


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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New Ways of Ontology

New Ways of Ontology

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New Ways of Ontology

The End of the Old Ontology

TODAY more than ever before the serious-minded are convinced that philosophy has practical tasks. The life of both the individual and the community is not molded by their mere needs and fortunes but also at all times by the strength of dominant ideas. Ideas are spiritual powers. They belong to the realm of thought. But thought has its own discipline and its own critique—philosophy. Therefore philosophy is called upon to include within its scope the pressing problems of the contemporary world and to co-operate in the work that needs to be done.

Many who feel this make it a condition of their occupation with philosophical matters that they be led on as straight a way as possible to the solution of pressing problems of their own present situation; and if, instead of the straight way, manifold detours become necessary, they turn aside disillusioned, believing that philosophy is nothing more than an ivory-tower game of thought. The impatience of the desire for knowledge does not permit them to achieve that engrossment in the problems which is the beginning of insight. They want to start with the end. Thus with the very first step they unwittingly divorce themselves from philosophy.

It has always been the strength of the German mind that it knew how to master its impatience. By not shying away from the long and arduous approach, even when demands were pressing and the tasks urgent, it found the way of meditation. So it was with Cusanus, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. So, in all probability, it is basically still today, although we have behind us times of deviation from this line which brought with them all the dangers of shallowness and one-sidedness. Just when the task is most urgent, genuine philosophy must return to its foundations. There is no other way of conquering a new wealth of thought for a new world situation.

Philosophy cannot enter upon practical tasks without knowledge of being as such. For the tasks themselves grow out of a total datum of existing realities, and these must be understood and penetrated to the root before man can venture to shape them according to his goals. So all technical science builds upon the exact knowledge of the laws of nature, medicine upon biological laws, and politics upon historical knowledge. In philosophy it is no different, even though its object is a universal one embracing both the whole man and the world in which he lives. Therefore, it is less immediately evident at which level of being its basic concepts must be found, and philosophers, time and again, come to think they can go their way without an ontological foundation.

Actually, no philosophy can stand without a fundamental view of being. This holds true regardless of standpoint, tendency, or the general picture of the world which it adopts. The reason why not every philosophy begins with a discussion of being lies in the ease with which in this field ideas are accepted and laid down undiscussed. They are not even noticed, nor does one suspect to what degree they are decisive for all that follows. Even the natural world view, which regards all things as substantial bearers of changing qualities

and relations, involves an ontological prejudgment. To a much higher degree, however, this applies to philosophical interpretations of the world, determined as they are by a specific point of view.

Among historically recorded systems of philosophy there is none for which the domain of the problems of being, taken in strict universality, is not essential. The more profound among them have at all times raised the question of being, each of them seeking to answer it in accordance with its particular outlook. According to whether this question is either posed and discussed or ignored, doctrinal systems can be classified as founded or unfounded ones, regardless of their respective points of view or doctrinal tendencies. The more significant accomplishments of all periods, recognizable even to a superficial glance because of their far-reaching effect, are without exception "founded" systems.

In no way does this mean that founded systems are ontologically constructed systems or even realist ones. The great theoretical structures of German idealism illustrate this truth in the most characteristic fashion. When Fichte, in his early *Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre*, derives the being of things from creative activities of the Ego, he furnishes an answer to the question as to what the being of things is. His is a basic ontological thesis, and, as such, it is a foundation for all that follows, even down to the truly burning questions with which his *Wissenschaftslehre* is concerned—questions about man, will, and freedom.

The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for Schelling and Hegel in all phases of their philosophies, no matter whether the ultimate foundation of being be sought in a subconscious intelligence, in the fusion of subject and object, or in Absolute Reason. In fact, the same holds true for Kant and even Berkeley. Fundamentally though the immaterialism of the latter

may differ from transcendental idealism, the thesis "*esse est percipi*" is still as much an ontological proposition as Kant's finely balanced assertion that things in space and time are only phenomena.

By their fundamental theses the idealist systems are no less ontologically constructed than the realist ones. The distinctive mark of the former, as contrasted with the latter, is that their concept of being is a derived one. And therewith they find themselves irreconcilably opposed to the tradition of the Old Ontology. This opposition is a conscious one, deliberately chosen on epistemological and ethical grounds. Further, it is an opposition which, in view of the indifference of the later idealists of the nineteenth century toward fundamental questions, led to the dissolution of the old ontology.

This dissolution marks a decisive step in the history of philosophical theories. Indeed, the dissolution did not first begin with idealism. The way was prepared for it by the typically modern trend toward an epistemological-critical foundation of philosophy, and by the end of the seventeenth century it reached its first high point in Leibniz's philosophy. This philosophy is still, in its own way, the creation of a thoroughly ontological type of thought. Yet in the main Leibniz has already left the tracks of the old ontology.

The question then arises as to what the old ontology actually was. We mean by it that theory of being which was dominant from Aristotle down to the expiration of Scholasticism. Although it produced a multitude of divergent varieties of thought and finally ran out in an incurable division of tendencies, it was uniform in its fundamentals, and to the thinkers of the modern age, who from several sides drew up a concentrated attack upon it, it presented a unified hostile camp.

The old theory of being is based upon the thesis that the universal, crystallized in the *essentia* as substantial form and

comprehensible as concept, is the determining and formative core of things. Besides the world of things, in which man, too, is encased, there is a world of essences which, timeless and immaterial, forms a kingdom of perfection and higher being. The extreme representatives of this doctrine even assigned true reality to the universal essences alone, thereby disparaging the world of time and things. Their successors in the nineteenth century, considering universals only under the form of concepts, called this trend "conceptual realism." The expression is misleading, because it was the point of that theory that universals were not just concepts. Instead, one may well speak of a "realism of universals."

Scholastic ontology, far from being limited to this extreme view, showed the theory of universals in richly varying gradations. It was not necessary to attribute to essences a being "prior to things" or "above" them. They could be conceived also in the Aristotelian manner as substantial forms subsisting "in the things." Thus the difficulties of a duplication of the world were avoided without a surrender of the fundamental conception. Of course, medieval philosophers could not entirely rest content with this, because a speculative, theological interest prompted them to conceive universals as entities pre-existing in the *intellectus divinus*.

Apart from this, the gist of this ontology does not lie in the gradations of the fundamental thesis. Nor does it lie in the speculative-metaphysical tendencies combining with it but solely in the basic view of the nature of the universal itself—in the conviction that the universal is the moving and teleologically determining principle of things. Here an age-old motif of mythical thinking enters: the teleological interpretation of temporal occurrence in analogy to human action. Aristotle gave this idea a philosophical form, linking it closely to a theory of *eidos* patterned chiefly on organic nature. Ac-

according to this view, essence is a substantial form, and, as the end of an evolutionary process, it determines the growth of the organism. This scheme of interpretation was transferred from the organism to the whole world, and, in analogy to the organic, all processes of inorganic nature were considered teleological.

This scheme had the advantage of solving the riddle of the structure of the world in an amazingly simple manner. If only the observer succeeds in grasping the substantial form of a thing, he holds at once the key to all the changes which it suffers. The substantial form, however, is comprehensible by means of the concept, and the methodological tool for this comprehension is the definition. Definition again is a matter of the intellect whose whole business consists in gathering the essential elements of the form from the final stages of the natural processes of growth and in then putting these elements together in an orderly fashion.

This procedure, surely, must not be conceived in the manner of a crude empiricism. The most general traits of essence, that is, those that are shared by many kinds of *essentia*, cannot simply be gleaned from a survey of things. Here the Aristotelian epistemology did not offer the right lever, and soon Scholasticism espoused the Platonic idea of intuition (*intuitio, visio*). Philosophers became more and more used to subordinating the intellect to a superior faculty of insight to which they ascribed a direct contact with the highest ontologically determining formal elements.

Herewith the old ontology took on a deductive character. Once human reason feels itself to be in possession of the highest universals it is readily concluded that reason can actually "derive" from these universals all that which it does not know how to extract from experience. In this manner, there arose that neglect of empirical knowledge and that luxuriant growth

of a metaphysics deducing its conclusions from pure concepts which was first challenged by the later nominalism and finally defeated by the beginnings of modern natural science.

It goes without saying that in as summary a discussion as the present one we cannot do justice to medieval metaphysics. But here our concern is not with medieval metaphysics but with contemporary issues. For these, it is imperative that we achieve a clear view of certain fundamental traits of the ontological views which were at the basis of that metaphysics. We must learn from the mistakes of these old ontological views, so that any and every attempt at a new ontology may dissociate itself unambiguously and consciously from all such errors.

The critical epistemology of the modern age from Descartes down to Kant did not succeed in completely replacing the old ontology with a new doctrine of equal value. But it had so thoroughly destroyed its presuppositions that a metaphysics erected on the old basis was no longer possible. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which the work of thorough housecleaning reached its end, marks a historical boundary beyond which ontological thinking all but vanishes. This is noteworthy, because the Kantian critique was actually not leveled against the foundations of the old ontology but rather against the speculative-rational metaphysics which had been built upon it.

In Kant it is above all the deductive mode of procedure which is done away with. Deductions can be made only from a priori certain principles, and apriorism is here subjected to a searching critique. The a priori is limited to two forms of intuition and a few categories. And even these are considered valid only for phenomena and not for things as they are in themselves. Thus substantial forms are excluded as a matter of course, and along with them the doctrine of *essentia* is obliterated. More important still is the fact that the *Critique of Judgment* attacks teleology even on its very home ground,

that of organic nature, depriving it of all constitutive significance.

The latter point is perhaps the most important of all. At any rate, it hits the weakest side of the old ontology drifting in the wake of Aristotle. But surely it is the point least understood and valued by Kant's contemporaries and followers. The philosophies of nature of both Schelling and Hegel ignored the critique of teleological judgment and carried on once more in conformity with the Scholastic example. The Kantian critique had been a transcendental one, that is, an epistemological critique of the presuppositions of the theory of organic nature. Rationalist idealism, however, believed itself to be in possession of unassailable universal certainties on the strength of which the enigmatic purposive equipment of living beings—and actually of all nature from the bottom up—is supposed to become amenable to teleological interpretation.

The Categories of Being

A SURVEY of this state of affairs at once clearly shows that the New Ontology can in no way consist of another resuscitation of the old one. Not only has the teleological scheme of interpretation proved untenable despite all efforts at renewal. It has become necessary, moreover, to exclude every sort of thesis which might serve as a disguise for an outdated metaphysics. That is not quite as easy as it might seem at first glance. The traditional grooves still determine modern thinking, and usually the investigator does not realize to what extent they lead him on. So in the recent past the doctrine of *essentia* experienced a rebirth in phenomenology—seemingly without any metaphysical aspiration but, in truth, not without the reappearance of very old and often conquered difficulties and not without a temptation to equally old and often censured mistakes.

It will not do to approach the new doctrine of being as an “ontology of essences.” In fact we must dissociate ourselves from this doctrine of essences, not only because with it substantial forms again loom up, but also because such a doctrine invariably involves the hypostatizing of universals. This in turn breeds a tendency to transmogrify the universal consid-

ered simply in its own right into something all-important and fundamental. And behind this tendency there always lurks, consciously or unconsciously, the postulate of deductivity: "Derivation" is possible only from universal statements, and these, therefore, appear to be an expression of the very principles of being.

Behind all this there hides more than one mistake. Although it is very true that all principles are universal, it does not follow that all universals are principles. There is also a very peripheral universal—for instance in the recurrent external characteristics revealed by widely scattered particulars—and it is precisely this universal which first offers itself to experience. But any attempt to classify things or animate beings according to such universals would furnish a classificatory order, but one which would completely miss the ontic condition of things. General traits of external appearance, arbitrarily gathered, do not indicate where the principles of being lie. For that we need other criteria. One of the weaknesses of the old ontology consisted in its failure to provide these criteria.

To this is added a second weakness. Even though it is unassailably true that only from universal statements may something be derived (deduced), yet it does not follow that universal statements from which something is derived express something "ontically" universal. But if they do not, they are untrue statements—in Kantian language, synthetic judgments a priori without "objective validity." Of course, deductions can be logically drawn from such statements just as well as from true ones. But the conclusions will be just as little true as the premises. No philosophical aspiration, however moderate its claims, is thereby served.

Evidently it is this very mistake that the central argument of the *Critique of Pure Reason* combats. It does so by counter-arguing all such deductivity—one might say, the ontological de-

duction—with a “transcendental deduction” that concerns itself with the objective validity of those a priori principles by virtue of which synthetic judgments are a priori true. It is well known how much store Kant set by this deduction. But considering that it rests completely on categories tied up with experience (for this deduction confined the objective validity of the categories to “possible experience”), it is readily realized that it precludes *a limine* a purely a priori knowledge of the essence of things. This achievement of the *Critique* is at first a negative one. But its results are thoroughly affirmative and, as such, are of the greatest importance.

All ontology has to do with fundamental assertions about being as such. Assertions of this sort are precisely what we call categories of being. Like the Kantian categories—which, as far as content is concerned, are also precisely this: fundamental assertions about being—they have the character of universal constitutive principles comprising all more specialized ontological assertions. Hence, the new ontology might be expected to provide a transcendental deduction also of these ontological assertions. Otherwise, it is argued, it could not guarantee their objective validity. That, however, would mean that this ontology in its turn was in need of an epistemological foundation which would have to provide the justification of a priori principles of an even wider scope.

Thereby a way for ontology is traced, and this way once more follows the scheme of the old deductivity. But it is here that the roads of the old and the new ontology part. Just as in regard to the problem of being it is today no longer a question of substantial forms and of the teleological determination of actual processes by these forms, so also the problem at issue is no longer that of a *post factum* justification of a priori principles. The categories with which the new ontology deals are won neither by a definition of the universal nor through

derivation from a formal table of judgments. They are rather gleaned step by step from an observation of existing realities. And since, of course, this method of their discovery does not allow for an absolute criterion of truth, here no more than in any other field of knowledge, it must be added that the procedure of finding and rechecking is a laborious and cumbersome one. Under the limited conditions of human research it requires manifold detours, demands constant corrections, and, like all genuine scholarly work, never comes to an end.

Here one may truly and literally speak of new ways of ontology. The basic thesis can possibly be formulated like this: The categories of being are not a priori principles. Only such things as insights, cognitions, and judgments can be a priori. In fact the whole contrast between a priori and a posteriori is only an epistemological one. But ontology is not concerned with knowledge, much less with mere judgments, but with the object of knowledge in so far as this object is at the same time "transobjective," that is, independent of whether or to what extent being is actually transformed into an object of knowledge. The principles of the object in its very being are in no way *eo ipso* also cognitive principles. In some fields they can be quite heterogeneous, as the manifold admixtures of the unknowable in nearly all basic problems of philosophy amply prove. From this alone it follows that the principles of being cannot be a priori principles of our intellect, that they, as a matter of fact, are just as indifferent to the dividing line between the knowable and the unknowable as the being whose principles they are.

At this point it is incumbent upon us radically to unlearn the old and start to learn the new, not only if our approach be from the old ontology, but also if it be from the standpoint of transcendental epistemology. Of course, as far as their content goes, ontological categories can occasionally coincide with

cognitive categories; and within certain limits this must be the case wherever an objectively valid knowledge of objects takes place a priori. But it must not be supposed that this occurs everywhere and without limits. The apriorism in our knowledge is subject to a very fundamental limitation, because our categories of understanding coincide at best only in part with the principles of being. This coincidence reaches farthest where it is a question of insights that are practically relevant and indispensable to the business of life—in other words, in that field of objects to which our understanding is best suited. And correspondingly, it fails most signally where we are confronted with broad theoretical questions concerning our total world picture and its philosophical interpretation. For it is manifest that with our rational principles we can grasp a priori only that aspect of the real world which in itself is framed in accordance with those same principles.

One further step must here be taken. The statement that ontological categories are not a priori principles means simply that they cannot be immediately recognized a priori. Inasmuch as they are at all accessible to knowledge, they must be grasped by other methods. For this, a point of departure seems to offer itself in the relation between cognitive and ontological categories. We already know why this relation must involve at least a partial identity. It might then be concluded: In so far as the ontological categories are the same as the cognitive categories, it should be possible to discover the former as included in the latter. In this way one might at least be able to grasp a priori a sector of the ontological principles.

Even this hope proves deceptive. In the first place, we have no criterion to measure the extent of that categorial identity. And precisely where on practical grounds we are more or less certain of this identity—in everyday life and for our natural orientation in the world—this identity is philosophi-

cally worthless because it does not bear upon the problems of philosophy. But where these begin, it becomes extraordinarily questionable and soon fails us completely. In the second place, in our cognitive apparatus there is lacking one fundamental prerequisite for so exploiting this identity: an immediate knowledge of our own cognitive categories.

It lies in the nature of all knowledge to be directed not toward itself but toward its object. What, in the process of knowing, the knower becomes conscious of are traits of the object only, not traits of his own action. Least of all do the inner conditions of his action fall within his consciousness; but cognitive categories are counted among these. So, philosophy had to pass through a long historical process before it finally began to become aware of a few of the cognitive categories as such. This awareness requires a reversal of the natural cognitive direction, a turning around, as it were, from the object to the knower. And in fact with this reversal, knowledge of a second order sets in where knowledge itself is made the object of knowledge. This epistemological reflection is "secondary" and must be carried through "against" the natural attitude. When it sets in, it does not lead immediately to the categories of understanding but by a special method must be directed toward them.

This is why not only the ontological categories but even our own cognitive categories on which all knowledge a priori rests are not themselves known a priori. In fact, it must be added that generally they remain unknown in the knowledge of the object. They function in our knowledge but do not in turn become an object of knowledge. Only through the intervention of epistemological reflection are they brought to the light of consciousness. But that is a phase of knowledge reached only late in the historical process. Were the function-

ing of these categories in our knowledge dependent upon our knowledge of them, all human knowledge, even the most naïve, would have to await a philosophy to make them conscious. But since philosophy actually presupposes naïve knowledge, philosophy, on this hypothesis, could never have arrived at the simple understanding of objects.

Actually, the reverse order prevails: Although cognitive categories are the first condition of our knowledge—especially of the a priori elements in it, which are nowhere absent, not even in the naïve world view—they are not the first to be recognized in it. They are not unknowable, but can be known only indirectly, namely as mediated through the simple knowledge of the objects which is based upon their functioning. If they are known at all, they are, we might say, rather the thing known last. And this order is irreversible. That explains why they are hardest to know. The many detours and blind alleys by which epistemology tries to arrive at them provide an unambiguous demonstration of this fact.

Thus the possibility of making ontological categories comprehensible by a detour through the cognitive categories must be considered altogether negligible. One might believe that in the last analysis it is rather the cognitive categories which can be made intelligible by a detour through the ontological categories. The latter, at any rate, lie in the natural direction of cognition—in the background of objects—albeit the simple knowledge of objects may not penetrate to them. But since all knowledge of objects has in it the tendency toward progressive advance, it may very well, by dint of a progressive deepening, lead directly to ontological categories.

That this is so, at least in principle, is demonstrated by the most ancient and primitive form of philosophical research, which, long before the appearance of epistemological thought,

sought single-mindedly after the principles of being. An outstanding example of such a search is furnished by the whole sequence of the great pre-Socratics. And it cannot be denied that in this effort they really found various ontological principles which, in the course of a much later and critically mature exploration, have proved valid.

There is, however, no need of harking back this far. Where, after all, did Kant take his categories from? Certainly not from the Table of Judgments which, it must be remembered, he first had to complete for this purpose. The truth of the matter comes out rather in the *Analysis of Principles*: The categories are drawn from the content of knowledge such as it has emerged from the whole field of scientific research. That, however, means that they are drawn from our knowledge of objects; in other words, they are taken from the object itself in so far as it has disclosed itself at a certain stage of scientific knowledge. This is revealed most clearly in the *Analogies of Experience*. From the analysis of process and change arises the category of substance; and from the analysis of objectively determined succession the existence of a causal relationship is made intelligible. Of course, to the idealistically trained thinker it will by no means be apparent that by proceeding in this manner we arrive directly only at categories of the object and not at all at "pure concepts of the understanding" (nor at fundamental principles of the *Determining Judgment*). It is all the more noticeable, however, to the latter-day interpreter who takes the trouble of re-enacting in his own thought and critically illuminating the Kantian conclusions.

After this we need hardly waste words in showing that much the same must hold even to a higher degree of Fichte's and Schelling's attempts to derive their categories from one single principle. Critics have often remarked that actually everything is here taken from experience while it is ascribed

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solent. Inepte. 6. Aut ubi nox abiit etc. Affirmare vix dubitem melius
quemquam, vel μιν οτος c E ca RP RET οι vαν NE n

AMORUM I. ELEG. V. 19 Qua timidus latebras speret habere pudor. Ecce Corinna venit, tunica velata recincta, Candida dividua colla tegente coma : | 10 Qualiter in thalamos formosa Semiramis isse Dicitur, et multis Lais amata viris. Deripui tunicam; nec multum rara nocebat : poetice magis , dubium hoc lucis et umbra quasi certamen , quam nostratem Zz Fontaine , post Ovidium . expressisse; qui sic, lib. x, Fab. xv : »« Soit lorsque la lumi re Pr cipite ses traits dans l'umide s/jour ; Soit lorsque le Soleil rentre dans sa carri re , . Eit que n' tant plus nuit, il n'est pas encor jour. Quod verbatim ex Ovidio : αυ  δ  nox alit , nec tamen orta dies. Unde facile conjicias non tam illaboratos illi versus obvenisse. ' 8, Qua Himidus latebras speret LaAere pudor. Quis hic poetam non agnoscat omnium maxime verecundum, et quid deceat , religiosissime XN NCNI ! Sed quam brevi sui omnino dissimilis , quas servat pudori , latebras subripiet! — 9. Ecce Corinna venit. Adest improvisa. Narrat Apuleius , Apolog. Lesbiam Catullum , pro Clodia , nominasse ; Propertium Cyz Zi2 Hostiam dissimulasse ; Tibullum vero , Delia , Planiam. Quam vero Ovid. Corinne ficto sub nomine decantarit, non constat. Sed illa arte, ingenio et corporis dotibus celebris , cui feminae nomen indiderit , quie vel ipsi olim Pindaro non impar zmula. — FHlecincta. Discincta tunica, Ze enim prepositio quandoque ejus verbi, cum quo componitur , significatum contrarium facit ; ut reve o, resero, recludo, refego , et similia. Man. ' 10. Dividua. Yd est, sparsa, non in nodum collecta ; sed in utrumque , humerum rejecta. Videtur imitatus Noster Apollonium Rhod. , rtt , 45: Δευχο σε δ' ικ τερθε χ μας ινεξιμ νη  μοις. Ita et Stat. Theb. lib. virt, vers. 489: ^ Dieiduique cadunt in brachia crines. Francius notaverat in margine , d//fusa : sed magis aptum vaticinantibus, Bun w. 11. 4a fAalamos formosa Semiramis isse. Scribo, famosa Semiramis. His. Jn (Aalamum, Ald. Gryph. et marg. Bersmanni. 12. Admafa viris. Yn quodam codice legimus , Zeis ama!a procis. Utraque lectio probatur. MAn. J/7rzs, est in veteribus. Cior. Repone vivis, ( x fide optimorum codicum. Z2/oc7 enim secundum Festum, gu poscunt aliquam in matrimonium : hinc Penelopesrocz. Nusquam procorum mentio apud latinos scriptores occurrit , quoties de

meretricibus agitur; virorum, passim. Sic Propert. libro τι, Elegia quinta, versu 6 : Phryne tam multis facia beata viris. Pro Zai*, codices nonnulli, ZZzis : sed nil necesse. Laidis Propertius etiam meminit, τι, Eleg. v, τ. H. 13. Zirzpui. Derepur Puteaneus et Neapolitanus cum Regio : recte. Sic et defrahere et deducere vestem. — Nec multum rara noceóa! , hoc est, tunica 272 tenuique filo, ex Corinnng omni corpore dn multum subducebat oculis meis : tenuissimam. vult fuisse vestem, tunicam

20 P. OVIDII NASONIS Pugnat tunicam sed tamen illa tegi.
 Quumque ita pugnaret, tamquam qua vincere nollet, :5 Victa est non
 zgreditione sua. Ut stetit ante oculos posito velamine nostros, In
 toto nusquam corpore menda fuit. Quos humeros, quales vidi
 tetigique lacertos! Forma papillarum quam fuit apta premi! 20 Quam
 castigato planus sub pectore venter ! | Quantum et quale latus!
 quam juvenile femur! Singula quid referam ? nil non laudabile vidi;
 Et nudam pressi corpus ad usque meum. Cetera quis nescit? lassique
 requievimus ambo. 25 bombycinam, nempe Coam, aut sericam: ut
 apud Horat. Cozus f/2z pene videre est, ut nudam. Plin. lib. v1, cap. Xv
 , deserico: Zam multiplici operculo, tam longinquo orbe petitur, ut zn
 publico Matrona iraluceat. Quibus similia apud eundem habes de
 veste Assyria lib. xz , cap. 2. Perperam autem quidam interpretes ,
 zz/fum cum rara construit , quum cum zocebat , debeat. Hara autem
 tunica est eadem , ni fallor, quam Ziz//azz tunicam vocat Plautus ,
 Epid. Act.11, Sc.11, vers. 45 : ubi opponitur sgZsse tunice. Yigiws.
 14. Pugnat tunicam etc. Propert. libro 11, Eleg. xit, vers. 4:
 Interdum tunica duxit operta moram, — ðè lamen illa tegi. Sed
 tamen, meliores. Sic et Art. Amat. 1, 666 : Pugnando vinci sed
 tamen illa volet. Ut et ibi libri nonnulli : quomodo idem mox :. Sed
 volui vinci viribus illa tamen. H grNs. 15. Que quum ita pugnaret.
 Quumque illa , rectius sex libri. Ingw. — Qu« vincere nollet. Se
 vincere Francofurt. credo pro , 57 wzcere. 19. Quos humeros, quales
 etc. Recte et eleganter Propert. Eleg. cit. 12 : -*. Oculi sunt in amore
 duces. 21. Quam castigato. Csesar τi, de Bell. Gall. E èn fronte
 leeiter castigatus, ut legit Faernus. BERsw. Non accurate satis , ut
 nec recte aliquantulum dimisso , interpretatur Ma— rius: melius
 dixerat antea, emezdafo , correcto, nimirum per fasciam , qua
 tumescentes et exuberantes niAmis papillas solebant coercere. 23: il
 non laudabile vidi. NiAil ZHlaudabile codex Neapolitanus et Junianus.
 Hxrws. 25. Cetera quis nescit P? Reticet pudenter ulteriora , que
 tamen satis indicat, quum addit , 7/zss7 requieieimus ambo. Sed in
 hoc eo laudandus magis, quo sibi facilius in tali—bus enarrandis
 veteres indulgebant. — GConferendus cum Nostro Propert. qui libro
 11, Eleg. x1 et xit , idem hoc argumentum prior tractaverat , et

Ovidio forte reczfavera ; nam, ut ait ipse, Trist. 1v, El. x, 45: Swpe
suos solitus recitare Propertius ignes ; ubi notanda sane egregia
verbi acceptio, qua Zgzes vocet carmina , quibus fideliter adeo
commissi spi

AMORUM I. ELEG. VI. 21 Proveniant medii sic mihi szpe
dies ! rant calores poete , in quem /ofa Venus irruit. 26. Proveniant
εἰς mihi ec. Simili fere voto Propert. Eleg. cit. 37 : Quod mihi si
secum t«les concedere Illa velit , vita» longus et annus erit. \$i dabit
hiee multas, fiam immortalis in illis. Adeundum quoque luculentissi—
mum Catulli carmen v : Vivamus , mea Lesbia, atque amemus , etc.
ELEGIX VI. DIRJE IN JANITOREM , QUI FORES ORANTI ADAPERIRE
RECUSABAT. Jaxirron, indignum! dura religate catena, Difficilem
moto cardine pande forem. Quod precor, exiguum est : aditu fac
janua parvo Obliquum capiat semiadaperta latus. Longus amor tales
corpus tenuavit in usus ; b 1. Janilor..... dura religate catena elc. De
cafenato janitore vid. Lips. ad Sen. lib. rz, de Ira cap. 37. hime. δὲ
Praefat. Zn pufem fortunatius àcalenato repulsum janitore , sepe
nocte sera, foribus ingratis adJacere. — BHeligate. Hoc verbum pro
simplici Zgare vel e///garz, poni solere docuit Torrent. ad Horat. 1 ,
Od. 35. — Janitor (indignum !) Sortem illius fingit se dolere , quo
cerlius eum sibi devinciat. Ostiarius autem, vel /az//or, quem
C/austrituum appellat Lanius (ap. Gell. xi , 10;) puerum ab janua ,
Corn. Nep. . (in Hannibale) aditum obsidebat , ut eos admitteret vel
dimitteret , qui dominum conveniebant. Comes illi plerumque canis
alligatus. — Dura religate catena. Sed et ipsum janitorem ca/ezafum
fuisse, testis Suetonius , de Claris Rhet. ubi : « L. Votacilius Pilutus
servisse dicitur, atque etiam os//arius veteri more ἐν catena fuisse. »
Quae verba quidem ve/erz more , indicant morem hunc, tempore
quo scribebat , abolevisse ; et cafenas jam a janitore in januam
translatas fuisse. 2. Diffícilem. Contra facilis cardo, apud Horat. libro
r, Od. 35, vers. 5: Quas prius multum faciles movebat Cardines. 3. d
difu fac janua parvo. Primo Neapolitanus : forte pro pzzvo. 4.
Obliquum capiat semiadaperta latus. Non ut tota pateat, poscit, sed
quod satis, ut, qui oZ//guum se et quasi furtim immittat , possit
excipere. 5. Longus amor eic. Id est : qui me amor jamdudum
peredit (/ozgus) macilentum adeo corpus effecit (fenzaeif) , ut nullus
fere aditus sit tam angustus, per quem non (quz

22 P. OVIDII NASONIS Aptaque subducto pondere membra dedit. Ille per excubias custodum leniter ire Monstrat; inoffensos dirigit ille pedes. At quondam noctem, simulacraque vana timebam: Mirabar, tenebris si quis iturus erat. — — 10 Risit, ut audirem, tenera cum matre Cupido ; Et leviter : fies tu quoque fortis, ait. Nec mora, venit Ámor : 'non umbras nocte volantes, Non timeo strictas in mea fata manus. | Te nimium lentum timeo; tibi blandior uni : 15 Tu, me quo possis perdere, fulmen habes. Adspice, et, ut videas, immitia claustra relaxa, corporis gracilitas!) facile ingrediar. Sic et Simsthe , apud Theocriti Idyll., B, 87, clamat amore confecta: Καί μευ χρώς μὲν ὁμοῖος ἐγίνετο πολλᾷχε θάψω. Et in sequente versu avdentior : αὐτὰ δ? λοιπὰ ὅς ἔτ' ἧς χαεῖ δέρμα. 6. Su&ducto corpore. S\$ubtili corpore Excerpta Scaligeri et Puteani , quomodo et Arundelianus pro diversa lectione. Martial. lib. x, Epigr. c1: Habere amicam nolo, Flacce, subtilem , Cujus lacertos annuli mei cingant. Regius et Moreti unus, sz4Zuctopondere. Sic Amorum, lib. 11, El. x;v. 24: Pondere, nonnervis, corpora nostra carent. H. 11. Ziüsil, uf audrrem. Sententia huic similis est illa Tibul., τ, EÍ. τd: En ego quum tenebris tota vagor anxius urbe , Securum in tenebris me facit esse Venus. C. Ut audirem meliores: Scriverio placebat, Jussi/f μὲ euderem : in uno enim Moreti , /zss// μὲ audivit ; perperam. Martial. lib. τd, 44; vers.6: Et secum , sed ut audiam , susurrat. HEINS. 12. δος fu guoque fortis. Sic et Tibullus ad Deliam, x, El. τd, 16: Audendum est : fortes adjuvat ipsa Venus. 19. Nocte volantes. Silentes , Regius : male. Vide Petron. cap. 63. 14. Séricías in mea fata manus. Ex Propertio adumbratum , libro ur, Elegia xtv, vers. 5 : Quid faciam? obductis committam . mene tenebris , Ut.timeam audaces in mea membra manus ? Notandum vero ait Marius , srcfzs manus dici, ut s£rictum ensem. Sic et Epist. xit , 100; ... fratres Inter se szrictas conseruere 71anus. Plura exempla reperies apud eruditissimum Benteium , qui felicissime Horatio rz, Od. 6: S/rzfos ungues restituit. Bünn. 16. Tu me quo possis perdere fulmen Zabes. Potestatem intelligit ad amicam introducendi , vel foras excludendi, quz tota penes janitorem. 17. Aspice, et uf videas (non zzvideas) , immitia claustra relaxa , ex optimis libris est reponendum : quomodojam in

Observationibus lib.11, cap. xx1, emendavit noster Gronovius.
Theod. Marcilius ad Persii, Sat. v , male, u/zeideas , interpretatur ,
zzspectes. WgiNs. — Immitia clausíra. Elegancia sua non caret

AMORUM I. ELEG. VI. 23 Uda sit ut lacrimis janua facta
meis. Certe ego, quum posita stares ad verbera veste, Ad dominam
pro te verba tremante tuli. 20 Ergo, quz valuit pro te quoque gratia
quondam, Heu facinus! pro me nunc valet illa parum ? Redde vicem
meritis; grato licet esse, quod optas. Tempora noctis eunt ; excute
poste seram : Excute; sic unquam longa relevare catena, a5 regii
codicis lectio , nom mif/a. Sic libro secundo Art. Amat. 187 : Sepe
suos casus , nec mitia facta puelle , Flesse \$ub arboribus Milaniona
ferunt. Ubi etiam /mmi/t/a nonnulli scripti. Sic venti non equi , pro
iniquis , τi, Am. xv1, 22 : Met. v, 171. Non circumspectis , pro
Zucirconspectis : et passim talia. B. — Zmmiftia claustra. Nihil apud
eroticos obvium magis, quam iste amantium dire in januas et
janitores , qui faciles minus illis se praebebant. Tib. 1, El. 11, 7 :
Janua difficilis domini, te verberet imber , Tò Jovis imperio fulmina
missa petant! 19. Quum posita stares ad verbera veste. De modo
quo servos haberent Romani, quibusve servas ,si quid deliquerint ,
domina torquerent cru— ciatibus , vidend. PriGwoniUus, de Servis;
Buniowy , Mém. de 1 Acad. des Inscript. tom. xxxv , p. 328; et
Propert. rv, Eleg. vui, 39, sqq. ubi Cynthiam sic loquentem inducit :
Nostraque quod Peiale tulit ad monumenta coronas , Codicis
immundi vincula sentit anus. Caditur et Lalage, tortis suspensa
capillis , Per nomen quoniam est ausa rogare meum. 21. Ergo.
Mallem ergoze : deinde, pro te mea gratia, vellet Francius. 22. J//a
parum. Nihil, Douza excerpta. 23. Jledde vicem meritis; grato licet
esse etc. Quidquid effutiant Micyl. Heins. et Burmann. qui summi
guidem , sed homines tamen (Quintil.) ut suam quisque sententiam
tueatur, locum sic velim interpungas : ... Grato licet esse , quod
optas. Sensus quippe : jamdudum ezopfas profecto , ut quod tibi
prestiti , rependas officium ; ea sese praebet Occasio , quam tu
arripias Zicef , grafum ie prastandi. Non enim satis video cur op/e/
janitor , ut fempora noctis eant; et versus hic znfercalaris omnino
distrahendus praeuntibus, vel pone subeuntibus. a4. Excufe poste
seram. Multis hac illustrat Salmasius Exerc. Plin. pag. 649, et seqq.
Aliquid etiam attulerunt. Turneb. x1x , adv. 7 ; et Lips. de Cruce ri ,
cap. 6. 25. sc. Optantisest. Virg. Ecl. 1x, . vers. 3o, et 21; et

praesertim x , 4 : Sic tibi, quum fluctus subterlabere Sicanos , Doris
amara suam non intermisceat undam. Et Tibullus lib. 1, Eleg. 1v , 1 :
Sic umbrosa tibi contingant tecta, Priape. — Longa relevere catena.
Prima edd. et codd. nonnulli , sc unguam dura releere cafena.
Puteaneus cum regio , et Jureti excerptis , et Arundeliano : σῆς
uzguam longa eic. , longa etiam est in ex. Scalig. et Puteani ;
hocest, qua diu , Jezgumqgue te ligavit ; recte. Vox enim /ozga signi

5ñ P. OVIDII NASONIS Nec tibi perpetuo serva bibatur
 aqua. Ferreus orantem nequicquam , janitor, audis: Roboribus duris
 janua fulta riget. Urbibus obsessis clause munimina portze Prosint; in
 media pace quid arma times ? Quid facias hosti, qui sic excludis
 amantem ? Tempora noctis eunt; excute poste seram. Non ego
 militibus venio comitatus et armis : Solus eram , si non szvus
 adesset Amor. Hunc ego, si cupiam, nusquam dimittere possim : 35
 Ante vel a membris divider ipse meis. Ergo Àmor, et modicum circa
 mea tempora vinum Mecum est, et madidis lapsa corona comis.
 ficantior vim habet, quam vulgus existimat. Sic/ozgus luctus apud
 Virg. XI, 214; Ita enim cum veterrimo romano codice, vel contra
 aucto— ritatem Servii lego. Zozgus pontus, Valer. Flacc. r , 127 ; ex
 MSS. Vulgata lectio tota quanta est consàrcinata fuit ab audaculis
 librariis , qui , quia superius legebatur, dura reZgate cafena , nefas
 existimarunt , si id ibi tantum legeretur , ut etinfra, dure fransite
 catene. Vlx1Ns. Egregia restitutio, et verum est, quod de voce
 Jozgus observat Heinsius : idem enim sepe, quod perpetuus, notat.
 Sic Horat. 11, Od. vit, 17: "Ergo obligatam redde Jovi dapem ,
 Longaque fessum militia latus Depone sub lauru mea... Et idem libro
 eodem , Od. xtv ; 19* : ... Damnatusque fongz Sisy phus JEolides
 laboris. Bun. 26. Serva. Servis congruens et apta. Servi enim apud
 majores aquam tantum bibebant. Vide ad Petron. cap. LXXI. C/fo
 aquam liberam gustabunf. 27. Orantem nequicquam , janitor , audis.
 Scribendum opinor , 227: ut sit vociferantis; nam 2z4/£ est in uno
 Moreti. H. Nihil mutandum. Ferreus audis , Yd est immotus , nihil
 curans preces meas; audis quidem, sed quasie ferro esses, non
 moveris. 31. Quid facias hosti. Facias pro facies , bene optimus
 Palatinus: tres alii , /zceres : &ostis etiam 'Pa-teaneus. Catullus , xxtr
 , 23: Quid faciant hostes capta crudelius urbe? 35. Nunquam
 dimittere possum. Nusquam dimittere possum , melio— res. Lege ,
 possim. His. Demitfere etiam nonnulli. 97. Modicum circa mea
 tempora vinum. Quasi dicat ; z2odice vino sum usus : ne me igitur
 repellas, ut qui ebrietatis notas /roz/e praferret. — Circum mea
 tempora vinum. Circa , Puteaneus. Tibull r, Eleg. tr, 3. Malto perfusus
 tempora Baccho. H. 38. Mecum est. ta Livius lib. 1v, 3a : fecum

triumphos, secum spolia , secum victoriam esse ; cum hostibus
scelus eic. , et lib. xxx, 33 : Victoria est cum Penis. — Et madidis
lapsa

AMORÜUM I. ELEG. VI. NM ct Arma quis hzc timeat? quis non eat obuius illis? Tempora noctis eunt ; excute poste seram. Áo Lentus es? an somnus, qui se male praebet amanti, Verba dat in ventos aure repulsa tua ? At, memini, primo, quum te celare volebam, Pervigil in mediz sidera noctis eras. Forsitan et tecum tua nunc requiescit amica : 45 Heu! melior quanto sors tua sorte mea ! Dummodo sic, in me durz transite catenz. Tempora noctis eunt; excute poste seram. Fallimur? an verso sonuerunt cardine postes? Raucaque concuss signa dedere fores ? 5o Fallimur ; impulsa est animoso janua vento. corona comis. Naud scio an non legendum potuit, πέξ madidis etc. , ut indicet se non eo convivium protulisse , quo corone fluerent , /aée— rentur e capite convivarum : quod ut facilius fieret , corone unguentis irrorabantur. Si vero sponte non deffuerent , scindebantur aut detrahebantur; ac proinde, velut signo dato, convivarum quisque effundebatur in amplexus ejus , quse proxima ei assidebat. Insignis, et ad rem nostram plurimum faciens, Tullii locus, Tuscul. Quist. v : « Itaque nec pulchros illos administratores aspiciebat, nec plenum artis argentum, nec manum porrigebat ad mensam. Jam ipse deffuebant corone. » 41. Lentus es ? an somnus qui fe male prebet amanti. Scribe , qui se male praebet amanti : aàque ita codex Douze , et Sarravii , et Arundelianus. Hkrws. Recte addit zz/e, quia, teste Servio ad Virg. x, /En. 3521, preberr bona dicuntur. — 4z som— nus, qui se male prebet amanti. Nihil amanti pejus, quam illum invenire dormientem , qui possit ad amicam introducere. Quod ita planum, expresse adeo ex ipsis poeta verbis elucet, ut interpretandum libens omiserim , nisi in interpretando alii oberraverint. 43. Quum fe celare volebam. Mc celare volebam ,. septem codices : quatuor , fe solebam: recte. Canace, id te celaeímus unum. Fast. 1v, 149: Ut fegat &oc celetgue viros Fortuna virilis Prestat. HETNS. 47. 4n me dure transite catene. Vere igitur cafeza,, et dura quidem , janitor erat impeditus , quum exoptet Ovidius ut in ipsum janitoris catene transeant , modo , ut ille, cum amica requiescat. 49. Fallimur ? an. Codex Douzez, fallimus ? aut. 5x. Fallimur. Male in Aldinis codicibus interrogative legitur : supra enim interrogat; hic autem afhirmat : unde et causam reddit ,

dicens impulsa etc. MAR. — Animoso. "416rerso Neapolitanus : quod
apte quidem explicari potest , et olim etiam

ab P. OVIDII NASONIS Hei mihi! quam longe spem tulit
 aura meam ! S1 satis es rapte, Borea, memor Orithyiz, Huc ades, et
 surdas flamine tunde fores. Urbe silent tota : vitreoque madentia
 rore 55 Tempora noctis eunt; excute poste seram. Aut ego jam
 ferroque ignique paratior ipse, Quam face sustineo, tecta superba
 petam. Nox et Ámor vinumque nihil moderabile suadent : Illa pudore
 vacat ; Liber Amorque metu. Go Omnia consumsi : nec te precibusve
 minisve Movimus , o foribus surdior ipse tuis! Heinsio placuisse ex
 adscriptis orc libri ejus notis video: sed longe elegantius est
 azzmoso. Et Virgilius 11, Georg. 441. anzmosos Euros dixit. Et ita
 Apuleius lib.i, Metam. exa— nimes venífos quoque dixit. Sic et
 animosum flugíum Stat. vix, (Theb. 325; et animosum idem est,
 quod vehemens , violentus. Pro zzpz/sa, malebat etiam Heinsius ez
 pulsa , quod in uno codice exstabat ; sed vehementius, et ezzmoso
 vento convenientius Zzpu/sa. Bun M. 58. Quam face sustineo. Quem,
 Puteaneus et Arundelianus, cum editionibus nonnullis. Zzzez
 subintellige: proparatzor, prima editiones et Scriverianus , potentior.
 Mihi distichon hoc suspectum est. Hrrws. Non tam facile damnare
 audeo ; sed ex vestigiis codicum legerem : Aut ego jam ferroque
 ignique paratior, ista Quam face sustineo , tecta superba petam. Hoc
 sensu ; ego jam instructor (72rati milites , armati) ista face, quam
 sustineo, petam tecta. Si quem retinendum est , lege cum Francio :
 -. Ignique paratior illo , vez ipso , Quem face sustineo. Ut ignem a
 face distinguat ; gerit enim ignem in face, ut alii in lucerna : ut Epist.
 tr, 120 : Sepulchrali lumina mota face ; et supr. I1, 11: Vidi ego
 Jactatas mota face crescere flammās; E'I arro apud Non. in /zz :
 Ignis in face adfertur. Yn quibusdam erat, parattor omni ; in uno ,
 feroctor omni. BURM. 60. Pudore vacat. Solent plerumque cujusvis
 ordinis homines nocte , quam die , esse licentiosiores , et ad facinora
 perpetranda (quoniam ab alis non adspiciuntur) paratiores. Idcirco
 Czsar , quum nocte posset Corfinium, quod milites, quibí przsidio
 erant, ipsi se jam dedidissent, ingredi noluit. Ejus verba sunt lib. 1,
 de bello Civili : « Tamen veritus , ne militum introitu, et nocturni
 temporis licentia, oppidum diriperent, eos, qui venerant , collaudat
 etc. » 62. Surdror. Durior, in omnibus libris scriptis. Cror. \$zrZior

Neapolitanus, pro diversa lectione ; eleganter: quomodo et
Scriverianus codex. Paulo ante , vers. 54, dixit: Huc ades , et surdas
flamine tunde fores. Infra Eleg. vii ; vers. 77

AMORUM IL ELEG. VI. M ^3 Non te formosz decuit servare
puelle Limina : sollicito carcere dignus eras. Jamque pruinosos
molitur Lucifer axes; .— - 65 Inque suum miseros excitat ales opus.
At tu, non letis detracta corona capillis, Dura super tota limina nocte
jace. Tu dominz, quum te projectam mane videbit , Temporis
absumti tam male testis eris. to Qualiscumque vale, sentique
abeuntis amorem ; Lente, nec admisso turpis amante; vale. Vos
quoque, crudeles rigido cum limine postes , Duraque conserva ligna
valete fores. Surda sit oranti tua janua, laxa ferenti. Sicsupra Elegia
tv, 62 , surZes puto similiter scribendum. Qua /ice! ad Surdas
prosequar usque fores : nam veterrimus Puteaneus, sueeas. Vulgati
sevas : duras tamen fores dicit mox, versu ultimo. Hxrws. 63. Non te
formose decuit elc. Non dignus sane , cui formose puelie mandaretur
custodia; sed qui potius vigil et so//ici/us tetro car certi custos
adsideres. — 64. Sollicito. Francius , perpetuo. 69. Quum
teprojectam. V ariant codices admodum. Putean. prolectam ;
dejectam Mentelianus et Neapolit. : sed nihil muto. 11 , Fast. 537 :
" Tegula projectis satis est velata coronis. . Noster Epist. xx, 165; de
Hymen.: Projicit ipse sua deductas fronte coronas. B. 71. Sentique
aleuntis amorem. Honorem , meliores; et pro Zez/e, Lenía, ut ad
dominam hec referantur ; sed initio Elegic similiter, Te nimium
lentum timeo. H. Cris— pinus eliam explicat percipe , co— 'O gnosce
: sed sensus vulgata lectionis satis planus illis, qui Latine sciunt: tu
Zeníe, qui me non audis , vicissim sez// gravem amorem , quo ego
abiens torqueor; nec potiaris, etiamsi maxime cupias , etiam tua ,
quam amas : hac est vis vocis sez£ire. B. 74- Durague consería.
Scripti plerique , ac in his meliores , cozseree. Janitoris consereas
vocat fores. Sic ille Libanus apud Plautum , 4sizaría , Act. 11, Sc.
111, vers. 6: Nolo ego fores conservas meas a te verberarier. Apud
Apuleium sub finem libri vir, Metam. Asinus et Equiso cozserez
appellantur. Sic et apud jurisconsultos edes serve, arca serva, fundus
servus et similia occurrunt. Sic Rutilius in elegante Itinerario, 1, 215:
Leges restituit , libertatemque reducit , Kt sereas famulis non sinit
esse suis. H. — Ab indignatione in janitorem , ad januam ipsam

transit; et coz— sereas fores vocat, qua tali sero obedire se
paterentur ; et va/ere jubet, quia non amantem admittunt.

a8 P. OVIDII NASONIS ELEGIA VII. ^ . IN SE IPSUM , QUOD AMICAM MANU LJESERIT. A P'E manus in vincla meas, meruere catenas , Dum furor omnis abit , si quis amicus ades. Nam furor in dominam temeraria brachia movit. Flet mea vesana Izsá puella manu! Tunc ego vel caros potui violare parentes; US Sava vel in sanctos verbera ferre Deos. Quid? non et clypei dominus septemplicis Ajax Stravit deprensos lata per arva greges? ». Omnis abit. Vel abi! pro abiit legendum cum Douze codice ; vel abest rectum est : quia si rediret furor, periculum erat, ne iterum in puellam irrueret. Infr. El. x , 9. Nunc límor omnis abest : ubi etiam abit , codices. Bun wm. — ὃς ὁ φίλος amicus ades. Sic omnino legendum (ut in correctiore codice vidimus) ; non adest. Est autem ordo : O tu amice , si quis amicus zdes, dum omnis fu. ror abest , ede manus etc. MAR. \$7 quis amicus adest, frustra multi codices : ita Horat. r1, Od. 37, 51: ... 'O Deorum , Si quis hzc audis. Bun. 5. Tunc ego vel caros etc. Nullum est tam immane facinus, quod non ille possit admittere , qui In dóminam temeraria brachia movit. Sic impietas in parentes vel carissimos, et in Deos sacrilegium , crimina vix dicit , si furori illius comparaveris, quem in imbellem feminam, et eam amantem , non pudeat debacchari. — Pofuz violare. Neapolitanus , Zzniare : forte recte ; versu enim 11: vzolare repetitur , ubi eadem varietas : hic vero malim 7/zgzlare. HrNs. Penates etiam Putea—neus ; sed nihil muta: gravissimum enim hoc crimen , de quo vid. Abraham , ad Ciceron. in Vatin. cap. 5. Deinde , ἐν sanctos arma movere Deos , Farnesianus et Douzz codex : rectius vero parezíes, quam penates (qui et ipsi Dii sunt), Diis quasi opponuntur. Bunw. 7. Quid? non et clypei etc. Exemplis , ut mos est, tentat lenire , quod non possit purgare; et qui causam tueantur, Ajacem advocat et Oresten : vid. Sophocl. 7a flagellif. et Euripidis Orest. — Qui noz. Lege, Quid ? nonne. Sic infr. a1, x, 12: Nonne erat in curas una puella satis ? Et Amorum libro 11, Eleg. vi, vers. 29 : Quid? nonne Alpheon diversis currere terris Virginis Arcadise certus adegit amor?

AMORUM I. ELEG. VII. Et, vindex in matre patris, malus ultor Orestes, Ausus in arcanas poscere tela Deas? 10 Ergo ego digestos potui violare capillos ! Nec dominam mota dedecueret com ? Sic formosa fuit; talem Schoneida dicunt Msenalias arcu sollicitasse feras. Talis perjuri promissaque velaque Thesei (5 Flevit pracipites Cressa tulisse Notos. Sic, nisi vittatis quod erat Cassandra capillis, Procubuit templo , casta Minerva , tuo. 9.]Malus ultor Orestes. Recte malus ultor , qui, ut patrem a matre sua mactatum ulcisceretur , ipsam interfecit. Vid. Juv. Sat.vit, vs. 214. 10. usus in arcanas poscere tela Deas. Yn Furias , quas facibus et pugione armatas instantes ubique sibi , in parricidii poenam , videre Orestes arbitrabatur. Furie quippe « Dez speculatrices et vindices facinorum et scelerum. » Cic. de N. D. ui, 18: Erant autem in terris Furz : in calo Dire ; apud Inferos Eumenides ; et tres quidem numero, Tisiphone , Alecto , Megara. 11. Jgestos potut violare capillos. Laniare scripti , recte ; nam wo/are jam precesserat paulo ante. Ita et in illa Epist. Medez, vers. 157 : Vix me continui , quin sic laniata capillos Clamarem. Et sepe alibi. H. — Zges/os capillos. * Ornate, et ad artem compositos. Melius azo/are , quam Zaniare : crimen enim amicam verberantis, sacrilegium, ut vid. , nominat ; et v/oemus quidquid szcrz;m nobis esse debuit. 13. ifc formosa fuit. Sic mihi pulēīχa fuit, Sarravianus. Forte, sic quoque pulchra fuit. Pro dicam, recte O idem Sarravianus , dicas : nisi cum Neapolitano et tribus aliis malis , d;cunt : duo Vaticani, fama est. H. Si vel unus codex addiceret, Heinsii conjecturam reciperem : elegans enim est, et hoc vellet ; licet come essent mofe ex statione , et ita deberet deformior videri , tamen szc quoque pulchra fuil ; tanta erat vis forme , ut his non extingueretur ! Franc. legebat , £/ formosa fuit. B. — Talem S\$cheneida dicunt Menadias arcu sollicitasse feras. Dua apud poetas memorantur Atalante: altera venatrix Arcadica, Jasii filia: altera Bootica , cursu celebris, filia Schenei. Sed Ovidius hoc loco confudit nomina , id quod et alibi facit : eamque , qua Jasii , ScAznerda vocat. M. — Scheneida. Atalantam , Schoenei filiam, de qua non ad Heroid. xvr, 263, sed ad Met. x, 560, sqq. dicemus. 17. Ótc , nisi viflatis quod erat Cassandra capillis etc. Mirandum hunc Virgil. locum

in memoriam revo— cat ex /Eneid. libro r1, vers. 403 : Ecce
trahebatur passis Priameia virgo Crinibus a templo Cassandra ,
adytisque Minovõ, Ad cselum tendens ardentia lumina frustra ;
Lumina! nam teneras arcebant vincula palmas. Vitia autem erat
fascia quedam ,

30 P. OVIDII NASONIS Quis mihi non, Demens, quis non mihi, Barbare, dixit? Ipsa nihil : pavidō lingua retenta metu. 20 Sed taciti fecere tamen convicia vultus ; Egit me lacrimis, ore silente , reum. Ante meos humeris vellem cecidisse lacertos ; Utilius potui parte carere mei. In mea vesanas habui dispendia vires ; 25 Et valui penam fortis in ipse meam. Quid mihi vobiscum, cūdis scelerumque ministra ? Debita sacrilegū vincla subite manus. An, si pulsassem minimum de plebe Quiritem , qua circum caput crines religabant veteres, et quai matronas praeipue a virginibus discernebat. Nec matronū solum s///afz ; sed et sacerdotes, vates , Deorum statue, are, supplices et victims. /En.1t, 156: «ov F'itteque Deūm , quas hostia gessi. 19. Darbare, dixit. Dicat alter Mentelii, nisi Zize antique , pro dixisset. FIERNs. 22. Egit me lacrimis etc. Prioris versus sensum evolvit : lacrimae illius , sente etiam ore, reum me arguerunt. - 26. Et valui penam forfīs inire meam. Sic septem scripti ; male. Francius volebat, Jz pezaem valui fortis et ipse meam : elegans vero usus verbi va/ere : itā valere zn sceJus Propert. εν, Eleg. vir, 68. 3 zn aliquem valent. N ellej. Paterc. 11, 46 : Ne quid esset Zn literis quod valere contra caput aīque existimationem posset. Cicer. τi, Verr. 71. B. 29. An , si pulsassem etc. Quid enim de illo , 51 verZerasse , quum vel pulsanter , et minimum quidem de plebe , plectilex voluerit ? — Quirifēs proprie, qui Cures incolebant, Sabinorum oppidum; ut Zomazni, qui Zomaem. Quirifēs etiam appellabantur cives urbani , pagani , non milites. Militum nomen erat honorificentius, quam Quzr/£uz ; quum plebei etiam ignobiles , qui nullam reipublice operam navaverant, possent Quizrifēs esse. — Minimum de ple&e Quirifem. Regius et Neapolitanus, minima de plebe : quod non spernendum, nisi quis malit , med;z de plebe. Hg1Ns. Verisimilis Heinsia conjectura, et ita citavit hunc ver— sum olim Salmasius, observ. ad Jus Atticum , pag. 267 ; ubi de hac injuria, qua per verbera infertur , et | Grecis «ixix dicitur, disputat : ego tamen nihil temere contra codices mutandum esse puto ; Ze p/eóe enim simpliciter etiam notat abJectam sortem. Notandum vero Marius monuit, Quzr/fez hic in singulari poni, quum pluraliter tantum veteribus usurpatum fuisse Quiz/fes, notet Schol. Hor. ad illa lib. 11,

Od. vii: Quis te redonavit Quiritem Dis patriis. Sed et Noster 111,
Am. El. xiv, 9: Ignoto meretrix corpus junctura Quiriti, Et passim ille
et alii. Colerus vero Parerg. cap. Xxxv1 , docuit differen

AMORUM I. ELEG. VII. 31 Plecterer? in dominam jus mihi majus erit ? 3o Pessima Tydides scelerum monumenta reliquit. Ille Deam primus perculit; alter ego. Sed minus ille nocens : mihi, quam profitebar amari, Lzsa est : Tydides szvus in hoste fuit. I nunc, magnificos victor molire triumphos ! 35 Cinge comam lauro; votaue redde Jovi : Quaeque tuos currus comitatus turba sequetur, Clamet : Io! forti victa puella viro! Ante eat effuso tristis captiva capillo , Si sinerent lese, candida tota, gena. — τ fo Aptius impressis erat os livere labellis , Et collo blandi dentis habere notam. Denique, si tumidi ritu torrentis agebar, tiam inter pu/sare et verberare , quorum hoc gravius, et ideo a Cicerorone, Civem verberare scelus esse dicit; quod Noster ad pu/sationem perexaggerationem transtulit,quum manus suas , cedzs scelerisque mi— uistras vocet. Bunw. 31. \$clerum monumenta. Francius malebat , documenta : nihil opus ; amat Noster illam vocem mozumenfa:in fine Elegice 57222 vocat.Bunw. 33. Et minus ille nocens : me quam profitebar amare , Lesi. Lege, At minus, aut cum Sarraviano , \$ed. Deinde Puteaneus , πολέ, quam profitebar amari, Lesa sit. Lege, Lesa esf : nam Farnesianus et Douza liber, me quam profítebar amare Lesa esf. Arundelianus: év Mihi, quàm profitebar amare , Lesa est. HziNs. 35. I nunc, magnificos etc. Ironice; non erat enim unde tantum superbiret, quia, ut ait Virg. /En. i1: ov Namque etsi nullum memorabile nomen Fominea in perna est, nec habet victoria laudem. — Fictor molire. Rectius codex Dou285, molife. HgiNs. Sed sequentia cinge , et redde , aptius esse molire , docent. Bunw. 37. Comitantum turba sequetur. Comilatus Puteaneus, per appositio— nem. Malim tamen , comifatriz fur4a; nam optimus Palatinus, comi— tatur: Neapolitanus et duo alii , comitetur. Junian., comifantía. Arundelianus, comitafurturba sequentum : alii aliter. Hgrss. Ego mallem : Quique tuoscurrus comitatur turba, frequenter — À Clamet : Io etc. Vel comitantur turba , frequentes. B. 42. Et collum blandi. Collo , dant scripti meliores. Hits. 43. δὲ tumidi ritu torrentis agebar , cecague me etc. Apte minus inter se figure videntur hic cohzrere ; et celerius poeta a metaphora /o7renis, ad feram transcurrit, cui ,

32 P. OVIDII NASONIS Cacaque me pradam fecerat ira
 suam ; Nonne satis fuerat timidz inclamasse puella, 45 Nec nimium
 rigidas intonuisse minas ? Aut tunicam summa deducere turpiter ora
 Ad mediam? medi: zona tulisset opem. At nunc sustinui , raptis a
 fronte capillis , Ferreus ingenuas ungue notare genas. ' 5 5o Adstitit
 illa amens, albo, et sine sanguine, vultu, Czduuntur Pariis qualia saxa
 jugis. Exanimes artus, et membra trementia vidi; Ut quum populeas
 ventilat aura comas; Ut leni Zephyro gracilis vibratur arundo ; | 55
 Summave quum tepido stringitur unda Noto. Suspenszque diu
 lacrimae fluxere per ora, praedam voranti Zr2z jure adsimilat. 46.
 Intonutsse minas. Manus Neapolitanus et Junianus: sed nihil
 mutandum ; nisi reponi placeret : Nec minimum rigidas intonuisse
 minas. Nec minimum , subintellige fuera. 47. Ora. Recte est ora, tam
 hic , quam in Metamorph. et decipitur, mea quidem sententia,
 Ciofanus, qui Regium deceptum censet in hujus scripture
 vindicatione : nam quanti, obsecro, est altera illa , quam ipse nobis
 substituere ausus hoc loco ore , pro o2! Dovza. 48. Ut mediam.
 Scribe cum Puteaneo et tertio Palatino, eodemque optimo, tum et
 prima editione : Aut tunicam summa deducere turpiter ora Ad
 mediam : medie zona tulisset opem. H. 49. Hapfis. Et hic duo
 Vaticani ruplis habent. Francius , forte ta— men prenszs , scripsisse
 Ovid. conjicit. Ita certe Noster, Met. τὰ, 476: Dixit ; et adversa
 prensis a fronte capillis. Nihil tamen sine libris muto. B. 31. Adstitit
 illa amens etc. Pro amens , multi veteres , gemezs : duo, demens.
 Lego , tremens pavidus et sine sanguine vultu. Nisipro amens, malis
 parens. Met. vi, 527, de Philomela: Illa tremit , velut agna pavens,
 qua saucia cani Ore excussa lupi. — A láo non movendum, quod
 comparatio a marmore desumpta requirit: candidissimum enim rum.
 Neque etiam azezs est movendum; id est zoz sua , ut alibi dicit;
 quum mens abiisset, et consternata esset impetu meo ; et mox ,
 membra trementia sequuntur. Bun. 50. \$ummave guum tepido
 stringitur unda noio. Ypsam rem mirifice ex— ponit verbum hoc
 sZrzgere. Undam enim , quum levioris ventu aflatu impellifur, crispari
 dicas, et quasi in rugas contrahi. Quod feliciter admodum expressit
 , "antiqua vir apud recentiores indole, nec satis unquam laudandus

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