EDMUND HUSSERL

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THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

TRANSLATED BY

LEE HARDY

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

EDMUND HUSSERL

COLLECTED WORKS

EDITOR: RUDOLF BERNET

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TRANSLATIONS

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EDMUND HUSSERL

THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

A Translation of
Die Idee der Phänomenologie
Husserliana II

TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION BY

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KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

In the winter semester of 1902/03, Edmund Husserl offered a lecture course at the University of Göttingen on the general theory of knowledge. At the conclusion of that course he recorded the following sentiment on the envelope containing his lecture notes: "From time to time I am born up by the conviction that I have made more progress in the critique of knowledge than any of my predecessors, that I have seen with substantial and, in some respects, complete clarity what my predecessors scarcely suspected or else left in a state of confusion. And yet: what a mass of unclarity in these pages, how much half-done work, how much anguishing uncertainty in the details. How much is still just preliminary work, mere struggle on the way to the goal and not the full goal itself, actually achieved and seen from every side? Will it not be given to me, with powerful effort redoubled and with the application of all my vital energies, actually to arrive at the goal? Is this half clarity, this tortuous restlessness, which is a sign of unresolved problems, bearable? Thus I am, after many years, still the beginner and the student. But I want to become the master! *Carpe diem.*"[1] On November 4, 1903, he added this dismal observation, "The anguish only grows greater, and I remain in the same old place. No progress has been made."[2]

The philosophical impasse Husserl experienced in the years immediately following the publication of the *Logical Investigations* (1900/01) was compounded by serious professional disappointment in 1905. In April of that year, the *Ministerium* had made known its intention of appointing Husserl as an associate professor (*Ordinarius*) at the University of Göttingen. But on May 11th the appointment was blocked by the Philosophy Faculty. In his diary, Husserl recorded the reason for its opposition: "the lack of my scientific significance."[3] Undeterred by this vote of no confidence from his colleagues, Husserl remained resolute in his critical inquiries. It was during this time, in fact, that his philosophical ambition grew to Kantian proportions: having published limited studies in the philosophy of arithmetic and logic, he now took upon himself the task of providing a comprehensive critique of reason in its several divisions – theoretical, practical, and evaluative.

At some point between 1903 and 1905 Husserl finally achieved insight into the methodological procedure required by the general problem of knowledge. On February 18, 1905, he made the following triumphant entry in his notebook: "I am so firmly convinced that in it I possess the true method for the critique of knowledge, that I see it as my life-goal to solve by its means the main problems of the critique of knowledge one by one – to that end I will

work incessantly, year in and year out."[4] An initial sketch of this method can be found in what are now known as the *Seefelder Blätter*, dating from the summer of 1905. In September of 1906, confident that he now possessed the tools equal to his task, Husserl referred to the critique of reason as "the general task that I must accomplish for myself if I am to call myself a philosopher."[5]

Thus Husserl's sense of philosophical vocation took shape in the first decade of the twentieth century. The subsequent course of his thought can be seen as an attempt to fulfill the task he had then envisioned under aegis of the methodological insight he had acquired midway between the publication of the *Logical Investigations* (1900/01), a clarification of the basic concepts of pure logic by way of descriptive psychology, and *Ideas I* (1913), a systematic attempt to introduce transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophical discipline.

The first public exposition of the motivation, sense, and implications of Husserl's newly discovered method – called the "phenomenological reduction," or, alternatively, the "epistemological reduction" – was given in five lectures later published under the title, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*. These lectures were delivered between April 26 and May 2 of 1907 as an introduction to Husserl's "*Dingkolleg*," a four-hour lecture course given in the summer semester of that year and later published as *Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907*.[6] Husserl wrote the "Train of Thought in These Lectures" in the evening immediately following the presentation of his final lecture. This piece is included at the end of this volume as a restatement and extension of the argument given in the five lectures. The original manuscripts – M III 9 I/3a, 4a, 6a, 22a – were edited by Walter Biemel and published as the second volume of *Husserliana* in 1950. In 1963 part of *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* was translated into English by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian so that it might be included in an anthology they were editing at the time entitled, *Readings in Twentieth Century Philosophy*. In 1964 their complete translation appeared as a separate volume, published by Martinus Nijhoff.

Since the first publication of these lectures in English, the conventions of Husserl translation developed and solidified as additional works of Husserl were translated by Dorion Cairns, Fred Kersten, Dallas Willard, John B. Brough, and others. It became clear that the *Idea of Phenomenology* should now be re-translated for the official English language edition of the *Collected Works of Husserl* in order to bring it in line with current Husserl translation practice and to correct the outright mistakes that inevitably afflict first translation efforts.

In the Third Lecture of the *Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl defines phenomenology as the "science of pure phenomena" (see below, p. 35); in the

same lecture he characterizes the phenomenology of knowledge, more specifically, as the "theory of the essence of the pure phenomenon of knowing" (see below, p. 36). Such a phenomenology would advance the "critique of knowledge," in which the problem of knowledge is clearly formulated and the possibility of knowledge rigorously secured. It is important to realize, however, that in these lectures Husserl will not enact, pursue, or develop a phenomenological critique of knowledge, even though he opens with a trenchant statement of the problem of knowledge that such a critique would solve. Rather, he seeks here only to secure the possibility of a phenomenological critique of knowledge; that is, he attempts to secure the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge, not the possibility of knowledge in general (see below, pp. 37-39). Thus the work before us is not phenomenological in the straightforward sense, but pre-phenomenological: it sets out to identify and satisfy the epistemic requirements of the phenomenological critique of knowledge, not to carry out that critique itself.

To keep these two levels of theoretical inquiry distinct, I will call the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of knowledge the "critical level"; the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge the "meta-critical level." Although distinct, these levels nonetheless interact: the initial statement of the problem of knowledge on the critical level governs the identification and elaboration of the requirements on the meta-critical level; the work done on the meta-critical level to indicate how these requirements will be satisfied in turn leads to a reformulation of the problem of knowledge on the critical level. The productive interaction between these two levels inquiry is key to understanding the progress of the text before us. Husserl's initial formulation of the problem of knowledge is broadly Cartesian; the reformulation is specifically phenomenological. Thus the exposition given in these lectures recapitulates the order of the discovery: it retraces the steps in the development of Husserl's thought concerning the problem of knowledge, and it invites the reader to tread the same path.

The initial formulation of the problem of knowledge at the critical level in Lecture I has two parts. First, the problem of knowledge entails the problem of "transcendence": how can consciousness reach out beyond itself and "make contact" with an object wholly external to it? (see below, p. 19) Second, the problem of knowledge involves the problem of "correspondence": how can we be assured of an agreement between the act of knowing and the object known? (see below, p. 17) The first part of the problem of knowledge is to be solved by a theory of intentionality, an account of how acts of consciousness refer to objects. The second part is to be solved by a specifically phenomenological

version of the correspondence relation between act and object, calling upon, as we shall see, the strict correlation between the real and intentional components of knowing.

Both parts of the problem of knowledge are defined by the fact that, in most cases, our consciousness of objects and the objects of which we are conscious are ontologically distinct. They are separated by a gap between two orders of being. If we are to account for the possibility of knowledge, then, we must not only show how consciousness can go beyond itself and make contact with an object that is not itself a part of consciousness, we must also be assured that the object really is "in itself" the way it appears to be in consciousness. But if things exist independently of our consciousness of them, we can always ask, as Husserl did, "what do the things themselves care about our ways of thinking and the logical rules that govern them?" (see below, p. 61) Somehow we must be in a position to demonstrate an agreement between the two if we are to account for the possibility of genuine knowledge.

These two problems – transcendence and correspondence – together constitute the "riddle" of knowledge. Husserl takes the first, the problem of transcendence, as his initial guide (see below, p. 27). And it immediately leads him to a recognition of the first requirement for the critical project: the critique of knowledge must be based upon a form of knowledge that is itself entirely free of the problem of transcendence. Otherwise, the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge would be burdened by the very riddle it seeks to solve. Because of the comprehensive nature of the philosophical problem of knowledge, Husserl must, of course, be prepared at the outset of his critical inquiry to make knowledge in general problematic, granting no special exemptions to any traditionally favored forms of knowledge. But if, after careful consideration, all forms of knowledge remain problematic, then clearly the form of knowledge embodied in the critique of knowledge will have no place to stand. To fulfill the first requirement, Husserl must make a thorough canvas of the various types of knowledge in hopes of discovering one that is completely unproblematic on the point of transcendence.

I will call the knowledge to which the problem of transcendence applies "Type One" knowledge; knowledge free of that problem, if there is any, "Type Two" knowledge. If all knowledge is of Type One, then the project of philosophically securing the possibility of Type One knowledge is doomed from the very outset. Clearly the knowledge represented in the critique of knowledge must be of a different order than the knowledge for which the critique is supplied. If the critique of knowledge is to be possible, it needs leverage; another type of knowledge must be isolated and secured as its basis for comment on the possibility of Type One knowledge.

Husserl indicates how this requirement will be satisfied by making the familiar Cartesian move in Lecture II: while the knowledge of external objects is problematic, the knowledge of internal objects is not. Not all knowledge is saddled with the problem of transcendence. For in the direct reflective apprehension of its own acts, consciousness does not move beyond itself. It remains within the sphere of immanence. While it is possible to doubt the validity of our knowledge of objects transcendent to consciousness, it makes no sense to doubt our claims about what is given within the very midst of consciousness itself. In the former case we can always doubt whether we have it right; in the latter case, Husserl claims, doubt makes no sense. For here we have a "sphere of absolute givenness" (see below, p. 26), where what we claim can be directly measured by what we see, without remainder. Here consciousness does not go beyond what is immediately given to it.

The rigorous abstention from all knowledge claims involving transcendence (Type One), and the consequent restriction of the critique of knowledge to claims concerning the domain of immanence (Type Two), is the "phenomenological reduction," the methodological move required for the solution of the problem of knowledge as it is comprehensively posed by philosophy.

After the discovery of sphere of immanence in the reflective apprehension of the acts of consciousness, Type Two knowledge undergoes two successive extensions of domain. Both of the extensions are motivated by reference to additional requirements for the critique of knowledge identified at the metacritical level. First, if the critique of knowledge is to be a genuine science, it must amount to more than a mere collection of reports on particular acts of consciousness. If it is to issue general claims about the essence of such acts, then essences must also be proper objects of Type Two knowledge. And so they are, Husserl claims. In a process called "ideating abstraction" – which Husserl names but does not explain here – the essence of a particular phenomenon can be grasped in a way that makes doubt senseless. "It is senseless to question and to doubt what the essence of red is ... provided that, while one is seeing red and grasping it in terms of its specific kind, one means by the word 'red' exactly what is grasped and seen ... We grasp it – there it is; there is what we mean, the species red. Could a divine being, an infinite intellect, do anything more to grasp the essence of red than to see it as a universal?" (see below, p. 42) If this is indeed the case, then the reflective apprehension of the acts of consciousness will afford much more than a record of private mental occurrences; when followed by acts of ideating abstraction it will yield insights into the very essence of the acts of consciousness and, among them, the acts of knowing. Statements issued on the basis of such insights into essence will count as *a priori* truths, not empirical generalizations over the regularities of mental life.

Thus phenomenology will become a science. But it will not be like other sciences. For the other sciences assume the general validity of Type One knowledge; that is, they assume the success of transcendence on the part of consciousness. For them, doubt is always a localized affair, to be resolved by appeals to other parts of knowledge of the same basic type. But phenomenology, as the critique of knowledge, takes the general validity of Type One knowledge as its explicit theme. Thus it cannot assume the existence of a world of transcendent objects in causal relation with each other, for it is precisely this assumption that is put into question by the critique of knowledge. Phenomenology, then, will not try to give a causal account of knowledge and its connection to the world; it will not seek to explain knowledge as a "natural fact"; it will not engage in theoretical constructions of the hypothetical-deductive sort. It cannot borrow from the results of empirical disciplines; more pointedly, it cannot be based upon the deliverances of psychology, either explanatory (as in Wundt), or descriptive (as in Brentano). Nor can it make use of the speculations of evolutionary biology. Rather, its task is to exhibit the essence of knowing within the framework of the phenomenological reduction (see below, p. 41). Thus it must remain entirely a matter of reflection, direct intuition, analysis, and description.

The first expansion of Type Two knowledge, so as to include not only acts but essences, will lead Husserl to reformulate the problem of transcendence as stated on the critical level. The shift from transcendence to immanence was motivated by the need to locate and secure a type of knowledge not afflicted by the problem of transcendence. But the admission of the knowledge of essences into the sphere of Type Two knowledge makes it clear that the crucial epistemic distinction is not simply between what is external and what is internal to consciousness in some picturesque sense, but rather what is inadequately given as opposed to what is adequately given. For the issue here is not location, but indubitability. Knowledge claims are indubitable just in case they are made on the basis of the adequate givenness of their corresponding objects. An object is adequately given when everything intended in the knowledge claim has its counterpart in what is intuitively given in the experience which grounds that claim, when "nothing that is meant fails to be given" (see below, p. 45). In such cases, Husserl maintains, it makes no sense to doubt. If, upon the putative perception of a house, I claim to see a house, my claim goes far beyond what is actually given in the perceptual experience. What was actually given was a finite sequence of ostensible house-appearances, on the basis of which I claimed that I saw a house. But my claim may be refuted by subsequent experience. As I walk, it may turn out that what I saw was only a house façade, or a cleverly painted wall of a commercial establishment, or one phase of a particularly vivid dream sequence. Acts of

perception, on the other hand, have no sides. They are given – whole and entire – in the reflective apprehension I have of them. So, while I may be deceived regarding the house I apparently perceive; I cannot be deceived, Husserl will claim here, in my reflective apprehension of the fact that I am having an apparent house-perception.

This point having been made, there is no reason to think that only items immanent to consciousness in the real sense can be adequately given, or that all objects transcendent to consciousness – in the sense of being external to it – must be given inadequately. The initial assumption was that the distinction between immanence and transcendence in the real sense is co-terminous with the distinction between adequate and inadequate givenness. Thus the phenomenological reduction, in seeking to remove all traces of transcendence in knowledge, would strictly limit Type Two knowledge to an examination of the acts of consciousness. But the experience of universals, as Husserl describes it, shows that this is not the case. Acts of consciousness may be adequately given by virtue of being immanent to consciousness in the real sense, but this fact does not preclude the possibility of other kinds of objects being adequately given on other grounds.

This leads Husserl to redefine the distinction between immanence and transcendence, and thus to reformulate the problem of transcendence on the critical level. Immanence, in the phenomenologically revised sense, will be correlated with adequate givenness; transcendence with inadequate givenness. Call these revised senses "phenomenological immanence" and "phenomenological transcendence." In the case of essences, or, more generally, universals, we now have entities that are transcendent in the real sense (external to consciousness) but not in the phenomenological sense (since they can be wholly given); conversely, they are not immanent in the real sense (since they are not real parts of consciousness), but they are in the phenomenological sense (again, because they can be wholly given).

The phenomenological reduction, consistently applied, will have implications for the status of the knowing subject as well as the known object. It is one thing to set aside all positing of existence with respect to external objects; but positing the existence of the subject of knowing, the "I" of the "I think," must also be inhibited insofar as that subject is identified as a particular empirical person inhabiting the transcendent world it knows. Thus, together with the outward transcendence of physical objects, the "inward transcendence" of the empirical ego – annexed to a body that is in turn part and parcel of the world – must fall under the reduction. In this move, the phenomenon of knowing, then, will be divested of all "psychological apperception" and thereby rendered "pure" (see below, pp. 33-34). For the special purposes of the critique of knowledge, consciousness will no longer be construed as a

regular inhabitant of the world it takes as its object; it will be referred to as "pure consciousness" (later: "transcendental consciousness").

This implication of the methodological requirements of the critique of knowledge, worked out on the meta-critical level, in turn forces another revision of the formulation of the problem of knowledge on the critical level. Henceforth the question is not how the psychological phenomenon of knowing can transcend itself, but how the *pure* phenomenon of knowing can transcend itself. Transcendence is no longer the problem of reaching out from the inner workings of one part of the world to another, but the transcendence of a pure consciousness to which both the empirical object and empirical subject appear.

The first requirement for the critique of knowledge, the requirement of Type Two knowledge, motivated the reflective turn to acts of consciousness. The second requirement for the critique of knowledge – a basis for general statements – motivated the expansion of Type Two knowledge so as to include essences. The object domain of Type Two knowledge will now undergo a second expansion in connection with a third requirement for the critique of knowledge: that the problem of correspondence become phenomenologically accessible (see below, pp. 29, 35-36, 55). For if the problem of knowledge is to receive a phenomenological solution, the relation between the act of knowing and the object known must be drawn into the sphere of immanence in the phenomenologically revised sense; it must itself be given, and, as such, open to direct investigation under the constraints of the reduction. Otherwise, knowledge claims concerning correspondence, insofar as they posit transcendent relations between acts and objects, will be afflicted by the very problem they seek to solve.

Husserl addresses this issue in Lecture Five. There he states that while the physical object which appears is transcendent (in both the real and phenomenological sense) to the act of consciousness that apprehends it, the same is not the case for the appearances of the physical object whereby it presents itself to consciousness. In phenomenologically reduced experience, these object-appearances are wholly given. Although they are not a real part of consciousness, thus transcendent in the real sense, they are absolutely given, thus immanent in the phenomenological sense. This fact provides Husserl with all the resources he needs for a phenomenological version of the correspondence theory. The phenomenon of knowing, the act of knowing as given in reflection, is adequately given. It intentionally contains the systems of appearance whereby objects, persons, properties, universals, and states of affairs present themselves to it. For every possible objectivity, there is a corresponding set of appearances whereby it appears. The correspondence relation is not between stripped-down acts occurring within a self-enclosed mind and objects external to it, as we have in Descartes. Consciousness is not like an empty container

into which ready-made objects of knowledge, or its representatives, are simply inserted. Rather, it is a highly complex temporal system of mental processes by which the givenness of the known object is "constituted." This means that in every case of knowledge there is a strict correlation between the real (later "noetic") and the intentional (later "noematic") components of the act of knowing, which itself can be wholly given in an act of reflective apprehension. The task of the phenomenological critique of knowledge, then, is to identify, analyze, and describe the various ramified systems of presentation and representation correlated to the various kinds of possible objectivities, and in so doing, identify the forms of evidence which serve to justify belief in the existence and determinations of the objectivities so given.

In the *Idea of Phenomenology* we have only an initial sketch of the phenomenological research program thus conceived. In the subsequent *Ding und Raum* lectures, to which these five lectures were an introduction, Husserl pursues in great descriptive detail the manifold correlations involved in our perceptual awareness of material things in space. In his next major publication, *Ideas I*, the plan of the research program will be elaborated with a more extensive and sophisticated account of the noetic-noematic correlation (Part III) and complemented by a specifically phenomenological theory of rationality (Part IV) – the very project Husserl had envisioned for himself in 1906.

I have represented the progress of thought in the *Idea of Phenomenology* as one driven by an interaction between two levels of inquiry, the critical and the meta-critical. On the critical level, the problem of knowledge was initially stated in terms Husserl inherited from the tradition of modern philosophy: how can the acts of knowing, which occur within the mind, reach out and make contact with objects wholly external to it; and how can we be sure that they correspond to the objects they thus encounter? As we saw, once the requirements for answering such questions were specified and the conditions of their satisfaction worked out through several preliminary phenomenological reflections, the questions themselves were transformed. No longer is it a matter of how acts, encased in some inner psychological sphere, move beyond themselves in order to make contact with external objects, but rather how the givenness of objects is intentionally constituted within a consciousness that embraces both the givenness of the empirical mind and the empirical world of which that mind is a part. The questions, thus transformed, can now be answered on the basis of the resources phenomenology has at its disposal under the reduction; it need not consult empirical research on the causal connections between minds and objects, or rely on speculative arguments that serve as a bridge from the interior of the mind to the great outdoors.

The phenomenological reduction could suggest itself as a viable methodological procedure for the solution to the problem of knowledge only on the

kind of theory of intentionality that Husserl had already adopted in the *Logical Investigations*. Theories of intentionality fall into two main categories: relational and adverbial. The relational account takes "intentionality" to refer to a relation that obtains between two terms – in this case, the act of knowing and the object known. The nature of this relation, causal or otherwise, is variously specified. But the main point here is that the relation obtains only if the two terms of the relation also exist. Just as the relation "taller than" cannot obtain between me and my brother, unless my brother and I also exist, so an act of consciousness cannot be intentionally related to an object unless that object also exists. Those who hold to a relational account of intentionality must, of course, be in a position to account for the fact that we can think about, or imagine, non-existent objects; and they are quite naturally tempted to posit a panoply of objects – called "ideas" in the modern tradition – that exist inside the mind and serve as the proper objects of those thoughts and imaginations of things that do not exist outside the mind, thus preserving the existence condition by positing the "in-existence" of the objects of consciousness. To keep the account consistent, it is often held that the immediate objects of veridical perceptions are also mentally in-existent objects, generated by the causal powers of physical objects in the neighborhood of the mind. Belief, then, in the existence of objects transcendent to consciousness will always involve a causal inference from the immediately perceived representational object in the mind to the external object that ostensibly caused it. Such an inference is, of course, deductively invalid, as David Hume, among others, was happy to point out, thus intensifying the problem of knowledge based upon a relational theory of intentionality.

Adverbial theories take intentionality to name not a relation between an act of consciousness and its object, but rather the property of an act of consciousness whereby it refers to its object. Furthermore, adverbial theories hold that acts of consciousness have it within their power to refer to objects, even if those objects do not exist. Husserl clearly belongs to the adverbial camp. In the third lecture of this volume he claims that if the acts given in reflection "happen also to refer intentionally to objective reality, then that referring is a characteristic that resides in them, while nothing is thereby assumed concerning the *existence or non-existence of reality*" (see below, p. 34). Again: "the relating-itself-to-something-transcendent, to refer to it in one way or another, is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon" (see below, p. 35). This means that a phenomenological reduction, which forbids the use of the existence of objects or their putative causal powers for explanatory purposes, leaves untouched the resources required for an adequate account of intentionality. Such an account, unburdened by the problem on transcendence in its own case, need only describe the internal structure of the acts of consciousness

whereby they refer to their objects. If those objects exist, then the acts may also be said to be in relation to them; but their intentionality does not depend upon the existence of the objects to which they refer. A complete account of intentionality can thus be given with the materials delivered by the reflective apprehension of the acts of consciousness and their analysis – no appeal need be made to divine veracity; no hypothetical causal account need be constructed. In this approach, Husserl also firmly aligns himself with the internalist approach to epistemology, which demands that the conditions of knowledge be accessible from the first person standpoint.

Yet a residual problem remains. It is, ironically, a problem created by the very adverbial theory of intentionality of consciousness that made phenomenology capable of solving the problem of knowledge in the first place. The problem can best be stated as a point a realist might make: if it is the case that consciousness can bring it about that a world appear to it independently of the existence and causal influence of any world, then is it not possible that the world, in itself, is not at all the way it appears to be to consciousness? We know that appearances can be deceptive in the local sense. Doesn't Husserl's theory of intentionality and constitution mean that they can be deceptive in the global sense as well? (see below, p. 59) The move Husserl made to pull the correspondence relation into the sphere of immanence seems to leave this problem unsolved – perhaps even phenomenologically unsolvable.

In *Ideas I* Husserl admits that it is logically possible that the world, in itself, is wholly other than the way it appears to be in consciousness (*Ideas I*, section 48). There are basically two ways he can handle the skeptical worry at this point: 1) become an idealist; or, 2) develop a theory of rationality that makes this possibility untroublesome. If the conflict of interpretations over the question of whether Husserl was a realist or idealist – still raging today – is any indication, it is fair to say that Husserl explored both of these options. One is to collapse the object known into the system of its appearances with no remainder, thus adopting an idealism of a roughly Berkeleyan sort. The other is to develop a theory of rational doubt that will maintain that while it is logically possible for the world to be otherwise than it presents itself in experience, we would be rationally justified in doubting that it is the way it appears to consciousness only on the basis of motivations arising from experience itself. And it is hard to know what these motivations could possibly be, other than the complete randomization of experience against the background memory of orderly experience.

In my work on this new English version of Husserl's *Idee der Phänomenologie*, it has been my aim to upgrade the Alston-Nakhnikian translations of 1963 and 1964 in matters of both style and accuracy. On three points I have

consistently deviated from their translation policy. I have translated *Sinn* as "sense" rather than "meaning" (annexing the latter to *Bedeutung*). I do this to disassociate Husserl's concept of *Sinn* from exclusively linguistic concerns. *Sinn*, for Husserl, is the intentional element of an act of consciousness whereby that act refers to its object. It is intentionally resident in all acts of perception, memory, imagination, and the like. As such, it far exceeds in scope the concerns of the philosophy of language; indeed, for Husserl, it also precedes those concerns insofar as all linguistic reference is ultimately founded on pre-predicative acts of consciousness. Second, I have translated "*natürliche Wissenschaften*" as the "positive sciences" rather than the "natural sciences" or "sciences of the natural sort." I do so because the term "natural sciences" calls to the mind of the English reader such sciences as physics, chemistry, and biology; whereas Husserl meant by this locution all the sciences insofar as they are based upon the assumption of the "natural attitude," the assumption of the existence of the world, the validity of transcendent experience – that is, all the sciences except the properly philosophical science of phenomenology, which seeks to assess the basic and pervasive assumption of the positive sciences without participating in it. In his later writings Husserl himself referred to all such sciences as the "*positive Wissenschaften*" (see the *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, written in the 1930's, for example). So the use of the English cognate for this term in a translation of his earlier work would seem permissible. Third, the term "*psychisch*" is transliterated by Alston and Nakhnikian as "psychic," as in "psychic experience," or "psychic data." By this Husserl means experience or data as they pertain to the mind. But the term "psychic" calls to the mind of the English-speaking reader images of people with clairvoyant powers, who regularly invite perfect strangers to chat with them over the phone about the details of their private lives. To avoid all associations with the para-normal and occult, I have translated the term "*psychisch*" as "mental," "of the mind," and the like.

An additional terminological difficulty is posed by Husserl's use of the term of "*reell*" both as an adjective and as an adverb. This term is best explained by reference to its place in a three-way conceptual partition between the *reelle*, the *reale*, and the *intentionale* components of an act of consciousness. First, the contrast between *reell* and *intentionale*: in expanding the domain of what is included in the phenomenon of knowing, Husserl seeks to go beyond the temporal parts, layers, and phases of an act that actually make it up to those elements that do not make it up, but are essentially referred to by that act, or serve as the structural features of the act that make such reference possible. The former are *reelle* components of the act, the latter are *intentionale* parts. The concept of *reelle* components receives further definition by reference to

a second contrast. Under the phenomenological reduction, the acts under investigation are no longer to be construed as acts within the mind of an empirical person, part and parcel of the world, but rather as occurring within a pure consciousness to which that person, as well as the world, appears. Thus Husserl will use the term *reell* to distinguish those components from *reale* components of an act psychologically apperceived as part of the world, connected, as are all parts of the world, by relations of cause and effect. As a English translator, I have only the word "real" to work with, unless I want to resort, as other translators have, to such barbarisms as "really ingredient" and the like. My solution is to put the German word "*reell*," with its various adjectival endings, in brackets after the English word "real" every time "real" is used to translate "*reell*." This solution is less than elegant; but terminological accuracy on this point trumps the claims of felicitous style.

Beyond these shifts in semantic policy, I have tried to clean up minor errors in the 1963-64 translations and to conform the style of my own work more naturally to the syntactic expectations of the English-speaking reader. If I have been successful in doing so, it is in large part because of the fine assistance I received from my former student, Bo-Mi Choi, in her careful and thorough review of the penultimate draft of my translation. As a native German-speaker, she served as an invaluable guide to German idiom. Jürgen Sander reviewed the Addenda and made several helpful suggestions. Jill Forcier read through the entire manuscript in search of grammatical mistakes, stylistic glitches, and typographical errors.

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ENDNOTES

1. Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997, p. 74, my translation.
2. *Husserl-Chronik*, p. 77, my translation.
3. *Husserl-Chronik*, p. 90, my translation.
4. *Husserl-Chronik*, p. 87, my translation.
5. *Husserl-Chronik*, p. 99, my translation.
6. Edited by Ulrich Claesges, *Husserliana XVI*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

LECTURE I

[17][1] In earlier lectures I drew a distinction between *positive* and *philosophical science*. The former originates from the natural attitude of the mind, the latter from the philosophical.

The *natural attitude* of the mind is not concerned with the critique of knowledge. In such an attitude, our attention is turned – in acts of intuition and thought – *to things* given to us, and given as a matter of course, even though they are given in different ways and in different modes of being according to the source and level of our knowledge of them. In perception, for example, a thing stands before us as a matter of course. It is there, in the midst of other things, both living and lifeless, animate and inanimate. That is, it stands before us in the midst of a world, part of which is perceived as particular things are perceived, part of which is given in connection with memory – from whence it spreads out into the indeterminate and the unknown.

It is to this world that our judgments refer. We make statements – sometimes singular, sometimes general – about things: their relations, their alterations, their functional dependencies and laws of transformation. Thus we find expression for what presents itself in direct experience. Following up on motives provided by experience itself, we infer from what is directly experienced in perception and memory to what is not experienced; we generalize; we apply in turn general knowledge to particular cases, or, in analytical thought, deduce new generalizations from general knowledge. Pieces of knowledge do not follow upon one another as a matter of mere succession. Rather, they enter into logical relations with each other, they follow from each other, they "agree" with each other, they confirm each other, thereby strengthening their logical power.

On the other hand, they also enter into relations of contradiction and strife; they fail to agree with each other; they are canceled by *assured* knowledge, [18] their pretense to knowledge discredited. Perhaps these contradictions arise from the sphere of laws governing the pure forms of predication: we succumbed to equivocation; we drew fallacious inferences; we miscounted or miscalculated. If this is so, then we will restore formal consistency, resolve the equivocation, and the like.

Or the contradictions upset the system of motivations that has been established by experience: grounds for belief provided by experience enter into conflict with each other. Where do we look for help then? We proceed to

[1] The numbers in brackets refer to the page numbers of the German edition in *Husserliana II*.

assess the grounds for the various possibilities of determining or explaining the matter; the weaker must give way to the stronger, which, for their part, only hold as long as they stand up, that is, as long as they do not get involved in a similar logical battle against new epistemic motives introduced by a broadened sphere of cognition.

This is how positive knowledge makes progress. It takes possession, to an ever greater degree, of a reality that simply exists and is given as a matter of course by examining it more closely with respect to its extent, its content, its elements, relations, and laws. Thus the various positive sciences come into being and grow – the natural sciences, as sciences of physical and mental nature, the human sciences, and, on the other hand, the mathematical sciences, the sciences of numbers, of manifolds, of relations, etc. The latter sciences do not deal with real actualities, but rather with ideal possibilities that are valid in themselves and, besides that, unquestioned from the very outset.

In every step of knowledge taken by the positive sciences, difficulties arise and are resolved, either by pure *logic* or by an appeal to the *facts* on the basis of impulses or rational motives that lie in the things themselves, that seem to come from them as *requirements* which these things, as given, impose upon knowledge.

We will now contrast the *natural attitude of thought*, or natural motivations of thought, with the *philosophical attitude*.

Once reflection on the relation between knowledge and the object is awakened, abysmal [19] difficulties open up. Knowledge, the thing taken most for granted in natural thinking, suddenly stands before us as a mystery. But I must be more exact. What is *taken for granted* in natural thinking is the possibility of knowledge. Constantly engaged in productive activity, advancing from discovery to discovery in newly developed sciences, natural thinking finds no occasion to raise the question of the possibility of knowledge as such. To be sure, *knowledge* becomes a problem for it in a *certain way*, as does everything else that occurs in the world: it becomes an object of positive research. Knowledge is a natural state of affairs; it is the experience of some knowing organic being; it is a psychological fact. And like any psychological fact, it can be described with respect to its kinds and forms of interconnection; its genetic relations can be investigated. On the other hand, knowledge is, according to its essence, *knowledge of objectivity*, and it is such by virtue of the *sense* that is immanent to it, the sense by which it *relates* itself to objectivity. And natural thinking also deals with such relations. As an object for investigation, it takes, in their *formal* generality, the a priori connections between meanings and meaning-validities, the *a priori* laws that belong to objectivity *as such*; it gives rise to a *pure grammar* and, at a higher level, a pure logic (which yields a whole complex of disciplines by virtue of its

various possible delimitations), and again to a normative and practical logic as an art of thinking, especially scientific thinking.

Thus far, however, we still stand on the ground of *natural* thinking.[2]

But it is precisely this correlation between epistemic experience, meaning, and object – touched upon here for the sake of contrasting the psychology of knowledge and pure logic with ontology – that represents the source of the deepest and most difficult problems, which, taken together, comprise the problem of the possibility of knowledge.

[20] In all of its manifestations, knowledge is a mental experience: knowledge belongs to a knowing subject. The known objects stand over against it. How, then, can knowledge be sure of its agreement with the known objects? How can knowledge go beyond itself and reach its objects reliably? What appears to natural thinking as the matter-of-fact givenness of known objects within knowledge becomes a riddle. In perception, the perceived object is supposed to be immediately given. There stands the thing before my perceiving eyes. I see it; I grasp it. But the perception is nothing more than an experience that belongs to me, the perceiving subject. Likewise, memory and expectation are subjective experiences, along with all the acts of thought built upon them, on the basis of which we mediately posit real existence and determine any *truth* about such existence. How do I, the knowing subject, know – and how can I know for sure – that not only my experiences, these acts of knowing, exist, but also what they know exists? Indeed, how do I know that there is anything at all that can be set over against knowledge as an object?

Should I say: only phenomena are genuinely given to the knowing subject, and the knowing subject never gets beyond the interconnections of its own experiences. Thus it can only be truly justified in saying: I exist, and everything that is not me is mere phenomena, resolves itself into phenomenal contexts. Should I adopt, then, the standpoint of solipsism? This is a hard and exacting demand. Should I, with *Hume*, reduce all transcendent objectivity to mere fictions, which can be explained by means of psychology, but not rationally justified? But that too is a hard and exacting demand. Does not Hume's psychology, like any psychology, transcend the sphere of immanence? When it uses such terms as "custom," "human nature," "sense organs," "stimulus," and the like, is it not dealing with entities that – by its own admission – enjoy a transcendent existence, even while its aim is to degrade everything that transcends actual "impressions" and "ideas" to the level of fiction?[3]

But what is the use of appealing to contradictions, if [21] *logic itself is in question* and becomes problematic? Indeed, the *real meaning of logical*

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[2] See Addendum I.

[3] See Addendum II.

lawfulness, which natural thought would not dream of questioning, now becomes *questionable* and even *dubious*. Biological lines of thought now crowd in upon us. We are reminded of the modern theory of evolution, according to which man has developed through the struggle for existence and the process of natural selection, and with him, of course, also his intellect, and with the intellect the forms that belong to it, especially the logical forms. Do not logical forms and logical laws, then, simply express the contingent peculiarities of the human species? But couldn't they have been different? And won't they become different in the course of future evolution? Knowledge, then, is just *human knowledge*, bound to the *forms of the human intellect*, incapable of making contact with the very nature of things, with the things themselves.

But here again an absurdity immediately leaps to the fore: does the knowledge with which such a view operates, or even the possibilities, which it considers, make any sense if the laws of logic are given over to such relativism? Does not the truth that there is this possibility, or that possibility, implicitly presuppose the absolute validity of the principle of non-contradiction, according to which a given truth excludes its contradictory?

These examples should suffice. The possibility of knowledge has become a riddle in every respect. If we immerse ourselves in the positive sciences, we find, to the degree they have developed into exact sciences, everything clear and intelligible. We are sure that we are in possession of objective truth, which has been grounded through reliable methods that actually make contact with objectivity. But as soon as we engage in reflection, we fall into error and confusion. We get involved in patently untenable positions, even in contradictions. We are in constant danger of falling into skepticism, or worse yet, into any one of the forms of skepticism that have, unfortunately, one and the same characteristic: absurdity.

The playground of these obscure and contradictory theories, as well as the endless [22] controversies associated with them, is *epistemology* and *metaphysics* – for metaphysics is bound up with epistemology both historically and by way of the subject matter. The task of epistemology, or the critique of theoretical reason, is first of all a critical one. It must expose and reject the mistakes that natural reflection upon the relation between knowledge, its sense, and its object almost inevitably makes; and it must thereby refute the explicit or implicit skeptical theories concerning the essence of knowledge by demonstrating their absurdity.

On the other hand, its positive task is to solve the problems pertaining to the correlation of knowledge, its sense, and its object by inquiring into the essence of knowledge. Among these problems is the problem of explicating the essence and sense of knowable objectivity, or what amounts to the same thing,

objectivity in general: the sense, that is, which is prescribed a priori (essentially) to objectivity by virtue of the correlation between knowledge and its object. And this, of course, pertains to all of the basic forms of objectivity as they are predelineated by the essence of knowledge. (The ontological forms, as well as the apophantic and metaphysical.)

It is precisely through the successful execution of these tasks that epistemology qualifies as a critique of knowledge, or, more exactly, as a *critique of positive knowledge* within all the positive sciences. It thus puts us in the position of being able to give an accurate and definitive interpretation of the results of the positive sciences with respect to what exists. For the epistemological confusion in which we are placed by natural (pre-epistemological) reflection on the possibility of knowledge (on the possibility of knowledge making contact with its object) is predicated not only upon false views about the essence of knowledge, but also upon self-contradictory, and therefore fundamentally misleading, *interpretations* of being as it is known in the positive sciences. Thus one and the same natural science is interpreted in materialistic, spiritualistic, dualistic, psychomonistic, positivistic, and many other ways, depending upon what interpretation is thought to be the necessary conclusion of such reflections. Only epistemological reflection yields the distinction between [23] positive science and philosophy. Only through such reflection does it become clear that the positive sciences are not the ultimate sciences of being. What is required is a science of what exists in the absolute sense. This science, which we call metaphysics, grows out of a "critique" of positive knowledge in the particular sciences. It is based upon the insight acquired by a general critique of knowledge into the essence of knowledge and known objectivity according to its various basic types, that is, according to the various basic correlations between knowledge and known objectivity.

If we then disregard the metaphysical purposes of the critique of knowledge and attend solely to its task *of clarifying the essence of knowledge and known objectivity*, then it is a *phenomenology of knowledge and known objectivity*, which forms the first and fundamental part of phenomenology in general.

Phenomenology: this term designates a science, a complex of scientific disciplines; but it also designates at the same time and above all a method and an attitude of thought: the specifically *philosophical attitude of thought*, the specifically *philosophical method.*

In contemporary philosophy, insofar as it claims to be a serious science, it has almost become a commonplace that there can be but one method for acquiring knowledge in all the sciences, including philosophy. This conviction is in complete accordance with the great traditions of the philosophy of the 17th century, which also held that the salvation of philosophy depends upon its taking the exact sciences – especially mathematics and mathematical

natural science – as the methodological model. This posited methodological parity between philosophy and the other sciences goes hand in hand with positing a parity in their subject matter as well. Even today one must still reckon with the prevailing opinion that philosophy, more specifically, the overarching theory of being and science, can not only be related to all the other sciences, but can also be grounded on their findings [24] in the same way that the sciences are grounded upon each other, the conclusions of one serving as the premises for others. Here I remind the reader of the favorite ploy of grounding epistemology on a psychology of knowledge or on biology. In our day, reactions against these fatal prejudices are frequent. And prejudices they are indeed.

In the sphere of positive research, one science can readily build upon another and one can serve the other as a methodological model, although only to a certain extent determined and limited by the nature of the areas of research in question. *Philosophy, however, lies in a wholly new dimension.* It requires a *wholly new point of departure* and a wholly new method, a method that distinguishes it in principle from every "positive" science. This is why the logical procedures that lend a unity to the positive sciences, in spite of the specialized methods that differ from science to science, have an essentially unitary character in contrast to the methodological procedures of philosophy, which constitute, in principle, a new unity. This is also why the pure philosophy within the whole critique of knowledge and the "critical" disciplines in general must disregard and refrain from making any use of the entire intellectual achievement of the positive sciences as well as natural wisdom and lore (which are not organized as a science).

By way of anticipation, this doctrine, which will be given a more detailed and exact grounding in subsequent remarks, is suggested by the following consideration.

In the skeptical mood necessarily created by critical epistemological reflection (here I mean the initial reflection that occurs within the natural mode of thought and thus precedes any scientific critique of knowledge), every positive science and every positive scientific method ceases to count as an available possession. For here the ability of knowledge to make contact with an object has become enigmatic and even dubious in its very sense and possibility – and here exact knowledge is no less enigmatic than non-exact knowledge, scientific no [25] less than prescientific. What becomes questionable is the possibility of knowledge, more precisely, the possibility of knowledge making contact with an objectivity that is, after all, what it is in itself. At bottom, what knowledge accomplishes, the sense of its claim to validity or justification, the sense of the distinction between valid knowledge and knowledge that merely makes a pretense to validity, is in question; as is,

on the other side, the sense of objectivity, which is and is what it is whether it is known or not, and yet as an objectivity is an objectivity of a possible knowledge, in principle knowable even if it has as a matter of fact never been known or will be known, in principle perceivable, imaginable, and determinable by predicates in a possible judgment, etc.

It is impossible to see, however, how operating with assumptions drawn from positive knowledge, no matter how "exactly grounded" they are in it, can assist us in resolving the doubts generated by the critique of knowledge, or solve its problems. If the very sense and value of positive knowledge *as such*, with *all* its methodological arrangements, with all its exact groundings, has become problematic, then this effects every principle drawn from the sphere of positive knowledge that might be taken as a point of departure as well as every ostensibly exact method of grounding. The most rigorous forms of mathematics and mathematical natural science here have not the slightest advantage over any actual or alleged knowledge belonging to common experience. Thus it is clear that there can be no talk of philosophy (which begins with the critique of knowledge and remains entirely rooted in such a critique) orienting itself to the exact sciences methodologically (or even with respect to its subject matter!), or taking the method of the exact sciences as a model, or that it is the task of philosophy to extend and perfect the work accomplished in the exact sciences according to a method that is essentially the same for all the sciences. In comparison to all positive knowledge, philosophy, I repeat, lies in a *new dimension*; and to this new dimension there corresponds a fundamentally *new method* which [26] is to be contrasted with the "natural" method – even if, as our metaphor already suggests, it has its essential connections to the old dimension. Anyone who denies this has failed to understand the peculiar level at which the problems of the critique of knowledge must be posed, and thus has failed to understand what philosophy actually wants to accomplish – and should accomplish – and what gives philosophy, as opposed to all positive knowledge and science, its proper character and authority.

[29] At the outset of the critique of knowledge, then, the entire world – physical and psychological nature, and ultimately one's own human ego, together with all the sciences that deal with such objectivities – must be assigned the index of *dubitability*. Its being, its validity, remains undecided.

Now the question is: how can the *critique of knowledge establish* itself? As the scientific self-understanding of knowledge, it seeks to determine scientifically, and thus objectively, what the essence of knowledge is and what it means to say that it is related to an objectivity, and that it is objectively valid or correct in those cases where it is to count as genuine knowledge. Although the *epoché* – which the critique of knowledge must exercise – begins by placing all knowledge in question, it cannot continue to do so in the case of its own knowledge; and although it initially deprives all givenness of its validity, it cannot continue to do so in the case of the givenness it has itself established. If it cannot presuppose anything as *pregiven*, then it must begin with some knowledge that it does not take unexamined from other sources, but rather provides for itself and posits as primary.

This primary knowledge may not contain anything that bespeaks of the unclarity and dubitability that otherwise lends to knowledge the character of being enigmatic and problematic so that we are finally put in the embarrassing position of having to say that all knowledge as such is a problem, something that is incomprehensible, in need of clarification and doubtful in all its claims. In terms of the correlate of knowledge, we may put it this way: if we are allowed to take no being as pregiven because the lack of epistemological clarity entails that we do not understand what it could mean for a being to be *known in itself* and yet be *known in knowledge*, then it must be possible to point out some being that we must without doubt [30] acknowledge as absolutely given insofar as it is given with complete clarity, on the basis of which every question about it must and will find its immediate answer.

And now we recall the Cartesian doubt. Reflecting on the manifold possibilities of error and delusion, I might fall into such a state of skeptical doubt that I finally say: I am certain of nothing, for me everything is doubtful. But as soon as I say that, it becomes evident that not everything can be doubtful for me. For in making the judgment that everything is doubtful it cannot be doubted that I am making this judgment. For this reason it would be absurd to persist in universal doubt. In every case of determinant doubt it is without doubt certain that I am so doubting. The same is true of every *cogitatio*. However I might perceive, imagine, judge, infer – whether these

acts are attended by certainty or uncertainty, whether they actually have objects or not – it remains absolutely clear and certain that with respect to perception I am perceiving this or that, that with respect to judgment, I am judging this or that, etc.

Descartes made use of this consideration for other purposes; but with the appropriate modifications we can use it here as well.

If we make an inquiry into the essence of knowledge, no matter what the status of our doubt concerning its ability to make genuine contact with objectivity may be, or the status of that ability itself, it is still the case that knowledge is the title for a highly ramified sphere of being that can be given to us absolutely, and must be absolutely given to us in its details at any particular time. So, those forms of thought that I actually realize in thinking are given to me insofar as I *reflect* on them, accept them and posit them in a *pure act of seeing*. In a vague way I can talk about knowledge, perception, imagination, experience, judgment, inference, and the like. When I reflect, then, of course, only the phenomenon of such vague "talking about and referring to knowledge, experience, judgment, etc." is given. But it is nonetheless given absolutely. Even the phenomenon of vagueness takes its place under the title of knowledge in the broadest sense. But I can also actually carry out an act of perception and turn my regard to it. Furthermore, I can represent a perception to myself in imagination or in memory and turn my regard to its givenness within imagination. Then it is for me no longer [31] a matter of empty talk or vague opinion, a mere idea of perception. Rather, perception stands right before my eyes, as it were, as something given, either actually or by way of imagination. The same holds for every intellectual experience, for every form of thinking and knowing.

Here I have treated the reflective seeing within perception and imagination as equivalent. If we were following the Cartesian meditation, perception would have been emphasized first; to some degree it corresponds to the so-called inner perception of traditional epistemology, though this is, admittedly, an ambiguous concept.

Every intellectual experience, indeed every experience whatsoever, can be made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension while it is occurring. *And in this act of seeing it is an absolute givenness.* It is given as an existing entity, as a "this-here." It would make no sense at all to doubt its being. To be sure, I can wonder what sort of being this is, and how this mode of being is related to other modes. Furthermore, I can wonder what givenness means here, and can, upon a further act of reflection, see this act of seeing itself, the act in which this givenness, or this mode of being, constitutes itself. But here I am all the while moving on absolute ground: the perception, as long as it lasts, is and remains an absolute entity, a "this-here," that is what it is in itself,

something that I can refer to as a final criterion in determining what being and being-given might mean, and here must mean, at least for the manner of being and givenness exemplified by the "this-here." And this holds for all specific forms of thought, no matter how they are given. They can also be given in imagination; they can stand "as it were" before our eyes, and yet not be there as presently existing actualities, as actually occurring perceptions, judgment, etc. But even then they are in a certain sense given. They stand before us as objects of intuition. We speak of them not in vague and sketchy terms, or by way of empty opinion. Rather, we see them, and, as we are seeing them, we can examine their essence, their constitution, their immanent character and conform our talk by a pure measure to what is seen in the fullness of its clarity. All this, however, must be [32] supplemented by a discussion of the concept of essence and the knowledge of essence.

For the moment, we maintain that a sphere of absolute givenness can be indicated at the very outset. And it is precisely this sphere that we need if it is to be possible for us to envision a theory of knowledge. Indeed, our lack of clarity with regard to the sense or essence of knowledge requires a science of knowledge, a science that dedicates itself solely to getting clear on the essence of knowledge. It will not explain knowledge as a psychological fact; it will not investigate the natural conditions under which acts of knowledge come and go, or the natural laws by which they originate and change. To investigate such things is the task that a positive science sets for itself, the natural science of mental facts, of the experiences of the individual minds that undergo them. Rather, the critique of knowledge seeks to clarify, to bring to light, the essence of knowledge and the legitimacy of its claim to validity, a claim that belongs to its essence. And what else can this mean than to bring the essence of knowledge to direct self-givenness?

Recapitulation and Amplification. In its constant progress from one success to another in the various sciences, positive knowledge is entirely confident in its ability to make contact with objectivity and has no occasion to worry about the possibility of knowledge and the sense of known objectivity. But as soon as reflection is directed upon the correlation between knowledge and objectivity (and eventually upon the ideal meaning-content on the one side, and known objectivity on the other) difficulties, untenable positions, and conflicting but seemingly well-grounded theories abound. This forces us to admit that the possibility of knowledge, with regard to its ability to make contact with objectivity, is a riddle.

A new science, the critique of knowledge, is called for here. Its task is to resolve these confusions and clarify for us the essence of knowledge. The possibility of metaphysics, as a science of being in the absolute and final sense, depends upon the success of this science. But how [33] can such a

science of knowledge establish itself? For a science cannot use as a pregiven foundation what it places in question. But all knowledge is put in question here, since the critique of knowledge takes as its problem the possibility of knowledge as such and its ability to make contact with objectivity. Once it begins, no knowledge can count for it as simply given. Thus it may not take over anything from the sphere of pre-scientific knowledge. All knowledge bears the index of dubitability.

With no knowledge given at the beginning, however, it is impossible to make progress in knowledge. Thus the critique of knowledge cannot begin. There can be no such science at all.

At this point I suggested that this is true in that no knowledge can, at the beginning, count as pregiven *without examination.* However, even if the critique of knowledge cannot take over any knowledge at the outset, it can nonetheless begin by giving itself knowledge – not knowledge it grounds upon or logically derives from immediate knowledge that must already be given. Rather, what is required is knowledge that the critique of knowledge can immediately point out and which is of such a sort that it precludes every doubt concerning its possibility and – being absolutely clear and indubitable – contains nothing enigmatic that might provide the occasion for all the skeptical confusions. I then referred to *Cartesian doubt* and to the sphere of absolute givenness, that is, to the circle of absolute knowledge, which is comprehended under the title of the evidence of the *cogitatio*. It now remains to be shown in more detail that the immanence of this knowledge means that it can serve as an appropriate point of departure for the critique of knowledge; furthermore, that *because of such immanence*, this form of knowledge is free of that enigmatic character which is the source of all skeptical predicaments; and, finally, *that immanence is the necessary mark of all knowledge that comprises the critique of knowledge*, and that any borrowing from the sphere of the transcendent, any attempt to ground epistemology on psychology, or any positive science, is nonsense not only at the start but at any point along the way.

By way of amplification, I add the following: there is an apparently sound argument [34] to the effect that epistemology cannot get underway because it places knowledge as such in question and so must place any knowledge with which it begins in question as well. If all knowledge is a riddle to epistemology, then so is the first piece of knowledge with which it commences. I maintain that this apparently sound argument is but a deception. The deception arises from the vague generality of the language. What is "placed in question" is knowledge in general. But that is not to deny that there is any knowledge at all – for that would lead to an absurdity. Rather, it is to say that knowledge contains within itself a certain problem, namely, how it is possible for it to

achieve what we usually take it to achieve: contact with objectivity. I may even doubt that such an achievement is possible. But doubt as I may, a first step can be taken when the doubt is canceled by the fact that I can point to certain kinds of knowledge that render such doubt pointless. Although it is true, moreover, that if I begin by not understanding knowledge at all, then this lack of understanding embraces all knowledge in its indeterminate generality, this does not mean that every instance of knowledge that I come upon in the future must forever remain incomprehensible. It may be that a great riddle accompanies that class of knowledge which initially crowds to the fore, and that I am compelled to say, with some embarrassment, that knowledge as such is a riddle. But then it may soon afterwards become apparent that this riddle does not inhabit certain other kinds of knowledge. As a matter of fact, this is the case, as we shall soon see.

I said that the knowledge with which the critique of knowledge must begin may not contain anything that can be questioned or doubted, anything that throws us into epistemological confusion and thus gives rise to the critique of knowledge in the first place. We must show that this holds for the sphere of the *cogitatio*. But this will require a deeper going reflection, one that will afford us essential advantages.

If we take a closer look at what is so enigmatic about knowledge, and what causes our predicament in our first reflections on the possibility of knowledge, we find that it is its transcendence. All positive knowledge, prescientific and even more so scientific, is knowledge that takes its objects as transcendent; [35] it posits objects as existing, and claims to make cognitive contact with states of affairs that are not "in the genuine sense given" in it, not "immanent" to it.

Upon closer examination, this *transcendence* turns out to be *ambiguous*. It can refer to the fact that the known object is not really [*reell*] contained in the act of knowing. In this case, "given in the genuine sense" or "immanently given" would be understood in terms of real [*reelle*] containment: the act of knowing, the *cogitatio*, has real [*reelle*] moments that really [*reell*] constitute it; but the thing to which it refers and which it ostensibly perceives, remembers, and the like, is to be found in the *cogitatio* itself as an experience not really [*reell*] as a part, as something that actually exists inside it. Thus the question is: how can experience, so to speak, go beyond itself? *Here "immanent" means "really [reell] immanent to the experience of knowing."*

But there is *another sense of transcendence*, whose counterpart is an entirely different kind of immanence, namely, *absolute* and *clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense*. This givenness, which excludes any meaningful doubt, consists of an immediate act of seeing and apprehending the meant objectivity itself as it is. It constitutes the precise concept of

evidence, understood as immediate evidence. All knowledge that is not evident, that refers to or posits what is objective, but *does not see it for itself*, is transcendent in this second sense. In such knowledge we go beyond what is *given in the genuine sense*, beyond *what can be directly seen* and *apprehended.* Here the question is: how can knowledge posit something as existing that is not directly and genuinely given in it?

Before critical epistemology enters into deeper levels of reflection, these two senses of immanence and transcendence are initially interwoven with each other in a confused fashion. Clearly those who bring up the first question of the possibility of real transcendence in fact also bring the second question into play, the question concerning the possibility of transcendence beyond the sphere of evident givenness. But they are implicitly supposing that the only actually comprehensible, unquestionable, absolutely evident givenness is that of a *moment really* [*reell*] *contained* in the act of knowing. [36] Thus they regard everything about the known objectivity that is not really [*reell*] contained in it as enigmatic, problematic. But we shall soon see that this is a fatal mistake.

Now one may understand transcendence in one or the other sense, or one may initially take it in its ambiguous sense, but transcendence remains both the initial and the guiding problem for the critique of knowledge. It is the riddle that stands in the way of positive knowledge and the impulse behind these new investigations. One could at the outset characterize the task of critique of knowledge as one of providing a solution to the problem of transcendence, thereby giving this new discipline its preliminary delimitation, instead of giving a more general characterization of its theme as the problem of the essence of knowledge as such.

At any rate, if the riddle connected with the initial establishment of this discipline lies here, then we can determine more exactly what cannot be claimed as pregiven. Nothing transcendent may be utilized as pregiven. If I do not understand *how* it is possible for knowledge to make contact with something transcendent to it, then I also do not know *whether* it is possible. The scientific validation of the transcendent existence of something is of no assistance to me anymore. For all mediate validation is ultimately based upon immediate validation, and the riddle is already contained in what is immediate.

Yet someone might say: "That mediate as well as immediate knowledge contain the riddle is certain. But it is only the *how* that is puzzling, whereas the *that* is absolutely certain. No sensible person will doubt the existence of the world; besides, the skeptic betrays himself by his practice." Very well, then we will answer this person with a stronger and more far-reaching argument. For this argument will not only show that one may have no recourse to the content of the positive sciences, which take their objects to be transcendent,

at the beginning of epistemology, but that one may have no such recourse *throughout its entire development.* Thus it proves the fundamental thesis *that epistemology can never be built upon a positive science of any kind.* Hence we ask: what will our opponent propose to do with his transcendent knowledge? We put at his disposal the entire stock of transcendent truths belonging to the objective [37] sciences, and we leave their truth value unaltered by the emergence of the riddle concerning the possibility of transcendent science. Now what will he propose to do with his all-embracing knowledge? How does he think he will get from the "that" to the "how"? The fact that he knows that transcendent knowledge is actual guarantees for him as logically obvious the fact that transcendent knowledge is possible. But the riddle is *how* it is possible. Can he solve this riddle by assuming all the sciences, or by presupposing all or any transcendent knowledge? Let us consider: what more does he really need? He takes the possibility of transcendent knowledge for granted, even as analytically obvious, since, as he says to himself, in my case there is knowledge of the transcendent. What he lacks is wholly apparent.[1] What is unclear to him is the relation to transcendence; what is unclear is the "contact with a transcendent" that is ascribed to knowledge, to knowing. Where and how would he achieve clarity on this point? Only if the essence of this relation is somewhere given to him, so that he could see it, so that the unity of knowing and the known object, which is suggested by the phrase "making contact with objectivity" [*Triftigkeit*], would itself stand right before his eyes. Then he would not only have knowledge about its possibility, rather this possibility would be clearly given to him. But for him this possibility is itself something transcendent, a known possibility, but not a possibility that is given and seen. Apparently his thought is this: knowing is something other than the known object; knowing is given, but the known object is not given; and yet knowing is supposed to relate to the object, to know it. How can I understand this possibility? Naturally the answer is: I could only understand it if the relation itself could be given, as something that can be seen. But if the object is and remains something transcendent, and if knowing and the object are actually separate, then surely he can see nothing here, and his hopes for finding a way to somehow achieve clarity by drawing conclusions from transcendent presuppositions are obviously foolish. [38]

As a consequence of this line of thought, he would also have to give up his starting point: he would have to acknowledge that, in this situation, knowledge of the transcendent is impossible, and that his alleged knowledge of the transcendent is a mere prejudice. Then the problem is no longer how transcendent knowledge is possible, but rather how to explain the prejudice that

[1] See Addendum III.

ascribes a transcendent accomplishment to knowledge. This is the way *Hume* took.

Disregarding that approach, we will illustrate the fundamental notion that the problem of "how" (how transcendent knowledge is possible, or, more generally, how knowledge as such is possible) can never be solved on the basis of pregiven knowledge concerning what is transcendent, or from pregiven principles of such knowledge, taken from anywhere, even from the exact sciences, by adding the following consideration: a person born deaf knows that there are tones, that harmonies are based on tones, and that a splendid art is derived from them. But such a person cannot understand *how* tones do such a thing, or how tonal works of art are possible. Such a person couldn't even *imagine* them, that is, couldn't see them and in seeing them apprehend how they are possible. Knowledge of existence would be of no help here; and it would be absurd to propose to deduce the "how" of music, to clarify its possibilities, by way of inference from such knowledge. It will not do to draw conclusions from the existence of things one merely knows but does not see. Seeing cannot be demonstrated or deduced. It is a manifest piece of nonsense to try to clarify possibilities (and immediate possibilities at that) through a logical derivation from non-intuitive knowledge. I may be wholly certain that there are transcendent worlds; I may grant full validity to the content of all the positive sciences. But I cannot borrow anything from them. I should never imagine that I can get to where I want to go in the critique of knowledge by way of transcendent suppositions and scientific inferences – namely, to be able to envision the possibility of the transcendent objectivity of knowledge. And that holds not only for the beginning of the critique of knowledge, but for its entire development, so long as it sticks to the problem of clarifying *how knowledge* [39] *is possible*. And that holds not just for the problem of transcendent objectivity, but for the clarification of any possibility.

If we combine with this the extraordinarily strong tendency to judge in a transcendent sense wherever a transcendently directed act of thought occurs and a judgment is to be based upon such an act, thus falling into a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, then we can give a sufficient and complete deduction of the following *epistemological principle*: in every epistemological investigation, into whatever type of knowledge, the epistemological *reduction* must be performed, that is, all transcendence that comes into play here must be excluded, must be supplied with the index of indifference, of epistemological nullity, with an index that says: the existence of all transcendent entities, whether I believe in them or not, does not concern me here; this is not the place to pass judgment on the issue, to do so is entirely beside the point.

All of the basic errors in epistemology are connected to the above mentioned μετάβασις, on the one hand, the error of psychologism, and on the

other, the error of anthropologism and biologism. This μετάβασις is exceedingly dangerous, partly because the proper sense of the problem is never made clear and remains totally lost in it, and partly because even those who have gotten clear on the problem find it very difficult to hang onto this clarity and, in subsequent thought, easily slip back into the temptations of the natural modes of thinking and judging as well as those false and misleading formulations of the problem which grow on their basis.

[43] By the foregoing considerations we have determined precisely and reliably what the critique of knowledge may and may not use. While its riddle is the possibility of transcendence, it may never under any conditions draw the actuality of what is transcendent into its account. The sphere of usable objectivities, of usable knowledge, which present themselves as valid and remain free of the marks of epistemological vacuity, however, does not reduce itself to zero. For we have secured the entire sphere of *cogitationes*. The being of the *cogitatio* – more precisely, the phenomenon of knowledge itself – is beyond question and free of the riddle of transcendence. Such existences are already presupposed in the initial statement of the problem of knowledge. The question of how the transcendent enters into knowledge would surely forfeit its sense if not only the transcendent but also knowledge itself were given up. It is also clear that *cogitationes* present a sphere of *absolutely immanent givenness, whatever else we might mean by "immanence."* In the seeing of the pure phenomenon the object is not external to knowledge, or to "consciousness"; rather, it is given in the sense of the absolute self-givenness of what is simply seen.

But this point needs to be secured by the *epistemological reduction*, the methodological essence of which we now propose to examine *in concreto* for the first time. We need this reduction in order not to confuse the evidence of the being of the *cogitatio* with the evidence for existence of *my cogitatio*, the evidence of the *sum cogitans* and the like. We must guard ourselves against this fundamental confusion between the *pure phenomenon* in the phenomenological sense and the *psychological phenomenon*, the object of psychology as a positive science. If I, as one thinking in the natural mode, consider the perception I am presently undergoing, [44] I apperceive it immediately and almost unavoidably (as a matter of fact) in relation to my ego. It stands there as an experience of this experiencing person, as this person's state, as its act; the sensory content stands there as content that is given, sensed, and recognized by this person, and integrates itself within the perception of objective time. Perception, or any *cogitatio*, thus apperceived is a *psychological fact.* Thus it is apperceived as a datum in objective time, belonging to the experiencing ego, the ego that is in the world and endures for a time (a time that is measured by empirically calibrated instruments). Thus it is a phenomenon in keeping with the sense of the positive science we call psychology.

The phenomenon in this sense falls under the law to which we must subject ourselves in the critique of knowledge, the law of the *epoché* in relation to

everything transcendent. The ego as a person, as a thing belonging to the world, and experience as the experience of this person – even if entirely indeterminant – exist in the order of objective time: they are all transcendent and, as such, epistemologically null. Only through a reduction, which we shall call the *phenomenological reduction*, do I acquire an absolute givenness that no longer offers anything transcendent. If I place the ego and the world and the experience of the ego as such in question, then reflection upon what is given in the apperception of the relevant experience, upon my ego – a reflection that simply "sees" – yields the *phenomenon* of this apperception: the phenomenon, roughly, of "perception apprehended as my perception." Of course, I can also refer this phenomenon to my ego in the mode of natural reflection, and posit this ego in the empirical sense by saying: I have this phenomenon, it is mine. If I then wanted to acquire the pure phenomenon, I would again have to place the ego as well as time and the world in question, thereby bringing out a pure phenomenon, the pure *cogitatio*. But while I am perceiving I can also regard this perception itself in an act of pure seeing, just as it is, ignoring its relation to the ego, or abstracting from that relation. The perception thus grasped and delimited in "seeing" is then an absolute perception, devoid of every transcendence, given as a pure phenomenon in the phenomenological sense. [45]

Thus to every psychological experience there corresponds, by way of the phenomenological reduction, a pure phenomenon that exhibits its immanent essence (taken individually) *as an absolute givenness*. All positing of a "non-immanent reality," a reality not contained in the phenomenon and therefore not given in the second sense, even if it is intended in the phenomenon, is shut off, that is, suspended.

If it is now possible to take such pure phenomena as objects for research, it is evident that we are no longer doing psychology, a positive science that takes its objects to be transcendent. We are not making an investigation of psychological phenomena, of certain occurrences in so-called real reality (whose existence remains in question throughout), nor do we speak of them. Rather, we are investigating what exists and remains valid whether anything like objective reality exists or not, whether the positing of such transcendence is justified or not. We speak then of just those things that are absolutely given; if they happen also to refer intentionally to objective reality, then that referring is a characteristic that resides in them, while nothing is thereby assumed concerning the *existence or non-existence of reality*. And thus we drop anchor on the shore of phenomenology, whose objects are posited as existing, as any science posits the existence of the objects it investigates, but not as existing in an ego, in a temporal world, but rather as entities absolutely given and grasped in pure immanent seeing: what is purely immanent here is first of all

to be characterized through the *phenomenological reduction*; I mean precisely what is immanent, not what it refers to beyond itself, but rather what it is in itself and what it is given as. This discussion is, of course, only a roundabout way of helping us to see what is to be seen here, namely, the distinction between the quasi-givenness of transcendent objects and the absolute givenness of the phenomenon itself.

Additional steps, additional considerations, are necessary, however, if we are to gain a firm footing on this new land and not, in the end, run aground on its shore. For this shore [46] has its share of rocks, and it is covered by clouds of obscurity that threaten us with the gales of skepticism. What we have said up to this point pertains to all phenomena. But, of course, for the purposes of the critique of reason, only cognitive phenomena are of interest to us. Yet what we will now establish here can be applied to all phenomena, as it holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for all of them.

The way in which we have envisioned the critique of knowledge has led us to a beginning, to the mainland of givenness, of which we may avail ourselves and, above all, of which we appear to stand in need: to fathom the essence of knowledge I must naturally possess knowledge in all its questionable forms *as given*, but in such a way that this givenness has in itself nothing of the problematical character that the other forms of knowledge bring with them, however much they might appear to offer a givenness of their own.

Now that we have secured for ourselves the field of pure knowledge, we can conduct a study of this knowledge, and establish a science of pure phenomena, a *phenomenology*. Is it not obvious that this science must be the basis for the solution to the problems that have been agitating us? For surely I can get clear on the essence of knowledge when I see it for myself, and when it is itself given to me, just as it is, in "seeing." I must study knowledge inunanently, through a pure seeing, within the pure phenomenon, within "pure consciousness": its transcendence is, of course, dubitable; the existence of the objectivity, to which it refers, is not given to me insofar as it is transcendent. What is in question, then, is how this objectivity can nonetheless be posited, and what sense it has, and may have, if such positing should be possible. On the other hand, the relation to something transcendent, whether I question the existence of the transcendent object or the ability of the relation to make contact with it, still contains something that can be apprehended within the pure phenomenon. The relating-itself-to-something-transcendent, to refer to it in one way or another, is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon. It would almost seem that it all depends on having a science of absolute *cogitationes*. Since I have to strike out the pregivenness of anything transcendent to which I might refer, where else could I examine not only the sense of this referring that reaches out beyond itself but also its possible *validity*, or the

sense of such validity, except where this sense is absolutely given [47] and where the sense of validity comes to givenness within the pure phenomenon of relation, confirmation, and justification?

But here again we are stalked by the doubt that something more has to come into play, that the givenness of validity also brings with it the givenness of the object, which, for its part, cannot be the givenness of the *cogitatio* insofar as it is a matter of valid transcendence. However that may be, a science of absolute phenomena, understood as *cogitationes*, is the first thing that is required, and it will have to yield at least the main part of the solution.

What we intend to establish, then, is a phenomenology, a phenomenology of knowledge as the theory of the essence of pure phenomena of knowing. And the prospects are good. But how is phenomenology to proceed? How is it possible? I am to make judgments, indeed, judgments that are objectively valid. I am to gain scientific knowledge of pure phenomena. *But doesn't all science lead to establishing an objectivity existing in itself, thus to what is transcendent?* What is scientifically established is "in itself": it counts as existing whether I know it and posit it as existing or not. Is it not the essence of science to have as its correlate only the objectivity that is known by science, that is scientifically grounded? And is it not the case that what is scientifically grounded is universally valid? What is the situation here? We move in the field of pure phenomena. But why do I say *"field"* – is it not rather an eternal *Heraclitean stream* of phenomena? What statements can I make about it? While I am seeing it, I can say: this here! – it exists, indubitably. Perhaps I can even say that this phenomenon includes that phenomenon as a part, or that it is connected with that one, or that this phenomenon flows into the other one, etc.

But obviously there is nothing by way of *"objective" validity* about these statements. They have *no "objective sense"*; they have only a *"subjective" truth.* At this point we will not conduct an investigation in order to find out whether these statements, insofar as they claim to be "subjectively" true, also have their objectivity. But it is clear even in a fleeting glance that the higher dignity of objectivity, which the natural judgments of prescientific experience [48] enact, so to speak, and which the valid judgments of the exact sciences bring to an incomparably higher level of perfection, is entirely lacking here. Thus we will not attribute any particular value to such judgments as "This is here," and the like, which we make on the basis of pure seeing.

Such judgments remind us of the famous Kantian distinction between *judgments of perception* and *judgments of experience.* The affinity is obvious. But, lacking the concept of phenomenology and the phenomenological reduction, and unable to loose himself entirely from the grip of psychologism and anthropologism, Kant did not arrive at the ultimate intent of the distinction

that must be made here. For us it is not a matter of merely subjectively valid judgments, the validity of which is limited to the empirical subject, and objectively valid judgments in the sense of being valid for every subject in general. For we have excluded the empirical subject; and transcendental apperception, consciousness as such, will soon acquire for us a wholly different sense, one that is not mysterious at all.

We now return to the main theme under consideration. Phenomenological judgments, as singular judgments, are not terribly instructive. But how do we acquire judgments, especially scientifically valid judgments? The word "*scientific,*" however, immediately places us in a predicament. Doesn't *transcendence*, we might ask, come along with objectivity, and with transcendence the doubt about what it means and whether and how it is possible? Through the *epistemological reduction* we exclude all transcendent presuppositions, because the possible validity and sense of transcendence is in question. But then are the scientific conclusions, the transcendent conclusions of epistemology themselves still valid? Is it not obvious that before the possibility of transcendence is demonstrated no transcendent conclusion of epistemology is secure? But if the epistemological *epoché* requires – as it appears to do – that we ascribe no validity to transcendence before we have demonstrated its possibility, and if the demonstration of the possibility of transcendence itself, in the form of an objective demonstration, requires transcendent assumptions, then it appears [49] that we are faced with a circle that makes both phenomenology and epistemology impossible – and our labor of love will, up to this point, have been in vain.

But we will not immediately despair of the possibility of phenomenology and the critique of knowledge that is quite obviously bound up with it. What we need here is a further step that will roll out this spurious circle for us. But we have already taken this step in principle by distinguishing the two senses of transcendence and immanence. Descartes asked, as you will recall, after he had established the evidence of the *cogitatio* (or rather, in a phrase we have not adopted, the "*cogito ergo sum*"): *What is it that assures me of this basic givenness?* The answer: clear and distinct perception [*clara et distincta perceptio*]. We can latch onto this point. I need not mention the fact that we have already grasped the matter in a purer and deeper way than Descartes did, and that we have thus grasped and understood evidence, clear and distinct perception, in a purer sense. With Descartes we can now take the additional step (*mutatis mutandis*): whatever is given through clear and distinct perception, as it is in any singular *cogitatio*, we are entitled to accept. But if we recall the third and fourth meditations – the proof of God's existence, the recourse to divine veracity [*veracitas dei*], etc. – we should expect a bad outcome. So, be very skeptical, or rather, critical.

We have acknowledged the givenness of the pure *cogitatio* as absolute, but not the givenness of the external thing in outer perception, even if this givenness claims to present the being of the thing itself. The transcendence of the thing requires that we put the thing in question. We do not see how perception makes contact with what is transcendent; but we do understand how it makes contact with what is immanent, if it is a reflective and purely immanent perception which has undergone the reduction. But why do we understand this? Because we directly see and grasp precisely what we intend in the seeing and the grasping. To have an appearance before one's eye, which refers to something that is not itself given in the phenomenon, and to doubt whether it exists or how its existence is to be understood – that makes sense. But to see and to intend nothing other than what is grasped in the seeing, and yet still [50] question and doubt – that makes no sense at all. In essence this is to say: seeing, grasping what is self-given, insofar as it is an actual seeing that presents an actual self-givenness and not a givenness that refers to something not given – that is something ultimate. This is *absolute self-evidence [absolute Selbstverständlichkeit]*. What is not self-evident, what is problematic, perhaps even mysterious, is to be found in acts of referring to what is transcendent, that is, in referring to, believing in, or even thoroughly proving something that is not given. It is of no help to us that there is an absolute givenness to be found here, i.e., the givenness of the referring, the believing themselves. We need only reflect to discover it. But what is given here is not what is meant.

But is absolute self-evidence, self-givenness in the act of seeing, present only in the singular experience and its singular moments and parts; can it be only a matter of positing a *"this-here"* in the act of seeing? Could not there also be a positing of other forms of givenness as the absolute givenness of, for instance, universals, where a universal would come to self-evident givenness in an act of seeing and any doubt concerning it would be absurd?

How remarkable it would be to restrict absolute givenness to the phenomenologically singular givenness of the *cogitatio* follows from the fact that the entire meditation on evidence, which we have, following Descartes, carried out, and which was surely illuminated throughout by clarity and self-evidence, would lose its validity. In the case of a singular *cogitatio* that lies before us, say a feeling that we are experiencing, we could perhaps say: it is given. But we could by no means dare to state the most universal proposition: *the givenness of any reduced phenomenon is an absolute and indubitable givenness.*

But this is just to help you along the way. In any case, it is illuminating to note that the possibility of a critique of knowledge depends on the indication of forms of absolute givenness other than the reduced *cogitationes*. Upon

closer consideration, it turns out that we already go beyond these *cogitationes* when we predicate something of them in judgment. We do so when we say: this or that phenomenon of representation lies at the basis of this phenomenon of judging; this [51] phenomenon of perceiving contains these or those moments – color contents and the like. Even if we grant, for the sake of the argument, that we are making these assertions in the most exact conformity to the givenness of the *cogitatio*, the logical forms, which are reflected in the linguistic expression, take us beyond the mere *cogitationes*. There is here a surplus, which does not consist of a mere agglomeration of more *cogitationes*. And even if, with such predicative thinking, new *cogitationes* join those *cogitationes* about which we are making statements, the former do not constitute the predicative state of affairs, the object of the statement.

For those who can place themselves in the position of pure seeing and can stay clear of all natural prejudices, it is easier to conceive of knowledge that can not only bring particulars, but also *universals, universal objects, and universal states of affairs to absolute givenness.* This knowledge is of decisive significance for the possibility of phenomenology. For it is the peculiar character of phenomenology to analyze and conduct research into essences within the framework of a reflection that involves only pure seeing, a framework of absolute self-givenness. And that is necessarily its character; for it aims to be a science and a method that clarifies possibilities, possibilities of knowledge, possibilities of evaluation, and clarifies them on the basis of their fundamental essence. Such possibilities are generally dubitable, and so research into them will be a general research into essence. Analysis of essence is *eo ipso* general analysis, knowledge of essence based on knowledge directed to essences, to universal objectivities. Here talk of the *a priori* has a legitimate place. For what does *a priori* knowledge mean, if not knowledge that is directed to general essences and that draws its validity solely from the domain of essence? (And here we exclude the concepts of the *a priori* as distorted by the empiricists.)

In any case, this is one justified concept of the *a priori*; another concept arises when we range under the title *a priori* all those concepts that have, in a certain sense, their principle meaning as categories, and then, in an extended sense, all those laws of essence that are grounded in them. [52]

If we concentrate on the first concept of the *a priori*, then phenomenology will deal with the *a priori* in the sphere of origins, the sphere of absolute givenness, with species that can be grasped in a general seeing, and with the *a priori* states of affairs that constitute themselves on the basis of these species in a way that can be immediately seen. If we direct ourselves to the critique of reason, not only theoretical reason, but also practical reason, and any other form of reason as well, the chief goal is of course the *a priori* in the second

sense, that is, to establish the principle of self-given forms and states of affairs, and, by means of these, to develop, analyze, and evaluate those concepts and laws of logic, of ethics, of value theory, that have a claim to the status of principles.

LECTURE IV

[55] If we restrict ourselves to just the phenomenology of knowledge, then we will be concerned with the *essence of knowledge* that can be exhibited in direct intuition. That is, we will be concerned with the exhibition and analytical partitioning of the various sorts of phenomena that are embraced by the broad title "knowledge" within the framework of the phenomenological reduction and self-givenness. Then the question is: what is essentially contained and grounded in such phenomena; from what factors are they constructed; what possibilities of combination do they found when they are taken essentially and as purely immanent; and what general relations flow from them?

And here we will not only be concerned with what is really [*reell*] immanent, but also with what is *immanent in the intentional sense.* It belongs to the essence of cognitive experiences to have an *intentio*: they refer to something; they relate themselves in one way or another to an objectivity. This "relating itself to an objectivity" belongs to them even if the objectivity does not. What is objective can appear, can achieve a certain givenness within appearance, even though it neither really exists in the phenomenon of knowing nor as a *cogitatio*. To explain the essence of knowledge, and to bring the essential connections that belong to it to self-givenness, is to inquire into both of these sides, to investigate this relation that belongs to the essence of knowledge. Here lie the riddles, the mysteries, the problems concerning the final sense of the objectivity of knowledge, including its validity or invalidity when it is a matter of judgment, its adequation when it is a matter of evidence, etc.

In any case, such research into essence is obviously research into universals. The singular phenomenon of knowledge, coming and going in the stream of consciousness, is not the object of phenomenological determination. Phenomenology is directed to the "sources of knowing," [56] to the general origins which can be seen, to absolutely given universals that provide the general criteria in terms of which the sense and also the correctness of all our highly intricate thought is to be ascertained, and by which all the riddles concerning its objectivity are to be solved.

But can *universality*, can general essences, and the general states of affairs that belong to them, actually achieve the same kind of self-givenness that a *cogitatio* does? *Does not the universal as such transcend knowledge?* Knowledge of universals, of course, is given as an absolute phenomenon; but we will search in vain for the universal that is supposed to be identical in the strongest sense across like immanent contents of innumerable possible acts of knowing.

Our answer is, of course, the answer we have already given: the universal has this form of transcendence. Each real [*reelle*] part of the phenomenon of knowing, of this phenomenological particularity, is itself a particularity. Thus the universal, which is not a particularity, cannot be really [*reell*] contained in the consciousness of universality. But one could take exception to *this* kind of transcendence only on the basis of a prejudice that stems from an inappropriate view of knowledge that is not drawn from the sources themselves. One must get especially clear on the fact that the absolute phenomenon, the reduced *cogitatio*, does not count as an absolute givenness because it is a particular, but rather because it displays itself in pure seeing after the phenomenological reduction as something that is *absolutely self-given*. But in pure seeing we can discover that universality is no less such an absolute givenness.

Is this actually so? Let us consider cases where the universal is given, that is, cases where a purely immanent consciousness of universality constitutes itself on the basis of a seen and self-given particularity. I have a particular intuition of red, or several particular intuitions of red; I attend to pure immanence alone; I perform the phenomenological reduction. I separate off anything that red might signify that might lead one to apperceive it as transcendent, as, say, the red of a piece of blotting paper [57] on my desk, and the like. And now I actualize in pure seeing the sense of the thought red, red *in specie*, the *identical universal* that is seen in this or that; now the particularity as such is no longer meant, but rather red in general. If we in fact do this in a pure act of seeing, would it still make sense to doubt what red in general is, what is meant by "red," what it is according to its essence? We see it – there it is; there is what we mean, this species red. Could a divine being, an infinite intellect, do anything more to grasp the essence of red than to see it as a universal?

And if two species of red are given to us, two nuances of red, can we not judge that they are similar to each other – not these particular, individual red phenomena, but rather the species, the nuances as such? Isn't the relation of similarity a universal that is absolutely given?

Thus this givenness is a purely immanent givenness, not immanent in the false sense, namely, existing in the sphere of individual consciousness. Here we are not speaking of the acts of abstraction that occur in the psychological subject, and the psychological conditions under which they are performed. Rather, we are speaking of the universal essence red, or the sense red, and its givenness in the act of seeing a universal.

Thus it is senseless to question and to doubt what the essence of red is, or what the sense of red is, provided that, while one is seeing red and grasping it in terms of its specific kind, one means by the word "red" exactly what is

grasped and seen. Likewise it makes no sense, with respect to the essence of knowledge and fundamental structure of knowledge, to doubt what its sense is while one has the relevant exemplary phenomena and the relevant species given right before one's eyes in a reflection that involves only acts of pure seeing and ideating within the sphere of the phenomenological reduction. Now of course knowledge is not as simple a matter as red. One must distinguish the manifold forms and kinds of knowledge. Moreover, one must investigate the ways in which these forms and kinds are related to each other. For to understand knowledge is to clarify generally the *teleological interconnections* of knowledge, [58] which amount to certain essential relations of various essential types of intellectual forms. And this would include the ultimate clarification of the principles, which, as the ideal conditions of the possibility of scientific objectivity, serve as norms governing all of the procedures of empirical science. The entire investigation carried out for the sake of clarifying these principles moves within the sphere of essence, which, in turn, constitutes itself on the underlying basis of singular phenomena within the phenomenological reduction.

At every step the analysis is an analysis of essence and an investigation of universal states of affairs that are constituted within immediate intuition. The entire investigation is thus an *a priori* investigation – but not, of course, in the sense of mathematical deduction. What distinguishes it from the "objectifying" *a priori* sciences is its method and its goal. *Phenomenology carries out its clarifications in acts of seeing, determining, and distinguishing sense.* It compares, it distinguishes, it connects, it places in relation, it divides into parts, it separates off moments. But it does all this in the act of pure seeing. It does not engage in theory or mathematical construction; that is, it offers no explanations in the sense of deductive theories. Because it seeks to clarify basic concepts and basic propositions, which, as principles, govern the possibility of the objectifying sciences – and also makes its own basic concepts and principles into objects of reflective clarification – it ends where objectifying science begins. Thus it is a science in an entirely different sense, with entirely different tasks to fulfill and entirely different methods. *The procedure of seeing and ideating within the strictest phenomenological reduction is its exclusive domain; it is the specifically philosophical method insofar as this method belongs essentially to the sense of the critique of knowledge and thus to any critique of reason in general* (thus to the critique of evaluative and practical reason as well). Whatever genuinely belongs to philosophy in addition to the critique of reason must be referenced to this critique. This would include the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of [59] the entire life of culture and history [*Geistesleben*], thus metaphysics in the widest sense.

In such cases of seeing, one speaks of evidence, and in fact those who are acquainted with the precise concept of evidence, and have a firm grip on its essence, have just these kinds of occurrences in mind. The fundamental point is that one does not overlook the fact that evidence is this consciousness, a seeing consciousness that directly and adequately apprehends itself, that evidence signifies nothing other than adequate self-givenness. Epistemologists of the empiricist persuasion, who speak so much of the value of investigating origins, and yet remain just as far removed from the true origins as the most extreme rationalist, would have us believe that the entire distinction between evident and non-evident judgments consists in a certain feeling by which the former make themselves known. But how can feeling contribute to the intelligibility of anything here? What can it accomplish? Is it, perchance, to call out to us: "Stop! Here is the truth!"? And why should we believe this feeling? Must this belief also be supplied with an index of feeling? And why does the judgment with the sense "2 times 2 is 5" never have this index of feeling, and why can't it have it? How does one actually come to this theory of feeling-indices? Well, one says to oneself: "Logically speaking, the same judgment, say the judgment "2 times 2 equals 4," can at one time be evident to me and at another not be evident to me, the same concept of 4 can at one time be given to me intuitively with evidence, and at another time be given by way of a mere symbolic representation. Thus in both cases it is the same phenomenon with respect to content, but in the one case a distinguishing feeling lends it a preferred value, a character of value." But do I in fact have in each case the same phenomenon, the one accompanied by a feeling, the other one not? If one attends to the phenomenon, one will immediately notice that the same phenomenon is not presented in both cases, but rather two essentially different phenomena that merely have something in common. If I see that 2 times 2 equals 4, and then say this in vague symbolic judgments, then I am referring to an equality. But to refer to an equality is not to have the phenomenon of equality. Thus in the two cases the content is different: in the one case I see, and in the act of seeing the state of affairs is itself given; but in the other case I have only the symbolic reference. In the one case I have intuition, in the other, an empty intention. [60]

Does the difference then consist in this, that in both cases there is a common feature, the same "sense," at one time with the index of feeling and the other time not? But one should look at the phenomenon itself, and not speak of it and construe it from on high. Let us take a simpler example: if I at one time have a vivid intuition of red, and at another time think of red in an empty symbolic intention, then is it the case that both times the same red-phenomenon is really [*reell*] present, the one time with feeling and the other time without feeling?

One need only consider the phenomena to realize that they are entirely different, united only by what can be identified in both cases, what we call the "sense." But if the difference exists in the phenomena themselves, do we still need something like a feeling to distinguish them? And does not the distinction consist in this, that in the one case the self-givenness of red lies before us, the self-givenness of numbers and numerical equality, or, subjectively expressed, that this matter itself is adequately grasped in an act of seeing, and in the other case the matter is merely referred to? For this reason we cannot accept the notion of evidence as feeling. It itself could only be justified if it were to prove itself in an act of pure seeing and if this act of pure seeing meant precisely what we expect of it – which contradicts the notion of evidence as feeling.

Applying the concept of evidence, we can also say: we have evidence of the being of the *cogitatio*, and because we have evidence, the *cogitatio* implies no riddle, and therefore implies no riddle of transcendence; it counts for us as something unquestionable, something we can make use of. To no lesser degree we have evidence of universals. *Universal objectivities* and *states of affairs* come to self-givenness for us, and they are in the same sense unquestionably given, in the strongest sense adequately self-given.

Accordingly, the phenomenological reduction does not signify the limitation of the investigation to the sphere of real [*reellen*] immanence, to the sphere of what is really [*reell*] contained in the absolute "this" of the cogitatio, and it does not at all signify the limitation to the sphere of the *cogitatio*, but rather the limitation to the sphere of *pure self-givenness*, to the sphere of what is not merely talked about and [61] referred to; but also not to the sphere of what is perceived, but rather to what is given in exactly the same sense in which it is meant – and self-given in the strictest sense – in such a way that nothing that is meant fails to be given. In a word, it is a limitation to the sphere of pure evidence, "evidence" here understood in a strict sense that excludes "mediate evidence" and, above all, evidence in the loose sense.

Absolute givenness is an ultimate. Of course, one can easily say and maintain that something is absolutely given when in truth it is not. Again, absolute givenness can be talked about in a vague way, or it can be given in absolute givenness. Just as I can see the phenomenon red and merely, without seeing it, talk about it, so I can talk about the seeing of the red and see the seeing of the red, and thus apprehend the seeing of the red itself in an act of seeing. On the other hand, to deny self-givenness in general is to deny every ultimate norm, every basic criterion that lends sense to knowledge. But then one would have to take everything as illusion, and, in an absurd way, also take illusion as such to be an illusion, and thus get involved in the absurdity of skepticism. But clearly only those who countenance grounds, who assign

some meaning to seeing and evidence, can argue in this way against the skeptic. The one who does not see, or does not want to see, the one who speaks and argues, but always remains in a position of accepting all contradictions and at the same time denying all contradictions – with such a person we cannot even get started. We cannot answer by saying, "obviously" it is so, because such a person would deny that anything can be "obvious"; it is as if a blind person would want to deny that there is such a thing as seeing – or better, as if a person who can see would want to deny that he himself sees and that there is anything like seeing. How could we convince such a person, under the assumption that he has no other mode of sense perception?

If we hold onto the self-givenness which, as we have already established, is not the self-givenness of real [*reeller*] particulars, say, the absolute particulars of the *cogitatio,* then the question arises as to how far this self-givenness extends and to what extent, or in what sense, it is bound to the sphere of the *cogitationes* [62] and the generalizing universals drawn from the sphere. If one has thrown off the first and immediate prejudice that sees the absolutely given only in the singular *cogitatio* and the sphere of real [*reellen*] immanence, then one must also do away with the additional and no less immediate prejudice, according to which new self-given objectivities grow *only* in the general intuitions derived from this sphere.

"*Cogitationes* are absolutely given to us in reflective perception in that we consciously experience them" – so one would like to begin; and then we could spy out the universals that are singled out within them and within their real [*reellen*] moments, apprehend the universals in intuitive abstraction, and constitute the essential connections that are based purely in these universals as self-given states of affairs in a thinking that sees and relates. And that would be all.

No tendency, however, is more dangerous to the intuitive knowledge of origins, of those things absolutely given, than to think too much, and to draw out of such thoughtful reflection things that are ostensibly obvious – things that for the most part are not explicitly formulated and for that reason not subject to any critique based on an act of seeing; things that rather remain unexpressed, determining and inappropriately limiting the direction of research. *Intuitive knowledge is that form of reason that sets itself the task of bringing the discursive understanding to reason.* The understanding must not be allowed to interrupt and smuggle its unredeemed banknotes among those that have already been cashed; yet its method of exchange and conversion, which is based upon mere treasury bonds, is not questioned here at all.

Hence: as little understanding as possible, as much pure intuition as possible (*intuitio sine comprehensione*). Indeed, we are here reminded of the speech of the mystics when they describe the intellectual act of seeing that

contains no discursive knowledge. The whole trick here is to let the seeing eye have its say and to exclude all transcendent reference that is interwoven with seeing, those things that are ostensibly given or thought along with what is seen, and, finally, those things that in subsequent reflection get imputed to what is given. The constant question is: is the intended object [63] also given in the genuine sense, seen and apprehended in the strictest sense, or does the intention go beyond it?

Supposing this to be the case, we soon realize that it would be a *fiction* to believe that intuitive research moves in the sphere of so-called *inner perception* and a purely immanent abstraction built upon it that ideates its phenomena and phenomenal moments. There are diverse modes of objectivity and, with them, diverse modes of so-called givenness, and perhaps the givenness of particular existing things in the sense of "inner perception" and the givenness of things in positive, objectifying science is only one kind of givenness, while the others, although characterized as presenting non-existent entities, are still types of givenness if only because they can be set over against the other sorts and distinguished from them with respect to their forms of evidence.

[67] If we have established the evidence of the *cogitatio*, and, in a further step, acknowledged the evident givenness of universals, then this step will immediately lead us to take additional steps.

By perceiving color and exercising the reduction upon this perception, I acquire the pure phenomenon of color. And if I then perform a pure abstraction, I acquire the essence of phenomenological color in general. But am I not also in full possession of this essence when I clearly imagine this color?

[*Memory*, however, is not a simple matter. From the very start it offers different forms of objectivity and givenness, all interwoven with each other. Thus one could refer to the so-called *primary memory*, to the *retention* that is necessarily bound up with every perception. The experience that we are now undergoing becomes objective for us in immediate reflection, and in this experience the same object continues to present itself: the same tone, which has just existed as an actual now, remains the same tone from that point on, only now moving back into the past and thus constituting the same objective point in time.] And if the tone does not cease but rather endures, and during its continuation presents itself as the same or as changing in content, can we not grasp this fact – the fact that it endures or changes – with evidence (within certain bounds)? And does not this mean, in turn, that seeing reaches beyond the pure now-point, that it is thus capable of intentionally holding on, in a new now, to what no longer exists now, and is therefore capable of becoming certain about a stretch of the past as a matter of evident givenness? Here again we must distinguish between, on the one hand, what is objective, what is and was, what endures and changes, and, on the other hand, the phenomenon of the present and the past, the phenomenon of duration and change, which is at times a now, and in whose profiles, which it contains, and in the constant [68] alteration it undergoes, brings temporal being to appearance, to presentation. The object is not a real [*reelles*] part of the phenomenon – in its temporality it has something that cannot be found in or resolved into the phenomenon even though it constitutes itself within the phenomenon. It presents itself in the phenomenon, and in the phenomenon it is given with evidence as "existing."

A further point can be made in connection with the givenness of essence: it does not constitute itself just on the basis of perception, and the retention woven within perception, in such a way that it, so to speak, plucks out a universal from the phenomenon itself; rather, it constitutes itself by *universalizing* the appearing object, positing a universal with regard to it: for instance, temporal content in general, duration in general, change in general. Further-

more, imagination and recollection can serve as its basis by providing possibilities that can be purely apprehended. In the same sense it can pick out universalities in these acts, universals that, for their part, are not really [*reell*] contained in these acts.

Obviously a completely evident apprehension does *refer back* to a singular intuition, on the basis of which it must constitute itself, but not necessarily to a *singular perception* that presents the exemplary particular as something really [*reell*] given in the present. The essence of the phenomenological tone quality, tone intensity, the tone of colors, brightness, and the like, is itself given even if the ideating abstraction occurs on the basis of a *perception* or on the basis of a *representation in imagination.* The actual *positing of existence*, or the modification of that positing, is in both cases *irrelevant*. The same holds for the apprehension of essence that relates to the species of mental data in the genuine sense, such as judgment, affirmation, denial, perception, inference, and the like. And, of course, it also holds for general states of affairs that belong to such universals. The insight that of two different tones, one is lower and the other is higher, and that this relation is not reversible, constitutes itself in an act of seeing. The instances must stand before our eyes, but not in the same way that states of affairs do in perception. In a consideration of essence, perception and imaginative representation are entirely equivalent – the same essence can been seen in both, [69] can be abstracted in both, the positing of existence in each case being irrelevant. That the perceived tone together with its intensity, its quality, etc., *exists* in a certain sense, while the tone in imagination, that is, the imagined tone, does *not exist*; that the one is really [*reell*] present with evidence, while the other is not; that, in the case of recollection, it is posited as having been rather than as existing now, and must now be re-presented – all this belongs to a different consideration. For the consideration of essence, such matters do not come up, unless it directs itself to precisely these distinctions, which also have their givenness that can be presented and about which general insights can be established.

It is, moreover, clear that even if the underlying instances are given in perceptions, it is precisely that which lends distinction to the givenness of perception – namely, existence – that has no bearing on the matter. Imagination, however, not only functions in the same way as perception in the consideration of essence, it also seems that *singular* things are *given* in it, even given with evidence.

Let us consider *mere imagination*, without the positing that belongs to memory.

An imagined color is not a givenness in the sense of color sensation. We now distinguish between the imagined color and an experience of imagining this color. The hovering of the color before me – to put it roughly – is a

"now," a presently existing *cogitatio*, but the color itself is not a presently existing color, it is not being sensed. On the other hand, it is in a certain way given: it stands before my gaze. Like the colors of sensation, it can also be reduced through the exclusion of all transcendent significance. Thus it signifies to me not the color of the paper, the color of the house, and the like. All empirical positings of existence can be suspended. Then I can take it just as I "see" it, as I "experience" it. Nevertheless, it is not a real [*reeller*] part of the experience of imagination. It is not a presented color, but a re-presented color. In both cases it stands, as it were, before the gaze, but not as a real [*reelle*] presence. Nevertheless, it is seen, and as seen it is in a certain sense given. Here I do not posit it as a physical or a mental *existence*; neither do I posit it in the sense of a genuine *cogitatio*; for a *cogitatio* is a real "now," a givenness, which is characterized with evidence as givenness in the "now." [70] That an imagined color is not given in one or another sense does not mean that it is given in no sense. It appears and appears itself; it presents itself; in an act of seeing it in its re-presentation I can make judgments about it and about the moments that constitute it and their interconnections. Of course these moments too are given in the same sense and not "actually" existing anywhere in the experience of imagination; they are not really [*reell*] present, only "represented." The pure judgment of imagination, that merely gives expression to the *content*, the singular essence of what appears, can assert: this is of this kind, contains these moments, changes thus and so, without in the least passing judgment on existence as actual being in actual time, on the actual being of the now, of the past, or of the future. Thus we could say that a judgment is made about the *individual essence*, but not existence. For precisely this reason, the general judgment pertaining to essence – which we usually designate simply as the judgment of essence – is independent of the distinction between perception and imagination. Perception posits *existence*; but it also has an *essence*, which, as a *content* posited as existing can be the same in re-presentation.

But the contrast between *existence* and *essence* means nothing other than that here two modes of being manifest themselves in two modes of givenness which have to be distinguished. In the mere imagining of a color, the existence that concerns the color as an actuality in time has no bearing on the matter; no judgments are made about it, and nothing of it is given in the *content* of the imagining. But the color appears, it stands there, it is a "this," it can become the subject of a judgment, even an evident judgment. Thus a mode of givenness manifests itself in the intuitions of imagination and such evident judgments as are grounded in them. But of course we are restricting ourselves to the sphere of singular individuals, so we can't get much underway with these kinds of judgments. Only when we construct general judgments of

essence do we attain the secure objectivity required by science. But nothing like that comes up here. So, we seem to have fallen into a pretty kettle of fish.

We began with the *evidence of the cogitatio*. At first it appeared as though we were on firm ground [71] – being, pure and simple. One had simply to grasp it and to see it. That one could make comparisons and distinctions with regard to such givenness, that one could bring out specific universalities and thus attain judgments of essence – all that one could easily admit. But, upon closer examination, it now turns out that the pure being of the *cogitatio* does not present itself as so simple a matter; it turns out that *diverse forms of objectivity* "constitute" themselves in the Cartesian sphere, and that "constitution" means that things given immanently are not, as it first appeared, in consciousness as things are in a box, but rather that they present themselves in something like "appearances," in appearances that are not themselves the objects, and do not really contain the objects, appearances that in a certain sense create objects for the ego in their changing and highly peculiar structure – "create" insofar as it is appearances of precisely such a sort and structure that belong to what we have been calling "givenness."

The *original object of time* constitutes itself in perception and the retention that belongs to it. Only in such a consciousness can time be given. Thus the universal constitutes itself in a *consciousness of universality* that is built upon perception or imagination, and in imagination as well as in perception it constitutes itself by disregarding the positing of the existence of the intuitive content in the sense of singular *essence*. Thus, to remind ourselves once again, we have the categorial acts, which are presupposed by evident assertions. The categorial forms that come to the fore here, that get expressed in such words as "is" and "is not," "the same" and "the other," "one" and "several," "and" and "or," in the form of predication and attribution, etc., indicate forms of thinking by means of which thought-forms that, if appropriately built up, come to consciousness on the basis of given objects synthetically connected in elementary acts so as to present states of affairs of this or that ontological form. It is also here that the "self-constitution" of specific objectivities takes place in acts of thought formed in certain ways. And consciousness, in which givenness and likewise the pure act of seeing things occur, is once again not something like a mere box in which [72] things given simply are; rather, *seeing consciousness* – apart from mere attentiveness – is *just acts of thought formed in certain ways*, and things, which are not acts of thought, are nonetheless constituted in them, come to givenness in them – and, as a matter of principle, show themselves to be what they are only when they are thus constituted.

But is this not a plain miracle? Where does this constituting of objectivity start, and where does it end? Are there any real limits to it? Doesn't a

givenness occur in every representation, in every judgment? Isn't every objectivity, insofar as it is seen, imagined, or thought in such and such a way, a givenness, even an evident givenness? In the perception of an external thing, say the house standing before us, it is precisely the thing that is perceived. This house is a transcendence, and forfeits its existence after the phenomenological reduction. What is then actually given is the appearing of the house, this *cogitatio*, emerging in the stream of consciousness and eventually flowing away. In this house-phenomenon we find a red-phenomenon, an extension-phenomenon, etc. And these are given with evidence. But is it not also evident that a house appears in the house-phenomenon, thus giving us a reason to call it a house-perception? Furthermore, is it not just a house in general, but this house, determined in such and such a way and appearing with just these determinations? Can I not with evidence make a judgment by saying: according to the appearance, or according to the sense of this perception, the house is so and so, a brick building, with a slate roof, etc.?

And when I call forth a fiction in my imagination, so that, say, before me St. George the knight is killing a dragon, is it not evident that the imagined phenomenon represents precisely St. George, even the one right before me; and that it represents this St. George as something transcendent? Can I not here make a judgment, not about the real [*reellen*] content of the appearance within imagination, but rather about the appearing object? To be sure, only a side of the object – and soon another side – falls within the framework of the actual re-presentation. But however that may be, it is still evident that this object – the knight St. George, etc. – lies within the sense of the appearance, and manifests itself within the appearances as a "givenness." [73]

And finally, let us consider so-called symbolic thinking. Without any intuition, I think "2 times 2 is 4." Can I doubt that I am thinking about this numerical proposition and that this thought does not concern, say, today's weather? Here too I have evidence, and therefore something like givenness. And if we are prepared to go this far, then nothing prevents us from also recognizing the fact that in a certain way what is completely absurd can also be "given." A round rectangle does not appear to me in the imagination, as the dragon killer did, nor does it appear in perception as an arbitrary external thing. But an intentional object is nevertheless obviously there. I can describe the phenomenon, "thinking of a round rectangle," in terms of its real contents, but the round rectangle is not in there. Yet it is evident that it is thought in this thinking and that roundness and rectangularity are attributed to it when it is thought in this way or that the object of this thought is round and rectangular at the same time.

Now we should not maintain that what we have cited in this last series of considerations is given in the genuine sense of actual givenness. Otherwise it

would turn out that anything perceived, imagined, pretended, or symbolically represented, every fiction and absurdity would be "given with evidence." We only want to point out the *great difficulties* that lie here. And yet, as a matter of principle, these difficulties cannot, prior to their clarification, prevent us from saying that *evidence and givenness are co-extensive.* The chief question will be, of course, exactly what is actually given and what is not given when evidence occurs in its pure state? What is produced within the phenomenon by inauthentic thinking and then imputed to it without any grounds in givenness?

Above all, answering this question is not a matter of establishing arbitrarily choosen appearances as given, but rather gaining insight into the essence of givenness and the self-constitution of the different modes of objectivity. Surely every thought-phenomenon has its objective reference, and such a phenomenon – and this is a primary insight into its essence – has its real [*reellen*] content, moments that make it up in a real [*reellen*] sense as a belief; and, on the other hand, it also has its intentional object, an object that it intends as constituted in a certain way according to its essential kind. [74]

If this situation is actually to be made evident, then this evidence itself must teach us all we need to know. In evidence, it must become clear what "intentional inexistence" really means and how it is related to the real [*reellen*] content of the thought-phenomenon itself. We must see in which connection it appears as actual and genuine evidence, and what is actually genuinely given in this connection. This will be a matter *of exhibiting the different modes of genuine givenness, and, in this regard, the constitution of the different modes of objectivity and their relation to each other:* the givenness of the *cogitatio*, the givenness of the *cogitatio re-lived in a fresh memory*, the givenness of the *unity of appearances* persisting in the phenomenal stream, the givenness of the *change* in such a unity, the givenness of the *thing* in "outer" perception, the givenness of the different forms of imagination and recollection, as well as the givenness of manifold *perceptions* and other kinds of *representations* that are synthetically unified in corresponding connections. And of course there is also *logical givenness*, the givenness of *universality*, of *predicates*, of *states of affairs*, etc., and the givenness of *absurdity*, *contradiction*, of a *non-existent object*, etc. In general, givenness – whether it manifests itself in connection with something merely represented or truly existing, real or ideal, possible or impossible – is a *givenness in the phenomenon of knowing*, in the phenomenon of thought in the widest sense of the word, and *in each case this initially miraculous correlation is to be investigated in terms of its essence.*

The essence of givenness can only be studied with regard to all its basic forms in knowing. For only in knowing is it given, is it to be seen with

evidence. This *evident act of seeing* is itself *knowing in the most precise sense*; and objectivity is not something that is in knowing like something is in a sack, as if knowing were a completely empty form – one and the same empty sack – into which one thing is put, [75] and then another. Rather, in givenness we see *that the object constitutes itself in knowing*, that one can distinguish as many basic forms of acts of knowing, groups, and interconnections of acts of knowing, as there are basic forms of objectivity. Moreover, the acts of knowing, more broadly apprehended as acts of thought in general, are not free-floating particularities, coming and going in the stream of consciousness. Rather, essentially related to each other, they display teleological *forms of interconnection* and corresponding connections of fulfillment, corroboration, confirmation, and their counterparts. And everything depends upon the interconnections that present intelligible unity. They themselves constitute objectivity; they connect in a logical way those acts of inauthentic givenness with acts of authentic givenness, acts of mere representation, or rather mere believing and acts of insight, and the manifolds of acts that are related to the same object, be they acts of intuitive or non-intuitive thinking.

And it is only in these connections that the objectivity of the objective sciences, and above all the objectivity of real spatial-temporal actuality, constitutes itself – not in one blow, but in a gradually ascending process.

All of this can be studied, and studied in the sphere of pure evidence, in order to clarify the great problems of the essence of knowledge and of the sense of the *correlation of knowledge and known objectivity*. The original problem was *the relation between subjective psychological experience and the reality in itself apprehended in this experience*, at first the real reality, and later the mathematical and other forms of ideal reality. But first we need that insight that the *radical problem* is rather the *relation between knowledge and object*, but in the *reduced* sense, according to which we are dealing not with human knowledge but rather with knowledge in general, without any relation to existential co-positings, be they of the empirical ego or of a real world. We need the insight that the truly significant [76] problem is the problem of the *ultimate sense-bestowal of knowledge*, and thus of objectivity in general, which is what it is only in its correlation to possible knowledge. Furthermore, we need the insight that this problem can be solved only in the sphere of pure evidence, in the sphere of givenness, which provides the ultimate norms because it is absolute; and that accordingly, we must investigate one by one all the basic forms of knowledge and all the basics forms of objectivity that come to givenness in it either fully or partially, in order to determine the sense of all those correlations that can be explicated.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM I

In knowledge, nature is given, but so is humanity in its associations and cultural works. All that is *known.* But to the knowledge of culture belongs valuing and willing as parts of the act that constitutes the sense of objectivity.

Knowledge refers to the object with a varying sense in varying experiences, in the varying affects and actions of the ego.

In addition to the formal *logical* doctrine of sense, and the doctrine of true propositions as valid senses, we have in the natural attitude still *other positive scientific investigations*: we distinguish basic species (regions) from objects and consider, for instance, for the region of mere physical nature in its essential generality, what belongs ineliminably to it and to every object of nature in itself and in its relation to nature. We develop an ontology of nature. There we explicate the sense – and that means the valid sense of a natural object as the object of the knowledge of nature, as an object meant in such knowledge: that without which a possible object of nature, that is, an object of possible external experience of nature, cannot be thought if it is to be capable of truly existing. Thus, we consider the *sense* of external experience [*Erfahrung*] (the object-meant), indeed the sense in its *truth,* its true or valid existence according to its essential constituents.

Likewise we consider the *true sense of an artwork in general* and the specific sense of a particular artwork. In the former case, we study the "essence" of a work of art in its pure generality; in the latter case, the actual content of the actually given artwork, what here comes to the same thing as the knowing of the determinant object (as truly existing, according to its true determinations), say a symphony of Beethoven's. Likewise we study generally the essence of the state in general, or empirically the essence of the German state in some epoch, according to its general features or in entirely individual determinations, thus this individual objective being "the German state." The parallel here is something like the determination of the natural features of the individual object Earth. Thus, in addition to empirical research, we have empirical laws and individuals, ontological research, research of truly valid senses not only in formal generality, but also in the particularity of material regions.

To be sure, pure research into essences is never, or only in exceptional cases, cultivated in complete purity. Nonetheless, some groups of scientific investigations point in this direction; yet they remain on a natural basis. To these belong psychological research, directed upon cognitive experiences and ego activities in general or in relation to the relevant object regions – upon the subjective manners in which such objects give themselves to us, in which the subject relates itself to them, how it comes to form such "representations" of them, which kinds of acts and experiences (e.g., evaluative and volitional) play a role in the formation of such representations.

Further: a particularly sensitive problem is that of the possibility of arriving at the being of the object itself, first just with respect to nature. It is there on its own, one says to oneself, whether we are there knowing it or not; it proceeds along its course by itself. We recognize other humans beings through expression in their bodiliness, thus on the basis of physical objects, just as we recognize, on the one hand, artworks and other cultural objects, and, on the other hand, social groups. It seems, at first, that if we were only in a position to understand the possibility of the knowledge of nature, we would also be in a position to understand the possibility of all other forms of knowledge by means of psychology. And psychology does not appear to offer any special problems, since the one who is knowing directly experiences his own mental life and that of others by way of analogy to it in "empathy." Let us limit ourselves, as it was done in epistemology until recently, to the theory of the knowledge of nature.

ADDENDUM II

An attempt at alteration and supplementation: assume that I would be just as I am, that I would have been just as I was, and that I would be in the future just as I will be; assume that in all this there is nothing lacking by way of my perceptions pertaining to the five senses or any other perceptions in general; nothing lacking by way of my apperceptive processes, none of my conceptual thoughts, none of my imaginations and thought experiences, or any of my experiences in general – assume all of them in their concrete fullness, in their determinate arrangements and connections; what would prevent there from being simply nothing at all in addition to them? Could not an all-powerful God or a deceitful spirit have so created my mind and supplied it with mental content that nothing exists of all the objectivities that are meant within it insofar as they are extra-mental? Perhaps things do exist outside of me, but not one of those that I take to be real. And perhaps there is nothing outside me at all.

But I do assume that there are actual things, things outside of me – but on what basis? On the basis of external perception? With one look I apprehend my thing-filled surroundings, right up to the most distant world of fixed stars. But perhaps that is all a dream, a deception of the senses. This and that visual content, this and that apperception, this and that judgment, that is the given, the only given in the genuine sense. Does perception carry with it some *evidence* for this achievement of transcendence? But a piece of evidence, what is this other than a certain mental characteristic? Perception plus the characteristic of evidence, that is the given, and why something should now correspond to this complex is an enigma. Perhaps I then say: we *infer* transcendence, through inferences we go beyond the immediate given, it is generally an achievement of inferences that what is not given is grounded in what is given. But even if we set aside the question of how such grounding can be achieved, we will respond: analytical inferences would be of no help, for the transcendent is not implied in the immanent. But synthetic inferences, how can they be anything other than inferences of experience? What is experienced provides experiential grounds, that is: rational grounds of probability for what is not experienced, but then only for what is experienceable. But transcendence is in principle not experienceable.

ADDENDUM III

Unclear is the *relation of knowledge to what is transcendent.* When would we get clarity and where would we get it? Now, if and where the essence of this relation would be given to us, so that we could *see* it, then we would understand the possibility of knowledge (for the relevant form of knowledge, where this insight was achieved). The requirement, of course, appears from the very outset to be *unfulfillable* for all transcendent knowledge, and thus transcendent knowledge appears to be *impossible.*

The *skeptic* says: knowledge is something other than the known object. Knowledge is given, but the known object is not given – especially and as a matter of principle in the sphere of those objects that are called transcendent. And yet knowledge is supposed to relate itself to the object and know it – how is that possible?

How an image corresponds to a thing – that we believe we understand. But that it is an image we would only know from cases given to us in which we have the thing just as we have the image so as to compare the one with the other.

But how can knowledge go beyond itself to reach the object and yet be sure of this relation with complete indubitability? How can we understand that knowledge, without losing its immanence, can not only be correct but can also demonstrate this correctness? This being the question, this possibility of demonstration presupposes that I can see that the knowledge of the relevant kind accomplishes what is here required. And only when that is the case can we understand the possibility of knowledge. But is transcendence an essential characteristic of certain objects of knowledge – how does it go here?

Thus the consideration presupposes precisely this: that transcendence is an essential characteristic of certain objects, and that known objects of that type can never be immanently given and can never exist immanently. The whole conception also presupposes that immanence itself is not in question. How immanence can be known is intelligible, how transcendence is known, unintelligible.

Natural thought in life and in science is untroubled by the difficulties concerning the possibility of knowledge, while *philosophical thought* is determined by the position taken with respect to the problems of the possibility of knowledge.

The perplexities in which the reflection on the possibility of a knowledge that makes contact with the things themselves becomes involved: how can knowledge be sure that it corresponds to things as they exist in themselves, that it "makes contact" with them? What do the things themselves care about our ways of thinking and the logical rules that govern them? They are laws of our thinking, psychological laws. – Biologism, psychological laws as laws of adaptation.

Absurdity: when one engages in natural reflection upon knowledge and subordinates it and its achievements to the natural system of thought found in the sciences, one at first gets involved in theories that, although initially attractive, invariably end up in contradiction or absurdity. – Tendency toward blatant skepticism.

Even an attempt like this at staking out a scientific position on such problems can be called epistemology. But inevitably there emerges here the idea of epistemology as a science that would solve the difficulties just mentioned as it provided us with a definitive, clear, and therefore internally consistent insight into the essence of knowledge and the possibility of achieving it. – A critique of knowledge in this sense is the condition of the possibility of a metaphysics.

The *method* of the critique of knowledge is the phenomenological method, phenomenology as the general doctrine of essence, within which the science of the essence of knowledge finds its place.

What sort of method is this? How can a science of knowledge establish itself if knowledge as such, its sense and its achievement, is put in question? What method can then lead us to the goal? [4]

A. The First Step in the Phenomenological Consideration

1. At the very outset one might wonder whether such a science is at all possible. If this science calls all knowledge into question, how can it then begin, since every piece of knowledge that might be chosen as a point of departure is thereby also called into question?

The difficulty here, however, is only apparent. For knowledge is not *denied*, nor is it regarded as doubtful in *every* sense, when it is "called into question." The question is directed to certain achievements that have been attributed to knowledge, but it remains an open question whether the difficulties pertain to all possible types of knowledge. At any rate, if epistemology is to address the possibility of knowledge, then it must possess forms of knowledge concerning the possibility of knowledge that are themselves indubitable, that count as knowledge in the strictest sense – where there is absolutely no doubt about their own possibility or the fact that they have made contact with their object. If we become unclear or uncertain as to how it is possible for knowledge to reach its object, and if we are then inclined to doubt whether such a thing is possible, then we must first consider indubitable cases of knowledge or possible knowledge – ones where knowledge actually reaches, or would reach, its object. At the outset we may not simply assume that some example of knowledge is indeed knowledge, otherwise we would have no possible or – what comes to the same thing – meaningful goal.

Here the *Cartesian meditation on doubt* provides us with a beginning: the being of the *cogitatio*, of experience as it occurs and is simply being reflected upon, cannot be doubted; the intuitive, direct apprehension and possession of the *cogitatio* is itself a knowing, the *cogitationes* are the first absolute items of givenness.

2. What follows quite naturally from this is the *first epistemological reflection*: what constitutes the unquestionability of these cases, and, in contrast to them, the questionability of other cases of alleged knowledge? Why is there in certain cases the tendency to skepticism and the skeptical question: how can contact with a being be made in knowledge?; and why, in the case of *cogitationes*, is this doubt and this difficulty absent? [5]

One answers – and this is the obvious answer – in terms of the conceptual pair or word pair *immanence* and *transcendence*. The intuitive knowledge of the *cogitatio* is immanent, the knowledge that belongs to the objective sciences – the natural and the human sciences, and, upon closer consideration, the mathematical sciences as well – is transcendent. With the objective sciences comes transcendence, which is always questionable. One can ask: how can knowledge reach out beyond itself, how can it make contact with a being that is not to be found within the confines of consciousness? With the intuitive knowledge of the *cogitatio*, this difficulty falls away.

3. At first one is inclined to interpret, as if it were entirely obvious, immanence as real [*reelle*] immanence, indeed, as real [*reale*] immanence in the psychological sense: the object of knowledge also exists in the experience of knowing, or in the consciousness of the ego, to which the experience belongs, as a real actuality. One takes it to be a simple matter of course that

the act of knowing finds and makes contact with its object in the same consciousness and in the same real [*realen*] now. The immanent is in me, the beginner will say at this point, and the transcendent is outside of me.

Upon closer examination, however, one can distinguish between *real [reelle] immanence* and *immanence in the sense of the self-givenness that constitutes itself in evidence.* What is really [*reell*] immanent counts as indubitable precisely because it presents nothing else, it refers to nothing "beyond" itself, because here what is meant is also adequately self-given, full and complete. At first any form of self-givenness other than the self-givenness of the really [*reell*] immanent is not yet in view.

4. So at first no distinction is made. The first step toward clarity is now this: the really [*reell*] immanent or, what means the same here, the adequately self-given is beyond question. I may make use of it. That which is transcendent (not really [*reell*] immanent) I may not use. For that reason I must perform the *phenomenological reduction*; I must *exclude all that is posited as transcendent.*

Why? If I am unclear about how knowledge can make contact with what is transcendent, not the self-given but rather what is referred to "beyond," [6] then surely no forms of transcendent knowledge or science will assist me in achieving clarity. What I want is *clarity*. I want to understand the *possibility* of this contact, that is, if we consider what we mean here: I want to bring within my purview the essence of the possibility of this contact, to bring it to givenness in an act of seeing. A "seeing" cannot be demonstrated. A blind person who would like to be able to see cannot acquire that ability through scientific demonstrations; physical and physiological theories of color yield no intuitive clarity about the sense of color comparable to the clarity possessed by those who can see. If the critique of knowledge is a science that seeks only to clarify all species and forms of knowledge – as this consideration shows without doubt – then *it can make no use of the positive sciences*. It cannot tie into the results of the positive sciences, nor their conclusions about what exists, for all of these remain in question for it. All of the sciences are for it only *science-phenomena.* Every tie to science of this sort signifies a mistaken μετάβασις. This comes about only through a mistaken, but entirely natural, *shifting of the problem:* between the explanation [*Erklärung*] of knowledge as a natural fact as offered by the natural science of psychology, and the clarification [*Aufklärung*] of knowledge in terms of the essential possibilities of its achievement. Thus, if this shifting is to be avoided, and we are to remain focused upon the sense of the question concerning this possibility, the *phenomenological reduction* is required.

This means: everything transcendent (everything not given immanently to me) is to be assigned the index of zero, that is, its existence, its validity is not

to be assumed as such, except as at most the *phenomenon of validity*. I may have recourse to the sciences only as phenomena, and therefore not as systems of valid truths, or as premises, or even as hypotheses that I could use as points of departure – for instance, the whole of psychology or the whole of the natural sciences. For the proper *sense of the principle* lies in the constant requirement of sticking with the things that are put in question *here* by the critique of knowledge and not to confuse the problems brought up *here* with entirely different problems. The clarification of the possibilities of knowledge does not follow the ways of objective science. [7] To bring knowledge to evident self-givenness, and to try to see therein the essence of its achievement, is not a matter of deducing, inducing, calculating, and the like; and it is not a matter of deriving in a reasoned way new things from things already given, or from things that count as already given.

B. The Second Step in the Phenomenological Consideration

At this point we need a *new level of consideration* in order to achieve a higher degree of clarity regarding the essence of phenomenological research and its problems.

1. First the Cartesian *cogitatio* itself requires the phenomenological reduction. The psychological phenomenon in psychological apperception and objectification is not really an absolute givenness, rather, only the *pure phenomenon*, the reduced phenomenon. The experiencing ego, the object, the human being in world-time, the thing among things, etc., are not absolute givennesses, and therefore experience as this human being's experience is not an absolute givenness either. *We abandon once and for all the basis of psychology – even descriptive psychology.* Thus the question that initially drove us is also *reduced*: not how can I, this person, in my experiences, make contact with a being in itself, something that exists out there, outside of me; in place of this question, which was ambiguous and, because of its transcendent freight, unstable and complex, we have now a *pure basic question*: how can the pure phenomenon of knowledge make contact with something that is not immanent to it, how can the absolute self-givenness of knowledge make contact with something that is not self-given, and how is this contact to be understood?

At the same time the concept of *real [reellen] immanence* is reduced. It no longer signifies *real [reale]* immanence, immanence in the consciousness of a person and in a real [*realen*] mental phenomenon.

2. It would seem that once we have the "seen" phenomena, we also have a phenomenology, a science of these phenomena.

But as soon as we begin there, we notice certain limitations. [8] The field of absolute phenomena – taken in their particularity – does not appear to be sufficient to satisfy our intentions. What will these particular "seeings" do for us, even if they bring the *cogitationes* to self-givenness with complete certainty? At first it would appear entirely obvious that one can perform logical operations on the basis of these "seeings," that one can compare, distinguish, subsume under concepts, predicate. But later it will turn out, as we shall see, that new objectivities stand behind these operations. If we simply accept what seems obvious here, and consider it no further, then we will not see how generally valid claims are to be made, claims of the sort we need.

But there is something that appears to help us along: *ideating abstraction.* It yields for us generalities, species, and essences that admit of insight – and thus it appears that the magic word has been spoken: we seek intuitive clarity about the essence of knowledge; knowledge belongs to the sphere *cogitationes*; so we must simply raise, in an act of seeing, the general objectivities of this sphere to consciousness of generalities, and a doctrine of the essence of knowledge becomes possible.

We take this step following Descartes's observation concerning *clear and distinct perception.* The "existence" of the *cogitatio* is guaranteed by its *absolute self-givenness*, by its givenness in *pure evidence.* It follows that wherever we have pure evidence, the pure and direct seeing and grasping of an objectivity itself, we have the same rights, the same certainties.

This step provides us with a new objectivity that counts as absolute givenness, the *objectivity of essences*; and just as the logical acts that find expression in statements based upon what is seen remain at the beginning unnoticed, so it is at the same time with the field of *statements regarding essences* with respect to general states of affairs given in pure seeing, at first undifferentiated from particular cases of general givenness.

3. Do we now have everything, do we have a fully delineated phenomenology and a clear self-understanding that puts us in possession of all that we need for a critique of knowledge? [9] And do we have clarity about the problems that are to be solved?

No, the step that we took leads us further. To begin with, it makes clear to us that *real [reelle] immanence* (and, respectively, transcendence) is only a special case of the *broader concept of immanence as such.* It is now no longer obvious and unquestioned that *what is absolutely given* and *what is really [reell] immanent* are one and the same thing; for the general is absolutely given and yet not really [*reell*] immanent. The *knowledge* of generalities is itself something singular; it is at any given time a moment in the stream of consciousness. The *general* itself, which is given in evidence within the

stream of consciousness, is, on the other hand, not something singular, but rather something general, and thus, in the real [*reellen*] sense, transcendent.

As a result, the concept of the *phenomenological reduction* acquires a more precise and deeper determination, and a clearer sense: it is not the exclusion of the really [*reell*] transcendent (say, in the psychological-empirical sense), rather it is the exclusion of the transcendent as such, as an existence to be assumed, that is, everything that is not absolute givenness in the genuine sense – the absolute givenness of pure seeing. But of course everything else we said remains the same: validities, actualities, etc., that have been scientifically induced or deduced, or derived from hypotheses, facts, or axioms, remain excluded and are permitted only as "phenomena"; and, of course, the same holds for all recourse to any "knowing" ["*Wissen*," "*Erkenntnis*"]: research must restrict itself to *pure seeing* – but not, therefore to the really [*reell*] immanent. For it is research in the sphere of pure evidence, and, moreover, it is research into essences. We also said that its field is *the a priori within absolute self-givenness.*

Thus the field is now characterized. It is a field of absolute knowledge, where the matters of the ego, the world, God, mathematical manifolds, and any scientific objectivities whatever, remain undecided; a knowledge that is therefore not dependent on these things, which have their own validity, whether one is skeptical with respect to them or not. All that remains the same. What is fundamental is to *apprehend the sense of absolute givenness, the absolute clarity of being given,* [10] which excludes every meaningful doubt, in a word, *evidence that is absolute seeing and apprehends itself as such.* In a certain sense, the historical significance of the Cartesian meditation no doubt lies in the discovery of this kind of evidence. But for Descartes, to discover and to abandon were the same. We do no more than grasp purely and formulate consistently what is already contained within this age-old intention. In this connection we have set ourselves against the psychologistic interpretation of evidence as a feeling.

C. The Third Step in the Phenomenological Consideration

Once again we need a new level of consideration in order to achieve a higher degree of clarity about the sense of phenomenology and the phenomenological problematic.

How far does self-givenness extend? Is it confined to the givenness of the *cogitatio* and the ideations that grasp it in its generality? As far as self-givenness extends, so far extends our phenomenological sphere, the sphere of absolute clarity, of immanence in the genuine sense.

We are now led somewhat further into the depths, and in the depths lie obscurities, and in the obscurities lie the problems.

At first everything seemed quite straightforward, scarcely requiring hard work on our part. One might cast aside the prejudice of immanence as real [*reeller*] immanence, as if it all came down to that, yet, at least in a certain sense, one remains attached to real [*reellen*] immanence. Initially it appears that the examination of essence only has to grasp what is really [*reell*] immanent in the *cogitationes* in their generality and to establish the relations that are grounded in essences – an apparently easy matter. One reflects, looks back upon one's own acts, accepts their real [*reellen*] contents, just as they are, only under the phenomenological reduction. This appears to be the only difficulty. And now there remains nothing else to do but to lift what is seen into the consciousness of generality.

Things are a bit less accommodating, however, once we consider what is given more closely. First: the *cogitationes,* which [11] we take to be simply given and therefore entirely unmysterious, conceal all sorts of transcendencies. If we look closer and now notice how, in the experience of a tone, for instance, even after the phenomenological reduction the *appearance and that which appears stand over against each other*, and do so *in the midst of pure givenness*, that is, within genuine immanence, then we begin to wonder. The tone lasts for a while; then we have the unity of the tone and its temporal span with its temporal phases – the now-phase and the past phases – in evident givenness; on the other hand, when we reflect, the phenomenon of the tone duration, which is itself a temporal phenomenon, has its own now-phase and phases of "having been." And in any now-phase of the phenomenon we might pick out, what we have before us as an object is not just the now of the tone itself, for the now of a tone is only a point in the duration of a tone.

Detailed analyses belong to the special tasks we will take up in the near future, but the above indication already suffices to make us aware of something new: the phenomenon of tone perception, even the evident and reduced phenomenon, requires a distinction within immanence between the *appearance* and *that which appears.* Thus we have two forms of absolute givenness, the givenness of the appearing and the givenness of the object – and the object within this immanence is not immanent[1] in the real [*reellen*] sense; it is not a part of the appearance, for the past phases of the tone duration are still objective, and yet they are not really [*reell*] contained in the now-point of the appearance. Thus what we found in the case of the consciousness of generality – that it is a consciousness that constitutes a self-givenness which is not really [*reellen*] contained in it and is not to be found as a *cogitatio* – we also find in the phenomenon of perception.

[1] In the manuscript "transcendent."

At the lowest level of consideration, at the naïve stage, it first appears as if evidence is just plain seeing, a featureless mental look, always one and the same, bearing no distinctions within itself: seeing sees just things, [12] things are simply there, and in truly evident seeing they are there in consciousness and seeing simply sees them there. Or to use an image with a different sense: evidence is a direct grasping, or taking, or pointing to something that simply is and is there. All distinctions lie in the things, which are for themselves and have their distinctions by themselves.

Note how different the seeing of things proves to be upon closer analysis. Even if one still places under title of "attentiveness" an indescribable and undifferentiated seeing, it still turns out that it makes no sense at all to speak of things as if they were simply there and need only to be seen. For this "simply being there" is a matter of certain experiences of a specific and changing structure, such as perception, imagination, memory, predication, etc.; and things are in them not as they might be in a case or container, rather, things *constitute themselves* in these experiences even though they are not to be found in them in the real [*reellen*] sense. For "things to be given" is for them to *present* themselves (to be represented) as such in these phenomena. And this does not mean that the things are once again there for themselves and then "send their representatives into consciousness." Such a thing cannot happen for us within the sphere of the phenomenological reduction. Rather, things exist, and exist in appearance, and are themselves given by virtue of appearance; to be sure, taken individually, they exist, or hold, independently of appearance – insofar as nothing depends on this particular appearance (on this consciousness of givenness) – but essentially, according to their essence, they cannot be separated from appearance.

Thus this wonderful correlation between the *phenomenon of knowledge* and the *object of knowledge* reveals itself everywhere. And now we note that the task of phenomenology, or rather the field of its tasks and research, is not such a trivial thing, as if one would just have to look, just have to open one's eyes. Even in the first and simplest cases, in the lowest forms of knowledge, pure analysis and examination of essence is confronted by the greatest of difficulties. It is easy to speak of the correlation in general terms, but very hard to get clear on the way in which an object of knowledge constitutes itself in knowledge. [13] The task is this: to track down, within the framework of pure evidence or self-givenness, *all correlations and forms of givenness*, and to elucidate them through analysis. And of course not only particular acts will come under consideration here, but their complexities, their connections by way of agreement and disagreement, and the teleologies which emerge from such connections. These connections are not conglomerations, but rather unities that are characteristically bound up, congruent as it were, unities of

knowledge, which, as unified, also have their unified objective correlates. Thus they belong to *acts of knowledge*, their types are types of knowledge, and the forms that inhabit them are forms of thought and forms of intuition (not to be understood here in the Kantian sense).

At this point it is a matter of tracing, step by step, the forms of givenness [*Gegebenheiten*] in all their modifications – the authentic and inauthentic; the simple and the synthetic; those constituted in one blow, so to speak, and those that, according to their essence, can only be built up gradually; those that are absolutely valid, and those that, in the process of cognition, only approach givenness and full validity in an infinite progression.

In this way we finally arrive at an understanding of how the transcendent real object can be encountered within the act of knowing (i.e., how nature can be known), first as an object merely intended [*gemeint*], and how the sense of this intending [*Meinung*] is gradually filled out in the continuously developing context of knowledge (insofar as this context possesses the forms appropriate to the constitution of an object of experience). We then understand how the object of experience constitutes itself in a continuum, and how the manner of this constitution is prescribed to it, in that its essence requires just such a gradated constitution.

Along this way lie the methodological forms that are determinative of all the sciences and constitutive of all that is given within the sciences, thus the elucidation of the theory of science, and hence implicitly the elucidation of all the sciences: but, of course, only implicitly, since the critique of knowledge will become capable of being a critique of the particular sciences, and thus capable of evaluating them metaphysically, only when this enormous work of elucidation is accomplished. [14]

These then are the problems of givenness, the problems of the *constitution of objectivities of every kind within knowledge*. The phenomenology of knowledge is a science of the phenomenon of knowledge in a twofold sense: of [acts of] knowledge as appearances, presentations, acts of consciousness in which these or those objectivities are presented, become objects of consciousness, either passively or actively; and, on the other hand, of the objectivities themselves as objects that present themselves in just such ways. The meaning of the word "phenomenon" is twofold because of the essential correlation between *appearing* and *that which appears*. "φαινόμενον" proper means "that which appears," and yet it is predominantly used for the appearing itself, the subjective phenomenon (if one is allowed to use this misleading expression in a rough psychological sense).

In reflection the *cogitatio*, the appearing itself, becomes an object, and this encourages the development of the equivocation. Finally, it need not be emphasized again that when we speak of inquiry into the objects of knowledge

and the modes of knowledge, we always mean inquiry into essences that, within the sphere of absolute givenness, exhibit in their generality the definitive sense, the possibility, and the essence of the objectivity of knowledge and of the knowledge of objectivity.

Of course the *general phenomenology of reason* has to solve the parallel problems of the correlation of evaluation and value, etc. If one uses the word "phenomenology" so broadly as to include the analysis of all self-givenness, then even apparently unconnected data would come together: analysis of sensuous forms of givenness according to their various species, and the like – the common element here is the method of the analysis of essences within the sphere of immediate evidence.

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