

Muster nehmen!

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ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE
DER ERKENNTNIS

VON

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RESEARCH INTO PHÄ7i
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THE RECOGNITION

OF

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PART ONE
THE IHNG AND ITS PROPERTIES

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FOREWORD.

The following investigations deal with the difficulties inherent in the properties of things. Herbart's discussions on this subject are taken up again. His aporetic is determined by the fact that the properties of a thing are designated as what the thing "is" as the subject of predications: the foreign element lies in how the connection of the copula in a certain "situation," the restriction inherent in it, is reflected precisely in the so-called universality of logic; Verifiability belongs to the conception of the *ens praedicabile*. But instead of performing the copula in the proper manner, it is the philosophical task to comprehend this performance itself from the horizon implied in the copula. In doing so, the *a priori* loses its position in the structure of knowledge with regard to the "object". It cannot be gained at all through "critical" analysis. Nor can it be gained through mere "reflection" on what is given in any attitude. Rather, it can only be gained by dismantling this attitude itself down to its first hidden motives, by understanding it as a specific situation that underlies the questioning approach to things. This is probably a departure from some of Husserl's formulations. But I believe that even there I remain only his student.

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Part II will be published at the beginning of next year.

H a n B L i p p s.

Herbart has pointed out the difficulties inherent in the concept of a thing and its properties: "The essence of things is not known to us through the senses. For firstly, all the properties of things given in perception are relative. Circumstances not only interfere with perception, but also determine it in such a way that it is clear that things would not have these properties at all without these accidental circumstances. A body has colour; but not without light; what is this property in the dark? It sounds, but not without air: what is this property in a vacuum? It is heavy, but only on Earth; on the Sun, its heaviness would be greater; in infinite empty space, it would no longer exist. It is fragile when broken: hard or soft when penetrated; it can be melted when exposed to fire; — and thus there is not a single property that defines what it is, left completely alone. — Secondly: the majority of properties are incompatible with the unity of the object. Anyone who wants to answer the question: what is this thing? answers with the sum of its characteristics; according to the formula: This thing is a and b and c and d and e. If one were to take this answer literally, it would be absurd, for the question was about one thing, not many things that can merely be summed up but cannot be fused into a unity. But one should understand the answer in such a way that

Textbook for an introduction to philosophy, see Aufl. i g .

The thing is the possessor of those properties and can be recognised by them. Precisely because one must recognise it by what it has and not by what it is, one is forced to admit that the thing itself, the possessor of those characteristics, remains unknown.

We begin with an examination of the first question. It concerns the so-called relativity of properties. However, even its introduction leads to difficulties:

Herbart speaks of the colour "that a body has". The window pane, for example, also has such a colour in the light of the setting sun. And it would certainly not have it without this coincidental circumstance. As a result of the reflection, it is ruby red. However, it does not actually look that way. Namely, it does not look the way lead looks grey and sulphur looks yellow. In fact, it is transparent. The red colour is not perceived as belonging to it. Nevertheless, it appears on the window pane and its presence is revealed precisely in the fact that it creates the red colour with the converging and incident rays of light. We consider it to be only a red appearance that is, as it were, superimposed on the glass. Just as glare and reflected light remain, in their own way, detached from the objects that they nevertheless "belong" to, on which they appear.

But such an "appearance" is also, for example, the rainbow. It is, of course, bound to light by its very substance. It only appears when the sun is shining. It is lost in the colours in which it plays, quite unlike lead in grey, which is, in a very special sense, only grey in appearance. In the case of the rainbow, there is something "behind" it that certainly cannot be discovered, something that "looks" like that, or anything else for that matter. And not only that — are the colours the properties of the rainbow? After all, it actually consists entirely of colours. Can one here, in

case of the rainbow, or even a bruise, which is just that and "nothing more," say that we do not know what moves the senses.⁹ Of course, the rainbow is mere illusion. But rainbows and bruises have destinies. Their existence cannot be denied. Meanwhile — WEB "exists" here, then?

Herbart asked about the substance to the accidents: "No one takes the simplicity of perception as real." However, simplicity of perception is present in the so-called afterimage. The fact that it is not only an illusion, but also an objective illusion, i.e. only accessible to a subject, does not alter its transcendence. One readily admits that colours are actually present here: blue and red qualify or determine something. The pitfall lies in the fact that the question of what exists is answered, as it were, when something concrete is designated by red, blue, etc.

The difficulties hidden in the relationship between substance and accident are not thereby eliminated; they become particularly urgent here:

One speaks of blue as a concrete individual feature that differs from the blue of another thing. And only in contrast to the nominalist endeavour to leave it at these individual instances of blue does Husserl fix "the blue" as their idea. We reject the approach of individually different blues altogether. However, this also falls away as their interpretative flip side, the approach of "blue" as an ideal species.

The inevitability of the approach of such an ideal species arises — says Husserl — among other things from a

E. Husserl I, Logical Investigations II, p. i i s.

Analysis of cases where we speak of "two things being of the same colour". It is by no means the case that only identical colours exist: "In fact, wherever there is sameness, we also find identity in the strict and true sense. We cannot describe two things as identical without specifying the respect in which they are identical. The respect, I said, and this is where identity lies. Every equality relates to a species to which the things being compared belong; and this species is not itself merely the same on both sides, nor can it be, since otherwise the most chained regressus in infinitum would be inevitable. By designating the aspect of the comparison, we use a more general generic term to refer to the circle of specific differences in which the identical feature occurs in the compared elements. If two things are equal in form, the form species in question is the identical feature; if they are equal in colour, it is the colour species, and so on. Equality is the relationship between objects that belong to one and the same species. If it is no longer permissible to speak of the identity of the species, of the aspect in which equality occurs, then talk of equality also loses its basis.

Of course, things are the same in some or all respects. In the present case, they are the same in terms of colour. They have the same colour. For example, blue. But it was not meant to be that simple when equality was introduced as something constituted by identity in an argument that ended with the approach of blue as an ideal species. For what was taken as equal were not things that have the same colour, but their individual characteristics, which were taken for granted and assumed in advance. Namely, something like the blue of this thing and a different blue of that other thing. It is explained that they are equal in terms of the species to which they belong. But equal (in

In the strict sense, there is nothing here if the colour of this thing and the colour of that thing are considered in terms of their species. Specifically, both are the same, namely "blue". Only different colours, e.g. red and orange, could be the same or different. Or perhaps two blues, e.g. in terms of their intensity. One must be careful not to remove the established identity of the colour(s) from the context in which it never appeared and transfer it to an identity of "blue" as a colour species. "In itself" nothing can be identical at all, — with itself, as if identity were a reflexive relation. As if identity, in the distinguished case, were precisely through its reflexivity, i.e. through what appears to be its factual content, to overturn the fact that relations can only exist between two or more members. One is only compelled to attribute this supposed reflexivity to identity (in the sense used here) if one fails to recognise that this identity only occurs in actual statements, that it only has a function there. Namely, an orienting function. For example, to exclude another colour. Such a species, encapsulated by identity, as it were, which, according to this one peculiarity, would also be accorded the other peculiarity of ideality (as opposed to individual blues), cannot be discovered. Blue by no means denotes an ideal species, but quite simply "a certain colour".

Zusatz.

Equality is an original relationship, something like "identity" (in the non-binding sense in which one takes the common meaning of " ") not constitutive for equality. Of course, in the sense in which things are equal, an identity. In the case of things of the same colour considered so far, however, it was a specific type of identity. We contrast things that are the same in that they have the same specific colour with two bodies that are equal in terms of their weight. They have the same weight; one weighs as much as the other. In comparing the two, we In weighing each other against each other, an "identity" is established, to which a mutual interchangeability of bodies is linked here. It is constitutive of weight itself, i.e. of that relation to which bodies are weighed against each other.

This "quantitative" identity is different from the identity in the case of colour, where the form is the mere difference. Identity in the sense of non-difference is not a relation at all. And just as little as identity in relation to any object can be applied to an object (and certainly not in relation to any object), the difference consists merely of a logical relation between so-called objects as such, i.e. regardless of their characteristics (which determine their equality or inequality). The difference is, for example, the colour "here" and "there". It is a difference insofar as this here is a different colour from that there. However, difference does not require any respect in which it would have (such as, for example, sameness), because their things are related to each other.

would have been led to because of this, since it doesn't matter at all what kind of existence they have. Diversity is expressed much more — just like identity — by "the colour" or "the colours", but not by those that actually "are a colour". It can be said that identity and diversity are never based on what they are made of. They do not characterise. If one objects here that blue is indeed different from green, one fails to notice how this supposed difference is then reduced to the mere fact that blue is not green. Of course, one is accustomed to formulating identity accordingly as a. But on closer inspection, this is nothing more than a mere repetition of a thesis.

In particular, identity is not a reflexive relation. With the formula $a = a$, we can only associate one meaning in the case of the mathematical formulation that every quantity is equal to itself. However, this statement is neither true nor correct in any sense; rather, it can only be introduced as an axiom in Ansati. It emerges as the irreducible root of certain mathematical theorems. For the time being, therefore, this statement does not concern identity, but equality. And not equality of things, but of mathematical quantities. In other words, an equality that can only be formulated by a mathematical equation as a transformation of one side into the other. Reflexivity only becomes apparent when one takes what is on both sides of the equation under a supposition that is different from the one under which both sides of the equation stand in this equation. Namely, under an objective supposition. Under this assumption, one can then say that in certain equations, such as in $s = s$, both sides contain the "same" number and that, in this respect, s is equal to itself. In other words, identity itself is not a reflexive relationship. For "The same" here refers to the number on one side of the equation and the number on the other side. Identity merely serves as an orienting category. That which is being referred to, i.e. that which it relates to another, is not identical in itself. Flexibility is limited to the identity relationship. And it can be found there because both sides of the equation turn out to be the same outside of this equation. It should be noted, however, that it is nevertheless and precisely because of this that it is a genuine reflexive relationship, because the number itself has been incorporated into these different dimensions.

So there is no "law of identity". At most, there is a pattern, a formula that recurs as the same from case to case where identity is concerned. But this form of identity is not a normal framework in the strict sense. Namely, nothing that is unique ever appears differently in this form, entangled in any consequences. There is nothing to be found where a "validity" could begin.

The so-called ideality of the blue of the colour body coincides with the reduction of identity. As long as one does not make that which is merely the same colour into an ideal object, there is no reason for the time being to attribute the various shades that have the same colour, e.g. blue, to blue itself and to assign so-called isolations of blue.

However, if blue, for example, fades in this place and , while others are spared — was it not inevitable to apply individual, different shades of blue? Or can we not help but think of something like a spot (or the blue applied here as a chemically reactive colour) — to return to the question posed in the introduction? For blue itself cannot turn grey. Only the spot, one might think, which first has one colour and then another. Moreover, the alleged isolation of blue poses considerable difficulties; it is not blue in the same way that what exists is blue, namely blue as nothing other than its own property. The fact that "blue" is its defining characteristic, that blue is "realised" in it, is not sufficient for clarification.

But even before that, concerns arise. The memory that blue could be an accident of and σ does not help us to decide our question, as this question recurs in truths that are precisely s u b s t a n t i a l . The material, i.e. that which is "woven" into two screws, for example, is the same, namely iron. Is it not "the iron" that actually oxidises when the screws rust? For only a material can be the carrier of this process, just as only a colour has the potential to become blue. The fact that precisely that which is the same here and there changes here and not there does not pose any difficulty for the time being. For

It is only the same S I o I I or the same colour that changes. So we are not committing the absurdity of including something in the process of change that would be excluded from such scientific considerations from the outset as an "ideal object".

Of course, one always tries to argue away the substance or colour as the actual cause of oxidation or bleaching. In doing so, one rightly emphasises that iron cannot actually oxidise at a specific point in time. Something can only be predicted about "iron" in the sense of "in general", i.e. as a general concept. However, two things are accepted as a given from the outset: namely, that if a change is asserted about the piece of iron, the "mere facticity" of this change is attributable to the specificity of this particular piece of iron as a mere thing. In both cases, the piece of iron (or any piece) is assumed to be an object subject to the predicate in question. It is interpreted according to the judgement scheme. However, there is no judgement in either case. For the time being, this is not the case when it is established that it is specifically the iron, this substance defined in such and such a way, that is oxidising here. For here one merely fixes the beginning of a material quality or a material change. The fact that it is not possible to define the substance of this thing other than as specific does not lead to the absurdity of now defining it, namely as only specific.

— d. i. disregarding the fact that the substance of this thing

— certain substances must be assumed to actually oxidise at some point. Nothing at all has been said here about iron. For example, when its chemical and physical properties are listed and thus "linked" to the substance.

For the second, however, just as iron cannot appear only as the subject of a validity, conversely the

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Individual pieces of iron are banished into the realm of facts, as subjects that have been hastily assigned to them. At first glance, the fact that the piece of iron breaks in my hand has no "subject" at all. It can be observed and reported, but that does not make it a judgement. A judgement would be , for example, if I make a prediction about the piece of iron. It is only a subject insofar as something "happens" to it, and only then is it even posited as an "object". The relationship of a subject to a predicate, described as "happening", is not a factuality bound in time. What is confusing here is the ambiguity of the "mere fact". For ee can also denote the randomness of a connection as opposed to its necessity . Thus, it is coincidental that iron has precisely these properties, even though this is generally and absolutely true of iron as a metal. If, on the other hand, we determine that in the given case, iron is the actual carrier of a process, then there is no connection that could be necessary or coincidental. "Coincidence" here, where its primary fulfilling meaning lies, has no counterpart in necessity whatsoever.

It was logical that, in order to demonstrate the difference between iron and its isolation, both were taken as "objects". It was pointed out that they are very different in many ways. For example, one is destructible, while the other seems to be strangely immune to destruction. But it is precisely because this was consistent that we can use it to correct this distinction:

, it would be just as wrong to let blue remain blue or even "always" blue as it would be wrong to say that blue, when it has faded, is "no longer" blue. Of course, blue remains blue and three remains three. In the empty sense that blue is blue and three is three, blue is something different from green, for example. It is in this difference from other colours that it becomes

in the process, it is retained as one of its own essence. And in doing so, it is assumed that the conception of an ideal object has come to a fraudulent end; the only thing that remains as the bearer of change is the "individual object". But if

"Blue turns into grey" does not mean that something blue turns into something grey, namely a blue spot into a grey spot. Nor does it mean that when one substance is transformed into another, a piece of one turns into a piece of the other. The piece, i.e. this lump, remains exactly the same. The colour changes. Namely, into another colour. Or "the iron" changes. Only under a certain supposition was it "an ideal object". But precisely not as that which is actually any substance or any colour.

This brings us to the discussion of one of Jean Herin's most difficult problems: difficulty:

If one leaves the so-called term in its usual logical sense, namely as a subsumption term, then one is faced with insurmountable difficulties, for example in the following sentences: "The Osram lamp was invented, is constructed in such and such a way, breaks easily, is cheap and is widely used throughout the continent." Or: "The lion has a tail, lives to be 60 years old, lives in prides in Africa and is becoming extinct." What is being said here? Surely not about the individual Osram lamp, which is certainly constructed in such and such a way, or about the individual lion, which has a

Because these things are not what he found

e, was

in what dies out. And then: What actually spread über den across the entire continent? But neither that was found, nor the ex-

emp lar von of such a lamp. And the individual lion, of which there is certainly

As far as the species is concerned, it reaches a certain age, be it 30 or 60 years, but not 40 years old.

It seems obvious to correct this as follows: The G a t t u n g actually died out and the 'l' y p was invented. This means that the Einsel-Löwe or the first example of a lamp is not what dies out or is explored, but then of course one must accept that the species does not have a tail and the type does not break. So that what actually has a different approach would be wrongly lumped together. But does the species actually die out and not just the lion, as dvi Z y a n k a l i — i.e. this substance — is discovered and has these and those properties? For the time being, it was emphasised against simplification that the species only exists in the individual lflwan.

Jean Herring, The Essence, the Entity and the Idea (Husierl's Yearbook IV, p. 539 J.-

there would be, the species as something special, insofar as it — and only it — is something that exists in itself (see B. the dei extinction) have no content. However: there is no such thing as the species alongside the individual lions, which are indeed but on the other hand, belong to it again. And what does it mean that something, for example, a genus, under the supposition that it is that, Oberdia is still "determined" by something, the individual lion was also "in it"?

One might assume that some of the statements in question are general. However, "The lion lives to be 60 years old" does not refer to every lion. The same applies to "the lion" as applies to wax, which melts at ...*. The comparison with wax shows how the "Detail" in Palle des Löwen is not under the direction of a "tiberha Oteht. It only creeps in because an individual is insofar as he has made it his own nature +. Similar to etwai v o n Waohs nt, but where this moment of reflectiveness is missing. Re- and thus the detail is ontologically bound to the conception which is approved by "Lowe" as "Art".

The difficulties arise here from how one believes one must take "lion" etc. as conceptual certainty or ali dai "was" of "something". One interprets the statements in question as the predicative representation of an object. The misunderstanding lies in the way one makes the predicates belong to something: one treats them as attributes. When we asked what it is that both dies and dies out, as is discovered, we were asking too much. Namely, if one thinks that ea co is something like the same thing, i.e. as an identifiable object, what dies and dies out in the sense that it is a dying thing and a dying out. These predicates cannot be applied to the same object. The question arises as to whether this difficulty is not just a matter of convenience. Traditional logic is, of course, based on the idea that something in the subject position,

What is actually dai and that is, the **tatsächlich** also as), eni **das** is meant by Prß-dikatsitelle gemeint nt. Wo then so easily played away werden can, that only something that is so and co can exist in the subject position, something here!) is taken up under his concept and drawn into the predication as if into another field.

3.

We noted above how blue is not blue itself. Namely, it does not look blue, for example. The objection to the alleged isolation of blue now turns against us. For the same applies to materials. "Iron" is not "real iron". We mean: Ee is not Y o n iron like the piece in my hand. We have not been able to escape the scheme of realisation. Is it not the case that it is not the iron that oxidises, but the piece in my hand as iron, which is only specific in relation to another piece that does not oxidise?

See also the later explanations of the text:

The question of what "iron" actually is remains unanswered. It is not answered by simply naming something. One could point to the inkblot on the desk as something that is actually "a stain." For only some stain (i.e., one that is more or less "individual" due to the circumstances of its creation) can occur at all. But something like

"Blue itself" cannot be demonstrated in this sense. One says that it is only "exemplified" in the ink stain, for example. This establishes the fact that blue cannot experience individual design at all. The difference between this blue and that blue can only be sought in a specific sense. But it is no different with iron.

Of course, one is tempted here to fall back on the doctrine of subsuming an object under its concept. For here one does not encounter the difficulty that was posed with "a blue": namely, to determine something by that which in concreto could only be found as *Leroy*. "Iron" has a substantial meaning from the outset. But is it possible to interpret this to mean that

"iron" indicates the concept under which individual objects fall? These individual objects would then, insofar as they actually fulfil the so-called conceptual characteristics, be real iron.

One immediately notices how — and if one speaks of the realisation of a reality, it cannot be otherwise — precisely that which one wanted to fix in the term "substance" is lost. I mean that which makes it possible to describe the iron as a specific substance. To specify its relationship to the piece of iron in my hand was to say that this string is "made of iron". A term that merely encompasses something would be, for example, casting material. There are no pieces of *daYon*. There are only pieces of what is casting material. That is, of course, "by its nature" casting material, but this nature is not recognised by "iron", "lead", etc.

Irrefúhrönd is talking here about the "concept" that belongs to the word. It is assumed that it is *8ein müøøe*, which *ee maeht*, dat the word can be used to refer to this and that piece of iron. However, the word "iron" denotes a material, and by no means through the mediation of a so-called concept. The word *Yer-wandt* can be used to designate what "*Yon Eiøen*" is. The body is not referred to in any natural way. "Spherical", for example, is already something else as a "definition". The piece of iron "has" a spherical shape. And it is crucial here to recognise where this difference lies. It lies less in what is made of iron or is spherical in shape, as if one object were *x«8' «uTò* and the other only *xoTà cup.)eŞqxóx*. It is precisely this view, which proceeds from objects that can be easily determined, that we will have to abandon. The difference lies rather in the truths indicated by "iron" and "ball" themselves. They modify "being" on their own. For example, to the extent that something is only iron in the sense that nothing else can be designated by iron other than the substance of a body, i.e. what it actually is.

The complication in the so-called "definiteness" of an object as iron was overlooked. If "iron" is defined at all, and if "iron" indicates the species of something, then it can only be the substance of which the body is made. Secondly, however, the body is referred to by the statement that it is made of iron, to its what, i.e. to its nature. One is inseparably linked to the other. Two things were not asserted in the statement that this "is" iron. For iron, insofar as it determines the substance of which this is made, is also precisely its "determination". But that is not decisive: i. The question of the specific.

Being made of iron is not the same as being made of iron. The material is not a complementary addition to iron. It is something different from the material, which — namely the old material, pieces of iron — is itself made of iron.

"

Different only concerns the substance of a body. A substance can only differ specifically from another. If the substance of this body is specifically the same as that of another body, then they are simply the same substance. However, if we simply leave it at the so-called ϵ , then the approach of a so-called specific identity of different "objects" becomes inevitable. And it is clear how precisely this undermines the so-called ideal nature of a species to which these objects — namely, as individual members of this species — are supposed to belong.

However, it is also noticeable that the iron in *møiner Ham* is not "real iron" in the sense that iron is completed by existence. Then, instead of the iron itself, there would be something that is actually — strictly speaking — merely qualified by "iron". Thus — namely qualified or "determined" as iron — it is not iron. Iron is real when it occupies the position explained above in the real structure of a piece of iron. The fact remains that iron oxidises, gradually and continuously, when, for example, a nail rusts. The fact that "iron" is not itself made of iron is a mere triviality if "iron" means the same thing in both cases. However, it is wrong to fixate on a difference here.

It is even more difficult to note that "a human being" is by no means to be interpreted simply as "One" refers to subsumption under a general concept. We will show later that this subsumption is a special operation to which what is called the determination of something cannot be reduced in any case.

In "human being" too — as opposed to "slave", for example — the nature of something is indicated. But here, insofar as no species is fixed. Iron, lead ... are substances in the narrower sense, insofar as they simply indicate "what" something is. Da-

, "a human being" is something insofar as it is an example of the type referred to in "human being". The internal reference to a "Art," the "reflectiveness" hidden in the dialectic of the exemplar, is absent from the materials. — One also speaks of the exemplars of an idea. But this means nothing more than their exemplifications. And here, YO2°-läufig recalls how the idea is the predicable constituent of a so-called object. It has been "elevated to an idea," i.e., transposed into it. "Exemplar" remains a metaphorical expression here. One searches in vain here for a kind of the star described above. As a so-called exemplar of an idea, something is merely grasped; it has been recognised as being this and that, or such and such. The idea is incorporated into the constitution of a so-called object. In this way, however, a particular structure of reality is designated. For the time being, it is not simply and directly there.

"What" of another, which would be determined by them. The kind is not something that can be defined merely as p.opt{, namely here and there, depending on

"g a n z" realises; males and females form the lion, and it is an open question, for example, whether the poplar grown from a cutting is an "IndiYiduum". However, it is the species conceived in this way when questioning things in the YOiflus that is determined by "human". Just as the material of which the nail is made is determined by iron or meeting, but not, or not directly, the nail itself.

However, this was definitely a certain material, i.e. the material that is there. In short: what is made of iron is not simply "anything". Iron does not simply add itself to something as its "anything" left open in its definition, nor is the material something like a material, as if being made of iron meant as much as consisting of iron.

Nor is "being human" reduced to just anything that can be described as "human".

would be characterised. The "one" in "one human being" has no external meaning in this sense, but rather an internal meaning. As an example, something is a human being. The "one" has no reference to generality. It is as if "human being" did not denote a species, but a genus. This is precisely what is denoted in the phrase "a human being", as something that is specific as an example. In contrast, something like "a rainbow" is only defined by the manner of its occasional appearance. The rainbow remains confined to the context of the atmosphere, etc., which will be described in more detail. "Rainbow" refers to a typical phenomenon of this kind. A "phenomenon"

— it is crucial how something appears due to the circumstances of its appearance, i.e. in its individual form, is a rainbow. Nothing is a rainbow "in itself". Strictly speaking, such a reflected selfhood, as it would be formulated in "in itself" or "in itself", cannot be assumed here at all.

The isolation of a species, supposedly expressed in the phrase "one human being," has an actual counterpart in the realm of what is conceived as "nature" in general. It is described as "being made of iron." The emphasis is shifted in both cases. There are "pieces of" iron. One takes the material as if it remained in a totality that is one-sided in its pieces, i.e., not annexed by the piece of which it is the substance, like the "species" of the specimen that has made its species its own as a specimen. The particularity of the specimen is a consequence of its reflectiveness.

"Material" is, of course, even more ambiguous. When asked what this actually is, one might answer "Ze-derholz" (wood), thereby referring to the origin of a material. Here, the "what" has a different meaning than when we assume that it is — in the case of iron, for example — something questioned in terms of its physical, i.e. substantial nature, i.e. it is being questioned about...

conceived primarily as material substance. Cedar wood is "mere" (i.e. initially nothing more than) material; in other words, "a piece" of cedar wood. Iron, however, is "mere" material, i.e. something that cannot be understood as anything other than a specific mode of differentiation of material substance. And in this respect, it is "a piece" of iron.

In the case of the rainbow, what appears to be a species has turned out to be merely a type. In view of the occasional circumstances under which it occurs, something is a rainbow. Its individual form is precisely what is typical. What a rainbow is can be exemplified by the rainbow here and now, as in a case. However, insofar as this is nothing more than a typical case, it has not been defined. In fact, what is determined is, for example, type and substance. They (and not, for example, the piece of iron) are the actual carriers of the so-called "whatnesses". The whatnesses do not isolate themselves. But neither does the substance, nor the type. For the type, it was shown how the so-called particularity of the specimen is in fact only its reflectedness. However, the so-called "detail" of the piece of iron is no different from that of the rainbow: with regard to the "circumstance" of an existence, insofar as it is formless, etc., something is addressed as "a (mere) piece of". Certainly: this is "some" piece. But here, too, "any" does not mean the indeterminacy of the object in relation to its concept, but rather the contingency taken into account in the structure of this so-called "whatness." The same applies to "spot." By no means are "spot" and "piece" general "whatnesses" or concepts. One must see how individuality here belongs to *luck* and spot, but does not appear as the uninvited, logically accompanying peculiarity of objects that are only "generally" conceptualised.

Firstly, one notices here how what is taken to be a piece of iron or a rainbow is not just anything, any object. Secondly, however, how rainbow, **piece**, etc. are distinguished as truths, unlike human beings, iron or blue. They do not determine anything. Immediately, something is a rainbow, etc. However, insofar as human being and iron are primarily the determining truths of the species, of the substance, "human being" and "iron" also indicate the "what" in the sense of the nature of what is then asked what it actually is. For the time being, we will only note this difference within what is brought to a common denominator in Aristotelian logic.

We said that, like a rainbow, iron is referred to as "something". "Something" — here, there is no object that would simply be "perceived" as this or that. This inevitably brings us back to the concept or idea under which something is perceived. Namely, as this and that or as being like this and that. And in "rainbow" and "iron," only something would be designated. But if something is addressed as a rainbow or as iron, then the different positions of the eog. truths, or rather the difference between these truths themselves, as only in one case is something questioned in terms of its nature, but then actually "addressed" in a certain mode, *conceived*. In questioning "things," one is, as it were, ahead of oneself. One anticipates that which — if one speaks of the mere conception of something — awaits its determination as if predetermined.

If one remains stuck in the so-called conception, one overlooks how the "what" that characterises something already has a certain mode of appeal in advance. Something is addressed as an appearance. It is then recognised as a rainbow. Or: something is first questioned about its nature and then recognised as iron.

It is then iron. Unlike something a rainbow did, namely simply and straightforwardly "being" what one calls a rainbow. We said: Only in the case of iron is there talk of destiny in the special sense that nature can only be preserved through its destiny. In substance and nature, the approach to determination is described in the sense that both deln "what" first create the index "destiny".

Finally: How would it be otherwise in the case of monosemantics? For example, in the case of the sky, the earth, the moon. Should the case here be that the indefinite "a" is replaced by "the" because there is only one and no other objects that fall under one?

"Heaven" etc. fall under this category? As if "one" did not remain ambiguous even if we disregard the "one" of the specimen. A rainbow and a piece of iron — in both cases, something is designated that has been understood according to the configuration of its respective existence. Indeed: is something characterised by the fact that it is referred to as a piece of iron? Certainly

"Iron". But the fact that it is only "a **piece...**" shows precisely how one has limited one's description to the characteristics of the material. — Even "sky" does not only identify and designate. Namely, something that is taken as unique in itself due to its position in our world, but which is not attributed uniqueness due to the fact that it is the only object of a concept.

6.

The usual doctrine of the generality of the concept is based on false premises. The possibility of identifying this or that thing as a piece of iron is by no means based on the fact that the word "iron" has a "concept"

i H. A m m a n n , Human Speech I, '90 5, p. 82.

belongs to the word "iron", under which this and that falls as an object. We detached the meaning of the word from the scheme in which it is usually placed. "Iron" is not simply a "designation". One traces the meaning of a word back to its "fixed, existing" • affiliation with objects of a certain and uniform nature. In this case, the word does not primarily belong to what can be designated by its use. Primarily, "iron" refers to a material. The piece in my hand is made of the same material as the hook in the wall, and in this respect, both "are" iron.

The fact that each time the only specifically determinable substance is the actual basis for possible determination, which in turn can only ever refer to a "this here" that as such is not something specific, explains the impossibility of simply assigning the word "iron" in the sense that it "denotes" it. On the other hand, however, it is precisely this that makes the peculiarity of being a name comprehensible. "This metal" — one might say — is called "iron".

If something is referred to as "iron", it is not interpreted as the "realisation of an idea" that "language conveys" to us. The approach of "objects" leads us to construct such relationships between a mere "something" and its idea, its determinacy, or its concept. In "iron", however, something is captured that one encounters when dealing with things. Namely, a substance. "Iron" does not designate an object, but rather "something is distinguished". Namely, by defining a selectively conceived nature. In "earth", for example, something else has been "taken". That this and that are generally is "iron", but that what we stand on is only "the earth". does not distinguish between the "meanings" of these words. The difference lies in the things themselves.

Theodor Conrad, Sprachphiloi. Unters. I (Arch. f. d. ger. Psycho-
\O@i6, DIN, '9^ , p. \$3 .

The mere word *iat* denotes the place where linguistic philosophy and "ontology" intersect. The word.

i.e. the word, insofar as it is not yet "animated" by the accompanying meaning of speech, i.e. by what is actually meant in the particular case in the phrase in which the word occurs or what is designated by it, is precisely the point where the relationship of language to concept formation becomes apparent. The investigation of "what" something is merges into an analysis of the meaning of the word. The investigation of the meaning of the word becomes the means of determining the actual "sion" of a

"To understand, namely to fix an attitude in the way one approaches things. "The words of language are not so much the reproduction of fixed certainties of nature and the world of ideas, but rather they designate directions and guidelines of the determinate itself." What is understood as belonging to a "mere word" is then rather presented as a differently modified belonging of the vocabulary to that which — when speaking of denotable, intentionally graspable objects — necessarily remains undiscovered. Only "iron", but not, for example, "stain", can we designate as a

"Names" are used. One only knows "what it means: "A spot". In terms of their "meaningful substance", "iron" and "spot" differ. "Animal" is also

not a name, for example. One knows this word when one knows that it can be translated as "bête", for example. In the concrete sense, there is no difference between what is designated by both words.

"The scientific definition of the animal would contain the same characteristics in both languages. But the difference in the way it is experienced is clearly evident in the figurative use, which in German emphasises more the dull instinctiveness, and in French more the irrationality and incomprehensibility of the animal. The distance of the animal

i E. C a z s i r e r , Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. I. Language. , p. 955.

Here, man is sought more in the moral sphere, there more in the intellectual sphere. intellectual sense"'. Nevertheless, there is a difference between "bête" and "Animal" the relationship that the word "bête" means "animal". And it is important to note that this relationship between the two words cannot be traced back to any other fact. The relationship between das and das HeiDens is not based on the fact that both words mean the same thing. That is precisely not the case. Of two expressions, one could say that they mean the same thing. That they have the same meaning, and through this sameness, this meaning would then become apparent as that in which both expressions coincide. However, what "bête" means cannot be expressed other than through the translation of this word. "Translation" is to be taken here in its most literal sense, namely as a transformation from one "language" to another. One does not simply exchange "mere" words that would be assigned to the same meaning. The untranslatability of a word — e.g. the German "Roß" — thus denotes the limit of actual translatability, as it exists between "bête" and "animal". However, this translation does not in any way exceed the limits of actual untranslatability. That would only be the case if one believed that the term "translation" should not be taken literally and missed an identity in the sense of a correspondence, which was of course wrong from the outset.

The meaning of the word cannot be separated from a mere sign. The fact that one cannot speak of the phonetic side of a word as if its "form" merely designated something is demonstrated by the so-called grammatical forms. The genitive is not merely a modus significandi. We tend to overlook the simple fact that a word is, for example, a genitive. That the genitive, infinitive, etc. are something that one k e n ,n t. That die80

Hermann Ammann, *Human Speech*, I. • 9•5, p. roy.

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Forms "denote" something very specific. A mere sound complex would have a deficiency in itself. In the genitive, etc., there is something corresponding to the basic verbal meanings. There, setting aside the entire hidden and introducing a purely grammatical problem if one overlooked the actual genitive nature, which admittedly cannot be distinguished lexically in terms of meaning, but whose unadulterated presence motivates the truth of the genitive in the various phrases in which it then lexically denotes this and that. However, the fact that a sound complex can undergo variations of the type of inflection, for example, reveals the peculiarity of its significance. This is particularly evident when comparing the words with the elements of sign language.

A gesture must occur in the field of understanding; gazes must be able to meet. A gesture can only be interpreted. It indicates something that can be sought and found in its original place. The building remains silent in a specific sense. Nothing has become "loud" in it. Just as in the articulation of speech sounds, something has first found its character, its "meaning". The difference between "meaning" as the substance of a word and its designation lies primarily in how this "meaning" carries itself and cannot be interpreted merely as a reference to something that already exists before this word. The "meaning" of a word cannot be gained by abstraction from the actuality of its use.

The labels are not "expressions" at all. They are distinguished by the "turn of phrase" they convey. "When we use the word 'expression', we always have actual language use in mind, often a very specific linguistic expression, in which the relevant feature of the expression is in the foreground, while with words we think more of the readiness of the elements of the language at the utterance, of belonging to the vocabulary of the language, of the virtual validity that is independent of the actual **realisation** in the actual use of the language, but also independent of the **sozial-
wußtumslage** and the current need for expression of the individual." (A. Mann, 1st c. page 68.)

The restriction of Socrates to the *tuUJio8«t* is therefore understandable. He cannot bring his "possessions", that which he knows, into the light, and knowledge in ignorance is based on the tension between the *koJox*, in the sense of that which is addressed, i.e. taken, and the task of bringing *ktJos*, i.e. the reference inherent in the word, the character of its substance, to explicit execution.

The ability to refer to something as "iron" was not conveyed by a "concept" associated with the word, but rather by the relationship that exists between things and "what" they are made of. The "meaning" of the word "iron" is not general, but rather the use of this word. By this I do not mean that something was simply "identified" in "iron". "Iron" and "lion" are names — as opposed to "spot", for example — but they are not proper names. One such name is, for example, "felis leo". However, this example immediately refutes the doctrine that the affiliation of a proper name with the thing it designates is unmediated:

If proper names were mere brands, then it should be possible to specify to whom they are assigned. But to whom is "felis leo" assigned? Neither to this or that lion, nor to the species. One could answer, for example, "to this animal." But then one is fixing something that is utterly indefinable. The meaning of "This animal" becomes tangible in the altered *weiae* in which we face it, what and if it has been "given a name". This is not simply the thing whose natural reference to us is captured in "lion" and which one simply "knows"; just as one cannot say "this lion...", one cannot say "this tems leo...". One can only say something like:

x P a u l a M a t t h e s, SprachPorm, Wort- und Bedeutungskategorie und Be-
handle. Niemeyer Halle *9*** p. 4 f.

p. "Natural" By this By this I do not mean a primarily given, but
but a reference under which something like "nature" was conceived in the first place.
It is present, for example, in so-called primitive peoples and is lost in schizophrenics.

"This copy of 'f. 1.'" Certainly: knowledge of a proper name is conveyed through identification; it consists precisely in its execution. But something that could be designated, an object, perhaps even an "individual" object, is not identified in this process. Unless it belongs directly to its bearer, the proper name does not exist outside the problem of meaning. It is by no means the case that only "as soon as one steps out of the circle of light of fully awakened consciousness, the sharp dividing line between designation and collective meaning becomes blurred." What could be given a proper name of the questionable form in question was first conceived in the wake of a particular biological theory. (Before Linnaeus, for example, "species" were taken to be constant in the same way that we consider crystal forms to be lawful; the possibility of one species transforming into another or of their spontaneous emergence was taken for granted).

The name of a totem also reveals a certain concept. What is primarily conceived here is the kinship of the members of a clan to a particular animal species. The totem is not a genus based on common ancestry. The Bororo say that they are red parrots, and the Trumai that they are certain aquatic animals. This shows how the reference to nature with "species" of animals, etc. is replaced here by another, how the subject finds and determines itself here on the basis of a special correlation, the opposite pole of which, of course, remains indefinable. Ultimately, however, this is also the case, for example, in the case of "You" or "he". And ineios also includes the Moda-

r Ammann, I. c. p. 26.

s ct-. E. Räd 1, History of biological theories in modern times, I '93-
p. 563 N'I., II 9°6, p. /ts.

3 E. Caesirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, II. The mythisthe
Denkea, zg95, p. 336 l'.

According to the report by K. v. d. Steinen, quoted by Levy-Brühl,
fonctions mentales dans les aociétfs inférieures ° i 9ss, p. g 4.

qualities of the so-called "hot" in a totem, a family, etc.

We return to the question of the agent of change. In describing the iron as that which actually oxidises when the nail rusts, we meant two things: that it is the iron that changes, and that it is in the iron that what "changes" is found. The iron changes: namely, it is changed on and within itself. What this means is that a change is not, first and foremost, a mere transformation. Such a transformation affects, for example, the nail that rusts or breaks. It is only the nail from before that — broken — is no longer what it was before.

Secondly, the oxidation of iron is not merely a "modification" — such as when a quantity is represented differently but not changed in itself when its elements are rearranged. A quantity would not even be capable of undergoing any kind of intervention or interference. But next to the iron was the blue. It was the blue itself, i.e. the colour quality that is only specifically distinguished from others, that is seen, that "arises" for the eye.

We began with the question of what exists, and so far have only managed to fixate on the "reality" of what, in the wake of its recognition, had been taken as ideal for the so-called species. What emerged as specific was that which differs. It does not differ in the same way that the blue spot here differs from the other blue spot there. Both were addressed as ink stains according to their individual design. They change in the way one meant when one tried to grasp what exists in change as a transformation of something. Of course — "the ink stains exist". But what exactly are we referring to here?

A wax candle melts, leaving behind a lump. We still say it is the same candle as before. By this we do not mean something "behind" it, something that was once a candle and has merely changed its form. It is as if something is classified as a candle and not rather as a candle.

"taken" would have been. So we would not encounter the difficulty: "The candle" is still there, during and after the change, — but what remains is no longer a candle. There is no constancy here, such as that preserved by the ink stain on my table in the change of surroundings. Nor is there any such as that of "the hyacinth here," which stood as a bulb by the window and is now sprouting and blooming.

One thing is certain: the candle has not simply disappeared. What a candle was is still there. Namely, the wax is still there. But the fact that what was a candle is then simply referred to as a substance, i.e. that the horizon under which the thing is conceived can be drawn differently, regardless of the so-called changes in the enduring identity of the thing, reveals the problem of this identity. For it can no longer be grasped as the identity of an object existing in phases, remaining in the alternation of accidents. At best, this would merely reduce the common view of the world to a schema. Of course, its correction (or justification) cannot be expected here. But what has been answered, as it were, under the hand, should be understood.

The change does not affect any so-called accidentia at all. Neither in the case of "iron", where the conditions were not characteristics that could have been predicted from it. (Cf. p. i 3 fl.) Nor in the case of a transformation, at the beginning and end of which there is simply a difference. ii/fan objects that "something" is being transformed. Of course. But that is irrelevant to the subject in question. Its origin lies in the — predetermined and accepted — Syn-

thesis, which is clearly enough designated in the predicative formulation of the object *ala aeanao* being such and such. The alleged identity of what one wanted to hold fast to as an object reduces itself to the unity in this very synthesis. One is confronted with the fact of transformation, and: What has been transformed — one must necessarily ask here as much in vain as one must ask what exists.

8.

A candle is there for a while and then it is gone. With "a candle," *ea* behaves no differently than *piit* did with the *loo* talers, in regard to which *kant* reminded him that *ioo* real talers contained no more than *ioo* possible talers that were merely imagined. And he went on to say that 100 real talers belonged to my fortune and that it certainly made a great difference whether they were in a position to increase my fortune or not.

But what does "my fortune" mean here? Surely, if my fortune amounts to 100 talers, it does not consist of minted silver talers. It does not consist of "real", i.e. material talers. My fortune does not consist of such "things"; it is irrelevant whether I possess a paper note as an instruction for "100 thalers". Nevertheless, it is still thalers. For I can exchange them, put them in a deposit. And 100 thalers are certainly available. But where here — to return to Kant's argument in the possibility of proving God — is the existing thing or things to which the certainty of 100 thalers would apply? Where is even that which is actually "a thaler"?

Kant correctly showed that existence is not a real, i.e. genuine predicate. But he left it at that. Namely, at the concept as a "mere assertion" to which an "object" belongs as something that can be explained in predicative determinations.

The doctrine of the position of my concept presupposes precisely that.

One cannot juxtapose 100 real thalers and 100 imaginary, merely possible thalers. It is two different facts that 100 thalers are present, namely in a fortune, and that they are not present, namely that they are missing somewhere. That, for example, with all of them

Provisions can exist and cannot exist — this is not an alternative that one would have to decide on with all its certainties. What should that be at all, his 100-mark coins certainly not, for at best there are precisely those 100 marks, and what would "those" still mean if they did not exist? When this very moment, i.e. the supposed individuality, could only find its fulfilment in the context of facts. Something that would have emerged from its possibility into existence, as it were, something that would be the same before and after, namely as a conceptual what with and without existence that would make sense, cannot be discovered. Significantly, Kant also equates the concept of 100 talers with its "mere idea," i.e., more precisely, with the moment of determinacy (as the core of the idea) decided upon in the idea. What Kant describes as the position of a concept is, strictly speaking, only the position of a fact. It matters little that the absence of a hundred talers is also a fact.

Even Kant could only find a difference in the financial situation with and without a hundred thalers. And in his case, it is by no means the case that the mere idea, i.e. the concept, is actually "expanded" in the true sense of the word. For it is simply impossible to specify what exactly is to be given to whom in Kant's synthesis: to be given or not to be given is, for Kant, only a reflected relationship. Kant argues that if

If existence were a predicative property, then either all judgements about existence would be tautologies, or no single assertion about existence could be true. For I could not predicate existence from mere conception, since it would then no longer be mere conception. If one objects to Kant's argument that it must also apply to all other predicates, one fails to recognise that the other "predicates" are by no means predicated by Kant. Kant's position is fully expressed in the statement that existence is only a modal predicate. The other predicates are possible as residual products, but not existence itself. Existence cannot be analytically determined from synthesis under the guise of a predicate. Kant's "synthetic judgements" are not actually "judgements" at all, in which it is a question of whether something applies to something else or not. For Kant, the subject of the judgement is just as impossible outside the judgement as its object is outside the context of experience. Maimon believed that Kant had not sufficiently answered the question *quid facti*. He had not specified a principle for synthesis. But that which cannot be synthesised at all, namely the original synthesis, only becomes a synthesis *post factum*. With regard to such a fact, one can only bear *quid iuris*, but not seek to obtain a criterion for correctness in a single sentence. Maimon saw precisely the limits of Kant's question. But it was wrong to then want to answer a supposedly unanswered question that is fundamentally unanswerable from the perspective of transcendental philosophy. Not even the principle of contradiction is a genuine principle of analytical reasoning in Kant. share'.

Alexander Koyré, *L'idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de St. Anselme*. Paris, 3rd edition, p. s3g.

s When Kant says that **according to the principle of contradiction, one or the other** the other is certainly *aei*, the question is justified: was that *aei* what

In Kant, a leap arises here, in relation to which there is only an aporia of the beginning to be dealt with, but not to be resolved. The synthesis solves Maimon's problem before it can even be posed. Subject and predicate arise analytically from the original meaning, to which necessity belongs as a result of transcendental activity. There is a Sinai in this result. Thus, Kant understands the fact that the object is an explicabile. Necessity, i.e. certainty, contributes nothing here in Kant that would then be evident. That is why existence is so meaningless in Kant. Even in the case of the triangle, as long as only "predicates are connected with it," no existence is assumed. Because only in the course of the world

it is actually certain. Kant speaks of tautologies. A tautology is a statement that is always true, but

only superficially, insofar as the same thing appears twice in these connections.

Comes. However, the alleged criterion of truth cannot function at all, because nothing has been asserted. In fact, there is nothing else here, either the irrevocability of a proposition or simply the fact that something **else** is being denied here that has just been asserted. So the contradiction. Because contradictions do exist. They are by no means impossible. However, nothing can be specified here that is "impossible", i.e. that is mutually exclusive according to a "negative criterion of truth". Namely, for example, according to the fact that it corresponds to a certain "form". For positive or negative here is only that which constitutes the same thing in one's *i* in position and negation. In logic, one contrasts *p* and non-*p*. So Maimon recognised that a contradiction can only exist between propositions. And it is only from the "circumstance" of a statement that it can be inferred whether another contradicts it. *p* and non-*p* are artificial formulas. They are only the general scheme, the symbolic expression of the contradiction itself.

However, one would have to demand that a contradictory statement indicate what exactly contradicts each other. In fact, we encounter negative criteria of truth when we deduce from the peculiarity that something straight cannot be crooked and something round cannot be angular that it is the specific different predicates that are mutually exclusive. Here we actually obtain a negative criterion, insofar as only an impossibility is established. And this is an impossibility that is not merely an incompatibility, such as that of the regular decahedron. Or: red and blue are not yet "contradictory predicates". But insofar as they appear as determining features, one can freely say that red is not blue and blue is not red.

something can occur, something can be constituted, something can be constructed. Being grasped is only one side of the process.

The existence of a hundred talers is not a "general" concept. One hundred talers is by no means an isolated concept under which something falls and which would be general. This is clearly demonstrated by the case of non-existence. Where it is by no means the case — as in the case of a certain number that does not exist — that something is specified that does not exist and then, of course, does not exist once and for all. — But what then are one hundred talers?

§ 9.

Our criticism of Kant's doctrine of existence, as presented in particular in the short work **YOR I Q63**, was based on the observation that my wealth does not consist of "real" talers, i.e. of something that could be defined as talers. This denied not only the materiality of the hundred talers, but their very existence. Certainly, they are present — for I can exchange them — but they cannot undergo any transformation like the minted silver coins. Conversely, one cannot say that the latter are possibly "missing" from my fortune. They can be lost or destroyed, they could also not be there (which would mean that their existence is accidental). In contrast, ea are simply "a hundred talers" — in other words, something like "isolated" hundred talers — which may be present in my assets or may be missing from them in a very real sense. This is precisely what is so tricky here.

However, the absence of a hundred thalers is by no means the negation of the existence of a hundred thalers. The two facts are not linked like the contradictory sides of an alternative. The hundred thalers are not in the case of what is there or not there and what remains identical in this case, insofar as it is determined by the

state of Daaeina (ruled by itself). However, one hundred talers do not denote the same "truth", which would then be a kind of isolated reality.

One lacks them, one asks for them and receives them, exchanges them.

"One hundred thalers." Namely, this matter. One immediately notices that the one hundred thalers appearing in the specified contexts are neither isolated by *hic et nunc* nor are they generally *aind*. Of course, what belongs to me is something different from what belongs to you, but it is not possible to distinguish the hundred talers in my possession from those in the possession of another. For what should be different, or whose claim should be disputed, when something that "would be" a hundred talers is to be found neither here nor there? Through detail in the sense of individuality, only something could be added that is not even up for discussion in the first place: namely, what was concealed in the so-called concept, which was then contrasted with the hundred thalers themselves (namely as a specific "objectivity"), but which, on the other hand, would then no longer be "merely" a hundred thalers. Of course, this is precisely in line with the usual understanding. Existence will no longer be referred to as *complementum poasibilitatis*. But one is content to let existence be indicated in facts or to let objects be "given". Existence then remains beyond the determination in whose field the so-called object must first constitute itself as being in truth this and that or such and such.

However, if existence cannot be demonstrated as a predicate, the task arises of designating what is actually meant by it. The scheme for this is already laid out. Existence can only be reduced to something that is "theoretically different"; after all, the so-called object had presented itself as nothing else. Both existence and object must prove themselves. They are virtually designed for legitimation. It

It is then inevitable to treat the existence of the hundred talers according to the scheme of the existential judgement. One regulates — and nothing more — that there are "a hundred talers". "But it is there, this existence. . . not so much a predicate of the thing itself, but rather of the idea one has of it."

We tried to put Kant's example of the hundred talers in the right place for the time being: by the "existence" of a hundred talers, we no longer mean that they are present. Strictly speaking, nothing else can be considered here. They are certainly present in reality. But that means that the presence of a hundred thalers is as much a fact as, for example, the fact that it is raining. But a hundred thalers cannot be there. The index of existence is borne by the fact that one hundred thalers are present or the fact that one hundred thalers are missing, etc., but not by the one hundred thalers themselves. On the other hand, it is precisely through the circumstance of its existence, through the fate of its minting, that something is "a thaler", namely this coin; it is a thaler in actuality.

§ 10.

It is true that the real thaler could not exist. But not in the way Kant understood it. Namely, not because existence is not contained in the concept of the thaler. Precisely that — namely the "mere concept" of a thaler in general — became doubtful. But because the thaler, insofar as it is "really a thaler," has the *Z u - f a l l*. This means that

if one leaves *ea* in existence in the transformation under which it appears in the so-called existential judgement, then

Kant, The only possible proof for a demonstration of existence
Gotte's i 263, I, i.

It is easy to formulate existence and non-existence as alternatives. For then there are mutually exclusive partners. Namely, judgements. It is possible to write down formulas here that are positively or negatively determined. One is, in essence, the negation of the other. But even in the case of the existence of a hundred talers, one also looks for the contradictory partner. It is no different with "it is raining". We said above that

"It is not raining" could only be established as a contradictory statement by way of the meaning of the assertion, i.e. with regard to the circumstances. But what excludes each other here? Where, in the instance in which the contradictory statements are tested for their truth, only one partner is present, but the other is not in a position to detach himself and step forward freely, as in the case of contradictory judgements, by means of his own formulation, which is only oriented towards that of the other. The alternative arises here first and foremost from reality as its contingency. And insofar as the partner is already missing, i.e. insofar as the alternative is included here in reality as its contingency, a proposition of the excluded third party is impossible from the outset. In the case of contradictory judgements, the forms constituted by contradiction are true or false. Here, on the other hand, there is no exclusion of the false and the true. As it were, at the moment of its emergence, the partner itself is that which is excluded altogether. Non-being is basically the same as being: in the sense that here, through position and negation, identical differences are not determined, but rather that here, sameness is linked precisely to the dialectic of the process of negation.

The concept of truth here is oriented towards that of reality. In addition to "being so in reality," there is also

the correctness or incorrectness of an equation or, correspondingly, the correctness or incorrectness of a judgement. The distinguishing feature of existential truth is that it is not necessary to specify what is actually true. As is the case, for example, with an equation. What was of interest here was the synthesis itself. Namely, the connection between numbers or the correctness of such an equation or its possibility. One can correct such a connection by changing it. And the situation is similar in the case of a judgement, where there is no real formulation, but rather a scheme for the operation. It is the case that the exclusion exists precisely with regard to the formulas. Whereas here it basically only refers to the same thing, whether it rains or does not rain. Insofar as assertion and denial refer to the same facts, their correlate is "theoretically different". What is true is just as impossible to discover here as what is false. Negation is not the "side" on which the decision falls here. An assertion such as that it is raining can certainly be corrected. However, nothing can actually be corrected here, i.e. changed, as in the case of a formulation. And insofar as "true" here does not — like "correct" — denote the distinguishing index of something, insofar as the assertion that it is not raining (in which *daa positum* simply changes without "following" from its falsity) could be "true" to me, — insofar as here, where "being in truth" is combined with "being in reality", truth is, as it were, its own substance.

Here lies one motive of transcendental idealism.

Admittedly, it has not actually been grasped here. The appeal of transcendental idealism becomes clear precisely from this, where everything is oriented towards factuality, but where truth is oriented from the outset towards verifiability, where facts are nothing more than arguments with a legitimising function for theses, —

eo ipso there is a tacit restriction to a specific concept of truth.

Kant did not recognise the proprietary nature of mathematical equations. He speaks here, as elsewhere, of synthetic judgements without distinction. In an equation, the self-contained nature of "it is (in reality) so" is missing. What may be of interest here is merely the synthesis itself or its correctness. Right and wrong are properties of what is formulated. However, Kant's question about the possibility of mathematical judgements was posed from the outset in such a way that it referred to the

Couturat correctly noted that Kant, in his argument in favour of the synthetic nature of arithmetic equations, remained within the subject-predicate scheme of judgement. However, he failed to notice how wrong it is to apply the scheme of judgement at all in this context. It is not enough to recall the relational judgements in order to make Kant's restriction clear. When Couturat undertakes to prove the analytical nature of equations, he does so precisely by means of the decisive element of Kant's proposition. He assumes that something is asserted in the equation at all. That it is true or false. But it can only be correct or incorrect. Namely, correctly calculated. The equation formulates an operation with numbers. But the truth is missing, as is a fact that could be used as a criterion for the correctness of this operation. True: the connections are regulated by axioms. But the axioms are not hypotheses. The number i is actually "defined" by its equality with other numbers. But what is identity here? Pis is an *even* number, but not "the same" as the sum $5 - \{ - \}$. Nothing "follows" from such a "definition" of i . Namely, how can one speak of an analytical deduction when analytically it would be necessary to deduce that something is this way or that way? Only truths, e.g. facts, can be analytical. One then speaks of self-evident and meaningless truths that are "only" correct. But correctness — namely, of an operation — is precisely the only thing that could be up for discussion in the case of the calculation. Kant notes that in the combination of $6 - \{ - \} 7$, "die i s" is not included. It was believed that this had to be corrected to ; actually, it was a matter of the *G l e i o h l e i t m i t i a*, which had to be included in it. There is no improvement in this. Although Kant showed the right instinct in leaving it at "der i s". Namely, with the i s, which could only be brought out by an operation such as calculation. In doing so, he had — on closer inspection — dropped the wrong premise, namely that this was a predication at all.

applied mathematics. "Constructible" only means: transferable into vividly fulfilling reality. But what is actually still "true" here? Nothing other than with other facts. So it is probably the construction of the triangle itself, if it happens in reality. Kant speaks of synthesis. But there is no actual synthesis in his case. What appears as the predicate in his case is, just like what appears as the subject, only the remnant of an original synthesis a priori with which he begins. In fact, only synthesis has been defined here as synthesis, namely through its transcendental conditions. So, that which cannot be composed at all, namely the original synthesis, only becomes such post factum.

"Synthesis." The question of its possibility cannot even be asked. It is superseded by the fact. It is not a "correct" synthesis. Something like correctness is not even achievable here. Ee has — as we said — no choice but to assume its existence from the outset, even in the case of a triangle, if predicates are associated with it. This is because cc can only occur in a synthesis and because it is then constructed by chance, i.e. it is there with its own properties. Ea constitutes itself in a transcendental act, one side of which is precisely this fateful constitution, but the other side of which presents itself as a grasping of what is constituted in this way. The departure from reality,

i.e. of the diversity into which the world breaks down, has been shifted in a remarkable way into something else. For just as the unity of apperception is the condition for unity in the summarisation of diversity, so, on the other hand, this diversity is what first of all helps to create an awareness of the identity of "I think, which must be able to accompany all my ideas". One notices the paradigmatically recorded insight

aatz in the diversity in which reality first finds its truth. In a deeper sense, the a priori also remains accidental here. The fact that Kant must speak of universal validity, i.e. of lawfulness, in order to go beyond the merely empirical, clearly shows this. For the lawfulness of reason itself as a sphere of justification does not change the fact that there is nothing here that is not somehow "true".

Thus, at the beginning of the epistemology introduced by the critique of reason, there is a certain anticipation. It is the same anticipation that was decisive for Leibniz's conception of the monad. It can be grasped in the way in which the temporal neutrality of the copula has been placed at the centre of the whole problem here. The opportunity of my self, referred to in the circumstance of my existence, has undergone a remarkable increase in importance here. The world has shifted into its representation, namely into a multiplicity of theses or aspects that are based on competition or harmony. This diversity is defined by a boundary condition that necessarily remains unknown. One starts from a "consciousness," from an uprooted and objectless sphere of meaning as a sphere of adjudicating reason. For a somewhat sublimated consciousness, only "objects" are constituted. They are correlates of theses. Here, there are motivations and legitimations of theses. Something is set in motion that can only be understood retrospectively, as it were, through elaboration.

i.e. by explicitly drawing constitutions as that which is actually meant. Only in this way can \emptyset be fixed at all. In the dimension of consciousness as a judicious reason, initial disputes can be resolved in a higher truth. In the structure of such consciousness,

"norms" are preserved. It is as if there were a field of decision-making within consciousness. What about

, if one is actually "committed" to the truth in such a strange way⁹

Only by reflecting a predicative fact in a temporally neutral **structure** do the so-called objects come into being here. Of course, it was not until Kant that the copula was fully realised in the appropriate manner. Only to the "I" can "being" be added, and "I am" does not imply any material existence. However, the copula has not yet been properly understood here. Namely, on the basis of the "situation" in whose dialectic the temporal neutrality of the copula is linked to the originally synthetic unity of apperception.

In the case of mere (i.e. abruptly imposed) reality — what, then, should actually still be established in a genuine sense? But from a Copernican point of view, observation loses its meaning as well. For here there is only an "objective" this or that. However, it is in reality this or not this.

That which is decided in the dimension of pure consciousness is the same as that which is constituted in the first place. Namely, being with the index of truth into which reality has been translated. That something is asked for, or that the so-called truth is sought, is here only one interpretation of the telos that pervades the process of transcendental constitution. One simply has to accept it as something inevitable. Of course — truth is also and precisely here its own substance. But here at all as truth. Instead of discussing the differences of truth itself, one discusses here differences in the realm of what is "true". One speaks of essential truths and finds them equally in a mathematical equation as in the similarity of red and orange. But in the case of the former, there is something to be addressed that is right; a truth that has its own substance.

would be, one searches in vain. The equation presented a question based on a combination of terms. It could be solved by mathematical operations. The question of decidability made sense here. There was a solution here. Such a question, which can be incorporated into a scheme with unknowns, is lacking in questions relating to reality. The modalities of the question vary and the answers are only sometimes decidable.

We showed how the so-called truths have a different position in the anticipated structure of reality, which cannot be reduced to a simple scheme. The question of what something actually is can only arise in interaction with nature, i.e. in handling, and this is where the anticipation of my own existence lies, from which the question of "what something is" first becomes meaningful. It is here, first and foremost, that substance takes on its weight. Only on the basis of such an approach to things can what is "in itself" be conceived. "Things" here are not the individual things with which one can easily believe one can answer the question of what is "recognised". For they are by no means only found. This is precisely the rich core of transcendental philosophy. Except that these things, such as a piece of chalk, a stain, and a giraffe, do not constitute a subject as objects belonging to this or that, but rather are taken as this and that. It is not the case that perception without concepts is "blind", i.e. without result. Rather, it is blind in its own course if it is not guided by the previously conceived mode under which things are questioned as to "what" they are and "how" they are. Neither of these questions is answered directly by so-called determinacy. Only the nature of something could be determined, or the colour "with" which something is painted. Or

the type of a phenomenon is characterised. In order to perceive, one must engage with things.

Only through the intertwining of "consciousness" in the sphere of existence itself can things be questioned in this way, can their "nature" be discerned. Only behind a boundary inherent in the world is it possible to address the world in this way, i.e. to bring it into being. , nothing is "wax" per se. It does not come about through perception either. One addresses it as wax and treats it as such, but does not perceive it only in this way. In the mode of addressing, which is the precipitation of logos, something is understood in terms of its substance, if it is taken. This is very different from how, on the other hand, something is understood only in terms of its references and then understood as a shadow or as a "bicycle". Or, for example, as "my property". What, for example, should be the constitutive nature of an "escalator scaffold"? Is something only understood as such, or is it "in itself" such? Certainly, there is the "idea" of it — but what use is that here?

Reality is, in a very tangible sense, based on the essence formulated in the sum. "Being in reality" does not only serve as an argument for truth in the sublime sense, as it is constituted in the sphere of pure consciousness. It is as if an autonomous reason were simply inserted into a brutal reality to which it is bound only as its subject matter. The schema designed on the basis of the intentionality of consciousness has been postponed here. The approach of the "immediately found" conceals only the boundary condition of so-called consciousness, which was designed from the outset for a specific purpose. Namely, the constitution of the opposite. One does not notice how "Being" only has meaning when it stands behind a boundary inherent in reality, and how, in this respect, the effect...

is not constituted by a subject, i.e. not in a sphere of meaning, but, like the status of **knowledge** itself, is interwoven with reality and it is from there that knowledge first and foremost acquires its natural position.

We will not be able to attain absolute being as the residue of transcendental reduction •. Namely, not in such a way that the being of the transcendent is in a one-sided dependence on it. The antithesis between esse and exsistere does not lie in the fact that one cannot not be. The existence designated in the sum does not precede the existence of things. But it remains true that the existence designated in the sum is in fact something other than the connection between the I and the

" r der Gop1a, daa in die Wirklichkeit zwar ver-
but cannot be found within it.

Consciousness is not the realm of the "immediately given." "Given" in the true sense is, for example, my book. Namely, insofar as it is only there in relation to me. And it is no different with "here," the

"around me". Nothing else exists. By this I mean that I cannot escape it, and thus I fixate on a situation. Namely, that I find myself here. The "otherness" of the so-called existence of something then presents itself as an opportunity for myself.

The a priori lies elsewhere than in consciousness, for example, in its regularity. It is tangible in the anticipations of insight. In short, it is that one already is when one searches, asks, observes, lets the senses do something.

Erroneous knowledge is part of knowledge, but it is not a mere mistake . Both are "medial"; knowledge is, for example,

Ober dai Knowledge as a relationship of being, cf. Scheler, Die Formen dTs Wissens und der Bildung, Bonn i ge5, p. 3o.

8 For a critique of this absolute being, cf. Joseph König, The Concept of I•tuitōn, Halle i gs6, p. 365 ff.

as far as I am concerned. Their concept is to be understood in "anthropological" terms. More specifically, their so-called intention is based on a certain personal status. In cognition, something is sought. Cognition is not as indifferent a monadic event as it appears when it is defined by the thesis of the constitution of objective truth, whose testability must be read in transcendental philosophy as a peculiarity of the "object in general".

Anticipations are not "prerequisites." Nothing is "set" in them at all. Rather, if one asks and also assumes, something is "taken" in advance. In contrast, for Kant's a priori, the reference to truth was essential. This gave the a priori a certain dignity; as a condition of the possibility of experience, it is presented as a priori. However, its partner here is no longer the a posteriori. It is a priori insofar as it can only be brought to bear retrospectively in philosophical reflection on the preceding handling of things, on the so-called attitude towards representation. Namely, by bringing the self-evident aspects of this attitude to explicit execution. In this sense, philosophical reflection is no longer directed towards consciousness. There is no need for too/J to modify theses neutrally. There is nothing embarrassing about starting somewhere. What was previously nothing more than a so-called example, and in this respect not exactly free of concerns, is here *seiner*, namely in its topicality, that which is to be understood. That reality is constituted by fate — only another way of saying that reality as truth is its own substance — now takes on the concrete meaning that truth, i.e. ultimately reality, can only be born in an existence that is twisted into being. It is therefore not only technically unavoidable that only from a standpoint within the

The world can be understood from one aspect of this very world, from which it could then only be conceived in terms of ideas, but in concrete and real terms it is contained in the categories as modi of the addresser, i.e. ultimately in the logoe, the entanglement in this very world as transcendental anticipation. The world can only be understood intramundane. In pure perception, there is, of course, such a thing as the object of a concept. By abandoning its entanglement, the "in reality" loses its meaning. Reality is then just as rootless as truth as a common denominator. In the so-called natural attitude, one finds oneself "attuned to an environment". Namely, with one's body.

However, it is difficult to reintroduce the "I", which is initially nothing more than an unavoidable moment of an interpretative-toxic context, back into the world, where it is supposed to have a point of view. And the world is not a multiplicity of mere "objects" between which one then also stands. Properly understood, epistemology is in fact nothing more than interpretation, insofar as it is a certain way of looking at things.

takes off.

Behind the supposedly mere differences in dignity of what is generally called knowledge lie differences in the mode of knowledge itself. It is not at all appropriate to speak of "knowledge" in such general terms. One is placed into knowledge as one is placed into other fates. And it is only from the concrete fact into which one is placed that one can develop what one is accustomed to setting as the so-called task of knowledge. As if what knowledge is could be assumed in advance in its idea. As if knowledge simply had something to accomplish. In particular, assertoric certainty is not simply a certainty of a certain degree, namely one that can be increased and surpassed by other certainties. Only reality can be certain, i.e. that which one can only

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can be stated. However, this is not something that one can be certain of — above all else. The fact of certainty merely reflects the mutual restriction of knowledge to reality, as formulated above: that reality can only be questioned and addressed behind a boundary inherent in reality.

§ 1 B.

Under the premise of conventional logic, the approach of a principium individuationis seems inevitable. One started from the possibility of completely identical things. Namely, things that are identical in all their static determinations, i.e. with regard to determinations as they are known solely by conventional logic. One also started from identical

"objects". The principium individuationis is then, of course, already obsolete insofar as the object is such and such, i.e. from the outset as the

"Y e r e i n z e l u n g" was conceived as a predicative entity designated in the so-called "Idea". Admittedly, the D a - a e i n would be the principle of a Yereinzelung here, but on closer inspection, its result is missing. 1

This atomistic conception of a difference between purely individual things, which would only be determined in one way or another, must be abandoned. For we searched in vain for something that would be, say, "a red"; the supposedly ideal colour that appears on objects, i.e. that is realised in the so-called colour moment that supposedly persists in things, was nothing more than this specific and, insofar as it is identical, but not therefore ideal, colour red itself. The same applied to iron. More specifically, it was shown how red and iron, as determining truths, only concern the colour or the material of the thing, which are distinguished by the fact that they themselves can only differ specifically. It was by no means the case that an "object" in red

"s o i n" mercy would have and thus red "on him" would have been realised; øo one cannot make use of the inherent properties here. Not even that which something actually is — namely, for example, iron — has been isolated by the fact that it refers to the nature of the piece in my hand. This erroneous opinion arose solely from the above-mentioned misjudgement of the structure of determination. The fact that there is a peculiar kind of identity between substances and colours, which lies in the fact that it is the same substance and the same colour here and there — which is not possible, for example, with shadows, spots, etc. is not possible — is only because substances or qualities are present here, because precisely that which is "essential" to something can only differ in a specific way. The type also became the primary carrier of a determination. It was, in fact, that which one knows or does not know. Here, the determination did not refer directly to an "object" that would have presented itself as its individualisation.

Of course, the species is "there" in specimens. But in their structure, the detail is inherent; it is not at all an "isolation" of something. But then it becomes clear how the problem, whose solution was sought in the principle of individuation, was insidiously introduced in the first place. For even where something is constituted precisely by the circumstance of its existence, where something is addressed in terms of its individual form, therein lies precisely what is typical. For example, the shadow here is simply different from the one there. This difference is entirely in line with the fact that both are "shadows" in the first place. They are not different shadows, as if there were a so-called numerical difference at the boundary of specific differentiation. Only colours, for example, or substances or numbers differ specifically (in the strict sense). However, the specific difference represents here only one form of difference:

As "individuals", wax and blue stand next to my bicycle, for example. Of course, my bicycle is a single riding

It is insofar as it is either a bicycle in general or one of my bicycles. But not in the sense that something general is now determined as "my" bicycle. The bearer of such a determination cannot be found. For what about, for example, a so-called identity if all of its parts have been replaced one after the other? Or if it has been taken apart and its parts scattered and used for other purposes? One might say that they belong to "my bicycle" — namely, the one from earlier. However, we are only revisiting earlier discussions here when we note that something is not

"A bicycle" "1st", namely, remains in the flux of its so-called accidents. Only through the circumstances of fate and references can it be this, namely my bicycle. On the other hand, however, the fact that the hundred thalers are in my possession does not give them any individuality. We said that they are a "thing" that is bound in the context of existence, absence, change. Hegel denied the isolation of the hundred thalers; by this he meant their necessary determinacy.

"against other things". But there is a difference: by virtue of the fact that it exists in the first place — that is synthetic I

— or: by being bound to the context of existence or absence, it does not exhibit mere "abstractness".

Precisely when something is "taken" as a bicycle, i.e. addressed as such, it is not classified under "bicycle".

i "The concept of a hundred thalers," says Kant, "is not increased by perception. The concept here refers to the hundred thalers mentioned earlier, which are imagined in isolation. In this isolated state, they are indeed an empirical content, but they are cut off, without connection and certainty in relation to others. The form of identity with itself deprives them of their relation to other things and makes them indifferent as to whether they are perceived or not. But this so-called concept of a hundred thalers is a false concept; the form of simple relation to itself does not belong to such limited, finite content; it is a form imposed on it by the subjective understanding; a hundred thalers are not a self-referential entity, but something changeable and transitory." (Logic, Works III, p. 86.)

A bicycle is not an object that can be explained in predications. And we noted above that "iron" and "cube" (in the sense that a piece of iron is, for example, "a cube") are not distinguished as e.g. determinations with regard to their position in relation to the object to which they are subject, in that something different was understood in each of these two determinations, namely, first, the nature of the body in the sense of what the body is made of, and second, the fate of its form. And the remarkable thing here was that although the substance was primarily and in a proper sense determined by "iron", what was primarily determined here could only be determined as this substance, i.e. as the substance of which this body is made. That would be simple if substance were the same as material. However, it is difficult because, on the one hand, matter as that of which something is made can only differ specifically, but on the other hand, it can only be defined as the matter of this body, which is not specifically distinguished from other bodies. Iron and cube each comprise something different, even though the "body" in my hand is both in one:

It would be easy if "iron" and "cube" were defined in the same way as "three" or "triangle". Because triangle, three, quantity are defined. Not defined as three or triangle, as if a three or a triangle were in the sense that one assumes with objects. That is not the case here. At most, something can only have the "value" of a triangle, and in a corresponding sense, "a three" can appear on the side of an equation. But that is precisely why three and triangle are determined in and of themselves. They are nothing more than "determined". They are, in contrast to everything that is referred to as this and that, kept in safekeeping, but remain beyond comprehension, i.e. beyond a concept that is impossible here from the outset concept. Precisely here and only here, at

Three, triangle, etc., but not in the case of deo Daseienden, one could most appropriately consider the expression "bearer of a determination" to be appropriate. Insofar as, for example, nothing more than "a triangle," "three," "a set," or "the set of all ordinal numbers" actually "is":

Mathematics examines congruent triangles, for example. These are certainly not the triangles that are drawn. But they are the ones that are drawn, constructed, which, because they are drawn, have not yet been brought into existence. But they are not merely made visible either. The representation is not a mere image that has simply been made clear. In that the straight line is "drawn," it has acquired a peculiar aspect. It has become manifest. It is encountered in this form. It is first and foremost through their representation that mathematical sets or numbers have become what can be ordered and calculated with.

The representation of a quantity is precisely the basis for its most excellent properties. However, in this case, for example, through order, a quantity is "itself" but not realistically verifiable.

changes, it indicates the impossibility of applying something here that would be "actually" this quantity in the sense that something is actually iron or an iron cube.

Two differently determined numbers can be different numbers or the same number. The latter is the case when something is both one and the other — e.g. the number following *i* and the smallest prime number. Identity here only concerns the "carrier" of determinations. It is identical when the determinations are linked. "Both" here means "the same". In the case of the piece of iron in my hand

The necessity of representation in mathematical matters is the very core of Kant's doctrine of schematism. Representability is here hidden in the discourse on the form of intuition. Of course, one has simply overlooked here a constraint with regard to possible construction. But what is actually guaranteed here remains as unanswered as the question of what Kant actually posits as binding.

ea is precisely the opposite. It is b e i d e a, namely from Eiaen and a cube, and ea is excluded that both are "the same" 8ei. Ea is therefore a manufactured difficulty if one—like Herbart—fails to recognise this identity here. The whole confusion in the question of the principle of individuation becomes apparent in the fact that ea can come to "several" precisely where something is merely determined (although not to several carriers of this determination in the sense of eaemplars •). On both sides of an equation or at different points in a sum, for example, there is the number 3. Certainly, the equal sign in the equation denotes equality and not simply "identity"; it would be pointless to use this sign where identity (namely with an orienting function) actually exists. But in the equation there is a specific equality. For what is on both sides of an equation is not something that is equal in terms of properties: the numbers on both sides are not counterparts. They are not examples of 3 that are equal to each other or that can be added together. Taken as such examples, 3 and 3 together would be "two", namely two threes, but never = 6. The threes on the sides of an equation are not equal to each other like things that can only be equal to each other in a certain respect. Rather, it is the number that appears on both sides in $3 = 3$ or that appears multiple times in a sum. Taken as "the same" number, it is of course subject to a supposition under which I cannot calculate with it, but under which I can only compare it with other numbers — i.e. with J, 2, Precisely because there cannot be "one" 3 at all, but only 3 in general, i.e. because 3 cannot be realised can occur three times.

, Yergl. In contrast, H. Rickert (das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins ° 1ge\$) and for criticism, see my review in Gött. Gel. Anz. i88. Jahrg. z ge 6, p. i85 ff.

We said that the two sides of an equation are neither identical nor equal in any respect. One is inclined to consider "how much" as such a respect in this particular case. However, difficulties arise when dealing with imaginary or complex numbers, or even transfinite numbers. The number on the sides of an equation, the number that can be added, is something completely different from the quantity.

Numbers can be increased and decreased, but not added together. A number cannot be represented, i.e. written down in digits, in the same way as a cardinal number. A number is the quantity of certain things. Similar to a multiplicity, it can only be represented by abstract elements. It is only something in its elements, in relation to which it can first enter into a relationship with other numbers. These relationships exist more specifically between what constitutes the number. A number can be illustrated as a concept: by lines or by dots. However, the digits and characters in which a cardinal number is written down, e.g. as a decimal fraction, are not in this sense mere "signs" of something that is only designated in them, i.e. merely meant in the sign. They are means of representation, and it is precisely in the representability of a number that its nature is documented. Representation is one aspect of the number, similar to how the straight line, through its representation, i.e. by being drawn, experiences something inherent in its nature. The cardinal number "is" what is written down in digits, in a different and much more actual sense than a number or a concept ultimately "is" what belongs to them and from whose peculiarities they have been abstracted when illustrated by a diagram.

i.e. Couturat, (Die philosophischen principles of mathematics, German
 Von C. Siegel, 1908, p. 268 ff.). He states that the number on both
 sides of an equation are the same, in that they are only represented by different numbers.

Transformations, such as equations, cannot be performed between numbers at all. A number, insofar as it is oriented towards the quantity it indicates, can only be replaced by other numbers. If one asks what a number actually is, it is a shift in the question if one does not look for numbers where they can actually be found, namely in mathematical operations — but if one is tempted to take the question in a positivist epistemological sense, in order to then find the essence of the number in the quantity.

The same number appears twice on both sides of an identical equation. It makes sense to speak here of a supposition under which the terms of the equation are the same number. However, one could not say in the same sense that two numbers could be the "same" number under a certain supposition. Numbers do not differ from each other in any specific way. For identity can only occur in the number itself, i.e. in the formulation of something as a number. For example, the things here are or have the same number as the things there. The numbers are only specifications. What appears to be the existence or realisation of the number is in fact only its actuality. A number does not occur by itself. In particular, it is not realised in that whose quantity it indicates. There is no correspondence between the number and its elements, as if a number could be found in itself other than as an indication of something actual. The number must be divided into the side of the actual and the side of its indicating function. There is nothing here that could occur once or several times; but there is also nothing here that could be seen as the same, namely as a "carrier of determinacy," even under a certain supposition.

Things with their properties, i.e. what we encounter in terms of general knowledge or ignorance, only indicate a particular direction in our engagement with reality. They are not the "next":

We are talking about the rain outside. It cools down, stops, and changes. Whether it is a process or a state or something else — one cannot ask. It is no different with the other impersonal pronouns. However, the difficulty here does not lie in the impersonal "it". For "the sun is shining" can hardly be described as a statement about the sun, but only about the weather. And the weather itself? It can change, for example when it gets cold, but there is nothing that changes in it itself. What changes is, more precisely, the weather "outside", "here", "now". However, these additions do not merely "describe" it; the deictic reference does not represent an actual determination. Rather, "the weather" itself has the occasionality that is implied in "here" etc. That is why the weather can only "change". Rain and sunshine are now, of course,

"Conditions". These relate to the status of the bets. This could be One only encounters this when, instead of explicitly updating the concept of "state", one attempts to determine the so-called essence of the state by comparing it with processes, etc. In doing so, one adhered to what one designated as a state, but not to what "state" actually means, and what must be present when choosing this particular expression to designate something (even if it is not explicitly carried out here, namely in the attitude of natural life). That something is referred to as weather, etc., that something is "encountered" in it, namely from a standpoint intertwined with the world, therein lies the decisive shift from the doctrine.

of the constitution by a meaningful consciousness, which, as it were, always answers only itself.

According to Sigwart, in cases such as "it is smooth" or "it is wide," the impersonal "it" is a known and in itself determinable subject implied. We just don't bother to mention it in detail. The ground is slippery to walk on, or the path is long. Or in other cases, "es" refers to an "unanalysed set of objects or impressions" to which the predicate applies. In "it is freezing," "it is thawing," there is no doubt about what is freezing and what is thawing; but by not naming anything specific, such as "the lake is freezing," I am implying that the freezing or thawing is taking place throughout the entire area without limitation. And in a phrase such as "it is Sunday," what is meant is "today is Sunday." "The present itself, which I do not perceive as an external thing, but which is given to my immediate consciousness as a link in a series of successive moments in time, is that subject." However, "today" is just as little as "out here" something concrete and identifiable and something about which one could say something. Today, yesterday, etc. cannot be separated from the fact of my existence, which, precisely as the occasion of my own self, can only be determined and grasped in states. If "it is still far away," then it is not simply a certain path, but "my" path. i.e. a path that is not only related to me, "whose" length, but rather describes a state within the framework of a "situation" in which I am not only placed, but which was already constituted as a "situation" for me. The fact that it is "my path" is not determined by a subject, but rather has an effect precisely in its impersonal form. There is nothing here that could be set as predicate and then determined by a predicate. The fact that the mode of the counterpart does not impose itself at all here is precisely shaped in the impersonal form

s Die Impersonalien, Freiburg i. Br. i 888, p. 4 // . 17

and expressed. The sentence "I am cold" is no less impersonal¹ because nothing is "predicated" before me. Rather, only a momentary state is described

, i.e. something from which the moment cannot be separated in the sense that one could understand "now" as a more precise determination. For what is expressed in "I am cold" can only be distinguished from the circumstance of my existence, which is given in the occasion of myself. It is therefore not possible to regard the impersonal elements as logically incomplete. The "here" is, as in "it is raining," implicitly taken or "given" Here, just as little as the "now" of the moment, does it designate an identifiable point in time. The word "here" does not have

simply to describe the spatial environment of the person speaking. As if its actual meaning were only constituted on the basis of the respective conception of this place. The meaning of "here" is not something that can be "understood" at all. The opportunity is banished into the "here" itself, which, if one describes its "meaning" as occasional, appears as mere occasionality of its use, which changes from case to case. And likewise: at this moment, (some) time is actually *f i e r t*. Namely, precisely as *t i m e*. No differently than in the "somewhere" where space is etched in the first place; the prefix "some" does not simply represent, in a purely logical sense, the openness of the determinacy of a so-called place in space.

It was wrong to use a linguistic design such as impersonal information from a specific "analysis of an overall

Günther Stern, on types of objects (Philos. Anzeigen, Bonn, I.) Page 35.

a H u s a e r l , Logical Investigations > II. p. 8 i . "According to one view, however, the meaning is a general conceptual one, insofar as 'here' designates a place as such everywhere; but this general meaning is followed, varying from case to case, by the direct idea of place, which, under the given circumstances of speech, is made comprehensible and subordinate to it by this indicative conceptual idea of 'here'."

"It rains" is not only a "finished form" in the sense that we "form and hear it without becoming aware of the analysis of the overall concept expressed by it" ¹. The impersonal form rather denotes rather a concept, i.e. something that is in a "immediate conception" at all, but can only be carried out explicitly insofar as it can be grasped anew. In contrast to the view of "it" (in "it knocks") as an "intentionally only generally indicated sentence complement," it has been noted that in "it knocks," the verb is intransitive. But that is not sufficient. It is not -only in such a way that here the Yerb "no longer refers to an acting subject, but to the given situation" and only "denotes the acoustic phenomenon". For impersonal is the mode of the situation — namely "one's" situation, e.g. "my" situation — in which something is approached. "Someone is knocking" is — logically speaking — no less impersonal than "it is knocking". The eog. validity of a "predicate" — because it is inevitably applied generally — is not restricted here or referred to a certain, but just left undefined "subject". The linguistic structure of the sentence does not indicate any judgement at all.

§ 14.

The object designed according to the schema of predication is to be designated as this and that. It is designed for objective truth. Its so-called properties designate something that "it" is as the subject of the predications. Namely, it "is" in the sense that it is simply indicated in its predicate. A what stands in place of the predicate. E.g. blue. But to whom does it actually belong? The bench is painted blue, the amethyst looks blue.

H a n e C o r r o d i , The Subject of the aog. impersonal verbs. (Journal for Comparative Linguistic Research, LIII, p. io.)
91. c. p. 6.

3 cf. the investigations in part s.

a u s , — a simple "blue" as a mere property cannot be maintained.

A brief discussion of Herbart's concerns about inherence shows the fallacy of such a concern. He says:

"The possession or having of characteristics must ultimately be attributed to something that is peculiar to the nature of the thing, as a determination of its what" •. But precisely then, when we actually

If "provisions of his what" exist, then there can no longer be any question of inherent nature. Namely, in the cases of the triangle and the three already mentioned above. We said that something would at best have "the value of a triangle". Congruent triangles are no more different from e a c h other than the two twos in a -}- a are different examples of two. We have already mentioned how, precisely here, where something (such as two) is p l u r a l i s i e r t, it nevertheless remains "the same number" and there is by no means such a thing as different ones that are equal to each other.

Even the congruence of geometric figures is not an equality of different things. A triangle and a circle, or an obtuse-angled and a right-angled triangle, are different. But only what has every value *of* a triangle can be congruent. I mean: a triangle and a circle are only different in the same way that 3 and J are different as numbers. They are different under a supposition under which they are compared to what "they are". The *identitas indiscernibilium* does not prevent the plurality of the two. But on the other hand, it does not prove the possibility of actual equality, as Leibniz questioned. What could be strictly identical is precisely where the *identitas indiscernibilium* **applies**, namely numbers, etc., from the perspective of what they are. In certain respects — e.g. as even numbers — they are then equal to each other. And where this is not the case

It is possible to apply the principle mentioned above, namely to the figures shown in the calculation. However, this again lacks the possibility of comparison. So precisely where we have definitions of a simple "what", what is actually "is" is missing. The triangle created by construction has no "properties" in the field designated by its congruence or non-congruence with other triangles. The triangle, the two, etc. have the so-called properties. These properties are simply located here in the continuation of the definition. One determination is connected with the other. In this respect, the properties of the triangle are actually determinations of its what. One can then say that the triangle is based on consequences, that something applies to the triangle at all, namely that which is then documented in the specific characteristics of the triangle.

The properties are therefore here determinations of what in a different sense than one might initially assume. Namely, insofar as the connection between the one and the other is correct. However, it was precisely the truth inherent in a property that posed the real problem for Herbart. In this context, the only property that could occur was the same as in predicative synthesis, whose constitutive element was the so-called object. Namely, for example, "white" or "hard" as the determining what. Its "inherence" would, of course, be something very strange.

It makes little difference here whether one replaces the subsumption under a concept with the ps4d\$ig at an jiopp/. For the predicative schema according to which the "object" is designed is retained here: "In seeking to define a particular object, we will first say, for example: It is aci Xsuu6g or kappöt. But the question of the essence of an object is satisfied to a much greater degree when we learn that it is fiv4piunoç or Innoç. Here we are not told what the object is like, but what it is" +. It is then further explained how "white" is primarily related to colouring and only indirectly "realised" in that which is " " .

I J. Hering, *The Essence, the Entity and the Idea* (Husserl's Yearbook £. Phän. IV, p. 506.

•desien norov it is. But the colouring is just as much "white" as the animal.
 "a horse . One encounters tpv&pbzpc and lzaöz9c side by side. The comparison
 results in a division into simple and complex morphs. — Already the
 However, "ein P:ferd sein" remains below the threshold of its actual problem here. This is
 because "Pferd" determines the species of this animal. As an example, it is "ein"
 P:ferd; the indefinite article expresses something different here than, for example, in "ein
 Regenfiogen" '. And "ein Weiß" can only be a specific white. The P•arbe of this animal
 is neither a
 "ideal" still has a colour that "adheres to it". There is neither a
 direct nor an indirect "realiaator" of white.

The object of knowledge, as long as it is indicated in the truth of a
 synthesis, is rather its result. Its structure is that of usual logic; it is
 linked to the predicate. We corrected this to mean that something is
 spoken of as this and that. If one deals with things in a very tangible
 way, one recognises, for example, what can be named but not
 designated, such as the aog. object. In doing so, one was, as it were,
 ahead of oneself when, for example, one already "took" it in terms of
 its nature and then as this and that in a specific sense of the word.
 "certain", or if one considers, for example, 9 as a mere phenomenon
 and then applied it to the typical characteristics of his case
 , for example, as a "rainbow" in knowledge and custody.

But it is no different with so-called properties. The differences
 briefly mentioned above in the introduction to the problem at
 hand should demonstrate this. And what about the properties of a
 hundred talers? Of course, one hesitates to deny them anything like
 properties at all. For one can say many things about them. Namely,
 what is contained in their "concept" in a real sense and in the sense
 that is relevant here. A hundred talers could exist somewhere or be
 absent. A hundred talers would indeed be something that "can exist
 with all its predicates and also not exist". But they lack the so-called
 B e -

* YergL above p. ooE.

creations. They are not minted hundred-thaler coins. But we said that their existence — or non-existence — depends on the chance of their existence, i.e. on the **chance** that they have in themselves. It is not enough to characterise them by their "appearance". As if something that simply looks a certain way were a thaler. The appearance of a **thaler** is changed when it is worn. The minting is a property of the thaler that does not remain only insofar as it has once experienced it and it is a fate. Rather, it remains alongside the other property, that it is worn. Only in conjunction with the first is the second property even possible here. However, neither one nor the other can be described as an "inherence". One already has reservations about calling these two characteristics properties at all. In order to fix this term, one goes back to what it denotes, for example, in the case of silver. The fact that silver looks like this and that, is tough, etc., belongs to it as the aspects in which it presents itself. But here, too, difficulties immediately arise. The body was taken as nature, i.e. in terms of its nature, when the question was asked what it actually is. Its appearance, etc., belongs to its nature as defined as "silver". But the imprint also remained "its" quality. What then actually constitutes the so-called properties?

The question was asked whether, in the case of the rainbow, there were not simply the colours that it consists of. In response, we pointed out the difficulty of specifying what should then exist. For "blue" defines a colour. What "blue" meant could only be specifically differentiated, namely from other colours. Accordingly, the existence of the rainbow or the blue spot would remain; it was precisely the fact of its existence that had been referred to as a rainbow or a spot.

"

67

Kant did not answer the question of what exists at all. In individual cases, he replaced it with the question of the determinacy of presupposed existence. And since this determinacy was simply predicative, existence had no choice but to remain, as it were, the boundary condition for the solution of this predicative synthesis.

However, we had only described what exists. Herbart posed the question based on the characteristics that define the essence of things, but with which it is not identical. "The essence of things is not known to us through the senses." Herbert bases his question on sensory qualities and leaves them where he found them, namely in the thing itself. Only here could the reality indicated by the qualities in question become **tangible**. The fact that colours, etc., are bound to a physical organisation remains a statement that is not burdened by interpretation or explanation. However, such an interpretation already stands at the beginning of the so-called theory of knowledge. It asks about the relationship between sensations and the qualities of being that are at best only attested to in them. The approach then lies in the reality index given in the occurrence of sensations. And instead of asking about the ontological position of blue in the structure of things, one believes it is simpler and more straightforward to ask whether blue — or what instead "exists" — exists. We showed above that something like the "existence of blue" is, as it were, necessarily stuck in its infancy.

But that was hardly the intention. The reality value of sensory qualities up for discussion, thereby taking up a question that had actually already been rendered obsolete by the negative decision of scepticism. A correction or justification of the common world view can only be undertaken on its own ground. Scepticism never left him. Philosophically, that cannot be the aim. The question of the reality value

The sensory qualities only acquire meaning and significance when they are incorporated into metaphysical problems. And it is in the fact that philosophy can only be abandoned in order to grasp the common world view that the objective strength of Herbart's considerations lies. What we object to, however, is the attempt to reduce the problem at hand to a common denominator under the heading of inherence.

§ 16.

If only the blue spot can be specified as existing, but not blue per se: does blue then belong to it, is it simply its nature,* when nothing other than extension can be discovered in the spot as a possible nature, but extension apparently belongs to colour, so that the spot seems to consist simply of blue or these and those colours, like the rainbow? Certainly, the spot is not blue in the same sense as ink, which is coloured blue, or as the bench, which is painted blue. "Spot" refers "merely" to the colour. Blue defines it, and therein lies the crux of the matter. But blue defines it in the special sense that it is what makes it a stain in the first place. Neither the bench nor the ink nor the stain "are" simply "blue" if one does not limit "being" to the predicative belonging of blue to all three. However, it is wrong to simply let what belongs to them predicatively be inherent in them, or to let an "element" attached to them be determined by blue in the same empty sense in both cases, that it falls under blue or that it realises blue. Rather, the type of "determination" present here is inherent in the conception of the stain.

It is stuck in the mode in which something is presented here as a mere spot — and nothing more —

. Similar to how something was nothing more than "a piece" of iron, where "a piece" meant the renunciation of a designation in the strict sense. What is now "blue" here in some sense that is not merely predicative

"Be" — again, one asks in vain. Or rather: the fact that it was taken as a blue spot already implied a renunciation of the answer. But the fact that one had to take it as a spot at least is significant. And not in the sense that blue is a property that necessarily has to be supported by a carrier, which at best is only inherent; the fact that it is precisely not so is shown by the spot, insofar as it is not blue at all. But this is indicated by the fact that only one colour — i.e. something that can only differ specifically — can "be" blue or be called blue, so that blue cannot exist "by itself" in this sense, as something that was not "conceived" in it at all.

The rainbow consists of yellow, green, etc. For now, it is a phenomenon. That is to say, there is nothing behind it. This is not to say anything about the rainbow retrospectively, but only to explain what is "taken" as a rainbow. It is not only technically impossible to get closer to it or behind it. It has no position in space. It does not fill it like something "real" that spreads out into space and is rooted in it. The rainbow lacks this inner relationship to space. As a mere illusion, the rainbow has been moved behind a boundary inherent in the space. As an illusion, it is incorporated into the environment. This is where it differs from the blue of the sky, which remains banished behind the realm of the material par excellence.

That is not a metaphor. Metaphorically, I would rather mention the usual **use of** the word "stand" where it merely describes something. But in "standing in itself" is precisely the actual meaning of "to stand" to explicit fulfilment.

However, the rainbow is an illusion of a different kind, like the subjective afterimage of a colour sensation or the objectively existing mirage of an oasis. It is not a coloured image. The fact that the rainbow consists of colours is precisely what has been conceived as the origin of the colours in which the rainbow plays, set in and on the so-called atmosphere itself. Due to the circumstance of its existence, its typical formation, it is indeed a rainbow.

However, insofar as the rainbow consists of colours, its existence is bound to light. It is held by the light source and bound to a constellation like the shadow that follows the lamp when it is carried away. It is

"nothing," nothing subsists in it. But on the other hand — it has "Properties"—it is not simply what it consists of, but something else, namely colours. But can we say here, where it consists of colours, that its "what" is "unknown to us through the senses"? Is not the "what" evident here, where the rainbow is no different than in the series and is accessible? We take up the question posed by Herbart and, upon examining its outcome, find ourselves at a loss. The example of the spot is no different. Insofar as it is not (further) defined by blue as "this" spot, as if blue were a property incidental to the spot, but rather, conversely, "spot" denotes a position incidental to the colour, while the colour is something immediately accessible.

S*8.

However, we also immediately notice the fading away that comes with the shift from familiarity to what then becomes. What the rainbow is "in itself" and what it is "left alone" seems to be a question that cannot be asked here at all. As an illusion, the rainbow was indeed

It was designed to be dialectical and physical. The colours it consists of are strangely empty. What could be seen is missing. They arose, of course, from the materiality, namely the water droplets, but no differently than, for example, the colour that the window pane in the glow of the evening sun and then remained in front of the glass in the sense that the glass could only become visible behind it (namely that of the glass and not the spatial one of the glass pane).

However, mere appearance is not simply "nothing" in the sense of imagination. As if it were not what one thought it to be. As mere appearance, it was just mentioned, so it was probably taken as "something" after all. Thus, it is not exempt from Herbart's question. Herbart simply did not notice the anticipations that give his question its meaning and weight in the first place. They lie in the conception of nature itself.

§ 13.

Herbart contrasts something that is only relative in relation to something else with something that is absolute in itself. As that which it is in itself. He adds: that which is "left alone". Did he mean that, just as blue is blue and a triangle is a triangle? Namely, that it "remains" in the sense that we established earlier? Then it would of course be correct that anyone who wants to answer the question: What is this thing? answers with the sum of its characteristics, and that then the second aporia (quoted above) immediately arises, that the thing only has the many characteristics, but is not the many. Herbart does not explain this in more detail and believes that "left alone" sufficiently demonstrated by its opposite. He lists and juxtaposes: A body has colour, but not without light. It is fragile when broken. It is heavy, namely on earth. It is hard or soft when one wants to penetrate it. So im-

It must react.

The body proves to be fragile and hard in the circumstances in which it finds itself. However, these characteristics do not grow in it like colour, which first arises in the light. The body takes on an appearance. We will only note this difference for the time being. Another is more important: fragility, elasticity, heaviness — these are properties that become tangible in states. They are dispositions to changes that the body experiences. These changes, which are causally dependent on external influences, are predetermined in the nature of the body. They therefore characterise it. These properties are activated through reference to others. They are first mobilised in processes. And here it is simple: these are certainly not properties that indicate what the body is "quietly left alone" for itself. This conception of a thing that is for itself and not only through its latent predisposition to be activated by changes from others seems to be completely wrong.

Apparently, the same applies to the properties of hard or soft. I experience them when I want to penetrate the body. Hardness, it seems, has no advantage over brittleness, for both are linked to the **body** being attacked, undergoing an intervention or an attempt at intervention. How it then defends itself against the intrusion, how it parries the attempt, is what we fixate on in our determination that it is hard or soft. But is hardness really just a property of the body that manifests itself during the intervention, like the brittleness of glass, which one must reckon with when throwing it on the floor? One overlooked the fact that hardness is not only a property, but also a quality.

The hardness was equivalent to the brittleness in that the body simply proved to be hard or brittle. In other words, neither of these qualities grew on him like colour. However, this does not mean that the hardness can also be found in the body. Namely, in the same way that the brittleness could be found in him: as an inherent quality of the body. The fact that hardness is not distinguished from colour here is the first complication. The second lies in the fact that hardness and colour are not permanent properties of things because they are "perceived". Of course, one shies away from describing hardness as a quality of perception. One leaves it at a "such-and-such qualified content" to be found in the "phenomenal sphere." The cautious foresight of the terminology, which here resorts to the abstract, is significant. Under the scheme devised by epistemology, however, the peculiarity of sensory quality cannot be grasped at all.

§ 30.

One could speak of such a specific "qualification" of a "holding" in the case of, for example, the sensation of warmth. I perceive the temperature of a body insofar as my physical condition is affected by it. However, such an effect (in the strict sense) is absent in the case of pressure sensations. I merely "feel" the hardness of the thing when I touch it. Without there being any such correspondence here between a thing that affects me and my so-and-so qualified responsibility. Here, one cannot speak of "mediation" through sensation in the same sense — as the structure of the illusions in both cases shows. In the case of the sensation of pressure, the contact is different. Here, it is impossible to distinguish between an impression and something else that is only given in it. Of course, the hardness that is said to belong to the thing is something other than the

An impression that one is equally inclined to dismiss without hesitation, since it can only be found in my body. However, one senses is the hardness itself, and that, of course, if it — namely this quality — is present in a very concrete sense in the tentative gliding of the finger over the body. We emphasise: hardness as a quality. It is, of course, the hardness of the thing. But how is this different from the hardness that is predicated of the thing and has thus become "objective", which is a constituent part of the thing as an object that is such and such, that can be explained as this and that. It would certainly be correct to say that such an objective constituent is, at best, only given intentionally, or that there is a reason for positing it. In the scheme characterised by the use of the intentionality of consciousness, however, the transcendence of a quality — i.e. the fact that something is "indicated" in terms of quality — undergoes an interpretation that does not do justice to its peculiarity. The different mode of inherence of what is indiscriminately called property (namely in the sense of a predicative moment that can be demonstrated in the thing) could not become a problem here at all. Thus, precisely that which was concealed was the question of the reality value of sensory qualities. first and foremost, it was able to prove its philosophical meaning.

The crucial point here is that warmth is nothing more than a state. In our experiential interaction with things, it constitutes itself as a fact. We perceive that something is warm. Warmth does not refer to some property picked up from objects, but to something that was conceived as a state from the outset. The special relationship between warmth and the body as its state is expressed precisely in this term. Namely, as a special mode of "belonging". Warmth is not simply one of the body's other so-called properties. Between the body and its

Heat, in particular, is not merely an abstract relationship, such as the so-called inherent nature of a property, which was conceived more precisely as a predicative property and could only be "copulatively" linked to another.

Heat is nothing more than a state. Nevertheless, it can be found in things. For it can be fixed, and in this respect it is similar to brittleness or heaviness.

S a i.

When determining heat, perception mediates. However, "experiences" of this kind are only an excellent example of how we deal with things. It remains unclear whether seeing and hearing are not involved in other ways. The essence of their performance remains hidden if one determines this performance from the outset solely on the basis of the function that the senses could perform in the structure of experience, which is after all determined by a particular telos. It is taken for granted that seeing ends with a "purpose". But what is conveyed in colours?

"Certainly." It is difficult to answer this question, precisely because seeing is an immediate form of access. One sees the colours on objects. One does not "have" them, as one has the sensation of warmth on one's hand, for example. One says that objects are seen. Of course — their colour is seen. But what does that mean?

"Their" colour? The white of the piece of chalk, that colour. This quality is indistinguishable from the colour of a piece of paper. The observation that colours are not linked to the state of this or that body then leads to the conclusion that colours "themselves" — namely as the specific colours that are distinct from one another — are what is achieved in seeing without mediation.

The apparent immediacy of seeing things now leads to the thesis of reactivity.

of colours: Apart from the light in which they are born, colours cannot be sought in things for that very reason, because they belong to "mere appearance". Of course, for me, things appear in colours. But one is inclined to interpret this reference as meaning that they appeared to me "as such." As if the approach of a material nature were inevitable and the relativity of appearance were only understood in terms of a pretence of this appearance, namely something immediate and

"intentional" could be determined. It is striking here, however, how the thesis of the relativity of sensory appearance loses all its edge when this transition to the approach of an objective nature is carried out under the constraints of the system. Namely, when sensations occurring at the edge of consciousness are included in the transcendental constitution of objects. For then the thing is, in terms of its truth, nothing other than than what it appears to be and what it is meant to be. — As a mode of givenness, the phenomenon was here a

It is quite another thing to simply take it as a "given." It then becomes the prototype of the fact that "something" is represented in consciousness at all and thus arises in the first place in its manifestation. Every appearance then expresses a deeper truth, and every conflict is then "precisely what is required by broader contexts for the preservation of overall unanimity." That one sees something "oneself" would then mean nothing more than: as it is, namely as it was or was to be designed by a thetic consciousness as being in truth.

Sensory perception is taken up here as an instance for legitimising the approach of what was initially mere "signitive intention". Sensory perception...

It then retains the dignity it has in the attitude of natural life. But it retains this dignity only because the natural attitude has been transposed into the system of transcendental phenomenology as a whole.

Of course, one cannot answer the question of what is seen in such a straightforward manner. That one "sees things" — namely, "sees" — rather, is precisely the phenomenon of the understanding the nature of colour. Under the scheme of intentionality, both were misunderstood. This scheme already fails in the case of perception. For the mode of the "opposite," which could only be linked to the constitution of the intentional object as its object-being, arises first and foremost in dealing with things: when one engages with them. And even seeing is not merely an intentional reference. The chalk and the rainbow — both are "visible". But does that mean that it (?) could be seen? In the case of chalk: it — namely this substance, i.e. the substance of which this is made — looks white. White is part of its appearance. But something that was picked up by sight, as it were, and only just (intentionally) affected in a raw sense, is sought in vain. This is precisely where the peculiar dialectic of appearance lies. In itself, it is appearance. And so it must be held fast, but not as the representation of something else, which is this or that and also, for example, white. With the rainbow, it is no different. The colours of which it is composed are not — namely, each as the specific colour — "seen".

Visibility was no more a peculiarity of certain objects than seeing is a tailor-made possibility of "having" these objects "immediately". This is concealed here by the introduction of the intentionality of consciousness. Then, in sensations, there is supposedly "something

what is given". However, when we see, there are no sensations in the sense of impressions. And what is strange is the connection between seeing and factual constellations, where the intentionality of consciousness cannot be such a tangible relationship between consciousness and the object. There is no relation at all in seeing. For that which could be seen is missing. So-called visibility is initially nothing more than a fact whose occurrence is bound to matter. Appearance also originates there; the rainbow is created by reflection on water droplets, etc. But only in the realm of visibility is there

"Appearance," and the fact that appearance is thus doubled in materiality as actual reality, is precisely what characterises the dialectic of visibility. Hence, the function peculiar to seeing is to comprehend its distinguished position among the senses. The senses have a place in dealing with things. They are a kind of handling. One encounters things with them. Seeing is primarily an activity which, together with light, can unlock materiality to visibility. This is also the case with the rainbow, which consists of colours and is an illusion, i.e. there is nothing behind it, which is how it appears. Seeing is a condition of colour. It is primarily a function. Seeing is characterised by radiance: seeing comes to meet the body and works together with light in the reflection or iridescent appearance of a mineral. Here is not only an ideal. What is required is not a "point of reference," but rather the directionality of vision as a property that can be readily identified in it. The genesis of iridescent surfaces clearly shows how appearance comes about in the first place in vision. Nevertheless, it is the appearance of the body. It would be premature to dispute this "a_{ein}" on the basis of assumptions that lead to a certain arbitrary interpretation of vision.

t P l e ß n e r , Die Einheit der Sinne (The Unity of the Senses), Bonn i gs3, p. sl i Pf.

hear what is referred to as "knowledge" or as the object belonging to knowledge. Something like an object does not look like that at all. Moreover, appearance is limited to a part of what is called sensory perception. This is precisely where the effort lies in determining what we want to call the cognitive viability of sensory qualities:

§ 22.

It is immediately apparent that "hard" or "white" indicates what the body is and to what extent, while "heavy," "elastic" are only fixed in the sense of "what kind of" as its characteristic properties. In terms of quality, the body is preserved in a completely different way, i.e., it has been preserved in a state that is different from its properties, which are only its — i.e. moments that are linked to the fate of the body. In what is specifically like him, he is present in the specific and actual sense; in the temporally neutral sense of the present, he is "there". Let us not trivialise this by saying that he is simply "given" in it. For what is given in another, what presents itself in another, is precisely what can be experienced. For example, any given quality. In warmth, the body does not present itself. Warmth is "nothing more than" a quality.

Colour arises as a quality. "The arising of colour and deciding are one and the same." Qualities, on the other hand, are states; they are "such" qualities; they are causally linked to other states. A quality, however, is defined by its own "character." Namely, nothing more than "that." The birth of quality can be understood — as was Goethe's intention in his theory of colours, for example — but there is no *causa efficiens* of colour.

Let us now orient the aporia that Herbart places at the beginning of his metaphysics towards brittleness or towards

Goethe, Theory of Colours, didactic part p. 6g5.

When something is warm, it appears to be constructed from the outset. For when he asks whether A, if it is B, might not be something else, brittleness and warmth are inherent properties that cannot be separated from their bearer because they are intertwined with its existence. However, Herbart's question does have a certain meaning when it comes to qualities. For the body is red, hard — that is what it is. And what it is there, in which it has, as it were, detached itself from itself as something not inherent in it, cannot be defined, i.e. explained, like the "barrel" in which the body finds itself in certain appropriate conditions.

Properties such as warmth, etc., appear strangely "dull" when compared to qualities. The idea that it is the body itself that has these properties, the fact that the self arises in the first place because something is contained in the quality, that something is transferred into it — such things do not come to mind here. And this is not because it is through this metamorphosis and in this transformation that identity as such acquires a tangible meaning. Something may well be "given" in warmth, heaviness, elasticity. In the broad sense of the word, one could say that these qualities are an expression of something else, namely of something real. But never in the precise and, in this case, literal sense of something appearing, becoming visible, acquiring a surface. This is something other than merely expressing itself in the sense that something allows its dispositions to be "seen" (in a figurative sense). And yet, although this metamorphosis is linked to my bringing the thing into the light, taking on appearance and being brought into the light are two different things. In appearance, something has undergone a metamorphosis to a different status, whereby we

i H. Martiù • - Conrad, *idealontologie* (Yearbook for Philosophical and Physical Research IY), p. aos, 3s5.

contrast the "statua" with the state in the usual sense. Here, something has become manifest in something else. Phenomenality is a stage of manifestation of something that is not actually present, but which can nevertheless be attained.

In the dark, colour does not simply disappear. That would be to attribute too much reality to colour. Rather, it is simply that the coloured appearance of things recedes into a state of latency determined by the (material) properties of things, from which it is then brought into the light. Here, in the case of colour, talk of a mere appearance has a thoroughly justified core that is not only understandable from the perspective of epistemological questions, but also tangible in a dialectical-metaphysical sense. This is lacking in hardness, which is in the same situation as colour in that it too — even though the body itself, i.e. here: in its original physical completeness, is perceptible in it — cannot be found as a genuine quality of the body, but rather as its external property. like its material structure, which has been transformed into hardness as a quality. Hardness is not as independent as colour. Therefore, the possibility of a corresponding appearance is lacking here. One cannot speak of a level of manifestation here. Hardness does not appear in any independent manifestation; by this I mean: I feel it when I press my body against the body. This "not getting away from" is very compatible with the following: as a quality, namely as a translation of having gotten away. For the decisive factor is that hardness can only be found as a sensory quality. Namely, in this intermediate state. — neither on the body nor on my body. It belongs to the body "itself". Only in the sense that it is oriented in opposition to the metaphysically specified sense of appearance, i.e. to phenomenality understood in metaphysical terms. But not in the same way that qualities are moments of the body and

as such in him. We assumed that I am affected by the warmth of the body, that I experience it, mediated by a corresponding sensitivity of my skin. I merely feel it. Nothing in it is "present" to me. In the specific so-called senses for heaviness, etc., as they are examined side by side in physiology, something immeasurable is "achieved," but not grasped in a translation. The term "sense" therefore retains there the meaning that it has in the qualities from that point of view.

comes.

t a3.

The present in appearance, etc., is therefore not a present as merely a favourable situation. This would then simply lie in the fact that the recognising person now also faces his object. To express it in this way is not sufficient here. The extent to which it is "favourable" is precisely what needs to be understood. For in the favourability of a situation, as in cognitive dignity, the metaphysically comprehensible concrete has only been brought to a premature interpretation, which has been fixed as a temporally neutral present, and which in turn is dialectically linked to the "Waa" of quality.

The presence that belongs to quality can be grasped in terms of how a thing "is" hard, blue, etc. We understand this precisely when we deal with the aporia that lies in the fact that we also attribute blue to the amethyst lying in the dark as a colour peculiar to it. Or that we ask without prejudice what something looks like on the inside, even though things only acquire their appearance when they are first brought into the light or broken apart, and even though, as shown above, the radiance of vision is involved in their coming into being. However, this does not mean that the appearance has come into being (as one might hastily interpret). Namely, not in the sense that the thing has changed when it has become visible. Certainly

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The visibility of a thing is bound to the fate of that very thing. Namely, to the fact that it is brought out of the darkness or broken apart. However, the visibility of the body is not a state to which it has changed from another. To obtain its appearance is not in itself the fate of the body. We distinguish appearance as a state from a condition. One might object here that colour is also merely applied to the structure of the body.

"Nature" is: to react to radiation in such a way as to absorb certain rays and reflect others. However, appearance cannot be reduced to the actualisation of a physically comprehensible disposition. Disposition and activated disposition — both can be determined or inferred, but not seen. Colours cannot be found in the realm of physics at all. However, colours do not simply arise as modifications that are applied to the organs of perception (tuned to certain wavelengths). "Seeing" cannot be reduced to the function of what physiologists call the "eye". It is, for example, at least an open question whether bees, whose physiological range of vision is shifted by about 20% compared to ours, can see ultra-

This is where Goethe's theory of colours comes into play. There is no need to interpret it in terms of the natural philosophical speculation of his time. And to do so would certainly misjudge Goethe's intention. His polemic against Newton's interpretation of the Priam experiment is not based on a speculative view of light. Nor does he need to refer here to the fact that it is not possible to practise the colours into the light in a "sensual, eye-like" way, even though they are only produced by the prism.

For Newton merely proved that colours arise when light is sent through a prism and the waves of different vibration modules diverge. Insofar as other investigations are limited to physical optics, Newton's omission is not embarrassing, and the focus of Goethe's theory of colours has shifted to physiology and sensory physiology. v. U e x k ü l l correctly identifies the "eyes" of the various animal groups, whose function and performance are compared in terms of physiology, as "photoreception" organs. However, he objects to the usual terminology insofar as he believes that colours, etc., refer to something that **"everyone**

violet as a colour. The fact that colours are primarily to be sought only "in the eye" is, of course, usually understood to mean that "they (i.e. the sensory qualities) have their place in the perceiving organism and therefore, as such, are not attached to the object of perception." However, the reasons taken from physics and physiology were not sufficient "to make the subjectivity of qualities probable in a sense other than that expressed in this theory of relativity." And Frischeisen-Köhler, following Riehl, believes that the question of the reality value of sensory qualities can be raised again for discussion in the *Sinae*, since the "exclusive subjectivity" of sensory qualities has by no means been proven. The question is "whether reality does not contain properties that are to some degree similar to those subjectively perceived."

It should be noted that the question of the reality value of sensory qualities is not a "scientific controversy" at all. In particular, it is not a matter of deciding, on one basis or another, whether sensory qualities also have an extra-subjective reality. It is precisely sensory qualities that demonstrate the fallacy common to this realism and the conventional view.

only knows itself." As if only the empirical connections could be what remains beyond

verbal analysis. But the fact that a person who is red-blind does not know what red is does not prove the subjectivity of colour in the sense *that it* has its place of existence "in the subject." This does not even apply to the afterimage, whose existence is related to a subject. For it is no different than, for example, the existence of seeing being held by the light source. (Ch. Th. Beer, A. Bethe, J. v. Uexküll, Proposals for an objectifying nomenclature in the physiology of the nervous system, *Centralbl. f. Physiol.* XIII, p. i 32 ff. and J. v. U e x k ü l l , On the position of

comparative physiology on the hypothesis of animal souls, *Biol. Centralbl.* XX, p. /tg /f.)

i F r i s c h e i s e n - K ö h l e r , The Reality of Sensory Phenomena, *Ann. der Naturphilos.*, VI, p. 366.

2 The doctrine of the subjectivity of sensory qualities and its opponents (*Quarterly Journal of Science, Philosophy and Sociology* XXZ, p. s86). — Likewise

B. Lotze, *Metaph.* i 8Q9, p. Sol.

3 i s c h e i e e a - X ö h l e r , l. c. p. 31d.

It lies in allowing colours to "be there" at all, or rather in allowing reality to solidify in material carriers of truths. The properties are exaggerated to become, at best, represented material "moments". On the other hand, however, this also initiates the idealistic reduction of reality. Namely, to mere objects that "are" red, etc., in the sense that they are equated with each other through the execution of such determinations. This then involves denying reality to the so-called appearance and being able to incorporate it into the transcendental constitution as something merely unreal. The misleading aspect here lies primarily in the relation of seeing to an "object." One fails to recognise how the the "intentionality" of the senses indicates precisely their entanglement in reality.

The appearance of a thing is not simply the manifestation of the thing to a mere "subject" that "recognises" it. If that were the case, then the question would naturally arise as to whether things actually

"as," i.e. that is, "as what" they appear to be. But in the physical organisation, there is not merely the possibility (or limitation) of "access" to material properties, which — and this remains incomprehensible — would be intentionally affected in this case. Even in the approach to the question mentioned, the sensory qualities are not left where they could be found at all. The thesis of the "similarity of sensation and what is sensed" and its antithesis compare something that is not there at all. Only in the case of temperature sensation is there such a thing as a correspondence between two *as* and thus qualified states. In the case of sensory qualities, this is absent from the outset. For sensory qualities are neither objective properties nor properties of sensations in which something could be represented. The epistemological question of a correspondence between the phenomenal and the transcendent must be replaced here by the question of the relationship between sensory qualities and physical properties.

Constellations of matter. The study of phenomena does not belong to epistemology, but to natural philosophy.

The "statement of consciousness, as which attributes sensory properties to objects in nature, regardless of whether they are perceived or not" • therefore only contradicts a misinterpretation of the correct fact that the so-called sensory properties of things cannot be found as properties. It only turns them — when viewed correctly — against the relativity of sensory properties. However, they are only "relative" because they could not possibly be inherent in things. The statement of consciousness to which E. Landmann refers in favour of a reality of sensory properties is rather to be understood through the temporal neutrality that is connected with quality insofar as it is present in quality.

The appearance of a body can be concealed. For example, by a glare in front of it, when the surface of a metal reflects and thus remains hidden from view. We argued that the latency of appearance — here or in the case of the mineral lying in the dark — should not be reinterpreted as an existence of this appearance that is merely dispositional and thus pressed down into the temporality of the body. Rather, it should be understood precisely from the temporal neutrality of appearance as a status. Herbart says: something is coloured, but not without light; colour arises in the encounter with another. It is correct to say that colour does not simply adhere to things. But the solution of classifying things in causal relationships was wrong. It applies to the actual (material) properties. For appearance, it only applies in certain cases.

c Edith Landmann, *The Transcendence of Knowledge*, p. 3.

where appearance is distorted. Perception itself is not causally dependent on the encounter of the thing with other things.

Of course, perception also changes. For example, in the case of

Iron, when it is put into fire. It becomes red-hot. But this change simply consists in the fact that what has the appearance changes, so that accordingly its appearance also changes or disappears. This change in appearance cannot be compared at all with a change in the nature of the body. However, appearance can of course also be changed. It can be causally influenced or distorted. For example, in the case of a rod that appears broken in water or appears in other colours, or, for example, when I eat santonin and see yellow. The senses deceive us. But only because they primarily convey certainty.

If one simply takes the so-called sensations as a point of passage for far-reaching intentions and sets something like the "object of knowledge", then the problem of sensory illusions becomes very simple. For then there is no longer any conflict to be demonstrated as required by overarching connections. However, a real problem arises when one notices that there is a certainty that is carried by the senses and that makes the senses what they are. It is by no means the certainty "of" or about another, and certainly not about a so-called outside world. The so-called existence of an outside

world can only be a problem in hermeneutics. Nothing at all is guaranteed in sensory certainty. It is indeed the nerve centre of so-called empiricism, but it must not be confused with its "certainty". There are no degrees of sensory certainty. It cannot be sought, achieved or justified. Rather, it is contained in the fact that one is immersed in reality through the sensory perception of things. The senses have a function there. And it is

newly clear how it is not "objectivities" that one "recognises", and how that which is eog. knowledge cannot be demonstrated at all in the schema of intentionality. Instead of intentionality, to which everything is strung like a nerve: vividness, presence and objectivity — we actually only have concrete interaction with things. This is where the so-called transcendence of cognition comes in. Contemplation can no longer be taken as direct access to something. Why is that? This question is answered first and foremost by the metaphysical dialectic of the different modes of "appearance". And the same applies to the moment of direct access that is hinted at here. One was guided by an arbitrary interpretation of knowledge. However, "knowledge" means something else in the context of appearance, appearance, etc., and it is only within the realm of experiential interaction with things that a knowledge attitude in the narrow and strict sense can be distinguished as an excellent mode. This is the case, for example, when the nature of something is questioned in terms of what it is. In this respect, of course, knowledge is anticipated before it is actualised. But it was not so in terms of the idea. Only in appearance is there such a thing as immediacy in a concrete sense, where substances "open up" according to their qualification.

What is conveyed in the vivid mode of reality as is played off as a vivid property has a very different position metaphysically. "Immediacy," presence, etc. is something concrete here. By this I mean: presence, for example, is not only to be found as a moment — namely on the basis of a "relationship" between subject and object. That is precisely what fails. For in quality there is something "hidden" that in a raw sense is precisely not contained in it. And that is why it can only belong either to appearance or to another form of external perception.

appearance, and that is why, when nothing else is there, mere appearance is all that remains. That is precisely why quality is a what or a how. In this respect, it has a particular affinity with appearance. Presence therefore belongs to appearance only insofar as appearance has a prior connection with things that can be seen.

The presence linked to quality means nothing other than the temporal neutrality of being. Weight, elasticity, etc., these properties found in things, do not, in contrast, relate to time, to which matter, as that which is real in the true sense, stands in an inner relationship. "Time" here means clock time, which, abstracted from xiyots, would become empty of itself, as it were, if conceived as a mere dimension. Temporal neutrality is just as much an attractive peculiarity of qualities as temporality is of elasticity, heaviness, etc.

Insofar as the body is lost in its Schieksale and can only be found in warmth, etc., as in its properties, it is "wholly therein". Namely, insofar as warmth, etc., are not merely "properties" of another. In the case of qualities, however, "completely in it" means something else. Namely — and only here — its presence. Colour is

not a responsibility chained to the fates of the body and thus chained to time.

a5.

It is the senses themselves that deceive us when they come into contact with things. Sensory illusions do not change the fact that something becomes visible in the strict sense. It is just as too much to add to the appearance: "as something is". Then one does not notice that the "being" in "being (i.e. of the body) appearance" is first and foremost shaped in the appearance, that the body only becomes manifest in the appearance and does not merely find a repetition of itself in it, as if the appearance

see nothing more than an image, a copy. Even if the appearance is causally changed, it remains a status. The thing itself is not changed here.

The conflict between the individual sensory perceptions is taken as an argument that they cannot have a "real existence". "For the objects of sensory perception, there is full proof of their falsity . ." — The approach hidden behind this thesis of a consistent positing of an object that proves itself to be "true," the tacit transposition of existence into simple facts, cannot be overlooked. Things are presented here as such and such, or as that and that which exists. The fact that the conflict is then precisely what is required in its place, this consequence has of course not been drawn here. By conceiving of the thing as a praedicabile, however, one has from the outset relinquished the possibility of making the viability of sensory qualities a problem at all. The supposedly philosophical reasoning here has not departed from the basis of the natural or dogmatic attitude. The appearance, i.e. something that "belongs" to the thing, is what is falsified and affected. The falsification does not simply consist in the fact that things are not as they appear. As if things presented themselves as "something red" etc. and could or should be found in their predicative existence "themselves" — namely as they are "in themselves" in a completely empty and indifferent sense.

Herbart speaks of the body "as it is at rest". However, this is not a metaphor used merely to explain an abstract concept such as that of "in itself". It emerges as something very concrete. We understand it through its opposite:

i Blocked by me.

u F' r a n z B r e n t a n o , Psychol. v. empir. Standpunkte i826 I, p. iss.

We perceive only colours, but not sounds, as material properties. Although it is precisely the sound that does not lose its connection to the place of its material origin. Nor does the tone, in which "the struck object serves only as a basis for eliciting the tone" and does not "interfere with the produced sound with its own mass-laden interior" *. However, the body only becomes loud when it reacts. Of course, I have the ability to defend myself when Zins is bent out of shape and screams when torn apart. But this is only his nature "expressing itself." Something has been transformed into something else in the noise, the tone. Appearance, on the other hand, denotes a "status" acquired in foreign light and not such a real transformation. Ineofecn's conception of status included precisely the moment of being left alone. The position of colour here, in the actual appearance, is also different from that of, for example, iron held in a forge fire and made red-hot there. It turns red when it has just abandoned its "original basis of being". In the dark, it is red.

S*6.

In mere visibility, no recognisable sustainability would initially be fixed. This is provided by appearance. And it only acquires its meaning here under the conception of the material. It is formulated in the fact that it is appearance here at all.

Truth does not simply have the formula: So and so is ea. It is bound to or anticipated in the mode in which "things" are questioned. For example, in terms of their "nature" in the sense of what a body is, whose nature is precisely what it indicates. Only when something is "taken" in this way is it possible to examine it in terms of how it is used.

v H. Conrad-Martiu, 1. c. See also 8§. See H. Gonrad-Martiu.

looks like. One expects to always **encounter** surfaces behind which materiality remains banished in unexplored **depths** as *apei-ron*. Only here is there such a thing as surfaces in which something has reached the limits of its self-containedness and breaks through to visibility. We react: visibility is bound to materiality; even the origin of appearance is set in **matter**. Mere visibility **would** be nothing more than **an** increasing fact. It "belongs" to nothing, while appearance is precisely an ontological category and **in this respect is related to the category of matter**. This is what materiality of this kind **looks like**. **It would be** pointless to **now** allow a substance to be given vividly, i.e. as an object of perception. It is not an object at all. It is the same substance here and there. Just as the colour was the same here and there — and the same difficulties would arise as above, when **Matt** attempted to take the colours as what is actually seen. It is equally impossible to allow the substance to be merely given in what one sees. Namely, just as in the so-called appearance, the object appearing in it is given — whereby the carrier of properties as something that is this or that, as something that can only be obtained analytically from original synthesis, remains as the **only** possible type of the object of knowledge. The piece of chalk is taken for its substance and seen as such. Through the eye and light, only colour was created.

The terms "actually" and "in itself" only make sense in connection with appearance when they refer back to what the appearance has. Only when the microscope is set to a certain setting, for example, does one see the object as it actually looks. Namely, when the con-

I H. Conrad-Martius — I. c. p. 5 ff.

See Yerpl. on this: W i l h e l m S c h a p p, Contributions to the Phenomenology of Perception (inaugural dissertation, Göttingen, 1909), in particular section II, see below, chapter 3.

The preference for sharply defined aspects is curious. For the blurred contour is no less true in its place. But one seeks the other. The one that does not simply belong to one of the possible aspects in which the thing would be lost, as it were, in its representations. Even the so-called "clarity" of the preferred aspect can only be understood from what had been conceived in advance when the object was questioned.

Something like a lion or a wax ball does not look like the wax itself. Of course, the lion is yellow. Or is it the fur or something else? With wax, such questions do not arise at all. I mean that here, with wax, the quality has a completely different and more distinguished position.

We previously emphasised the difference between the yellowness of a spot and the fact that this colour belongs to the colours of the rainbow. The differences lay in the formal affiliation of yellow. In both cases, however, it could not be said that what was yellow had yellow as a property. Of course, yellow defined the spot, and the rainbow "played" in yellow, etc. But yellow did not belong to either of them. On the contrary, the spot and the rainbow had been conceived precisely as the mode of existence of yellow. The appearance of inherent nature arose here only because qualities can only differ specifically. In this respect, however, they were similar to substances, for example. They did not require a so-called carrier on which they could then experience the isolation that had been safely attributed to them in the approach of colour moments. The spot was determined by yellow as the colour specifically different from others, namely characterised, no differently than a piece is characterised by iron, and it could not be characterised differently than what was taken as a spot or merely as a "piece".

However, if a body appears yellow, it is by no means determined or characterised by this colour in this sense. The "appearance" refers precisely to the mode in which the colour is inherent in the body. Here, colour is indeed a property. Colour is not a property in the case of the bench that is painted blue, for example. The fact that it was once painted in this way is its peculiarity. It has properties in the sense of circumstances that have led to its existence and which continue to carry it forward as this bench. One might say that the colour actually belongs to the paint. But even in the so-called "colour" that is applied, something is only a circumstance.

Existence has been addressed.

It is not at all important here to ultimately identify colour as a property. That was not the opinion when we described the position that colour has in appearance and where it inherits, as its own and as its natural one. Rather, only the inherent nature of this position has been characterised in its naturalness.

In addition to "appearance," we consider habitus in the sense of external appearance. The lion has no "appearance." Its external appearance includes stripes and spots, etc. After all, it has no "surface" above a "Depth" – it would be pointless to ask what it looks like "inside". Only something that has acquired a certain character, i.e. what a lion is in the sense of a specimen, can have a habitual form. The configuration of a crystal is something else, and the shape of a wax ball is yet something else. For here the spherical shape is accidental in the sense that it is not a quality bound to the external appearance as to the habitus. It is not the truth of the wax ball. Nothing has come to light in it as in the

Habitua. For habitus is not merely an expression of something else in an indifferent sense. That which "is," namely the lion in its appearance, has first and foremost been shaped by what we call its external appearance.

Only here could something like *eidos* be conceived. Colour and form are not properties of the lion. Colour does not inhere in it. The inherence of colour was not, for the time being, the abstract general relationship that one posits between one "object" and another "thing". Appearance was the specific dialectically tangible mode under which colour is inherent. We referred to appearance as a status. Physically, matter qualified in this way is broken up by light to become visible. The fact that this is not a change in the body, but only a metamorphosis to another level of manifestation, was characteristic of the nature of colours themselves. They can only be found in the realm of appearance. Appearance was not a concept defined in terms of epistemology, but rather demonstrated in its natural dialectic. What colours "are" can be understood from their natural origin in and on physically qualified matter. The inherent nature of colours, i.e. their being a property, was therefore a natural relationship (although not one that could be grasped by the methods of natural science, especially not physics). Accordingly, however, the configuration of a crystal is also the simple effect of matter with certain properties. The aim here is not to establish an undisputed fact, but only to define what is meant by "configuration" in this context. Colour and shape belong to the "external appearance" of the lion. Here, they do not have the direct reference to nature as described in the inherent nature of a quality and in the configuration. The external appearance is not a status. It does not have a metamorphosis ahead of it. It does not contain

something has become visible. Namely, something that Yorher could only just achieve differently, but "already" achieve; e.g. as matter of such-and-such a physical constellation. In its external appearance, we said, what the lion

"is". Instead of the inherent nature of a property, the task here is to understand to what extent it actually "is".

If something looks blue, then blue is of course a "that". This means that the body, in the quality in which it manifests itself, has detached itself from itself. However, the quality remains a "how". It is precisely here in the realm of mere sensuality, i.e. where it has its actual position. However, the quality is not just one of many properties, as if what it has were represented by their combination. Its inherent nature is something other than the relationship of a so-called characteristic to an object. It is a natural relationship: the fact that blue is a property, a quality, only acquires tangible meaning when it is determined by the transformation that is designated in the material "appearance". The property has no carrier at all. But it is no different with external appearance. The lion is

"That." Namely, what we perceive as an external appearance, in which colour and shape merely occur. Conversely, we say that it is "a lion." In doing so, we are not claiming that something here — for example, what one has before one's eyes — falls under the concept of "lion." It is simply wrong to allow "objects" to be found in perception and then defined (in the sense of classified). Rather, one defines the species here with "a lion". It was conceived when something was taken as an external appearance in the first place, or when something was addressed in terms of "its" external appearance.

Summary.

Herbart began with a thesis, which he then explained: The essence of things is not known to us through the senses. For the properties given in perception are relative . . . the body has colour, but not without light. What then is this property in the dark? . . . no property indicates what the body is in itself when left completely undisturbed.

Cases in which *da*e Was is known to us are, for example, the circle or the two. Both "are" a circle or two, insofar as they are determined or defined as such. But in both cases, something is missing that supports this determination. One cannot speak here of a "Waa of things" that would be known to *una*.

When asked what this thing is, one answers "iron". And not, for example, "ball" or "a piece of iron". Not because it is *x«8' «uro*, but because it is made of iron. Only when one knows the material does one know "what" the body is. So one does not ask directly about something like the definiteness of the object. One does not ask about a thing in itself. Rather, one asks about the things one deals with and which one must already have taken in terms of their material nature, even if one does not "know" them and therefore asks what they are. More specifically, one asks here about something that is specifically distinguished from other things. The concept of species presupposes the conception of "nature." And if one defines something as iron, one had to have considered its "simple" nature. The species designated as "human" in "Hyacinth" was something else. "hyacinth" was something else.

However, a completely different mode of determination applies in the case of the rainbow. We described the rainbow as something typical. What may be unknown here is something that was conceived more closely as a "phenomenon" due to the circumstances of its existence.

Finally, nothing has been determined in "spot". As A 'mere' spot has been mentioned, and that is where it ends. The spot can only be described. For example, as a 'blue spot'.

b)

However, Herbart understood the "whatness of things" differently. Namely, as what they are in themselves. Just as a triangle is a triangle and two is two.

"is." Only because of this could he continue: "Whoever knows the answer to the question, 'What is this thing?', answers according to the sum of its characteristics using the formula: This thing is a and b and e and d and e." One notices the correspondence of this formula with that of a praedieable substratum. The object has characteristics, features. If anything, then two, three and so on are objects. They are, without further ado. Namely, simply because a and 3 have been "defined" as different numbers and there is nothing that would be "one a".

Of course, Herbart does not want to take the formula quoted literally. He believes that then it would be incongruous.

"For the rule was of 'one', not of many things that **can** merely be added together but **cannot** be merged into a single entity... The thing is the possessor of those properties... Because one must recognise it by what it has and not by what it is, I feel compelled to admit that the thing itself remains unknown." The object remains "unknown" here, of course. Namely, insofar as one searches in vain for what was actually posited as existing here:

The number, the straight line, has a, b, c ... as properties, insofar as being straight is linked to a, b, c, "straight" itself denotes such a "thing". The straight line and the triangle are merely the basis of consequences that become apparent in what is straight or triangular. And that

what applies to the triangle does not refer to the individual individual, but to the particular, e.g. the right-angled triangle.

However, the difficulty that one thing is many things is also absent when the "thing" in the synthesis is constructed as actually consisting of a, b and c. For it is not binding in the sense that it was in the case of straightness, etc., that it should be a or b. *M e u k m a l e* are missing. The so-called object is here only "determined as an object". A synthesis is carried out whose boundary condition necessarily "remains unknown". A and b, etc., are "many" only under the supposition that, for example, a was something other than 3. The fact that Herbart left a and b etc. as different things, that he understood them as determinations in the same way as something is actually determined in "triangle", has its parallel in Maimon's remark that in *Eant* the question *quid facti* did not receive a sufficient answer with regard to synthesis. However, the question of the possibility of a connection is superseded in Kant by the fact of an original

"Synthesis." For Herbart, too, coherence is a connection that would have a true, i.e., a connection inherent in itself, whose truth cannot be reduced to mere factuality. However, "real thinking" cannot be questioned at all when it comes to things. The triangle can be linked to other determinations as a determination.

However, the possibility of its further determination does not change the fact that it is "finitely" determined. It is simply not defined at this moment; and it is also not defined in the sense that something abstract and general remains ultimately defined, insofar as its ultimate definitions are simply open. ("Logically," the surface is the more general and therefore also the simpler concept than the plane. However, F. Klein says of the concepts of an "arbitrary curve" and an "arbitrary surface" that "from a mathematical point of view, nothing is more obscure and un-

more certain than the aforementioned ideas" ... Their investigation could "only be approached once the theoretical framework of elementary geometry had been established on the basis of suitable axioms and the conclusions derived from them"*.

Mathematically, straight lines and planes are elementary.

The triangle and the straight line are often referred to as ideal objects. But it is not enough to simply assign them the
To deny "reality" when one cannot dispute the plurality of triangles. For example, there are congruent triangles. The only thing that is correct is that here, too, what is associated with properties is only "the triangle," but not what has the value of a triangle. Only the certainty indicated in "triangle" can be linked internally, which is read as inherent to the triangle. ("Triangle" is a concept in a different sense than, for example, "grey horse". In both cases, one can explain something like their "concept". But only "grey horse" is a quality concept. A grey horse is a horse insofar as it is white; white is implied as a defining characteristic, it belongs d e t e r m i n a t i v e l y and not only p r ä d i k a t i v to the concept of the grey horse. In terms of its colour, something is called a grey horse. One can say that "grey horse" is also defined in relation to simple and empirically given concepts, such as "horse". However, in the case of "grey horse", only a designation is set. But it is not a "Object" has been "defined" here.) •

Blue, hard, etc. cannot be linked; there are no such "determinations" as straight, etc. If one rigidly adheres here to objects determined by blue and hard

i On the first award of the Lobachevsky Prize (Math. Ann. L, p. 586/8). ø H e r m. R i t z e I , But analytical judgements (Jahrb. f. Philos. u. phäno-nöenol. Forsch. III, p. s8á.
3 Aueh der „Körper“ der Physil im Sinne eines mechanischen Systems ist kein Qualitäts-, aondern ein definiertes Begriffi und deshalb analysierbar
The physical properties here establish a difference compared to geometric structures, e.g. something can only have "the value" of such a body.

If we had to, the aporia developed by Herbart would inevitably arise. Blue, hard, etc. are then simply four things, which in turn would be one thing. Namely, the object that supposedly has blue, hard, etc. as its properties, but which in fact can only be broken down into "pre-existing" elements.

However, we emphasised that blue is by no means an abstraction among others in the predicative constitution of an object, but simply a colour. Blue cannot "determine" anything else. For example, not something like the thing. But that was not "determined" at all. The so-called determinations were predicates, and the supposedly determined individual concrete was represented so completely in predicates that it constituted itself as an "object" in their coverage or contradiction. Namely, in an infinite succession of such positions, whose diversity, defined by the unknown boundary condition of the entire system, was reflected in the so-called object and in its "individuality"; the transcendental-philosophical concept of truth was thus laid out in Leibniz's monad.

What is referred to as a candle is not simply "the same" as what is "made of wax". The candle can only be made of wax, and wax plays the role of the material, but not that of the substance. The identity in the change was not the identity of an object persisting in the change. What was identical here, or rather what was identical, was the object persisting in the change.

What was identical here, or rather

what remained, could not be specified at all. This question itself was wrong. All that could be discovered was a transformation or metamorphosis. However, the example of metamorphosis clearly shows that there would be no metamorphosis at all if something remained "identical" here. Metamorphosis and transformation only refer to different modes in which one is linked to the other. It is not the case that "something" simply

loses its spherical shape and is no longer a sphere. Rather, what remains can only be taken as a mere piece and characterised by the determination of "one" substance. The "one" only acquires meaning here through nature, which was conceived; it does not refer to the so-called "object".

So all that remained was to deal with "the things". Here, the problem of inherence came into play. In the scheme of the object, the change appeared as a change in inherent properties. It could only be grasped here when a change was registered. But: in and through them, iron undergoes changes; the silver thaler is transformed. They experience destinies. The minting of the taler disappears in its wear and tear insofar as it is gradually destroyed. The taler is transformed in the process; for in the end, only a piece of silver remains. And the iron oxidises; the iron has no properties with which it could be clad, as it were, in a phase. The so-called change manifests itself in concrete terms as something very different, namely, for example, as fate or all that is to come, and we said that something had been taken into account in the circumstances of its existence in the case of the rainbow, which "plays" in colours and cannot be defined as such and as being so. The so-called change is not opposed by any persistence.

It is not only in the case of the rainbow or the bruise that it is impossible to speak of their properties or characteristics

Persistence and change can only be juxtaposed if one brings change into the scheme that something remains unchanged remains as it was **es vorher** Then persistence is no longer **nur** borderline case of change. Becoming different does not simply remain unfulfilled. Yielmehr is æ from the outset a possible probationary period brtl. Pæet-, insofar as we øß only with the change, i.e. with possible result of such a change **ing** confuse. The Andøri- that belongs to the form of the change **wird** not abolished dumh the similarity of the later state of Dinga with the earlier one. What bø- hent ütðArum still æoht about the Aedæung h. mmm° men; the persistence Rather, its meaning is based on change.

speak. It also fails in the case of the minted silver coin or the blue-painted bench, whose parts may have been completely replaced at some point, yet which has remained "the same" bench. The question of what they are in themselves cannot be asked at all. But this is not so easy in the case of the egg. The question of what iron is is answered by the sum of its characteristics. One can "recognise" iron by these characteristics. That is, one determines that a metal submitted for testing is iron. The melting point is related to the physical and chemical constitution of iron, which explains its states. But what then should actually remain unknown here? One asks, "What is iron in itself?" But "in itself" is, for the time being, nothing more than an empty definition applied to things out of nowhere. One "knows" what something is when one has "determined" it. For example, as iron. But in this case, with regard to knowledge, that is necessarily the end of the matter. The determination means something different for iron than it does for a straight line or a triangle, which are defined, i.e., constituted by determinacy.

The characteristics of iron are not properties belonging to iron properties. We would describe its colour, for example, as such a property. For its inherent nature was to be regarded as a natural relationship. The category of property had been determined by the simple nature of something. However, this must be limited for the time being; it remains open whether this concept of property perhaps represents only one of several equally possible variations of "property".

In the concept of appearance, however, the property of "what things are" takes on meaning. The sensory quality has been translated into the material nature of the body as a what. The body has become visible. And the light that is foreign to it. So it is left alone in this. And just as it is itself, it is seen there. The appearance

is inherent in it, namely not a material change, but a status. If one describes it as a peculiarity of the realisation that something is contained within it, but yet remains untouched and distant, then it acquires its primary meaning in how things are seen here at the level of phenomenality. The immediacy of seeing is different from that of perception. For when one confronts perception with what one only suspects or deduces on the basis of an experience that is immediate in this sense, perception is an actual interaction with things, where one also encounters them and faces them.

Originality therefore has various roots; firstly, the immediacy of perception mentioned above; then the originality implied in appearance, because something has been revealed and made apparent there and has thus gained its "in itself" as opposed to originality in the third

sense, as is the case, for example, with hardness. For here one can only speak of its originality insofar as hardness does not belong to phenomenality, but to the thing itself.

.just as it is primarily in its vivid decisiveness. Colours and tones are qualities of a different kind, like the fence, which tells us nothing about itself and only about the thing to which it belongs. In no case, however, does originality simply present itself as the immediacy of fulfilling perception. "Knowledge" is modified according to the reference to "things" that is evident in the circumstances of my existence and refracted in various ways in the senses. However, it is not only "intentionally related" to an object that is constituted in theses and verifiable. It has no such pretension to truth whatsoever. The things I encounter — which I see or hear — are not objects. But what I know or what I do not yet know is something that is in each case "assigned" by me and for me in one way or another.

The concept of what is "given" in a natural setting reflects the reference to an "object" to which theses are motivated, confirmed or crossed out. The "given" can only be represented as *ens praedicabile*. In the predication, which can be true or false, something has merely been "found". However, in the reference of the statement to a "theme", the dialectic of the logical copula is designated, which is dealt with in Part II of these investigations.

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