies, suddenly began to recognise the process of modernisation as an opportunity for choice - rational willed choice. Pay close attention to this formula; it implies that the Conservative Revolution is not archaic!

This is not a surge of archaics. Everything that is a surge of archaic is archaeomodern, and the presence of archaic does not lead us into any traditional society, much less into any Conservative Revolution. The surge of archaicism within the framework of archaeo-modernity is fundamentally bought under any circumstances by the presence of this painful construction. And the Conservative Revolution arises when there is a movement towards real modernisation, when a reasonable and strong-willed subject appears. But this subject, having appeared, sees this modernisation not as a destiny, but as a challenge. And then it can only question the justification of the kerygma of modernity. The conservative-revolutionary subject questions modernity and makes a conscious and volitional choice in favour of structure.

It is the intellect that consciously and volitionally takes the side of dreams in the psycho-analytical model. An example of this choice is Carl Gustav Jung. Freud, who stood on the side of kerygma versus structure in order to

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and creates a methodology for working with structure. Suddenly his disciple, the modernist and psychoanalyst Jung, appears and says: "Should I not side with the archetypes, should I not recognise their ontological properties?" That is, don't you reconsider this critique of the irreflexive within the subject in favour of the irreflexive?

This is a similar feature of many conservative revolutionaries: their deep fascination with kerygma, modernism, their youth spent in the most revolutionary radical circles, their engagement in revolutionary progressive philosophy. This is what makes them fundamentally different from other conservatives. Conservatives are always in favour of preservation, be it the preservation of archaic structures or of the archaeomodern. Conservatives do not fix their attention on the subjective rational-will sphere; they either do not reach it, acting out of inertia, or they immediately slip into the moment where there is a choice and side with the modernists, as Chaadayev did.

In the space of a peculiarly conceptualised modernisation, of rationalisation, of breaking away from the roots, of the transition to the subject, to the volitional sphere, at the border between kerygma and structure, lies the possibility of a Conservative Revolution. Conservative Revolution can never be a mere tribute to inertia. When we say, "Well, we are Russians, we are human beings, we have archetypes that work," that would be archaeomodern. It is similar to both postmodern and Conservative Revolution, but it is neither postmodern nor Conservative Revolution, it is archaeomodern. The real Conservative Revolution is a matter of the subject, a conscious and volitional choice, a deliberate and non-inertial appeal to structure as a value.

This is militant structuralism, structuralism with a machine gun. It is not by chance that one of the founders of structuralism was Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoy, whom all representatives of the structuralist and structuralist movement in the West know as a phonologist and a major structural linguist, but no one knows that he applied these models to the political philosophy of Eurasianism.

The Conservative Revolution is the choice of the subjective beginning, that is, the particular instance that undergoes modernisation, notices archaeomodernity, recognises it as a disease, but decides that in addition to the two possibilities of dealing with archaeomodernity - preservation of the status quo and exorcism of the structure - there is a third way. This is the way of the Slavophiles and Eurasians. It is not by chance that the notion of "revolutionary conservatism" was born in their midst. It was coined by

Samarin, then already Thomas Mann took it, and from Thomas Mann it was borrowed by our orthodox teachers and authorities like Arthur Müller van den Broek, Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt and others.

*The revolutionary potential of conservatism*

This is where the most interesting thing arises. The conservative-revolutionary path requires a subject and, consequently, a rational willed choice, something that archaeomodernity is fundamentally incapable of. It requires a clear, sharp and distinct understanding of the conflict between archaics and modernity, as well as a full realisation and even a sense of the painfulness of their superpositional existence within a single common model, the model I have described. Since all political philosophy is first a philosophy and then a political practice, then, of course, the correctly formulated assumptions and postulates of conservative-revolutionary methodology as a powerful therapy for the Russian archaic-modern cannot exist in itself as a mere laboratory of thought, but neither can it immediately translate into a political movement. The desire to separate these things ("let's do politics and stay out of philosophy" or, conversely, "let's study philosophy and politics is a dirty business") is absolutely perverse. For the hundredth or even the thousandth time, we must begin by bringing the political and the philosophical together, intersecting, and from this combination of the political and the philosophical, what will become the Russian Conservative Revolution must finally be born.

This place of the doctor, which we have been talking about, must first be repulsed, asserted and reclaimed - this is the very first action. Thus, one must recognise archaeomodernity as a disease, stand in fundamental opposition to it, take the side of the archaic in archaeomodernity, act in the name of traditional society, but at the same time, one must be no less, if not more, a rational-willed modernist, a real and full-fledged subject, because otherwise this situation will never be resolved, and the swamp of archaeomodernity will swallow up all endeavours. This is the revolute potential of conservatism, which is necessary for us to win back a concrete position, for a real political and philosophical therapy for our Russian society and the whole world.

First of all, we need to find the place where modernity will be clear as a paradigm and archaic will be clear as a paradigm. In other words, we need to be modern enough to understand both modernity and archaic. This is what I'm talking about

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I spoke in the lecture "Enoch darkened" and in the book "Postphilosophy". And I described a detailed description of modernity and traditional society as two opposite para-digmas in the book "Philosophy of Traditionalism". "The crisis of the modern world", "East and West", Guénon's "The Kingdom of Quantity and the Signs of Time" and Evola's "Revolt against the Modern World" and "Riding the Tiger" are not to be overlooked.

We must strictly separate the living and the dead, the rational and the reckless, structure and kerygma. To do this, we must understand them and fix both reflexive and irreflexive beginnings in our subject. That is, we must reflect clearly, in the Kantian way, on the work and structure of pure reason, and then, following the philosophers of suspicion, think and reflect on structures in order to stand on their side, firmly knowing what this side is and how it is organised.

We are, however, getting too far ahead of ourselves when we talk about taking the side of structure. Let's be consistent:

- we first realise that archaeomodernity is a disease,
- then we realise that it cannot be cured in favour of modernisation.

of the nation,

- Further, having nevertheless mastered a certain level of modernisation, becoming a subj-

We opt for a structure, and we're going to

- By taking the side of the structure, we take a series of steps that translate into intellectual and, in parallel, social, political and, ultimately, concrete political action.

### *La chose vile*

Practical advice for the conservative revolutionary.

Firstly, conservative revolutionaries must reject a simplistic understanding of the problem of tradition and modernity; it is much more complicated than that. First, we need to realise that at the centre of the conservative revolutionary's consciousness, the archaeomodern is the main object. Archaeomodern is what we Russians deal with outside and inside; it is what we treat, not only in others, but also in ourselves, but we treat it as "the other us". The one who will treat is not the one who is there now, not the one who eats.

The thematisation of the archaeomodern is, among other things, the main political task of our authorities, whether they will preserve it or not, reco-



Whether they accept it as healthy or intuitively feel that it is not normal. The conversation about modernisation, or not modernisation, conservatism, and all politics, is coming into focus in our society now that the smokescreens of previous political phases have been dispelled. Any discourse about our power and our politics (and about our power and our politics), about our past, present and future, must and does now take place in the space of archaeomodern thought, however we approach it and from whatever position we wish. In archaeomodernity we find the most important thing. It is the main object, what in alchemy is called *la chose vile*, a certain "disgusting filthy thing", which is nevertheless the primary material of the Great Work and holds within itself the possibility of being transformed into gold.

Archaeomodernity is the main object, there is no other. From now on we are doomed to deal with it; we must treat it, bring it into the light and at the same time purify it with the methods of the Conservative Revolution.

*Stupidity is our weapon*

A conservative revolutionary should have three strategies depending on who he is addressing.

The first strategy if he sees before him an archaeomodernist who has a very strong structure and a very weak (on the verge of extinction) kerygma. In this case we are dealing with a Russian (Eurasian) frame. If there is so little kerygma that God be with it, then it is necessary to support and in every possible way inflate the archaic beginning in such a person. It is not necessary to say anything clever to it, it is necessary to say everything very stupid and very weighty.

The pure archaic beginning in archaeomodernity, where there is no kerygma, but a single structure (a person is not delirious - or wandering at night on the rooftops - in this case, but simply sleeping peacefully), we must strengthen it in every possible way. Moreover, where there are attempts to modernise our people, to wean them from being so stupid, we should resist it and say: "No, stop, stupidity is our weapon". This is in fact the weapon of the conservative revolutionary, because the modernist kerygma calls "stupidity" the unconscious of the Russian man, which is quite complete, but it is just crushed, it cannot make ends meet and therefore it is sick. But this is what is most valuable.

This is where the tactical possibility of our supporting the archaeomodernists in the face of the modernists opens up.) But we must bring this support to

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It is absurd to glorify the archaic not only in Putin but also in the porcelain Medvedev. We could suggest canonising him right now, for his future services to the Motherland. He already has a lot of merits - he has implemented national projects, and in general he is a worthy man, and he will do a lot more worthy things. And Zubkov is a worthy person, practically all of them are worthy people, and you can vote not even for one, but for two, three, with two or three hands. In this way, our support will strengthen the dream structures of our society. In this case, the more foolish the better, if we are talking about a Russian person, a real Russian, who has no thoughts at all, who is innocent in this respect, because when thoughts arise, temptation comes with them.

### *CR modernisation*

When we turn to those Russian people who have structure left and already have a kerygma, and this kerygma begins to work, we resort to a different strategy. In this case, we are dealing with a subject who is reflexive, and he is extremely valuable to us. Having met such a subject, we must put aside political and philosophical jouissance and move on to the form of communication number two. It is true that there is practically no such subject in pure form, except in liberal (but not "illiberal") circles. There are almost no such people in Russian circles, except among mathematicians.

But in any case, when meeting other people with signs of subjectivity or in their own circle, it is vital for conservative revolutionaries to carry out an operation of fundamental modernisation of their own consciousness. Conservative revolutionaries must be modern people, thoroughly comprehend Western European philosophy, and then - with the help of the instruments of this magnificent and ideal Western European philosophy - scrupulously revise their own structure, their Russian dreams, extracting from all this a distinctive Russian subject, a Russian rationality, which as such does not yet exist, but which can and must. In other words, the main task of conservative revolutionaries is self-modernisation and modernisation of their own kind, modernisation in the very fundamental paradigmatic sense that I mentioned. It is about the fact that the paradigm of modernity must be comprehended and mastered, i.e. the conservative revolutionary fundamentally differs from the archaeomodernist in that he feels absolutely free in the kerygma. Including the kerygma of modernity.

The conservative-revolutionary type is a unique type in the Russian context, a type of intelligent Russian that is almost unheard of in our time. There has never been such a Russian, because usually Russian is just stupid, and smart is not Russian. The clever Russian is a paradox. And by saying "stupid" I do not want to offend my people. "Stupid" - in a good sense, in a sacred sense, stupid means sacred, too sacred to be smart. We have to stop being too sacred.

*To the Russian kerygma*

Conservative revolutionaries within the conservative-revolutionary medical therapeutic space need to create something that is not even close. The most important task of the therapeutic metaphysical action is to create a Russian subject, someone who does not exist. To build a kerygma that will grow out of our structure, not to borrow a kerygma from somewhere else, but to grow it out of ourselves. We have some outlines for such a kerygma. This is, first of all, the theology of Russian Orthodoxy, especially in its pure Old Believer form. These are prolegomena to the Russian kerygma. But note that it is the Old Believers who are the bearers of the Russian kerygma to a greater extent than the New Believers, who are to a greater extent products of the archaeomodern. In a certain sense, the Old Believers preserved and further developed in the persecutions both rational and volitional principles, the ability to base their lives and actions on rules and norms that were in sharp contradiction to those of the environment. In their struggle with the environment, the Old Believers forged the Russian subject, Russian self-consciousness and Russian will. But look: they were the founders of the modernisation of Russian society. It was on them that the real national modernisation was based. Remember the well-known facts about Russian manufactures and Russian industry, and even about Russian art, actively financed by Old Rite merchants. The Old Believers, operating freely and without complexes with structures, are still at the level of consciousness much more modern than the Nikonians. But the Nikonians are more modern than the usual materialists, atheists and agnostics, who believe in just some old-fashioned nonsense. Thus the church monist Kuraev, our Bultmann, says: "Only the kerygma in Orthodox doctrine is acceptable to us, everything else should be chased away, all myths, all sacred things. But the Old Believers are even more modernistic than Kuraev, so much so that they place personal opinion and personal will at the pinnacle of values. There is no such thing in Russia at all.

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The Old Believers have never known it. For an Old Believer, a person's thought is comparable to power; they can say, "Get out of here!" to anyone they want - to the tsar, to an official, to the patriarch. And they did say it and paid, but they still say it and still pay.

This is the Russian subject, where the decisions of consciousness and will are installed as an absolute imperative in the archaeomodernist compute in which we live. The Old Believers are, in my opinion, an example and a model for Russian conservationist revolutionaries, although in its current situation, it is more of a monument to the Russian subject, but not the Russian subject itself. Perhaps a map and a plan to find it. The real archaics are ordinary people who have nothing in their heads at all.

Thus, conservative revolutionaries today face a completely new task: the task of Russian modernisation, which would be the transubstantiation of Russian structure into Russian kerygma. And this has nothing to do with fetishistic incantations about glamour, technology, the banalities of business or commerce. Archaeomodernists understand modernisation as a styling machine; in reality, modernisation is a purely philosophical phenomenon. Whoever is incapable of this philosophical action is disqualified for modernisation. The task of conservative revolutionaries is to carry out a national modernisation of Russian society, consciously, piercingly, with open eyes, looking at the structure, the kerygma, their conflict, the archaeomodern, the modernist project and the masses of heavy archaic unconsciousness. Can you imagine the gigantic work ahead of us?

### *The Trial of Archaeomodernity*

I came at it from different angles, in several steps, and now all the lines are converging into one. I think we have to be clear about what we are dealing with. And not just wait for the crisis of archaeomodernity to come. Archaeomodernity is thematised now, which means that it is already in crisis. Crisis is as much about division as it is about judgement, in Greek. The judgement of archaeomodernity is our task

We have to say that what we have now is not good, it is very, very bad, and moreover, to continue to maintain the status quo is monstrous because it only blocks real recovery. When we say, contrary to the obvious, that "this person is healthy," when he is sick, we deprive him of his last chance for a real cure. When we say that this liar and thief is a doctor, we deny him

yourself and others any chance of real recovery. It must be said that a thief is a thief. We should not necessarily fall into a historian if a thief is a thief. Well, a thief is a young man, it's also a very Russian trait, archaic. You're probably not only a thief, but also delusional? Well, that's good, our man! We are not offending you, sit in your place, if you want, we'll put you higher, but don't give your thieving ravings as medicine. And even less should we make lying and stealing the occupation of conservative revolutionaries. We must not deceive ourselves. There is enough lying and stealing without us, we need to concentrate on healing.

Archaeomodernity and the maintenance of the status quo is the most negative political-philosophical programme there can be. The pure modernists and liberals who pull half out of this unnatural combination, like Chaat-Daev, are extremely helpful to the Slavophiles. They are liberals, and we need them very much. They are good, as they show the essence of what we are dealing with. But there are almost no such people; most modernists are quasi-modernists, in fact, another edition of the same archaeomodern.

### *Dialogue with Soros*

I have told many times how I was at a Soros conference when three hundred grantees came together to talk about the open society. They all said, "That's good, Popper, George Soros, give me money. "A great book by Popper and also Hayek, give me money, George Soros," said another. Then a journalist came out and said: "George Soros, I haven't read Popper, give me money just .... money." The only people who seemed to know Popper were the political scientist Maxim Sokolov, who looked like a "bearded woman", but his calm face showed that he had already received money from Soros, and Mark Masarsky, a former philosopher who had thrown himself headlong into speculation and the co-operative movement (at first he gained everything, then he lost everything, now he repents and asks to be called "philosopher" again).

I went to the podium and in English - before that everyone had been speaking in Russian, Soros was being translated, he was practically asleep, anticipating the next and the next and the next speaker, his earphone was falling out of his ear (everything was organised in a monstrous, completely non-billionaire way - and they stole it here) - I said: "Soros, get out of here, you're a pig, we don't need your 'open society', an open society and the political anthropology on which it is based are not compatible with the values of our people". Soros jumped up, woke up, came to life,

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came to the microphone and said: "This is the first person here of you who read Popper, the first person who immediately sent me away, if you had read him, you would have sent me away too, maybe. And you're bastards, not liberals... Money, yes money. Money is nothing, Popper is everything." Hall: "Yes, yes, yes, yes, that's right, your lordship, but just give me the money." After that he started giving grants for everything, for complete outrage, just so long as people did something. He was tired of insisting that if there was a subject, there would be modernisation, and if it was "Uncle Soros, give money", there would be no modernisation.

Thus, 90 per cent of Russian modernists are archaics, and the real modernists should be us, conservative revolutionaries, and we should know Western European philosophy, as the Slavophiles and Eurasians knew it so well.

### *Modernity attacked by postmodernity*

How should we deal with modernists? If we are modernists, if we are really convinced and real, if we are right, then we have another strategy in store for them. In this case, our modernism must be active and ahead of the curve. In this case, I highly recommend not only modernising your consciousness and your life, but also researching postmodernity. It's easy, if you really really want to understand modernity, then you will understand postmodernity.

If we remain at the level of archaeomodernity, postmodernity will be a mystery behind seven seals. But we conservative revolutionaries can master the postmodern and use this language to talk to the modernists so that they will shut up forever. Not just by retelling them some fragmentary Russian dreams, which they will only habitually mock, but by mastering Deleuze and Baudrillard, by approaching them from the rear, from the future. They will babble something about positivism from Comte, and we will tell them Barthes. Thus, the question will be finished.

Postmodernism in our conditions can be a wonderful elegant weapon of the conservative revolutionary, because we don't have any postmodernism, and there can't be any carriers of it. It is not dangerous, it is a completely harmless thing because what we call postmodernism in Russia is the position of Yukst, it is archaeomodernist nonsense about postmodernity, it is not postmodern. It simply cannot exist in Russia, because there is no modernity. Therefore, the modernisation of conservative revolutionaries must simultaneously embrace the postmodern.

It is not enough to become retromodernists (let us now master Kant, then Comte, Hegel, and we will talk). It must be done, without it there will be no subject, no rational-volitional instance. But this is not enough, we need to master postmodernity, and moreover, no one but us in Russia will master postmodernity in the philosophical sense, because it is the Conservative Revolution that moves us with its energy into modernity, and beyond it, in its purest form. The act of Conservative Revolution is possible only as a volitional and rational choice between kerygma and structure. In choosing in favour of structure, we affirm the highest form of kerygma, the highest act of reason - to consciously sacrifice oneself. But such a sacrifice is only possible when this reason is there.

Archaeomodernity, on the other hand, "sacrifices reason" when it does not exist. It is no great sacrifice to give away what does not belong to you, what you do not have. But when you understand the magic power of reason, not pseudo-understand, not (un)understand (in one word), but when you actually know almost bodily how such a marvellous phenomenon as reason functions, to agree to give this marvellous and precious thing to the dark monstrous squelching structure, the work of dreams, This is really a gesture, this is really a choice, this is really an action that will immediately bring about a change in the very structure of the world - and of course, in power, because power is nothing but the embodied form of knowledge. It is not by chance that Foucault's book was called *The Will to Truth*, like Nietzsche's *The Will to Power*. In fact, knowledge and power are identical in the dimension of the subject.

### *Russian subject*

The Russian subject, set as a task and goal on the horizon of the Conservative Revolution, is not the Western European subject we are talking about, it is a different subject. We cannot say anything more definite about it, because it is something that does not exist yet. The Russian subject must be characterised by the properties of the subject (as we understand it in modernity), but at the same time, it must be something else.... The Russian subject is a very special eschatological phenomenon. In order to begin to address it, to think about it, one must first realise that there has never been a Russian subject before. There was "Russian", there was a subject, but there was no Russian subject. The search for this subject, its institutionalisation through the philosophical and political process, is the most important thing. The Russian subject is the key.

Archaeomodernity has always thwarted any approach to this subject. It put insurmountable obstacles in its way. There was a non-Russian subject, but we never reached the Russian subject. Archaeomodernity is to blame, it blocked this process. We must do away with it, destroy it, break this painful, disgusting model of the relationship between kerygma and structure.

*Eurasianism as a political philosophy: the fractionalisation of humanity*

Now for the significance of the political philosophy of Eurasianism.

I gave a lecture on this subject at the philosophy department of the Leningrad State University to students who were more open and attentive than the professors, who, on the contrary, were delirious, while the students, on the contrary, were not delirious, just scratching, just sitting there. When I wanted to illustrate to them what the political philosophy of Eurasianism is, I gave them this picture. The human fraction corresponds exactly to the pair structure and kerygma.

There is the Tsarist political philosophy, where there is the kerygma (autocracy, Orthodoxy, nationality) in the numerator and there is the Russian - dream - structure at the bottom, in the denominator, which perceives and reinterprets all this in its own way. There is another fraction, the political philosophy of Sovietism. It has the same Russian structure beneath it, in the denominator, which (to an even greater extent) re-tolerates this new kerygma, now Soviet. Both are archaeomodern, but with completely different numerators.

The political philosophy of Eurasianism is to understand what these fractions have in common and to bring them to a common denominator. And they do have a common denominator; it is the Russian structure; it penetrates across the dividing line into both Soviet and tsarist philosophy. But it is not Tsarist political philosophy that is the structure, but something common that is in both Tsarism and Sovietism.

Eurasianists, as structuralists and political actors, called for exactly this. They said: "Let's find a common denominator; this common denominator is in the depths, where Jung's irreflexive principles or archetypes of the collective unconscious or Freud's impulses are. So let's subvert their reflexion," said the Eurasians, "let's create a political philosophy of Eurasianism, on the basis of the common denominator, let's go deeper,

Than others, to rise higher than others."

Why we are not understood when we address our Eurasian discourse. We propose to go deeper in order to go higher. And both



makes flatlanders cringe.... But today I've revealed my cards... We are always perceived as something else. We are always below the line of banal knowledge and above the line of intellectual reflection. But in archaeomodernity, everything is so mixed up that this line is no longer there, because part of modernity (and its kerygma) has collapsed below this line. This line between kerygma and structure is ratio. It is this fraction, the ratio, the ratio, the reason, that is rotten, that has failed.

There are free flows between kerygma and structure when we say: let us take the Russian structure as the common denominator of the white and red model (we are operating here with primitive categories - this is "higher maths" for cats). We are not calling for the white or red kerygma, we are calling for the Russian structure, for what is common to the denominator. But, this denominator never had its own kerygma, its own numerator. The numerator consisted of some alien kerygma. And certainly the common denominator does not fit the liberal Western kerygma.

The task that the first Eurasians set themselves, and which they began to solve, was to give this great Russian mute a language, not the Cuckoo language he usually speaks, but a real Eurasian language, a real Russian language. It will be strange, it will also resemble something dreamlike, but we will not get away from dreaming, neither in the Conservative Revolution, nor in the Art Cheomodern, nor in the Postmodern. But this work of dreaming must be recognised, it must be open, it must freely and quietly penetrate our national intellect and return to its shadowy spheres.

Do you know what energy we will release when we take at least one step in this direction? The first real step in this political-philosophical Eurasian practice? The fact that you do not see this energy means that we have not yet taken this step. The energy of awakening structures is an energy that can change the course of world history, to collapse everything or, on the contrary, to create everything from scratch. Only by touching it crookedly and obliquely did the Soviet Union manage to create grandiose structures. And this while still being sick, delirious: gigantic technical breakthroughs, huge will impulses, mobilisation of the masses, who went in endless streams to the front and construction sites. This required energy, gigantic energy, but this energy immediately made itself felt as soon as the Russian structure was moved a little.

The task of the Conservative Revolution is to realise a national explosion. The birth of the Russian subject is a mystery, something that has never happened in our history. To do this is to do everything.

To be honest, the Orthodox kerygma does not really help us to do this, because it says: hello, everything is finished, now according to our cycles you will all rot, whether archaeomodern or postmodern, it is all the kingdom of the Antichrist. The Orthodox kerygma is absolutely correct, but unfortunately it deprives us of the hope to realise what we are talking about. Here I suggest that, while fully preserving the Orthodox kerygma and affirming it, we turn to other conservative and revolutionary methodologies, in particular to Heidegger, to his doctrine of Ereignis or the Second Beginning (Zweite Anfang).

I think that by fundamentally identifying the people with the Heideggerian categorisation of Dasein, we have opened up the possibility of the future, because according to Heidegger, the time of Dasein flows differently from the time of reason. Dasein time flows from the future to the past. In the horizon of the future, Dasein is Sein, that is, being proper. We said in one of our lectures on Heidegger that we Russians have the people instead of the European Dasein. Thus, the nation, in its most genuine and authentic being, lives in the future. Heidegger called this the "ontological future" when Dasein becomes Sein, Er-Eignis, i.e. an event. He saw this event as the final choice of the authentic and the true after the chain of delusion has been realised. All Western philosophy according to Heidegger is an accumulation of delusions that lead to eschatological therapy. When the delusions have accumulated to the last supreme Nietzschean nihilistic model, there will be an upheaval, and not that everything will return to its proper place, but Dasein will emerge to an eternal and irreplaceable dimension of being.

Our task then is to realise the Russian Ereignis, that is, to make the Russian people come true. The Russian people can and must come true in the act of the emergence of the Russian subject. The Russian people has not come true - not yet. And it is Providential. Perhaps the accumulation of errors and the very phenomenon of archaeomodernity is not a temporary and accidental distortion of our destiny. It is not a cold we caught somewhere. It is a fundamental, fatal, fatal disease, which is meant to purify us for a higher fulfilment.

I think that in this conservative-revolutionary action and in the theme-

The main object of study is the real path to what can be called Russian Ereignis.

If we can even remotely guess what we are talking about now, bearing in mind the significance of the Political and the State, as was mentioned in the same lecture on Heidegger, which replaces full-fledged philosophy for Russians (that is why, when we speak of the kerygma in Russia, we usually speak of the State), we realise that we cannot simply speak of a philosophical movement, of a direction of thought. Any genuine thinking, any even the smallest step in spirit, in this direction, will automatically entail fundamental social and political upheavals. And vice versa: the main socio-political processes of relevance - even if by a reverse logic, even if from the opposite shadow side - are about to come into contact with the philosophical problems we are discussing.

This is gonna be fun.

*The cure of archaeomodernity as the main national task*

If we have correctly diagnosed archaeomodernity as a disease, if we have adopted the model of Jungian psychoanalysis corrected by traditionalism as a working methodology, we can well outline ways of curing archaeomodernity. A correct diagnosis, as doctors know, is half the battle.

What is the goal of such therapy?

It is necessary to bring the content of the Russian collective unconscious to the level of kerygma, to the "numerator". This means trying to describe in words the main lines of force of this collective unconscious, to put them into concrete forms, gradually elevating them to the status of a normative worldview.

In the course of this process, the individuation of the people will take place, that is, its cure from psychosis and schizophrenia (masses) and from neurosis (elites). Being cured, the masses will put forward from their environment a new generation of Russian carriers of a healthy conservation-revolutionary traditionalist and, in the limit, hyperborean kerygma. This generation must knock at the gates of power. As long as we have only schizophrenics in the denominator, they cannot knock anywhere.

The neurotics and paranoids will be given the opportunity to be cured, and those who refuse to be cured will be revealed as sick. Those who knock from below and those who are cured from above will form a Russian coalition. They will take on the function of recovering doctors.

They will continue to treat the elites and the masses, starting with themselves, as any doctor should (*medico cura te ipsum*).

At some point, archaeomodernity will be broken.

### *Stages of therapy*

Finally, it is possible to describe the sequence of steps that should be taken in the concrete realisation of the project of the Russian cure for archaeomodernity:

- descent into the national unconscious down to the deepest layers - without losing consciousness, i.e. psychoanalysis of the Russian people;
- creating a dream map, an atlas of Russian dreams;
- catalogisation of layers of the Russian structure and demarcation of their boundaries;
- building rational kerygmatic models that reflect and accurately represent unconscious structures;
- Permanent experiments on oneself and others to test how a particular kerygmatic hypothesis works on structures, with adjustments in methodology and language;
- Surgical removal and isolation of the most pathogenic foci (elites) actively obstructing therapy;
- The creation and institutionalisation of Russian science, based on the permanent filtration of rational-kerigmatic models borrowed from the West on behalf of the Russian unconscious, with their deactivation at the border of penetration into Russian society;
- revision of historical, especially humanitarian knowledge about Russia from the position of Russian psychotherapy (Slavophiles, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Eurasians, Silver Age, National Bolshevism), i.e. development of a new Russian episteme;
- The study of intellectual authors critical of the West (including Western ones), including the most marginalised, and their status as figures of global significance;
- the seizure of power in Russia by the healing Russian people;
- the coming of the magic age.

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***Annotation***

The book is a collection of articles, lectures and excerpts from monographs united by the theme of archaeomodernity, a special concept introduced by the author as a sociological, philosophical and political science concept. Archaeomodernity is seen as a social anomaly based on contradictions between the collective unconscious and the collective consciousness. Archaeomodernity most often arises in the course of exogenous and forced modernisation. The author suggests ways and means of overcoming archaeomodernity in Russia, based on an awareness of the deep psychological structures of Russian society.

***Abstract***

The book represents the choice of articles, lectures and fragments of different books written by author united by the main topic - archeomodernity. This concept introduced by author in different works tries to get the essence of the morbid social structure based on the disharmonic associations of contradictory elements. The archeomodernity is present when the modernisation of society has outer sources and don't correspond to the psychological roots of given society. The result is ugly acculturation and the pathology where the collective consciousness is in opposition to the collective unconsciousness. The author proposes his own method to cure this kind of social illness.

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