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W E ß K E

V

THE REALITY OF HUMAN BEINGS



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THE REALITY OF HUMAN BEINGS



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
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ON THE MORPHOLOGY OF NATURAL SCIENCES

In the history of natural science, this is usually taken as a "known field". The achievements of a generation in this field are listed. However, achievements are measured by goals, and it is believed that the goals of natural science have always been in the same direction. Science is regarded here as a body of factual knowledge, of facts that can be learned. Today's natural science is absolutised as the benchmark for natural science of all times. Individual researchers are then regarded as continuing the work of their predecessors, or they appear as precursors of what is to come. However, when science is viewed in this way as a layer of yield, the actual history of natural science is distorted. The perspective described in the statement of "progress" cannot do justice to what a particular era actually knew. For natural science is a human endeavour. It is bound to specific situations and concrete subjects. Pursuing natural science is a freely chosen orientation of human existence. Science is supported by a special relationship **to** the world, which can solidify into a certain worldview, but which can also be grasped in the sovereignty of a certain outlook on life. One must not overlook the pathos inherent in the demand for objectivity and provability of a truth. And it is a certain "mood" of life that dominates certain periods with a craving for the "curious" and collects only the strange under the heading of natural history. It is precisely in natural science that the relationship in which one "stands to being as a whole" is expressed. There is such something like a scientific world view, and knowledge of nature is usually taken as the prototype for knowledge in general — see, for example, Kant. However, behind every scientific research there are certain types of minds. The form, the face of a science is decisive

This determines it. There has been a change in the style of natural science. Sciences always have a very specific physiognomy. Science is by no means something anonymous. The researcher or his generation is the owner, but not just the "owner" of a truth. He should be portrayed as such and **not just** as the bearer of some discoveries, etc. The uniqueness of each science is difficult to put into a formula. However, the nature of natural science is only one way of grasping the consciousness of a time, that which is alive in it. Scientific methodological attitudes are linked to ideological and political tendencies. An example of this is Linnaeus. He is praised for having created a uniform nomenclature and a system. It is assumed that he saw this as a necessary task that he and his generation had to accomplish before others. In fact, however, the creation of such a catalogue initially expresses a certain conception of his vocation: Linnaeus assumes dominion when he gives plants their names. It is the dominion assigned to man by his position in creation. This is how Linnaeus' achievement was also understood by his contemporaries. Linnaeus' coat of arms features three crowns: they symbolise the three kingdoms of nature that he has taken possession of. It has been pointed out how military and political concepts play a major role in his biography. For example, his opponents reproached him for saying that botany was a republic in which everyone had equal rights. Under his portrait is written: Deus creavit, Linnaeus disposuit. It is the steward who is mentioned here together with the creator. The ideology behind this is unmistakable. If one overlooks the temporal constraints of the goal of any kind of natural science, it can be difficult to defend its scientific validity in the face of certain types of research. The embarrassment is natural when confronted with, for example, Goethe's morphology and theory of colours. In general, one does not know what to make of the theory of colours. In the case of morphology, however, it was only through a

Reinterpretation, to gain your understanding. It was taken as a **precursor** to Darwinian ideas of descent — we will see later that it could hardly have been misunderstood. But are morphology and colour theory unscientific because they seem to fit either hardly or not at all into the framework of conventional science? What is scientific or unscientific is determined only by the specific directives of a particular science. The concept of "science" in our sense is narrower than the range of actually possible types and directions of knowledge. But can we therefore describe that which our science cannot contribute to as "pre-scientific" or speak of "intuition" here — whereby this expression can only laboriously conceal a discrediting?

Nature and natural science

First of all, it is important to understand the unique nature of science. Science begins — as the following will make clear — with the destruction of our original attitude towards nature. Nature has been "disfigured". This is not meant as a reproach; it is not a mistake that needs to be rectified. It **simply** means that **nature** is no longer found as and where we originally encountered it. This is not to advocate any kind of romanticism. The old natural science has simply been superseded; natural science has become something different from what it used to be — for this is how it is, and not as "natural history".

To translate "historia naturalis*". Here, a naturalist was someone who had witnessed something with their own eyes, who had been there or present and then communicated what they had seen. Such natural history is a continuation of a natural interest in the things and phenomena of this world. This was taken to be a world shared by all of us;

Only then does "witnessing" mean anything. This knowledge extended to all kinds of things, and it was primarily the strange, the bizarre, the collected, that was reported as strange. Natural history broadened the horizon, which is always limited as such. Insofar as it conveyed knowledge of things that defied the usual standards, it created space for the mystery that surrounds human beings. Aesthetic contemplation was associated with this; people described the physiognomy of a landscape, etc. And for Humboldt, nature was a "cosmos" that had to be presented in a comprehensive overview. Here, nature was "described". The world view associated with this type of natural history research was based on the continuation of natural perspectives. However, natural science now means a transformation of this classical concept of nature, e.g. the world view. It is precisely the renunciation of this vividness that characterises modern natural science. World "view" **now** means the theoretical idea that **one** has **of nature**. Natural history was rooted in a position that was not even questioned as "natural". Now it is explicitly included. Circumstances and observers appear in the representation of **nature**. Apparatus is not used to refine the senses — the aim is to switch them off. The observer is to be relieved of something, his control largely replaced by "objective" controls. Sensuality does not convey anything communicable. Modern natural science dispenses with the evidence of sensual affectivity. A certain type of knowledge is elevated to a paradigm here. Knowledge focuses here on the quantifiable. In this way, it succeeds in conquering a certain layer of reality. The tendency is towards analysis, and the view of the whole disappears. However, the peculiarity of modern natural science is not only characterised by analysis and quantification. Its style is best understood by the basic criterion: that which can be produced in its factors is considered to be known. The fact that this knowledge can be found by everyone is its distinguishing feature.

This science is something anonymous. It is practised as a subject. One "represents" this subject, and that means that the individual or collective subject behind it becomes irrelevant. It is no longer the case that the natural scientist is honoured as a witness for having been present at something. It is precisely the pride of natural science that anyone can carry out the experiment themselves and verify it. Nature becomes something that is "cited" in the laboratory, something that can be confessed there. The objectivity of natural science is a consequence of this anonymity.

This knowledge now wants to be free from ideological ties, and it is certainly also free from "assumptions" that lie in that direction. But in emphasising this lack of assumptions, certain motives come to the fore. Certainly, natural science dispenses with personal dispositions. However, it is precisely in this elimination that the ideological nature of its criterion of truth lies. This means that there is no source of error to point to. The fact that worldviews are the motives behind scientific attitudes does not imply any interference in science, whose direction and goal they determine. Of course, people usually confuse the indisputable decision that lies behind a science, for example, with what can then be proven in that science. In doing so, however, they undermine the rigour of science, just as they do when they disregard the world view described in "Application" easily dismisses this. Questions must be **"acute"**. The authenticity of a problem is proven by the meaning of a scientific discovery, which is not something that can be taken for granted, but a fact that remains tied to the historical situation. Scientific "activity" conceals the fear of possible futility behind science. However, the scope of scientific knowledge loses nothing by reflecting on the decision behind it; it must only be limited to the extent that is appropriate.

The new task

In the wake of this kind of scientific understanding, however, the task of actually "writing" the history of natural science arises. It is important to portray researchers as "owners" of a special kind of science. This means, however, that we must re-evaluate our assessment of Goethe as a natural scientist, for example. Until now, he has been seen primarily as a "discoverer," and the discovery of the intermediate hyoid bone was considered a very special achievement on his part.

For example, in Virchow. Du Bois Reymond gives Goethe this assessment: "The work on the intermaxillary bone in particular satisfies even the most rigorous scientific standards." However, this discovery is something that anyone could have made; one must not overlook the fact that this discovery only gains its value through the history of its development, and Goethe had no interest in this. It was overlooked that Goethe, in fulfilling his profession as a natural scientist, was not just an amateur whose intentions would have had only the significance of relaxation.

If one overlooks the style of thinking and the confinement of knowledge to a historical situation, one is inclined to attribute genius to something that actually merely expresses the historical situation of a generation. The only thing that belongs exclusively to Goethe, for example, is his theory of colours. Through morphology, however, he placed himself within his generation. It continues things that were not foreign to his contemporaries. Goethe took a position between Geoffroy and Cuvier. Of course, it is difficult to identify the decisive aspect of this morphology. Its point of origin can only be understood by viewing it as a transition.

For us, it goes without saying that we characterise animals by their "habitus". However, this was not always the case. Before the 18th century, the physical

The appearance of **animals and plants was mostly misunderstood**. One need only look at the illustrations of animals and communities in books published at that time. It is as if one had never seen the actual forms. Goethe once remarked that experience is always only half of the experience. People had no eye for what we take for granted today, so that we find it difficult to notice the difference between our own view and that which guided them. It is a view that is "foreign" to us when animals

— as in the past — can be seen as the embodiment of "characters": the lion was considered an expression of ferocity, while the dog was seen as vigilant. The external appearance was nothing more than an appendage, a trait, a character that the animal — understood as demonic, as it were — had decided upon. In the fantastical nature of old depictions, the inorganic nature of these animals is immediately apparent. There is a "de-realisation" in this, when the exterior of an animal is not understood in terms of its function, but is seen only as the representation of a being. Just as alchemy expresses a "view" of things that differs from that of modern chemistry: the expansion of power by making "forces" visible and audible is something different from the practice of the correct "treatment" of a substance.

Linné did not see such "characters" in habitual peculiarities. However, he also regarded them merely as "characteristics". He viewed and classified animals solely as "bodies". The form of the animal had to be discovered. Namely as a form in "metamorphosis". Goethe then draws a parallel between that of plants and that of insects. Goethe says that the latter was only more striking and had been noticed earlier. For it would simply have been a requirement of economy to find the same animal in the caterpillar, pupa and butterfly. Goethe then compares both types of transformation. The plant is only apparently a boundary. The experience of sprouting teaches us that its parts are very independent.

from each other. In plants, the succession of states is linked to their coexistence; the flower emerges from the plant. In insects, however, there is a temporal succession of different states, with each moult leaving the previous one behind. Goethe also finds metamorphosis in the vertebrae: they are related at their core, but diverge from one another in terms of their form depending on their purpose. According to Buffon, there is an original and universal plan in the animal kingdom, and Goethe, in the course of metamorphosis, proposes a "type" in which the forms of all animals are contained according to their potential. Button's method of "painting" organisms leads to a "morphology" that studies the architectural characteristics of animals. In morphology, the aim was to represent the newly discovered form in a comprehensible way.

However, the difference between our "morphology" and theirs is now apparent: modern science approaches things in a schematic order. There is a

The "method" of morphology. It has a path that can be followed by anyone and that can be learned. For ancient morphology, however, something else was decisive: it sought concrete orientation. Goethe talks about how it is important to grasp the external parts of a form in context in order to master the whole in perception. For him, morphology is a discipline whose experiments he was able to find in the course of art, knowledge and science, and he talks about how closely this scientific desire was connected with the urge to create art and imitate. The comprehensibility of a form lies in the way in which one perceives its contours, i.e. how one understands its individual features from the outset in relation to the context in which it exists as a whole. Only from this perspective was it possible for Goethe to write to Nees van Esenbeck that he was not attracted to the formless, seemingly arbitrary nature of cryptogams, that he "as a friend grasped

Goethe speaks of the vitality of perception and of the need to remain flexible and malleable in relation to nature, following the example it sets for us. He says that phenomena are not detached from the observer, but rather are engulfed and entangled in the observer's individuality. Finding the point of union has always been a mystery, because the individuality of each person would have to be consulted separately. Only an elevated, passionate mind is capable of grasping nature. He says "that such an aperçu, such awareness, comprehension, representation, concept, idea, whatever one may call it, always — no matter how one behaves — retains an esoteric quality. In general, it can be expressed, but not proven; in detail, it can be demonstrated, but it cannot be fully and completely explained. Even two people who had been inspired by the same idea would find it difficult to agree on its application in detail. Indeed, to go further, we may assert that the individual solitary, silent observer and nature lover does not always remain in agreement with himself and, from one day to the next, takes a clearer or darker view of the problematic subject, depending on whether the power of the mind can express itself more purely and completely in the process. For the sake of a systematic overview, however, the individual is encountered as "Case". It is measured according to the principles of this view.

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Fa 11, Example and Experiment

The logical difference between natural science at that time and ours today lies in the fact that its object was not classified under the category of case, but under that of example. In the tactical transformation of leaves into crown leaves "condenses" the view for Goethe. He drew a lesson from it. The general significance of an example

lies in the fact that one can "learn" something from it. This teaching did not refer to how things actually are in nature, nor to what happens, but to how one should view things. For this morphology, it was a matter of gaining a way of thinking, of coming to terms with the products of nature in order to strive for their "spiritual participation" in them. Goethe's phrase "to grasp the eternal in passing" is only an expression of grasping events in nature from the perspective of an example, that the simple is hidden in the manifold.

If something contains a lesson, it is an example. However, the lesson contained in phenomena, the "lesson that phenomena themselves are," refers to seeing. "I do not ask about objects at all, but demand that everything should conform to my way of thinking." But it is a consequence of an interest that concerns the relationship one places oneself in with things that Goethe had to hate apparatus. For they distort precisely this relationship. He was only concerned with what surrounded him on earth and could be perceived directly by the senses; he was never interested in astronomy. But Goethe was generally suspicious of experiments, and this is related to his declaration that he wanted to ask not about causes, but only about conditions. Of course, it is not entirely clear at first glance how cause and condition can be contrasted with each other. Modern science also speaks of conditions. However, this expression is ambiguous. For here, the conditions are part of the event over which the experimenter has control as something known to him insofar as he can produce them technically. Only from this point of view does he argue at all. With the intention of separating the factors involved in an event, experimentally distinguished cases are realised. However, the unfortunate thing here is that the experiments have been separated from humans, as it were, and are only carried out with artificial instruments.

show, recognise nature, indeed, what it can achieve, thereby "restricting and proving it". In response to these arguments, Goethe emphasises the recapitulative, merely demonstrative nature of his "experiments". The condition here is what the experimenter must fulfil in order for things to manifest themselves. In other words, the circumstances under which a phenomenon occurs, or in relation to which a form can be understood as a variation of a type. However, these circumstances cannot be formulated in isolation. They are only circumstances for certain living beings, for example. What we see, chemically and physically speaking, E. B., the same condition, means different things as circumstances depending on the form and function of an animal. Only in conjunction with its sensory organisation can it be discovered as its own, i.e. as the environment corresponding to it. **This**, however, places the morphology of the time in stark contrast to Darwinism. For Goethe, for example, adaptation is not something whereby different animals are compared and naively reduced to one, namely "our" anthropomorphically absolutised "Nature" can be related to. Adaptation here does not mean a goal at all, but rather the fact that every living thing in its world

Goethe therefore also rejects the supposed practicality of organisms. Every animal is physiologically perfect, "no part of it is useless when viewed from within". It is something "formed by circumstances into circumstances", a "small world that exists for its own sake and through itself". I said that Goethe's exclusive property is only the theory of colours. It has fared worst in the assessment of Goethe's scientific writings to date. There was little that could be done with it. However, Goethe himself was partly to blame for this through his polemic against Newton. He criticised Newton's experiments — and not happily. But insofar as he criticised, he misunderstood himself. Precisely in order to explain in more detail what has been hinted at about the style and type of a science, Goethe's

Colour theory is particularly relevant here.

Goethe's Theory of Colours

Goethe's **criticism** of Newton was actually a rejection; he attacked "truths" but rejected this whole type of science. In doing so, he betrayed his own worldview by presenting it as a scientific one. His opponents, however, **did** the same: they sought to present as provable what was in fact an ideological decision. The excessive, vehement nature of Goethe's polemic against Newton points precisely to his personal commitment to the cause. It therefore does not mean salvation, but rather a trivialisation of Goethe's theory of colours, if one incorporates the underlying metaphysical attitude into it — as if his theory of colours belonged to speculative natural philosophy. Admittedly, his contemporaries believed they had to understand him in this way, but he himself was not comfortable with this. In any case, he remained silent on the matter. Goethe was not a speculative natural philosopher; the richness and precision of his observations are recognised even by Helmholtz.

What appears in Goethe as a criticism of Newtonian optics is in fact merely an acknowledgement of its achievements. Goethe objects to the fact that nature is "separated, as it were, by experiments" and that "what artificial instruments show limits and proves what nature can achieve". Physicists can only discover what their assumptions allow them to see. With regard to colours, he can only help to create the circumstances under which colours are seen. In physics, colours are only mentioned allegorically. Today, optics is in fact only a section of the physics of ether waves. Even colour-blind people can study optics; Newton himself had only a very poor ability to distinguish colours.

This has also become common knowledge today. The front line of Goethe's theory of colours has turned against psychology.

postponed. It **is believed that** colours are something like "psychiatry". Colours are certainly linked to a specific sensory organisation. Bees see "colours" differently than we do. But does that mean colours are mere "sensations"? We can no longer say that. Because that would ignore the fact that colour is something that can be grasped, understood, "comprehended" in some way. We, for example, see

"Basic" colours, e.g. mixtures of such colours; however, the Greeks saw colours as being bound to matter. And one cannot understand the appeal of Chinese ceramics if, when looking at their glazes, one does not take into account the completely different way in which the Chinese conceive of colour. As soon as one sees colours, one is already under the spell of a certain interpretation. Especially when we see "mere" colours, this abstraction reveals a certain perspective that we take for granted, but which can only be illustrated to others through examples. Goethe says of the elementary phenomena of nature that one must "first modify them in order to be able to assimilate them to some extent".

People talk about a "world" of colours. This is not just an empty phrase. Because nature is not perceived in the same way by the different senses. Only when touching, smelling and seeing are there "sensations" in the true sense of the word. In our private, self-centred existence, we are addressed here. Smells and tactile impressions have an extremely vital significance. The smell of gas warns **me**; the "seriousness" of resistance is experienced through touch. But when it comes to colours, "nature as a whole" presents itself to me here. What one sees oneself, in which one is present as a witness, so to speak.

One "experiences" the world in colours. Certainly — appearances can be deceiving. Through smell and touch, one seeks to ascertain the authenticity of something that one has initially only seen. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle "the perceptions through the eyes are most important". For in seeing, I bring myself into relation with the world as a whole. Defects in other senses only produce a

Uncertainty. Blindness, however, means exclusion from the world and being pushed back into the realm of purely private existence. In colours and tones, we relate to beings in their entirety; there is no equivalent to painting and music in the other senses. It is precisely from this point that Goethe approaches colour. He accuses Newton of failing to find an explanation for the painter's ingenious activity. Painting is explicitly included in the empirical material of his theory of colours. For him, artistic representation is the primary truth of colours. He later writes to Jacobi that the **title** "Chromatics" would have been less controversial for his theory of colours.

Colours are seen "outside". They are fleeting phenomena whose occurrence is bound to the situation of an observer. A certain perspective is required to see colours. But a certain perspective means: certain possibilities realising and other non-existing perspectives.

"The creation of colour and decision-making are one and the same." Colours are born in "circumstances"; the aim is to "release them from their abstract state, as it were". And certainly, "neither experiments nor pigments are capable of presenting the complete colour circle".

Goethe describes such situations: "The sun is heralded by a redness as it shines down on us through a greater mass of vapours. The higher it rises, the brighter and yellower the glow becomes. When the darkness of infinite space is viewed through atmospheric vapours extinguished by daylight, the colour blue appears. On high mountains, the sky appears royal blue during the day because only a few fine vapours float above the infinite, gloomy space; as soon as one descends into the valleys, the blue becomes brighter until, in certain regions and with increasing vapours, it finally turns completely white-blue." Goethe then gives the example of an old oil painting in which a black velvet skirt suddenly turned into a light blue plush skirt after the painting was wiped with a damp cloth.

He explained this to himself "from the doctrine of the trüben means". The artist liked to base his already aged black paint with a special varnish to make it quite deep, which absorbed some moisture when washed and thus became cloudy, causing the underlying black to immediately appear blue. But what does "trübe.s Mittel" ("cloudy medium"), "unter-liegen" ("**underlying**") etc. mean? To what extent is the colour "shadowy"? After all, cloudiness only seems to reduce the intensity of the light. Of course, Goethe's use of the terms "Finsternis" ("darkness") and " " ("cloudy") is not entirely clear. In the negative colours of the blue series, darkness and cloudiness are indeed clearly distinct: blue can be seen against the backdrop of darkness. Darkness remains darkness here; it is by no means brightened. Blue is seen "on top of" it. The cloudiness of the vapours is added here: the denser the atmosphere becomes, the less colour one sees here; blue transitions to white-blue and then to white. However, the positive colours are seen on the basis of light; light shining through a cloudy medium becomes clouded down to yellow and red. The more cloudiness, the more colour appears here. Certainly, when it is said that blue **is** seen "above" black, when there is talk of "cloudiness" due to vapours, this is not easy to understand in a "tangible" way. But does it then have only a metaphorical, and ultimately only speculative, meaning? I do not believe so. Goethe later says in his remarks on the sensual and moral effect of colour that

Blue always carries something dark with it... Just as we see the high sky and distant mountains as blue, a blue surface also seems to recede before us. Just as we like to pursue a pleasant object that flees before us, we like to look at blue, not because it presses upon us, but because it draws us in. Blue gives us a feeling of age, just as it **reminds** us of shadows ... Rooms that are wallpapered in pure blue appear spacious in a sense, but actually empty and cold. "Empty", "**cold**", "retreat" etc., these words only have a figurative meaning here

"figurative" meaning? The difficulties in interpreting Goethe's theory of colours arise from the opinion that words always refer to something specific. As if the meaning of a word **were** originally **fixed** in reality **and** could therefore only be transferred to other "things". But when we say that a colour, a contour, a board, etc. is "hard", none of these cases can be distinguished from others as the actual "original" meaning of

"Hard" is certainly considered here in its own way, "hard" describes an impression that different things can make. It is a certain meaning that is taken up here, which — initially objectively neutral — is then merely further defined in different ways from the concretion of a specific context. Applied to Goethe's theory of colours: blue is not metaphorically characterised as "cold". When Goethe speaks of "darkness", he means "nothing more than" "darkness". In this respect, Goethe can speak of phenomena in the morning and evening glow that are "the teaching itself" that everything "here is transformed into a kind of manifestation". The laws and rules to which Goethe subjects colours cannot be "revealed to the mind through words and hypotheses". However, it is precisely and solely the actual, fundamental meaning of "dark," "above," etc., that one is compelled to consider when observing the primordial phenomena, the perception of which is then later reinforced by the remarks on the sensual and moral effect of colours. Goethe's primordial phenomena are different from fashionable ones. For in a model, I demonstrate something that is definable in itself,

i.e. what can be made clear from itself. However, the clarity of the original phenomenon can at best be compared to illustration by means of an example. Examples are not only a convenient means of making something clear to someone, but also the only means, if it is not initially within the scope of their original understanding.

The type of knowledge represented by Goethe was not actually related to "nature". Goethe was only interested in nature insofar as he was involved in the phenomena himself. He wrote to Schiller that in his observations of nature

"**always** results in **a** subjective whole". He moved from the visual arts to natural science. What was initially intended to be merely a tool then appealed to him as an end in itself. He understood the problems as facilitating observation. In morphology — when Goethe says, for example, that the body of a fish "fits" into the water — this results in a quasi-aesthetic, and thus somehow inappropriate, way of looking at things. With colours, however, it is different. For their creation is bound up with the fact that certain aspects can be taken up and thus grasped. Goethe therefore devoted a different kind of seriousness to the theory of colours; the expression

"aper9u" would be ill-suited here. Goethe never applied it to colour theory either. For Goethe, colour was "the lawfulness of nature in relation to the sense of sight".

What is of particular interest is not so much nature itself as the relationship between "the most significant earthly object, the human being," and this **nature**.

THE WAY OF LIFE OF THE "PTTMIVEN"

Mayer-Groß contrasts "existential behaviour" with a mindset that separates subject and object; among primitive peoples, he argues, the realm of existential behaviour is greater than that of rational thinking. However, there are several points to be made in this comparison:

Questions that are "resolved in existence" are primarily questions whose resolution involves a world view. "World view" here means something that has become part of one's experience and destiny, an attitude that one has made one's own, something to which one is committed, something one can stand up for.

However, dealing with things can also be described as "existential behaviour". Only when one engages with things does something like their "meaning" emerge. Things are addressed in relation to something specific. Their essence always lies in the direction of a particular question. We dispose of things in advance. They must be turned around in order to be understood. However, the elucidation of certain meanings refers to a specific direction of existence. Things are understood in relation to a specific meaning. The Kate-

6 rien stand under the horizon of a certain interpretation of D a s e i n s e I b s t. The expression "existent behaviour" behaviour" does not refer to anything in which a "reason" emerges in a fateful turn of events, on the basis of which something is decided ("clairvoyantly") — rather, it refers to the everyday understanding of things, which contains a "reason" that is initially concealed.

The "subject-object split" now refers to a certain contrast only in relation to existential behaviour in this second sense:

things, insofar as they are taken on one side, insofar as they are encountered as e t v i s, which is used and considered

can be, are not objects. Ob-iectum is what one imagines. Namely, what one "somehow" imagines. Something of which one "forms a picture". (There are no "given" imaginations.) As an object, something can be viewed "as it is" or "from a different point of view". Some things speak for, others against a particular view. The view of a thing can be established. The projection one makes of something seeks to encounter its essence. However, when dealing with things, such a "core" as the object has, which one imagines "somehow" in this respect, is precisely what "S e ite" opposite, in terms of which they are understood in their meaning, namely within a horizon of meaning. What one imagines can be formulated in terms of characteristics. Something that can be formulated in this sense is, for example, the cause of something. That which is identified as the cause is judged in this context as something that succeeds. In contrast, the "reasons" for something are precisely that which (as "favourable circumstance", "influence", "condition", "occasion", etc.) than to that which is referred to as "where it lies that ...". The cause is something that is actually brought out in the analysis, as opposed to the favourable circumstances, conditions, etc., which can only be discovered in their connection with them as the "condition for" etc. The reason why ... is understood as a circumstance, influence, etc. However, the references articulated here are not negated by the precise specification of a cause. Condition, influence, etc. are not "preliminary stages" for the concept of cause, which is why the "Causal concepts" of primitive people can be measured. The "subject-object split" merely refers to the specific mindset of judgement. The critical

¹ The "subject-object split" does not yet capture what is unique about science. It lies in the wake of the "thematization" of something. (See the later explanations in the text.) Something that has already been discovered here — pre-scientifically — is then methodically examined.

and in this respect, the "individualistic" attitude of judgement, whose point of view is always "mine", or rather a point of view only insofar as it is represented by someone, the correctable idea that someone forms of something, is contrasted with the ("collectivist") understanding in dealing with things. In the meaning of things, i.e. in what they are addressed as, one has expressed oneself. In addition to conclusive concepts, there is, for example, the conception of "something round", i.e. something that is provisionally left as "something round". But this means that here something can only be addressed or discussed in new terms, from other angles, but cannot actually be presented as an object or a thing in accordance with its core. "Language" is always a specific common language. It is something that one has learned, but not formed oneself. One grows into the world of meaning of one's mother tongue, which in this respect is a "means" of cognition and not just a means of communicating with others.

We contrast the "collectivist" world view with the "individualistic" world view. A world view is "relative" in that it denotes a particular standpoint towards the world, which in this case is the universe under discussion. A world view also does not have the existential

. There are certain directives according to which a subject area is approached and developed. And again, something special lies in the "technical-scientific mindset". It is "de-restriction": space, for example, is something that is initially encountered in the specific spatiality of things and is only concealed here. It is first and foremost in calculation and measurement that it is thematically grasped and revealed (Heidegger). The next step is then the de-restriction of environmental areas into "dimensions." The "streets" of physical space are freed from the meaning that refers back to the spatiality of existence, as it was shaped in the original concepts of "place," "location," etc.

' Cf. E. Weisgerber, *Muttersprache und Geistesbildung*, 1929, esp. pp. 71ff.

The significance of a world view. For here, the world is merely that to which one relates, but not an object to which one is related. A world view, such as the Copernican one, is something that can be developed, justified and improved in certain respects. It is something that one is convinced of. Beliefs are something that one has "gained for oneself" or that one has been taught. One shares the belief of another or makes it one's own. The world view is something different from the "view" of the world, i.e. what the world appears to be, insofar as it is interpreted and understood. This view of the world, as it becomes comprehensible in the various languages, in their internal form or in the meanings and categories that are leading here, is something that precedes the image one forms of what is already understood as the "world" in this context.

The term "primitive" is now subject to a specific directive. It conveys a certain opinion about indigenous peoples. "Primitive" means that they demonstrate not only a historically and chronologically earlier stage of human behaviour, but also a structurally and genetically earlier stage. Like Mayer-Groß, I do not believe that one can speak of "development" in this context. For, first of all, the supposedly primitive ideas also occur among non-primitive peoples, without being regarded here as mere "remnants" of an earlier stage of development. On the other hand, something appears here to be undeveloped and deficient only from the perspective of a development that is determined by the rationalisation of an idea and related to the formation of ideas. The English

On the concept of the world, cf. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (Husserl-Festschrift 1929), p. 84 ff.

° "It is astonishing to see that the Chinese and the Japanese (with their primitive mentality) have provided more examples than peoples such as the Andamanese or the Negritos" (Olivier Leroy, *La raison primitive*, 1927, p. 33).

Anthropologists have attempted to explain how, i.e. based on what experiences, what attitudes lead people to think this way; Lévy-Bruhl, on the other hand, asserts the fundamentally different, "pre-logical" nature of these assumptions.

For example, it is believed that the concepts of primitive peoples are undeveloped because they are "undifferentiated" and "diffuse". One speaks of "an original perception way of thinking, which determines and shapes things not according to their objective circumstances, but rather through subjective, affective perception ... The world of the primitive, the objects of this world, are not determined according to an objective system of interrelationships, but rather here

Lévy-Bruhl quotes, for example, the report by K. von den Steinen: "The Bororó coldly imply that they are actually red macaws, as if a caterpillar said it was a butterfly." (Among the Indigenous Peoples of Central Brazil, 2nd edition, 1897, p. 305.) Apart from the unusual nature of this conception — to what extent is it "prelogical"? Lévy-Bruhl believes that the Bororós did not notice the contradiction inherent in the fact that they were red parrots, i.e. creatures that were obviously not Bororós. However, the report in question does not suggest that the Bororo considered oieh to be "the same as" red parrots, in the sense that they confused themselves with them — such a nonsensical idea cannot be inferred from the report in question. But if we leave it at that, even if it is only a vague understanding of this "to be the same as" where something always refers to something specific "the same as" — then the concept in question logically stands alongside, for example, species, gender, etc. Only objects, i.e. things that cannot be addressed at all, neither as "a Bororó" nor as "a red parrot", are "different" here from the outset and in an absolute sense. Namely, insofar as their determinations would be required in an overarching systemic context at the point that is fixed by the object and that is constitutive for the object. However, something other than this "meaning" that comes to the object from a system is the meaning in the sense of what something is taken and understood to be. "Meaning" here does not mean something that belongs to (an object), but rather the intended aspect under which something reveals itself to me. The highlighting of an object is contrasted here with the situation in which something reveals itself to me. The belonging of A to another B, which belongs to the same totem, i.e. is the same as A, is not a "mystical participation" of A in B.

creates the meaning of the world." And as an example of the diffuse character of primitive ideas, R. Thurnivald's report serves to illustrate that the Aelanesier of the Bismarck Archipelago think not only of water droplets when they hear the word *ciki*, "but also of the spots they leave behind, the sound they make as they fall, the regular intervals at which they fall from the roof, and finally the unexpected suddenness of their fall." The word in question therefore does not mean "the naming of a concrete, entirely individual single thing, but rather a thing within an overall situation"³. However, we too call a spot created by a drop "a drop". Namely, precisely because we understand where this spot comes from, what it "means". "Drop" does not refer to a "completely individual single thing" from the outset. A drop is what drips or has dripped onto something. The word

"Drop*" does not refer to an object defined by characteristics "in itself". One cannot imagine a drop in the sense that this idea would derive its directive from an objective systemic context. Something appears to us as 'a drop'. However, this 'appearing as something' merely refers to the being-through (Heidegger) ° of the world, from which something either merely 'appears' or 'happens' to us, etc. This means that it is not only in the "primary layers of the soul" that "what we call ideas and feelings are not so sharply separated". From

¹ H. Werii, Introduction to Developmental Psychology, 1926, p. 48. Ethnopsychological Studies of South Sea Peoples. (Beth. 6 d. Zeitsehr. applied psychology) 1913, p. 91.

* V'erner, op. cit., 5. 80.

Something other than this "mood" is the fixed relationship of a living being to its environment. It manifests itself precisely in the choice of areas that an animal, for example, seeks out in order not to end up in a "foreign element".

Wer n e r, op. cit., p. 48.

Rather, things are only put together when one deals with them. One experiences them when, for example, one looks around or acts. Observation, overview, caution, etc. are signs of prudent alertness. However, observation and foresight stand alongside concern, timid shyness, etc. What one encounters, experiences, etc., is what one "lives through". "Experience" means being present. Only in the world can something be "lived through". Feelings, emotions, etc. can only be called experiences when one is "unpleasantly affected". "depressed", "cheered up", etc. feels through what one "experiences" in that sense. Only if one "somehow" "feels" 6iCh...

-find", there is such a thing as opening oneself up to the world or closing oneself off from it. (An expression such as "the psychological peculiarity of 'primitive peoples'" does not say enough here. Something that is actually only a "psychological peculiarity" would manifest itself, for example, in the way one is inclined to view something, assess a situation, or adopt a certain point of view or attitude. "To view something as something" does not mean to appreciate one aspect of it and thus in its what,

i.e. as what it shows itself to be, but rather: seeing something under a certain directive only as ... What is seen as ... is, in this respect, something already grasped, i.e. something — even if perhaps only provisionally — understood, thus already somehow already revealed. The meaning of things lies not only in the aspect to which they are addressed, but e s p e c i a l l y in the reference to this aspect. This, however, expresses a specific fundamental movement of life. Every question, every unknown aspect of ... points to a specific direction of interpretation. "True" has existential meaning. In perception, observation, etc., it is a matter of "dealing with" things. The so-called objectivity of the object does not lie in the absence of disturbing affects, as if the original

However, ideas and judgements are not "experiences". There are no conscious "experiences" at all. See above.

Interpretation of things would be "subjective" and could be measured and corrected against the objectivity of the object. An object is something that is open to discussion. When discussing, one talks about or to a thing. "Thing" originally means "matter", something that is presented for decision. It is part of the concept of objectivity that the decision can be justified and upheld in the face of objections. The idea one has of an object is, of course, something that can be corrected. Rationalisation only affects such "ideas". And the improvement through rationalisation lies in the gradual elimination of that which is removed from (public) discussion.

The same applies to the so-called instability of primitive ideas: "While our perceptions show a large degree of fragmentary structure in that the fragments possess a certain independence in their objective form and content, are 'stable', this is much less the case with primitive perceptions." Mayer-Groß aptly points out that a particular figure or colouring does not mean anything in itself, but only in the context of the whole. A stereometrically defined shape, for example, can 'be' many different things: it can be understood as the random shape that something, a piece of wax for example, has simply taken on. Or as a finished form, as a "point" in which a needle, for example, has undergone its technical design. Or perhaps as the natural, i.e. crystalline, form of a mineral or as the habitual morph of a protozoon. The various technical or natural meanings of the form, which at first does not emerge at all as a mere "form", can be demonstrated, for example, in the illusions: there is a shift to other relationships when contours that at first appeared to be the wrinkles of a crumpled sheet, on closer inspection

Wemer, op. cit., p. 84.

3 Lipps, Die Wirklichkeit des Menschen

Viewed as something external, but at the same time also as something independent, such as the drawing of a butterfly wing. Axich understands colour, for example, either as a "coating of" or as the "essence" of something in the sense of its natural appearance, or he takes it as something that has just dripped somewhere, etc. It is a special turn of phrase, namely a certain direction of the theme when one understands a colour merely as a "specific colour", namely as a specific primary colour, or as a mixture of such primary colours; or when, in the concept of the octahedron, something is understood merely as a stereometric shape. This thematisation is not mere "abstraction"; it is not to be understood merely as highlighting a dependent "moment" of an object. In the thematisation, an — admittedly excellent — aspect of colour, under which it can also manifest itself, is actually reversed. Another example is the number concepts of indigenous peoples. They not only contain the reference

on material things, but also on counting and its means, e.g. on the hand as the model for this counting. Only in a concealed manner does the primitive "have" or "know" the numbers here, which are to be revealed as that which is merely larger and smaller, and must first be revealed. The number becomes a topic insofar as its order, etc., is the guiding circumstance here, in which case something "is" 2, 3, etc.

So, this so-called instability isn't something that's unique to primitive thinking, nor is it something that can be fixed by the stability of what's being talked about. It's a really superficial thing to say that there are stable and unstable "ideas." Something is considered "primitive" here that is in fact only the original counterpart to the thematisation. Certainly, what is thematically addressed has already been explored beforehand. However, this does not mean that "development" is indicated in the thematisation. The thematisation, of course, enables something like

"Science". And there is a development in this knowledge: old ideas are abandoned and replaced by better ones. In rationalisation, however, it is a development of the ideas themselves that is marked, but not a stage of "idea formation". The "objectivity" of the idea is not only the result of a certain behaviour — it is often something that is intended from the outset. Its emergence can only be motivated by a certain attitude. It is subject to the same directive as the method of achieving this objectivity. In particular, the objectivity of ideas cannot be measured by the "concepts" under which things are originally taken. The schema of an idea is contrasted here with the category. "Category" means: the anticipated perspective under which things are "questionable". In the idea, one simply "overcomes" the object, which is something clearly defined, whose various interpretations can confirm and correct each other, provided that there is only one "core" to be hit here. Something else, however, is the prudent disposal of things, insofar as one addresses them on ... and insofar as they reveal themselves from the side to which they are turned. (The categories as possibilities for hitting the mark are not "conditions" — as, for example, the conditions of the experimenter are something that is just as much a part of him as the interpretation of the way things react in this case — namely, without revealing what they are in the process.) Here, one understands things. For example, one may know something. For example, a mineral, insofar as one discovers the meaning of certain colour phenomena in it, etc. Other things, on the other hand, may be "closed" to us from the outset.

For example, certain colours, provided that their conception lies in a particular turn of phrase and we are caught up in the spell of a different interpretation. Moreover, however, it is a certain attunement to ... in which there is, first and foremost, something like this, such an "experience" (experifi) that sets in. Yor-sicht,

Observing, caring for, ensuring that ... point to a certain relationship to the world: one already knows things somehow, even if one has not yet fathomed something specific. One must somehow be, i.e. be present, in order to be able to discover something like "landscape", for example, or so-called "nature"*. Namely, nature in the sense of what shows itself not only to me, i.e. **from** one side, **as** what it "is" (in the sense of:

"means"), but rather something that presents itself excellently as it is. Or: when one discovers the physiognomy of something, one is "addressed" by it. Or: the concept of "savages" articulates the distant, as they merely "appeared" to their discoverers as "savages". Something else is, for example, the relationship expressed in the Greek term $\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ i, in which the Greek stands in relation to the "stranger" insofar as the latter "speaks an incomprehensible language". And the decisive factor here lies not only in the way in which human beings understand themselves in their questionability, but rather in the "fundamental nature of the being of their existence" that can be grasped in this: whether, for example, one is so involved with things that one can deal with them perceive them, and in this respect have them at one's disposal, so that they then return in their whatness to what one has anticipated in addressing them, so that one then actually comprehends them

"puts into safekeeping". Or whether one finds oneself belonging to the world in such a way that one — and this appears as "indifference to the spheres of reality" — one does not deal with things "embarrassedly" and **does not take** them to heart in the way that they present themselves **to us under** the horizon of a particular situation (as "this" or "that" that "exists" there, for example), namely as what they "really are", — but that one can only "touch" that which, as a "being", merely bears these and those "**traits**", i.e. its appearance in the

See G. Stern, *Über das Haben*, 1928, chap. 3.

Heidegger, review of E. Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, II. (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1929, issue 21, p. 1009).

Meaning "is" that one can also "be" in the mask, which one cannot actually encounter as a being, but rather can only "call upon" in its name and to which one can command oneself.

The parallelism between so-called archaic-primitive thinking and schizophrenic thinking can then no longer be interpreted as meaning that a deeper biological layer is breaking through in the illness. I agree with Mayer-Groß here; the indication that not only the alleged primitives, but also world and religious systems appear in people who knew nothing about them before their illness is conclusive. However, even here, it is not simply "the existential attitude" into which an incipient brain disease draws people. What initially bears the stigma of the disorder: "beside oneself", "shaken" or only just "Confusion" occurs in the wake of certain experiences. The so-called symptoms of the illness reveal a change in one's relationship to the world. The shift relates to the nature of being in the world. The dizziness or bewilderment of ... are not simply ways of being "moved" by things — just as shock, fright, etc. are nothing more than such "affects". For affects and feelings are something that is "understandable". Namely, on the basis of a specific "state of mind". For example, one laughs at what "seems" funny. Here, one is open to what can only "seem" funny in this way, as one detaches oneself from the situation in which one experiences it. Only when one anxiously anticipates something does one startle at the unexpected, etc. Even in the dazed state of ... there is only a kind of being-in-the-world described. The basis of its interpretation is crazy here, if one finds oneself referred to things in the sense that one can only experience oneself as related to them.

PRAGMATISM AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

The current philosophical situation in Germany is defined by existential philosophy. It represents a break with previous philosophy. Despite the diversity of its systems and viewpoints, from today's perspective one can recognise the uniformity of its intentions, the consistency of its problems. It remained surrounded by an attitude that was taken for granted, but which is no longer equal to what is pushing for a breakthrough in the intellectual situation of our time. The fact that these were teachings and systems seems to call this into question. Perhaps there has never been a time when all these systems were as "known" as they are today. But it is precisely the fact that this philosophy can be transformed into mere knowledge that makes it suspect. We have become distrustful of what can be represented within the limits of reason, what can be captured within it, what can be made available to everyone in general forms without requiring existential commitment. We sense the non-binding nature of these systems and doctrines.

The influence of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard is characteristic of today's situation. Both were considered outsiders in their day. Their thinking was so different. These are not teachings and positions that can be demonstrated, whose validity can be discussed. It is a new overall attitude. It is not a way of thinking that finds peace in solutions, only to then be able to dispense with itself again, as it were. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard were both hostile to "systems". **Everything** seems to be trivialised in these systems. They pointed out how they distract from the seriousness that has broken out in me as my own reality. The uncertainty, tension, openness and fragmentary nature of our temporal existence contrasts with the closed totality of such didactic pieces. Both discovered the "inhuman" in

the approach of, for example, a "pure" **subject** of knowledge. For Nietzsche, the desire for a system is nothing less than a lack of integrity.

The question of what philosophy actually "is" is reposed here. It is freed from the embrace in which it has been held by science since Descartes. For Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, cognition is an "interpretation." This "interpretation" means an illuminating understanding, a revealing of the reasons for our existence that were initially lost. Existential philosophy, insofar as it is not a doctrine, can therefore only be demonstrated. For in this new movement of thought, the space that is to be traversed here in steps of reflection first becomes visible. This reflection is, of course, aware that it will find no ground. Only the direction of the path of such thinking can be determined.

There is a quote from Kierkegaard: "The philosopher of the system is like a man who builds a castle but lives in the shed next door. This fantastic being does not live in what he thinks, but a man's thoughts must be the building in which he lives." It is easy to see a certain affinity between the motives of such thinking and those of pragmatism. For if pragmatism can undertake to analyse the practice of cognition without being swayed by points of view, what else does it reveal in this but the indifference and irrelevance of these scholastic philosophical discussions? Pragmatism, too, has as its opponent a philosophy which, misjudging its original nature, acts like a

Vissenseliaft, only as the highest, wanted to establish, but which could never actually be acute, which always lost out in matters that had already been carried out by actual science within those boundaries, within

which they are meaningful at all. And pragmatism, in the same way as existential philosophy, has the system

1 ›hiloso}shie. For it, too, this opposition does not mean discussing and confronting the other in order to determine the right of a stand point and

Both distance themselves from this opponent right from the start, without even engaging with him. And the comparison between the two is so demonstrative because neither has influenced the other. In order to show the different positions of these two types of philosophy, a parallel will now be drawn, in which one will be approached from the perspective of the other. The point of reference is determined by the mutual orientation towards the concept of truth. For once again, both pragmatism and existential philosophy seek to regain a relationship with reality. Pragmatism does so by pointing to simple practice, which it plays off against the exaggeration of the concept of truth established by tradition. Existential philosophy does so in its desire for honesty in thinking, in its appeal to the seriousness of the individual. We will therefore attempt to define the field of pragmatism and existential philosophy. I discover this field in a specific mindset. This mindset is linked to certain demands that pragmatism is willing to make on truth, or — in existential philosophy — to a determined search for "actual" truth.

2.

Admittedly, criticism has consistently made pragmatism too cheap. One must seek to penetrate the great intentions of James and Dewey in order to sense the proximity to pragmatism in the young Nietzsche, for example, who in the **second** "Untimely Meditation" speaks of the "idlers in the garden of knowledge".

Dewey speaks of the "prejudice that what exists must be something that is somehow recognised" — as if the structure of what exists could only lie in the concept. For our original relationship to things is **not** knowledge at all. Rather, when dealing with things, we concern ourselves with

Things as the next thing. One has and experiences them, for example, in handling them, in desiring them, in their controversial nature as objects. They appear to me as resistance. I notice the weather outside if it affects my mood. One experiences things in the course of practice. For example, I do not need to "recognise" a number written as a decimal fraction — I just need to be "familiar with it", with its notation, etc., in order to be able to calculate with it. Recognising in the true sense of the word, however, would mean that one "takes custody" of something, insofar as one understands or imagines it. In which case, an "inventory" taken into possession is then considered to be true. Originally

However, one "relates" to things and does so correctly or incorrectly depending on how attuned one is to them; error means a misgrasp. The way and direction of my interaction with something is reflected in what and how something is experienced. At first, what exists has no conceptual structure like the object of knowledge, which is always somehow "pre-present". And doesn't the word "comprehend" already point in the direction of getting a grip on something, of grasping it, in order to understand it in such a way that one knows what to do with it? Things are never isolated as objects.

recognised, but always experienced within the context of specific situations.

The most obvious reality had thus been suppressed here. But what then does "knowledge" mean? We speak of the "object* of knowledge." That which is to be known becomes an aspect of an opposite. It is thus only an object "for the time being." Knowledge has an "episodic" character (DeWey). Cognition always involves a question. It means investigating, observing, examining, looking eagerly. However, the driving force behind this heightened activity is always an opportunity. It lies in the interruption of my self-knowledge. Cognition is concerned with its restoration. Thus, cognition is always embedded in a horizon that is not itself cognitive, but which, on the other hand, holds, carries forward and secretly guides the cognising subject. For it is no coincidence that one strives

Knowledge. There is no such thing as disinterested, "pure" knowledge. One wants something in return. Namely, **to be able** to dispose of things again. All knowledge is relative to a particular natural situation. Whatever it may be, whatever it may want, it cannot transcend the situation, and because knowledge leads back to the manageability of things, it has an "instrumental function" (Dewey).

So far, we have been talking about the "place" of knowledge. But how does it take place? In the distancing from, in the "Subject-object division" refers to being thrown back upon oneself. Behind the abstract relationships that epistemology introduces, pragmatism recognises in attitudes, affections, etc. the existential events, the reality in which these relationships are to be found. The object of knowledge is to be explained and analysed. One seeks to find indicative signs in the view of being able to get along with others again. And what was initially conceived and imagined in this direction proves to be true insofar as it subsequently fulfils itself as an actual possibility of interaction. Truth lies in the resolution and clarification of situations. A situation is only characterised by truth insofar as the division that has been overcome is present, insofar as freedom of action has been regained. Knowledge and truth only exist in their after-effects. In the prudence and clarity of practical interaction. Truth is in what springs forth, what "becomes" through reasonable intervention. And it is not fixed, insofar as it shifts in the direction of the advancing overall situation. Truth cannot therefore be taken possession of in a layered manner. It is only a means and must not be hypostasised and exaggerated into the ultimate reality. It does not have any "intrinsic" permanence. It is only a change that demands to be redeemed. Truth does not lie in any correspondence with objects, but in the fact that certain operations "fit" the situations.

But truth is not found in individual human beings either. If truth remains internal, it runs the risk of being thwarted. For the situation whose open brightness **all around** is the discovery of truth is the "field" of practice. In the field of practice, one encounters others. My abilities, and therefore also my knowledge, are determined, i.e. limited, by consideration for these others. I may or may not be the right person for the job; truth can therefore only be experienced collectively. Knowledge requires correction by others. Truth is therefore not absolute insofar as its emergence depends on the mutual goodwill of those who communicate with each other, interweave their knowledge and allow it to be transformed in the process. Franklin: "A person who recognises their belonging with others gives up all truth that is self-evident." Any direct assertion of truth **destroys** its communication. For assertions prevent the listener from responding. Communication of truth becomes important when its mobility and its endangerment by the dogmatic obstinacy of the isolated individual have been recognised. In fact, in Franklin's social psychology, as this

E. Baumgarten* has shown that pragmatism is already inherent. For it is a way of thinking, an attitude that also secretly guides the American lifestyle. Pragmatism reflects something that also shapes everyday American life. Behind pragmatism lies a harmonious ethos. This ethos appeals to human "reasonableness," turning the situation around so that it demands the creation of reliable bonds everywhere and the maintenance of availability. It is an attitude that stands in opposition to the exclusive possession of knowledge.

The fact that such an ethos comes to the fore in pragmatism is precisely what makes this philosophy so "elite". This is because pragmatism is not a contrived point of view. Here, knowledge and truth are understood in the breadth of their

E. Baumgarten, Benjamin Franklin and the Psychology of American Everyday Life. (Neue Jahrbücher 1933, p. 251ff.)

Concretion, as a human matter, described. A certain self-image of human beings, a certain way of interpreting oneself, worldviews and philosophies of life are understood in pragmatism and made explicit. A certain type of person, namely one who is naturally and inevitably determined, is discussed here. Pragmatism is an addendum that philosophy applies to life here.

This is what is immediately apparent as being so radically different about this approach compared to the systematic philosophy that has prevailed since Descartes. For the fact that these philosophical systems sought to discover the true essence of being in the image of the whole of existence led to an alienation from oneself. Even in their defence and criticism, these philosophies always remained attached to each other as schools. And it was Descartes' position in particular that repeatedly prevailed here. Certainly, human beings have always been understood here in some way in their essence and in the motives of their existence. However, this anthropological foundation remained unrecognised and was only secretly guiding. Human beings were not determined by the forces of their nature, but were only formulaically included — e.g. in terms of achievements, such as knowledge, as the condition of their possibility. However, this "subject" of knowledge denotes an inhuman position. It is dissected here as if detached from time. As an Archimedean point from which, however, human beings themselves, in their factual isolation, are lifted out of their hinges and brought into suspension. Here, they are regarded as rational beings. But in fact, they are only representatives of this rationality. And they are cut off from the underlying origins of their existence. Above the general, one forgets here that he is an individual. The factual existence of the individual is betrayed to the timeless. Since Descartes, philosophy has been in conformity with science. It shares its anonymity. It can be represented by means of the general. Its problems are said to be timeless. One

verifies the accuracy of its insights. Pragmatism represents a correction to these philosophical systems. For example, it also reveals the generally concealed horizon of science when it strives for objectivity of knowledge and truth. It is precisely here that it is easy to detect the seal of finitude: for only a being that is always in situations can have the desire to make itself largely independent of the particularities of these situations and can seek means to make situations available that are applicable everywhere, at any time and for everyone. Objectively, truth is here only a careful "means" that is given to one.

3.

Pragmatism is a reflection on what actually happens in cognition. It reveals the truth in life and represents a correction of traditional teaching insofar as it destroys its illusory nature. It seeks to return to unadulterated reality. Existential philosophy, however, does not merely seek to be such a correction in order to reveal the illusory nature of an ideology. It is not a simple, objective reflection that, as in pragmatism, brings about comprehensibility — certainly of agreement with regard to the ground that one simply should not have denied. The sincerity of existential philosophical thinking is more than mere "honesty." In existential philosophy, genuine pragmatic questioning is contrasted with the effort to remain in "authenticity." Existential philosophy does not seek enlightenment. Its very theme becomes irrelevant when existential philosophy turns against "addiction," as happens in knowledge and understanding, insofar as these mean evading reality in oneself. Real reversal here stands in contrast to reflection arising from hasty interpretation .

Existence points to the doom of the hen, over whom science gains power, and who is thus blinded to himself and cheated of his own possibilities. It does not correct objectively, but rather st e l l t m i c h, insofar as it brings me back from a pretence of myself. Insofar as I cannot find myself where philosophy sought me as the subject of knowledge. Kierkegaard wants to sober up the individual, to bring me back to the reality of my existence, which is temporal and accountable, from my lostness in a generality such as reason or "objective spirit". Nietzsche also wants a realism of human existence. It would not depend on images or any worldviews, but on getting to the bottom of what really moves me and is mostly hidden, on the foundations of our conscious existence. Existential philosophy that only appeals cannot be made public and exposed in factual structures. It requires inner effort, a commitment to gain new ground in self-reflection. This philosophising takes place in steps. The crisis that occurs in the process contrasts existential philosophy with philosophising since Descartes. which always strove for the right "method". Method is a factual way that can be taught and learned. Namely, how to take control of things, deal with them, make objective progress, and obtain reliable results. Due to the constraints of circumstances, this very philosophy, which sought to establish itself as the highest science in its pursuit of the right method, slipped away. It pursued its goal insofar as it brought it into the realm of new disciplines. Epistemology, logistics, and various psychological schools arose as a result of the influence of the Cartesian position. This philosophy overlooked the reality of my existence, this existence that spans between birth and death. It was betrayed here to timeless generality, as it were, immobilised by its tension, its openness, its fragmentary nature.

Heidegger's book is called "Being and Time". It raises the question of the meaning of "being" in a new way. This has always been understood in some way when it has been discussed. However, this average understanding needs to be made explicitly available. This is done by placing it explicitly under the horizon of human existence. For existence understands itself in the manifold meanings under which it takes being. One can ask two questions here: 1. To what extent does the manifold meaning of being become the constitution of my existence experience? Or 2. To what extent does the temporality of human existence denote the inner possibility of its relationship to the world?

i.e. the view from which the world presents itself to him? The second question will be briefly discussed here:J

When we ask about the temporality of our existence, this cannot mean associating this existence with time as we know it in its objective sense, familiar to us as the present, future, etc. For its meaning, i.e. the objective meaning that makes something present, etc. for us, is only a reflection of the temporality of our existence. In existence, time is "laid out" in contrast to things that only extend "in" the time constituted by it.

To what extent is existence itself temporal? Existence resembles the formal basic feature of being human, even before the particularities of its anthropological or psychological nature. We now "find" ourselves existing, i.e. it is impossible to return "behind" us, for example, "in front" of us in our existence, which we can only accept and to which we can only relate in some way. We are not in control of our existence, and therefore not in control of ourselves, insofar as we have no control over our beginnings. We "have" to be. This means that our existence is not given to us, but "imposed" upon us.

In every step of our existence, it is therefore about ourselves. It therefore means an ability, a possibility in relation to exist^{ing}, which is presented here as inherited under the horizon of

Possibilities. What becomes apparent in this: our life demands to be "guided" in some way. We design ourselves towards a meaning. In this respect, we understand ourselves. Every step of my existence therefore means an interpretation of my being, insofar as it happens as a seeing-engaging with the world in situations. In this, in that I am not powerful over myself, insofar as I cannot lay the foundation of myself, but can only take it from the world, in that in my always-already-being its possibility is overtaken, existence shows itself as fact. It is the fact of our existence. This **means that** it is not a fact in the usual sense of the word, which refers to something that has happened in time, has originated from somewhere and has thus left its **origin** in time behind. For example, a hook is something that has become a hook from something else. It was not there before, but instead was just a piece of iron. The fact that this hook then exists somewhere and sometime shows how it is constituted by the context of events, held by encompassing situations. It has a "place" in time, namely in the temporally expanding reality. But the facticity of being-there, which it has in itself in its temporality, is different. And one cannot separate finding oneself from being. Being-there manifests itself as a "state of mind." Temporality thus explicates itself in unity with being.

Secondly: if one has to be, one projects oneself onto possibilities and is thus ahead of oneself or beyond oneself. However, insofar as this concerns myself in my assumed existence, I approach or return to myself at every step of my existence. And again: I do not relate to any future here, as one might otherwise expect to do with the future. It is not time that is open here, but I myself am the open one. I discover myself as an open question. However, this responsibility for oneself, insofar as one comes to oneself in what one takes on, occurs at the moment of decision. Existence "manifests itself" insofar as it takes place in steps.

And it is temporal from within, ultimately in the Wursel, insofar as it is connected to itself precisely in its coming into being. Temporality thus "creates" precisely this selfhood. But the temporality of things means precisely the opposite of such a connectedness manifesting itself in selfhood. What they are, they are from something else, and time is something into which they are torn, carried away by, left behind in.

But if every step of existence occurs as responsibility for itself, namely as 2'lyor 6t6orot, then **knowledge** as understanding, namely understanding oneself in relation to things, is included here from the outset. Knowledge occurs as an interpretation of oneself in situations. Existence takes place in concepts, insofar as every understanding means a distinction of itself. Here, too, knowledge is about something; knowledge does not want to see itself as "s e Ib s t," as pragmatism denied, that knowledge made itself the advocate of otherworldly truth. For him, however, truth was a s a e hli c he

Akkordans,

Acting appropriately to the situation. However,fiyya is everyone's business. We are talking here about being a steward of situations; this means making it understandable, explaining to what extent something is "right" here, i.e. under the given circumstances.

circumstances is the given truth. It should never be forgotten that even the most correct point of view can become obsolete over time. However, dealing with the world in existential philosophy does not mean solving situations as fields of practice. Here it is important to take responsibility for oneself, and my interpretation of this has no end. Nietzsche: Existence is capable of infinite interpretation. Insofar as it always commits itself to a new reality when it reveals its past in the light of the future. For my past reveals itself here as a destiny that is never finished, with which one must always come to terms anew. For man is a becoming being and always on the way to himself. His relationship to himself can be seen in the direction of losing oneself or finding oneself.

to shape oneself in one's true nature. One loses oneself in insincerity when one is lost in the pursuit of science, without having grasped the meaning of one's actions — as Nietzsche saw scholars. To become true, however, means an elevation of existence. And honesty is to appropriate one's origins, to stand up for what one actually is. The situation here is not an objective situation, i.e. not a collision in a field in which one appears, meets others, or crosses paths with their intentions. Where it is the case that every concern is taken away from me, that one can recognise for the other. Truth here is something that others are interested in.

However, the situation that has befallen me in my fate cannot be "resolved" in this way at all. There is no escape from ... No one can relieve me of anything here, insofar as only I myself can do something here. Of course, existential philosophy not only does not misjudge, but emphasises the decisive importance of others in the interpretation of life, and in this respect it coincides with Dewey's thinking. For it is precisely through the other that I can be brought to myself, before myself, when he appeals to me to win me back from my drifting into self-revelation. The one is freed here, released by the other — which, of course, requires an open willingness to allow oneself to be confronted by the other. Somatic dialectics also creates such crises and transformations. When

Socrates asks what this or that is "is," he did not define any terms. He spoke of a *z?yi i yoterrixtj*. The other should be released here, with which he carried himself as knowledge that was initially unconscious to him. He should therefore be brought to the explicit execution of himself, appropriating himself in his self-understanding*.

¹ For an attitude such as Franklin's, on the other hand, it was decisive that he turned somatic **irony** into a method: by feigning uncertainty, he lured others into the open so that the "truth" could emerge from different sides.

For Nietzsche, it was important to penetrate to the "basic text" of human nature, and Kierkegaard spoke of the "original script" of human existential conditions, which he wanted to read again. This is precisely what happens here when existence, in reading its concepts, concerns itself with "Yorgriffs," in its basic approach to the creation of the visits articulated in the concepts. Here, one concerns oneself with oneself and becomes

— driven step by step — of it. In this

However, "being affected" as an expression of a crisis is the specific philosophical "affect" that β Zoyd{rtv de6 Plato refers to. Scientific philosophy knew no affect. It was something in which one could simply take an "interest", but in which one did not need to take any interest at all. When pragmatism was **referred** to above as an "addendum," it was in the sense of an enlightenment. This took place in analysis. Here, however, in existential philosophy, the addendum emphasises a necessary dependence. Namely, that which can only be a guiding principle in the examination of the world. This affect of being affected is therefore not just something that comes along and accompanies, but is connected to the step of this philosophising, which takes a turn here.

4.

Is existential philosophy "self-reflection"? Not in the sense that self-reflection usually means thinking about oneself, examining one's situation and one's relationship to the world and other people. Such self-reflection occurred, for example, in Marcus Aurelius and Montaigne. For here, views, attitudes and mindsets arise. They mature through experiences one has had in life. And "view" denotes a fixed relationship to something. Views can be held onto or abandoned. They are belief or disbelief. One somehow "come" to scepticism; reserve is considered the "proper" thing, etc. But something else is the unstoppable

The restlessness of existential philosophy. In which the uncertainty of our existence has broken open, in which we have discovered ourselves as an open question. This reflection is characterised by bottomlessness. In this context, do not the experimentalism in Kierkegaard's psychology and the tentative nature of Nietzsche's aphoristic philosophy both stand in contrast to the compelling conceptuality of Heidegger as the representative of contemporary existential philosophy? The way in which Heidegger develops his outline of human existence, defining its framework in order to understand guilt and fate in their inner possibility, is technically "skilful" and an achievement, insofar as the emphasis is on the "worked" aspect. Is it now a contradiction to what was said earlier that existential philosophy should not be demonstrated in a didactic manner?

Let us examine Heidegger's language here. It is precisely this language that causes offence, with its supposedly contrived and violent expressions. In this regard, we might first recall Aristotle, whose expression $\tau\omicron\ \zeta(\ \delta\nu\ \epsilon\iota\rho\alpha\iota\ \sigma\ \beta\omicron$ is also not a word readily offered by the language, and who is not criticised for having coined this expression. In principle, however, it should be noted that only those who do not read Heidegger's language as it demands to be read will find fault with it. It demands to be read literally — which is not self-evident. For in general, people read differently. They read with a view to orientation, in order to get to know the thoughts of the other. They read over it, but above all "in between". Here, one understands what is "meant". Writer and reader meet here in a state of average comprehensibility. Most things remain only half-said here, and that is acceptable. And it is precisely the dimension of philosophical discussions that tends to be largely determined by traditions and schools. "Subject," "object," "transcendental," etc. — somehow one can "go along" with this. But the fact that Heidegger is now to be read "literally" means the opposite.

such reading. Not in the sense that one adheres to the words here, as in a description whose factual accuracy motivates one to take them literally. Rather, it is a matter of adhering to the word in the sense of what it means as a word.

"means". This is something different from the factual meaning to which it is usually applied. Heidegger appeals to a return to the power of the word. It is important to regain the direction in which the word has a meaning in itself — as this reference, which is bound to the word and not yet fixed in an objective sense, has always secretly guided the choice of a word when struggling to formulate a thought. Of course, it is a special "fulfilment" that words such as "sorrow," "state of mind," etc. acquire here. It is discovered first and foremost in the pursuit of a movement of thought that can only be appealed to. It is not simply a matter of pointing to the given field of factual references, in and through the articulation of which language was initially formed. However, the unfamiliar and arguably violently offensive nature of the turns of phrase and word combinations prevents us from slipping into such obvious and familiar factual fulfilments. The fluctuating conceptuality of existential analysis is therefore something quite different from the precision of systematic concepts. For precise means executed, and every systematic concept can be executed, namely, by definition, "realised." But through "concern" and "state of mind" one is set, namely forced into the structure of what one had already understood in the foundation of one's own **existence**.

But then, of course, Heidegger's swinging conceptuality pushes existential analysis towards the philosophising of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. It is not a way of thinking that would be accessible to someone who "only" "thinks", who only values something, who is only willing to accept what can be elevated to the transparency of reason. Existential analysis also addresses the individual who is

must bring something with him. Wherever he can be pointed to as something within him. Nothing can be said so directly here. Nietzsche: "Understanding me is a privilege that must be earned." Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, both sought their readers. Heidegger also seeks them. And Nietzsche's sincerity — what is it other than the enemy of cheap complacency, which thinks it possesses the truth in formulas and unquestioning acceptance.

THE PURPOSE OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY

I do not want to persuade anyone here to believe something that, if they study it, they will somehow already believe. The meaning of science itself is not unquestionable. It is not self-evident that science should exist — that it should still exist today. For science is born of struggle. Each era wins its battle against another era, establishing itself as the measure of what is to be considered real and what is to be considered merely illusory. It is precisely in this that an era proves its reality, that it imposes the direction, nature and level of the struggle on other eras, that it swings them to transform themselves and thus allow themselves to be assigned a relative significance. But what science originally fought against is no longer a power today. This has robbed science of its tension. Our pathos has changed. Science today has focused on objectivity and provable truth. The individual is no longer claimed as an authority. Science no longer tolerates the personal pathos of genuine conviction. It does not need it. The question is where science can find a new passion.

As a product of its time, science is essentially questionable. It is traditional property — or so it seems. Certainly, it is not heritage. Property lacks what characterises heritage: that one is unquestionably connected to it. Heritage is that in which one has passed oneself on. For example, language, the ethos of a yoke and its goods. This must be taken on responsibly. It must be taken into account at every step. Existence sees itself as its distinguishing feature.

However, possession must be justified as possession. And only application seems to be able to justify it. Legitimation seems to be able to come only from outside. It is considered dead if it does not find this justification. And possession is also something questionable. It harbours possibilities of change. It is an unstable relationship. It is always on the brink

of exchanging its subject. The owner is always on the way to becoming a slave to his possession, to slipping into becoming the object of this relationship.

Science as mere possession — that is how it appears at first glance. It seems to sink into the endlessness of what is of no concern to anyone. The solidity and precision of scientific methods is seductive, tempting us to merely learn science. The way we see science fragmented into subjects today, it seems to be left to the discretion of anyone and everyone. One believes one detects irresponsible frivolity. And the busyness of the specialist scientist seems only to laboriously conceal the fear of complete meaninglessness. Science arouses amazement, but no participation. A utopian practicality is spreading. And the actual belief in the Science, when viewed objectively, appears to be a form of superstition that can quickly turn into hostility when science appears to fail. It is then dismissed as academic science. seems to fail. It is then reviled as school science.

However, this crisis in science is not due to the limits of its capabilities, but to an awareness of its meaning. Certainly — Science as property seems to describe our most obvious relationship to it. But is that really the case? Is science really just a position? To argue for it — and that means to provide supporting reasons after the fact — would the first telltale sign be to consider vacating this position in advance? If science is considered property, has it not been distorted by the "average person" who seeks to belittle everything, especially their opponents? Is wanting to hold on to science as mere non-binding property not an evasion? Is it not an attempt to insert science into the system of safeguards that humans need in everyday life to protect themselves from the intrusion of essential questions? Science as property — do we not have here the knowledge...

What is being played out before our eyes, as presented to us by their traitors?

Galileo once said: There is no greater hatred in the world than that of ignorance towards knowledge. Where does this hostility stem from, that it can degenerate into hatred? Hatred means being tense and uncomfortable. Those who hate simply do not want to accept that they cannot exist alongside something ^{else}. What is it that makes knowledge so envied? What is it about ignorance that cannot be compared to knowledge? Science does not need or want protection; science is something very unbourgeois. Namely, science as an attitude. Nietzsche once said: "The virtues of the soldier are inherent in the scientist." What did he mean by that?

He had in mind the uncertainty of the scientist's beginnings. Things are tackled in science. To recognise means to be at work. And only a daring approach, confident that its prerequisites will be fulfilled by its own abilities, succeeds in wresting things from their instability and getting hold of them. It is important to approach things tactically. Science tries its hand at things, and this trying expresses how it always ^{knows} itself to be placed in the unknown. Empirical science is an empirical science. It is an intervening power. Nature is placed under conditions here; the level on which it must place itself is imposed on it. Science imposes itself on reality. The field of reality in which we live today has been opened up, exposed and created by science. And by a science that keeps itself outside of practice. For mere practice remains within a **horizon** that is accessible to natural perception. Practice is a matter of an existence that is secure in its being. Science must not have in mind the application that is made of it when it begins. For whoever connects themselves to what is the goal of the limited field of vision of the present

recognised, does not have the freedom necessary to place itself **under** the future, to be precisely its chosen one. Only pure science, which maintains its purity, discovers what remains closed to those caught up in practice as a possibility. Kepler would not have been able to calculate the planetary orbit if Archimedes had not developed the theory of conic sections. Only science that is kept alive in this direction ensures that it does not slip into the merely internal relationship that the expert has to the tasks of his field. In forgetfulness of the **meaning** of the decisions that determined his methods. Those who understand nothing but chemistry do not understand it properly either, as Lichtenberg already said.

Scientific attitude — on this belongs Discipline.
"Under the masks of freedom, discipline is the most urgent." The secrecy of true greatness is expressed in this. It needs no pathos; its self-assured freedom does not need to be addressed. Freedom — this does not mean a vague idea, but rather that human instincts rule over others. It manifests itself in harsh clarity. Nothing else but the courage of the soldier is proof of this. For this courage is something other than witty, showy bravado. Clear-sightedness is part of it. Only the brave are men of facts. That is what Nietzsche **means**. Facts must be faced like opponents; distance is required. Objectivity — namely cold heartiness. Objectivity in science does not mean detachment, as if one were exempt from oneself. Science, in the superiority of its distance, its instinctive distrust of aberrations of thought, does not have the tempting relaxation of anonymity. This objectivity has been cheapened, but it is anything but that. It is quite the opposite:

Objectivity — and Nietzsche considered honesty in
, which is "one of our most recent virtues as a matter of propriety"
— means integrity of thought^{®*}. Objectivity

is different from universal validity. **It is not** as if science should be attributed with an absolute validity that remains indifferent as a guarantee of certainty. Objectivity is the opposite of such universal validity. It means the appropriateness of knowledge to its object.

That one takes it seriously. That one really encounters it, comes across it. Resistance purifies the relationship to things that we call knowledge. It stands in contrast to thinking that ^{runs} short-circuited within itself. Knowledge always requires renewed examination.

This means that one must engage with it. Truth does not exist independently of the person who recognises it. It does not want to be and cannot be absolute. In order to do justice to a matter, anything but the elimination of oneself is required. Rather, one must be equal to the task. One must delve deep within oneself in order to recognise the matter appropriately. Character is required. Only in the living encounter of two core realities does one reveal itself to the other. Unlocking meaning is the first thing required in science. Goethe once said: It is always unfortunate when one is led to strive for something with which one cannot connect oneself in regular self-activity. There is no directionless, indifferent truth. To stand up for the inevitable is the only access to your reality. Only in the light of what is grasped as the future does it reveal itself. Truth is a form of existence for which concrete humanity is responsible. "Concrete" humanity means humanity connected to its kind and its time. Reality is not merely a field of experience, as some would have us believe. We are not buccaneers in this field, conquering and setting facts aside. Rather, reality is a field of vocation. Committing oneself to a new reality means knowledge. This is what Nietzsche meant when he said that science addresses precisely what the soldier also finds in himself.

And what about the binding nature of science? It is not binding in terms of knowledge. Bindingness does not mean the authoritativeness of some body of knowledge that is foreign to our lives and demands respect. Science is not a mask of anonymity, as if we were forced to submit to an unchangeable world reality in science. The binding nature of science is the binding nature of an action whose authority everyone finds within themselves, for which they must freely acknowledge responsibility.

STANDPOINT AND EXISTENCE

1.

I would like to follow up on Ms Madelung's presentation on the choice and change of standpoint in physics** and ask about the standpoint itself. I would like to determine what a standpoint "is". Not as if I wanted to define it. I do not want to approach the question critically and analytically, as if saying what a point of view is would be the same as asking what it essentially amounts to. Rather, I want to unfold the self-image hidden within it. To make it more transparent. I want to break it down into motives that are initially buried. My aim is to reveal the circle of meaning that is unexpectedly included in it. When we talk about a point of view, in what direction is the relationship to things addressed here? When "point of view" is used as a general formula for this relationship, in what direction is it distorted, pushed away from the original references to which we are committed?

The formulation of the theme — "Standpoint and Existence" — is ambiguous. Firstly, it means that standpoint "is" can be understood within the framework of human existence in its inner possibility in such a way that the constitution of this existence itself comes to light. Secondly, however, the standpoint is contrasted here with the positions and attitudes in which human beings usually take refuge.

In order to bring into focus what standpoint means, e.g. as a physical standpoint, it is first necessary to define it from the outside.

1. A standpoint is something different from a point of view or location, for example, although it also implies a perspective. The standpoint stands in a certain contrast to the point of view. For as a point of view, it is determined

something as a manifold of possibilities, i.e. in places of this manifold given calibration points. The **point of view** means a perspective, insofar as something here is shifted perspectively, showing itself from itself in a certain view. An overview here requires an increase in points of view. The matter requires to be addressed from different sides. There is an order here, a system of perspectives, each of which can only be understood in its meaning, as a shortening, for example, by taking the others into account. The fact that one can only see a thing from a certain point of view means a restriction here. — However, one point of view claims to prevail over the others. And its perspective does not refer to a view of the matter, but rather to a representation that is asserted here as authoritative in that point of view.

2. A point of view that one encounters is a position that one advocates. One sets out to defend it, to assert it. The advocate of one point of view engages in discussion with the representative of another point of view. For the other is, without further ado, an opposing point of view. However, the other is not called upon here to correct a view. In which case, one would not consider the matter against each other, but with each other. A point of view always remains relative to possible opponents. Only in this way can one define one's position in a limiting way, withdrawing, expanding, shifting and improving this position. For the point of view one seeks to win always means precautions one takes.

3. From one's standpoint, one seeks an image, a representation. To obtain something. Through translation, one seeks to make something available to oneself. The orientation behind the choice of a point of view does not imply a clear view in the sense that a thing presents itself to me more or less clearly. Whether a thing reveals itself clearly to me depends on the circumstances of the situation.

By changing my position, I can try to gain a clearer view. Or I can try to overcome the bias of my attitude by challenging the other person. But from one point of view, I want to explain something here. For example, I want to be able to explain it from my side. I give it a structure here that suits me.

4. One takes a position when assessing cases, e.g. in diagnosis. Or in the judge's ruling. A case is assessed here insofar as it is necessary to assign it a systematic value on the basis of a scale of pre-formed concepts. The case is understood here as ... The doctrine of subsumption under concepts in visual logic is a logic of standpoint. In establishing a standpoint, the cases that need to be dealt with are anticipated. Reality appears here as a scope of possible cases. Positions relate to the problematic nature of reality. Problems are not questions we ask of the world, but something in which we ourselves are questioned. It is precisely the standpoint, the position I represent, that is in turn called into question by the case, that is, put to the test. It is this claim as a doctrine that gives the standpoint its viability. A standpoint may or may not be equal to reality. It then claims to be able to assert itself anytime and anywhere.

2.

I now want to confront the representation of a point of view, i.e. the relationship in which one relates to something as a point of view, with other attitudes.

Viewpoints are something objective. They are anonymous. They can be demonstrated and proven. The agonistic nature of every viewpoint must be noted. Insofar as the potential opponent is constitutive for a viewpoint. It must therefore be accessible to the opponent. It must be demonstrated by means of the general.

can be made. Only if a position can be maintained does it prove to be secure, i.e. it fulfils the requirements that must be placed on it as a position. To represent a point of view means, **first**, to support and maintain it with arguments and, second, to assert and enforce it.

Anonymity and objectivity distinguish a point of view from a conviction. This is sometimes also referred to as a standpoint that one represents. However, convictions have no objective compelling force. They cannot be proven or taught. Only in the free relationship of one existence to another can something like a shared conviction arise. Convictions can only be awakened in others. In doing so, one appeals to the person themselves. One lives a conviction. Someone's conviction is always someone's personal conviction. Convictions that "one" has, i.e. for which no one is responsible, are considered from the outset to be false, blind convictions. For only from one's own origin can something like a conviction come about. Convictions — these are the "Views" that one arrives at as a fixed relationship to reality. They have their authority within oneself. They mature. One is invested in them. One cannot argue about them, one can only fight for them. Even stubborn narrow-mindedness invokes "convictions" in the face of factual arguments. But what can be proven does not tolerate and does not need the seriousness of real conviction.

With regard to Schlegel's vortex theory, Goethe expressly speaks of a "long-held conviction". Such knowledge always retains something esoteric. One could express it in full, but not actually prove it. It is something that resists all exoteric treatment. And in clear contrast to the presentation from a single point of view, he emphasises in his theory of colours that here, things themselves are the teaching. He knows of a better knowledge, anchored in a depth that no arguments can reach.

can affect something. And he speaks of an original sense of truth in relation to this conviction. It is a knowledge that reveals itself from within to the outside. It only becomes fixed in the awareness of what it was seeking. Then "aperru". This "view" refers to an original relationship with things, in whose unveiling he sees himself. However, a position cannot claim to be truth, only correctness.

What is the difference between "true" and "correct"? We speak of truth when something reveals itself as what it is. This is how we distinguish real gold from imitation gold, for example. And "true" is an analogous concept. We also understand a person to be true when they reveal themselves for who they are. A true word, a true thought means something different from a correct word and a correct thought. A thought is true if it reveals something in its light, as if by reflection. A correct thought, however, is a guiding thought. One that helps us progress when we take it in. One that provides the key to solving problems. A point of view is also correct in this sense. And as a point of view, it claims nothing more than such correctness. Insofar as it is, after all, a position that initiates a representation, the representation of facts is provisionally laid out **in it**. We also sometimes allow a conviction "be right*." However, we have something in mind here that may also be secondary as a view. Namely, insofar as it is an attitude that guides me in my experiences.

Every conviction is a decisive conviction. However, I explore my possibilities within it. The position I decide on is chosen by me.

Choosing means making a decision based on given, objective possibilities. Possibilities that are available to everyone at any time, that can be taken up by them — without obligation — and that can also be taught to them. Views that one professes, convictions,

Here, decisions are made in the light of the fact that existence itself is subject to conditions and is thereby understood as unconditional. These are final decisions, on the basis of which things are given meaning and on the basis of which the question of the right relationship between things only makes sense in the first place.

3.

The standpoint represents a foundation, insofar as it contains an understanding of things. What is special about this foundation? Namely, in comparison with the "ground" that is laid secretly and essentially precedes what is responsibly arrived at in everyday interaction, in the examination of things, in every step **of our existence**? Reality is interpreted insofar as it is taken up as a **situation in** which one finds oneself. By taking perspectives and considerations into account, by establishing connections, we open ourselves up **to** reality. In **doing so, we** come back to ourselves, accepting ourselves as we find ourselves. For in dealing with things, it is about ourselves. Understanding things means understanding oneself in the sense of an *ia/r* "lot. Things reveal themselves to me in the mirror of my possibilities. Anticipations are guiding here. In their commonality, they are what they are. They reveal themselves to me in aspects, turns of phrase. The what of things is their meaning. Things are objects of the concept in the sense that the concept is the one-sided relationship in which I fulfil myself and come to myself in my existence. This existence is taken up here in its **factuality**. The borderline situation of man is described in this. That he does not have control over his beginning, that he cannot go back before himself. It becomes experience in the inevitability of **always** finding oneself in **situations**. In their interpretation, this happens

A gradual condensation of the context of reality. Kant already spoke of such a "context". In this way, we gain a foothold in reality. What happens in this interpretation of things is a foundation of ourselves. Things always appear to me in a certain view. The anticipations that become guiding principles in insights, etc., are marked by preliminary decisions. They come to light in these decisions. The world reveals itself as a counterpoint to my existence, which understands itself in its being.

Reality, it was said, is perceived as a situation. In the addictive passage, it is destroyed. A foundation is laid here insofar as one always regains one's footing. And as every step here is known to relate to steps already taken. The situation is perceived in its openness and questionability. And the individual concepts, as well as the whole of experience, are something here that one can only relate to retrospectively. Which cannot be separated from the pull. The concepts of everyday life cannot be defined, but only illustrated by examples. In such a way that the other person is subtly drawn into the vortex of self-understanding through the concreteness of the example. Points of view, on the other hand, can be developed and presented objectively. Namely as given and selectable possibilities. These are not the foundations of my being, as if something like my situation were ever to arise in them. One does not gain a foothold in reality here. In another sense, they are, for example, a foundation of nature. In physics, nature is forced onto the plane on which it encounters itself in the experiment, onto which it must be transferred. The world of physics is the environment of physical apparatus. In the wake of such observation, it reveals itself. However, this "observation" means something different from the observation of reality, when it brings out other sides of things in dealing with them, when things show themselves to me in changing situations and in changing meanings. The implementation is missing here.

Positions are created in a vacuum. However, they do not signify, like the foundation of my existence, an *épée* in the suspension of an *épée* ipor. Standpoints are formulated for each barrel. For reality is taken here taken as something that can become acutely problematic in a certain direction, depending on the case. Here, it is not something in which one finds oneself placed, as in situations, but something from which one finds oneself placed in situations. This reality is interesting as a scope for possible constellations.

What distinguishes a situation from a circumstance? A situation is always unfathomable, insofar as existence itself is absorbed in its fatefulness. Here, however, I use the term "circumstance" to describe something that anyone can find themselves in.

, the practice of a specific project determines it' itself as this situation. Situations are excellent, e.g. practical situations. Models can illustrate them. Insofar as every situation under the orientation of a company, there is a state of affairs here that can be good or bad.

This position provides the decisive basis for assessing cases. As a position, it means the provision of the means of calculating representation. The certainty of being faced with situations requires the position to be secured. Cases are provided for in its development.

4.

A representation is created in the standpoint. Nature is forced into a translation. We speak of the language of physics and the language of law because certain concepts are decisive for perceptions of *Allen* from standpoints. How does standpoint representation relate to representation that can be experienced in actual language?

Humboldt spoke in relation to the various languages

from a different world view. Every language has a specific interpretation of things embedded in it. Language becomes virtually constitutive for the articulation of things. It dictates their meaning. The verbal roots, the basic meanings, denote the fundamental decisions of language. The most diverse objects can be forced into the circle of meaning of a word. Certainly, the defining function of the word is largely obscured by the communicative tendency of our speech. But the intellectual interpretation that touches on things in this process cannot be overlooked. The presence of meanings bound to the word makes us search for the right word for something, e.g. And the diversity of language is also evident in the diversity of fields of meaning, e.g.: funden, gießen, ihm. The most diverse is "sprengen"^{o*}. The **word** is the pointed distinction, the expression of what is alive in us as an impression or as a feeling. Here, the word is something that is only just taken in, i.e. it undergoes condensation and sharpening. However, the word has no autonomous meaning. Its meaning is first and foremost established on the basis of an understanding of what remains essentially unexpressed. What is not indeterminate, but perfectly clear, yet beyond all expressibility, has **only** been illuminated by the articulated **conciseness** of the word. The underlying layers of the word must be noted. Every language has a certain potency. It lies in the possibilities stored in the roots of the language. It is important to gain an inner relationship to it in order to be able to say something through the turns of phrase that one gives to the word. Translating means bringing something into the light of the decisions of another language. Humboldt remarked that one can only step out of the circle of one language by stepping into the circle of another. One needs the decisiveness of language. The remarkable thing is how one can somehow say everything in every language. This universality of language is something

other not only as the totality of experience, but as the universal validity of a point of view.

The horizon of language varies. Each language describes a specific world. Horizon is different from field of vision. Fields of vision are something natural, objective, random. Something lies within fields of vision. One can free oneself from one's random field of vision. Having the same field of vision means sharing it. However, the narrowness and breadth of a horizon characterises the person themselves. There are people without a horizon. For them, everything remains isolated from each other. They seem unfree. Who are without a world, stubbornly caught up in pursuing goals. Broadening one's horizons means a transformation of human existence. Insofar as language is worldly, it fulfils the form of existence of a people. Its horizon marks the line that sees existence around it, within which it remains, separating the bright and visible from the dark and unilluminable.

The general validity of a point of view is different from universality. It means the extent to which the limits of a point of view can be stretched. Because points of view apply to specific cases. That is what their correctness refers to. They are instructions for dealing with cases. They are claimed to be authoritative. This calls into question their viability. They are developed as something that can be arbitrarily applied anywhere, anytime, to anyone in a specific situation. As something in which existence is freed from the constraints of views, opinions and language. The world, in relation to which a relationship is established, is neutralised, cut off for tasks whose direction is determined, for example, by time, whereby it understands its authority in the state of its science, or for those that arise from the typical cut of life, whose order and structure are to be enforced in law, for example.

Reality here is not something that is absorbed **beneath** the **horizon** of situations. Rather, it is a space that is traversed as a scope for possible situations and cases. In which existence seeks to spread out cautiously, securing itself.

Addition

The only thing that matters for the standpoint is that it is applied and enforced in a decisive manner. Thus, there is the standpoint from which one judges something, i.e. looks at and perceives something in relation to something specific. For example, the standpoint of the surgeon, the doctor, society, etc.

The location in the sense of a viewpoint that can be changed must be distinguished from the location as defined by the time in which one lives. One is connected to it. One is a slave to one's time. Proximity and distance to something are determined by this. And "distance" here means a natural impartiality. In this respect, one sees things differently today than one did a hundred years ago. One has locations within things or in relation to things — even without intending to observe them. This contrasts with the point of view that refers specifically to the perspectives from which something is viewed.

(However, a "time" can also refer to a point in time against which other times are measured. Its enforcement is directed at an opponent who is forced to accept the level at which he must position himself.)

Only this reference to an opponent distinguishes the standpoint that one defends at the risk of one's existence from conviction. Anonymous are only factual assertions.

RESPONSIBILITY, ATTRIBUTION, PUNISHMENT

Responsibility and accountability are considered to be the conditions that must be met in order for punishment to be justified. The average understanding of what punishment "is" is the guiding principle here. It is the privilege of everyday life to come to terms with itself, precisely in the oblivion of its origins, to give it a relief-like agility in the piercing analysis of situations. Here, security arises precisely from transience. It only disappears when viewed with caution. One seeks a point of view from which punishment can be taken in order to shed light on it from a different angle.

What the punishment "is" is replaced, for example, by the other question of what it essentially amounts to. In "Yergeltung" is believed to be the appropriate formula. However, the fact that punishment is considered here to be "a kind" of retribution shows that this is only the first tentative step towards giving punishment a meaning. In fact, such an explanation "covers up" what punishment is rather than revealing it.

One way out is to shift the question of what the punishment is to the other, what it "should" be, and to understand this question as a question about the purpose of punishment. One then seeks its essence outside of it. Punishment is regarded here as a means of deterrence. As a means, however, it must also be measured by its purpose. The question arises as to whether other means might not be better here. In general, however, there is something pitiful about trying to intimidate people with punishment. It simply provokes defiance. — Or else one believes that one must search for something like a "meaning" of punishment. The "meaning" of punishment refers to something inherent in it. Certainly — the purpose of a thing is also revealed in it. In the design of something, one can clearly point to a

referred to a specific purpose. There is the "actual" purpose of something as opposed to its incidental use.

But "meaning" as the "what for" of something is not such a specific "what for". Every human existence, every action

s. B. has a "meaning". Without this meaning, they could not be understood, explained, judged or justified. But not every action is a means to an end. And likewise, just compensation — which is sometimes considered the meaning of punishment — is not merely an end to which the punishment would be "related" insofar as it brings it about. Justice — so it is believed here — is reflected in punishment. Punishment is understood as an institution, as if encompassed by an order that prevails within it. In terms of meaning, the law responds to the fairness of punishment. The aim is to give punishment its own weight in terms of its meaning. However, this question of the meaning that is sought and found in punishment is obviously preceded by the other question of the simple "what" of punishment. On what basis are various things understood as "punishment"? On what basis does language allow "punishment" to mean something more than just the narrower sense?

"Atoned for"—why does she also allow foolishness to be "punished"? In what contexts does something reveal itself to be a "punishment"? And, strictly speaking, responsibility and attribution were also invoked in this case, except that this motive—as the approach of both shows as mere conditions of punishability—remained unrecognised. But what are responsibility and attribution themselves, and how do they relate to each other?

2.

1. The concept of attribution articulates an interpretation that means different things in relation to an event: that this event originated somewhere and, in this respect, its causes can be lost in the context of reality — and: in a "will" something like

To be able to discover the origin, direction and basis of this event. The question of attribution concerns the extent to which such will has been realised in the shaping of things, the extent to which an event can be outlined as his deed. A person's "power" is revealed in what can be attributed to him.

2. Someone is "attributed" something in the sense that they — in the original meaning of the word — is to blame for it, that it is attributable to them. One asks whether they are fundamentally the perpetrator, whether something is actually as it seems.

A. or rather B. should be held responsible — if, for example, A. did something under the hypnotic compulsion of B. Someone must be guilty. This is required in order to explain an event. This attribution of something to someone implies an internal relationship that is easy to establish and decide, but whose meaning cannot be discussed from different points of view. However, clarity about the attribution of something is required in advance, because it is not only the perpetration of something that is in question, but also the "guilt" of something in the narrower sense, in that certain requirements have not been met. And "attributability" here refers to the acute nature of this attribution in terms of consequences: a person is attributable if they can be held responsible for something, if they can be made accountable for something.

3. In another case, however, it is precisely the addition of calculation s elb st , what is in question. Certainly not to this or that person. Rather, whether something that someone has definitely done can actually be attributed to them. Insofar as it did not actually originate from "them". "Them" here refers less to the person themselves, acting of their own accord, than to what they do under the influence of others. Rather, "him" in what he does as a freely acting being. The contrast here is that what he does happens out of a need that, as it were, deprives him of himself and drives him to despair. His "intervention" is prevented here. Which is why one can speak of a "short circuit"

actions." Kretsehiner characterises them as "actions where active impulses bypass the whole personality and are directly translated into actions." Many cases of infanticide by unmarried mothers fall into this category. Despair, concern for their own existence and that of their child drives them to it. Such a mother kills her child "without thinking about anything else" because she does not know how else to help herself. Without hesitation. In a despair that causes her to lose all sense of proportion. As at under a compulsive urge .

"If it weren't for the child, then..." is a thought that may well occur to others in such a situation. But while such a thought generally cannot prevail over other motives that arise, here it has "broken through" as if unchecked. What happens here is as if separated from the perpetrator. The act is not "his" language. It does not bear "his" traits — compared to him "otherwise". It does not characterise "him", but is a symptom of something. This corresponds to the fact that in medical psychology, the homesickness reaction in the form of arson and infanticide can be described and explained as a typical syndrome. Only "in fragments" does the **act** belong to its **perpetrator**. And this **means** "diminished responsibility". Responsibility slips into explanation.

4. One speaks simply of "incapacity" in the case of intoxicated persons. Here, it is not the personality but consciousness that is impaired. In other words, the intoxicated person is not in a state of "full consciousness". And we know that if he had been, he certainly would not have done what he did. Such certainty was lacking in the third case. For whereas intoxication is a state whose effects are known, which can simply be expected as a result of poisoning and whose presence can be readily established, in this case it was necessary to "eye for" situations and people in order to be able to "understand" the reduced accountability for an act. It happened

¹ E. Kretschmer, Medical Psychology, 4th edition, 1930, p. 185.

Yes, but also fully conscious, deliberate and considered. Only the field of vision was narrowed here, the perspective distorted. Impulsive, blinded to everything else, the deed was seen here. However, this abnormality in human behaviour, characterised by its sudden and decisive nature, is something different from the abnormality of a state in which something has been "automatically" omitted. When intoxicated, a person's orientation is simply suspended. They do not know what they are doing. They are not aware of it. And that means: they are not explicitly focused on the consequences of what they are doing. They have not taken them into account in their intentions. Not being aware of them does not mean carelessness. For to be careless would mean to lack ... — which would of course be attributable to a certain behaviour. However, due to the intoxicated person's state, this possibility is ruled out. He would not have done it if he had been in control of himself. What happens in a state of intoxication is therefore different in appearance from, for example, arson committed as a reaction to homesickness. It seems crude and senseless. However, the intoxicated person also does and says things that he would otherwise have been inhibited from doing. Meanwhile — perhaps he would have been inhibited from doing things that he otherwise felt compelled to do. This is why a person's true nature and opinion can reveal themselves when intoxicated. Because here everything happens without the control of alert consciousness — namely, for example, the consciousness of responsibility and criminal liability. Obviously, the intoxicated person cannot be blamed for what he would have refrained from doing in a clear state of consciousness in view of his responsibility and the criminal liability of the act. One notices the contrast between the fourth and third cases: in the third case, something was not attributed because it did not correspond to the "true nature" of the person concerned. In the fourth case, something is not attributed, although perhaps it is precisely in this that the "true nature" of the person concerned comes to light.

, the determination of of accountability is summarised as follows

the extent to which someone can be held responsible. However, it must be shown that responsibility is not only a "condition" of punishment, but that the "inner possibility" of punishment must be demonstrated from the concept of responsibility.

3.

One has responsibility insofar as one is "called upon" to do something.

Human existence is responsible in itself. This is the expression of its temporality. Selfhood is realised in the fact that existence responsibly comes back to itself and returns to itself.

That is to say, she takes on more than she can handle as the one she "is" in terms of fate and guilt. Existence happens in such steps towards oneself. She stands by her fate, which is not something finished, but something that needs to be "finished". And the perfection of guilt comes to light in the fact that one can only behave in the "acceptance" of it. For what one has done, one is not relieved of in the sense that one could leave it behind. One remains bound to it in guilt. Certainly — it cannot be changed, but it can be "accepted," and one can approach it. However, one is responsible or is made responsible "for" something if one — as the person called upon to do so — has to vouch for it and take responsibility for it. This responsibility can be regulated. The civil servant, for example, is responsible for everything that happens in his department. For reasons of expediency, the owner of a dog is responsible for any damage it causes. Someone acts "irresponsibly" if they expect to get away with it. The possibility of a responsibility becoming acute — which they acknowledge in this case — is not taken into account here. However, someone who is "irresponsible" is someone who is completely unaware of responsibility, who disregards claims, who disregards their binding nature.

The 's distinction between Accountability, the determination of which always relates to actual or possible cases, is something whose degree varies greatly. Different people are expected in different ways to meet certain requirements. "Expecting" different things does not just mean anticipating them — as, for example, a paralytic can only be "anticipated" to behave in a certain way. Rather, different things are demanded of different people. Something is expected of someone, but not only "in relation to someone". The responsibility of an adult is judged differently than that of children. The demands placed on them are downright different. Recognition of the degree of a person's responsibility as described here leads to them being judged too harshly. The question of accountability becomes acute within the specific limits of a specific responsibility.

One is held accountable when one has failed to meet certain expectations and is therefore at fault for something. One is "called to account" here. You are then accountable, for example, to someone who acts as the representative of these violated claims. (Not everyone can hold you accountable in this way, however.) Or the other person simply appeals to me, seeks me out, i.e. brings me back to the awareness of my responsibility.

However, to "stand by" what one has done means to take responsibility for it. For example, by making amends and setting things right. Responsibility, however, usually takes the form of justification. One tries to explain what one has done, i.e. to present it in retrospect with supporting reasons in such a way that, given the circumstances, the demands have been met as far as possible.

4.

Even in punishment — which makes it a matter of responsibility — one is reduced or subjected to ... Someone to

*8

Taking responsibility, making him pay for ... b-c-deutet virtually means punishing **him** by making him "pay" for it. **Tian** is punished for stupidity, mistakes. Limited self-confidence, blindness and vanity must be "atoned for". One is punished for something that one cannot be held responsible for. Insofar as responsibility is a projection of possibilities, it emphasises how I am connected to that which — when held responsible — experiences a distinguishing distinction. And the "freedom" of existence consists precisely in allowing oneself to be free, **in being able to** justify oneself with regard to ... "But freedom is the opposite of "self-willed". For in my "I-fönnen" I justify myself. Punishment, however, is the consequence of self-will. In having to atone for one's recklessness, it becomes apparent how one had let things slip out of one's hands — as an example of how one must have grasped something in order to later return to it and give it the tip in a responsible manner. Punishment is forfeited in the surrender of one's freedom. One becomes unfree when one stubbornly closes oneself off from knowledge. However, any "failure to ..." means such a decapitated relationship to ... Self-will believes it can override the responsibilities that are expressly indicated in rights and obligations.

Only such offences can be punished — but not the action, not the deed, not the wrongdoing that has been committed. (Whereby "action" is defined as that in which existence fulfils itself; action is a step towards self-realisation. The measure of a person, human greatness, is revealed in action. — "Deed," however, means what "happens" as a result of an action. Deeds give things a face. The greatness of a deed reveals the power of a "personality." — Finally, even as "wrongdoing against someone," something takes on its own existence; "wrong" is not simply a **predicate** of the action or of what one does. For only this wrongdoing against someone can be punished by that person.

will be punished — provided that he restores the relationship that existed between the first and the second. The injustice against the other, for example, is something that simply affects him. However, one cannot "offend" the other so directly, but only the person of the other, insofar as claims come to light here — no differently than in property, for example.

The punishment is the consequence of a misdemeanour that one has "forfeited". This invites comparison with the punishment meted out by Nemesis. Here, however, it is the transgression that is punished by Nemesis. Hubris misjudges itself in attempting to interfere with something whose natural superiority then becomes apparent in Nemesis. The transgressor has brought about his own fate. It is the beginning itself that ultimately leads to the exposure of his vain endeavour. It remains at this beginning. The transgressor is not powerful over what he touched and what then turns against him. He is subject to the power of the things he dared to touch. Nemesis lacks the "returning to ..." insofar as Nemesis lies in the simple natural continuation of an action. The transgressor is only brought back to himself insofar as he experiences his inferiority. He had been presumptuous in relation to the limits imposed on his nature. The transgressor was not in the position of not having met expectations, but in the other position of not having respected a superiority. And while Nemesis rejects presumption within its limits, thus revealing the powerlessness of the transgressor, one forfeits the punishment precisely insofar as one has not exercised the freedom to do something. Finally, however, the transgressor is merely

The "object" of Nemesis, by whom he is struck as by fate

. But to "punish" someone with contempt means to make them bear this contempt as a consequence. This implies that they are not merely the object of this contempt and cannot escape this contempt as a "fate". "Bearing" is something active. It stands in tension *with* resistance and opposition. When one bears something, one is done with it.

Carrying is an achievement. Those who carry something do not deviate in this respect. And as long as one carries the consequences, one does not slip into becoming a mere object of punishment. What if, in self-deception about what this contempt actually "affects" here, i.e. what it refers to and comes back to, one merely resigns oneself to this contempt? **The fact** that one is the subject of the punishment and not its object is also the difference between punishment and retribution. Insofar as one bears the punishment as a consequence, one is brought before oneself in it. This return to oneself is inaugurated in the act of punishment. Retribution, however, merely causes one to "think about it again" if, for example, one had already forgotten it. Retribution can be a lesson, a warning, and can become a reason to be more cautious. Moreover, one can only retaliate for what one person has done to another. And whether and how one retaliates — whether, for example, one should repay evil with good — depends on the nature of the person, whether they are vindictive, grateful or generous.

If punishment is to be demonstrated in terms of its inner possibility from the perspective of responsibility, then this also sheds light on the consequences of its actualisation — which, of course, are not merely the "purpose" of punishment. If one were merely the object of punishment, as if one were simply being inflicted with evil for the sake of retribution, it would be difficult to see how punishment could bring about improvement. The opposite — stubbornness would be to be expected. But the fact that punishment confronts one with one's own failings is, of course, a starting point for improvement — which is why punishment can also take the form of chastisement.

EFFECTIVENESS IN NATURAL POPULATIONS

In the conceptual examination of reality, one believes one can find a measure for the "primitiveness" of primitive peoples. The concept of reality is thereby unquestioningly determined by the intentions that prevail in science and its methodology. Reality and the goal of such intentions — one is implied in the other. The direction, nature, status and limits of recognition would indeed be something that would facilitate the search for preliminary stages. But the examples that illustrate such primitive "forms of thought" show something else. Namely, how reality is first and foremost something in which humans exist; how, under its horizon, things are less recognised than understood in terms of meaning and translated into language. The examples show how, from the outset, the reference to a development is determined by the rational elaboration of scientific ideas.

One believes, for example, that the same word refers not only to the drop of water, but also to the stain it leaves behind, and also to the sound it makes, etc., and that the concepts of primitive peoples are undifferentiated and diffuse. However, the factual vagueness of such a word is merely the flip side of a power of language in general — namely, that due to the diversity of the meaning of the word, the most factually diverse things — even in our language, for example — can be named and understood as "drops". And if one wishes to find a lack of stability in the fact that the same thing — e.g. a spiral carved into wood — "is" different things in different contexts, one need only briefly recall that nothing can arise on its own for that which is only understood in one place —

Werner, Introduction to Developmental Psychology. Leipzig, 1926.

namely within the framework of a reality that is perceived in the meaning of individual things as if gathered together in knots. — And what does the "undeveloped" nature of numerical concepts mean, in which not only groupings of things are implied, but also counting and its means? An essentially original relationship to numbers is expressed in this. "Origin" is not, however, as relative a term as "preliminary stage". An original relationship contrasts with a freely chosen point of view from which something is taken up as a theme, under which one makes oneself the guardian of certain interests. — The examples mentioned only illustrate differences that are foreign within the boundaries in which a language is also foreign. Only a different self-image is expressed in the variously directed concepts. That is why one can still try to translate them. However, such a free approach fails in cases such as belief in demons, the use of masks or the sphere of influence of taboos. Here, humans are so different in their essence, namely not in their concept of themselves, that it is impossible to approach them with a corresponding understanding.

However, a transition to the interpretation of these phenomena is now established in that the concept refers to a schema (Kant) and that, in this respect, it also falls within the sphere of the power of imagination. For the fact that concepts can be illustrated by examples, that they can be awakened, that the example transports one into the execution of the perspective that constitutes the concept, shows that the sensualisation of a concept does not simply mean the acquisition of an objective view, but first and foremost a bringing to life. Concepts are skilful tools with which one can handle or view things: my nature is activated when I attune myself to things in the process of understanding. For example, it is a spiritual-sensory interpretation that is touched upon when one imagines it as "exploding".

"Standing," "lying down" articulated. And the gestural nature of the basic verbal meaning is less about the external than the here-and-now, as tension, serenity, etc., with implied movement patterns. Closer to our topic is the sensual version, which experiences the impression in the word. In passing through human emotion, it is reborn. Through expression in words, that which moves me is delivered to itself in such a way that I can hold it up before me freely. And even the structure is not the simple expression of that which moves us — it is intercepted within it and set on a course: here, too, there are patterns.

One way of articulating what moves human beings in such a sensual and comprehensive manner is also the belief in demons. The Tibetans explain that demons do not actually exist, or rather, they only exist for those who experience them; the saint, who is free of emotions, knows no demons. To be seized by emotions and possessed by demons is the same thing. This is expressed precisely in the fact that demons do not wander freely, i.e. they are not imagined in the sense of 'merely thought up' — certainly not with the intention of providing an explanation. Rather, humans find themselves possessed by a reality that is impossible to explain. The fear that grips one demonically is not a fear based on objective grounds. It is not a fear of something that is recognised and anticipated as a danger. Something that occurs in its own time — that is, within the horizon of a space opened up in this context. For if one is always "oneself" and responsible for this fear, one finds oneself at the mercy of the surprising intrusion that takes possession of one. And accordingly, the hatred with which a person is possessed as if by a demon is different from that with which one persecutes someone who is a persistent, lingering thinker and thinker, in whom antipathy usually seeks to take responsibility.

¹ A. David-Neel, **Initiations** lamalques. Paris 1930. — K. Zucker. Psychologie dee Schamanisierung (Z. f. d. get. Neurol. n. Psych., Vol. 150, 1934).

in which a person's spirituality — that to which they are sensitive — is revealed.

Reality is something that cannot be grasped, but rather something that must be allowed to happen, something to which one must simply submit. The "taboo" can be understood from this perspective. The fear of the taboo is not a fearful fear. It is not because of its threatening nature that something is avoided here; although its meaning should be understood. It is precisely this freedom towards things that is lacking, which would allow them to be recognised at their core. To touch the taboo is just as impossible as when someone who lacks shame or tact does something impossible. One misses the mark when

one touches it. Not as if one were using one's abilities incorrectly assessed — rather, one deceives oneself into thinking that what one can certainly "do" is not yet within one's power. Not as if one had lost control over it once it had started. But one is not "oneself" what one is sure of and does in the sense that it is up to me to begin. It is part of the concept of taboo to be contagious. This is where, without being aware of it, the initiative is nevertheless assigned to the individual.

Names are also taboo. The word can be used to "summon" something. E6 kiinn Wfthr become what is outlined in the word. However, this summoning means commanding oneself to it — as if a relationship of ownership were hanging in the balance, suddenly exchanging its subject with the object. The pull of the word is here placed in the power of the fortes itself. But at first glance — from voæ Žó'oc çrš/zoc-zisø — it looks as if the word were endowed with an occult, incomprehensible power — misjudging the limits and actual performance of the word — this vis magica is evident from the same root. One understands the explanatory conceptual power of language, the possibility of communication through language, when one approaches a seemingly so remote use of the word as

it is also a curse, for example. Because one "hears" something in the word; that means: the word invokes, awakens in the other what has been expressed in the word. The meaning of the word, which is naturally at the centre of the philosophy of language, in relation to which one is always tempted to isolate it from the word, or to connect it only associatively, which has often been confused with the concept — this "meaning" of the word springs from a power that the word has as a transformative, articulating sensualisation.

In the case of rain magic, for example, preliminary drawings are used to force the manifestation of an event that is self-contained and only needs to become powerful. Practice here does not mean proceeding in a knowledgeable and prudent manner — just as here, too, things are not sought as objects in their comprehensible suitability for something, but only as the seat of powers. The mere act of thinking oneself means a preliminary formation through which an event can be set in motion. Through imaginative preliminary sketches, things are given power over themselves, just as one must experience oneself as the seat of a cosmic efficacy. Here, one experiences oneself in relation to things — that is, in the direct reversal of what is meant by anthropomorphism.

In general: here, human beings find themselves open to a reality that can only be perceived in transparent features, but which cannot reveal itself for what it is. For one must stand in freedom to things when they appear to one as what they "really are," when they are **recognised** in their whatness, i.e., understood in their objective meaning, when one wants to gain insight into things from freely chosen points of view. But a reality that reveals itself to me in its external features creates a bondage on my part, or rather, this is presupposed. (A fundamental attitude towards the world that has changed in this direction also becomes apparent in the connection that

between the alienation of the perceptual world and hearing voices — which is meant to be **nothing** more than a parallel to what has just been said. The absence of visual hallucinations is significant here. For while things are sought out and viewed with the **gaze**, it is primarily the prelude to actions that is judged, and while things are seen at a distance from me, the ear is reached by the sound, which has already overcome the distance to me when I hear it. From a vital bondage, the patient is pushed in the direction of auditory hallucinations. The same fundamental disturbance is also expressed in the fact that the appearance of things is transformed in the direction of strangeness: the sick person cannot free himself to the possibilities of things, he cannot freely enter into things that seem to harbour a mystery for him or to portend all kinds of uncanny things. So when — as is often the case among primitive peoples — the image is taken for the search, the dream weighs as much as reality, this does not mean a lack of critical discernment, but rather a de-realisation of the external appearance, insofar as it is taken merely as a "face" in which something wants to reveal itself to me. The mask, too, is the sight of a being that one cannot freely encounter. One is at the mercy of its gaze, without being able to take it in and see through it.

The tangibility of the taboo, the possibility of its profanation, the fact that man is not powerful here in terms of what he is and does, but that he has to be here, etc. — but this returns in a strange shift to the feeling of shame. For one is ashamed of what one is not actually "oneself", but only "also" are, in which one participates as in something generally human. "Nakedness" denotes something in which one finds oneself compromised in one's personal integrity. One seeks to hide one's nakedness from view, insofar as one

Avoids duality, into which he would fall through his object. In these parallels, however, a homology of affects is revealed. Just as comparative anatomy contrasts analogous and homologous formations as variations of a basic type, homology between the affective sphere of taboo and the feeling of shame also points to something universal in the constitution of human nature.

CHANGE IN THE SOLDIER

A comparison of soldiers from different wars shows that "soldier" is not a normative common term. There is no core of truly essential definitions that could be identified as something that repeatedly prevails in the changing nature of reality and could be used to measure its representation. This becomes clear when attempting to develop a psychology of the soldier. The direction changes in which the question of the soldier's existence takes on its specific and "natural" meaning. The spread of interest varies. Reality is different in each case, from which the concept of the soldier derives the essence of its meaning and the conciseness of its content.

The soldiers of the armies of the 17th century, for example, are understood from the outset as a certain type of person. Their character is determined by the people from whom they were recruited, who had the aptitude and desire for this profession. One can approach them psychologically, for example by trying to portray them as examples of adventurers: The question of the **meaning** of existence leads him into the unknown. The lack of ties at the beginning of his journey gives the drifter the freedom to let encounters and experiences take on ultimate meaning. The image of the adventurer can be built on motives that are rooted in human nature and in the condition of existence. The inner potential of the adventurer can be understood in this way.

The soldier of the 1870 war is not something so original. What is expressed in his character cannot be easily grasped psychologically. He is shaped as if by his own law. Standing in a traditional belief, he knows the meaning of his calling. It is a certain spirit that shapes and guides him, in relation to which the word "soldierly" finds its original fulfilment here as a measure and value designation. It strikes a certain style that prevails as an attitude.

The **meaning** of morphological observation takes on a different significance for soldiers who found themselves in the last war. Here, a radical change in the relationship to the world took place. It was already foreshadowed by the shift from economic to technical thinking. While in the field of economics, problems are still being discovered and addressed, technology is only concerned with tasks. Problems are something that one deals with, the clarification of which remains explicitly related to the fact that real problems cannot be eliminated. This is in contrast to tasks that simply need to be carried out and which, in a strange, never entirely transparent but deeply rooted anticipation, contain their own resolution. The fact that technology is not underpinned by the indispensability of a belief is evident once again in the existential non-binding nature of what is technically correct. However, the relaxing nature of its objectivity creates danger. Unsecured, man discovers himself here as an open question. He finds himself referred to himself, i.e. to "his" time, as the authority that decides what has become illusory and what is real. For he is subject to the principle of this time, whose commanding expression was the last war, whose decisive figure was the soldier of that war.

One notices: "Being a soldier means different things. The logic of the relationship expressed therein changes. The origins of the tension that activates the reality of military existence lie at different points.

"Soldierly" as a stylistic quality does not mean "military". The military is — so it seems at first — an area in which it is necessary to acquire the internal **knowledge** of a skilled person. It is about military skills. The military is called upon as an expert to assess a situation —

It is no different than seeking advice from engineers. However, the military is primarily a "school". And not just one that you go through and then leave behind, but one that professional soldiers remain in. It is a practical exercise. And the use of the word "Mitnöver" shows that the purpose of this exercise is to prepare for an emergency. Those called up as soldiers "serve" in the military. The troops are a "body". The drill they are taught through training is a "potency" (Clausewitz) that can be estimated as a variable in the calculation of tactical operations. The military is a type shaped by the special nature of its profession. The image by which it is known is one of appearance: the military can be recognised by certain traits, by its focused gaze and by its objective training. But soldiering shapes a person's style. The soldier had become the bearer of the Prussian Ceistes in particular. He was the first class in Prussia. Here, the army was not primarily just a means of achieving political ends. The soldier's authority expressed a certain attitude towards life. Only where the soldier was considered the highest class — as is also characteristic of Japan in relation to China, according to E. B. — could this obligation to be exemplary arise. (In England, for example, there is no specific soldierly ethos that consciously sets itself apart from the non-soldierly. The English officer

Zier is a typical Englishman .)

Military discipline, which is simply regarded as the typical military attitude of a serving soldier, is not yet true soldierly discipline. "Discipline" means — this applies in general — not merely what someone can be taught or what one **can** practise oneself: it means having control over the inclinations and motives that push and pull within us. Then it would be merely an attitude, the preservation of which would only be in tension with its abandonment. However, discipline is not only achieved through

overcoming something. It is something positive. At its core, it is the gradual fulfilment of something.

The discipline of the soldier is based on the exclusivity with which he submits to what Clausewitz called *esprit de corps*. One must recognise the formative power of this ethos. Something becomes "true" here by being realised. One's gaze must not remain fixed on military traditions. Tradition is the custom that is followed, forms that are preserved as tradition. Tradition, in which one remains bound, but from which one can also free oneself and assert one's individuality, is merely preserved or cultivated. But the military conquers whatever it applies itself to. It shapes things extensively. Its spirit forms, insofar as it releases forces. We call the "real", i.e. accomplished soldier the

"Type" of soldier. Whereby "type" means something different here than it does in the case of the "type" of civil servant, for example. For here we are referring to the limitations of a human being when we

do not allow "the civil servant", for example, to deny himself. What we are looking at here is what has been shaped in a person by the circumstances of his profession, his peculiarities that can be explained by this. The person himself, however, is trained as a soldier. Cold heartiness and boldness, clarity of thought — these are virtues that are tailored to the general situation of the person.

The glory that a soldier can achieve highlights the direction in which he is understood: as a human possibility of being a measure of human greatness. For this glory means more than just being famous. One is only famous in the mouths of others; among them, one is considered to be the one who ... The desire **to** become **known**, to have one's significance confirmed, to want to be talked about — in short: ambition — is not a thirst for fame. There is the fame of victory. "Victory" is not merely a relative term. "Power" is revealed in victory.

One is trained to be a soldier. That one "becomes a soldier"

It cannot be determined from an examination of given characteristics — it only becomes apparent in practice — as the effortless fulfilment of the demands placed on soldiers. Military courage, for example, is something special. It is not a simple characteristic. How else can someone be characterised as courageous, insofar as that describes their nature? Strength and defensive capability, which are evident in such courage, are not requirements. But what prevails in military courage and **can** be exemplary **is** the willfulness of an attitude. Experience teaches this above all else; courage creates men of action. This attitude stands in tension with what it conquers outside. The courage that is required in all duties means taking decisive action. For soldiers in particular, it is better to make a wrong decision than no decision at all. For situations can only be recognised, i.e. faced, if one is in them. They can only reveal themselves in the light of a beginning. I stand by your principle. Even with the wrong decision, one remains the subject of the situation. Hesitant inaction, however, means giving up one's "status," insofar as this can only be assured in the activity of tension, in overcoming instability. Hesitation means allowing oneself to slip into becoming the object of the situation. Hesitation is the beginning of flight, where it becomes difficult to decide which of the two comes first: being fixated on things or having to seize opportunities which, since each is indifferent, cannot justify my behaviour.

On the other hand, soldiers are often accused of lacking "civil courage". Soldiers are said to be "strong men only when an order from above relieves them of the responsibility for using an iron fist". First of all, courage is not as simple as bravery. The courageous person overcomes inhibitions and reservations that arise in the face of danger. They do not allow themselves to be intimidated. Courage is — in contrast to bravery — a strength that is consciously recognised as justified. Imbued with the rightness of a cause or the

The correctness of a plan breaks through the forms that limit responsibilities. Being aware of the responsibility for what one does shows courage. Military personnel may now have an "instinctive respect" for legality as an expression of the limits of their vocation or their field as something they understand. The lack of moral courage attributed to the soldier, which makes his behaviour appear "typical" for him, has other reasons: it is not an escape from responsibility. Nor does it mean the correctness of the civil servant. The soldier has an instinctive reluctance to touch an established order. Its stability ultimately depends on **goodwill**, which can quickly become illusory without the intangible powers behind it having been refuted. For those who are in the elementary realm, there is no way at all into the circumstances of intersecting responsibilities, through which decisions are restricted in advance and access to reality is blocked.

Esprit de corps is also the reason for camaraderie. Camaraderie is not a community in the same sense as a clan is a natural community, or as the Yolk is a community of fate, or as friends are connected to each other. Comradeship can only arise where one is not at home. Always somehow "outside": in the field, in camp, in the barracks. Where there is no longer any private life. The soldier consciously distances himself from the settled citizen; he is sworn to the flag he follows. Comradeship manifests itself in standing up for one another. It is not always in dangers in the narrower sense that it proves itself. It is activated when the contrast emerges between oneself and those against whom one sets oneself apart without regard. The spirit in which such a thing as comradeship exists is alive only in the tension of its fulfilment. And in contrast to the open indeterminacy, the horizon-like nature of the spirit as an expression of an already existing community, it is present as a clearly defining direction. It "gives in

What we call the martial virtue of the army is, in a sense, the binding agent between the natural forces that are at work within it. The crystals of martial virtue adhere more easily to the spirit of the guild (Clau-sewitz).

The soldierly, as an expression of a certain attitude to life, does not coincide with the image one has of a "good soldier". Its characteristics are said to be bravery, courage, etc. However, these terms are not taken in the sharpness and depth of their actual existential meaning. In this original meaning of bravery, for example, specific demands are made on the individual ; it measures what is considered to be The "greatness" of a person is in focus. In contrast to courage, which is an expression of vital strength, revealing the side on which one stands. The question of what someone is courageous in always takes precedence over the other question of whether they are courageous at all. For the latter would not actually characterise "them", but merely their "nature". In the description of the "good soldier", on the other hand, courage and bravery are placed alongside reliability and resistance. And they are taken up in order to agree on a general formula for suitability as a soldier or for what is required of him in terms of performance. Bravery here is something that is either present or not. It refers to the actual resistance of a troop. This bravery can be outlined and measured, and one can be easily compared with another. However, one notices the difference between such a quality, objectified in terms of value, and original characteristics — such as the cold-bloodedness and blind courage of the daredevil, which points to something more fundamental. Or how bravado is something specific, namely not only something different from resistant bravery, but also something different from courage. For courage requires prudence. Bravado, however, throws itself into danger. The certainty of victory emphasises the non-existence of danger. Tenacity in resistance

However, it can indicate natural toughness just as much as it can mean stubborn defiance — in other words, complete opposites: self-assured calm as an expression of simple strength that makes the opponent retreat, and an irritated, provoked attitude that has to prove itself to the other and expresses itself in words such as, "We can do that too." Westphalia and Saxony were both good soldiers, despite the different mental configurations of their tribes.

2.

War always occurs in some form or another at different times and in different **places**. It is directed and grouped by the force fields into which it falls, as **an expression** of which **it asserts** itself, suppressing everything else.

Military expeditions that are carried out according to plan — for the pacification or subjugation of certain tribes, for example — are not yet wars. And wars cannot be reduced to the military tasks they set. For war lies — "arising from something" —

"Coming over" — beyond all order as the existing standard of calculation. However, only to the outsider does it appear as the breaking through of this order. The warrior himself knows about the special nature of the space in which something like a battle takes place. He knows about the intensity of this event: that it is no coincidence that battles are fought in the same field and in the same way. And he is part of it. It is less a sense of duty that enables him to endure, but rather a primal relationship to war, which has become his element. The soldier of the last war knew that he was the true bearer of an era. That his form of existence belonged to the war that had shaped him and defined him as a type. He knew about the shift in reality,

When he found her authority within himself, he still wanted to prove himself according to traditional standards. For the soldier of the material battle had become a different person from the one who went into the field in 1914. His basic experience was different. His emotions have changed. He experiences history not in the sweeping breadth of authoritative meanings, but as a situation that must be mastered by will and tactics. He is the first to have a sense of the magnitude of war. By standing up for the inevitable, he gains access to reality. For what distinguishes this warrior from the citizen, whose insubstantiality he discovers in the destruction of the appearance of his objectivity, is that he understands what he is placed in as fate — but not as mere "fortune" with which one must come to terms, from which one must detach oneself. Fate and chance are something that passes and is regarded as something to be expected.

But fate "befall" one, however. They are not "external" facts and events that affect me only as an object without any inner connection to me. Rather, one is the subject of "one's" fate. The concept of fate encapsulates the knowledge that one must not simply assert oneself in the face of encounters, but that one must take charge of them, that one finds oneself "confronted" with them. Not really a new reality, but a deeper one, was discovered in the war. What was encountered as experience must somehow be inherent in the human constitution. In an excellent sense, it is true here that whoever asks about the warrior is somehow asking about himself. And this is especially true when it comes to the war. For

"Warrior" is not a mere status. Nor is there any established ethos of the warrior. And he knows no "traditions". It is as if something primordial **were coming to the fore**. **Despite** the change of scenery, despite the fact that the warrior of 1914 has entered a new space, that war here has become time itself—again and again, the primal natural breaks through. The warrior is not an adventurer. As the mercenaries probably were. Or the soldiers of Cortez. They became

Enticed to come along. By vague expectations of booty and unknown lands. The adventurer shares with the player the desire to challenge fate. Except that the adventurer not only accepts fate, but also shapes it. He dares and pushes forward. Security is a restrictive boundary for him. He seeks to get involved. For him, danger is less about self-discovery and proving himself than it is about representing the unknown. Longing lives in the adventurer. Which is something different from craving sensation. For it is not that desire has its object that distinguishes it from longing, but that it seeks to assimilate it. The movement of longing, however, has the opposite direction: Longing for something expresses what is essential here: wanting to move from something to something else. An adventurer is someone who has travelled around and experienced many things. The adventurer is restless. He is compelled to always dare something new, to always reach further. For what he has achieved immediately recedes into disappointment. Behind possibilities not yet tried. He cannot remain in the emptiness that every achievement creates in its limits. — The armies of the 16th and 17th centuries consisted of adventurers. For a small wage, they risked their lives, expressing through this "purchase" that they wanted to free themselves from those who might otherwise owe them something. Unbound, fearless, they were "capable of anything". The warrior is not an adventurer. The secret pleasure that comes with being placed in a situation is not a longing. The elemental nature in which the warrior "stands" does not have the appeal, the pull and the allure of the unknown.

Today, soldiers are no longer weapon bearers in the sense that they used to be required to "carry" weapons. The meaning of war has changed. It is part of the concept of a weapon that it "targets" the enemy and does not merely hit them like an object. Arguments are the "weapons" of a discussion. The enemy should be defeated, the battle should

be decided. The "decisive" blow refers to the destruction of the possibility of being able to face up to the situation again. For it is the opponent's position that is at stake here. "Position" here means the move chosen in the game, which has been agreed upon as what is to be asserted, defended, attacked or taken. One admits defeat when the decision of the weapons has been "invoked". The gestures: wielding weapons, stretching weapons, crossing weapons, holding weapons, etc. express how the weapon is less — like a tool — a suitable means to an end, as the "means" chosen in the context of a decision is part of a defined field. The weapon binds its bearer.

It is clear that today's technical constructions can only be metaphorically referred to as "weapons". Explosive and gas grenades, bomber aircraft are means of destroying an enemy that is distributed as a mass in zones that are gassed as **spaces**, rolled up as trenches, cleared by fire rolls. Even the spray of a machine gun takes into account what comes into its range as an "object".

This war was a ruthless display of force. The effect for which this apparatus was designed is the release of forces. Unrestrained, left to their own devices, they have destructive effects to which the enemy is exposed as an object. Nevertheless, the soldier knew where he had to stand. Instinctively, he was drawn to the focal points of this action, where he was to be used up like material. The sophistication of these constructions is remarkable — especially in contrast to the brutally primitive single-mindedness of their immediate effects. It is precisely the complexity of their deliberate approach that makes the effects seem senseless when such calculations ultimately result in the outbreak of elements.

Mobilisation means something different today than it did in the past. The arsenal has been replaced by the inventory of technical possibilities,

that are available. They are what is being mobilised today. That is, if these constructions are given a warlike twist. The inner correctness of these constructions reveals the particular objectivity of technology: it is neutral insofar as it primarily **knows** only goals, but no purposes. It is a means for everything and everyone. It does not have the binding power of an existential centre — as, for example, the economy still had. Conversely, in the increasingly definitive constructions, in the increasingly powerful instruments and weapons, technology binds actions. The probability of a weapon being used increases with its perfection. Technology appears as armour. The elemental world in which one finds oneself involved bears the mark of purpose in its overwhelmingly participatory constructions. It is an "anonymous" power; no one responsible stands behind these high speeds — which are perceived as playful — behind the isolation and increase of forces, whose binding is essential for things to go well.

The soldier of today's war is less called upon to wield a weapon than to be an engineer and technician. The soldier has entered the realm of work (E. Jünger). Agility is what counts, finding one's way around this space. As the opposite of technical equipment, it has become an element. Even as a mere horizon, nature has been lost here. The landscape took on a technical relief. It was transformed. Its atmosphere was charged with possibilities. The enemy remained mostly invisible. The danger appeared in zones. Here, danger no longer meant the breach of security. With regard to such genuine dangers, it remained undisputed that security had increased today. Meanwhile, everywhere and at all times, one found oneself confronted by these new possibilities, to which one was freely and openly exposed. Danger had become risk. Only then did this specific blindness exist. "mechanically" . The adventurer

advances into a world of natural forces and weapons; it is important for him to participate in such forces. He

"braces itself" against dangers embodied in things. But in the strangely diluted space of the technical world, one must "be lucky." It is foolish to entrust oneself to the automatism of clever machines and push oneself to the limits of what is possible. When, as a sign of the beginning of a battle that has been prepared in detail and set in motion like a machine, a red flare rises silently from the trench, the recognition of this signal, in the complexity of its meaning, has nothing as elementally stirring as the trumpet signal of earlier times, which one simply had to follow. Never before has there been such a life-shattering emptiness on the battlefield. The noise of this work process, understood only in its material meaning, was not illuminated by any symbolism.

Compared to 1870-71, the last war seems strangely formless. This is not only due to the tactics he developed: that increased firepower had forced the dissolution of fixed formations, that no more manoeuvres were carried out by troops brought together against the enemy; that here, on the contrary, the **infantry** had become more mobile **in** adaptation to the firepower and was scattered as a mass across the battlefield; that here the emphasis of the battle had shifted from the infantry to machine guns, above all to artillery, which was deployed according to new **tactics** oriented towards strips of terrain; that the success of an undertaking that dissolved into individual actions could only be calculated in overview and, in its outcome — with the elimination of the leader of even the smallest units such as the company — depended entirely on the ability, prudence and skill of the individual, unlike in the past. The last war was formless, insofar as it did not concentrate in such structures as, for example, the battle for the flag had been in the past. The military events of 1870, the "bataille," had a specific meaning that this

It became binding, as it were, in that it was understood as victory or defeat and came to fruition. From then on, it was guided and accepted. From there, it gained a place in memory that went beyond the visible and tangible. For the flag in question signified less a directional symbol for securing cohesion and leadership than it did bringing their meaning to life. To grasp its significance, it is necessary to penetrate the basic forms in which this struggle was interpreted and by which it was constrained. The meaning of the flag was brought to mind as it was carried forward and fell, and "brought to mind" here does not merely mean "expressed." The level of reality is defined in this so-called symbolism. The flag concretises that which one — has bound himself by oath —.

The last war, however, was not about victories, which are always something clear-cut. Rather, it was about successes that had to be measured in terms of one's own efforts. Economic considerations prevailed. Successes are never final, self-contained things. Something is only "considered" a success if it is evaluated in relation to the intention of a beginning. Certain "interests" were decisive for the way this war was conducted. Success can only be seen from one point of view. Namely, any processes, circumstances or events that are initially desired for what they are in their simple reality. The fact that everything here was aimed at the simple destruction of the enemy shows a disempowering of the old soldierly style. The last war was fought by peoples whose ethos had become alien to war. The fact that pacifist enlightenment had taken away the freedom to declare war, and the uncertainty towards war that this created, gave it precisely the scope that makes it appear degenerate when measured by military standards. The inhumanity of this last war heralds the achievement of its telos: it was not about power, whose

Recognition by the defeated presupposes precisely the untouched nature of the free relationship in which one stands to the other. Here, it was merely a matter of power. In *this* relationship, power is merely violence: the greater the power, the less violence it needs to enforce its will. Never before had all physical means of violence been brought into play. However, the formlessness of this war and the unsymbolic nature of the categories that guided it meant that it did not come to a proper, i.e. "right" end — just as brutal reality can only find its determining factor in the consequences of its transformation, in the effects of events. When victory is complete, something actually disappears.

3.

A person's character is revealed in their face. It reveals them in their unique, unmistakable way. Everyone has 'their' face. It reveals them. By their gait, but by their face, insofar as one recognises the face, one recognises someone. "Face" has a double meaning: to look out into the world and to become visible in the direction taken *in the moment*. However, this "direction" is not a perspective that can be objectively determined and specified. Rather, it is emphasised in a person's "gaze". In how they look at you, for example. Some kind of tension is constitutive for the features of a face, which are not natural-morphological, but rather something "spiritual". The animal is the "centre" of its environment. Its gaze is fixed on what is closest. Its vision is related to naked life. Animals have their species character in

"Face" written; something "general" comes into it depending on the representation. However, the "humanity" of features points to a categorical difference. The child's features are understood as undeveloped, its gaze as "simple". This is because the face represents a confrontation with a "world". To give someone a face

means recognising their free relationship to what is encompassed as the world as a whole and what can therefore reveal itself under a horizon of decisive possibilities. In doing so, they understand themselves as being somewhere, in a situation that is theirs alone. How they see the world is what makes them themselves. Only then is there a representation of a world broken through selfhood.

The faces and posture of the soldiers of 1870, as shown in the photographs hanging in the hallway of my old barracks, were so different. They seem strange to us today. And this strangeness reveals a distance that goes beyond what can be expressed in words. For "strange" is not simply that which is still unfamiliar, which needs to be learned, i.e. gradually fixed in its factual particularity. Beyond mere factual difference lies the utterly different nature of a foreign "existence": the other stands there as "foreign" to me here; it is precisely when one encounters foreignness that one becomes aware of what is equally inalienable as one's own. In each of these pictures, we recognise men with distinctive faces. They are faces that are all different, but each of which clearly "looks" a certain way. There is distance in them. At the same time, they appear "posed" in the picture — all striving for authenticity in their self-representation. Taking the viewpoint only as a starting point in order to be able to convey emotional diversity and the decisiveness of an attitude. One notices the inadequacy of photographic reproduction here. For the image of a person — and that means, above all, how they see themselves, namely how they try to grasp and hold on to themselves — is also determined by the reality in which their appearance is captured. What makes the photographs of the 1980s seem so strange and rigid is that they were men who were "seen through a temperament". They are faces that demand to be interpreted ambiguously.

Examples of such images were provided in an excellent **essay** by **B. E. Werner**, "Vom Gesicht der deutschen Armee" (The Face of the German Army) (Die neue Linie, June 1935). **The following remarks** were inspired by

this.

to be able to comprehend those that, banished to the realm of mere visual appearance, are frozen and created in their proper breadth, and therefore cannot be grasped by technical means. They were men who knew that being a soldier was a duty, who knew that they had been called up to serve in a world whose values were unquestionably traditional. Their actions were determined by a sense of duty rather than by the decisiveness of political conviction. "Piety of action" is a phrase that they were still able to fulfil. The uninhibited steadfastness of their gaze shows how the war meant an enhancement of their lives, a "time of vigorous progress" for them. They knew that "when the storm was over, something new would be ready." The day of battle was a day of honour for the veterans. Being in the field meant being tested and proven. In a battle that also had something festive about it. It was about the flag, to which victory was attached, whose capture symbolically made it clear that the decision belonged to those who succeeded in getting back on their feet in the uncertain situation. Daa GanEe was clear in its sequence, transparent in the planning of its structure. Vividly present in the memory. Here, the individual was still "6el". His commitment fulfilled the meaning of a life that was determined by classical standards.

These men still knew the war; they had experienced it experienced it like others did. This distinguishes them from the soldiers of peacetime before 1914, and the latter distinguishes them from the soldiers of the last war. The images from my time in service do not show the weathered faces of the 1980s. Instead of real steadfastness and calm, only their assumed posture, into which their bearers, finding it inappropriate, merely try to stretch themselves. Instead of real determination, a self-confidence carved out of the East — less a core belief than a yes-saying confidence that still holds itself on this side of experience. It is a certainty that is already taken as confirmed by a lack of resistance.

In the often empty expressions on these faces, we see reflected the vague, vague "ideals" in which this era seeks to relax. — The soldierly is overshadowed here by the military. And at the same time, these faces represent a variety of types. In this period, just as there were professors' heads back then. They are the reliefs of certain tasks and living conditions, against whose imprint no substance of their own can assert itself here.

This division into two types is striking when compared to the images of frontline soldiers. Harshness characterises these sharp faces, frozen in inner tension. This person has become a "type". With increasing purity, Gich outlines here the contours of an existence that has been burned out by transcendence. One notices the distance from the faces of the generation of 1870. Here, it was still the nature of a person, calm and restlessness, diversity and poverty of an "inner self" that was revealed in their gaze. And insofar as there is a certain attitude towards life, towards the world, in the tension or dreaminess of a gaze, it is a gaze that "looks into the world" but is not fixed and bound there. It is "free" and not objectively bound like the gaze of this new soldier of my generation, who has gone to war and looks outwardly at things. As the zero point of orientation, the centre of this gaze differs from the core centre of the other. What can be seen in this gaze is action, sharpness, "optical" penetration. It is "simple" and without visualisation. The contours of the soul's configuration recede into the bosom of their origin in the light of its departure towards objectivity. In truth, this gaze assures itself that it will come along. It is tense with sharp perception. It belongs to people who found themselves suddenly thrown back into the elemental. Animalistic intuition plays around their features. And their gaze, attuned to perception, no longer pays attention to what may present itself to them. Placed in the chaotic emptiness of the battlefield, it becomes

Everything appears fragmented and without horizon. There is loneliness in this gaze. It is precisely in the wiped-away appearance of their own physiognomy that it becomes apparent that the free relationship to the world described in "Anschauung" has receded behind an attitude of elementary concern: it is the proximity of destruction, but not of death, that lies like a shadow over these faces that have become simple. And you can see it in them: they are faces that have been transformed within themselves.

When the individual diversity in the faces of today's soldiers recedes so conspicuously, this reveals the emergence of an orienting principle that is beginning to assert itself in the face as well as in what is neutrally called "life." Here, one finds nothing more of the soft indeterminacy of features than the expression of unformed, elusive ideals. There is a lack of open ambiguity, of being able to freely respond to different demands. What is meant by a "good face" has changed, and Ernst Jünger has noted that the **meaning** of photography for the type of person we are today has shifted: it is precisely in the technology of photography that he finds the translation in which he can represent himself. These are closed faces, purposefully set on active engagement, features that have been shaped in the practice of tackling tasks and facts. In contrast to naïve self-assertion and demands, the radiance of these faces manifests the tension of a world that can only be grasped. It is the sharp, focused gaze of the technician who must be able to use the apparatus of modern warfare. The old standards fail in the face of this soldier. His situation highlights that of the people of his time. He belongs to a new order. It is no longer a question of the futile protection of goods. The fact that existence is surrounded by dangers is something to which this generation can unreservedly commit itself. Knowing that only by advancing, by pushing boundaries, can the uncertainty that their fathers had discovered be banished.

GOETHE'S COLOUR THEORY

Ana's thoughts on an interpretation

There does not appear to be any compelling factual connection between Goethe's scientific writings, morphology and colour theory. In the history of various subjects, it is believed that they can be given their place. The assessment also varies. Morphology is mentioned with praise. Little could be done with colour theory, which was a specific fulfilment of Goethe's profession. Goethe's polemic against Newton seems to have been decided in Newton's favour long ago. But the question is whether this does not simply mean that Goethe's theory of colours was certainly not, from the outset, on the path that has become the irrevocable destiny of Western science. Goethe's theory of colours does not provide what seems to speak in favour of Newton's theory of colours. It offers nothing to technology. It does not impart any expertise that could be useful in the construction of apparatus. But if Goethe's theory of colours is not only distinguished from Newton's as a type of knowledge, if it is already in its subject matter

— in that it is a theory of colour — incomparable with Newton's optics? The fact that Goethe was unable to encounter Newton at all makes the excessive vehemence of his polemic against Newton understandable. The flaw in this polemic — that he disputed the validity of physical demonstrations — shows how he failed to grasp the actual core of his opposition to Newton. It lies not only in the very different goal of modern natural science. The field taken up with the goal, or rather set within it, is different.

However, Goethe's morphology also seems to me to be misunderstood when it is placed within the context of contemporary endeavours, for example as a precursor to developmental theories. The cool reception it received should

This is puzzling. In fact, she too was ahead of her time. It is not as if her time had not yet come — just as Mendel's findings were only **recognised** for their factual significance later on. The intentions of Goethe's "science" are not to be understood as factual statements. If, for example, one compares Goethe's morphology with the idealistic morphology of his time, it is viewed **from** a perspective that is foreign to it. Its very intention is then betrayed. But this also means misunderstanding its connection **with** the theory of colours. One then virtually **blocks** one's access to it. Immediately, the beginning of the theory of colours becomes incomprehensible:

"The eye owes its existence to light ... From indifferent animal auxiliary organs, light brings forth an organ that is unrivalled, and thus the eye forms itself in light for light, so that inner light may meet outer light." Only Goethe's morphology can prepare one for these statements. For Goethe did not stop at the comparative anatomical observations of contemporary French morphologists, who sought to reduce animal forms to a common denominator, who were concerned with developing a plan, for which the demonstrated kinship of animals was the means of seeing them in detail and objectively. For Goethe, however, form was less the subject of critical analysis than something to be grasped as "B il dun g". Goethe, for example, calls the fish a "decisive inhabitant" ° of the water. Because it is formed "by the water into water". This means that water not only has an effect — namely retrospectively — reshaping the fish. The fish is rather organised for the water, insofar as it sustains itself in it and is able to do so. "It is precisely through this that an animal derives its external purposefulness, because it is as well organised from the outside as

¹ Introduction to the Theory of Colours. XXVIII, p. 14. — I quote from the complete edition by Cotta, 1857.

• XXYII, p. 253, p. 208 ff., p. 276.

is formed from within." Water is something with which fish live, an element that **is integral to the basis** of their existence. Goethe believes that fish are not merely adapted to water as their environment. Such a way of thinking can **only** be suggested where, **at first glance**, "foreign" conditions in the true sense of the word are taken into account — as, for example, when one looks at the **secondary** transformation of a seal's feet. However, the "element" of an animal is not just an external circumstance like its accidental environment. It is the origin and destination of "existence conceived in activity". The "character" of an animal lies **in** how "It relates to things, and things relate to it." The animal is governed by its element; it is part of its formation. This is why, for example, the goal of adaptation can be to regain the element, whereby a land plant — Polygonum, for example — develops floating leaves in the water and relocates the stomata on their surface in order to regain access to the air. The organisation^o of an animal has a reason that is incomprehensible, which can only be penetrated "with the complex of mental powers that we call genius". Water is the "natural destiny" ^o of the fish. But just as the fish is created by water for water, so the eye "owes its existence to light".

However, "indifferent animal auxiliary organs" **would be**, for example, the pit eyes of lower animals. They are "indifferent" insofar as they are still undifferentiated — meaning here: undecided — and do not yet "contain" what is "conceived as the goal" in the eye. The animal finds its way around, i.e. it merely helps itself with this. It allows itself to be guided by differences in brightness without

¹ Introduction to a general theory of comparison. (Goethe's scientific writings, ed. by R. Steiner, IV, 2nd section, pp. 575/76.)

^o C. Nägeli distinguishes between organisational characteristics and adaptive features (Meehanistic-physiological theory of evolution. 1884).

^o XXX, p. 411.

[^] XXYII, p. 133.

But actually, it is the ability to overcome the distance between here and there. While the pit eye is only a means of orientation, human vision has its own goal: we want to "see". Human vision is something that — like thinking — is exercised in a specific sense, but not only that. Therefore, in the true sense, the eye represents an upgrade, an "acheminement" compared to the mere performance of the pit eye. And what does it mean that the light in the eye creates an organ "that becomes its own"? What does " " mean? "Sunlike" nature of the eye? Light is only real in relation to the eye, to which it means precisely this: to allow transparency to things, so that they can be seen in their place as in another place in space, as where I myself am. Light is srr_ys(p light only as the act of seeing. of seeing. Accordingly, however, the eye is sun-like. It is dependent on its openness to light: it is what it is only with light; it is sun-like in its inability to see without light, i.e. it cannot be an eye in the true sense. Insofar as living beings depend on light in their eyes, this is only allowed to be light. Through the eye as a "decisive formation" in the sense of Goethe's morphology, the "pure conditions" are created on the basis of which colours are born: colour is "the lawful nature in relation to the sense of the eye".

However, recognition of the superiority of the human eye implies that colour cannot simply be defined as a sensation. It is important to emphasise the crucial difference between sight and smell, taste and touch. We speak of "sensations" here because we are approached by things in our private, self-centred existence. Smells,

¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1048 b 1W36.

° Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 418 b 9.

° Introduction to the Theory of Colours, **XXVIII**, p. 15.

Tactile impressions are of paramount importance. A taste warns me; when I touch something, I encounter resistance. The tongue, the probing finger, etc. are the given and activated means of experiencing something about things and through things. To be smellable means to have a smell; it is a possibility provided by things to allow oneself to be affected by them through smell. In seeing, however, things are not only accessible in detail. It is not only something about them that is experienced. Rather, things are visible as a whole and within the framework of a world that "wants to reveal itself to the eye in a special way through colours"*. Blindness therefore means a fate and not just a compensable misfortune like the loss of other senses, which

— as mere aids — are replaceable within limits. And visibility is not a possibility inherent in the specific nature of things, but rather a possibility that lies within me. Seeing is in one's own hands, it is active. One must approach things freely in order to make them visible to oneself at a distance, in order to be able to understand them from different perspectives. They are elevated to a level of manifestation when one allows them to show themselves in the light.

In doing so, they translate themselves into their colourful appearance. Seeing is an interpretation of things. One interprets them within the framework of pure relationships — e.g. also perspective — which are created by the eye as a distinct formation.

There is an "innate totality" of colours. In particular, it is the material structure of things: how they transmit, absorb or reflect light, etc., which translates into colours. It appears at the boundaries of things. The coloured surface of things — this is something that stands in tension with their unexplored depth. The fact that "chromaticism is grounded in the subject" is evident in the neutrality of appearance. Certainly, in its appearance, the thing "itself" stands before me, namely insofar as it is present in it

¹ Preface to the Theory of Colours, **XXVIII**, p. 5.

[^] **yazbeatebre**, § 812, **xXXIII**, p. 203.

presented. But the material nature of things, that in which they are incomparably different, in which they can therefore be clearly grasped, is overlooked. Like the rose, for example, which is so deeply embedded in its scent that it can only be defined as such, as "rose scent". Or how one can feel the chalk itself, how it feels. A colour, however, is defined as this colour, i.e. by the place it occupies in the colour wheel. There is an inner order to colours. And while sometimes it is the smell, sometimes the taste that is characteristic of something, everything looks a certain way, and the real and the imitation can look the same. Appearances are deceptive. One needs sensations in the true sense of the word to be certain of the reality of something. One checks, for example, by smell *whether* what one sees is a real rose. On the other hand, the fact that the visible appearance can also be an illusion is only the flip side of a specific truth of the appearance, namely that it is referred to as an appearance. However, sensations in the true sense lack precisely this truth. While sensation assures us of a "meaningless presence" of things, nature has "emerged from its indifference" in colour. Nature has "ascended to man" in colours — insofar as the colourful appearance of things is only in their interpretation by the eye. For Goethe, colours are not — as they are for physicists — phenomena in the sense of something perceptible and ascertainable; for him, they are a "significant phenomenon". For Goethe, the "movement" of colour does not mean the fleetingness of phenomena that appear and disappear: colour shows its movement in the perception of difference.

The fact that we have to refer to the colour of violets in order to define a particular shade of blue is not an objection to this. Nor is the fact that the Greeks understood colour in terms of its material composition, i.e. that they combined what we see as the changing colours of the sea, namely blue, green, etc., to express it.

- Theory of Colours, § 745, **XXVIII**, p. 189.

The worldliness of pure relationships, which in seeing —and also in hearing'—are the reason why there is painting and music, but nothing corresponding in the realm of the other senses. Goethe repeatedly objects to Newton on the grounds that he cannot provide any justification for the harmony of colours and for the genius of the painter. In fact, however, colour as colour was not important to Newton at all. What interested him was the process that could be produced by the technical means of physics, for which the appearance of colour was only a visible indicator, but one that could also be registered in other ways. The part of Newton's optics that deals with

"Colours" are dealt with, i.e. explained, in a way that could be demonstrated by someone who is colour blind. Newton himself had a very limited ability to distinguish between colours. On the other hand, if Goethe took such offence at the fact that Newton — in his explanation of his prism experiment — allowed the different colours to be contained in light, then these are not actually the colours themselves that are packed into the "light".

'Colour and sound cannot be compared with each other in any way; but both can be related to a higher formula, both can be derived from a higher formula, but each separately. Like two rivers that spring from a mountain but flow under completely different conditions into two completely opposite regions of the world, so that no single point along their entire course can be compared to the other, so too are colour and sound. Both are general elementary effects, acting according to the general law of separation and convergence, of rising and falling, of weighing and counterweighing, but in completely different directions, in different ways, on different intermediate elements, for different senses.' (Theory of Colours, § 748, XXVIII, p. 190.) — Sound is an expression and thus the given means of expression. For it is heard as the vocalisation of something; the "purity" of sound contrasts with noise, which — again measured against sound — sounds muffled due to the material that does not allow the sound to come through freely.

° That is why Goethe's theory of colours should be understood today as being directed less against physics than against psychology. For psychology regards colour as a sensation, and sensation

But to what extent is it essential for painting that colours are not sensations? Colours can be seen, but sensations cannot be reproduced in the same way. For a sensation—insofar as it cannot be separated from what is experienced in it—can only be imitated. The imitated smell is then not "itself" what it purports to be. But a colour, insofar as it is not something in or of things, can be presented or freely reproduced as that colour. The indifference of colour to the specific nature of things, the fact that colour is merely appearance and, as appearance, testifies precisely by its very nature that it can be true or not, is the starting point for "the deepest foundations of knowledge on which the painter's style rests". For painting must not remain a reproduction in the sense of "petty recording".

Rather, "the eye sets itself free by

discovery as a "certain mode of consciousness" (Descartes) through which the nature of things is conveyed to me. However, precisely when we stick to what we actually mean by "sensation," when we leave aside colours, which, if anything, are not "subjective" sensations from the outset: in sensation I experience things themselves, in hardness, for example, the seriousness of the resistance that a body opposes to any attempt to interfere with it. Just as things are generally not perceived as "objects" but in their interaction and counteraction and in the context of the respective situation. In the ability of soggy paths to impede my steps, the elemental importance of solid ground becomes paramount. Only self-consciousness allows one to overlook the fact that one is never in a vacuum: the senses are ways of being open to where one lives. The scent one picks up already means seeking to come to terms with things: one "lets" see here affix: Sensing is a tentative feeling that has possibilities for retreat. Only the finger, placed in the service of actual "knowledge" and proceeding intelligently and measuredly, is an "organ" of the human being. In psychology, however — and this shows how unquestioningly a certain epistemological position becomes authoritative — the senses are already assumed to be the specific tools for obtaining lasting knowledge.

¹ Simple imitation of nature, masonry, style. (XXV, p. 24.)

the contrast of the individual imposed on it and thus produces a satisfying whole. — As simple as these actually harmonious contrasts are, which are given to us in the narrow circle, so important is the hint that **nature** is designed to elevate us **to** freedom through totality, and that this time we receive a naturalisation for aesthetic use directly handed down to us." It **was not until** the early 19th century **that** colour became almost exclusively a means of representation determined by optical impression. In Titian, for example, "the colourful unity of the picture is not based on relationships in the realm of imitation, but on relationships of the absolute; it is these that give the individual imitative case its eternally valid rule and deeper meaning."

But how can it be demonstrated that "chromaticism is founded in the subject" — if it is not to have the crude meaning that the location of colour is as a sensation in the subject? To delve into Goethe's theory of colours, let us consider atmospheric colours. For example, the emergence of dawn. The "highest energy light, such as that of the sun" is dazzling and colourless. Seen through a cloudy medium, however, this light appears yellow. And the more moisture there is in the air, the redder the sun appears. The further it rises above the horizon, the more its pure light can prevail as the haze layer becomes less dense, and the hotter and yellower its glow becomes. — But "when the darkness of infinite space is viewed through atmospheric hazes illuminated by daylight, the colour blue appears" ¹.

The colour "appears" — namely within the framework of certain

¹ Theory of Colours, § 812, 813, XXVIII, p. 203.

• Th. Hetzer, Titian. 1935. pp. 49 and 263.

° Colour Theory, § 150 to 156, XXVIII, p. 54 ff.

° Goethe mentions a case of "momentary clouding" in this context: the black colour of the skirt of a clergyman portrayed turned blue when the picture was cleaned with a wet sponge. After drying, it turned black again. The

Conditions described by the darkness of a background, the haziness of a foreground, etc., which are linked to vision. And the hazier the medium, the brighter and bluer the sky becomes. And the more transparent the atmosphere, the darker and richer the blue colour becomes. In the valleys, the sky appears white-blue, while high up in the thin air of the peaks, it is seen as royal blue.

But if Goethe describes colour as something that can be seen, what phenomenon has been reduced to this? What does the "cloudy medium" mean in this context? What does it mean that light is "darkened" — but obviously not in the most obvious sense, that it loses brightness! To proceed further here, let us assume that for Goethe, the colour spectrum does not run in the same direction ¹. There is a break at the point where yellow transitions to **green** to blue: in the colours that are close to light — the positive colours — the intensity decreases from red to orange to yellow, and then increases again in the (negative) colours of darkness from blue to indigo to violet. However, it is clear that light cannot simply predominate in light colours. For example, a bright blue has more light than a glowing red. The difference that occurs in colours can be understood in terms of the circumstances of their formation: in the yellow series, light is in the background. The inherently free radiation of light is inhibited by the cloudiness of the background. And the more it is held back here, the more it has to resist, the more powerful the colour appears here; it is most powerful in the restrained **glow** of ruby red. — In the blue series, however, it is initially a mistiness of the background against which the

Fimis had absorbed water during cleaning. It therefore appeared as a cloudy medium through which the underlying black **had to** appear blue. (Colour Theory, § 172, **XXVIII**, p. 58.)

¹ Here I follow the interpretation of colour theory given by Hedwig Conrad-Martins, which is, of course, fundamentally different. (Colours, Husserl Festschrift 1929, p. 345 ff.)

Light penetrating and entering in opposition. However, a polar opposition of colours is now evident in that, while the positive colours that appear on the basis of light become more powerful the more light is bound by the cloudy medium, in the blue series the colour becomes lighter and brighter the less light as such can oppose the darkness, i.e. the more light is bound by the murkiness of the background.

However, does the statement that "light is held back" or "bound" by the vapours in the atmosphere, etc., imply a factual explanation? The unresolved nature of such "assertions" associated with these words would make critical discussion as impossible as it is unnecessary. Instead of allowing ourselves to be led by the word to what is objectively known, it is important here to start from the word itself.

— namely under the guidance of its meaning — to be taken up in the colour given. One "sees" the light becoming clouded down to red. This does not mean that it is to be visualised in the sense that one need only "look" in order to find an assertion confirmed by experience. For then everything would remain understood in its outward appearance. "Clouding," for example, would then refer to something like a mixture, i.e., its result, and "dark" would be used to refer to the absence of light. This means that what is expressed in these words would only change fleetingly through the gaze insofar as something else is, as it were, only reflected in them — namely, something whose meaning can be deduced from the things themselves or from the circle of their familiarity. The "clouding" of light seen in red is something else. Insofar as one has to look closely in order to grasp what is meant by the word. Only in this way can one discover what, as a phenomenon, is "the teaching itself", but which is not

— like something to be observed outside — only the cover of a view. Seeing is not merely access to colours (e.g. their origin), as if they were something tangible. Just as the flower becomes accessible in "its" scent,

or as something is present in "its" taste. However, colour cannot be vindicated as the place where it is seen, i.e. where it is only seen, as it were.

Ruby red is seen as a "restrained glow"¹. The colour's origin is written all over its face. It is an expression of Goethe's to "redeem" the colour "from its abstract state, as it were". The fact that the origin of colours is seen at all, i.e. that colours are not seen merely as qualities, is evidenced by the "sensual-moral effect of colours".

The "characteristic" of colour means something different from the "character" of a smell, which refers to its unmistakably perceptible content. Every colour has its own character. It determines us, for example, when choosing a colour. "Just as yellow always carries light with it, so one can say that blue always carries darkness with it ... This colour is on the negative side and, in its highest purity, is, as it were, a charming nothingness." ° For it has its origin in nothingness, i.e. in the darkness of space fleeing into infinity. The depth of this colour, which draws the eye, makes blue surfaces seem to recede. "Rooms that are wallpapered in pure blue appear, in a sense, spacious, but actually empty and cold."

Goethe speaks of a polarity of colour insofar as it can decide between two sides. "The emergence of colour and deciding are one and the same." ° What does "deciding" mean here? It would remain incomprehensible if "emerging" meant here what it means in natural science, where the emergence of something is linked to the convergence of circumstances, where every emergence has a reason outside itself, a *causa extrinseca*. "The thinking person is particularly mistaken when he inquires about cause and effect: the two together make up the indivisible phenomenon." ⁴ "One may

¹ a. 0., p. 348.

° Theory of Colours, § 778 to 783. XXVIII, p. 198.

° Theory of Colours, § 695, XXVIII, p. 176.

Maxims and Reflections. Edited by M. Heckör, 1907, No. 1234.

Do not think mechanically about what is of a higher nature." For both colours, their emergence is therefore a decision, because colour has absorbed its reason so deeply within itself that it bears witness to its own emergence. Its phenomenon is "even the teaching"^o. One must not look for anything behind it. Because colour is a specific, decisive colour, its origin is a primordial phenomenon, "which cannot be revealed to the mind through words and hypotheses, but only through phenomena to the eye". "When I finally calm down with the primordial phenomenon, it is still only resignation; but there remains a big difference between resigning myself to the limits of humanity and resigning myself to the hypothetical limitations of of the narrow-minded individual."

"Limits of humanity" — these are not limits of human knowledge in the sense of given, simply accepted ^{facts}. Rather, they encompass the same thing as the "innate destiny" of human beings.

Such a doctrine is, of course, more difficult to grasp than a scientific theory, which has been designed as teaching material in the sense of y'iBqye and constructed for comprehensibility. On the other hand, it "carries its application with it." There is no need to reinterpret or twist the facts in order to present them — which in this case would mean "derivation" — as evidence supporting the theory. Goethe's materials on colour theory, which admittedly require a certain amount of concentration to appreciate the relationship between the phenomena compiled therein, are somewhat

¹ M. u. R. No. 238.

^o M. u. R. No. 575.

^o Theory of Colours, § 175, XXYIII, p. 60.

[^] M. u. R. No. 577.

Schopenhauer's view on this matter shows how far removed he was from Goethe's thinking. For Schopenhauer, the primordial phenomenon is "something that is given per se and forever beyond explanation" (Das Sehen und die Farben, 2nd edition, 1854, p. 71). Accordingly, he believes that in his theory he can attribute it to an "inexplicable ability of the retina," i.e., to a fact that can only be understood in its outward appearance, if at all.

other than the findings of positive science gathered in the course of performing tasks. The Fall as an illustration of a theory is contrasted with the condensed view in the conciseness of an example in which "the eternal can be grasped in passing". 'So that what is composed there can be considered simpler here, and Newton can place a phenomenon derived from Goethe at the top of the list.

For Goethe, colour cannot be explained in physical terms. For things are only coloured insofar as they are absorbed into the circle of a living being that is open to nature in a specific way in the eye. Only when this relationship to things ^{is} distorted into a relationship between subject and object¹ can the question arise as to whether colours should be assigned to the object as "objective" or whether they should be attributed to the subject of cognition as "subjective". However, in believing that colour must be understood as the determination of an object that is perceived as existing, one is already disregarding the circumstances in which it was originally discovered and is effective. However, the subjectivity or objectivity of the inner-worldly conditions in which colours are seen or physical processes are measured does not imply relativity in the supposed sense, nor does it imply the opposite.

¹ Such a mere consideration of the dependence between the determinations of subject and object has, for example, also become the unquestioned theme of Schopenhauer's theory. It was Newton's fundamental mistake "that, without knowing anything about the effect (and Schopenhauer considers colour to be an 'affection of the eye!'), he hastily proceeded to the conception of the cause" (ibid., p. 21). Schopenhauer then seeks to describe colour as a "qualitatively divided activity of the retina". In that colour is for him merely an indicator of a (admittedly physiological and not physical) process, in that he explains hypothetically what Goethe sees as an indivisible phenomenon, he agrees with Newton. This is why Goethe could by no means see Schopenhauer as an advocate of his theory of colours, as the latter would have liked, but only as an opponent (cf. Goethe's letter to C. L. F. Schultz in 1816, Works IV, vol. 27, p. 105).

But if the emergence of colour is something other than the creation of an effect, then Goethe's experiments must also mean something other than physical experiments.

The physicist analyses phenomena. He subjects nature to conditions, whereby the conditions are what he technically has at his disposal. Nature is forced onto the level to which it must translate itself. Nature is not actually understood, but only grasped; in the positive facts, one wants to gain control over it. Through the desire for science as such, which is sought here as expertise, nature in the true sense of the word disappears from view. The conditions of the experiment are essentially artificial, insofar as it is a demonstration of a systematic connection designed from one's own resources. It is created in the basic experiment. Nature is distorted in this process, i.e. it is not left in the place where it originally belonged: physical nature is, as it were, the "element" of physical apparatus.

This is because it is through their circuitry that the conditions are created in the first place within which nature is assimilated and explored. Only that which these apparatus respond to is there for physical observation. The physicist creates experiences.

Goethe's search for truth, however, deliberately seeks to repeat experiences. His empiricism, which "becomes intimately identified with the object"¹, is not an experience that is called upon to judge, which is more the invoked principle of security than the guiding principle of knowledge. It represents a point of view that can be asserted. For Goethe, experience is something. For him, discovery is "the significant exercise, the activation of an original sense of truth that has long been quietly developed and suddenly, with lightning speed, leads to fruitful knowledge. It is a revelation that develops from the inside to the outside

¹ M. u. R. No. 565.

Discovery is not a chance find. Goethe is concerned **with** finding "pregnant **points**" where nature "freely" brings something to his attention. He must therefore fulfil certain conditions. His experiments are very simple: a few pieces of coloured paper, a hole in the window shutter through which the sun shines, etc. Goethe was suspicious of apparatus. He downright hated it. "Microscopes and telescopes actually confuse the pure human senses." For both involve an illusory point of view, i.e. the actual point of view becomes illusory. The excessive sharpness here "throws the inner faculty of judgement out of balance with the outer senses". Because the innate purpose of the eye is misunderstood, everything becomes confused. "It is unfortunate that experiments have separated nature from man, and that nature is only recognised in what artificial instruments can do, thereby limiting and proving what it can achieve." Goethe was preoccupied with his earthly surroundings. He has *Sich* For example, he was never interested in astronomy*.

Hatred reveals a person's spirituality. That which they are sensitive to. Goethe was sensitive to the wilful anxiety of theorists who find a narrow but secure basis in the rejection of positive facts and who want to use argumentation to assert a point of view that

• M. u. R. No. 562.

° XXX, p. 364.

* M. u. R. No. 502.

In morphology, too, Goethe emphasises concrete orientation. For him, morphology is a science whose desire is connected with "the urge to create and imitate" (XXVII, p. 5). He says that the phenomenon "is not detached from the observer, but rather engulfed and intertwined with the observer's individuality" (M. u. R. 1224). The


"Finding the point of union would always remain a mystery, because the individuality of each person would have to be considered separately." It was only from this decisive attitude that Goethe, for example, could write to Nees van Esen-beck that he was "not attracted to the formless, seemingly arbitrary nature of cryptogams" and that, "as a friend of tangible forms, he felt almost a revulsion towards these creatures that are so difficult to distinguish."

Anonymous, who overeats and is always justifiable and teachable. But what does one gain from this? Only a consistent specialist knowledge of a world that has been stripped of its essential references. The physicist must not imagine that his world, because it is "objective", is also the "real" world. It is a truncated world. And being "objective" does not mean giving priority to reality.

Goethe's theorising was different. It took place "with consciousness, self-awareness, freedom and, to use a bold word, with irony." Irony — that is the utmost seriousness of genuine conviction. It is indispensable, deeply rooted, and impervious to discussion, yet it recognises the parable-like nature of all knowledge. Goethe did not proceed inductively. He thought in analogies. Not as if similarities were established by retrospectively comparing what had already been recognised. Rather, Goethe discovered in the parallels between different cases the direction in which they could be recognised in the first place. However, this direction cannot be emphasised enough. It requires constant renewed access in order to be able to remember one thing from another. This — and not a modest relativisation, not a restriction — is what he meant when he wrote to Schiller that "his observations of nature always result in a subjective whole". Goethe himself said that it was not nature that actually occupied him, but the relationship of the "meaningful earthly object, the human being" to nature.

Farbenlehre, Foreword. **XXVIII**, p. 7.

F R Ü H E S C H R I F T E N



THE SUBORDINATION OF THE ORGANS

On the Philosophy of Biology

I do not wish to discuss the subordination of organs here in the same way that biology would. Rather, I want to use it as a starting point for considerations that concern the subject of biology and its methodology itself.

The term "subordination of organs" was coined by Cuvier and adopted by Goethe. It has recently reappeared in the ecological research of Uexküll. The emphasis here is on very different aspects. With

"Subordination of organs is now referred to as nothing more than a simple fact, e.g. parasites such as tapeworms, in their developed state, i.e. in their final stage, are nothing more than genital tubes. They have lost their organs of movement. In addition, they have lost their nervous system and much else. The so-called individual now represents only a passage to the species. In the continuity of the species, something like what we are trying to define here as a 'developed' individual occurs. The soma is here only an auxiliary organ for the generational process. At the expense of reproduction, the other organs have been suppressed. The emphasis is on generation. The nervous system and organs of movement have become irrelevant. The organisation of such a parasite has arisen through adaptation. We are dealing here solely with adaptive characteristics.

However, this differs greatly from what Cuvier refers to as the subordination of organs. The same applies to Goethe. The subordination of organs refers to a distinct phenomenon. Organisation is used here for classification purposes. Instead of adaptive characteristics, we have organisational characteristics in the sense of Nägeli*. They are indicated in the subordination of individual organs. The difference from the other view is clear:

Not what something is used for, or what it is not capable of doing and is therefore lacking, but where an organ comes from, is asked. There are certain characteristics of the organisation here. They have the type as their background. Subordination here is only the expression of genuine diversity. This diversity of form is something other than mere difference. In the context of subordination as a simple fact, as we mentioned above with regard to parasites, there is nothing more than a typical form of transformation. Certainly, the organisation of a parasite is typical. However, the rule here lies in the direction of transformation or change. But the opposite is true when we use subordination in the Goethean sense for classification. The similarity of the different organisations is the starting point here. It is the type itself that diverges into diversity here. The type changes. One can speak here of formations, configurations, and the respective configuration is characterised by the subordination of certain organs. Cuvier could speak here of the caractere dominateur. Historically, the Tübingen physiologist Kielmeyer is of significance here: On the relations of organic forces among themselves in the realm of different organisations, 1793. The subordination of organs has been conceived here as a phenomenon in its own right. It no longer merely describes a fact. The fact that something has become irrelevant and is therefore missing is no longer merely understood here. As if subordination were nothing more than a description of facts from a teleological perspective. Rather, a construction plan is taken as a basis here when it is said that one thing grew at the expense of another, that something could only be added to it if something was taken away from another. Kielmeyer speaks of the single force which, like light, splits into different colours, here into sensation, reproduction, etc.

At that time, a specific concept of the organism was established.

conceived, which is best demonstrated, for example, by comparing vertebrates and insects, or even better and more simply, animals and plants. This is most beautifully expressed by Karl Gustav Carus, who later became the personal physician to the King of Saxony, in his work "On the Kingdoms of Nature, Their Life and Their Relationship" (1818). For example, Carus points out how diversity prevails over unity in plant organisation, whereas the opposite is true in animal organisation. Plants are an integral part of the whole. It is essential for their development that they remain connected to the earth organism. He then goes on to speak of a division of the plant in the direction of the two fundamental forces of the earth organism, meaning its relationship to gravity and its relationship to higher world bodies. This is indicated by the division of the plant into roots and stems, leaves and flowers. The plant lacks a closed unity in the spatial structure of its body. One half, namely that responsible for absorption and metabolism, appears here purely externally on the other, namely that responsible for sensation and movement, but is not actually absorbed by it as in the animal. Anchoring to the ground is essential for the plant. He emphasises the dependence of plant life on the life of the earth as essential for the organisation and subordination of the individual organs. The plant is a unity that has only been imperfectly achieved. In every internode, in every bud, it is contained as a whole. It is not important here whether these discussions by Carus are accurate in detail, whether they are not too speculative in detail, i.e. derived from sources other than the things themselves, but precisely when you perceive the inadequacy of Carus's definitions, you currently have what we are trying to highlight here, namely the typical blueprint of an organisation. Only here does it make sense to speak of development, and in particular of metamorphosis.

The term "organism" had, of course, appeared earlier, for example in the works of Thomas Hobbes. At that time, "organism" was used to describe a particularly complex mechanism, namely one that functioned particularly efficiently and was perfect. The organism, the most perfect machine, is an expression that occurred frequently at that time. What is new here in Kielmeyer etc. is only the contrast to the mechanism. Of course, no one really explained what an organism was. At best, instructions were given to guess what was meant by the use of the word "organism". And one ties in with Aristotle's definition that in an organism, the whole comes before the parts. The organism is a whole from the outset. It is not merely assembled like a machine. The parts cannot be detached from the whole without the whole itself falling apart as an organism. The subordination of the organs is oriented towards their wholeness.

Strictly speaking, however, this definition of the organism, which is opposed to the mechanism, also represents a turn away from the teleological view. It is remarkable that it is precisely the teleological view, in the form of the introduction of entelechy, that believes it can behave in a non-mechanistic manner. I said that the conception of the organism in Kielmeyer etc. was unteleological. It is so insofar as the diversity of forms was the real problem at that time. The subordination of organs was then a feature of organisation. A machine is defined by its purpose. The diversity of purposes here determines the diversity of mechanical construction. A machine can therefore only be understood in teleological terms. Its unity is defined by the purpose for which the machine is designed. But what about plants and animals? Here we have a diversity of forms without any discernible diversity of purposes.

, the organism has been called nothing less than a purpose-driven entity.

moderation system. It is expedient insofar as it is consistent with preservation, and every organism, regardless of its organisation, is consistent with preservation. The only thing that is correct about this is that the interdependence of the parts must be understood by analogy with the expediency of a machine. However, mechanists and vitalists both make the same mistake when they allow the organism to be determined by performance. And in particular: functionality can only be spoken of where there is also the possibility of destruction, of decay. By this I do not mean only the tactical possibility of destruction. Rather, I mean a possibility inherent in the nature of the matter. Namely, that purposefulness is not compatible with completeness. The possibility of preservation is limited. The organism is influenced by the environment. And there is an optimum of environmental factors. However, optimum is a technical term, not a physical one. And it is significant that vitalists can offer nothing more than a technical argument against a mechanism which, insofar as they regard it from the outset as a "mere" machine, they also misunderstand in a technical sense.

I said that expediency only exists where the possibility of destruction is inherent in things themselves. The fact that life can pass into death has not been explored with the same intensity as the other question, whether something living can arise from something dead. And what is important in the case of death is not that the organism simply decays and then falls prey to mere physical and chemical laws. What is important is that the life process itself leads to increasing mechanisation. Mechanism is not actually the foundation, but rather a result of organic development. The so-called prospective potency of the elements decreases. The organism approaches mechanisation all the more as the parts of the organism gain independence. After all, it consists of more or less independent organs with self-%

functions, on whose integrity its preservation depends. Once the organs have developed, there is an interaction between them and the organism. No part can then be removed without affecting the organism. The fate of the organism has become dependent on the fate of its parts. With development comes a progressive internal limitation of the parts. It is only because the parts become increasingly independent that localist theories such as the carcinoma theory in pathology have become possible at all. And it must be noted how, through the limitation of the prospective potencies of the parts, their analytical and teleological assessment becomes possible at all. For the subordination of organs, the finished organism is a more suitable object than the developing organism. And the closer the realm of the possible coincides with that of the real, the more certain the prognosis becomes. In practical terms, the more unfavourable a prognosis is, the easier and more reliably it can be made by the arête, who after all has only to reckon with the potential of the organism for healing. The expediency of the organism as a general principle, however, must be rejected altogether. It is nothing more than a dogma. I would like to take an example from comparative anatomy, from which we can learn about the subordination of organs in the sense of an organisational feature. In higher vertebrates, there is the so-called descent of the gonads. I am referring to the change in position of the testicles to the caudal end of the body. It can be assumed that in the vertebrate ancestors, the germ layer extended over the entire body cavity and that it was composed of as many parts as there were trunk segments. In the germ layer, this extension is still retained by most vertebrates. However, it is restricted in development. While in the lowest vertebrates the gonads often extend almost throughout the entire coelomic cavity, in the higher vertebrates

Forms corresponding to regional differentiation along the main axis of the body are restricted to the middle or rear region of the body. Up to the reptiles and birds, the sex glands remain in the place where they were formed during embryogenesis, namely at the lumbar notch of the rear body wall. It is only in mammals that descent occurs. Here, it can be traced from the lower to the higher forms in ascending order through the various stages of its development. While in reptiles the gonads are regularly located cranially from the kidneys, in adult mammals they are regularly found far caudally from the kidneys, apart from the few cases of so-called testicond mammals.

It is now clear that there is no way to justify the major shift from a location that is still cranial to the kidneys to the caudal end of the body. The mechanism of descent is completely unclear. It is assumed that the inguinal ligament exerts a pulling force through shrinkage processes. Its original significance is still unclear. It should be noted that in mammals, the gonads are suspended from a duplication of the peritoneum; they are not, as in reptiles and birds, firmly fixed behind the peritoneum to the posterior wall of the body cavity. It is only because of this great mobility that the gonads can shift at all in mammals. If we now consider this descent of the gonads, the subordination expressed therein, as an organisational feature, the exceptions to this descent take on a force that virtually proves this descent to be a necessity. Such exceptions are found in primitive mammals, e.g. elephants, rock hyraxes, marsupials, and secondly in whales. In whales, there is certainly nothing more than an adaptation. Due to their adaptation to life in water, the gonads are located intra-abdominally on the

front abdominal wall; and the same is true of armadillos, in which a wide inguinal ring with a prominent small cremasteric sac is reminiscent of an earlier complete descent. Whales and armadillos therefore have secondary testicles, which I believe to be the result of adaptation. True testicles are only found in primitive mammals and elephants. Here, the gonads remain in the place of their origin, in close proximity to the kidneys. A mechanical theory cannot explain why the mechanical factors that are otherwise assumed to be effective did not lead to a descent in this case. However, it must be emphasised here that elephants also exhibit other primitive characteristics in their organisation. For example, they still have a bicornuate uterus. The cerebellum remains almost uncovered by the pallium, and the hand skeleton is primitive. We therefore have a remarkable law in the descent of the gonads, which is proven precisely by the apparent exceptions. What appears to be an exception is in fact a necessary ingredient of this law. In the descent of the gonads, we have a peculiarity that is characteristic of the organisation of vertebrates. It is an organisational feature. This is clearly demonstrated by cases where the descent is reversed secondarily, namely through adaptation.

I said that the descent here expresses a subordination. By this I do not mean that it is necessary to interpret this descent as a law. This is what Armin Müller ^{^*} does when he discovers this strange lawfulness and says that it expresses a polar tension between the gonads as the principle of disintegration and the nervous system as the carrier of the actual character-dominant in Cuvier's sense. In this interpretation, I can see nothing more than, at best, a "preposterous idea" in the sense that Goethe speaks of it. I mean a commentary that is unnecessary.

I said that the descent was something that **applied** to all species. Namely, the descent as an organisational feature that has become a necessity. For the Descensus is no longer a mere fact that could be observed repeatedly in individual cases and that did not exist in certain cases, namely in elephants and primitive mammals. Rather, the change in position indicated by the descent is a law — if you will, even a universal law — insofar as the non-migration of the gonads in the case of elephants, the apparent exception, belongs precisely to this law. One could also say that in the descent, a metamorphosis has taken place in Goethe's sense.

Goethe, who knew Kielmeyer and was friends with Carus, speaks extensively about the subordination of organs. Goethe's concept of metamorphosis has often been considered controversial. People questioned whether Goethe, when he spoke of the transformation of leaves

For example, when he speaks of a real transformation or a conceptual metamorphosis that takes place only in the mind. And people have almost always wanted to answer the question in the latter sense. Of course, I do not know what was actually meant by this. Goethe starts from the observation that certain external parts of a plant sometimes transform into others; that they merge into the form of the neighbouring parts, sometimes completely, sometimes more, sometimes less. He recalls the filling of a flower when petals develop instead of stamens and anthers, and certainly — in this retrospective metamorphosis — Goethe is thinking of a real, physically complete transformation of stamens into petals. He also points to other abnormalities. **He recalls** how leaves appear on tulip stems, half of which are still green, while the other half are already coloured like the **crown** and

are raised. Such occurrences are, for him, direct proof of a transformation taking place within the organs themselves. Goethe now concludes that, even in the case of regular, progressive metamorphosis, a transformation of the leaves accompanying the nodes into calyx and corolla leaves, stamen, etc. is taking place. Goethe is by no means talking about the transformation of an idea of the leaf.

Goethe also seeks to clarify the process of this gradual transformation. Under the influence of the humoral pathology that prevailed at the time, he speaks of the supply of refined juices, which results in the formation of finer organs. At each stage, the organ system that developed earlier prepares the specific substances that are important for the development of the next one. Goethe takes the view here that the form and structure of a particular organ ultimately depends on its material composition and material influences. This is essentially the same idea that Julius Sachs expressed ninety years later in his treatise "On the Substance and Form of Plant Organs". Sachs speaks here of organ-forming substances. These ideas have only come to the forefront of discussion in recent years in connection with the study of animal and plant hormones. The discovery of plant metamorphosis, i.e. the discovery that the various flower organs are modified leaves, was made by Caspar Friedrich Wolff before Goethe, as is well known. Wolff also sought a cause for these transformations. He saw it in the gradual decline in vegetative power, in weaker nutrition, which leads to more imperfect development of the leaves in the flower region. Goethe rejects this **explanation**. This is precisely characteristic of his concept of metamorphosis. He says it is simply absurd that the different shapes of the leaves in the flower should be based on atrophy. It is wrong to regard the flower organs

generally be understood as inhibitions. Goethe was particularly opposed to allowing the character to be portrayed in this way. He says that in his attempts to explain various hypotheses, he will use different interpretations, depending on which one better expresses what he has in mind. He recognised that the causal investigation of or in metamorphosis cannot focus on the actual form itself, i.e. on metamorphosis, at all.

It is by no means natural philosophical speculation when he speaks of the secret relationship between the various external parts of plants. When he says that a stamen could just as well be regarded as a coiled-up petal, just as we can say that a petal is a stamen in a state of expansion, or that a sepal is a contracted petal, well be regarded as a petal that has been sucked together, just as we can say of a petal that it is a stamen in a state of expansion; or that a sepal is a contracted stem leaf approaching a certain degree of refinement, just as we can say of a stem leaf that it is a sepal formed by the application of cruder forces. In such **back and forth**, the transforming leaf by no means attempts to become an abstract idea. The metamorphosis that Goethe discovered is something very concrete. It is a scientific discovery, but by no means a natural philosophical speculation. This is precisely what distinguishes Goethe's research from the discussions of contemporary philosophy. — I am referring here primarily to Schelling — that he did not approach things with ideas borrowed from elsewhere, but rather, like a natural scientist, allowed himself to be taught by the things themselves. To see the difference between Goethe's efforts and the investigations of speculative philosophy, one need only compare Goethe's theory of colours with the commentary it received in Hegel's encyclopaedia through its incorporation into Hegel's system.

In Goethe's work, therefore, there are by no means two types of explanation running side by side. Metamorphosis against the background of

The type that changes is that which could only be discovered. And the **explanations** given here, namely the physical and chemical explanations, always seem somewhat short-sighted. It is important to see that metamorphosis is not merely a transformation. Where, of course, something different must stand at the beginning and end of this process. Of course, when Goethe says that the stamen could just as well be regarded as a petal as a petal could be regarded as a transformed stamen, the beginning and end of a process seem to be interchanged or interchangeable. But metamorphosis itself is not such a process. Although it naturally manifests itself in such processes. Something that would be the same cannot be discovered either in the case of metamorphosis or in the case of transformation. The identity that could still be found here lies solely in the fact that it is a metamorphosis. Metamorphosis is a transposition. I mean a modification of a type that does not break down into different things in metamorphosis, but rather into a multiplicity.

I said that even in the context of a transformation, there would be nothing to be found that could be identified as an identical carrier in the transformation, a persistent carrier of the change behind this change. When a candle is transformed into a lump, **namely** when I place it on the stove, there are two different things at the beginning and end of this process. It will not be possible to discover anything that remains. Perhaps one might say the wax; but the wax was certainly not a candle, although one can say of the lump that it is made of wax. Here, too, identity consists solely in the process itself, insofar as it is a transformation, i.e. a change. One could even say that it would not be a transformation, a genuine change, if something identical could be discovered here. So the fact that one cannot actually designate something identical here, but can only find it as a categorical component of the processes themselves, has

Metamorphosis and transformation together. But only transformation is an actual process.

I said that causal explanations are somewhat short-sighted in this regard. What I mean by that is this: physical and chemical laws are somewhat **misleading** in that **they** are based on a formula that can generally be expressed as follows: when M becomes M 1, N becomes N 1. Biologically, such a causal law is not very useful at first. Biologically, we are not interested in M 1, M 2, II 3 and N 1, N 2, N 3 to the same extent. The N have different factual meanings; one takes precedence over the other. Herbst has shown, for example, that the embryo decays when calcium is removed. This decay of the germ when I decalcify the water in which it lies does not have the same significance as the necessity of calcium being present in the water for a blastula to develop. The biologist has, as it were, a technical interest. We spoke earlier of the significance of the optimum as a strictly non-physical concept for biology. Biology is not interested in any causal connection, but in the conditions of a specific event. The decay of the germ during decalcification is as natural as the presence of lime during the formation of the blastula. But the fact that a blastula is formed at all is incomprehensible. Necessity is inherent only in the causal relationship itself^{6*}.

In mineralogy, it is no different. This technical interest is not limited to the organic realm. Certainly, the functional relationships that cause hydrogen and oxygen to combine to form water can be understood quantitatively. Water is created in a causal manner. The properties of water, its structure, its transparency, etc. can also be understood in chemical and physical terms. But even if this structure of water can be predicted on the basis of atomic theory, it is pointless to allow this qualitative structure to be determined by physical and chemical laws.

The structure itself is not a chemical-physical property. It only has the value of one.

Only someone who is completely unfamiliar with the problems of physical knowledge could think that reducing biological phenomena to physical and chemical structures is a solution to the problems posed by these phenomena. Of course, Kant said that natural science contains only as much science as can be found in mathematics. Here, people usually overlook the significance of the "Actually." Namely, when one attempts to justify the mechanism through the possibility of mathematical treatment. Despite their mathematical formulation, the results of mathematical physics do not lose their character of empirical insight and certainty. Strict certainty and insight are limited to the mathematical formulation. The correctness of such a formulation depends on a number of conditions that have nothing to do with mathematics. Only one of these is, for example, that nature in general or the section in question has a mechanistic structure. Not to mention other prerequisites that are connected with the justification of the inductive method in general. And furthermore: one makes the assumption of the regularity of the course of nature. This is an assumption that cannot be proven in any way. Of course, there is a limitation in the practical application of the laws of nature as established by biology. The mode of application of such laws is entirely different. It cannot be compared to the utilisation of a science that is possible where the recurrence of identical cases can be expected; where it is possible to determine the details by numerical specification of general legal formulas or to calculate the size of an unknown natural factor from equations.

From a physical perspective, the peculiarity of the phenomenon **always** remains coincidental. It cannot be derived from general laws. Mechanics is not the most logical generalisation, but rather the most mathematically dominant. Only within the constructive system do the most mathematically permeated, the most formal laws appear to be the most general ones.

most general in the sense that logic speaks of universal concepts namely those that apply to all or most things have in common. Rather, in the general sense of quantitative laws from which, ideally, every particular law can be derived through numerical specification. An event in nature can, of course, be explained by tracing it back to chemical and physical laws. Secondly, the universality of these laws remains unchanged when it is established that it is impossible to reduce a metamorphosis, i.e. the growth of the plant itself, to what is physically and chemically happening in the plant. It is therefore not the case that, in the case of organic matter, the chemical and physical laws

"could not be achieved". As if there were a residue here that belongs specifically to the field of biology and requires teleological explanations. I am not claiming at all that a specific law is not sufficient to explain this, but only that physics and chemistry can only deal with the section they have selected.

Certainly — in most cases, the chemical specificity of species, genders and organs has been successfully proven. But is it therefore justified to say that form, etc., is a consequence, the result of chemical structure? Form is not a physical-chemical property at all. And finally, there are uncertainties regarding the causal relationship itself. It is precisely here that one should point to crystal formations as structures that are, after all, precisely

are in fact completely amenable to causal analysis. The crystal, of course, describes a formal property of certain chemical substances. The shape of crystals can be explained by their **structure**. In its own pieces and with the mother liquor, the crystal is chemically identical. Crystal formation is a faithful expression of the simple nature of this substance. Its colour is no different. All of its properties can be explained and understood from conditions that are completely accessible to chemical and physical research. However, the fact remains that a crystal is nothing more than matter constituted in a certain way. *Ala m a t e r i e* Properties are also taken from shape and colour here from the outset. The inherent nature of colour, i.e. the property of colour, is in fact a natural relationship between colour and matter. It is the natural destiny of a mineral to appear in certain colours and to manifest itself in this way. Of course, colours are merely seen. They are therefore not subjective. But they belong to the phenomenon insofar as they cannot be found in the physical structure itself, from whose interaction with light and the eye, etc., they arose. It must now be noted here that a mineral, a crystal, is questioned, examined and approached in a completely different way from an organism. We talk about a crystal looking this way or that. We ask what it looks like inside. We examine its colour by breaking it apart. We ask about its actual colour. And, on the other hand, we consider it pointless to attribute an interior to a jellyfish or a plant flower in the same sense as to a crystal. This means that we perceive matter differently than we perceive an organism. In another sense, the chromatophores appear red to the organ to which red belongs as "its" colour due to the presence of the chromatophores. I mean: there is a fundamental difference in the attribution of a property in the case of a mineral.

and in the case of a Pßanze. Categorically, there are differences here.

However, the divisibility of the mineral, i.e. its fragmentability, then also represents something different from what was assumed, such as the wholeness of an organism or the wholeness-relatedness of its organs, which was led to by the problem of the subordination of the organs. In this case, divisibility is nothing more than the peculiarity inherent in the nature of matter, namely that division is always possible to create new visible surfaces. Only matter with these specific qualities has a surface at all. It is wrong to speak of a surface in this sense in the case of a jellyfish, namely as an interface at which the jellyfish has broken open to become visible. A jellyfish does not have a simple appearance in the same sense as a mineral, where we said that the inherent nature of colours merely denotes a natural relationship. A jellyfish, and this applies to every organism, has a habitus. It does not appear so directly in its appearance as matter actually does in its colours, etc., in its form, quite literally and literally "coming to light".

Let us now turn to wholeness. It has been suggested that modern natural science tends to lead to wholeness. It has been thought that the difficulties of biology can be excused by the fact that classical mechanics has also undergone further development. Köhler has also identified wholes in the realm of inanimate objects. I am referring to physical forms at rest and in a stationary state. He starts from the concept of Gestalt quality coined by Ehrenfels. The characteristic peculiarities of a form cannot be understood from the similar properties of its parts. They remain intact when all parts are changed according to certain laws. The melody, for example, represents such a super-overarching totality. And now there are also physical

Systems whose grouping is not simply additive in nature. For example, if a certain amount of charge is applied to a conductor, this results in a very specific distribution of the charge. The charge has its own structure. Pure portions of this charge can be changed without affecting the charge as a whole. And even the last remnant of such a charge, after amounts have been gradually subtracted from it, represents the electrical charge in its original structure. The amount of charge is, of course, purely cumulative. But not the structure itself. And a circumstance that is objectively inherent in the nature of the matter becomes the reason for carrying out this very summary of a charge.

What is striking here is that the charge does indeed arise physically. Thus, an unformed event becomes a formed event. What we have here is what could be described in organisms as *generatio aequivoca*. And precisely because it is impossible in the case of animals and plants to speak of such a *generatio aequivoca*, or indeed of any *generatio* in the sense of creation, I want to show you how the designation or characterisation of the organism as a whole, how the designation of the subordination of the organs as a whole relationship, is misleading. The fact that in the case of Köhler's physical forms the whole is preserved does not merely bear an external resemblance to organisms — there is no analogy whatsoever here. For what is preserved here in the case of physical forms, namely the form, is precisely what is not preserved in animals and plants. Animals and plants grow. The difficulty here lies in determining the structure that could be claimed as a whole. Carus has just spoken of the peculiarities of plant organisation, where diversity overgrows unity. But is the situation any better in the animal kingdom? What is the whole here? The egg, perhaps, or the

Pupa? Or the finished butterfly? Through metamorphosis, all animals and plants are distinguished. What is actually preserved here? Certainly not the structure. If there were any structure here at all, it would not lie in the cross-section, but in the longitudinal section of the organic process, namely in the metamorphosis itself. Completely arbitrarily, one seeks here to make the form of the "finished" animal the telos. Under the after-effects of idealistic morphology, the form is attributed a logical significance that it does not possess at all. Driesch's entelechy is precisely oriented towards this. Aristotle understood Telos to be that in which something comes to an end and in this respect is completed. For him, the prototype of organic design was actually the objects of technology, the Poiesis. And we have just said that from a teleological point of view, the cooperation and opposition of the organs can be understood, but only in the sense of a very vague analogy to a machine. It is equally wrong to make the finished organism the telos, just as the egg is the beginning and origin of development. To seek the telos in the finished organism is entirely arbitrary. Even the approach to a finished organism is arbitrary. I recall the parasites here again. In their supposedly developed state, in an arbitrarily assumed final stage, they are nothing more than genital tubes. The entire soma is actually limited to being a container and dispenser of gametes. With the same justification as this final stage, one could also designate the cyst or another stage as complete. And finally, what is an individual anyway? Is it the plant stock or the polyp stock or the individual polyp? And what about formations such as Volvox? And finally, the fertilisation processes show that even in cases where we believe we can most readily speak of the individual animal as an independent individual, it does not stand up to scrutiny. One could still claim the stem for this.

Nothing "arises" through mechanical causality or entelechial efficacy, for what arises would at best be only a stationary state. The dogmatic

) Mechanism is still very close to vitalism. Vitalism takes mechanism too seriously, as it were. It overestimates it. That which is a possible task—not of natural science, but only of philosophical reflection—is made here the means of solution. Vitalists, especially Driesch, start from the assumption that organisms are like machines. And we have already said that a machine is not something physical at all, but something technical. They failed to recognise that the causal explanation is just that: an explanation.

It is completely wrong to try to grasp the whole organism, which is led by the subordination of the organs, in this crude manner. It has often been noted that it is not necessary to define the organism by specifying characteristics, that one always necessarily stops at some selected characteristics. For the time being, we have shown that the organism is by no means a system of forces. It is precisely the unity of the organism that presents the problem, which did not go hand in hand with a diversity of purposes. However, it is impossible to prove that the organic is a special form of natural occurrence. And not only because, as is sometimes said, one would have to know in advance what is organic in order to be able to decide in each individual case whether an organic process is present, but because "organic" is not a genuine definition at all, nor is it a characteristic whose presence or absence could be disputed. One naively starts from objects and acts as if the examination of objects were readily abandoned. Objects — by which I mean carriers of determinate qualities. Those that are examined in terms of their determinate qualities, in terms of their being truly so and

be questioned about their behaviour. Now, we already said above in the case of a mineral that this is by no means just an object that is then defined and known in such and such a way. We pointed out that the piece of chalk in my hand must already be taken in a very specific way in order to be questioned at all. We spoke of anti-assumptions. One such assumption is that the piece of chalk is granted a nature at all. It is not a matter of recognising a so-called object, but of knowing something in which "Knowledge" has any meaning at all. If, for example, I have a blue mark in front of me, it makes no **sense** at all to speak of knowledge here. If I answer the question, "What is that?" with "a blue mark," the designation implies that nature has not been taken into account at all. It is just a mark; I use the colour to describe it. The colour is by no means a property here, in the sense that in the other case the chalk had white as a property, insofar as white here stood in a natural relationship to the matter qualified in such and such a way, which then also looked like this and that. Knowledge and non-knowledge both presuppose a very specific mode in which what is being questioned has already been taken. In this respect, it is justified to say that when questioning things, one is already ahead of oneself. One cannot ask questions into a void. In other words, there is not simply an object of knowledge that one could set as a mere empty *x* and then simply continue to define. So when one says that one must already know beforehand what an organism is, or what life is, what is correct about this is that here too, knowing or not knowing presupposes a very specific anticipation. Of course, it is not knowledge or knowing, because such knowledge and knowing exist only on the basis of such assumptions that are characterised by an inquiring attitude. One inquires into things only insofar as one

deals with them at all. When dealing with things, something like knowledge or ignorance takes on its meaning. In a vacuum, it is impossible to speak of seeing things, of characteristics, etc. The chalk and the stain both have the colour white as a property, but who does not see the logical difference that exists here with the two different relationships of belonging? Only in one case, namely in the case of chalk, is it possible to speak of inherence. In the white, a nature comes to light in a perfectly natural sense, namely that of matter qualified in such and such a way, as is chalk. The stain has no property. It is characterised solely by its colour. A nature has been dispensed with precisely where something has been referred to as a stain.

We can also say that every question is ontologically charged. Here we return to lines of thought that occur in transcendental philosophical discussions. When we said that what distinguishes the organism cannot be identified as a group of characteristics, that it cannot be "known" at all, we meant that the a priori contained in questioning animals and plants must be rejected as necessarily anticipated if the biologist's question is to have any meaning at all.

We were unable to define the boundaries of the individual. Neither spatially, in the case of the Pfiansenstock, etc., nor temporally, when we took the parasites in their generational change. It was impossible to isolate anything as the actual individual in this cycle. Nevertheless, the tapeworm has a habitus, a form that minerals lack. "Oe-8taIt" means something completely different here than there. We recall the distinction we made earlier between metamorphosis and transformation. The mineral simply "looks"

. Its nature has simply been translated into the colours in which it plays. A pansy flower does not look blue in this sense; the colour is part of its external appearance.

If, in the case of organisms, one always contrasts an inner aspect with an outer aspect and says that only an inner aspect is reflected in the outer aspect, then there was a grain of truth in this. It was only wrong to interpret this relationship between an interior and an exterior in the crude sense attempted by entelechy, or even the so-called "psychoid," to which Driesch's speculations led.

One cannot speak at all of the effectiveness of a factor hidden within or acting from outside into materiality as the external in itself. The existence of such a factor would, of course, have to be demonstrated in some way. We counter these natural philosophical speculations with a natural philosophical reflection in a different sense. It is true of minerals that they can be found in their appearance, in their form. Their nature is revealed in their colours. It has become visible in them. And we said that the plant had not become so visible in its external appearance, in its habit. That is to say, such and such qualified matter, which is only capable of breaking out into visibility, which actually manifests itself in a thoroughly natural sense, as Goethe also pointed out, in colours, is not at all decisive here. The plant to which colour belongs as its external appearance is precisely not simply matter. While a mineral can be found in all its properties — and this applies to all dead things — a plant or an animal is in no sense simply what one calls its colour, shape, etc. Plants and animals are specimens of a species. Sulphur, etc., are merely substances with certain properties. There are pieces of them, but no specimens in the sense that, in living events, something of a species is the bearer of that event. Something of a species, the specimen, is by no means something like an individual. Plants, animal sticks, parasites, etc. are also of a species and are therefore "exemplary". In all these cases, there is something like a form in the sense of an external

Appearance. And the difference between a metamorphosis and a mere transformation becomes clear here. Only dead things that have lost their so-and-so-ness can be transformed and can come into being. At the beginning and end of a process, as we said, there is something that is simply different. But here, where we have the habitus and something that has the habitus, even though it does not separate itself as an interior from an exterior or as a substance from its accidents, consists in the fact that something that persists cannot be found, insofar as it is no longer an aporia, since it was taken from the outset as something whose form was merely something "external". As long as one spoke of entelechies, it was inevitable that the forms at all as a stationary state, as effective. Once again: in being of a certain kind, in being characterised by an external appearance, only the mode in which something was addressed is affected, but not any particular kind of effectiveness of a factor. It is only the a priori formulated under which one deals with animals and plants at all. The diversity of organisation, which was characterised by the different ways in which the organs were subordinated, remained a mystery in entelechy. Entelechy presented itself as a pure construction into which, abandoning the starting point of purposefulness, diversity could only be smuggled in. In the conception of the organic, however, insofar as it is merely "of a kind," diversity has been formulated from the outset. In diversity, in the modification of a blueprint, lay precisely the problem that had been posed in the subordination of organs when this fact was conceived by Cuvier, Kiemeier and Goethe. The type then presents itself as a concept that is already anticipated in the species.

We spoke of anticipations and referred to Kant in doing so. The neo-Kantians do the same, albeit in a completely different sense. They speak of the specific complex

of a GanEen as an anticipated abbreviation. Their anticipation is therefore, strictly speaking, a hypothesis. One that has yet to prove itself. The organism is here a concept that has been established in a certain way and that will be developed and further defined as research progresses. They start from the idea of an object. They focus on an object of knowledge. In contrast, it should be noted that our anticipation is not a "concept" that could be applied hypothetically. Our anticipation is merely the anticipation without which questioning things would be meaningless. It is the mode in which one takes things by confronting them in the first place. Expressed in old terminology, it is a formal category. It should be noted, however, that this formal category is gained through a transcendental-philosophical reflection whose peculiarity in relation to classical transcendental philosophy has yet to be established. Classical transcendental philosophy proceeds from science. It presupposes its facts and is concerned with its legitimacy. It ends with the establishment of the principles of natural science. It emphasises arrio-

We have not identified any such principles. Principles could, of course, only be introduced hypothetically and would have to prove themselves. Philosophy must therefore reject any attempt to establish such principles. The sciences themselves must provide certainty in their own field. Philosophy is assigned to the a priori in a different sense than classical transcendental philosophy assumed. Here, the a priori was the theme. The emphasis has shifted, as it were, in that we now say instead that philosophy itself is an afterthought. An addendum insofar as it highlights the self-evident truths that are decisive in the natural attitude and thus also in scientific investigation. The a priori that we emphasise here is much less binding than the a priori whose emphasis is the usual transcendental

Philosophy is becoming obsolete. We did not take knowledge as our starting point at all. The meaning and purpose of science are changing. Philosophy is not an addendum in the sense that, just as it once believed it could philosophically justify classical mechanics, it now, in hindsight of course, proves the theory of relativity to be philosophically necessary. That was a shameful spectacle. But if we allow philosophy to be an "addendum" here, it has a different meaning. It can only be "added" if the lively approach to things, from which science itself arises, precedes it. It is precisely the tension that exists between the object of pre-scientific worldviews and the object of science that has been bridged in this way.

ABOUT THE PUNISHMENT

According to one view, punishment is nothing more than a measure to achieve a goal that could possibly also be achieved by other means. These so-called relative theories — the theory of correction, the theory of deterrence, etc. — are contrasted with the explanation that punishment has meaning in itself. And even critics on the other side believe that nothing other than retribution can be considered. But if the theory of retribution is based on other types of retribution, then punishment is suddenly attributed much more to its institution, or punishment itself becomes an institution. The insistence that punishment has meaning in itself has, after all, a real **motive**, which is not, however, expressed in the theory of retribution, namely the simple observation that punishment is something at all.

Moreover, when one introduces the convenient idea of retribution, one means revenge. And this refers to various things. **First of all**, there are cases in which **someone** takes revenge on another for something. Here, in fact, only something is repaid and nothing is gained beyond the satisfaction that a compulsive desire has obtained through its blind effect. The situation is different — and one is more tempted to link punishment to this — when an act is avenged. For then revenge, instead of standing behind the action as a blind desire, is rather incorporated into its enduring and illuminating intention and can therefore also be achieved in a real sense. The demand for this revenge is **motivated**. And alongside this revenge, which is achieved through retribution, and is therefore no longer retribution, we encounter another type: nemesis. We mean the fact that an act turns against the perpetrator in its wake. More specifically, it is the crime in which one misses the mark, touching something whose natural superiority then comes to light in nemesis.

However, nothing is actually "avenged" here. The person affected by Nemesis simply "deserves" their fate. Namely, insofar as they brought it upon themselves. Nor is anything made up for here. For it is not the success of the crime that provokes Nemesis. Rather, it is the act itself, which in its wake leads to the exposure of this very act as a vain endeavour. Nemesis in particular tempts us to derive punishment from it, because it is also "caused" by the perpetrator. However, Nemesis achieves its goal by merely affecting the perpetrator. And this is precisely where punishment differs. For the punished person is in no sense the object of the punishment. Recognising this, and subsequently understanding the fallacy of assuming a connection between punishment and retribution, requires, of course, the separation of the execution of punishment from the act of imposing the punishment, which is what constitutes punishment in the first place.

We referred to the imposition of punishment, i.e. — insofar as this constitutes punishment — punishment as an act. By this we mean that punishment is not an action. For action is understood to be something that is done and in which something is realised, even if only indirectly. Such an action is, for example, chastisement. When punishing, however, nothing is achieved, not even indirectly.

"realised". The enforcement of punishment, which one is inclined to cite as an objection here, is indeed a consequence of the imposition of punishment, but it is indirectly realised by allowing the punishment to be carried out. The imposition of punishment is different from "having the punishment carried out". For it is only on the basis of the imposition of punishment that one can have the punishment carried out on someone. The imposition of the punishment does not "cause" anything at all. For punishment inaugurates a performance. Namely, a performance by the person on whom the punishment was imposed. The so-called "atonement" is a performance by the punished person.* In the act of imposing the punishment, the

P person of the punished person in a peculiar way, but does not encounter the punished person in the true sense of the word, as is the case, for example, when inflicting harm. However, the failure to recognise that the execution of punishment has only an indirect function — insofar as it provides the actual basis for what is directly initiated by the punishment — explains the deceptive appearance that punishment is a mode of retribution.

The punishment is therefore not simply the suffering that is realised in the execution of the sentence. It consists, for example, in the punished person "giving" their head, i.e. in a performance. It is in the nature of a service that it cannot be performed actively, in the same way that an act or action can still be "performed" even if the subject is compelled to do so. One can only be compelled to do something, but not to perform a service. The service cannot therefore be attributed to the subject. However, only a service performed by someone can be inaugurated by an act. The punishment, in which the imposition of the punishment is terminated by the performance of the punished person, is something quite different from, for example, penance, which can only be undertaken by the penitent in a free act. The what of a performance is also different from the what of an action: something is performed directly. An action, on the other hand, in the realisation of which the person performing the action still has a hand, as it were, can only be of one type — namely, insofar as "something is committed" in this action. — The question arises as to what the punishment actually refers to.

We maintain that only an offence can be punished. Daliei attaches particular importance here to the distinction between the offence and the act in which the offence may be committed. An offence cannot be committed at all, but only committed. Only the act in which the offence is committed is carried out. And therein lies the difference between an offence and a crime, namely that an act can imply the latter very concretely, i.e. that

an act can be sacrilegious — but that "Yergehen" does not refer to any quality of this act inherent in the act itself. There is a second point to consider. The offence cannot be reduced to the value quality of an action. It is not as if it were simply wrong to appropriate someone else's property, for example, but rather that this action constitutes something which, in view of the nature of property, qualifies as an "offence". The offence does not consist in the failure to comply with a "norm", or as if the offence lay in the fact that it is an exception to the otherwise applicable law. After all, one offends against something, namely — in general — against things. In this respect, a person also falls under the concept of a thing. Let us just note that the offence against the person is something different from, for example, the injustice against the person, namely against the person who is the person. That against which one commits an offence is not vulnerable at all. Even in the case of the offence against the

* See A. Reinaeh, *Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes* (The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law). (*Jahrb. f. Philos. u. phänomenol. Forschung*, I, 2.)

° For example, in J. Fries, *Philosophical Legal Theory*, 1803, p. 59.

' However, the offence is not limited to this type. In addition to the type of offence against something, we also have the type of offence against someone. See, for example, God, whose intangibility is precisely manifested in the fact that one can only "transgress" against him. Namely, in sin. The transgression designated by "sin" is constituted in a way of being of the human person, according to the difference of this status vis-à-vis the other and, in a special sense, of integrity itself. However, this way of being is not simply an inherent quality, but a habitus in which the moment of freedom is formally contained in its connection to the person. "Sinner" is therefore an existential determination of a completely different kind than, for example, "transgressor" or "criminal." For if these words do not simply designate the perpetrator of a particular act, they can only mean the presence in a person of a disposition (as opposed to habitus) that manifests itself in transgressions or crimes. (This point in particular would require further explanation, which has had to be omitted due to lack of space.) The fact that there are "sinners" does not therefore constitute a counterargument to the above statement that "offences" do not describe the nature of the act and, by extension, the perpetrator

In addition to the wrongdoing committed against someone through the execution of an act, there is also the injustice committed against that person in the very act itself. This injustice directed against someone is not merely a predicate of the act, as if the act were simply wrong, but has its own existence separate from the act. If it were otherwise, forgiveness, for example, would be impossible. For only this injustice committed against me can be forgiven, but neither the act, which can no longer be reached in the past, nor its outcome, which at most could be changed. This does not erase the injustice done to me — such as the guilt of the other person, which lay in the fact that he "could" commit this injustice against me, ^{which} can be forgiven and thereby annulled — but through forgiveness, this injustice is somehow affected in its existence, as impossible as it is to reinterpret the peculiarity of this situation, whose misjudgement is only the result of not having fixed the circumstances of an offence, other than by "forgiving" the injustice committed against me.

Similarly, the offence emerges as the actual object of punishment. It would be pointless to seek retribution for an offence. Only the act in which the offence was committed can possibly be avenged. One can continue to be punished for the act. Namely because it was also mean; "Mean" is a characteristic of the act itself. One cannot be punished for what was done in the act. Nor for the act that was seen, i.e. for what the act manifested externally. This act can only be avenged, and revenge can only be achieved by bringing about a certain effect. Punishment, on the other hand, is not something that brings about an effect or achieves anything. For the execution of punishment cannot be invoked here, insofar as the

¹ Something else and not expiable through forgiveness is, of course, guilt in the sense of a debt incurred only by committing an offence.

The approach to punishment lies with the punished person who carries out the punishment. And this performance could only be inaugurated by an act, but not achieved by an event. And precisely in the fact that punishment cannot achieve anything like revenge, which consists of an event and can thus, as it were, stand alongside its cause in a field external to itself, the intimate and primary relationship that punishment has to the offence is documented, of which one can just as little say that it

"happened," i.e., that it has entered into an external existence. And further, the remark: insofar as punishment is an achievement, it can be omitted. In the case of revenge, there is only an omission of the act of revenge.

This is related to the fact that the desire for revenge generally has its motives — albeit concealed at first — but that punishment, like forgiveness, is not generally motivated as such; rather, each individual act of punishment or forgiveness has its own motive. The uniqueness of the function of punishment and forgiveness can only be determined in **relation** to the act to which they are assigned. However, it cannot be interpreted in terms of "meaning" in the same way as, for example, revenge. And only the imposition of punishment can have a purpose.

F R A G M E N T R R I S C H E S



INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

An introduction to philosophy can only be found in philosophy itself. In sciences, which are presented in the form of results and **can** be easily learned, the task of an introduction is to teach beginners the basics or to guide them... However, an introduction can also lead the reader to a goal that is initially unknown to them; one explains how one arrived at the questions that ... And here it is always the point of view of the beginner or reader that is taken in the introduction. The practice of such an introduction counts on the natural interest of the other person. This interest is aroused by opening up a field to them; science is "pursued" and scientific questions are "investigated". However, philosophy is not a "subject" in which the other person can be so easily "carried along". "Introduction" here does not only refer to the beginner. It is not possible here to leave them to their own devices; one cannot expect them to take on tasks as something that is naturally given, as if it were a subject, when one points them out. Philosophical problems are not readily understood. One can only be introduced to philosophy. It is not a natural impulse in which philosophy introduces itself.

PSYCHOLOGY AND **PHILOSOPHY**

Are JYI psychology and philosophical psychology simply the same thing? The change in wording is an indicator of the fundamental difficulty in defining "psychology". Tension is essential to it. It is both one thing: empirical science, and another: a philosophical endeavour, insofar as it reflects on the existence of human beings. Psychology plays between the two. The fluctuation in the designation of the subject is an expression of a

necessary embarrassment. Psychology cannot establish itself as an individual science. It is not a subject whose status, methodology or field determines its boundaries. In general, science is orientation about the world that is present in detail. It explores what occurs in the world. And nothing that applies to science applies, strictly speaking, to psychology.

Firstly: Science can be taught and learned; it exists in a body of knowledge. Natural science is radical in its orientation: compelling in its facts, strong in its knowledge of general laws, justified by the technical mastery of nature that it achieves. Secondly: Science is anonymous. Everyone here is merely an administrator. It is practised in a continuum of many individuals, each of whom is related to the others. Its subject matter is the phenomena in which reality unfolds. Its findings can be repeated at will and are accessible to everyone. Thirdly: science can be focused on individual problems. In every science, a field of research is opened up to which an internal relationship must be established. This relationship is unambiguous, but second-hand. It replaces our original, intrinsically diverse relationship with things.

Psychology also presents itself as a science when it conducts experiments. It then examines memory, attention, etc. But it cannot be cultivated in this way. If it is not tacitly guided by a deeper desire for knowledge of human nature, it loses itself in trivialities. For there is an average understanding of what psychology "should" be. One has somehow understood this even if one is still embarrassed about its goals and methods. Montaigne, Vauvenargue, Stendhal, and Nietzsche are considered psychologists. There is an original desire for psychology — which is something different from any traditional and acquired factual "interest"^{2*}, of which one makes oneself the advocate. That is why one can, through psychology,

disappointed, but also moved. Scientific knowledge can simply be "possessed". Only a few people are owners here. However, knowledge of human nature is something that cannot simply be "possessed" in such a non-committal way; it is something that can only be inherent to a person or not.

For human beings have — first of all — an existential interest in their "neighbour" with whom they live, with whom they have dealings, to whom they always relate in some way. And this relationship is mutual. Knowledge of human nature refers to the characteristics, possibilities and inevitabilities of a nature that is our own.

Secondly: Waa means "reality" of human beings, and what does "experience" mean here? — "Experience*" usually means: knowing, namely knowing about the phenomena of reality in relation to which one gains experience, which one then has at one's disposal. One shares these experiences with others. Their testimony is valid, for example. It is the experience that ... , and experience here is the solid ground that spreads more and more. Phenomena are understood and explained insofar as one refers to the other. Reality here is a field of orientation. One has a narrow or broad field of vision here, which needs to be expanded. In relation to human beings

"w i r d" but some experience, whose place is in "nature",
i.e. in the constitution of human beings as free and historical beings. Reality, too, can be explained by something deeper than what is apparent on the surface. But this reality, or rather its context, is something that is self-sufficient and can be reconciled with itself. Here, one sees through appearances in their incomprehensible externality. The reality of human beings, however, is an indicator of existential possibilities.

Thirdly: The empirical reality of human beings is assessed differently from how reality is otherwise assessed in physiology and morphology. There is a norm, i.e. a "measure" of human beings, insofar as they have to meet specific requirements.

has. (A plant, for example, is merely adapted or not ^*.) The reality of human beings is understood anthropologically from the outset if it is in tension with the demands of "life" that is somehow led. Types of people are not "purely" natural**.

Fourthly: knowledge of human nature **is always** universal; it **is** not a separate science that could focus on individual problems. Where it does so in experimental psychology, it examines mere "phenomena" whose arena and playground is the human being. Humans are merely encompassed by these laws; certainly, they also "are" these laws, but they are not entirely these laws, nor are they these laws in essence. Empiricism cannot remain confined to itself here; the brute necessity of natural events comes to the fore as inevitability, insofar as it stands in tension with what humans "want." And psychology is universal insofar as it concerns everything possible as human existence: ethos, knowledge, science, worldview, etc.

Fifthly: Everyone is involved in understanding others. It is part of understanding the world. Here, "world" has the human meaning as in "unworldly," "escapism," etc. We recognise ourselves in others, encounter them as belonging to our world. What psychology recognises therefore also arouses defence and connection. Here, it is more difficult to remain free from oneself. It is always necessary to maintain a willingness to keep an open mind to what is factual.

This tension distinguishes psychology from anonymous science.

There is no continuum of development of this science by many individuals. And if there is, then it only applies to the observation of endless arbitrariness. Psychology only exists as a totality. There are always only a few, distinguished by fate, who gain this relationship with others. In psychology, it is always the researcher himself who comes to the fore. This is the special situation of psychology: to be universal and to have an affinity with philosophy, because both are concerned with human beings. Their reality in one is the

Experience is necessary in order to penetrate the constitution of one's **existence**. Whereas the other asks what a human being is, namely what he can, should and is allowed to do. This explains two facts: firstly, the tendency to use psychology as a substitute for philosophy, thereby blocking its entry. Secondly, psychology is always entangled in philosophical preconceptions in its approach and field of application; it has not freed itself from this as much as the other (individual) sciences.

Firstly: Insofar as psychology is knowledge of human nature, it is an attitude that seeks to confirm and justify itself. It manifests how one stands or believes one must or can stand in relation to another. The relationship to the other is somehow "shifted" in the process. Knowledge of human nature goes hand in hand with self-creation. In Vauvenargues, Nietzsche, etc., the destructive-polemical tendency takes hold. The other is assessed somewhere here, for example, when the arrangement of his love for humanity is seen through as nothing more than ... A certain malice is part of it. Knowledge of human nature can thus become a distortion of self-knowledge — through inhibitions, interests; there is a certain "fairness" in it when something is dealt with dismissively ... Distance is part of being a man of the world. Certainly — the focus here is already on "the human being", but knowledge of human nature can lead to the concealment of the philosophically understood question of the human being. Unless it has its tension. Which lies in the fact that one questions oneself. One avoids the risk of genuine self-reflection. Destruction means something different to Vauvenargues than philosophical destruction. For eighteenth-century French psychologists, it is critical, revealing, exposing the illusory nature of reality. Philosophical destruction, however, seeks to demonstrate what avarice, for example, "actually" is, namely its inner possibility. And insofar as pedantry, shame, etc. are presented here as existential possibilities, psychology always tips over into

Philosophy. Psychology merely defines the level at which philosophy can be applied as existential analysis.

Secondly, psychology seeks answers to the question of what a human being is, in all the individual aspects of what he is, and what can be observed and ascertained. The interpretation of these facts is **always** determined by a philosophical position. Certainly, every science is based on ideological motives. (Which is different from assumptions. Assumptions are objectively justified, right or wrong. As part of science, they must be acknowledged or critically rejected. However, the metaphysical principles in which a science, i.e. the meaning of this science, is anchored are something else. Pointing them out does not mean discrediting science, whose results remain correct even if it has lost its ideological foundation as a whole. One always seeks to transfer prerequisites into motives and vice versa. This constitutes a betrayal on both sides. Existential decisions evaporate into provable facts, or the validity of a science is presented as something that is "subjective," i.e., merely more or less "belief." All fundamental scientific questions arise from metaphysical situations, from a shock and amazement that is unique and will never recur. In which the field of science is opened up in order to be processed as material. For every science moves further and further away from its place of origin; the typical, impersonal pathos of objectivity and provable truth develops, which is no longer based on existence. However, this metaphysical embedding varies greatly among the individual sciences. Only from a distance do zoology and botany border on ideological attitudes. In contrast to Newtonian physics, which had a theological cosmology as its background, modern physics has become self-reliant in the creation of concepts such as "positive fact" and "objectivity". Psychology, however, is now virtually entangled in philosophical preconceptions.

She wants to examine "phenomena of consciousness" as the "immediately given," whereby she has remained dependent on the decisive positions of Descartes, which she has adopted without examination. "Epistemology" has infected her. The influence of philosophy extends not only to science and teaching; "philosophical" ways of seeing and discoveries also dominate, unnoticed and often distorted, the thinking and observations of the ordinary man. More specifically, however, the academic concept of psychology is determined by the dogmatism into which Descartes' position has slipped. Psychology is cultivated as a separate science that examines the phenomena of consciousness; its extension into the unconscious emphasises precisely that it finds its purpose in consciousness.

Descartes did not doubt as a sceptic, but methodically. For him, doubt is the necessary condition for certainty. But how? Descartes' presentation is careless, clumsy, skewed; his doubts are weakly founded. It may indeed seem as if the cogito marks a limit to doubt insofar as it ends here. As if Descartes had found a realm in which certainty and reality can be found, the idea of which was already familiar to him and guided him in his search. Doubt would then be a means in the sense of a passage, a path to something. However, it should be noted how doubt is transformed into a "means" under his hand. It is not a boundary between areas that is opened up, but a boundary that is given as a determination. Through separation and distinction from sensory reality, I comprehend myself. The rejection of the reality of sensuality is the affirmation of myself. Doubt is not just one type of cogito among others, but rather every cogito is doubt. Just because "cogito" and "sum" are the same, there is no conclusion here. Cogitatio is consciousness in Descartes. Cogi-tationis nomine illa omnia intelligo, quae nobis conscüs in nobis **fiunt**, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. Imagination, feelings, sensations are Descartes' ways of Sich-seiner-

Becoming conscious in contrast to sensory reality. Thus, even in perception, insofar as it is a cogito, the existence of sensory objects is doubted. This doubt is therefore not an academic game. It is a step. A real disenchantment. I only awaken to myself insofar as I withdraw from immediate life. Becoming aware of it happens in tandem with the disempowerment of the world.

However, Descartes' presentation is ambivalent. He compares, for example, the reality of sensation outside of me and "in me". The cogito becomes for him a "given" content of consciousness. And from this point of view, psychology takes up this cogito as phenomena of consciousness that appear in consciousness as the existing field of reality and are observed, described, massified and explained as "the psychological". In this context, the human being is merely the scene of these phenomena. "The psychic" and psychology as an individual science arise under the pressure of dogmatism, into which Descartes' doubtful considerations have slipped. A certain ideology thus stands at the beginning of this doctrinal school psychology. Ideological and doctrinal — in both cases, something is belittled, devalued, insofar as it fails in relation to reality. An image is being imposed here. The thinking that is perpetuated in school traditions is ideological insofar as it remains caught up in itself. To characterise something as ideological means to point out the **tension** in which it stands in relation to unadulterated reality.

For what is the subject of psychology? The impressions, attitudes, etc. of existence. What does it mean to call laughter something "psychological", or the emotions that cannot be separated from their physical expression? Psychology belongs, along with ethnology, anthropology, sociology and geography, to our knowledge of the world. The world is that in which we move, in which life with others takes place; and because there is an original desire for psychology — as opposed to the factual interests of the isolated sciences,

which one can simply share or not —, a definition of the subject of psychology is as superfluous as it is impossible. School psychology was called psychology without a soul. Because it was simply not mentioned, it was not to be acknowledged in stubborn blindness. In the approach to "the psychological", however, something worse comes to light, namely that it was a psychology without people. The possibility and reality of human beings is different from the reality that spreads out in appearances, happens in situations, has to be dealt with, and simply has to be understood. This reality does not speak to me. I merely infer it, but it does not reveal itself to me in the way that the reality of human beings can reveal itself to me. Kant speaks of the pragmatism of human knowledge insofar as it demonstrates what "human beings as freely acting beings make of themselves".

Existence "happens" in avarice, wastefulness, greed. It takes steps towards itself, whereby it can gain in its authenticity and lose itself in its inauthenticity. Avarice, pedantry, etc. are fates. The possibility and reality of human beings can only be represented as actions of selfhood, for existence does not have its past behind it. It is not scattered in a context of reality. Its past can be found in itself as fate. However, Descartes' philosophy was also decisive for psychology in a second direction, namely in its very beginning with sensations. And the fact that psychology did not see sensations openly follows from a dogmatisation of Descartes' position. For him, sensation was also a mode of doubt. In the knowledge of itself, certainty and reality were created. For Descartes, what is true, real and certain is what he can recognise in unity with himself. What does not disturb him in his self-certainty, what does not alienate him from himself. In other words, only clear and distinct knowledge. The then exists when something is seized by the mind (is§ ...

ABOUT THE ROOM

The pathos and the gnostic are different ways of experiencing oneself in the world. Space, for example, is perceived differently tonally than visually. Take marching as opposed to walking—covering a distance. When marching to music, one experiences oneself in one's action extending into space, in one's vital activity. The visual and acoustic spaces are different, if the acoustic space here is the one in which one experiences oneself while following the rhythms of music. It urges one to move. One cannot sit still, one is carried away by marching music. When marching, space is experienced insofar as one advances into it. Marching is an action that extends into space; as a vital activity, marching is different **from** the intention of walking. When walking, a **distance** is covered, space is traversed. There is a **start** and a finish. Walking a path is a task that one undertakes, that one somehow completes in a routine manner. One anticipates obstacles and plans ahead. Orientation serves the purpose of walking. One does not seek to exert oneself more than **is necessary**. Effort can be "wasted". Laziness in walking is different from the laziness of lifelessness of someone who has distanced themselves from their vital experiences. — Unlike walking, marching has no specific local destination. Spatial distances become indifferent. There is no partial completion of tasks, no step-by-step approach to a goal. Each step here only holds something. And it is not only space, but also time that is experienced differently when marching. Otherwise, it is something you take, something you need. The moment only has meaning in relation to the step-by-step completion of overarching tasks. Time passes slowly here when it is not filled. Those who are removed from their vitality are always under pressure to do something. Animals, however, know no boredom. Boredom

arises when one cannot find meaning in oneself. One seeks to dispel it. And at least to fill the time somehow with something, if one cannot fulfil it in the realisation of self-creation. This time can be "lost" if one slips away. For human existence is subject to the compulsion of giving meaning, of becoming oneself. However, the vital tension of marching lies in the motor skills of the legs, the radiance of the torso. Marching means relaxation from demands and requirements, under the pressure of which fatigue and moroseness have just arisen. They are overcome by the tension of this action, which contrasts with a gradual, step-by-step beginning. Here, the moment does not derive its meaning from a whole. Here, one always starts afresh, but does not return to ... The marcher is as attuned to the moment as to the space, but does not rise above it. Music now induces a certain movement. Namely, one that would not be possible at all without rhythm. Which is why one tries to give oneself this rhythm through one's appearance, which is why it is better to march together. The sound shapes the space of marching like an action extending within it. This space only exists in the act of seeing, as the pole of my movement directed towards it. The sound first and foremost shapes the structure of this space, which cannot be separated from the experience of being in it. One cannot attempt to make it concrete.

One walks through the room, marches into the room, dances in the room. Marching and dancing are unlimited, undirected movements. The boundaries of the parade ground are only the barriers to marching. Dancing is aimless. The individual movement phase is sought here in itself. It does not only have a function of conveying the achievement of the goal. Rotational movements are otherwise avoided. This is because they cause dizziness and mean a loss of orientation. The (optical) space of life is

When riding a carousel, however, one surrenders to the circular motion. This expresses a changed overall experience. The specific directions, stability and spatial valences of our space are suspended.

Compared to the functional spaces in which we live, it is a homogenised space. Music induces a change in our spatial relationship in our movement. However, this space can only be felt and not made tangible. Backward movements are otherwise extremely unpleasant. And are only performed under duress. In dance, they are natural, not because there are no obstacles, but because in dance, orientation and security are not sought at all — and even in an empty hall, with the guarantee of not bumping into anything, it remains awkward to move backwards. Movement never takes place in an "empty" space. Movement is related to sensation insofar as, if something affects me, it moves me. So that I feel myself being moved by something, namely insofar as I tune into what I feel.

There are three spaces: 1. the space in which we live, 2. the space in which expansive, lively movement takes place, 3. the "objective" space of physics.

1. The space in which we live is not oriented towards me. I myself am merely a point of reference for up and down, right and left, front and back. "Down" is the ground on which I stand, "up" rises from it. "Right" means on the right-hand side. On the right, reaching out and grabbing, reaching for ... Something is on the right.

"To me." But in the space of our lives, there is a here and a there. Backwards and forwards are indifferent to the way there and the way back. The space in which we live is manageable. One can draw a map of it. Places are targeted here. It is visually available. In this space, one "stays", is on the move, etc. Orientation means determining one's location. In this space, there are paths that can be laid out as roads. The places have

Here, different values apply. Everyone has their place here, separated from one another. This space is experienced perspectively. **One** is **always** at a location that provides a viewpoint. This space is the world's counterpoint **to an existence** that is concerned with itself in its being. Here, there are distances to be covered, and it is in gradually covering these distances that the transience of human existence comes to the fore. In this space, one always has something "ahead" of oneself. And the principle, the inner possibility of this space, is selfhood in its unfolding. This space shares the contextual nature of reality. EG It is understood, comprehended, one knows what is going on in it. One experiences this space in its unfolding availability.

2. The spatiality as that towards which the rhythmic sounds induced trunk motor skills has no spatial valences. It lacks a rigid, stable axis system. Circular movement shows that this spatiality has no here. The experience of this spatiality means a suspension of overarching plans, such as overcoming space. It is characterised by presence, which does not push for completion in the future. This spatiality is free from the "dynamics" of the space of our lives. One is here devoted to the moment in its particularity. And this homogenised space has no metrical properties, distances, but only **qualities** such as width, height, depth. While the space in which we live can be estimated, observed and actively explored, this spatiality in can **only** be perceived pathically in its **structure**. This space is not an object of knowledge. It is not a being whose essence, whose inner possibility could be questioned. It does not have the potential to be explored. The fact that this space in its structure cannot be detached from a certain modality of self-perception therefore only means that it is An also gon an transcendental consideration.

For transcendental is an investigation, die sich auf die Mög• lichkeit unseres Verhältnisses zu Gegenständen und auf die Möglichkeit, diese a **priori zu erkennen**, bezieht. Das „Seiende“

presents itself to a finite being as an object. **Kant** examines human nature in the sense of the constitution of a finite being. He takes a pragmatic view of human beings in terms of what they make of themselves as freely acting beings. Heidegger provides a metaphysics of human existence. However, the capacity for meaning, in the nature of man, which he shares with **animals** — whereby nature here is what a being is capable of in relation to others — does not refer to finitude in the sense of the temporality of a constitution. In psychology, human beings are made the subject of philosophy in a different sense than in existential analysis. In their nature, as defined by their capacity for sensuality, human beings do not stand in tension with an intuitu8 originarius. Kant shared Descartes' disregard for sensation; he regarded the faculty of sensuality as receptivity for "intuitions." For him, sensation was merely the material for synthesis. I do not know whether Herder's meta-criticism had its motives here.

Along with the transformation from visual to acoustic spatiality, a transformation occurs in the experience of one's own body. This involves a shift in my perception of my body schema, as the body is experienced as uniformly centred. There is a different proximity of the body's extremities to me. The feet are further away from me than the hand, for example. And when seeing, there is a zero point of orientation, which is located at the bridge of the nose, for example. When dancing, however, I have "sunk down from the eye area into the torso." When dancing, one does not feel oneself to be somewhere in the midst of ... , setting oneself apart in a "here" from some "there," in whose greater or lesser range the span of a space to be traversed manifested itself.

The relationship between **EBID** space and experience, as induced in a sensation, whereby our orientation, posture, etc. are the "expression" of this sensation, is further reflected in the **postures** of anxiety, constriction,

liberated, in our likes and dislikes. Restriction is also a way in which our body feels. Something makes us anxious, has a liberating effect, and postures induce restriction, etc. As a result, they also become...

"Expression" of ... understood. Except that, of course, there would be no mere emotions behind this expression here — our imposition is rather physical, tinged with spatial motor activity. There would be no constriction if we were not our own bodies, if we did not have to "hold" ourselves in some way when we feel something, when something affects us. The sensory organs are merely "necessary" for seeing. They must be accepted as organs, although seeing itself cannot actually be explained by the eye. However, in the movement of confinement, one becomes aware of one's body. It is not only that its presence is the condition for ...

But even when walking, the body is shifted, moved, and guided into space. There are no pure cases of pathic and gnostic behaviour. One swings and sways one's arms, strides differently, steps differently; one can hear who is coming up the stairs just by the sound of their footsteps. People's walking styles are as varied as their handwriting. Every hand movement has its own specific character. From these movements, we can deduce what a person is feeling. How they relate to the world, how they "are", is revealed in their relationship to space.

i.e. in the motor skills of his movements. The anxious person looks at his arms in his distress, the sad person lets them fall, the embarrassed person does not know where to put his hands. The movements are not a "parable" of an action. We simply behave differently, reaching out or withdrawing, etc., in relation to the "space" whose width, depth, etc. is symbolically experienced as the world. The expressive meaning of these gestures as postures can only be understood in terms of spatial symbolism. However, the expansion of our bodily space into the **surrounding space** can be understood both as

Enrichment can be experienced as a threat. It is not the objective degree of danger that deters one from throwing oneself into the space, but rather the perceived threat of abandoning one's usual posture. Just as certain movements cannot be performed without music, expressive movements cannot be imitated and performed externally. They can only be successful if they are based on experience. Provided that experiencing something and being moved by something in a certain way are one and the same thing.

3. The space of physics is not perceived at all. Nor is it the space in which we live and know. It is "recognised" in the overview of an observer detached from the world. The structure of this space reveals the state of observation. Namely, the state of technical possibilities according to which this space is constructed. One seeks to gain a structured idea of it. The possibility of this space is answered by the directives of science, which are essentially anonymous, of which one is only the advocate. Kant himself cites the Copernican standpoint merely as a parable of transcendental contemplation. It can be critically analysed in terms of its factual premises, but not traced back to its hidden origins through existential analysis. The recognition of this space does not imply gnostic "seeing". Only an observer who stands in reality and lives **in it** can "see". The distance of this observer is an inner worldly counterpart. However, the space of physics is that of the universe, which as a whole is "opposite" to a point of view that **can** only be represented.

MASK

It is a different "world" that comes to the fore in the concept of taboo. The peculiarity of the affectivity expressed in taboo, the strangeness of the way in which

it finds existence here in the midst of beings, is demonstrated by the use of animal masks, for example. It expresses how the Menech, in interpreting an existence, understands not from himself but from something else, how he therefore — in the totem — can also be experienced as related to animals. Whereby humans take what is given to **nature**. The mask repeats the "features" of something. Morphological aspects are interpreted spiritually here. In such a way that a "being" is represented in these features, and not only in the sense of an image, but "represented" "in itself", namely by sketching — as, for example, the rain in the rain spell — "made". The "*Auneze*" of a being is regarded here as a character that it has decided upon. Or as something that it "has on", with which it is "equipped" or which it has acquired through some coincidence. These features of the mask, reduced to the essentials, signify an elevation. For primitive people, **an** animal's appearance "is" different from how we understand it in the sense of an external "appearance", not only as a manifestation of a certain nature, but also in the meaning of its details. We recognise in the appearance something that was created by una — that is to say, we "recognise" it, namely we know about it.

The characteristics with which "gifted" things are understood among primitive peoples are not objective characteristics. Just as we understand a wing "in" a creature as something for flying. In being gifted, however, I express a power to do something. Then there is the idea that one can acquire or appropriate these characteristics. In the hair, one acquires the eyesight of the antelope. Provided, of course, that this hair is not understood in its objective meaning as hair, but as "something from the antelope (endowed with such eyesight)". — Only the unbroken and flawless nature of a thing or an action ensures the magical effect; for in the absence of recognisable meanings, there are no unimportant details.

That these are "beings" that come into play here, which, in their

Although external appearances can only be recognised under their sign, nothing prevents us from trying to explain these appearances: the raven is black because it singed its feathers while fetching firewood. The turtle is flat because it let itself be carried to a considerable height above the earth in a bet with the vulture; etc. And such causes are contrasted with the snake's condemnation to crawl along the ground. So because once ... , therefore ... : Mythical is a story that can only be told in signs, but which cannot be penetrated by foresight. Whereby "the raven" that **once** ... is taken in analogy to the specific individual raven that bears the perceptible traces of the burn. For perceptions here still mean only an occasional foothold, without the ground of actual experience having been gained. They remain isolated. They have no exemplary significance as a path or procedure. Only in an inscrutable, not yet objectively understood coherence, i.e. only as a recognised connection, do they become decisive.

"The raven" is defined here by the role it plays in the animal world and in this respect as "one of its own". The crow, for example, belongs here as his relative in the wider circle of his family. (Just as in our culture, it is the species and not the individual animal that is defined as a raven and seen as such.) "A" raven — this can only be determined from the context.

The mask in **the** narrower **sense** has facial features. But here, too, there is a gaze that, in its rigid immobility and lack of depth, is the "staring" of a "being". The absent-mindedness of this gaze enhances the captivating effect of its sudden presence. The incorporeal, unreal and immovable nature of the mask is striking. It needs no reverse side. The sight of the mask signifies an encounter in which I am merely the object. I find myself at the mercy of its gaze, without being able to take it in and see through it, i.e. without being able to respond to it.

SPIRITUAL HISTORY OF THE AFFECTS

The soul, its scope, and emotions vary at different times. There are no universal human feelings. For example, people today are affected by different things than those in the eighteenth century. It is not an earthquake, but a bank crash that preoccupies and horrifies people today. Insofar as a system of safeguards clearly does not hold up here, one would have expected it to do so. However, no belief in the true sense of the word has been shaken here and demands justification. The centre has shifted, and today "life" is oriented towards it; even the concept of life has changed. There is a spiritual history of emotions.

DIFFERENCES

Le Bon's "Psychology of the Masses" overlooks differences: for example, when in 1789 the nobility renounced its chartered privileges "in a moment of enthusiasm," something its members would never have accepted as individuals, this was not yet a mass phenomenon. No one wants to lag behind a measure that is unclear, about which one — still blinded for the time being — is not yet certain of one's position. The decision is pressing, and it is difficult to decide whether one is **under** the influence of others here, or whether no one wants to appear in a false light.

According to Klages, attributing truthfulness or loyalty to someone means "inevitably thinking of them as equipped with the corresponding power to resist their opposite." For example, bravery only exists in overcoming something; the brave person does not give in to temptation. And courage takes hold where others fail. But the truly brave are **far from** lying! And Nietzsche's "truthfulness has something opposite to it, which can only be discovered and understood in the implementation of its conception.

ON TASTE

Taste is a sensation for ... But not only in the sense of mere sensitivity to something that has been organised in the senses. In those who have aptitude, which — in the case of hearing, for example — can be developed through practice. And a trained eye refers to professional skill. But taste develops with the individual; there is maturity involved here. Sensitivity to certain smells does not mean that they "offend my taste". Even the preference one has for certain colours when painting one's walls does not necessarily indicate actual taste. The fact that certain colours are perceived as pleasing to the eye does not mean that one finds them "explicitly pleasing". After all, taste also makes choices.

One claims — in approval and rejection — to "have taste". Which is something other than putting one's colour perception or perfect pitch to the test. Not as if one therefore knows how to impose "one's" taste on others. Not at all. Provided that one merely admits to oneself. So that in this respect "one cannot argue about taste", as one You can't argue about that. After all, something like a person's level of sophistication is reflected in their taste. For example, a person's primitiveness. They are "unsure" in this regard. The undifferentiated nature of a taste — where the taste tends towards differentiation — signifies a lack of education. Something else is the undifferentiated in the sense of the "ordinary" taste that flattens itself to the level of the masses. "There's no accounting for taste" means here: one appeals in vain if the person does not want to be awakened.

However, "there's no accounting for taste" also means

Applied to what one eats. However, the "refined palate" of the wine connoisseur, etc., merely refers to the sharpness of a sense, and the aforementioned idiom refers here to the fact that no one can go beyond "themselves", i.e. cannot feel differently than they actually do. This private validity of sensory perception is, however, something different from the general "taste" in the strict sense of the word and, to put it bluntly.

You either have taste or you don't — just as you either have tact or you don't. But while tact spares the feelings of others, the "impossible" in terms of taste lies in representations, parallels, allusions and comparisons. Tact refers to uncertainties in which people can be overlooked. It is aware of the precariousness that lies in the fact that, in comparison, the other person is actually in my hands. For example, it reveals a "lack of taste" to call William I "the Great" and even to compare him to Christ. Or not only as a cinema character, but also to dress up as Frederick the Great for real parades. Confidence in such matters, a sure feeling for ... shows itself as "taste". This characterises people no differently than their wit, for example, but does not determine their "level" like good or bad taste, which refers to what one "appeals".

However, "taste" is also demonstrated, for example, in the furnishing of a room or in flower arrangements. This refers to a confident sense of effect. The good and bad taste demonstrated here refers less to an involuntary level of sophistication and more to a person's conscious "culture" in terms of standards.

2.

, what one finds tasteful — for example, the tinkling of bells
, for example — does not yet characterise it. Because what one

What he finds in it varies. The connoisseur "tastes" the oyster. It is precisely the **special nature** of taste that **allows us to discover something** in things. What we see with our eyes varies. Only a certain familiarity with ... or a quickly found affinity allows us to find **taste in something**. Refined taste stands in contrast to ordinary taste, which — at the very limit of still being taste at all — without being able to **discern anything** in the direction just mentioned, simply likes this or that, which remains stifled in the expression of what the broad presentation of certain stimuli has quite rightly counted on. What has been waiting, as it were, for a release of inhibitions, without anything actually becoming "free", i.e. independent of itself. What the above merely anticipates, what it alludes to, is called something, namely its inclination, "tasteless".

Not simply natural things — flowers, colours — but their arrangement and use can appeal to a particular taste. (Although the beauty of the sea or a flower can certainly be perceived.) Only certain landscapes speak to us; we want to be in them because their mood strikes a chord within us. But this does not yet reveal a specific "taste" in the sense that everyone has their own personal taste when it comes to pictures. Connoisseurship, which relates to the style and artistic quality of a picture, is independent of such specific, self-selecting taste. The Friek Gallery in New York, for example, lacks a "face" in this respect; it only contains established masterpieces. The sheer number of pictures expresses how they meant nothing to their owner, that they said nothing to him. Just as a preference for Bosch may be based on the infernal nature of his pictures, insofar as one expects something in them, something that is discovered in one's own taste. One finds oneself — somehow — again, finds something...

where **one** fulfils **what one cannot say oneself**. One finds one's way to oneself through taste. It is in its differentiations and actions that the human being himself comes **to the fore**: what he has come to, where he **has** stopped, what he **has** strayed **from**. If "**something suits you**" in this, you also have a taste for the rhythms of certain music, for the looseness of the tinkling.

N a t h r ä g e

Taste protects one from something. Unlike shame, taste is something that one has to be wary of. It is a sure sense of the effect that something has on oneself, or in connection with its author. The somewhat clumsy allusion to himself makes Fichte's remark, for example, "What kind of philosophy one chooses..."* so embarrassing and almost tasteless. It is tasteless to turn "enlightenment" into a sensation, to expose the fates of real people to curious scrutiny in newspapers, cinemas and waxworks. Postcards that only know how to find the image of life in the banal, and even seem to delight in the ordinary, are tasteless. Or a zinc casting of Bismarck, insofar as it distorts his features into the ordinary. Conversely, Wilhelm I, portrayed as "the Great", cannot succeed in this. It is not the act of laughing at someone that is distasteful, but rather the exposure of that person.

On the other hand, it is merely "tasteless" to refer to Hegel as the "great Swabian", a bland platitude that one tires of upon first hearing it — anticipating its repetition, as it were.

Taste, as a sense, is a sure perception of ... Precisely as such, it can be offended — as can the ear, for example, by a discordant note. A refined ear, i.e. one that is sure of its perceptions, hears what is out of tune.

For the sense

Proper openness to ... does not only mean receptivity. Insofar as sounds, colours, etc. are determined by the living thing that creates them, which is limited to them. (The correct core in the doctrine of the "subjectivity" of sensory qualities.) Hence, for example, the viewer's own measure in adjusting the microscope until one has the "correct" view. For example, the discomfort that Yerschwommenes causes. But sounds and colours are also filtered out in this way in the clarity of their relationships. The selective aspect of the "correct" view. For example, the discomfort that Yerschwommenes causes. But sounds and colours are also filtered out in this way in the clarity of their relationships. The selective aspect of the "correct" view. For example, the discomfort that Yerschwommenes causes. But sounds and colours are also filtered out in this way in the clarity of their relationships. The selective aspect of the "correct" view. For example, the discomfort that Yerschwommenes causes. But sounds and colours are also filtered out in this way in the clarity of their relationships. The selection of "personal" taste is an intensification of sensory selection.

While personal preferences are reflected in what one likes, beauty is recognised and discovered. Something **"is" beautiful** — namely a park or an area, but also a path, an animal, a picture, a woman, etc. And even in the phrase "it's beautiful here," the situation of being here — somewhere — indicates "where" beauty can be found. Not just anything — only images can be compared in terms of their beauty. For only "in its own way" can something be beautiful. However, this way cannot be determined objectively. While the quality of an illustration is proven and confirmed — by the fact that it fulfils its purpose — the beauty of an illustration is something that must be grasped. The illustration, for example, is designed and has a personal style. Only connoisseurship reveals the beauty, namely the artistic quality of a painting by Vermeer. The cityscape of Delft is so beautiful as an image.

The Kantian definition "beautiful is that which pleases without interest" overlooks the interest in the sense of the practical, living relationship in which one must stand to a path, a landscape, etc., in order to discover it as a beautiful landscape, etc. Only the condition of interest is excluded. Just as, for example, the tiger as an image of a specific species is a beautiful animal, or a butterfly in the extravagant abundance of its colours — but here it is not recognised as ... , whereby in this definition

would be taken down a different path, as it were. Only this interest in a "task" is rejected. Which is why Schopenhauer's contemplation of the idea is somewhat different from the lingering observation of "aesthetic" behaviour. One must be free to allow an image to have an effect on oneself. Beauty is not something that is openly apparent; one can pass it by. Colours or tones are not automatically beautiful. A colour is only beautiful in the movement of its shades, in its depth that draws the eye.

"Ugly" is not the opposite of "beautiful". Ugly is that which is repulsive, tasteless. "Not beautiful" is equivalent to: not "further" beautiful.

"Art" means skill, proficiency in something: arithmetic, drawing; it is an "art" to write letters or to conduct a conversation
Eu. Yon einem

"Artist" — see, for example, a magician — is someone whose abilities cannot be separated from him in the broadest sense. His abilities are his secret, inimitable.

In works of art — as in masterpieces — skill and craftsmanship are demonstrated and proven.

For something to be a beautiful "image" means that it is beautiful in its artistic quality.

The word is also, in its current form, the expression itself. The utterance signifies a liberation from ... Something else, however, is the freedom of a "drawing" in the narrow sense, which does not merely depict something, but rather "draws" something by outlining and composing it, i.e. creating it. The creative aspect of language means something else: that it establishes connections, that it is the origin of an interpretation. It is creative in this sense. The drawing, however, is without such "interest".

A beautiful animal, a beautiful landscape, etc. are also beautiful as "creations".

However, what "appeals without interest" does not necessarily have to be beautiful: for example, young dogs playing, but also a certain trait in a certain person, etc.

The painter sees things "with different eyes." This makes his view transparent to something substantial within them. That is precisely what it means to "draw" something. Menzel's illustrations do not convey factual knowledge. Rembrandt does not demonstrate the texture of the elephant's skin. Rather, its wrinkledness is "captured" and actually brought into being by the drawing. One says that something in a picture is dull or weak. And one notices the lack of a certain mastery. One **recognises Frans Hals** by his brushstrokes. Pictures are "creations" of man, so beauty is to be understood from his nature. Others "live" precisely in a picture. With the earthiness and thunderousness of Tintoretto's colours, one has the ptyyer?9 of *the fort* . The transparency of the picture means being open to it. Just as yellow lies in envy, which finds its equation in it. Al8 nvyyrJ9 with the whole of being, Franz Marc draws the animalistic, the nature of the horse, the unnameable being indicated here. The nobility of a portrait lies in the way in which the ordinariness of the subject is placed in the context of the whole of being, and Rembrandt has more of this substance than van Dyck. The transfiguration that finds something in the image does not mean idealisation, but rather spiritualisation in the direction mentioned. Just as spirit manifests itself in the sensing of distant affinities. Spirit is not an ability in the sense of specific openness. It is ecstatic. In drawing, this yrn}ti is brought into being. Being as a whole is grasped visionarily when this or that is "drawn" in this way. Which is why even a fragment reveals the art of Titian.

Even in the word itself, the expression is the expression itself. And even in language, nothing is left out. The word " " remains " " but is still attached to " " which is only just revealed in it.

taken; ea merely determines things. But something is drawn or flourishes precisely because it is enchanted by the reality that is otherwise lived. And certainly — even in the perception of smoothness and heat, something is not left alone. But smoothness is something qualitative, i.e. something specific; without being understood in its specificity, it cannot be understood — this is what is meant here by being released from the knot of reality. Although, on the other hand, the drawn bears the traces of its time, whose style it has adopted. Or rather, the spatial feeling of the Baroque is also determined by art.

The ghostly nature of an excavated bedstead points to a specific insubstantiality. It has no connection to the earth that shelters it. Its parts lack any torso-like quality. No material has been shaped into it. It has been factory-made from raw materials. Its concept cannot be separated from the establishment of a life that has become unreal. Unlike the ancient Roman roads, motorways require constant maintenance; the comparison between the two is flawed.

In the judgement of taste, a claim is decided. For example, that of being a beautiful house. In contrast to such objective standards, there are personal standards for what one finds pleasing in one's own interpretation.

ILLNESS

Human illness, as it can be expressed, is something different from the symptoms of cirrhosis of the liver, for example, which is a perceptible process; measured in physiological terms, it is assessed as pathological. Measured in terms of demands, but not in terms of performance, the person feels ill and that something is "missing".

A broken leg and torn muscle are considered illnesses just like osteomyelitis or a felon. This is because the bone breaks just like wood does under heavy load, whereas

"has been infected" with typhoid fever, in the case of mitral insufficiency, the organ is unable to cope with stress. If a person can no longer assert and find "themselves", paralysis is a "mental" illness. Psychopaths are unable to cope with the demands of life.

However, inability to cope with life is not merely a matter of "health". It is not just a question of not getting ahead, of a lack of success in life. Rather, they cannot cope with life. Even in the case of Yeronal poisoning, the body reacts no differently than in wound healing and callus formation: only after the trauma. Typhoid fever, however, develops as an illness. And it is one that makes people feel sick in the truest sense of the word. It cannot be localised like a paronitium, which is felt in the finger. But the heart is seen as the actual "seat" of life; one moves something in acinem Herz ; ala Herzsangst shows erateigerte Angst.

' THINKING

"England can afford it," "must accept it" or "fear that...", namely: in a situation. Insofar as thinking can be something objective, downright "appropriate". But one can also speak of England's "envy". Insofar as it finds itself called upon to make comparisons in which it fares poorly. The direction that thoughts naturally take is briefly referred to here as "envy". The person in the situation is the "subject" of the thoughts in which this situation is taken up.

MORAL

Stupidity is something moral. The moral aspect – not to chicken out – is self-evident. In this respect, human beings are bound to themselves. (Kant's moral law.)

"Morality, however, consists of certain views about what is considered proper. In this respect, the individual is required to fulfil certain demands. There is a bourgeois morality. Those who place themselves outside such standards are amoral. However, it is immoral to disregard barriers that one basically wants and needs oneself.

The slave morality, i.e. the morality created by slaves, contrasts with the ethos of the slave as a given order that encompasses his existence. Morality is something social; ethos belongs to every original community — it becomes tangible in language, for example.

MORAL VALUE

The person is the bearer of moral value insofar as this value is first and foremost determined by them and not merely attributed to them in judgement. Only the French, for example, "know" what bravura is. Only certain times can give substance to the concept of "faith". The Scottish are specifically stingy. But morality and stupidity are also different for everyone. In itself, however, something is vicious or inferior, impossible, etc. It is not only "considered" to be so. That also exists, but it refers to the hierarchy of values in the sense that some people overlook ... , while others have too much taste, ... Before and after Ennius, "one considers it despicable" to charge interest.

A N M E R K U N G E N

The books published by Lipps with the abbreviations of the titles used below:

Investigations into the Phenomenology of Knowledge. Part One: The Thing and Its Properties. Bonn 1927. Part Two: Statement and Judgement. Bonn 1928. = Ph. D. E. I and II.

Investigations into a Hermeneutischen Logic. (Philosophical Treatises, Volume 7) Frankfurt am Main 1938. = H. Log.

Human Nature. (Frankfurt Scientific Contributions. Cultural Studies Series, Volume 8) Frankfurt am Main 1941 = D. m. N.

After Lipps' death, in addition to the present volume, the earlier volume belonging to it was published:

The binding nature of language. Works on the philosophy of language and logic. Frankfurt am Main, 1944 and 1954 — Vol. 1.

Angle brackets in the author's text indicate additions, square brackets indicate additions by the editor. Numbers with asterisks in **the text** refer to separate notes at the end of the respective general notes. — Unless otherwise indicated, the titles of the texts "Fragmentarisehes" have been added for printing purposes. — The MSS cited are typewritten pages dictated by Lipps.

ESSAYS AND LECTURES

On the Morphology of Natural Science

Deutsche Rundschau, vol. 59, 1932, pp. 38–40, published under the pseudonym J. H. Snellen.

The content is closely related to the lecture series "The Philosophical Problems of Natural Science" by S.-S. 1931, which is available in a course-recorded train of thought of eight manuscript pages. On the history of natural science, it states:

"Style change in natural science. Goethe and Newton; Linnaeus, Carus. 'Discoveries that are 'not quite right' and therefore remain unknown.

'4 The meaning of knowledge changes. Different ideologies (example: Linnaeus as administrator of creation). Pretensions of alchemy: the ideal of the sage. Expansion of the limits of human capabilities. — Humboldt's cosmoa. Kingdoms of nature.

Natural science has become a subject today. Experimental psychology as an example of a subject area. — Craftsmanship. One
One 'drives' natural science; one is diligent, loses oneself in the subject one represents. — Impersonal pathos of objectivity and provable truth. Question of the ideological motives behind it. Decisions whose validity has no authority other than existence. Suggestion of complete meaninglessness behind every science. Distortion of nature in this process."

For the passage about Linnë, see the essay by Karl Henke, *Wissenschaftliche Erziehung in den Naturwissenschaften* (Scientific Education in the Natural Sciences) (I4db. d. Pädagog., lirs. v. H. Nohl u. L. Pallat, p. 393ff.).

To distinguish between natural history (*liistoria naturalis*) and natural science, the above-mentioned lecture excerpt refers to Bruno Snell's interpretation of *farogla* in *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie* (Philol. Unters., vol. 29, 1924, p. S9) and that of *γῶδῶις* bet Snell *ibid.* (p. 72 ff.) and in Oskar Becker, *Mathematische Existenz* (Jb. f. Ph. u. phän. F., vol. 8, 1927, p. 6768.). The reference to *Philos. Anzeiger*, vol. 3 apparently refers to the essay by Snell, *Znr naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffs-bildung im Griechisehen* (*ibid.*, 1929, p. 243ff.).

Characterisations of modern mathematical natural science such as this, in the sense that its "world view" is distinguished from the "natural world view", recur frequently in Lipps, often in discussions of the "unconditional nature" of science.

On Goethe's natural science, cf. on morphology: "The Subordination of Organs" (p. 135 ff.); on colour theory: *Ph. d. E. I*, p. 80, 84 *Arim. I, II*, p. 18 note 2 ; on both: "Goethe's Theory of Colours" (p. 108 ff.). On the philosophy of natural science, see also "The Subordination of Organs" in its entirety and that mentioned in the relevant note. Lipps' biological dissertation (Göttingen 1913) and his medical dissertation (*Arch. f. exper. Pathol. u. Pharmakol.*, vol. 85, 1920, pp. 235-255) should be mentioned here.

The Experience of Primitives

Philos. Anzeiger, vol. 4, 1929/30, pp. 66–77. Response to the essay by W. Mayer-Gross, "On the Question of the Psychological Characteristics of So-Called Primitive Peoples" (*ibid.*, pp. 51–66), summarised under the main title "The problem of primitive forms of thought".

For the content, see "Die Wirklichkeit bei den Naturvölkern" (p. 82 ff.) with the relevant *Arim.* and "Maske" (p. 176 ff.).

Pragmatism and Existential Philosophy

The MS is the German original, corrected by Lipps in his own hand, of an essay published in French translation in *Recherches philosophiques*, vol. 6, 1936/37, pp. 333–345. The present reprint follows twice the slightly corrected version of the French print, as well as an additional, slightly different copy of the German text (see below)

, which differs slightly from the German text (see below notes °• and *•).

On pragmatism, see the comment in "Erkennen der Dinge" (Recognising Things) (vol. 1, p. 208). Kierkegaard is cited only occasionally by Lipps, Nietzsche more frequently, and Heidegger repeatedly, especially in the many quotations in the second part of Ph. d. E., which is influenced by the impression made by "Being and Time". Lipps held seminar exercises on "Being and Time" in Göttingen in 1931 and in Frankfurt am Main in 1937. From the former, there is a four-page manuscript of a course of thought in which, in connection with Heidegger's departure from Husserl and Kant, the main focus is on the concept of consciousness. The manuscript begins with the following guiding principles for understanding Heidegger's philosophy:

"Not to make it clear from within oneself. Let yourself be put in that position. Avoid superficial understanding. — Approach it as a directive. Only by dealing with it from somewhere can you deal with it. No criticism that remains stuck to its subject."

** MS: "in passing through ..."

°*MS: "The obvious, the vitality of life ..."

The meaning of the study of science

Preprinted. One-time public lecture given at the suggestion of the rector at the beginning of the 1937/38 academic year at the University of Frankfurt am Main.

Only a few of the handwritten additions in the manuscript could be readily incorporated into the text. The rest, which belong to the passages referred to in the text (with the exception of one unclear passage consisting of two words), are as follows:

• For at first (it is) only excessive faith. Here, one persuades oneself more to something. (The matter?) to face up to.

°* No one can escape it. Everyone (has) to pay for it in their own place.

° A psychological perspective seems to be called for (here).

• Hatred born of powerlessness. When (one) cannot reach (the) opponent.

^ (,) not available in stocks. Knowledge is not capital that can be used to draw bills of exchange. Certainly, there is (knowledge as) a layer of yield.

•• Most obvious. But not most essential!

•* X-ray!

® • [Ernst jünger, Blätter und Steine, p. 221, No. 43.1

® • :Instinctive distrust of aberrations (of) thought. Keep the pros and cons in mind without wavering.

" * Lack of resistance in things themselves. Recognising the endurance of things. Things enduring urgent recognition. Only in resistance do we experience the reality content of a recognition. [Cf. Vol. 1, p. 124.]

Position and Existence

Unpublished. Lecture given on 2 December 1937 at the Strasbourg Scientific Society in Frankfurt am Main.

On this topic, cf. the earlier comparisons between the "attitude of judgement" on the one hand and "understanding in dealing with things" on the other in "Die Erlebnisweise der Primitiven" (The Way Primitives Experience Things) (p. 26ff.), "Daa Urteii" (vol. 1), "Wortbedeutung und Begriff" (vol. 1) and "Beispiel, Exempel, Fall" (vol. 1); the remarks on predication and apophansis, judgement and logos in H. Log., p. 121ff.; and the later ones on standpoint and natural worldviews, the reality of physics and that of the sentient choir in D. m. N., p. 86 ff. — Sections 3 and 4 belong in particular and in detail to the circle of ideas in H. Log.

** Professor Erwin Madelung, Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Frankfurt am Main, gave a lecture on "Choice of Perspective and Change of Perspective in Physics" at the Strasbourg Scientific Society on 3 June 1937.

* Here, dots in the manuscript indicate that examples were to follow in the lecture, as in H. Log., p. 93: "One blows up lawns, but also bridges, with dynamite; horsemen gallop across the street, etc." See also "Metaphors" (vol. 1, p. 67 f.).

Responsibility, Accountability, Punishment

Archive for Legal and Social Philosophy, vol. 31, 1937/38, pp. 167–175. Originally a lecture given in April 1936 at the local branch of the German Philosophical Society in Frankfurt am Main.

The topic, as indeed the whole subject of law in Lipps' work, dates back to the time when he studied philosophy in Göttingen from 1911 to 1914. In the autumn semester of 1911 and the winter semester of 1911/12, Adolf Reinach gave a lecture series there on "Free Will, Attribution and Responsibility". See also note "The Judgement" (vol. 1).

For the content, see "On Punishment" (p. 153ff.), on the topic of law, see also: "The Judgement" (vol. 1, p. 231f.), "Example, Exemplum, Case ..." (vol. 1, p. S4 ff.), "Remarks on the Promise" (vol. 1, p. 971f.).

The Effectiveness of Natural Forces

Research and Progress, 15. 5g. 1939, pp. 353–354. — Excerpt from a lecture given by Lippe on 16 February 1939 at the Völkermuseum in Frankfurt am Main as part of an event organised by the German Society for Cultural Morphology. The manuscript of the essay, which differs slightly from the printed version, is still available.

On this topic, see "Die Erlebnisweise der 'Primitiven'" (pp. 26 ff.) and, closely related to our essay in terms of its origin, "Maske" (pp. 176 ff., see the relevant note) and D. m. N., chapters 4, 11, 14 (see below). — Although parts of the essay have been slightly corrected for inclusion in the book, it has been printed here in full for the sake of context.

If desired, the text can be illuminated in every detail by parallel passages. On the formation of concepts among primitive peoples, cf. in addition to the above-mentioned 's essay " " also: Ph. d. E. I, p. 30 note 2, p. 31f. ; on taboo (or sacrilege, nemesis) and on magic, maake, and beings can be found in many places in Lipps; on the changed basic attitude towards the world in schizophrenics, which is used for comparison with the one discussed, see D. m. N., chapter "Stimmungen" (Moods); for a comparison of the fear of 'taboo' with the feeling of shame: *ibid.* chapter 'Schamgefühl' (Feeling of Shame). On the connection between words and imagination, cf. 'Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache' (The Binding Nature of Language) (vol. 1) and the corresponding sections in H. Log. and D. m. N.; specifically on the concept of the schema in this context: H. Log., p. 63f., D. m. N., p. 94f. Note 1 and p. 65.

* The following passage, omitted from the MS "Vaake" in the reprint (originally a note to a chapter entitled "Affects" in the first MS by D. m. N. — see note "Psychology and Philosophy"), can be added to this paragraph: "Certainly — the 'view' of the world is different among primitive peoples. In their concepts, totemism

For example, the 'logic' that emerges is different and specific in each case. But there is nothing special about that. Lévy-Bruhl's term 'priilogiach' refers — since sensory certainty is always priilogical — strictly speaking only to the specific reality of a specific sensation."

Wandlung der Soldaten Die

neue Linie, 11th *kg.*, 1939, p. IM36.

On this topic, see "Der Soldat des letzten Krieges" (The Soldier of the Last War) (Deutsche Schriften zur Wissenschaft, vol. 4, Frankfurt am Main 1934, 2nd edition 1935; also printed in part in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 14 April 1935) and the earlier review of the book by W. M. Schering, Die Kriegaphilosophie von Clausewitz (Bl. f. Dt. Ph., vol. 11, 1937/38, pp. 315—316).

Goethe's Theory of Colours

Jb. d. Freien Dt. Hochstifts zu Prankfurt a. M., 1936-1940, pp. 123—138. Preparation of a lecture given by Lipps on 7 February 1939 in Rome at the Kaiaer-Wilhelm Institute for Art and Cultural Studies in the Palazzo Zuccari and printed in its original version in the "Publications of the Department of Cultural Studies" of this institute, 1st series, Lectures, H. IS, Leipzig 1939.

On this topic, see "On the Morphology of Natural Science" (p. 9 ff.) and the relevant note.

EARLY WRITINGS

The Subordination of the Organs On the Philosophy of Biology

Unpublished, without title. The habilitation lecture that Lipps gave at 30 July 1921 in Göttingen. (The much shorter lecture "Geometry and Experience" in Vol. 1, which according to the Göttingen Deanery records was the habilitation lecture, must have been the colloquium lecture.) — The division into four sections and a further subdivision into six new paragraphs was only made for the purposes of printing.

In the individual case, cf. the mention of Armin Müller (p. 134) in the discussion cited below in note °•; on the critique of mechanism and vitalism: a discussion by J. S. Tlaldane, available as an MS, no longer traceable at the publisher's, *Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Biologie* (translated by Ad. Meyer, Berlin 1932). See also D. m. N., p. 63 note. Goethe's morphology is discussed later in "Zur Morphologie der Natur-wissenschaft" (p. 14 ff.) and "Goethes Farbenlehre" (p. 108ff.). With its last part on the anticipations of cognition, the work anticipates in principle the essay "Die Frage nach dem Wirk8ächkeits-wert der Sinnesqualitäten" (*Wissenseh. Festschr. zur 700-Jahrfeier d. Kreuzsehule s. Dresden*, 1926, pp. 124—130), or rather its elaboration in Ph. d. E. I, §§ 15-27, and indeed this book as a whole.

C. Nägeli, *Mechanistic-physiological theory of the theory of evolution*, 1884. , 1884. Cf. "Goethe's Theory of Colours" (p. 110 note 2).

A handwritten addition could be deciphered as follows (not entirely verbatim in the second sentence): "At the same time, however, it is clear that botany is increasingly more physiological than zoology. The focus here was very different, as the form of the organ is related to its function (Goebel, p. 8). Botanical organography is freer from idealistic concepts. All Darwinian influences have had a weaker effect here." — "Goebel p. 8" refers to Karl Goebel, *Organography of Plants*, Part 1, Jena 1898.

* The handwritten addition "Gegenbaur 1859" probably refers to his book "Grundzüge der vergleichenden Anatomie" (Fundamentals of Comparative Anatomy).

* The following handwritten addition should be inserted here: "The so-called 'expediency' uav. (boils down to) the fact that nothing does anything that is not expedient. Radl in his book on phototropism [(Emanuel Radl, Über den Phototropismus der Tiere, Leipzig 1903):] (Phototropism is) expedient for all those organisms in which it occurs, and it is expedient within the limits in which it is or can be active. Radl opposes the view that expediency is, as it were, only an appendage, which is useful, but without which (the organism) remains what it is. Properly understood, expediency means nothing more than what is expressed, among other things, in the subordination of the organs. However ... "

* Ygl. Lipps' review of: Armin ülller, Das Individualitäts-problem und die Subordination der Organe (Gött. gel. Anz., 187th year, 1925, pp. 247-249).

* Handwritten addition (as far as can be deciphered): "Finally, in developmental mechanics, everything is transferred into complexes of determination, into hereditary structure, structure ... Formative potential is ultimately represented in the preformation of the germ substance. Preformation of the 18th century versus epigenesis in Hückcl, somewhat physical-chemical. Against (the) confusion (that) arises therein."

Wolfgang Köhler, Die physischen Gestalten in der Puhe und im sta-
tionären Zustand, Braunschweig 1920.

On punishment

Archive for Legal and Economic Philosophy, Vol. 17, 1923/24, pp. 591–596. On this topic, see "Responsibility, Imputation, Punishment" (pp. 72 ff.); specifically on revenge: D. M. N., pp. 128 ff. Note 2.
on revenge: D. m. N., pp. 128 f. Note 2.

QUESTIONNAIRE

(Unpublished)

Introduction to Philosophy

A single sheet, entitled "Introduction to Philosophy (S.-S. 1930)", written in connection with the aforementioned lecture series by S.-S. in 1930, preserved by Hipps among the handwritten notes for his W.-S. 1936/37 in Frankfurt am Main as an introduction to philosophy, read in the lecture series "Science and Knowledge".

For the content, see H. Log., p. 21f. Note 1; on 'philosophy' also: "Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache" (The Binding Nature of Language) (vol. 1) p. 111 f. note, D. m. N., p. 56 and *ibid.* note 1, H. Log., p. 62.

Psychology and Philosophy

In the original, pages 1–8, which contain our **text**, have been stapled together with pages 1W19, which form the template for the text "On Space", from a formerly more extensive manuscript. There is also an abridged copy with handwritten additions to our **text**, which are printed below, unless otherwise indicated. — The manuscript was probably created (see note "Maske") in connection with the course "Philosophical Psychology" by S.-S. in 1936, whose first lecture had the same content as our **text**, and the additions were perhaps made during the preparation for the course "Psychology of Man" by S.-S. 1938, which again dealt with the same subject in greater detail at the beginning.

For content, see D. m. N., Introduction. — Among Lipps' psychological writings, this book deserves special mention. Preliminary work is still available, which is the source of some of the fragmentary texts in this volume: 1. The first, the book in its larger Teil coherent preparatory MS, which was available in the spring or autumn of 1938, and the addenda attached to it, which mainly consist of preliminary work on the last five chapters of the book and probably follow on from the lecture series 'Der Aufbau des Charakters' (The Structure of Character), S.-S. 1939, both of which differ considerably from the printed text. 2. The carbon copy of about ninety pages of later additions, which were written in the field in 1939/40 without any continuous connection and are essentially similar in content, but only partly included in the book. 3. The typescript, which was continuously corrected during typesetting. — A preliminary draft of the chapters by D. m. N. on *shame* and consciousness: an essay translated into French by Leo Delfoss, "La pudeur et la conscience," from around 1937 or 1938, probably intended for *Recherches philosophiques*, where two essays by Lipps had already been published, but which was not printed there. Lipps listed it last in a list of his writings published up to 1938 submitted to the ministry as not yet published. — On psychology, see also the contents of the present volume, in particular the discussion by Hans Driesch, *Grundprobleme der Psychologie* (Dt. Literaturzeitung, H. 32, 1930, col. 1493-1495). — **Lipps's** problems of logic also **touch** more and more explicitly **on** those of psychology.

The handwritten additions mentioned above at the points indicated in the text read:

- Task. Can (will be) tested, (one eats) seIb questioned here. Experience is art! (One becomes) lost in it.
- Do not know here (=) understand (have understood). Man (is) not an object! It is not (the case here) to become practically ready (su) to encounter (... , Bondem) as (the other)!

Understanding is always on the way to inner possibility.
Reality factum in the sense of Kant's question quid facti.

- One form (is, for example) 'pathological'.
- * Human psychology is not medical psychology!

Across the room

For the origin of the text, see note "Psychology and Philosophy". The MS still contains the rest of the transition to our **text** and shows how it relates to the previous one: psychology and epistemology were oriented towards Gnostic vision, from which it is more difficult to find one's way back to pathic vision. Specific contrast between hearing, under the influence of which one stands, and active vision. — Page 174, paragraph 2 is marked "addition" in the MS, and is followed by the paragraph on the realm of physics, which was moved from there to the end for printing. — A new paragraph, which breaks off from the MS, then continues with the sentences: "Pathic and gnostic are two typical differences taken from the diversity of ways of perceiving. But touch, taste and smell point in a new direction of the modality of perception. One experiences something in them. Which means nothing gnostic."

For content, see D. m. N., p. 13, 23 note; on space, see also: *ibid.* p. 82 f., 79 f., "Die Erlebnisweise der 'Primitiven'" (5.27 f. note 1); an unpublished excerpt from S.-S.'s 1931 lecture "Die philosophischen Probleme der Naturwissenschaft" (see also note "Zur Morphologie der Naturwissenschaft") contains the following passage:

"Space. Supposedly mere 'abstraction' of mathematical-physical space. However, it is impossible to specify the 'location' of a rainbow or an afterimage in a manifold of locations. Distance of the 'surface colour' from the 'space-filling' sound; eeriness of silence.

'Here' and 'there' cannot be specified in terms of location. Here with me. Different spatial circumstances of things. Places and locations. Arrangement of 'spaces', getting to know oneself in paths and hanging. (Primitive.)

Venturing forward. Behind me, the escape room.

Different spaces jostle each other, passing each other by. (Under the hand, it has become clear. Philosophy as an addendum.) To what extent, then, is it still the 'same' space in different insights?

In the fear of space (and vertigo), a more narrowly defined existential meaning of space emerges... Difference between the fear of space and actual phobias.

(E. Straus, *Die Formen des Räumlichen* [The Forms of Space]. In: *Nervenarzt* 1930, p. 633ff. :) The inducing power of music when marching; lively steps; indifference to distance, opening up to 'vastness'. Qualities of space. Present movement. Increase in trunk motor skills. Dancing in space; dance without support (after rückwärts s. B.) as purposeful movement. Body always experienced as uniformly centred; shift of the ego in relation to the body schema: awake, active in the root of the nose (gnostic). When dancing, shifted down into the torso (pathic). — Torso space symbolism in Greek and Christian prayer. — Not the objective measure of danger, but the experience of danger is decisive in jumps, where one throws oneself into space. — Increasing abandonment of special existence in minuet, waltz, **jazz**. —

Instead of abstraction, specific meaning: C-lengths are calculated as something that causes concern. However, distances are then measured. De-worlding of space. (This only means neutralisation. For example, the number is already 'neutral' insofar as it is the quantity of anything. However, the decisive step is from number to quantity.

** "Parable of an action" refers to Klages: *Ausdrucck und Gestaltungskraft*, p. 49. See also D. in. h'., p. 15 f.

Mask

The text was initially listed in an MSS catalogue under the title "Flaske" by Lipps and was then classified together with "Psychology and Philosophy" (p. 161ff.) and "On Space" (p. 170ff.) under "Psychology Lecture". Lipps pasted it onto three sheets from passages not included in D. ru. N. from the main part of the first manuscript of the book (see note "Psychology and Philosophy") and the addenda from 1939/40 (see *ibid.*), probably when completing the book. Some parts have been omitted in this reprint:

Partly because it reappears, slightly modified, in "Die Wirklichkeit bei den Naturvölkern" (p. 82 ff.) (cf. there on demon beliefs, rain magic, the appearance of "Ge•icht"), partly because it was no longer directly applicable (cf. note * to that essay).

On this topic, cf. "Die Wirklichkeit bei den Naturvölkern" (op. cit.) and the relevant Anna.

* Paragraphs 3 and 4 should later be included here as notes.

◦ At this point, the first MS by D. m. N., chap. "Taboo", refers to paragraph 5 as note.

Geistesgeschichte der Affekte

The texts "Geistesgeschichte der Affekte" (The Intellectual History of Affects), "Unterschiede" (Differences) (second paragraph) and "Krankheit" (Illness) (first paragraph) are taken from the addenda to the first manuscript of D. m. N. written in 1939/40 (see note

"Psychology and Philosophy").

Lipps incorporated our **text**, a passage isolated in terms of content in the manuscript, with slight changes as a note in the chapter "Sehamgefühl" (Sense of Self) of the printed manuscript of D. m. N. It is reproduced in this form. Only the originally intended sentence is added at the beginning and the originally last sentence at the end. During the final corrections to the book, Lipps replaced the passage with the note **now** found on p. 41f.

The idea behind our text is reminiscent of something similar from Lipps*'s lecture "Der Begriff des Volkes" (The Concept of the People) by W.-S. 1938/39. There he spoke of the current politicisation of the concept of the yolk and, in this context, generally of the "increasing objectification of the spheres that are fought over and that give **direction** to life".

Under the influence of

The source of the two texts summarised here is a single note taken by Lipps from a larger manuscript, which belongs in the context of D. m. N. It refers to Gustav Le Bon, *Psychologie der Massen* (translated by Rudolf Eisler, Leipzig 1919). The opening sentence printed here begins a page of the addenda to the first 3iS of D. m. N. (see note "Psychology and Philosophy") written in 1939/40 and mentioned in the previous note, which continues as follows:

There are obvious misconceptions, for example, that an indirect tax is not as significant as a direct tax. This would be true if one paid the same amount in both cases. However, the perception is different! Criticism here hits the mark in a way that is usually overlooked. Then, with a new paragraph, our passage follows: "When in 1789 the nobility..."

In the continuation, a distinction is made — as slightly modified in D. m. N., p. 138 and *ibid.* note 1 u. 3 — between mass and quantity, e.g. average and the neutrality of "man". Conversely, something similar must have preceded our text in the first-mentioned MS, and this was referred to in the original opening sentence, which has been replaced here: "In Le Bon's psychology of crowds, all this is intertwined."

Regarding the passage "... which would never be accepted by its three members as individuals," Lipps refers to both texts on p. 20 in *Le Bon*. There it says: "For the individual in the crowd, the concept of the impossible disappears," followed by examples of this.

The second of the texts entitled "Differences" here, which refers to Klages, *Expression and Creative Power*, p. 109, can be found on one of six pages transcribed by Klages, which are part of the above-mentioned addenda to the first manuscript, written in autumn 1940.

D. m. N. belong and whose content has been incorporated into almost everything else in the book as a critique of Klages: D. m. N., p. 151f., 22 and *ibid.* note 2. — On what Lipps had in mind with the specificity of the contrast between Nietzsche's concept of "honesty" and its opposite, cf. "Pragmatism and Existential Philosophy" (p. 45f., 50, 54), "Sinn des Studiums der Wissenschaft" (pp. 58 f.).

lib e r d e n G e s c h m a c k

The notes titled MS here comprise the first eight of nineteen pages that were sent back from Russia after Lipps fell on 10 September 1941, and which were written between May and September of that year while on the march and during the fighting. These are texts of very different content, five of which form the conclusion of the present volume and have been kept in the order in which the sheets were arranged in the shipment. Two of them ("On the Subject of 'Causality'" and "Relativity and Relativism") were included in Vol. 1, and three remained in print.

Our text was the initial preparation for a seminar on Kant's Critique of Judgment, originally announced for W.-S. 1939/40. — p. 185, penultimate paragraph, to p. 186, second paragraph, is crossed out in the manuscript with "Ge st a l t f i n d u n g". The quotation refers to H. Wölfflin, *Gedanken zur Kunstgeschichte*, 1941, p. 130.

*"The philosophy one chooses depends on what kind of person one is one is *as* a person." (First Introduction to the Science of Science. Introduction.)

Illness

For the origin of the first of the two texts summarised here (first paragraph), see note "Geistesgeschichte der Affekte" (*Intellectual History of Emotions*). The second, titled "Krankheit" (Illness) by Lippe himself, belongs to the pages mentioned in the previous note.

In a typescript of his lecture series "Zur Pathographie des Genies uixd Soziologie des Ruhmes" (On the Pathography of Genius and the Sociology of Fame), held in 1932/33 at the T. II. Hannover and preserved among Lippe's manuscripts, there is, among other things, a passage on the concepts of "healthy" and "sick".

"which are not tailored from the outset" to "what the physician actually deals with," but whose meaning is almost indifferent and can only be seen from the range of their use, where the following is said in particular about illness:

When we speak of 'healthy' and 'sick', it is the contrast between impressions that we wish to describe, but this contrast is by no means to be found in the things themselves, on the basis of which one could classify them... A broken leg is not described as an illness, but as an accident. It is a traceable event. One has overlooked its origin and course from the outset; one understands this whole process. Where we can do this, we do not speak of illness. Illness is arehaisch, (something) that befalls one and that one would like to get rid of. The concept of contagion is tailor-made for this term... Infectious diseases are very similar to poisoning; nevertheless, one will only speak of different types of illness here.

'Diseases' speak... 'Healthy' and 'sick' are by no means objective alternatives."

Thinking

For the origin of the text, see note "On Taste".

The content, a guiding principle of hermeneutic logic in the sense developed by Lipps, can be clarified here by parallel passages from various contexts . See , for example FI. Log., p. 9 f., D. m. N., p. 59, 91, "Causality" (vol. I), p. 137f.

Morality

For the origin of the text, see note "on taste". On "stupidity is something moral", cf. D. m. N., pp. 40, 59.

Si t tli ch er W ert

For the origin of the text, see note "On taste".