

NOTES ON DHAMMA
(1960–1965)



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To the memory of my Upajjhāya,
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Dve'me bhikkhave paccayā micchādīṭṭhiyā uppādāya. Katame dve. Parato ca ghoso ayoniso ca manasikāro. Ime kho bhikkhave dve paccayā micchādīṭṭhiyā uppādāyā ti.

Dve'me bhikkhave paccayā sammādīṭṭhiyā uppādāya. Katame dve. Parato ca ghoso yoniso ca manasikāro. Ime kho bhikkhave dve paccayā sammādīṭṭhiyā uppādāyā ti.

Āṅguttara II, xi, 8&9 <A.i, 87>

There are, monks, these two conditions for the arising of wrong view. Which are the two? Another's utterance and improper attention. These, monks, are the two conditions for the arising of wrong view.

There are, monks, these two conditions for the arising of right view. Which are the two? Another's utterance and proper attention. These, monks, are the two conditions for the arising of right view.

PREFACE

The principal aim of these *Notes on Dhamma* is to point out certain current misinterpretations, mostly traditional, of the Pali Suttas, and to offer in their place something certainly less easy but perhaps also less inadequate. These *Notes* assume, therefore, that the reader is (or is prepared to become) familiar with the original texts, and in Pali (for even the most competent translations sacrifice some essential accuracy to style, and the rest are seriously misleading).^a They assume, also, that the reader's sole interest in the Pali Suttas is a concern for his own welfare. The reader is presumed to be subjectively engaged with an anxious problem, the problem of his existence, which is also the problem of his suffering. There is therefore nothing in these pages to interest the professional scholar, for whom the question of personal existence does not arise; for the scholar's whole concern is to eliminate or ignore the individual point of view in an effort to establish the objective truth—a would-be impersonal synthesis of public facts. The scholar's essentially horizontal view of things, seeking connexions in space and time, and his historical approach to the texts,^b disqualify him from any possibility of understanding a Dhamma that the Buddha himself has called *akālika*, 'timeless'.^c Only in a vertical view, straight down into the abyss of his own personal existence, is a man capable of apprehending the perilous insecurity of his situation; and only a man who does apprehend this is prepared to listen to the Buddha's Teaching. But human kind, it seems, cannot bear very much

a. These books of the Pali Canon correctly represent the Buddha's Teaching, and can be regarded as trustworthy throughout. (Vinayaṭīkā: Suttavibhaṅga, Mahāvagga, Cūḷavagga; (Suttapīṭaka:) Dīghanikāya, Majjhimanikāya, Saṃyuttanikāya, Aṅguttaranikāya, Suttanipāta, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Theratherīgāthā. (The Jātaka verses may be authentic, but they do not come within the scope of these *Notes*.) No other Pali books whatsoever should be taken as authoritative; and ignorance of them (and particularly of the traditional Commentaries) may be counted a positive advantage, as leaving less to be unlearned.

b. The P.T.S. (London Pali Text Society) Dictionary, for example, supposes that the word *attā* in the Suttas refers either to a phenomenon of purely historical interest (of the Seventh and Sixth Centuries B.C.) known as a 'soul', or else to the reflexive 'self', apparently of purely grammatical interest. All suggestion that there might be some connexion (of purely vital interest) between 'soul' and 'self' is prudently avoided.

reality: men, for the most part, draw back in alarm and dismay from this vertiginous direct view of being and seek refuge in distractions.

There have always been a few, however, who have not drawn back, and some of them have described what they saw. Amongst

c. The scholar's sterile situation has been admirably summed up by Kierkegaard.

Let the enquiring scholar labour with incessant zeal, even to the extent of shortening his life in the enthusiastic service of science; let the speculative philosopher be sparing neither of time nor of diligence; they are none the less not interested infinitely, personally, and passionately, nor could they wish to be. On the contrary, they will seek to cultivate an attitude of objectivity and disinterestedness. And as for the relationship of the subject to the truth when he comes to know it, the assumption is that if only the truth is brought to light, its appropriation is a relatively unimportant matter, something that follows as a matter of course. And in any case, what happens to the individual is in the last analysis a matter of indifference. Herein lies the lofty equanimity of the scholar and the comic thoughtlessness of his parrot-like echo.—S. Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, tr. D. F. Swenson, Princeton 1941 & Oxford 1945, pp. 23-24.

And here is Nietzsche.

The diligence of our best scholars, their senseless industry, their burning the candle of their brain at both ends—their very mastery of their handiwork—how often is the real meaning of all that to prevent themselves continuing to see a certain thing? Science as self-anaesthetic: do you know that?—F. Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay.

And so, in the scholarly article on *Tāvatiṃsa* in the P.T.S. Dictionary, we are informed that 'Good Buddhists, after death in this world, are reborn in heaven'—but we are not told where good scholars are reborn.

We do not, naturally, forget what we owe to scholars—careful and accurate editions, grammars, dictionaries, concordances, all things that wonderfully lighten the task of reading the texts—and we are duly grateful; but all the science of the scholar does not lead to a *comprehension* of the texts—witness Stcherbatsky's lament:

Although a hundred years have elapsed since the scientific study of Buddhism has been initiated in Europe, we are nevertheless still in the dark about the fundamental teachings of this religion and its philosophy. Certainly no other religion has proved so refractory to clear formulation.—T. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad 1927, p. 1.

these, today, are the people known as existentialist philosophers, and an acquaintance with their mode of thinking, far from being a disadvantage, may well serve to restore the individual point of view, without which nothing can be understood. Here is a passage from an expositor of their philosophies.

The main jet of Marcel's thinking, like all existentialism, is forced from the conclusion that the type of thought which dominates or encloses or sees through its object is necessarily inapplicable to the total situation in which the thinker himself as existing individual is enclosed, and therefore every system (since in principle a system of thought is outside the thinker and transparent to him) is a mere invention and the most misleading of false analogies. The thinker is concerned with the interior of the situation in which he is enclosed: with his own internal reality, rather than with the collection of qualities by which he is defined or the external relations by which his position is plotted; and with his own participation in the situation, rather than with the inaccessible view of its externality. His thought refers to a self which can only be pre-supposed and not thought and to a situation in which he is involved and which he therefore cannot fully envisage; so that in the nature of the case philosophic thought cannot have the complete clarity and mastery of scientific thought which deals with an object in general for a subject in general. To look for this type of thinking in philosophy is to overlook the necessary conditions of human thinking on ultimate questions; for philosophers to produce it at this time of day is sheer paralysis induced by superstitious regard for the prestige of contemporary science or of the classical philosophies.^d

'The essence of man is to be in a situation' say these philosophers, and this is their common starting-point, whatever various conclusions—or lack of conclusions—they may eventually arrive at. Every man, at every moment of his life, is engaged in a perfectly definite concrete situation in a world that he normally takes for granted. But it occasionally happens that he starts to think. He becomes aware, obscurely, that he is in perpetual contradiction with himself and with the world in which he exists. 'I am, am I not?—but what am I? What is this elusive

d. H. J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1952, p. 83. This is a useful summary. (See also, for greater detail and further references, R. Grimsley, *Existentialist Thought*, University of Wales Press, Cardiff 1955).

self that is always elsewhere whenever I try to grasp it? And this familiar world—why is it silent when I ask the reason for my presence here?’ These insidious doubts about the assurance of his personal identity and the purpose of his existence in a world that has suddenly become indifferent to him begin to undermine his simple faith in the established order of things (whatever it may happen to be), whose function it is to relieve him of anxiety. And the great service performed by the existential philosophies is to prevent a return to complacency.

The peculiarity of existentialism, then, is that it deals with the separation of man from himself and from the world, which raises the questions of philosophy, not by attempting to establish some universal form of justification which will enable man to readjust himself but by permanently enlarging and lining the separation itself as primordial and constitutive for personal existence. The main business of this philosophy therefore is not to answer the questions which are raised but to drive home the questions themselves until they engage the whole man and are made personal, urgent, and anguished. Such questions cannot be merely the traditional questions of the schools nor merely disinterested questions of curiosity concerning the conditions of knowledge or of moral or aesthetic judgements, for what is put in question by the separation of man from himself and from the world is his own being and the being of the objective world. ...These questions are not theoretical but existential, the scission which makes the existing individual aware of himself and of the world in which he is makes him a question to himself and life a question to him. ...Existential philosophies insist that any plain and positive answer is false, because the truth is in the insurmountable ambiguity which is at the heart of man and of the world.^e

Existential philosophies, then, insist upon asking questions about self and the world, taking care at the same time to insist that they are unanswerable.^f Beyond this point of frustration these philosophies cannot go. The Buddha, too, insists that questions about self and the world are unanswerable, either by refusing to answer them^g or by indicating that no statement about self and the world can be justified.^h But—and here is the vital difference—the Buddha can and does go beyond this point: not, to be sure, by answering the unanswerable, but by showing the way leading to the final cessation of all questions about self and the world.ⁱ Let there be no mistake in the matter: the existential phi-

e. H. J. Blackham, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-3.

losophies are not a substitute for the Buddha's Teaching—for which, indeed, there can be no substitute.^k The questions that they persist in

f. The scholar or scientist, with his objective method, cannot even ask such questions, since on principle he knows and wishes to know nothing of self, and nothing, therefore, of its inseparable correlative, the world. (The world, we must understand, is determined as such only with reference to self; for it is essentially 'what belongs to self', being that in which self is situated and implicated. My world, as Heidegger notes, is the world of my pre-occupations and concerns, that is to say *an organized perspective of things all significant to me and signifying me*. The collection of independent public facts produced by the scientific method is inherently incapable of constituting a world, since it altogether lacks any unifying personal determinant—which, indeed, it is the business of science to eliminate. Things, not facts, *pace* Wittgenstein, make up my world.)

g. *Ekam antaṃ nisinno kho Vacchagotto paribbājako Bhagavantaṃ etad avoca. Kin nu kho bho Gotama, atth'attā ti. Evaṃ vutte Bhagavā tuṅhī ahoṣi. Kim pana bho Gotama, n'atth'attā ti. Dutiyam pi kho Bhagavā tuṅhī ahoṣi. Atha kho Vacchagotto paribbājako uṭṭhāyāsanaṃ pakkāmi.*

Avyākata Saṃy. 10 <S.iv,400>

Being seated at one side, the wanderer Vacchagotta said to the Auspicious One,—How is it, master Gotama, does self exist? When this was said the Auspicious One was silent.—How then, master Gotama, does self not exist? A second time, too, the Auspicious One was silent. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta got up from his seat and went away.

h. *Tatra bhikkhave ye te samaṇa-brāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino, Sassato attā ca loko ca [Asassato attā ca loko ca (and so on)], idam eva saccaṃ mogham aññaṇaṃ ti, tesaṃ vata aññaṇaṃ eva saddhāya aññaṇaṃ ruciyā aññaṇaṃ anussavā aññaṇaṃ ākāra-parivitakkā aññaṇaṃ diṭṭhinijjhāna-kkhantiyā paccattaṃ yeva ñāṇaṃ bhavissati parisuddhaṃ pariyodātaṃ ti n'etaṃ thānaṃ vijjati*
Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,234>

Therein, monks, those recluses and divines whose belief and view is thus, 'Self and the world are eternal [Self and the world are non-eternal (and so on)], just this is truth and all else foolishness',—that other merely than faith, other than preference, other than tradition, other than excogitation, other than acquiescent meditation of a (wrong) view, they should have private knowledge, purified and cleansed, such a thing is not possible.

i. *Tayidaṃ saṅkhatam olārikaṃ, atthi kho pana saṅkhārānaṃ nirodho, Atth'etan ti. Iti viditvā tassa nissaraṇadassāvī Tathāgato tad upātivatto. Ibid.*

This is determined and coarse; but there is such a thing as cessation of determinations—that there is. Knowing thus, and seeing the escape, the Tathāgata passes beyond.

It is for this reason that the Ariya Dhamma is called *lokuttara*, 'beyond the world'.

asking are the questions of a *puthujjana*, of a ‘commoner’,^l and though they see that they are unanswerable they have no alternative but to go on asking them; for the tacit assumption upon which all these philosophies rest is that the questions are valid. They are faced with an ambiguity that they cannot resolve.^m The Buddha, on the other hand, sees that the questions are *not* valid and that to ask them is to make the mistake of assuming that they are. One who has understood the

j. It is all the fashion nowadays to hail modern science as the vindication of the Buddha’s *anattā* doctrine. Here is an example from a recent book: ‘This voidness of selfhood, which forms the distinguishing feature of the Buddhist analysis of being, is a view that is fully in accord with the conclusions drawn by modern scientific thinkers who have arrived at it independently.’^k The supposition is that the Buddha solved the question of self and the world simply by anticipating and adopting the impersonal attitude of scientific objectivity. The seasoned thinker is not likely to be delayed by this sort of thing, but the beginner is easily misled.

k. To arrive at the Buddha’s Teaching independently is to become a Buddha oneself.

*N’atthi kho ito bahiddhā añño
samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo evaṃ
bhūtaṃ tacchaṃ tathaṃ dhammaṃ
deseti yathā Bhagavā.*

Indriya Saṃy. vi,3 <S.v,230>

Outside here there is no other recluse or divine who sets forth as the Auspicious One does so real and factual and justified a Teaching.

l. See, for example, the Sabbāsavasutta, Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>:

*Ahan nu kho’smi, no nu kho’smi, kin
nu kho’smi, kathan nu kho’smi, and
so on.*

Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? [See M.i,2 at PARAMATTHA SACCA §2.]

m. Several of these philosophies, in their conclusions, point to a mystical solution of the existential ambiguity, seeking to justify it in some form of Transcendental Being. But they do not *deny* the ambiguity. Practising mystics, however, who have seen the Beatific Vision, who have realized union with the Divine Ground, are fully satisfied, so it seems, that during their mystical experience the ambiguity no longer exists. But they are agreed, one and all, that the nature of the Divine Ground (or Ultimate Reality, or whatever else they may call it) is inexpressible. In other words, they succeed, momentarily at least, in eliminating the mystery of the individual by raising it to a Higher Power: they envelop the mystery within the Mystery, so that it is no longer visible. (‘By not thinking on self transcend self’—Augustine.) But a paradox is not resolved by wrapping it up inside a bigger one; on the contrary, the task is to unwrap it. Mahāyāna and Zen Buddhism have a strong mystical flavouring, but there is nothing of this in the Pali Suttas. Mystically inclined readers of these *Notes* will find them little to their taste.

Buddha's Teaching no longer asks these questions; he is *ariya*, 'noble', and no more a *puthujjana*, and he is beyond the range of the existential philosophies; but he would never have reached the point of listening to the Buddha's Teaching had he not first been disquieted by existential questions about himself and the world. There is no suggestion, of course, that it is necessary to become an existentialist philosopher before one can understand the Buddha: every intelligent man questions himself quite naturally about the nature and significance of his own existence, and provided he refuses to be satisfied with the first ready-made answer that he is offered he is as well placed as anyone to grasp the Buddha's Teaching when he hears it. None the less many people, on first coming across the Suttas, are puzzled to know what their relevance is in the elaborate context of modern thought; and for them an indication that the existential philosophies (in their general methods, that is to say, rather than their individual conclusions) afford a way of approach to the Suttas may be helpful.

The Note on Fundamental Structure perhaps needs a remark. It is offered as an instrument of thoughtⁿ to those who are looking for something on these lines, and such people will probably find it self-explanatory. The fact that it is unfinished is of no great consequence, since anyone who succeeds in following what there is of it will be able to continue it for himself as far as he pleases. Those who are unable to understand what it is all about would be best advised to ignore it alto-

n. It is for *negative* thinking. 'Precisely because the negative is present in existence, and present everywhere (for existence is a constant process of becoming), it is necessary to become aware of its presence continuously, as the only safeguard against it.'—S. Kierkegaard, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Positive or abstract thinking abstracts from existence and is thus incapable of thinking it continuously. The difficulty that arises for the positive thinker is expressed by Kierkegaard in these terms.

To think existence *sub specie æterni* and in abstract terms is essentially to abrogate it.... It is impossible to conceive existence without movement, and movement cannot be conceived *sub specie æterni*. To leave movement out is not precisely a distinguished achievement.... But inasmuch as all thought is eternal, there is here created a difficulty for the existing individual. Existence, like movement, is a difficult category to deal with; for if I think it, I abrogate it, and then I do not think it. It might therefore seem to be the proper thing to say that there is something that cannot be thought, namely, existence. But the difficulty persists, in that existence itself combines thinking with existing, in so far as the thinker exists. *Op. cit.*, pp. 273-4.

gether: not everybody needs this kind of apparatus in order to think effectively. The Figure in §I/13 was first suggested (though not in that form) by a chapter of Eddington's,^o but neither its application nor the manner of arriving at it, as described in this Note, seems to have anything very much in common with Eddington's conception.^p

A Pali-English Glossary together with English Translations of all quoted Pali passages will be found at the end of the book. These are provided in order to make the book more accessible to those who do not know Pali, in the hope that they will think it worth their while to acquire this not very difficult language. Some additional texts, referred to in the *Notes* but not quoted there, are also provided.

All textual references are given (i) by Vagga and Sutta number, and in the case of Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara references also by the title of the Saṃyutta and the number of the Nipāta respectively, and (ii) by Volume and Page of the P.T.S. editions. The P.T.S. reference is given within brackets after the Vagga and Sutta reference.

The views expressed in this book will perhaps be regarded in one quarter or another either as doubtful or as definitely wrong. To prevent misunderstandings, therefore, I should make it clear that I alone, as the author, am responsible for these views, and that they are not put forward as representing the opinion of any other person or of any body of people.

Ñāṇavīra

Būndala, Ceylon.

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o. A. S. Eddington, *New Pathways in Science*, Cambridge 1935, Ch. XII.

p. A. S. Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, Cambridge 1939, Chh. IX & X. The equivocal posture of the quantum physicist, who adopts simultaneously the reflexive attitude of phenomenology (which requires the observer) and the objective attitude of science (which eliminates the observer), expressing his results in equations whose terms depend on the principle that black is white, makes him singularly unfitted to produce intelligible philosophy. (Camus, in *L'Homme Révolté* [Gallimard, Paris 1951, p. 126], remarks on Breton's surrealist thought as offering the curious spectacle of a Western mode of thinking where the principle of analogy is persistently favoured to the detriment of the principles of identity and contradiction. And yet, in *The Principles of Quantum Mechanics* [Oxford <1930> 1958], Dirac introduces us, without turning a hair, to certain abstract quantities, fundamental to the theory, that [p. 53] can be replaced by 'sets of numbers with analogous mathematical properties'. These abstract quantities, as one reads the early chapters, do indeed have a surrealist air about them.)

1. A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA

Api c'Udāyi tiṭṭhatu pubbanto tiṭṭhatu aparanto, dhammaṃ te desessāmi: Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass'uppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhatī ti.
Majjhima viii,9 <M.ii,32>

But, Udāyi, let be the past, let be the future, I shall set you forth the Teaching: When there is this this is, with arising of this this arises; when there is not this this is not, with cessation of this this ceases.

Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass'uppādā idaṃ uppajjati; yadidaṃ avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ, saḷāyatana-paccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanass' upāyāsā sambhavanti; evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

When there is this this is, with arising of this this arises; that is to say, with nescience as condition, determinations; with determinations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-&-matter; with name-&-matter as condition, six bases; with six bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, holding; with holding as condition, being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing-&-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair, come into being; thus is the arising of this whole mass of unpleasure (suffering).

Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati; yadidaṃ avijjānirodhā saṅkhāranirodho, saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho, viññāṇanirodhā nāmarūpanirodho, nāmarūpanirodhā saḷāyatananirodho, saḷāyatananirodhā phassanirodho, phassanirodhā vedanānirodho, vedanānirodhā taṇhānirodho, taṇhānirodhā upādānanirodho, upādānanirodhā bhavanirodho, bhavanirodhā jātinirodho, jātinirodhā jarāmaṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanass' upāyāsā nirujjhanti; evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hoti.
Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,262-3 & 264>

When there is not this this is not, with cessation of this this ceases; that is to say, with cessation of nescience, ceasing of determinations; with cessation of determinations, ceasing of consciousness; with cessation of consciousness, ceasing of name-&-matter; with cessation of name-&-matter, ceasing of six bases; with cessation of six bases, ceasing of contact; with cessation of contact, ceasing of feeling; with cessation of feeling, ceasing of craving; with cessation of craving, ceasing of holding; with cessation of holding, ceasing of being; with cessation of being, ceasing of birth; with cessation of birth, ageing-&-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair, cease; thus is the ceasing of this whole mass of unpleasure (suffering).

1. The traditional interpretation of *paṭiccasamuppāda* (of its usual twelve-factored formulation, that is to say) apparently has its roots in the Paṭisambhidāmagga <i,52>, or perhaps in the Abhidhammapiṭaka. This interpretation is fully expounded in the Visuddhimagga <Ch. XVII>. It can be briefly summarized thus: *avijjā* and *saṅkhārā* are *kamma* in the *previous* existence, and their *vipāka* is *viññāṇa*, *nāmarūpa*, *saḷāyatana*, *phassa*, and *vedanā*, in the *present* existence; *taṇhā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava*, are *kamma* in the *present* existence, and their *vipāka* is *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* in the *subsequent* existence.

2. This Note will take for granted first, that the reader is acquainted with this traditional interpretation, and secondly, that he is dissatisfied with it. It is not therefore proposed to enter into a detailed discussion of this interpretation, but rather to indicate briefly that dissatisfaction with it is not unjustified, and then to outline what may perhaps be found to be a more satisfactory approach.

3. As the traditional interpretation has it, *vedanā* is *kamma-vipāka*. Reference to Vedanā Saṃy. iii,2 <S.iv,230> will show that as far as concerns bodily feeling (with which the Sutta is evidently dealing) there are seven reasons for it that are specifically not *kamma-vipāka*. Only in the eighth place do we find *kammavipākajā vedanā*. This would at once limit the application of *paṭiccasamuppāda* to certain bodily feelings only and would exclude others, if the traditional interpretation is right. Some of these bodily feelings would be *paṭiccasamuppānnā*, but not all; and this would hardly accord with, for example, the passage:

*Paṭiccasamuppānaṃ kho āvuso
sukhadukkhaṃ vuttaṃ Bhagavatā
(Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. iii,5
<S.ii,38>).*

The Auspicious One, friend, has said that pleasure and unpleasure are dependently arisen.

4. There is, however, a more serious difficulty regarding feeling. In Aṅguttara III,vii,1 <A.i,176> it is clear that *somanassa*, *domanassa*, and *upekkhā*, are included in *vedanā*, in the specific context of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation. But these three feelings are mental, and arise (as the Sutta tells us) when the mind dwells upon (*upavicarati*) some object; thus they involve *cetanā*, ‘intention’, in their very structure. And the Commentary to the Sutta would seem to allow this, but in doing so must either exclude these mental feelings

from *vedanā* in the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation or else assert that they are *vipāka*. In either case the Commentary would go against the Sutta we are considering. This Sutta (which should be studied at first hand) not only treats these mental feelings as included in *vedanā* but also specifically states that to hold the view that whatever a man experiences, pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, is due to past acts, is to adopt a form of determinism making present action futile—one is a killer on account of past acts, a thief on account of past acts, and so on. To take these mental feelings as *vipāka* would be to fall into precisely this wrong view; and, in fact, the traditional interpretation, rather than that, prefers to exclude them from *paṭiccasamuppāda*, at least as *vedanā* (see Visuddhimagga, *loc. cit.*). Unfortunately for the traditional interpretation there are Suttas (e.g. Majjhima i,9 <M.i,53>¹) that define the *paṭiccasamuppāda* item *nāmarūpa*—also traditionally taken as *vipāka*—in terms of (amongst other things) not only *vedanā* but also *cetanā*, and our Commentary is obliged to speak of a *vipākacetanā*. But the Buddha has said (Aṅguttara VI,vi,9 <A.iii,415>²) that *kamma* is *cetanā* (action is intention), and the notion of *vipākacetanā*, consequently, is a plain self-contradiction. (It needs, after all, only a moment's reflection to see that if, for example, the pleasant feeling that I experience when I indulge in lustful thoughts is the *vipāka* of some past *kamma*, then I have no present responsibility in the matter and can now do nothing about it. But I know from my own experience that this is not so; if I choose to enjoy pleasure by thinking lustful thoughts I can do so, and I can also choose [if I see good reason] to refrain from thinking such thoughts.)³

5. Let us now consider *saṅkhārā*, which we shall make no attempt to translate for the moment so as not to beg the question. We may turn to Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. i,2 <S.ii,4> for a definition of *saṅkhārā* in the context of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation.

*Katame ca bhikkhave saṅkhārā.
Tayo'me bhikkhave saṅkhārā,
kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro citta-
saṅkhāro. Ime vuccanti bhik-
khave saṅkhārā.*

And which, monks, are determinations? There are, monks, these three determinations: body-determination, speech-determination, mind-determination. These, monks, are called determinations.

But what are *kāyasaṅkhāra*, *vacīsaṅkhāra*, and *cittasaṅkhāra*? The Cūḷavedallasutta (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,301> & cf. Citta Saṃy. 6 <S.iv,293>) will tell us.

Kati pan'ayye saṅkhārā ti. Tayo'me āvuso Visākha saṅkhārā, kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro cittasaṅkhāro ti. Katamo pan'ayye kāyasaṅkhāro, katamo vacīsaṅkhāro, katamo citta-saṅkhāro ti. Assāsapassāsā kho āvuso Visākha kāyasaṅkhāro, vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro, saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro ti. Kasmā pan'ayye assāsapassāsā kāyasaṅkhāro, kasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro, kasmā saññā ca vedanā ca citta-saṅkhāro ti. Assāsapassāsā kho āvuso Visākha kāyikā, ete dhammā kāyapaṭibaddhā, tasmā assāsapassāsā kāyasaṅkhāro. Pubbe kho āvuso Visākha vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācaṃ bhindati, tasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro. Saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā, ete dhammā citta-paṭibaddhā, tasmā saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro ti.

—But, lady, how many determinations are there?—There are, friend Visākha, these three determinations: body-determination, speech-determination, mind-determination.—But which, lady, is body-determination, which is speech-determination, which is mind-determination?—The in-&-out-breaths, friend Visākha, are body-determination, thinking-&-pondering are speech-determination, perception and feeling are mind-determination.—But why, lady, are the in-&-out-breaths body-determination, why are thinking-&-pondering speech-determination, why are perception and feeling mind-determination?—The in-&-out-breaths, friend Visākha, are bodily, these things are bound up with the body; that is why the in-&-out-breaths are body-determination. First, friend Visākha, having thought and pondered, afterwards one breaks into speech; that is why thinking-&-pondering are speech-determination. Perception and feeling are mental, these things are bound up with the mind; that is why perception and feeling are mind-determination.

q. A present intention (or action) is certainly *determined*, but it is determined by a superior (or more reflexive) intention that also is present: it is, therefore, not *pre-determined*. (To be future is essentially to be under-determined. See FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.) Every voluntary (or reflexive) intention (i.e. every volition or act of will) is perpetually revocable, and every involuntary (or immediate) intention (i.e. every inclination or tendency) is voluntarily modifiable. (There is a mistaken idea, common [and convenient] enough, that our inclinations are in the nature of impulses to which we can only submit, rather as a stone passively suffers the pressure that moves it. But, far from being an imposition that must be passively suffered, an inclination is an active seeking of a still only *possible* state of affairs. Cf. 'D'ailleurs, si l'acte n'est pas pur mouvement, il doit se définir par une intention. De quelque manière que l'on considère cette intention, elle ne peut être qu'un dépassement du donné vers un résultat à obtenir. ...Lorsque les psychologues, par exemple, font de la tendance un état de fait, ils ne voient pas qu'ils lui ôtent tout caractère d'appétit [ad-petitio].'—J.-P. Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, Gallimard, Paris 1943, p. 556. ['Besides, if the act is not pure *movement*, it must be defined by an *intention*. In whatever way we may consider this intention, it can only be a passing beyond the given towards a result to be obtained. ...When the psychologists, for example, turn tendency into a state of fact, they fail to see that they are taking away from it all character of *appetite* <ad-petitio>'.]) Cf. CETANĀ [E].

Now the traditional interpretation says that *saṅkhārā* in the *paṭiccasamuppāda* context are *kamma*, being *cetanā*. Are we therefore obliged to understand in-&-out-breaths, thinking-&-pondering, and perception and feeling, respectively, as bodily, verbal, and mental *kamma* (or *cetanā*)? Is my present existence the result of my breathing in the preceding existence? Is thinking-&-pondering *verbal* action? Must we regard perception and feeling as intention, when the Suttas distinguish between them

(*Phuṭṭho bhikkhave vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti...* | (Contacted, monks, one feels; contacted, one intends; contacted, one perceives;...))

[*Salāyatana Saṃy. ix,10 <S.iv,68>*]? Certainly, *saṅkhārā* may, upon occasion, be *cetanā* (e.g. *Khandha Saṃy. vi,4 <S.iii,60>*³); but this is by no means always so. The *Cūḷavedallasutta* tells us clearly in what sense in-&-out-breaths, thinking-&-pondering, and perception and feeling, are *saṅkhārā* (i.e. in that body, speech, and mind [*citta*], are intimately connected with them, and do not occur without them); and it would do violence to the Sutta to interpret *saṅkhārā* here as *cetanā*.

6. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suppose from the foregoing that *saṅkhārā* in the *paṭiccasamuppāda* context cannot mean *cetanā*. One Sutta (*Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. vi,1 <S.ii,82>*) gives *saṅkhārā* in this context as *puññābhisāṅkhāra*, *apuññābhisāṅkhāra*, and *āneñjābhisāṅkhāra*, and it is clear enough that we must understand *saṅkhārā* here as some kind of *cetanā*. Indeed, it is upon this very Sutta that the traditional interpretation relies to justify its conception of *saṅkhārā* in the context of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation. It might be wondered how the traditional interpretation gets round the difficulty of explaining *assāsapassāsā*, *vitakkavicārā*, and *saññā* and *vedanā*, as *cetanā*, in defiance of the *Cūḷavedallasutta* passage. The answer is simple: the traditional interpretation, choosing to identify *cittasaṅkhāra* with *manosaṅkhāra*, roundly asserts (in the *Visuddhimagga*) that *kāyasaṅkhāra*, *vacīsaṅkhāra*, and *cittasaṅkhāra*, are *kāyasañcetanā*, *vacīsañcetanā*, and *manosañcetanā*,—see §16—, and altogether ignores the *Cūḷavedallasutta*. The difficulty is thus, discreetly, not permitted to arise.

7. No doubt more such specific inadequacies and inconsistencies in the traditional interpretation of *paṭiccasamuppāda* could be found, but since this is not a polemic we are not concerned to seek them out. There remains, however, a reason for dissatisfaction with the general manner of this interpretation. The Buddha has said (*Majjhima iii,8*

<M.i,191>) that he who sees the Dhamma sees *paṭiccasamuppāda*; and he has also said that the Dhamma is *sandiṭṭhika* and *akālika*, that it is immediately visible and without involving time (see in particular Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,265>). Now it is evident that the twelve items, *avijjā* to *jarāmarāṇa*, cannot, if the traditional interpretation is correct, all be seen at once; for they are spread over three successive existences. I may, for example, see present *viññāṇa* to *vedanā*, but I cannot *now* see the *kamma* of the *past* existence—*avijjā* and *saṅkhārā*—that (according to the traditional interpretation) was the cause of these present things. Or I may see *taṇhā* and so on, but I cannot *now* see the *jāti* and *jarāmarāṇa* that will result from these things in the *next* existence. And the situation is no better if it is argued that since all twelve items are present in each existence it is possible to see them all at once. It is, no doubt, true that all these things can be seen at once, but the *avijjā* and *saṅkhārā* that I *now* see are the cause (says the traditional interpretation) of *viññāṇa* to *vedanā* in the *next* existence, and have no causal connexion with the *viññāṇa* to *vedanā* that I *now* see. In other words, the relation *saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ* cannot be seen in either case. The consequence of this is that the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation (if the traditional interpretation is correct) is something that, in part at least, must be taken on trust. And even if there is memory of the past existence the situation is still unsatisfactory, since memory is not on the same level of certainty as present reflexive experience. Instead of *imass'uppādā idaṃ uppajjati, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati*, 'with arising of this this arises, with cessation of this this ceases', the traditional interpretation says, in effect, *imassa nirodhā idaṃ uppajjati*, 'with cessation of this, this arises'. It is needless to press this point further: either the reader will already have recognized that this is, for him, a valid objection to the traditional interpretation, or he will not. And if he has not already seen this as an objection, no amount of argument will open his eyes. It is a matter of one's fundamental attitude to one's own existence—is there, or is there not, a *present* problem or, rather, *anxiety* that can only be resolved in the *present*?

8. If *paṭiccasamuppāda* is *sandiṭṭhika* and *akālika* then it is clear that it can have nothing to do with *kamma* and *kammavipāka*—at least in their usual sense of ethical action and its eventual retribution (see KAMMA)—; for the ripening of *kamma* as *vipāka* takes *time*—*vipāka* always follows *kamma* after an interval and is never simultaneous with it. It will at once be evident that if an interpretation of the

paṭiccasamuppāda formulation can be found that does not involve *kamma* and *vipāka* the difficulties raised in §§3&4 will vanish; for we shall no longer be called upon to decide whether *vedanā* is, or is not, *kamma* or *vipāka*, and there will be no need for such contradictions as *vipākacetanā*. Irrespective of whether or not it is either *kamma* or *vipāka*, *vedanā* will be *paṭiccasamuppanna*. We shall also find that the apparent conflict of §§5&6 disappears; for when *saṅkhārā*, as the second item of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation, is no longer necessarily to be regarded as *kamma*, we shall be free to look for a meaning of the word *saṅkhārā* that can comfortably accommodate the *kāya-*, *vacī-*, and *citta-saṅkhārā* of the Cūḷavedallasutta, as well as the *puñña-*, *apuñña-*, and *āneñja-abhisāṅkhārā* of Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. vi,1. (We may note in passing that though *kamma* is *cetanā*—action is intention—we are in no way obliged, when we deal with *cetanā*, to think in terms of *kamma* and its eventual *vipāka*. Present *cetanā* is structurally inseparable from present *saññā* and present *vedanā*; and thoughts about the future are quite irrelevant to the present problem of suffering—

Yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhas-
min ti [Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy.
iv,2 <S.ii,53>].^r)

Whatever is felt counts as unpleas-
ure (suffering). [See *Vedanā* Saṃy.
ii,1, quoted in NIBBĀNA.]

9. It will be convenient to start at the end of the *paṭicca-*
samuppāda formulation and to discuss *jāti* and *jarāmarāṇa* first. To
begin with, *jāti* is ‘birth’ and not ‘re-birth’. ‘Re-birth’ is *punabbhavā-*
bhinibbatti, as in Majjhima v,3 <M.i,294> where it is said that future

r. The anguish of the moment when a man apprehends that he is go-
ing to die is evidence of this perpetually present *saṅkhāradukkha* (see *Vedanā*
Saṃy. ii,1, quoted in NIBBĀNA), and has to do with the changing joys and
miseries of this life only in so far as they are, in fact, *changing*.^{cf.17} It is this
anguish that makes deliberate suicide, even if it is to be painless, such a dif-
ficult enterprise. Only the *arahat* has *no* anguish in the face of death:

Nābhinandāmi maraṇaṃ
nābhinandāmi jīvitaṃ,
Kālaṃ ca paṭikaṅkhāmi
nibbisaṃ bhatako yathā;
Nābhinandāmi maraṇaṃ
nābhinandāmi jīvitaṃ,
Kālaṃ ca paṭikaṅkhāmi
sampajāno patissato.
Theragāthā vv. 606 & 607.

I delight not in death, 606
I delight not in life,
I await my time
like a hireling his wage;
I delight not in death, 607
I delight not in life,
I await my time
composed and aware.

‘birth into renewed existence’ comes of *avijjā* and *taṇhā*; and it is clear that, here, two successive existences are involved. It is, no doubt, possible for a Buddha to see the re-birth that is *at each moment* awaiting a living individual who still has *taṇhā*—the re-birth, that is to say, that is *now* awaiting the individual who *now* has *taṇhā*. If this is so, then for a Buddha the dependence of re-birth upon *taṇhā* is a matter of direct seeing, not involving time. But this is by no means always possible (if, indeed, at all) for an *ariyasāvaka*, who, though he sees *paṭiccasamuppāda* for himself, and with certainty (it is *aparapaccayā ñāṇam*), may still need to accept re-birth on the Buddha’s authority.^s In other words, an *ariyasāvaka* sees *birth* with direct vision (since *jāti* is part of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation), but does not necessarily see *re-birth* with direct vision. It is obvious, however, that *jāti* does not refer straightforwardly to the *ariyasāvaka*’s own physical birth into his present existence; for that at best could only be a memory, and it is probably not remembered at all. How, then, is *jāti* to be understood?

<p>10. <i>Upādānapaccayā bhavo; bhavapaccayā jāti; jātipaccayā jarāmaṇaṃ...</i></p>	<p>With holding as condition, being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, age-&-death...</p>
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The fundamental *upādāna* or ‘holding’ is *attavāda* (see Majjhima ii,1 <M.i,67>), which is holding a belief in ‘self’. The *puthujjana* takes what appears to be his ‘self’ at its face value; and so long as this goes on he continues to be a ‘self’, at least in his own eyes (and in those of others like him). This is *bhava* or ‘being’. The *puthujjana* knows that people are born and die; and since he thinks ‘my self exists’ so he also thinks ‘my self was born’ and ‘my self will die’. The *puthujjana* sees a ‘self’ to whom the words *birth* and *death* apply.^t In contrast to the *puthujjana*, the *arahat* has altogether got rid of *asmimāna* (not to speak of *attavāda*—see MAMA), and does not even think ‘I am’. This is *bhavanirodha*, cessation of being. And since he does not think ‘I am’ he also does not think ‘I was born’ or ‘I shall die’. In other words, he sees no ‘self’ or even ‘I’ for the words *birth* and *death* to apply to. This is *jāti-*

s. This, naturally, is not to be taken as denying the possibility of evidence for re-birth quite independent of what is said in the Suttas. (A curious view, that the Buddha was an agnostic on the question of re-birth and refused to pronounce on it, seems to be gaining currency. Even a very slight acquaintance with the Suttas will correct this idea. See e.g. Majjhima ii,2 <M.i,73-7>.)

nirodha and *jarāmarañanirodha*. (See, in Kosala Saṃy. i,3 <S.i,71>, how the words *birth* and *death* are avoided when the *arahat* is spoken of.

Atthi nu kho bhante jātassa aññatra jarāmaraṇā ti. N’atthi kho mahārāja jātassa aññatra jarāmaraṇā. Ye pi te mahārāja khattiyamahāsālā... brāhmaṇamahāsālā... gahapatimahāsālā..., tesam pi jātānaṃ n’atthi aññatra jarāmaraṇā. Ye pi te mahārāja bhikkhū arahanto khīṇāsavā..., tesam pāyaṃ kāyo bhedanadhammo nikkhepanadhammo ti.)

—For one who is born, lord, is there anything other than ageing-&-death?— For one who is born, great king, there is nothing other than ageing-&-death. Those, great king, who are wealthy warriors... wealthy divines... wealthy householders..., —for them, too, being born, there is nothing other than ageing-&-death. Those monks, great king, who are worthy ones, destroyers of the cankers..., — for them, too, it is the nature of this body to break up, to be laid down.

The *puthujjana*, taking his apparent ‘self’ at face value, does not see that he is a victim of *upādāna*; he does not see that ‘being a self’ depends upon ‘holding a belief in self’ (*upādānapaccayā bhavo*); and he does not see that birth and death depend upon his ‘being a self’ (*bhavapaccayā jāti*, and so on). The *ariyasāvaka*, on the other hand, does see these things, and he sees also their cessation (even though he may not yet have fully realized it); and his seeing of these things is direct. Quite clearly, the idea of *re-birth* is totally irrelevant here.

11. Let us now turn to the beginning of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation and consider the word *saṅkhāra*. The passage from the Cūḷavedallasutta quoted in §5 evidently uses *saṅkhāra* to mean a thing from which some other thing is inseparable—in other words, a *necessary condition*. This definition is perfectly simple and quite general, and we shall find that it is all that we need. (If a *saṅkhāra* is something upon which something else depends, we can say that the ‘something else’ is *determined* by the first thing, i.e. by the *saṅkhāra*, which is therefore a ‘determination’ or a ‘determinant’. It will be convenient to use the word *determination* when we need to translate *saṅkhāra*.)

t. While maintaining the necessary reservations (see Preface) about his views, we may observe that Heidegger, in his *Sein und Zeit* (Halle 1927, p. 374), subordinates the ideas of *birth* and *death* to that of *being*, within the unity of our existential structure. I exist, I *am*, as born; and, as born, I *am* as liable at every moment to die. (This book, in English translation [by J. Macquarrie & E. S. Robinson, *Being and Time*, SCM Press, London 1962], has only lately [1965] become available to me: I find that, where they disagree, Heidegger, as against Sartre, is generally in the right.)

12. Some discussion will be necessary if we are to see that *saṅkhāra*, whenever it occurs, always has this meaning in one form or another. We may start with the fundamental triad:

<i>Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā;</i>	All determinations are impermanent;
<i>Sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā;</i>	All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering);
<i>Sabbe dhammā anattā.</i>	All things are not-self.

(Dhammapada xx,5-7 <Dh. 277-9>) A *puthujjana* accepts what appears to be his ‘self’ at face value. When he asks himself ‘What is my self?’ he seeks to identify it in some way with one thing or another, and specifically with the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* or one of them (see Khandha Saṃy. v,5 <S.iii,46>⁴). Whatever thing (*dhamma*) he identifies as ‘self’, that thing he takes as being permanent; for if he saw it as impermanent he would not identify it as ‘self’ (see DHAMMA). Since, however, he *does* see it as permanent—more permanent, indeed, than anything else—he will think ‘*Other* things may be impermanent, but not *this* thing, which is *myself*’. In order, then, that he *shall* see it as impermanent, indirect methods are necessary: he must first see that *this* thing is dependent upon, or determined by, some *other* thing, and he must then see that this *other* thing, this determination or *saṅkhāra*, is impermanent. When he sees that the *other* thing, the *saṅkhāra* on which *this* thing depends, is impermanent, he sees that *this* thing, too, must be impermanent, and he no longer regards it as ‘self’. (See SAṅKHĀRA.) Thus, when *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā* is seen, *sabbe dhammā anattā* is seen. And similarly with *sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā*. We may therefore understand *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā* as ‘All things upon which other things (*dhammā*) depend—i.e. all determinations (*saṅkhārā*)—are impermanent’ with a tacit corollary ‘All things dependent upon other things (*saṅkhārā*)—i.e. all determined things (*saṅkhatā dhammā*)—are impermanent’. After this, *sabbe dhammā anattā*, ‘All things are not-self’, follows as a matter of course.⁴

13. Every thing (*dhamma*) must, of necessity, be (or be somehow included within) one or more of the *pañc’upādān)akkhandhā*, either generally—e.g. feeling in general, feeling as opposed to what is not feeling—or particularly—e.g. this present painful feeling as opposed to the previous pleasant feeling (present as a past feeling). In the same way, every determination (*saṅkhāra*) must also be one or more of the *pañc’upādān)akkhandhā*. Thus the *pañc’upādān)akkhandhā* can be regarded either as *saṅkhārā* or as *dhammā* according as they

are seen as ‘things-that-other-things-depend-on’ or simply as ‘things themselves’. See Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,228>. ⁵

14. *Saṅkhārā* are one of the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* (or, in the case of the *arahat*, one of the *pañcakkhandhā*—see Khandha Saṃy. v,6 <S.iii,47>). The Sutta mentioned in §5 (Khandha Saṃy. vi,4)³ says explicitly, in this context, that *saṅkhārā* are *cetanā*. If this is so, *cetanā* must be something that other things depend on. What are these things? The answer is given at once by the Khajjaniasutta (Khandha Saṃy. viii,7 <S.iii,87>⁶): they are the *pañc’(upādān)akkhandhā* themselves.^v

15. This leads us to the *puññābhisaṅkhāra*, *apuññābhisaṅkhāra*, and *āneñjābhisaṅkhāra*, of §6. These determinations are clearly *cetanā* of some kind—indeed the Sutta itself (Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. vi,1) associates the words *abhisaṅkharoti* and *abhisañcetaṃ*. A brief discussion is needed. The Sutta says:

*Avijjāgato’yaṃ bhikkhave purisa-
puggalo puññaṃ ce saṅkhāraṃ
abhisaṅkharoti, puññūpagaṃ hoti
viññāṇaṃ.*

If, monks, this individual man, who is involved in nescience, is determining a meritorious determination, consciousness has arrived at merit.

The word *puñña* is commonly associated with *kamma*, and the traditional interpretation supposes that *puññūpaga viññāṇa* is *puññakam-*

u. It may seem, upon occasion, that *saṅkhāra* and *dhamma* coincide. Thus the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* are what *attavād’upādāna* depends on, and they are therefore *saṅkhārā*. But also it is with them that *attā* is identified, and they are thus *dhammā*. This situation, however, is telescoped; for in *attavād’upādāna*, which is a complex affair, what is *primarily* (though implicitly) identified as *attā* is *upādāna*, and the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* are involved only in the second place. See PARAMATTHA SACCA §§3&4. (This, of course, is not the only way in which they are *saṅkhārā*, though §3 might give that impression. The reciprocal dependence of *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa*—with or without *upādāna*—is another. And see also what follows.) The word *upādāna* (lit. ‘taking up’) has a certain ambiguity about it. As well as ‘holding’ (seizing, grasping), which is eminently a characteristic of fire no less than of passion (the *upādāna* of *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* is *chandarāga*, ‘desire-&-lust’), the word can also mean the *fuel* of a fire (Majjhima viii,2 <M.i,487>; Avyākata Saṃy. 9 <S.iv,399-400>). The burning fuel, being held by the ‘holding’ fire, is itself the fire’s ‘holding’. The fire is burning, the fuel is burning: two aspects of the same thing.

mavipāka in the following existence. *Puñña* is certainly *kamma*, but nothing in the Sutta suggests that *puññūpaga viññāṇa* is anything other than the meritorious consciousness of one who is determining or intending merit. (When merit is intended by an individual he is con-

v. This Sutta shows that *saṅkhārā*—here *cetanā*—determine not only *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, and *viññāṇa*, but also *saṅkhārā*: *Saṅkhāre saṅkhārat-tāya saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharonti... Saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharontī ti kho bhikkhave tasmā Saṅkhārā ti vuccanti.*⁶ The question might arise whether these determinations that are determined by determinations do themselves determine (other) things or not. Are there determinations that do not, in fact, determine anything? The answer is that there cannot be. A determination is essentially *negative*—‘*Omnis determinatio est negatio*’ said Spinoza—, and a negative, a negation, only exists as a denial of something positive. The positive thing’s *existence* is asserted by the negative in the very act of denying it (just as atheism, which exists as a denial of theism, is evidence that theism exists); and its *essence* (or nature) is defined by the negative in stating what it is *not* (if we know what atheism is we shall know at once what theism is). A *negative* thus determines both the existence and the essence of a *positive*.

In what way is *cetanā* negative? A sheet of paper lying on a table is determined *as a sheet of paper* by its potentialities or possibilities—i.e. by what it is *for*. It can be used for writing on, for drawing on, for wrapping up something, for wiping up a mess, for covering another sheet, for burning, and so on. But though it *can* be used for these things, it is *not actually* being used for *any* of them. Thus these potentialities *deny* the object lying on the table as it actually is (which is why they are potentialities and not actualities); nevertheless if it were not for the fact that *these particular* potentialities are associated with the object on the table we should not see the object as a ‘sheet of paper’. These potentialities, which are *not* the object, determine it for what it is. We know what a thing is when we know what it is for. Thus these potentialities can also be understood as the *significance* or *purpose* of the object, and therefore as its *intention(s)*. (This account is necessarily restricted to the crudely utilitarian level, but will serve to give an indication.) One of these intentions, though of a special kind (present only when there is *avijjā*), is that the object is *for me*—it is *mine*, *etaṃ mama*. And all these intentions are nothing more nor less than *cetanā*. (See also CETANĀ & ΑΠΤĀ.) Determinations generally, whether they are *cetanā* or not, have two essential characteristics: (i) they are bound up with what they determine and (ii) they are *not* what they determine (or not wholly). And, of course, determinations in their turn require other determinations to determine them; which is why *saṅkhārā* are themselves *saṅkhatā*. Thus, a sheet of paper is *for* wiping up a mess, which is *for* having my room clean, which is *for* my personal comfort, which is *for* attending to my concerns, which is *for* my future comfort. Cf. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 63 *et seq.*

scious of his world as ‘world-for-doing-merit-in’, and consciousness has thus ‘arrived at merit’.) In §14 we saw that *cetanā* (or intentions) of all kinds are *saṅkhārā*, and these are no exception. As we see from the Sutta, however, they are of a particular kind; for they are not found in the *arahat*. They are intentions in which belief in ‘self’ is implicitly involved. We saw in §10 that belief in ‘self’ is the condition for birth, and that when all trace of such belief is eradicated the word *birth* no longer applies. Belief in ‘self’, in exactly the same way, is the condition for consciousness, and when it altogether ceases the word *consciousness* no longer applies. Thus, with cessation of these particular intentions there is cessation of consciousness. The *arahat*, however, still lives, and he has both intentions (or, more generally, determinations) and consciousness; but this consciousness is *niruddha*, and the intentions (or determinations) must similarly be accounted as ‘ceased’. (This matter is further discussed in §22. See also VIÑÑĀNA) *Saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ*, which means ‘so long as there are determinations there is consciousness’, is therefore also to be understood as meaning ‘so long as there are *puthujjana*’s determinations there is *puthujjana*’s consciousness’. Even though the Khajjaniyasutta (§14) tells us that determinations are so called since ‘they determine the determined’ (which includes consciousness), we must not conclude that the determinations in ‘determinations are a condition for consciousness’ (*saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ*) are determinations *because* they are a condition for consciousness: on the contrary, they are a condition for consciousness *because* they are determinations. Thus, *vitakkavicārā* determine *vacī*, which is why they are called *vacīsaṅkhāra*; and it is as a *saṅkhāra* that they are a condition for *viññāṇa*. In particular, *puññābhisāṅkhāra*, *apuññābhisāṅkhāra*, and *āneñjābhisāṅkhāra*, are *cetanā* that determine *viññāṇa* as *puññūpaga*, *apuññūpaga*, and *āneñjūpaga*, respectively. They are certain *intentions* determining certain consciousnesses. Since they *determine* something (no matter what), these intentions are *determinations* (as stated in the Khajjaniyasutta). As determinations they are a condition for *consciousness*. And as *puthujjana*’s determinations they are a condition for *puthujjana*’s consciousness (which is always *puññūpaga*, *apuññūpaga*, or *āneñjūpaga*). Exactly *why* determinations are a condition for consciousness will be discussed later.

16. There is nothing to add to what was said about *kāyasaṅkhāra*, *vacīsaṅkhāra*, and *cittasaṅkhāra*, in §5, except to note that we occa-

sionally encounter in the Suttas the terms *kāyasaṅkhāra*, *vacīsaṅkhāra*, and *manosaṅkhāra* (not *cittasaṅkhāra*). These are to be understood (see Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. iii,5 <S.ii,40>) as *kāyasañcetanā*, *vacīsañcetanā*, and *manosañcetanā*, and should not be confused with the former triad.^w Other varieties of *saṅkhārā* met with in the Suttas (e.g. *āyusaṅkhārā*, ‘what life depends on’, in Majjhima v,3 <M.i,295>), do not raise any particular difficulty. We shall henceforth take it for granted that the essential meaning of *saṅkhāra* is as defined in §11.

17. Consider now this phrase:

*Tisso imā bhikkhave vedanā aniccā
saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā...*

There are, monks, these three feelings, which are impermanent, determined, dependently arisen...

(Vedanā Saṃy. i,9 <S.iv,214>). We see in the first place that what is *saṅkhata* is *anicca*; this we already know from the discussion in §12. In the second place we see that to be *saṅkhata* and to be *paṭiccasamuppanna* are the same thing. This at once tells us the purpose of *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulations, namely to show, by the indirect method of §12, that all the items mentioned therein are impermanent, since each depends upon the preceding item. The question may now

w. So far are the expressions *cittasaṅkhāra* and *manosaṅkhāra* from being interchangeable that their respective definitions actually seem to be mutually exclusive. *Cittasaṅkhāra* is *saññā ca vedanā ca*; *manosaṅkhāra* is *manosañcetanā*; and the passage from the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta (ix,10) quoted in §5 makes an explicit distinction between *vedanā*, *cetanā*, and *saññā*. But the two expressions are really quite different in kind, and are not to be directly opposed to each other at all. (i) The *citta* of *cittasaṅkhāra* is not synonymous with the *mano* of *manosaṅkhāra*: *citta*, here, means (conscious) experience generally, whereas *mano* distinguishes *thought* from *word* and *deed*. (ii) The word *saṅkhāra* has a different sense in the two cases: in the first it means ‘determination’ in a quite general sense (§11); in the second it is a particular *kind* of determination, *viz* intention or volition. (iii) The two compounds are grammatically different: *cittasaṅkhāra* is a *dutiya* (accusative) *tappurisa*, *cittaṃ + saṅkhāro*, ‘that which determines mind (*citta*)’; *manosaṅkhāra* is a *tatiya* (instrumentive) *tappurisa*, *manasā + saṅkhāro*, ‘determination (intention or volition) by mind (*mano*)’, i.e. mental action (as opposed to verbal and bodily action)—cf. Majjhima vi,7 <M.i,389>. Clearly enough (ii) and (iii) will apply *mutatis mutandis* to the two senses of the expressions *kāyasaṅkhāra* and *vacīsaṅkhāra*.

arise, ‘What about the first item—since there is no item preceding it, is it therefore permanent?’. In several Suttas (Dīgha ii,1 <D.ii,32>; Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. vii,5 <S.ii,104>; *ibid.* vii,7 <S.ii,112-5>) the series runs back to

nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanam,
viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, and
then forward again with *nāma-*
rūpapaccayā viññāṇam.

with name-&-matter as condition, six bases; with consciousness as condition, name-&-matter; ...with name-&-matter as condition, consciousness.

This is remarked upon by the Buddha (Dīgha ii,1 & Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. vii,5) as follows:

Paccudāvattati kho idaṃ viñ-
ñāṇam nāmarūpamhā nāparam
gacchati; ettavatā jāyetha vā
jīyetha vā mīyetha vā cavetha vā
uppajjetha vā yadidaṃ nāma-
rūpapaccayā viññāṇam, viñ-
ñāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāma-
rūpapaccayā saḷāyatanam,

This consciousness turns back from name-&-matter, it does not go further; thus far may one be born or age or die or fall or arise; that is to say, with name-&-matter as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-&-matter; with name-&-matter as condition, six bases;...

and so on. In this formulation it is clear that there is no ‘first item with no item preceding it’—*nāmarūpa* depends upon *viññāṇa*, and *viññāṇa* depends upon *nāmarūpa*, each being determined by the other. If the *puthujjana* decides upon *viññāṇa* as ‘self’, he finds its permanence undermined by the impermanence of *nāmarūpa*; and if he decides upon *nāmarūpa* as ‘self’, its permanence is undermined by the impermanence of *viññāṇa*. (We may note in passing that the traditional interpretation of *nāmarūpa* as ‘mind-&-matter’—see Visuddhimagga Ch. XVIII—is quite mistaken. *Rūpa* is certainly ‘matter’ [or perhaps ‘substance’], but *nāma* is *not* ‘mind’. Further discussion is out of place here, but see NĀMA. We may, provisionally, translate as ‘name-&-matter’.)

18. Since to be *saṅkhata* and to be *paṭiccasamuppanna* are one and the same thing, we see that each item in the series of §17 is preceded by a *saṅkhāra* upon which it depends, and that therefore the total collection of items in the series depends upon the total collection of their respective *saṅkhārā*. In this sense we might say that the total collection of items is *saṅkhārapaccayā*. But since this statement means only that each and every particular item of the series depends upon a particular *saṅkhāra*, it does not say anything fresh. *Saṅkhārapaccayā*,

however, can be understood in a different way: instead of ‘dependent upon a collection of particular *saṅkhārā*’, we can take it as meaning ‘dependent upon the fact that there *are* such things as *saṅkhārā*’. In the first sense *saṅkhārapaccayā* is the equivalent of *paṭiccasamuppanna* (‘dependently arisen’), and applies to a given series as a *collection of particular items*; in the second sense *saṅkhārapaccayā* is the equivalent of *paṭiccasamuppāda* (‘dependent arising’), and applies to a given series as *the exemplification of a structural principle*. In the second sense it is true quite generally of *all* formulations of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, and not merely of *this* formulation (since any other formulation will consist of some other set of particular items). *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is, in fact, a structural principle (formally stated in the first Sutta passage at the head of this Note), and not one or another specific chain of *saṅkhārā*. It is thus an over-simplification to regard any one given formulation in particular terms as *paṭiccasamuppāda*. Every such formulation *exemplifies* the principle: none states it. Any *paṭiccasamuppāda* series, purely in virtue of its being an exemplification of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, depends upon the fact that there *are* such things as *saṅkhārā*; and *a fortiori* the series of §17 depends upon the fact of the existence of *saṅkhārā*: if there were no such things as *saṅkhārā* there would be no such thing as *paṭiccasamuppāda* at all, and therefore no such thing as this individual formulation of it.

19. But though it is an over-simplification to regard any one series as *paṭiccasamuppāda*, it is not entirely wrong. For we find a certain definite set of items (*viññāṇa*, *nāmarūpa*, *saḷāyatana*, *phassa*, and so on) recurring, with little variation (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,56>,⁹ for example, omits *saḷāyatana*), in almost every formulation of *paṭiccasamuppāda* in particular terms. The reason for this recurrence is that, though *paṭiccasamuppāda* is a structural principle, the Buddha’s Teaching is concerned with a particular problem, and therefore with a particular application of this principle. The problem is suffering and its cessation; the sphere in which this problem arises is the sphere of experience, of sentient existence or being; and the particular items, *viññāṇa*, *nāmarūpa*, and the rest, are the fundamental categories of this sphere. In consequence of this, the series, *nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ*, *viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ*, *nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ*, *saḷāyatana-paccayā phasso*, and so forth, is the fundamental exemplification of *paṭiccasamuppāda* in the Buddha’s Teaching, and the particular items are the basic *saṅkhārā*. (See KAMMA for a Sutta passage where the *paṭ-*

iccasamuppāda is exemplified on an entirely different level. Failure to understand that *paṭiccasamuppāda* is essentially a structural principle with widely different applications leads to confusion.) These particular items, then, being the fundamental categories in terms of which experience is described, are present in all experience; and this basic formulation of *paṭiccasamuppāda* tells us that they are all dependent, ultimately, upon *viññāṇa* (this is obviously so, since without consciousness there is no experience).^x But since all these items, including *viññāṇa*, are dependent upon *saṅkhārā*, the series as a whole is *saṅkhārapaccayā*. (Though this is true in both the senses discussed in §18, the first sense yields us merely a tautology, and it is only the second sense of *saṅkhārapaccayā* that interests us.) If, therefore, we wish to express this fact, all we have to say is *saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ*. Since *saṅkhārapaccayā* (in the sense that interests us) is the equivalent of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, *saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ* presumably means ‘*viññāṇa* is *paṭiccasamuppāda*’. Let us try to expand this phrase.

20. Any given experience involves *paṭiccasamuppāda*, but it may do so in a number of different ways at once, each of which cuts across the others. Thus (experience of) the body is inseparable from (experience of) breathing, and (experience of) speaking is inseparable from (experience of) thinking; and both (experience of) breathing and (experience of) thinking are therefore *saṅkhārā*. But in all experience, as its fundamental categories and basic *saṅkhārā*, there are *viññāṇa*, *nāmarūpa*, and so on. Thus whenever there is breathing (*kāya-saṅkhāra*), or thinking (*vacīsaṅkhāra*), or, of course, perception and feeling (*cittasaṅkhāra*), there are *viññāṇa*, *nāmarūpa*, and so on, which also are *saṅkhārā*. Similarly, all experience is *intentional*: it is inseparable (except for the *arahat*) from *puññābhisāṅkhāra*, *apuñ-*

x. *Viññāṇa*, being the *presence* of the phenomenon, of what is present, is negative as regards essence. Other things can be described directly by way of their positive essence as this or that, but not consciousness. Consciousness, however, is necessary before any other thing can be described; for if something is to be described it must first be present in experience (real or imaginary), and its presence is consciousness. Since consciousness can be described only as that upon which other things depend, it is the *existential determination* and nothing else. This will explain also what follows. (Note that the word *existential* is used here in the simple sense of a thing’s existence as opposed to its essence, and not in the pregnant sense of *bhava*. See VIÑÑĀṆA.)

ñābhisaṅkhāra, and *āneñjābhisaṅkhāra*. But in all experience, once again, there are *viññāṇa*, *nāmarūpa*, and so on, its fundamental categories and basic *saṅkhārā*.^y In other words, any exemplification of *paṭīccasamuppāda* in the sphere of experience can be re-stated in the form of the *fundamental* exemplification of *paṭīccasamuppāda* in the sphere of experience, which is, as it must be, that beginning with *viññāṇa*. Thus *viññāṇa* and *paṭīccasamuppāda* are one. This, then, is the meaning of *saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇam*; this is why ‘with determinations as condition there is consciousness’.

21. This discussion may perhaps have made it clear why *saṅkhārā* in the usual twelve-factored *paṭīccasamuppāda* series can include such a mixed collection of things as intentions of merit, demerit, and imperturbability, in-&-out-breaths, thinking-&-pondering, and perception and feeling. These things, one and all, are things that other things depend on, and as such are *saṅkhārā* of one kind or another; and so long as there are *saṅkhārā* of any kind at all there is *viññāṇa* and everything dependent upon *viññāṇa*, in other words there is *paṭīccasamuppāda*. (We may ignore the irrelevant exception of *āyusaṅkhāra* and *saññāvedayitanirodha*, lying outside the sphere of experience. See Majjhima v,3 <M.i,295>.) Conversely, *viññāṇa* (and therefore *paṭīccasamuppāda*) ceases to exist when *saṅkhārā* of all kinds have ceased. (It might be asked why *kāyasaṅkhāra* and the other two are singled out for special mention as *saṅkhārā*. The answer seems to be that it is in order to show progressive cessation of *saṅkhārā* in the attainment of *saññāvedayitanirodha*—see Majjhima v,4 <M.i,301> and Vedanā Saṃy. ii,1 <S.iv,216>—or, more simply, to show that so long as there is *paṭīccasamuppāda* there is body, speech, or [at least] mind.)

22. It should be borne in mind that *paṭīccasamuppāda anulomaṃ* (‘with the grain’—the *samudaya sacca*) always refers to the *puthujjana*, and *paṭilomaṃ* (‘against the grain’—the *nirodha sacca*) to the *arahat*. *Avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā* is true of the *puthujjana*, and *avijjānirodhā saṅkhāranirodho* is true of the *arahat*. This might provoke the objection that so long as the *arahat* is living he breathes, thinks-&-ponders, and perceives and feels; and consequently that cessation of

y. See also the heterogeneous series of items (*pariyesanā*, *lābha*, and so on) appearing in the middle of the *paṭīccasamuppāda* formulation of Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,58>.

avijjā does not bring about general cessation of *saṅkhārā*. It is right to say that with a living *arahat* there is still consciousness, name-&-matter, six bases, contact, and feeling, but only in a certain sense. Actually and in truth (*saccato thetato*, which incidentally has nothing to do with *paramattha sacca*, ‘truth in the highest [or absolute] sense’, a fallacious notion much used in the traditional exegesis—see PARAMATTHA SACCA) there is, even in this very life, no *arahat* to be found (e.g. *Avyākata Saṃy. 2* <S.iv,384>—see PARAMATTHA SACCA §4 [A]); and though there is certainly consciousness and so on, there is no apparent ‘self’ for whom there is consciousness.

Yena viññāṇena Tathāgataṃ paññāpayamāno paññāpeyya, taṃ viññāṇaṃ Tathāgatassa pahīnaṃ ucchinnaṃ tālāvattukataṃ anabhāvakataṃ āyatiṃ anuppāda-dhammaṃ; viññāṇasaṅkhāya vimutto kho mahārāja Tathāgato...

That consciousness by which the Tathāgata might be manifested has been eliminated by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, dug up, made non-existent, it is incapable of future arising; the Tathāgata, great king, is free from reckoning as consciousness....

(*Avyākata Saṃy. 1* <S.iv,379>). There is no longer any consciousness pointing (with feeling and the rest) to an existing ‘self’ and with which that ‘self’ might be identified. And in the *Kevaddhasutta* (*Dīgha i,11* <D.i,223>), *viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ*,^z which is the *arahat*’s ‘non-indicative consciousness’, is also *viññāṇassa nirodho*. While the *arahat* yet lives, his consciousness is *niruddha*, or ‘ceased’, for the reason that it is *ananuruddha-appaṭiviruddha* (*Majjhima ii,1* <M.i,65>). In the same way, when there is no longer any apparent ‘self’ to be contacted, contact (*phassa*) is said to have ceased:

*Phusanti phassā upadhiṃ paṭicca
Nirūpadhiṃ kena phuseyyuṃ
phassā.*

Contacts contact dependent on ground—
How should contacts contact a ground-
less one?

z. In the line

*Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ
sabbatopahaṃ,*

Non-indicative consciousness, limitless,
wholly non-originating.

the compound *sabbatopahaṃ* (in *Majjhima v,9* <M.i,329>, *sabbatopahaṃ*) is probably *sabbato* + *apahaṃ* (or *apabhaṃ*) from *apahoti*, *a* + *pahoti* (or *apabhavati* [*apabhoti*]). (Note that in the *Majjhima* passage preceding this line there is a Burmese *v.l.*, *nāpahosi* for *nāhosi*.)

(Udāna ii,4 <Ud.12> This matter has already been touched upon in §§10 & 15. (See also VIÑÑĀṆA & PHASSA.)

23. *San̄khārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ*, as we now see, can be taken to mean that any specific series of *sañkhāra-sañhatadhamma* pairs (one or more) of which the first contains *viññāṇa* is dependent upon the very fact that there are *sañkhārā* at all. *Avijjāpaccayā sañkhārā* will then mean that the very fact that there are *sañkhārā* at all is dependent upon *avijjā*; and with cessation of *avijjā*—*avijjānirodhā*—all *sañkhārā* whatsoever will cease—*sañkhāranirodho*. This is perhaps most simply stated in the lines from the Vinaya Mahāvagga:

<p><i>Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā</i> <i>Tesaṃ hetuṃ Tathāgato āha</i> <i>Tesañ ca yo nirodho</i> <i>Evamvādī mahāsamaṇo.</i></p>		<p>Of things originating with conditions, The Tathāgata has told the condition, And what their cessation is. The Great Recluse speaks thus.</p>
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Here, *Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā* are all things whatsoever that depend upon *hetū* ('conditions'—synonymous with *paccayā*). Since each of these things depends upon its respective *hetu* (as in any *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation), it shares the same fate as its *hetu*—it is present when the *hetu* is present, and absent when the *hetu* is absent. Thus the *hetu* of them taken as a whole (*all things that are hetuppabhavā*) is no different from the *hetu* of their individual *hetū* taken as a whole. When there are *hetū* at all there are *hetuppabhavā dhammā*, when there are no *hetū* there are no *hetuppabhavā dhammā*; and *hetū*, being nothing else than *sañkhārā*, have *avijjā* as condition. *Tesaṃ hetuṃ* ('their condition'), therefore, is *avijjā*. To see the Dhamma is to see *paṭiccasamuppāda* (as noted in §7), and *avijjā* is therefore *non-seeing* of *paṭiccasamuppāda*. *Avijjāpaccayā sañkhārā* will thus mean '*paṭiccasamuppāda* depends upon non-seeing of *paṭiccasamuppāda*'. Conversely, seeing of *paṭiccasamuppāda* is cessation of *avijjā*, and when *paṭiccasamuppāda* is seen it loses its condition ('non-seeing of *paṭiccasamuppāda*') and ceases. And this is cessation of all *hetuppabhavā dhammā*. Thus *tesaṃ yo nirodho* is cessation of *avijjā*.

24. We must now again ask the question of §17: 'What about the first item of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formulation—since there is no item preceding it, is it therefore permanent?'. The first item is now *avijjā*, and the Buddha himself answers the question in a Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (X,vii,1 <A.v,113>). This answer is to the effect that

avijjā depends upon not hearing and not practising the Dhamma. It is not, however, the only way of answering the question, as we may see from the *Sammādiṭṭhisutta* (*Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>*). Here we find that *avijjā* depends upon *āsavā*, and *āsavā* depend upon *avijjā*. But one of the *āsavā* is, precisely, *avijj'āsava*, which seems to indicate that *avijjā* depends upon *avijjā*.^{aa} Let us see if this is so. We know that *saṅkhārā* depend upon *avijjā*—*avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā*. But since something that something else depends upon is a *saṅkhāra*, it is evident that *avijjā* is a *saṅkhāra*. And, as before, *saṅkhārā* depend upon *avijjā*. Thus *avijjā* depends upon *avijjā*. Far from being a logical trick, this result reflects a structural feature of the first importance.^{ab} Before discussing it, however, we must note that this result leads us to expect that any condition upon which *avijjā* depends will itself involve *avijjā* implicitly or explicitly. (In terms of §23 the foregoing argument runs thus. *Avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā* may be taken as ‘with non-seeing of *paṭīccasamuppāda* as condition there is *paṭīccasamuppāda*’. But this itself is seen only when *paṭīccasamuppāda* is seen; for *paṭīccasamuppāda* cannot be seen as *paṭīccasamuppāda* before *paṭīccasamuppāda* is seen. To see *avijjā* or non-seeing, *avijjā* or non-seeing must cease. *Avijjā* therefore comes *first*; for, being its own condition, it can have no anterior term that does not itself involve *avijjā*.)

25. The faculty of *self-observation* or *reflexion* is inherent in the structure of our experience. Some degree of reflexion is almost never entirely absent in our waking life, and in the practice of mindfulness it is deliberately cultivated. To describe it simply, we may say that one part of our experience is immediately concerned with the world as its object, while at the same time another part of our experience is concerned with the immediate experience as its object. This second part we may call *reflexive* experience. (Reflexion is discussed in greater detail in *SHORTER NOTES & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE*.) It will be clear that when there is *avijjā* there is *avijjā* in *both* parts of our experience,

aa. Cf. *Avijjā kho bhikkhu eko dhammo yassa pahānā bhikkhuno avijjā pahiyati vijjā uppajjatī ti. Saḷāyatana Saṃy. viii,7 <S.iv,50>*

Nescience, monk, is the one thing with a monk's elimination of which nescience is eliminated and science arises.

ab. On the charge of ‘circularity’ that common sense may like to bring here, see Heidegger, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-6.

is divided within itself, it is still one single, even if complex, structure. The effect of this may be seen from the Sabbāsavasutta (Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>) wherein certain wrong views are spoken of. Three of them are:

<p><i>Attanā va attānaṃ sañjānāmī ti;</i> <i>Attanā va anattānaṃ sañjānāmī ti;</i> and <i>Anattanā va attānaṃ sañjānāmī ti.</i></p>	<p>With self I perceive self; With self I perceive not-self; With not-self I perceive self.</p>
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A man with *avijjā*, practising reflexion, may identify ‘self’ with both reflexive and immediate experience, or with reflexive experience alone, or with immediate experience alone. He does *not* conclude that *neither* is ‘self’, and the reason is clear: it is not possible to get outside *avijjā* by means of reflexion alone; for however much a man may ‘step back’ from himself to observe himself he cannot help taking *avijjā* with him. There is just as much *avijjā* in the self-observer as there is in the self-observed. (See CETANĀ [B].) And this is the very reason why *avijjā* is so stable in spite of its being *saṅkhatā*.^{ac} Simply by reflexion the *puthujjana* can never observe *avijjā* and at the same time *recognize* it as *avijjā*; for in reflexion *avijjā* is the Judge as well as the Accused, and the verdict is always ‘Not Guilty’. In order to put an end to *avijjā*, which is a matter of recognizing *avijjā* as *avijjā*, it is necessary to accept on trust from the Buddha a Teaching that contradicts the direct evidence of the *puthujjana*’s reflexion. This is why the Dhamma is *paṭisotaḡāmī* (Majjhima iii,6 <M.i,168>), or ‘going *against* the stream’. The Dhamma gives the *puthujjana* the *outside* view of *avijjā*, which is inherently unobtainable for him by unaided reflexion (in the *ariyasāvaka* this view has, as it were, ‘taken’ like a graft, and is perpetually available). Thus it will be seen that *avijjā* in reflexive experience (actual or potential) is the condition for *avijjā* in immediate experi-

ac. The Aṅguttara Sutta (X,vii,1) referred to in §24 begins thus:

*Purimā bhikkhave koṭi na pañ-
ñāyati avijjāya, Ito pubbe avijjā
nāhosi, atha pacchā sambhavī
ti. Evañ ce taṃ bhikkhave vuccati,
atha ca pana paññāyati, Ida-
paccayā avijjā ti. Avijjaṃ p’ahaṃ
bhikkhave sāhāraṃ vadāmi, no
anāhāraṃ.*

An earliest point of nescience, monks, is not manifest: ‘Before this, nescience was not; then afterwards it came into being’. Even if that is said thus, monks, nevertheless it is manifest: ‘With this as condition, nescience’. I say, monks, that nescience, too, is with sustenance, not without sustenance.

(In the P.T.S. edition, for *c’etaṃ* read *ce taṃ* and adjust punctuation.)

ence. It is possible, also, to take a second step back and reflect upon reflexion; but there is still *avijjā* in this self-observation of self-observation, and we have a third layer of *avijjā* protecting the first two. And there is no reason in theory why we should stop here; but however far we go we shall not get beyond *avijjā*. The hierarchy of *avijjā* can also be seen from the Suttas in the following way.

Katamā pan'āvuso avijjā...

*Yaṃ kho āvuso dukkhe aññāṇaṃ,
dukkhasamudaye aññāṇaṃ,
dukkhanirodhe aññāṇaṃ,
dukkhanirodhagāminīpaṭipadāya aññāṇaṃ,
ayaṃ vuccat'āvuso avijjā.*

(Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>)

Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ...

Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ...

Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ...

Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodhagāminīpaṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ.

*Ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo,
seyyathīdaṃ sammādiṭṭhi...*

Katamā ca bhikkhave sammādiṭṭhi...

*Yaṃ kho bhikkhave dukkhe ñāṇaṃ,
dukkhasamudaye ñāṇaṃ,
dukkhanirodhe ñāṇaṃ,
dukkhanirodhagāminīpaṭipadāya ñāṇaṃ,
ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave sammādiṭṭhi.*

(Dīgha ii,9 <D.ii,305-12>)

But which, friends, is nescience?...

That which is non-knowledge of suffering,
non-knowledge of arising of suffering,
non-knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
non-knowledge of the way that leads to
ceasing of suffering,
this, friends, is called nescience.

And which, monks, is the noble truth of suffering...

And which, monks, is the noble truth of arising of suffering...

And which, monks, is the noble truth of ceasing of suffering...

And which, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to
ceasing of suffering?

Just this noble eight-factored path,
that is to say: right view...

And which, monks, is right view?...

That which is knowledge of suffering,
knowledge of arising of suffering,
knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
knowledge of the way that leads to
ceasing of suffering,
this, monks, is called right view.

Avijjā is non-knowledge of the four noble truths. *Sammādiṭṭhi* is knowledge of the four noble truths. But *sammādiṭṭhi* is part of the four noble truths. Thus *avijjā* is non-knowledge of *sammādiṭṭhi*; that is to say, non-knowledge **of knowledge** of the four noble truths. But since *sammādiṭṭhi*, which is knowledge of the four noble truths, is part of the four noble truths, so *avijjā* is non-knowledge **of knowledge of knowledge** of the four noble truths. And so we can go on indefinitely. But the point to be noted is that each of these successive stages represents an additional layer of (potentially) reflexive *avijjā*. Non-knowledge **of knowledge** of the four noble truths is non-knowledge of *vijjā*, and non-knowledge of *vijjā* is failure to recognize *avijjā* as *avijjā*. Conversely, it is evident that when *avijjā* is once recognized anywhere in this structure it must vanish everywhere; for knowledge of the four noble truths entails knowledge **of knowledge** of the four noble truths, and *vijjā* ('science') replaces *avijjā* ('nescience') throughout.^{ad}

ad. Compare also the following:

Rūpā [Saddā... Dhammā] *loke piyarūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ, etth'esā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati ettha nivisamānā nivisati...* *Rūpataṇhā* [Saddataṇhā... Dhammataṇhā] *loke piyarūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ, etth'esā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati ettha nivisamānā nivisati.*

Visible forms [Sounds... Images (Ideas)] are dear and agreeable in the world; herein this craving arises, herein it adheres...
Craving-for-visible-forms [Craving-for-sounds... Craving-for-images (-ideas)] is dear and agreeable in the world; herein this craving arises, herein it adheres.

And the converse:


...etth'esā taṇhā pahīyamānā pahīyati ettha nirujjhamānā nirujjhati.

...herein this craving is eliminated, herein it ceases.

Dīgha ii,9 <D.ii,308-11>

Not only is there craving, but there is craving for craving as a condition for craving: indifference to craving destroys it. (*Taṇhā*, be it noted, is not the coarse hankering after what we do *not* have [which is *abhijjhā* or covetousness], but the subtle craving for *more* of what we have. In particular, I *am* because I *crave to be*, and with cessation of craving-for-being [*bhavataṇhā*, which is itself dependent on *avijjā* and, like it, without first beginning—Aṅguttara X,vii,2 <A.v,116>], 'I am' ceases. *Bhavataṇhā*, in fact, is the craving for more craving on which craving depends.)

2. PARAMATTHA SACCA



ÑĀṄAVĪRA THERA AT THE ISLAND HERMITAGE,
WITH EYES CLOSED.

1. In Bhikkhunī Saṃyutta 10 <S.i,135> we find these verses.

Māro pāpimā:

Kenāyaṃ pakato satto, kuvaṃ sattassa kārako, 1
Kuvaṃ satto samuppanno, kuvaṃ satto nirujjhatī ti. 2

Vajirā bhikkhunī:

Kin nu Sattoti paccesi, Māra, ditṭhigataṃ nu te, 3
Suddhasaṅkhārapuñño'yaṃ, nayidha sattūpalabbhati; 4
Yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo Ratho iti, 5
Evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti Satto ti sammuti. 6
Dukkham eva hi sambhoti, dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca, 7
Nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti, nāññaṃ dukkhā nirujjhatī ti. 8

Māra the Evil One:

By whom is this creature formed? Who is the creature's maker? 1
Who is the arisen creature? Who is the creature that ceases? 2

Vajirā the nun:

Why do you refer to 'the creature', Māra, are you involved in 3
(wrong) view?
This is a pile of pure determinations; there is, here, no 4
creature to be found.
Just as for an assemblage of parts there is the term 5
'a chariot',
So, when there are the aggregates, convention says 6
'a creature'.
It is merely suffering that comes into being, suffering that 7
stands and disappears,
Nothing apart from suffering comes into being, nothing other 8
than suffering ceases.

Let us consider them in some detail.

2. The speculative questions in the first two lines are of the same order as those of the *assutavā puthujjana* in the Sabbāsavasutta (Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>) ending with:

*Etarahi vā paccuppannam addhānaṃ
ajjhataṃ kathaṃkathī hoti Ahan nu
kho'smi, no nu kho'smi, kin nu kho'smi,
kathan nu kho'smi, ayan nu kho satto
kuti āgato, so kuhiṃgāmī bhavissatī ti.*

Or he is a self-questioner about the present period: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This creature—whence has it come? Whither is it bound?'

The word *satta* is found in both, and clearly with the same meaning. The *puthujjana* is speculating about himself, and *satta* in this context is himself considered, with a certain detachment, as a creature; it is a creature regarded, in one way or another, as a ‘self’; for the *puthujjana* takes what appears to be his ‘self’ at face value—he regards himself as a ‘self’ (see *ATTĀ*). It is the *puthujjana*’s concept of a creature. The third line (the first of the reply to Māra) confirms this; for Māra is asked, a little rhetorically perhaps, why he refers to ‘the creature’, why he has this involvement in (wrong) view. ‘The creature’ is an involvement in (wrong) view, *diṭṭhigata*, precisely when the creature is regarded in some way as ‘self’; for this is *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* or ‘personality-view’, the view that *one is, in essence, somebody* (see *SAKKĀYA*). And the following passage:

Kim pana tvaṃ Poṭṭhapāda attānaṃ pacesī ti. Oḷārikaṃ kho aham bhante attānaṃ pacceṃi... Manomayaṃ kho aham bhante attānaṃ pacceṃi... Arūpiṃ kho aham bhante attānaṃ pacceṃi...

—But to what self, Poṭṭhapāda, do you refer?—To a coarse self, lord, I refer... To a made-of-mind self, lord, I refer... To an immaterial self, lord, I refer...

(*Dīgha* i,9 <D.i,185>) allows us to understand *Satto ti pacesi*, reference to ‘the creature’, in exactly the same way, namely, the taking of the creature as ‘self’.

3. *Suddhasaṅkhārapuñjo’yaṃ* follows at once; for if the regarding of the creature as ‘self’ is *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, then the creature so regarded is *sakkāya*, which is the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* (*Majjhima* v,4 <M.i,299>). And the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* are *saṅkhārā* if they are what something else depends upon. What depends upon them?

Na kho āvuso Visākha taññeva upādānaṃ te pañc’upādānakkhandhā, na pi aññatra pañcah’upādānakkhandhehi upādānaṃ. Yo kho āvuso Visākha pañcas’upādānakkhandhesu chandarāgo taṃ tattha upādānan ti.

The five holding aggregates, friend Visākha, are not just holding; but neither is there holding apart from the five holding aggregates. That, friend Visākha, in the five holding aggregates which is desire-&-lust, that therein is holding.

(*Majjhima* v,4 <M.i,299>) *Upādāna*, therefore, depends upon the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* (as we may also see from the usual *paṭicca-samuppāda* formulation). And the fundamental *upādāna* is *attavāda*,

belief in 'self'. (See A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §§10, 12, & 13.) Compare also Khandha Saṃy. ix,1 <S.iii,105>:

Rūpaṃ upādāya Asmī ti hoti no anupādāya; vedanaṃ...; saññaṃ...; saṅkhāre...; viññānaṃ upādāya Asmī ti hoti no anupādāya.)

Holding matter there is '(I) am', not not holding; holding feeling...; holding perception...; holding determinations...; holding consciousness there is '(I) am', not not holding.

4. *Nayidha sattūpalabbhati* now presents no difficulty. The *puthujjana* takes his apparent 'self' at face value and identifies it with the creature: the creature, for him, is 'self'—*Satto ti pacceṭi*. He does not see, however, that this identification is dependent upon his holding a belief in 'self', *attavād'upādāna*, and that this, too, is *anicca saṅkhata paṭicasamuppanna*; for were he to see it, *upādāna* would vanish, and the deception would become clear—

Evam eva kho Māgandiya ahañ c'eva te dhammaṃ deseyyaṃ, Idan taṃ ārogyaṃ idan taṃ nibbāna ti, so tvaṃ ārogyaṃ jāneyyāsi nibbānaṃ passeyyāsi, tassa te saha cakkhuppādā yo pañcas'upādāna-kkhandhesu chandarāgo so pahīyetha; api ca te evam assa, Dīgharattaṃ vata bho ahaṃ iminā cittena nikato vañcito paladdho; ahaṃ hi rūpaṃ yeva upādiyamāno upādiyim, vedanaṃ yeva..., saññaṃ yeva..., saṅkhāre yeva..., viññānaṃ yeva upādiyamāno upādiyim.

Just so, Māgandiya, if I were to set you forth the Teaching, 'This is that good health, this is that extinction', you might know good health, you might see extinction; with the arising of the eye, that in the five holding aggregates which is desire-&-lust would be eliminated for you; moreover it would occur to you, 'For a long time, indeed, have I been cheated and deceived and defrauded by this mind (or heart—*citta*): I was holding just matter, holding just feeling, holding just perception, holding just determinations, holding just consciousness'.

(Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,511>). With the vanishing of belief in 'self' the identification would cease. The *ariyasāvaka*, on the other hand, sees the creature as *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*; he sees that *upādāna* is dependent upon these *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*; and he sees that the *puthujjana* is a victim of *upādāna* and is making a mistaken identification. He sees that since the creature is *pañc'upādānakkhandhā* it cannot in any way be identified as 'self'; for if it could, 'self' would be impermanent, determined, dependently arisen; and the *ariyasāvaka* knows direct from his own experience, as the *puthujjana* does not, that perception of selfhood, of an inherent *mastery* over things, and

perception of impermanence are incompatible. Thus *nayidha sattūpalabbhati*, ‘there is, here, no “creature” to be found’, means simply ‘there is, in this pile of pure determinations, no creature to be found such as conceived by the *puthujjana*, as a “self”’. The Alagaddūpamasutta (Majjhima iii,2 <M.i,138>) has

<i>Attani ca bhikkhave attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne...</i>	Since both self, monks, and what belongs to self actually and in truth are not to be found...
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and the meaning is no different. The words *saccato thetato*, ‘in truth, actually’, mean ‘in the (right) view of the *ariyasāvaka*, who sees *paṭīcasamuppāda* and its cessation’.^{ae}

5. The next two lines (5 & 6) contain the simile of the chariot. Just as the word ‘chariot’ is the name given to an assemblage of parts, so when the *khandhā* are present common usage speaks of a ‘creature’. What is the purpose of this simile? In view of what has been said above the answer is not difficult. The *assutavā puthujjana* sees clearly enough that a chariot is an assemblage of parts: what he does *not* see is that the creature is an assemblage of *khandhā* (*suddhasaṅkhārapuñja*), and this for the reason that he regards it as ‘self’. For the *puthujjana* the creature exists as a ‘self’ exists, that is to say, as an extra-temporal monolithic whole (‘self’ could never be either a thing of parts or part of a thing).^{af} The simile shows him his mistake by pointing out that a creature exists as a chariot exists, that is to say, as a temporal complex of parts. When he sees this he no longer regards

ae. The question discussed here, whether *saccato thetato* a ‘self’ is to be found, must be kept clearly distinct from another question, discussed in A NOTE ON PAṬĪCASAMUPPĀDA §22, viz whether *saccato thetato* the Tathāgata (or an *arahat*) is to be found

<i>(diṭṭh’eva dhamme saccato thetato Tathāgate anupalabbhamāne...</i>	since here and now the Tathāgata actually and in truth is not to be found...
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Avyākata Saṃy. 2 <S.iv,384>). The reason why the Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is *rūpa-*, *vedanā-*, *saññā-*, *saṅkhāra-*, and *viññāṇa-saṅkhāya vimutto* (*ibid.* 1 <S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling, perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely *not* the case with the *puthujjana*, who, *in this sense*, actually and in truth is to be found.

af. Cf. ‘La nature même de notre être répugne à ce qui a des parties et des successions.’—J. Grenier, *Absolu et Choix*, P.U.F., Paris 1961, p. 44. (‘What has parts and successions is repugnant to the very nature of our being.’)

the creature as ‘self’, and, with the giving up of *sakkāyadit̥ṭhi*, he ceases to be a *puthujjana*.

6. The final two lines (7 & 8) may be discussed briefly. It is in the nature of the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* to press for recognition, in one way or another, as ‘self’; but the *ariyasāvaka*, with his perception of impermanence, can no longer heed their persistent solicitation; for a mastery over things (which is what selfhood would claim to be; cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> & Khandha Saṃy. vi,7 <S.iii,66> 7)—a mastery over things that is seen to be undermined by impermanence is at once also seen to be no mastery at all, but a false security, for ever ending in betrayal. And this is *dukkha*. (See DHAMMA.) Thus, when *attavād’upādāna* has been removed, there supervenes the right view that it is only *dukkha* that arises and *dukkha* that ceases.

Upāy’upādānābhinivesavinibaddho khvāyaṃ Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena; tañ cāyaṃ upāy’upādānaṃ cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusayaṃ na upeti na upādiyati nādhiṭṭhāti, Attā me ti. Dukkhaṃ eva uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati, dukkhaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ nirujjhatī ti na kañkhati na vicikicchati, aparapaccayā ñāṇaṃ ev’assa ettha hoti. Ettāvatā kho Kaccāyana sammādit̥ṭhi hoti.

This world for the most part, Kaccāyana, is bound by engaging, holding, and adherence; and this one [i.e. this individual] does not engage or hold or resolve that engaging or holding, that mental resolving adherence and tendency: ‘My self’. ‘It is just suffering that arises, suffering that ceases’—about this he does not hesitate or doubt, his knowledge herein is independent of others. So far, Kaccāyana, is there right view.

Nidāna / Abhisamaya Saṃy. ii,5 <S.ii,17>

7. The question now arises whether the word *satta*, which we have been translating as ‘creature’, can be used to denote an *arahat*. Once it is clear that, in a right view, nothing is to be found that can be identified as ‘self’, the application of the word *satta* becomes a question of usage. Is *satta* simply *pañc’upādānakkhandhā*—in which case it is equivalent to *sakkāya*—, or can it be applied also to *pañcakkhandhā*, as the sixth line might seem to suggest? If the latter, then (at least as applied to deities and human beings) it is equivalent to *puggala*, which is certainly used in the Suttas to refer to an *arahat* (who is the first of the *aṭṭhapurisapuggalā*),^{ag} and which can be understood in the

ag. The *dit̥ṭhisampanna* (or *sotāpanna*) is the *sattama puggala* or ‘seventh individual’. Aṅguttara VI,v,12 <A.iii,373>

obvious sense of one set of *pañcakkhandhā* as distinct from all other sets—an *arahat* is an ‘individual’ in the sense that one *arahat* can be distinguished from another. It is not a matter of great importance to settle this question (which is simply a matter of finding Sutta passages—e.g. Khandha Saṃy. iii,7 <S.iii,30>; Rādha Saṃy. 2 <S.iii,190>; Aṅguttara V,iv,2 <A.iii,35>—that illustrate and fix the actual usage of the word). It is of infinitely more importance to understand that the *puthujjana* will misapprehend *any* word of this nature that is used (*attā*, ‘self’; *bhūta*, ‘being’; *pāṇa*, ‘animal’; *sakkāya*, ‘person, somebody’; *purisa*, ‘man’; *manussa*, ‘human being’; and so on), and that the *ariyasāvaka* will not.



8. It is quite possible that the notion of *paramattha sacca*, ‘truth in the highest, or ultimate, or absolute, sense’ was in existence before the time of the Milindapañha; but its use there (Pt. II, Ch. 1) is so clear and unambiguous that that book is the obvious point of departure for any discussion about it. The passage quotes the two lines (5 & 6) containing the simile of the chariot. They are used to justify the following argument. The word ‘chariot’ is the conventional name given to an assemblage of parts; but if each part is examined individually it cannot be said of any one of them that it is the chariot, nor do we find any chariot in the parts collectively, nor do we find any chariot outside the parts. Therefore, ‘in the highest sense’, *there exists no chariot*. Similarly, an ‘individual’ (the word *puggala* is used) is merely a conventional name given to an assemblage of parts (parts of the body, as well as *khandhā*), and, ‘in the highest sense’, *there exists no individual*. That is all.

9. Let us first consider the validity of the argument. If a chariot is taken to pieces, and a man is then shown the pieces one by one, each time with the question ‘Is this a chariot?’, it is obvious that he will always say no. And if these pieces are gathered together in a heap, and he is shown the heap, then also he will say that there is no chariot. If, finally, he is asked whether apart from these pieces he sees any chariot, he will still say no. But suppose now that he is shown these pieces assembled together in such a way that the assemblage can be used for conveying a man from place to place; when he is asked he will undoubtedly assert that there *is* a chariot, that the chariot *exists*.

According to the argument, the man was speaking in the *conventional* sense when he asserted the existence of the chariot, and in the *highest* sense when he denied it. But, clearly enough, the man (who has had no training in such subtleties) is using ordinary conventional language throughout; and the reason for the difference between his two statements is to be found in the fact that on one occasion he was shown a chariot and on the others he was not. If a chariot is taken to pieces (even in imagination) it ceases to be a chariot; for a chariot is, precisely, a vehicle, and a heap of components is *not* a vehicle—it is a heap of components. (If the man is shown the heap of components and asked ‘Is this a heap of components?’, he will say yes.) In other words, a chariot is most certainly an assemblage of parts, but it is an assemblage of parts *in a particular functional arrangement*, and to alter this arrangement is to destroy the chariot. It is no great wonder that a chariot cannot be found if we have taken the precaution of destroying it before starting to look for it. If a man sees a chariot in working order and says ‘In the highest sense there is no chariot; for it is a mere assemblage of parts’, all he is saying is ‘It is possible to take this chariot to pieces and to gather them in a heap; and when this is done there will no longer be a chariot’. The argument, then, does not show the non-existence of the chariot; at best it merely asserts that an existing chariot can be destroyed. And when it is applied to an individual (i.e. a set of *pañcakkhandhā*) it is even less valid; for not only does it *not* show the non-existence of the individual, but since the functional arrangement of the *pañcakkhandhā* cannot be altered, even in imagination, it asserts an impossibility, that an existing individual can be destroyed. As applied to an individual (or a creature) the argument runs into contradiction; and to say of an individual ‘In the highest sense there is no individual; for it is a mere assemblage of *khandhā*’ is to be unintelligible.

10. What, now, is the reason for this argument? Why has this notion of ‘truth in the highest sense’ been invented? We find the clue in the Visuddhimagga. This work (Ch. XVIII) quotes the last four lines (5, 6, 7, & 8) and then repeats in essence the argument of the Milindapañha, using the word *satta* as well as *puggala*. It goes on, however, to make clear what was only implicit in the Milindapañha, namely that the purpose of the argument is to remove the conceit ‘(I) am’ (*asmimāna*): if it is seen that ‘in the highest sense’, *paramatthato*, no creature exists, there will be no ground for conceiving that *I* exist. This allows us to understand why the argument was felt to be necessary. The *assutavā*

puthujjana identifies himself with the individual or the creature, which he proceeds to regard as 'self'. He learns, however, that the Buddha has said that 'actually and in truth neither self nor what belongs to self are to be found' (see the second Sutta passage in §4). Since he cannot conceive of the individual except in terms of 'self', he finds that in order to abolish 'self' he must abolish the individual; and he does it by this device. But the device, as we have seen, abolishes nothing. It is noteworthy that the passage in the *Milindapañha* makes no mention at all of 'self': the identification of 'self' with the individual is so much taken for granted that once it is established that 'in the highest sense there is no individual' no further discussion is thought to be necessary. Not the least of the dangers of the facile and fallacious notion 'truth in the highest sense' is its power to lull the unreflecting mind into a false sense of security. The unwary thinker comes to believe that he understands what, in fact, he does not understand, and thereby effectively blocks his own progress.

3. SHORTER NOTES



ÑĀṄAVĪRA THERA RELEASING A TARANTULA

Atakkāvacara

Sometimes translated as ‘unattainable by reasoning’ or ‘not accessible to doubt’. But the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* is also, in a sense, inaccessible to doubt; for I cannot doubt my existence without tacitly assuming it. This merely shows, however, that one cannot get beyond the *cogito* by doubting it. And the Dhamma is beyond the *cogito*. The *cogito*, then, can be reached by doubt—one doubts and doubts until one finds what one cannot doubt, what is inaccessible to doubt, namely the *cogito*. But the Dhamma cannot be reached in this way. Thus the Dhamma, though certainly inaccessible to doubt, is more than that; it is altogether beyond the sphere of doubt. The rationalist, however, does not even reach the inadequate *cogito*, or if he does reach it^a he overshoots the mark (*atidhāvati*—Itivuttaka II,ii,12 <Iti. 43>); for he starts from the axiom that everything can be doubted (including, of course, the *cogito*). Cf. also Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,232-3> & i,2 <M.i,8>. See NIBBĀNA.

a. When he is being professional, the rationalist will not allow that what is inaccessible to doubt is even intelligible, and he does not permit himself to consider the *cogito*; but in his unprofessional moments, when the personal problem becomes insistent, he exorcizes the *cogito* by supposing that it is a rational proposition, which enables him to doubt it, and then to deny it. ‘*Les positivistes ne font qu’exorciser le spectre de l’Absolu, qui reparait cependant toujours et vient les troubler dans leur repos.*’—J. Grenier, *op. cit.*, p. 44. (‘The positivists do nothing but exorcize the spectre of the Absolute, which however always reappears and comes to trouble them in their sleep.’) For Grenier, the Absolute is not (as with Bradley) the totality of experiences, but is to be reached at the very heart of personality by a thought transcending the relativity of all things, perceiving therein a void (pp. 100-1). Precisely—and what, ultimately, is this Absolute but *avijjā*, self-dependent and without first beginning? And what, therefore, does the Buddha teach but that this Absolute is *not* absolute, that it can be brought to an end? See A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §§24 & 25.

Attā

In the *arahat*'s reflexion what appears reflexively is only *pañcakkhandhā*, which he calls 'myself' simply for want of any other term. But in the *puthujjana*'s reflexion what appears reflexively is *pañc'upādānakkhandhā*, or *sakkāya*; and *sakkāya* (q.v.), when it appears reflexively, appears (in one way or another) as being and belonging to an extra-temporal changeless 'self' (i.e. a soul). The *puthujjana* confuses (as the *arahat* does not) the *self*-identity of simple reflexion—as with a mirror, where the *same* thing is seen from two points of view at once ('the thing itself', 'the selfsame thing')—with the 'self' as the *subject* that appears in reflexion—'my self' (i.e. 'I itself', i.e. 'the *I* that appears when *I* reflect'). For the *puthujjana* the word *self* is necessarily ambiguous, since he cannot conceive of any reflexion not involving reflexive experience of the subject—i.e. not involving manifestation of a soul. Since the *self* of self-identity is involved in the structure of the subject appearing in reflexion ('my self' = 'I itself'), it is sometimes taken (when recourse is not had to a supposed Transcendental Being) as the basic principle of all subjectivity. The subject is then conceived as a hypostasized play of reflexions of one kind or another, the hypostasis itself somehow deriving from (or being motivated by) the play of reflexions. The *puthujjana*, however, does not see that attainment of *arahattā* removes all trace of the desire or conceit '(I) am', leaving the entire reflexive structure intact—in other words, that subjectivity is a parasite on experience. Indeed, it is by his very failure to see this that he remains a *puthujjana*.

The question of *self-identity* arises *either* when a thing is seen from two points of view at once (as in reflexion,^b for example; or when it is at the same time the object of two different senses—I am now both looking at my pen and touching it with my fingers, and I might wonder if it is the *same* pen in the two simultaneous experiences [see RŪPA]), *or* when a thing is seen to *endure* in time, when the

b. In immediate experience the thing is present; in reflexive experience the thing is again present, but as implicit in a more general thing. Thus in reflexion the thing is *twice* present, once immediately and once reflexively. This is true of reflexion both in the loose sense (as reflection or discursive thinking) and *a fortiori* in the stricter sense (for the reason that reflection involves reflexion, though not *vice versa*). See MANO and also VIÑÑĀNA [D].

question may be asked if it continues to be the *same* thing (the answer being, that a thing at any one given level of generality is the *invariant of a transformation*—see ANICCA [A] & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE—, and that ‘to remain the same’ *means* just this).^c With the question of a thing’s self-identity (which presents no particular difficulty) the Buddha’s Teaching of *anattā* has nothing whatsoever to do: *anattā* is purely concerned with ‘self’ as *subject*. (See PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C].)

‘Self’ as *subject* can be briefly discussed as follows. As pointed out in PHASSA [B], the *puthujjana* thinks ‘things are *mine* (i.e. are my concern) because I am, because I exist’. He takes the subject (‘I’) for granted; and if things are appropriated, that is because *he*, the subject, exists. The *ditṭhisampanna* (or *sotāpanna*) sees, however, that this is the wrong way round. He sees that the notion ‘I am’ arises *because* things (so long as there is any trace of *avijjā*) present themselves as ‘mine’. This significance (or intention, or determination), ‘mine’ or ‘for me’—see A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [E]—, is, in a sense, a *void*, a *negative* aspect of the present thing (or existing phenomenon), since it simply *points to a subject*; and the *puthujjana*, not seeing impermanence (or more specifically, not seeing the impermanence of this ubiquitous determination), deceives himself into supposing that there actually exists a subject—‘self’—independent of the object (which latter, as the *ditṭhisampanna* well understands, is merely the *positive* aspect of the phenomenon—that which is ‘for me’). In this way it may be seen that the *puthujjana*’s experience, *pañc’upādānakkhandhā*, has a *negative* aspect (the subject) and a *positive* aspect (the object). But care is needed; for, in fact, the division subject/object is not a simple negative/positive division. If it were, only the positive would be present (as an existing phenomenon) and the negative (the subject) would not be present *at all*—it would simply not exist. But the subject is, in a sense, phenomenal: it (or he) is an existing phenomenal negative, a *negative that appears*; for the *puthujjana* asserts the present reality of his ‘self’ (‘the irreplaceable being that I am’). The fact is, that the intention or determination ‘mine’, pointing to a subject, is a complex structure involving *avijjā*. The subject is not simply a negative in relation to the positive object: it (or he) is *master* over the object, and

c. ‘It takes two to make the same, and the least we can have is some change of event in a self-same thing, or the return to that thing from some suggested difference.’—F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, Oxford (1883) 1958, I,v,§1.

is thus a kind of positive negative, a master who does not appear explicitly but who, somehow or other, nevertheless *exists*.^d It is this master whom the *puthujjana*, when he engages in reflexion, is seeking to identify—in vain!^e This delusive mastery of subject over object must be rigorously distinguished from the *reflexive* power of control or choice that is exercised in voluntary action by *puthujjana* and *arahat* alike.

For a discussion of *sabbe dhammā anattā* see DHAMMA.

d. With the exception of consciousness (which cannot be directly qualified—see VIÑÑĀNA [C])—every determination has a positive as well as a negative aspect: it is positive in so far as it *is* in itself something, and negative in so far as it is *not* what it determines. This is evident enough in the case of a thing's potentialities, which are given as images (or absents) together with the real (or present) thing. But the positive negativity of the subject, which is what concerns us here, is by no means such a simple affair: the subject presents itself (or himself), at the same time, as certainly more elusive, and yet as no less *real*, than the object. Images are present as absent (or negative) reality, but *as images* (or images of images) they are present, or real. Also, being plural, they are more elusive, individually, than reality, which is singular (see NĀMA). The imaginary, therefore, in any given part of it, combines reality with elusiveness; and it is thus easily supposed that what is imaginary is subjective and what is real is objective. But imagination survives the disappearance of subjectivity (*asmimāna, asmī ti chanda*):

Samvijjati kho āvuso Bhagavato mano, vijānāti Bhagavā manasā dhammaṃ, chandarāgo Bhagavato n'atthi, suvimuttacitto Bhagavā.
Saḷāyatana Saṃy. xviii,5
<S.iv.164>

The Auspicious One, friend, possesses a mind (*mano*); the Auspicious One cognizes images (ideas) with the mind; desire-&-lust for the Auspicious One there is not; the Auspicious One is wholly freed in heart (*citta*). (Cf. Saḷāyatana Saṃy. xviii,5, quoted at PHASSA [D].)

The elusiveness of images is not at all the same as the elusiveness of the subject. (It is in this sense that science, in claiming to deal only with reality, calls itself objective.)

e. 'I urge the following dilemma. If your Ego has no content, it is nothing, and it therefore is not experienced; but if on the other hand it is anything, it is a phenomenon in time.'—F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, Oxford (1893) 1962, Ch. XXIII.

Aniccatā or ‘impermanence’, in the Buddha’s Teaching, is sometimes taken as a ‘doctrine of universal flux’, or continuous change of condition. This is a disastrous over-simplification—see PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C].

In the Khandha Saṃyutta (iv,6 <S.iii,38>) it is said of *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhārā*, and *viññāṇa*:^f

*uppādo paññāyati; vayo
paññāyati; ṭhitassa aññā-
thattaṃ paññāyati.*^f

Arising (appearance) is manifest; disappearance is manifest; change while standing is manifest. (Cf. Aṅguttara III,v,7, at the head of FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.)

f. Cf. ‘La “chose” existe d’un seul jet, comme “forme” [Gestalt], c’est-à-dire comme un tout qui n’est affecté par aucune des variations superficielles et parasitaires que nous pouvons y voir. Chaque ceci se dévoile avec une loi d’être qui détermine son seuil, c’est-à-dire le niveau de changement où il cessera d’être ce qu’il est pour n’être plus, simplement.’—J.-P. Sartre, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-7. (‘The “thing” exists all at once, as a “configuration”, that is to say as a whole that is unaffected by any of the superficial and parasitic variations that we may see there. Each *this* is revealed with a law of being that determines its *threshold*, that is to say the level of change where it will cease to be what it is, in order, simply, to be no more.’ [The occurrence of the word *parasitic* both here and in (c) below is coincidental: two different things are referred to. Should we not, in any case, prefer the single word *subordinate* to *superficial and parasitic*?])

The third characteristic, *ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ*, occurs as ‘Invariance under Transformation’ (or similar expressions, e.g. ‘Unity in Diversity’ or ‘Identity in Difference’) in idealist logic (Bradley) and in relativity and quantum theories. The branch of mathematics that deals with it is the theory of groups.

This third characteristic answers the question *What?*—i.e. ‘Is this the same thing that was, or is it another?’ (see ATTĀ)—: it does *not*, as the argument *Na ca so na ca añño* in the Milindapañha mistakenly implies, answer the question *Who?* If the answer were quite as simple as that, it would not take a Buddha to discover it—a Bradley would almost do. In other words, the question of impermanence is not *simply* that of establishing these three characteristics. See NA CA SO for a discussion of the illegitimacy of the question *Who?* (It is perhaps being over-charitable to the Milinda to associate its argument with the three *saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni*: the Milinda is probably thinking in terms of flux or continuous change. Bradley, while accepting the principle of identity on the *ideal* level, does not reject a *real* continuous change: we may possibly not be wrong in attributing some such view to the Milinda in its interpretation of the Dhamma. See PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C].)

These three *saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni* (Aṅguttara III,v,7 <A.i,152>), or characteristics whereby what is determined (i.e. a *saṅkhata dhamma*) may be known as such (i.e. as *saṅkhata*), concisely indicate the fundamental structure in virtue of which things are *things*—in virtue of which, that is to say, things are distinct, one from another. It is also in virtue of this structure that all experience, including the *arahat*'s, is intentional (see CETANĀ) or teleological (i.e. that things are *significant*, that they point to other, possible, things—e.g. a *hammer* is a thing for hammering, and what it is for hammering is *nails*; or, more subtly, a particular shade of a particular colour is just *that* shade by pointing to all the other distinct shades that it *might* be, while yet remaining the same colour, but actually is *not* [cf. Spinoza's dictum 'Omnis determinatio est negatio']).^g The *arahat*'s experience, as stated above, is teleological, as is the *puthujjana*'s; but with the *arahat* things no longer have the particular significance of being 'mine'. This special significance, dependent upon *avijjā*, is not of the same kind as a thing's simple intentional or teleological significances, but is, as it were, a parasite upon them. Detailed consideration of this structure and its implications seems to lead to the solution of a great many philosophical problems, but these are no more than indirectly relevant to the understanding of the Buddha's Teaching.^h Some people, however, may find that a description of this structure provides a useful instrument for thinking with. (See FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.)

For a discussion of *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā* see DHAMMA.

g. McTaggart, in *The Nature of Existence* (Cambridge 1921-7, §§149-54), remarks that philosophers have usually taken the expressions 'organic unity' and 'inner teleology' as synonymous (the aspect of *unity* becoming the *end* in the terminology of the latter conception), and that they distinguish 'inner teleology' from 'external teleology', which is what we normally call volition. Without discussing McTaggart's views, we may note that the distinction between 'inner' and 'external' teleology is simply the distinction between immediate and reflexive intention. *Every* situation is an organic unity, whether it is a cube or bankruptcy we are faced with.

h. Some description of the complex parasitic structure of appropriateness, of being mastered or in subjection ('mine'—see PHASSA), seems not impossible; but it is evidently of much less practical consequence to make such a description—supposing, that is to say, that it could actually be done—than to see how it *might* be made. For if one sees this (it would appear to be a matter of describing the peculiar weightage—see CETANĀ—of the special unitary intention 'mine', *superposed* on all other weightage, immediate or reflexive), then one *already* has seen that appropriatedness is in fact a parasite.

Verses 651, 652, and 653, of the Suttanipāta are as follows:

651 *Kassako kammanā hoti, sippiko hoti kammanā,
vāṇiḥo kammanā hoti, pessiko hoti kammanā.*

652 *Coro pi kammanā hoti, yodhājīvo pi kammanā,
yājako kammanā hoti, rājā pi hoti kammanā.*

653 *Evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ kammaṃ passanti paṇḍitā
paṭṭicasamuppādasā kammavipākakovidā.*

651 By action is one a farmer, by action a craftsman,
By action is one a merchant, by action a servant,

652 By action is one a thief, by action a soldier,
By action is one a priest, by action a king.

653 In this way the wise see action as it really is,
Seeing dependent arising, understanding result of action.

Verse 653 is sometimes isolated from its context and used to justify the ‘three-life’ interpretation of the twelve-factored formulation of *paṭṭicasamuppāda* as *kamma/kammavipāka*—*kamma/kammavipāka*, an interpretation that is wholly inadmissible (see PAṬṬICASAMUPPĀDA and A NOTE ON PAṬṬICASAMUPPĀDA). When the verse is restored to its context the meaning is clear: *kammaṃ paṭṭicca kassako hoti, sippiko hoti*, and so on; in other words, what one is *depends* on what one does. And the *result* (*vipāka*) of *acting* in a certain way is that one is known accordingly. For *vipāka* used in this sense see Aṅguttara VI,vi,9 <A. iii,413>:

*Vohāravepakkāhaṃ bhikkhave
saññā vadāmi; yathā yathā
naṃ sañjānāti tathā tathā
voharati, Evaṃ saññī aho sin ti.
Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave
saññānaṃ vipāko.*

Perceptions, monks, I say result in description; according as one perceives such-and-such, so one describes: ‘I was perceptive thus’. This, monks, is called the result of perceptions.

(For the usual meaning of *kammavipāka* as the more or less delayed retribution for ethically significant actions, see e.g. Aṅguttara III,iv,4 <A.i,134-6> [The P.T.S. numbering has gone astray here].)

The question of *kamma* or ‘action’—‘What should I do?’—is the *ethical* question; for all personal action—all action done by *me*—is either *akusala* or *kusala*, unskilful or skilful. Unskilful action is rooted in *lobha* (*rāga*), *dosa*, *moha*, or lust, hate, and delusion, and (apart

from resulting in future *dukkha* or unpleasure) leads to arising of action, not to cessation of action—

taṃ kammaṃ kammasamudayaṃ saṃvattati na taṃ kammaṃ kammanirodhāya saṃvattati.

That action leads to arising of action, that action does not lead to ceasing of action.

Skilful action is rooted in non-lust, non-hate, and non-delusion, and leads to cessation of action, not to arising of action. (Aṅguttara III,xi,7&8 <A.i,263>) The *puthujjana* does not understand this, since he sees neither arising nor cessation of action;ⁱ the *diṭṭhisampanna*

i. A *puthujjana* may adopt a set of moral values for any of a number of different reasons—faith in a teacher, acceptance of traditional or established values, personal philosophical views, and so on—, but in the last analysis the necessity of moral values, however much he may feel their need, is not for him a matter of self-evidence. At the end of his book (*op. cit.*, p. 111) Jean Grenier writes: ‘*En fait toutes les attitudes que nous avons passées en revue au sujet du choix ne se résignent à l’absence de vérité que par désespoir de l’atteindre et par suite des nécessités de l’action. Elles n’aboutissent toutes qu’à des morales provisoires. Un choix, au sens plein du mot, un “vrai” choix n’est possible que s’il y a ouverture de l’homme à la vérité; sinon il n’y a que des compromis de toutes sortes: les plus nobles sont aussi les plus modestes.*’ (‘In fact all the attitudes we have passed in review on the subject of choice are resigned to the absence of truth only out of despair of attaining it and as a consequence of the necessities of action. They end up, all of them, only at provisional moralities. A choice, in the full sense of the word, a “real” choice is possible only if man has access to the truth; if not there are only compromises of all kinds: the noblest are also the most modest.’) And Sartre, more bleakly, concludes (*op. cit.*, p. 76) that man is bound by his nature to adopt values of one sort or another, and that, although he cannot escape this task of choosing, he himself is totally responsible for his choice (for there is no Divine Dictator of values), and there is absolutely nothing in his nature that can justify him in adopting this particular value or set of values rather than that. The *puthujjana* sees neither a task to be performed that can justify his existence—not even, in the last analysis, that of perpetual reflexion (Heidegger’s *Entschlossenheit* or ‘resoluteness’, acceptance of the guilt of existing; which does no more than make the best of a bad job)—nor a way to bring his unjustifiable existence to an end. The *ariyasāvaka*, on the other hand, does see the way to bring his existence to an end, and he sees that it is this very task that justifies his existence.

Ariyaṃ kho ahaṃ brāhmaṇa lokutaraṃ dhammaṃ purisassa sandhanaṃ paññāpemi.

Majjhima x,6 <M.ii,181>

I, divine, make known the noble world-transcending Teaching as the business of man.

does understand this, since he sees both arising and cessation of action—

Yato kho āvuso ariyasāvako akusalañ ca pajānāti akusalamūlañ ca pajānāti, kusalañ ca pajānāti kusalamūlañ ca pajānāti, ettāvata pi kho āvuso ariyasāvako sammādiṭṭhi hoti ujugatā'ssa diṭṭhi, dhamme aveccappasādena samannāgato, āgato imaṃ saddhammaṃ

In so far, friend, as a noble disciple understands unskill and understands the root of unskill, understands skill and understands the root of skill, so far too, friend, the noble disciple has right view, his view is correct, he is endowed with tried confidence in the Teaching, he has arrived at this Good Teaching.

(Majjhima i,9 <M.i,46>)—; the *arahat* not only understands this, but also has reached cessation of action, since for him the question ‘What should I do?’ no more arises. To the extent that there is still intention in the case of the *arahat*—see CETANĀ [F]—there is still conscious action, but since it is neither unskilful nor skilful it is no longer action in the ethical sense. Extinction, *nibbāna*, is cessation of ethics—

Kullūpamaṃ vo bhikkhave ājānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā

Comprehending the parable of the raft, monks, you have to eliminate ethical things too, let alone unethical things.

(Majjhima iii,2 <M.i,135>).^j See MAMA [A].

For a brief account of action see NĀMA; for a definition see RŪPA [B].

j. Hegel, it seems, in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, has said that there can only be an ethical consciousness in so far as there is disagreement between nature and ethics: if ethical behaviour became natural, conscience would disappear. And from this it follows that if ethical action is the absolute aim, the absolute aim must also be the absence of ethical action. This is quite right; but is ethical action the absolute aim? The difficulty is, precisely, to see the action that puts an end to action in the ethical sense. Whereas unskilful action is absolutely blameworthy as leading only to future unpleasure and to the arising of action, there is action, leading to a bright future, that yet does not lead to the ending of action. See Majjhima vi,7 <M.i,387-92>. The generous man, the virtuous man, the man even who purifies his mind in *samādhi*, without right view remains a *puthujjana*, and so does not escape reproach:

Yo kho Sāriputta imaṃ ca kāyaṃ nikkhipati aññañ ca kāyaṃ upādīyati taṃ ahaṃ Sa-upavajjo ti vadāmi. Majjhima xv,2 <M.iii,266>

One who lays down this body, Sāriputta, and takes hold of another body, he I say is blameworthy.

Citta

Cittavīthi, ‘mental process, cognitive series’. Visuddhimagga, Ch. XIV etc. It is, perhaps, not superfluous to remark that this doctrine, of which so much use is made in the Visuddhimagga (and see also the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha), is a pure scholastic invention and has nothing at all to do with the Buddha’s Teaching (or, indeed, with anything else). It is, moreover, a vicious doctrine, totally at variance with *paṭīccasamuppāda*, setting forth the arising of experience as a succession of items each coming to an end before the next appears (*imassa nirodhā idaṃ uppajjati*—cf. A NOTE ON PAṬĪCCASAMUPPĀDA §7). The decay first seems to set in with the Vibhaṅga and Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. (See SAÑÑĀ, and refer to *The Path of Purification* [Visuddhimagga translation by the Ven. Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu], Semage, Colombo 1956, Ch. IV, note 13.)

Connected with this doctrine is the erroneous notion of *anuloma-gotrabhu-magga-phala*, supposed to be the successive moments in the attainment of *sotāpatti*. It is sometimes thought that the word *akālika* as applied to the Dhamma means that attainment of *magga* is followed ‘without interval of time’ by attainment of *phala*; but this is quite mistaken.^k *Akālika dhamma* has an entirely different meaning (for which see PAṬĪCCASAMUPPĀDA). Then, in the Okkantika Saṃyutta <S.iii,225> it is stated only that the *dhammānusārī* and the *saddhānusārī* (who have reached the *magga* leading to *sotāpatti*) are bound to attain *sotāpattiphala* before their death; and other Suttas—e.g. Majjhima vii,5&10 <M.i,439&479>—show clearly that one is *dhammānusārī* or *saddhānusārī* for more than ‘one moment’. For *gotrabhu* see Majjhima xiv,12 <M.iii,256>, where it says that he may be *dussīla pāpadhamma*. In Sutta usage it probably means no more than ‘a member of the *bhikkhusaṅgha*’. For *anuloma* see SAKKĀYA [B].

See NĀMA [C] and the Glossary for meanings of *citta*. For *cittasaṅkhāra* as opposed to *manosaṅkhāra* see A NOTE ON PAṬĪCCASAMUPPĀDA §§5 & 16.

Cetanā

See first, ANICCA, NĀMA, & A NOTE ON PAṬĪCCASAMUPPĀDA [F]. *Cetanā*, properly speaking, is ‘intentional intention’—i.e. ‘will’ or

‘volition’—, but the word *intention*, in its normal looser meaning, will include these, and is the best translation for *cetanā*. The following passage from Husserl’s article ‘Phenomenology’ in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* may throw some light on a stricter or more philosophical sense of the word.

But before determining the question of an unlimited psychology, we must be sure of the characteristics of psychological experience and the psychical data it provides. We turn naturally to our immediate experiences. But we cannot discover the psychical in any experience, except by a ‘reflexion,’ or perversion of the ordinary attitude. We are accustomed to concentrate upon the matters, thoughts, and values of the moment, and not upon the psychical ‘act of experience’ in which these are apprehended. This ‘act’ is revealed by a ‘reflexion’; and a reflexion can be practised on every experience.¹ Instead of the matters themselves, the values, goals, utilities, etc., we regard the subjective^m experiences in which these ‘appear’. These ‘appearances’ are phenomena, whose nature is to be a ‘consciousness-of’ their object, real or unreal as it be. Common language catches this sense of ‘relativity’, saying, I was thinking *of* something, I was frightened *of*

k. The notion of two successive ‘moments’, A and B, as *akālika* or non-temporal is a confusion. Either A and B are *simultaneous* (as e.g. *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa*), in which case they are indeed *akālika*; or B follows A and they are *successive* (as e.g. the in-&-out-breaths), in which case they are *kālika*. Even if there is no interval of time between the ending of A and the beginning of B, it remains true that B comes *after* A, and *time* is still involved. The source of the confusion is in the contradictory idea of a moment as the smallest possible interval of time—i.e. as *absolute* shortness of time—, and therefore as *no* time. Two *successive* moments are, thus, also *no* time: $0 + 0 = 0$. This is nothing but a mystification: it is like the notion of ‘absolute smallness of size’ in quantum theory (Dirac, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4), introduced to compensate for other philosophically unjustifiable assumptions made elsewhere. (Quantum theory, of course, being an elaborate and ingenious rule of thumb, does not require philosophical justification; but *ipso facto* it provides no foundation for philosophy.) To the idea of a ‘moment’ as the shortest *empirically* observable interval of time there is no objection; but this merely marks the threshold below which changes are too small and rapid to be clearly apprehended as discontinuous and are grasped irrationally and ambiguously as a *flux*. What it does *not* mark is the boundary between *kālika* and *akālika*. See PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C]. A different approach to this whole question is outlined in FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.

something, etc. Phenomenological psychology takes its name from the ‘phenomena’, with the psychological aspect of which it is concerned: and the word ‘intentional’ has been borrowed from the scholastic to denote the essential ‘reference’ character of the phenomena. All consciousness is ‘intentional’.

In unreflective consciousness we are ‘directed’ upon objects, we ‘intend’ them; and reflection reveals this to be an immanent process characteristic of all experience, though infinitely varied in form. To be conscious of something is no empty having of that something in consciousness. Each phenomenon has its own intentional structure, which analysis shows to be an ever-widening system of individually intentional and intentionally related components. The perception of a cube, for example, reveals a multiple and synthesized intention:¹¹ a continuous vari-

1. Cf. ‘Now by phenomenology Peirce means a method of examining any experience you please with a view to abstracting from it its most general and, as he claims, its absolutely necessary characteristics.’—W. B. Gallie, *Peirce and Pragmatism*, Penguin (Pelican) Books, London. The word ‘abstracting’ is unfortunate—see MANO [B]. For more on ‘reflexion’ see DHAMMA [B] & ATTĀ [A].

m. Later in the same article Husserl speaks of the ‘bare subjectivity of consciousness’, thereby indicating that he identifies consciousness, in one way or another, with ‘self’. He evidently accepts the *subject* revealed in reflexion (see ATTĀ) at face value, and regards it as consciousness (though for other *puthujjanā* it may be, instead, matter (substance) or feeling or perception or determinations or, in some way, all five—see Khandha Saṃy. v,5 <S.iii,46> [4]). See VIÑÑĀṆA. This extract has to be taken with considerable reserve: Husserl’s doctrine is not acceptable in detail.

Husserl goes on to make the following remarks. “The “I” and “we,” which we apprehend presuppose a hidden “I” and “we” to whom they are “present”. ...But though the transcendental “I” [i.e. the reflexive “I” to whom the immediate “I” is revealed] is not my psychological “I,” [i.e. the immediate “I” apprehended in reflexion] it must not be considered as if it were a second “I,” for it is no more separated from my psychological “I” in the conventional sense of separation, than it is joined to it in the conventional sense of being joined.’ Husserl seems to be aware that, taken in isolation, no single one of the trio of wrong views of the Sabbāsavasutta on the nature of reflexion—see A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §25—is adequate; but, also, he is unable to escape from them. So, by means of this ingenious verbal device, he attempts to combine them—and succeeds in falling, very elegantly, between three stools.

ety in the ‘appearance’ of the cube, according to the differences in the points of view from which it is seen, and corresponding differences in ‘perspective’, and all the differences between the ‘front side’ actually seen at the moment and the ‘back side’ which is not seen, and which remains, therefore, relatively ‘indeterminate’, and yet is supposed equally to be existent. Observation of this ‘stream’ of ‘appearance-aspects’ [Sartre suggests ‘profiles’] and of the manner of their synthesis, shows that every phase and interval is already in itself a ‘consciousness-of’ something, yet in such a way that with the constant entry of new phases the total consciousness, at any moment, lacks not synthetic unity, and is, in fact, a consciousness of one and the same object. The intentional structure of the train of a perception must conform to a certain type, if any physical object is to be perceived as there! And if the same object be intuited in other modes, if it be imagined, or remembered, or copied, all its intentional forms recur, though modified in character from what they were in the perception to correspond to their new modes. The same is true of every kind of psychical experience. Judgement, valuation, pursuit,— these also are no empty experiences, having in consciousness of judgements, values, goals and means, but are likewise experiences compounded of an intentional stream, each conforming to its own fast type.

Intentions may be regarded basically as the relation between the *actual* and the *possible*. A thing always presents itself from a particular point of view; there is an actual aspect together with a number of possible aspects.^o The set of relations between the actual aspect and all the alternative aspects is the same, no matter which one of the various aspects should happen to be actual. It is in virtue of this that a thing remains the same, as the point of view changes. Intentions are the *significance of the actual aspect*; they are *every possible aspect*, and there-

n. Bertrand Russell seems to say (*Mysticism and Logic*, Penguin (Pelican) Books, London, VIIIth Essay) that a cube (or whatever it may be) is an *inference*, that all possible appearances of a cube are *inferred* from any single appearance. But this supposes that inference, which is a matter of logic or thinking (*takka, vitakka*), is fundamental and irreducible. Husserl, however, says that a cube is an *intention*. Note that *vitakka* does not go beyond first *jhāna*, whereas *cetanā* is present up to *ākiñcaññāyatana* (Majjhima xii,1 <M.iii, 25-9>).

fore the thing-as-a-whole. In intentional intention the possible aspects show themselves as possible, and the actual aspect, consequently, appears as *optional*. There is now exercise of *preference* (with the pleasant preferred to the unpleasant),^p and this is volition in its simplest form. There is no limit, however, to the degree of reflexive complexity that may be involved—every reflexive attitude is itself optional. It will be seen that intentions by themselves are a purely structural affair, a matter of negatives; and when the question is asked, ‘What are the intentions *upon this occasion?*’ the answer will be in the positive terms of *nāmarūpa* and *viññāṇa*.^q We must also consider the matter of the difference of emphasis or ‘weight’ possessed by the various possible aspects: though each alternative to the actual aspect is *possible*, they are not all equally *probable* (or *potential*), and some stand out more prominently than others. The emphasized aspect may, of course, be the actual aspect as the negative of all the possible

o. It seems that, at the first level of complexity, the actual aspect is *necessarily* accompanied by precisely *three* possible aspects (like a tetrahedron presenting any given face). For details see FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE I. Cf. Bradley’s acute observation (*op. cit.* [Logic], I,iv,§§13 & 14) that, in disjunctive judgement, where it is given that A is *b* or *c* (not both), though we can say with the certainty of knowledge that if A is *b* it is not *c*, we can say that if A is not *c* then it is *b* only if we make the assumption that, because we do not find a predicate of A that excludes *b* or *c* [i.e. *b-or-c*], therefore there is none. It now turns out that we do find such predicates and that the disjunction must be fourfold: if A is *b* or *c* it must be *b* or *c* or *d* or *e*. No doubt the only evident example is the three-dimensional nature of geometrical space, which can be represented by four points (the vertices of a tetrahedron), any one of which can be taken as the point of origin to the exclusion of the other three (which remain *possible*). (These mathematical illustrations are treacherous; they make things appear simpler than they are, and contain self-contradictions—‘points’, for example—; and the picture must be abandoned before it is allowed to mislead.)

p. This does not mean that what is preferred will necessarily be obtained; for each aspect, actual or possible, is presented with its own arbitrary inertia at the most immediate level of experience. Reflexive intention can only *modify* the *given* state of affairs. (Strictly, [there is] an arbitrary ‘weightage’ *prior* to (i.e. below) immediate intention; this is ‘discovered’ in a perspective by consciousness and immediate (involuntary) intention is a modification of it (and of that perspective); then reflexive intention is a modification of all this.) But, other things being equal, the pleasant dominates the unpleasant (‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ being understood here in their widest possible sense).

aspects; and this will tend to preserve the actual state of affairs. This is ‘attention’ (*manasikāra*) in its simplest terms: it may be described as ‘direction of emphasis’. Clearly, there will be no intentional intention that does not involve attention. (A thing—a lump of iron, say—has many possible purposes; and these determine it for what it is; they are its intentions. But when the lump is to be used, one among these purposes must be attended to at the expense of the others—it cannot be used both for driving a nail into the wall and as a paper-weight at the same time.) And, naturally, where there is attention there is intentional intention (i.e. *cetanā*); and there is no consciousness without at least incipient attention. (I have taken attention as essentially reflexive, but it might be argued that there is already immediate attention as the perspective of immediate intention.)

Dhamma

The word *dhamma*, in its most general sense, is equivalent to ‘thing’—i.e. whatever is distinct from anything else (see ANICCA). More precisely it is *what* a thing is in itself, as opposed to *how* it is;^r it is the *essence* or *nature* of a thing—that is, a thing *as* a particular essence or nature distinct from all other essences or natures. Thus, if a thing is a *solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I now see*, its nature is, precisely, that it is *solid*, that it is *pleasant*, that it is *shady*, that it is a *tree for lying under*, and that it is *visible to me*. The solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see *is* a thing, a nature, a

q. Though there is intention (*cetanā*), both simple and reflexive (i.e. volition), in the *arahat*’s experience (*pañcakkhandhā*), there is no craving (*taṇhā*). In other words, there is, and there is not, intention with the *arahat*, just as there is, and there is not, consciousness (*viññāṇa*—q.v.). There is no consciousness without intention. Craving, however, is a gratuitous (though beginningless) parasite on the intentional structure described here, and its necessity is not to be deduced from the necessity of intention in all experience. Intention does *not* imply craving—a hard thing to understand! But if intention did imply craving, *arahattā* would be out of the question, and there would be no escape.

r. *How* a thing is, is a matter of structure, that is to say, of intentions (*cetanā*) or determinations (*saṅkhārā*). See CETANĀ. These are essentially negative, whereas *dhamma* is positive.

dhamma. Furthermore, each item severally—the solidity, the pleasantness, the shadiness, and so on—is a thing, a nature, a *dhamma*, in that each is distinct from the others, even though here they may not be independent of one another. These *dhammā*, in the immediate experience, are all *particular*. When, however, the *reflexive*^s attitude is adopted (as it is in *satisampajañña*, the normal state of one practising the Dhamma), the particular nature—the solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see—is, as it were, ‘put in brackets’ (Husserl’s expression, though not quite his meaning of it), and we arrive at the *nature* of the particular nature. Instead of *solid, pleasant, shady, tree for lying under, visible to me*, and so on, we have *matter (or substance), feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness*, and all the various ‘things’ that the Suttas speak of. These things are of *universal* application—i.e. common to *all* particular natures (e.g. *eye-consciousness* is common to all things that have ever been, or are, or will be, *visible to me*)—and are the *dhammā* that make up the Dhamma. The Dhamma is thus the Nature of Things. And since this is what the Buddha teaches, it comes to mean also the Teaching, and *dhammā* are particular teachings. The word *matter*—‘I will bear this matter in mind’—sometimes expresses the meaning of *dhamma* (though it will not do as a normal rendering).

s. This word is neither quite right nor quite wrong, but it is as good as any. See CETANĀ, MANO, and ATTĀ, and also FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE (where, in Part I, the possibility of reflexion is shown to be structurally justified). The possibility of reflexion depends upon the fact that all experience (the five *khandhā* or aggregates) is hierarchically ordered in different levels of generality (or particularity), going to infinity in both directions. This supports another hierarchy, as it were ‘at right angles’ to the original hierarchy. In *immediacy*, attention rests on the world. This requires no effort. In *reflexion*, attention moves back one step from the world in this second hierarchy. It does not, however, move back spontaneously: it requires to be pulled back by an intention that embraces both the ground level and the first step. This pulling back of attention is reflexive intention. A *deliberate* entering upon reflexion requires a further reflexive intention; for deliberate intention is intention to intend (or volition). *Double* attention is involved. But though, in immediacy, attention rests at ground level, the entire reflexive hierarchy remains ‘potential’ (it is *there*, but not *attended to*), and immediacy is always under *potential reflexive observation* (i.e. it is *seen* but not *noticed*). Another way of saying this is that the ‘potential’ reflexive hierarchy—which we might call *pre-reflexive*—is a hierarchy of *consciousness* (*viññāṇa*), not of *awareness* (*sampajañña*). For awareness, reflexive intention is necessary.

Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā;
Sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā;

All determinations are impermanent;
All determinations are unpleasurable
(suffering);

Sabbe dhammā anattā.

All things are not-self.

Attā, ‘self’, is fundamentally a notion of *mastery over things* (cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> & Khandha Saṃy. vi,7 <S.iii,66>7). But this notion is entertained only if it is pleasurable,^t and it is only pleasurable provided the mastery is assumed to be permanent; for a mastery—which is essentially a kind of absolute timelessness, an *unmoved* moving of things—that is undermined by impermanence is no mastery at all, but a mockery. Thus the regarding of a thing, a *dhamma*, as *attā* or ‘self’ can survive for only so long as the notion gives pleasure, and it only gives pleasure for so long as that *dhamma* can be considered as permanent (for the regarding of a thing as ‘self’ endows it with the illusion of a kind of super-stability in time). In itself, as a *dhamma* regarded as *attā*, its impermanence is not manifest

t. This notion is pleasurable only if it is itself taken as permanent (it is *my* notion); thus it does not escape *saṅkhāradukkha*. But unless this notion is brought to an end there is no escape from *saṅkhāradukkha*. The linchpin is carried by the wheel as it turns; but so long as it carries the linchpin the wheel will turn. (That ‘self’ is spoken of here as a *notion* should not mislead the reader into supposing that a purely abstract idea, based upon faulty reasoning, is what is referred to. The *puthujjana* does not by any means experience his ‘self’ as an abstraction, and this because it is not *rationaly* that notions of subjectivity are bound up with nescience (*avijjā*), but *affectively*. Reason comes in (when it comes in at all) only in the second place, to make what it can of a *fait accompli*.)

Avijjāsamphassajena bhikkhave
vedayitena phutṭhassa assuta-
vato puthujjanassa, Asmī ti pi’ssa
hoti, Ayaṃ ahaṃ asmī ti pi’ssa
hoti, Bhavissan ti pi’ssa hoti,...

To the uninstructed commoner, monks, contacted by feeling born of nescience-contact, it occurs ‘(I) am’, it occurs ‘It is this that I am’, it occurs ‘I shall be’,...

Khandha Saṃy. v,5 <S.iii,46>. And in Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,66-8> it is in relation to feeling that the possible ways of regarding ‘self’ are discussed:

Vedanā me attā ti; Na h’eva kho
me vedanā attā, appaṭisaṃvedano
me attā ti; Na h’eva kho me
vedanā attā, no pi appaṭisaṃ-
vedano me attā, attā me vediyati
vedanādhammo hi me attā ti.

My self is feeling; My self is not in fact feeling, my self is devoid of feeling; My self is not in fact feeling, but neither is my self devoid of feeling, my self feels, to feel is the nature of my self.

(for it is pleasant to consider it as permanent); but when it is seen to be dependent upon *other dhammā* not considered to be permanent, its impermanence does then become manifest. To see impermanence in what is regarded as *attā*, one must emerge from the confines of the individual *dhamma* itself and see that *it depends on what is impermanent*. Thus *sabbe saṅkhārā* (not *dhammā*) *aniccā* is said, meaning ‘All things that things (*dhammā*) depend on are impermanent’. A given *dhamma*, as a *dhamma* regarded as *attā*, is, on account of being so regarded, considered to be pleasant; but when it is seen to be dependent upon some other *dhamma* that, not being regarded as *attā*, is manifestly unpleasurable (owing to the invariable false perception of permanence, of super-stability, in one not free from *asmimāna*), then its own unpleasurableness becomes manifest. Thus *sabbe saṅkhārā* (not *dhammā*) *dukkhā* is said. When this is seen—i.e. when perception of permanence and pleasure is understood to be false—, the notion ‘This *dhamma* is my *attā*’ comes to an end, and is replaced by *sabbe dhammā anattā*. Note that it is the *sotāpanna* who, knowing and seeing that his perception of permanence and pleasure is false, is free from this notion of ‘self’, though not from the more subtle conceit ‘(I am)’ (*asmimāna*);^u but it is only the *arahat* who is entirely free from the (false) perception of permanence and pleasure, and ‘for him’ perception of impermanence is no longer unpleasurable. (See also A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §12 & PARAMATTHA SACCA.)

Na Ca So

Na ca so na ca añño, ‘Neither he nor another’. This often-quoted dictum occurs in the Milindapañha somewhere, as the answer to the question ‘When a man dies, who is reborn—he or another?’. This

u. *Manifest* impermanence and unpleasurableness at a coarse level does not exclude (false) perception of permanence and pleasure at a fine level (indeed, manifest unpleasurableness *requires* false perception of permanence, as remarked above [this refers, of course, only to *saṅkhāradukkha*]). But the coarse notion of ‘self’ must be removed before the subtle conceit ‘(I am)’ can go. What is not regarded as ‘self’ is more manifestly impermanent and unpleasurable (and, of course, not-‘self’) than what is so regarded. Therefore the indirect approach to *dhammā* by way of *saṅkhārā*. *Avijjā* cannot be pulled out like a nail: it must be unscrewed. See MAMA & SAṅKHĀRA.

question is quite illegitimate, and any attempt to answer it cannot be less so. The question, in asking *who* is reborn, falls into *sakkāyadit̥ṭhi*. It takes for granted the validity of the person as ‘self’; for it is only about ‘self’ that this question—‘Eternal (*so*) or perishable (*añño*)?’—can be asked (cf. PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA, ANICCA [A], & SAKKĀYA). The answer also takes this ‘self’ for granted, since it allows that the question can be asked. It merely denies that this ‘self’ (which must be either eternal or perishable) is either eternal or perishable, thus making confusion worse confounded. *The proper way is to reject the question in the first place.* Compare Aṅguttara VI,ix,10 <A.iii,440>, where it is said that the *dit̥ṭhisampanna* not only can *not* hold that the author of pleasure and pain was *somebody* (either himself or another) but also can *not* hold that the author was *not somebody* (neither himself nor another). The *dit̥ṭhisampanna* sees the *present* person (*sakkāya*) as arisen dependent upon *present* conditions and as ceasing with the cessation of these *present* conditions. And, seeing this, he does not regard the *present* person as *present* ‘self’. Consequently, he does not ask the question *Who?* about the present. By inference—

atītānāgate nayaṃ netvā | having induced the principle to past and future

(cf. Gāmini Saṃy. 11 <S.iv,328>^v—he does not regard the *past* or *future* person as *past* or *future* ‘self’, and does not ask the question *Who?* about the past or the future. (Cf. Māra’s question in line 2 of PARAMATTHA SACCA §1.)

(The Milindapañha is a particularly misleading book. See also ANICCA [A], PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C], RŪPA [E], & PARAMATTHA SACCA §§8-10.)

Nāma

In any experience (leaving out of account *arūpa*) there is a *phenomenon* that is *present* (i.e. that is cognized). The presence, or cognition, or consciousness, of the phenomenon is *viññāṇa* (q.v.). The

v. *Dhamm’anvaye ñāṇaṃ* is knowledge dependent upon the inferability of the Dhamma—i.e. knowledge that the fundamental Nature of Things is invariable in time and can be inferred *with certainty* (unlike rational inference) from present to past or future. See Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. iv,3 <S.ii,58>. In other words, generalization without abstraction—see MANO [B].

phenomenon has two characteristics, *inertia* and *designation* (*paṭigha* and *adhivacana*). The *inertia* of a phenomenon is *rūpa* ('matter' or 'substance'), which may be seen also as its *behaviour*; and this *presents itself only in the passage of time (however short)*. (These four *mahābhūtā* are the general modes of behaviour or matter: *earthy*, or persistent and resistant, or solid; *watery*, or cohesive; *fiery*, or ripening, or maturing; *airy*, or tense, or distended, or moving. See RŪPA.) The *designation* of a phenomenon is *nāma* ('name'), which may be seen also as its *appearance* (the form or guise adopted by the behaviour, as distinct from the behaviour itself).^w *Nāma* consists of the following (Majjhima i,9 <M.i,53>¹): whether (the experience is) pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral (*vedanā* or 'feeling'); shape, colour, smell, and so on (*saññā* [q.v.] or 'perception [percepts]'); significance or purpose (*cetanā* [q.v.] or 'intention[s]'); engagement in experience (*phassa* [q.v.] or 'contact'); and (intentional) direction of emphasis (*manasikāra* or 'attention'). *Phassa* is included in *nāma* since *nāma*, in specifying *saññā*, necessarily specifies the pair of *āyatanāni* ('bases') and kind of *viññāṇa* involved (e.g. perception of sourness specifies tongue, tastes, and tongue-consciousness), whereas *rūpa* does not (*inertia* or *behaviour* does not specify its mode of appearance, visual, auditory, and so on): *nāma*, in other words, entails (but does not include) *viññāṇa*, whereas *rūpa* is simply 'discovered' by *viññāṇa* (see RŪPA). *Manasikāra* is included in *nāma* since, whereas *rūpa precedes manasikāra* (logically, not temporally: behaviour takes place whether it is attended to or not—the clock, for example, does not stop when I leave the room), *nāma involves manasikāra*: experience is always particular or selective, one thing to the fore at once and the rest receding in the background. *Rūpa*, in other words, in order to appear—i.e. in

w. Inertia or behaviour, as just noted, is what we call 'matter' or 'substance', *rūpa*—and *nāma* is the appearance of *rūpa*—its 'name'. The appearance of *rūpa* is 'what it looks like', its description (though not the description of how [it] behaves). Conversely, *rūpa* is the behaviour of *nāma*—its 'matter'. So we get *nāmarūpa*, 'name-&-matter'. (N.B. Neither the use here of the word 'appearance' [= *manifestation*, as opposed to *substance*] nor our normal use of the word 'reality' [see (b) below] has anything to do with the celebrated [and fictitious] distinctions between Appearance and Reality of Bradley and others. The idea that there is a so-called 'reality' behind or beyond phenomena ['mere appearance'] is a mistake ['the illusion of hinder-worlds' in Nietzsche's phrase]. Phenomena present themselves for what they are, and can be studied and described simply as they appear. But this is not to say that they are simple. Cf. Sartre, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-14.)

order to be phenomenal as *nāmarūpa*—, must be *oriented*: a phenomenon cannot present all aspects at once with equal emphasis, but only in a perspective involving *manasikāra*. (*Manasikāra* is involved as an intentional modification of the perspective or direction of emphasis that is *given* at the most immediate level. Cf. CETANĀ [E] & Bradley, *op. cit.* (*Logic*), III/I, vi, §13.)

To be *present* is to be here-and-now; to be *absent* is to be here-and-then (then = *not* now; at some other time) or there-and-now (there = *not* here; at some other place) or there-and-then. *Attention* is (intentional) difference between presence and absence, i.e. between varying degrees of presence, of consciousness (“Let this be present, let that be absent!”). *Consciousness* is the difference between presence (in *any* degree) and utter non-presence (i.e. non-existence). (An image may be present or absent, but even if present it is always *absent reality*. Mind-consciousness, *manoviññāṇa*, is the presence of an image or, since an image can be absent, of an image of an image.)^x *Intention* is the absent in relation to the present. Every present is necessarily accompanied by a number of absents—the present is singular, the

x.	{Present Real = {Central {Actual		{Absent Imaginary = {Peripheral {Possible
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(The disjunctions ‘central/peripheral’ and ‘actual/possible’ [or ‘certain/possible’] represent two slightly different aspects of the more general ‘present/absent’: the former is as it is in strict reflexion, the latter is as it is in abstract judgement or discursive reflection—see MANO [B].) Although, relative to the *imaginary* of mental experience, five-base experience is *real*, yet, relative to what is *central* in a given field of five-base experience, whatever is *peripheral* in that field is already beginning to partake of the nature of the imaginary. In general, the further removed a thing is from the centre of consciousness the less real it is, and therefore the more imaginary. In mental experience proper, however, where there is more or less explicit withdrawal of attention from reality (see MANO), what is central in the field is, precisely, an image (which may be plural), with more imaginary images in the periphery. (There is no doubt that images are frequently made up of elements of past real [five-base] experience; and in simple cases, where the images are coherent and familiar, we speak of *memories*. But there are also images that are telepathic, clairvoyant, retrocognitive, and precognitive; and these do not conform to such a convenient scheme. The presence of an image, of an *absent reality*, is in no way dependent upon its ever previously [or even subsequently] being present as a *present reality* [though considerations of *probability* cannot be ignored]. On the other hand, no image ever appears or is created *ex nihilo*. See FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE [C] & [L].)

absent is plural. Each absent is a *possibility* of the present, and the ordered total of the present's absents is the *significance* of the present (i.e. what it points to, or indicates, beyond itself), which is also its intention. (In general, no two absents—even of the same order—are of exactly the same 'weight'.) *Volition* (which is what is more commonly understood by 'intention') is really a double intention (in the sense used here), i.e. it is *intentional intention*. This simply means that certain of the absents (or possibles) are *intentionally emphasized* at the expense of the others. When, in the course of time, one absent comes wholly to predominate over the others (often, but not necessarily, the one preferred), the present suddenly vanishes, and the absent takes its place as the new present. (The vanished present—see ANICCA [A]—is now to be found among the absents.) This is a description of *action* (*kamma*) in its essential form, but leaving out of account the question of *kammavipāka*, which is *acinteyya* (Aṅguttara IV,viii,7 <A.ii,80>⁸), and therefore rather beyond the scope of these *Notes*. See also a definition of action in RŪPA [B], and an ethical account in KAMMA.

The passage at Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62-3>⁹ is essential for an understanding of *nāmarūpa*, and it rules out the facile and slipshod interpretation of *nāmarūpa* as 'mind-&-matter'—*rūpa* is certainly 'matter' (or 'substance'), but *nāma* is not 'mind'.^y The passage at Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,190-1>¹⁰ makes it clear that all five *upādānakkhandhā*, and therefore *viññāṇa* with *nāmarūpa*, are present both in five-base experience and in mental experience. Thus, a *visible* (real) stone persists (or keeps its shape and its colour—i.e. is earthy) *visibly* (or in reality); an *imagined* stone persists *in imagination*. Both the actual (real) taste of castor oil and the thought of tasting it (i.e. the imaginary taste) are unpleasant. Both matter and feeling (as also perception and the rest) are both real and imaginary.^z See PHASSA [A]. *Nāmarūpa* at Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,63,§21>⁹ may firstly be taken as one's own *cognized* body. Cf. Nidāna/Abhisamaya Saṃy. ii,9 <S.ii,24>:

*Avijjānīvaraṇassa bhikkhave bāl-
assa/pañḍitassa taṇhāya sampay-
uttassa evaṃ ayaṃ kāyo samudā-
gato. Iti ayaṃ c'eva kāyo bahiddhā
ca nāmarūpaṃ, itth'etaṃ dvayaṃ.*

A stupid/intelligent man, monks, constrained by nescience and attached by craving, has thus acquired this body. So there is just this body and name-&-matter externally: in that way there is a dyad.

This passage distinguishes between *nāmarūpa* that is external and one's own body. Together, these make up the totality of *nāmarūpa* at any time. The body, as *rūpa*, is independent of its appearance; but

together with its appearance, which is how we normally take it, it is *nāmarūpa*. *Nāmarūpa* that is external is all cognized phenomena apart from one's own body. Cf. Majjhima xi,9 <M.iii,19>:

...imasmiñ ca saviññāṇake kāye
bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu...

...in this conscious body and
externally in all objects...

y. When *nāma* is understood as 'mind' or 'mentality' it will inevitably include *viññāṇa* or consciousness—as, for example, in the Visuddhimagga (Ch. XVIII *passim*). This is entirely without justification in the Suttas; and it is clear enough that any mode of thinking that proposes to make a fundamental division between 'mind' and 'matter' will soon find itself among insuperable difficulties. 'Mind' (i.e. *mano* [q.v.] in one of its senses) *already* means 'imagination' as opposed to 'reality', and it cannot *also* be opposed to 'matter'. 'Reality' and 'matter' are not by any means the same thing—is real pain (as opposed to imaginary pain) also material pain? There are, to be sure, various distinctions between body and mind (in different senses); and we may speak of bodily (*kāyika*) pain as opposed to mental or volitional (*cetasika*) pain—see Majjhima v,4 <M.i,302>; Vedanā Saṃy. iii,2 <S.iv,231>—, but these are distinctions of quite a different kind. Bodily pain may be real or imaginary, and so may volitional pain (grief), but *material* pain—painful feeling composed of matter—is a contradiction in terms. (Observe that there are two discrepant senses of the word *cetasika* on two successive pages of the same Sutta [Majjhima v,4]: (i) on one page <M.i,301> we find that *saññā* and *vedanā* are *cittasaṅkhāra* because they are *cetasikā* [see A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §5] and (ii) on the next <302> we find that *vedanā* may be either *kāyikā* or *cetasikā* [see above]. *Citta* and *cetasika* are not fixed terms in the Suttas, and, as well as different shades, have two principal [and incompatible] meanings according to context, like their nearest English equivalent, 'mind, mental' [which, however, has to do duty also for *mano*—see Glossary]. In (i), evidently, *cetasika* is 'mental' as opposed to 'material' [see also A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [g]], and in (ii) it is 'mental' as opposed to 'sensual'. In the Suttas the contexts are distinct, and confusion between these two senses does not arise; but a passage from Russell will provide a striking example of failure to distinguish between them: 'I do not know how to give a sharp definition of the word "mental", but something may be done by enumerating occurrences which are indubitably mental: believing, doubting, wishing, willing, being pleased or pained, are certainly mental occurrences; so are what we may call experiences, seeing, hearing, smelling, perceiving generally.' [*Op. cit.*, VIIth Essay.] 'Mind', whether in English or Pali [*mano, citta*], represents an intersection of mutually incompatible concepts. Confusion is often worse confounded by the misunderstanding discussed in PHASSA [E], where matter is conceded only an inferred existence in a supposed 'external world' beyond my experience.)

Though, as said above, we may *firstly* understand *nāmarūpa* in the Dīgha passage as one's own cognized body, properly speaking we must take *nāmarūpa* as the total cognized phenomena (which may not be explicitly formulated), thus: (i) 'I-[am]-lying-in-the-mother's-womb'; (ii) 'I-[am]-being-born-into-the-world'; (iii) 'I-[am]-a-young-man-about-town'. In other words, I am ultimately concerned not with this or that particular phenomenon in my experience but with myself as determined by my whole situation.

z. A distinction approximating to that between *nāma* and *rūpa*, under the names 'forme' and 'matière', is made by Gaston Bachelard in his book *L'Eau et les Rêves, Essai sur l'imagination de la matière* (José Corti, Paris 1942). Bachelard regards matter as the four primary elements, Earth, Water, Fire, and Air, and emphasizes the *resistant* nature of matter (which would correspond to *paṭigha*). This book (there are also companion volumes on the other elements) is written from a literary rather than a philosophical point of view, but its interest lies in the fact that Bachelard makes these fundamental distinctions quite independently of the Buddha's Teaching, of which he apparently knows nothing. He is concerned, in particular, with the various 'valorisations' of the four elements as they occur in literature, that is to say with the various *significances* that they may possess. These are examples of *saṅkhārā* (as *cetanā*):

*rūpaṃ rūpattāya saṅkhatam
abhisāṅkharonti*

Matter as matter is the determined that they determine. (See Additional Texts 6.)

(cf. A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [F]). The philosophical distinction between primary and secondary qualities also seems to approximate to that between *rūpa* and at least certain aspects of *nāma*. (Here is Bradley [*op. cit.* (A.&R.), Ch. I]: 'The primary qualities are those aspects of what we perceive or feel, which, in a word, are spatial; and the residue is secondary.' But see RŪPA [E].) These indications may serve to assure the apprehensive newcomer that the technical terms of the Suttas do not represent totally strange and inaccessible categories. But it is one thing to make these distinctions (approximately, at least), and another thing to understand the Buddha's Teaching.

See Itivuttaka II,ii,7 <Iti.38>.12

The opinion has been expressed (in the P.T.S. Dictionary) that *nibbāna* is not transcendental. If by ‘transcendental’ is meant ‘mystical’, either in the sense of having to do with a (supposed) Divine Ground or simply of being by nature a mystery, then *nibbāna* (or ‘extinction’) is not transcendental: indeed, it is anti-transcendental; for mystification is the state, not of the *arahat* (who *has* realized *nibbāna*), but of the *puthujjana* (who has *not*).^{aa} For the *arahat*, all sense of personality or selfhood has subsided, and with it has gone all possibility of numinous experience; and *a fortiori* the mystical intuition of a trans-personal Spirit or Absolute Self—of a Purpose or an Essence or a Oneness or what have you—can no longer arise. Cf. Preface (m). Nor, for one who sees, is the nature of *nibbāna* a mystery at all. When a fire becomes extinguished (*nibbuta*) we do not suppose that it enters a mysterious ‘transcendental state’: neither are we to suppose such a thing of the person that attains *nibbāna*. See Majjhima viii,2 & PARAMATTHA SACCA [A].

But if ‘transcendental’ means ‘outside the range of investigation of the disinterested scholar or scientist’, then *nibbāna* is transcendental (but so are other things). And if ‘transcendental’ means ‘outside the range of understanding of the *puthujjana*’—though the dictionary hardly intends this^{ab}—, then again it is transcendental. Only this last meaning corresponds to *lokuttara*. (i) Existence or being (*bhava*) transcends reason (*takka*, which is the range of the scholar or scientist), and (ii) extinction (*nibbāna*) transcends existence (which is the range of the *puthujjana*):

(i) There is no *reason* why I am, why I exist. My existence cannot be demonstrated by reasoning since it is not *necessary*, and any attempt to do so simply begs the question. The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* is not a logical proposition—logically speaking it is a mere tautology. My existence is *beyond* reason.

(ii) I can assert my existence or I can deny it, but in order to do either I must exist; for it is I myself who assert it or deny it. Any attempt I may make to abolish my existence tacitly confirms it; for it is *my* existence that I am seeking to abolish.

aa. Cf. 'De qui et de quoi en effet puis-je dire: "Je connais cela!" Ce coeur en moi, je puis l'éprouver et je juge qu'il existe. Ce monde, je puis le toucher et je juge encore qu'il existe. Là s'arrête toute ma science et le reste est construction. Car si j'essaie de saisir ce moi dont je m'assure, si j'essaie de le définir et de le résumer, il n'est plus qu'une eau qui coule entre mes doigts. Je puis dessiner un à un tous les visages qu'il sait prendre, tous ceux aussi qu'on lui a donnés, cette éducation, cette origine, cette ardeur ou ces silences, cette grandeur ou cette bassesse. Mais on n'additionne pas des visages. Ce coeur même qui est le mien me restera à jamais indéfinissable. Entre la certitude que j'ai de mon existence et le contenu que j'essaie de donner à cette assurance, le fossé ne sera jamais comblé. Pour toujours je serai étranger à moi-même. ...Voici encore des arbres et je connais leur rugueux, de l'eau et j'éprouve sa saveur. Ces parfums d'herbe et d'étoiles, la nuit, certains soirs où le coeur se détend, comment nierai-je ce monde dont j'éprouve la puissance et les forces? Pourtant toute la science de cette terre ne me donnera rien qui puisse m'assurer que ce monde est à moi.'—A. Camus, *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*, Gallimard, Paris 1942, pp. 34-5. ('Of whom and of what in fact can I say "I know about that!" This heart in me, I can experience it and I conclude that it exists. This world, I can touch it and I conclude again that it exists. All my knowledge stops there, and the rest is construction. For if I try to grasp this self of which I am assured, if I try to define it and to sum it up, it is no more than a liquid that flows between my fingers. I can depict one by one all the faces that it can assume; all those given it, too, by this education, this origin, this boldness or these silences, this grandeur or this vileness. But one cannot add up faces. This same heart which is mine will ever remain for me undefinable. Between the certainty that I have of my existence and the content that I strive to give to this assurance, the gap will never be filled. Always shall I be a stranger to myself. ...Here, again, are trees and I know their roughness, water and I experience its savour. This scent of grass and of stars, night, certain evenings when the heart relaxes, - how shall I deny this world whose power and forces I experience? Yet all the science of this earth will give me nothing that can assure me that this world is mine.') A more lucid account by a *puthujjana* of his own predicament could scarcely be desired. This situation cannot be transcended so long as what appears to be one's 'self' is accepted at its face value: 'this self of which I am assured', 'this same heart which is mine'. The paradox (Marcel would speak of a *mystery*: a problem that encroaches on its own data)—the paradox,

attā hi attano n'atthi

|(His) very self is not (his) self's.

|(More freely: He himself is not his own.)

(Dhammapada v,3 <Dh.62>), must be resolved. This necessarily rather chromatic passage, which does not lend itself kindly to translation (though one is provided), makes the overtone of despair clearly audible. Needless perhaps to say, this despair marks the extreme limit of the *puthujjana*'s thought, where it recoils impotently upon itself—and not by any means his normal attitude towards the routine business of living from day to day.

Ye kho te bhonto samaṇa-brāhmaṇā sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññāpenti te sakkāyabhayaṃ sakkāyaparijegucchā sakkāyaṃ yeva anuparidhāvanti anuparivattanti. Seyyathāpi nāma sā gaddūlabaddho daḷhe thambhe vā khīle vā upanibaddho tam eva thambhaṃ vā khīlaṃ vā anuparidhāvati anuparivattati, evam evīme bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā sakkāyabhayaṃ sakkāyaparijegucchā sakkāyaṃ yeva anuparidhāvanti anuparivattanti.

Those recluses and divines who make known the annihilation, perishing, and un-being, of the existing creature,—they, through fear of personality, through loathing of personality, are simply running and circling around personality. Just, indeed, as a dog, tied with a leash to a firm post or stake, runs and circles around that same post or stake, so these recluses and divines, through fear of personality, through loathing of personality, are simply running and circling around personality.

(Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,232>) Cessation of ‘my existence’ (which is extinction—

bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ

Extinction is cessation of being.

[Aṅguttara X,i,7 <A.v,9>]) is beyond my existence. See ATAKKĀVACARA.

The idea of *nibbāna* as the ultimate goal of human endeavour will no doubt strike the common man, innocently enjoying the pleasures of his senses, as a singularly discouraging notion if he is told that it is no more than ‘cessation of being’. Without actually going so far (overtly, at least) as to hope for Bradley’s Absolute (‘It would be experience entire, containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would

ab. The dictionary merely says that *nibbāna* is not transcendental since it is purely and solely an *ethical* state to be reached in this birth. But this is altogether too simple a view. As pointed out in KAMMA, an understanding of the foundation of ethical practice is already beyond the range of the *puthujjana*, and ultimately, by means of ethical practice, the *arahat* completely and finally transcends it. *Nibbāna* is an ethical state inasmuch as it is reached by ethical practice, but inasmuch as that state is cessation of ethics *nibbāna* is transcendental. (It must be emphasized, lest anyone mistake this for a kind of antinomianism, that the *arahat* is in no way exempted from observance of the disciplinary rules of the Vinaya. How far he is capable of breaking them is another question. See Aṅguttara III,ix,5-7 <A.i,231-4> & IX,i,7&8 <iv,369-72>.)

still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss.’ [*Op. cit.* (A.&R.), Ch. XV)],—without perhaps going quite so far as this, even a thoughtful man may like to expect something a little more positive than ‘mere extinction’ as the *summum bonum*. We shrink before the idea that our existence, with its anguishes and its extasies, is *wholly* gratuitous, and we are repelled by the suggestion that we should be better off without it; and it is only natural that the *puthujjana* should look for a formula to save something from (as he imagines) the shipwreck.^{ac}

In the Udāna (viii,3 <Ud.80>) *nibbāna* is spoken of by the Buddha in these terms:

<p><i>Atthi bhikkhave ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅ- khatam, no ce taṃ bhikk- have abhaviṣṣa ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅ- khatam na yidha jātassa bhūtassa katassa saṅkha- tassa nissaraṇaṃ paññāyetha.</i></p>	<p>There is, monks, a non-born, non-become, non-made, non-determined; for if, monks, there were not that non-born, non-become, non-made, non-determined, an escape here from the born, become, made, determined, would not be manifest.</p>
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‘Such a positive assertion of the existence of the Unconditioned’ it is sometimes urged ‘must surely imply that *nibbāna* is not simply annihilation.’ *Nibbāna*, certainly, is not ‘simply annihilation’—or rather, it is not annihilation at all: extinction, cessation of being, is by no means the same thing as the (supposed) annihilation of an eternal ‘self’ or soul. (See Majjhima xi,2, above.) And the assertion of the existence of *nibbāna* is positive enough—but what, precisely, is asserted? In the Asaṅkhata Saṃyutta (i,1 & ii,23 <S.iv,359&371>) we read

<p><i>Yo bhikkhave rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo, idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhatam/nibbānam;</i></p>	<p>The destruction, monks, of lust, of hate, of delusion—this, monks, is called (the) non-determined/extinction.</p>
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and we see that, if we do not go beyond the Suttas, we cannot derive more than the positive assertion of the existence here of the destruction of lust, hate, and delusion. And this is simply a statement that to get rid, in this very life, of lust, hate, and delusion, *is* possible (if it were not, there would be no escape from them, and therefore—Aṅguttara X,viii,6 <A.v,144>—no escape from birth, ageing, and death). And the *arahat* has, in fact, done so.

But if, in our stewing minds, we still cannot help feeling that *nibbāna* really ought, somehow, to be an eternity of positive enjoyment, or at least of experience, we may ponder these two Sutta passages:

Tisso imā bhikkhu vedanā vuttā mayā, sukhā vedanā dukkhā vedanā adukkhamasukhā vedanā, imā tisso vedanā vuttā mayā. Vuttaṃ kho paṇ'etaṃ bhikkhu mayā, Yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmin ti. Taṃ kho paṇ'etaṃ bhikkhu mayā saṅkhārānaṃ yeva aniccatāṃ sandhāya bhāsitaṃ...

Vedanā Saṃy. ii,1 <S.iv,216>

There are, monk, these three feelings stated by me: pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling, neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling—these three feelings have been stated by me. But this, monk, has been stated by me: ‘Whatever is felt counts as unpleasure (suffering)’. That, however, monk, was said by me concerning the impermanence of determinations... (See *Vedanā Saṃy.* i,9, quoted at *A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA* §17.)

Āyasmā Sāriputto etad avoca. Sukhaṃ idaṃ āvuso nibbānaṃ, sukhaṃ idaṃ āvuso nibbānan ti. Evaṃ vutte āyasmā Udāyi āyasmantaṃ Sāriputtaṃ etad avoca. Kim paṇ'ettha āvuso Sāriputta sukhaṃ, yad ettha n'atthi vedayitan ti. Etad eva khv ettha āvuso sukhaṃ, yad ettha n'atthi vedayitaṃ.

Aṅguttara IX,iv,3 <A.iv,414>

The venerable Sāriputta said this:— It is extinction, friends, that is pleasant! It is extinction, friends, that is pleasant! When this was said, the venerable Udāyi said to the venerable Sāriputta,—But what herein is pleasant, friend Sāriputta, since herein there is nothing felt?—Just this is pleasant, friend, that herein there is nothing felt.

ac. Jaspers, with the final and inevitable ruin of all his hopes, still reads his temptation to despair in a positive sense—we are able, he concludes, ‘in shipwreck to experience Being’ (*...im Scheitern das Sein zu erfahren.*’—K. Jaspers, *Philosophie*, Springer, Berlin 1932, Vol. iii, p. 237). But the Suttas are less accommodating. See *Majjhima* iii,2 <M.i,136-7> for an account of the eternalist’s unrelieved angst in the face of subjective non-being (*ajjhattaṃ asati paritassanā*) upon hearing the Buddha’s Teaching of extinction. He apprehends annihilation, despairs, and falls, beating his breast, into confusion. But not so the *ariyasāvaka*.

Paṭiccasamuppāda

For a fuller discussion of some of this, see A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAM-UPPĀDA.

In spite of the venerable tradition, starting with the Paṭisambhidāmagga (or perhaps the Abhidhamma Piṭaka) and continued in all the Commentaries (see Aṅguttara V,viii,9 <A.iii,107,§4>), *paṭiccasamuppāda* has nothing to do with temporal succession (cause-and-effect). Precedence in *paṭiccasamuppāda* is structural, not temporal: *paṭiccasamuppāda* is not the description of a *process*. For as long as *paṭiccasamuppāda* is thought to involve temporal succession (as it is, notably, in the traditional ‘three-life’ interpretation), so long is it liable to be regarded as some kind of hypothesis (that there is re-birth and that it is *caused* by *avijjā*) to be verified (or not) in the course of time (like any hypothesis of the natural sciences), and so long are people liable to think that the necessary and sufficient criterion of a ‘Buddhist’^{ad} is the acceptance of this hypothesis on trust (for no hypothesis can be known to be certainly true, since upon the next occasion it may fail to verify itself). But the Buddha tells us (Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,265>) that *paṭiccasamuppāda* is

<i>sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opana- yiko paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi.</i>	immediate, timeless, evident, leading, to be known privately by the wise.
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What temporal succession is *akālika*? (See CИTTA [A].) For an *ariyasāvaka*, *paṭiccasamuppāda* is a matter of direct reflexive certainty: the

ad. To be a follower of the Buddha it is certainly *necessary* to accept on trust that for one who is not rid of *avijjā* at his death there is re-birth, but it is by no means *sufficient*. What is sufficient is to see *paṭiccasamuppāda*—

<i>Yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati</i>	He who sees dependent arising sees the Teaching.
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(Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,191>). For those who cannot *now* see the re-birth that is at every moment awaiting beings with *avijjā*, the dependence of re-birth on *avijjā* must be accepted on trust. They cannot get beyond temporal succession in this matter and must take it on trust that it is a question of dependence (and not of cause-and-effect)—i.e. that it is *not* a hypothesis at all, but (for the Buddha) a matter of certainty. But accepting this on trust is not the same as seeing *paṭiccasamuppāda*. (*Past* and *future* only make their appearance with *anvaye ñāṇaṃ* [see NA CA SO [A]], not with *dhamme ñāṇaṃ*. ‘As it is, so it was, so it will be.’ *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is just ‘As it is’—i.e. the *present* structure of dependence.)

ariyasāvaka has direct, certain, reflexive knowledge of the condition upon which *birth* depends. He has no such knowledge about *re-birth*, which is quite a different matter. He knows for himself that *avijjā* is the condition for birth; but he does not know for himself that when there is *avijjā* there is *re-birth*. (That there is *re-birth*, i.e. *saṃsāra*, may remain, even for the *ariyasāvaka*, a matter of trust in the Buddha.) The *ariyasāvaka* knows for himself that even in this very life the *arahat* is, actually, not to be found (cf. Khandha Saṃy. ix,3 <S.iii,109-15> and see PARAMATTHA SACCA [A]), and that it is wrong to say that the *arahat* ‘was born’ or ‘will die’. With *sakkāyanirodha* there is no longer any ‘somebody’ (or a person—*sakkāya*, q.v.) to whom the words *birth* and *death* can apply. They apply, however, to the *puthujjana*, who still ‘is somebody’.^{ae} But to endow his birth with a condition in the past—i.e. a *cause*—is to accept this ‘somebody’ at its face value as a permanent ‘self’; for cessation of birth requires cessation of its condition, which, being safely *past* (in the preceding life), cannot *now* be brought to an end; and this ‘somebody’ cannot therefore *now* cease. Introduction of this idea into *paṭiccasamuppāda* infects the *samudayasacca* with *sassatadiṭṭhi* and the *nirodhasacca* with *ucchedadiṭṭhi*. Not surprisingly, the result is hardly coherent. And to make matters worse, most of the terms—and notably *saṅkhāra* (q.v.)—have been misconceived by the Visuddhimagga.

It is sometimes thought possible to modify this interpretation of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, confining its application to the present life. Instead of *temporal succession* we have *continuous becoming*, conceived as a *flux*, where the effect cannot be clearly distinguished from the cause—the cause *becomes* the effect. But this does not get rid of the temporal element, and the concept of a flux raises its own difficulties.^{af}

The problem lies in the *present*, which is always with us; and any attempt to consider past or future without first settling the present problem can only beg the question—‘self’ is either asserted or denied, or both, or both assertion and denial are denied, all of which take it for granted (see NA CA SO). Any interpretation of *paṭiccasamuppāda* that involves time is an attempt to resolve the present problem by referring to past or future, and is therefore *necessarily* mistaken. The argument that both past and future exist in the present (which, in a certain sense, is correct) does not lead to the resolution of the problem.

ae. So long as there are the thoughts ‘I was born’, ‘I shall die’, there is birth and death: so long as the five *khandhā* are *sa-upādānā*, ‘somebody’ becomes manifest and breaks up.

af. The notion of *flux* can be expressed thus: $A = B, B = C, A \neq C$, where A, B, and C, are consecutive (Poincaré's definition of continuity). This contradiction can only be concealed by verbal legerdemain. (The origin of this misleading notion, as of so many others in the traditional interpretation, seems to be the Milindapañha, which, to judge by its simile of the flame, intends its formula *na ca so na ca añño* to be understood as describing continuous change.) The misunderstanding arises from failure to see that change at any given level of generality *must* be discontinuous and absolute, and that there *must* be different levels of generality. When these are taken together, any desired approximation to 'continuous change' can be obtained without contradiction. But change, as marking 'the passage of time', is no more than change of aspect or orientation: change of substance is not *necessary*, nor is movement. (See ANICCA [A], CITTA [A], & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.) Kierkegaard (*op. cit.*, p. 277) points out that Heraclitus, who summed up his doctrine of universal flux in the celebrated dictum that one cannot pass through the same river twice, had a disciple who remarked that one cannot pass through the same river even once. If everything is changing, there is no change at all.

The assumption of a single absolute time, conceived as a uniform continuity (or flux) of instants, leads at once to a very common misconception of the Dhamma:

- A. Even if I *now* perceive things as self-identically persisting in time, my present perception is only one out of a flux or continuous succession of perceptions, and there is no guarantee that I continue to perceive the *same* self-identities for two successive instants. All I am therefore entitled to say is that there *appear* to be self-identities persisting in time; but whether it is so or not *in reality* I am quite unable to discover.
- B. The Buddha's teachings of impermanence and not-self answer this question in the negative: In reality no things exist, and if they appear to do so that is because of my ignorance of these teachings (which is *avijjā*).

But we may remark: (i) That A is the result of taking presumptively the rational view of time, and using it to question the validity of direct reflexive experience. But the rational view of time is itself derived, ultimately, from direct reflexive experience—how can we know about time at all, if not from experience?—, and it is quite illegitimate to use it to dig away its own foundations. The fault is in the act of rationalization, in the attempt to see time from a point outside it; and the result—a *continuous* succession of *isolated* instants each of no duration and without past or future (from a timeless point of view they are *all* present)—is a monster. The distinction in A (as everywhere else) between 'appearance' and 'reality' is wholly spurious. (ii) That since our knowledge of time comes only from perception of change, the nature of change must be determined before we can know the structure of time. We have, therefore, no antecedent reason—if we do not actually encounter the thing itself—for entertaining the self-contradictory idea (see

[FOOTNOTE (AF.) CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE.]

Poincaré above) of continuous change. (iii) That, whether or not we do actually perceive continuous change, we certainly perceive discontinuous changes (so much is admitted by A), and there is thus a *prima-facie* case at least in favour of the latter. (iv) That the experiments of the Gestalt psychologists indicate that, in fact, we perceive only discontinuous changes, not continuous change (cf. Sartre, *op. cit.*, p. 190). (v) That if, nevertheless, we say that we do at times and in the normal way have intuitive experience, distinct and unambiguous, of continuous change, and if we also say that continuous change, in accordance with B, is what is meant by the teaching of impermanence, then it will follow that at such times we must enjoy a direct view of ‘reality’ and be free from *avijjā*. Why, then, should we need a Buddha to tell us these things? But if we reject the first premiss we shall have no longer any grounds for having to assert a uniformly continuous time, and if we reject the second we shall have no longer any grounds for wishing to assert it. (On the question of self-identity, see ATTĀ.)

Our undeniable experience of movement and similar things (e.g. the fading of lights) will no doubt be adduced as evidence of continuous change—indeed, it will be said that they *are* continuous change. That movement is evidence of what it is, is quite certain; but it is not so certain that it is evidence of continuous change. We may understand movement as, at each level of generality, a succession of contiguous fixed finite *trajectories* (to borrow Sartre’s expression), and each such trajectory, at the next lower level, as a relatively faster succession of lesser trajectories, and so on indefinitely. But, as discussed in FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE [H], our ability to perceive distinctions is limited, and this hierarchy of trajectories is anomalously apprehended as a series of discrete continuities of displacement—which is, precisely, what we are accustomed to call *movement*. In other words, it is only where our power of discrimination leaves off that we start talking about ‘continuous change’. (Consideration of the mechanism of the cinematograph—see the foregoing reference—is enough to show that continuous change cannot safely be inferred from the experience of movement; but it must not be supposed that the structure of movement can be reduced simply to the structure of the cinematograph film. See also FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE [M].)

Phassa

Phassa, ‘contact’, is defined (Saḷāyatana Saṃy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word *phassa*, primarily at least, as *contact between these three things*.^{ag} So long as there is *avijjā*, all things (*dhammā*) are fundamentally as described in the earlier part of the Mūlapariyāyasutta (Majjhima i,1 <M.i,1>); that is to say, they are inherently *in subjection*, they are *appropriated*, they are *mine* (See ANICCA, MAMA, & A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [F]). This is the foundation of the notion that *I am* and that *things are in contact with me*. This contact between me and things is *phassa*. The *ditṭhisampanna* sees the deception, but the *puthujjana* accepts it at its face value and elaborates it into a relationship between *himself* and the *world* (*attā ca loko ca*—which relationship is then capable of further elaboration into a variety of views [Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,233>]).^{ah} But though the *ditṭhisampanna* is not deceived, yet until he becomes *arahat* the aroma of subjectivity (*asmī ti*, ‘[I] am’) hangs about all his experience. All normal experience is dual (*dvayaṃ*—see NĀMA, final paragraph): there are present (i) one’s conscious six-based body (*saviññāṇaka saḷāyatānika kāya*), and (ii) other phenomena (namely, whatever is *not* one’s body); and reflexion will show that, though both are objective in the experience, the aroma of subjectivity that attaches to the experience will naturally tend to be attributed to the body.^{ai} In this way, *phassa* comes to be seen as contact between the conscious eye and forms—but mark that this is *because* contact is *primarily* between

ag. This interpretation of *phassa* is not invited by the Mahānidāna-suttanta (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>⁹), where *nāmarūpapaccayā phasso* is discussed without reference to *saḷāyatana*, and in terms of *adhivacanasamphassa* and *paṭighasamphassa*. These terms are more easily comprehensible when *phassa* is understood as ‘contact between subject and object’. (It is an elementary mistake to equate *paṭighasamphassa* [‘resistance-contact’] with five-base-contact [*cakkhusamphassa* &c.] and *adhivacanasamphassa* [‘designation-contact’] with mind-contact [*manosamphassa*]. *Adhivacana* and *paṭigha* correspond to *nāma* and *rūpa* respectively, and it is clear from Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,190-1>¹⁰ that *both nāma and rūpa* are conditions for *each* of the six kinds of contact. See NĀMA.)

subject and object, and not between eye, forms, and eye-consciousness. This approach makes it possible to see in what sense, with the entire cessation of all illusion of 'I' and 'mine', there is *phassanirodha* in the *arahat* (where, though there are still, so long as he continues to live, both the conscious body and the other phenomena, there is no longer any appropriation). But when (as commonly) *phassa* is interpreted as 'contact between sense-organ and sense-object, resulting in

ah. The *puthujjana* takes for granted that 'I am' is the fundamental fact, and supposes that 'things are mine (or concern me) because I am'. The *diṭṭhisampanna* sees that this is the wrong way round. He sees that there is the conceit (concept) '(I) am' because 'things are mine'. With perception of impermanence, the inherent appropriation subsides; 'things are mine' gives place to just 'things are' (which things are still *significant*—they point to or indicate other things—, but no longer point to a 'subject'); and 'I am' vanishes. With the coming to an end of the *arahat*'s life there is the ending of 'things are'. While the *arahat* still lives, then, there continue to be 'objects' in the sense of 'things'; but if 'objects' are understood as necessarily correlative to a 'subject', then 'things' can no longer be called 'objects'. See ATTĀ. Similarly with the 'world' as the correlative of 'self': so long as the *arahat* lives, there is still an organized perspective of significant things; but they are no longer significant 'to him', nor do they 'signify him'. See Preface (f).

ai. If experience were confined to the use of a single eye, the eye and forms would not be distinguishable, they would not appear as separate things; there would be just the experience describable in terms of *pañc'-upādānakkhandhā*. But normal experience is always multiple, and other faculties (touch and so on) are engaged at the same time, and the eye and forms as separate things are manifest to them (in the duality of experience already referred to). The original experience is thus found to be a *relationship*: but the fleshly eye is observed (by the other faculties, notably touch, and by the eyes themselves seeing their own reflexion) to be invariable (it is always 'here', *idha*), whereas forms are observed to be variable (they are plural and 'yonder', *huraṃ*). Visual experience, however, also is variable, and its entire content is thus naturally attributed to forms and none of it to the eye. In visual experience, then, *forms are seen, the eye is unseen*, yet (as our other faculties or a looking-glass informs us) *there is the eye*. Also in visual experience, *but in quite a different way* (indicated earlier), *objects are seen, the subject is unseen* (explicitly, at least; otherwise it [or he] would be an object), yet *there is the subject* ('I am'). On account of their structural similarity these two independent patterns appear one superimposed on the other; and when there is failure to distinguish between these patterns, *the subject comes to be identified with the eye* (and *mutatis mutandis* for the other *āyatanāni*). See VIÑÑĀNA for an account of how, in a similar way, consciousness comes to be superimposed on the eye (and the six-based body generally).

consciousness’—and its translation as ‘(sense-)impression’ implies this interpretation—then we are at once cut off from all possibility of understanding *phassanirodha* in the *arahat*;^{aj} for the question whether or not the eye is the subject is not even raised—we are concerned only with the eye as a sense-organ, and it is a sense-organ in *puthujjana* and *arahat* alike. Understanding of *phassa* now consists in accounting for consciousness starting from physiological (or neurological) descriptions of the sense-organs and their functioning. Consciousness, however, is not physiologically observable, and the entire project rests upon unjustifiable assumptions from the start.^{ak} This epistemological interpretation of *phassa* misconceives the Dhamma as a kind of natural-science-cum-psychology that provides an *explanation* of things in terms of cause-and-effect.

aj. *Phusanti phassā
upadhiṃ paṭicca
Nirūpadhiṃ kena
phuseyyuṃ phassā*

Contacts contact
dependent on ground—
How should contacts contact
a groundless one?

Udāna ii,4 <Ud.12> It must, of course, be remembered that *phassanirodha* in the *arahat* does not mean that experience as such (*pañcakkhandhā*) is at an end. But, also, there is no experience without *phassa*. In other words, to the extent that we can still speak of an eye, of forms, and of eye-consciousness (seeing)—e.g.

Samvijjati kho āvuso Bhagavato cakkhu, passati Bhagavā cakkhunā rūpaṃ, chandarrāgo Bhagavato n’atthi, suttacitto Bhagavā

The Auspicious One, friend, possesses an eye; the Auspicious One sees visible forms with the eye; desire-&-lust for the Auspicious One there is not; the Auspicious One is wholly freed in heart (*citta*). (Cf. ATTĀ [C].)

(Saḷāyatana Saṃy. xviii,5 <S.iv,164>)—to that extent we can still speak of *phassa*. But it must no longer be regarded as contact with *me* (or with *him*, or with *somebody*). There is, and there is not, contact in the case of the *arahat*, just as there is, and there is not, consciousness. See CETANĀ [F].

ak. The reader may note that the word ‘sensation’ is claimed by physiology: a sensation is what is carried by, or travels over, the nervous system. One respectable authority speaks ‘in physiological terms alone’ of ‘the classical pathways by which sensation reaches the thalamus and finally the cerebral cortex’. Presumably, therefore, a sensation is an electro-chemical impulse in a nerve. But the word properly belongs to psychology: Sensation, according to the *Pocket Oxford Dictionary*, is ‘Consciousness of perceiving or seeming to perceive some state or affection of one’s body or its parts or senses or of one’s mind or its emotions’. What, then, is sensation—is it nervous impulse? or is it consciousness? Or is it not, rather, a convenient verbal device for persuading ourselves that consciousness *is* nervous impulse, and therefore physiologically observable? ‘Consciousness’ affirms our authority ‘is the sum of the activities of the whole nervous system’, and this appears to be the current official doctrine.

The notion of *sensation*, however, as we see from the dictionary’s definition, is an abomination from the start—how can one ‘perceive the state of one’s senses’ when it is precisely *by means* of one’s senses that one perceives? (See MANO.) Another individual’s perception (with *his* eye) of the state of my eye may well have, in certain respects, a one-one correspondence with my perception (with *my* eye) of, say, a tree (or, for that matter, a ghost, or, since the eye as visual organ extends into the brain, a migraine); but it is mere lazy thinking to presume from this that when I perceive a tree I am *really* perceiving the state of my eye—and then, to account for my sensation, *inferring* the existence of a tree in a supposed ‘external’ world beyond my experience. The reader is referred to Sartre’s excellent discussion of this equivocal concept (*op. cit.*, pp. 372-8), of which we can give here only the peroration. ‘*La sensation, notion hybride entre le subjectif et l’objectif, conçue à partir de l’objet, et appliquée ensuite au sujet, existence bâtarde dont on ne saurait dire si elle est de fait ou de droit, la sensation est une pure rêverie de psychologue, il faut la rejeter délibérément de toute théorie sérieuse sur les rapports de la conscience et du monde.*’ (“Sensation, hybrid notion between the subjective and the objective, conceived starting from the object, and then applied to the subject, bastard entity of which one cannot say whether it is *de facto* or *de jure*,—sensation is a pure psychologist’s day-dream: it must be deliberately rejected from every serious theory on the relations of consciousness [which, for Sartre, is subjectivity] and the world.”) Descartes, it seems, with his ‘representative ideas’, is the modern philosopher primarily responsible for the present tangle—see Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 200 *et seq.* (Heidegger quotes Kant as saying that it is ‘a scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general’ that there is still no cogent proof for the ‘being-there of things outside us’ that will do away with all scepticism. Then he remarks “The “scandal of philosophy” is not that this proof is yet to be given, but that *such proofs are expected and attempted again and again*’.) Removal of the pseudo-problem of the ‘external’ world removes materialism, but does not remove matter (for which see NĀMA & RŪPA).

Bala

The distinction between *indriya* and *bala* seems to be that *indriya*, ‘faculty’, means a qualitative range of capacity or extent of dominion in a given province, whereas *bala*, ‘power’, implies rather a quantitative superiority of endowment. As *faculties* the five items, *saddhā*, *virīya*, *sati*, *samādhi*, and *paññā*, are, in the *ariyasāvaka*, either effective or latent all at once (see *Indriya Samy.* vi,2 <S.v,228>) and are totally absent from the *puthujjana* (*ibid.* ii,8 <S.v,202>¹¹). As *powers* they are the strength of the *ariyasāvaka*, who has equipment for practice of the Dhamma that is lacking in the *puthujjana*.

Katamañ ca bhikkhave bhāvanā-balaṃ. Tatra bhikkhave yam idaṃ bhāvanābalaṃ sekhānaṃ etaṃ balaṃ sekhamhi.

And which, monks, is the development-power? Herein, monks, as to the development-power, this is the trainers’ power, in trainers.

(*Aṅguttara* II,ii,1 <A.i,52>) It is sometimes supposed that a *puthujjana* possesses these faculties and powers, at least in embryo, and that his task is to develop them. This is a misunderstanding. It is the *puthujjana*’s task to *acquire* them. It is for the *sekha*, who *has* acquired them, to develop them.

Mano

Much mental activity (imagination) is to some extent reflexive (in a loose sense);^{al} and reflexion brings to light not merely *things* (as does the unreflexive attitude) but also the *nature* of things (see DHAMMA). Thus *dhammā*, as the external counterpart of *mano*, can often be understood as ‘universals’.^{am} This does not mean, of course, that the mind will necessarily choose to attend to these universal things that appear; it may prefer to enjoy the images as the eye enjoys visible forms; nevertheless, it is reflexively withdrawn from the immediate world. See NĀMA [B].

Note that just as the eye, as *cakkhāyatana* or *cakkhudhātu*, is that

*yena lokasmiṃ lokasaññī
hoti lokamānī*

[that] by which, in the world, one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world

(Saḷāyatana Saṃy. xii,3 <S.iv,95>), i.e. that *thing in the world* dependent upon which there is *perceiving and conceiving of the world*, namely a spherical lump of flesh set in my face; so the mind, as *manāyatana* or *manodhātu*, also is that *yena lokasmiṃ lokasaññī hoti lokamānī*, i.e. that *thing in the world* dependent upon which there is *perceiving and conceiving of the world*, namely various ill-defined parts of my body, but principally a mass of grey matter contained in my head (physiological and neurological descriptions are strictly out of place—see PHASSA).^{an} This is in agreement with the fact that all five *khandhā* arise in connexion with *each* of the six *āyatanāni*—see NĀMA & PHASSA [A]. For ‘perceiving and conceiving’ see MAMA [A].

More loosely, in other contexts, the mind (*mano*) is simply ‘imagination’ or ‘reflexion’, which, strictly, in the context of the foregoing paragraph, is *manoviññāṇa*, i.e. the *presence* of images. See NĀMA [C]. The Vibhaṅga (of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka) introduces chaos by supposing that *manodhātu* and *manoviññāṇadhātu* are successive stages of awareness, differing only in intensity (and perhaps *also*, somehow, in kind). See CITTA.

al. For reflexion in the stricter sense see DHAMMA [B]. Something of the distinction between these two senses of reflexion can be seen in the following two Sutta definitions of *sati* or ‘mindfulness’:

(i) *Ariyasāvako satimā hoti paramena satinepakkena samannāgato cirakatam pi cirabhāsitam pi saritā anussaritā.*

The noble disciple is mindful, he is endowed with the highest mindfulness and discretion, he remembers and recalls what was done and what was said long ago.

E.g. Indriya Saṃy. v,10 <S.v,225>. This is more ‘reflection’ than ‘reflexion’. *Sati*, here, is mindfulness (calling to mind) of the *past*, and therefore memory or recollection.

(ii) *Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī... vedanāsu vedanānupassī... citte cittānupassī... dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassam. Evaṃ kho bhikkhave bhikkhu sato hoti.*

Here, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body in the body... feelings in feelings... mind in the mind... ideas in ideas, ardent, aware, mindful, having put away worldly covetousness and grief. Thus, monks, is a monk mindful.

Vedanā Saṃy. i,7 <S.iv,211> In this context, *sati* is mindfulness of the *present*. Here we might be said to have both the present and its image together.

am. A universal becomes an *abstraction* only in so far as an attempt is made to think it in isolation from all particular or concrete content—divorced, that is to say, from existence. The stricter the reflexion the less the abstraction.

A distinction must be made between ‘relative universals’, where the *content* of a given experience is generalized (‘this horse’, ‘this brown’, appear as examples or instances of ‘horse’ and ‘brown’, i.e. as one of ‘all possible horses’, of ‘all possible browns’), and ‘absolute universals’, where the *characteristics* of a given experience *as such* are generalized (‘this matter’, ‘this feeling’, &c., appear as examples of ‘matter’, ‘feeling’, &c., i.e. as one of the *rūpakkhandhā*, of the *vedanākkhandhā*, and so on: see Majjhima xi,9 <M.iii,16-7>—cf. CETANĀ [A]. The former is partly a discursive withdrawal from the real into the imaginary (or from the imaginary into the imaginary imaginary, as when a particular *imagined* horse is generalized); the latter, more radical, is an intuitive withdrawal from the immediate (both real and imaginary) into the reflexive, in the stricter sense of note (a[ii]) above. Cf. Bradley, *op. cit.* (*Logic*), I,ii,§§24-27. Note: (i) That ‘this horse’ is ‘one of all possible appearances or aspects of this horse’ before it is ‘one of all possible horses’, and unique particulars (e.g. ‘Socrates’) will not reach the second stage. (ii) That the appearance of universals (of any kind) is due to *reflexion* and not to *abstraction*; and *reflection* is a combination of both: thus ‘relative universals’ do not cease to be universals as reflexion becomes stricter; they simply tend to be disregarded (or ‘put in brackets’). (iii) That *abstractions* and *ideas* are the same thing; and, though they do not exist *apart* from images, they are not anchored to any one particular image; but, in the sense that they necessarily have one or another concrete (even if multiple) imaginary content, the abstraction is illusory: abstraction is a discursive escape from the *singularity* of the real to the *plurality* of the imaginary—it is *not* an escape from the concrete. (This shows the reason for Kierkegaard’s paradox—see Preface [n].) (iv) That it is a function of the practice of *samādhi* to reduce discursive thinking: mindfulness of breathing is particularly recommended—

ānāpānasati bhāvetabbā
vitakk’upacchedāya

Mindfulness of breathing should be developed
for the cutting-off of thoughts.

(Udāna iv,1 <Ud.37>). (The fact that almost nothing is said in these *Notes* about *samādhi* is due simply to their exclusive concern with right and wrong *ditṭhi*, and is absolutely not to be taken as implying that the task of developing *samādhi* can be dispensed with.)

Cakkhum, Etaṃ mama, eso'ham asmi, eso me attā ti samanupassati.
Cakkhum, N'etaṃ mama, n'eso'ham asmi, n'eso me attā ti samanupassati.
 Majjhima xv,6 <M.iii,284>

‘This is mine; this am I; this is my self’—so he regards the eye.
 ‘Not, this is mine; not, this am I; not, this is my self’—so he
 regards the eye.

If *N'etaṃ mama* is translated ‘This is not mine’ the implication is that *something other than this is mine*, which must be avoided. These three views (of which the *sotāpanna* is free) correspond to three degrees or levels of appropriation. *Etaṃ mama* is the most fundamental, a rationalization (or at least a conceptual elaboration) of the situation described in the *Mūlapariyāyasutta* (Majjhima i,1 <M.i,1-6>) and in the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta* iii,8 <S.iv,22-3>. *Eso'ham asmi* is a rationalization of *asmimāna*. *Eso me attā* is a rationalization of *attavāda*—it is full-blown *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*. Though the *sotāpanna* is free of these views, he is not yet free of the *maññanā* of the *Mūlapariyāyasutta* (which is fundamental in all *bhava*) or of *asmimāna*, but he cannot be said to have *attavāda*.⁴⁰ See DHAMMA [D] & PHASSA. The *sotāpanna* (and the other two *sekhā*), in whom *asmimāna* is still present, know and see for themselves that notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ are deceptions. So they say *N'etaṃ mama, n'eso'ham asmi, n'eso me attā ti*. The *arahat* is quite free from *asmimāna*, and, not having any trace of ‘I’ and ‘mine’, does not even say *N'etaṃ mama, n'eso'ham asmi, n'eso me attā ti*.

an. This account of mind (as *manāyatana*) is not entirely satisfactory. We should probably do better to envisage mind in this context as five imaginary *ajjhattāyatanāni* related to the five real *ajjhattāyatanāni* (eye, ear, and so on) as imaginary sights and sounds (and so on) are related to real sights and sounds. (See NĀMA [B].) The *world*, of course, includes both the real (or present) and the imaginary (or absent); and just as, to see real things, there must be a real eye (incarnating a real point of view) ‘in the world’, so, to see imaginary things, there must be an imaginary eye (incarnating an imaginary point of view) also ‘in the world’. Cf. Majjhima v,3 <M.i,295>.

Rūpa

In the Kevaddhasutta (Dīgha i,11 <D.i,223>), it is said that the question ‘Where do the four *mahābhūtā* finally cease?’ is wrongly asked, and that the question should be ‘Where do [the four *mahābhūtā*] get no footing? Where do *nāma* and *rūpa* finally cease?’ Matter or substance (*rūpa*) is essentially *inertia* or *resistance* (see Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>⁹), or as the four *mahābhūtā* it can be regarded as four kinds of *behaviour* (i.e. the four primary patterns of inertia—see

ao. The Mūlapariyāyasutta is as follows. (i) The *puthujjana* ‘perceives X as X; perceiving X as X, he conceives X, he conceives In X, he conceives From X, he conceives “X is mine”; he delights in X...’. (ii) The *sekha* ‘recognizes X as X; recognizing X as X, he should not conceive X, he should not conceive In X, he should not conceive From X, he should not conceive “X is mine”; he should not delight in X...’. (iii) The *arahat* ‘recognizes X as X; recognizing X as X, he does not conceive X, he does not conceive In X, he does not conceive From X, he does not conceive “X is mine”; he does not delight in X...’. This tetrad of *maññanā*, of ‘conceivings’, represents four progressive levels of explicitness in the basic structure of appropriation. The first, ‘he conceives X’, is so subtle that the appropriation is simply implicit in the verb. Taking advantage of an extension of meaning (not, however, found in the Pali *maññati*), we can re-state ‘he conceives X’ as ‘X conceives’, and then understand this as ‘X is pregnant’—pregnant, that is to say, with *subjectivity*. And, just as when a woman first conceives she has nothing to show for it, so at this most implicit level we can still only say ‘X’; but as the pregnancy advances, and it begins to be noticeable, we are obliged to say ‘In X’; then the third stage of the pregnancy, when we begin to suspect that a separation is eventually going to take place, can be described as ‘From X’; and the fourth stage, when the infant’s head makes a public appearance and the separation is on the point of becoming definite, is the explicit ‘X is mine (*me*, not *ma-ma*)’. This separation is first actually realized in *asmimāna*, where I, as subject, am opposed to X, as object; and when the subject eventually grows up he becomes the ‘self’ of *attavāda*, face to face with the ‘world’ in which he exists. (In spite of the simile, what is described here is a single graded structure all implicated in the present, and not a development taking place in time. When there is *attavāda*, the rest of this edifice lies beneath it: thus *attavāda* requires *asmimāna* (and the rest), but there can be *asmimāna* without *attavāda*.) Note that it is only the *sekha* who has the ethical imperative ‘should not’: the *puthujjana*, not ‘recognizing X as X’ (he perceives X as X, but not as impermanent), does not see for himself that he should not conceive X; while the *arahat*, though ‘recognizing X as X’, no longer conceives X. See KAMMA.

NĀMA). Behaviour (or inertia) is independent of the particular sense-experience that happens to be exhibiting it: a message in the Morse code (which would be a certain complex mode of behaviour) could be received in *any* sense-experience (though seeing and hearing are the most usual). In any one kind of sense-experience there is revealed a vast set of various behaviours, of various patterns of inertia; and in any other contemporary sense-experience there is revealed a set that, to a great extent, corresponds to this first set.^{ap} (One particular group of behaviours common to all my sense-experiences is of especial significance—it is ‘this body’,

<i>ayaṃ kāyo rūpī catummahābhūṭiko</i>	this body composed of matter, of the four great entities
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[Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,500>].) Thus, when I *see* a bird opening its beak at intervals I can often at the same time *hear* a corresponding sound, and I say that it is the (visible) bird that is (audibly) singing. The fact that there seems to be one single (though elaborate) set of behaviours common to all my sense-experiences at any one time, and not an entirely different set for each sense, gives rise to the notion of one single material world revealed indifferently by any one of my senses. Furthermore, the material world of one individual largely corresponds to that of another (particularly if allowance is made for difference in point of view), and we arrive at the wider notion of one general material world common to all individuals.^{aq} The fact that a given mode of behaviour can be common to sense-experiences of two or more different kinds shows that it is independent of any one partic-

ap. Mind-experience is not considered in this Note to avoid complication. It is not, however, essentially different. See MANO [c].

aq. Natural science, in taking this concept as its starting-point and polishing it a little to remove irregularities, has no place for the individual and his sense-experience (let alone mind-experience or imagination); for the material world of science is *by definition* utterly without point of view (in relativity theory *every* point is a point of view, which comes to the same thing), it is uniformly and quite indifferently *communal*—it is essentially *public*. Consciousness, intention, perception, and feeling, not being public, are not a part of the universe of science. Science is *inherently* incapable of understanding the nature of material change due to conscious action—which is, concisely, reflexive exercise of preference for one available mode of behaviour (or set of them) at the expense of the others. (Quantum physics, in hoping to reinstate the ‘observer’—even if only as a point of view—, is merely locking the stable door after the horse has been stolen.)

ular kind of consciousness (unlike a given perception—blue, for example, which is dependent upon eye-consciousness and not upon ear-consciousness or the others); and being independent of any one particular kind of consciousness it is independent of *all* consciousness *except for its presence or existence*. One mode of behaviour can be distinguished from another, and in order that this can be done they must *exist*—they must be present either in reality or in imagination, they must be *cognized*. But since it makes no difference in what form they are present—whether as sights or sounds (and even with one as visible and one as audible, and one real and one imaginary)—, the difference between them is not a matter of consciousness.^{ar} Behaviour, then, *in itself* does not involve consciousness (as perception does), and the *rūpakkhanda* is not *phassapaccayā* (as the *saññākkhanda* is)—

ar. A visual and an auditive experience differ in consciousness (whether or not they differ in matter); but between two different visual (or auditive) experiences the difference is in matter (or substance, or inertia) and not in consciousness. [At this point the question might be asked, ‘What is the *material* difference between the simple experiences of, for example, a blue thing and a red thing (ignoring spatial extension)?’ The immediate answer is that they are simply *different* things, i.e. *different inertias*. But if it is insisted that one inertia can only differ from another in *behaviour* (i.e. in *pattern* of inertia)—in other words, that no inertia is absolutely simple—, we shall perhaps find the answer in the idea of a difference in *frequency*. But this would involve us in discussion of an order of structure underlying the four *mahābhūtā*. See FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE [J.] Thus it will be observed that all difference in appearance (*nāma*) is difference in either consciousness (*viññāṇa*) or matter (*rūpa*). Why is this? Neither consciousness nor matter, by itself, can *appear* (or be manifest); for consciousness by itself lacks substance or specification—it is pure presence or existence without any *thing* that is present (or exists)—, and matter by itself lacks presence or existence—it is pure substance or specification, of which one cannot say ‘it is’ (i.e. ‘it is *present* [or *absent*]’). Appearance or manifestation must necessarily partake of both consciousness and matter, but as an *overlapping* (— —) and not simply an addition (for the simple superposition of two things each itself incapable of appearing would not produce appearance). Appearance is existence *as* substance, or substance *as* existence, and there must be *also* simple existence (or consciousness) and simple substance (or matter) to support this imbrication. Appearance, in a manner of speaking, is *sandwiched* between consciousness and matter: there must be *rūpa*, and *nāma*, and *viññāṇa* ($\frac{\text{r}}{\text{n}} \frac{\text{v}}{\text{v}}$). (There is more to be said about this, but not briefly.) It is because of this structure that all differences in appearance can be resolved into differences either of consciousness or of matter (or both).

see Majjhima xi,9 <M.iii,17>. In itself, purely as inertia or behaviour, matter cannot be said to *exist*. (Cf. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 212.) And if it cannot be said to *exist* it cannot be said to *cease*. Thus the question ‘Where do the four *mahābhūtā* finally cease?’ is improper. (The question will have been asked with the notion in mind of an existing general material world common to all. Such a general world could only exist—and cease—if there were a general consciousness common to all. But this is a contradiction, since consciousness and individuality [see SAKKĀYA] are one.) But behaviour can get a footing in existence by being *present in some form*. As *rūpa* in *nāmarūpa*, the four *mahābhūtā* get a borrowed existence as the *behaviour* of *appearance* (just as feeling, perception, and intentions, get a borrowed substance as the *appearance* of *behaviour*). And *nāmarūpa* is the condition for *viññāṇa* as *viññāṇa* is for *nāmarūpa*. When *viññāṇa* (q.v.) is *anidassana* it is said to have ceased (since *avijjā* has ceased). Thus, with cessation of *viññāṇa* there is cessation of *nāmarūpa*, and the four *mahābhūtā* no longer get a footing in existence. (The passage at Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta xix,8 <S.iv,192>,

...bhikkhu catunnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ samudayañ ca atthagamañ ca yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti,

...a monk understands as they really are the arising and ceasing of the four great entities.

is to be understood in this sense.) From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that in order to distinguish *rūpa* from *nāma* it is only necessary to separate what is (or could be) common to two or more kinds of consciousness from what is not. But care is needed. It might seem that *shape* is *rūpa* and not *nāma* since it is present in both eye-consciousness and body-consciousness (e.g. touching with the fingers). This, however, is a mistake. Vision is a *double* faculty: it cognizes both colour and shape (see FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE §§I/4 & II/8). The eye *touches* what it *sees* (it is only necessary to run the eye first across and then down some vertical lines or bars to discover this), and the result is *coloured shapes*. The eye is capable of intentional movement more delicate even than the fingers, and the corresponding perception of shapes is even more subtle.^{as} Similar considerations apply, though in a much lesser degree, to hearing (and even to taste and to smell) where perception of shape, when present (however vaguely), corresponds to movement, real or imaginary (which will include the directional effect of two ears), of the head or of the entire body.^{at} But provided different kinds of consciousness are adequately distinguished, this method

gives a definite criterion for telling what is matter from what is not. It is consequently not necessary to look for strict analysis of the four *mahābhūtā*: provided only that our idea of them conforms to this criterion, and that they cover all the primary modes of matter, this is all that is needed. Thus it is not necessary to look beyond the passage at Majjhima xiv,10 <M.iii,240> for a definition of them. (It is easy, but fatal, to assume that the Buddha's Teaching is concerned with analysis for its own sake, and then to complain that the analysis is not pushed far enough.) A human body in action, clearly enough, will present a behaviour that is a highly complex combination of these primary modes: it is behaviour of behaviour, but it still does not get beyond behaviour. (It is important to note that the laws of science—of biochemistry and physics in particular—do *not* cover behaviour (i.e. matter) associated with conscious [intentional] action.)^{au}

as. Strictly, the shapes are there before the eyeball is moved, just as the hand perceives the shape of an object merely by resting on it; *movement* of the eyeball, as of the fingers, only confirms the perception and makes it explicit. This does not matter: we are concerned only to point out the similarity of the eye and the hand as both yielding perceptions of shape, not to give an account of such perceptions.

at. This discussion, it will be seen, makes *space* a secondary and not a primary quality (see NĀMA [D]): space is essentially *tactile* (in a wide sense), and is related to the body (as organ of touch) as colours and sounds (and so on) are related to the eye and the ear—indeed, we should do better to think of 'spaces' rather than of any absolute 'space'. Space, in fact, has no right to its privileged position opposite time as one of the joint basic determinants of matter: we are no more entitled to speak of 'space-(&-)time' than we are of 'smell-(&-)time'. Time itself is not absolute (see PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C] & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE §11/5), and material things, as they exist, are not 'in' time (like floatage on a river), but rather have time as their characteristic; space, however, besides not being absolute, is not, strictly, even a characteristic of matter. On the other hand, our first four sense-organs are each a part of the body, which is the fifth, and space *does* hold a privileged position relative to colour, sound, smell, and taste. Thus we sometimes find in the Suttas (e.g. Majjhima vii,2 <M.i,423>) an *ākāśadhātu* alongside the four *mahābhūtā*; and for practical purposes—which is ultimately all we are concerned with—space can be regarded as a quasi-material element. But the Milindapañha has no business whatever to put *ākāsa* together with *nibbāna* as *asaṅkhata*.

au. *Pace* Russell: 'Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics'. *Op. cit.*, VIIIth Essay, §xi.

Consciousness (*viññāṇa*) can be thought of as the *presence* of a phenomenon, which consists of *nāma* and *rūpa*. *Nāmarūpa* and *viññāṇa* together constitute the phenomenon ‘in person’—i.e. an *experience* (in German: *Erlebnis*). The phenomenon is the *support* (*ārammaṇa*—see first reference in [c] below) of consciousness, and all consciousness is consciousness of something (*viz*, of a phenomenon). Just as there cannot be *presence* without *something* that is present, so there cannot be something without its being to that extent *present*—thus *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa* depend on each other (see A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §17). ‘To be’ and ‘to be present’ are the same thing.^{av} But note that ‘being’ as *bhava*, involves the existence of the (illusory) *subject*, and with cessation of the conceit (conceit) ‘(I) am’, *asmimāna*, there is cessation of being, *bhavanirodha*. With the *arahat*, there is just *presence of the phenomenon* (‘This is present’), instead of the presence (or existence) of an apparent ‘subject’ to whom there is present an ‘object’ (‘I am, and this is present to [or for] me’, i.e. [what appears to be] the subject is present [‘I am’], the object is present [‘this is’], and the object concerns or ‘belongs to’ the subject [the object is ‘for me’ or ‘mine’]—see PHASSA & ATTĀ); and consciousness is then said to be *anidassana*, ‘non-indicative’ (i.e. not pointing to the presence of a ‘subject’), or *niruddha*, ‘ceased’ (see A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §22). *Viññāṇanirodha* refers indifferently to *anidassana viññāṇa* (*saupādisesa nibbānadhātu*,

av. A distinction must be made. ‘To be’ and ‘being’ are (in English) ambiguous. On the one hand they may refer to the *existence* of a phenomenon as opposed to *what it is* that exists (namely, the phenomenon). This is *viññāṇa* (though it does not follow that *viññāṇa* should be translated as ‘being’ or ‘existence’). On the other hand they may refer to the *existing thing*, the *phenomenon as existing*; in other words, to the *entity*. But a further distinction must be made. The entity that the Buddha’s Teaching is concerned with is not the *thing* but the *person*—but not the person *as opposed to* the thing, as subject in distinction from object. Personal existence is a synthetic relationship, dependent upon *upādāna*, and consisting of a subject and his objects. Being or existence in this pregnant sense is *bhava*, at least as it occurs in the *paṭiccasamuppāda* context, and the ‘entity’ in question is *sakkāya* (q.v.) or *pañc’upādānakkhandhā*. (It must be noted that the ‘existence’ of the living *arahat* is, properly speaking, not *bhava* but *bhavanirodha*, since the conceit ‘(I) am’ has ceased. Strictly, there is no *arahat* to be found. See [b].) *Bhava* is to be translated as ‘being’ (or ‘existence’).

which refers to the living *arahat*: Itivuttaka II,ii,7 <Iti.38>¹²) and to cessation, at the *arahat*'s death, of all consciousness whatsoever (*anupādisesa nibbānadhātu*).^{aw} *Viññāṇanirodha*, strictly speaking, is cessation of *viññāṇ'upādānakkhandha* as *bhavanirodha* is cessation of *pañc'upādānakkhandhā* (i.e. *sakkāyanirodha*), but it is extended to cover the final cessation of *viññāṇakkhandha* (and therefore of *pañcakkhandhā*) at the breaking up of the *arahat*'s body.

Consciousness, it must be noted, is emphatically no more 'subjective' than are the other four *upādānakkhandhā* (i.e. than *nāmarūpa*). (This should be clear from what has gone before; but it is a commonly held view that consciousness is essentially subjective, and a slight discussion will be in place.) It is quite wrong to regard *viññāṇa* as the subject to whom the phenomenon (*nāmarūpa*), now regarded as object, is present (in which case we should have to say, with Sartre, that consciousness as subjectivity is *presence to the object*). *Viññāṇa* is negative as regards essence (or 'what-ness'): it is not *part* of the phenomenon, of what is present, but is simply the presence of the phenomenon.^{ax} Consequently, in visual experience (for example), *phenomena are seen, eye-consciousness is not seen* (being negative as regards essence), yet *there is eye-consciousness* (eye-consciousness is present *reflexively*).^{ay} In this way consciousness comes to be associated with the body (*saviññāṇaka kāya*), and is frequently identified as the subject, or at least as subjectivity (e.g. by Husserl [see CETANĀ [B]] and Sartre [*op. cit.*, p. 27]). (To follow this discussion reference should be made to PHASSA, particularly [C], where it is shown that there is a natural tendency for subjectivity to be associated with the body. Three distinct pairs of complementaries are thus seen to be superimposed: eye & forms (or, generally: six-based body & externals); consciousness & phenomena; subject & objects. To identify consciousness and the subject is only too easy. With attainment of *arahattā* all trace of the subject-&-objects duality vanishes. Cf. also ATTĀ [C].)

aw. Strictly, we cannot speak of the 'living *arahat*' or of the '*arahat*'s death'—see A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §§10 & 22. The terms *saupādisesa* and *anupādisesa nibbānadhātu*, which sometimes give trouble, may be rendered 'extinction-element with/without residue'. *Saupādisesa* and *anupādisesa* occur at Majjhima xi,5 <M.ii,257&259>, where they can hardly mean more than 'with/without something (stuff, material) left'. At Majjhima i,10 <M.i,62> the presence of *upādisesa* is what distinguishes the *anāgāmī* from the *arahat*, which is clearly not the same thing as what distinguishes the two extinction-elements. *Upādisesa* must therefore be *unspecified* residue.

Sakkāya is *pañc'upādānakkhandhā* (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,299>), and may conveniently be translated as ‘somebody’ or ‘person’ or, abstractly, ‘personality’. See PARAMATTHA SACCA, also for what follows.

An *arahat* (while alive—that is, if we can speak of a ‘living *arahat*’) continues to be *individual* in the sense that ‘he’ is a sequence of states (Theragāthā v. 716)¹³ distinguishable from other *arahanto*

ax. See Khandha Saṃy. vi,2 <S.iii,54>. *Viññāṇa* is positively differentiated only by what it arises in dependence upon. E.g., that dependent upon eye and visible forms is eye-consciousness, and so with the rest. Cf. Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,259>. That none of the five *upādānakkhandhā* is to be regarded as ‘subjective’ can be seen from the following passage:

*So yad eva tattha hoti rūpagataṃ
vedanāgataṃ saññāgataṃ sañ-
khāragataṃ viññāgataṃ te
dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato
gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato
parato palokato suññato anattato
samanupassati.*

Whatever herein there is of matter, of feeling, of perception, of determinations, of consciousness, these things he regards as impermanent, as suffering, as sickness, as a boil, as a dart, as a calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as wasting, as void, as not-self.

Majjhima vii,4 <M.i,435> (This formula, which is applied in turn to each of the ascending *jhāna* attainments, should be enough to dispel any idea that *jhāna* is a mystical experience, in the sense—see Preface (*m*)—of being intuition of, or union with, some Transcendental Being or Absolute Principle.)

ay. In reflexion, different *degrees* of consciousness, of presence, will be apparent. Distinction should be made between immediate presence and reflexive presence:

Immediate presence: ‘a pain is’, or ‘consciousness of a pain’.

Reflexive presence: ‘there is an existing pain’, or ‘there is consciousness of a pain’.

We can say ‘there is consciousness’, which means ‘there is immediate presence’ (‘of a pain’, of course, being understood or ‘in brackets’), and this is reflexive evidence. But we cannot say ‘consciousness is’, or ‘consciousness of consciousness’ (i.e. immediate presence of immediate presence), since presence cannot be immediately present as a pain can. In French, the verbal distinction is more marked: *être/y avoir* (‘*ceci est*’/‘*il y a ceci*’). In Pali, the distinction is: *ruppati/atthi rūpaṃ*; *vediyati/atthi vedanā*; *sañjānāti/atthi saññā*; *abhisankharonti/atthi sañkhārā*; *vijānāti/atthi viññāṇaṃ*. (The reflexive reduplication of experience is, of course, reduplication of all five *khandhā*, not of *viññāṇa* alone.)

(and *a fortiori* from individuals other than *arahanto*). Every set of *pañcakkhandhā*^{az}—not *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* in the *arahat*’s case—is unique, and individuality in this sense ceases only with the final cessation of the *pañcakkhandhā* at the breaking up of the *arahat*’s body. But a living *arahat* is no longer *somebody* or a *person*, since the notion or conceit ‘(I) am’ has already ceased. *Individuality* must therefore be carefully distinguished from *personality*,^{ba} which is: being a person, being somebody, being a subject (to whom objects are present), selfhood, the mirage ‘I am’, and so on. The *puthujjana* is not able to distinguish them—for him individuality is not conceivable apart from personality, which he takes as selfhood. The *sotāpanna* is able to distinguish them—he sees that personality or ‘selfhood’ is a deception dependent upon *avijjā*, a deception dependent upon not seeing the deception, which is not the case with individuality—, though he is not yet free from an aroma of subjectivity, *asmimāna*. The *arahat* not only distinguishes them but also has entirely got rid of all taint of subjectivity—‘he’ is individual but in no way personal. For lack of suitable expressions (which in any case would puzzle the *puthujjana*) ‘he’ is obliged to go on saying ‘I’ and ‘me’ and ‘mine’ (cf. *Dīgha* i,9 <D.i,202>; *Devatā Saṃy.* iii,5 <S.i,14>¹⁴). Individuality where the *arahat* is concerned still involves the perspective or orientation that things necessarily adopt when they *exist*, or are *present*, or are *cognized*; and for each individual the perspective is different. Loss of *upādāna* is not loss of point of view. See RŪPA and remarks on *manasikāra* in NĀMA.

az. Past, future, and present, ‘five aggregates’: matter (or substance), feeling, perception, determinations, and consciousness.

ba. Taken in conjunction with what follows it, this evidently means ‘A *puthujjana* must take good care to become a *sotāpanna*’. In other words, a purely intellectual distinction (i.e. without direct experience) is not possible. (This statement perhaps requires some modification to allow for the *anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato*. One who is *anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato*, though a *puthujjana*, is not at that time *assutavā* (through hearing the Dhamma he has some understanding, but he can still lose this and return to his former state). But to be *anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato* it is by no manner of means enough to have studied the Suttas and to profess oneself a follower of the Buddha. See *Aṅguttara* VI,x,3-6 <A.iii,441-3> & СИПА. *Anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato* may be translated ‘endowed with acquiescence in conformity (*scil.* with the Dhamma)’; such an individual is not of contrary view to the Teaching, but does not actually see it for himself.)

Sakkāyadiṭṭhi (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,300>) is sometimes explained as the view or belief (often attributed to a purely verbal misunderstanding)^{bb} that in one or other of the *khandhā* there is a permanent entity, a ‘self’. These rationalized accounts entirely miss the point, which is the distinction (Khandha Saṃy. v,6 <S.iii,47>) between *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* (which is *sakkāya*) and *pañcakkhandhā* (which is *sakkāyanirodha*). To have *diṭṭhi* about *sakkāya* is not an optional matter (as if one could regard *sakkāya* from the outside and form *diṭṭhi* about it or not, as one pleased): *sakkāya* contains *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (in a latent form at least) as a necessary part of its structure.^{bc} If there is *sakkāya* there is *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, and with the giving up of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* there comes to be cessation of *sakkāya*. To give up *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, *sakkāya* must be *seen* (i.e. as *pañc’upādānakkhandhā*), and this means that the *puthujjana* does not see *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* as such (i.e. he does not recognize them—see MAMA [A] and cf. Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,511>). A *puthujjana* (especially one who puts his trust in the Commentaries) sometimes comes to believe that he *does* see *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* as such, thereby blocking his own progress and meeting with frustration: he cannot see what further task is to be done, and yet remains a *puthujjana*.

Saṅkhārā

A full discussion of this key word is given in A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA. It is there maintained that the word *saṅkhāra*, in *all* contexts, means ‘something that something else depends on’, that is to say a *determination* (determinant). It might be thought that this introduces an unnecessary complication into such passages as

*Vayadhammā saṅkhārā appa-
mādena sampādetha*
and
*Aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppāda-
vayadhammino*

To disappear is the nature of deter-
minations; strive unremittingly.
Impermanent indeed are determina-
tions; to arise (appear) and disap-
pear is their nature.

bb. If *avijjā* were simply a matter of verbal misunderstanding, a maggot would be an *arahat*.

bc. The reader is referred to the passage (*d*) in the Preface, quoted from Blackham. It is not possible to lay too much stress on this point. See also DHAMMA [C], NIBBĀNA [A], & A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §§24 & 25.

(Dīgha ii,3 <D.ii,156&7>). Why, instead of telling us that *things* (*dhammā*) are impermanent and bound to disappear, should the Buddha take us out of our way to let us know that *things that things depend on* are impermanent and bound to disappear? The answer is that the Dhamma does not set out to *explain*, but to *lead*—it is *opanayika*. This means that the Dhamma is not seeking disinterested intellectual approval, but to provoke an effort of comprehension or insight leading to the abandonment of *attavāda* and eventually of *asmimāna*. Its method is therefore necessarily indirect: we can only stop regarding *this* as ‘self’ if we see that what *this* depends on is impermanent (see Dhamma for more detail). Consider, for example, the Mahāsudassanasuttanta (Dīgha ii,4 <D.ii,169-99>), where the Buddha describes in detail the rich endowments and possessions of King Mahāsudassana, and then finishes:

*Pass’Ānanda sabbe te saṅkhārā
atītā niruddhā vipariṇatā.
Evaṃ aniccā kho Ānanda
saṅkhārā, evaṃ addhuvā kho
Ānanda saṅkhārā, yāvañ c’idaṃ
Ānanda alam eva sabba-
saṅkhāresu nibbindituṃ, alaṃ
virajjituṃ, alaṃ vimuccituṃ.*

See, Ānanda, how all those determinations have passed, have ceased, have altered. So impermanent, Ānanda, are determinations, so unlasting, Ānanda, are determinations, that this, Ānanda, is enough for weariness of all determinations, enough for dispassion, enough for release.

This is not a simple statement that all those things, being impermanent by nature, are now no more; it is a lever to prize the notion of ‘self-hood’ out of its firm socket. Those things were *saṅkhārā*: they were things on which King Mahāsudassana depended for his very identity; they determined his person as ‘King Mahāsudassana’, and with their cessation the thought ‘I am King Mahāsudassana’ came to an end. More formally, those *saṅkhārā* were *nāmarūpa*, the condition for *phassa* (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>⁹), upon which *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* depends (cf. Dīgha i,1 <D.i,42-3> together with Citta Saṃy. 3 <S.iv,287>).

Saññā

Saññā and *viññāṇa* (perception and consciousness) may be differentiated as follows. *Saññā* (defined in Aṅguttara VI,vi,9 <A.iii,413>) is the quality or percept itself (e.g. blue), whereas *viññāṇa* (q.v.) is the presence or consciousness of the quality or percept—or, more strictly,

of the thing exhibiting the quality or percept (i.e. of *nāmarūpa*). (A quality, it may be noted, is unchanged whether it is present or absent—blue is blue whether seen or imagined—, and the word *saññā* is used both of five-base experience and of mental experience.)

It would be as wrong to say ‘a feeling is perceived’ as it would ‘a percept is felt’ (which mix up *saññā* and *vedanā*); but it is quite in order to say ‘a feeling, a percept, (that is, a felt thing, a perceived thing) is cognized’, which simply means that a feeling or a percept is present (as, indeed, they both are in all experience—see Majjhima v,3 <M.i,293>¹⁵). Strictly speaking, then, what is *cognized* is *nāmarūpa*, whereas what is *perceived* (or *felt*) is *saññā* (or *vedanā*), i.e. only *nāma*. This distinction can be shown grammatically. *Vijānāti*, to cognize, is active voice in sense (taking an objective accusative): consciousness *cognizes a phenomenon* (*nāmarūpa*); consciousness is always consciousness of something. *Sañjānāti*, to perceive, (or *vediyati*, to feel) is middle voice in sense (taking a cognate accusative): perception *perceives* [a percept] (or feeling *feels* [a feeling]). Thus we *should* say ‘a blue thing (= a blueness), a painful thing (= a pain), is cognized’, but ‘blue is perceived’ and ‘pain is felt’. (In the Suttas generally, due allowance is to be made for the elasticity in the common usage of words. But in certain passages, and also in one’s finer thinking, stricter definition may be required.)

At Dīgha i,9 <D.i,185>, Poṭṭhapāda asks the Buddha whether perception arises before knowledge, or knowledge before perception, or both together. The Buddha gives the following answer:

Saññā kho Poṭṭhapāda paṭhamam uppajjati, pacchā ñāṇam; saññ’uppādā ca pana ñāṇ’uppādo hoti. So evam pajānāti, Idapaccayā kira me ñāṇam udapādī ti.

Perception, Poṭṭhapāda, arises first, knowledge afterwards; but with arising of perception there is arising of knowledge. One understands thus: ‘With this as condition, indeed, knowledge arose in me.’

Saññā thus precedes *ñāṇa*, not only temporally but also structurally (or logically). *Perception*, that is to say, *is structurally simpler than knowledge*; and though perception comes first in time, it does not cease (see CITTĀ) in order that knowledge can arise.^{bd} However many stories there are to a house, the ground floor is built first; but it is not then removed to make way for the rest. (The case of *vitakkavicārā* and *vācā*—A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §5—is parallel.)

The temptation must be resisted (into which, however, the Visuddhimagga [Ch. XIV] falls) to understand *viññāṇa*, in the primitive context of the *khandhā*, as a more elaborate version of *saññā*, thus approximating it to *ñāṇa*. But, whereas there is always consciousness when there is perception (see above), there is not always knowledge (which is *preceded* by perception). The difference between *viññāṇa* and *saññā* is in *kind*, not in *degree*. (In looser contexts, however,—e.g. Majjhima v,7 <M.i,317>—*viññāṇa* does tend to mean ‘knowing’, but not in opposition to *saññā*. In Majjhima xv,1 <M.iii,259-60>¹⁶ & xiv,8 <227-8>¹⁷ *viññāṇa* occurs in both senses, where the second is the complex consciousness of reflexion, i.e. the presence of a *known* phenomenon—of an *example of a universal*, that is to say.)

bd. Cf. Bradley on *judgement* (*op. cit.* [Logic], T.E. II): ‘I have taken judgement as the more or less conscious enlargement of an object, not in fact but as truth. The object is thus not altered in existence, but qualified in idea. ...For the object, merely as perceived, is not, as such, qualified as true.’ And on *inference* (T.E. I): ‘And our inference, to retain its unity and so in short be an inference, must... remain throughout within the limits of its special object.’ ‘Every inference, we saw, both starts with and is confined to a special object.’ ‘If, on the one hand, the object does not advance beyond its beginning, there clearly is no inference. But, on the other hand, if the object passes beyond what is itself, the inference is destroyed.’ For Bradley, all inference is an ideal self-development of a real object, and judgement is an implicit inference. (For ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ we shall prefer ‘immediate’ and ‘reflexive’, at least in the first place.)

This will scarcely be intelligible to the rationalist, who does not admit any experience more simple, structurally speaking, than knowledge. For the rationalist, moreover, all knowledge is explicitly inferential, whereas, as Sartre has pointed out (*op. cit.*, p. 220), there is no knowledge, properly speaking, other than intuitive. Inference is merely instrumental in leading to intuition, and is then discarded; or, if intuition is not reached, it remains as a signpost. Rational knowledge is thus at two removes from perception (which, of course, is intuitive); and similarly with descriptive knowledge. Intuition is immediate contact between subject and object (see PHASSA); with the reflexive reduplication of intuitive knowledge (see ATTĀ [A] & MANO [b]), this becomes immediate contact between *knowing* (reflecting) subject and *known* (reflected) object; which, in the case of the *arahat*, is simply (presence of) the *known thing*. Cf. also Heidegger, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-62 & 212-30.

4. FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE

SHOWING 'INVARIANCE UNDER TRANSFORMATION'

*Tiṇ'imāni bhikkhave saṅkha-
tassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni.
Katamāni tīṇi. Uppādo
paññāyati, vayo paññāyati,
ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññā-
yati. Imāni kho bhikkhave
tīṇi saṅkhatassa saṅkhata-
lakkhanāni ti.*
Aṅguttara III,v,7 <A.i,152>

There are, monks, these three determined-characteristics of what is determined. Which are the three? Arising (appearance) is manifest; disappearance is manifest; change while standing is manifest. These, monks, are the three determined-characteristics of what is determined.

*Tayo'me bhikkhave addhā.
Katame tayo. Atīto addhā,
anāgato addhā, paccuppanno
addhā. Ime kho bhikkhave
tayo addhā ti.*
Itivuttaka III,ii,4 <Iti.53>

There are, monks, these three periods. Which are the three? The past period, the future period, the present period. These, monks, are the three periods.

I. Static Aspect

1. Let *o* represent a thing.^a
 2. If we wish to represent another thing, not *o*, we must represent it by another symbol; for we cannot distinguish between *o* and *o* except by the fact of their being spatially separated, left and right, on this page; and since this is a representation, not of a structure *in* space (i.e. of a spatial object), but of the structure *of* space (amongst other things), which structure is not itself spatial, such spatial distinctions in the representation must not be taken into account.^b Thus, whether we write *o* once or a hundred times still only one thing is represented.
 3. Let us, then, represent a thing other than *o* by *x*. (We are concerned to represent only the *framework* within which things exist, that is to say the *possibility* of the existence of things; consequently it does not matter whether there *are* in fact things—it is enough that there *could* be. But the actual existence of things is indispensable evidence that they *can* exist; and when there actually is a given thing *o*, there actually are, also, *other* things.)^c We now have *two* things, *o* and *x*.
-

a. An *existing* thing is an experience (in German: *Erlebnis*), either present or (in some degree) absent (i.e. either immediately or more or less remotely present). See NĀMA & RŪPA.

b. See RŪPA [E], where it is shown that space is a secondary, not a primary, quality.

c. All this, of course, is tautologous; for ‘to be a thing’ means ‘to be able to be or exist’, and there is no *thing* that *cannot* exist. And if anything exists, everything else does (see (a) above). Compare this utterance of Parmenides: ‘It needs must be that what can be thought of and spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is no thing to be’. (Parmenides seems to have drawn excessive conclusions from this principle through ignoring the fact that a thought is an imaginary, and therefore *absent*, experience—or rather, a complex of absent experiences—; but the principle itself is sound. The images involved in thinking must, individually at least [though not necessarily in association], already in some sense be *given*—i.e. as what is *elsewhere*, or *at some other time*, or both—at the immediate level, before they can be thought. Perhaps the method of this Note will suggest a reconciliation between the Parmenidean absolute denial of the existence of no thing, with its corollary, the absolute existence of whatever does exist, and the merely *relative* existence of every thing as implied by the undeniable fact of change.)

4. We are, however, still unable to distinguish them; for, since spatial distinctions are to be disregarded, we cannot tell which is the original thing, o or x. Experience shows us that when we are conscious of one thing we are not also equally conscious of another thing; or, better, it can always be observed (by reflexion) that two (different) experiences are not both the centre of consciousness at the same time. The difference between two things is, ultimately, their order of priority—one is ‘this’ and the other is ‘that’—, and this difference we represent by a difference in shape; for if two things are identical in all qualitative respects, have *all* their properties in common (including position if they are tactile things—and it must be remembered that the eye, since it is muscular, is also an organ of touch, giving perceptions of space and shape as well as of colour and light),^d no priority is evident, and there are not *two* things, but only one; and thus difference in priority can be represented by difference of qualitative property. But difference in shape alone only tells us that if one of them is ‘this’ the other is ‘that’—it does not tell us *which* is ‘this’.^e

5. We have, then, to distinguish between *first* and *second*, or *one* and *two*. At first sight this seems easy—*one* is obviously o and *two* is o x. But since it makes no difference *where* we write these symbols (spatial distinctions being of no account), we cannot be sure that they will not group themselves o o and x. Since o and o are only one thing, namely o, we are back where we started.

6. To say that o and o are only one thing is to say that there is *no* difference between them; and to say that o and x are two things is to say that there *is* a difference between them (no matter which precedes). In other words, *two* things define a thing, namely the difference between them. And the difference between them, clearly, is what has to be done to pass from one to the other, or the *operation of trans-*

d. Strictly, we should not go *from* muscles *to* spatial perceptions. Spatial perceptions come first; then we observe that whenever there are spatial perceptions a muscular organ can be found; finally we conclude that a muscular organ is *very probably* a condition for spatial perceptions. See PHASSA & RŪPA.

e. McTaggart, I discover, (op. cit. §45) bases his version of fundamental structure on a twofold direct appeal to experience: first, that something exists, and secondly, that more than one thing exists. But this is not enough: it is essential also to see that, of two things, in so far as they are two, one is ‘this’ and one is ‘that’.

forming one into the other (that is, of interchanging them). A little thought will show that this operation is *invariant* during the transformation (a 'journey from A to B'—to give a rough illustration—remains unchanged as a 'journey from A to B' at all stages of the journey), and also that the operation is a thing of a higher or more general order than either of the two things that define it (a 'journey from A to B' is more general than either 'being in A' or 'being in B' since it embraces both: a 'journey from A to B' may be *defined* as the operation of transforming 'being in A' into 'being in B' and 'not being in B' into 'not being in A'). Each of these two things, furthermore, is itself an operation of the same nature, but of a lower or more particular order (a 'journey from one part of A [or B] to another' is 'being in A [or B]', just as a 'journey from A to B' is 'being in Z', where A and B are adjacent towns and Z is the province containing them). But we must get back to our noughts and crosses.

7. Since $o\ o$ is *one*, and $o\ x$ is *two* (though the order of precedence between o and x is not determined), it is evident that we can use these two pairs to distinguish between *first* and *second*. In *whatever* way the four symbols, o , o , o , and x , may pair off, the result is the same (and it makes no difference whether $o\ o$ is regarded as one thing and $o\ x$ as two things, or, as in the last paragraph, $o\ o$ is regarded as no operation and $o\ x$ as one operation—*nought* precedes *one* as *one* precedes *two*). We have only to write down these four symbols (in any pattern we please) to represent 'two things, o and x , o preceding x '.

8. As these four symbols pair off, we get two distinguishable things, $o\ o$ and $o\ x$ (which are 'o first' and 'x second'). These two things themselves define an operation—that of transforming $o\ o$ into $o\ x$ and $o\ x$ into $o\ o$. This operation is itself a thing, which we may write, purely for the sake of convenience, thus: $\begin{matrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{matrix}$.

9. It will readily be seen that if $\begin{matrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{matrix}$ is a thing, then another thing, not $\begin{matrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{matrix}$, will be represented by $\begin{matrix} x & x \\ x & o \end{matrix}$; for if we take $\begin{matrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{matrix}$ as 'o precedes x', then we must take $\begin{matrix} x & x \\ x & o \end{matrix}$ as 'x precedes o'. But we do not know which comes first, $\begin{matrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{matrix}$ or $\begin{matrix} x & x \\ x & o \end{matrix}$. By repetition of the earlier discussion, we see that we must take three of one and one of the other to indicate precedence; and in this way we arrive at a fresh thing (of greater complexity) represented

by $\begin{array}{c|c|c|c} \text{o} & \text{o} & \text{o} & \text{o} \\ \text{o} & \text{x} & \text{o} & \text{x} \\ \text{o} & \text{o} & \text{x} & \text{x} \\ \text{o} & \text{x} & \text{x} & \text{o} \end{array}$. Here it is clear that though in the fourth quarter, $\begin{array}{c} \text{x} & \text{x} \\ \text{x} & \text{o} \end{array}$, x pre-

cedes o, yet the first quarter, $\begin{array}{c} \text{o} & \text{o} \\ \text{o} & \text{x} \end{array}$, precedes the fourth quarter. So in the whole we must say ‘o precedes x *first*, and then x precedes o’.

10. Obviously we can represent the negative of this fresh thing by

$\begin{array}{c|c|c|c} \text{x} & \text{x} & \text{x} & \text{x} \\ \text{x} & \text{o} & \text{x} & \text{o} \\ \text{x} & \text{x} & \text{o} & \text{o} \\ \text{x} & \text{o} & \text{o} & \text{x} \end{array}$, and repeat the whole procedure to arrive at a thing of still

greater complexity; and there is no limit to the number of times that we can do this.

11. In §7 we said that in whatever way the four symbols, o, o, o, and x, may pair off, the result is the same. In how many ways can they pair off? To find out we must number them. But a difficulty arises. So long as we had the four symbols written down *anywhere*, the objection that we were using spatial distinctions to distinguish one o from another did not arise (and in §8 we noted that we chose to write them $\begin{array}{c} \text{o} & \text{o} \\ \text{o} & \text{x} \end{array}$ purely for convenience’ sake). Once we number them (1, 2, 3, 4), however, the objection becomes valid; for the only distinction between o_1 and o_2 and o_3 —apart from the numbers attached to them—is their relative spatial positioning on this page. But at least we know this, that $\begin{array}{c} \text{o} & \text{o} \\ \text{o} & \text{x} \end{array}$ represents ‘o precedes x’; and so it follows that, even if we cannot distinguish between the first three, x comes fourth. In any way, then, in which we *happen* to write down these four symbols, *x marks the fourth place*. (If, for example, we had written them o x o o, the symbol x would still mark the fourth place.) And if x comes in the fourth place in the first place, it will come in the first place in the fourth place. This means that we can choose the first place at our convenience (only the fourth place being already fixed) and mark it with ‘x in the fourth place’, i.e. $\begin{array}{c} \text{o} & \text{o} \\ \text{o} & \text{x} \end{array}$. With the fourth place determined, we are left with a choice of three possible arrangements:

$\begin{array}{c|c} \text{o}_1\text{o} & \\ \text{o}_2\text{x} & \\ \hline \text{x}_4\text{o} & \\ \text{o}_3\text{o} & \end{array}$, $\begin{array}{c|c} \text{o}_1\text{o} & \\ \text{o}_2\text{x} & \\ \hline \text{o}_4\text{x} & \\ \text{o}_3\text{o} & \end{array}$, $\begin{array}{c|c} \text{o}_1\text{o} & \text{o}_4\text{o} \\ \text{o}_2\text{x} & \text{x}_4\text{o} \\ \hline \text{o}_3\text{o} & \end{array}$. Note that we must adjust the position of x in

the *fourth* tetrad to come in whichever place we choose as the *first*. Let us (again purely for convenience’ sake) choose the first of these three possibilities. It is clear that if x comes in the fourth place in the first place and in the first place in the fourth place, it will come in the third

place in the second place and in the second place in the third place. So

now we can complete the scheme thus: $\begin{array}{c|cc} o_1 & o & o \\ o & x & x \\ o & x & x \\ \hline o & o & o \end{array}$. But although we can

now distinguish between the second place and the third place, we cannot tell which of the two, $\begin{array}{c} o \\ x \end{array} \begin{array}{c} o \\ o \end{array}$ or $\begin{array}{c} o \\ o \end{array} \begin{array}{c} x \\ x \end{array}$, is the second and which the third: all we can say is that if one of them is the second the other is the third. This, as we shall see, is all that is necessary. Let us refer to them,

for convenience, as 2/3 and 3/2, so: $\begin{array}{c|cc} o_1 & o & o \\ o & x & x \\ o & x & x \\ \hline o & o & o \end{array}$.

Replacing the symbols by numbers, we finally have this:

$$\begin{array}{c|cc} 1 & 2/3 & 2/3 \\ 1 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline 3/2 & 4 & 4 \\ 3/2 & 4 & 4 \\ \hline 1 & 2/3 & 2/3 \end{array} \quad \text{(the figure is enlarged to accommodate the numerals).}$$

12. In this way the four symbols, o, o, o, and x, when written $\begin{array}{c} o \\ x \end{array}$, can be numbered $\begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 3/2 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} 2/3 \\ 4 \end{array}$; and we see that pairing off can be done in three ways: [1 – 2/3] [3/2 – 4], [1 – 3/2] [2/3 – 4], and [1 – 4] [2/3 – 3/2]. These may be understood as the operations, respectively, (i) of interchanging column $\begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 3/2 \end{array}$ with column $\begin{array}{c} 2/3 \\ 4 \end{array}$, (ii) of interchanging row $\overline{1 \ 2/3}$ with row $\overline{3/2 \ 4}$, and (iii) of doing both (i) and (ii) in *either* order and therefore both together (this really means that the three operations are mutually independent, do not obstruct one another, and can all proceed at once).^f And these, when set out in full—first the original arrangement $\begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 3/2 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} 2/3 \\ 4 \end{array}$ (which may be taken as the zero operation of no interchange), and then the results of the other three operations, $\begin{array}{c} 2/3 \\ 4 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 3/2 \end{array}$, $\begin{array}{c} 3/2 \\ 4 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 2/3 \end{array}$, and $\begin{array}{c} 4 \\ 2/3 \end{array} \begin{array}{c} 3/2 \\ 1 \end{array}$ —, make up the figure at the end of the

f. If we describe the three operations as ‘horizontal interchange’, ‘vertical interchange’, and ‘diagonal interchange’, it will readily be seen that *any* one of the three is equivalent to the other two done together. And since each is *both* the other two, it is *not either* of them.

last paragraph. It is easily seen that no question of priority between 2/3 and 3/2 arises.

13. We have found that a thing can be represented, in increasing com-

plexity of structure, as follows: o , $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o & o & o \\ o & x & o & x \\ o & o & x & x \\ o & x & x & o \end{smallmatrix}$, and so on, indefinitely.

The first of these, o , clearly does not allow of further discussion; but the second, $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, as will be seen from what has gone before, can be re-

garded as a combination, or rather *superposition*, of *four operations*: no interchange, interchange of columns $|\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} - \begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ x & o \end{smallmatrix}|$, interchange of rows $|\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} - \begin{smallmatrix} o & x \\ o & o \end{smallmatrix}|$, and interchange of columns and rows together $|\begin{smallmatrix} o & o & x & o \\ o & x & o & o \end{smallmatrix}|$; the

whole being represented so: $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o & o & o \\ o & x & x & o \\ o & x & x & o \\ o & o & o & o \end{smallmatrix}$. A thing represented by $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, that

is to say, consists of four members, one of which corresponds to each of the four operations. As we go to greater complexity and consider a

thing represented by $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o & o & o \\ o & x & o & x \\ o & o & x & x \\ o & x & x & o \end{smallmatrix}$, we find that the following operations are

superposed: no interchange; interchange of column 1 with column 2 and of column 3 with column 4; similar interchange of rows; interchange of column 1-&2 with column 3-&4; similar interchange of rows; and any or all of these together. The total is sixteen; and the whole representation is given below (the numbers are not necessary but are given for clarity's sake, with 2/3 just as 2 and 3/2 as 3 and corresponding simplifications in the other numbers).

oo							
ox	ox	xo	xo	ox	ox	xo	xo
oo	xx	oo	xx	xx	oo	xx	oo
ox	xo	xo	ox	xo	ox	ox	xo
oo							
ox	xo	xo	ox	xo	ox	ox	xo
oo	xx	oo	xx	xx	oo	xx	oo
oo	xx	oo	xx	xx	oo	xx	oo
ox	xo	xo	ox	xo	ox	ox	xo
oo							
ox	ox	xo	xo	ox	ox	xo	xo
ox	xo	xo	ox	xo	ox	ox	xo
oo	xx	oo	xx	xx	oo	xx	oo
ox	ox	xo	xo	ox	ox	xo	xo
oo							

Here we have sixteen members, one corresponding to each operation (as before). If we go to still more complex representations of a thing (as indicated in §10) we shall get 64 members, and then 256 members, and so on, indefinitely. Note that any of these representations can—more strictly, though less conveniently—be written in one line, in which case there are no columns-and-rows; and we are then concerned throughout only with interchanges of symbols—singly and in pairs, in pairs of pairs and in pairs of pairs of pairs, and so on. (This, incidentally, throws light on the structure of a line; for we are taking advantage of the structure of a line to represent structure in general. The structure of the line—or, more exactly, of *length*—is seen when we superpose all the members of the representation.)

14. It is a characteristic of all these representations that the operation of transforming any given member into any other member of the set transforms *every* member of the set into another member of the same set. The whole, then, is *invariant under transformation*. Attention, in other words, can shift from one aspect of a thing to another while the thing as a whole remains *absolutely* unchanged. (This universal property of a thing is so much taken for granted that a structural reason for it—or rather, the possibility of representing it symbolically—is rarely suspected.) See CETANĀ (Husserl's cube).

15. Representations of a thing in greater complexity than the 4-member figure show the structure of successive *orders of reflexion* (or, more strictly, of *pre-reflexion*—see DHAMMA [B]). Thus, with 16-members we represent the fundamental structure of the fundamental structure of a thing, in other words the structure of first-order reflexion; whereas with four members we have simply first-order reflexion or the structure of the immediate thing. (In first-order reflexion, the immediate thing is merely an *example* of a thing: it is, as it were, 'in brackets'. In second-order reflexion—the 16-member figure—, first-order reflexion is 'in brackets' as an *example* of fundamental structure.) In the 16-member representation, *any* two of the other 15-members of the set together with a given member uniquely define a tetrad with the structure of the 4-member representation; and *any* such tetrad uniquely defines three other tetrads such that the four tetrads together form a tetrad of tetrads, and this again with the same structure. From this it can be seen that the structure of the structure of a thing is the same as the structure of a thing, or more generally that the structure of structure has the structure of structure.⁸ The 16-member

representation gives the fundamental structure of first-order reflexion, just as 4-members represent the fundamental structure of immediacy, and the single member (o) represents simply immediacy, the thing.

16. The same structure, naturally, is repeated at each level of generality, as will be evident from the numbers in the figure at the end of §11. The whole (either at the immediate or at any reflexive level) forms a hierarchy infinite in both directions^h (thus disposing, incidentally, of the current assumptions of *absolute smallness*—the electron—in quantum physics, and *absolute largeness*—the universe—in astronomical physics).ⁱ It will also be evident that successive *orders* of reflexion generate a hierarchy that is infinite, though in one direction only (perpendicular, as it were, to the doubly infinite particular-and-general hierarchy).

17. The foregoing discussion attempts to indicate in the barest possible outline the nature of fundamental structure in its static aspect. Discussion of the dynamic aspect must deal with the structure of *duration*, and will go on to distinguish *past*, *present*, and *future*, at

g. There is an old axiom: *Quidquid cognoscitur, per modum cognoscentis cognoscitur*—Whatever is known, is known in the mode of the knower. This would imply that, if the mode (or structure) of immediate experience were different from that of reflexive experience, it would be systematically falsified in the very act of being known. A further act of reflexion would then be necessary to reveal the falsification. And this, in turn, would involve a further falsification, requiring yet a further act of reflexion. And so on indefinitely, with no end to the falsification; and fundamental structure (if any) would never be knowable. But we now see that the modes of immediate and of reflexive experience are the same, and consequently that any further act of reflexion can only confirm the original reflexive evidence, which is therefore apodictic. Fundamental structure guarantees reflexive knowledge of it.

h. The structure of the immediate hierarchy, based on $\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & X \end{smallmatrix}$, comes into view when the operations of interchange of §12 are themselves sub-

jected to these operations. The original operations are given by $\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & X & X & 0 \\ 0 & X & X & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}$, and

we operate on this to get $\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & X & X & 0 \\ 0 & X & X & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix} \parallel \begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ X & 0 & 0 & X \\ X & 0 & 0 & X \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}$; and, clearly, we can continue in-

definitely. Similarly for the hierarchies of each level of reflexive experience.

any time, as over-determined, determined, and under-determined, respectively. The way will then be open for discussion of *intention*, *action*, and *choice*, and the teleological nature of experience generally.

i. It is evident, in practice, that limits are encountered. There is, for example, a limit to the degree of smallness that can be distinguished. The reason for this is to be looked for on the volitional level. In order for a thing to be distinguished (or isolated) it must be observable *at leisure*, and this is a voluntary reflexive capacity. Beyond a certain degree of smallness this capacity fails. The smallest thing that can be distinguished has a certain appreciable size, but the visual (tactile) oscillations can no longer be controlled reflexively so that one part may be distinguishable from another part. And conversely, above a certain degree of largeness it is not possible to pass from one part to another at will, so as to appreciate the whole. Similar considerations will apply to perceptions other than size. The range of voluntary reflexion is not dictated by fundamental structure and varies (we may presume) from individual to individual, and particularly from individuals of one species to those of another. The ranges of an elephant and of an ant, at least as regards spatial perceptions, will scarcely overlap at all.

The existence of such limits can easily be demonstrated by an artificial device. If a cinematograph film is projected slowly enough, we perceive a series of stills, each of which we can examine individually. When the projection is speeded up, this examination becomes more difficult, and the series of stills is seen as a flicker. Then, at a certain point, the flickering ceases and we see simply a single (moving) picture. If, on the other hand, the projection is slowed down instead of speeded up, there comes a point past which the individual stills are no longer grasped as forming part of a series, and the unity of the film as a whole is lost.

II. Dynamic Aspect

1. Between its appearance and its disappearance a thing *endures*.

2. To fix the idea of duration we might imagine some rigid object—a lamp, say—together with the ticking of a clock. Both are necessary; for if either is missing the image fails. The image is no doubt rather crude, but will perhaps serve to make it clear that duration—what we sometimes call ‘the passage of time’—is a combination of unchange and change. *Duration* and *Invariance under Transformation* are one and the same.

3. We saw, in Part I, that a thing can be represented by the four symbols, o, o, o, and x, which pair off to define the operation of interchanging o o and o x. This, we found, can be done in three ways,

$\begin{array}{cc|cc} o & o & o & o \\ o & x & x & o \end{array}$, $\begin{array}{cc} o & o \\ o & x \end{array}$, and $\begin{array}{cc|c} o & o & \\ o & x & \\ \hline x & o & \\ x & o & \end{array}$, or by interchange of columns, of rows, and

of both together. We do not need, at present, to distinguish them, and we can take interchange of columns, $\begin{array}{cc|cc} o & o & o & o \\ o & x & x & o \end{array}$, as representative of the whole. When o o is transformed into o x and *vice versa*, the thing or operation (o, o, o, x) is invariant—all that has happened is that the symbols have rearranged themselves: $\begin{array}{cc} o & o \\ o & x \end{array}$ has become $\begin{array}{cc} o & o \\ x & o \end{array}$. This is one unit of duration—one *moment*. Clearly enough we can repeat the operation, so: $\begin{array}{cc|cc} o & o & o & o \\ x & o & o & x \end{array}$. It is still the *same* operation, namely interchange of columns. (The operation of transforming o o into o x automatically transforms o x into o o—when the old ‘o first’ becomes the new ‘x second’, the old ‘x second’ becomes the new ‘o first’, as with our journey of §I/6 from A to B—, and each time we are ready to start afresh.) This gives us a second moment; and by continued repetition we can get as many moments as we please, with the thing as a whole remaining unchanged.

4. We know, however, that the structure is hierarchical; and ‘a time must come’ when the thing as a whole changes—just as $\begin{array}{cc} o & o \\ o & x \end{array}$ becomes $\begin{array}{cc} o & o \\ x & o \end{array}$, so $\begin{array}{cc} o & o \\ o & x \end{array}$ must become $\begin{array}{cc} o & o \\ x & o \end{array}$. How many times must the transformation be repeated before the transformation is itself transformed? For how many moments does a thing endure? Let us suppose that it endures for a certain finite number of moments, say a hundred. Then, after a hundred moments the thing changes, and after another hundred

moments it changes again, and after yet another hundred moments it changes yet again, and so on. It will be seen that we do not, in fact, have a combination of unchange and change, but two different *rates* of change, one slow and one fast, just like two interlocking cog-wheels of which one revolves once as the other revolves a hundred times. And we see that this fails to give the idea of duration; for if we make the large cog-wheel really unchanging by holding it fast, the small cog-wheel also is obliged to stop. Similarly, we do not say ‘a minute *endures* for sixty seconds’ but ‘a minute *is* sixty seconds’—it would never occur to us to *time* a minute with a stop-watch. To get duration, the difference between the unchanging and the changing must be absolute: the unchanging must be unchanging *however* much the changing changes.^j If a thing *endures*, it endures for ever. A thing is eternal.

5. A thing changes, then, after an *infinity* of moments. And since the structure is hierarchical, each moment must itself endure for an infinity of moments of lesser order before it can give place to the next moment. And, naturally, the same applies to each of these lesser moments. It might perhaps seem that with such a congestion of eternities no change can ever take place at any level. But we must be careful not to introduce preconceived notions of time: just as the structure is

j. This will clearly permit different *relative* rates of change, or frequencies, at the same level. The ratios between such frequencies would seem to be arbitrary, but it is clear that they can change only discontinuously. In other words, the *substance* of my world (real and imaginary) at any time is not dictated by fundamental structure, and vanishes abruptly. (See RŪPA [C].) The only change considered by the main body of this Note, in its present incomplete form, is change of orientation or perspective. Duration does not require change of substance, though the converse is not true. (Might it not be that with every change of orientation in the world of one sense there is a corresponding change of substance in the world of each of the others? This is partly observable at least in the case of intentional bodily action; which, indeed, seems to change the substance also of its own world—as when the left hand alters the world of the right. But this supposition is not without its difficulties.) The ‘unchange’ that is here in question is on no account to be confused with what is described in AṬṬĀ as an ‘extra-temporal changeless “self”’. Experience of the supposed subject or ‘self’ (a would-be extra-temporal personal *nunc stans*) is a gratuitous (though beginningless) imposition or parasite upon the structure we are now discussing. See CETANĀ [F]. (Cf. in this connexion the equivocal existentialist positions discussed by M. Wyschogrod in *Kierkegaard and Heidegger* (The Ontology of Existence), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1954.)

not *in* space but *of* space (amongst other things)—see §I/2—, so the structure is not *in* time but *of* time. Thus we are not at all obliged to regard each moment as lasting the same length of *absolute* time as its predecessor; for we have not encountered ‘absolute time’. Naturally, if we regard a given thing as *eternal*, then each of the infinite moments for which it endures will be of the same duration—one unit. But if this eternal thing is to change (or transform), then clearly the infinite series of moments must *accelerate*. If each successive moment is a definite fraction (less than unity) of its predecessor, then the whole infinite series will come to an end sooner or later.

6. Now we see that *three* levels of the hierarchy are involved: on top, at the most general level of the three, we have a thing enduring eternally unchanged; below this, we have a thing changing at regular intervals of one unit of duration, one moment; and below this again, in *each* of these regular intervals, in *each* of these moments, we have an infinite series of moments of lesser order accelerating and coming to an end. We have only to take into account an *eternal* thing of still higher order of generality to see that our former eternal thing will now be changing at regular intervals, that the thing formerly changing at regular intervals will be accelerating its changes (and the series of changes repeatedly coming to an end at regular intervals), and that the formerly accelerating series will be a doubly accelerating series of series. There is no difficulty in extending the scheme infinitely in both directions of the hierarchy; and when we have done so we see that there is no place for anything absolutely enduring for ever, and that there is no place for anything absolutely without duration.^k

7. We can represent a thing by O. This, however, is eternal. To see the structure of change we must go to the 4-symbol representation $\begin{matrix} O & O \\ O & X \end{matrix}$, where o and x are things of the next lower order of generality. From §3 it will be seen that O is the *invariant* operation of interchange of columns: $\begin{matrix} O & O \\ O & X \end{matrix}$ becomes $\begin{matrix} O & O \\ X & O \end{matrix}$, and then $\begin{matrix} O & O \\ X & O \end{matrix}$ becomes $\begin{matrix} O & O \\ O & X \end{matrix}$, and so on, to infinity. But now that we have found that moments (or things) *come to*

k. It would be a mistake to attempt to take up a position outside the whole system in order to visualize it as passing from the future into the past through a ‘present moment’ in a kind of universal time. At any given level of generality, the ‘present moment’ lasts for one whole eternity relative to the next lower level, and there is thus no such thing as a ‘present moment’ for the system as a whole; nor has the system any outside (even imaginary) from which it may be viewed ‘as a whole’.

an end, some modification in this account is needed. In $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, o is 'this' and x is 'that' (i.e. 'not-this'), as we saw in Part I. When the moment marked by one interchange of columns comes to an end, 'this' vanishes entirely, and we are left just with 'that', which, clearly, is the new 'this'. The o's disappear, in other words. Thus when $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$ has become $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ x & o \end{smallmatrix}$ we shall not, contrary to what we have just said, have the same operation simply in the opposite sense, i.e. $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o & o & o \\ x & o & o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, since all that remains is $x|x$. In the repetition of the operation, then, x will occupy the same position as o in the original, and O (i.e. 'interchange of columns') will now be represented by $\begin{smallmatrix} x & x \\ x & o \end{smallmatrix}$. The second interchange of columns will thus be $\begin{smallmatrix} x & x & x & x \\ x & o & o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, the third interchange will be $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o & o & o \\ x & x & x & o \end{smallmatrix}$, and the fourth $\begin{smallmatrix} x & x & x & x \\ x & o & o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, and so on. It will be evident that, while O is invariant (eternally), the symbols at the next lower level of generality will be alternating between o and x. (For convenience we may start off the whole system with the symbol o at each level, though in different sizes, to represent 'this'; and we may then allow these to change to x as the system is set in motion. But we can only do this *below a given level*, since if only we go up far enough we shall always find that the system has *already* started. We cannot, therefore, start the system at any absolute first point—we can only 'come in in the middle'. It will be seen, also, that the system is not reversible: future is future and past is past. But this will become clearer as we proceed.)

8. Disregarding other things, consciousness of a thing while it endures is constant: and this may be counted as unity. We can regard consciousness of a thing as the thing's *intensity* or *weight*—quite simply, the degree to which it *is*. In §I/12 (f) we noted that *any* interchange is equivalent to the other two done together. Thus, to pass from 1 to 4 it is necessary to go by way of both 2/3 and 3/2, so: $\begin{smallmatrix} o-o \\ o-o \end{smallmatrix}$. The intensity or weight must therefore be distributed among the four symbols in the following way: $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o-o \\ o-x & x \end{smallmatrix}$, or $\begin{smallmatrix} 2 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 \end{smallmatrix}$. This will mean that the intensity of o is two-thirds of the whole, and of x, one-third. (A moment's reflexion will verify that 'this' is necessarily more intense than 'that'. Visual reflexion will do here; but it must be remembered that visual experience, which is easy to refer to, is structurally very complex—see §I/4—, and visual evidence normally requires further

break-down before revealing aspects of fundamental structure. It is usually less misleading to think in terms of sound or of extension than of vision, and it is advisable in any case to check the evidence of one sense with that of another.) When $\begin{smallmatrix} o \\ o \end{smallmatrix}$ vanishes we shall be left with x , whose intensity is only one-third of the whole. But just as $\begin{smallmatrix} o \\ o \end{smallmatrix}$ stands to x in the proportion of intensity of 2:1, so $\frac{x}{x}$ of a lesser order stands to o of the same lesser order in the same proportion, and so on indefinitely. Thus we obtain a hierarchy of intensity $\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}, \frac{1}{16}, \frac{1}{32}, \dots$ to infinity, the sum of which is unity. The total intensity at any time must be unity, as we noted above; and when the first term of this hierarchy, $\begin{smallmatrix} o \\ o \end{smallmatrix}$, which is $\frac{1}{2}$ the total intensity, vanishes, it is necessary to increase the intensity of the rest to compensate for this loss; and to do this we must make x , when it becomes $\frac{x}{x}$, *be* (or *exist*) correspondingly *faster*. This is achieved, clearly enough, by *doubling* the rate of existence (i.e. *halving* the relative length) of each successive moment. (When the first term of $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{32} + \dots$ vanishes, it is only necessary to double the remainder, $\frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{32} + \dots$, to restore the *status quo*.)

9. If we go to the 16-member representation it will be clearer what is

happening. This representation, $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o & o & o \\ o & x & o & x \\ o & o & x & x \\ o & x & x & o \end{smallmatrix}$, combines two adjacent levels of


generality: it is a combination of $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$ and $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$. But this combination,

we see, can be made in two ways: $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \left| \begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \right.$ and $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \left| \begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \right.$ and

$\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \left| \begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \right.$ and $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \left| \begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix} \right.$. Alternatively, however, we can regard

the combination of $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$ and $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$, not as that of two adjacent levels of generality, but as that of the *present* and the *future* on the same level of generality; and, clearly, this too can be made in these two ways. If, furthermore, we regard the *first* of these two ways in which the combination of $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$ and $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$ can be made as the combination of two adjacent, equally present, levels of generality, we must regard the *second* way as the combination of the present and the future, both of the same level

of generality; and, of course, *vice versa*. This means that, from the point of view of $\begin{smallmatrix} \text{O} & \text{O} \\ \text{O} & \text{X} \end{smallmatrix}$, $\begin{smallmatrix} \text{O} & \text{O} \\ \text{O} & \text{X} \end{smallmatrix}$ can be regarded either as *present but of lower order* or as *of the same order but future*. (And, of course, from the point of view of $\begin{smallmatrix} \text{O} & \text{O} \\ \text{O} & \text{X} \end{smallmatrix}$, $\begin{smallmatrix} \text{O} & \text{O} \\ \text{O} & \text{X} \end{smallmatrix}$ can be regarded either as *present but of higher order* or as *of the same order but past*.) In other words, the general/particular hierarchy can equally well be regarded—or rather, *must at the same time be regarded*—as the past, present, and future, at any one level of generality. (A simple illustration can be given. Consider this figure:



It presents itself *either* as a large square enclosing a number of progressively smaller squares all within one plane at the same distance from the observer, *or* as a number of squares of equal size but in separate planes at progressively greater distances from the observer, giving the appearance of a corridor. A slight change of attention is all that is needed to switch from one aspect to the other. In fundamental structure, however, *both* aspects are equally in evidence.) This allows us to dispose of the tiresome paradox (noted, but not resolved, by Augustine) that, (i) since the past is over and done with and the future has not yet arrived, we cannot possibly know anything about them in the present; and (ii) there is, nevertheless, present perception and know-

ledge of the past and of the future (memory is familiar to everyone,^l and retrocognition and precognition are well-known occurrences; though it is clear that awareness of movement or of change of substance provides more immediate evidence^m)—the very words *past* and *future* would not exist if experience of what they stand for were inherently impossible.ⁿ

10. *Past* and *future* (as well as *present*) exist in the present; but they exist *as past* and *as future* (though what exactly the pastness of the past—‘this is over and done with’—and the futurity of the future—‘this has not yet arrived’—consist of will only become apparent at a later stage when we discuss the nature of intention). And

1. All memory involves perception of the past, but perception of the past is not in itself memory. The question of memory, however, does not otherwise concern us in these *Notes*. (The attention we give to whatever happens to be present will, no doubt, permanently increase its weightage relative to all that does not come to be present.)

m. Neither movement nor change of substance is fundamental: fundamental structure is *necessary* for them to be *possible*, and this is true also of their respective *times* (see §4 (j)). In other words, the time (past, present, future) that is manifest in movement and in change of substance is dependent upon, but does not share the structure of, the time that is discussed in these pages. Thus, in movement, the time is simply that of the hierarchy of trajectories (see PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C]), and its structure is therefore that of the straight line (see §I/13): the time of movement, in other words, is perfectly homogeneous and infinitely subdivisible. In itself, therefore, this time makes no distinction between *past*, *present*, and *future*, and must necessarily rest upon a sub-structure that does give a meaning to these words. In fundamental time, each unit—each moment—is absolutely indivisible, since adjacent levels are heterogeneous.


n. McTaggart has argued (*op. cit.*, §§325 *et seq.*) that the ideas of past, present, and future, which are essential characteristics of change and time, involve a contradiction that can only be resolved in an infinite regress. This regress, he maintained, is vicious, and change and time are therefore ‘unreal’. It is clear enough that perception of movement, and therefore of time, does involve an infinite reflexive (or rather, pre-reflexive) regress. We perceive uniform motion; we perceive accelerated motion, and recognize it as such; we can perhaps also recognize doubly accelerated motion; and the idea of still higher orders of acceleration is perfectly acceptable to us, without any definite limit: all this would be out of the question unless time had an indefinitely regressive hierarchical structure. If this regress is vicious, then so much the worse for virtue. But see §I/15 (g), which indicates that it is not in fact vicious.

11. In §3 we took the interchange of columns as representative of all three possible interchanges: (i) of columns, (ii) of rows, and (iii) of both together. We must now discriminate between them. Neglecting the zero operation of no interchange, we may regard a thing as a superposition of these three interchanges (§I/13). We saw in §8 that $\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}$ ('this') has twice the intensity or weight of $\begin{smallmatrix} x & x \\ x & x \end{smallmatrix}$ ('that'), and this is obviously true of each of the three possible interchanges. But this imposes no restriction whatsoever on the intensities of the three interchanges *relative one to another*: what these relative intensities shall be is a matter of complete indifference to fundamental structure. Let us, therefore, choose convenient numbers; let us suppose that the weight of interchange of columns, $\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \end{smallmatrix}$, is one-half of the total, of interchange of rows, $\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \\ 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}$, one-third, and of interchange of both, $\begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \\ x & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}$, one-sixth, the total being unity. Then, in interchange of columns, 'this' $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \end{bmatrix}$ will have the value $\frac{6}{18}$, and 'that' $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ x & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ the value $\frac{3}{18}$; in interchange of rows, 'this' $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \end{bmatrix}$ will have the value $\frac{4}{18}$, and 'that' $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & x \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ the value $\frac{2}{18}$; and in interchange of both, 'this' $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \end{bmatrix}$ will have the value $\frac{2}{18}$, and 'that' $\begin{bmatrix} x & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ the value $\frac{1}{18}$. It will be observed that the three 'this' $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \end{bmatrix}$ are indistinguishable, whereas the three 'that' $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & x \\ x & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$, and $\begin{bmatrix} x & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ are not; and that consequently we simply have one single 'this', of value $\frac{12}{18}$ or $\frac{2}{3}$, and three separate 'that', of respective values $\frac{3}{18}$, $\frac{2}{18}$, and $\frac{1}{18}$, totalling $\frac{1}{3}$. *No matter what the relative weights of the three interchanges may be, the weight of 'this' is always twice the combined weights of the three 'that'.* This means, in effect, that however much the relative weights of the three 'that' may vary among themselves, the weight of 'this' remains constant.

12. The question now arises, *which* of these three possible interchanges is the one that will take place when the time comes for 'this' to vanish and 'that' to become 'this'. We said, in §7, that a thing, O, is the *invariant* operation of interchange of columns to infinity. This, however, is equally true of interchange of rows and of both columns

and rows. In other words, O is simply the invariant operation of interchange, no matter whether of columns, of rows, or of both. Any or all of these interchanges are O. It will be seen, then, that the invariance of O is unaffected by the distribution of weight among the three possible interchanges that can take place. A simplified illustration may make this clearer. Suppose my room contains a chair, a table, a bed, and a wardrobe. If there is no other article of furniture in the room, the chair is *determined* as the chair by its *not* being the table, the bed, or the wardrobe. In other words, the piece of furniture in my room that is not-the-table, not-the-bed, and not-the-wardrobe, is the chair. But so long as all these determinations are to *some* extent present it matters not at all where the emphasis is placed. The question of *degree*, that is to say, does not arise. If, when I am about to sit down and start writing, I pay attention to the chair, it will present itself strongly to me as being not-the-table, but perhaps only faintly as not-the-wardrobe, and hardly at all as not-the-bed; but if I pay attention to it when I am feeling sleepy, it will be most strongly present as not-the-bed, and much less as not-the-table and not-the-wardrobe. In either case the chair keeps its identity unaltered as ‘the piece of furniture that is neither table, bed, nor wardrobe’.

13. Let us consider two adjacent levels of generality, O and o, where O endures for one moment while o undergoes an infinity of transformations in an accelerating series. But the symbols O and o simply give the immediate thing (§I/15), and we need to see the *structure* of the thing. We must therefore write each thing in the form $\begin{smallmatrix} o & o \\ o & x \end{smallmatrix}$ and expand accordingly. We also need to see the structure of the two adjacent levels at the same time. This will give us the figure of §I/16



(This figure is out of scale: it should be one-quarter the size.)

We see that O is represented by $\begin{matrix} A & B \\ C & D \end{matrix}$ and o by $\begin{matrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{matrix}$. (Note that D, for example, is simply $\begin{matrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{matrix}$ with interchange of both columns and rows, i.e. $\begin{matrix} d & c \\ b & a \end{matrix}$, and similarly with B and C.) Let us suppose that, at the lower level, repeated interchange of columns (a-b, c-d) is taking place. This, naturally, will be taking place in all four quarters, A, B, C, and D. Let us also suppose that, to begin with, the relative weights of the three possible interchanges of O are 1(A-B) : 2(A-D) : 3(A-C). We have seen in §7 that whenever an interchange, $\begin{matrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x & 0 \end{matrix}$ say, takes place, it is actually not simply an interchange, but a disappearance of $\begin{matrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{matrix}$ leaving just x. This x is then the fresh $\begin{matrix} x & x \\ x & 0 \end{matrix}$, which in its turn becomes o, and so on. In other words, each time what we have represented as an interchange takes place, things lose a dimension. This statement can be inverted, and we can say that the present, each time it advances into the future, gains a dimension, with the consequence that immediately future things, when they become present, will necessarily appear with one dimension less. Though, from one point of view, O remains invariant throughout the series of interchanges (it is the series of interchanges, of any or all of the three possible kinds), from another point of view, each time an interchange takes place O vanishes and is replaced by another O differing from the earlier O only in that having been future to it (or of lower order—see §9) it has, relative to it, a second dimension. We must at once qualify this statement. The loss of a dimension takes place at the level, not of O, but of o, which is at a lower level of generality; and properly speaking we should say that O loses an infinitesimal part of its one dimension each time there is the loss of a dimension at the level of o. Similarly, O's successor is only infinitesimally future or of lower order. In other words, O's dimension is of a higher order than that of o. But consideration of O's possible interchanges takes place at the level of o, as we may gather from the necessity, noted above, of writing O in the reflexive form $\begin{matrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & x \end{matrix}$. It must therefore be understood that when we say that each future O has one more dimension than the present O, the dimension in question is a dimension of o, not of O. The original O, then, while present, has one dimension: its successor, so long as it is future, has two dimensions: and when this becomes present it appears as having one dimension, just as its predecessor did when present. But the original O now has no

dimension; for it has vanished. (That is to say, *o* has vanished: *O* is actually no more than infinitesimally closer to the point of vanishing—which means that it remains absolutely the same, in the ordinary meaning of that word. But we have to remember that changes in a thing's internal distribution of weight—the weight, that is, of its determinations—do not affect it.) Relatively speaking, then, each next future *O* has one more dimension, at the level of *o*, than the present *O*, even though it has but one dimension when it is itself present. If, therefore, the relative weights of the possible interchanges of the original *O* are in the proportions 3:2:1, the relative weights of the succeeding *O*, when it becomes present, will be in the proportion 9:4:1, that is, with each number squared. Following that, the next *O* will have relative weights 81:16:1, and so on. It is obvious, first, that the most heavily weighted of the possible interchanges will tend more and more to dominate the others and, in a manner of speaking, to draw all the weight to itself; and secondly, that it can only draw the entire weight to itself after an infinity of squarings, that is, of interchanges at the level of *o*. As soon as one of the three possible interchanges has drawn the entire weight to itself and altogether eliminated its rivals, that interchange takes place (at the level of *O*).^p In the case we are considering there will be interchange of rows, i.e. of *A* and *C*, and of *B* and *D*. Notice that this interchange is quite independent of the kind of interchange that is taking place at the next lower level: interchange of rows at the level of *O* does not in the least require that the interchange at the level of *o* should also have been of rows.

(UNFINISHED)

p. §I/4 (*d*) would seem to imply that three different frequencies are involved, all converging to infinity together. This will complicate the arithmetic, but can scarcely prevent the eventual emergence of one dominating interchange. (If they are not all to be squared together, the relative weights $a : b : c$ must be made absolute before each squaring:

$$\frac{a}{a+b+c}, \frac{b}{a+b+c}, \frac{c}{a+b+c}.)$$



ARMY SERVICE.

5. GLOSSARY
WITH
ADDITIONAL TEXTS



VEN. ÑĀṄAVĪRA, VEN. ÑĀṄAMOLI AND VEN. ÑĀṄAVIMALA
AT THE ISLAND HERMITAGE.

GLOSSARY

This Glossary contains all the Pali terms used in *Notes on Dhamma* together with their English equivalents (sometimes only approximate). Only the separate elements of some compound words are given. Words occurring in quoted Pali passages and whose meaning may be discovered from the English renderings of such passages are not always listed separately.

- Akālika* – timeless, intemporal.
akusala – unskilful.
acinteyya – not to be speculated about, unthinkable.
ajjhatta – inside, internal, subjective. (Opp. *bahiddhā*.)
añña – other, another. (Opp. *sa*.)
aṭṭhapurisapuggalā – (the) eight individual men.
atakkāvacara – not in the sphere of reason or logic.
atidhāvati – (to) overrun, overshoot.
attavāda – belief in self.
attā – self.
atthi – there is.
adhivacana – designation.
anattā – not-self.
anāgāmī – non-returner.
anicca – impermanent.
aniccatā – impermanence.
anidassana – non-indication, non-indicative.
anupādisesa – without residue.
anuruddha-pañiviruddha – approving-&-disapproving, accepting-&-rejecting, attracting-&-repelling.
anuloma – with the grain, in conformity. (Opp. *pañiloma*.)
anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato – one endowed with acquiescence in conformity.
anvaya – inference, inferability.
aparapaccayā – not dependent on others.
apuñña – demerit.
abhijjhā – covetousness.
abhisankharoti – (to) determine.
abhisankhāra = *sankhāra*.
abhisāñcetayati – (to) intend, will.
arahat – one who is worthy. (Usually untranslated.)
arahattā – state of the *arahat*.
ariya – noble. (Opp. *puthujjana*.)
ariyasāvaka – noble disciple.
arūpa – immaterial.
avijjā – nescience. (Opp. *vijjā*.)
asañkhata – non-determined.
asmimāna – conceit ‘(I) am’. (‘Conceit’, *māna*, is to be understood as a cross between ‘concept’ and ‘pride’ – almost the French ‘*orgueil*’ suitably attenuated. *Asmi* is ‘I am’ without the pronoun, like the Latin ‘*sum*’; but plain ‘am’ is too weak to render *asmi*, and *ahaṃ asmi* (‘*ego sum*’) is too emphatic to be adequately rendered ‘I am’.)
asmī ti chanda – desire ‘(I am)’. (See *asmimāna*.)
assāsapassāsā – in-&-out-breaths.
assutavā – uninstructed.

Ākāsa – space.

ākiñcaññāyatana – nothingness-base.

āneñja – immobility, unshakability, imperturbability.

āyatana – base.

āyusañkhāra – life-determination.

āsava – canker, intoxication.

Idha – here.

indriya – faculty.

Ucchedadiṭṭhi – annihilationist-view. (Opp. sassatadiṭṭhi.)

upavicarati – (to) dwell upon, ponder.

upādāna – holding.

upekkhā – indifference.

Etaṃ – this, that.

Opanayika – leading.

Kamma – action.

kāya – body.

kāyika – bodily.

kālīka – temporal, involving time.

kusala – skilful.

khandha – aggregate, mass, totality.

Gotrabhu – become of the clan or lineage. (Sometimes translated as ‘one who destroys the lineage’; the etymologists seem to be in doubt.)

Cakkhu – eye.

citta – mind, consciousness, cognition, spirit, heart, purpose, (conscious) experience, &c. (Citta is sometimes synonymous with *mano*, and some-

times not; it is occasionally equivalent to *viññāṇa* in certain senses. Related to *cetanā*, but more general. Its precise meaning must be determined afresh in each new context.)

cittavīthi – mental process, cognitive series.

cetanā – intention, volition, will.

cetasika – mental. (See *citta*.)

Jarā – ageing, decay.

jāti – birth.

jhāna – meditation.

Ñāṇa – knowledge.

Takka – reasoning, logic.

taṇhā – craving.

Tathāgata – (usually untranslated epithet of) the Buddha, (and, by transference, of) an *arahat*.

Tāvatiṃsa – ‘Heaven of the Thirty-Three’.

theta – reliable, actual.

Diṭṭhi – view. (Usually, wrong view.)

diṭṭhigata – going to, involved with, consisting of, (wrong) view.

diṭṭhisampanna – (one) attained to (right) view. (= *sotāpanna*.)

dukkha – unpleasure (opp. *sukha*), pain, suffering.

dutiya, tatiya tappurisa – accusative, instrumentive dependent determinative compound.

(Grammatical terms.)

dussīla – immoral, unvirtuous.

domanassa – grief.

dosa – hate.

dvayaṃ – dyad, duality.

dhamma – thing, image, idea,
essence, universal, teaching,
Teaching, nature, natural law,
&c. (cf. the Heraclitan ‘logos’).

dhamm’ anvaya – inferability of the
dhamma (to past and future).

dhammānusārī – teaching-
follower. (Opp. *saddhānusārī*.)

dhātu – element.

Nāma – name.

nāmarūpa – name-&-matter.

nidassana – indication, indicative.

nibbāna – extinction.

nibbuta – extinguished.

niruddha – ceased.

nirodha – ceasing, cessation.

Paccaya – condition.

pañcakkhandhā – five aggregates.

pañc’upādānakkhandhā – five
holding aggregates. (This needs
expansion to be intelligible.)

paññā – understanding.

paṭigha – resistance.

paṭīccasamuppanna – dependently
arisen.

paṭīccasamuppāda – dependent
arising.

paṭiloma – against the grain.
(Opp. *anuloma*.)

paṭisotagāmī – going against the
stream.

paramattha sacca – truth in the
highest, or ultimate, or
absolute, sense.

paritassanā – anxiety, anguish,
angst.

pariyesanā – seeking.

pahoti – (to) originate.

pāṇa – animal, living being.

pāpadhamma – evil-natured.

pāpima – evil one.

puggala – individual.

puñña – merit.

puthujjana – commoner.

(Opp. *ariya*.)

punabbhavābhiniḅbatti – coming
into renewed being, re-birth.

purisa – man, male.

phala – fruit, fruition.

phassa – contact.

Bala – power, strength.

bahiddhā – outside, external,
objective. (Opp. *ajjhatta*.)

bhava – being, existence.

bhikkhu – monk, almsman.

bhikkhunī – nun, almswoman.

bhūta – being.

Magga – path.

maññati – (to) conceive.

(See *asmimāna*.)

maññanā – conceiving.

(See *asmimāna*.)

manasikāra – attention.

manussa – human (being).

mano – mind. (See *citta*.)

mama – mine, of me.

maraṇa – death.

mahābhūta – great entity.

micchādiṭṭhi – wrong view.

(Opp. *sammādiṭṭhi*.)

me – mine. (Weaker than *mama*.)

moha – delusion.

Rāga = *lobha*.

ruppati – (to) ‘matter’, be broken.

(Untranslatable verb from
rūpa.)

rūpa – matter, substance, (visible)
form.

Lakkhaṇa – mark, characteristic.

lābha – gain.

loka – world.

lokuttara – beyond the world,
world-transcending.

lobha – lust.

Vacī – speech.

vicāra – pondering.

vijānāti – (to) cognize, be
conscious (of).

vijjā – science. (Opp. *avijjā*.)

viññāṇa – consciousness, knowing.

vitakka – thinking, thought.

vipāka – ripening, result,
consequence.

virīya – energy, exertion.

vedanā – feeling.

vediyati – (to) feel.

Sa – that, the same. (Opp. *añña*.)

sa- – with. (Prefix.)

saupādisesa – with residue.

sakkāya – person, somebody,
personality.

sakkāyaditthi – personality-view.

saṅkhata – determined.

saṅkhāra – determination,
determinant.

saṅgha – Community, Order.

sacca – truth.

sañcetanā = *cetanā*.

sañjānāti – (to) perceive.

saññā – perception, percept.

saññāvedayitanirodha – cessation
of perception and feeling.

sati – mindfulness, recollection,
memory.

satta – creature, sentient being.

sattama puggala – seventh
individual.

saddhā – faith, confidence, trust.

saddhānusārī – faith-follower.

(Opp. *dhammānusārī*.)

sandiṭṭhika – evident,
immediately visible.

samādhi – concentration.

samudaya – appearing, arising,
coming into being.

sampajañña – awareness.

samphassa = *phassa*.

sammāditthi – right view. (Opp.
micchāditthi.)

sassataditthi – eternalist-view.

(Opp. *ucchedaditthi*.)

saḷāyatana – six bases.

saṃsāra – running on (from
existence to existence).

sukha – pleasure. (Opp. *dukkha*.)

sutavā – instructed.

sekha – one in training, (self-)
trainer.

so (see *sa*).

sotāpatti – attaining of the stream.

sotāpanna – stream-attainer.

somanassa – joy.

Huraṃ – yonder.

hetu – condition (= *paccaya*).

ADDITIONAL TEXTS

Some of the more important Sutta passages referred to in the *Notes*, but not quoted, are given here (with translation) for the reader's convenience.

1. Majjhima i,9

Vedanā saññā cetanā phasso manasikāro, idaṃ vuccat'āvuso nāmaṃ; cattāri ca mahābhūtāni catunnañ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ, idaṃ vuccat'āvuso rūpaṃ; iti idañ ca nāmaṃ idañ ca rūpaṃ, idaṃ vuccat'āvuso nāmarūpaṃ.

Feeling, perception, intention, contact, attention,—this, friends, is called name; the four great entities and matter held (i.e. taken up by craving) from the four great entities,—this, friends, is called matter; thus, this name and this matter,—this, friends, is called name-&-matter.

2. Aṅguttara VI,vi,9

Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā.

Action, monks, I say is intention; intending, one does action by body, by speech, by mind.

3. Khandha Saṃy. vi,4

Katamañ ca bhikkhave rūpaṃ...

Katamā ca bhikkhave vedanā...

Katamā ca bhikkhave saññā...

Katame ca bhikkhave sañkhārā. Chayime bhikkhave cetanākāyā, rūpasañ-cetanā saddasañcetanā gandhasañcetanā rasasañcetanā phoṭṭhabbasañ-cetanā dhammasañcetanā. Ime vuccanti bhikkhave sañkhārā...

Katamañ ca bhikkhave viññāṇaṃ...

And which, monks, is matter?...

And which, monks, is feeling?...

And which, monks, is perception?...

And which, monks, are determinations? There are, monks, these six bodies of intention: intention of visible forms, intention of sounds, intention of smells, intention of tastes, intention of touches, intention of images/ideas. These, monks, are called determinations...

And which, monks, is consciousness?...

4. Khandha Saṃy. v,5

Ye hi keci bhikkhave samaṇā vā brāmaṇā vā anekavihitam attānaṃ samanupassamānā samanupassanti, sabbe te pañc'upādānakkhandhe samanupassanti etesaṃ vā aññataraṃ.

Whatever recluses or divines there may be, monks, who in various ways regard self, they are all regarding the five holding aggregates or a certain one of them.

5. Majjhima iv,5

Rūpaṃ bhikkhave aniccaṃ, vedanā aniccā, saññā aniccā, saṅkhārā aniccā, viññāṇaṃ aniccaṃ; rūpaṃ bhikkhave anattā, vedanā anattā, saññā anattā, saṅkhārā anattā, viññāṇaṃ anattā; sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe dhammā anattā.

Matter, monks, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, determinations are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent; matter, monks, is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, determinations are not-self, consciousness is not-self; all determinations are impermanent, all things are not-self.

6. Khandha Saṃy. viii,7

Kiñ ca bhikkhave rūpaṃ vadetha...

Kiñ ca bhikkhave vedanaṃ vadetha...

Kiñ ca bhikkhave saññaṃ vadetha...

Kiñ ca bhikkhave saṅkhāre vadetha. Saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharontī ti bhikkhave tasmā Saṅkhārā ti vuccanti.

Kiñ ca saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharonti.

Rūpaṃ rūpattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharonti,

Vedanaṃ vedanattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharonti,

Saññaṃ saññattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharonti,

Saṅkhāre saṅkhārattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharonti,

Viññāṇaṃ viññāṇattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharonti.

Saṅkhataṃ abhisāṅkharontī ti kho bhikkhave tasmā Saṅkhārā ti vuccanti.

Kiñ ca bhikkhave viññāṇaṃ vadetha...

And what, monks, do you say is matter?...

And what, monks, do you say is feeling?...

And what, monks, do you say is perception?...

And what, monks, do you say are determinations? 'They determine the determined': that, monks, is why they are called 'determinations'.

And what is the determined that they determine?
Matter as matter is the determined that they determine,
Feeling as feeling is the determined that they determine,
Perception as perception is the determined that they determine,
Determinations as determinations are the determined that they
determine,
Consciousness as consciousness is the determined that they
determine.

‘They determine the determined’: that indeed, monks, is why they are called ‘determinations’.

And what, monks, do you say is consciousness?...

7. Khandha Saṃy. vi,7

Rūpaṃ [Vedanā... Saññā... Saṅkhārā... Viññāṇaṃ...] bhikkhave anattā. Rūpañ ca h’idaṃ bhikkhave attā abhaviṣṣa nayidaṃ rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbheṭṭha ca rūpe, Evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahoṣī ti. Yasmā ca kho bhikkhave rūpaṃ anattā tasmā rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvattati, na ca labbhati rūpe, Evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahoṣī ti.

Matter [Feeling... Perception... Determinations... Consciousness...], monks, is not-self. For if, monks, matter were self, then matter would not lead to affliction, and one would obtain of matter ‘Let my matter be thus, let my matter not be thus’. As indeed, monks, matter is not-self, so matter leads to affliction, and it is not obtained of matter ‘Let my matter be thus, let my matter not be thus’.

8. Aṅguttara IV,viii,7

Kammavipāko bhikkhave acinteyyo na cintetabbo, yaṃ cinto ummā-dassa vighātassa bhāgī assa.

The ripening of action, monks, is unthinkable, should not be thought (i.e. should not be speculated about); for one thinking (it) would come to madness and distraction.

9. Dīgha ii,2

Nāmarūpapaccayā phasso ti iti kho paṇ’etaṃ vuttaṃ; tad Ānanda iminā p’etaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā nāmarūpapaccayā phasso. Yehi Ānanda ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakā-yassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho rūpakāye adhivacanasamphasso paññāyethā ti.

No h'etaṃ bhante.

Yehi Ānanda ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimित्तेhi yehi uddesehi rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho nāmakāye paṭighasamphasso paññāyethā ti.

No h'etaṃ bhante.

Yehi Ānanda ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimित्तेhi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa ca rūpakāyassa ca paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho adhvācānasamphasso vā paṭighasamphasso vā paññāyethā ti.

No h'etaṃ bhante.

Yehi Ānanda ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimित्तेhi yehi uddesehi nāmarūpassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho phasso paññāyethā ti.

No h'etaṃ bhante.

Tasmātih'Ānanda es'eva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa pacayo phassassa yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ.

Viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan ti iti kho pan'etaṃ vuttaṃ; tad Ānanda iminā p'etaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. Viññāṇaṃ va hi Ānanda mātu kucchiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātu kucchismiṃ samucchissathā ti.

No h'etaṃ bhante.

Viññāṇaṃ va hi Ānanda mātu kucchiṃ okkamitvā vakkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathā ti.

No h'etaṃ bhante.

Viññāṇaṃ va hi Ānanda daharass'eva sato vocchijjissatha kumārassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissathā ti.

No h'etaṃ bhante.

Tasmātih'Ānanda es'eva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa pacayo nāmarūpassa yadidaṃ viññāṇaṃ.

Nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇan ti iti kho pan'etaṃ vuttaṃ; tad Ānanda iminā p'etaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ. Viññāṇaṃ va hi Ānanda nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṃ nālabhissatha, api nu kho āyati jātijarāmarāṇadukkhasamudayasambhavo paññāyethā ti.

No h'etam bhante.

Tasmātih'Ānanda es'eva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa pac-cayo viññāṇassa yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ.

Ettāvatā kho Ānanda jāyetha vā jīyetha vā mīyetha vā cavetha vā uppajjetha vā, ettāvatā adhivacanapatho, ettāvatā niruttipatho, ettāvatā paññattipatho, ettāvatā paññāvacaraṃ, ettāvatā vaṭṭaṃ vaṭṭati itthat-taṃ paññāpanāya, yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ saha viññāṇena.

—‘With name-&-matter as condition, contact’, so it was said: how it is, Ānanda, that with name-&-matter as condition there is contact should be seen in this manner. Those tokens, Ānanda, those marks, those signs, those indications by which the name-body is described,—they being absent, would designation-contact be manifest in the matter-body?

—No indeed, lord.

—Those tokens, Ānanda, those marks, those signs, those indications by which the matter-body is described,—they being absent, would resistance-contact be manifest in the name-body?

—No indeed, lord.

—Those tokens, Ānanda, those marks, those signs, those indications by which the name-body and the matter-body are described,—they being absent, would either designation-contact or resistance-contact be manifest?

—No indeed, lord.

—Those tokens, Ānanda, those marks, those signs, those indications by which name-&-matter is described,—they being absent, would contact be manifest?

—No indeed, lord.

—Therefore, Ānanda, just this is the reason, this is the occasion, this is the arising, this is the condition of contact, that is to say name-&-matter.

‘With consciousness as condition, name-&-matter’, so it was said: how it is, Ānanda, that with consciousness as condition there is name-&-matter should be seen in this manner. If, Ānanda, consciousness were not to descend into the mother’s womb, would name-&-matter be consolidated in the mother’s womb?

—No indeed, lord.

—If, Ānanda, having descended into the mother's womb, consciousness were to turn aside, would name-&-matter be delivered into this situation?

—No indeed, lord.

—If, Ānanda, consciousness were cut off from one still young, from a boy or a girl, would name-&-matter come to increase, growth, and fullness?

—No indeed, lord.

—Therefore, Ānanda, just this is the reason, this is the occasion, this is the arising, this is the condition of name-&-matter, that is to say consciousness.

‘With name-&-matter as condition, consciousness’, so it was said: how it is, Ānanda, that with name-&-matter as condition there is consciousness should be seen in this manner. If, Ānanda, consciousness were not to obtain a stay in name-&-matter, would future arising and coming-into-being of birth, ageing, death, and unpleasure (suffering), be manifest?

—No indeed, lord.

—Therefore, Ānanda, just this is the reason, this is the occasion, this is the arising, this is the condition of consciousness, that is to say name-&-matter.

Thus far, Ānanda, may one be born or age or die or fall or arise, thus far is there a way of designation, thus far is there a way of language, thus far is there a way of description, thus far is there a sphere of understanding, thus far the round proceeds as manifestation in a situation,—so far, that is to say, as there is name-&-matter together with consciousness.

10. Majjhima iii,8

Yato ca kho āvuso ajjhattikañ c'eva cakkhum [sotaṃ, ghānaṃ, jivhā, kāyo, mano] aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā [saddā, gandhā, rasā, phoṭṭhabbā, dhammā] āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti, evaṃ tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti. Yaṃ tathābhūtassa rūpaṃ taṃ rūp'upādānakkhandhe saṅgahaṃ gacchati; ...vedanā...; ...saññā...; ...saṅkhārā...; yaṃ tathābhūtassa viññāṇaṃ taṃ viññāṇ'upādānakkhandhe saṅgahaṃ gacchati.

It is when, friends, the internal eye [ear, nose, tongue, body, mind] is unbroken, and external visible forms [sounds, smells, tastes, touches, images/ideas] come in the way, and there is the appropriate connexion,—it is then that there is the appearance of the appropriate kind of consciousness. Of what thus comes into existence, the matter goes for inclusion in the holding aggregate of matter; ...the feeling...; ...the perception...; ...the determinations...; of what thus comes into existence, the consciousness goes for inclusion in the holding aggregate of consciousness.

11. Indriya Saṃy. ii,8

Yassa kho bhikkhave imāni pañc'indriyāni sabbena sabbaṃ sabbathā sabbaṃ n'atthi, taṃ ahaṃ Bāhiro puthujjanapakkhe ʒhito ti vadāmi.

In whom, monks, altogether and in every way there are not these five faculties, of him I say 'An outsider, one who stands on the commoner's side'.

12. Itivuttaka II,ii,7

Dve'mā bhikkhave nibbānadhātuyo. Katamā dve. Saupādisesā ca nibbānadhātu anupādisesā ca nibbānadhātu.

Katamā ca bhikkhave saupādisesā nibbānadhātu. Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu arahaṃ hoti khīṇāsavo vusitavā katakaraṇīyo ohitabhāro anuppattasadattho parikkhīṇabhavaśaṃyojano sammadaññāvimutto. Tassa tiṭṭhant'eva pañc'indriyāni, yesaṃ aviḡhātattā manāpāmanāpaṃ paccanubhoti sukhadukkaṃ paṭisaṃvediyati. Tassa yo rāgakkhayo dosa-kkhayo mohakkhayo, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave saupādisesā nibbānadhātu.

Katamā ca bhikkhave anupādisesā nibbānadhātu. Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu arahaṃ hoti khīṇāsavo vusitavā katakaraṇīyo ohitabhāro anuppattasadattho parikkhīṇabhavaśaṃyojano sammadaññāvimutto. Tassa idh'eva bhikkhave sabbavedayitāni anabhinanditāni sītibhavisanti, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave anupādisesā nibbānadhātu.

Imā kho bhikkhave dve nibbānadhātuyo.

There are, monks, these two extinction-elements. Which are the two? The extinction-element with residue and the extinction-element without residue.

And which, monks, is the extinction-element with residue? Here, monks, a monk is a worthy one, a destroyer of the cankers, one who has reached completion, done what was to be done, laid down the

burden, achieved his own welfare, destroyed attachment to being, one who is released through comprehending rightly. His five faculties [seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching] still remain: owing to their being intact he experiences what is agreeable and disagreeable, he feels what is pleasant and unpleasant. It is his destruction of lust, hate, and delusion, monks, that is called the extinction-element with residue.

And which, monks, is the extinction-element without residue? Here, monks, a monk is a worthy one, a destroyer of the cankers, one who has reached completion, done what was to be done, laid down the burden, achieved his own welfare, destroyed attachment to being, one who is released through comprehending rightly. All his feelings, monks, not being delighted in, will become cold in this very place: it is this, monks, that is called the extinction-element without residue.

These, monks, are the two extinction-elements.

13. Theragāthā 715, 716

715 *Na me hoti Ahoṣin ti, Bhavissan ti na hoti me;
Saṅkhārā vibhavissanti: tattha kā paridevanā.*

716 *Suddhaṃ dhammasamuppādaṃ suddhaṃ saṅkhārasantatiṃ
Passantassa yathābhūtaṃ na bhayaṃ hoti gāmaṇi.*

715 'I was' is not for me, not for me is 'I shall be';
Determinations will un-be: therein what place for sighs?

716 Pure arising of things, pure series of determinants –
For one who sees this as it is, chieftain, there is no fear.

14. Devatā Saṃy. iii,5

*Yo hoti bhikkhu arahaṃ katāvī
Khīṇāsavo antimadehadhārī,
Mānaṃ nu kho so upāgamma bhikkhu
Ahaṃ vadāmī ti pi so vadeyya
Mamaṃ vadantī ti pi so vadeyyā ti.*

*Pahīnamānassa na santi ganthā,
Vidhūpitā mānaganthassa sabbe;
Sa vītivatto yamataṃ sumedho
Ahaṃ vadāmī ti pi so vadeyya
Mamaṃ vadantī ti pi so vadeyya;
Loke samaññaṃ kusalo veditvā
Vohāramattena so vohareyyā ti.*

—A monk who is a worthy one, his task done,
His cankers destroyed, wearing his last body, –
Is it because this monk has arrived at conceit
That he might say ‘I say’,
And that he might say ‘They say to me’?

—For one who is rid of conceit there are no ties,
All his ties of conceit (*mānaganthā’ssa*) are dissolved;
This wise man, having got beyond conceiving (*yaṃ mataṃ*),
Might say ‘I say’,
And he might say ‘They say to me’:
Skilled in worldly expressions, knowing about them,
He might use them within the limits of usage.

15. Majjhima v,3

*Yā c’āvuso vedanā yā ca saññā yaṃ ca viññāṇaṃ, ime dhammā saṃ-
saṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā
vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ. Yaṃ h’āvuso vedeti taṃ sañ-
jānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti, tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no
visaṃsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhu-
jitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ.*

That, friend, which is feeling, that which is perception, that which is con-
sciousness,—these things are associated, not dissociated, and it is not
possible to show the distinction between these things having separ-
ated them one from another. For what, friend, one feels that one per-
ceives, what one perceives that one cognizes,—that is why these things
are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to show the distinc-
tion between these things having separated them one from another.

16. Majjhima xv,1

*Tasmātiha te gahapati evaṃ sikkhitabbaṃ. Na rūpaṃ upādiyissāmi, na ca
me rūpanissitaṃ viññāṇaṃ bhavissatī ti. Na vedanaṃ... Na saññāṃ...
Na saṅkhāre... Na viññāṇaṃ upādiyissāmi, na ca me viññāṇanissitaṃ
viññāṇaṃ bhavissatī ti. Evaṃ hi te gahapati sikkhitabbaṃ.*

Therefore, householder, you should train yourself thus. ‘I shall not
hold matter, nor shall my consciousness be hanging to matter.’ ‘I shall
not hold feeling...’ ‘I shall not hold perception...’ ‘I shall not hold
determinations...’ ‘I shall not hold consciousness, nor shall my con-


sciousness be hanging to consciousness.’ For thus, householder, should you train yourself.

17. Majjhima xiv,8

Kathañ c’āvuso anupādā paritassanā hoti. Idh’āvuso asutavā puthujjano ariyānaṃ adassāvī ariyadhammassa akovido ariyadhamme avinīto sappurisānaṃ adassāvī sappurisdhammassa akovido sappurisdhamme avinīto rūpaṃ [vedanaṃ, saññaṃ, saṅkhāre, viññāṇaṃ] attato samanupassati rūpavantaṃ [...viññāṇavantaṃ] vā attānaṃ attani vā rūpaṃ [...viññāṇaṃ] rūpasmiṃ [...viññāṇasmiṃ] vā attānaṃ. Tassa taṃ rūpaṃ [viññāṇaṃ] vipariṇamati aññathā hoti, tassa rūpa [...viññāṇa] vipariṇāmaññathābhāvā rūpa [...viññāṇa] vipariṇāmānuparivatti viññāṇaṃ hoti, tassa rūpa [...viññāṇa] vipariṇāmānuparivattajā paritassanā dhammasamuppādā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhanti, cetaso pariyādānā uttāsavā ca hoti vighātavā ca apekhavā ca anupādāya ca paritassati. Evaṃ kho āvuso anupādā paritassanā hoti.

And how, friends, is there anxiety at not holding? Here, friends, an un-instructed commoner, unseeing of the nobles, ignorant of the noble Teaching, undisciplined in the noble Teaching, unseeing of the good men, ignorant of the good men’s Teaching, undisciplined in the good men’s Teaching, regards matter [feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness] as self, or self as endowed with matter [...consciousness], or matter [...consciousness] as belonging to self, or self as in matter [...consciousness]. That matter [...consciousness] of his changes and becomes otherwise; as that matter [...consciousness] changes and becomes otherwise so his consciousness follows around (keeps track of) that change of matter [...consciousness]; anxious ideas that arise born of following around that change of matter [...consciousness] seize upon his mind and become established; with that mental seizure, he is perturbed and disquieted and concerned, and from not holding he is anxious. Thus, friends, is there anxiety at not holding.

LETTERS
(1960–1965)



ÑĀNAVĪRA THERA.

[L. 1]¹

NAMO TASSA BHAGAVATO ARAHATO SAMMĀSAMBUDDHASSA

— *Ekaṃ samayaṃ Ñāṇavīro bhikkhu Būṇdalagāme viharati araṅ-
ñakuṭikāyaṃ. Tena kho pana samayena Ñāṇavīro bhikkhu rattiyā
paṭhamaṃ yāmaṃ caṅkamaṇa āvaraṇīyehi dhammehi cittaṃ pari-
sodheti, yathāsutaṃ yathāpariyattaṃ dhammaṃ cetasā anuvitakkeṭi
anuvicāreṭi manasānupekkhati. Atha kho Ñāṇavīrassa bhikkhuno evaṃ
yathāsutaṃ yathāpariyattam dhammaṃ cetasā anuvitakkayato anuvicā-
rayato manasānupekkhato virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi,
Yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammanti.*

So dhammānusārī māsaṃ hutvā diṭṭhipatto hoti.

(27.6.1959)

*‘Atthi Kassapa maggo atthi paṭipadā yathā paṭipanno sāmaṃ yeva
ñassati sāmaṃ dakkhīti, Samaṇo va Gotamo kālavādī bhūtavādī attha-
vādī dhammavādī vinayavādīti.’*

*‘Diṭṭhīvisūkāni upātivatto,
Patto niyāmaṃ paṭiladdhamaggo,
Uppannañāṇo ’mhi anaññaneyyo
Eko care khaggavisāṇakappo’*

These books contain the Buddha’s Teaching; they can be trusted abso-
lutely from beginning to end:

(Vinayaṭīka:) Suttavibhaṅga, Mahāvagga, Cūlavagga; (Suttaṭīka:)
Dīghanikāya, Majjhimanikāya, Saṃyuttanikāya, Aṅguttaranikāya, Sutta-
nipāta, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Theratherīgāthā.

No other books whatsoever can be trusted. Leaving aside Vinaya seek
the meaning of these books in your own experience. Do not seek their
meaning in any other books: if you do you will be misled.



ÑĀṄAVĪRA THERA WALKING IN THE FIELD.

I. LETTER TO MR. N. Q. DIAS

[L. 2]

27 March 1962

Dear Mr. Dias,

The Pali for 'awareness' (as you are no doubt aware) is *sampajañña*. In the Suttas it is frequently linked with 'mindfulness' or *sati*, in the compound *sati-sampajañña*, 'mindfulness-and-awareness'. In the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta awareness (of bodily actions) is included in the section on mindfulness of the body, so we can perhaps conclude that, while it is not different from mindfulness, awareness is rather more specialized in meaning. Mindfulness is general recollectedness, not being scatterbrained; whereas awareness is more precisely *keeping oneself under constant observation*, not letting one's actions (or thoughts, or feelings, etc.) pass unnoticed.

Here, to begin with, are three Sutta passages to indicate the scope of the practice of awareness in the Buddha's Teaching.

(a) And how, monks, is a monk aware? Here, monks, in walking to and fro a monk practises awareness; in looking ahead and looking aside he practises awareness; in bending and stretching...; in using robes and bowl...; in eating, drinking, chewing, and tasting...; in excreting and urinating...; in walking, standing, sitting, sleeping, waking, speaking, and being silent, he practises awareness. <Vedanā Saṃy. 7: iv,211>

(b) And which, monks, is the development of concentration that, when developed and made much of, leads to mindfulness-and-awareness? Here, monks, feelings are known as they arise, feelings are known as they endure, feelings are known as they vanish; perceptions are known as they arise, perceptions are known as they endure, perceptions are known as they vanish; thoughts are known as they arise, thoughts are known as they endure, thoughts are known as they vanish. <A. IV,41: ii,45>

(c) Here, Ānanda, a monk is mindful as he walks to, he is mindful as he walks fro, he is mindful as he stands, he is mindful as he sits, he is mindful as he lies down, he is mindful as he sets to work. This, Ānanda, is a mode of recollection that, when developed and made much of in this way, leads to mindfulness-and-awareness. <A. VI,29: iii,325>

The next thing is to sort out a verbal confusion. When our actions become habitual we tend to do them without thinking about them—they become ‘automatic’ or ‘instinctive’ (scratching one’s head, for example, or blinking one’s eyes). We commonly call these ‘unconscious actions’, and this usage is followed by psychology and science generally. But this is a misunderstanding. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as an ‘unconscious action’. The Buddha defines ‘action’ (*kamma*) as ‘intention’ (*cetanā*), and there is no intention without consciousness (*viññāṇa*). An *unconscious* action is no action at all, it is purely and simply *movement* as when, for example, a tree sways in the wind, or a rock is dislodged by the rain and rolls down a mountainside and derailed a train (in this latter case it is quaintly called, in legal circles,¹ ‘an Act of God’ but if there is no God there is no Act, only the movement of the rock).

In the Buddha’s Teaching, all consciousness is action (by mind, voice or body) and every action is conscious. But this does not mean that every action is done in awareness—indeed, what is commonly called an ‘unconscious action’ is merely a (conscious) action that is done *not deliberately*, that is done *unawares*. What we commonly call a ‘conscious action’ is, strictly speaking, a *deliberate* action, an action that requires some thought to perform (as, for example, when we try to do something that we have not done before, or only infrequently). When we do such actions, we have to consider what we are doing (or else we shall make a mistake); and it is this *considering what we are doing* that constitutes ‘awareness’. An action that we do without considering what we are doing is an action that is done without ‘awareness’.

So long as we are awake, obviously enough, there is always some degree of awareness present, since new problems, large or small, are always presenting themselves, and we are obliged to *consider* them (even if only for a moment or two) in order to deal with them. (When we *dream*, on the other hand, awareness is in abeyance; and it is this very fact that *we are unable to look at our dream problems objectively* that distinguishes dreams from waking experience. When we are awake we are always aware ‘I am awake’, but when we dream we are *not* aware ‘I am dreaming’; and, in fact, when we have a nightmare and struggle to wake up, all we are doing is *trying to remember [or become aware] that we are dreaming*, and if we succeed we wake up.) But though, unlike in sleep, there is always some degree of awareness present in our waking life, it is normally only enough to enable us to deal with unexpected circumstances as they occur; for

the rest we are *absorbed* in what we are doing—whether it is the daily task of earning a livelihood, or our personal affairs with our emotional attitudes towards other people (affection, dislike, fury, lust, boredom, and so on), it makes no difference. To maintain a detached attitude is difficult when there is much routine work to be done in a hurry, and it robs our personal relationships with others of all emotional satisfaction. We prefer to get through our work as quickly and with as little effort as possible, and then to wallow in our emotions like a buffalo in a mud-hole. Awareness of what we are doing, which is always an effort, we like to keep to the absolute minimum. But we cannot avoid awareness altogether, since, as I remarked earlier, it is necessary in order to deal with unexpected problems, however insignificant, as they arise.

But this awareness is practised merely for the purpose of overcoming the obstacles that lie in the path of our daily life—it is practised simply in order to get through the business of living as expeditiously and as efficiently as possible.

Awareness in the Buddha's Teaching, however, has a different purpose: it is practised for the purpose of attaining release from living. These two different purposes, while not directly opposed, do not in fact co-operate—they are, as it were, at right angles to each other; and since the amount of awareness that can be practised at any one time is limited, there is competition between these purposes for whatever awareness is available. Thus it happens that in activities requiring much awareness simply for their successful performance (such as writing this letter) there is not much scope for the practice of awareness leading to release (though no doubt if I got into the unlikely habit of writing this same letter twice a day over a number of years I should be able to devote more of the latter to it).

The Buddha tells us (in the *Itivuttaka* III,30: 71-2) that three things harm the progress of the *sekha bhikkhu* (one who has reached the Path but who has not arrived at *arahatship*): fondness for work (i.e. building, sewing robes, doing odd jobs, and so on), fondness for talk, and fondness for sleep. In the first two, as we can see, much awareness must be devoted to successful performance of the task in hand (making things, expounding the Dhamma), and in the third no awareness is possible. From the passages I quoted earlier it is clear that awareness for the purpose of release is best practised on those actions that are habitual and do not require much thought to perform—walking, standing, sitting, lying down, attending to bodily

needs of various kinds, and so on. (The reference to 'sleeping' in passage (a) means that one should go to sleep with awareness, bearing in mind the time to awaken again; it does not mean that we should practise awareness while we are actually asleep.) Naturally a *bhikkhu* cannot altogether avoid doing jobs of work or occasionally talking, but these, too, should be done mindfully and with awareness as far as possible: 'he is mindful as he sets to work', 'in speaking and being silent he practises awareness'. The normal person, as I remarked above, does not practise awareness where he does not find it necessary, that is to say, in his habitual actions; but the *bhikkhu* is instructed not only to do these habitual actions with awareness but also, as far as possible, to confine himself to these actions. Drive and initiative in new ventures, so highly prized in the world of business and practical affairs, are impediments for one who is seeking release.

And how does one practise this awareness for the purpose of release? It is really very simple. Since (as I have said) all action is conscious, we do not have to undertake any elaborate investigation (such as asking other people) to find out what it is that we are doing so that we can become aware of it. All that is necessary is a slight change of attitude, a slight effort of attention. Instead of being fully absorbed by, or identified with, our action, we must continue, without ceasing to act, to *observe* ourselves in action. This is done quite simply by asking ourselves the question 'What am I doing?' It will be found that, since the action was always conscious anyway, we *already*, in a certain sense, *know* the answer without having to think about it; and simply by asking ourselves the question we become *aware* of the answer, i.e. of what we are doing. Thus, if I now ask myself 'What am I doing?' I can immediately answer that I am 'writing to Mr. Dias', that I am 'sitting in my bed', that I am 'scratching my leg', that I am 'wondering whether I shall have a motion', that I am 'living in Bundala', and so on almost endlessly.

If I wish to practise awareness I must go on asking myself this question and answering it, until such time as I find that I am automatically (or habitually) *answering the question without having to ask it*. When this happens, the practice of awareness is being successful, and it only remains to develop this state and not to fall away from it through neglect. (Similar considerations will of course apply to awareness of feelings, perceptions, and thoughts—see passage (b). Here I have to ask myself 'What am I feeling, or perceiving, or thinking?', and the answer, once again, will immediately present itself.)

The objection is sometimes raised that it is not possible to do two things at once, and that it is therefore not possible both to act and to be aware of the action at one and the same time. But this opinion is a pure prejudice, based upon a certain false notion of the nature of consciousness (or of experience). It is perfectly possible to be doing a number of things at the same time (for example, I am breathing as I write this letter, and I do not interrupt the one in order to do the other); it is not possible to devote *equal attention* to all of them at the same time, but this is another matter. And this is true also of acting and being aware of the action. This can be verified very simply; all that is necessary is to start walking and, while still walking, to ask oneself the question 'What am I doing?'; it will be found that one can give oneself the answer 'I am walking' without ceasing to walk (i.e. it is not necessary to come to a halt, or break into a run, or fall down, in order to answer the question).

Why should one practise awareness? I can think of three good reasons immediately, and there are doubtless others besides.

In the first place, a person who is constantly aware of what he is doing will find it easier to keep his *sīla*. A man who, when chasing his neighbour's wife, knows 'I am chasing my neighbour's wife', will not be able to conceal from himself the fact that he is on the point of breaking the third precept,² and will correct himself sooner than the man who chases his neighbour's wife without considering what he is doing. In brief, awareness leads to self-criticism and thence to self-correction.

In the second place, awareness is cooling and is directly opposed to the passions (either lust or hate), which are heating (this has no connexion with the mysterious qualities that are inherent in Oriental food, but missing from food in the West). This means that the man who constantly practises awareness has a powerful control over his passions; indeed, the constant practice of awareness actually inhibits the passions, and they arise less and less frequently.

In the third place, the practice of awareness is an absolute prerequisite for the understanding of the essence of the Buddha's Teaching. The reason for this is that the Dhamma is concerned not with any one single experience (consciousness, feeling, etc.) as such, but with experience (consciousness, feeling, etc.) in general. We do not need the Buddha to tell us how to escape from any particular experience (whether it is a simple headache or an incurable cancer), but we do need the Buddha to tell us how to escape from all experience whatsoever. Now, in the normal state of being absorbed by what we are doing

(that is, of non-awareness) we are concerned only with this or that particular experience or state of affair ('she loves me; she loves me not...'), and we are in no way concerned with experience in general ('what is the nature of the emotion of love?'). But when we become aware of what we are doing (or feeling, etc.), the case is different. Though we are still doing (or feeling), we are also observing that doing or feeling with a certain degree of detachment, and at that time the *general nature* of 'doing' and 'feeling' comes into view (the particular doing and feeling that happen to be present now merely appear as *examples* of 'doing' and 'feeling' in general); and it is when this general nature of things comes into view that we are able, with the Buddha's guidance, to grasp the universal characteristics of *anicca*, *dukkha*, and *anattā*. But here we are getting into deep waters, and I do not wish to add difficulties to a subject that is already not very easy.

P.S. Note that the three advantages of practising awareness mentioned in the last paragraph correspond to *sīla*, *samādhi*, and *paññā*, respectively.

II. LETTERS TO MRS. IRENE QUITTNER

[L. 3]

11 January 1964

Dear Mrs. Quittner,¹

As far as I can gather from what you say, it may be such that you are one of the (regrettably) few people to whom the *Notes* are really addressed. So I think that I ought to give you the opportunity—if you want it—of writing direct to me about things in the *Notes* that are not clear to you. Many things, certainly, are difficult in themselves, and more words about them will probably not help much; but there may be other things about which the *Notes* are unnecessarily obscure, and perhaps also things left out without any apparent reason; and here some further discussion might be useful. (In this connexion, your lament that the notes on *nāmarūpa* are inadequate may be justified. In the first place, however, a certain amount of amplification will be found in other notes^a and in the second place, I am not at all sure that a detailed study of the intricacies of *nāmarūpa*—particularly à la *Ñāṇavīra*—may not easily become a misdirection of effort: the very fact that the *Notes* say considerably more on this question than is to be found in the Suttas is already a doubtful recommendation. See *Notes*, RŪPA, last paragraph, third sentence from the end. But in these days of printed books a greater detail is demanded, and is perhaps not entirely objectionable. In any case, to say more I should have to say a lot more; and though the flesh is willing, the spirit is weak.)

I am by no means vexed that, as well as commendable, you should have found the book ‘arrogant, scathing, and condescending’, since the fact that it seems so is not altogether unintentional—though, also, it is not wholly a contrived effect. The individual notes were, for the most part, originally inscribed in the margins of my P.T.S. dictionary,² without any immediate thought of publication. And yet, they were written in exactly the same tone as what you find in the present book.^b In transcribing the notes for publication it was not through negligence that no attempt was made to alter the style: I preserved it knowing quite well that it would keep the reader at a

a. In general, as you get more familiar with the book you may find that difficulties raised in one part are answered—or partly—in another.

distance—which was what I wanted. Certainly, it is galling for the European (and perhaps not galling enough for the Oriental) to be treated as if he had no opinion worth consulting: the European reader expects his author to submit his reasons for what he says, so as to enable the reader to judge for himself; the author is required to take the reader into his confidence, and if he does not it is resented. In dealing with rational matters this is quite in order; both parties are assumed to have the same objective point of view (the same *absence* of point of view, in other words), and the reader follows the author's arguments in order to decide whether he agrees or disagrees; and having done so, he shuts the book and passes on to the next. But if the question at issue is not within the sphere of reason, all this is a misunderstanding. If the book is an invitation, or perhaps a challenge, to the reader to come and share the author's point of view (which may require him first to adopt *some* point of view instead of remaining objectively without any at all), it obviously defeats its own purpose if it starts out by allowing the reader to assume that he already does so. (At this point, I would refer you to three Suttas of the Aṅguttara: V,xvi,1-3: iii,174-6, i.e. Book of the Fives, Suttas 151-153, or the first three of the Saddhamma Vagga.³) In a live discussion, or in a correspondence, the appropriate relationship can perhaps be established gradually and painlessly; but in a book, impersonally addressed to unknown readers, the situation is less accommodating, and some outrage to the reader's self-respect (especially if it is what Camus calls '*l'orgueil européen*'⁴) must be expected. Without presuming to say whether the *Notes* are adequate in this respect, I shall try to show what I mean by referring to a point that you yourself have raised.

In your letter you have remarked—presumably with reference to note (a) of the Preface—that the author, with a few strokes of the pen,

b. A man, cast up alone on a desert island, might, after a time, and seeing no other people, give up wearing clothes without feeling immodest. Some strangers, landing on his island many years later and seeing him, might tell him about his immodesty in emphatic terms. But by that time he would quite likely have forgotten what the word means. So it is with one's thoughts. After a certain time in solitude they forget their modesty and go about naked. If one then shows them to a stranger without clothing them decently, he may well find them arrogant. But the word is no longer familiar. (I am, in any case, something of a solitary by nature, sadly lacking in warmth of feeling either for or against other people. This, really, is the unpardonable offence, and all the rest follows from it.)

has reduced the three baskets to two,⁵ and that without giving any reasons. It is now 2,500 years after the *parinibbāna*,⁶ and we find ourselves faced with a large accumulation of texts (to speak only of the Pali), some certainly reporting what the Buddha actually said, and others, no less certainly, the work of commentators, scholiasts, and so on; but one and all claiming to represent—or rather, claimed by Tradition as representing—the Buddha's true and original Teaching. The first difficulty, today, is to get started: it is obvious enough that we cannot accept all these texts, but where are we to draw the line? All we can do is to make a preliminary critical survey, and then, with an intelligent guess, divide the texts into those we will accept and those we will not. Having made the division we lay aside the critical attitude and set to work to grasp the Teaching. It would not be unduly difficult in the *Notes* to muster an array of critical arguments leading to the rejection of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. But at once the reader would have something positive and objective to seize hold of, and a learned controversy would start up moving more and more passionately away from the point at issue. 'In general,' says Kierkegaard,

all that is needed to make the question simple and easy is the exercise of a certain dietetic circumspection, the renunciation of every learned interpolation or subordinate consideration, which in a trice might degenerate into a century-long parenthesis.
(*CUP*, pp. 29-30)

So, in the *Notes*, there is nothing of this (though see the last sentence, first paragraph, of СИПТА). The reader is unceremoniously (condescendingly?) informed, at the start of the book, which texts the author regards as authentic and which not. Without so much as 'by your leave' the author decides for the reader where the line shall be drawn. The reader either throws the book away, or else swallows what seems to be an insult to his critical intelligence and accepts the book on the author's terms. If the book is all that it sets out to be (though the author must not on any account suggest to the reader that it might not be), it is possible that the reader may eventually come to share the author's point of view. If this should happen, the author's reasons for rejection of texts (here the Abhidhamma Piṭaka) will at once become perfectly evident—indeed, they will become the reader's own reasons. All is then forgiven and forgotten.

Do not forget that the book is written in Ceylon and not in England. With you there is no sacrosanct Buddhist tradition, and people

will listen to new ideas proclaimed even in a normal tone of voice: here it is quite otherwise. People will listen, but only if the unfamiliar is uttered loudly and firmly enough to inspire them with courage to think against tradition. Once the ice is broken they may take the plunge; and one or two already—laymen—seem to have embarked on a serious study of the *Notes*. The few English-speaking monks who have seen the book mostly don't like it, but traditional orthodoxy does not have the same official backing here as it does in hard-headed Burma. We have thought it prudent not to send copies to the two *pirivena* universities here, which are strongholds of Sinhalese Nationalism; but we have received a polite letter from the Librarian of the Maha-Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok saying that the book will be 'a useful work of reference' for the many monks of various nationalities who come to study there. There is a certain ambiguity about the Siamese that I have not yet fathomed.

[L. 4]

12 April 1964

Many thanks for your letter. If you feel like it, and if I am still about the place, by all means come and see me when you next visit Ceylon. I shall be only too happy to discuss things with you; but, at the same time, I rather fancy that I am less proficient at talking than at writing. Although earlier I did discourage both visitors and correspondents, the situation has since changed. My chronic digestive disorder has worsened and has now been joined by a nervous complaint (caused, ironically enough, by a drug prescribed to cure the amoebiasis), and the combination drastically reduces the time I can devote to practice: in consequence of this I have to get through my day as best I can with thinking, reading, and writing (it is only on this account that the *Notes* have made their appearance). So outside disturbances are now sometimes positively welcome.

Possibly the Ven. monk, in saying that *paṭīccasamuppāda* is taught in the present by Burmese and Siamese meditation masters, was referring to the Vibhaṅga or Paṭisambhidā interpretations mentioned at the foot of p. 676 (Ch. XVII, n. 48) of the Ven. Ñāṇamoli Thera's *Path of Purification* (Visuddhimagga translation).¹ I admit that I have not investigated these, but from all accounts they are unsatisfactory. In any case, the *paṭīccasamuppāda* formulation (as I see it) does not admit of

alternative interpretations—there is one and one only. I do not see that anyone offering a number of different interpretations as equally valid can possibly be right in any of them. (It is quite possible that someone actually reaching *sotāpatti*, and therefore seeing *paṭīcasamuppāda* for himself, might still hesitate before deciding on the meaning of the expanded—twelve term—formulation, since what he sees for himself is *Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti*,² etc., and not its expansion in terms—*avijjā*, *saṅkhārā*, and so on—whose meaning he may not know. But one thing is certain: *whatever* interpretation he gives will be in conformity with his private knowledge, *Imasmiṃ sati*..., and since he has *already* grasped the essence of the matter he will not look around for alternative interpretations.) But the Ven. Thera may have had something else in mind when he spoke.

There are several new references to, and quotations from, Bradley. I had already referred to him in ANICCA [A] without having read him, and merely on the strength of what others have said about him. But now I am actually in the course of reading his *Principles of Logic*, and I find that the reference was fully justified. It is satisfactory (and satisfying) to find someone else who has had the same thoughts (within limits, naturally) as oneself, particularly after the singularly depressing experience of reading some of the more recent English philosophers (Bertrand Russell & Co.). Bradley's idealism won't do, of course; but it is incomparably better than the current realism.

I am always pleased when I find a connexion between the Suttas and outside philosophies: it is not, to be sure, that the former can be reduced to the latter—the Dhamma is not just *one* way of thinking amongst others—, but rather that the Buddha has seen all that these philosophers have seen, and he has *also* seen what they could not see; and to discover this is extraordinarily exhilarating. Nobody can say to the Buddha, 'There is this or that that you have not taken into account'³: it is all taken into account, and still more. The Suttas give not the slightest pretext for the famous Sacrifice of the Intellect—Ignatius Loyola and Bodhidharma are strange bedfellows, indeed. Certainly there is more to the Dhamma than intellect (and this is sometimes hard for Europeans to understand), but there is nothing to justify the wilful abandonment of the Principle of Identity.

People, mostly, seem to be finding it difficult to make very much of the *Notes* (I, too, find it difficult sometimes, so I cannot say that I am astonished). The university professors who have had copies are silent except one from America who (very politely) attributes their un-

intelligibility to his ignorance of Pali, but whether this excuses me or him is not quite clear. Few *bhikkhus* have had copies, but one has remarked that ‘they contain a lot of mistakes’—which, from the traditional point of view, is quite true. This would probably be the opinion of the great majority, who, however, would perhaps add that, in a foreigner, it is excusable. Laymen here are sometimes interested, and at all events not hostile (except for one, who has been provoked to a fit of indiscriminate xenophobic fury, embracing Dahlke and the Ven. Nyānatiloka Mahāthera⁴ as well as myself—also strange bedfellows!). Expressions of approval have come from Germany and ‘Les Amis du Bouddhisme’ of Paris, I am pleased to learn, are enthusiastic. About thirty copies went to England, but (apart from a bare acknowledgement from Nottingham, and a brief note from a personal acquaintance) yours has been the only comment we have received. Of course, it is not easy to know to whom to send, and the choice of addresses is largely a matter of chance.

[L. 5]

14 July 1964

The Principle (or Law) of Identity is usually stated as ‘A is A’, which can be understood as ‘Everything is what it is’. Bradley (*PL*, Ch. V, p.141) remarks that, in this form, it is a tautology and says nothing at all.

It does not even assert identity. For identity without difference is nothing at all. It takes two to make the same, and the least we can have is some change of event in a self-same thing, or the return to that thing from some suggested difference. For, otherwise, to say “it is the same as itself” would be quite unmeaning.

Stebbing (*MIL*, p. 470) says:

The traditional interpretation of the law is metaphysical. If “A” be regarded as symbolizing a subject of attributes, then the formula may be interpreted as expressing the permanence of substance, or the persisting of something through change.

The second paragraph of *ATTĀ* says, in effect, that the Principle of Identity—taken, that is, with Bradley’s qualification that there must be ‘some change of event’ to make it meaningful—is no less valid in the Dhamma than it is everywhere else. Acceptance of this Principle (as

you will see also from the Stebbing quotation and from my further treatment in ANICCA, PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C], & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE) means rejection of the popular notion that ‘impermanence’ in the Dhamma means ‘universal flux’. With the rejection of this notion we come to see that the question of *anattā* can deal, not with the self-identity of things, but only with ‘self’ as the subject (‘I’, ‘myself’ etc.). But if one starts off sacrificing the intellect by assuming that the *anattā* teaching is denial of the Principle of Identity, then at once there is chaos.

In referring to Loyola and Bodhidharma in my last letter, I had in mind two ‘wilful abandonments of the Principle of Identity’. (i) Loyola: ‘In order never to go astray, we must always be ready to believe that what I, personally, see as *white* is *black*, if the hierarchical Church defines it so.’ (ii) Bodhidharma (or, rather, a modern disciple of his, in an article—‘Mysticism & Zen’, I think—in *The Middle Way*¹): ‘The basic principle of Zen is “A is not A”.’ (Note, in parenthesis, that once people start denying the Principle of Identity the question may arise whether the bare statement ‘A is A’ is quite as meaningless as Bradley supposes. A lot has been made in modern French writing, philosophical as well as literary, of Audiberti’s imaginative phrase *la noirceur secrète du lait*;² and this suggests that it may not be altogether meaningless to assert the contrary, ‘white is white’. This might perhaps seem trivial, except that a great deal of modern thinking—including mathematics—is based on a deliberate rejection of one or another of the Laws of Thought, of which Identity is the first. This may be all very well in poetry or physics, but it won’t do in philosophy—I mean as a fundamental principle. Every ambiguity, for a philosopher, should be a sign that he has further to go.)

[PR. 162–164: FULL-SIZED REPRODUCTIONS OF SECTIONS OF THE ORIGINALS OF L. 3 AND L. 4]

Dear Mrs. Chitties,

I have been sent, by the Ven.

Thun and his brother Mr. Samaratunga, your letter to them about my 'Notes on Idemna'.

As Mr. Samaratunga has remarked to me, it is very good of you to have taken so much trouble in reporting your reactions in such detail: it is not at all easy to know how the 'Notes' are being received unless people write and tell us, and for the most part all we get is a polite acknowledgment and nothing more. The interest you have expressed is also a particular encouragement to Mr. Samaratunga, who has taken great pains about having the book produced. But the reason for this letter is not simply to express appreciation.

As far as I can gather from what you say, it may be that you are

one of the (reputably) few people to whom the 'Notes' are really addressed. So I think that I should give you the opportunity — if you want it — of writing direct to me about things in the 'Notes' that are not clear to you. Many things, certainly, are difficult in themselves, and more words about them will probably not help much; but there may be other things about which the 'Notes' are unnecessarily obscure, and perhaps also things left out without any apparent reason; and here some further discussion might be useful. (In this connexion, your lament that the notes on nāmarūpa are inadequate may be justified. In the first place, however, a certain amount of amplification will be found in other notes (in general, as you get more familiar with the book you may find that difficulties raised in one part are answered — or partly — in another), and in the second place I am not at all sure that a detailed study of the intricacies of nāmarūpa (particularly in Ka Nāmarūpa)

intelligibility to his ignorance of Pali, but whether this excuses me or him up to a point is clear. The British have had copies, but one has remarked that 'they contain a lot of mistakes' — which, from the traditional point of view, is quite true. This would probably be the opinion of the great majority, who, however would ~~probably~~ add that, in a foreigner, it is excusable. Hagen, here, one sometimes intimated, and at all events not hostile (except to me) who has been provoked to a fit of indiscriminate xenophobic fury, embracing Dabke and the Van Nigamatilaka Mahāthāra as well as myself — also strange bedfellows!). Examiners of approval have come from Germany; and 'les Amis du Bouddhisme' of Paris, I am pleased to learn, are enthusiastic. About thirty copies went to England, but Capart from a bare acknowledgement from Nottingham, and a brief note from a personal acquaintance yours has been the only comment we have received. (Of course, it is not easy to know to whom to send, and the choice of addresses is largely a matter of chance.) From Columbia University Buddhist Study Group (Washington) we have their cryptic utterance: 'This material will be used to augment our collections in the most useful way with the understanding that your gift has been made without limiting conditions.'

As to printing the 'Notes', this seems to be Mr Samaratunga's eventual intention. The first printer's estimates were very high, and this decided us to do a cryptostyled edition first. Now somebody with personal influence has got a cost-price estimate, less than one third of the others, and this can perhaps be managed. But in any case we are writing until the present copies are exhausted (we did 250, and there are about 60 left), and would recipients have had time to express their opinion. The delay is also not unkind to me, since I am still finding more things to say.

With best wishes,

~
Nānāsiṃha

III. LETTERS TO MR. WIJERAMA

[L. 6]

4 March 1964

Dear Mr. Wijerama,

Many thanks for your admirably detailed letter. The attitude you speak of, that of cursing the world and oneself, is, in a sense, the beginning of wisdom. Revolt is the first reaction of an intelligent man when he begins to understand the desperate nature of his situation in the world; and it is probably true to say that nothing great has ever been achieved except by a man in revolt against his situation. But revolt alone is not enough—it eventually contradicts itself. A man in blind revolt is like someone in a railway compartment trying to stop the train by pushing against the opposite seat with his feet: he may be strong enough to damage the compartment, but the damaged compartment will nevertheless continue to move with the train. Except for the *arahat*, we are all in this train of *saṃsāra*, and the problem is to stop the train whilst still travelling in it. Direct action, direct revolt, won't do; but something, certainly, must be done. That it is, in fact, possible to stop the train from within we know from the Buddha, who has himself done it:

I, monks, *being myself subject to birth, decay, and death*, having seen the misery of subjection to birth, decay, and death, went in search of the unborn, undecaying, undying, uttermost quietus of extinction (*nibbāna*), and *I reached the unborn, undecaying, undying, uttermost quietus of extinction.* <M. 26: i,167>

Revolt by all means, but let the weapons be intelligence and patience, not disorder and violence; and the first thing to do is to find out exactly what it is that you are revolting against. Perhaps you will come to see that what you are revolting against is *avijjā*.

Now for flux. I see that you make a certain distinction between physical objects and mental states: let us therefore consider first physical objects. You say 'The idea of continuous change or that everything is continuously changing seems to me to be correct. But the difficulty arises when the idea is extended and it is stated that this object is not the same object. The chair that is in front of me being of matter is undergoing change. In that sense it will not be the same chair. But in another sense but much more real is the idea that the chair is there and

till it breaks down it will be so. This is still valid in spite of the changes that are taking place which may or may not be perceptible so long as the chair could be used as a chair’.

The distinction that you make here between ‘the idea of continuous change’ and ‘the idea that the chair is there’ is of the greatest importance, since it marks the distinction between the scientific view and the existential (or phenomenological) view. The question arises, Are these two views compatible, or if not, which is correct?

In spite of the fact that you say ‘The idea of continuous change is a matter of observation and it accords with the scientific view that matter is subject to continuous change’, I wish to suggest that the idea of continuous change is *not* a matter of observation (I shall discuss this later), but is purely and simply a theoretical consequence of the scientific claim to achieve complete objectivity. (Science aims at completely eliminating the observer—or individual point of view—from its results, thereby attaining complete generality. As soon as the observer is reinstated, as in quantum theory, change once again becomes discontinuous. The existential view, on the other hand, is that for an existing individual the world *necessarily* presents itself in one perspective or another. No individual can possibly see the world as science claims to see it, from all points of view at once. See Preface (f).)

You say ‘The chair that is in front of me *being of matter* is undergoing change’. This sounds as if you are *deducing* continuous change from the fact that the chair is of matter, and I suggest that what you are doing is to apply an abstract notion *that you have learnt about theoretically* to your concrete experience (i.e. to the ‘*much more real* idea that the chair is there’). The fact that you speak of ‘changes that are taking place which... may not be perceptible’ also gives the impression that you are making theoretical assumptions about the nature of change—how do you know anything about changes *that you cannot perceive*? (Here is Sartre speaking about material objects that are there in front of him:

Of course someone will object that I merely fail to see changes.... But this is to introduce very inappropriately a scientific point of view. Such a point of view, which nothing justifies, is contradicted by our very perception.... [B&N, p. 205])

You say ‘the difficulty arises when... it is stated that the object is not the same object’. Quite true; but you yourself show the way out of the difficulty when you say ‘When it is said that the infant is not the

same as the grown up man... it is correct. When it is said that it is the same infant who has grown up it is also correct...'. When an infant grows up into a man, we perceive that the infant has changed, and we express this by saying that the infant both is and is not the same as the man (we are taking the infant and the man only as physical objects, not as 'selves', which is a different question). Clearly, then, in order for us to be able to say 'this has changed' two things are necessary: (i) sameness, and (ii) not-sameness, or difference. Unless there is something that remains the same, we cannot say 'this'; and unless there is something that is different, we cannot say 'changed'.

Take your mango tree. Ten years ago it was a small plant, now it is a big fruit-bearing tree, and in virtue of this *difference* you say it has *changed*; but both the small plant and the big tree are mango, and both are in the same place (the small mango plant has not grown up into a jak tree, nor is it now in another part of your garden), and in virtue of this *sameness* you say that it is *not another* tree. Or consider a leaf that changes colour—first it is green, then when it dies it becomes brown, but it is still the same leaf. What remains the same is the *shape*, and what is different is the *colour*, and so we say '*this leaf has changed*'. This is quite simple owing to the fact that vision is a *double* sense, giving us perceptions both of shape and of colour, and it often happens that one remains constant while the other varies.

But let us take a more difficult case, and consider a change of colour alone. Suppose I have some blue curtains, and after a time I notice that 'the blue has faded'—how are we to understand this? Obviously, if I look at the curtains one day and find that they are crimson I shall not say 'the blue has faded' for the good reason that crimson is not blue at all—it is a different colour altogether. So I shall say simply 'the curtains have changed their colour' (just like the leaf). But if I say 'the blue has faded' I am saying that the curtains are still blue, but a slightly different blue, a lighter blue. What remains the same here is the *general* determination 'blue', and what is different is the particular *shade* of blue.

Take another case. I am looking at a spoon on the table in front of me. First I fix my attention on the bowl of the spoon and see the handle less distinctly out at one side; then I fix my attention on the handle and see the bowl less distinctly out at the other side. The spoon, as a whole, remains unchanged—in both cases it is exactly the same spoon. What is different is the particular *aspect* of the spoon within the general experience called 'seeing a spoon'. (Cf. CETANĀ.)

Two points arise here.

1. Leaving aside the cases where one sensible quality varies while another remains constant (the leaf, for example) and considering only the more fundamental cases where the change takes place within one and the same sensible quality or characteristic, we notice that it is always the more *general* feature that remains invariable while the subordinate or more *particular* feature varies. This suggests that there may be a certain *structure of change* that must be taken into account whenever we consider the question of change; and if this is so, it will mean that the statement 'everything is changing' needs strict qualification. (In the last part of the *Notes* I have tried to give a formal account of this fundamental structure within which change takes place, but I expect that you have perhaps not been able to make very much of it. No matter.)

2. If it is possible, in any given change, to make a clear-cut distinction between those features that do not vary and those that do, it will follow that the distinction between *sameness* and *difference* is absolute: in other words, that we cannot say 'approximately the same' or 'approximately different'. (So long as we use the word 'approximate' at all that will be an indication that we have failed to make the distinction properly clear-cut, since 'approximately the same' means 'the same but with a difference' and 'approximately different'—i.e. 'somewhat different' or 'rather different'—means 'different but partly the same'.) If this is so, it will follow that all change takes place discontinuously; for if 'same' means 'absolutely the same' and 'different' means 'absolutely different', there can be no intermediate category between sameness and difference.

Perhaps you will object that it is ridiculous to speak of one's curtains 'fading discontinuously', and from the commonsense point of view I would agree with you. But the fact remains that we do not 'see our curtains fading'; what happens is that one day we 'notice' that the curtains 'have faded'; and this is a sudden perception. No doubt, after a few more weeks, we shall notice that the curtains have faded still more, and we shall *infer* that all this time the curtains have been *gradually* fading 'without our noticing it'. 'But' you may say 'do we not sometimes actually *see* things in process of changing—as when, for example, the lights are quickly lowered at the cinema and fade in five or ten seconds?' We do: but observe that, in the first place, the change is from 'steady light' to 'fading light' and then from 'fading light' to 'darkness'. In other words, 'fading light' is perceived as a *thing* distinct

from both ‘steady light’ and ‘darkness’, and the change from one to another of these things is discontinuous. In the second place, there are reasons for supposing that what we actually perceive when we see a ‘fading light’—which has the same essential structure as a ‘flying arrow’—cannot be properly described as ‘continuous change’.

A. The ‘Gestalt’ school of psychology has specialized in experimental investigation of perception of change, and has reported that every change that we perceive takes place suddenly and absolutely. (See the passage from Sartre translated in ANICCA [A].) Whenever a perceived change is described as ‘taking place continuously’ it is to be presumed either that the necessary analysis of a complex experience is beyond the power of the perceiver, or else that, unwittingly, rationalization has taken place. (That we do, in fact, have experience of movement and other such changes is, of course, not to be denied; but these experiences are notoriously difficult to describe, and the problem of motion has puzzled philosophers from time immemorial.)

B. It can be shown by argument that the notion of continuous change is self-contradictory (in other words, that it contains a short circuit somewhere). There are two ways of doing this.

(i) The first is to show that all experiences that we might be tempted to describe as ‘continuous change’ (motion of material objects, fading [or brightening] of lights and colours, decay of matter, and so on) can be adequately and completely described in terms of discontinuous changes at different levels of generality. I am satisfied that the dialectic outlined in FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE is capable of doing this (which is one reason why I have included it in the *Notes*), but unless you have understood this note I cannot hope to make myself intelligible to you here. I have summed up this argument against the idea of flux in PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA: ‘The contradiction [involved in the definition of flux or continuous change] arises from failure to see that change at any given level of generality *must* be discontinuous and absolute, and that there *must* be different levels of generality. When these are taken together, any desired approximation to “continuous change” can be obtained without contradiction’. (The starting-point of any discussion of motion must always be Zeno’s Eleatic arrow. Some account of this celebrated paradox is given by Bertrand Russell—*M&L*, pp. 79-83—but the problem is not so easily solved as Russell likes to think.)^c

c. The solution described by Russell solves the problem by leaving it out. The problem is: *What is time?*

(ii) The second way of dealing with the notion of flux is to discuss it directly, and to show that it cannot be defined without encountering a self-contradiction. This, in fact, is what I have tried to do in the briefest possible way in PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA [C], with the definition borrowed from Poincaré: $A = B$, $B = C$, $A \neq C$. Let us, however, consider the notion of flux in more detail. The word itself means a *flowing*, and the idea it conveys is that of *smooth transition*, that is, *continuous change*. This is evidently opposed to discontinuous change, but without implying no-change or fixity.

My dictionary defines it as ‘a continuous succession of changes’, which we can use as a starting point. A *succession* of changes clearly means *one change after another*, and a *continuous* succession of changes will mean that there is no interval of time between these changes. But how much time does a single change take? *Either* it takes some time, in which case we are obliged to say that each individual change is a continuous change, and therefore itself a flux; *or* it takes no time and is instantaneous, in which case we have to conclude that a flux is itself instantaneous, since the individual changes take no time, and there is no time *between* the changes. The second alternative at once raises the objection that you cannot have a *succession* of changes—one change *after* another—if *no* time is involved. The first alternative—that every individual change is a flux—makes the definition circular: ‘a flux is a continuous succession of fluxes’, and we still do not know what a flux is.

Perhaps, then, we are wrong in thinking that ‘a continuous succession of changes’ is the same as ‘continuous change’. If these two are not the same, and ‘continuous change’ is the truth, then we must deny the existence of separate individual changes: there will be *change*, but not *changes* or *a change*. In other words we must renounce all attempt at defining flux in terms of individual changes, and must seek, rather, to take a *sample* of flux, of continuous change, and describe it. Here, then, is a flux—continuous change. Let us take a slice of this flux and divide it into three consecutive sections, calling them A, B, and C (note that we cannot take three consecutive *instants* in the flux without falling into contradiction, since instants, which are of *no* time, cannot be *consecutive*, i.e. *both* contiguous *and* successive—if two instants are contiguous both are of *no* time and have *no* time between them, and there is still *no* time and therefore no *succession*; if they are successive both are of *no* time and have *some* time *between* them, therefore they are not *contiguous*).

We have to ignore for the moment the fact that each of these three sections itself consists of continuous change, and we regard each section as a whole, without inquiring what is going on inside. We are expressly forbidden to introduce the idea of an individual change, and so we must say that 'A is the same as B' ($A = B$) and that 'B is the same as C' ($B = C$); for if we postulate that A and B (or B and C) are *both* contiguous *and* different we thereby automatically define a discrete individual change—there is 'a change' at the junction of A and B, where A changes to B. So far so good. But a flux is, in fact, *change*; and so we must introduce the idea of *difference* into our description. Let us therefore say that 'A is different from C' ($A \neq C$). Since A and C are not contiguous we have not defined any discontinuous change between them, and all is well—between A and C there is *change* but not *a change*. So our description— $A = B$, $B = C$, $A \neq C$ —does, in fact, agree with the notion of flux as continuous change. And we can take each individual section (A, B, and C) in turn and divide it into three lesser sections (a, b, and c) and describe it in the same way ($a = b$, $b = c$, $a \neq c$). In this way our description can be seen to apply to any sample of the flux that we like to take. But, alas! our description contains a self-contradiction: $B = C$ (or $C = B$) and $A \neq C$; therefore $A \neq B$; but also $A = B$; therefore both $A = B$ and $A \neq B$; and this outrages the Law of Contradiction, 'A is not both B and not-B'.

Regarding states of mind, which you differentiate (quite rightly) from physical objects in that they do not come within the sphere of science (though I cannot agree that they are 'not objects': they are *mental* objects),—you seem to think, and again you are right, that the notion of flux or continuous change does not apply to them. I have a slight impression that one reason why you do not apply the notion of flux to mental states is, precisely, that they are not in the sphere of science; and this, in its turn, suggests to me that you *do* apply the notion of flux to physical objects because they *are* in the sphere of science—in other words, out of 'superstitious regard for the prestige of contemporary science' (see Preface to *Notes*). It is quite possible that I am doing you an injustice here, but this is a matter that you must decide for yourself—in any case, I am only recording the impression that I get from your letter.^d But though I say that you are right in thinking that the notion of flux cannot be applied to states of mind, you will have gathered from what has gone before that I maintain that the notion of flux *also* cannot be applied to physical objects. Once the notion of flux is ruled out entirely, it becomes clear that the structure of change of

mental states (or mental objects) has much more in common with that of physical objects than might appear at first sight. (You say that mental states such as pleasure and grief ‘appear, vanish, and reappear’—but is this not true also of physical objects? Do we not have *familiar* sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and bodily contacts?) It is necessary to remember that the three characteristics (*Notes*, ANICCA), namely *arising, disappearance, and change while persisting*, apply to *all* experience, whether of physical objects or of states of mind. (The last characteristic, *ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ*, I understand as expressing the combination of absolute sameness and absolute difference that I suggested earlier in this letter was the essential structure of all change.)

As I understand your last paragraph, I gather that you consider that all mental states cease when one becomes *arahat*. This is not so (except in the particular sense of ‘cease’ of A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA §22 & VIÑÑĀṆA). There are still mental states for the *arahat* so long as he continues to live, but these states are now wholly free of lust, hate, and delusion. In other words, there is still consciousness for the *arahat* until his body breaks up in death. See also PHASSA [B].

Perhaps you will be wondering why it is that I am so anxious to destroy the notion of flux—or at least to eliminate it from the context of the Dhamma (I have nothing to say against its use in the context of science, nor have I anything to say against science itself in its proper place; but its proper place is not the Dhamma: scientific thinking and Dhamma thinking belong to two quite different orders, as I hope to have made plain in the Preface to the *Notes*). The reason is to be found in your letter itself. You say ‘The word flux means continuous change. If this idea is applied to everything it would be correct to say that what I see now, e.g. a tree, is not the same as I continue to watch it as it is subject to continuous change’ and also ‘I have heard as an extension of the same idea, Buddhist monks saying, pointing to an object, that the object is not there’. This doctrine is a complete misunderstanding and is wholly misleading. And, as you quite rightly point out, it is based on the notion of universal flux. In order, therefore, to undermine this

d. It is perhaps worth noting in passing that the current ‘orthodox’ interpretation regards mental states as no less of a flux than physical objects. Here is an example: ‘The stream of self-awareness that the un-instructed conceive to be a soul is made up of point-moments of consciousness, each of which has no more than a momentary duration.’ This is pure speculation, with no relation at all to actual experience.

false doctrine, it is necessary to point out that the notion of flux, at least as applied to experience, is a self-contradiction.

But why, if it is false, is this doctrine taught? The answer is, because it provides a conveniently simple interpretation of the Suttas, easily learned and easily preached. The Buddha has said that ‘What is impermanent, that is suffering; what is suffering, that is not-self’. This is understood (or rather, misunderstood) in the following way.

Impermanence is taken to mean continuous change (flux), and (as you have said) if this notion is correct, the idea of a thing’s continuing self-identity cannot be maintained—what *appears* to be the self-same tree persisting in time is not *really* the same since it is continuously changing. In consequence of this, the idea of *self* is an illusion; and it only persists on account of our *avijjā*, or ignorance of the truth of universal flux. If we remove this ignorance, we shall see that what we formerly took to be a lasting (or existing) selfsame tree (‘A = A’, the Principle of Self-identity) really has no abiding self at all—it does not *really* exist. And this explains why ‘what is impermanent, that is not-self’. And what is wrong with this? What is wrong with it is—as perhaps you have noticed—that it does *not* explain why what is impermanent is *suffering*, and what is *suffering* is not self.

Suffering (*dukkha*) is the key to the whole of the Buddha’s Teaching,^e and any interpretation that leaves suffering out of account (or adds it, perhaps, only as an afterthought) is at once suspect. The point is, that suffering has nothing to do with a tree’s self-identity (or supposed lack of self-identity): what it *does* have to do with is *my* ‘self’ as subject (I, ego), which is quite another matter (see PARAMATTHA SACCA §6). As I point out (ATTĀ), ‘With the question of a thing’s self-identity (which presents no difficulty) the Buddha’s Teaching of *anattā* has nothing whatsoever to do: *anattā* is purely concerned with “self” as *subject*’. But this is very much more difficult to grasp than the misinterpretation based on the notion of flux, so flux inevitably gets the popular vote (like the doctrine of *paramattha sacca*, of which it is really a part). The misinterpretation is actually of Mahāyānist origin; and in one of their texts (*Prajñāpāramitā*) it is specifically stated that it is only on account of *avijjā* that things appear to exist, whereas *in reality* nothing exists. But the fact is that, even when one becomes *arahat*, a tree continues to have a self-identity; that is to say, it continues to ex-

e. ‘Both formerly, monks, and now, it is just suffering that I make known and the cessation of suffering.’ <M. 22: i,140>

ist as the *same* tree (though undergoing subordinate changes on more particular levels—falling of leaves, growth of flowers and fruit, etc.) until it dies or is cut down. But for the *arahat* the tree is no longer ‘my tree’ since all notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ have ceased.

I don’t know whether all this discussion will make my criticism of the notion of flux any clearer to you, but it may at least make you aware that there are serious objections to the introducing of this notion from scientific contexts into Dhamma contexts. If this letter raises any fresh difficulties, please let me know.

P.S. If you do not want to keep this letter when you have finished with it, I would suggest that, rather than destroy it, you might give it to Mr. Samaratunga to put in his file.

[L. 7]

20 March 1964

I am reading Bradley’s *Logic*. This deals with the question of change and non-change, and particularly with the question how I can have knowledge of past and future if my perception is confined to the present. Bradley’s solution (which is inadequate, though extremely interesting) is by way of inference—we have immediate appearance, and from this we *infer* reality, though we can never be quite certain of it. But, as you will have seen, it is possible, if one has *assumed* the Idealist position (which is a mistake,^f though a full elucidation would take us into fundamental structure), to find another solution by *mis*-applying the Sutta teachings of *anicca*/(*dukkha*)/*anattā*. Bradley’s work has enabled me to see the situation in greater detail, though it still remains the same in essentials—‘Buddhist monks saying, pointing to an object, that the object is not there’.

[L. 8]

2 May 1964

Thank you for your letter. May I say that I again appreciate the fact that you have stated your questions in a clear and coherent way that makes the (rather difficult) task of answering them convincingly really quite a pleasure. And a well-put question sometimes almost answers itself.

f. There is no opposition between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’.

You ask for Sutta references of passages where the Buddha has ‘explained in specific terms the structure of change’. Beyond the two *uppāda/vaya/ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ* references (both given in ANICCA), I do not know of any at all. Perhaps this will astonish you; but the fact that the Buddha does not seem to have discussed the structure of change beyond this is, I think, not hard to understand. The point is this: provided a person does not have any preconceived ideas about the structure of change, an understanding of this structure is not necessary for the attainment of *nibbāna*.

An intelligent person observes that there is such a thing as change, that the things in his world do change from time to time; and the Buddha informs him that nothing that exists is exempt from change, that all existing things do come to an end sooner or later. And when that person considers this fact and applies it in the proper way (with *yoniso manasikāra*) to his own existence, it is enough (given certain other conditions) to lead him to enlightenment.

In general, it seems that the Buddha did not encourage philosophical or metaphysical investigation of matters that do not lead to *nibbāna*, for the good reason that a man might spend a lifetime in fruitless investigation and discussion of such matters, and die still unsatisfied, whereas he might quite quickly attain the goal by attending to the right things. (You may profitably read the *Cūḷamāluṅkya Sutta*—M. 63: i,431—on this question.¹) And it must be admitted that the whole question of the structure of change is one of the most difficult in philosophy.

Why then (you might ask) have I raised the question, when the Buddha did not? The reason is this: that today we do *not* approach the Dhamma without preconceived notions about change. In the prevailing scientific atmosphere we are all taught at school, particularly in the study of mathematics and science, that change is a continuous flux (we do not necessarily learn it *explicitly*, but it is implicit in these studies); and so, when we leave school, we *know already* that change is a flux, without even looking to see if it is so. And the consequence of this is that erroneous interpretations of the Dhamma (as I have already pointed out to you) have become firmly established.

Now, even supposing that my own speculations on the structure of change are somewhere near the mark (which, of course, remains an open question), I quite see that other people whose talents lie in other directions, might well scratch their heads over FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE for years without making anything of it at all; and it is for this reason

that I have given warnings that it is only for those who find it useful. Nevertheless, I have decided to include it, as well as some other philosophical discussion of change, in order at least to show that there is an alternative to the idea of flux. Once somebody is prepared to abandon the idea of flux as an article of faith that he has learnt (almost) on his mother's knee, he *may* come to see that these current interpretations of the Dhamma must not be accepted without question. And once he does this, then it is probably not necessary for him to inquire any further into the structure of change.^g

Let us now consider the principle that 'when change takes place within one and the same sensible quality or characteristic it is always the more general feature that remains invariable while the subordinate or more particular feature varies'. A little consideration, I think, will show you that this is really a tautology, and cannot therefore be denied. What I mean to say is this. If I am asked what I understand by the words 'particular' and 'general', I shall reply that what is *general* embraces two (or more) *particulars*, in such a way that each particular thing is an example or instance of the more general thing. (A number of leaves from different kinds of trees will each be a particular shade of green, and therefore all different one from another; but each and every one of these leaves is an instance of green in general.) And from this definition of 'particular' and 'general' it follows that any two particulars can be interchanged without affecting the general. (I can pick one leaf, and say 'this is green', and then I can throw it away and pick another leaf from a different tree, and say 'this, too, is green'. There is a *change* in the particular green that is in my hand, and unchange of *sameness* in the general green.) And it also follows that the converse is not true: there cannot be change of the *general* leaving any *particular* unchanged. (If the general colour of all the leaves changes from green to brown, every single leaf will be an instance or example of brown, and I shall be unable to find any leaf that is any shade of green at all.)

g. These ideas of 'Identity in Difference' and 'Invariance under Transformation' are not really new. F. H. Bradley wrote his *Logic*, which I am just finishing, in 1883, and he got the idea from earlier writers. But it went out of fashion with the logical positivists—Russell & Co. who, I must warn you, are *most* misleading, particularly Russell himself—, and has more recently started to return to favour in quantum theory. Here is a sentence from P. A. M. Dirac's *Principles of Quantum Mechanics* (1930): 'The important things in the world appear as the invariants... of... transformations' (p. vii). And, of course, as soon as you say 'invariant', you rule out 'flux'.

It should be clear that the principle enunciated above is implied in the very meaning of the words 'particular' and 'general'. But the question now is, Are we in fact entitled to make this distinction between 'particular' and 'general'? Do we in fact perceive a general green as well as a particular green? This is really a matter for each person to decide for himself, and instead of arguing the point I shall suggest a method of approach to individual cases.

Assuming that we are entitled to make this distinction, we see that in order to discover the general it is only necessary to put two particulars together, and what they have *in common* will be the general. This, I think, is clear. But also we can put it in a different way: we can say that whenever two particulars are found together, they *ipso facto* reveal the general. This means that whenever we perceive a *togetherness* of particulars, we do so *because* we perceive what they have in common (though it may be difficult to say precisely what it is). Whenever we see *two* (or more) *different* things that nevertheless *seem to belong to each other*, we are at once entitled to turn the situation the other way round and say that we see *one and the same* more general thing *presenting two different aspects*.^h

If you have grasped this idea, you will see that it can be applied to perception of change. In perception of change, we have first A, and then B; but we must *also* have the 'belonging-togetherness' of A and B, otherwise we fail to connect A's disappearance and B's appearance and do not say that 'A has changed into B' or that 'A has become B'.

If I see a jug on the table, and then I go out of the room and come back a short while later and see a glass on the table instead of the jug, I do not say 'the jug has become the glass' because I do not perceive them as belonging together. But if (by some miracle) the jug vanishes while I am actually looking at it and is immediately replaced by a glass, I shall

h. If we see a cow and a horse and a tree, we at once perceive—without *thinking* about it at all, and without any previous knowledge—that the cow and the horse 'belong together' and that the cow (or the horse) and the tree do not. Turning this round, we say that the cow and the horse are different aspects of one single more general thing, namely 'four-legged bestiality', and that the tree is not. It might be objected that 'four-legged bestiality' is merely an abstract idea that we do not 'perceive' at all; but this is not so. We *at once* perceive the 'togetherness' of the cow and the horse, and it is merely in order to give it a name and express it in words that we have to start thinking: the *thing* is perceived directly, but it may quite well happen that the thing does not have a familiar *name*.

rub my eyes and say 'How extraordinary! The jug seems to have become a glass'; and I say this because the disappearance of the jug and the appearance of the glass are perceived as *connected* (owing to contiguity in space and time).

Consider, now, the block of ice that melts and is immediately replaced by a pool of water. As you say, if we know beforehand that it is the nature of ice to melt and be replaced by water, there is no difficulty in seeing that a general feature has not changed; so we must suppose that we have never seen ice before, and also (by a stretch of the imagination) that we have never seen water before, either. So, then, a block of ice is brought in and placed on the floor in front of us; it melts, and there is a pool of water in its place. As in the case of the jug and the glass, we connect the first thing (the disappearance of the ice) with the second thing (the appearance of the pool of water) because they are spatially and temporally contiguous, and we say 'How remarkable—the thing called "ice" has changed into the thing called "water"!'. But what, here, are the particulars, and what the general?

The *particulars* are (i) the perceived spatio-temporal existence of the ice, and (ii) the perceived spatio-temporal existence of the water, and these are *different* (a) spatially, because the ice and the water do not have the same shape (the ice stands up, the water lies flat) and (b) temporally, because the ice is followed by the water. The *general* is the perceived spatio-temporal existence of the whole ice/water transformation, and this is *one and the same* (a) spatially, because both ice and water were in the same part of the room, and (b) temporally, because both were in the same part of the afternoon.

But suppose the disappearance of the ice in front of us was immediately followed by the appearance of a pool of water in the next room; or that it was followed, not immediately, but two days later by a pool of water in front of us. Here, first the spatial, and secondly the temporal, contiguity is missing, and we fail to perceive 'togetherness' and so we do not say that the ice has changed into the water. If the ice and the water are in different rooms or on different days, then *both* the general *and* the particular have varied and we do not perceive the *change* of ice into water.

This, of course, is not the only way that we perceive the change of the block of ice into the pool of water; but it is perhaps the most fundamental. There is also the question of the substance. Even without previous acquaintance with ice or water, we may perceive that though the particular reflections and transparencies are different be-

fore and after, yet the general characteristic of ‘transparency’ has remained invariant, and we are inclined to say that it is the ‘same stuff’ in two different forms. But, in English, there is no single *word* to cover both ice and water (unless we say H₂O), and it might seem that we do not *perceive* both as different aspects of one more general thing. But, as explained above, with the cow and horse, this is a mistake. (In Sinhalese, for example, although we can speak of *wandura* and *rilawa*, we cannot—as far as my slight knowledge goes—refer to both by one single word, as we can in English with the word ‘monkey’.² But this does not mean that the perceptions of an Englishman and a Sinhala are different.)

The case of the butterfly is much more complex. In the first place, we have not *two*, but *four* particulars: egg/caterpillar/chrysalis/butterfly. And the change from the egg to the butterfly may be a matter of months, not of a few minutes like the ice to water. We may, of course, actually observe any one of these three transformations (egg/caterpillar, caterpillar/chrysalis, chrysalis/butterfly), and then, as in the case of the ice/water, we sensually (visually) perceive the ‘togetherness’ as well as the difference, and we speak of ‘seeing a change’.ⁱ But we never actually see (at least on one occasion) all the three changes from egg to butterfly; and what actually happens is that, from different observations of these various changes at different times, we build up an *imaginary picture* of the whole affair, by means of which we can, if we wish, perceive *in imagination* all the three changes in the course of a few seconds. And it is to this imaginary experience that we refer when we speak of the ‘change from egg to butterfly’. But this imaginary experience follows the same principles as the real experience, and we can only speak of the (imaginary) change, egg/caterpillar/chrysalis/butterfly, if we perceive (in imagination) the ‘togetherness’ of these four particulars. As to the *name* of this togetherness, we meet with the same difficulty as before—there is no single word. The best we can do (after some thought) is ‘a living insect of the *lepidoptera* family’.

And when we come to the case of the man (the infant who grows up), the situation is impossibly complex. We have first to separate the man *as he sees himself* (that is, principally, his store of memories) from

i. Note here—a further complication!—that, in a sense, we do actually perceive the past (and the future) as well as the present; and this is explained in FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE §II/10. But you had better, for the time being at least, simply think that we ‘perceive the past with our memory’.

the man *as he is seen by others* (his body, his behaviour, his habits, his gestures, his temperament, his wife, his family, his occupation, his social position, his nationality, his health, his wealth, his police record, and so on). Then we take any one of these aspects we please, and consider, in the way I have indicated above, how Citizen Perera is perceived (or perceives himself) as a 'togetherness' of different particulars. His bank manager (if he is so fortunate as to have one) will perceive him as 'a bank account by the name of Perera', and this bank account will be a 'togetherness' of varying particular balances at six-monthly intervals. His mother will perceive him quite differently—as a body that has issued from hers and has gradually grown up, a 'togetherness' (which she might describe as 'flesh of my flesh'), of such successive particulars as pregnancy, birth, suckling, weaning, nursing in sickness, having a son at school, in a government office as a clerk, having a married son, having a son to support her in her old age, to give her a good funeral, and so on. His wife will perceive him as... well, there are many different ways in which wives perceive their husbands—and some wives have much the same sort of view as the bank manager. But no doubt you will be able to fill in details.

As to states of mind, the principle certainly applies in the same way. Whenever we speak of a 'change of mind' (which we often do), we do so because we perceive (by introspection or reflexion) a 'togetherness' of different particulars. When I say 'I changed my mind about going to Colombo', that means that I perceived a 'togetherness', describable as 'possibility of a journey to Colombo', that presented itself successively in two different particular aspects, 'about to go to Colombo' and '*not* about to go to Colombo'. With change of moods, description is more difficult; but we sometimes find we have certain definite sets of emotions governed by a more general state of mind. When we are in love, for example, we experience sudden changes from exaltation to depression, from joy to misery, which we do not have at other times. (Consider the state of mind of a lover waiting for his loved one, who is five minutes late.) And the 'togetherness' of these different emotions is the more general thing that we call 'being in love'.

I think, perhaps, that this will be enough for you to be getting on with. It is hardly possible to do more than give an indication, and then to let people try and see the thing for themselves. But in all cases where an 'objective scientific point of view' is adopted, there will necessarily be complete failure to understand the principle that we are

discussing; and for this reason I would suggest that you read Russell (if you *must* read him) with a certain amount of circumspection—Russell's logic is *not* the same as Bradley's logic.

On the question of flux (or continuous change), I should like to suggest a certain reflection. If one were asked what the immediate evidence was for the existence of flux, the answer would almost certainly be, It is our experience of motion, the fact that we perceive movement. But, now, when we go to the cinema we sit in front of a screen, and we spend two or three hours 'perceiving moving pictures'—we are perfectly satisfied that we *do* perceive movement at the cinema, and the only difference from the live theatre is the flatness of the screen and the black-and-white colouring. We are just as much excited or emotionally disturbed by a cinema show as we are by a theatre performance. But when we pause to consider the mechanism of the cinema, we come to understand that (looking at the matter from a slightly different point of view) all we really perceive is a succession of perfectly still pictures (Russell mentions this, but we are not here concerned with the conclusions he draws). And this being so, we are obliged to admit that perception of movement *need not be evidence of flux: we cannot safely infer* 'continuous change' from 'perception of movement'. I say this, not to *prove* that there is *not* 'continuous change', but to introduce a doubt into the unquestioning belief that there *is* 'continuous change'. If I can introduce a doubt, that may be enough. (I do not, however, want to suggest that the structure of change or movement is simply that of the cinema film.) These remarks are rather concentrated philosophy, and you may not make very much of them at present, but they might be of use a little later on.



ĀṇAVĪRA THERA IN FRONT OF HIS KUTI.