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INTRODUCTION
INTO ETHNIC
Psychology

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Gustav Gustavovich Shpet (1878–1937) — a prominent Russian thinker, a follower of Husserl, who made a significant contribution to the development of contemporary philosophy (philosophy of language, hermeneutics, aesthetics and the history of philosophy), as well as in art history, psychology and a number of other fields. Shpet's original constructions, his innovative ideas and research methods have not lost their relevance and scientific interest even today.

Introduction to Ethnopsychology is one of G. G. Shpet's major works. In which, based on a rigorous phenomenological method, he provides a masterful analysis of cultural and historical existence in one of its manifestations — social existence — and explores the concepts of "individual" and "collective," defining the very place of ethnic psychology in the system of sciences. It defines the place of ethnic psychology in the system of sciences.

The book is recommended for the widest possible readership. readers.

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FOREWORD

This edition of *the Introduction* reproduces my article, published in *Psychological Review* in 1919, in a revised and expanded form. Even then, according to the author's intention, this article was the first in

русском языке, из соображений исторической справедливости

Introduction to the study of ethnic psychology. The second part of the work (1920–1921) was presented by me, in its main part, at the Moscow Linguistic Society, which was then functioning at Moscow University, and was devoted to the methodology of *research* itself. The material I had collected was then incorporated into a university course, which I taught at Moscow University. In the Cabinet of Ethnic Psychology, which I founded at the same time, I planned to test my theoretical positions in the laboratory. The circumstances of the time prevented me from continuing this work. However, the growing interest in regional studies and the study of so-called national minorities is bringing the problems of ethnic psychology back into the spotlight, and I felt it was timely to once again defend my views, convinced that they could be of real importance for the development of a new

научной дисциплины.

A significant part of this issue is devoted to criticism and polemics. This is necessary both as a general clearing of the air and as a way of more clearly defining one's own position. The most recognised authority in the field of ethnic psychology, W. Wundt, has been subjected to the most severe attack on my part. In my opinion, Wundt represents the culmination of the development of psychological science in the second half of the 19th century — an apostle of the voluntaristic reaction against intellectualistic Herbartianism, on the one hand, and of psychophysical experimentation against spiritualistic commissions of the type of Fichte the Younger, Ulrich and Podobny, on the other. The new psychology was born in the same 1870s (the first edition of Wundt's *Outlines of Physiological Psychology* in 1873, *Psychology from an Empirical Point of View*, Brentano, 1874). Later attempts to renew psychology as a science in the form of various types of descriptive psychology, which arose independently of Brentano's reform (e.g., Dilthey and his followers), now merge into one. And if Humpf, Marty, and Meinong were direct students of Brentano, then the Englishman Stout joined the new psychology, following other teachers. Perhaps even more indicative is the sharp turn away from Wundt, accompanied by heated controversy, by representatives of the so-called Würzburg experimental school (*the psychology* of Aug. Mec-cepa 1914 can be considered the first experiment *in the new psychology system*). Finally, examples such as Jaspers (K. Jaspers) seem to unify all the genealogical diversity of new psychology.

It would seem that under such conditions there is no need for controversy; it is necessary to build on the positive foundation that has been found only . However, what has been done in *general*

psychology has not yet found its application in its specific areas, in particular in ethnic psychology. The aforementioned need to "clear the way" remained here. This necessity is further emphasised by the fact that Wundt's psychology, having taken a dominant position, has penetrated other specialities, where it has become, like Herbart's psychology before it, a kind of orio conzmuizis*. Linguists, philologists, literary scholars, legal scholars, ethnologists, and historians, too busy with their own specialised work, cannot enter into a discussion of issues raised by the struggle for the rights of the new psychology, and,

И ЖДИТСЯ В ПОМОЩИ КТО КОЙ СЫ ТО НИ БЫЛО ПСИХОЛОГИИ,

СПЕШИТ ВОСПОЛЬЗОВАТЬСЯ ХОТЯ ОТСТАЛЫМ, НО ОТСТОЯВ-

They seemed more stable. And they stood firm in the face of danger, scepticism and consistent, though not fundamental, opposition from the psychological community (for example, G. Naul). Some voices from specialists who warned about Wood's mistakes in their field of expertise (e.g., van Gygene in linguistics) did not warn: these mistakes are visible to specialists and therefore pose no danger to them, as long as his psychology is authoritative, and these mistakes stem not from his psychology, but from his insufficient familiarity with their speciality — they are as forgivable as the mistakes of specialists in the field of psychology are forgivable. True, there were more serious warnings, showing that, for example, Wundt's linguistic errors stem directly from errors in his psychology (A. Marty), but even these warnings are only now beginning to be seriously evaluated.

-
- general opinion (Latin)

And only now are statements such as the one made by Firkant at the last *Congress of Aestheticians and Art Historians in Berpie* (1924) beginning to take on real meaning. Firkandt categorically and generally expressed an opinion that I would also like to convey to the reader with my critique of Wundt: a deeper understanding of art requires a special psychology of primitive peoples; we are only at the beginning of it; "Wundt's ethnic psychology has no part in it (hat keinen Anteil an ihr); it attempts to pave the way to understanding without fundamental research structural razli-

•Јени њ и родстве нных этом у воп росов• (Kongress-bericht... — S. 348).

Is it worth dwelling on the fact that *our* situation is even more basic? Scientific psychology is in a state of neglect here, and if our linguists, art historians, and ethnographers wanted to make use of its services, where would they find an authoritative source? Here are some examples that come to mind (not the worst ones; I could name the worst ones — pomipericulosa*): one from the field of "poetic style" ("Elster's principles" — an authority!), the other a whole "guide" to "theory of literature"; the third is "syntax in psychological terms" (the author is an extremely respected name in *his* field) — but what kind of psychology is this? And what if, in fact, their special conclusions were based on this psychology?.. But if the Western colleagues of our specialists — who are always authorities for us — still live by "Wundtism," then it seems that there is no better support for us either... The author knows from experience that his own criticism of Wundt

• Dangerous names (Latin)

and was sometimes regarded as mere enthusiasm and an expression of a certain penchant for paradox. But all this proves the necessity of the criticism I have undertaken, especially since I know of no other similar work in our or Western literature to which I could refer. I do not dwell in such detail on the principles of French sociologists (the Durkheim school, Lévy-Bruhl) or American "social psychologists" (from Brinton to Malinowski), firstly, because criticism of them should be conducted primarily empirically, rather than fundamentally, and secondly, because my definition of ethnic psychology follows Steintal's line of thought, and, consequently, others are of interest to me only as temporary opponents or allies.

The main thing that connects me with this school is the preservation of its psychological terminology. My contribution lies in the new interpretation and application of this terminology and in the method that follows from it. The central term here has always been the term "soul" or "spirit of the people" . But, one might say, it was Brentano who, as is well known, revealed the positive meaning of the slogan (proclaimed by A. Lange) "psychology *without a soul*," and if *general* psychology can do without such a subject as

"souls," does this not apply even more so to

the "soul of the people"? I think that by now the term "soul" has been so thoroughly cleansed of metaphysical remnants that it can be used with confidence, knowing that even the most nervous individuals will be able to resist the temptations of its new charm, — only by giving the term some positive content from the science of "working concepts" — that of

what physicists call "molecule," being aware of the unreal, fictitious meaning of the corresponding "thing." It is only necessary to abandon the idea of the soul as a substance in order to immediately discard all hypotheses about its role as a substantial factor in social life. The same applies to the term "spirit." Only under this condition can both terms be interpreted in a serious sense as *a subject* (*materia in qua**) — which Hegel already demanded of "spirits." The term "spirit of the people," similar (but not identical) to "spirit of the times," "spirit of the profession, class, solidarity," etc., is now convenient in that it is interpreted *collectively*. This, in turn, finally overcomes the traditional conception of the subject as an individual person — a vague biological cover for the same hypothesis of substance. And further, it is easy to see the already actual positive content of the term. *Formally*, this is only an indication of a certain type or character, and therefore something that is initially collective, which obliges us, conversely, to treat the individual — in its structure and composition — as collective. All this is no longer a simple interpretation and reinterpretation of the term, but a new meaning, *a new principle, a new method*.

In reality, behind this formalism lies, critically speaking, a negative attitude towards any conception of the "spirit" or "soul" as a spontaneously acting factor that determines other forms of existence. Consequently, statements that this or that phenomenon in the life of a people is determined by "its spirit" no longer have any *psychological* meaning other than metaphorical (similar to "the sun rises"). Similarly,

* Materlz, in (relation to) which (Latin)

loses its former literal meaning of reasoning about the "spirit" and "soul" of the collective as some kind of "interaction" (formal, i.e. here — a hollow concept) between "uniquely real" individuals; the individual itself is collective, both in composition and as a product of collective influence. The real meaning, and this is already a positive definition, of such expressions lies elsewhere. *The reality* is a collective that should not necessarily be only a disorderly multitude by definition (like a "pile of sand"), but also orderly, organised (like a "library"), and...

ТОМ {ЭПИЛ ОН В СВОЮ Й СОБОК ИЗЗОСТИ И В СИЛ СОВО К П И 4 ОСТИ

He, the collective, is a subject of collective action, КО7 О-рое, which, in its psychological nature, is nothing more than the collective subjective reaction of the collective to all objective phenomena occurring in nature and its own socialised life and history. Every historically formed collective — a nation, a class,

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imagines, evaluates, loves and hates the objectively current situation, the conditions of its existence, its very existence — and *it* is precisely in *this relationship to* what objectively exists that its "spirit" is expressed, or •"character," or "nature," in the real sense.

It follows from the above that the material of psychology in this sense is entirely *objective*. We take "expression" and "expression" seriously as such, . i.e. as *the objectification of* the subject in

NEWS. БЫ ЛОЛ ЖН Ы ИЗПЩ ИТЬС Я «ЗП КЛЮ ЧПТЬ» ОТ О Ёе КТИ П-

to the corresponding subject. The mistake not only of Wundt, but of all psychologism, is that it views this kind of objectification as the realisation of the idea. This is what gives psychologists reason to say

It is as if every product of culture is a psychological product. The realisation of an idea is, in fact, objective, just as the idea itself is objective, and psychology has nothing to do with it; here, too, there are objective laws. But it is realised by subjects, and only through them it is in the objectification of all labour and creativity that the subjective and psychological are introduced. Any phenomenon of cultural and social life can be viewed as the necessary implementation of the laws of this life, but the idea passes through people's minds, becomes subjective, and subjectivism is introduced into the very objectification. A cultural phenomenon as an expression of meaning is objective, but in this expression there is a conscious or unconscious attitude to this "meaning", and it is precisely this that is the object of psychology. Not meaning, not significance, but co-significance, *accompanying* the realisation of the "historical" subjective reactions, experiences, attitudes towards it — this is the subject of psychology. *The sphere* of life is objectively enclosed and closed, the psychological atmosphere surrounding it is subjectively fluctuating. One must be able to read the "expression" of culture and social life in such a way as to understand their meaning and to sympathetically grasp, feel, and experience the subjective moods that accompany it. The labour and creativity of subjects are objectively captured and *expressed* in the products of labour and creativity, but this objective *image* also contains the subjective. In reality, it is a single process, but the scientific objects are different. A physical thing consists of natural material, no matter how much we change its form. *Whether* we make a statue or a gallows out of wood, only the form has changed. But as a social phenomenon, as a product of labour and creativity, as a thing and an object of consumption, this is simply a "sensual thing."

According to Marx, it is "sensual and supersensual" — he says that it "*reflects to people* the social character of their *own* labour in the form of the inherent properties of the products of labour themselves." One does not need to be a materialist, whether out of conscience or fear, to recognise the truth and the observable fact, and the methodological requirement that follows from it.

If we recognise the entire sphere of labour and creativity as objective, as anti-psychologism demands, it may seem that too little remains for psychology — except for purely formal definitions of reactions, such as: fast — slow, strong — weak, rich — poor, etc. formal definitions of reactions from the subject's point of view, such as: fast — slow, strong — weak, rich — poor, etc. And often, indeed, coui-al-psychological characteristics are limited to such indications (cf. banal: "•ITP-allies pea ruyt lively, quickly, the Dutch — slowly, sluggishly," etc.). However, if we do not limit ourselves to such banalities, we will soon see that the most elementary characteristics, such as "decisive," "impetuous," "passionate," etc., already require psychological analysis that is not merely formal. What we have called the "reactions" of the collective, its attitude to things and people, its "responses" to life and work, is already an endless realm of feelings, moods, and characters, for all social and ethnic psychology is essentially *social characterology*. But even so-called objective experiences are clearly subject to psychological analysis, both in terms of their composition, which is determined by the objective social conditions of time and place, and in terms of their predominant character. And we must recognise that

that the field of social psychological research ultimately encompasses not only the field of individual psychological study, but is even broader than it. In addition to the fact that social psychology from the very beginning raises the general and fundamental question of the determining environment, the material for study here is richer. After all, general psychology only treats the expression of emotions in any detail as a special (alongside introspection) source of study. And even then, it does not set itself the task of objectively capturing the subject in the products of his creativity, but only his natural anatomical and physiological apparatus. The expression of other mental experiences is *objectively* studied by it only on the basis of limited material on general psychophysical expression. On the contrary, social and ethnic psychology have at their disposal an abundant wealth of individually and typically diverse material from an infinite number of creative products themselves, bearing the subjective imprint of time, peoples, countries, etc. And the point here is not the empirical self-limitation of the researcher, but the tasks of the research itself. For general

PSYCHOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE К Л Ъ Т } Э И З О - С О У И Д Л Ы Н Ъ Х П } Э О Д К -

labour and creativity are, at best, only *an example of the general*, known from direct psychophysical observation. For social psychology, it is not only the temporal and spatial diversity of products and their subjects that is significant and interesting, but also — most importantly — their systematic distribution according to sociological categories (class, profession, economic groups, educational institutions, religious associations, everyday attitudes, etc.)

In the following, the author discusses his topic as it applies to *language*. One could choose any

Эthnic psychology has a wealth of material at its disposal but it is less clear in defining its tasks and establishing its own subject matter. The observations that constitute the material of this science are as ancient as those of its sister science, ethnology, and Herodotus, Xenophon, Caesar, Tacitus, Strabo, and Pliny must be mentioned. apparently among древних

SOURCE КОБ ETHNICITY PSYCHOLOGY. ALREADY TYPE ИК pИТ attempts to link the characteristics of national characters with differences in climate and geographical conditions.

But it is the data of ethnography that attracts scientific attention as material for psychological processing for the first time in an age that, with full awareness of the seriousness of science, has placed *the science of man* at the centre of its attention. Locke already used ethnographic arguments, and in the 18th century we encounter frequent attempts in psychological analysis to go beyond the "individual" and make the "collective" — the people and humanity — the subject of psychological research. Montesquieu used the concept of "national character," which he attributed to the environment and climate. Russo's a priori constructions provoked an understandable reaction among scholars familiar with the material that had brought about the great discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries. Research by naturalists

Such figures as L. Linnaeus, J. Buffon, and J. Blumenbach, working in the field of physical anthropology, could not help but touch upon the psychological aspects of *Homo sapiens*. Finally, ethnological, historical, political, linguistic and similar studies should, in turn, have led to the idea of a separate subject of ethnic psychology — the experiments of Iselin, Lord Kems (G. Gom) and Ferguson are already clearly moving in this direction. Teten seems to foresee the possibility of a new science: "What a task it would be to trace the inner humanity in all its various external states and to investigate the sensations, the uplifting of the spirit, the capacities of the heart, the powers of the will, which are revealed in each of these states; and then to observe their distinctive features in terms of degree, intensity, spread and duration of passive and active abilities, as well as the relationships arising from them. Perhaps the future will bring such a fascinating history of humanity and morality based on it; let us only hope that the current zeal for the study of man does not cease.

Anthropology, and in particular mental anthropology, at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, invariably included as an essential component a section devoted to questions of the psychology of peoples and races. For psychology in the early and mid-19th century, which was closely linked to philosophy, the idea of "Ayxa" and "national spirit," introduced into scientific discourse, was of enormous importance.

TeiensU. Pl3 ilosophisl3e Versucl3e uber die menscli lich3e Na-tur. — V. II. — Lpz., I 777. — S. 600. — Fairness demands that we not forget and ignore the historian:zkt and no poca (Bakt, che'o Reed in *Essays on the intellectual yowvrs of nien* (1785) reminds us of the scientific nature of "social actions of the mind" (Ess ays4... — I. Ch. 111 . — Of social operations of п3 ind).

The philosophy of history of Vegelina, on the one hand, and Herder, on the other, transformed by the Romantics into a code concept, popularised by the so-called historical school in the doctrine of law, deepened and interpreted by Hegel. This idea was interpreted in a unique way in the school of new psychology of Herbart, and his *followers* laid the foundation for contemporary ethnic psychology. This applies in particular to T. Weitz and Lazarus with Steintal; and it was the latter who introduced the name Völkerpsychologie, which has remained in use to this day. Perhaps it was linguistics rather than psychology that led them to the new science. In this regard, the name of W. Humboldt cannot be forgotten among their predecessors. Ethnology itself, primarily in the person of Bastian, supported the new science. Finally, Wundt's ethnic psychology is closely linked to a new direction in psychology, the founder of which is Wundt himself.

On the other hand, among the numerous forms of its manifestation, Or. Comte's idea of dynamic sociology has found those that are predominantly based on data from ethnography and ethnic psychology. Some studies in this direction — whatever name their authors give them — are, in terms of their content, also studies in the field of ethnic psychology. For example, this applies entirely to the direction led by Durkheim with his *L'Annee sociologique*, among whose representatives, along with Durkheim, Lévi-Bruhl occupied the most prominent place. Finally, in England, Comte's idea of sociology found support in Spencer's sociology, which is also rich in material on ethnic psychology; it is impossible to imagine the realisation of J. S. Mill's idea of "political ethology" without the support of

A significant contribution to the very content of this discipline was made in England, in particular by E. Taylor and Frazer.

And from these general observations, it is already clear that this psychological science has not only a name, but also a rich historical content that continues to grow. Nevertheless, doubts about the right of *ethnic psychology* to exist arise from many different sides. One Russian scholar, for example, categorically stated in 1905: "A few years will pass, and 'folk psychology' will already be a thing of the past." Not all critics of the "new science," however, take such an extreme negative view. Some believe that it solves problems that other sciences set for themselves; others find that it does not and will not justify the tasks and be the basis for other specialised "sciences of the spirit," and therefore does not have the right to exist; finally, still others directly and openly object only to its name. The latter, of course, can be counted among those who continue to place their hopes in this science, but by denying its name, they do not shed any light on the definition of its true subject and tasks. I am convinced that such disagreement in the very fact of recognising ethnic psychology as a special science, or discipline, or at least *a branch* of science — despite *the fact that research in this field continues on our soil* — — such disagreement is caused, if not exclusively, then mainly by extreme uncertainty in defining the subject of ethnic psychology and, consequently, its place among other sciences.



B In a preliminary announcement about a new journal
ed in January 1859, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und*
S *Wissenschaft*, its editors, Lazarus and Steintal, stated that ethnic
psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*) did not yet exist as a separate science,
but ^{that} the groundwork for it had been laid². From the growth of
psychological knowledge and the desire not only to know

²Published under the same editorship for 30 years; during this
time, 20 volumes of the journal were published.

20 tasks of *Völkerpsychologie* in connection with the science of language Steintal already mentions in his book: *Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie*. — V., 1855. — §§ 138—143 (p. 387 ff.) The year of publication of this book is apparently the year of the birth of our science, and not 1859, as is commonly stated. Steintal himself, in this book, cites Lauapyc'a's 1851 article (in *Deutsches Museum*) as the first indication of the idea of a new science, but he also notes its presence in K. Ritter and W. Humboldt, whom he thus considers, to a certain extent, to be our predecessors (pp. 388–369). In our country, it is customary to translate the term *Völkerpsychologie* as "folk psychology," which is, first of all, ambiguous. My translation: "ethnic psychology" (adjective — ethnopsychological) seems more convenient and accurate to me. Italians have long used the term *psicologia etnica* (but also *demopsicologia*).

the **a c t u a l** history of humanity and individual nations, but also to understand it in its internal foundations, "there arises a need to study the laws of social life and where it manifests itself not in individuals, but in various kinds of communities that it — therefore, in the broadest sense — in history. The task of such a science is therefore, in general, as follows: to prepare knowledge of the national spirit, just as psychology has hitherto striven to understand the individual spirit; or: to discover those laws of the human spirit which apply where many people live and act together as a kind of unity.

In the first issue of the journal, in an introductory article signed by both editors, the idea of a new science is revealed with more satisfactory completeness. Here, ethnic psychology is equated with "the science of the individual soul" as "the science of the national spirit, i.e., the study of the elements and laws of the spiritual life of peoples" (*Zeitschrift...* — 1. — IS. 7). According to the authors' explanation, this definition encompasses the following tasks: a) to understand *psychologically the essence* of the national spirit and its actions, b) to discover *the laws* by which internal, spiritual or ideal activity is carried out.

Russian readers were introduced to this article as early as 1859 by A. Z. Duvernoy in volume 11 of *Lemonicei rusgkoi ltimepn-tury i drevnosti* (*Lemonicei rusgkoi ltimepn-tury i drevnosti*), published by N. Tikhonrivov (Section II. — pp. 44-60), and in 1865 it was published as a separate booklet in Voronezh (reprinted from volumes 1 and V of "Philological Notes" from around 1864): *Mteintal and Latsafius*. Thoughts on folk psychology, conveyed by P. A. Giltebrandt. These references did not serve as a reason for us to accept and develop a new science.

the activity of the people, in life, art and science, and c) from КҖЕВІТ ОЦІОŠаутҖ, ПҖЕІ СНІ N ЬІ AND P O VODY БО3N AND KHOBC FI AND YA, the development and destruction of the individuality of any people. From this definition of ethnic psychology, it is clear that its authors understand it first and foremost as an explanatory science. At the same time, as can be guessed from the above comparison with history, ethnic psychology should be an explanatory science not only in itself, but also for history, and therefore for other "sciences of the spirit."

Indeed, the authors address the definition of the tasks of their science not only to psychologists, but also to all those who study historical phenomena of language, religion, art and literature, science, morals and law, social, state and domestic structures. 13 The basis of this appeal lies in their self-evident *premise* that all of the aforementioned phenomena must be explained from the inner essence of the spirit, i.e., they must be reduced to their psychological foundations (Ibid. — p. 1). This explanation is better understood in analogy with physiology as an explanatory science in relation to descriptive natural history. "But where," they ask, "is the physiology of the historical life of humanity? We answer: in ethnic psychology."

The tasks of ethnic psychology can be defined more precisely, on the one hand, by comparing it with psychology and, on the other hand, by comparing it with ethnology.

' Z 4eitshrift... — I. — 4S. 19. Cp.: La<•arus Geographie und Psjchologie. — Ibid. — S. 217.

Man as an "individual being" is the subject of *individual psychology*; social psychology, as the psychology of "social man or human society," arises alongside this psychology and as its "continuation" (Ibid. — p. 5). "Since the spirit of the people, however, lives only in individuals (in den Einzelnen) and has no existence separate from the individual spirit, it is natural that, as in the latter, only the same basic processes take place in it, which are explained in more detail by individual psychology" (Ibid. — p. 10— i). For authors such as the Herbartians, it follows that ethnic psychology also deals with associations and fusions, acceptance and condensation; in his work, further, the individual reveals his imagination, in practical life — reason and morality, and everywhere, but especially in religion — his feelings. In short, the *same* processes are at work here as in individual psychology, but more complexly and extensively; individual psychology also has a basis in ethnic psychology. Elsewhere, Lazarus, drawing an analogy between the two types of psychology, warns against excessive "analogy" and, limiting it only to "guiding principles of comparison," nevertheless establishes the thesis: "In the collective spirit, therefore, it can be said that individual spirits relate to each other in the same way that individual ideas or general spiritual elements relate to each other in the individual."

Z'NO SH S NIC ETN I CH CC KOI PS I KHOLOGII KOI /iOI OZIII

It is necessary to understand the following in this way. Ethnology, closely related to anthropology, considers humans—

' I inige sythetische Ged•uzkeiz zur Volkerpsychol die. — Zeitsc hrift... — 11I. — <S. h—9.

as an animal, as a product of evolution, abstracting from its spiritual development — in this sense, it can be regarded as a branch of zoology. But since man is more than an animal, since his nature also includes spirit, "physical ethnology" is joined by "*psychic ethnology*," i.e., the psychology of peoples (Z 4eitschrift... — 1. — < S. 13).

Therefore, ethnic psychology could be defined as the study of the spiritual nature of the human race and peoples, since it forms the basis of history or, in fact, the spiritual life of nations.

}EODOV.

YITIZ K, IS KHODYA IZ PSY CHOLOGII, M Y OT IDINICHNO GI Z D -

We come to the spirit of the people, and based on ethnology, we can come to the peoples as modifications of the human spirit from the human being as a natural species with its ramifications. Accordingly, in ethnic psychology, we can distinguish two parts: the first speaks of the spirit of the people in general, of the general conditions of their life and activity — it establishes the general elements of the relationship between the development of the spirit of the people and the development of the spirit of the individual., we can distinguish two parts: the first speaks of the spirit of the people in general, of the general conditions of their life and activity — it establishes the general elements of the relationship between the development of the spirit of the people and is part of the synthetic, general and abstract; the second, on the contrary, is concrete, it speaks of the truly essentialparticular forms of the national spirit and their development — it describes and characterises them in their specific features. "Therefore, the first part could be called *ethno-historical* (vëlkergeschichtliche) (ethnological and political) *psychology*, and the second — *psychological aetiology*, while the whole remains ethnic psychology (Vëlkerpsychologie)" (Ibid. IS. > 26—27; cp. 63). Subsequently, Steintal agreed to cede this second part of ethnic psychology to ethnology itself, which, of course, even more sharply emphasised

the general, synthetic, law-establishing character of ethnic psychology, which was left with the tasks of only the first part.

A simple list of questions or "topics" that make up the content of ethnic psychology may in itself cause a lot of confusion and doubt, but, not wanting to get bogged down in details, I will not dwell on them — the essence of the matter will become clear

NOTHING AND 3 P;EI1-I TSIPI PILNOI K;EITI KI POH YATIY ETIZ I CH CC -

psychology. Therefore, I will limit myself here to merely considering these topics so that I can later use them as examples. Specifically, ethnic psychology studies language, customs related to food and clothing, up to and including the administration of law and state institutions, as well as art, crafts, scientific culture, and religion.

'Begriff der Vtil kcrpsychologie.—Z4eitschrift... —XV I I. —< S. >

246. 6fi We would rather call *the aetiology* 'іастью more general, but it is possible that Steintal simply has what we call *ethnography*.

' 2:+eitschrift... — I — 4S. 30. A more detailed analysis of the issues. — S. 40—60. Cp. also: Ibid. — IV. — p. 134 (Special explanation about *science* in Steintal's article *Zur Geschiclitie der 'issenschaft*).



Thus, the basic concepts used by Lauapycya and Steintal to define the subject are clearly indicated. et chology. Indigenous peoples have a concept of *spirit*, which is further specified by reference to *collectivity* and even more specifically by reference to the form of this collectivity, *the people*. What content does ethnic psychology invest in these concepts?

In defining these concepts, we encounter great difficulties arising from the vagueness and even internal contradictions of the corresponding definitions, as well as a certain bias in the premises. The main premise, for example, in Lazarus and Steintal, is the belief that "spirit" is the subject of psychology (Z~~C~~eitschrift... — I. — S. 3), but until the meaning of this term is clarified, this is far from self-evident. Such bias stems from the analogy between the "national spirit" and the "individual spirit," and only from this analogy can one understand how ethical psychology is a "continuation" of individual psychology.

Having established this dogma, the authors at the same time made considerable efforts to emphasise the uniqueness of the spirit as a special subject of study. First of all, the concept of spirit must be understood from the fact that man is predestined by his very nature to social life and necessarily constitutes a member of society. Since individual psychology distracts precisely from

SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR OF HUMAN BEINGS, THEN IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOUL

as a spiritual entity can be the subject of a special science. Truly human life, say the authors, spiritual activity is possible thanks to joint and mutual action (*das Zusammen und Ineinander-Wirken*). "The spirit is the common product (*das gemeinſchaftliche Erzeugniſs*) of human society" (1. — S. 3). In this definition, the essential point is obviously the reference to *the interaction* of individuals, the result of which is d.t.

This is entirely consistent with the characterisation of spiritual interaction as *an objective spirit*, which Lazarus gives elsewhere in his journal (111. — p. 41). "Wherever a certain number of people live," he says there, "the necessary result of their life together will be that their subjective spiritual activity develops into objective spiritual content, which then becomes *the content, form, and organ* of their further subjective activity." Thus, *objective* language arises from the subjective activity of speech. Perhaps all this is true, but the opposition between the *subjective* and *objective* spirit is striking, and if the former is the object of psychology, why should psychology study the latter? For example, the proof

proof of Pythagoras' theorem is an objective result of subjective activity, but it would be strange if this theorem were studied not in geometry but in psychology. Perhaps the same is true of language and other "products" of subjective activity?

At least outwardly, but to a certain extent, this difficulty is eliminated if we return to the analogy of the national spirit with the individual soul, where the spirit can no longer be understood as a "result," but must be interpreted as a subject or *source* of spiritual activity. But here we encounter new difficulties: first, there is a temptation to postulate the "spirit," and then it remains unclear how we can penetrate from the objective expressions of the spirit to the spirit itself as a special object. Lazarus and Steintal recognise that the spirit of a people is not something permanent and unchanging; it changes throughout history. At the same time, however, they assume that a specific national spirit "contains something substantial, an unchanging core, which *itself* determines all changes in the spirit" (I. — S.+ 63). This careless formula should not, however, be taken literally, but it is always indicative of the difficulties encountered by its authors — the temptation to hypostasise in the face of unclear definitions is great here... The most accurate expression of their thought, it seems, is found in the following explanation by Lazarus (I I I. — S.T 7). "The spirit of the people," he says, "exists in the individual spirits belonging to the people. But it is precisely at the point of view that the spirit of the people has its subsistence in individual spirits that, on the one hand, scientific research into its activity becomes possible, and on the other hand, the need for a special task, different from research, becomes apparent.

individual spiritual life." We have no experience of this kind of knowledge about the soul of the people, analogous to the idea of the world soul. "So, by observing individuals (der Einzelne), we need to investigate

WHAT IS THIS 3H8 CH I'G, WHAT BO3NI KöT NEW e P} ö N TS bl .

To do this, one must know how they operate. — But it is obvious that such recognition only provides grounds for a purely formal analogy between individual and national spiritual activity (in both cases — associations, delays, and so on), or does it mean that the study of the spirit of the people boils down to the study of the individuals who comprise it, who are thus the real bearers of the objective spirit, i.e., in other words, it turns out that the objective spirit is studied by means of subjective individual psychology. Ethnic psychology, in this way, is dispersed into individual psychology, and if, nevertheless, there are still some specific tasks here, then they should simply constitute a "part" of individual psychology.

That "frequent" may be a special unity or unity of subjective processes. Lazarus and Shz insist that in the concept of the national spirit, if we do not want it to remain an empty name, we must see not an indefinite, vague post-position or a fantastic image of the inner qualities of the people, but a subject of all internal and external activity. But then we must bear in mind not the separate and random directions and facts of its manifestation, but their *unity* and *the laws* of their development. "The spirit, in the highest and truest sense of the word, is precisely *the regular movement and development of internal activity*" (1. — S. 7). This means that the spirit itself

is nothing more than a peculiar unity of mental processes, which does not coincide with the unity that arises from the soul itself. At least, this is how Lazarus's explanation can be understood: "The main difference between them [between the individual and the national spirit] consists, obviously, first of all in the fact that in the individual, large and often very separate masses of representations are connected by the unity of the subject; while in the national spirit, on the contrary, the unity of the object arises only from the similarity or combinability of content in individuals" (111. — +S. > 9). Consequently, the "subject" of ethnic psychology, as the unity of known types of activity of individuals, is in essence only the idea that unites these types, and the new thing that falls to the lot of ethnic psychology, as its subject, may be this unity itself in its concrete forms.

Such a conclusion is, of course, quite acceptable, but it creates new difficulties: 1) how do we arrive at such an idea, and is it not its *pure* domain, rather than psychology, that is *the true basis of "n'fx o duh"*? 2) How can we understand that ethnic psychology is an *explanatory* science, without assuming that the ideal unities mentioned have *the power* of real action?

By denying the substantiality of the national spirit, Litsa-pyc and Steintal insist even more strongly on the inadequacy of the concept *of the subject* as a definite unity — the question now is how this unity is achieved (I. — S.T. 28). *The simple sum* of individual spirits does not constitute such unity; on the contrary, a multitude of individuals only constitute *a people* when the spirit of the people unites them into one, and it is this spirit that is the bond.

principle, the idea of the people, their unity (I. — S. 29). How do we arrive at this idea? The spirit of the people, the authors define, is that which is common (gemeinsam) in the internal activity of all individuals of the people (allen Einzelnen des Volkes) in both content and form; or: "that which is *common in the internal activity of all individuals.*"

Such a definition is likely to cause great disappointment. The whole field of energetic psychology is

CSL AND COM OUVODI TC Y KI 3331e NEW INDIVIDUALS EL YZ OY PSYCHO-LOGY,
AND TO TOL bKO Tét KI IM P SHCHS MOZHNO ZN 3Tb THAT

common to all individuals. Moreover, if at

If the mother is still a phenomenon, sealed in the logical relations of genus and species, then the subsequent explanation of the phenomena of the national spirit can also only be individual-psychological. If, however, this commonality arises from an idea drawn from the very content — as required by simple consistency

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pr. +, and pr+t.T, must lie entirely in psychology.

It is clear that in both cases — even if we preserve the pro forma of its independence in ethnic psychology — it cannot be scientifically *explained*, and the concept of AUxа becomes derivative, secondary, an object of explanation rather than its source.



IV

Все названные недоумения, связанные с понятием «духа», как можно видеть уже из изложенного, проистекают из полной логики *the conceptual ambiguity of the notion of collective unity*. Some aspects of it need to be emphasised in particular. We are dealing with *two* concepts of collectivity which, while remaining distinct in themselves, can hardly be properly combined with each other. On the one hand, we are talking about *the interaction* of members who make up a collective whole. With this understanding, Lazarus and Steintal had to put the interaction itself at the forefront, in the form of the "result" of the activity of the spirit, as the object of study, and in the strict sense, this is no longer psychological processes, but not the individuals themselves, but something *else*. On the other hand, we are talking about *a certain commonality* in the mental life of individuals themselves, which can easily be thought of as a simple similarity of known mental functions and processes, conditioned, in the end, even by purely external conditions and circumstances of the life of a people or a group of individuals, as the authors themselves say: "the spirit of the people, i.e., consequently, the identical consciousness of many with consciousness

"A kind of, peculiar (Izt.)

This similarity, and consequently the idea of mutual belonging of these many in each of them, arises quite initially due to external relations of the same origin and close residence» (1. — S. 37). It is impossible to see how and why these similarities can be identified with *ozanwodeistvo*, a product of co-

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But just as these two concepts of *collective* agreement are incompatible with each other, they are also incompatible with the actual meaning of the content in which the subject of ethnic psychology should be revealed. Both in their oral and written expression, they are as *objective* a fact as a costume, a house, or a pavement, as a social fact, for it is precisely in its objectivity that it becomes social; The same applies to beliefs, which are social only in the forms of cult, rituals, and proverbs. In the same way, knowledge and science are also social only in their external, objective forms of **organisation**, etc. And every such area of facts constitutes a subject of study and has *its own science*. And if, in some respect, all this is connected with the concept of the people and united into one subject, then this subject also has its own science — ethnology.

On the other hand, language, science, customs, and beliefs do not represent any "similarities" in the psychology of individuals who make up a nation. At most, one could speak of similarities in experiences *related to* these objective social facts, but 1) then, along with them, one would have to include not only all other social and ethnic facts, but also natural ones, as well as ideas, because all these

objects can evoke similar and dissimilar reactions in both individuals and entire groups, and 2) this is precisely what Lauapyc and Shzeintal do not mention. If we ourselves take an unbiased approach to finding similarities in the psychological experiences of individuals who make up a particular *natural* group, then we must recognise that these similarities do not constitute any kind of special "spirit", but depend primarily on similarities in the corresponding *psychophysical* and anthropological organisations. To illustrate this idea, it suffices to recall the experiments in classifying the human psyche according to temperament, the distribution of predispositions or non-predispositions to certain types of diseases according to racial and anthropological characteristics, and so on.

Finally, I would like to note one more issue that arises in the analysis of concepts defining the subject of ethnic psychology. Perhaps, in the end, it is true that the "spirit" is *sui generis* collective unity, and yet it does not follow from this that it is the subject of *ethnic* psychology, since the concept of collectivity itself is not included in the concept of *the people* and is not identical to it. Collective associations of people can take many different forms. Estates, classes, groups, all kinds of "societies," armies, gangs, multiethnic hordes, secret and criminal organisations — all these are collective unities. And as such, they, in turn, can constitute the content of a special scientific subject — sociology, social psychology, history. What are the grounds for singling out *ethical* psychology, attributing fundamental significance to it, and

PHYSIOLOGY

not consider it a private matter, for example, sociology

OR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*

Lazarus and Steintal argue as follows: ethnic psychology is a continuation of individual psychology as the psychology of the social human being or human society, since for every individual that union which forms a nation — as something historically always given and distinct from all free cultural societies — is absolutely necessary and, in comparison with them, the most essential. On the one hand, a person never belongs only to the human race as a general species, and on the other hand, any other social union to which he or she may still belong is given through the mediation of the nation. The form of humanity's communal life is precisely its division into peoples, and the development of the human race is connected with the difference between races (I. —

B. 5). Of course, the very concept of "race" remains unclear, but psychological psychology, among other things, is called upon to reveal its meaning and significance in its content. — Despite the preliminary nature of the above argument, it is not without interest. It does not resolve the question of why ethnic psychology should be fundamental and explanatory in relation to other social sciences, since if "ethnicity" is empirically (historically) necessary and a common form, then it is not necessary to explain it. the main and explanatory one in relation to other social sciences, since if "the people" is *empirically* (historically) necessary and a common form of collective human life, it does not follow that it is a fundamentally necessary basis for any society. However, if we accept this argument only as a justification for the term "*ethnic*" in the definition of a special branch of psychology, it can be considered satisfactory.

New doubts arise only if, recalling previous definitions, we say that *the people*, being the subject of ethical psychology, like the rest of its content, must stand alongside it as the "result" of the national spirit, the interaction of individuals, its very constituents. This doubt is not at all a sophisticated trick, as it may seem; on the contrary, it leads to some important considerations, and it can be used to test the value of the definitions of ethnic psychology itself. It is impossible to dismiss it with a formal reference to the fact that "the people" is a vague concept in ethnic psychology, since no one would agree that "species-specific" concepts, such as beliefs, customs, language, etc., fit into such a category, and by going beyond the boundaries of the "people" in the study of these categories, will we not give rise to new doubts?

I will dwell on some of Lazarus and Steintal's highly interesting considerations, which I will use later on. Having asked themselves the question: what *is a people*, Lazarus and Steintal are not satisfied with the answer that comes from the natural-scientific genealogy of peoples, since, as they note, spiritual kinship and difference do not depend on genealogy (I. — IS. 34). Similarly, the indication of such objective characteristics as, for example, linguistic unity, does not achieve the goal, since, apart from empirical difficulties, we inevitably fall into a circle here: to the question "what is a *single* language," we have to answer

However, Shypu now defines it as follows: "...the psychology of peoples, dealing with the mental activity of larger groups connected by a common origin" (Narodovedenie 4e 74).

Chat — the language of a *single* people (1. — IS. 32). Indeed, "what makes a people a people lies not so much in known objective relations, such as origin, language, etc., as such, but exclusively in the subjective perception of the members of the people, who all together *regard themselves* as one people. The concept of "people" rests on the subjective opinion of the members of the people themselves about themselves, about their similarity and belonging. When it comes to plants and animals, the natural scientist classifies them into species on the basis of objective characteristics; when it comes to people, we ask them which people they consider themselves to belong to. Pacy and his colleague define a person objectively; a person defines a nation subjectively, he or she considers himself or herself to belong to it" (I. — S. > 35). Based on these considerations, the following definition is obtained: "A people is a certain group of people who see themselves as *one* people and consider themselves to belong to *one* people" (Ibid.). I find these ideas very interesting and, in some respects, remarkable, but I fear that if we try to give the concept of a people an "objective spirit" essential *objective* definition, we will expel it as a subject from ethnic psychology, and if we are satisfied with the *subjective* definition indicated, we will not go beyond the limits of individual psychology. In both cases, ethnic psychology is under serious threat. A solution must therefore be found.



V

B In 1886, Wundt published a programmatic article entitled: *On the Principles of Ethical Psychology*. In the article, he aimed, in essence, to eliminate the objections that had been raised against his theory of consciousness.

to eliminate the objections raised by Hermann Paul against ethnic psychology. At the same time, Wundt attempts to make some corrections to the definitions of Lazarus and Steintal. However, Wundt's extreme eclecticism, and in particular his exceptional manner of writing, which is vague and indistinct, made his differences with the founders of ethnic psychology barely perceptible at first glance. Thus, Steintal saw the difference between the new direction of ethnic psychology only in the narrowing of the content of this science. He argues at length about third-rate topics — whether ethnic psychology duplicates the solution of scientific questions,

¹ With minor changes, reprinted in Wundt's collection of articles: *Probleme der Völkerpsychologie*. — Leipzig, 1911, under the title *Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie*. — pp. 1–35. I quote

ПО ЭТОМУ ИЗДАНИЮ.

Begriff der Völkerpsychologie. Zeitschrift... XVII I. IS. 246.

In what respect does Oiza stand in relation to history and, as we already know, — as we have already seen, he concedes that part of ethnic psychology and ethnology and sees no reason to limit the content of ethnic psychology solely to questions of language, myths and customs, as Wundt would like. Meanwhile, as can be seen from Wundt's later works in this field, his remarks, firstly, noticeably divert ethnic psychology from the path that was marked out for it by the Journal :ztichnaya Psikhologiya (Ethnic Psychology), and secondly, without noticing or understanding the fundamental difficulties raised by Lazarus and Steinitz, Wundt often exacerbates these difficulties even further, thereby further weakening the already fragile foundations of contemporary ethnic psychology.

Like Lazarus and Steigal, Woidz proceeds from *the analogy* between ethnic psychology and individual psychology, but this premise does not become any smarter or more beautiful from the fact that Byrulm replaces the intellectualistic psychology of Gerbar with Wundt's voluntaristic psychology. Much more important is the fact that this premise obliges Wundt to recognise that the logical role of ethnic psychology is analogous to that of *physiognomy* (*Z4 iele5 m лW WE ege5. — S. 1 6*) and that the tasks of ethnic psychology are explanatory and explanatory. "As the task of PSYCHOLOGY," he says (*Ibid. — S. 2—3*), — is to describe the factual composition *of the individual's* consciousness in relation to its elements and stages of development, to introduce it into an explanatory connection, since it is undoubtedly necessary to consider it as an object of psychological research. This is analogous to genetic and causal **research into** the facts that are used for the

development of spiritual relations in human society." What kind of *explanations* should ethnic psychology provide?

Due to the vagueness of the concept of "spirit" in Lauapya and Steintal, this question remained unanswered. Wundt avoids the term "spirit" and prefers to speak of "soul-kindred," and it turns out that his *laws* of ethnic psychology boil down to the general laws of psychology, i.e., ultimately, to Wundt's voluntaristic psychology. Lazarus and Steintal thought that in ethnic psychology it would be necessary to talk about "delays,"

"mergers," etc., only on a more complex scale; Wundt thinks that the laws of association, apperception, etc., fully contain the laws of "folk psychology." But despite all the vagueness in the definition of basic concepts in Lazarus and Steintal, it remained clear to them that the subject of ethnic psychology must, in one way or another, be a *sui generis* subject. In Wundt, even this aspect is obscured.

"The field of psychological research," he argues, "which relates to those mental processes that, due to their conditions of formation and development, are connected with spiritual communities (Gemeinschaften), we refer to as *ethnic psychopathology*." Since the individual and society are mutually dependent, this is not a field that is completely separate from individual psychology. Individual psychology considers individual consciousness without delving deeper into the spiritual environment, but rather assuming it as something self-evident; on the contrary, ethnic psychology studies general phenomena of spiritual

¹ *Logik*. — V. I II. — S. 226. Cp.: *Volkerpsychologie...* — 2. Aiffl. — V. 1. — p. 1.

INTRODUCTION TO ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY

spiritual life, which must be explained from the connection of spiritual coexistence (*Gemeinschaft*). Therefore, in essence, we are talking not about different areas, but about different *aspects* of spiritual life, which only together exhaust the reality of spiritual life.

Thus, Wundt 1) shares another premise of Lazarus and Steintal — that spiritual phenomena are mental phenomena and should be studied in psychology, 2) by introducing the rather obscure term "*spiritual communism*" and making it the object of psychology, only apparently avoids contradiction, since the difficulties that bother him will not disappear as soon as one has to admit that the "spirit of the people" is an *objective* reality and that there are no forms of social interaction that are not objective.

еЗЛьТдТ — ТОТ, ЧТО, ИСХОДЯ ИЗ ПЪЕЛ}ЭиССудКа, д ЛГО
Psychology is the fundamental science for the "sciences of the mind," and since it is not yet capable of finding the true principles of these sciences, Wundt is forced to explain everything...

The term *Gemeinschaft* is very difficult to translate, yet in German literature, the contrast between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* is sometimes given great importance (for example, in Tönnies). Wundt also insists on the difference between these terms: *Logik...* — III. — <S. T 623 ff.), but, as far as I can tell, the source of this difference is not so much natural or psychological characteristics as legal definitions. Nevertheless, since Wundt values this distinction, I translate *Gesellschaft* using the already accepted term "society" (*societas*), and *Gemeinschaft* — through "commune" or "community" (*comunitas*), the common translation through "communication" is unsuccessful because it gives the term a connotation that it does not have.

For Wundt's concept of "die geistige Geineinschaft," see his *Logik...* — I II. — pp. 291–296. Cp.: *Grundriss der Psychologie. . .* —

§ 21.

the concept of "spiritual" phenomena to individual psychology. "•B especially ethnic psychology, — he says (Lo,P,f< k+. — II I. — /S. 227), — must recognise that works (die Erzeugnisse), the bearer of which is life, must have their ultimate sources in the individuals of which they are composed, since spiritual collective life exists just as little outside individuals (der Einzelnen) as the physical connection of individuals, such as a tribe or a people, which would exist outside of individual physical organisms. Therefore, it is impossible for ethnic psychology to come up with any *general* laws of spiritual phenomena that are not already contained in the laws of individual consciousness. And that is why only after

VPTSI BHO SO STOJEOI IY NDTI, KOGDIZ ON ZP YAVIYA ST, CHTO

•Ethnic psychology aspires to be nothing more than an extension and continuation of psychology in the field of common life phenomena•', as stated, for example, in his *Essay on Psychology*.

Similarly, consistency can be seen in his limitation of the content of ethnic psychology. If ethnic psychology is only "prolongation

NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY, THEN THE MAIN GOAL IS TO TRANSFER TO THIS "CONTINUATION" THE BASIC RESULTS OF THE CLASSIFICATION AND DIVISION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED IN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY.

is the desire to transfer to this "continuation" the results of the classification and division of mental processes that were already obtained at the "beginning", i.e. in individual psychology. The *problematic* division of mental processes into three groups: representation, feeling and т.оля, ВУНАТ ОУ]ЕРпичија the content of ethnic psychology with three problems: language, myths, иравы (Z4 iele5

'Volkerpsychologie... — I. — S. 4.

and/ nd5 W/ ege5. — S. 24). In itself, this circumstance may seem insignificant, and it may therefore seem strange that Wundt attaches such importance to it. However, it should be noted, first of all, that, as we shall see below, the insistence with which Wundt returns to this analogy deserves attention in some respects. and secondly, because it is a point that particularly undermines Wundt's credibility as a thinker. Wundt sensed something that justified such an analogy, but not only did he fail to realise it, he became completely confused in these three concepts of his psychology. Limiting the tasks of empirical psychology to these three problems clearly corresponds to its actual needs, but Wundt does not understand this, giving it completely unsound justifications. There is no need to go into Wundt's arguments, especially since the question is not about the principle of analysis, but about the principle of synthesis, which determines the subject matter.

ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY.

I only mention that it is proclaimed in Z+ iefe+ v+ nd+ W4 ege." In Wundt's self-standing problems (pp. 24, 29) remain in his *Viilkerpsychologie* (I. — p. 30), although already according to the myth, *art is associated* with religion and culture; in the realisation of this plan, art *simply took on* a special *and independent* role. In *Lugik...*— I I I.— S. 232. Wundt already directly identifies the *four* basic problems: language, art, myth and customs; and in *Grundr.!ss der Psychologie*, language is presented as a condition of spiritual coexistence itself and mediates the transition from a purely material existence to "all common, spiritual content or processes characteristic of coexistence" are divided into *two* classes: mythological representations and moral norms (§ 21, 2). (T o date, ten volumes of Runt's *Grundr.!s*!

In general, Wundt's work highlights even more clearly the contradiction we noted in Lazarus and Steintal: on the one hand, ethnic psychology studies the "products" of interaction or interrelationships, i.e. objectively given "things"; and on the other hand, ethnic psychology, being an explanatory science, cannot at the same time establish any general psychological laws, and such laws are

ONLY ZETKONY INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY. ЫИ ZTO

The contradiction evident in Wundt's basic definitions is even more pronounced in the execution of his tasks: for example, most of his major work *Volkerpsychologie* consists of linguistic, historical and ethnographic material; generalisations are essentially applications and illustrations of the general principles of Wundt's psychology; and only a small part is actually material from ethnic psychology². Even more indicative is his book *Ele.uente*

Durkheim, in my opinion, quite reasonably insists that social facts should be considered as *things*: "The first and most fundamental rule is *to consider social facts as things*." - *Les Règles de la Méthode sociologique*. — P. 20.

' To explain this, I will limit myself to one example.

In NAT, he devotes two enormous volumes of his *Völker-psychologie* to language, but I strongly doubt whether he had the right to call this work "ethnic psychology." It contains many psychophysical hypotheses and much criticism of linguistic theories, as well as his own linguistic theories. Zundt to call this work "ethnic psychology." It contains many psychophysical hypotheses, much criticism of linguistic theories, his own linguistic theories, and, finally, a certain amount of ethnographic and historical material, but there is no ethnic psychology. In the first volume, only chapters 4 and 5 deal directly with questions of language. Let us focus on chapter 4, which discusses sound changes (*Lautwandel*). It is clear from the outset that ethnic psychology has no place here. How does Wundt proceed?

INTRODUCTION TO ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY

der Volkpsychologie (Lpz., 1912) — with the exception of a few remarks scattered throughout the book, only two paragraphs are devoted to ethnic psychology itself (Chapters I, 6 and 9); then one can find only some "•сієды•" of general psychology — but, of course, no "laws" — and the rest of the book's content is pure *ethnology*. With the same right, any compendium of ethnology or cultural history could be titled: ethnic psychology.

He seeks *explanations*, and since it is unlikely that such a complex phenomenon could be explained by a single cause, he attempts to explain it from a *combination of causes* (I. — S. > 372; quoted from the second edition). Among the forms of sound change, Wundt distinguishes *associative* contact actions of sounds, *associative* actions "at a distance," and *associations* of sounds and concepts of his own language that change the sounds of words taken from a foreign language. The word "associative" indicates that, "despite the influence of physiological factors, the main effective motive consists in sound association" (Ibid. — IS. 405). The results obtained by Wundt in his research are very instructive: it turns out that in all phenomena of the first group, *psychological* and *physical* causes interact; and for the phenomena of the second group, the position that

•*Every sound change is a psychophysical process*"; the latter case is somewhat more complex, since here there is a purely sound association of concepts, which, of course, was not absent in the first two cases, but which, according to Wundt, does not constitute a psychological fact (p. 431, 458, 460). It is difficult to guess what ethnic psychology has to do with this. We are entering a more meaningful area than that of "psychophysical npouec-GOB*," namely, "regular and constant **changes** in sounds" (p. 473 ff.). Why does the people change the sound composition of words beyond recognition over the centuries? Wundt admits that there is no general answer to this question, but the very fact of change, in *his* opinion, is beyond doubt. He expresses regret that "the phonograph is only a modern invention" (ethical психологин

And, for example, Lamprecht, perhaps influenced by Wundt, called history "applied psychology." But even Krüger, a devotee of Wundt, rejects the understanding of ethnic psychology as a simple "application" of general psychology to the interpretation of ethnological facts.

Wundt would obviously have won if the zoanograph had been invented by Adam, and considers himself justified in pointing out only the probable reasons for this fact: *the influence of external ego-*

'teen environment, mixing of peoples and, oops, cultural influence. With the latter factor, it seems we have finally arrived to this very psychology, for, as Wundt himself defines culture here, it is "in its essence *a cultural development* and, as such, the main manifestation of the existing in a given cultural society *dyxo's development*" (IS. 484). True, Wundt immediately acknowledges that culture in general only indirectly influences the sounds of language, but nevertheless he distinguishes two factors in it: 1) intonation, 2) speech tempo and stress. An example of the first: the Iroquois do not have the labial sounds r, plz, b, bh, m, w, and they are replaced by the hard and lingual sounds — this is because it is their *custom* to speak with their mouths open. I have no doubt that if the Nemts had the same habit, Wundt would be able to pronounce his own surname, and he does pronounce it, *because* he smacks his lips before doing so, but the reason why it is possible to pronounce the labial sound W is because of the closing and opening of the lips.

covering their mouths, and nothing else. As for the "custom," it is a fact that requires explanation, and it would not be very

if it turned out that the Iroquois had developed the custom of speaking with their mouths open because they do not have labial sounds... But **that is not the case**, and **there is still ethnic psychology at work here**, and, of course, its **content** cannot be found in the "tempo" of speech.

' *Krüger F. Über Entwicklungspsychologie.* — Leipzig, 1915. — p. 157.



VI

4 To get a clearer picture of how Vugidt is "original" compared to Laiarus-Steintal, it is necessary to remain...
I on certain concepts introduced by him, partly to clarify the concepts that formed the basis for defining the subject of ethnic psychology by its founders. For Wood, these concepts are mainly the concepts of the "national soul" and "spirit of the community."

According to Lazarus and Steintal, as we know, *the spirit* is a common product of human society, and since it is assumed that interaction should be psychological, its products are considered to be the object of psychology. The main mistake here lies precisely in this assumption. Firstly, the interaction in question has *the subject* of mutual action; as if, therefore, on it NI O R* OLPS PSYCHO-acting," it is unclear how it itself transforms is the object of psychology. Secondly, the entire "material culture" is the subject of such interaction, and it is unclear where ethnology ends and ethnic psychology begins, where "history" ends and

"psychology"? It is precisely these difficulties that Wundt fails to see. Therefore, he almost completely reproduces the formulas of Lazarus and Steintal, and it seems to him that the shortcomings found in them by critics stem from their general psychological position. In this sense, he corrects them: he replaces Herbart's psychology with Wundt's, which, firstly, does not strengthen the position of ethnic psychology in the slightest, and secondly, introduces all the shortcomings of Wundt's

PSYCHOLOGY

"The task of ethnic psychology," says Wundt, "is given to us in all spiritual creations (die geistige Erzeugnisse) arising from the community of people:

WHO IS LIFE AND WHAT ARE THE PROPERTIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS?

of consciousness, as they imply the interaction of many." This formula would be recognised by the founders of ethnic psychology, and Wundt can therefore be countered with the same argument as them: language, myth, as well as skyscrapers and the Eiffel Tower, as well as cars and flint axes, as well as the fact that the ratio of the circumference to the diameter = π , and the fact that the earth and the sun move relative to each other, and much more — cannot be explained solely by the properties of individual consciousness, *because the latter can only explain the phenomena of that consciousness*. What will change in objective things and not

Elements of Volkerpsychologie... — p. 3; Cf.: *Volkerpsychologie...* — 1.— IS. 1; *Ziele und Wege...* — p. 25, 13. — In stark contrast to the idea that the objects referred to by Eunp as ethnic psychology are "products" or "creations" of spiritual interaction, is his own assertion that language is a *prerequisite* for it: <That condition, thanks to which it only becomes possible everywhere spiritual coexistence and which always participates in its development, is the function *function of language*" *Grundriss der Psychologie...* — p. 21. — 4S. 2).

relationships from "the interaction of many," if they only had consciousness but no hands, eyes, nasopharynx, larynx, vocal cords, etc., etc. — assuming at the same time a complete abundance of rocks, forests, metals, organic substances, etc. and assuming in all this a constant system of their relationships and orders? Perhaps we will have to wait until hands, throats, etc. grow out of consciousness itself. 3... Would it not be more reasonable to assume that the "interaction of many" can also explain only the phenomena of this interaction? Undoubtedly, these phenomena are *sui generis*, and they require their own science, but it is not clear why this should be ethnic *psychology*. To answer this "why," it is necessary to show that the aforementioned interaction is psychological, but since direct psychological interaction is denied in science, *volens-nolens** one has to resort to the laws of individual psychology. This approach to defining the subject of ethnic psychology is fundamentally flawed; *the very direction* of this line of research is flawed. Wundt, however, believes that the direction is correct and that all that is needed is to make some adjustments and repairs along the way. But in reality, Wundt approaches even this work with inadequate resources and poor material.

L: Ligiarius and Steintal understood the "interaction of many" to mean living people, each of whom had *a soul*, i.e., they were, to a certain extent, self-contained units of action, **the collective *manifestation*** of which in *society* was called *spirit*. Wundt made the following "repair": the soul in him — not a source, bringing into life "mechanics of representations", but rather a combination of volitional and

* Willingly or unwillingly (Latin)

acts similar to speech, which can only conditionally be called *the soul*, but the same condition obviously allows us to call other sets of such acts the soul, including sets whose interaction produces language, myths, and customs. Consequently, this condition allows us to speak only of *the soul of a person*, and not of his "spirit"; but "society" itself ceases to be a society of living, animated creatures and becomes *a spiritual entity*. The same applies to the fact that living members of a living society may have their own personal experiences — different in different eras and in different places — regarding their

LIVING B3P IM OD Y STVYA, TP K I PO VODA CBOeG VOZ-

actions on the natural environment surrounding them, as well as on nature itself and its phenomena, and that

•These perceptions *as such are not studied* by dualistic or "general" psychology — Wundt forgot about all this. This is how I see Wundt's "discovery" in defining the subject of ethnic psychology, and that is why I believe that he has not taken a step forward compared to Larnarus and Steintal, but rather a step backward.

Wundt condescendingly refers to "certainly an inevitable shortcoming" of "early attempts" in the field of ethnic psychology, "the basic views of Herbart's psychology with its one-sided individualism and intellectualism, which were linked to the metaphysical concept of a simple soul and the hypothesis of the mechanics of representation." No matter how much Herbart's followers deviated from him in particulars, in principle, according to Wundt, the relationship between the individual

' *Kolkerpsychologie*. — I. — +S.4 23—24.

D. SHI b NOY AND ETHNIC eCKOY 1 SYNCHRONOUS OCTif PEILOS I> RELATIONSHIP

the transition from fundamental science to its applications. Ethnic psychologists, moreover, could emphasise the unique nature of the "folk ear" as much as they liked and point out that it is not simply the sum of individual

D dLbH Y X S VOYSTV, THEY COULD NOT

STJENIT PJEI N TSIPI -

their objections. The individualistic direction of Herbart's psychology is reflected in the fact that the "spirit" is conceived by analogy with the individual soul: the representation of psychological "mechanics" in it corresponds

IN YUT ANDI VID dJI bH YS CO3Nd NI YA — ALL }EB3 HINUei TOL bKO

in that the latter are more complex entities. How can ethnic psychology, which has been destroyed by such a combination, be restored? ethnic psychology? How can the actualistic "dynamics" of the soul and the designation of the "national spirit" through the "national soul" help here? In the article *On the Goals and Paths of Ethnic Psychology*, Wundt's introduction of the concept of the "national soul" is of a purely defensive nature, and, defining it in the spirit of Lvtsarus and Steintal, he defends only this concept against Paul's doubts. Later, however, it turns out that this change conceals a great deal of insidiousness.

Ibid. — p. 25, cf. Wundt's article *Der F.inzelne und Vü'lksgemeinschaft* (Probleme der Viilkerpsychologie... — pp. 57—58).

' x'4 re/e+ в4лW WE egeè. — S. 1 2—13. Cp. S. 20 — Characteristic of Wundt's abstract mode of expression is that Stegnal in his note *Begriff der Volkerpsychologie* (Z4 eitscli rili... — XVI I. — p. 245), quotes the following passage from Wundt:

«In de m Ptunkte aber, auf welchem alles nkommt von dem der Beslancl der « k'ülkerpsychologie nbbangi, freuen wir uns Wu izdt als Buriges-genossen zu haben тразрядка моя; in the new edition Z<ieleè п+лW W4egv> the corresponding passage is reproduced without change; only instead of psycholoisclier Erfah rtuzgen it says seelischer and instead of psychologischen Gesei zeiz — psychisclien).

The concept of the soul, Wundt asserts, can only have empirical significance in relation to immediate facts of consciousness, "psychic processes." Naturally, ethnic psychology can also use the concept of the soul only in this empirical sense; and it is clear that in this sense the "national soul" has just as much right to real meaning as the individual soul claims this meaning for itself. The products of consciousness that arise from the joint life of the members of the folk community are just as much factual components of reality as the mental processes within a single consciousness... Thus, the national soul is the product of the individual souls of which it is composed; the latter, in turn, are no less the product of the national soul in which they participate.

This can be understood as follows: in individual psychology, we are dealing with the unity of mental processes, which we call *душнжу*; within these unities, we can distinguish the predominant directions or combinations of mental processes, allowing us to classify them — for example, the processes of will, feelings, and representations; then we can also represent the entire "mass" of mental processes that stand before us in individualised units as a unity, which we call *the soul of the people*, now distinguishing in it the directions and combinations that classify these processes into groups — language, myths, customs. From this it is not difficult to understand that every psychological process related to ethnic psychology takes place in the individual soul, and in addition there are individual "remnants" — which as a whole

¹ *Kolkerpsychologie... — I. — IS.> 9— 10.*

They belong only to individual souls, united according to the principle of the latter as a unity; they are the subject *only* of individual psychology. On the other hand, there are such unities that are determined only when considering the joint and mutual action of individual unities, and whose development can be considered in itself as a certain continuity, despite the fact that individual unities disappear one after another (*V'olkerpsychologie*.5 — 1. — IS. 11), — this is the domain of ethnic psychology. As a result, the "mechanics of representation" are replaced by *the algebra of acts*: the national soul — the common denominator of the "community", language, myth, customs — common divisors, individual "remnants" — other divisors...

If this somewhat overcomes the "intellectualism and individualism" of Herbart's psychology, it completely obscures the difference *between the singular and the plural*, i.e., it obscures the concept *of the collective*, which is fundamental to Lazarus and Steintal. This explains Wundt's statement, which at first glance may seem paradoxical: there is no sharp boundary between the individual and the collective! "Due to the constant interactions between individuals and the collective, it is inevitable that the boundaries between what belongs to the whole and what constitutes the property of the individual cannot be sharply drawn. One could even say that the mutual fusion of both areas is so inherent in the nature of the subject that it would be wrong to try to eliminate it by artificially distinguishing between concepts in this transition.

.area" (Ibid.) However, this does not save the subject of ethnic psychology, as it still remains

It is unclear how *ncixonoogy* can study bows and arrows, Tahitian necklaces, shamanic drums of the Yakuts or halala! of the Zulus, when all these are not psychic *processes*... Wundt only succeeded in making the unclear meaning of "collective" in Lazarus and Steintal even more obscure. We have seen that the *common* collective spirit of the people in Lauapyca and Steintal meant precisely that *which is common* to the members of the people, and that therefore it is ethnic psychology that has the right to its name. This nuance of the concept of the collective remains with Wundt, but it will become clear to us if we reproduce his concept of "spiritual community."



VII

ВUndt distinguishes two directions in which the experiences of individual consciousness extend beyond its own causality: the natural environment and *the spiritual*. An individual's relationship to the latter is their relationship to the "spiritual community." According to Wundt, materialistic and intellectualistic psychology cannot resolve the problems of this relationship. *Voluntaristic* psychology takes a different position. Here, too, the hypothesis of substance is powerless, and only the hypothesis of *actuality* resolves the problem (*Logik*. — III. — pp. 292—293). On the basis of these premises, it is easy to determine that representations, feelings, affects, and volitional impulses arise without the necessary cy-

ЩЕСТВОВЫ ГИ Я Д ХОВ НО ГО КОМ М ИТСТЕ: ОДНО]ЭОДІЗ Ы Х И Н -

DI VIDO V, PPO TOM OTHOC YATS PK IDINICHNOM SOZIZ PGI I YU

(Ibid. — < p. 294). On the contrary, language, mythological pressures, volitional developments, realised in the form of morals, presuppose as a substrate

'*Ль!gik*. — 111. — S. 291 ; cp. *ibid.* — S. > 23.

The individual acts only as a partial force that causes a phenomenon in connection and interaction with other similar partial forces. Since the works of the national soul are reduced to the spiritual energies of a multitude of interacting individual souls, the general principles for explaining these works and these elements are the same as those in individual consciousness. The only difference is that they cannot be explained from a *single* consciousness, "but are based on the spiritual interaction of many who relate to the named processes in the same way that the elements of imagination and will relate to the complex representations and volitional actions of an individual" (Ibid. — IS.+ 295). The bearer of such a "spiritual community" with "by the same right as a mental individual, can be called *spiritual organisms*." Every fundamental manifestation of life of such a composite organism, in turn, is an organic connection between its constituent parts. "Thus, the vital activity of language, art, myth, and morals forms spiritual organisations that are contained in the broader organic unity of the folk community" (Hard. — IS. 296). The latter has the ability to develop *an independent volitional unity*, giving it the character of *a collective personality* that subjugates the individuals who comprise it.

I cannot, of course, enter into a discussion of Wundt's *voluntaristic mythology*, but if we leave it aside, what new ideas did he contribute to replace the analogy between the mechanism of representations in the individual and the interaction of individuals, which he condemned in the Herbartians? — Again, the commonality of will in

INTRODUCTION TO ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY

the unity of representations in the collective spirit. But how can we imagine this commonality, and in such a way that there is no hypostatisation of the will, but only empirical data?

There are two characteristics that allow us to distinguish between individual and collective spiritual movements in the course of human life: certain facts as *general* (ge nereller) and as facts of an individual nature:

- 1) the involvement of *individuals* (Einzelner),
- 2) the realm of *arbitrary* actions with conscious motives. Both lie outside the processes of ethnopsychology. "For the latter, on the contrary, the realm of *impulsive* volitional actions (die t̃iebartigen Willenshandlungen) retains its predominant significance" (*V40lker-psychologie*. — I. — IS. 12). It is noteworthy that, based on this division, Wühl-idt distinguishes between "primitive" (Naturvölk) and "cultured people", whereas it is clear to an unbiased person that the latter division can only be obtained by generalising purely empirical material, and that voluntaristic metaphysics is just as incapable of resolving the issue as the premises of any other metaphysics. But even this is not what I would like to draw attention to now, nor is it the fact that defining the field of ethnic psychology as the field of impulsive volitional actions does not correspond at all to the content of this science, even if we accept

' And this division of volitional acts is nevertheless examined by Vierkandt in his otherwise very interesting book: *Vierkandt, A. Naturvölker und Kulturvolker*. — Lpz. , 1 896. Spann, on the contrary, quite rightly points out that this division is unacceptable as a socio-psychological criterion, since Wundt would have had to, according to his own

excluding from its content "science" and "higher forms" of collective life and limiting themselves only to language, myth and customs. That is not the issue here, especially since Wundt has already received an answer (mainly from Delbrück, as far as language is concerned). We are only interested in the question of the nature of the "community type" to which ethnic psychology is directed as its subject. Is it really only in impulsive acts that there is something "common" among the units that make up "folk spirit" or "spiritual community"? Why was ethnic psychology called by Wundt

"a continuation and extension" of individual psychology?

HOLOLOGY* е П }ЭП ВИ ЛЬHeC ЛИ ТОГДП ИЯЛО ТЫ УПЗЫ ДИТЬ

the relevant science is not ethnic psychology, but

ZOOL O GI CC KOI IISI HOL OGI e Y*... OLOPSTI M, CHTO DAL O

This is indeed the case, as the voluntarist Wundt teaches us, condescending to the intellectual superiority of the Shvish F4 and the intellectual inferiority of Lauapyca—Shteiztal. How do we arrive at this conclusion? As with the founders of ethnic psychology, the answer to this question is essentially predetermined by the recognition that ethnic psychology is an *explanatory* science. Only now does Wundt point out that

"beginning" from which her explanations should proceed. Under such conditions, it is unlikely that Wundt needed to provide so many arguments to convince the reader that all these explanations boil down to the most elementary individual psychological generalisations. The subject of ethnic psychology *was lost* in Wundt's explanations.

I define it as belonging to the field of ethnic psychology, among other things, as well as *economics and society*. See: *Sponn O. Win-schaft und Gesellschaft*. — S. 1 14.

However, Sponn himself does not give ethnic psychology a very prominent place (cf. his book *Kur yefates Sy.stem her Gesellsr.haftslehre*. — B., 1914).

What basis does Wundt have for calling this explanatory science, which boils down to the laws of impulsive volitional actions, *ethical psychology*?

In his article on the aims and goals of ethnic psychology, Wundt justified the right to this name by arguing that the people are the "most important" form of spiritual coexistence (IS. 25; cp.: *Logik...* — 111. — IS. > 228). In *Völkerpsychologie*, he repeats the same argument, recognising the very name as "inappropriate," since, in his opinion, it would be meaningless to contrast social psychology with individual psychology (1. <S.> 2). Finally, this same motif in *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie* compels him to prefer the old term not only to "social psychology" but also to "community psychology" (*Gemeinschaftspsychologie...* — p. 4). Perhaps it is not a matter of the name, but the inability to justify the term indicates an unclear understanding of its meaning...

"•Important" is always an accentual definition; as I have already pointed out in relation to La-tsar-us-Shteintal's definition, the fundamental necessity of singling out "the people" as a special subject of study is not apparent in such a definition. In *Elemente*, Wundt, apparently recalling their arguments about the people (p. 6), reproduces the argument that ethnological genealogy does not coincide with the qualification of the people in ethnic psychology. But Lazarus-Steintal and Gut went further, recognising *the subjectivity* in the definition of this category. Wundt did not dwell on this strange and interesting difficulty in defining his science and is willing to give up its name. Moreover, he cited such insignificant arguments in favour of the term "ethnic psychology" as the fact that it already had an approximately corresponding meaning in

was introduced" (*V4olkerpsychologie. — I. — .*). 2), and that peoples are the "most important" form of society, he gives a very compelling argument for the term: "Ethnic psychology," he says, "focuses its attention on the psychological regularity of communal life itself. *Local and national differences in its form are irrelevant to it*, since they do not shed any light on this regularity" (Ibid. — IS. 3; *my emphasis*). This leads to something very interesting: first, we distract ourselves from all individual differences, then in this abstract state we need to distract ourselves from "local and national" differences — in the end, what kind of ethnic psychology is this? This is precisely *Gemeinpsychologie*, as one linguist (O. Dietrich) suggested calling it, without, however, having in mind the pun that results from this...

In general, I believe that Wundt's definitions of ethnic psychology do not rise above the level of "impulsive" acts, and, bearing in mind the above prediction by the Russian scientist (Prof. D. Kudryavsky), I agree that *such* ethnic psychology is short-lived.



VIII

K As I already mentioned in passing, language, myths, morals, science, institutions, and so on, as well as any kind of "interaction" in general, since

it is not only an act, but also a "result" — an action as a consequence of activity — since it is, therefore, a *social fact*, nothing more than a "thing."

"Things" *are not*, in essence, a *psychological process*, and as such they are studied both in some "general" sciences — sociology, history, ethnology — and in specialised sciences — about groups, areas or spheres of known

"types" of this thing. Thus, we have special sciences: linguistics, the science of religions, the history of science, the history of ideas, and various "teachings" \leftrightarrow law, etc.; Accordingly, groups of philosophical problems are formed: the philosophy of language, religion, law, etc. Among the special sciences mentioned, *linguistics* has achieved the greatest development at present, appearing under various names: the science of language, linguistics, comparative linguistics, the psychology of language, the history of language; Sometimes the psychology of language is placed alongside the history of language as two parts of one science, and sometimes one of these parts is completely denied the right to exist. However

These issues were resolved in the interests of linguistics, and the debates they provoked are of considerable interest to psychology, as they clarify its role in solving linguistic problems. Psychology should listen to the opinions expressed here with particular sensitivity, since the question of its role is usually decided on the basis of special work on specific scientific material. No matter how useful this material may seem to psychology in its own interests, it cannot be concluded that psychology itself is necessary for this work. In such decisions, psychologists may encounter a great deal of dilettantism and "psychological" naivety, but with a serious attitude towards science and respect for the scientific work of other specialities, they are obliged to listen to the voice of the living needs of a specific science behind the approximate and, from their point of view, inaccurate expressions. It is quite natural that the opinions of linguists about the significance of psychology and *ethical psychology* for them should be taken into account with all possible impartiality, since behind their sometimes random, sometimes perhaps unsuccessful formulations lie truly *important pedagogical ideas*. It is quite reasonable that the judgements of linguistic specialists on the significance of psychology and ethical psychology for them should be taken into account with all possible impartiality, since behind their sometimes casual, sometimes perhaps unsuccessful formulations lie truly important ideas.

"Backwardness" is not a difficult issue for a psychologist, but it is not the way to achieve scientific cooperation and mutual assistance in solving scientific problems. Of course, a psychologist should expect the same attitude from a linguist. Unfortunately, in reality, these good wishes are rarely fulfilled, and the difficulties that were noted by some linguists, when they were

offered the help of *ethnic* psychology, did not receive the attention they deserved.

Therefore, the objections raised by Latsarusu-J. L. Teintal from the side of Paul remain

REMAIN UNRESOLVED.

E. Wundt, as can be easily understood from the above, was essentially unable to refute them, and directed his polemic against Paul in a direction that did little to advance the matter. His attacks on Herbartianism only show that he did not understand or did not want to understand the meaning of his objections. Wundt's "corrections" in the definition of ethnic psychology, as we have seen, did not correct anything, and the positive results of Wundt's research gave rise to a new polemic², and if Wundt's work could be recognised as a valid model of ethnopsychological research, then after Delbrück's criticism, and especially after the critical criticism of An and Margit, ethnic psychology would have been completely compromised. However, there were defenders of Wundt among linguists, such as O. Dietrich,

'Shteynthz and Misteli, in their responses to Paulio, in my opinion, failed to grasp the essence of Paulio's argument (*Steinthal* — Z4eitscl3 rift... T — XVI I. — <S. 24S ff ; *Misteli* Γε. — Ibid. — XIII. — 4S. > 376 ff).

It is interesting, for example, to note the following statement by the author of a *psychological* linguistics textbook: "I learned a lot from Wundt's work, but I hesitate to subscribe to Hales's judgement (*Mind*. — Vol. XI. — 1903. — P. 239): There is far too much theory and too little fact to please us. *The facts are quoted merely as illustrations of theories, not as proofs of them.* That is why I believe it is absolutely necessary to make a new universal review of the facts and to clarify *not only* what these facts *illustrate*, but what they prove. *Ginneken vaii*. P ril3ci pes de Liny,u istique psychologique. — 1907).

But it was precisely from him, as I will show, that the most damning argument against ethnic psychology in Wundt's understanding originated — or, at any rate, was supported and developed. The significance of the arguments put forward by linguists should not be underestimated on the grounds that they are only partial, concerning only one particular problem of ethnic psychology, since, due to the nature of linguistic problems, the questions they raise are of a completely universal character for ethnic psychology. In order not to go into details and not to stray too far from the main topic of this article, I will only express the following general considerations.

However we define the subject of ethnic psychology, it is clear that this subject is neither the realm of *direct* observation through the senses, nor the realm of self-observation, nor, finally, the realm of ideal constructs. The sphere of ethnic psychology is a priori defined as the sphere accessible to us through the understanding of a certain system of *signs*; consequently, its subject can only be grasped by deciphering and interpreting these signs. That these signs are not only signs of things but also *messages about* them is evident from the fact that the existence of the corresponding things is not limited to the pure appearance of signs. In other words, we are dealing with signs that not only serve as references to things but also express a certain *meaning*. To show what this meaning consists of is nothing more than to reveal the corresponding object with its content, i.e., in our case, this is the path to the precise fixation of the object of ethnic psychology. The dispute arises not only because of the accuracy of this definition, but even more so because it requires

The *fundamental* question of what actually constitutes meaning, since we distinguish signs and expressions in a specific area of knowledge sources. Thus, this preliminary and a priori indication of the scope of the subject of ethnic psychology not only says nothing about its nature, but does not even prejudge its existence precisely as a psychological subject. *Meaning* may turn out to be not only psychological, but also, for example, historical, or both, but with different starting points for interpretation.

Under these *обшире* определения, как *лє* ко видеть, all areas and contents that are outlined for ethnic psychology by both Wundt and Laia-Rus-Steintal are suitable, i.e. not only language, myth, customs, but also science, art, religion, professions, etc. Comparing these different areas of content or "sections" of ethnic psychology in the light of the considerations expressed above and comparing them with *language* as a subject of linguistics, it is not difficult to see that language, to a certain — and indeed profound — degree, is the natural and closest prototype and representative of any expression that conceals *meaning*. In this semantic capacity, language is such an object that a fundamental discussion of which a *potio** is valid for others.

Cp. for example, Popsbni's definition of myth: "Myth is the verbal expression of such an explanation (ap perception) in which the explaining image, which has only subjective meaning, is attributed with objectivity, actual existence in what is being explained." (*From A. A. Potebnya's notes on coffee. — Bon ros theory and psychology of creativity. — Kharkov, 1914. — P. 503*).

* According to the prevailing characteristic, based on *i traditidu-* (Latin)

forms and types of expression. This is evidenced not only by the tendency of many contemporary linguists to see semiotics as the central and, perhaps, fundamental task of linguistics, but also by a simple reference to its content, where, with the exception of phonetics itself, which is directly related to psychological phenomena accessible to us through direct observation and self-observation, rather than through interpretation, everything else either directly belongs to semasiology or is closely related to it. The real disagreements begin

' To what extent linguistics in the full sense also applies to *grammar*, the above arguments remain valid. However, with regard to *morphology*, there may be disagreement on the question of whether all word forms and their parts are categorical or non-categorical expressions (or rather, semantics or synsemantics, according to Marti's terminology), but it seems to me that there can be no dispute that they are all *signs*, and that is all that matters to us here. As for *syntax*, it deals with *meanings* or their forms, which, in turn, are signs of relations (regarding this definition of syntax, see

An interesting work: *Blumel R. Einföhrung in die SyNTiix*. — Heidelberg, 1914; "Syntax," he says, "studies 1) known meanings, 2) *forms* that are associated with these meanings. P ri

In this, he indirectly or directly deals with *the proposals*. Cf. also Marti's general position, to which I subscribe here: "It is beyond dispute that the knowledge of theoretical philosophy is, in its most important and essential part, knowledge of a semiological nature and may well be called 'universal semiology'. For essentially all considerations of the nature and genesis of *the means of language as such* are semasiological." *Morty A. U iztersiichuizgen zur G rundlegnizg der allgenzeineiz G raifnntik und Sprachphiloso-phie*. — Halle a. S., 190b. — V. I. — p. 51; cf.: *Funke G. I nizere Spraclzforiri. Eii3e Einföhrung in A. Manys Spraclphiloso;3hie*. — 1924. — pp. 19—26).

Only from the moment when we try to give a general answer to the question of what meaning is, but neither linguists nor psychologists are equally capable of answering such a general question, as it is already a philosophical one.

Within the limits indicated and taking into account the exceptional importance of language and the science of it, Paul's remarks against ethnic psychology are of particular interest to us.



IX

P Paul quite reasonably avoids the dispute over the merits of Herbartian or Wundtian psychology, since his arguments against ethnic psychology do not depend on metaphysical or ready-made psychological assumptions. He proceeds from the empirical observation of *interaction* wherever we encounter facts or phenomena of cultural and social life. Some basic science, which he calls *the doctrine of principles* (Rjepzi pienlehre), has the task of comprehensively clarifying the question of the interaction of individuals, the factors of culture, and the attitude of the individual as a whole (p. 7).

The main criticism that Paul makes of Wundt is that this central question—how individuals interact—is not a problem for Wundt at all (S. V). This is linked to Wundt's false belief that psychology studies "results" or "products", whereas it can only study individual *processes*. For itself, psychology can study

¹ Paul L. Prinz, *Geschichte der Sprachgeschichte*. — 4th ed. — Leipzig, 1909.

To understand language, but for this it does not need the history of language, but relies on direct observation. Psychology is an indispensable aid to understanding the development of language, but the history of language cannot reward it for this service. Moreover, psychology cannot benefit from the study of those languages whose prehistoric stages we have no sources for, although it is precisely these that Wundt is particularly fond of. In his book, Paul expresses his impression that Wundt approached the study of language with preconceived psychological views. One cannot but acknowledge the essential correctness of these remarks, and they, as we shall see, contain in nuce all of Paul's objections to ethnic psychology, although, of course, one cannot allow the fate of ethnic psychology to be determined by Wundt's failures in accomplishing the tasks of this science.

In the absence of the problem of interaction between individuals and the relationship between the individual and society, it is no longer possible to address Lazarus and Steintal. In his response, Paul Steintal (*Zeitschrift...* — XI I. — < S. 252) particularly emphasises that it is precisely the interaction referred to in Paul's "doctrine of principles" that constitutes the main subject of ethnic psychology, which, incidentally, has been clear to the founders of ethnic psychology from the very beginning. The only question here is how to understand this interaction. Paul asserts:

"It is a fact of fundamental importance, which we must never lose sight of, that all purely psychic interaction takes place only within a single soul. All communication between souls is only indirect, mediated by physical means.

* Literally — "in opexe", i.e. in the embryo (Latin).

Consequently, there can only be individual psychology, which cannot be contrasted with any ethnic psychology or whatever it may be called» (pp. 12–13). This fact was, of course, known to Steintal, but he did not see what lies behind this fact and what apparently prompts Paul to insist on it, although Paul himself did not manage to express with sufficient clarity what is essential here, since the conclusion he draws is not justified by the stated fact. Steintal, of course, did not think that *purely* psychic interaction was possible, as if psychic energy acted on distance, but by repeating this in his reply to Paul, he did not make Paul abandon his reproach. However, if Paul really had in mind not the banal truth that the psychic energy of one individual cannot act directly on the psychic energy of another individual, then he must admit that interaction itself has some *specific* characteristics here.

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which Paul could not help but feel in his work on the study of language and to which he appeals here. Paul himself explains his idea: no matter how we imagine the causal connection between different acts of consciousness of an individual, it is *not the same* as that between the acts of consciousness of different individuals. "On the contrary, the way in which the causal connection arises here is *completely different*; it cannot be ignored, but must always be kept in mind if one wants to correctly judge the relationships that have historically arisen through the interaction of individuals" (p. 14, Anm.; emphasis added). It must therefore be clear that if this interaction cannot be *purely* psychological, then it certainly

cannot be physical, and the type of causal connection that Paul refers to is something new, *sui generis*, which must be defined in terms of new characteristics inherent to it. If these are not purely mental processes studied by psychologists through self-observation, and not things of physical experience, then, again, the method of study must be an independent new method. That is why Paul's *conclusion* is incorrect: if there is no place here for *ethnic* psychology, then there is no place for *individual* psychology either.

Paul's positive view of interaction is therefore also fundamentally incorrect. His appeal here to "the theory of association of ideas, from the point of view of modern psychology, should be ignored, precisely as an amateurish attempt to resolve the issue. Meanwhile, under its influence, unfortunately, Paul falls into psychologism where, apparently, he wants to free himself from it. "*The very content of representation*," he says, "*is, consequently, not transferable. Everything we know, according to our opinion, about the content of another individual's representation rests solely on conclusions drawn from our own content*" (p. 15). How does Paul know that it is "*only on conclusions*"? Only the "history of languages" could have taught him this, and for psychology this is far from an indisputable truth. Meanwhile, the assertion that *the content of representations cannot be transferred* from one individual to another has great practical significance. For Paul, it is obscured by "proprietary" theories of consciousness: *the content* of representation, as an object of perception, is indeed "untransferable" from one

See my article *Consciousness and Its Owner* about the anniversary collection dedicated to Prof. G. I. Chelpanov.

It is not in any individual, it is neither "mine" nor "his", it belongs to no one, it is *transcendent*. Individuals are not vessels communicating with each other, but reality — whether natural or cultural — is not a liquid poured into vessels...

This clearly reveals the true meaning of Paul's objections, which have not yet been addressed, as well as Paul's own mistakes. The former is more interesting, and it is worth dwelling on some aspects of it. Paul happily avoids the influence of hypnosis, under which many philosophers and scientists still remain, as if all sciences can be conveniently divided into two groups: natural sciences and spiritual sciences. It is therefore clear to him that psychology, and consequently ethnic psychology, cannot be the basic science for the sciences of the spirit: the latter has too much to do with *the non-psychological*. Paul distinguishes, in general, four categories of influence that an individual experiences from society, and it turns out that psychological influences are the least significant here. The individual i) receives from society certain complexes of ideas, which he would have arrived at much more slowly or not at all, 2) he learns from it certain purposeful movements — here physiological factors are further assisted by psychological ones, 3) he receives from it objects of nature processed by human hands (tools, capital), which are passed from individual to individual and from generation to generation, so that they are the subject of common participation by different individuals, 4) he exerts physical coercion on another individual and, in turn,

experiences such (p. 8). I draw attention to the last two categories: they directly indicate that we are dealing here not only with the 'non-psychological', but also with the 'non-physical', which is clearly evident — the subject *of a new order*. Let us call it, together with Paul, *historical* — as an object of scientific attention — now, the historical directly emerges as something third, alongside the objects of the sciences of the physical world and psychology. But as such, the historical cannot be the object of ethnic psychology, just as it cannot be the object of individual psychology.

But does this mean that psychology has nothing to do with it at all? Paul, of course, does not deny the right of psychology to study language *in its own way* and to take material from the "history of language" for this purpose, but this in itself already indicates that the psychology of language cannot be the *main* science for the history of language or linguistics. The tasks of justification and explanation in psychology and linguistics (or the history of language) are as heterogeneous as the subjects of these sciences. Only in the psychology of language could psychology be an explanatory basis, but (either because of this or because of that) the psychology of language is a problem of psychology, not a science of language! Consequently, ethnic psychology, being, in the end, only the psychology of language, myths and customs, cannot take on the role of a basic science in relation to general linguistics. In other words, this means that Paul denies the *explanatory* significance of ethnic psychology. And since the defenders of ethnic psychology have always attributed this role to it, it becomes clear that by denying its explanatory tasks, it is denied itself.

let there be "only" one common, abstract, law-establishing psychology — but still a psychology that is *explanatory*. However, I repeat once again that what is important for us is not Paul's mistakes, but his *linguistic* insight. After all, he is instructive for us in the sense that he shows how Paul came to deny the fundamental role of psychology and to affirm "language history" as the only science of language, since language is specific in terms of its subject characteristics.

According to Paul, there is only one scientific method of study — *the historical one*. Where there is no historical and nevertheless scientific consideration of language, he asserts, there is only an imperfect historical consideration (p. 20). Let us leave aside the methodological weakness of this conviction and turn only to arguments based on the nature of the subject of linguistics. In any case, language turns out to be neither a subject of psychology nor of ethnic psychology, but only of history. When comparing the different meanings of a single word, he argues, one seeks to determine which of them is the primary meaning or which other meanings point to a lost primary meaning. To determine the original and primary meaning is to state *a historical fact*; when comparing related forms and deriving them from a single common basic form, they state *a historical fact*; when they establish a sound change between related forms and words and want to explain it by the influence of sound change, *they refer to the historical process*; when they try to characterise the internal form of language in the sense of Humboldt and Steintal, they do so by referring to

to the origins of forms of expression and their basic meaning. "So, in general," concludes Paul, "I don't know how one could successfully reflect on language without resorting to the means of its historical emergence" (p. 21).

The concise and convincing meaning of this argument is as follows: *the science of language as expression, since the latter is related to meaning, deals not with psychological processes, but with historical facts*. Due to the general significance of language among other forms of expression, this position also has universal and fundamental significance, which is very important for the entire course of our reasoning. To illustrate this significance more clearly, I will give an example from a different field — the study of myths. In 1906, Wundt wrote: " "Fetish " "езде " "является " "сам " "объектом " "к'уль'га" (*Völkerpsychologie...* — II. — 2. — S. 202); in 1912, Wundt stated: "The fetish is not at all an independent object of worship that characterises some primitive or later stage, but in all circumstances it is a by-product which, in its universal meaning, as the embodiment of demonic magical powers, can be found everywhere" (*Elemente...* — p. 225); previously, such "by-products" in Wundt's work were only amulets and talismans. That we are talking about *the meaning* expressed

Having only traced Paul's methodological judgements and conclusions, I cannot enter into a discussion of his views on the substance. Otherwise, there would be much to say about Paul's *twofold* confusion of what he calls "historical." He confuses the "history" (sequence) of meanings (senses) of words and forms with the "history" ("reality") of the things named by words, and then both of these "histories" with the (natural) "history" of sounds.

Wundt speaks directly about this, saying that it serves as a fetish. So, in that case, what should we examine in order to decide when Wundt was telling the truth, in 1906 or in 1912? Should we study any or all *of them*, and should we, having established the precise meaning of what is called cult and fetish, resolve this question through *historical* research into the origins of fetishism as a form of cult? Incidentally, I will ask one more question: will the study of *how* a given meaning, as well as a historically named fact, *was experienced* by a particular individual, become a *new* problem?

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the latter, what *response* did they elicit? It is also clear that if this problem *exists*, however important and interesting it may be, it should be placed alongside the first, and not instead of it, as is the case, incidentally, with Wundt, and which Paul quite reasonably refuses to accept.



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K Be that as it may, Paul's argument achieves two goals at once: 1) it convincingly proves that language is not a subjectology, at least, since the latter is an explanatory science, and that, consequently, there are no psychological *laws of language*, and 2) that not only psychology, but also *history...* cannot be a "doctrine of principles" on which this "particular" history of language is based.

This second, perhaps unexpected result of Paul's argument again gives reason for the proponents of the psychological basis of *the "sciences of the spirit"* to defend it as such *a basis* and thereby provide imaginary support for ethnic psychology. Among linguists, O. Dietrich took a similar position, sympathising greatly with Wundt and his ethnic psychology, despite the fact that he considers it necessary to change its very name. Although Dietrich insists that the psychology of language is, in his terminology, part of the general

And I don't like how he explains that psychology should consist of two parts: human psychology and animal psychology, and each of these parts can be individual or general. Since it is awkward to call the common psychology of animals *Volkerpsychologie*, he refers to it as

psychology, or, in Wundt's terminology, ethnic psychology, nevertheless the *fundamental* science remains in-

individual psychology, which is actually the subject of his *Grundziige*, very insistently reproducing Wundt's schemes. But I have not mentioned him here in order to follow his defence of psychologism, but for another purpose. Defending ethnic psychology in Wundt's understanding, Dittrich puts forward the most damning argument against Wundt and here strikingly coincides with Paul — although in general he is his staunch antagonist — and, perhaps more interestingly, also pulls the rug out from under ethnic psychology.

This time, it is not just a simple change of name that is at stake, but something more serious. In his *Problems of Language Psychology*, Dietrich noticeably deviates from both Wundt and his own previous views, and he himself sees the reason for this in the nature of his special studies as a linguist. For the psychology of language as such, he says, it acquires considerable self-

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due to the fact that the researcher in this field is *only a psychologist* (*Probleme...* — p. 10). In support of his idea, Dittrich gives an example whose significance goes far beyond the illustrative example and acquires, one might say, a truly catastrophic significance for psychologism in linguistics. Psychologists, he says, quite agree

as a general term: Gei3zeii3psychologie. — *Dittrich O. G* rundzuge der Sprachpsychologie. — Halle a. S., 1903— 1904. — B. I. Einleitung und Allgemeinpsychologische G rundlegung. See also his later book: Die Probleme der Sprachpsychologie. — Lpz., 1913. — p. 18 If.

defined language as "expressive movement." However, he only cites Wundt's definition. This definition is noteworthy because it vividly reflects all of Wundt's qualities: it reveals his logical helplessness, his naive psychologism, his artificiality and unnecessary use of ethnic psychology, and his inability to find and express the essence of things. Wundt says: Every language consists of sound manifestations or other sensory signs which, being caused by muscular movements, reveal states, representations, feelings, and affects to the outside world. The external and superficial approach to the matter in this definition is striking. However, let us follow Dietrich for now.

As from the point of view of linguistics, recognises Dittrich, such an understanding of language cannot be justified. "For the latter, namely for linguistics, on the contrary, it will always remain fundamental to know that language performs not only the function of *expression (ein Ausdruck)*, but also that of *impression (ein Eindruck)*, that communicability relates to its essence and that, therefore, it cannot be ignored in the process of communication. "*expression (ein Ausdruck)*, but also *impressions (ein Eindruck)*, that communicability is part of its essence and that, therefore, it cannot be ignored in the study of languages" (p. 11). Dittrich thus succeeded in finding a successful form for expressing a thought of colossal importance, since it now compels Dittrich to oppose his teacher in psychology on the very point that Paul considers to be Wundt's weakest point. It is obvious that if the existence of a linguistic phenomenon requires con-

The fact that "communication" is *essential* to language is, of course, not a discovery made by Dittrich. He himself refers here to Humboldt and, in particular, to Steintal. I think that Dittrich himself came to this characterisation of language, even though he had little

To state the fact of "communication," which arises as a *new* subject of attention, individual psychological explanations clearly reveal their powerlessness here. But the position of ethnic psychology also begins to waver. The fact is, as Dietrich now explains, that the "minimum condition" for a linguistic phenomenon must be recognised as the presence of *two* (Zweiheit) individuals, the speaker and the listener (p. 25, 20). These "only two" individuals, in various combinations with other pairs and units, create more complex relationships, but the basic fact of "communicability" is always present as a sui generis object. If we look for "messages" among various complex combinations on the basis of "communication," we find, among other things, the form of "the people,"

noted in his *Grundzüge*, under the influence of Delbrück (cf. *Grundzüge... — I. —* pp. 86, 87, A, B). Paul also points out to Wundt that the latter considers language from the point of view of *the speaker* and ignores *the listener*, which leads to his misunderstanding of the problem of interaction (*Prinzip... — p. 122*). The main significance of "communication", i.e. the indispensable participation in language not only of the speaker but also of the listener, is also attributed by Marti (*Untersuchungen... — p. 288 ff.*) to the clarification of the essence of language. In my opinion, the term *Eindruck* itself was chosen by Dietrich to denote the *communicative* function of language rather unsuccessfully, although *the contrast between Ausdruck and Eindruck* is very effective and vivid. This contrast is based on the old division of expression into subjective, *affective*, and objective, *rational* (Syntaxis figurati et

regularis, — cf. *Grüber Grundriss der Romaischen Philologie. — V. I. — p. 212 ff.*) Here again, I do not go into the substance of the matter, the consideration of which would require a careful and in-depth analysis of the "expression" on the one hand, and on the other hand, the sensory expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, the impression of the communicated, and on the other hand, the sensory expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, *the impression of the communicated*, and on the other hand, the sensory expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, the impression of the communicated, and on the other hand, the sensory expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, the impression of the communicated, and on the other hand, the sensory expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, the impression of the communicated, and on the other hand, the sensory expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, the impression of the communicated, and on the other hand, the sensory expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, the impression of the communicated, and on the other hand, *the sensory* expression, and further — in the "impression", on the one hand, the impression of the communicated, and on the other hand, sensory *expression*, and further — in "impression", firstly, the impression of *what is communicated* and the impression of *the* (emotional) "tone" of expression (*its "implied impression"*).

It can no longer be so decisive for linguistic phenomena that it can be made the main subject of linguistic science. Since ethnic psychology deals with this particular form, it cannot be the fundamental science for linguistics. The whole question is turned upside down, and it is not the axles that are inserted into the wheels, but the wheels that are put on the axles! If *communication* is a condition for *social interaction*, then language is a condition for all social interaction, and the science of language is the "foundation" of all social sciences, including ethnology and ethnic psychology. And if linguistics itself needs a more solid foundation, then the latter must be sought even deeper, in something like the "science of communication" in general. But that is not all; there is something even closer: on what basis, in fact, can we assert that "doubles" themselves, as a subject, are a subject of psychology? All the difficulties we have already encountered will recur here as well. The only

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There is a claim behind the "two" that there is a certain specificity that gives rise to a *new* science, but not *to ethnic psychology*.

Let us now turn our attention to another aspect of Wundt's definition above: language, he says, consists of sensory signs that inform us about internal states, feelings, emotions, and the like. But here we have Wundt's numerous works, written in German, i.e., representing a system of signs, but is what is expressed in them and what we are looking for in them Wundt's "feelings" and "internal states"? In them we find

* Thus (Latin)

would be precisely what would make such a scientific

DISCIPLINARY

That is why Paul is right in asserting that the subject of linguistics is *historical*, not psychological. But he is wrong when he thinks that the "study of principles" here is also some kind of "conglomerate" of information about historical factors and conditions of cultural life. No matter how essential general historical information may be in the study of specific historical objects, it cannot constitute the *logical* basis of any science. Fundamental principles, by their very nature, must and can only be *ideal*, not historical or empirical. "The study of principles," in other words, is always a *philosophical* study. The direction in which one should seek the fundamental principles for sciences whose subject matter is *expressed meanings*, or, in other words, for sciences based on

"communication," drawing their material from communication and arriving at their subject through it, as the formative principle of this material. Marti's "Universal Semasiology" already suggests a name for such a fundamental philosophical doctrine,

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- A fundamental error, a mistaken thesis (ancient Greek)

It would be unfair to forget here Husserl's "idea of pure grammar," which, as a purely a priori philosophical doctrine, of course, has nothing to do with the fantastic 'universal' grammar for all languages, as is sometimes mistakenly imagined. The opinions of B. Croce and K. Fosler on aesthetics as the fundamental science for linguistics contain, in my view, a partial truth, although Croce's main distinction between aesthetics and linguistics is too clearly based on the confusion of the two meanings of the word "expression": expression as communication and expression as expression.

which, in turn, is, of course, closely linked to the fundamental principles of philosophical consideration of the subject and its manifestations.

Thus, in general, I deny that psychology, and therefore ethnic psychology, can provide a basis that can give laws or explanations for the study of language, myths, science, etc., — for the role of foundation befits only the ideal philosophical sciences, and not the empirical sciences. On the other hand, I also deny that the aforementioned problems are problems of psychology itself, as if their subject matter could be characterised by the features that we generally establish for mental activity or mental experiences, for in reality the subjects of these problems are subjects of objective determination: historical, sociological, ethnological, and similar. But I do not deny the right of psychology itself to consider the corresponding phenomena as its object; on the contrary, the psychology of language, for example, is one of the important and essential branches of psychology. Language and other "expressions" are psychological or, more precisely, psychophysical phenomena, since they are mental and physical experiences of a person. But that is precisely why we must be careful in defining them as the subject of psychology. The fact is that psychology — and in this it is similar to the "natural sciences" — considers its subject not semiotically, but in its own existence, as *md ènop/ovro**. This fact serves, first of all, as a criterion for how psychology studies

"expression," in particular language, i.e., it is interested precisely in *the sound* itself, *the visual sign* and *noa+obnoe+ as such* — not in terms of meaning, but as a set of sensory

*These circumstances (ancient Greek)

intellectual, aesthetic, and other experiences, or, more precisely, empathic experiences. In this direction, she works with her tried and tested methods: self-observation, indirect observation, and experimentation. "Word" here is not an expression or a sign that must be deciphered so that we can get to the desired content, but rather the essence of complexes of sensations, perceptions, representations, sensory tone, instinctive or impulsive movement, volitional tension, and so on.

It is quite obvious from all that has been said that such tasks are solved by the psychology that until now

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that the carrier of the mental processes she studies is the psychophysical organism of a human being, a child, or an animal, that here she can "explain," establish causal relationships and laws, but that there is nothing for an ethnic psychologist to do here. And those who think, like Paul, that the tasks of psychology are generally limited to the study of the "laws" of mental life, that "psychology has never dealt with the concrete form of the individual human soul, but only with the general essence of mental processes," will be consistent in saying that psychology has nothing more to do here either. But if we think more deeply about the content of the text we encountered above, if we accept

An example of such language study can be found in Dittrich's book (*Grundzüge*). Even more interesting and insightful are the works I have already cited by van Giiizneken: *Pŷncipes de Linguistique psychologique*. 1907, or, for example, Delacroix H. *Le Langage et la Pens&e*. 1924.

XI

These concepts are, as we have seen, the concepts of "spirit" and "collectivity." All the questions that have given rise to so many difficulties and caused so much misunderstanding, such as the question of the *psychological* nature of our science, the interaction of INDIVIDUALS, the relationship between the individual and society, the collective, etc. U, are in one way or another connected with these concepts. It would be a major departure from the plan of my work if I were to undertake — in all respects, however, absolutely necessary — a fundamental and logical analysis of these concepts; I will limit myself to the minimum necessary, taking these concepts not in their generality, but in the relatively limited sphere of their application to the "social," "historical," and "ethnic" and with a view to finding meanings that would be consistent with the definitions of the subject of psychology. Let us begin with the concept of "spirit."

1) If not the original, then at least the most common meaning of the word "spirit" is that it refers to a specific, living and free being *sui generis*, surpassing in its qualities, power and strength

human beings and existing in conditions that are less restrictive, less difficult and higher than those in which human beings exist. In this sense, the spirit is the source of activity that has fundamental significance not only in the sphere of the spirit's own activity, but also in all real activity. Therefore, the spirit can take on objective forms of "visibility," can change them, remaining immortal within itself, so that its destruction can only be conceived under exceptional, "miraculous" circumstances. The products of the spirit's activity necessarily have objective-real significance and are part of the reality that surrounds us, or even constitute it. Nevertheless, the "spirit" is thought to violate some natural or customary laws — for example, by virtue of its influence, a "part" of the spirit can be equal to the "whole," it can act simultaneously in several places, it can act contrary to the laws of nature, etc. This concept of "hearing" allows for both the multiplicity of individual spirits and the dispersion of a single spirit among a multitude of carriers. In the first case, both simple external "coexistence" of diverse spirits and their communication, interaction, and even a more or less complex hierarchy of spirits are possible. In some exceptional circumstances, a person is not deprived of the ability to enter into relations and interact with individual spirits or with their entire "world." In the second case, the "spirit" is deprived of its personified status, becomes depersonalised, acts only collectively, "in unison", and although the products of its activity are still real and objective, nevertheless, relations with it or interaction with it are already impossible.

are locked — one can only "belong" to it or "participate" in it. — We attach the characterised meaning to such expressions as "world spirit", "God (Holy Spirit)", "angels", "spirit in history", "evil spirit," etc., on the one hand, and expressions such as "host of angels," "church as a body," etc., on the other. But in this sense, one cannot say, for example, "the spirit of nations" or "the spirit of man," since the spirit in this sense is "independent" and does not "belongs" to anyone; rather, the "people" or "man" themselves can be called "spirit" here. All the more so, it is impossible to say "the spirit of literature," "the spirit of laws," "the spirit of the times," etc. From all this, it is quite obvious that the "spirit" in this sense can be the object of any science *except psychology*.

2) The second meaning relates to the first as an ontologically purified concept to its empirical example. "Spirit" here acts as *a pure activity*. Its dispersion now denotes not its "distribution" among a multitude of "carriers," but only its conceivable nature. At most, one can admit for it some *substantial carrier*, entirely, however, exhausted by activity. Being a sphere of pure "possibility," "spirit" in this sense does not "violate" the laws of nature in any way, but rather is a prototype of lawfulness; in the same way, it is free from empirical contradictions and, on the contrary, is a place of logical order and connection. Therefore, it manifests itself, "manifests" itself not in phenomena of empirical "visibility," but in its systematicity and expediency. Detached from empirical conditions in its activity, it is the "absolute spirit" or "absolute

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volumes. It is not immortal, but "eternal." In this sense, we are talking about potential "wealth" or "riches of the spirit," and ero is the actualised form of understanding – CM as "ideal products" of spiritual activity. In this sense, we cannot speak of the "spirit of the people" and ptoch., just as we cannot speak of the "spirit of literature" and pod4ofiriom ; this spirit is again "nobody's." Of course, in this sense, "spirit" *cannot be the subject of psychology.*

3) The following meaning of the word "spirit" requires even more philosophical depth, as it completely renounces any effective basis in its definition and is a pure hypostatisation.

"•ideal•." "Spirit" itself is conceived as an idea or *meaning* and *essence*, or even as "reason," especially since we perceive it as the essence of a certain collective whole. The regularity we bring to this concept is purely normative in nature and is in no way defined as activity, but rather as order and systematicity in the products or results of activity. Therefore, "spirit" in this sense can already be "someone's" spirit or the spirit of something." Since spirit here acts as "sui-ness," it must be thought of as "unity," and, unlike the logical "species" or generic volume, it is thought of primarily as the unity of a certain multitude, albeit a multitude of an ideal order, as, **for example,** "the unity of ideas" or "idea of ideas" and so on, so that even when we speak of the "spirit of things" or the "mind of things," we renounce our real attachment to "things," having in mind their ideal correlate, just as we renounce the real meaning of "mind," having in mind exclusively its ideal "purity." — In this

In this sense, we can already speak of the "spirit of the times," the "spirit of history," the "spirit of laws," etc., as well as the "spirit of the people" and "humanity." In terms of this meaning, for example, Herder's definition cannot in any way be called tautological: the spirit of humanity is in the mist. In general, therefore, we can already speak of the "spirit of the peoples," the "spirit of language," etc., but even here *there is no reason to recognise the "spirit" as a subject of philosophy*; rather, it can be said that there are even fewer grounds for this here than in the first and second cases.

4) In a new meaning, we encounter the word "spirit" when it simply means "soul," as opposed to the body and separate from it. Therefore, we are dealing here primarily with *the human spirit* itself. By thinking of "spirit" in this case as separate from the body and transferring it in this "purity" to a special "world," we largely bring this meaning closer to the first of the meanings we have considered and transfer the characteristics of the latter to this new meaning. We understand the role, activity, and regularity of the "spirit" in this sense by analogy with the former, only assigning it, so to speak, a more limited sphere of activity. We can call this meaning of "spirit" and "spirits" anthropological, as opposed to the first of our meanings, which is cosmological. As the human "spirit" itself, it now appears to us as a collection of a certain kind of "parts" or "abilities" of the soul, so here too we can speak either of a single spirit distributed among "parts" or of a collection of "spirits," for example, "life spirits" or something similar. When referring to "abilities" or "parts" of the soul, "spirit" in this sense encompasses primarily the so-called higher abilities of the soul.

INTRODUCTION TO ETHNOPSYCHOLOGY

and because the concept of assessment has not only a classificatory but also a qualificatory meaning. In this sense, we can speak of the "spirit of NP OA<i>•" only in a metaphorical sense, transferring it to the nation, by analogy, to the qualifications and definitions of a person as an individual. In the same way, we speak, for example, about the age of a nation, its birth, etc. Since this meaning refers only to certain qualified and assessed "properties" or "aspects" of the human soul, since the "spirit" *is not a specific object of psychology* or any other science; it can only be the subject of moral reasoning.

5) We find the following meaning of the word "spirit" in

In cases where "spirit" refers only to a known state. Here we are again dealing with a relatively limited range of concepts, although broader than the previous one. This state is the state of a specific living being, a subject, which it encompasses entirely and even "captures." "Spirit" here is not a special "ability" or "part"; there cannot be as many "spirits" here as there cannot be any talk of its abstract meaning. It is simply a special "state", not only "constant" () but even relatively () not very long-lasting — "spirit", "mood", or "disposition". we say almost synonymously, so that the definitions sometimes added: "state of mind," "mood," or "disposition," in essence, create tautological expressions. Perhaps the most characteristic and essential feature of "spirit" in this sense is that, as a state, it encompasses the subject beyond his will and individuality.

This is "inspiration" or "intuition," the source of which we seek outside our own powers, in spheres above them. — Despite the sometimes active nature of this state itself, a person or individual is "passive" in relation to its emergence; they are only, as it were, a "receptor" of the "spirit" (for example, the divine spirit) in the first of our meanings, which is indeed active; the individual enters into "communication" with it and, precisely to that extent, experiences a "spiritual state." This state, in essence, is therefore the state of the individual as such and cannot be the state of the collective. To speak of the "spirit of the people" in this sense is again only possible in a highly conditional and metaphorical way. In this sense, the "spirit" is also a special and specific subject of psychology, but it can find its place among other "states" in purely descriptive analyses.

"states" in purely *descriptive* analyses of *individual psychology*.

«зльбой лспхолоеии.

6) Finally, we come to the last meaning that I notice in the word "spirit." In some respects, it is close to the third meaning I mentioned, where "spirit" is characterised as "meaning" or "essence." But while the aforementioned meaning pointed to the ideal nature of its bearer, the new meaning has an entirely real character. "Spirit" here denotes a certain concrete *type, style*, or "tone." In it, we have a vivid, directly tangible "image" of the idea as unity, but not abstractly logical, and also collective in its own way. Even if in this sense we are talking about the "spirit" of an individual or a group, we still understand the latter as a collective whole in itself.

A set or aggregate of experiences. This is not a temporary state, but a permanent "form" that not only captures a certain existing set of characteristics in an "image," but also reflects the entire mass of characteristics accumulated in the process of the historical "formation" of the spirit. This is not objectification or embodiment in the proper sense, simply because such objectification consists in the most empirical, highly diverse and inexhaustible. The "spirit" is, as it were, an echo of this vital diversity, a response to each of its sounds and tones, encompassing its entirety, but only in special symbolically projected correlations.

The "spirit" thus reflects reality, revealing to us in a condensed but accurate — albeit transformed and creatively shaped — form a certain structure of the experiences of collective organisation. The spirit here is not a being possessing higher powers, not an independent and detached entity, but also not a purely ideal essence, nor a state of an individual beyond his will and control, but a sensitive organ of collective unity, responding both reflexively and involuntarily, as well as creatively and consciously, to every event in the existence of this unity. Since "spirit" in this sense is a concrete existence, it is difficult to adequately express it in volumetric-logical forms and relationships, "types" and "type": but here we can talk about its greater or lesser condensation as a "type". — The "spirit of the people" is predominantly such a "spirit"; we recognise it in the "image" that symbolises the meaning and ideas of the "people" and which we reveal in typological images of its composition and changes over time.

"The spirit of the aristocracy," "the spirit of the times," "the spirit of the kingdom," "the spirit of the bourgeoisie," etc. — all these are only partial ingredients of their whole, losing nothing in their specificity, since they are "particles" or "members" of this whole, rather than independent moments or aspects of it. "Spirit" in this sense is a collection, a "bundle" of characteristic features of the "behaviour" of a people; in

COBOK NEWS FROM THE CONSTANT CTBEM AND "DISPOSITIONS" OF HIS eCTb
its nature. As a subject of study, this subjective nature is recognised in its objectification, as the totality of the people's reactions to the things surrounding them, to the circumstances in which they themselves participate, to the relationships objectively given to them and to the ideal: education. Therefore, the "spirit," being the subject of psychology, is studied by it not in an explanatory way, establishing abstract laws of psychology, nor in an individually descriptive psychology, but it can only be the subject *of such* a "collective" psychology, which only describes and does not go beyond the construction of typical structures; if an "explanation" is necessary, it is drawn from the historical whole, from racial biology, anthropology, sociology, and still not from abstract psychology. If ethnic psychology is a science about the "spirit," then only in this sense.



XII

Let us now turn to another fundamental concept for us, "collective," and examine it within the same boundaries that we have outlined

for the concept of "spirit." We should be particularly interested in those meanings of "collective" that can be linked to the concept of "spirit," and in this meaning of "AYxa" that makes it the subject of *ncuxonilruu*. However, we must bear in mind certain features of the "collective" as a subject that make its study fundamentally different from the study of a subject such as "spirit". We sought the meanings of the word or term "spirit" among actual things, properties, and relationships in the real world, whereas "collectivity" is not a thing among the things of the reality that surrounds us. Studying it as a subject does not involve searching in the realm of things, but requires an analysis of ideal-logical and formal-ontological relationships. Therefore, we can only expect a complete and comprehensive resolution of the question of the "collective" as a subject from a corresponding fundamental analysis, which

would reveal the structure of the object itself and shed light on its universal methodological significance. We approach the matter from another angle: we observe the existence of such things among real things to which collectivity as a method is applied, and here we try to find different meanings for it. For us, collectively, collectivity always appears as *realised collectivity*. This approach to the matter is preliminary, but it is entirely appropriate, since a fundamental study could also "proceed" from the same

"examples", and for our purposes this approach is sufficient.

1) The concepts of "collective object," "collectivity," or "collective" are primarily encountered in the context of *collections*. In this sense, a collective object is a collection of individual items of various types; each item, being an element of collectivity, is at the same time an independent member of it. The possible action of each specimen, as well as its place in the collection, remain strictly individualised. Definitions, classifications and other logical techniques are always applied to the "types" represented by the specimens, i.e. these are ordinary logical operations on general concepts and objects. *There is no reason to speak of the unity* of the "*spirit*" in the collection as such. The "collection" itself is not so much an object of scientific study as an auxiliary methodological technique for scientific study, "collecting." As a subject of study in its methodological role, it is a subject of logic, and in its special forms it is methodologically applied in the corresponding special sciences. Only in this sense can it find application in

psychology, but, of course, in no way *does it coincide with its subject matter* — even if psychology learned to collect souls, as *entomology* collects insects.

2) The concept of "collectivity" is often used to mean *a mass* or *multitude*. Here, collective means an indefinite collection of examples, as opposed to the first meaning of scholasticism.

NYKH PO VYID, NO, PONYATNO, }EPZN YKH I N,TSI BID £IL bHO,
which difference is ignored when considering the relevant collective. Each individual instance in the mass is an element, not a member of the whole: members are constructed "within" the mass again as collectives or aggregates in the same sense of multiplicity. In the case of the "actions" of the mass, it is considered as an action emanating from unity, which, in turn, is taken as a certain resultant force; its elements act more or less uniformly — in any case, individual differences for the whole are not essential here. Such a consideration also excludes in advance the possibility of interaction between the elements or members of the mass, and in no case can real interaction be allowed here. The relationship between the elements of the set is understood here as a formal relationship of similarity between individuals as elements: the relationship of the element to the whole is also completely formal. Mathematical set theory is closest to this understanding of the collective, and it also illuminates its methodological significance. Real collectives in this sense are, for example, a pile of sand, a bouquet of flowers, a cartload of cucumbers, a crowd of people, etc. — To speak о применении этого понятия коллективного

to the spirit ne comes into play. On the contrary, psychology can study the collective in this sense, but it is extremely important to emphasise right now that the task of studying

The study of "masses" *is a task for individual psychology*, which should consider "mass phenomena" simply as certain exceptional states of the individual soul. In any case, the study of this collective is not a task for ethnic psychology.

In order not to return to this question later, I will briefly explain my point. When studying the phenomena of so-called "mass" or "collective" psychology, it is necessary to carefully distinguish between the description or establishment of relevant facts and their explanation. The fact here boils down to stating that, under certain circumstances, a known group or

The "mass" of individuals, the "crowd," experiences the same feelings or performs the same actions. Since what is meant here is precisely sameness or similarity, and the individual differences of the subjects that make up the "crowd" are ignored, because the diversity of their interactions is eliminated, the subjects are not "members" of the collective, but its elements, and the "crowd" as a collective does indeed fit the second meaning of this concept. But, strictly speaking, is the compatibility of

of the "many" in the "crowd"? Would we not establish the same similarity by considering individuals sequentially and individually, only placing them in conditions that are known to all to be the same? As Marbe's relevant experiments show, indeed, under very similar conditions, within known limits, all individuals act similarly. But usually, when establishing facts of collective experience or collective psychology

logical reaction draws attention to a circumstance which, however, is not purely descriptive, but contains a certain assumption. Namely, it is believed that the collective reaction itself implies a certain summation of individual reactions, and the latter, in the collective manifestation, experience a significant increase in intensity. As for the "summarising" part, it is not easy to understand this definition psychologically, and there is no doubt that it is "composed" not of psychological, but of purely physical actions of the collective. As for as far as the intensification of the reactions themselves is concerned, it is equally clear that we are not talking about an increase in the entire mental activity of individuals, but only in certain aspects of it, so that not only does its study remain within the limits of individual psychology, but even its very establishment presupposes individual psychological analysis. In essence, the definition of these aspects of mental activity leads us to conclude that they constitute certain more "simple" or "elementary" mental movements, which are in fact similar in all individuals, and, as established by Marbe's experiments, a constant condition

I was pleased to find the following confirmation of my thoughts in Simmel: "When a crowd (eipe Me psc henmenge) destroys a house, passes a sentence, and shouts, the actions of individual subjects are summed up in a single event, which we designate as odvo, as the realisation of a single concept. This is where the great confusion arises: the final result of many subjective mental processes is interpreted as the result of a single mental process in the collective mind. *The unity of the resulting phenomenon is based on the unity of its psychological cause!* (*Soziologie*. — p. 559—t0).

The discovery of this similarity or "uniformity of reactions" is also an individual psychological factor — the speed of reaction. In short, it is not clear where and how we go beyond the limits of the individual or

"general" psychology. Therefore, the "collective consciousness" referred to by Lebon or Sigel, for example, is not some real entity or being "above" and "between" individual souls, but rather a similarity between the known non-regulations and actions of individuals. This similarity is achieved, as indicated, by ignoring all the particular characteristics of individuals, which levels them to one extremely low level of uniformity: each individual, at least from the point of view under study, becomes so similar to all other members of the "crowd" that the differences between them are so insignificant that there is not even an "average" here, but simply each individual provides sufficient material for determining the "experience of the crowd." The matter is complicated when explanatory hypotheses are introduced into the definition of such collective reactions. In general, these explanations are quite similar: BH - imitation, pointed out, for example, by Lebon, Sigel, and Bekhterev; "mental contagion" (*la contagion mentale*), which Vigouroux and Jukelie distinguish from suggestion in the proper sense, etc. All these factors, of course, are such that

Cp.: *Thumb und Marbe*. Experimentelle Untersuchungen über die psychologischen Grundlagen der sprachlichen Analogiebildung. — Leipzig, 1901; *Marbe*. Über das Gedankenlesen. — *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — 1910. — Bd. 56. Cp. also the general article by Brönnner W. Zur Theorie der kollektivpsychischen Egscheizgeseiz. — *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. — 191 I. — B. 141. — N. I. Krüger's fair criticism of Brönnner: Op: cit. — p. 131 ff.

require explanation, but perhaps they are indicated quite correctly — what do they explain? They explain how, under their influence, certain aspects of mental activity are intensified and sharpened, while others are increasingly extinguished, but the mental activity of each individual member of the

"crowd" and not the "spirit" or "soul" of this "crowd" as

That's right. They also explain, sometimes saying, the unity of action of the crowd. But this is incorrect — here the explanation adds something that is not present in the fact being explained. As I pointed out, we can only speak of *unity* of action here in a physical sense, but not in a psychological sense. In psychological terms, we are talking only about *the similarity* or *uniformity* of individual reactions and experiences. The illusion of the psychological unity of the "crowd" is created here by the fact that 1) the idea of crowd psychology is mixed with ideas about other meanings of the collective, which we will consider and the same;

2) factors that are cited here as explanatory

, themselves go beyond the meaning of the collective that we are considering here. But it is important to note that in doing so, they do not lead us directly into the realm of another collective, but into the realm of phenomena that are completely sui generis, and which, in fact, form the basis of the collectivity of the new order. Logically, we can state here a peculiarity: eĪq dXXo Jvo\$* through the mediation of *one* explanatory factor. Since the explanatory factor is broader in scope than the general explanatory factor and can, therefore, also explain facts beyond this type, then

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- Transition (reasoning) to another area (other -rpe part) — An error leading to the substitution of concepts, to wordplay.

It is clear that this creates favourable conditions for mixing up the roles themselves — an error that occurs quite often. But if, in order to avoid errors, we do not go too far and focus only on the factors mentioned as such, we will remain in границах here as well.

"general" psychology. I mean the following: experiences such as imitation, suggestion, sympathy, understanding, and similar experiences are *paired* experiences, i.e., two subjects are required for their realisation; the addition of any new subject creates new pairs of experiences: A with B, A with C, B with C, etc. As a result of a large connection, many pairs may be formed, constituting a collective, whose elements will be not individuals, but pairs of them. If we study the similarities between the members of a pair, we obviously do not go beyond general psychology, and then, for us, the experiences of the imitator and the imitated, the inspirer and the inspired, the explainer and the understood, etc., do not differ from one another. But if we study the relationship between two subjects, taking them in their individuality, then all this, consisting of the "relationship" and its two determinants, represents a new object of study: *sui generis intersubjective* or, to use Tard's term, interpsychological facts. The system of such pairs with their increasingly complex mutual

I am referring to "unconscious" suggestion that does not require any special "conditional techniques," i.e., what Vigouroux and Jukier call "psychic contagion." In the case of "conscious" suggestion, there is clearly no "mass" collectivity. The case of simultaneous (hypnotic) suggestion by one person to **many** people is a complex phenomenon consisting of "conscious" paired suggestion (suggesting to each of the subjects) and mutual "infection" (of the subjects).

Relationships represent, in fact, a new interactive and dynamic collectivity, and not a simple multiplication of similar and monotonous elements. This collectivity should not be confused with the collectivity of the "masses".

3) "Collectivity" in the third meaning of 6Jiizka is similar to the meaning just discussed and is also static in nature. But its role is primarily methodological. It is a collective of components, a "*sum*," a *totality in the true sense of the word*. The components here are not elements, as in the second case, but "members," as in the first, only not individual and not species, but, in turn, certain specific groups, which is very important for this meaning of collectivity, that these are not "natural" groups, but "arbitrary" ones: the individuals who make up the groups can therefore belong to different groups, which are logically even "intersecting" with each other. With such an "arbitrary" definition of groups as "members" of a whole, it goes without saying that there can be no question of their real interaction, and because of the "overlapping" individual members, one cannot even speak of their living together. The same

APPLIES ALSO TO COCTEIB}fGQ P, TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS BELONG:

belong to: the groups themselves, after all, are nothing more than a "coincidence" or the results of "selection" (for example, a "group" or the number of suicides in a given society, the number of students aged 21, etc.). The subject of scientific study, both as a whole and in its members, is not, however, its specific reality — since it does not exist in essence — but a certain artificial

"average" expressed statistically by a number. In other words, this study is not aimed at analysing pe-

causal relationships, but rather at certain abstract or logically constructed definitions and relationships. It is precisely in the application of statistical methods that the methodological role of this meaning of collective lies. We can also say that here we define the typical relationships of "members" to the whole and to each other, understanding by

"type" is precisely a certain "average," similar, for example, to Galton's "pink images," which should in no way be confused, of course, with logical

"type." *There can be no question* of the nature of "spirits" as collective in this sense. As for the psychological study of this meaning of collectives, again, it can be discussed not as a separate subject, but as a methodological technique. It can be applied, for example, in psychological anthropology or in a kind of psychological demography, as well as in *differential* psychology, but obviously not in ethnic psychology.

4) A new and very important meaning of the concept of "collectivity" — one which, as I have pointed out, is sometimes confused with the concept of "collective" as a mass — can be found when we take into account the interaction between the individuals that make up the group. Strictly speaking, we are studying the interaction itself as a kind of "product" or "result," and this subject is completely *sui generis*. But since the "carrier" or "producer" here is the collective, and since the elementary relations between its members also appear as multiple connections, then, along with the logical methods of studying "volumetric" generic relations, we proceed to study the aforementioned products in the same way as we study "collectives." Such a collective

We conceive of a collective as fragmented, but also consisting of elements, where each member and individual has a specific function that connects them to the whole. Such collectivity can be characterised as *an organisation*. We understand the diverse activities of an organisation as a certain internal harmony between members and elements in terms of coordination and subordination. It is essential that all the functions and interactions of the "organs" of such a collective are functions and actions of real significance. Consequently, in this sense, the "collective" plays a predominantly objective role, and moreover, in the sense of a real thing.

If we are to look for the corresponding thing among the things of the world around us, we must recognise it especially in social things. Sociology, which studies the forms and relationships of the social, deals with such collectives; history and ethnology study such collectives in their concrete existence. The interactions and real connections of a collective may be based on purely biological or organic conditions, such as a common origin, but the "social" itself is determined by a multitude of other conditions: temporal, spatial, teleological, and, of course, psychological, but always and without fail, real conditions! The reality of the social as resting on

Of course, collectives in the sense under consideration can be organic and even inorganic (for example, solar energy), but I will focus only on the "social" aspect, 1) in accordance with the general purpose of my presentation, and 2) I consider the social to be the primary example of this collective and think that transferring social analogies to other types of collectives is as convenient as the opposite path of analogy.

interaction and its constituent product i:st reality sui generis. Therefore, the usual methods of scientific analysis, the state of decomposition into simple elements, find their limits in the specificity of the subject itself. This means that the elements of the social are not psychological, biological or any other elements, but only social ones. Here we encounter specific phenomena arising from the relationship between the "pair" as a minimal social element and the elementary concept of "communication". Such relationships are often characterised as socio-psychological. I think that the addition of "psychological" here is unnecessary, as it gives rise to a misunderstanding of these elements as purely psychological. But psychology, in reality, does not participate in the interaction itself, but in the units that are part of the interaction, and psychology studies the corresponding phenomena as its object; the interaction itself cannot and should not be classified as psychological. What we find, for example, in Tard, Durkheim ("socio-psychic" phenomena — socio-psychiques), Fir-Kandt, etc., is not psychology, and this also applies to a large extent to the ethnic psychology of both Lazarus-Steintal and Wundt. And now we can see that this is not only because the *conditio sine qua pop** for the collective-social lies in its "objectification," but also because, in other cases, method of study, the subject itself, i.e. interaction, eludes us. The latter is a "relationship" and must be studied as such, rather than in its "terms"; as in mechanics

* A necessary condition (literally, a condition without which...) (Latin)

we study "movement" rather than "beat". A collective characterised by interaction is essentially a dynamic collective. "Power",

"marriage", "economy",

"language," "minister," "local supervisor," etc. — all these relationships in a dynamic collective are not psychological but social definitions. By "realising" them, we make a smaller mistake than when we move on to the psychology of the "pairs" that carry out these relationships. Relationships, of course, require terms that stand in relation to each other, but these terms can only be studied through the relationship itself and within it. The study of such a subject can be thought of as analogous to the mathematical concept of "mapping"¹, only here

"Correspondences" are always real correspondences, not imposed by us "arbitrarily," but inherent in the nature of things themselves. — So, in this sense, the collective *can be an object* of psychology. "Social psychology," since it studies this kind of object, is not psychology; we can only speak of "social psychology" derived from such a "collective" in the same sense that we previously allowed for "psychology of language," i.e., it is a branch of general psychology.

In this same sense, ethnic psychology sometimes understands its object, as we have seen. But since it is not a subject of psychology, it cannot be the object of ethnic psychology — except, again, in the sense of a branch of general psychology, but never in the sense of an independent science. Can this "collective" be called

Ср: *Zhegalkin*, If. Transfinite Numbers. — Moscow, 1908. — p. 23: •Сумо representation as a thing, as a pre-object of thought, is neither thing *a* nor thing *b*, nor a pair of things *a* and *b*, but is that which is obtained when we think of thing *a* and thing *b* as one whole, and that one of them corresponds to the other.

"Spirit"? Since we all relate specific cases and forms of real collective connections to a "single" carrier *and understand it as real, we can conditionally call it "spirit"* in the first of the meanings of this word. Since such a name decisively emphasises the non-psychological nature of the corresponding object, it may have serious justifications, although it also conceals some serious metaphysical dangers. But it is all the clearer that this collective is not a subject of ethnic psychology, for, as we have seen, the "spirit" in the specified sense is not the "spirit" that ethnic psychology can speak of.

5) The latter meaning is difficult to define and, as a result, often eludes the observer. and is often confused with the previous meaning. This makes it all the more important for us to understand it. Here we are again dealing with a dynamic collective, but one that does not have its own organisation, because it does not have any stable members or elements; they are, as it were, in a "fluid" state, constantly replacing each other, appearing and disappearing. As a whole, such a collective lives its "own" life, but any attempt to fix at least one moment in it necessarily requires correlating this moment with things and relationships outside this collective. No moment "acts" here in its own sense, but only "participates" in the whole, being directed towards something "outside" itself and the whole. I find it difficult to characterise this collective in any other way than by calling it a collective *muna*. We have already encountered the typical or type in relation to collectivity, but there we meant by "typical" simply a certain "average" that formally expressed known

formal relations. Here, however, we are not talking about formal relations, but about real relations. Similarly, "type" here does not mean "norm" or "ideal," and even less so does it mean a logical "generic" concept, because "type" essentially never has such a meaning, although such confusions are found in literature (for example, in Ryumelin). Here, "type" should be compared with "type" as the term is used in the characterisation of works of art: it necessarily includes an element of creativity, while nevertheless sometimes being an adequate expression of a certain collective subject. In this sense, a type is collective because it is "assembled" or "composed" of elements, features, and characteristics; it is also highly individual in terms of both the completeness of its characteristics and its irreplaceability. This is not

"•average", always impoverished in comparison with at least some individual components, and more is a set of similarities, since "•differences" are included in the type as particularly "•typical". The type is extremely intense and individual; it is not the result of generalisation, which distinguishes the individual, but representative of many individuals. If we look for examples of such a collective, bearing in mind that we are talking about reality, we will hardly find suitable examples; they must be sought in the realm of fluid processes that are essentially relevant, and such examples can be found, first and foremost, in our own experiences, which are concrete and vivid. Any analogy with "things" kills their vitality; psychology, with its "abstract" laws, conveys their vital collectivity as little as any analogy. Each experience is collective in itself, containing in its intensity an inexhaustible amount of influence –

; this applies even more to the extensiveness of experience. The totality of experiences is the collectivity of an infinite number of elements.

"General" psychology cannot compete with this. Here, there is a special "descriptive" psychology with special methods of typical, structural, and other constructions. The collective type, for example: a muddle, a Chinese person, a coward, may have an "imaginary" philistine and so on in its representative. But there may be a psychological truth in it. As I have pointed out, "compiling" such a collective is extremely difficult, because *experiences cannot be depicted other than in relation to the object of the experience*. Hence, when characterising experiences, we are forced to talk about "things", "people", "deeds", "ideas," and so on. And it becomes clear that, if we are not careful, we mistake the characterisation of things for the characterisation of experiences, and vice versa. In particular, it is easy to confuse this collective with the previous one, and we begin to see in the "social" the subject of "psychology," talk about "social psychology," etc. On the other hand, there are enough examples in the depiction of this psychological collectivity where it is replaced by a description of "life."

Thus, this collective *is the subject of psychology*, but not "general" psychology, but, as we have seen, sui generis psychology. It is not difficult to see that social and ethnic psychology have the task of studying this subject. Social phenomena, language, myth, customs, science, religion, simply every historical moment evoke corresponding feelings in people. No matter how individually different people may be, there is

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typically common in *their experiences as "responses" to what is happening before their eyes, minds and hearts.*

It is important to note and emphasise that such responses, emotional echoes, are not only heard in the voices and irritations coming from the objective natural environment of the collective and its social and historical circumstances, but they also express its emotional attitude towards concepts and ideas — "ideal objects," which are equally important to the individual and the collective as objective circumstances that do not depend on them. Such is the attitude of the "soul" towards science, towards philosophy as a whole and its individual problems and concepts — law, infinity, duty, beauty, etc. This circumstance in particular must be thought through and weighed up in order to be able to distinguish the "history" of the corresponding "ideas" as the history of the development of culture from the psychological attitude towards it of the collective under consideration, in whose *environment* this history is taking place. Perhaps nowhere is the psychology of a people more vividly reflected than in *its attitude* towards the spiritual values it has "created" itself.

There is no need to repeat that the typical "attitude" towards the objective is depicted as a concrete and truly complete experience of the collective composition invested in a specific representative of the people, class, caste, group, etc. Here, the collective

ACTIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FINDS ITS OWN SUBSTANCE

venous object, and it is here that *ethical psychology can find its own special and independent scientific subject.* On the other hand, it is obvious that the concept of spirit as a "type" or "style" is quite suitable for collectivity, just as "type" is. "Type" here is nothing more than "spirit"; we only add something new by pointing to its "collectivity." Finally, we said

about the "spirit of the people" as a subject of ethnic psychology and called it the "objective" spirit. The "spirit" as a collective subject is indeed objectified, expressed in language, myths and other content of ethnic psychology, and in this sense it is an "objective spirit". But, as we know, not only the "spirit" is "expressed," but also other "meanings" and "sensibilities"; that is why it is necessary to distinguish psychology from non-psychology. In addition,

Although it is "close" to these meanings, such as xopep@v, "spirit" nevertheless becomes a "social" phenomenon in itself. Its role in this sense cannot be denied, but it would be completely wrong to attribute everything to it — after all, it would be as strange as reducing, for example, the meaning of words only to the ideas and feelings of the speaker and not allowing them to denote things and relationships outside of him. In any case, whatever role we attribute to the "spirit," since it is also objectified in expression, it does not *become the sole explanatory factor*. And again, this is consistent with its characterisation as a typical collective psychological experience and the unity of many such experiences. Thus, ethnic psychology finds its subject matter and is defined not as an explanatory discipline fundamental to other sciences, but as *a descriptive psychology that studies typical collective experiences*.

Further clarification of the concept of "expression" (as "realisation", as "objectification," "expression," etc.) can be found in my work *The Theory of the Internal Form of the Word*, which is scheduled to appear in print after this work.



XIII

M It may seem that at least some of the definitions and explanations given above already touch upon questions of method

of our science and, consequently, go beyond the scope of the subject and its objectives. However, it should not be forgotten that the question of the subject of science is in itself a methodological question, especially since the subject predetermines its own method. Therefore, and vice versa, anticipatory references to the method contribute to the clarification of the nature of the subject itself as such.

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my definition of the socio-psychological as typically common in the reactions of the collective to objective reality is fundamentally different from the widespread and accepted definitions, which are composed under the influence of the objectifying and hypostasising tendencies of the *genetic* interpretation of the concepts

"spirit" and "soul", I consider it necessary to elaborate on my thoughts from this particular perspective and in this contrast.

This work was originally compiled in 1916. Published in 1915, during the war, the book *Krüger's Über Entwicklungspsychologie* (Leipzig) was very important to me.

First of all, we must take into account the methodological opinion that *description* is only a preliminary stage in scientific work. The description must be followed by *an explanation*, which is supposedly the only thing that makes science science. This opinion is an echo of the old rationalist idea, dating back to Aristotle, of true and higher knowledge as knowledge from *cause*. In reality, the relationship between descriptive and explanatory sciences is not at all a simple sequence...

then it is unknown and inaccessible. This now particularly prompts me to contrast more sharply my understanding of ethnic psychology as social, ethnological, descriptive, analytical, interpretative with its interpretation as anthropological, genetic, explanatory, and substantial. To clarify this contrast

As for the terms "anthropological" and "ethnological," I will refer to at least one definition by Drismans: "*Race is an anthropological concept that encompasses man as an individual being, subject to the laws of nature and standing in a great connection with all natural life, as opposed to the ethnological concept of a people, which understands man as a social being in his relationship to social and state life*" (*Rasse und Milieu*. — V., 1902. — p. 3). To this I would only add that anthropological study is always individual, while ethnological study is essentially collective. In a book published in 1920, *Hurwic z Elias Die Seeleiz der Volker. Ideen zu einer Vfilkerpsychologie*. — Gotha, I came across a definition that reminded me of my own: "That is why we have presented the subject of ethnic psychology as different in its modes of reaction, in its emotional activity (Gefuhlsbetoiznizg) among different peoples, and characterised the most ethnic psychology as a doctrine of the essential differences between peoples" (p. 19, cf. 1 1 , 1). However, the author's entire presentation shows that he stands on the anthropological and substantialist point of view. The same book provides a definition of uvi o-

NOST /тВух ступеллей. Both bodies и́зук sulleystvo stand side by side. The immediate goal and guiding idea of the description is not explanation, but classification and systematisation.

thematisation. On the contrary, explanation takes place where some generalisations of the nature of empirical laws are obtained, explained from more general positions containing indications of the causes of the phenomena being explained. And only in the case when an explanatory cause established in one way or another is taken as principium divisionus*, between the corresponding descriptions

, given by Kessler, where, among other things, it is noted as a sign of "always similar *reactions* due to the similarity of the premises of feeling and reaction" (p. 42). This

I consider this to be hasty. And what is meant by *the* aforementioned *premises*? Anthropological theories are directly related to biological ones, while the latter, under the influence of new natural philosophical theories and new explanations of heredity (especially Mendelianism), are noticeably leaning towards substantialist tendencies. **Modern genetics** is clearly substantialist in nature — cf., for example, the recently published interesting and significant book by Prof. L. S. Berg — Homogenesis or: Freedom Based on Regularities. — Pb., 1922, in particular the definition of evolution as the unfolding of already existing beginnings and the idea of autonomous orthogenesis based on the recognition of the forces inherent in the chemical structure and protoplasm. Whatever the real significance of these "forces" in the biological sciences, the assumption of ana—logical factors ("souls") u explanatory psychology, in its current state, could be dangerous, especially since, until the nature of biological substance is revealed, explanatory psychology may, if necessary, resort to biological hypotheses. There seems to be no data for the existence of a special substance independent of biology. This applies to the "collective soul" in particular.

* Primary cause, starting point (Latin)

and explanatory sciences, and a bridge is built between them, establishing a connection that does not, however, negate the independent goals, methods, and simple existence of the sciences of one order or the other. Some confusion in this clear relationship arises when, on the one hand, people start talking about genetic classification and, on the other hand, about genetic explanation, without noticing that the term "genetic" is used here in different senses. In the second case, we are talking about an explanation of genesis itself, in the first — *about genesis* as a fact that may or may not have an explanation, which is not as important as the statement of the fact of genesis and development itself. The confusion here becomes a direct mistake when one comes to the idea of *explanation from genesis*. Establishing "genesis" in the precise sense is establishing a *fact* that can be explained in various ways, both by causes believed to lie outside the object under consideration and by causes inherent in it. In the latter case, we are dealing with an explanation that leads to the assumption of stable, albeit modifiable, constants.

"forces," "substances." Only in this case is the *explanation from genesis* not a meaningless concept. In the first case, it is simply meaningless. For example, explaining modern beliefs from their origins and emergence, explaining the properties of a biologically perfect organism from the known or only presumed properties of its primitive ancestor, explaining the anthropological characteristics of a race from characteristics of a purely animal nature, etc. — all this is not absurd only in the mouths of those who have in mind their own

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or substances of development, and it makes no sense to those who reduce development entirely to factors of the external environment and circumstances.

From all this it follows that, since we in aglshize pred-meta put forward the task of science in that to prosly:the changes that the "subject" undergoes depending on the environment or circumstances, or, more precisely, although more broadly, depending on facts and factors that are objective and external to it, and at the same time to establish certain constants that are preserved in all the changes mentioned, regardless of their external or internal conditioning. It is clear that we must refrain from any genetic explanations on principle. As stated, this does not exclude the possibility of studying the sequential development and genesis of socio-psychological phenomena where such development can be factually established. If, under the influence of, for example, religious propaganda, a people assimilates a new set of habitual reactions to natural phenomena or their own way of life, we must trace *the sequence* of changes in their "attitudes" and "opinions," but explain them by the "development of the soul" of the people or their "aptitudes," "strength," 'talents', 'strength', etc.

Cf. Krüger. Op. cit. — pp. 50—51, cf. 218, 180.

Even such a consistent advocate and defender of descriptive psychology as Dilthey introduced the "development of mental life" into his description (see his *Ideen*, Achles Capitel), arguing that this development dependent not on internal forces, but on objective conditions (the body, the environment, and connections with the surrounding spiritual world). Krüger (Op. cit. — p. 86), on the contrary, believes that development is not directly given, and therefore consistently refers genetic consideration to "explanation."

laid down in this soul, we have no right. Other striking examples are a change of residence, a revolutionary change in the form of government, a radically new scientific or technical discovery, etc., and the resulting change in lifestyle, habits, or ways of responding to them. In such cases, it would be better not to even call the corresponding image "development" or "genesis," at least as a result of the most extreme changes in

"moods" of the people, class, or any organised group, and found consistency that would link the most extreme moments of the observed sequence into a certain unity. And in the latter case, it may always turn out that the objective conditions that maintain this constancy continue to exist. For example, changes in national sentiment may clash with the stability of class or professional habits, and vice versa. Referring to "substance" here is always dangerous, which is less noticeable when changes in group and class "consciousness" one has to refer to the constancy of the "national spirit," but this is easy to verify if we take as an example the constancy of a particular class, professional or ideological group as opposed to national variability. If this were not the case, then we would also have to consistently admit the soul of a class, estate, professional association, etc. However, no one prevents us, even from our point of view, from speaking of the stability of "dispositions" (acquired through collective experience), the constancy of developed "internal attitudes," collective "apperception," etc. It is only necessary not to assume that they are "innate."

Overall, this is not a denial of the possibility of genetic psychology, but only a demand for its precise place. However, with regard to collective psychology — both social and ethnic — I would like to raise general doubts about the applicability of genetic explanations to it. Let racial biology and genetics find them, for psychology already bears too much of the brunt of criticism and accusations of metaphysicality. Natural science stands firmly on its own two feet and is rich enough to afford the luxury of metaphysical explanations, but psychology would do better to lead a more modest lifestyle. In the end, even if biologists succeed in turning their "curls" and "buds" into reality, for psychology they will still remain only potentials, the actualisation of which will continue to require independent study and research.

One could also omit such an interpretation of the development of collective mental life, in which the latter could be explained by the structure and development of the material life of society. Thus, ethnologists speak not only of the material culture of peoples, but also of their "spiritual" culture. Since Bastian's time, the latter has never been overlooked. But it is worth looking at any contemporary work by Schurz, Schulze, Firckandt, and others, who are particularly fond of dwelling on the "spiritual life" of primitive peoples, to see that they are actually talking about language, myths, beliefs, art, i.e., systems of "spirit"spirit" which themselves are a constant source of *objective* psychological and subjective reactions on the part of the collective that makes up the people. One can argue whether these *objects* constitute

the subject of ethnology, but a biased psychological explanatory point of view is needed, for example, like that of Wundt, who considers any (objective) "product" of spiritual culture *to be a product* of (subjective) psychological origin, in order to consider them directly as the subject of psychology.

Ethnographic materialism seems to go furthest, as does historical materialism in general. It *explains* the spiritual culture and social structure of a collection of societies from the development of the material forces of society, ultimately from the development of the productive forces. But can such an explanation be called *genetic* in the strict sense? A genetic explanation would be appropriate in the following cases: 1) if it were based on the assumption of internal laws and forces of spiritual life itself, which is directly contradicted by the theory, and 2) if the theory denied the existence of spiritual life and consciousness, considering them to be only a deceptive phenomenon of material processes, a kind of "shadow." But historical materialism, as far as I know, does not deny consciousness as a fact; it only *explains* it differently than proponents of other theories. It does not say that spiritual and mental life *arise from the material*, but only asserts that p-esled-

Cp. for example, *Bukharin L. Theory of Historical Materialism.* — Moscow: State Publishing House, 1922. — pp. 262-4. *L. I. Aksiprod (Orthodox)* formulates his thought with transparent clarity: "The foundation of historical materialism was a very good and obvious and banal truth: if there were no human beings with their mental and physical abilities and capacity for intellectual, conscious activity, there would be neither social organisation nor world history. And historical materialism has never denied the existence of consciousness and its significance in the historical process, but rather

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHECKING PROCEDURE

It determines and predetermines the first, and again predetermines — which is especially important — not for each individual, but for the collective. This means that it determines the collective's spiritual and mental disposition, while the question of in which acts and experiences this disposition is actually actualised can only be resolved by pointing to the facts. Only in an imprecise sense can such an explanation be called genetic, as it itself and is called; it is explanation materialistic and economic. And therefore, here too, let the economists themselves decide what the "forces" they speak of are, whether they exist in substance or not. For psychology, referring to their substantial genetic meaning is pure metaphysics. A methodologically indicated explanation can take its place, as explained at the beginning of this paragraph, instead of with explanation biological, immanent and

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classifying description, not excluding ei o. In principle, however, it is necessary to always and strictly distinguish between an explanation that refers to the collective as such and an explanation for which the reality to be explained remains, after all, the individual. All

He sought to reveal the objective laws of historical development and social consciousness" (Philosophical Essays. — St. Petersburg, 1906. p. 180). As for explaining the genesis of consciousness, this same author, who is quite authoritative on questions of materialism, reinforces his opinion with references to G. Plekhanov and categorically states: "Most often, the objection raised against it {materialism} is that the materialist doctrine does not explain the origin of consciousness. *Materialism does not attempt to explain this origin*" (my italics. — Ibid. — p. 167).

Any genetic explanation — biological, racial, anthropological, etc. — always and inevitably remains an explanation *of the individual*. The laws and theories of heredity underlying this type of explanation are applied individually and distributively. On the contrary, the explanation of economic materialism is precisely an explanation of the collective as such; its distributive application can yield nothing but error and, as has been said, it acquires distributive meaning only when both the explanatory factor and the phenomenon being explained are hypostasised. It goes without saying that geneticism, in the sense explained above, will give rise to other symptoms of biological metaphysics following individualism, such as the notorious organic theory (Spencer, Scheffle, and others) and so on.



XIV

I will focus on one interpretation of genetic psychology, which may also be assigned a role in defining the essence of

psychology and social psychology. In modern psychology, there are increasingly frequent complaints that psychology studies its subject — the human subject — as if the life of his individuality existed outside of any environment, primarily independent of social

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There are high hopes for ethnic and social psychology, and *together* with them, for genetic psychology. Both of these may not be mere speculation. Genetic psychology, tracing the development of the human individual from child to mature adult, can undoubtedly fill many gaps in contemporary (incomplete) psychology. Genetics and biology are relevant here.

PSYCHOLOGY — N dDeZhH Y TOCHKI OPOsY. TO AND M CtT NO PO—

Therefore, it is unclear why this should be linked to social psychology. For example, Kruger takes this into account when studying the laws of

¹ K<ik does, for example, Krüger. — Op. cit. — S. 1 6, 141, 216 ei pass.

dividual psychology, as well as geographical, climatic, and prooch. environment does not mean engaging in social psychology. It is still the same individual and general psychology. The aberration arises from the fact that behind the individual, behind his back, they imagine "kind" as a kind of substantial essence, the transient manifestation of which they begin to consider the individual.

For those who do not wish to make such an assumption and at the same time do not accept any other "carrier" of mental states other than the human individual, social psychology cannot exist as a specific and independent science, but only as a simple "part" of general psychology. This is the position taken, for example, by Simmel. He rejects the "mysticism" of mental processes outside the individual soul and considers the only legitimate problem of social psychology to be the question: what modifications does the mental process of the individual undergo under the influence of social forces? He consistently comes to the conclusion that social psychology is not a counterpart to individual psychology, but only a part of the latter. However, Simmel does not deny that the fact that the social environment influences mental life gives rise to a special type of questions — partly statistical, partly ethnological. The peculiarity of the latter is that, under certain conditions, we do not perceive individual series of phenomena, but rather *a certain average*, referring to a special kind of concept — the type. The latter is not some kind of special real carrier of mental properties, but rather a certain ideal construction. By this, Simmel

' Sinzmel G. Soziologie. — Lpz., 1908. — S. 556—563.

* Narndu, in addition (French)

gives a lot. After all, the establishment of *tigia* is not the study of individuals as individuals, but rather an original form of education, the principles of which do not coincide with the principles of general education and the construction of a general concept. On the other hand, if types of individual character, behaviour patterns, etc. are possible, then they — precisely as individual formations — are also possible where the interaction of individuals is concerned, which Simmel considers to be a characteristic of society as a subject of sociology. A type is not a "carrier" in the sense of substance, and that is why the study of the typical cannot be explanatory, but it can be an "expresser" in the sense of representation, and moreover, a collective one. The question is only how to arrive at it. If we have sufficient material to construct a cultural and psychological type, for example, romanticism, we do so more or less methodologically consciously. What is the method here? It is that we already view the first representative of a given collective that we take for examination as a representative. Further idealising reconstruction consists in the fact that when we compare him with others like him, we recognise his own, specific, wholly individual characteristics. The positive result of the comparison is then compared with other typical formations of the same cultural sphere — the positive sum of characteristics is supplemented by the negative. If we did not have data for positive comparison, we would limit ourselves to negative ones — for example, if we tried to reconstruct *the type* of author of *The Tale of Igor's Campaign* as a socio-psychological type. General psychology does not know this method. However, differential psychology does, and it is necessary to apply it.

know that social and ethnic psychology is a real counterpart to it.

Simmel speaks only of social psychology, although he also has in mind national official education — it is no coincidence that he speaks of "ethnological interest" in psychology. To what extent we are entitled to separate ethnic psychology from social psychology and not consider the former as merely a part of the latter is a question we will have to discuss later, but we cannot fail to see the methodological value of taking socio-psychological definitions as our starting point. With this approach to the problem, first of all, the inadmissibility of a substantial carrier of the collective soul becomes clearer, since the object of social psychology is not only historically stable collective formations such as class, profession, estate, etc., but also ad hoc and freely organised associations of ideological, criminal, and generally consciously purposeful groups. Secondly, the characterisation of the "carrier" of the collective soul as a type, as an ideal formation, affirms the fundamentally descriptive nature of the corresponding research.

In general, therefore, Simmel's argument is

I am inclined to interpret this in my favour rather than against my understanding of ethnic and social psychology, especially when compared with Simmel's other considerations on social psychology. Thus, what has been said above about the insufficient understanding of collective psychology as the psychology of the acting masses is entirely consistent with the fact that Simmel

' Therefore, I consider it superficial to equate Simmel with Paul in resolving the question of the relationship between the psychological individual and the collective. Cp.: Kriiger. Op. cit. — p. 137.

He speaks of "the immediate, sensual action of the masses" as a motive that prompts the emergence of a special collective soul. According to his explanation, here the unity of the result incorrectly leads to the assumption of some single internal cause and subjective carrier. Rejecting this assumption, as he says, is sufficient grounds for distinguishing between genetic and social psychology. This is even more important for the same purpose and for refuting the false psychological prejudice, supported by Wundt and his students, about the reducibility of the spiritual formations of culture to psychologically explainable and genetic laws. The development of language, state, law, religion, morals, and other forms — let us add, objective forms — of the spirit goes far beyond the limits of the individual soul, whatever participation we attribute to them as individuals. This, according to Simmel, leads to the "mystical" assumption of a collective soul. However, it is necessary to distinguish between *the* spiritual *processes* in which law, language, etc. arise and operate, and their "ideal, conceivable *content*." The latter — for example, words and forms of language as they are found in dictionaries and grammars, norms of law in legislative acts, dogmas of religion, etc. — "possess an intrinsic value, independent of individual cases of their application by individuals." They possess a significance that is not a spiritual existence, and thus have little need for an empirical carrier, as does Zifagor's theorem. Such a carrier is arrived at by means of a false alternative: if the spiritual is not inherent in the individual spirit, it must be inherent in the social spirit. But there is still a third thing, "objective spiritual *content*, in which there is nothing psychological—

who is no longer there, as there is no psychological logical meaning to the judgement, although it can only reach the reality of consciousness within and as a result of mental dynamics. It follows that if we can speak of "origin" here, then in reality we can only refer to the interacting multitude of individual psychological units, and since the aforementioned spiritual contents are considered in their own unity, "they have no *origin* at all, but are an ideal creation, just as Pythagoras' theorem has no origin in terms of its content. This is the final answer to the question of a genetic explanation applicable to the spirit as *objective* content. It is given objectively, as given to "things" the surrounding empirical world, and therefore, like the latter, it is an object and a reason for the spiritual reactions and responses of everyone connected by the interaction or organisation of the collective. And in conclusion: just as, regardless of the individual's specific and singularly indefinite reaction, which varies from case to case, we speak of the characteristic and typical features of their behaviour, so too can we consider the reactions to a thing or idea on the part of the collective as relative not to a substantial subject, but to an ideal-typical one.

If we still had to, as explained above, In a sense, speaking descriptively about the "genesis" and "development" of the collective "soul," it would only be the development of the collective itself — the people, the class, etc. It is itself, in its collectivity, the bearer, and nothing else. How to study it is a question of interest and purpose. For example, one could study the development of a given society (people, etc.) with the aim of establishing a *psychological*

psychological theory of its development — as they say in German, *Entwickliingstheorie*. This would be the establishment of general laws of psychology, a psychological explanation, say, in ethnology or sociology. It was accepted by those who did not notice the mistake in this.

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On this premise, it is as unacceptable as *negri-emlemo* and its opposite — ethnological explanation in psychology. But one can also see another possibility: the representation of *psychology as the realisation of the self*, of its spiritual

Kp yuger yn re kaet in this Npta, KO GAZ says that his *Vol kerp>psychologie* is a psychological and interpretative approach to ethno-logical facts, since he views it merely as an extension of "general psychology," or rather as its "application" to cultural facts (Op cit. — p. 157). At the same time, he imagines that he will achieve something better if, like Wundt, he considers culture to be a "product" and "result" of mental activity (cf. p. 127–8, 133 f.), but only "theoretically" recognises in "psychological 'necessities'" "the 'carrier' and internal 'drives'" the "formative forces" of all cultural *development* (p. 177).

' And so, in certain cases in empirical scientific practice, it is possible to apply this method. In certain cases, an ethnologist may turn to a psychologist for an explanation that is beyond his or her grasp, just as a psychologist may turn to ethnology for an explanation of the specific (ethnic) characteristics that he or she may attribute to the object of study. This practical mutual assistance between the sciences does not make psychology a part of ethnology, nor does it make ethnology a part of psychology; neither can take the other as its foundation. However, it cannot be denied that ethnologists and honest explanations in psychology are, in fact, less odious methodologically than psychological explanations in ethnology. This is because a material-ethnological explanation that refers to "conditions" is not an explanation in the proper sense, but is nevertheless a "supplementary" (to the established internal explanation) legal justification. It is such in the broad sense of real

and spiritual life, and possibly, in special cases, a depiction (description and characterisation) of the spiritual life of society (the people and the state) in its development, what in German is called *Entwicklungsgeschichte*.

To put an end to the "genetic explanation," I will point out another misunderstanding that may lead to it. It also stems from an incorrect dilemma. People resort to a genetic explanation of mental life when they consider a mechanical explanation to be its only opposite. The successes of psychology are sometimes illustrated by reference to the fact that it has finally freed itself from the ideal of mechanical natural science and is becoming a natural science of the organic. However, how do we know that there are only these two types of explanation? In general terms, the question of the types of reality, the causes operating in them, and the corresponding types of explanation is not to be decided here, but it is a priori clear that the dilemma indicated is arbitrarily established. It is equally clear that even if it were justified, it would be possible, since explanation in general is contrary to...

determinism, but precisely because it does not ask for *the actual*, which is essentially a psychological explanation in ethnology. Thus, when we "explain" the rapid and vigorous growth of a cereal by the availability of suitable fertiliser, this explanation is only valid on the assumption that the "forces" driving plant growth — and *indeed* but that they are (additionally) placed in conditions favourable for their manifestation or actualisation: if, in certain cases, we explained the condition of the soil (for example, its moisture content by the presence of plants that protect it from drying out), **such an explanation would be accidental.**

Cf.: Kriiger. Op. cit. — p. 50.

is based on description, to deny both of its members. To deny is precisely the position defended in these pages — in favour of description based on interpretation. As a result

THIS IS THE POSITION OF ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY, WHAT ABOUT THE HISTORY OF WHICH—

social psychology, sociology and the so-called social sciences in general are directed, while ethnic psychology and its "continuation", historical psychology, are directed by ethnology and the history of things and ideas, institutions and culture, respectively. This in itself is sufficient justification for the fact that ethnic psychology will not turn into a law-making psychology, abstracted from everything concrete and alive. On the contrary, in all questions and answers, it must be concrete, tied to a specific collective, a specific people, a specific time, and a specific culture.



XV

H The question remains unanswered as to why and under what restrictions collective types of psychology can be called *ethnic* psychology. But before moving on to resolving this last question, we need to pause and consider some of the difficulties in our problem that we encountered when examining the definitions of ethnic psychology and which, perhaps, have not yet been fully resolved by my explanations. The main difficulties, it seems to me, lie in the question: where do we get the material for ethnic psychology and what fundamental principles do we use in developing it? As I have already pointed out, this material is not provided to us by self-observation, as in general psychology, or by observation and experience, as in the natural sciences. It consists of signs and expressions that need to be interpreted in order to find the subject of ethnic psychology in their meaning or in connection with their analysis.

In this regard, ethnic psychology is comparable to psychology, since the latter uses indirect methods, and, on the other hand, to cultural sciences, history, ethnology, etc. But, in essence, both

Another comparison does not stem from a direct analysis of the subject, but from certain dogmatic assumptions about what "*meaning*" itself is.

The first comparison can be called *psychological*; it stems from the assumption that the meanings of expressions are the representations and experiences of the expressing subject. Not only the one-sidedness, but also the direct falsity of such a premise is now sufficiently established, and in general it could only be supported by a new premise of philosophical illusionism. But the idea that the world is a representation, whatever its philosophical integrity, cannot serve as the basis for the real sciences, and therefore the criticism with which Paul opposed Wundt is so understandable and convincing. Paul, therefore, is a representative of

the second comparison, which can be called *nominalistic*, since it proceeds from the premise that the meaning of words is the actual diversity of individual things, processes, and relationships. But the contradiction of nominalism lies in the fact that, while affirming the reality of individual things, it leaves no independent object for general names (), so that the only valid instrument of cognition remains one (pomen). However, nominalism, as I pointed out in my analysis of Paul's views, revealing the shortcomings of the lionimania of "principles" and the nature of the "doctrine of principles," has all the advantages of over psychologism for dogmatism.

of the realism of the special sciences, for, in fact, "meanings" are not representations, but "lie in things" with their content.

When we reveal the "meanings" of such expressions as language, myth, art, we find certain social relations and phenomena that can be called "things." And if science operated with proper names, their meaning would be exhausted by the "thing" they denote, but it is precisely *common* names, the real weapons of science, that would be left without "meanings". Meanwhile, their actual meanings, *their "idetr,"* constitute a completely stable and reliable subject of study. No matter how much we talk about particular and individual forms of language, myths, and so on, whether we realise it or not, we base ourselves on a complete and *ideal* system of unities, according to which we arrange the empirical diversity of facts. The significance of this system is quite objective, and its fundamental justification is the only non-dogmatic foundation for all further scientific construction. That is why the basis of the science of language should be not psychology or history, but only *the philosophy of language*, and the basis of all sciences of culture or spirit should be *the philosophy of language*.

8•• •Y** *TR and spirit*. In general, therefore, "•thing•" can be a meaning, since we are talking about terms of singular (nomenclature) or proper names

, while in other cases "meaning" is an "idea". But it is worth remembering, first, the role of common names in science, and second, the conventionality of the term "individual," which presupposes, for its at least intensive unification, also some "idea," in order to agree that any science about "things," including

history, presupposes its own *ideal* foundation, that, consequently, the "idea" is not next to the "thing" as meaning, but in it is the meaning of the thing itself, that, therefore,

"idea" has the meaning 2nmtf;o2 v* This is not the place to consider questions such as what an "idea" is, as we

P;EIKODI M K HE YI D;E. , 3De Sb DOSTZTO'I NO IZ;EI ZN PTb, •ITO

whatever its content may be, its "carrier" — *the object* — is the real thing, (rt** of the one who is engaged in revealing the "meaning" in expressions.

But the expression expresses not only "the thing." Let us take language again as an example for clarity. Already involuntary

I dI M P L ЪШВ Н ЫЙ ВОС КЛИ ЦѐНИ Я dI ВОЗГЛ ПС Ы ВЫП ОЛ НП ЮТ

Two *sets* of functions: amazement, indignation, delight, anger, on the one hand, but they also draw our attention to the object of amazement, anger and delight. Intentional expressions are even more complex, and in them the "matter" that needs to be communicated, information that needs to be conveyed, interpreted, explained, and, equally, distorted, twisted, and much more, is in the foreground. This is the meaning of expressions, let's say, of the first order, their primary and specific meaning; here, the "expression" fulfils its direct, *actual* function. The function of a word or expression in general is only fulfilled in the necessary way when it finds

in the necessary *YP R THIS*

WORD HX. СЛОБО ДОДЖК-Ю

To be an "articulated" word, an expression must have a certain *form*; it must be "organised" in one way or another. *The formatting* function of a word can thus be the subject of special attention and study. Thus, we speak of the forms of a word

* Convex, relief (ancient Greek)

*• Fact, deed, action (ancient Greek)

grammatical, stylistic, aesthetic, logical. Hypotheses can be put forward about the psychological origin of such forms, and we do indeed talk about this in psychology, but, as already indicated, in psychology they cannot have independent significance and their study is subject to the general tasks of psychology. They can be studied as such in

"formal" disciplines, such as grammar and syntax. But in their empirical and self-sufficient development, they are studied precisely in the history of language and proto'z. Finally, if we turn to the desires or intentions of the "expresser" themselves, we arrive at *a certain order of "meanings,"* if you will, meanings of a "second order." Here, in fact, there is a *subtle* function of speech, in the narrow sense of "expression" as "discovery" or "manifestation" *of expression*. We begin to build assumptions about *how* the expresser *experiences* the content of their expressions. A new set of meanings emerges for us here: it is not only about the mood of the moment of the expresser, but about everything that determines this moment, about his inclinations, habits, tastes, about what we call *Gesinnung*, and in general about the whole structure of his soul, which represents a complex dynamic collective of experiences. This last "meaning" of expression is what I have referred to above not as *Ерщv*, but as *я ртрщv* of expression. For example, a professor from the department of thirty-five

JEd 3 C K'/Ch NO AND VYAL O, IN CC KOL bKO STP)EOMODNOY }EeCHI "NO-

demonstrates the great merits of his science. It would be unfortunate if we did not distinguish in such a speech the different orders of "meanings" in his expressions and <mixing

them together. Among such confusion, the definitions of the subject
ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY.

But it is not enough to simply distinguish between the orders of "knowledge" in expression; one must also be aware of their mutual relationship. It would be completely unnatural, for example, to seek a substantive "explanation" or "justification" of our professor's science in the "power" with which he deals with his subject. The natural relationship is clear: the subject is determined first and foremost by its own actions, and *experiences* run, so to speak, parallel to the disclosure of the subject itself, both in its action and in its entire content. This parallelism is not even a causal or functional connection, but it can be found in its original form. In general, no matter how complicated the situation may be in particular examples, in general it is still clear.

П|Э|Ф|Н|Ц|И|П|пальных 3«В|т|С|Н|мостей «зн|чени й» ост|з|ют-
Я|С|Н|И|М|И. t2Ж|Д|/ Т|Ф|М AND Z|т|С|b IN THE Е|Т|Ф|И|И|'|С|С|К|О|Й Г|С| И|С|Н|О|Л|О|Г|И
it is necessary to establish the facts of the establishment of "unnatural" relations. The most dangerous thing here is the confusion of concepts, due to which "spirit" as a meaning, with which we are dealing in the analysis of social

Ш|ь|н|о -И|С|Т|О|'Э|И|Ч|Е|С|К|О|Г|О П|'Э|О|Ц|С|С|С|П, П|О|Н|И|М|П|Е|Т|С|Ч П|С|И|Х|О|Л|О|Г|И
This confusion is harmful not only because it is erroneous in itself, but also because it misdirects the researcher's attention: it seems to him that the subject of psychological study of the process is identical with *this* "psychological" prsl-met. Indeed, the psychological as a reaction

¹ Regarding the external structure of the word, its moments and functions, see my *Aesthetic Fragments*, 1923, as well as the work on the "external form"

on this subject from the perspective of the experiencing collective either "gets entangled" in the "spirit" or does not fit into any specific scientific problem, remaining the preserve of novelists and amateur fantasists.

In terms of ethnic psychology, all of the above can be imagined as follows. In various forms of expression, in words, drawings, buildings, costumes, institutions, acts, documents, in short, in everything we call "products of culture," we distinguish their actual meaning as a certain objective content. We see in these objects their collective *girirado*, consisting of a complex system of organisation, the disclosure of which is the task of *the philosophical ethnological science* of these meanings, *the basis for* all other sciences about them. Since the system of "ideas" that constitutes the content of this science is realised in its real forms, we are dealing first of all with the general science about them as social forms, with *sociology*, and then with a system of special sciences covering various specific spheres or areas of the social. The materially "reified" content of social life is distributed among the "histories" of these areas, which in theory constitute *a common history*, closely related to etiology, initially limited to the "prehistoric" and now in some respects competing with history itself; it is possible that their difference is primarily methodological.

Witnessing social events unfolding before one's eyes as a direct series of reactions to the latter constitutes the second order of "meanings." Due to the peculiarities of this type of collective

, as I have already said, we cannot fix them in any other way than by linking them to the events unfolding before the experiencing subject, correlating them with the latter. That is why the grouping of content under "objective" headings is appropriate here: language, myth, knighthood, the Renaissance, cult, war, etc. These headings are indications of

Ideas that unite not only "objectified" content, but also the *psychological* reaction to it. These are the true and real unities of collective mental life, and not at all the similarity of the psychophysical organisms of peoples, eras, or population groups. The functional or morphological similarity of organisms or their characteristics affect the very reaction of a person, and they are the subject of general explanatory, in particular genetic, psychology. Here, however, we are talking about the very experiences that are similar among observers of what is happening before them. No matter how individually different these observers may be in their attitude to a particular event or sequence of events, it is possible to find commonalities in their reactions to it. We compile this commonality based on characteristics belonging to different individuals, but in relation to a given sphere of events — linguistic, religious, political, etc. — each of them is a representative of the entire responding group. And each reflects the collectivity of the group itself, since he is in more or less close contact with each member of it, experiences its influence, imitates it, sympathises with it, etc. Moreover, each member of the group, again to a greater or lesser extent, embodies a spiritual collectivity known as traditions, which can also be

considered as a system of spiritual forces that determine an individual's actual experiences, impressions, and reactions. Every living individual is therefore a *sui generis* collective of experiences, where his personal experiences are predetermined by *the entire mass* of aperietya that constitutes the collectivity of experiences of his kind, i.e., both his contemporaries and his ancestors. In general, the collective of experiences carried within an individual can be described as his *spiritual makeup*, and this is where we seek "second-order meanings." But usually, in depicting the spiritual state of a group in a given place and time, we take not individual individuals, but "fragments" of various individuals to compose a complete ideal image *of* an era, a people, etc. These types are types of spiritual makeup. As a subject of study, they constitute the subject of psychology, whose correct name, according to the subject that determines mental experiences, is comparative *psychology* (static). Only in relation to them is the exact place and subject of "dynamic" psychology determined: both historical and *ethnic*, just as in relation to sociology, the place and subject of history and ethnology are determined.

A sharp distinction between *the sciences of* sociology and social NOY PSYCHOLOGY, ETHNOLOGY AND ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY should not be taken as referring to *the subject matter* and *content* of these sciences as belonging to incomparably different spheres of reality. On the contrary, as I have repeatedly emphasised, we are actually dealing with a concrete unity of life, permeated by real interaction, and this fundamental unity of life is in no way destroyed by its distribution for the purposes of study across different scientific fields. Moreover, the above-mentioned

The main philosophical science focuses solely on this unity, in essence and idea, and is directed, i.e., consequently, it is equally fundamental for sociology and social psychology, and these sciences themselves are interrelated in terms of interaction and mutual assistance. Just as dangerous for scientific work is the mixing of such interacting tasks, as is the elevation of abstract "parts" to real, *independent* areas of existence. The idea that these two separate areas of reality are studied by two related sciences, for example, ethnology and ethnic psychology, so that these two halves can then be "put together" to form a "whole," is just as unrealistic as the idea so insistently put forward by Wundt that we are dealing with two approaches to the same thing, with two "points of view." In essence, this is a reflection of one of the prejudices of naturalistic psychology, namely that "man consists of soul and body" — a favourite maxim of moralists of all times — as if

Incidentally, this is how Münsterberg presents the matter — the same reality is viewed from two different perspectives: *social psychology and social physiognomy*

; put them together, and you get *sociology!* (Münsterberg, N. Grundzüge der Psychologie. — Vol. 1. — Leipzig, 1900. — p.

133). As if sciences were books that could be bound into a single volume... In general, it should be noted that often a "point of view" is only a *refugium ignaviae* refuge of inertia (Latin) in the realm of thought. Either the "point of view" has some kind of pre-me basis, and then it must be revealed, or it is a figment of whim, which must be taken into account, perhaps in a casual manner, but not in a scientific one.

These are two parts that fit together as well as a pen fits a penholder or a rudder fits a boat.

A person is a person, and in their experiences they experience — perceive, hate, love, fear, remember, etc. etc. — nature, themselves, or others — this is their psychology. Ethnic psychology in this sense is not limited in its object: a person's relationship to nature, themselves, or culture — all are equally its object. That is why the totality of experiences can be divided according to their object; there can be an infinite number of specific questions here: how a person experiences God, family, thunderstorms, war, etc. Ethnic psychology can therefore usefully borrow from ethnology the classification of the latter's objects and only ask how *this* is experienced by a person. On the contrary, its relative independence as a branch of psychology will be reflected in the fact that it asks: how does primitive man or man of a given era experience love, fear, pleasure, etc. — that is, what *does* he *love*, what *does he fear*, what does he worship, etc.?

Summarising everything said in the definition of ethnic psychology, we come to the conclusion that *ethnic psychology has as its subject the second order of "expression" or the specific spiritual structure of a person.*



XVI

«**Д** The spiritual structure of a person, a people, or a group in their real existence is uniquely combined and intertwined with other realisations.

historical reality and is undoubtedly one factor among others. It is the task of the historian or sociologist to take into account the significance of this factor and, when appropriate, to use it to explain a particular event in historical life. But it would be a completely perverse understanding of ethnic psychology if we were to conclude from this that ethnic psychology in general is called upon to be an *explanatory* science in relation to history. For its part, history is also only a "random" can explain certain phenomena of the national spirit, although, undoubtedly, it is history that creates the objective orientation of humanity's emotional experiences, establishing milestones that mark the path of the "spirit." In any case, it seems to me less one-sided and less erroneous to assert that that the "development of the spirit" is "explained" by its history — despite the tautological nature of such a statement — than the proclamation of general (individual) psychology as the "basis" of ethnic psychology, which thus appears to be

It is a "continuation and extension" of individual psychology and, therefore, must be consistent with *psychophysical* laws and explanations.

The demand that ethnic psychology be an explanatory science reflects a number of methodological prejudices of 19th-century logic. First of all, there is the prejudice that "mathematical natural science" is the "model" for all science, and secondly, that psychology is in some sense a "fundamental science." The latter prejudice, in particular, did little to clarify the meaning of the natural sciences and had a negative, lasting impact on the understanding of the so-called "sciences of the spirit." Finally, for ethnic psychology in particular, the prejudice about the supposed parallelism of the methods of ethnology and ethnic psychology proved to be harmful.

LOGY. FROM WHAT IS THE BASIS OF HOW AND IN ALL COMPLEXITIES

the correspondence between social processes and their experience by humans, it cannot be concluded that both "sides" should be studied using analogous methods. There can be no doubt that the idea of this parallelism is inspired by the idea of psychophysical parallelism, which is essentially unnecessary metaphysically and unacceptable empirically. Empirically, human mental life represents a uniqueness that cannot be reduced to anything else and cannot be compared to anything else; "parallelism," applied to the explanation of mental phenomena, provides only an additional reason for their "reification" and, consequently, for obscuring their uniqueness. History can only be compared to the development of the "spirit" in the sense that, through the richness of its content, we learn about the richness of the human spirit: experiment and self-observation are methods of psychological study, not historical ones

knowledge, and there would be no point in applying them if it were not for history — it is only in history that man learns about himself.

However, this cannot justify the assertion that history is the basis of ethnic psychology. But this has already been discussed, and we have come to the conclusion that the only basis for ethnic psychology should be recognised as "pure" and universal semiotics. After clarifying the subject of ethnic psychology as a second-order meaning, I would just like to add a few comments to prevent possible misunderstandings, which may arise from the dual placement of the theory of language, on the one hand, at the the "basis" of ethnic psychology, and on the other hand, as one of its own problems.

In the introductory article to their journal, which we have already discussed, Lauapyc and Stein-Tal list issues of ethnic psychology and describe their objectives in relation to them. The idea behind their journal — to link the study of ethnic psychology and linguistics — seems to be based on the remarkable idea that language is a means of expression and even a sign of identity, which the authors did not fully realise themselves, but which nevertheless made their work very productive.

The general idea of the authors of ethnic psychology about language as an expression and even a sign of nationality became popular in the 19th century under the influence of Herder and especially since the time of Goethe's *Address to the German Nation*. This idea acquired scientific significance in the works of W. Humboldt. But as an observation, this idea is very old. In *the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria*, I found the following note: "*Language* is defined as 'a means of expressing thoughts, moulded in accordance with the character of the people'" (Russian translation 1892.b — Book VI. — Chapter 15. — Column 747).

As is clear from everything I have said, the study of *language* is of particular importance for ethnic psychology, since it primarily provides a *model* for studying all other forms of "expression." "Language" is a problem in this sense; *philosophical*; the philosophical study of "language" is the basis for the study of all expressions with meanings. But alongside this, "language" as a product of culture, as culture itself, as a form of social interaction, is a problem for the empirical sciences, including ethnology and *ethnic psychology*. The philosophical approach to the study of language is of universal significance; linguistics, comparative, or the history of language, already has a more limited significance, since here the empirical forms of languages and their "laws" are studied; the tasks of ethnology are even narrower: in essence, they provide material for the special science of language. But what is the task of ethnic psychology? If I am right, then it is precisely in the field of language study that ethnic psychology will seem the poorest in content — the whole question boils down to *how language is experienced as a social phenomenon by a given people at a given time?* It may seem that there is no material for an answer here, especially when compared to how, for example, religious movements, the death of loved ones, wars, political revolutions, etc. are experienced. However, it is not difficult to see from historical examples that there is indeed material: the "revival" of a language is always associated with particularly passionate works about that language, its purity, etc. It is worth remembering the struggle for *their* language in the German academic world of the 17th century, or the concern for *their* language among the Polish people since the end of the 19th century, among Ukrainians in the present day, etc.

to see that there is interesting material here for social psychology. But it goes without saying that this also applies to the change in "perceptions" and feelings associated simply with the word and its meaning, which occurs together with the change in meanings and which is often inaccurately referred to as a "change in meaning". It is here that language, from a private object, from a *reason* for experience, becomes an "image," the basis and *source* of ethnic psychology. Along with the problem of language in this sense, other problems of ethnic psychology arise. The idea that there are two more problems — myths and customs, as Zundt believes — has no basis whatsoever, because it is based on a completely naive analogy between the individual and the national soul. Descriptive ethnic psychology can identify any type of "experience" and make it the object of its study, both as a completely "separate" fact and as a member of any complex classification. Typological constructions of ethnic psychology, of course, must be subject to the methodology of "typology," i.e., it is not limited to classification, but moves from simple and separate types to complex forms, correlations, and structures of specific relationships, taking them not **only** in a systematic classification, but also in a division by eras and periods, etc. Despite the systematic nature of this method, however, there remains considerable freedom in the composition of the types themselves, as well as in the study of the data directly. individual facts.

This freedom of ethnic psychology in the construction of its "types" explains the fact that there is an untenable analogy between the grouping of its problems and

the random classification of abstract general psychology, which Wundt supports, nevertheless had to have at least *some basis* in reality. It is significant that Wundt's critics noted not so much the methodological absurdity of this analogy as its limitations. The fact is that, no matter how much psychology sometimes tries to resemble natural science in the proper sense, creating abstract general explanations and laws, by the very nature of its material, none of its concepts are logical abstractions, but rather typical features that naturally and easily transformed into a designation of "character." Thus, "rational," "emotional" and "volitional" characters are easily understood by us as definitions of completely concrete and complete "types". This completeness of type does not depend in any way on the place of the corresponding "character" in the classifications of general psychology. Thus, from the point of view of general psychology, the types "religious," "aesthetic," and "moral," which arise from more "particular" classes of mental phenomena, are not "simpler" or "more abstract" than others.

"types." The methodological features of ethnic psychology in this direction can be compared with the features of "differential" psychology, with the difference that differential psychology builds its types on mental qualities themselves, while ethnic psychology builds them on their historical determinants; that, furthermore, the "types" of differential psychology are still *psychophysical* types, while the types of ethnic psychology are purely psychological; that, finally, the "dispositions" of differential psychology are individual, while the "spiritual makeup" in ethnic psychology

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHESKOU PSYCHOLOGY

PROGRAMME

is optimally collective. This parallelism in the methodological approach of differential psychology and ethnic psychology is quite understandable if we take into account the typological techniques that are equally applicable in the constructions of both sciences.

But, on the other hand, does such freedom in constructing types in ethnic psychology not provide an additional argument in favour of those who oppose its very name? What grounds do we have for calling a certain branch of psychology *ethnic* psychology, and would it not be more correct to retain only the general name of *social* psychology? The normal argument in defence of the independent field of ethnic psychology has already been presented in essence: psychology in its classifications can proceed from the classification of historical and ethnic determinants of the mental life of the collective human being, but it can also take up themes based on the characteristics of the experiences themselves. The latter considerations will necessarily be more formal in nature, while the former are, by their very nature, intuitive. This justifies the opposition between social psychology on the one hand and historical and ethnic psychology on the other, and I emphasise here the internal relationship between this opposition.

CONTRAST BETWEEN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORICAL AND ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY

ethnology. Here, a new opposition between psychology and "history" may seem arbitrary.

Cp. *Stern*, Die differentielle Psychologie. — Leipzig, 1911, in particular: Kar. XI I. — S. 168 ff. — Kleinpeter greatly simplifies the matter, reducing ethnic psychology to little more than a chapter of differential psychology. However, his entire description of the tasks of ethnic psychology is extremely biased. *Kleinpeter* L. Vonri3ge zur Einfuhrung in die Psychologie. — Lpz., 1914. — p. 384 ff.

"ethnic" and "ethnical" — aren't these two new types of psychology? Methodologically, of course not, and I don't think there's any harm in using these terms promiscuously. They merely reflect the state of affairs in history as a science: as long as it was considered convenient to contrast ethnology as the science of prehistoric man with history, it seemed that we were dealing not only with two empirically separate objects, but also, methodologically, with fundamentally different spheres. But this sharp division hardly corresponds to the current state of science and its already visible prospects for the future. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is true of historical and ethnic psychology.

However, I would not like to limit myself to this formal argument alone, and I will point out some more fundamental considerations in favour of the term *ethnic* psychology. First of all, attention should be paid to the fundamental importance of evolution in the study of historically mobile psychological types. This is, of course, a large and difficult question. The very application of the term "evolution" to human psychological life may be controversial, as it is controversial in its application to history, since it easily leads to very superficial and extremely harmful analogies between historical and spiritual life and the life *of an organism*.

The term "historical psychology" is also found in Lacan. See his article *Einige syntetische Gedanken zur Völkerpsychologie*. — *Zeitschrift...* — III. — <S. 3.

* Indiscriminately, mixed up, instead of (Latin)

The impressive observations made on this subject by

F. Grrtbner. — *Met hode der Eth nologie*. — Heidelberg, 1911. (pp. 3 f.; 71 ff.)

** With certain reservations (Latin)

Czech. On the contrary, I can least imagine the "development" of an individual's mental life and the spiritual life of a community as a continuous and systematic organic development, an "evolution". The spiritual life of humanity, like the mental life of an individual, proceeds in dialectical leaps and bounds, through periods of gradual accumulation of "mental energy" and sudden "Explosions," revolutions, submissive mental pliability or receptivity and violent resistance, creative destruction of that which is so difficult and slow to accumulate, and new lazy or frivolous creation. The spiritual life of a person, and even more so the spiritual life of humanity, is a monstrous phantasmagoria, a nightmare, rather than a systematic evolution of the seed, sown and perceived according to the laws of nature and within the time frame designated by it. Nevertheless, and perhaps precisely because of this, penetrating the secrets of mental processes so insistently raises the question: when and how did *it* begin? And this applies equally to the creation of individual "dispositions" and collective "structures". It does not matter whether we call it "evolution" or something else; what matters is that every moment of historical life has its own "beginnings" (iizitia) or "origins," and if ethnic psychology indicates its evolutionary nature in its name, then this name is entirely appropriate. One could also argue, and indeed some do argue, that the reference to "people" in the name of ethnic psychology is inappropriate because the time when "people" were the "initiators" is long gone, and now other collective groups play a decisive role in the life of the collective, and that we can expect even more new collective forms to emerge in the future. But this is a new question and, as is clear, it is not a methodological one and has no serious significance in matters of methodology.

But this is a new question and, as is clear, not a methodological one, and it has no serious significance in matters of methodology. Such a statement either requires starting from the end, where the "beginning" is mentioned, or anticipates future facts instead of starting from the data — and who knows what other collective humanity will give the title of tffivo to in the future...

Here, it is worth recalling Lazarus-Steintal's observation about the people, to which I promised to return above. "The researcher defines the race and tribe of a person objectively; a person defines the people to which he belongs subjectively, he counts himself among them; we classify a person according to the people to which he counts himself belonging." And then there is this wonderful thought: "A people is the spiritual product of the individuals who belong to it; they are not the people, but they are its continuous expression. To be more precise, a nation is the first product of the national spirit; for it is not as individuals that they create a nation, but as they destroy their separation."

Ethnic psychology is a descriptive typological science; it seeks not a logical general supreme concept for its categories, but a concept which, representing a general type, would in turn unite in itself, as in the highest type of collective, all types of human experiences defined by language, beliefs, customs, art, worldviews, etc. 7, etc. A nation is a historical whole that is always in the process of creation. In this sense, the nation is the direct task of ethnic psychology, to which all its specific tasks are subordinate as constituent elements of this whole, with their current, historically changing relationships and interactions.

A nation is primarily a historical category; its emergence, like its entire existence, is defined specifically in historical terms. The consciousness of a nation, that is, what constitutes *this* nation, is the object of ethnic psychology as a special experience: "nationality," ethnicity, etc., which are purely psychological categories. An analysis of this experience shows that its entire content consists of the appropriation of known historical and social relationships and their opposition to *other* peoples. The "spiritual makeup" of a people is a variable quantity, but one that is invariably present in any genuine social experience. The spiritual wealth of an individual is the past of the people to which he counts himself as belonging. However, it is not arbitrary, not only "subjective" — or, rather, the individual considers himself "subjective" — but we can also determine "from the outside," "objectively," under what *structure* his own spiritual content is revealed. The "subjective" definition of the individual himself cannot be considered arbitrary either. A person, in fact, defines himself spiritually, relates himself to a given people, he can even

«peri:to change" a people, to become part of and embody the spirit of another

. However, again, not "arbitrarily," but through дол — roro and persistent labour to recreate the determining

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is the spirit of *his* people. We define a specific spirit by collecting typical features of an "imaginary" representative, and this latter... already serves as a "norm" for determining the authenticity of each empirical individual to a given collective type, as well as for determining the extent of his deviation from

The defining sources of any particular experience lie in the spiritual structure that predetermines the actions and experiences not only of the individual, but of any group. We doubt the decisive role of the "people" in collective psychology as long as we imagine the "people" as a stable "thing" that can disappear, just as any "thing" disappears, dissolving into its elements and transforming into new combinations and connections. But the "people" in the psychological sense is a historically fluid form, and if this form were to transform into new forms before our eyes — say, if modern peoples were to divide into classes which, flowing from people to people, would create new, unprecedented collectives — we would only be consistent if we recognised that *new peoples had been born*. We would have the right to do so because we would have witnessed the creation of new, specific structures, in the light of which any new collective movement towards any new experience would become clear to us. To the extent that, for ethnic psychology, *the whole* that determines every "part" and every direction of the spirit is *the nation*, and to the extent that it makes precisely this, in its emergence and in history, its subject, to that extent its name is justified.

TOL ЪКО EMP}EICH eCKI, BUT ALSO P}EIN TSIPI ЪHO.



ОрааВаеННе

ПреАиСЈиОВие	3
I.....	14
II.....	18
III	24
IV	30
V	36
VI	45
VII	53
VIII	59
IX	66
X	76
XI	86
XII	95
XIIi.....	113
XIV	.123
XV	.132
XVI	.143

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PoAniy Yktoс chin (c. 10—180 AD) was liOAOИЗOBЗИИИии i
тоуками еiуе п deepest ancient-post Western Asia. \$P« *»A he belonged
to the circle

»nfteу wealthy and <firazochchl, miiogo read

And he travelled extensively: he visited the Greek islands, Syria and
Palestine, Egypt, various regions of Italy and *Rome*. A scholar, writer,
historian, and archaeologist in the true sense of the word, he devoted
all his energy and extraordinary literary talent to the creation of his
work, unique in its genre, the encyclopaedia

4 НРС FROM ШТИЧНЕЮТИ.

Pacttuem, *an* ancient city, dates back to the time of Papsanin — nci II p.
ii. e., nicknamed Yaobittim Pek Antonilop and the Greek Renaissance.
Rome was ruled by admirals and admirals of Greek culture (Trajan,
Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius), while in Greece, brilliant
writers and thinkers created works of art and philosophy, reflecting the
diversity of the era: the historical works of Plutarch, the poems of Arrian and
Appian, the philosophical treatises and discourses of Plutarch and
Epictetus, and the philosophical works of the meaning of the words of
Diotimus Christomachus and the dialogues of Aucipa. and the teachings of
T}EUA***PSTZOMP and GYOG{ZP

Plavdin Ptolemy. In line with this creative approach to the history of ancient culture

"second sophistry," the work of P. Avsattin becomes more understandable. His work contains "AJ96rloe

Description of historical and cultural monuments in the regions of Hellas, especially those related to the culture of Attica, Boeotia, and *Phocis in Central Greece*, as well as monuments of *architecture and art*.

Zia and monuments of architecture and art: Attica, Boeotia and Phocis in Central Greece, Argos and Corinth in Isthmia (connecting mainland Greece with the south), Sparta, Messenia, Elis, Achaea, Argos and the Peloponnese (southern Greece). The author's attention is drawn not so much to the ethnic and geographical characteristics of these regions as to their history and art, which are united in Pavshin. *In* this myth, the legends of *ABR* ioe *pre-present* and the actual history are so vividly presented in historical narrative, as the elements of archaeological, antique and historical elements are inextricably intertwined in his substantive analysis.

The book was written by a passionate writer and an old man, but not an old man in the traditional sense, rather a man who was deeply concerned about the fate of his people, the fate of his homeland. of his people, the country that was his cradle. And he expects it to be read by people who are just as passionate, who are able to devote themselves to this task with enthusiasm and dedication. I repeat after Paisius — not in reality or in their understanding — the routes ei'o puteyestpy po: z(a-pove4» m places *Af utiey El* lady.

This is enough to judge the authenticity of Paisit's composition, and if anything needs to be added, it is a few words in support of his Russian edition. Papisaii tteidnohrats peiziedil"p Ma /**Juspi** plyt, lot:-ledniy roz — izpestish translator s(veti:iot o premeti S. P. !!/tP3TI>ЯДЪИМ. First: this petbeuv◊A

It was published by Iskusstvo Publishing House in 1938–1940, and not so long ago it was reprinted without PSPPOI PTSevfi I*A•itelstvom "J*4OMIjE" (1994). Meanwhile, such a right is extremely necessary for the republication of S. P. Kordratiev's translations, since scientific accuracy, *of course*, is by no means included in the CHSAO .4 - the value of this, however, is written. The text of the Russian edition is based on the work of Pausanias and has been carefully checked against the Greek original. The text of the Russian edition of Pausanias' work has been carefully checked against the Greek original, eliminating numerous errors, stylistic inaccuracies and discrepancies in the rendering of proper names, and more accurately compiled the necessary information about such a figure, which was done by S. P. Podratsev in his detailed and thorough sketch of the life and work of Pausanias.

Scientific editor of the book, author of the commentary and scientific advisor — E. V. Nikitiuk. The general editor of the text and the introduction is Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Ancient History at Saint Petersburg State University, E. D. Fro-

ΛΟΒα.

Nliura is published in the series "Ancient Library" in the section "History". The volume is over 400 pages long. Published in III-IV quarters of 1996, it is rich in iconographic material and detailed *descriptions* of the places described.

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