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DUNS SCOTUS' THEORY OF THE CATEGORIES AND OF MEANING

BY

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN AND WITH INTRODUCTION BY

HAROLD ROBBINS

A Dissertation

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Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning

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Martin Heidegger's work, <u>Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and</u> <u>of Meaning</u> presents difficulties to the reader for two reasons. First the content of the work covers some subtle epistemological and ontological problems. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that Heidegger's subsequent works are all-pervasive. Almost instinctively, those familiar with his later works tend to think his early publications have the same outlook. They do not.

Two tasks arise at this point: the philosophical world in which Martin Heidegger moved when he wrote this work must be rediscovered, and we must uncover his chief philosophical concerns during the period of his early publication. However to do this we must take an indirect route. Since this work deals with Duns Scotus, an explanation of the thought of Duns Scotus - at least to the extent that it is presented in this work - is essential. Heidegger's thought in this work is presented in the context of a phenomenological study of Scotus. Understanding this book is impossible without at least some superficial knowledge of the salient features of Scotus' thought.

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THE THOUGHT OF DUNS SCOTUS

Let us be forewarned that Heidegger displays in this early work the

same attitude that he does in his other historical writings. He places himself in dialogue with another thinker and thus shows little interest in mere fact finding. It should not surprise us then if contemporary Scotist reviewed the book and found it not to be a fair interpretation of Scotist thought. However, this should not be taken to mean that Heidegger has inadequate knowledge of medieval thought. The notes to this work, if nothing else, give the lie to that view.

A. Duns Scotus' Position in the History of Medieval Thought

Duns Scotus is called the doctor subtilis. There are reasons for this. By accident of history he comes at the end of high scholasticism in the middle ages and employs the common method of scholasticism, namely, a critical analysis of former and current philosophical viewpoints with a view to arriving at synthesis. Scotus was imbued with the Augustinianism of his order, the Friars Minor, but he was also well conversant with the empiricist bent of Oxford scholars such as Roger Bacon, with the Latin Aristotelianism of the schools, and with the contributions of the Jews and Arabians, especially those of Avicenna. These influences he interpreted from the standpoint of his own insights.

B. Scotus' View of the Division of Philosophy

Scotus follows Aristotle in distinguishing activity according to its final cause. As regards human activity seen as facultative there are various habitus or habits, that is, ease in performance flowing from the capacity or faculty ordained to the final object and the frequency of performance. The intellective habitus admits of several distinctions respecting infused and acquired knowledge. Acquired knowledge is either speculative or practical. Speculative knowledge deals with thought or reality. Knowledge or the sciences of the real are: metaphysics, mathematics, and physics in the sense of cosmology.

The sciences of thought or rational sciences are logic, rhetoric, and grammar. This schema shows the importance of logic both for metaphysics and for grammar. It stands between the two. Medieval philosophy maintained a division (one that is perhaps not so clear today after the influences of critical philosophy) between logic as a propaedeutic to philosophy, formal logic, and logic as an applied method, material logic. It is such in metaphysics and grammar. It was a method of validation in order to arrive at science or certain knowledge.

Logic is related to grammar since both use language although in different ways or under different lights. Logic is concerned with language because the proposition at the very heart of logic is expressed in language. Logic has as its concern the truth or falsity of propositions. Yet logic comes even closer to grammar in the investigation of the term, since the inference of the term often is one which arises out of the language form. Thus the real is set in the domain of the intentional by language. The term can be seen as the intelligible species realized as the word. The word represents the real thing in the formal sign. The inference of the word is directly to the real thing. Thus, language differs from logic since formal logic is totally concerned with the intentional, whereas language as an intentional being directly refers to the real. Hence, Scotus states that a name signifies the thing immediately and not the concept.

It is from this juncture that logic can be applied to grammatical study to give rise to a clarification of the rational or intentional import of language, that is, to give precision to grammatical meanings. This is precisely the task of the Grammatica Speculativa which takes its stepping-off-point from this particular role assigned to logic by Duns Scotus. Thus, logic finds itself not only involved through its precision in deciding the truth or falsity of the

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objective reference in the propositional judgment, but also in the precision of its terms in the _verbum mentis:_ language in the light of the intellect.

But logic also applies to the real since all knowledge has for its object being; or as has been stated, logic has as its concern precision in deciding the validity of the objective reference of a proposition. It is because of this object of the intellect, _ens_, that logic has its universal determination. It is concerned with everything and anything if it is an object of the intellect. On the contrary, metaphysics is concerned with being in that the universal conditions of reality are aspects of being. The rational concerns of logic are terms or intentions of which there are two kinds: first and second intentions. First intentions can roughly be called simple apprehension. Second intention is the conceptualization of the object.

C. Scotus' Epistemology

Human cognition renders adequate knowledge, but not absolute knowledge. The real object of first intention is not cognized absolutely, and hence there arises in second intention an adequate and adequated knowledge of the real object. Logic as a science is concerned with the conditions of adequation. These are the category, the judgmental proposition, and the syllogism. The syllogism is the proper object of logic. The other distinctions in logic can be reduced to the syllogism as the simple (_incomplexum_) or integral parts of it.

Another aspect of adequation is the universal nature of concepts. The intellect in adequating the object by means of the concept does so under the light of the universal signs or aspects of the real object. This in short is the major epistemological problem of scholastic thought. It must be remembered that scholasticism not only presupposed the subject, but assumed the real. The main epistemological problem of scholasticism was one of reconciling the universality

of the concept with the individuality of the real object, a problem that it inherited from the Arabians.

Scotus' own views of epistemology and solutions to the problem of the one and the many seem to have undergone a considerable development in the course of his writing. Scotus begins with the common scholastic notions of cognition. His further developments in this area have in view his concerns with the individual. All knowledge arises through the senses by simple apprehension. The proper object of each of the external senses is informed by the sense form of the real object and this is taken over by the internal senses which form a common image or species of the sense cognition. This intelligible species is concepualized by the faculty of the agent intellect and thus there arises the universal concept in the possible intellect. From the species arising from individual sense knowledge the universal concept is abstracted. This, very generally, is the common viewpoint of most of scholastic thought as to cognition. Duns Scotus' own views have this as a background.

But it must again be emphasized that the logic of Aristotle, especially as interpreted by the Arabians, is the point of departure for the epistemological views of the scholastics. Aristotle's localization of the universal in the real (at least this is the way that the Arabians conceived of it) is the background for the problem of the one and the many as well as the particular and the universal. Intellectual knowledge for Aristotle is of the universal and sense knowledge is of the particular. Furthermore, the scholastics find that intellectual knowledge is always knowledge through universals even though it arises from individual sense knowledge.

The intentional forms of the universal concept are the predicables: genus, species, property, and accident. The genus can be predicated of anything

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in quid or can posit as a substance in that the res et res (this thing and that thing) differ numerically. The same is the case with the species. Property and accident note the differences of a thing in quale, or as a further determination of the thing. A property can be a proper attribute in that it is necessarily implied in the specific definition of a thing. Often the distinction between two things in a species depend on these qualifications. The final distinction between two things is called the ultimate difference.

The term itself must be seen as admitting to several distinctions. A term can be distinguished as to its supposition, for example, it can infer a real or intentional being. Or a term can have a direct or an indirect supposition or be a derived or denominative term.

Scotus considered the syllogism the heart of logic and the proposition or judgment the basic unit of the syllogism in that the proposition is the fundamental expression of a truth or a falsity. Two propositions form the premises of the syllogism. (According to Aristotle one of these must be universal.) The proposition consists of terms. These terms are simple or incomplexa, but the proposition is complexum or compounded. But even the term can be compound. If a term can be reduced to two more ulterior terms, it is compound. A simple term or name arises out of the act of simple apprehension.

Universal certain knowledge is arrived at by use of predication in syllogistic reasoning. In other words, scholasticism was in search of clear definitions. A clear definition was conceived of ideally as the proximate genus with its specific difference, e.g., rational animal. The dialectic common to scholastic writings was syllogistic reasoning to arrive at such possible definitions. Certain knowledge was knowledge of the thing and its cause.

This summary view of Aristotelian logic as it was used by the scholastics

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has a purpose. In this book it will be noted that the <u>Grammatica Speculativa</u> which Heidegger used as his source for the forms of meanings has this type of logical outlook as its framework. This kind of epistemology forms the background of the <u>Grammatica Speculativa</u> (thought at the time of Heidegger's writing as an early work of Scotus but later seen to be the work of Thomas of Erfurt). Scotus' later writing, or the authentic writing of Scotus, shows a considerably different epistemology. Nevertheless, an understanding of these points of Aristotle's logic will aid decidedly in understanding Scotus' doctrine of the transcendentals.

Scotus' concern for the individual brings him to abandon abstraction as the method by which the individual is grasped through a universal concept. He substitutes for it the term collecting. This activity of collecting notes from the particulars which are directly knowable in cognition is thus a mediate activity. Scotus develops a theory of knowledge as mediate, immanent act. It could be said that Scotus puts more emphasis on a theory of knowledge than a theory of cognition. This Heidegger takes careful note of in his explication of <u>verum</u>. However, Heidegger conceives of this in terms of the necessity of repudiating psychologism. He sees Scotus more clearly distinguishing the epistemological ramifications of the human activity of knowing from the psychic activity of cognition.

In cognition it is by means of the sense species that the object is simply or confusedly perceived, that is, is perceived without predications or terms of comparison (first intention). The terms of comparison rise out of the conceptualization by the intellect which in its active mode is conceived of as the agent intellect and in its passive mode as the possible intellect. But even if Scotus uses Aristotle's distinction of the two faculties of intellect:

the agent intellect and the possible intellect, he sees them not as two separate faculties, but as the active and passive modes (*modus intelligendi passivus* and *modus intelligendi activus*) of the act of knowing. Both sensation and the intellect are passive in that there is a movement from not-knowing to knowing. All knowledge is dependent on sense data in normal cognition. The object of cognition simply presents itself and aids thus in the creation of the phantasm or intelligible species according to the common notion of the object and after the manner of an instrument (*quasi instrumentum ipsius intellectus*). Nonetheless, even though cognition has a passive moment in that it is dependent on the object for its orgin, it is seen as primarily act since the appetitive power is the director and initiator of cognition in the senses just as the will is the initiator of intellective activity.

The instrumental role of the object can be more precisely put as first intention, the confused cognition of the object, and second intention, the conceptulization of the object. Although the sense species of the individual necessarily precedes the universal concept and there is no possibility of the universal concept without the phantasm or the sense species, first intention is merely included as inferred in knowledge. In other words, first intention is the immediate reference to the real object. The role of this reference in cognition is as the individual perceived species. The role of the objective reference in knowledge is as a phantasmic species on which notes can be made.

The sense species always arises through sensation. Scotus follows the common scholastic doctrine that sensation is always certain and free from error. It forms the proximate foundation for the certainty of knowledge because it is by reference to the date of sense that the judgmental consistency is arrived at. Thus, figments of the imagination and illusions are not seen to be

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false as sense, but can be false because the inference or their validity as notes is not at all certain in itself.

It is also on the basis of this sense certainty that we have awareness of ourselves. The intellect extracts from the inner sense that man has of himself a self-concept, and thus is aware both of what he is and that he is, although this knowledge is not immediate since it is dependent on the phantasm as again the mediate term.

Scholasticism distinguishes ordinarily between immanent and transient activity. Lower powers need more intermediaries in order to accomplish their ends, but higher powers are less in need of intermediaries for the accomplishment of their ends or perfection. A transient activity is one in which the agent and the end of the activity are definitely distinct because of the use of a means or intermediary to accomplish the end. An immanent activity is one in which the agent and the end are the same. Scotus views the intentional act of the intellect as an immanent activity. The activity of the intellect, the faculty or potentiality to know, is knowing and its end is knowing.

Scotus accepts the definition of truth as an adequation of the mind and the thing. His views of cognition and knowledge, as has been seen, have adequation for their background. The object stands to the intellect as the measured to the measure. The measure involved is the collection of notes from the sense species which creates the universal concept. Knowledge is primarily this immanent interplay between the sense species and the concepts of the intellect. Either one of them is an abstraction from the integral act that knowledge is. Truth is found primarily in the judgment or the judgmental sense as sufficient truth. Sense is infallible, thus safeguarding the sufficiency of knowledge. Falsity in judgment arises on the basis of an inadequate understanding

of the inference in sense. But this should not be taken as the primary meaning of the true. Scotus saw the true in two lights. The true is that which is adequated to the intellect, the known in the knower, or it is the adequation of that which is produced to the productive intellect. However, underlying both of these aspects of _verum_ is that formality of _ens_ to be manifestible in itself and as itself. Even if there were no knowing intellects, _ens_ would decidedly still have an inherent attribute to be manifest.

D. Scotus' Metaphysics

Scotus accepts the common scholastic view that metaphysics is the science which studies being as being. Again there was considerable development in Scotus' views of metaphysical being. In his early commentaries on Aristotle he accepts the ten categories as the ultimate genera and, therefore, the most intelligible because they are the most universal aspects of being. However, this means that within the domains of the categories or the ranges which the categories cover, being shows itself to be equivocal. [1]

Scotus is not satisfied to let the question of the inference of the predication of the categories rest here. To avoid sundering _ens_ by logical equivocity, Scotus finds that there must not only be an analogical sameness to _ens_, but _ens_ necessarily is a univocal term unless it is denominative, which then makes being not to be the adequate object of the intellect. It can be seen here that the question arises because of Scotus' view of _being_ which we

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[1]

To say that scholasticism made extensive rise of this term and the terms correlative with it is an understatement. It should be recalled that Aristotle's logic distinguishes three senses in which a term can be predicated of an object: univocal, equivocal and derivative. Things are said to be named univocally which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. Things are said to be named equivocally when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Things are said to be named derivatively when they derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination, _e.g._, courage, courageous.

will discuss at greater length later. Suffice it to say that being, in that it is not distinct from the essence, has a quidditative connotation, but as _esse_ is derived and dependent and thus an attenuated sense of being. Hence, Scotus comes to the position that being must be predicated univocally in all of the categories. They are then derived senses of being.

Also in stating that the copulative is univocal, Scotus does not rule out the other senses of predication. Our own concepts are the basis of the analogous and equivocal aspects of being. This can be seen in the equivocal sense of a category in predication in which being as the copulative is always the same. Thus Scotus finds being to be univocal because of the need for consistency in judgment, of the principle of non-contradiction. _Ens_ as a univocal term is both the consistency of judgmental sense, its measure, and the basis for the intelligibility of the real and, thus, coextensive with the real. Hence Scotus comes to find the ten categories as insufficient in that they can be seen to be valid logically, but they must be seen as having a _metaphysical_ genus prior to them, _ens communissime sumptum._ This is _ens in se_ or _esse purum._ Again the act of judgment for Scotus is a validation based on the intelligibility and univocity of _ens_ but Heidegger tends to view judgment in this work as a transcendental structure. Both Scotus and transcendental philosophy may find knowledge a productive act, but Scotus does not view the productive activity of the intellect as directly constitutive of the object. _Ens_ as the measure of knowledge is more so because of its inferred nature than as any determination in the sense of delimitation. It is on this basis that Heidegger can declare that the rod for measuring the object in the judgmental act is broken.

Besides _ens in se_ there is _ens habens esse,_ which is a denominative form of being falling under the ten categories. Thus the univocity of being is

not to be interpreted as primarily the logical measure of being.

Transcendence is then that aspect of being which is prior to the ten categories. There are two genera of transcendent being, that is, intrinsic modes: created and uncreated being. God is being, but creatures have being. This fact, that being is univocal in even these two genera, points up the indifferent nature of being.

E. Scotus' View of the Categories

Transcendence, then, properly belongs to metaphysics and not to logic. Logic deals with _ens_ as adequated to it, but this adequated being goes beyond, that is, transcends its sufficient comprehension as the absolute. The transcendent absolute is metaphysical being which is indifferent to the genera: created and uncreated or finite and infinite. In other words, that which is transcendent is: _ens_, _unum_, _verum_, _bonum_, as formalities of each other and not species.

Scotus finds other attributes of infinite and finite being which do not belong to all being. These are the disjunctive predications of _ens_: action and passion, act and potency, substance and accident, contingency and necessity etc. It is beyond our scope to deal here with the disjunctive predications of being as they relate to the ten categories, or the possibilities of transcendence outside of metaphysical being, such as wisdom.

Ens as the first intelligible is the simplest and most universal of all concepts and applies to all save when an impossibility is involved. This universality and univocity of _ens_ does not mean that no predication can be made to it. It merely means that the kind of predication must be viewed as non-tautologous only to the extent that there is a distinction in the predicate arising out of a formality.

Scholasticism makes frequent use of various types of distinctions,

differences, diversities, and relations. A distinction does not mean a lack of unity in the object, but it merely means a lack of identity. A logical distinction sees different aspects in the object which are in reality the same. A formal distinction is the existence of more than one form in an object. On the basis of formalities predications can be made of _ens_. These are all implicit in _ens_ as the first intelligible.

Since _ens_ is the first intelligible, all possibility of cognition depends on it. _Ens_ is the proper object of the intellect under the aspect of intelligibility. It is the object from which the intellect is defined. An object is adequate or commensurate to a faculty in two ways: by prime inference or by primacy of commonness. Scotus insists _ens_ is the commensurate object of the intellect in both ways. It cannot simply be what is inferred in knowledge that can function as an adequate object, because eventually inference must arrive at its object and there is no single object that is inferred. But in all that is inferred there is already being. Thus being is the object of the intellect by common inference.

Metaphysics for Scotus is primarily transcendental in the sense that he makes use of the term. This can be concluded both from his definition of the object of metaphysics (_ens in quantum ens_) and from the definition of _ens_ as the object of the intellect by common inference.

It is now necessary to further elucidate _ens_ as the first intelligible to better grasp the relation of the convertibles of _ens_ to it as _propriae passiones entis_.

Scotus finds no real distinction in _ens_ as _esse_ and _essentia_. Rather _ens_ can be seen as the first intelligible to be in first intention as a certain something. _Ens_ is intuited or known confusedly to be a certain quiddity or

whatness. But this quiddity -- precisely because of its confused, that is, un-differentiated nature -- cannot be the subject of metaphysics. For all science to be certain knowledge must be based on necessary being and not on merely contingent existents. Thus, _ens_, even though it is the first intelligible and the most universal of concepts, cannot as such be the object of metaphysics except to the extent that it implies necessity. Thus the object of metaphysics is _ens_ as that by which something is what it is. From this comes its penchant to have _esse_. As such it is indifferent to the singular and the universal and, depending upon the light under which it is viewed, it can be seen as the physical universal, the logical universal, or the metaphysical universal; or as a real singular it is the object of physics, as a universal or singular in thought it is the logical universal, and as it is in itself without any other determination it is the metaphysical universal. _Ens_ as the _maxime scibile_, that is, as the universal in itself, is the proper object of metaphysics. _Esse_ is restricted by Scotus to the physical universal. This is what actually exists. Any other use of _esse_, for instance, as a logical universal, is always qualified, _e.g._, _esse diminutum._

As has already been stated, _ens_ has two intrinsic modes: finite and infinite. Finite being is being that has existence (_ens habens esse_) and infinite being is being that is _ens in se_. Finite being is proximate to us because of our dependence on the phantasm. Its place in metaphysics is as a point of departure. Finite being is always derived and dependent and thus calls for its correlary. However, the same is not true of the converse.

Let us new see how the transcendentals are related to _ens_. _Ens_ is an irreducible, simple term and concept. Therefore, it is indefinible since no genus, species or property can properly be found for it according to strict

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logic. It can be predicated, universally *in quid*, but also it can be predicated *in quale* as inferred in figments, illusions, and improbable essences. All of the other transcendentals are predicated of *ens* and inferred in all predications *in quale*. They are **predicable** of *ens* after the manner of a proper attribute. A proper attribute is that qualifying property of a subject which is inferred in the essential definition of the subject, but not part of the definition. The transcendentals are convertible with *ens* in this sense since they have no quiddity of their own, but necessarily are simply qualifications of being as what is ultimately inferred in it as the proper object of the intellect by common inference. Nonetheless, they are not properties in the sense that a middle term can be used in a syllogism to relate them to *ens*, this being because of their lack of quiddity. Hence they transcend the functions of normal logic as they transcend the categorial.

F. Scotus' Standpoint on the Final Causes

So far we have spoken of Duns Scotus' epistemology and ontology -- at least to the extent that Heidegger touches on them. But Heidegger also touches on Scotus' cosmology. Thus we must make some mention of the pertinent principles which come to the fore in Heidegger's interpretation.

Following peripatetic thought in general, Scotus finds all sensible and all finite being, to be constituted by the four causes: efficient, final, material, and formal.

All finite being is derived and dependent being. The dependency of being is fourfold since it depends on the four causes. The four causes are traditionally divided into extrinsic and intrinsic causes. The formal and material causes are intrinsic causes: they are constitutive of the thing. Scotus conceives of matter as the principle of finitude. It is a shapeless,

invisible, all-receiving actuality which is intelligible but only through form.
All of reality is either actual or potential. Matter in itself partakes of
actuality, but it is dependent on form and, therefore, is in potency in relation
to form. Both matter and form together make up the composite. The individual
composite is distinguished in its own uniqueness by its thisness or haeceity.
As has been seen, the unique individual being for Scotus is the only being
which has _esse_ or existence and is known in cognition _confuse_, that is, in itself
without any immediate terms of reference which would make knowledge of it absolute.

To further explicate haeceity, it is necessary to come to a closer
understanding of Scotus' view of form and formality. Form is the principle of
actuality in the composite of finite being. As such it is also the primary
intelligible aspect of a composite. Although matter has **actuality**, it is not
totally actual but has potency to form, allowing successive forms. In the
composite there may exist a series of forms, some of them substantial, that is,
causing the composite to exist in itself or independently, and others accidental
or proper forms inhering in the substance. Thus it must be seen that any com-
posite does not rest necessarily on an identity of form, but on an integral
unity of the successive substantial and accidental forms.

This is the basis for Scotus' doctrine of the formal distinction. The
existence of multiple forms in a composite means that there is in the compos-
ite, a plurality of unified forms, that is, forms that are not really distinct,
forming a separate _res_ or thing, but which are distinct from each other in their
identity. Thus composites consist of formalities or inter-related complexes
of forms. Any composite thing presents in its unity a series of non-identical
formal aspects. These aspects are really the same in the unity of the thing,
but they are formally distinct in the actual existence of the thing. This is
in germ Scotus _distinctio formalis ex natura rei_ or _a parte rei_, or the formal

distinction according to the nature of the thing. Haeceity, a term more Scotist than Scotus, is a formality of the composite. It is a final preparation of matter in the taking on of the individual substantial form, but on the other hand the substantial form of a composite thing can be seen to be varying in intensity of degree among the various members of a species. Thus any individual nature can be said to be more like the common specific nature, which is likewise a coordinate form, or less like it. What can be seen here is the doctrine often attributed to Scotus that the final or ultimate form is necessarily the specifying form based on the ultimate difference. Any ultimate form may be merely another coordinate, albeit more individualizing, form of the composite. The individual is this unique individual as a composite which is its own coordination of forms in accord with the potential of matter to dispose itself for this individual complex.

The coordinate forms in a composite exist as actualities subservient to the specific form of the individual. As such they make up one thing which is actualized according to the various modes of its formalities.

. G. _Logical Aspects of Medieval Thought_

We have been tracing those doctrines of Scotus which Heidegger touches on in his interpretation of Scotus and paying particular attention to the logical aspects of this doctrine. This is perforce a necessity. Scotus obviously distinguished between the realms of metaphysics and logic. Nonetheless, it must be realized that scholastic thought owed much to Aristotle's logic. More than anything else it is the framework of Scholastic thought, allowing for its successes and forming the basis of its problem areas. The application of the dialectical method, the use of the syllogism and of syllogistic reasoning gave rise in scholasticism not only to a concern with objectivity, taken as the

logically certain, but also to the use and creation of distinctions to a degree not found elsewhere. Hence there is central to scholastic thought, and the thought of Scotus, the use of identity, relation, and distinction.

At this point a work of caution is in order. Since knowledge was merely taken for granted and the real presupposed, the role of logic in scholastic thought was not as central as it is in the thought of Kant, for instance. Heidegger himself expresses this caution in his introduction to this work. Unfortunately, he does not seem to take his own warning **seriously enough in his** interpretation of Scotus. For scholasticism, logic is merely a method of verification and a study of human thought processes. Thus the transcendentals are conceived of as totally real entities and not at all intentional. This is also true of relation, identity, and distinction.

Scotus' thought has often been called Formalism because he makes extensive use of the formal distinction. We have only attempted to show the basic ontological foundation of the formal distinction and formalities. This distinction does have further application, both ontological and epistemological. To better understand the formal distinction, we must further explain distinction and its correlative terms: relation and identity.

Unity differs from identity. For real unity, that is, for something to be considered as an aspect of a thing, res (Scotus does not put res among the transcendentals as do some other scholastics. He does, however, consider it a simple term) there is no need for identity. Formal identity is the characteristic of the species, either of the thing (real) or as an intentional object. This differs from real identity. Real identity simply means that two objects are the same thing because they have the potency to be actually the same. Of course to speak of an actual identity of things is at once inane and, at the same

time, beyond the scope of scholastic thought. It is merely presupposed. Aristotle spoke of synonyms both as to terms and concepts. Scholasticism never seems to have gone beyond this in asking about actual identity. Perhaps it is one of those often spoken of modern traits of Scotus' thought that he moves toward identity in being by use of univocity in describing being and by careful attention to the transcendental _unum_. In conclusion it can be said that a perfect identity does depend on a perfect or formal unity, but a formal or perfect unity does not depend on a perfect identity.

Formal identity ---and correspondingly formal distinctions and relations--- is one in which there is a sameness in its formal ground (_ratio_) and thus also primarily and in itself the same. This means to say that the ground definition in some fashion is also applicable as a definition to the second term. Scotus insists on the possibility of having real identity without having formal identity. This conclusion has its obvious ramifications in the realm of the transcendentals. The other transcendentals are convertible with _ens_ because they are all really identical. However, they are formally distinct.

Distinction is the correlative of identity. Just as the two terms of a comparison are necessarily really or formally identical without the aid of the intellect, so a real distinction rests on there being a divergence independent of the intellect. Since this divergence in reality does not depend on the intellect it is termed a _distinctio a parte rei_, or _ex natura rei_. Moreover since such distinctions are not correlative to unity, they are indifferent to the singular and plural. Scotus does make use of logical distinctions. But these should not be confused with the frequently used term, a virtual distinction. For, there are only two fundamental distinctions: a real distinction or a logical distinction. All other distinctions, _e.g._, essential distinctions,

accidental distinctions, substantial distinctions _etc._, fall in some way or another under these two distinctions. As a result it would seem that the virtual distinction is something of a misnomer since it would destroy the division of the real from the intentional. It would seem more exact if the virtual distinction were not referred to as a distinction at all, but seen merely as the _fundamentum in re_, the real ground for a logical distinction. Scotus' formal distinction is a kind of real distinction, just as are essential and accidental distinctions; but it differs from other real distinctions because the formal distinction is one in which the forms are actually distinct but really identical.

Thus the coordinate forms of a _res_ can be said to be unified in the thing but distinctly differentiated. In other words, a thing is constituted by formalities. This doctrine of formal non-identity has been seen to have repercussions as far as the transcendentals are concerned, namely, we have noted that the transcendentals are formally distinct but not really distinct, and more than a virtual distinction. Formal non-identity also has import for Scotus' doctrine of the faculties of the soul. The will and the intellect are formalities of the soul. From this it could be concluded that they also are formally distinct since faculties are defined by their proper object. However, this is not the case since the transcendentals other than _ens_ are predicated of _ens in quale_. Thus it must be concluded that the object of the will is not _bonum_, nor is _verum_ the object of the intellect. The proper object of both faculties is _ens_. The will can move or incline the intellect to attend to or gain knowledge of an object. The will too is related to _verum_ to the extent that cognition depends on its activity in the act of cognition. To the degree that the intellect is apperceptive of the object to which the will reacts, the intellect is related to _bonum_. The transcendentals are not virtually distinct. Hence they are not the

fundamenta in re which can serve as objects of the human faculties.

Besides positive relations and distinctions, there are negative relations and distinctions. Negative relations and distinctions must be kept distinct from a negative content however. They are not the same thing. Thus many terms which are expressed in the negative are positive in content, e.g., immortal. We have seen that Scotus considers such terms as the transcendent counterpart of derived and dependent finite being. Thus there is a general procedure in Scotus from the less perfect to the more perfect by way of negation. In other words, the negative aspects are removed, thus allowing for the conceptualizing of the perfection in itself. Usually this removal of the negative aspect of an entity is expressed as a negative relation. What must be remembered is that in the use of negative relations there must always be a terminus a quo, a derived but nonetheless positive content.

Besides this there are the distinctions between negation and privation. Privation is a lack of that which is proper to an object. The common example is the lack of sight in a blind man. Negation is simply the non-presence of that which isn't proper to the object. For instance, the lack of mobility on the part of a stone is not something that the stone doesn't have, but something that is not there.

H. Number

A final word should be said about number. The individual is that which has concrete existence. As such it is singular. Singularity implies not only the basis of number, but also a certain undividedness in itself and dividedness from all else. Thus two negative relations are involved in the singular. The haecceity of the object makes every singular object to be non-synonymous with every other object. Yet this uniqueness is a positive content

which is expressed negatively as the lack of division in the subject. Number is based on the haecceity of the object, but not on its uniqueness. Rather it is based on the singularity of the object, a note which each existent participates in. As such it falls under the category of quantity, under which can be subsumed indivisibleness. As quantified, each number can be seen to stand in definite relations to each other number, or can be plotted as definite integers of set distance or size from each other. Thus number cannot be seen as the ultimate form arising from the ultimate distinction that arises between the given number and the last integer. This distinction pertains to any one of the numbers as an ultimate difference. Objects can be counted because of their specific nature as a quantified descrete object.

II

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S EARLY THOUGHT

A. Perspective on Heidegger's Development

Heidegger's thought has been divided into several periods: the young or Ur-Heidegger, Heidegger I or early Heidegger, Heidegger II or later Heidegger, the contemporary Heidegger. Not everyone makes the same divisions. Nor are the divisions made seen to be significant to the interpretation of Heidegger's thought. Be that as it may, the young Heidegger certainly has viewpoints that are distinct from his later views as he himself attests. This book is the major work of the young Heidegger -- in length if nothing else. Heidegger has a publishing history of fifteen years before the publication of Being and Time catapulted him to world fame.[1]

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[1] These are the works of Heidegger published before 1927.

Continued

1. "Das Realitaetsproblem in der Modernen Philosophie"
in Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 1912, (25) pp. 353-363.

2. "Neue Forschungen Fuer Logik" in Literarische Rundschau fuer das
katholische Deutschland, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1912 (38), pp. 466-
72, 517-24, 565-70.

3. Review for Kants Briefe in Auswahl, F. Ohmann, ed., Leipzig,
1911, in Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,
Freiburg im Breisgau, 1913, (39) p. 74.

4. Review for N. Bubnoff, Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit, Ein
grundlegender theoretisch-philosophischer Gegensatz in
seinen typischen Ausgestaltungen und in seiner Bedeutung fuer
die modernen philosophischen Theorien, Heidelberg, 1911, in
Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,
Freiburg im Breisgau, 1913, (39) pp. 178-79.

5. Review for F. Brentano, Von der Klassifikation psychischer
Phaenomene, Neue durch Nachtraege stark vermehrte Ausgabe der
Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Leipzig, 1911, in
Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,
Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914, (40) pp. 233-34.

6.. Review for C. Sentroul, Kant und Aristoteles, L. Heinrichs
trans., Kempten und Muenchen, 1911, in Literarische Rundschau
fuer das katholische Deutschland, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914
(40) pp. 330-32.

7. Review for F. Gross, Kant-Laienbrevier, Eine Darstellung der
kantischen Welt und Lebensanschauung fuer den ungelehrten
Gebildeten aus Kants Schriften, Briefen, und muendlichen
Aeusserungen, Zusammengestellt von Dr. F. Gross, 2rt verbesserte
Auflage, Munich, 1912 in Literarische Rundschau fuer das
katholische Deutschland, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914 (40)
pp. 376-377.

8. Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus, Leipzig, 1914. Freiburg
im Breisgau (dissertation at Freiburg, 1913).

9. "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft" in Zeitschrift
fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 161 (1916) pp. 173-
188 (for the venia legendi in July, 1915).

10. Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, Tuebingen,
1916 (slightely changed for print with a concluding chapter from
the habilitation reading, summer semester 1915).

11. Review of own book Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns
     Scotus in Kant Studien XXI.   (1917) pp. 467-468.

12. "Abendgang auf der Reichenau" in: Das Bodenseebuch, 1917, Constance,
     p. 152.

This publishing history of his and the comments that have been made about the privately issued or unpublished writings of this time seem to indicate that Heidegger's development falls into an early period (1912-17) during which he is publishing -- a period in which his development in thought in many respects parallels that of Husserl between the Logical Investigations (which Heidegger admits influenced him greatly) and Husserl's Ideas. After 1917 Heidegger sees himself as a phenomenologist. It would seem probable that the long period of non-publication prior to Being and Time and the works published shortly after that, was a period of gestation.[2]

Whatever validity is given to these various divisions of Heidegger's philosophical output, one thing is clear: Heidegger's Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning cannot be interpreted merely as a less developed version of his later writings. Heidegger himself has warned us specifically against this in his Unterweg zur Sprache, published in 1961. There he tells us that he sees this work from a fundamentally different viewpoint than he did at the time of its writing. Then, he had attempted to investigate the question of being and its relation to language in this work. Now, however, he admits this relationship was not completely clear to him at the time.

B. Heidegger's Early Approach to Language

We must investigate Heidegger's understanding of the terms of the relation

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[2] The same was the case with Max Scheler between his dissertation on the "Relations between Logical and Ethical Principals" (1897) and his famous "Formalism in Ethics" (1913-16). Unfortunately, Heidegger had no access to Scheler's first volume on logic, the Logik I since the author withdrew its publication in 1905-6. A farsimile of the galley proofs of Scheler's Logik I was published by permission of the general editor of the collected edition of Scheler's works at the Elhuis Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1975.

between language and being. We can do so in the present work, however, only by indirection, since it is Scotus' thought that is the vehicle of Heidegger's investigation into the contemporary problem of the categories and of meaning. This is evidenced by Heidegger's own admission in his review of the work, which is appended to this dissertation.

Even in his early work, Heidegger is not dealing with language as merely an ontic phenomenon. He expressly claims that his level of investigation is one that is ontic-transcendental. He is fully cognizant that the word in itself, i.e., as sense perceptible object, has no immediate relation to known things. The central nexus in which the _modus significandi_ (the way in which the meaning exists or means) and the _modus essendi_ (the manner after which things exist) are united in the _modus intelligendi_ (the manner of knowing) in the terminology of Scotus. Here, Heidegger turns to Husserl, thus showing the influence of the latter on his own development. It is only in the context of experience (_Erlebnisse_) that language takes on meaning. (Heidegger designates this as the teleology of language.) Also according to Husserl, language is an intermediary between two levels of acts: from above, the logical limits of language and from below, the limit of mute and elemental experience. Heidegger states that language is primarily concerned with content and this content is subject to logical worth. But logical worth depends upon an act of consciousness. By an act of consciousness is not meant, however, the individual psychic acts which change as the disposition of the individual changes.

C. Language & Logic

The act of judgment as a psychic act has an import that transcends the level of the merely psychic. This is the logical act of judgment and it stands at the juncture of language content and the object. This can be seen in the two moments of the _modus significandi_: the _modus significandi passivus_

and the _modus significandi activus_. The _modus passivus_ takes up the language content as object and the _modus activus_ as the act of predication, the _modus intelligendi activus_ thus finds itself restricted to the content of language (and Heidegger suggests that it be designated as noetic). Although a restriction it should not be seen as being merely negative, for the _modus significandi_ has the universal tendency to touch on everything. Whatever meanings can be found in the _modus intelligendi_ as formed on the basis of the forms of the _modus essendi_, arise at the moment of judgment as that moment which obtains or is valid for sense or meaning. It is at this point that a theory of meaning becomes nothing other than a division of logic. The _modus essendi_ finds in its content the categories of meaning which, through judgment, are raised to the structures of logic in the _modus intelligendi_.

We find ourselves presented with a logic of grammar, a much discredited concept, especially at the time of Heidegger's writing. This is not to say that language can be directly and primarily deduced from formal laws; for Heidegger recognizes a dual aspect of language -- one that is open to theoretical treatment and one which is not. Logic may be universal in its application, but its application is always from the standpoint of the cohesion of thought. language as an ontic phenomenon can be viewed from a transcendental aspect.

D. _Theory of Science_

This is the context in which Heidegger deals with a theory of science and his discussion of a theory of science as a merely schematized possibility makes it amply clear that the logical treatment of language is from a theoretical aspect and solely that.

Most theories of science have failed because theory and practical concerns are combined in them. This has been possible because sufficient care

has not been taken in theorizing on the sciences. Since the immediate is always merely given and in need of demonstration, the movement to the realm of demonstration is the point of creation of the diverse domains of reality. Whatever domain of reality in question, it will create its own use of the categories and methodology if not strapped to merely practical concerns rather than having ontic-transcendental depth. Obviously, because of the hermeneutic circle, crises will arise in the sciences calling for re-evaluation and furthermore, the deepening of criticism in the history of thought will leave the system open. Logic is again limited to logical application.

E. Teleogy of Language

- On the basis of the limits of logic, a logic of grammar also excludes genetic consideration. Genetic considerations do not give rise to a grammar of language. The meaningfulness of language flows from its teleology. This is its proper given. But in the proper given the meaning-giving-word is seen to be already formed. Thus the past of language has some importance. The question of the past in this regard is most amply treated in the conclusion. Heidegger actually wrote the conclusion of this work at a later date, at the time of its publication. Besides being rhetorical in nature, it looks at the viewpoints presented in the work with some degree of retrospect. He notes that the exposition that he has made has not really dealt with the full implications of the teleological aspects of which the past is one. Respecting the past and its history, Heidegger warns against looking at the task of history as merely an empirical relating of facts just as a theory of science must have more than merely practical concerns. History must find its delimitation in a meta-physical-teleological determination. Thus the teleology of language is seen as a type of teleology, that is, the arrival at its own completion in accord

with its nature or proper methodology. It does not differ from the general

teleology of mind. But mind is only to be fully conceived of in light of its

history, conceptualized philosophically. This activity leads to an ever more

profound view of the cosmos.

F. Present View of Language and Later Views

In this work of the young Heidegger, the elements of his thought on lan-

guage are present as they are in Being and Time. In Being and Time Heidegger

speaks of speech rather than language. In other words he speaks of language

from its teleological aspect, ultimately, the logos. Consequently, language

cannot be treated as mere words. It will be remembered that in Being and Time

Heidegger coins the term Woerterdinge, an almost polemical expression to point

up this devaluation of language. In this work Heidegger insists on the content

of language as that which is meaningful. This meaningful content has a certain

manner of meaning or forms of meaning. This is not too different from the sense

of language being in its interpretation. Even further than this, speaking,

along with silence and listening, is the meaningful link that allows for under-

standing in being-in-the-world. All in all, it would seem that the explana-

tion of language given in Being and Time is merely a more articulated version of

what is presented in this work and that in both works language is a formed and

formative element of experience.

This would be the case if we didn't pay close attention to the context

in which language is discussed in both of these works. Heidegger states in his

conclusion that the theory of meaning can only be properly viewed if set in the

context of judgment and the subject and thus it takes on significance on an

ontic-transcendental level. Heidegger attempted in both of these works to

relate language to being, but in this work being -- and consequently meaning--

are taken as something static (ontic). The work rests on a metaphysical position which Heidegger later abandons.

G. Influences on the Young Heidegger

Heidegger was influenced in his early development not only by Husserl, but also by the neo-Kantians, particularly by Rickert and Lask, to a lesser degree by Kuelpe and Lotze. Heidegger specifically takes note of this in his autobiographical statement. We can see, however, that the direction of his thought at this period was away from the neo-Kantians and toward positions similar to those of Husserl, if we recall that he also speaks of the necessity of repudiating the neo-Kantians in his colloquium with Ernst Cassirer on the island of Davos. However, the influence of the neo-Kantians is strongly in evidence in this work. We have already noted that in this work there are allusions to the major concern of the neo-Kantians, namely, the logic of science. It would seem that under this influence the early realism of Heidegger developed as a critical realism interested in the problem of judgment from which is viewed the validity of logic, speech, and grammar. In a similar stance to Nicolai Hartmann, Heidegger originally insisted on the presumption of the real. Later, more careful analyses of judgmental sense not only developed his critical views, but eventually led to an abandonment of realism in favor of phenomenology.

H. Transcendental Standpoints in this Work

The framework of Kantian transcendentalism stands out in Heidegger's position that the question of forms of meaning and of the categories can only be seen in its true significance if set in the context of the subject-object relation. He further notes in his treatment of form that Kant was the first to discover the meaningfulness of form for logic. Thus critical philosophy which conceives of logic as a study of the epistemological possibilities of man

is the unifying thread of this work and from out of this view of logic or from a transcendental viewpoint both being and the forms of meaning are investigated. The transcendental aspect of the ontic phenomenon of language is its grammatical meaning--the logical value found in the kinds of grammatical distinctions and nexus that language makes.

Form, of course, also existed for the scholastics, but it must be realized that since the critical problem did not exist for the scholastics, form was never primarily an epistemological structure. Even though form is the primarily intelligible aspect of the thing and thus it is at the very basis of any scholastic epistemology, and even though there are formal terms, formal concepts, formal propositions etc. in logic, scholastic logic did not consider these terms in their radical epistemological consequences, but rather as a further ontological extension of the doctrine of form as a real cause. As an ontological extension, cognition and knowledge could be seen in causal terms and only aspects of the critical problem come to light in the problem of the universal. Logical form is not concerned with function, in that ontological truth is primarily inherent in it, but logical function reather has an ontological basis of which it is an attenuated manifestation. The function of logic is to render certain knowledge by conforming to the real which is intelligible in itself and thus conforms to logical function.

But the central concern of Heidegger in this work is the critical problem of judgment and the significance of judgmental sense. It is only from out of his critique of judgment that his other concerns become understandable. The question of being in this work is found in Heidegger's critical views.

This is not to say that Heidegger failed to recognize that the place of logic in transcendental idealism is decidedly different from the place it

occupies in any philosophy preceding it. Heidegger expressly notes this in speaking of Kant and finds that a critical view on which can be based a theory of science was not really attempted to any significant extent before Kant. Further, he finds that this critical view must be extended and more thoroughly investigated if knowledge of the domains of reality is to be advanced. Heidegger's view that reality has determinate domains is a stance that he shared at the time of his work with the neo-Kantians and is known to have abandoned in his lectures shortly after the first world war. Heidegger held the view, common to many contemporary philosophers and especially to the neo-Kantians, that an investigation of being as such was impossible other than as an ontical investigation. The terms that describe such an investigation are called "categories".

This point is significant because Heidegger's critical stance not only leaves unclear the relation of language to being, but it also leads Heidegger to interpret Scotus in a way that is greatly at variance with Scotus' view of the role of the categories and the relation of thought and being.

I. The Critique of Judgment

Let us examine more closely this second term of our relation being largely as judgmental sense, from the standpoint of a critique of judgment. Heidegger's critique of judgment, as it stands in evidence in his interpretation of Scotus, can be summarized as follows. Meaning can obtain or be valid for the real as object of cognition. By this assimilation to cognition the object is invested with the index of cognition -- judgment. Because the object is assimilated to knowledge through judgment, every judgment is said to obtain or be valid. The judgment is sufficient for the various domains that come under its scrutiny. As has been said, meaning and intelligibility arise because of the assimilation of the object through judgment. It should not be assumed, however,

that the object is anything other than that which is known. True, there is a residue that must be sought after by continual refinement of view. But it must be remembered that what is being dealt with is immanent thought. The residue that fails in judgment is no absolute unknown, but the basis for the teleology of mind.

Hence any construct of the object as an intentional copy must be repudiated. The destructive nature of psychologism is evident here. It is only from out of psychologism that solipsism and copy theories arise. Heidegger spends much of his effort in his other early writings: _Das Realitaetsproblem in der modernen Philosophie_ (1912) and _Die Lehre von Urteil in Psychologismus_ (1914) on this problem. The act of judgment as valid sense is not just an individual act of the ego. The act positioning the ego is one act, the same for each ego and as an intentional act the same as any other thesis. It is rather that thought works with meaning contents than with concepts of things. These contents form a peculiar domain to which all other levels of act must relate. Heidegger's view of the transcendental is not based on the a priori as such, but on the ability of judgment to attain to being. But this assimilation of being to judgment then makes any ontology necessarily conformed to the capabilities of judgmental sense.

We can see here a further implication of Heidegger's view of being as an ontic concern. In rejecting psychologism, Heidegger also rejects any possibility of a view of being that is dynamic, since this rejection necessitates a view of being that is abstract. By removal of the psychic act Heidegger finds that the sense of judgment is not involved with events or processes, that is, not with the concepts of things but with meaning contents that allow for categorization on the basis of judgmental acts founding valid method. In other words, Heidegger's view on the sense of judgment approaches

Husserl's view of philosophy as a science of essences. Certainly, Heidegger was fully aware of the abstractive nature of his logical concern. He states that the "is" in the proposition does not extend to the manifoldness of experience (the concepts of things) but must not be reduced to a mere copulative relation. There is this homogeneous realm of meaning contents arising out of the sameness of judgment.

Again Heidegger's view of the place of logic in philosophy brings him to skew his interpretation of Scotus. Scotus accepts univocal, equivocal, and analogical concepts of things. He merely insists that the predication of these concepts has a univocal moment since the object of the intellect is _ens_, conceived of as necessary and hence as an essence in the broadest sense. _Ens_ is the common inference of all acts of judgment as a predication _in quid_, that is, as to what it is. Hence in each act of predication all the transcendentals and all the categories are univocally inferred. For Scotus categorial domains are impossible except in an attenuated sense as mere concepts of things.

Heidegger sees this as a failure of medieval philosophy and holds to the view that domains of reality are a critical refinement beyond the view of Scotus. Heidegger is standing at the -- it would seem -- impossible point of attempting to find agreement between neo-Kantian criticism and Husserl's intentionality. The meaning contents as experience assimilated through judgment are categorized and thus, there arise the transcendentals as the ultimate categories of judgment. They are the central features of being -- being as the basic sameness of the judgmental sense. It may be observed -- as Heidegger does -- that this view is very similar to Husserl's noema. But besides the fact that Heidegger's view of intentionality differs from Husserl in that he is still holding to neo-Kantian criticism, Heidegger's views of intentionality

differs from Husserl in another important respect: He is known to have rejected in his lectures shortly after the First World War, the transcendental ego, substituting for it the transcendental nature of the real. [3]

J. Heidegger's Approach to Scotus' Categories

Heidegger examines three of Scotus' four ultimate genera. He does not examine bonum, the good. Under verum, the true, he examines the problem of judgment, but this is also true in a more derived sense of his examination of ens and unum, being and the one, since a critical stance is the unifying bond of the work. (Scotus himself considers the transcendental verum to be in itself independent of judgment.) Heidegger states that ens is the first determination of judgment, both in determining judgment and in judgment being determined. Unum presupposes ens as is the case with all of the ultimate genera. Unum is that aspect of ens which allows for its multiplicity because an object is one object and not any other object. Thus, unum is that aspect of ens which points up what ens is not, namely, not another. The another in question here must be kept distinct from the other (alterum) which Scotus considers an irreducible concept. The distinction is that unum shows the indivisiveness of ens as indifferent to all distinctions, whereas the other is always that particular res (thing) and not this res.

But more than this, unum is an equivocal term: It means both one and the one. Heidegger deals extensively with the concept of one as number. And it is at this point that the divergence between Heidegger and Scotus stands at cross purposes. Although Heidegger finds that the context in which he is dealing, namely, an interpretation of Scotus aimed at investigation the problem

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[3]   Conf. introduction to this work.

of the transcendentals and their domains and the forms of meaning insofar as grammar impinges on logic, is not the place for attempting to distinguish the realms of the logical and the mathematical, nonetheless, Heidegger approaches the question of the one and one with this problem in mind. Scotus, on the other hand, gave extensive treatment to _unum_ because of his concern with the univocity of being in the context of the problem of the one and the many which is transposed into epistemological terms as the problem of the particular and the universal. The sameness of _ens_ can be seen as its form of oneness.

Heidegger notes that Scotus found that the thing (_res_) as a unity was in itself indifferent to singularity and plurality, but exists as uniquely individual. The singular is an abstraction of the individual based on its being undivided in itself. Specificity only comes into question in the case of counted objects. In this instance the discreteness arising from out of the specificity of the object is necessary for classification. The unique individual then is indifferent to the same and the different, the singular and the plural, the one and the other. The one is predicated of each and every _ens_ as an _in quale_ predication of _ens_ which is predicated of an object _in cuid_.

K. Conclusion

I have attempted in these remarks to touch on the central nerve of Heidegger's thought at the time of the writing of this work. From this position, the emanations that flow from it and the various influences that are evident in this work should become easier to grasp. This does not mean to minimize any of the influences that are evident in this work: the Kantian concerns with the transcendental and judgment, the Husserlian influences as to act, the neo-Kantian concerns with a theory of science, nor the Hegelian concerns with the logical subject, the hermeneutic circle, and thought as history. I have made

no attempt to be exhaustive.

Many of these elements can be seen in a transformed state in the early Heidegger. Nonetheless, it still seems necessary to keep in mind the ontic view of this work for its proper comprehension. Being as the intelligibility of thought in historical evolvement is still viewed in this work as an essentializing process. The sameness of judgmental sense is transcendental both because of the forms of judgment which are the ultimate logical categories and the critical deepening of sense through the history of thought. The categories of Aristotle may be found to be insufficient, but this insufficiency will be supplied for by a proper grasp of the transcendental through proper methodology.

Because of the teleology of history, a formal and definitive methodology is impossible for the various domains of reality. But as Heidegger states at greater length in: _Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft_, written as a _venia legendi_ in 1915, there is the possibility of provisional norms that are always open to further criticism.

Hingeltungscharakter is the only neologism, other than _west_ (be-ing), that Heidegger uses in this work. Erasmus Schoefer feels that this is a germanization of the Latin _intentio_ or _inclinatio_. We have translated it as _intentionality_. It must be remembered that _intentio_ or the intentional act for Scotus only arises because of the _inclinatio_ of the will to being not just as a first reaction to apperception but as directive of all intentional acts.

In this translation _Gegenstaendlichkeit_ and _das Gegenstaendliche_ will be translated by _objectiveness_ and _objective_. _Objektivitaet_ will be translated by _objectivity_. Any use of _Objekt_ or _objektiv_ will be noted.

There are extensive bibliographies on both Heidegger and Duns Scotus. Hence there is no need to overburden this work by repeating them. I will include

here only those works which deal with the young Heidegger:

Baglietto, G., "La formazione del pensiero di Martin Heidegger nei suoi scritti giovanili" in Annali di Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, 1957 (26) pp. 190-221.

Campo, M., "Psicologia logica e ontologia nel primo Heidegger" in Rivista di Filisofia Neoscolastica, 1939 (31) pp. 474091.

Caputo, John D. "Phenomenology, Mysticism and the Grammatica Speculative," in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 5, May, 1974, pp. 101-117.

Garulli, E., Problemi dell Ur-Heidegger, Urbino: Argalia, 1969, 182 --.

_____ "Problemi della filosofia giovanile heideggeriana" in Il Pensiero XI (1966) pp. 226-253.

Lehmann, K., "Metaphysik Transcendentalphilosophie und Phanenomenologie in den ersten Schriften Martin Heideggers" in Philosphsches Jahrbuch, 1963-64 (71) pp. 331-57.

Manzano, D., "La Habilitations-schrift de M. Heidegger sobre Escoto" in Verdad v Vida (24) Madrid, 1966, pp. 305-325.

Poeggeler, O., Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, Tuebingen: Pfuellingen, 1963, 407 pp. The first two chapters deal with the young Heidegger.

Vattimo, G., "Problemi della filosofia giovanile Heideggeriana" in Il Pensiero, n. 3 1966, pp. 226-253.

To Heinrich Rickert in deep gratitude and admiration

I.

Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning

Foreword

The research lying before you was completed in the early part of 1915 and presented to the faculty of philosophy of the University of Freiburg in Breisgau as an habilitation during the summer of that same year. There have been several inessential changes made, and an additional final chapter has been added.

The dedication is an expression of due thanks. However, it likewise wants to demonstrate the conviction, while still preserving freely and openly one's own "standpoint," that the problematic and world-orientated character of a philosophy of values is called on for decisively progressing and deepening the treatment of philosophical problems. Its orientation in the history of thought presents a productive base for the creative forms of problems, drawn from long personal experience. As witness for this, there remains the philosophical creativity of an Emil Lask. For him in his far off soldier's grave, may this mention be a remembrance of true gratitude.

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Freiburg in Breisgau, September, 1916

Martin Heidegger

Introduction

Logo:

" ... in looking back into the internal essence of philosophy there are neither precursors nor followers. "

Hegel, W. W. I. p. 169

Historical research into medieval culture in general stands today at such a level of competency in impressive insight and substantive worth, that it should not seem strange if earlier hastily made-judgments, which rested solely on lack of knowledge, have disappeared; and likewise, the interest of scientific history in this period is in a stage of increasing growth.

If the propelling force and abiding power of the philosophical and theological life of the intellect is realized in what it gave to the whole environment of medieval man, which had as its ground the transcendent, primordial relationship of the soul to God, then it is

not difficult to maintain that there is unanimity on the indispensa-
bility and meaningfulness of historical research on this aspect of
medieval culture. Clemens Baeumker and his school have been doing
untiring and exemplary work in this direction. And as Martin
Grabmann concludes in his instructive inaugural speech at Vienna,
there are still wide regions of the not-so-easily digested history
of medieval philosophy that are untreated.

Sentences and Summae of the early and high scholastics,
great and philosophically substantive works, are still inedited.
Even the works of leading scholastics, as those of an Albert the
Great, are still not fully and completely printed. For the establish-
ment of Aristotelian influences on scholasticism -- l'action d'Aristote
as Mandonnet calls it -- the definitive research and publication of
the Latin translations of Aristotle, the researching and editing of
the unpublished scholastic Aristotle commentaries and lexicons are
still future tasks for scholars. Much still needs to be exploited for
knowledge of the period of transition from the early scholastics to
high scholasticism, for showing the stage of evolution in the Fran-
ciscan school from Bonaventure to Scotus. Also the pervasive phi-
losophical influence of Aquinas, as it comes to expression in his
immediate and later disciples' works, which remain unpublished in
part, leaves a wide range for research. [1]

Text editions, completeness of materials, and their re-
liability are indispensable foundations for any further fathoming of
the thought-content of scholasticism. And the realization of these
foundations needs a sure working with all of the means of modern
historical research. But with mere collection, cataloguing, and
indexing all of the preconditions for an evaluation of the intellectual
work of medieval philosophy are still not fulfilled.

Certainly the rich fruits of this research have already
forced the revision of long-held judgments concerning the for-
malism of scholasticism respecting its "slavish" relationship to
Aristotle and its ancillary status to theology, and insures a more
dependable historical judgment on this area of medieval philosophy.

Since pure philosophical talent and a truly fruitful capacity
for historical thought are found all too seldom in a single persona-
lity, it becomes understandable that it is possible only in extra-
ordinary cases that there is an actual philosophical evaluation of
scholastic philosophy, especially since the difficulties and the
tediousness of this pioneer work, which calls for the finest critical
analysis, are surmounted only by manuscript analysis and use of
special libraries. A division of tasks must be made here. It goes
without saying that the historian of medieval philosophy can hardly
work without philosophical schooling, but likewise a theoretical and

systematic evaluation of scholasticism is not possible without a certain measure of historical interest. More historical and literary and predominantly theoretical-philosophical investigations thus will profit from each other.

The history of philosophy is not and cannot be just history if it belongs, on the other hand, in the scholarly area of philosophical research. The history of philosophy has a different relationship to philosophy then, for instance, the history of mathematics to mathematics. It has this difference not on the basis of history of philosophy, but on the basis of history of philosophy.

Outsiders, and at times also supposed insiders, think that they must see in the history of philosophy a sequence of more or less often repeated solutions to "errors." Let us add that the philosophers have never even agreed what philosophy is at all. It seems a fact then, that philosophy as a science stands in complete questionableness.

To the truly understanding view, however, there appears another situation. Philosophy has its worth, like any other science, as a value of culture. At the same time, it has as its own to raise the claim of being valid and function as value of life. The thought-content of philosophy is more than the content of a science which can be engaged in out of personal predilection, and out of the desire to

further and shape culture. Philosophy lives in a state of tension

with the living personality. Out of its depths and vital fullness it

forms content and claims of value. Most of the time, there is at

the base of every philosophical conceptualization of the personal point

of view of a respective philosopher. This determination of all philo-

sophy by the subject was expressed by Nietzsche in his inexorably

astringent method of thought and ability for plastic description with

the well known phrase, "drive philosophizes."[2]

In view of the constancy of human nature, it becomes under-

standable that philosophical problems repeat themselves in history.

There cannot be found here a development that in a sense progresses

steadily toward new questions on the basis of already found solutions

of the past. Rather, there is mainly found here an always fruitful

attempt to uncoil and exhaust a limited domain of problems. This ever-

renewed struggle with more or less the same group of problems, this

pervading sameness of the philosophical mind, not only enables but de-

mands a corresponding comprehension of the "history" of philosophy.

Although the religious. political and cultural aspects in the

stricter sense are indispensable for the understanding of the genesis

and historical conditions of a philosophy, these aspects can, never-

theless, be set aside for the sake of purely philosophical interests

which as such are concerned with the perspective problems themselves.

Time, taken here as an historical category, is bracketed out as it were. Solutions to related domains of problems begin to gather in the center of the problem itself.

The history of philosophy is essentially related to philosophy so long as, and only so long as it is not "pure history," an empirical science. On the contrary, it is the history of philosophy when it projects itself into a purely philosophical systematic5. A. Trendelenburg, the noted historian of philosophy, states: "At the point where history stops being merely the past, it gives its most effective goad to the mind. "[3]

The treatment of scholasticism that follows will be on the basis of the conception we have laid out so far of the essence and task of the history of philosophy.

In accord with the character of the development of all philosophy as an uncoiling of specific problems, progress lies for the most part in the deepening and the restatement of the questions to be formulated. Perhaps nowhere else do these determine the solutions quite so powerfully as in philosophy. A philosophical and "historical" consideration in this sense will have to draw on such delineations of problems; and that in turn is only possible if the problems, which appear within the field of research, are themselves in some way recognized in their own theoretical originality

and if their relationship with other problems is looked into. The latter point must not be overlooked, since no problem stands alone all by itself, but is always swallowed up with others, grows out of them, and itself puts forth new problems.[4]

No matter how the results of modern philosophical research are evaluated, it is beyond dispute that modern philosophy is strong and impressive as to the depth and the precision contained in its questions. This strength has its foundation in a pronounced consciousness of method, in an awareness of the manner of grasping problems, and of their exigency. This characteristic of modern science is only a reflex of modern culture in general, which has succeeded, through the self-awareness (not to be taken in an ethical sense) of its own development as something new.

In the Middle Ages there doesn't seem to have been this consciousness of method, this fully evolved bent and courage to question, this constant control of every phase of thinking.

In that respect, the domination of the idea of authority and the great stock put in all tradition might serve as a hallmark. These are surely traits that belong peculiarly to medieval thought and life in general and that stand out as more than just an external quality.

Medieval man's manner of thought is more closely approached if the singular fact is remembered that I would like to

earmark as <u>the</u> <u>absolute</u> <u>devotion</u> <u>and</u> <u>submission</u> <u>in</u> <u>temperament</u> <u>to</u> <u>the</u> <u>material</u> <u>that</u> <u>was</u> <u>known</u> <u>to</u> <u>be</u> <u>handed</u> <u>down</u> <u>by</u> <u>tradition.</u> This bent to hand oneself over to the material as it were, keeps the subject bound to one orientation and takes from him the inner possibility and the desire for easier flexibility. The value of a state of affairs (object) moreover, dominates over the value of the ego (subject).

Thus the individuality of the single thinker disappears in the fullness of the <u>material</u> to be mastered by him. This phenomenon, with its stress on the general and on principles, fits nicely into the picture of the middle ages. This domination by the <u>general</u> must have forced its way full-grown into the realm of the then sciences, where method is something which searches for general norms, staying clear of individual peculiarities. The attitude of the philosophical <u>Summae</u> -- uniformity in structure, repetitious formula, question forms -- is generally and confidently employed as a point in case.

Recall too the increasing consideration given to <u>dialectics,</u> especially from the thirteenth century onwards, and the result is that the notion that there isn't any conscious method is destroyed in its foundations.

If, however, this kind of argumentation should prove to be irrelevant, then it must be that the concept of method holds <u>another</u>

meaning for us. For it doesn't seem possible that the character-ization just made be objected to, even if it apparently has no issue.

In fact, method connotes for us not so much the determined, fixed form in the presentation and communication of ideas, but rather the spirit of investigation and the formulation of problems. More exactly, the lack of consciousness of method should indicate that medieval man didn't succeed in rising above his own work with a certain intellectual jolt to consciously reflect on the problems as problems, on the possibility and manner of getting hold of them, on their relationship with other problems and their import. At least that is so for philosophical thought in the Middle Ages.

The Middle Ages didn't have what has come to be an essential ingredient of modern thought: the freeing of the subject with his ties to the environment, with his fixation in his own life. Medieval man is not in the modern sense with himself -- he sees himself as always suspended in metaphysical tension. Transcendence restrains him from a purely human attitude in the face of the whole of reality. Reality as reality, as real world-about, is for him a constraining phenomenon in that it immediately and constantly appears as dependent on and measured by transcendent principles. Consequently, the theory of knowledge for example, does not have the free width and breadth of modern theory --

despite its undeniably deep insights. It too remains constrained

by transcendence, and by the problems of the suprasensory.

Constraint doesn't mean here a lack of freedom, a servitude, but

a one-sided orientation of intellectual life.

The current of individual life in its manifold intricacies,

bends and returns in its multiform and widely divergent conditions,

remained covered up, in good part, for the man of the Middle

Ages. As such it wasn't known. All of this, however, doesn't

force a decision as to whether in the end the idea of transcen-

dence must be totally predominant in a philosophy. That can only

happen if the boundaries of the realm of transcendence were firmly

established and gathered up whole into the life of the individual.

It can also be asked if the absence of a fully developed

consciousness of method ought really be counted as a lack.

Doesn't the constant deliberation and discussion of the path to be

followed instead of blazing a fresh trail betoken a weakness?

Isn't it a sign of unproductivity? "Constant knife-sharpening

gets to be boring if there isn't anything around to cut. "[5]

It would be, in fact, both useless and uninteresting if

methodological awareness were capable of nothing further than

taking note of pure possibilities in order to solve all sorts of so-

called prior questions in a planned solution of a problem, without

really getting a firm grasp on the theme. For generally creative

considerations of methods are possible and probable only after

the work of research has been accomplished. But to what avail

is knowledge of method if it isn't able to be applied anywhere, if

the problem has been solved? Does the word method allow of

of being understood in another sense, one of a more fundamental

nature?

Certainly, methodological awareness can be understood as

knowledge about, the focus being on the fundamentals which make

a certain domain of problems possible primarily. It can also be

understood as a demonstration of totally singular principles

which are the foundation of a determinate cognitive complex

which receives its meaning from these principles.

Not only is knowledge of these principles of concern here;

but first of all, knowledge of the complex relationship between them

and that for which they are principles. What matters here is not

only the that and what, but the how of the principal interconnections.

Thus it results that method is the form of the unified

content in a sphere of cognition.

> That should not be called "method" which in
> actuality isn't a consciously pursued path of
> discovery but simply the expression of a
> secretly recognized totality of significance. [6]

This seems to be immediately applicable to our use of the

term. And yet it isn't beside the point when we say that our con-

cept of method is then only one which is extensive, that is, more profound in principle and more reliable. Hence it primarily makes the other concepts possible as being genetically real or congnitively <u>practical</u>: it bestows meaning on them.

But a concept of method of this type seems to have been of trusted application even in scholasticism -- at least insofar as it was filled with the true spirit of Aristotle. The attention to the treatment of first principles, the whole of metaphysics as a science of principles, speaks for that. A decision will have to be come to in this regard in the course of the investigation that follows.

What is <u>not</u> said needs to be considered if there is to be productive insight and thorough evaluation of the wealth of scholastic thought; put more concretely, it shouldn't be lost from sight that there is no lapse into <u>empirical-genetic</u> <u>explanations</u> in the analyses of signification. It was attempted to hold on to the objective meaning-content and not to explain away what was forthcoming in "significance." Scholasticism attempted to stay attuned to the descriptive content.

Another question is how far did scholasticism -- given its metaphysical direction of thought -- get in its treatment of metaphysical realities. But despite these metaphysical "enclosures" -- understandable in view of the whole attitude of scholastic

thought -- which suppress as such the "phenomenological reduc-tion," more exactly, make it impossible, there are, nevertheless, instances of phenomenological observation hidden in the type of thought that scholasticism was -- perhaps in this thought most especially.

In accordance with the aforementioned principles, there definitely is a problem that has to be brought out and looked at from the perspective of modern research. And indeed the prob-lem that has been chosen is of the kind that modern logic is parti-cularly preoccupied with: the theory of the categories.

Windelband -- thanks are due to him for much valuable stimulation in the advancement of this problem -- has written:

> For those who know the history of this
> task (the projection of the system of the
> categories) it is without question that it
> is the turning point for the scientific move-
> ment since Kant. For that matter, there
> seems to be universal agreement that Kant
> himself was taken up in the attempt at a
> solution. [7]

And Eduard von Hartmann, the author of the first modern, developed theory of the categories, speaks of the "decisive role which the conceptualization of the theory of the categories has al-ways played in the philosophical world-view," and he has the history of philosophy determined directly by the history of the theory of the categories. [8]

Up until now, the logic of scholasticism has been considered, for the most part, to be hair-splitting syllogistic and a copy of Aristotelian logic. But once an attempt is made to understand it from the viewpoint of modern problems in logic, then another aspect is immediately in evidence. It appears in a completely new aspect, in such a fashion that there is systematically produced the totality of basic concepts which sustain and form what can be experienced and thought.

To be sure, the problem of the categories is not about to be pursued through the whole history of scholasticism. More to the point, it will be submitted to evaluative consideration by examination of the Franciscan Duns Scotus, the "most subtle of all the scholastics" in Dilthey's words.

Duns Scotus doesn't receive our direct attention just because he is rightfully famous for a kind of thought which is unusually apt and critical for logical problems. His striking individuality as a thinker characterizes him in general as having unmistakably modern traits. He has a more extensive and accurate nearness (haecceitas) to real life, to its manifoldness and possible tensions than the scholastics before him. At the same time, he knows how to turn, with the same ease, from the fullness of life to the abstract world of mathematics. The "life-forms" are as familiar to him (to the extent that is the case in general in the Middle Ages) as the

"gray on gray" of philosophy.

Hence, there are in Duns Scotus all of the preconditions for an examination of the problem of the categories.

Add to this that there is among his works one which Husserl refers to as "the theory of forms of meanings," which are essentially related to the theory of categories, in that it presents the various categorical formations of "meaning in general" and lays the foundations for all further investigation of logical problems of sense and validity.

Although <u>modern</u> problems and their solutions are purposely related to scholasticism, and a certain affinity begins to be evidenced between them, no attempt at all is being made to put the originality and even the independence of modern logic in question.

Apart from the questionability and the scientific disvalue of such an attempt, it is not even initially possible since the intellectual milieu from which modern logical investigations have grown is totally different from that of scholasticism. However, this doesn't exclude the possibility that scholastic and modern reasoning might be concerned with the same problems in the same intellectual domains. However, the possibility of comparing these two great heights: scholasticism and modern thought -- in the beginning and in a certain sense separate in fact -- only occurs in that this has been raised to the level of a reflexion in systematic philosophy,

granted this <u>appears to be</u> completely and <u>purely</u> an historical investigation.

In this first attempt at largely a new manner of investigation of medieval scholasticism, that is, in its interpretation and validation with the help of the problem-content of philosophy as such, the immediate question is certainly not to distinguish line by line the systematic teachings of a single philosopher -- in our case Duns Scotus -- from contemporary and earlier systems, then to company them with each other, to present the <u>common</u> thought-content, and finally to hold the contents of the teachings up against Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophy. Such a total presentation and comparison -- which, in my opinion, probably doesn't significantly curtail the autonomous individuality of the investigator -- can first be begun with some expectation of <u>philosophical</u> issue after the systematic content of medieval scholasticism has been made more understandable -- at least in its most important and recurrent problems.

In the energetic approach that contemporary theoretical philosophy takes to problems and in its corresponding capability at mastering these problems, the understanding of the history of philosophy is enriched and deepened. But this also makes it more imperative that we deal with the tasks we have set down.

It is impossible to think of touching a definite task, of

writing a <u>philosophically</u> valuable <u>history of scholastic logic in
the middle ages</u>, without first clarifying the ultimate and most
difficult problems of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. It is to
this end that Emil Lask directed his book on judgment, a book rich
in problematics. [9]

A further requisite for a dispatch of our stated project,
one that will be somewhat satisfying philosophically, will be to
draw principally on the psychology of scholasticism. This re-
quisite may seem to be unjustifiable today when the non-philosophy
of <u>psychologism</u> has been overcome for the most part. [10] What
only matters here is the question whether the psychology of scho-
lasticism coincides without difficulty with the modern psychology
of the natural sciences. It does not. On the contrary, it should be
recalled to mind that scholastic psychology preserves an objective-
noematic orientation in its main problematics precisely because it
isn't attuned to a dynamic-flux psychology of the real -- a circum-
stance which favors extensively the prospective of the phenomena
of intentionality.

I hold the philosophical, more exactly, the phenomenological
handling of the mystical, moral-theological, and ascetic writings of
medieval scholasticism to be especially crucial in its decisive in-
sight into this fundamental characteristic of scholastic psychology.
By pressing forward on such paths, one first penetrates to the living

heart of scholasticism which decisively put down the guidelines for a cultural epoch, activating and invigorating it. [11]

The Theory of the Categories
(Systematic laying of the foundation for the understanding of the theory of meaning.)

The _philosophical_ interpretation and presentation of the Grammatica Speculativa of Duns Scotus as a theory of meaning necessarily calls for a prior investigation of the elements and conditions which first make possible an understanding of the designated problem area in general.

It is a necessary task of scientific _history_ to investigate the historical conditions and genetic elaborateness of the branch of knowledge in question from inside of scientific consciousness. This will be accomplished later when we make an overall presentation of medieval logic. It will yield for purely philosophical explication that vital and original plasticity and fullness which always springs from deeply comprehended history.

It is _not_ possible by this means to enhance the understanding by systematic philosophy of the theory of meaning or even for systematic philosophy to understand it.

The theory of meaning must first be elevated to a concept and this is only possible in a way commensurate to the essence of what can be conceptualized. What is contained in a determinate

concept of the theory of meaning can only be understood if the

general elements of meaning are recognized, which found and

construe this content. Incontestably, the theory of meaning, the

"grammar", must be considered a definite division of the whole

of that which can be known, that is, that which can be determined

theoretically. Granted, this is an entirely preliminary matter.

By comparing this particular science, as the theoretical

treatment of the objective is termed, with the other sciences,

that should become evident which is proper to it; or better still,

by putting it in its determined place in a system of sciences --

provided there is a unified grouping of the sciences.

The "system of the sciences" is not directly a univocal

concept. For one thing, it can be understood as an integration of

the sciences in existence at a certain time in order to orientate

them to certain standpoints. Any kind of arrangement of what is

already historical datum, of what is accomplished in a definite

period of the history of thought, can have only a limited validity and

is forced to undergo change like everything else that is subject to

the movement of history. Such a system of the sciences can, in

practice,be extremely meaningful in its period. For the history of

thought it might be a creative means for grasping the salient

characteristic of a cultural epoch. But it has to be given a low

rating from a purely theoretical viewpoint and from the point of

view of what it contains. Hence, only that system of the sciences can be valuable on a theoretical level, which isn't limited to a classification of the existing sciences, but spans all of the sciences in general. How is such a "system" possible?

How is it to be known at any time what new sciences will arise in the future or when the number of sciences will be exhausted -- provided this possibility exists?

Any systematics or theory of the sciences is a concern for philosophy. It can be maintained that the individual sciences must have been derived from philosophy as the "general" science. But it should not be forgotten that philosophy itself, and philosophy in particular, has been subjected to severe alterations. Thus, we are faced with the same insufficiency as there was with the first concept, that of a "system of the sciences". It becomes evident that it even is preferable, because it is more productive by far, to be content with a classification of the present sciences rather than to create new ones and thus yield to utopian possibilities. And yet it is not impossible to require that a system of the sciences be more than a practical classification of the present sciences. It's just that too much store should not be put by this possibility.

There can be no creation of new sciences. In view of the fact that it needs a long historical evolution as well as those conditions which determine its formation and progress, the way in

which sciences are created is not purely theoretical in the way that the system in question should be. Thus, it comes back to elaborating what's historically given. Or is there still another way in which it is possible to justify a purely theoretical system of the sciences?

In fact, such a system is possible if _more_ isn't demanded of it than it is capable of. It ought only render an outline, as it were, for possibly the main kinds of sciences and for their manner of relation -- a framework in which new developments can be included. There has not always been a clear awareness of a "system of the sciences", so conceived; hence, there have been and still are a great divergency of viewpoints that are met in the process of coming to the notion of this kind of a system. It has largely been the case that purely theoretical considerations have been combined with a practical orientation to the existing sciences. This explains the variety of systems of science found in the history of thought.

It lies outside of the purview of our investigation to unravel the problem of the theory and systematics of the sciences in its complete depth and expanse. Neither does a complete account of the various solutions that have been attempted and their more or less sharp divergencies belong here. We want to mention only the most salient points here, those which serve as guidelines for the

various efforts made at a system of the sciences.

The sciences have been classified in view of epistemological psychology, for instance, as does Francis Bacon in respect to the faculties of the mind. The purpose of each science is possibly a basis on which to attempt a classification (theoretical and practical sciences). Then too, the method predominantly employed by a science can serve to designate it. This is possible in two ways: first, on the basis of the procedures used to arrive at knowledge (methodology of research: explanatory and descriptive sciences); second, on the basis of the difference in composition which is presented by the knowledge that has been gained in a science (methodology of presentation: generalizing and individualizing sciences). Finally, the proper object and the real form of each science can be considered as a basis for any systematics of the sciences (ideal and real sciences). This last way of classifying the sciences -- as any such attempt of this type -- will not be too well founded unless the logic in the composition of the presentation is thoroughly considered and included in it -- or at least the methodology of research is. Which of the various classificatory possibilities enters into the scope of our task?

The principles for selection from among the various classifications arises on the basis of the ability of the classification to lay a foundation for understanding our project. We want to know

what Scotus thinks is covered in the <u>Grammar</u> (as a theory of meaning). The singularity of its domain of objects is to be recognized. Thus, we are led back to something even more primordial, to the <u>domains of objects;</u> and in this there is indicated the proper direction, the sole one in which our task can be accomplished.

Individual sciences treat of various domains of objects or of one and the same object under different aspects -- "from another side". We think the individual domains of objects show evidence of belonging to determinate domains of reality. Proper to them, each in its own way, there is a determinate composition and construction. Thus, we see ourselves before a task on which the name of "theory of the categories" is commonly put. But it is none of our concern here to demonstrate to the full how Duns Scotus disposes of the number and arrangement of the <u>Aristotelian</u> categories, traditional to the Middle Ages. If we can show what is characteristic of the actual scope of the categories and make those distinctions that are prior to these domains, we have made further progress. This is to be understood in the sense that the Aristotelian categories seem to be only a <u>determinate class in a determinate domain</u> and not <u>directly</u> the categories. This touches on the drift of the concern of our whole research; in case that there are diverse domains of reality, these are to be clearly recognized in their particularity and accordingly contrasted with

each other.

It may seem completely one-sided merely to set the categorical characteristic in relief -- and in fact, it is. But it surely shouldn't be just dismissed as unfounded. This should only be done if the phenomena to be investigated were altered by this kind of consideration, if their nature were falsified, and therefore, if something were put into Duns Scotus different from what is actually found in him. Certainly, our investigation of a specific level of the categorial should make this side of Scotistic philosophy more explicit and distinct than perhaps it was for Duns Scotus himself. That doesn't change the fact that everything that will be presented belongs to the realm of thought of the philosopher and this alone is what matters. Since Duns Scotus was not completely aware of the signficance and novelty of the categorial in their domains when he expressly dealt with them, it must be realized too that he didn't produce a solution for these problems in systematic order and completeness. Thus, it lies within our designated province not to bring it systematically to completion nor to fill in omissions, but rather to bring together what we find scattered in his writings in order to form a surveyable whole.

Thus, this study of Duns Scotus' theory of meaning has a very definite viewpoint in mind. This study will lead us at least to the point of enabling us to see the diverse domains and their

distinctness, as well as the totality of what can be thought in its

clarity. This will then put us in a position later to assign a

proper place to the domain of meanings.

The use of the term, the logical position of a phenomenon,

is really more than just an expression favored by logicians. At

the bottom of it lies a definite conviction -- we aren't going into

it here -- of the immanent composition, fundamental to the essence

of the logical, from which follows that every phenomenon that be-

longs at all to the range of the intelligible requires a definite

place according to its content. Every place is grounded on a spatial

determination. This determination is an ordering and is itself

only possible on the ground of a system of references. In the

logical sense the "place" is based on order. Whatever has a

logical place fits in a determinate fashion within a certain referential

whole.

Not only is scholastic thought revealed from a new side;

rather -- and this is the main point -- we gain the proper sub-

structure for the understanding of the theory of meaning. The fact

that the theory of the categories is set before the theory of mean-

ings as a basis for understanding it, doesn't imply anything as to

the logical relation of the two domains. It will only be possible to

answer this question when both phenomena are themselves sufficiently

understood. Then it should be easy to decide about their prece-

dence.

Until now we have known nothing about the existence of multiple, distinct domains of reality. If they were discussed, what was said has to be taken as conjectural. How do we arrive at any certainty on this question, and what is this certainty like? That there is a domain of reality, still more, that there are diverse domains of reality, cannot be deductively demonstrated a priori. Matter-of-factness can only be demonstrated. What is the sense of the demonstration? What is demonstrated stands as itself before us. Figuratively speaking, it is immediately grasped; no detour through something else is necessary; one factor of the demonstrable fixes the gaze. In the practice of cognition, we only have to gaze and to comprehend what is comprehensible, and to exhaust the pure itself of what is presented. There can be no doubt, no probabilities, no illusions about what is immediate. For immediacy does not, as it were, allow of anything between itself and its apprehension (simplex apprehensio).

Only by means of demonstration can knowledge be gained of the domains of reality. Therefore, the number of domains or the completeness of what has been demonstrated cannot be decided beforehand. Hence, it is indifferent in principle which area is the first to be characterized in a demonstration. In practice, however, the tendency is to seize upon the data which are already most

familiar. The most familiar is empirical reality, in which we move every day, which abides in time and space -- the _physical reality of nature._ True, there is the view that strictly speaking it is the _psychic_ that is immediately given. Apart from the fact that most people usually don't know the psychic initially as a proper world at all, or come to know this only after lengthy reflection, this viewpoint is too heavily laden with presuppositions which really can't be easily cleared up. For example, to the extent that it is said that the psychic is the closest to the perceiving (logical) subject, it _is_ indeed the subject itself. This may be true in a _certain_ sense. But _methodologically,_ the sensible world is the first and immediately given -- the world-about-us (_Umwelt_).

Yet we do not want to take our starting point from it. When we said before that nothing definite can be said about the domains of reality, their nature and number, by means of an a priori, deductive procedure, nonetheless general considerations can be used as a start. There is even a certain necessity for this if it is desired to account for procedures.

Chapter One

The Unum, Mathematical, Natural, and Metaphysical Reality

Every domain of objects is a domain of objects. Even if we know nothing at all more exact about the domains of reality here in question, a something is thrown in our way, an object. Each and everything is already an object because we are talking about them as problematic in every respect. Primum objectum est ens ut commune omnibus. This ens is given in every object of knowledge to the extent that precisely the object of knowledge is an object. Just as the objects of the sense of sight, be this object black or white, are objects of color, so is every object in general, no matter what content it may present, an ens.

We find a remark of Duns Scotus that sounds almost modern. We often have the experience that we have something objective in our way without knowing if it's substance or accident. In other words, the objective has no more proximate categorial determination. When we have something objective in our minds, there can be doubt of the category which it belongs to, of whether it exists in itself or in another. Its type of reality is not yet determined at all and yet, something is given. Aliquid indifferens concipimus: we grasp onto something which lies prior to every categorial formation. Thus ens means the total sense of the objective sphere in general, the permanent moment in the objective, the category of

categories.[1] <u>Ens</u> perdures in every <u>object</u> -- no matter what it, in being constantly differentiated, retains as its fullness in content (<u>salvatur</u>).

<u>Ens</u> belongs to the <u>maxime scibilia</u>. This can have two meanings. A <u>maxime scibile</u> is what is primordially know. This is not to be understood so much in a temporal-genetic sense as in a <u>logical</u> sense. <u>Maxime</u> here contains a logical-theoretical idea of <u>value</u> and is characteristic of the primal element of the objective, namely, <u>objectiveness</u>. Conceived of as the <u>maxime scibile</u> in the sense given, <u>ens</u> has the exact meaning of the <u>condition for the possibility of knowing objects in general.</u>

<u>Maxime scibile</u> can also mean that which can be cognized with the greatest certainty. This meaning -- significant as it is for the psychology of knowledge, that is, in relation to subjectivity -- does not interest us here. The first, objectively categorical meaning of the <u>maxime scibile</u> shows that <u>ens</u> presents something <u>ultimate</u> and <u>supreme</u>, beyond which there can be no further question.[2]

This is also the <u>genuinely philosophical meaning of objective determinations.</u> The scholastics know this under the name of the transcendentals. A transcendental is that which has no genus beyond it in which it inheres. Nothing more can be predicated of it.

This <u>ultimateness</u> of <u>ens</u> as objectiveness in general is what a transcendental essentially is. It is only accidental to <u>ens</u> that it pertains to many individual objects and is predicated through them. These individual objects are not also transcendentals because the concept of <u>ens</u> is given with them. <u>Only that which is convertible with ens may be reckoned with the transcendentals in the strict sense.</u> In this way <u>convertibility</u> can be regarded as the criterion for deciding what besides <u>ens</u> can be considered as belonging to the transcendentals.[3] Among the elements that constitute the object, convertibility circumscribes that ultimate domain standing supreme in the <u>logical</u> order.

The other transcendentals such as <u>unum</u>, <u>verum</u>, <u>bonum</u>, etc., seem to function as quasi-properties of <u>ens</u>. Hence, they are not primordial in the same sense that is <u>ens</u> as objectiveness in general. There is no established order of rank among them so that one is more primordial than the other respecting its character as constitutive of the object. No one of the transcendentals can be explicated (<u>manifestari</u> not <u>demonstrari</u>) without a circular argument. As often and as long as it is attempted to discover something about these ultimate factors as something ultimate, that is, they are thought as objects, all of the constitutive elements are given with them as with any other object.

The transcendentals as such cannot be the object of a parti-
cular science. This impedes their essence. For they are to be
encountered in any science whatsoever that has to deal with
objects. If it were desired to attempt to research the manifold,
singular objects up to the point of their ultimate theoretical
structural elements, frequent and useless repetitions of the
transcendentals would have to be made.[4]

There is nothing apparently that can be done with ens as
"anything at all". Everything stops at this as at the ultimate.
Or have we still not exhausted the significant content of ens?
But beyond the object as such there cannot be anything objective
that could be predicated of it in general. General loses all mean-
ing here. Nonetheless, more can be predicated of ens, provided
that predication isn't incorrectly and narrowly restricted merely
to subsumption. Yet through further predications we arrive at
the circular argument that we have already mentioned. This
doesn't really matter, since this unavoidable "misfortune"
(Hegel) isn't our fault but that of the object in general and as such.
Accordingly, we have to accept this as an absolute fact. It should
be observed then that in the following predications we will move in
this circle. But every time we will come to a standstill at dif-
ferent points of the circumference.

We say something is a something and apparently we haven't gotten beyond the object by this common triviality. Yet there is in this sentence a productive moment, that of _relation_. The object is related to itself. To what extent is something a something? Because it isn't another. It is a something and in its being something it is not-other-being. Hegel states: "Something is what it is only in its bounds."[5] Duns Scotus was acutely aware of this relation in the object in general: _Idem et diversum sunt contraria immediata circa ens et convertibilia._[6] The one and the other are both given with the object. Not the one or even the one in antithesis to two, but the one and the other; _heterothesis_ is the true origin of thought as mastering of the object.

Just recently a modern thinker has very accurately re-iterated these primative and seemingly vacuous considerations in an investigation of great depth and subtlety, having its origins in transcendental philosophy.[7] It indicates the fundamental distinction between the one and one (number). In other words, it demonstrates that number isn't a purely logical construction that still remains not given with the object in general. Further on it will be pointed out how much Duns Scotus -- who, by the way, had pursued mathematical studies "with a passion"[8] -- was concerned with the distinctions in the concept of the _unum_ -- a distinction which

isn't strange to most of scholasticism. Otherwise, Rickert could not have placed a proposition from out of Meister Eckhart on the front of his significant investigation!

Idem et diversum sunt contraria, quia idem est quoddam unum et diversum quoddam multum.[9] The quoddam is noteworthy. It is all too tempting to think of unum as something countable. This Duns Scotus wants to avert in advance with the quoddam. He was quite well aware of the difficulties in the problems which are essentially tied to the concept of the object. Nonetheless, he would not expostulate expressly on them. He seldom did this sort of thing.[10]

Before a stronger bead can be drawn on heterothesis, the idem et diversum, an objection should be averted. It could be supposed that in a philosophy orientated toward the substantial and thingness as scholasticism appears to be at first sight, idem et diversum is valid for real things only, that is, the idem et diversum would have only a very limited area of application and they cannot be related to ens commune as the primal category of objectiveness. Indeed, Duns Scotus concedes that idem et diversum is predicated most generally of substances (real things), which means that they represent the most proximate area of application. This concession pertains more to its frequency of application in a definite objective

area, <u>not</u> to the range of the "area of governance" for which the distinction is valid. It is also valid for qualities, quantities, relations, even for negations and privations; in other words, for anything at all which is known as a something.[11] However, Duns Scotus does remark in one place that the term <u>res</u> must not be kept reserved for natural reality, that it rather means everything which is not <u>nothing</u> at all. Nothing is what includes a contradiction, for example, a square circle. So anything which doesn't contain a contradiction is a <u>res</u>, whether an <u>ens reale</u> or <u>ens rationis</u>.[12]

Whatever is said concerning <u>idem et diversum</u> from this point on, refers to its primordial objective character.

In heterothesis there are three moments: the relation and the terms of relation (the related). Relation is between the related and these related <u>establish</u> the relation. Relation and the related are, from a certain standpoint, correlative. The one and the other are the related. "Between" them there perdures a relation. What kind of relation is this?

We get the surest information about that if we proceed from the related that establish the relation, that is to say, we start from the one. The <u>unum</u> is equivocally predicated. It can mean <u>unum,</u> <u>convertible</u> with <u>ens,</u> or <u>unum the</u> <u>principle of number.</u>

On the one hand, _unum_ means that _through_ which every object is an object; on the other, _unum_ can be taken _as_ _number_.[13] _Multitudo_ has a corresponding validity. Not every "multiplicity", better manifoldness or plurality, directly establishes number. Manifoldness has in itself a broader domain of validity than number, just as does the _unum_ as transcendent. Plurality needs _generally_ _distinct_ objects only; and as a concept, it doesn't contain _anything_ _quantitative_ yet.[14.] What is here said in a precursory manner about _unum_ and _multum_ as transcendentals, will first be set in full light when it is compared to the quantitative, to the domain of number.

Unum as convertible with objectiveness in general is due to every object. Everything that is _is_ (object), as long as it is _one_ of them.[15] How is the being of the object and the being of the one to be thought then, and how are _ens_ and _unum_ related to each other? Certainly, _unum_ as convertible is nothing quantitative. It is indisputable that _unum_ means something different from _ens_. Do we not then have with every object -- which itself is necessarily _one_ object -- _two_ other objects?

Duns Scotus states that _unum_ (_ens_) doesn't add a new object anymore to _ens_ in the way that somehow being white adds to the substance. Every object is _one_ object in itself and by itself.

Unum is immediately given, rather, with whatness as its form (determination). Convertibility doesn't infer an absolute difference of two objects, but merely a different aspect and determination by which its content can be regarded. If an object were one object only through addition again of a new object, the next question in line is to how the new object is one; and so, there would occur a processus ad infinitum toward the primal object of thought. Whatever is designated as an object, at the same time signifies one object -- the what is one something. However, unum isn't what is meant first. Rather it is in itself a privation just to the extent that an object is not the other. Thus, it does not add to the concept of the object any positive factor of content. The convertibility of unum with ens cannot then relate to the object's essential content. Were this the case, a "multiplicity" for instance couldn't be one object just to the extent that plurality as plurality is precisely not a one-ness. If each plurality, nevertheless, is one plurality, it evidently indicates that the what of the object doesn't touch on unum but is necessarily conjoined to it as an essentially fundamental determination. Every what exists in the form of the unum. It perdures in all objects, no matter how diverse their content, as the one identical determination.[16]

The determining character of the unum transcendens is

also brought out in the way that Duns Scotus contrasts it to <u>unum</u> as number. <u>Unum</u> <u>transcendens</u> is something <u>about</u> the object, something <u>through</u> <u>which</u> an object becomes an object -- a moment which is the condition of objectiveness in general. But <u>unum</u> as number is <u>itself</u> <u>object,</u> and it is a wholly specific case of objectiveness.[17]

How is <u>unum</u> <u>transcendens</u> to be conceived of as determination with more exactness?

The concept of form plays just as decisive a role in Aristotelian philosophy as it does in Transcendental philosophy. It is indispensable to scientific thought, above all to philosophy. Of course this does not imply that this concept is clear and univocal in each and every case. Since the concept of form will have bearing on the rest of our investigation, and since it will be particularly crucial in the consideration of the theory of meaning, we should make some general, introductory remarks about it here where it expressly comes up for the first time.

In Aristotelian philosophy form has prime metaphysical import as the constitutive principle of physical, psychic and metaphysical realities. But the role it plays in the domain of logic is by no means a subordinate one. It was really Kant who rendered the concept of form a decisive predominance in the logical domain,

and since then it has become the indispensable _instrumentum_

logicum. This sense of the concept must be subject to precursory

consideration here.

Everything that stands "over against" the ego in experience

is in some way _comprehended._ The "over against" itself is al-

ready a definite _regard_ (_respectus_) which the ego deals with the

object in. Of course, the far and near in space isn't what is thought

here. The "over against" is an expression borrowed from natural

reality, used for the designation of the suprasensory relationship

of _consciousness._ In its nature, conscious-being is a singular

relation. Just as everything in natural reality which stands over

against me is something else as soon as I change my place --

despite the fact that in this "over against" there is retained an

identical moment, namely, the pure _over-against_ -- thus it is

in experience, in being-conscious. This relation of the ego to the

non-ego perdures as the primal relation: when I change the "place"

as it were, I stand over against the other objects I am grasping.

Already in that a something (_ens_) known to me at all is

given, in that I make something into an object of my consciousness,

the concept of determination has come into play. It is already

clear what an object is, if only as if in the dawn in which merely

something of the objectiveness in general of it can be made out.

If there isn't this first moment of clearness, I would not even be in some sort of absolute darkness; for this would still imply that I can again be enlightened. Rather it should be stated: I have no object at all; I live blindly in absolute darkness; I cannot get myself mentally, intellectually in motion; thinking stands still. Through _ens_ I gain the first determinateness; and to the extent that each _ens_ is _unum_, I gain the <u>first</u> <u>order</u> in the manifold fullness of the objective. <u>Thus</u> <u>determination</u> <u>has</u> <u>something</u> <u>to</u> <u>do</u> <u>with</u> <u>the</u> <u>order</u> <u>in</u> <u>the</u> <u>given</u>. <u>It</u> <u>makes</u> <u>it</u> <u>conceivable</u>, <u>knowable</u>, <u>comprehensible</u>.

Although _unum_ adds nothing new to the object, it brings more clarity to the object, organizes it in its way. The determinateness of _unum_ is not co-original with _ens_. Rather its determinateness is erected on _ens_. "Object" means something positive, absolute. _Unum_ is no longer primordial: it already presupposes _ens_. _Unum_ organizes the object in a certain kind of having of itself (_quendam modum se habendi_). Because of _unum_, _ens_ has a certain regard in which the object is dealt with. This "regard" is not positive but negative; or, more precisely, _privative._ _Unum_ as privative determination doesn't somehow exclude the positive, or else _unum_ could not be said of God, the absolute.

We know that juxtaposed to _unum_ is _multitudo_, multiplicity.

To what extent is _multitudo_ a privation and hence _unum_ the _privation of a privation?_ [18]

Duns Scotus proceeds from general considerations in explaining this peculiar relation. Later these will occupy us at greater length in dealing with the theory of meaning. It often happens that something that is predicated positively of objects is a privative affair complex. Thus "corporeal" is a privative affair complex whereas "incorporeal" (mental) is something positive. [19] But since material reality lies immediately near us and is more familiar than the incorporeal, and also since positive meanings are given prior to privative meanings, we mostly lend positive meaning to that which is known proximately and privative meaning to that which is less known. Such is our conception of the reality of creation. It has a positive meaning because it lies immediately near, even though it is finite and limited and is not a positive state of affairs next to divine being, whose positive content, however, has the _privative_ meanings: _unending, limitless._ The privative form of meaning expresses a positive state of affairs.

The concept of _unum_ is gained from the form, which holds together the parts of an object (principle of organization). From one viewpoint _unum_ is undivided and simple; on the other hand _multum_ is divided and multiform.

The manifoldness arises, therefore, out of the distinction of one-ness and consequently, expresses the privation of unity. Although multum is grasped as having positive meaning (as divisum), according to its content it is privative. Conversely, unum is expressed by a privative meaning and imports in content a position, something positive which excludes that privation which lies in multitudo. Relative to its content, unum designates something positive; in view of the mode of meaning in which it is signified (modus significandi), it means a privation. Unum is a privation of the privation that is in the multum -- this, for its part, is the privation of unum. So it happens that unum is defined by multum and conversely. Hence, it is evident how unum is joined to the object: Unum bestows a determination on the object through the privative mode of meaning. An object is one object and not any other object.[20]

A sufficient foundation has now been laid for a decision on the question before about the manner of relation of idem and diversum. It might seem as if unum and multum were not in need of this extensive treatment. Idem and diversum are plainly different. Between them exists a directly irreducible relationship of diversity, which finds its simplest expression in the "not". It is by this alone that unum, a something, is negated, that the

other is had not to be conjured up.

> Negation only turns some thing into a non-something
> or into nothing. It makes the object in general
> disappear, in a manner of speaking, and in like
> manner otherness or diversity can never spring
> forth from non-identity. [21]

Thus it has become quite evident that the nature of the

present antithesis between _idem_ and _diversum_ isn't clear straight

away. Hence the individual antithetical types have to be investi-

gated, and then it has to be decided what application can be found

for the case in point. It has already been indicated that pure

negation isn't sufficient as the main feature of the relation in

question. What is antithetically made a term of a relation for the

object by use of _not,_ surely makes a contrary; but it doesn't posit

anything (_nihil ponit_), that is, create _another_ object nor require

any subject as privation does. For it can be.said that "nothing"

doesn't see just as a stone doesn't see. [22] Duns Scotus expresses

the peculiarity of this antithesis, of the contradictory, in the fol-

lowing pithy fashion: _Contradictio salvatur in ente et non ente._ This

contrariety continues to obtain in the real of being and non-being. [23]

True, being and non-being are antithetical; but they are not

different. Difference is found only in the realm of being, for dif-

ference is not merely negation (separation) but at the same time

a conjunction. Only where there is a point of view, a higher

unity against which that can be measured which is to be distin-

guished, is something like difference possible. Negation as it

shows up in contradiction belongs to "subjective logic". "Non-

human" might be said even of an ass, that is, of an existing

object; but negation conceived of to the degree of pure negation

is only a being in understanding, that is, a cognitive position of

the subject. Negation has no objective relevance to contradiction.

Non-white, in being juxtaposed to white, is not black; but its

meaning encompasses every being and non-being from which

white is excepted.[24]

However, the one and the other are transcendentals, pri-

mordial determinations of the object and as such they are conver-

tible with the object. Both pertain to what is objective. Conse-

quently, the contradictory does not apply to them.[25]

What about privation? Privation pertains only to the realm

of being, and thus it has a narrower domain of validity than con-

tradiction. Yet privation seems to be the pertinent expression

for the relation between unum and multum, for both the former

and the latter are in the domain of ens. This relation has even

more bearing here if we keep in mind the characteristics of unum

and multum that have been given: these determine the one as the

privation of a privation (that is, of the manifold). Privation too

has to be disposed of as an impertinent relation. Surely it exists in the domain of being, but it doesn't posit an object. What has been stated about contradiction also holds for privation, for it is a definite kind of contradiction to the extent that pure negation is involved in it -- although with the determinate relation to an exactly delineated object of negation, habitus. However, privation is different from contradiction in that it doesn't allow of the disappearance of the object into nothingness, but it needs an object which is had to bear the determination which is disposed of by privation (subjectum habitus). Hence, neither nothing because it is not an object nor a stone because it is without the quality of sight but only a living being which has the capacity of seeing can be called blind.[26]

Since contradiction lets one term of the relation slip into nothing, and since privation doesn't posit an object as a term of relation even though it stays in reach of being, they both are unsuited for the true relations which are called for by the terms unum and multum. Taken by itself, unum as well as multum is absolute.[27]

The sole relation which characterizes the nature of both terms of the relation is contrariety. For it is proper to the terms of the relation here that each of them posits another object with different content.[28]

It is superfluous to go further into the theory of contrariness here, especially into the relations of the three types of antithesis and their logical order. That doesn't mean that the theory of contrariety isn't basically significant for every philosophy. Even value philosophy, a contemporary direction of thought which has attained a deserved recognition and prevalence, is occupied with decisive aspects of the concept of contrariety.

What has the weight of relevancy in our present investigation is the insight that unum as transcendental, as primal determination of the object, co-originally requires multum. Consequently, heterothesis is the true origin of the thought of the object.

> The logical beginning, the one and the many ...
> must already be since there isn't any object if
> there isn't the one and the other, and the sub-
> ject can't at all start to think logically if it
> doesn't already think 'immediately' the one
> and the many in the first step. [29]

It has been said that unum is an equivocal expression meaning both unum transcendens, the determinateness of the object convertible with ens, and unum as the principle of number. In all that has been said about unum transcendens so far, nothing has been said about number. From this it can be concluded that unum as the principle of number must involve something else. In other words, number is not a datum co-primordial with the

object in general, present in the very origins. The other signi-
fies merely a multipleness, thus not "both: the second accord-
ing to quantity, the distinct according to quality."[30]

Number is a logical construction posterior to the object in
general. In order to bring out the distinction between unum
transcendens and unum as number -- or in present usage,
between one and the one -- and also to delineate more closely
the uniqueness of the one, unum as the principle of number ought
now be subjected to a look. The congruity of the relations which
hold sway in the "origins" of the logical domain doesn't so much
allow characterization by positively delineating contours as it does
by comparing the phenomena involved.

Unum as principium numeri is not restricted just to pure
number, to the mathematical in Duns Scotus' meaning. The term
unum is to be taken even here in the wider sense of including the
perception of counted objects. And this again is the case in several
ways. Hence unum as principium numeri will serve as heading
for diverse investigations as accords with the divergencies in
meaning of the expression numerus.

That pure number logically precedes counted objects is
beyond dispute. For this reason, we will deal with pure number
first in our treatment of counted objects and their related

problems; it should be shown at the very beginning that nothing

that is able to be numbered is a coordinate datum of the _unum_

transcendens. Also consideration of pure number and of the ob-

jective application of numeration should advance the general

direction of our investigation aiming at a division of the domains

of reality. Offhand, it may seem a considerably more consistent

and appropriate procedure -- at this point where the treatment

of the first transcendental has been completed -- to take up

those that come next, _verum_ and _bonum,_ and thus to pass on to

a special characterization of these singular domains of the real.

However, the arrangement chosen here affords a clearer and more

certain support of the conceptual ties between the individual trans-

cendentals and their different domains of reality: this arrange-

ment will prove itself in dealing with the _unum_ as well as later

with the _verum._ The possible lack of a logically ordered over-

view -- something not to be gainsaid -- will be dispensed with by

an adequate summary at the end of this section.

Unum and multum are in no way numerical. It is possible

to hold and even demonstrate the opposite: that number is contained

in them. The one is one and the other is one. One and one equal

two. Taking this two now as one and adding a further other to it,

I get three. In this fashion it is possible to progress at will in a

number series.

Still, this view puts something into the concept of the one and the other which isn't actually met there. When I say the "one and the other", I am not yet counting, not determining any how much. It is only in the _so much_ that number has its first basis. Duns Scotus says it in this way: The _ratio mensurae_, the concept of measure, must be added to _unum transcendens_ and _multum transcendens._[31] _Multum_ in the domain of number is not simply the other, the multiple. It is more than this. It is even more than set. It could be said too much has been put into the primordial determinations of the object with the above deduction of numbers from the one and the other; and we want to stress with the one and the other and still others that a manifoldness and plurality is posited, a quantity from which could be gained even the simple quantity, one.

But this attempt must fail. Certainly, a multiplicity is given with _unum_ and _multum._ However, Duns Scotus makes the emphatic statement: _Non omnis multitudo causat numerum simpliciter._ The one as primal determination of the object stands beyond limitation and limitlessness. The thought of measurement and of quantitative determination can't even come up here.[32]

Pure number still isn't arrived at in the concept of mani-

foldness. It is precisely essential for a set not to have a deter-
mination, and what characterizes it more is that it is not an
ordering of the objects that make it up. It is only a heap, as
it were, an arbitrary all in all. Duns Scotus states that pure
number isn't a unity or a determinateness like the gathering of a
rock pile. [33] For this reason, set is still outside the domain of
mathematics. The fact that there are mathematical disciplines
today -- indeed some of them fundamental -- that expressly
deal with the multiple and set, more exactly with "powers", in
contradiction to what has been stated. For if calculations are
made with a set and even with "infinite" ones and it is demon-
strated, for example, that the sum of rational numbers is not
the same power as the sum of real numbers, then there has been
an interpolation of determinations of quantitative kind in the con-
cepts of set and classes in order to render such calculations pos-
sible. On this fact rests, for example, justified objections to the
deduction of the cardinal numbers from an apparently simpler con-
cept of classes. It isn't possible to give further concern here to
the doctrine of manifolds which is not only interesting from a
philosophical viewpoint, but also highly significant. We must
secure in every respect the proposition of the manifold given with
the idem et diversum not yet being of a mathematical character.

Just as the one is not yet one, so manifoldness isn't a

so much, a number. Manifoldness only requires distinct objects

in general. But numbers are distinct in a very definite respect

and not only in this. For this distinction is one proper to a

number only.[34] For numbers to be able to be distinct in a very

definite respect, they must likewise stand in a definite "medium",

they need a vital force which gives them stability and keeps them

that way.

It has already been said every number involves a so much;

further, the viewpoint of measure must be joined with the unum

transcendens so that one comes from the one. This can now be

expressed broadly: The medium for the numerical is quantity.[35]

Duns Scotus calls quantity, the "governess", the one who rules

measure.[36] The mathematician is only able to move in the medium

of quantity. It is the necessary means for all of his objects. It

is the condition of the possibility of mathematics. In itself, how-

ever, it is not the object of mathematics.

Quantity belongs among the ten categories which have

import for the reality of nature. More precisely, it is an accident,

a property. Nonetheless, mathematics is not natural science, nor

does it concern itself with the accidental as the independent realm

of numbers shows.

Quantity is not the object of mathematics after the manner that it can be said of it that it inheres in substance, _sed quasi medium supponitur_. Mathematics doesn't deal with substances just as it doesn't with natural reality in general. In mathematics quantity has a completely different meaning and function than in natural reality. [37]

According to Duns Scotus the mathematician doesn't at all use the concept of the accident. Mathematical demonstration of its objects is usually carried on "as if" they exist in themselves. [38]

A science is not mathematical just because it demonstrates its objects _abstractly_ and _extrasensorily_, for this is also the case in the demonstration of the objects of logic. A science is mathematical if it regards its objects from the viewpoint of _measure_ or of _quantity_. Also this concept of the quantitative is seen to be independent of the concept of motion. Hence, the extrasensory realm of the mathematical is not intertwined with natural reality. Mathematical judgments have validity whether or not there is motion: they are not dependent on the actuality of natural reality.

The extrasensory character of mathematics is also manifest in the fact that the mathematician is not concerned in the least to find a sum of counted objects in natural reality which corresponds with the pure numbers that he may deal with. Hence, it is a matter

of indifference to him if the radii are properly drawn or not in
dealing with the theory of the circle. What is decisive is that ideally ·
the points of the circumference of a circle are equidistant from the
center.[39] A clearer expression of the non-empirical nature of
the non-sensory objects of mathematics would be hard to find.

Thus it has been shown that pure number is a construct
which arises on a very determinate basis. Quantity is the consti-
tutive category of the realm of numbers. It circumscribes a deter-
minate objective area which has been seen to be of a non-sensory
nature according to its actual form. Unum as pure number no
longer dominates the broad, all-incompassing scope that does
unum transcendens as the determination of the object in general.

What has been expressly designated as the property of the
realm of number might be already sufficient to keep the one from
being identified with one. Nonetheless, that which we have presented
as characteristic of the realm of number isn't complete. Indeed it
is exactly that which gives number its genuine definite nature
which is still obscure.

Unum as number is supposed to be principium numerorum.
Thus, there are many numbers and also an origin, a "principle".
The manifoldness of the "one and the other" is normless, as it
were. There are countless many others besides the one. What

exactly is the one's other is not already prescribed in it. Each

other can become the other of the one.

I would like to explain the situation with a figure, really

with just one figure: the one is any point in a field. I can proceed

at will from here in many directions to some other. This is not

the case in the area of number. Here we come up against a se-

quence that has a direction which is completely determined, univocal,

and singular. Here again if the point means one, so there is a two,

a three, etc. -- a completely determined "path" fixed by the

determinateness of these numbers. It is now possible to explain

this unique form by which every number is exactly determined and

every number is distinct from another number in a completely

determinate manner. We will see how the essential moments of

the mathematical realm that we have just pointed out and how quantity

as the "medium" and how the non-sensory character come to hold

sway and prove the conditions which make possible the determination

which is proper to numbers.

Duns Scotus establishes the eristics for the determinant

form at a point where there is an immediately clear manifestation

of the problem and where the problem can accordingly be put easily.

This point cannot be in the abstract realm of pure number but in

the realm of "pure numbers", that is, of counted objects. Here

it can be easily asked how it happens that <u>ten</u> objects, not being

<u>one</u> but <u>many</u>, nonetheless yield <u>one</u> exactly determined number.

What is the moment which confers <u>thisness</u>, <u>oneness</u>, <u>determinate-</u>

<u>ness</u> on what is undeniably a given plurality? Duns Scotus himself

acknowledges that investigation on this point isn't easy, and the

opinions respecting the nature of this moment are divergent. [40]

We will closely follow the philosopher's own ideas in this matter as

he starts out by critically discussing three divergent theories in

preface to his own view that indicates that the problem <u>can</u> <u>only</u> <u>be</u>

<u>brought</u> <u>to</u> <u>a</u> <u>solution</u> <u>in</u> <u>the</u> <u>realm</u> <u>of</u> <u>pure</u> <u>number.</u> For number

doesn't first come into being through counting. It's the converse.

It is more the case that counting is first possible on the basis of

pure number.

Thomas Aquinas championed the view that a number has its

determination and its haeceity from its <u>last</u> <u>unit</u> in the sense that

this unit doesn't absolutely make determinations <u>as</u> <u>unit</u>, but it

does so on the basis of its determinate <u>interval</u> from the first of the

units out of which number is compounded. According to this dis-

tance and so the specified last unit of the respective number from

its first, there arises the determinateness of a number. These

various distances characterize numbers as different in determina-

tion from one another.

The function conferring the form and determination can affect this unit which is last at any given time either to the extent that it is this unit or insofar as it has a determinate distance from the first. Duns Scotus sharply rejects both possibilities.

Whatever claims to function as the form of an object has to permeate the material of the whole object, stamp its determination on the matter as a whole, as the soul as the essential form of man determines and vivifies all parts of the body. But the last unit of a number doesn't extend its determinateness as this unit to the preceding units of the number. It lets them untouched as it were. It has no function whatsoever in their determination.

Moreover, the last unit of a number itself belongs to the units which make up the matter awaiting determination. Other- wise if the last unit weren't the matter but the form of number, four, for example, would become three. Hence the last unit as such, being itself inherent in matter, has no precedence over the others such that the last unit would show up as the form in determin- ing the whole of the preceding units.

Nor is the function of informing proper to the last unit of a number from the other alternative, from its distance from the first unit. The interval from one unit to the other -- it should not be thought of as spatial or temporal -- is a relation in every case.

If such were the basis for the determination of a number, it couldn't possibly be a determined quantum, but only a relation, a reference.

Furthermore, how can this distance, once it is assumed that it is the form of number, fulfill the nature of its form and, at the same time, extend over all other units as a relation when this distance pertains to the first and the last terms only and to no term between them? To the extent that this distance gives a certain precedence to the last member over the first, it is impossible to discern how any of the units that make up the number concerned could be in the first or the last or in any one position. If the last unit were, nevertheless, the form of the whole number, then the stated equivalency of the single units would not be possible.[41]

The originator of the second theory that Duns Scotus takes note of isn't named. It is an outcrop from number being considered a discrete phenomenon rather than a continuum. Just as determinate continuity constitutes the form of unit, for example, for the line, the plane, or the body, all of them having determinate forms of continuity, thus number gets its determination and unit from certain discretions. Just as the parts of the continuum are the material for the form of continuity, so the units present the matter for the various discretenesses through which individual numbers

first come to be determinate species. Besides, such a theory of
the determination proper to a number makes it understandable why
number doesn't consist of <u>numbers</u> rather than of <u>units</u>. A de-
terminate species can't ever possibly be part of <u>another</u> determi-
nate species. In their determination numbers each have a parti-
cular <u>discreteness</u> different from other numbers and, consequently,
represent different species. In one of these species the others
cannot be part.

Criticism is made of this view using the context of a
general discussion of it. Parts which are unified in a whole and
have no greater unit determination as if they <u>didn't</u> participate in
a whole aren't parts of a whole which is, in itself, representative
of a unit. But this is the case with numerical units if discreteness
is supposed to be the form making them determinate. If it weren't
precisely that the units are unified in <u>one number,</u> then each would
be distinct and separate from the others. But this is how they
exist in the number according to this present theory. Because they
are discrete, they can be counted: they constitute number. Thus
number <u>by itself</u> isn't <u>one,</u> one unit, but it is such only through
aggregation (<u>aggregatio</u>) of units. In other words, <u>discreteness</u>
generally doesn't constitute a determinant form.

If number should receive its unit from its discreteness, its

being an actually existing part would belong to those objects which
are counted. <u>Six</u> rocks make up a different quantity (<u>Anzahl</u>) than
seven rocks. It is not only in thought that one is different from
the other. Now it is impossible that an absolute form -- as
numerical determination is -- belongs to the material without the
latter being altered. If just one rock is added to the six, then the
six rocks stop having the form of <u>six</u> and gain from the seven a
form which is surely different from the former. If then the six
actual rocks themselves aren't changed by this new absolute form,
the form of seven, as the determinate form of a number in general,
cannot be <u>an actually existing component</u> of the quantity concerned.
Discretion is thus excluded from being the form which confers unit.[42]

The third theory, that of Henry of Ghent, is of less import-
ance. Duns Scotus makes just a few specific points in clarification
of it. He states that numb ers originate from the continuum and
also have the unity of the continuum. But how would number be
distinct from the continuum then? The distinctness is imbedded in
the order of the parts which are combined inside a uniform view-
point, that is, the continuum shows no breaks. As a discrete
quantity, number does not lack breaks. Consequently, it is a
species of quantity for itself. Number is distinct from the continuum
in that it has breaks. Apart from this, number isn't <u>positively</u>

distinct from the continuum and the privative doesn't create a new species. Therefore, Duns Scotus remarks that he cannot understand how number should get its unit and determinateness from the continuum, whereas number is negatively characterized precisely by the lack of a continuum; but since numerical determination is something positive, its basis must be found elsewhere.

According to the theory under discussion, number has the same essential form as the first unit, that is, ultimately the same as the continuum from which it is cut off, as it were. Only in an accidental sense are numbers different, in that they are distinct through their different intervals from the first unit. The nature of the units that constitute numbers isn't tied to this distinction, however, since number stays unchanged if the first unit takes the place of the second and vice versa.

The fact that this doesn't establish a specific difference between numbers can be shown in the following manner. Much and little as discrete quantities have a function similar to large and small in the continuum. Large and small aren't specifically different just as many and few aren't. Just as a small magnitude steadily grows through addition without there being any specific change, so are numbers not specifically distinct if they change their distance from the first unit, that is, become larger or smaller.

The line of argument respecting large and small and many and few can be understood in two ways: either mass and plurality are properties of quantity or they signify qualities. From the first way it follows that magnitude and plurality don't specifically differ in the continuum and in the area of numbers. If, however, large is juxtaposed to small and many to few, that is, if these determinants are taken as qualities, then it is certainly correct that small and large act as determinants of the realm of discrete numbers just as small and large do for the continuum. But it doesn't follow from that that many and few are determinations of numbers of the same species, just as large and small may be determinants of magnitude with the same property. Continua vary only in regard to different aspects of divisibility. But large and small are not affected by this. However, the determinants many and few change with the type of discrete quantity in question. No matter how much a magnitude increases in the continuum, the continuum always remains the same in property. But if a unit is added to a specific number, the number is essentially changed, i.e., it becomes another. Many and few in the realm of numbers betokens just a difference in property. Hence the continuum and the realm of numbers are different in essence. Thus it has been shown that the theory in question is impossible.[43]

Up to this point we have only proceeded negatively in considering what form could come into question for conferring both determinateness and unit on number. The time has come to find a positive answer for the present question.

It must be realized first of all that a unit of _ten counted_ objects is not a _reality_ added to the objects, but an _ens rationis_, a _form_ of thought in which _consciousness_ collects the given objects. [44]

The given objects as such are in no position to constitute a numerical unit. They are this and that, that is, as objects one or the other object. Their numeracity becomes a unit only through consciousness. Number has its pure and genuine "existence" only as _non-sensible object_, and as such it is then related to the objects to be counted. Just as there are real and non-sensory relationships, so there are also real and non-sensory _quantities_. [45]

Pure number lets things -- counted as one, two, three, etc. -- out of the question. In dealing with pure numbers the sense of counting is what is in question and what makes counting possible and the _form of number itself_. Pure, mathematical number is what denumerates real objects and objects in general. Denumerable objects _are being counted_ and brought into order. But pure numbers _count themselves_. They have in themselves determinateness which comes to them from the outside. In themselves

they determine the progression from one to the other. Number as pure quantity measures itself (per aliquid sui). It has a determined position in relation to others, i. e., numbers build a series: they are subjected to laws of series which reciprocate for their totality. Numbers aren't willy-nilly thrown in a heap.[46]

Now the question can be answered finally concerning the form which confers unit and determinateness on number. Since pure number isn't a real construct inherent in corporeal or psychical actuality, but exists in the non-sensory, from such must the form which confers its unit be drawn. What specifically is the realm of actuality for mathematics? It has been said earlier that quantity is the constitutive category for the objective realm of mathematics. If it's that, then the determinant form must come to be understood through quantity. Thus it is necessary to get a closer look at the essence of quantity.

It is impossible to give a definition for it that would be technically correct, since we're dealing with an ultimate. Its essence can only be described or demonstrated (notificari). Quantum is the "how much". It can therefore be designated as "so much" or as that which is accomplished through measurement. Consequently, measurability appears to be the basic quantitative moment.

Duns Scotus shows this not to be the case. Measureability

is only a property of quantity, but it doesn't betoken its real essence. To put it more exactly, it is a property of that which is quantitative. Quantity itself is nothing quantitative. Rather quantity consists in the divisibilitas in partes eiusdem rationis. "Divisibility", determinability through "sections", the division into parts of the same identical profile is its essence. This determinability from the same viewpoint or, in modern terms, from the viewpoint of laws of series governs pure quantum: it is not quantity itself, but flows from it as it were. Quantity is so constituted that it makes determinability possible. Measurability is only a consequence of this first determinability, i. e., of the progression in the quantity from the one to the other in accordance with a definite point of view (quantitas domina mensurarum). The pure continuum which makes discreteness possible is not primarily compounded of the discrete. It precedes everything discrete as an identity which makes possible that which can be determined in accord with an identical viewpoint. It is as if it were the lawfulness of series itself. For it is nothing else but this that the divisibilitas in partes eiusdem rationis claims to connote.[47]

With this we have come to see the determinateness of number through the law of series. In that number in a series occupies (situ distinguitur) a specifically definite position (situs),

it is also sufficiently determined as this <u>one</u> identical number.
The "one" is thus of the same species as numbers measured
through it. The individual numbers are only distinguished through
their <u>position</u> in the series (<u>situ</u> <u>recte</u> <u>distinguitur</u> <u>propter</u>
<u>maiorem</u> <u>vel</u> <u>minorem</u> <u>replicationem</u> <u>talium</u> <u>unitatum</u>). Two
numbers are not distant with equal immediacy in their gradation
from one. Thus two times three isn't six, but it works out to be
<u>six</u>, <u>i.e.</u>, the result of multiplication can be set in equivalency to
<u>six</u> which as such is there only once and has its determinateness
through its position in the series.[48]

Thus Duns Scotus <u>himself</u> seems to <u>accept</u> the concept of
distance, which he had rejected as <u>insufficient</u> for determining
number in his critical appraisal of the theory of Thomas Aquinas.
This is in fact the case, as a later observation shows. It's just that
he says the concept of distance is <u>not</u> <u>the</u> <u>primary</u> <u>aspect</u> through
which numbers gain their determinateness. There can only be
talk of a distance when the object concerned already has a specific
position and this position obtains through laws of series.[49] One
and the numbers following it in the series are identical in
<u>specification.</u> An <u>uniformitas</u> governs the realm of numbers.
Numbers are not compounded from any special units or objects
of a heterogeneous type. They exist in a homogeneous "medium"

which -- as by now should have become abundantly clear -- is represented by pure quantity (*unum et numerus sunt unigenea*). Heterogeneous objects always exclude a unit and determination as is proper to pure numbers. [50]

If we now juxtapose *unum transcendens*, the one, and *unum* as *principium numeri*, one, their difference should be clear. It should likewise become clear that one cannot be directly derived from the one, that rather novel presuppositions are required for this -- new moments that are not already given with the one. It is first *quantity* and the *homogeneous medium* that make number possible and form it into a distinctly specific phenomenon. The one and the other are only generally distinct. One and two are distinct in a completely specific respect (*ratio*). This *respect* constitutes the domain of number and also sets it in determined bounds, *i. e.*, forms it into a domain of objects definitely distinct from the remaining domains. *Unum transcendens* is valid for every object whatever domain of reality it may belong to. It has validity too for numbers. One makes sense only in the domain of the quantitative.

It already has been stressed several times in the preceding discussions that we have to distinguish pure number from numbered objects. The unifying form of a definite number of objects is not a

real part of the objects themselves, not something which belongs to the same domain of reality as they themselves do. The unifying form is added to objects through <u>consciousness</u>. At the same time it has been pointed out that there can only be such a thing as the unifying and determinate form in question in the non-sensory, mathematical domain; this is on the strength of the domain's special constitution which is characterized by quantity and the homogeneous medium. Turned around, it is a fact that what is non-sensory is applied to the determination and numeration of objects which are of a sensory nature, that is, they lie outside of the domain of the mathematical. How is this possible?

With number and its unifying form as a guide, we thus gain access to the sphere of natural reality in order to study the forms encountered there and their <u>difference</u> from the form of the purely mathematical.

<u>Form</u> is a correlative term. Form is form for the material. All material is in form.[51] Moreover, the material is always in a form commensurate with it. Put in another way, form gets its meaning from the material. If we want to grasp then the unifying form in the sphere of the real world, we will look to concerning ourselves with the material itself which is to be collected in the unit; on this the decision depends as to which specific form it can be

unified in. Our interest then gravitates to the study of the categorical structure of reality, to the sensory as well as the non-sensory. Thus our proper task which is to distinguish the domains of reality advances a meaningful step by conceptualizing the unifying form as having sway in the world of the real.

The real objects of natural reality are set off from the other objective domains by a preliminary distinction in that they are characteristically _entia extra animam_. However, it is not here that it should be decided if a sufficient criterion for reality is gained from this. For it can be immediately asked if _psychic_ reality isn't just as real as physical reality. In any case the criterion _extra animam_ doesn't assert anything decisive as long as a _positive and adequate determination is not made of psychic reality itself_. There is nothing easy about that; especially today when psychology is on the way to expanding into an autonomous science. It still isn't a problem that is satisfactorily answered. If we keep in mind that a delineation of the psychic as opposed to the realm of logic has contributed something for a better understanding of the reality proper to the psychic and also that this delineation has been of much help in asking after the nature of the psychic with more precision and without a detrimental confusion of domains of reality, it will appear fit in our present case to post-

pone the question of the nature of the psychic world in dealing with logic. Therefore, I wish to deal first with physical reality taken as a domain belonging to the real world. If the word _anima_ is taken loosely in the meaning of "consciousness", then _extra animam_ alludes to reality as transcendent to consciousness and includes the psychic and the physical in itself. But more precise distinctions come to be made about these problems, we will know with sufficient exactness -- if not with sharp, conceptual precision -- what functions here as reality.

Intelligendum est ... _quod esse existere non consequitur essentiam primo, sed primo consequitur individuum. Individuum enim per se et primo existit, essentia non nisi per accidens._[52] In these sentences Duns Scotus makes a very accurate formulation touching a much disputed problem of that time -- a formulation containing a thought of wide-range import. What really exists is an individual. There is not intended in the concept of the individual an _undetermined_ object of a determined species. "Being individual" does not coincide with being-of-an-object-in-general. But that doesn't imply at all that the concept of the individual is already exhausted by _unum transcendens_ in its distinguishing one object from another. _Individuum_ implies determinateness as this unique one, that can be encountered at no other time or place. It is es-

sentially repugnant to this determinateness to be further reduced

into independent qualitative moments. The individual is an

irreducible ultimate. It intends the real object kat' exochēn

prout includit existentiam et tempus. Two apples on the same

tree don't have the same "aspect" to the sky. Each one is al-

ready different from the other in its spatial determination, even

though they may be completely the same.[53.] Everything which

really exists is a such-here-and-now.[54] The form of indivi-

duality (haeceitas) is to furnish a primal determination of the

really actual. This reality constitutes an "insurveyable multi-

plicity", an "heterogeneous continuum". This peculiar aspect of

the immediately given has been sharply emphasized at the present

time -- especially by Rickert who has made it the basis of his

fundamental methodology.[55]

The problem is then: How can there be counting with this

insurveyable manifoldness? Number is determined by its position

in the series (situs). The series only is a series in view of a law

of series. This says something about succession, distance,

mutual conditions of determination for the neighboring members of

the series. Numbers have their fixed position: they neither arise

nor pass away, they remain exempt from every alteration. Is

there something of this kind in actual reality? If I say "four

trees", is there a determinate position in a determinate series specified in this; or turned around, are "four trees" determined by a position in a series? For I can group "four trees" in many ways. How and to which of the trees at hand must I proceed in order to get to "five trees"? How can I count the trees in general if each is different from the other in its spatial determination, apart from its difference in growth, in foliage, blossoms, fruits, conditions of growth, etc. For each is another. There is no foundation at all in the particularities of the trees for a count of five. Nevertheless, they are counted.

It was pointed out earlier that the vital element of number is the "homogeneous medium". But empirical reality, to which belong the trees as individually different from one another, is anything but homogeneous. Rather absolute manifoldness is precisely what denotes it.

Consequently, if counting is possible in actual reality, that is, if number has gained any footing there and any applicability, there is no possibility of that without homogeneity. If I view this tree only in its individuality as not having been there before and never recurring, and if I view any other tree like this, then a count could never be arrived at. I could only say that the one and the other. But they could only be called "two" if the one and the

other were projected, as it were, into an homogeneous medium --

a projection in which only the general determinateness of being-

tree would be retained. This projection into an homogeneous

medium means then: Only a certain aspect of objects is looked

at and only that.

These aspects always circumscribe a specific domain of

an homogeneous species. It is what denotes them, as it were.

The heterogeneous discrete is cancelled in this aspect. It cannot

be understood a priori then, that there are such views. They can

only be gathered from empirical reality because it is distinguished

by a categorial structure which allows such. This structure de-

serves a closer characterization. If it has been said that em-

pirical reality reveals a specific categorial structure, that means

to say that it is formed, determinate, ordered. Where there is

order -- even the most simple order -- already there, there can

no longer be talk of an absolute manifold. Hence empirical reality,

conceived of as absolute manifoldness, is a conceptual limit, so much

so that every doctrine of the categories must needs deal with it.

The natural world-about-us -- and at the same time

medieval man's stable and intercalary world of the supra-sensory --

is categorially determined for him. The sensory and the supra-

sensory world with all the mutual relationships involved have an

ordered existence. The main feature of this order should be given in advance: it is thoroughly <u>permeated by analogy</u>.[56] We haven't met this concept up till now. We are only acquainted with the homogeneous continuum and the absolute manifoldness of the heterogeneous continuum. <u>Analogy presents us with a new characteristic of order</u>. An insight is given into the nature of the categorial structure of actual sensory and supra-sensory reality by exposing the constitutive elements of the concept of analogy.

To begin with, two forms of analogy have to be distinguished. A word has its meaning. Nonetheless, the latter undergoes a differentiation in meaning, which is particular to them and derivative of them in its application to various domains of reality. Thus the words <u>principium</u> and <u>causa</u> have something in common -- their original meaning -- being that they both mean something out of which another precedes or through which it perdures. This general meaning is different in significance in the domain of logic where it means <u>basis</u> and in the domain of actual reality where it means <u>cause</u>. Both are inconvertible. <u>Principle</u> is thus used analogously as <u>basis</u> and <u>cause</u>.

Furthermore, a word's meaning can have reference to an object which has a certain similarity with what is in fact inferred by the meaning.[57]

But <u>none</u> of these forms of analogy are by themselves prior to the categorial structure of actual reality.[58] <u>Analogy, which permeates the world of the real, is such per attributionem.</u> The analogates are here in a determinate relation of homogeneity. <u>Whatever exists in analogy is neither totally different nor totally the same.</u>

The constitutive elements of analogy are: a certain <u>identity</u> in meaning and yet a <u>difference</u> as to their domain of application. To the degree that identity in meaning, the uniformity of viewpoint, can be called a homogeneous factor that is found in all the analogates, there is the element of analogy which forms the basis of the order. To the degree that the <u>commune</u> in the different domains is found to be <u>different, manifoldness</u> is retained in analogy as well. Hence, if analogy permeates the fundamental structure of actual reality, the implication is this: homogeneity and heterogeneity are in some fashion <u>interwoven</u> in this domain. Despite a certain unity of viewpoint there is still the manifoldness which for its part is such that it doesn't exclude the <u>identity</u> of viewpoint. Thus there results a peculiar unity in manifoldness and a manifoldness in unity.[59]

This is the fundamental characteristic of the <u>genus metaphysicum</u> that encompasses the sensory and the supra-sensory

world. The relationship of the unity and the manifoldness is altered depending on the difference of the _attributio_. If unity and manifoldness are grasped as analogous to the domain of numbers, then the difference of the _attributio_ can be expressed in the difference of the progression of the manifoldness from the unity. Accordingly, even the manifoldness is measured against the unity in a different manner. Likely this measuring can't be purely quantitative since such a thing is only possible in the extra-sensory domain of the mathematical. We will see that measuring has the character of _value_ _judgments_ and of _value_ _determinations_. _Unity_ is the _measure_ of the manifoldness which originates from it: a difference in unity implies a difference in the _type_ of measure.

Monas potentially contains the multiple: somehow the multiple precedes from _monas._ In some way or other it is the starting point. On the one hand, it is the possible "source" of multiplicity both as to the _form_ and essentiality of the objects which make up the multiplicity. But on the other hand, it is the source for the substance and the material, that is, it is compounded of material in dealing with number.

Monas can be the source of the multiplicity of objects according to its essentiality in another twofold manner. In the first place it can be so as an active, creative principle. Of such a

kind is the _unitas Dei_. It is not through division that the plurality of creatures precedes from it. Otherwise, it would be destroyed itself as absolute unity. The "number" of created realities begins _per sui communicabilitatem_.

As for the second manner, unity can contain multiplicity in itself "passively" as it were. The _unity of the genus meta-physicum is such_. Multiplicities don't have their origin in it by a _division_ into homogeneous parts, but by _division in partes subjectives_.

As to the division of the unity of a real magnitude, an extended body, the unity itself is compounded of the _material_ (the _substance_) of the particular parts. The parts so result in this _divisio in partes integrales_ that the original unity can be re-gained through "integration". This unity is accidental to the natural objects because it rests on real quantity (extension); the unities aren't such _by themselves_, but by extension as the incidence of them. [60]

Only the two first kinds of unity, the _unitas Dei_ and the _unitas generis metaphysici_, are significant in the present investi-gation. Through them can be established analogy's classificatory nature as it is proper to the domain of actually sensory and supra-sensory reality.

There lies then in analogy, as has been said, the moment of homogeneity, the identity of view. As for the present case where we are dealing with the real world this implies that each and every thing has actual reality. In the strictest, absolute sense, only God is actual. He is the absolute that is existence existing in essence and in existence be-ing (west). Natural reality, the sensorially real, exists as created only. It does not exist as the absolute, but "has" existence through communicabilitas. Although both creator and creation are real, they are so, however, in different ways. Here we meet the heterogeneous moment in analogy. The difference lies in the degree of reality. The unum infinitum as reality centered in itself and absolute is the highest value and the incontestable measure of all reality.

Created reality is in turn radically real to the same degree. Within the bounds of the sensorially real world where the well-known ten categories of Aristotle have validity, only substance has real existence. Accidents are only real to the extent that they inhere in substance as participants in its reality. Accidents are entia per attributionem ad subjectum. Substance is a genus metaphysicum, analogous to the absolute. The same analogous relationship protrudes into the domain of accidents among which there is one which is such that it can become an accident "for

itself", quantity, whereas the others are able to inhere in sub-stance through it only. [61]

Thus order in the domain of the real is not that of gene-ralization in accord with pure genera: a generalization in which each of the "supposits" has the meaning of genus in an equivalent sense. Such is the case, for example, in the systematizations of Zoology and Botany.

The character of the analogue comes into the domain of the actual through the value standpoint of degrees of reality. Every single object of natural reality has a determined valueness, a degree of its being real. This degree increases the more in-tensive the object participates in absolute reality. [62] In this pre-eminently esse divinum is distinguished from esse creaturae; hence there is again no possibility of specification as to genera or species as is the case in the world of sense. If the categories can generally be spoken of in the absolute, they must contain a com-pletely different order and a completely different structural nexus, a meaning corresponding to absolute reality. [63]

Thus the concept of measure which determines the quan-tities in mathematics does not prevail in the real world. If it were to be applied to reality too, then the classificatory nature of analogy, which includes heterogeneity, must be destroyed.

Reality can only be considered then in accord with its homogeneous existence. Besides, the me__ura perfectionis is proper to reality, its being the judgment of objects according to their degree of reality.[64]

So it seems that a preeminent place is to be conceded to number and measure in the whole of knowledge. A contemporary logician expresses this opinion:

> For every cognitive power, every possibility
> for the logical determination of the sensory seems to
> be enclosed in the thought of number ... there is
> realized in number the highest postulate, which
> first makes all cognition into cognition. For
> number is a general viewpoint from which we put
> into concept the sensory manifold as uniform and
> homogeneous.

This is not the place for a critical evaluation of the theoretical views at the bottom of these sentences. So much, however, has arisen in the preceding expositions that in its nature cannot be measured critically against modern logic: the noteworthy difference between unum and unum, the preeminent impossibility of comprehending empirical reality through pure number, the historical in its individuality. Systems in series, whose general "point of intersection" has to be individuality, do not suffice for this either. Because series and a fortiori systems in series only exist in the domain of the homogeneous, attempts of the type to bring the individual to the fore are without prospect from the start.

Mathematical-scientific knowledge is simply not knowledge as such.

A peculiar insight is had into the sphere of reality in which aspects of value attain determinant force with this kind of categorial characterization of the actually sensory and supra-sensory world of objects. A purely logical dismemberment of the totality of objects (a metaphysical one too, according to the medieval sense) appears now to be vigorously painted over through unum et diversum for unity's sake -- albeit for a unity of a special kind. If the viewpoint of transcendental philosophy is brought into account, then it appears that medieval realism -- whether naive or critical -- which holds firm to the binding character of natural reality, is rather a spiritualism than a naturalism. Also, it is precisely the feature of degrees of actual reality as grounded in analogy, which should overcome the problems that every dualism meets without sinking back into an impossible monism. The fact that the traditional matter of Aristotle's categories doesn't encompass the totality of categories must be laid at the door of the prevalence of transcendence characteristic of the medieval mind. The categories are merely the ordinal forms for a definitely bounded area, which is inherent in character in the whole of the metaphysical world-view.

A comparison with the modern scientific treatment of natural reality shows that it has to thoroughly redo the insurveyable multiplicity of empirical reality into a homogeneous domain if theoretical physics is to come into use as a method of investigation. In a certain way this refashioning also occurs in medieval "physics" through the predominant importance attributed to the concept of motion. But it is not difficult to understand that the categorial forms of modern science are much more numerous and complex, that before everything else they stand in the service of a completely new plane of inquiry.

Rather it could be supposed that the above order of actual reality was tailored to cultural-scientific research. But this is likely not true. The concepts of "personality", of the individual with intellect, are not, it is true, alien to scholasticism (think of the doctrine of the trinity, of angelology, and of anthropology). But the complexities of the historical personality, his particular essence, his conditionality and manifold effectiveness, his interwovenness with the environment, the thought of historical evolvement and the problems incumbent with it are present to the medieval mind with only a very insufficient conceptual precision.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to want to brand this insufficiency of the categorial characterization for the work of the

individual sciences as absolutely worthless.

Apart from the valuable insights used in treating the meta-physical problems concerning <u>God</u> and <u>world,</u> before everything else in the categorial characterization in discussion probably still renders an insight into the structure of the empirical domain of reality, which has not yet been treated of scientifically. If we consider that empirical reality is, in the first place, <u>transformed</u> by the words of language, more exactly, by their meanings since only determined "sides" of them enter into meaning, and further-more, that meanings and their forms still are in some way deter-mined by actual reality as material, then it is easy to understand that a theory of the forms of meanings, as they are supposed to be demonstrated in the course of our investigation, has to refer to empirical reality for an understanding of individual forms.

Therefore, in the context of the theory of meaning we shall come to terms anew with this domain of the theory of the categories. Perhaps we have to return to other domains. Perchance too, none of them will be <u>thoroughly</u> sufficient for understanding the <u>forms of meaning.</u>

But before this we ought to bring to completion the character-ization of the <u>transcendentals</u> left and of the domains of reality which are attainable for them by <u>specifying their meaning.</u>

Second Chapter

Verum and Logical Reality

Convertibility with the object was established earlier as that which denotes transcendentals. Accordingly we have first to investigate at the beginning of this chapter whether convertibility is proper to verum.

Every object is one object. Every object is a true object. How does it happen that it is allowed to be called true?

With the multiple problems which are attached to the concept of unum, Duns Scotus also touches on the question of whether unum exhibits a different object from ens, a res, or of whether it means only a certain kind of "having of itself" (quendam modum se habendi). At the same time he remarks that this problem extends to other transcendentals, too, thence to verum.[1] Is verum then an object beside the object or only a certain way in which it is given? Just as unum turns out to be the primal form of the object in general, so too verum must be apprehended as a formal relation. The object is true object in regard to cognition. Insofar as the object is object of cognition, it can be called true object. In it there is to be seen the fundamentum veritatis.[2] Transcendental philosophy has found the most precise expression for this relation: the object is only object as object of cognition: cognition is only

cognition as cognition of the object. There is no object (Objekt) without a subject and vice versa. Certainly it would be an interpretation carried too far if it is claimed that verum in scholasticism is a conception with this sense. In principle it means nothing else but the relation of every object to cognition. Because the object enters cognition in some way, is met by it, becomes true object, that is, an object having a place in cognition. These possibilities of relation represent successively the degrees of comparison for the unity of the object and cognition. First of all, every object stands opposite cognition as determinable by it. Determinableness can be reduced to the minimum that can be stated about the object in general: that it is object of cognition. The maximal and minimal extent and complexion of determinability do not belong among the purely theoretical problems to be touched on here, as it is a question of factual cognition. Whatever is in some way determinable must "assimilate" to the knowing subject. in order to be determined. The determinable object undergoes an informing from cognition. Indeed, form is the factor which invests determinateness. Determinability is the "possibility of being affected" (Lask) through form. Determinateness is "affected" by form. In this way there is some instance with the object on the part of cognition. Viewed from the side of the object, it is assimilated

to cognition.   For example, whatever is contradictory, like a

square circle, resists such assimilation.   Cognition cannot even

do anything as it were with such an object.   The determinability of

this object reduces itself to the declaration that it is indeed an

object, but an impossible. one.

The object that has been changed from determinable to deter-

minate has itself a corresponding position in cognition.   The object

is now in the knowing subject as the known in the knower.   The x

of the cognitive adequation is solved: the object has entered into

knowledge.

Thus _verum_ doesn't, _in practice_, add anything new to the

object.   It only invests it with its own index and asserts that every

object has a possible relation to cognition.   It is only in cognition

that it is first allowable to speak properly of truth.   _Every object is_

an object and as such related to cognition.

Verum shows itself to be in the domain of _cognition in_

general as does _unum_ in the domain of mathematics and in the

actual domain of counted objects. [3]   Now we must conceive of this

domain of cognition in its particularity and in its difference from all

the others.

Concerning the two fundamental forms of cognition _verum_

in intellectu can be spoken of in two senses.   The truth of _simplex_

apprehensio, of simply having an object, doesn't have falsity as its
contrary, but _non-cognizance, a not knowing._ In a certain sense
also simple representation, this certain-bringing-something-to-
oneself-in-givenness, can be called _false_ to the extent that it puts
a determination on the object which _isn't_ due to it. This meaning,
wrong in itself, can nonetheless come to consciousness. Even
though it doesn't admit of an objective fulfillment, nevertheless it
is something object-like, a _quid nominis,_ a signification free from
a judgmental character.

Because the given becomes the object as given at any time,
simple re-presentation is therefore always _true._ Measure and
the measured coincide as one here. Truth exhausts itself in given-
ness and doesn't reach beyond it. The kind of fact it represents
will have to be determined later. [4]

Cognition is _judgmental_ if its truth has the antithesis of
falsity. Judgment is that which admits being called _true_ in the
proper sense. All cognition is judgment and every judgment is cog-
nition. When we said that _verum transcendens_ refers to a domain
of cognition which has not been dealt with yet, we now know on
which structure of this domain study must be done for its particular
properties -- on judgment. It has recently been nor incorrectly
called the "cell" of logic, its primal structure.

That judgment now exhibits a <u>composition</u> (<u>compositio</u>) doesn't defy its character as primal structure, which could be expected to be a completely simple unit without parts. The complex (<u>complexum</u>) of judgment separates it from the concept (<u>incomplexum</u>). True, concepts are complex too, but in a way different from judgment. Its complexion can be in it only but in such a fashion that it stands in close relation with the actual character of judgment.

The judgmental structure must reveal how the component parts of the structured whole are interjoined.[5] Whatever there is to encounter in judgment as the moment which invests coherence and unity on judgment, whatever is primarily proper to judgment, must likewise reveal the nature of the domain in which there are judgments. If judgment is to represent a structured unity, then the component parts (<u>extrema</u>) which do the unifying cannot be completely separate and relationless. Rather it lies in the content of the component parts to mutually <u>require</u> themselves. As <u>belonging to one another</u> they require the unity of judgment. The <u>nota compositionis</u>, the relation establishing unity, structures the <u>est</u> in judgment. But the <u>est</u> doesn't mean any <u>exists</u>, any real being of the kind of sensory and extra-sensory objects. <u>Rather the mode of reality</u> (<u>esse verum</u>) <u>is intended. For this relation we have at our disposal today the fortunate term: to obtain</u> (<u>gelten</u>).

Contrary to what is generally presented as the judgmental

relationship which scholasticism taught, the meaning of the copula

est should not be restricted to subsumption; nor does it coincide

with exists. Duns Scotus had a correct understanding of the sin-

gular significance and function of the copula in that he conceived

of its being as general as possible. Its relation to "obtain" and

likewise the proper mode of the real remains untouched and the

same in every judgment.[6] No doubt differentiations as to the re-

lation between subject and object can be found, but they come to be

known through a determination which lies in the actual content of

judgment.

The relation which obtains in the copula, the esse as re-

lation between subject and predicate, proves itself to be the

proper bearer of truth. Judgment obtains, is true, and is "made"

true by the propositional acts of the subject in its behalf.[7] Judg-

ment as true cognition means likewise that there is cognition of an

object. This enters into judgment and is thus conceived of in its

what and that. As for judgment this means there is a subjugation

to the object. According to Duns Scotus, conformity with the object

isn't simply a sort of copy, a sort of repetition in thought, of that

which "lies in things" as if the judgmental relation also existed

ontologically. The meaning content of the objective material which

comes to be given along with the form of reality proper to it is taken up by judgment. Better put, the content in question becomes <u>informed</u> through judgment and in this way becomes valid cognition. The true is constituted in cognition. [8]

Objects contain only <u>virtualiter</u> what is included in judgment as a unified meaningful whole. The judgmental relation isn't a "similar sign" of the <u>affair complex</u> which can be found as different domains in the objective world. On the contrary, it is <u>equivocal.</u> Duns Scotus illustrates this with the relationship between the hoop, for instance, over the door of an inn and on the wine. <u>The hoop implies the wine since it is the sign of the inn.</u> In itself it is <u>not at all like the wine</u>, but for the connoisseur it is the true sign for the serving of wine. Thus it would be a false sign for a serving of milk and stuff similar. Thus judgment, as a valid complex of meaning, is different from the objects for which it obtains in cognition, both as to its reality and as to its valid structure. [9]

No doubt Duns Scotus is struggling with this expression in order to bring out sharply the heterogeneity, which he has become aware of, between judgment and the objects known in and through it. The extent to which he makes progress in the cognition of the proper evaluation of the content of judgment as the validating sense, is seen precisely in his distinguishing judgment itself as <u>objectivising,</u> that

Duns Scotus has uncovered a difficulty here. With it in mind every "copy theory" which works with cognition as represen- tation sees itself in the end taking a position. For it is simply impossible to compare the sense of judgment to the real objects (Objekte) since I only know of the real objects (Objekte:) just exactly through cognition -- judgment. An object (Objekt) that isn't cognized is no object (Objekt) for me. We do not outstrip the judgmental content so to attain real objects (Objekte:). The copy theory offers an insurmountable difficulty here. Conse- quently, Duns Scotus gives this theory up and decides for immanent thought. Thus it won't happen that the "reality of the external world is argued away." He does not "side" with "Subjectivism", "Idealism" or any other epistemological spectre whatsoever. A correctly understood idea of immanence doesn't remove reality and cause the external world to fade into a dream. On the contrary, it is precisely because of the absolute primacy of valid sense that the measuring rod of all psyciological, psychological, and economic- pragmatic theories of cognition is broken and there is inconcussibly grounded the absolute validity of truth, genuine objectivity.

The capacity of the sense of the judgmental act is orientated to -- and immediately pertains to -- the meaning content of the com- ponents (extrema) which enter into judgment and contain the judgmental

relation _virtualiter_. The meaning content of the data, the im-
mediately viewed content, is the measure of the sense of judgment:
from out of it the sense of judgment draws its objective validity.
The sense of judgment, it could also be said, is the logical form of
reality and structure of the coherent factors presenting the affair
complex. [12]

An attitude that offers fruit for the field of science can only
be if individual sciences rise to the zenith of conscious application
of the methods proper to them at any given time. This is accomp-
lished through a certain maturity in the evolvement of the history
of thought and especially through the decisive influence of per-
sonalities of genius (for instance, of Galileo in physics). It is
only since Kant that we can speak of a theory of science. Prior to
him, individual questions in this regard had come up but without any
systematic coherence with the problems which are touched on in the
logic of the preceding. But wherever the individual sciences are
only in their rudiments and the method proper to each of them has
not emerged with the necessary plasticity and acuity and gone its
sure route, then every condition is lacking for work in scientific
theory. Not just that. The incentive is lacking in general -- the
incitement to begin to see these problems as problems in the first
place. This is the case with scholasticism.

problems in many of the domains of scientific theory.

As compared to the understanding and solution of logical problems in the psychologistic sense (a view that has only recently been losing strength), scholastic thought has a maturity of view for the peculiarity and proper value of the domain of logic that is not to be disregarded or undervalued, no matter how much it restricts itself to generalizing viewpoints. Precisely because the cognition of the domain of logical validity has become more acute and profound in the battle against psychologism, we find it to be a matter of no little interest to check in Duns Scotus how far he went in his attempt to wrestle out a boundary against the psychically real.

This consideration ought to be continued in the confines of the knowledge of the sphere of logical sense, and it ought to demarcate this domain more clearly from the heterogeneous continuum of empirical reality and the homogeneous continuum of the mathematical. The question about the significance of the extra animam has to be made clear, too. It was left open above. The ens rationis stands in contrast to the actual sensory and extra-sensory world (ens naturae). Actual reality is such that it doesn't depend on the soul (cuius esse non dependet ab anima). The ens rationis is thus an ens in anima. Logical reality belongs to the "soul". How is

this belonging to be conceived of more precisely? [13]   Is the ens

rationis to be taken in the sense that it belongs to the soul like a

memory which suddenly mounts in the life of the soul, like feelings

of grief or joy which shake our interiors, often existing just for

moments and then disappearing? Is judgment in anima in that this

judgment is made with the psychic power of the intellect just to

give place to other psychic occurrences? But what would happen

then to the truth of judgment? Then judgment would only be true so

long as the execution of the judgmental activity perdures. If the

psychic activity of judging were "true", then there would be no truth.

If then the ens logicum is taken to mean an ens rationis or ens in

anima, the inference can't be such that logical reality is a compo-

nent, a dissection of psychic reality.

Ens logicum is further characterized as an ens diminutum:

it intends a mode of being that is attenuated as against actual,

natural reality and for that reason it doesn't belong in the objective

domain of metaphysics which is incontestably a science of the real.

It is interesting to note in passing the similarity that this designation

of the logical as ens diminutum has with the views of a contempo-

rary. Rickert calls logical sense "non-real". Duns Scotus states,

even expressly, that logical being doesn't have the reality of actual

existence and, for this reason, the category of causality isn't

applicable to this domain either. This category doesn't have any sense in the domain of logic. In other words, we are unquestionably not concerned here with a happening, an origination, and a passing, with processes or events; in short, with natural realities.[14]

Psychic reality certainly isn't any ens diminutum. On the contrary, it is the essential form of man. It imparts to him at the very first his existence as man. Not only that. For Duns Scotus the soul is "primary as individual. It in itself already forms a substance for itself, that is, apart from its union with the body it forms a substance by itself; and therefore, it is not first individualized through embodiment."[15] But it is precisely the individual that is determined as the proper existent -- this has been stated above.[16] Moreover, it is easy to see why the psychic is thoroughly dominated by the category of causality on the basis of the theory of reciprocal effects.

All this necessitates accepting the designation ens in anima as not intending a psychical reality but a logical actuality. This expression can only stand for what today is called "noematic sense": intentionality as a correlate of consciousness is inseparable from it and yet not really (reell) contained in it. The "in" designates the relationship wholly proper to consciousness, the interconnectedness of all meanings and values with the living mind and not some kind of

adherence of an element as a part in a whole.

Thus the _ens rationis_ means the _content_, the _sense_ of the psychic acts. It is a being in the considering, thinking conscious-ness, the _ens cognitum_, that which is thought and judged. This must be distinguished from that which is _subjective in intellectu_, that manner in _which_ the activity of understanding and the acts of knowing are in the soul as actual psychic capabilities. Likewise both of them lie within the category of quality, a category of actual reality. With the _ens in anima_, however, we must under-stand the _secundo consideratum_. Hence the _ens in anima_ is not the objective in the objective (_objektiv_) cognition of reality and in its objective meaning -- _non tamquam primo considerato in quantum consideratum._ [17] It could hardly be stated more plainly that the meaning is that the _content_ is detached from cognitive activity, from judgments, that the judgmental _sense_ functions as the repre-sentation and the epistemological constitution of the real objects (Objekte). This _content_ is that which _obtains_. Of it can be said that it is _true._ Taken strictly, the single psychic acts of judgment are neither true nor false; rather they exist or do not exist. The knowing subject becomes aware of the judgmental sense which is given as "real" in a certain sense, being taken into the actual life of the individual intellect.

Bolzano (Husserl was really the first to discover him and reveal his significance for contemporary logic) believes that there is in the Greeks already the idea of a purely logical content detached from psychic reality:

> If I demonstrate below the basis of the opinion that the concept of truth in itself was not unknown to the ancient Greeks even, then it seems to apply that they too connected with the expression <u>sentence</u> (<u>protasis</u>, <u>apophansis</u>, <u>logos apophantikos</u>) the concept stated above -- at least at times. For a truth in itself is also a sentence in itself. The fact, however, that they usually explained sentences as a kind of speech (<u>logoi</u>), doesn't at all lead us to the conclusion that they viewed only those sentences which are expressed in words as true sentences. For it could certainly be that only the sense condition of language hindered them from expressing themselves about this object in so abstract a manner that it could be claimed that they were not actually understood by their readers. [18]

It seems to me that the logic of <u>scholasticism</u> has to be looked at from the same viewpoint if any sense at all is supposed to be made of its logical theories.

But the singularity of the valid domain of the logical can be viewed from still another side. Thus it should become unmistakably clear that its existence is independent of every actual reality.

Our awareness of life, thought and cognition in nature is gauged to the actual objects (<u>Objekte</u>) of immediate reality. The scholastic term for this natural attitude is <u>prima intentio</u>. By a

certain indirection of our gaze, knowledge can be adapted to its own content (secunda intentio). Everything that exists in the object world (Objektwelt) of the metaphysical, the physical, and the psychic -- mathematical and even logical objects -- is absorbed into the realm of secunda intentio. In it alone is there a knowledge of objects (Objekte) for us. The most cardinal distinction of the modes of reality is that between consciousness and reality, more exactly, a mode of reality that is not specifically valid and that for its part is always and only given in and through a nexus of sense with some sort of validity.

Duns Scotus designates the absolute dominance of logical sense over all worlds of objects (Objektwelten), knowable and known, as the convertibility of the ens logicum with objects. Whatever is an object can become an ens diminutum. Whatever is known, whatever likewise judgments are made on, must enter the world of sense. Only in this world is it known and judged. Only in that I live in the valid, do I know about existence. [19]

In separating the domains of actual reality -- especially from mathematical objects -- a contrast was made showing the difference in constitution of their categories. How does this difference fit into the domain of the logical? Is there something to be met here like order, validity, gradation? Is there a degree of

existence here too as in the actual sensory and supra-sensory world, a degree that corresponds to God's, creatures', substances', and accidents' modes of being? It has already been explained that the domain of the actual is convertible with the logical and that the domain of the actual can be covered over as it were by the logical. Real objects (Objekte) are taken into the sphere of logical sense. This acquirement would be totally unintelligible if we should take the ens logicum for a psychic reality.

This entrance of reality into sense is only possible so that reality be grasped by the logical, that something be torn out of it, made separate, set off, and put in order. That which establishes order is something formal. Forms are determined in their meaning by the material of the objective world (Objektwelt) and thus they can always be reapplied to it. The ordering form of the logical is general is judgment. As related to the subject it is permitted to express it this way too: It is essential to logical content that "it be expressed" (praedicari). This is only possible for the reason that the logical content obtains. In the domain of the real, that which occurs and exists as real is designated in the logical domain according to its proper mode, namely, according to judgment, that is, it is given a "meaning" (praedicari est intentio).

We have cognition because of judgment. The particular com-

ponents of this ordering form are the categories. They aren't at all

just copies taken from the real realm of objects (Objektbereich).

The real as it were, gives only the impulse (occasio), presents

the point of departure for the making of ordering relationships

which have no adequate correspondence in the real.[20]

The intentionality of the objective realm (Objektbereiche)

to be known is proper (sunt applicabiles) to judgment as having a

sense and to the categories that make up judgment. They "encompass"

the material that can be met in data and receive it into their charge

as it were. The moment which determines order and characterizes

the logical domain is intentional, valid, predicable. The logical

domain isn't analogous as is the case with the real. It is univocal.[21]

> The noematic, the content of the psychic acts, forms
> a peculiar objectiveness. Whenever objects stand
> directly (understood in the unmodified sense) under
> the fundamentally different higher genera, all ob-
> jective senses and all noemata taken in their
> totality, as diverse as they may be, are principally
> from a single highest genus.[22.]

This is the same as Duns Scotus' univocity of the realm of logical

sense as against the order by analogy in the world between sensory

and extra-sensory actual objects (Objekte).

The logical domain is an homogeneous one. The same has

been said of the mathematical.

The logical domain is extra-sensory. The same obtains for

the mathematical. Do both domains coincide then? Is logic mathematics or mathematics logic or is neither the case?

It would not only be beyond the scope of our task to decide these questions here, but in general there is no possibility for a solution using the means of scholastic thought. Yet on the basis of what has been said so far, it can be decided that the two domains in question cannot be brought to coincide, although they may both be of an extra-sensory nature. Homogeneity, which contains its own proper character because of the unity in reference, is different in the two worlds. The homogeneity of the mathematical domain has its basis on quantity. The homogeneity of the validating domain of logic rests on the intentional, on intentionality. To the extent that the intentional and quantity are removed from each other, to that extent is logic different from mathematics.

The intentional is the "regional category" of the logical domain. This shows anew that psychic being can not be what is referred to by ens in anima. Only that can be intentional which has sense and meaning, not realities. They can at most be come upon by sense and meaning, but not vice versa.

> H. Siebeck finds precisely in Duns Scotus "the beginnings of a newer psychology": The one who is epoch-making in medieval philosophy isn't Thomas Aquinas, but Duns Scotus. The substance of the medieval weltanschauung received its retentive stability and

> strength from the Thomist codification of course.
> For hundreds of years afterwards it has served the
> clerical world as the foundation for opposition·
> against new systems and methods. But the
> characteristic features of the new itself and the
> first sure steps in its direction are found in the
> deeply exhaustive and incisive critique which Duns
> Scotus did not tire of making on the stability of
> the traditional systematic. [24]

He was the first to rediscover the psychic world of objects (Objektwelt)

of interior experience for "independent research".

Duns Scotus' sharp insight into the individuality and singul-

arity of empirical facts, along with a clear discernment of the world

of logical validity permits the view that he also separated the operative

domains of logic and psychology. On the other hand, it is not sur-

prising that the interest in logic comes to predominate strongly

precisely when the "higher" life of the soul is in consideration.

At first sight this could appear as a disadvantage and it would be

possible to come to the oft-repeated idea that scholastic psychology

isn't worth anything because its treatment is only conceptual since

it takes no attitude, strictly speaking, toward empirical facts.

But this factual predominance of the logical viewpoint must

be correctly evaluated.

Cognitive acts are not so much objectively viewed as psychic

realities but more as to their function, their achievement. Seen

thus, they don't really belong any more to the domain of psychology

as the Real Science (<u>Realwissenschaft</u>) of the psychic, but to <u>logic</u>

if it is not wanted to assign them to the very particular domain of

<u>phenomenology</u> (and indeed preferably to the "noesis").

Thus thought is characterized directly as the psychic activity

which grasps truth as truth. By mere givenness consciousness may

be gauged to the "true", but it is only through judgment that the

true becomes conscious as a true, valid sense. In that sense is

distinguished into sensation and perception on the basis of the <u>achieve-</u>

<u>ment</u> of its specific thought, and perception is valued more highly,

sense is not viewed just as psychic reality, which arises and goes

away, but as regards its content.[25] It is only as such that it

lets itself be fully conceived of. Rickert states, "We can only

fathom the subject and its acts from out of values." He and

Husserl are the contemporaries who the most expressively demon-

strate this way of looking at acts. He stresses that an investigation

that is involved in this way with thought doesn't work with con-

cepts of things (<u>Sachbegriffe</u>) but with meaning contents.

Duns Scotus states that the subject as psychic reality may

evoke, may cause actual acts; the subject doesn't cause a reality to

arise relative to its objective content (<u>circa tamen objectum</u>) but per-

mits the sense to be known through its achievement. If actual know-

ing is removed, that is, if the subject doesn't think and judge,

then the subject doesn't know the content either. It isn't actually known. But that doesn't mean that with the disappearance of the act of judgment the content is destroyed too, that its mode of reality, its validity (scibile in potentia) is lost as the act loses its own mode, its own existence.[26]

The act of judgment can be considered in two ways. First, it can be considered as regards its psychic reality that enables judgment to actually take place. This way of viewing judgment is the province of psychology. Second, there can be a consideration of the content of judgment, of its sense, and thus of its proper connection with the act of judgment. Duns Scotus states that the logician presupposes the work of the psychologist: the investigation of the thought activity through which those achievements are brought about. There are good grounds for dispute as to whether it is in fact necessary that the consideration of logical content should first be approached after fundamental investigation into the activity of thought. It is probable then that we no longer ply logic today with a quiet conscience. Whatever the decision is as regards the relation of logic and psychology, it is of no consequence for the case in front of us. It must be noted as important that Duns Scotus not only tacitly distinguishes in his investigations logical and psychological modes of consideration, but stresses expressly

their difference.[27]

The psychic -- as the scholastics investigated it -- is particularly where cognitive and voluntary activity is dealt with much more than the psychic real as conceived of in today's natural sciences. The scholastic considered the sense-giving function, the "act character" of the psychic, at the same time. Consequently, scholastic psychology must be evaluated and judged with this attitude in mind. Much of what they taught in physiology and on the psychology of sense activity in particular may be considered incorrect or at least insufficient today. Still, the theory of act presents much that is unquestionably of interest and value.

To my knowledge there is not yet been any fundamental and extensive investigation on the concept of act, on the intellective and emotive acts in scholasticism. We could only point out these problems here. For our task is to broadly distinguish and then to delineate the individual domains of reality. I presume that this task has now been accomplished.

The "transcendental" determinations of _unum_ and _verum_ belong to every object. All domains of reality are able to be _inferred by_ the _extra-sensory,_ _validating,_ _logical_ _constructs_ _of_ _sense,_ to the extent that cognition of these domains is sought and gained. In

the domains of the knowable we have come up against the sense
(physical and psychic) domains of natural reality and extra-sensory
reality, that is, the domain of metaphysical objects (Objektgebiete)
and the extra-sensory objective domain of mathematics along with
that which has been called the logical.

It necessarily follows from this that the ten Aristotelian
categories and a theory of categories that is confined to them must
come out to be not only imperfect but wavering and irrelevant in its
determination. This last is so because the theory of categories is
wanting in awareness of the differences in its domains and thus
in awareness of the distinction that the categorial forms are dif-
ferentiated in meaning, as they are determined by the nature of
their domains.[28]

It was known to Duns Scotus too that the ten traditional
categories are valid only for actual reality. Doubtless the domain
of intentions is capable of other ordering forms. It certainly
presents its own objective domain. Intentions can be known and de-
fined in themselves. Thus logic itself requires its own categories.
There must be a logic of logic.

Duns Scotus goes even further. Non ens is an object of
cognition too, enters into judgment, is grasped in meanings and

denoted by words. Because judgments can be made about _non ens_, there must be a most general concept of _non ens_, a category which cannot fall under the ten actual categories. The same is valid of the phantasy structures (_figmenta_) of non-natural reality and of privation.

It can be objected that _figmenta_ and _privationes_ gain their general formal determination through reduction and abstraction from natural reality whose _figmenta_ and _privationes_ they are. For that reason their own categories may be superfluous. If I form the judgment that blindness is a privation, there is presupposed here a very general concept of privation. Furthermore, the separation of _ens_ from _non ens_ doesn't lead to this or that determined _ens_ and _non ens_, but to the concept of _non ens in general._

Figments and privations are, then, like intentions, objects of a proper species; and they require corresponding _generalissima,_ that is, categories.

Not every special object of cognition is in fact determined by the ten categories (_non quodlibet intelligibile_), but only actual objects (_Objekte_). Certainly logic considers the categories in general as regards their intentionality in the material. Thus the categories of the non-real must necessarily come into the

horizon of the logician as is the case in fact with Duns Scotus. [29]

It can be seen again in what has just been said, that Duns Scotus has a clear awareness of the tasks of the theory of categories. Likewise, the consideration of _figmenta_, _privationes_, and _non entia_ supports the contention that the number of domains of reality that have been adduced up to now is still not finally exhausted.

Third Chapter

The Form and Content of Language

The Domain of Meaning

Ens logicum, that is, sense as well as the components that can be encountered in it, meanings, has been proven to be its own proper world as against real being. This has two sides: as it relates to "existence", better, its mode of reality (its thatness) and in view of its essential content (whatness). A property of this construct has been intentionally left out of consideration until now, namely, the fact that meaning and sense inhere in words and word complexes (sentences). Sense and meaning are able to be expressed through speech structures. The language forms become expressions in the widest sense of the word as structures laden with meaning and sense.

This nexus of logical content and language form brings up the question of how far the latter is to be included in logic. In this puzzling nexus ultimately so essential and insoluble that logic, language formation and its structure has to be included in its problem domain? Hasn't every grammatical "in" itself a logic and vice versa? How does Duns Scotus go at these questions? Does he draw a boundary line between logic and grammar?

Further, it has to be investigated as to whether his regulation of boundaries arises out of his conception of the logical and logic.

If the structures of language in general require their own science for proper treatment, then they must make a mode of observation possible which is detached from logical investigation, just as on the other hand, logical problems must be able to be solved without drawing on language elements as <u>components of</u> <u>proof.</u>

Duns Scotus stresses the independence of the logical, of sense in judgment and in judgmental complexities (conclusions) before all else. <u>These logical structures have their own actuality,</u> <u>if they are not expressed in language too.</u> They are "something prior" and don't need language for their existence, that is, for their ultimate validity. As regards words as such, logical structures are that which are laden with present value, the <u>content</u> (<u>significatum</u>).[1]

The word has no intentional character as a complex of sounds or aggregate of letters. If it is used as expression, it doesn't contain any new quality. It doesn't really bear a meaning in itself. Otherwise a Greek would have to immediately <u>understand</u> it if he read or heard a Latin word.[2] Duns Scotus succeeds in seeing the further distinctions with great acuity, directly on the basis of

this radical separation of language structure from logical content.

There is no coherence, no order in the words as such. They are simply conglomerates which stand unrelated next to each other without sense or meaning. Only when they are considered as laden with sense and meaning does the possibility open up for a distinction and, consequently, a concatenation.

A sentence, considered simply as a limited sequence of words, is a singularity. The content of the sentence, however, judgment, can be singular or universal. Also the distinction of complexum from incomplexum only lets itself be understood from out of the meaning content. That which is primary is the concept, in a wider sense, the meaning; it is simple in comparison to judgment. In a derivative manner the word and the sentence also admit of being conceived of as simple and compounded. Strictly speaking, it cannot be said either that a sentence is true or false. It is at the most spoken or written, or it isn't. Truth and falsity can only be predicated of the sense inhering in the sentence and, furthermore, it only can be said of this insofar as it contains objective value, not insofar as it is the content of a sentence. Thus the written sentence, "Man is a living being", is not false, although the word man and the words living being are different. But this sentence is just as little true. For true and false are

predicated on that which inheres in the sentence -- on <u>judgment.</u> [3]

Both constructs, sentence and sense, word and meaning, belong to different objective domains, no matter how strangely close they may be connected. Language elements are <u>sensory</u> (visual, auditory, motor): they are perceptible. They belong in the world of the actually existing. They perdure in time, arise and disappear. Sense and meaning, on the other hand, are absent from any sense perception; as such they aren't subject to any alteration. They are the same in timeless identity.

With all the difference of sound structures in the various languages, the identity of the domain of sense stays untouched in its validity, even if its content too may be "conceived of" and brought to understanding in the most diverse word and sentence forms. [4]

Neither was Duns Scotus unacquainted with genetic, physiological-psychological considerations. He addresses to himself this ensnaring objection: Man as a social being is in communication with others. He must make himself understandable. <u>Bound</u> up with the sense that is understood, there must necessarily be the means of expression too. Thus meaning and sense have an essential relation to specific words and sentence structures that are connected with them and only with them. But Duns Scotus makes

the observation that is't not the word containing the meaning (vox significativa) which is the apparatus for making oneself understood, but it is the throat and the lung which construct the physical existence of the word. Nature furnishes these means for word formation. However, this doesn't lead to the conclusion that also the unity of meaning and word is from nature. Language structures that have arisen naturally are more signa ad placitum.

For its part this genetic consideration also shows how completely different in kind, in the mind of Duns Scotus, the meaning is as opposed to the word. [5]

The wide reaching distinction of logical content from language content -- a separation that sets the principal moments in relief -- could not be achieved by a mode of thought in which the essence of the logical would still lie in obscurity. This separation must be looked at as a purely theoretical one. How far it is possible to live in a completely logical framework, to comprehend without linguistic supports, remains a factual question left over from the psychology of thought. However. the problem is solved, the validity of the separation carried out above is not affected by it in the least.

However necessary and valuable the separation of the domains of logical sense structures and grammatical language

structures may still be for the working out of their heteroge-
neous nature, this separation should, nevertheless, be removed,
forgotten as it were as soon as one lives in knowledge and its pre-
sentation. Here the alogical character of linguistic structures dis-
appears. They reveal themselves to be realities charged with a
peculiar function, to be bearers of meanings and sense constructs.
They reveal themselves by means of these bearers of meanings
and sense constructs, that is, by their objectively referential
nature, to be "signs" for objects (Objekte). It could be said that
it is in this way that the spheres of existing grammar and validat-
ing logic again blend into one for whoever lives in actual speech
after having been so radically torn asunder in the preceding.

Language structure is a sign of meaning, of sense. And
this again is the "sign" of objects. Thus the sentence: Quidquid
est signum signi, est signum signati,[6] in a certain sense finds
its application. This is said to assert for the relational coherence
of the grammatical, logical, and objective spheres that word and
sentence indicate the objective domain as constructs laden with
meaning and sense. Things stand in thought and these inhere in
words and sentences.

If the inclusiveness of the domains mentioned is now to be
recognized after the theoretical separation that preceded, then the

concept <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>sign</u> <u>and</u> <u>being</u> <u>of</u> <u>sign</u> must be thematized.

But this theory of the <u>sign</u> can only be considered as a preliminary clarification, analytical in nature. The questions that prove to be decisive are: "What kind of signs are the language structures <u>vis-à-vis</u> the immediately signified and the logical contents?" Furthermore, what is the meaning of the nature of the sign <u>vis-à-vis</u> the immediately signified -- the objects? Depending on the determinations of the specified natures of the signs that occur, the actual relation between the sign and the signified will, in like fashion, take on a respectable meaning. Perhaps the relations in question prove to be not at all alike. Consequently, the coherence of the three domains, of lived thought, cognition and understanding, which internally appear so unified, will perhaps prove to be <u>constructed</u> <u>heterogeneously</u> too. The uniqueness of these coherences then requires a treatment which corresponds to its current factual nature. The domain of the problem and its mode of presentation differ sharply when they are applied these essential interconnections. And so indeed the pos- sibility appears that the ultimate and most profound problems have their foundation and ground in that field of investigation which is seemingly so poor in valuable ideas and fullness of life.

Thus we must begin by clarifying the concept of "sign".

Significare extensive sumitur pro dare intelligere. [7] Through the sign something becomes objective to consciousness. The sign averts from itself to another object. There lies something _relational in content, a referential character_ in the concept of sign. Hence the sign in itself is of the nature of a _substructure_ on which its referential function is built. From out of it comes the knowledge of the signified.

The _relational character_ and the _substructural being_ of the sign are the constitutive moments of the sign, and the specifications of signs themselves take on an appearance in accord with their specifications.

First there can be a _real_ relation between sign and signified. For it lies in the sign's real nature to refer to what is signified. Thus is smoke a sign of fire. It is only here that there first appears the difference in relation. It is a question in itself as to the amount of _certainty_ or high degree of evidence by which such a sign refers to what is signified.

Secondly, the relation is possibly purely in thought. The reference to what is signified _doesn't_ already lie in the sign as such. Whatever serves as a sign, for example, the "gestures of the monks" (a prescribed hand language used by monks in periods of regular _silentium_), can indicate a multiplicity and a diversity.

That which it's supposed to indicate is determined by arbitrarily fixing it. [8]

Duns Scotus speaks of a "truth" in the sign and understands by that what the sign enounces. If there is a real relation in the sign, then there is immediately given the conformity of the sign with what is signified. Whatever the relation is aiming at is doubtlessly marked out. As regards the second type of relations, there are still various possibilities as to what the relation is aiming at. Thus the idea that the first type of signs is "truer" than the second type becomes understandable.

That truth which is covered by judgment cannot be what is intended by truth here. Indeed it has this in common with the truth of judgment, that it can elicit a distinctly high degree of certainty and conviction, considered <u>pros hēmas</u>, on the part of the knowing subject. To speak in the terms of Husserl, the "means of motivation" among the acts comprehending the sign and what is signified is tighter and more immediate than with the first type of signs. [9]

The following touches closely on the distinction that has been advanced. There are signs which constantly "carry with them" what is signified. Thus an eclipse, the darkening of the sun and the moon, is a sign for the position of the earth between the sun

and the moon. Everytime that the sign is given, there must be included in that thought what is signified too. The relationship of a judgment to its expression is different. It does not have its own basis for such in the expressed situation given along with it. Suppose that the judgment is wrong. Then there is nothing that would correspond to it in the objective domain. The judgment lacks that which it is supposed to <u>show</u> insofar as it is taken as a sign.

If the temporal moments in which exist the sign and that which is signified are put under consideration, then again the sign relation can be distinguished accordingly. The sign can <u>refer back</u> to what has been or <u>infer in advance</u> what is to be expected, or the reference of the sign alludes to a present.

Moreover, the sign can be the <u>cause</u> of that which is signified as lightning is of thunder. Or conversely, the sign can be the <u>effect</u> of that which is signified, as smoke is of <u>fire.</u>[10]

If the sign's function as <u>substructure</u> is put into consideration, then in this way too it is possible to arrive at distinctions, namely, insofar as signs are presented to sense in various manners like visual and auditory data. Various sense organs can often work together in the grasping of signs likewise.

<u>What kind of sign is the word then?</u>

Does it permit itself to be ranged somewhere among the number of things just brought up? Its means of presentation is through the senses (<u>Vox representur</u> (<u>sic</u>) <u>sensui</u>).[11] In that it is an aggregate of sounds it is an auditory sign. In that it is a written symbol it is a visual sign. These are both sense signs. How then is the relation to what is signified to be determined? It was already brought up before, when language content was separated from language form, that words and word aggregates as such didn't indicate anything. How can they still become signs?

Duns Scotus gives a clear indication: <u>Vox enim est signum se offert sensui, aliud derelinquens intellectui.</u>[12] There is needed "the meaning-bestowing-act" (Husserl). Through it something is bestowed on the word (<u>intellectus rationem voci tribuit</u>). Through it the word becomes an expression (<u>dictio</u>).

<u>Thus in a totally unique manner expressions are unities of the sign and the signified.</u>

The clouded over, grey sky indicates rain. We are even wont to say that it "means" rain. But the sky as such hasn't a meaning anything like the expression <u>sky</u>. Expressions are "meaningful signs" (Husserl) in contradistinction to "referential signs."

In every expression there is to be uncovered a

characteristically independent act through which the word attains
its content. Duns Scotus was aware of this level of act in its parti-
cularity. He considers significant acts to be not simply psychic
realities or occurrences but acts in which a content inheres.
They aim at this content, at meaning; and they genetically
eventuate in the thinking subject. The status of their content re-
sides in their meaning. [13]

Can the phenomenon that inheres in the physically real
meaning-bestowing-act be somehow even more closely determined?
Can any one property be singled out, permitting it to be reputed
henceforth as a phenomenon sui generis and evaluated accordingly?

It will have to be asked first off which domain of reality
the phenomenon, meaning, is to be ranged in. It has just been
said that meaning inheres in the psychically real meaning-bestowing-
act and that it is always actualized if I want to make known to
myself the meaning of a word. Hence, it doesn't take much to see
that the meaning belongs situated in the domain of psychic realities
since it "inheres" in the act, is given with it, and is connected
with it.

Its actual existence seems even more beyond contest, as
apparently its actual mode of reality can be presented from still
another aspect.

For this, reference has to be made to an aspect of meaning which has gone unheeded so far.

In the majority of cases at least, meanings have an object besides their content, their what. They tend toward an object that they are known through. Let us take the case in which one such object is actually existing: for example, a tree. If this tree loses its existence, then the meaning seems likewise to disappear into nothing. For if there no longer exists that which the meaning can intend and which it can gain its footing on, then the meaning itself becomes illusory. Its reality stands and falls with that of the object. In this way, object and meaning belong to the same domain of reality.

Does this line of argument touch on the facts? Duns Scotus is given to think that, insofar as the meaning is related to the object, it doesn't say anything concerning it save that it presents it, containing what a tree is, not that it is (exists).

Consequently, meaning shows itself to be detached from actualities. Questions of existence relative to the objects meant are something which transcend the theory of meanings. Existence can only be predicated in judgment. A predication is always something about another, that is, there is a relation given in every predication. Whenever this characteristic is missing in a meaning, the

relation predicates nothing beyond the representation of something. There is lacking in the nature of the meaning-bestowing-act the specific capacity for having a point of view.

The meaning goes untouched no matter if the object meant exists, changes, or disappears. If the meaning were actually connected with the object as had been deduced above on the face evidence, then it itself would have become another with the object.

Duns Scotus states expressly that existence is completely extraneous to meaning (res ut intelligitur, cui extraneum est existere secundum quod significatur).

This thought is fundamental and it is important to think it through to the end. Duns Scotus teaches the freedom in its domain of meaning.

To the degree that the meaning-bestowing-act represents an existing psychic actuality, there can be talk of the "inherence" of meaning in it even though it cannot be identified as a real inter-connection. The meaning-bestowing-act enables me to live in the meaning of the word, to really present (vergegenwaertigen) its meaning to myself. But the meaning itself cannot in the first instance gain existence and reality through its act because it does not really exist at all. [14]

The phenomena of logical content and of language form, which we presented in the beginning as being completely different, now show a wholly singular interrelatedness. This unity of word and meaning now should be looked at since we have only examined them precursorily before this.

We ought to look into the possible problems that arise from this unity and the reason they arise.

Part II

The Theory of Meaning

In the foregoing part we had as our purpose to distinguish and to separate out the characteristics of the various domains of objects. At the conclusion the world of meanings emerged as a new independent domain. But we made only a precursory presentation of it as such. Nor did we say anything about its relation to other domains. More important still, we said nothing about the question of its possible structure.

Consequently, we must decide at the outset what -- if anything -- can be asked about this domain and whether these questions form an autonomous, special group of problems justifying the demand for a discipline concerned with them -- a theory of meaning. A complete delineation of the concept of the theory of meaning and of its import will then enable us to decide the extent in which philosophy has to be and generally can be occupied with "language" -- the relations of the theory of meaning to logic have to be further thought out. These questions are to be dealt with in terms of what is in the general section of the Grammatica Speculativa of Duns Scotus.

The second chapter then attempts a presentation and in-

terpretation of the theory of the forms of meanings as the theory of modi significandi. This takes up by far the most space in Duns Scotus' treatise.

Steinthal made mention of the treatise. He notes that "the famous scholastic, John Duns Scotus, wrote this treatise 'with interest in logic'."[1] De Wulf values it as "the greatest accomplishment in the field of speculative grammar."[2] Paolo Rotta makes a short reference to the philosophy of language of Duns Scotus.[3] Karl Werner deals with the subject more at length in his article Die Sprachlogik des Johannes Duns Scotus.[4] This investigation remains noteworthy in that it attempts to show the historical place of the treatise within the whole of the grammatical theories of the middle ages, for the most part following Thurot.[5] However, it is surely not always fortunate in its use of materials. A more thorough, historical characterization of the treatise, with reference to the systematic tasks of a theory of meaning, is still awaiting special investigation. The following arrives at only a theoretical understanding of the underlying theory there.

Chapter One

Meaning and Function of Meaning

The Principles of the Theory of Meaning

It is possible to pose questions on that organic whole of words which meaning inheres in (expressions), which we call language, and which unfolds in its manifold peculiarities. How in general did it <u>come to be?</u> What factors have been at work and still are at work both to expedite and impede the evolvement of language? Furthermore, can the growth of language be studied using singular individuals? Might it not be a too rash and one-sided act, should the value of such investigations of language be disclaimed?

An extensive sphere of influence -- deeply rooted in part -- has been achieved by evolutionary thought in the scientific thinking of the present. Of course, the dangerous inclination in this consists in claiming to see the explanation of an object in the kind and manner of its <u>evolution</u> and thence what is <u>primary</u> and what is <u>ultimate</u> as regards its possibilities of being known. Yet this absolutization of historical-psychological thinking overlooks the one thing that is possibly a constructive method of preceding, which is completely the contrary. Along with the question as to <u>how</u> <u>language</u> <u>has</u> <u>come</u> <u>to</u> <u>be,</u> there is the other possibility -- <u>what</u> <u>it</u> <u>should</u> <u>accomplish.</u> Thus knowledge of the object is not achieved in the genetical explanation. There is also a <u>teleological</u> <u>understanding.</u> Looking at it from the standpoint of logic, this too

is <u>not</u> the base and keystone of the knowledge of the object; but it is preferable by far to the genetical explanation as the <u>way</u> to the true "origin".

The kind and manner of the determinations that something has in its state of perfection exhibit its achieved <u>goal</u>. The use of language is said to be perfect if it is such that it awakes in the hearer and speaker the full sense of that which the speaker refers to by speaking. Thus language as a capacity is orientated to the perfect communication of speech.

It becomes directly evident that the <u>content</u> of language has an overwhelming significance. To use a name perfectly doesn't mean just to express it, to actualize it as sound. This can be done by a properly trained bird. Rather, to use a name perfectly means to find application for it as a <u>meaning-hearing-word.</u> But this is not the case if, for instance, a Latin pronounces a Hebrew word in Hebrew without knowing what he is saying. [1] For the perfect use of a name there is required that its meaning is <u>actually (aktuell)</u> known to the speaker. This holds not only for everyday pre-scientific speech; but likewise -- if not in its strongest measure -- for the presentation of scientific cognitions: they wouldn't be possible at all without language. We can know something about objects and their states of affairs only in and

through the nexus of meaning. The domain of meaning tra-
verses scientific speech and communication as well as the corres-
ponding order in the scientific train of thought even though the
science may be very specialized and advanced.

Hence there is little wonder either that all reflexion of a
more incisive nature comes up against the question of the extent to
which language accomplishes the expression and presentation of
the objects meant and the states of affairs referred to.

In his proof of the complete difference in kind of psychic
reality from the physical, Bergson came to the insight that our
language succeeds in a very insufficient manner at putting in ex-
pression the refinements of psychological analysis:

> Bref, le mot aux contours bien arrêtés, le mot
> brutal qui enmagasine ce qu'il y a de stable, de
> commun et par consequent d'impersonel dans
> les impressions de l'humanité, écrase ou tout au moins
> récouvre les impressions délicates et fugitives de
> notre conscience individuelle. 2

"Brisant les cadres du language," we would be able to see
the life of our souls in a totally different regard. Rickert, more
than anybody else, persuasively demonstrated that word meanings
do not attain the insurveyable manifoldness of the immediately
given, but rather that they present their predetermined formations
and transformations vis-à-vis the immediately given. He showed

this to be related to the problem of the limitations in the con-
struction of scientific concepts. [3]

This leads to the conclusion that a formal content must al-
ready be imbedded in meanings as such, making this function
possible. Meanings are thus subject to the viewpoint of _logical_
worth. As a procedure it is without question that this is justified
provided that it is made clear that all knowledge, that is, all
judgments are constructed out of meanings which are necessarily
their stable elements. Consequently, the guiding value of an investi-
gation of meanings is _truth_ as sense that is obtaining. Only
knowledge is true and knowledge is always knowledge of the object.
Therefore, if truth is still the principal viewpoint, then the un-
avoidable requirement is that the relation of the domain of meanings
to the being of objects be discerned. What has been said is supposed
to be just a precursory reference to the different problems re-
lative to meanings.

We must now show the extent to which Duns Scotus recog-
nizes these problems and the way in which he gives them a solution.
It was already indicated in the first part of this investigation how
sharply Duns Scotus separates the sense perceptible _form of the_
word from the extra-sensory _content of the word,_ the _meaning._
This is designated in the sentence: _Vox repraesentatur sensui_

aliud derelinguens intellectui, a proper act of consciousness cor-
responds to the meaning. Duns Scotus expresses what these acts
are capable of relative to the meaning in the following words:

> Intellectus duplicem rationem ei (voci) tribuit
> scilicet rationem significandi, quae vocatur
> significatio, per quam efficitur signum vel
> significans, et sic formaliter est dictio; et
> rationem consignificandi, quae vocatur modus
> significandi activus, per quam vox significans
> fit consignum vel consignificans et sic formaliter
> est pars orationis. 4

Above all then the word retains generally a meaning through
an act of consciousness. Something is objectively vis-à-vis
consciousness inferring it. This doesn't mean that a real ob-
ject is made which exists independent of consciousness. In this
way the word comes to expression. It means something. Duns
Scotus doesn't think of the meaning of a word either in the sense of
a sensationalistic psychology as if meaning were nothing more
than a phantasmic image or known objects, which are bound by
association with the sensory sounds of the word. In Scotus' view
meanings are not psychic realities. They don't belong to an actual
combination inside of which they are caused. They must be
conceived of as intentional contents, as achievements of intentional
acts (intentiones inductae per animam). The more of a compre-
hended expression that is filled with sense vis-à-vis verbal

sounds which are merely perceived in sense lies in the acts of

meaning. [5]   Lotze states:

> However the whole sense of this first activity of
> thought isn't exhausted by this objectivization of the
> content which has just originated now. Conscious-
> ness can little present it to itself except that con-
> sciousness assigns the content a determined place.
> It can hardly distinguish the content from its own
> stimulated state without conferring on the content
> another kind of existence in place of the sort of
> being which as such was the state of the content.
> What is referred to in this postulation ... shows
> us most simply that language by its actual per-
> formance ... by its whole vocabulary (with the
> exception of interjections, auth.) links them to the
> determinate forms of substantives, adjectives, verbs,
> the parts of speech in general ... I include that
> first act of thinking in this indivisible achievement
> of conferring one of these logical formations on the
> content presented. For this act objectivizes the
> content for consciousness or precisely for ob-
> jectivization by consciousness it confers on the
> content one of these determinate forms. [6]

This lengthy quotation from H. Lotze's Logik has been put

here for a purpose. It could be called an illustrative translation of

Duns Scotus' brief sentences.

Meaning is already formed in becoming objective through

the act. In the modus significandi there lies a certain state of

affairs as regards meaning. The essence of this form of meaning

now deserves clarification as such.

The term modus significandi can be understood either as

the modus significandi activus or the modus significandi passivus.

The modus activus is the act of meaning as an accomplishment of consciousness. It is called this because the bestowal of meaning by the apprehending consciousness is "like an action". The modus passivus means the result of the accomplishment, the objective correlate of the act, which Lotze designates as impression, immediate givenness to the extent is is conceived of in the measure of meaning, that is, is informed.[7] The modus activus is nothing else than the subjective side, the modus passivus being the objective side of meaning.

The same affair complex can be expressed in phenomenological terminology:

> From the noetic viewpoint the term expressing should designate a special stratum of acts with which all other acts must adjust themselves in their own manner and with which they must blend necessarily such that every noematic act-meaning and consequently its inherent relatedness to objectiveness (modus essendi) stamps itself "conceptually" revealing itself in the noematic factor of expressing (modus significandi passivus).[8]

Meaning gets a determinate form from the modus significandi:

> All logical distinctions and especially all distinctions of categorial form constitute themselves in logical acts in the sense of intentions (modi significandi activi).[9]

Since the differentiation of the parts of speech shows there

are different forms of meaning, the questions arise: What are

the categorial forms for meanings determined by? What does

the principle of their differentiation lie in? Duns Scotus formu-

lates this problem in the question: a quo modus significandi

radicaliter oriatur?

The modi significandi activi are subordinate to an essential

law in that they are a determined class of intentional acts of

consciousness. This law is valid for acts in general: intellectus

ad actum determinatum non vadit nisi aliunde determinatur.[19]

Acts are determined from somewhere. They are determined by

something which isn't form. In this there is expressed the neces-

sary correlation between the quality and the material of the act,

between noesis and noema, between form and content. This

principle of determination of the material of each form doesn't

say anything yet about the nature of the determining material.

A meaning is a meaning in a determinate form only by a deter-

minate modus significandi. The latter as act must be determined

by a specific material, that is, there corresponds to every modus

significandi a specific modus essendi. Thus, a new concept is

arrived at which is indispensable for the theory of the categories of

meaning.[11]

Nonetheless Duns Scotus adduces an objection against what has been said. The word deitas is feminine in gender but the genus is valid as the modus significandi. Nothing in this particular object meant, from out of which the relevant form could be determined, corresponds to the genus feminine as a form of meaning which includes in itself the thought of passivity. [12] The same is valid for privations and figments, since no real being is inferred in their meanings. Nonetheless, expressions for privations and figments, such as blindness, chimaera, also have specific forms of meaning and are subjected to specific categories of meaning. [13]

In solution to these objections, Duns Scotus indicates that the modus significandi of a meaning doesn't have to be taken directly from the perceptible material of the reality included in the meaning and of which the modus significandi is directly the determinate form. The form can be determined from somewhere else too, and it is sufficient that it doesn't contradict the content for which it is claimed to be the form; that is to say, it suffices that this form can become determinant for any content, or that the content allows of this informing. This assessment becomes especially meaningful for the modi significandi of abstract, extra-sensory meanings. Namely, we grasp these in forms of

meaning which were originally tailored to sensory meanings. The

objection in regard to the term _deitas_ is basically no objection since

genus must not be grasped as a form of meaning. However Duns

Scotus solves the apparent objection, which he took seriously, with

the help of an _important principle_. He also draws on it to put

aside the difficulty touching privations and figments. Privations

retain precisely the form of the _habitus_ corresponding to them

just as the meanings of fictive contents are determined by the

forms of meaning of the _partial meanings_ of _real_ content,

which construct them.[14]

The difficulty regarding privations doesn't seem to be quite

so satisfactorily solved, however. For it can be validly asserted

that forms of meaning determine the meaning content of the pri-

vation through the form of the _habitus_, if they are determined from

out of the _habitus_ as from their content, and thence they are

"false" as far as the determination of the form goes (_consignifi-

cative falsa_).[15] The "falsity" touched on here is not the

contrary of truth as is due to judgment and to it _only_. Accord-

ingly it's not without ground that Duns Scotus makes the addition

consignificative. A falsity is intended which can be only relative

to the _modi significandi_. According to the objection brought the

modus significandi is false formally. It lacks precisely _that which_

it appears to be. It gives itself out as the form of meaning of a privation and it is precisely not that; but it is as such a form of meaning of the _habitus_, of a meaning content, in which a real object is meant.

But in fact the form of meaning of the privative expression, determined by the _habitus_, is not consignificatively false; that is, privation has to be conceived of as _ens secundum animam_: Its actual being is its being known. If then on the basis of the above principle the _modus significandi_ must be determined by the _modus essendi_, and if the latter coincides with the _modus intelligendi_ in the case of privation, then the form of meaning, which is determined from _habitus_, is rightly due the privative meaning. If then on the basis of the above principle the _modus significandi_ must be determined by the _modus essendi_, and if the latter coincides with the _modus intelligendi_ in the case or privation, then the form of meaning, which is determined from _habitus_, is rightly due the privative meaning. Namely, privation can't be conceived of without reverting to _habitus_, which it negates (_privatio non cognoscitur nisi per habitum_).[16]

A noteworthy thought stands uncovered because of this extremely condensed but equally precise solution to the problem of the material determination of the form of meaning: namely, not

DUNS SCOTUS' THEORY OF THE CATEGORIES AND OF MEANING

BY

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN AND WITH INTRODUCTION BY

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Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning

Table of Contents

Martin Heidegger's work, <u>Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning</u> presents difficulties to the reader for two reasons. First the content of the work covers some subtle epistemological and ontological problems. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that Heidegger's subsequent works are all-pervasive. Almost instinctively, those familiar with his later works tend to think his early publications have the same outlook. They do not.

Two tasks arise at this point: the philosophical world in which Martin Heidegger moved when he wrote this work must be rediscovered, and we must uncover his chief philosophical concerns during the period of his early publication. However to do this we must take an indirect route. Since this work deals with Duns Scotus, an explanation of the thought of Duns Scotus - at least to the extent that it is presented in this work - is essential. Heidegger's thought in this work is presented in the context of a phenomenological study of Scotus. Understanding this book is impossible without at least some superficial knowledge of the salient features of Scotus' thought.

I

THE THOUGHT OF DUNS SCOTUS

Let us be forewarned that Heidegger displays in this early work the

same attitude that he does in his other historical writings. He places him-
self in dialogue with another thinker and thus shows little interest in mere
fact finding. It should not surprise us then if contemporary Scotist reviewed
the book and found it not to be a fair interpretation of Scotist thought. How-
ever, this should not be taken to mean that Heidegger has inadequate knowledge
of medieval thought. The notes to this work, if nothing else, give the lie
to that view.

A. Duns Scotus' Position in the History of Medieval Thought

Duns Scotus is called the _doctor subtilis_. There are reasons for this.
By accident of history he comes at the end of high scholasticism in the middle
ages and employs the common method of scholasticism, namely, a critical analy-
sis of former and current philosophical viewpoints with a view to arriving at
synthesis. Scotus was imbued with the Augustinianism of his order, the Friars
Minor, but he was also well conversant with the empiricist bent of Oxford
scholars such as Roger Bacon, with the Latin Aristotelianism of the schools,
and with the contributions of the Jews and Arabians, especially those of Avicenna.
These influences he interpreted from the standpoint of his own insights.

B. Scotus' View of the Division of Philosophy

Scotus follows Aristotle in distinguishing activity according to its
final cause. As regards human activity seen as facultative there are various
habitus or habits, that is, ease in performance flowing from the capacity or
faculty ordained to the final object and the frequency of performance. The
intellective _habitus_ admits of several distinctions respecting infused and
acquired knowledge. Acquired knowledge is either speculative or practical.
Speculative knowledge deals with thought or reality. Knowledge or the sciences
of the real are: metaphysics, mathematics, and physics in the sense of cosmology.

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The sciences of thought or rational sciences are logic, rhetoric, and grammar. This schema shows the importance of logic both for metaphysics and for grammar. It stands between the two. Medieval philosophy maintained a division (one that is perhaps not so clear today after the influences of critical philosophy) between logic as a propaedeutic to philosophy, formal logic, and logic as an applied method, material logic. It is such in metaphysics and grammar. It was a method of validation in order to arrive at science or certain knowledge.

Logic is related to grammar since both use language although in different ways or under different lights. Logic is concerned with language because the proposition at the very heart of logic is expressed in language. Logic has as its concern the truth or falsity of propositions. Yet logic comes even closer to grammar in the investigation of the term, since the inference of the term often is one which arises out of the language form. Thus the real is set in the domain of the intentional by language. The term can be seen as the intelligible species realized as the word. The word represents the real thing in the formal sign. The inference of the word is directly to the real thing. Thus, language differs from logic since formal logic is totally concerned with the intentional, whereas language as an intentional being directly refers to the real. Hence, Scotus states that a name signifies the thing immediately and not the concept.

It is from this juncture that logic can be applied to grammatical study to give rise to a clarification of the rational or intentional import of language, that is, to give precision to grammatical meanings. This is precisely the task of the Grammatica Speculativa which takes its stepping-off-point from this particular role assigned to logic by Duns Scotus. Thus, logic finds itself not only involved through its precision in deciding the truth or falsity of the

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objective reference in the propositional judgment, but also in the precision of its terms in the _verbum mentis_: language in the light of the intellect.

But logic also applies to the real since all knowledge has for its object being; or as has been stated, logic has as its concern precision in deciding the validity of the objective reference of a proposition. It is because of this object of the intellect, _ens_, that logic has its universal determination. It is concerned with everything and anything if it is an object of the intellect. On the contrary, metaphysics is concerned with being in that the universal conditions of reality are aspects of being. The rational concerns of logic are terms or intentions of which there are two kinds: first and second intentions. First intentions can roughly be called simple apprehension. Second intention is the conceptualization of the object.

C. _Scotus' Epistemology_

Human cognition renders adequate knowledge, but not absolute knowledge. The real object of first intention is not cognized absolutely, and hence there arises in second intention an adequate and adequated knowledge of the real object. Logic as a science is concerned with the conditions of adequation. These are the category, the judgmental proposition, and the syllogism. The syllogism is the proper object of logic. The other distinctions in logic can be reduced to the syllogism as the simple (_incomplexum_) or integral parts of it.

Another aspect of adequation is the universal nature of concepts. The intellect in adequating the object by means of the concept does so under the light of the universal signs or aspects of the real object. This in short is the major epistemological problem of scholastic thought. It must be remembered that scholasticism not only presupposed the subject, but assumed the real. The main epistemological problem of scholasticism was one of reconciling the universality

of the concept with the individuality of the real object, a problem that it inherited from the Arabians.

Scotus' own views of epistemology and solutions to the problem of the one and the many seem to have undergone a considerable development in the course of his writing. Scotus begins with the common scholastic notions of cognition. His further developments in this area have in view his concerns with the individual. All knowledge arises through the senses by simple apprehension. The proper object of each of the external senses is informed by the sense form of the real object and this is taken over by the internal senses which form a common image or species of the sense cognition. This intelligible species is concepualized by the faculty of the agent intellect and thus there arises the universal concept in the possible intellect. From the species arising from individual sense knowledge the universal concept is abstracted. This, very generally, is the common viewpoint of most of scholastic thought as to cognition. Duns Scotus' own views have this as a background.

But it must again be emphasized that the logic of Aristotle, especially as interpreted by the Arabians, is the point of departure for the epistemological views of the scholastics. Aristotle's localization of the universal in the real (at least this is the way that the Arabians conceived of it) is the background for the problem of the one and the many as well as the particular and the universal. Intellectual knowledge for Aristotle is of the universal and sense knowledge is of the particular. Furthermore, the scholastics find that intellectual knowledge is always knowledge through universals even though it arises from individual sense knowledge.

The intentional forms of the universal concept are the predicables: genus, species, property, and accident. The genus can be predicated of anything

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in _quid_ or can posit as a substance in that the _res et res_ (this thing and that thing) differ numerically. The same is the case with the species. Property and accident note the differences of a thing _in quale_, or as a further determination of the thing. A property can be a proper attribute in that it is necessarily implied in the specific definition of a thing. Often the distinction between two things in a species depend on these qualifications. The final distinction between two things is called the ultimate difference.

The _term_ itself must be seen as admitting to several distinctions. A term can be distinguished as to its supposition, for example, it can infer a real or intentional being. Or a term can have a direct or an indirect supposition or be a derived or denominative term.

Scotus considered the syllogism the heart of logic and the proposition or judgment the basic unit of the syllogism in that the proposition is the fundamental expression of a truth or a falsity. Two propositions form the premises of the syllogism. (According to Aristotle one of these must be universal.) The proposition consists of terms. These terms are simple or _incomplexa_, but the proposition is _complexum_ or compounded. But even the term can be compound. If a term can be reduced to two more ulterior terms, it is compound. A simple term or name arises out of the act of simple apprehension.

Universal certain knowledge is arrived at by use of predication in syllogistic reasoning. In other words, scholasticism was in search of clear definitions. A clear definition was conceived of ideally as the proximate genus with its specific difference, _e.g._, rational animal. The dialectic common to scholastic writings was syllogistic reasoning to arrive at such possible definitions. Certain knowledge was knowledge of the thing and its cause.

This summary view of Aristotelian logic as it was used by the scholastics

has a purpose. In this book it will be noted that the _Grammatica Speculativa_ which Heidegger used as his source for the forms of meanings has this type of logical outlook as its framework. This kind of epistemology forms the background of the _Grammatica Speculativa_ (thought at the time of Heidegger's writing as an early work of Scotus but later seen to be the work of Thomas of Erfurt). Scotus' later writing, or the authentic writing of Scotus, shows a considerably different epistemology. Nevertheless, an understanding of these points of Aristotle's logic will aid decidedly in understanding Scotus' doctrine of the transcendentals.

Scotus' concern for the individual brings him to abandon abstraction as the method by which the individual is grasped through a universal concept. He substitutes for it the term collecting. This activity of collecting notes from the particulars which are directly knowable in cognition is thus a mediate activity. Scotus develops a theory of knowledge as mediate, immanent act. It could be said that Scotus puts more emphasis on a theory of knowledge than a theory of cognition. This Heidegger takes careful note of in his explication of _verum_. However, Heidegger conceives of this in terms of the necessity of repudiating psychologism. He sees Scotus more clearly distinguishing the epistemological ramifications of the human activity of knowing from the psychic activity of cognition.

In cognition it is by means of the sense species that the object is simply or confusedly perceived, that is, is perceived without predications or terms of comparison (first intention). The terms of comparison rise out of the conceptualization by the intellect which in its active mode is conceived of as the agent intellect and in its passive mode as the possible intellect. But even if Scotus uses Aristotle's distinction of the two faculties of intellect:

the agent intellect and the possible intellect, he sees them not as two separate faculties, but as the active and passive modes (*modus intelligendi passivus* and *modus intelligendi activus*) of the act of knowing. Both sensation and the intellect are passive in that there is a movement from not-knowing to knowing. All knowledge is dependent on sense data in normal cognition. The object of cognition simply presents itself and aids thus in the creation of the phantasm or intelligible species according to the common notion of the object and after the manner of an instrument (*quasi instrumentum ipsius intellectus*). Nonetheless, even though cognition has a passive moment in that it is dependent on the object for its orgin, it is seen as primarily act since the appetitive power is the director and initiator of cognition in the senses just as the will is the initiator of intellective activity.

The instrumental role of the object can be more precisely put as first intention, the confused cognition of the object, and second intention, the conceptulization of the object. Although the sense species of the individual necessarily precedes the universal concept and there is no possibility of the universal concept without the phantasm or the sense species, first intention is merely included as inferred in knowledge. In other words, first intention is the immediate reference to the real object. The role of this reference in cognition is as the individual perceived species. The role of the objective reference in knowledge is as a phantasmic species on which notes can be made.

The sense species always arises through sensation. Scotus follows the common scholastic doctrine that sensation is always certain and free from error. It forms the proximate foundation for the certainty of knowledge because it is by reference to the date of sense that the judgmental consistency is arrived at. Thus, figments of the imagination and illusions are not seen to be

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false as sense, but can be false because the inference or their validity as notes is not at all certain in itself.

It is also on the basis of this sense certainty that we have awareness of ourselves. The intellect extracts from the inner sense that man has of himself a self-concept, and thus is aware both of what he is and that he is, although this knowledge is not immediate since it is dependent on the phantasm as again the mediate term.

Scholasticism distinguishes ordinarily between immanent and transient activity. Lower powers need more intermediaries in order to accomplish their ends, but higher powers are less in need of intermediaries for the accomplishment of their ends or perfection. A transient activity is one in which the agent and the end of the activity are definitely distinct because of the use of a means or intermediary to accomplish the end. An immanent activity is one in which the agent and the end are the same. Scotus views the intentional act of the intellect as an immanent activity. The activity of the intellect, the faculty or potentiality to know, is knowing and its end is knowing.

Scotus accepts the definition of truth as an adequation of the mind and the thing. His views of cognition and knowledge, as has been seen, have adequation for their background. The object stands to the intellect as the measured to the measure. The measure involved is the collection of notes from the sense species which creates the universal concept. Knowledge is primarily this immanent interplay between the sense species and the concepts of the intellect. Either one of them is an abstraction from the integral act that knowledge is. Truth is found primarily in the judgment or the judgmental sense as sufficient truth. Sense is infallible, thus safeguarding the sufficiency of knowledge. Falsity in judgment arises on the basis of an inadequate understanding

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of the inference in sense. But this should not be taken as the primary meaning of the true. Scotus saw the true in two lights. The true is that which is adequated to the intellect, the known in the knower, or it is the adequation of that which is produced to the productive intellect. However, underlying both of these aspects of _verum_ is that formality of _ens_ to be manifestible in itself and as itself. Even if there were no knowing intellects, _ens_ would decidedly still have an inherent attribute to be manifest.

D. Scotus' Metaphysics

Scotus accepts the common scholastic view that metaphysics is the science which studies being as being. Again there was considerable development in Scotus' views of metaphysical being. In his early commentaries on Aristotle he accepts the ten categories as the ultimate genera and, therefore, the most intelligible because they are the most universal aspects of being. However, this means that within the domains of the categories or the ranges which the categories cover, being shows itself to be equivocal. [1]

Scotus is not satisfied to let the question of the inference of the predication of the categories rest here. To avoid sundering _ens_ by logical equivocity, Scotus finds that there must not only be an analogical sameness to _ens_, but _ens_ necessarily is a univocal term unless it is denominative, which then makes being not to be the adequate object of the intellect. It can be seen here that the question arises because of Scotus' view of _being_ which we

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[1]
To say that scholasticism made extensive rise of this term and the terms correlative with it is an understatement. It should be recalled that Aristotle's logic distinguishes three senses in which a term can be predicated of an object: univocal, equivocal and derivative. Things are said to be named univocally which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. Things are said to be named equivocally when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Things are said to be named derivatively when they derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination, _e.g._, courage, courageous.

will discuss at greater length later. Suffice it to say that being, in that it is not distinct from the essence, has a quidditative connotation, but as _esse_ is derived and dependent and thus an attenuated sense of being. Hence, Scotus comes to the position that being must be predicated univocally in all of the categories. They are then derived senses of being.

Also in stating that the copulative is univocal, Scotus does not rule out the other senses of predication. Our own concepts are the basis of the analogous and equivocal aspects of being. This can be seen in the equivocal sense of a category in predication in which being as the copulative is always the same. Thus Scotus finds being to be univocal because of the need for consistency in judgment, of the principle of non-contradiction. _Ens_ as a univocal term is both the consistency of judgmental sense, its measure, and the basis for the intelligibility of the real and, thus, coextensive with the real. Hence Scotus comes to find the ten categories as insufficient in that they can be seen to be valid logically, but they must be seen as having a _metaphysical_ genus prior to them, _ens communissime sumptum._ This is _ens in se_ or _esse purum._ Again the act of judgment for Scotus is a validation based on the intelligibility and univocity of _ens_ but Heidegger tends to view judgment in this work as a transcendental structure. Both Scotus and transcendental philosophy may find knowledge a productive act, but Scotus does not view the productive activity of the intellect as directly constitutive of the object. _Ens_ as the measure of knowledge is more so because of its inferred nature than as any determination in the sense of delimitation. It is on this basis that Heidegger can declare that the rod for measuring the object in the judgmental act is broken.

Besides _ens in se_ there is _ens habens esse,_ which is a denominative form of being falling under the ten categories. Thus the univocity of being is

not to be interpreted as primarily the logical measure of being.

Transcendence is then that aspect of being which is prior to the ten categories. There are two genera of transcendent being, that is, intrinsic modes: created and uncreated being. God is being, but creatures have being. This fact, that being is univocal in even these two genera, points up the indifferent nature of being.

E. Scotus' View of the Categories

Transcendence, then, properly belongs to metaphysics and not to logic. Logic deals with ens as adequated to it, but this adequated being goes beyond, that is, transcends its sufficient comprehension as the absolute. The transcendent absolute is metaphysical being which is indifferent to the genera: created and uncreated or finite and infinite. In other words, that which is transcendent is: ens, unum, verum, bonum, as formalities of each other and not species.

Scotus finds other attributes of infinite and finite being which do not belong to all being. These are the disjunctive predications of ens: action and passion, act and potency, substance and accident, contingency and necessity etc. It is beyond our scope to deal here with the disjunctive predications of being as they relate to the ten categories, or the possibilities of transcendence outside of metaphysical being, such as wisdom.

Ens as the first intelligible is the simplest and most universal of all concepts and applies to all save when an impossibility is involved. This universality and univocity of ens does not mean that no predication can be made to it. It merely means that the kind of predication must be viewed as non-tautologous only to the extent that there is a distinction in the predicate arising out of a formality.

Scholasticism makes frequent use of various types of distinctions,

differences, diversities, and relations. A distinction does not mean a lack of unity in the object, but it merely means a lack of identity. A logical distinction sees different aspects in the object which are in reality the same. A formal distinction is the existence of more than one form in an object. On the basis of formalities predications can be made of ens. These are all implicit in ens as the first intelligible.

Since ens is the first intelligible, all possibility of cognition depends on it. Ens is the proper object of the intellect under the aspect of intelligibility. It is the object from which the intellect is defined. An object is adequate or commensurate to a faculty in two ways: by prime inference or by primacy of commonness. Scotus insists ens is the commensurate object of the intellect in both ways. It cannot simply be what is inferred in knowledge that can function as an adequate object, because eventually inference must arrive at its object and there is no single object that is inferred. But in all that is inferred there is already being. Thus being is the object of the intellect by common inference.

Metaphysics for Scotus is primarily transcendental in the sense that he makes use of the term. This can be concluded both from his definition of the object of metaphysics (ens in quantum ens) and from the definition of ens as the object of the intellect by common inference.

It is now necessary to further elucidate ens as the first intelligible to better grasp the relation of the convertibles of ens to it as propriae passiones entis.

Scotus finds no real distinction in ens as esse and essentia. Rather ens can be seen as the first intelligible to be in first intention as a certain something. Ens is intuited or known confusedly to be a certain quiddity or

whatness. But this quiddity -- precisely because of its confused, that is, un-differentiated nature -- cannot be the subject of metaphysics. For all science to be certain knowledge must be based on necessary being and not on merely contingent existents. Thus, _ens_, even though it is the first intelligible and the most universal of concepts, cannot as such be the object of metaphysics except to the extent that it implies necessity. Thus the object of metaphysics is _ens_ as that by which something is what it is. From this comes its penchant to have _esse_. As such it is indifferent to the singular and the universal and, depending upon the light under which it is viewed, it can be seen as the physical universal, the logical universal, or the metaphysical universal; or as a real singular it is the object of physics, as a universal or singular in thought it is the logical universal, and as it is in itself without any other determination it is the metaphysical universal. _Ens_ as the _maxime scibile_, that is, as the universal in itself, is the proper object of metaphysics. _Esse_ is restricted by Scotus to the physical universal. This is what actually exists. Any other use of _esse_, for instance, as a logical universal, is always qualified, _e.g._, _esse diminutum_.

As has already been stated, _ens_ has two intrinsic modes: finite and infinite. Finite being is being that has existence (_ens habens esse_) and in-finite being is being that is _ens in se_. Finite being is proximate to us because of our dependence on the phantasm. Its place in metaphysics is as a point of departure. Finite being is always derived and dependent and thus calls for its correlary. However, the same is not true of the converse.

Let us now see how the transcendentals are related to _ens_. _Ens_ is an irreducible, simple term and concept. Therefore, it is indefinible since no genus, species or property can properly be found for it according to strict

logic. It can be predicated, universally _in quid_, but also it can be pre-
dicated _in quale_ as inferred in figments, illusions, and improbable essences.
All of the other transcendentals are predicated of _ens_ and inferred in all
predications _in quale_. They are **predicable** of _ens_ after the manner of a proper
attribute. A proper attribute is that qualifying property of a subject which
is inferred in the essential definition of the subject, but not part of the
definition. The transcendentals are convertible with _ens_ in this sense since
they have no quiddity of their own, but necessarily are simply qualifications
of being as what is ultimately inferred in it as the proper object of the intel-
lect by common inference. Nonetheless, they are not properties in the sense
that a middle term can be used in a syllogism to relate them to _ens_, this being
because of their lack of quiddity. Hence they transcend the functions of normal
logic as they transcend the categorial.

F. Scotus' Standpoint on the Final Causes

So far we have spoken of Duns Scotus' epistemology and ontology --
at least to the extent that Heidegger touches on them. But Heidegger also
touches on Scotus' cosmology. Thus we must make some mention of the pertinent
principles which come to the fore in Heidegger's interpretation.

Following peripatetic thought in general, Scotus finds all sensible
and all finite being, to be constituted by the four causes: efficient, final,
material, and formal.

All finite being is derived and dependent being. The dependency of
being is fourfold since it depends on the four causes. The four causes are
traditionally divided into extrinsic and intrinsic causes. The formal and
material causes are intrinsic causes: they are constitutive of the thing.
Scotus conceives of matter as the principle of finitude. It is a shapeless,

invisible, all-receiving actuality which is intelligible but only through form. All of reality is either actual or potential. Matter in itself partakes of actuality, but it is dependent on form and, therefore, is in potency in relation to form. Both matter and form together make up the composite. The individual composite is distinguished in its own uniqueness by its thisness or haecceity. As has been seen, the unique individual being for Scotus is the only being which has _esse_ or existence and is known in cognition _confuse_, that is, in itself without any immediate terms of reference which would make knowledge of it absolute.

To further explicate haecceity, it is necessary to come to a closer understanding of Scotus' view of form and formality. Form is the principle of actuality in the composite of finite being. As such it is also the primary intelligible aspect of a composite. Although matter has **actuality**, it is not totally actual but has potency to form, allowing successive forms. In the composite there may exist a series of forms, some of them substantial, that is, causing the composite to exist in itself or independently, and others accidental or proper forms inhering in the substance. Thus it must be seen that any composite does not rest necessarily on an identity of form, but on an integral unity of the successive substantial and accidental forms.

This is the basis for Scotus' doctrine of the formal distinction. The existence of multiple forms in a composite means that there is in the composite, a plurality of unified forms, that is, forms that are not really distinct, forming a separate _res_ or thing, but which are distinct from each other in their identity. Thus composites consist of formalities or inter-related complexes of forms. Any composite thing presents in its unity a series of non-identical formal aspects. These aspects are really the same in the unity of the thing, but they are formally distinct in the actual existence of the thing. This is in germ Scotus _distinctio formalis ex natura rei_ or _a parte rei_, or the formal

distinction according to the nature of the thing. Haeceity, a term more Scotist than Scotus, is a formality of the composite. It is a final preparation of matter in the taking on of the individual substantial form, but on the other hand the substantial form of a composite thing can be seen to be varying in intensity of degree among the various members of a species. Thus any individual nature can be said to be more like the common specific nature, which is likewise a coordinate form, or less like it. What can be seen here is the doctrine often attributed to Scotus that the final or ultimate form is necessarily the specifying form based on the ultimate difference. Any ultimate form may be merely another coordinate, albeit more individualizing, form of the composite. The individual is this unique individual as a composite which is its own coordination of forms in accord with the potential of matter to dispose itself for this individual complex.

The coordinate forms in a composite exist as actualities subservient to the specific form of the individual. As such they make up one thing which is actualized according to the various modes of its formalities.

. G. Logical Aspects of Medieval Thought

We have been tracing those doctrines of Scotus which Heidegger touches on in his interpretation of Scotus and paying particular attention to the logical aspects of this doctrine. This is perforce a necessity. Scotus obviously distinguished between the realms of metaphysics and logic. Nonetheless, it must be realized that scholastic thought owed much to Aristotle's logic. More than anything else it is the framework of Scholastic thought, allowing for its successes and forming the basis of its problem areas. The application of the dialectical method, the use of the syllogism and of syllogistic reasoning gave rise in scholasticism not only to a concern with objectivity, taken as the

logically certain, but also to the use and creation of distinctions to a degree not found elsewhere. Hence there is central to scholastic thought, and the thought of Scotus, the use of identity, relation, and distinction.

At this point a work of caution is in order. Since knowledge was merely taken for granted and the real presupposed, the role of logic in scholastic thought was not as central as it is in the thought of Kant, for instance. Heidegger himself expresses this caution in his introduction to this work. Unfortunately, he does not seem to take his own warning **seriously enough in his** interpretation of Scotus. For scholasticism, logic is merely a method of verification and a study of human thought processes. Thus the transcendentals are conceived of as totally real entities and not at all intentional. This is also true of relation, identity, and distinction.

Scotus' thought has often been called Formalism because he makes extensive use of the formal distinction. We have only attempted to show the basic ontological foundation of the formal distinction and formalities. This distinction does have further application, both ontological and epistemological. To better understand the formal distinction, we must further explain distinction and its correlative terms: relation and identity.

Unity differs from identity. For real unity, that is, for something to be considered as an aspect of a thing, res (Scotus does not put res among the transcendentals as do some other scholastics. He does, however, consider it a simple term) there is no need for identity. Formal identity is the characteristic of the species, either of the thing (real) or as an intentional object. This differs from real identity. Real identity simply means that two objects are the same thing because they have the potency to be actually the same. Of course to speak of an actual identity of things is at once inane and, at the same

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time, beyond the scope of scholastic thought. It is merely presupposed. Aristotle spoke of synonyms both as to terms and concepts. Scholasticism never seems to have gone beyond this in asking about actual identity. Perhaps it is one of those often spoken of modern traits of Scotus' thought that he moves toward identity in being by use of univocity in describing being and by careful attention to the transcendental _unum_. In conclusion it can be said that a perfect identity does depend on a perfect or formal unity, but a formal or perfect unity does not depend on a perfect identity.

Formal identity —and correspondingly formal distinctions and relations— is one in which there is a sameness in its formal ground (_ratio_) and thus also primarily and in itself the same. This means to say that the ground definition in some fashion is also applicable as a definition to the second term. Scotus insists on the possibility of having real identity without having formal identity. This conclusion has its obvious ramifications in the realm of the transcendentals. The other transcendentals are convertible with _ens_ because they are all really identical. However, they are formally distinct.

Distinction is the correlative of identity. Just as the two terms of a comparison are necessarily really or formally identical without the aid of the intellect, so a real distinction rests on there being a divergence independent of the intellect. Since this divergence in reality does not depend on the intellect it is termed a _distinctio a parte rei_, or _ex natura rei_. Moreover since such distinctions are not correlative to unity, they are indifferent to the singular and plural. Scotus does make use of logical distinctions. But these should not be confused with the frequently used term, a virtual distinction. For, there are only two fundamental distinctions: a real distinction or a logical distinction. All other distinctions, _e.g._, essential distinctions,

accidental distinctions, substantial distinctions etc., fall in some way or another under these two distinctions. As a result it would seem that the virtual distinction is something of a misnomer since it would destroy the division of the real from the intentional. It would seem more exact if the virtual distinction were not referred to as a distinction at all, but seen merely as the *fundamentum in re*, the real ground for a logical distinction. Scotus' formal distinction is a kind of real distinction, just as are essential and accidental distinctions; but it differs from other real distinctions because the formal distinction is one in which the forms are actually distinct but really identical.

Thus the coordinate forms of a *res* can be said to be unified in the thing but distinctly differentiated. In other words, a thing is constituted by formalities. This doctrine of formal non-identity has been seen to have repercussions as far as the transcendentals are concerned, namely, we have noted that the transcendentals are formally distinct but not really distinct, and more than a virtual distinction. Formal non-identity also has import for Scotus' doctrine of the faculties of the soul. The will and the intellect are formalities of the soul. From this it could be concluded that they also are formally distinct since faculties are defined by their proper object. However, this is not the case since the transcendentals other than *ens* are predicated of *ens in quale*. Thus it must be concluded that the object of the will is not *bonum*, nor is *verum* the object of the intellect. The proper object of both faculties is *ens*. The will can move or incline the intellect to attend to or gain knowledge of an object. The will too is related to *verum* to the extent that cognition depends on its activity in the act of cognition. To the degree that the intellect is apperceptive of the object to which the will reacts, the intellect is related to *bonum*. The transcendentals are not virtually distinct. Hence they are not the

<u>fundamenta in re</u> which can serve as objects of the human faculties.

Besides positive relations and distinctions, there are negative relations and distinctions. Negative relations and distinctions must be kept distinct from a negative content however. They are not the same thing. Thus many terms which are expressed in the negative are positive in content, <u>e.g.</u>, immortal. We have seen that Scotus considers such terms as the transcendent counterpart of derived and dependent finite being. Thus there is a general procedure in Scotus from the less perfect to the more perfect by way of negation. In other words, the negative aspects are removed, thus allowing for the conceptualizing of the perfection in itself. Usually this removal of the negative aspect of an entity is expressed as a negative relation. What must be remembered is that in the use of negative relations there must always be a <u>terminus a quo</u>, a derived but nonetheless positive content.

Besides this there are the distinctions between negation and privation. Privation is a lack of that which is proper to an object. The common example is the lack of sight in a blind man. Negation is simply the non-presence of that which isn't proper to the object. For instance, the lack of mobility on the part of a stone is not something that the stone doesn't have, but something that is not there.

H. <u>Number</u>

A final word should be said about number. The individual is that which has concrete existence. As such it is singular. Singularity implies not only the basis of number, but also a certain undividedness in itself and dividedness from all else. Thus two negative relations are involved in the singular. The haecceity of the object makes every singular object to be non-synonymous with every other object. Yet this uniqueness is a positive content

which is expressed negatively as the lack of division in the subject. Number
is based on the haecceity of the object, but not on its uniqueness. Rather it is
based on the singularity of the object, a note which each existent partici-
pates in. As such it falls under the category of quantity, under which can be
subsumed indivisibleness. As quantified, each number can be seen to stand in
definite relations to each other number, or can be plotted as definite integers
of set distance or size from each other. Thus number cannot be seen as the
ultimate form arising from the ultimate distinction that arises between the given
number and the last integer. This distinction pertains to any one of the numbers
as an ultimate difference. Objects can be counted because of their specific
nature as a quantified descrete object.

II

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S EARLY THOUGHT

A. Perspective on Heidegger's Development

Heidegger's thought has been divided into several periods: the young
or Ur-Heidegger, Heidegger I or early Heidegger, Heidegger II or later Heidegger,
the contemporary Heidegger. Not everyone makes the same divisions. Nor are
the divisions made seen to be significant to the interpretation of Heidegger's
thought. Be that as it may, the young Heidegger certainly has viewpoints that
are distinct from his later views as he himself attests. This book is the
major work of the young Heidegger -- in length if nothing else. Heidegger has
a publishing history of fifteen years before the publication of Being and Time
catapulted him to world fame.[1]

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[1] These are the works of Heidegger published before 1927.

Continued

1. "Das Realitaetsproblem in der Modernen Philosophie" in _Philosophisches Jahrbuch,_ 1912, (25) pp. 353-363.

2. "Neue Forschungen Fuer Logik" in _Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,_ Freiburg im Breisgau, 1912 (38), pp. 466-72, 517-24, 565-70.

3. Review for _Kants Briefe in Auswahl,_ F. Ohmann, ed., Leipzig, 1911, in _Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,_ Freiburg im Breisgau, 1913, (39) p. 74.

4. Review for N. Bubnoff, _Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit, Ein grundlegender theoretisch-philosophischer Gegensatz in seinen typischen Ausgestaltungen und in seiner Bedeutung fuer die modernen philosophischen Theorien,_ Heidelberg, 1911, in _Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,_ Freiburg im Breisgau, 1913, (39) pp. 178-79.

5. Review for F. Brentano, _Von der Klassifikation psychischer Phaenomene, Neue durch Nachtraege stark vermehrte Ausgabe der Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt,_ Leipzig, 1911, in _Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,_ Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914, (40) pp. 233-34.

6. Review for C. Sentroul, _Kant und Aristoteles,_ L. Heinrichs trans., Kempten und Muenchen, 1911, in _Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,_ Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914 (40) pp. 330-32.

7. Review for F. Gross, _Kant-Laienbrevier, Eine Darstellung der kantischen Welt und Lebensanschauung fuer den ungelehrten Gebildeten aus Kants Schriften, Briefen, und muendlichen Aeusserungen, Zusammengestellt von Dr. F. Gross,_ 2rt verbesserte Auflage, Munich, 1912 in _Literarische Rundschau fuer das katholische Deutschland,_ Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914 (40) pp. 376-377.

8. _Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus,_ Leipzig, 1914. Freiburg im Breisgau (dissertation at Freiburg, 1913).

9. "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft" in _Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik,_ 161 (1916) pp. 173-188 (for the venia legendi in July, 1915).

10. _Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus,_ Tuebingen, 1916 (slightely changed for print with a concluding chapter from the habilitation reading, summer semester 1915).

11. Review of own book Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus in Kant Studien XXI. (1917) pp. 467-468.

12. "Abendgang auf der Reichenau" in: Das Bodenseebuch, 1917, Constance, p. 152.

This publishing history of his and the comments that have been made about the privately issued or unpublished writings of this time seem to indicate that Heidegger's development falls into an early period (1912-17) during which he is publishing -- a period in which his development in thought in many respects parallels that of Husserl between the Logical Investigations (which Heidegger admits influenced him greatly) and Husserl's Ideas. After 1917 Heidegger sees himself as a phenomenologist. It would seem probable that the long period of non-publication prior to Being and Time and the works published shortly after that, was a period of gestation.[2]

Whatever validity is given to these various divisions of Heidegger's philosophical output, one thing is clear: Heidegger's Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning cannot be interpreted merely as a less developed version of his later writings. Heidegger himself has warned us specifically against this in his Unterweg zur Sprache, published in 1961. There he tells us that he sees this work from a fundamentally different viewpoint than he did at the time of its writing. Then, he had attempted to investigate the question of being and its relation to language in this work. Now, however, he admits this relationship was not completely clear to him at the time.

B. Heidegger's Early Approach to Language

We must investigate Heidegger's understanding of the terms of the relation

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[2] The same was the case with Max Scheler between his dissertation on the "Relations between Logical and Ethical Principals" (1897) and his famous "Formalism in Ethics" (1913-16). Unfortunately, Heidegger had no access to Scheler's first volume on logic, the Logik I since the author withdrew its publication in 1905-6. A farsimile of the galley proofs of Scheler's Logik I was published by permission of the general editor of the collected edition of Scheler's works at the Elhuis Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1975.

between language and being. We can do so in the present work, however, only by indirection, since it is Scotus' thought that is the vehicle of Heidegger's investigation into the contemporary problem of the categories and of meaning. This is evidenced by Heidegger's own admission in his review of the work, which is appended to this dissertation.

Even in his early work, Heidegger is not dealing with language as merely an ontic phenomenon. He expressly claims that his level of investigation is one that is ontic-transcendental. He is fully cognizant that the word in itself, i.e., as sense perceptible object, has no immediate relation to known things. The central nexus in which the modus significandi (the way in which the meaning exists or means) and the modus essendi (the manner after which things exist) are united in the modus intelligendi (the manner of knowing) in the terminology of Scotus. Here, Heidegger turns to Husserl, thus showing the influence of the latter on his own development. It is only in the context of experience (Erlebnisse) that language takes on meaning. (Heidegger designates this as the teleology of language.) Also according to Husserl, language is an intermediary between two levels of acts: from above, the logical limits of language and from below, the limit of mute and elemental experience. Heidegger states that language is primarily concerned with content and this content is subject to logical worth. But logical worth depends upon an act of consciousness. By an act of consciousness is not meant, however, the individual psychic acts which change as the disposition of the individual changes.

C. Language & Logic

The act of judgment as a psychic act has an import that transcends the level of the merely psychic. This is the logical act of judgment and it stands at the juncture of language content and the object. This can be seen in the two moments of the modus significandi: the modus significandi passivus

and the _modus significandi activus_. The modus pa ivus takes up the language content as object and the _modus activus_ as the act of predication, the _modus intelligendi activus_ thus finds itself restricted to the content of language (and Heidegger suggests that it be designated as noetic). Although a restriction it should not be seen as being merely negative, for the _modus significandi_ has the universal tendency to touch on everything. Whatever meanings can be found in the _modus intelligendi_ as formed on the basis of the forms of the _modus essendi_, arise at the moment of judgment as that moment which obtains or is valid for sense or meaning. It is at this point that a theory of meaning becomes nothing other than a division of logic. The _modus essendi_ finds in its content the categories of meaning which, through judgment, are raised to the structures of logic in the _modus intelligendi_.

We find ourselves presented with a logic of grammar, a much discredited concept, especially at the time of Heidegger's writing. This is not to say that language can be directly and primarily deduced from formal laws; for Heidegger recognizes a dual aspect of language -- one that is open to theoretical treatment and one which is not. Logic may be universal in its application, but its application is always from the standpoint of the cohesion of thought. language as an ontic phenomenon can be viewed from a transcendental aspect.

D. _Theory of Science_

This is the context in which Heidegger deals with a theory of science and his discussion of a theory of science as a merely schematized possibility makes it amply clear that the logical treatment of language is from a theoretical aspect and solely that.

Most theories of science have failed because theory and practical concerns are combined in them. This has been possible because sufficient care

has not been taken in theorizing on the sciences. Since the immediate is always merely given and in need of demonstration, the movement to the realm of demonstration is the point of creation of the diverse domains of reality. Whatever domain of reality in question, it will create its own use of the categories and methodology if not strapped to merely practical concerns rather than having ontic-transcendental depth. Obviously, because of the hermeneutic circle, crises will arise in the sciences calling for re-evaluation and furthermore, the deepening of criticism in the history of thought will leave the system open. Logic is again limited to logical application.

E. Teleology of Language

On the basis of the limits of logic, a logic of grammar also excludes genetic consideration. Genetic considerations do not give rise to a grammar of language. The meaningfulness of language flows from its teleology. This is its proper given. But in the proper given the meaning-giving-word is seen to be already formed. Thus the past of language has some importance. The question of the past in this regard is most amply treated in the conclusion. Heidegger actually wrote the conclusion of this work at a later date, at the time of its publication. Besides being rhetorical in nature, it looks at the viewpoints presented in the work with some degree of retrospect. He notes that the exposition that he has made has not really dealt with the full implications of the teleological aspects of which the past is one. Respecting the past and its history, Heidegger warns against looking at the task of history as merely an empirical relating of facts just as a theory of science must have more than merely practical concerns. History must find its delimitation in a meta-physical-teleological determination. Thus the teleology of language is seen as a type of teleology, that is, the arrival at its own completion in accord

with its nature or proper methodology. It does not differ from the general
teleology of mind. But mind is only to be fully conceived of in light of its
history, conceptualized philosophically. This activity leads to an ever more
profound view of the cosmos.

F.   Present View of Language and Later Views

In this work of the young Heidegger, the elements of his thought on lan-
guage are present as they are in Being and Time. In Being and Time Heidegger
speaks of speech rather than language. In other words he speaks of language
from its teleological aspect, ultimately, the logos. Consequently, language
cannot be treated as mere words. It will be remembered that in Being and Time
Heidegger coins the term Woerterdinge, an almost polemical expression to point
up this devaluation of language. In this work Heidegger insists on the content
of language as that which is meaningful. This meaningful content has a certain
manner of meaning or forms of meaning. This is not too different from the sense
of language being in its interpretation. Even further than this, speaking,
along with silence and listening, is the meaningful link that allows for under-
standing in being-in-the-world. All in all, it would seem that the explana-
tion of language given in Being and Time is merely a more articulated version of
what is presented in this work and that in both works language is a formed and
formative element of experience.

This would be the case if we didn't pay close attention to the context
in which language is discussed in both of these works. Heidegger states in his
conclusion that the theory of meaning can only be properly viewed if set in the
context of judgment and the subject and thus it takes on significance on an
ontic-transcendental level. Heidegger attempted in both of these works to
relate language to being, but in this work being -- and consequently meaning--

are taken as somthing static (ontic). The work rests on a metaphysical position which Heidegger later abandons.

G. Influences on the Young Heidegger

Heidegger was influenced in his early development not only by Husserl, but also by the neo-Kantians, particularly by Rickert and Lask, to a lesser degree by Kuelpe and Lotze. Heidegger specifically takes note of this in his autobiographical statement. We can see, however, that the direction of his thought at this period was away from the neo-Kantians and toward positions similar to those of Husserl, if we recall that he also speaks of the necessity of repudiating the neo-Kantians in his colloquium with Ernst Cassirer on the island of Davos. However, the influence of the neo-Kantians is strongly in evidence in this work. We have already noted that in this work there are allusions to the major concern of the neo-Kantians, namely, the logic of science. It would seem that under this influence the early realism of Heidegger developed as a critical realism interested in the problem of judgment from which is viewed the validity of logic, speech, and grammar. In a similar stance to Nicolai Hartmann, Heidegger originally insisted on the presumption of the real. Later, more careful analyses of judgmental sense not only developed his critical views, but eventually led to an abandonment of realism in favor of phenomenology.

H. Transcendental Standpoints in this Work

The framework of Kantian transcendentalism stands out in Heidegger's position that the question of forms of meaning and of the categories can only be seen in its true significance if set in the context of the subject-object relation. He further notes in his treatment of form that Kant was the first to discover the meaningfulness of form for logic. Thus critical philosophy which conceives of logic as a study of the epistemological possibilities of man

is the unifying thread of this work and from out of this view of logic or from a transcendental viewpoint both being and the forms of meaning are investigated. The transcendental aspect of the ontic phenomenon of language is its grammatical meaning--the logical value found in the kinds of grammatical distinctions and nexus that language makes.

Form, of course, also existed for the scholastics, but it must be realized that since the critical problem did not exist for the scholastics, form was never primarily an epistemological structure. Even though form is the primarily intelligible aspect of the thing and thus it is at the very basis of any scholastic epistemology, and even though there are formal terms, formal concepts, formal propositions etc. in logic, scholastic logic did not consider these terms in their radical epistemological consequences, but rather as a further ontological extension of the doctrine of form as a real cause. As an ontological extension, cognition and knowledge could be seen in causal terms and only aspects of the critical problem come to light in the problem of the universal. Logical form is not concerned with function, in that ontological truth is primarily inherent in it, but logical function reather has an ontological basis of which it is an attenuated manifestation. The function of logic is to render certain knowledge by conforming to the real which is intelligible in itself and thus conforms to logical function.

But the central concern of Heidegger in this work is the critical problem of judgment and the significance of judgmental sense. It is only from out of his critique of judgment that his other concerns become understandable. The question of being in this work is found in Heidegger's critical views.

This is not to say that Heidegger failed to recognize that the place of logic in transcendental idealism is decidedly different from the place it

occupies in any philosophy preceding it. Heidegger expressly notes this in speaking of Kant and finds that a critical view on which can be based a theory of science was not really attempted to any significant extent before Kant. Further, he finds that this critical view must be extended and more thoroughly investigated if knowledge of the domains of reality is to be advanced. Heidegger's view that reality has determinate domains is a stance that he shared at the time of his work with the neo-Kantians and is known to have abandoned in his lectures shortly after the first world war. Heidegger held the view, common to many contemporary philosophers and especially to the neo-Kantians, that an investigation of being as such was impossible other than as an ontical investigation. The terms that describe such an investigation are called "categories".

This point is significant because Heidegger's critical stance not only leaves unclear the relation of language to being, but it also leads Heidegger to interpret Scotus in a way that is greatly at variance with Scotus' view of the role of the categories and the relation of thought and being.

I. The Critique of Judgment

Let us examine more closely this second term of our relation being largely as judgmental sense, from the standpoint of a critique of judgment. Heidegger's critique of judgment; as it stands in evidence in his interpretation of Scotus, can be summarized as follows. Meaning can obtain or be valid for the real as object of cognition. By this assimilation to cognition the object is invested with the index of cognition -- judgment. Because the object is assimilated to knowledge through judgment, every judgment is said to obtain or be valid. The judgment is sufficient for the various domains that come under its scrutiny. As has been said, meaning and intelligibility arise because of the assimilation of the object through judgment. It should not be assumed, however,

that the object is anything other than that which is known. True, there is a residue that must be sought after by continual refinement of view. But it must be remembered that what is being dealt with is immanent thought. The residue that fails in judgment is no absolute unknown, but the basis for the teleology of mind.

Hence any construct of the object as an intentional copy must be repudiated. The destructive nature of psychologism is evident here. It is only from out of psychologism that solipsism and copy theories arise. Heidegger spends much of his effort in his other early writings: _Das Realitaetsproblem in der modernen Philosophie_ (1912) and _Die Lehre von Urteil in Psychologismus_ (1914) on this problem. The act of judgment as valid sense is not just an individual act of the ego. The act positioning the ego is one act, the same for each ego and as an intentional act the same as any other thesis. It is rather that thought works with meaning contents than with concepts of things. These contents form a peculiar domain to which all other levels of act must relate. Heidegger's view of the transcendental is not based on the a priori as such, but on the ability of judgment to attain to being. But this assimilation of being to judgment then makes any ontology necessarily conformed to the capabilities of judgmental sense.

We can see here a further implication of Heidegger's view of being as an ontic concern. In rejecting psychologism, Heidegger also rejects any possibility of a view of being that is dynamic, since this rejection necessitates a view of being that is abstract. By removal of the psychic act Heidegger finds that the sense of judgment is not involved with events or processes, that is, not with the concepts of things but with meaning contents that allow for categorization on the basis of judgmental acts founding valid method. In other words, Heidegger's view on the sense of judgment approaches

Husserl's view of philosophy as a science of essences. Certainly, Heidegger was fully aware of the abstractive nature of his logical concern. He states that the "is" in the proposition does not extend to the manifoldness of experience (the concepts of things) but must not be reduced to a mere copulative relation. There is this homogeneous realm of meaning contents arising out of the sameness of judgment.

Again Heidegger's view of the place of logic in philosophy brings him to skew his interpretation of Scotus. Scotus accepts univocal, equivocal, and analogical concepts of things. He merely insists that the predication of these concepts has a univocal moment since the object of the intellect is _ens_, conceived of as necessary and hence as an essence in the broadest sense. _Ens_ is the common inference of all acts of judgment as a predication _in quid_, that is, as to what it is. Hence in each act of predication all the transcendentals and all the categories are univocally inferred. For Scotus categorial domains are impossible except in an attenuated sense as mere concepts of things.

Heidegger sees this as a failure of medieval philosophy and holds to the view that domains of reality are a critical refinement beyond the view of Scotus. Heidegger is standing at the -- it would seem -- impossible point of attempting to find agreement between neo-Kantian criticism and Husserl's intentionality. The meaning contents as experience assimilated through judgment are categorized and thus, there arise the transcendentals as the ultimate categories of judgment. They are the central features of being -- being as the basic sameness of the judgmental sense. It may be observed -- as Heidegger does -- that this view is very similar to Husserl's noema. But besides the fact that Heidegger's view of intentionality differs from Husserl in that he is still holding to neo-Kantian criticism, Heidegger's views of intentionality

differs from Husserl in another important respect: He is known to have rejected in his lectures shortly after the First World War, the transcendental ego, substituting for it the transcendental nature of the real. [3]

J. Heidegger's Approach to Scotus' Categories

Heidegger examines three of Scotus' four ultimate genera. He does not examine bonum, the good. Under verum, the true, he examines the problem of judgment, but this is also true in a more derived sense of his examination of ens and unum, being and the one, since a critical stance is the unifying bond of the work. (Scotus himself considers the transcendental verum to be in itself independent of judgment.) Heidegger states that ens is the first determination of judgment, both in determining judgment and in judgment being determined. Unum presupposes ens as is the case with all of the ultimate genera. Unum is that aspect of ens which allows for its multiplicity because an object is one object and not any other object. Thus, unum is that aspect of ens which points up what ens is not, namely, not another. The another in question here must be kept distinct from the other (alterum) which Scotus considers an irreducible concept. The distinction is that unum shows the indivisiveness of ens as indifferent to all distinctions, whereas the other is always that particular res (thing) and not this res.

But more than this, unum is an equivocal term: It means both one and the one. Heidegger deals extensively with the concept of one as number. And it is at this point that the divergence between Heidegger and Scotus stands at cross purposes. Although Heidegger finds that the context in which he is dealing, namely, an interpretation of Scotus aimed at investigation the problem

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[3]   Conf. introduction to this work.

of the transcendentals and their domains and the forms of meaning insofar as grammar impinges on logic, is not the place for attempting to distinguish the realms of the logical and the mathematical, nonetheless, Heidegger approaches the question of the one and one with this problem in mind. Scotus, on the other hand, gave extensive treatment to _unum_ because of his concern with the univocity of being in the context of the problem of the one and the many which is transposed into epistemological terms as the problem of the particular and the universal. The sameness of _ens_ can be seen as its form of oneness.

Heidegger notes that Scotus found that the thing (_res_) as a unity was in itself indifferent to singularity and plurality, but exists as uniquely individual. The singular is an abstraction of the individual based on its being undivided in itself. Specificity only comes into question in the case of counted objects. In this instance the discreteness arising from out of the specificity of the object is necessary for classification. The unique individual then is indifferent to the same and the different, the singular and the plural, the one and the other. The one is predicated of each and every _ens_ as an _in quale_ predication of _ens_ which is predicated of an object _in cuid_.

K. Conclusion

I have attempted in these remarks to touch on the central nerve of Heidegger's thought at the time of the writing of this work. From this position, the emanations that flow from it and the various influences that are evident in this work should become easier to grasp. This does not mean to minimize any of the influences that are evident in this work: the Kantian concerns with the transcendental and judgment, the Husserlian influences as to act, the neo-Kantian concerns with a theory of science, nor the Hegelian concerns with the logical subject, the hermeneutic circle, and thought as history. I have made

no attempt to be exhaustive.

Many of these elements can be seen in a transformed state in the early Heidegger. Nonetheless, it still seems necessary to keep in mind the ontic view of this work for its proper comprehension. Being as the intelligibility of thought in historical evolvement is still viewed in this work as an essentializing process. The sameness of judgmental sense is transcendental both because of the forms of judgment which are the ultimate logical categories and the critical deepening of sense through the history of thought. The categories of Aristotle may be found to be insufficient, but this insufficiency will be supplied for by a proper grasp of the transcendental through proper methodology.

Because of the teleology of history, a formal and definitive methodology is impossible for the various domains of reality. But as Heidegger states at greater length in: Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft, written as a venia legendi in 1915, there is the possibility of previsional norms that are always open to further criticism.

Hingeltungscharakter is the only neologism, other than west (be-ing), that Heidegger uses in this work. Erasmus Schoefer feels that this is a germanization of the Latin intentio or inclinatio. We have translated it as intentionality. It must be remembered that intentio or the intentional act for Scotus only arises because of the inclinatio of the will to being not just as a first reaction to apperception but as directive of all intentional acts.

In this translation Gegenstaendlichkeit and das Gegenstaendliche will be translated by objectiveness and objective. Objektivitaet will be translated by objectivity. Any use of Objekt or objektiv will be noted.

There are extensive bibliographies on both Heidegger and Duns Scotus. Hence there is no need to overburden this work by repeating them. I will include

here only those works which deal with the young Heidegger:

Baglietto, G., "La formazione del pensiero di Martin Heidegger nei suoi scritti giovanili" in Annali di Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, 1957 (26) pp. 190-221.

Campo, M., "Psicologia logica e ontologia nel primo Heidegger" in Rivista di Filisofia Neoscolastica, 1939 (31) pp. 474091.

Caputo, John D. "Phenomenology, Mysticism and the Grammatica Speculative," in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 5, May, 1974, pp. 101-117.

Garulli, E., Problemi dell Ur-Heidegger, Urbino: Argalia, 1969, 182 --.

_____ "Problemi della filosofia giovanile heideggeriana" in Il Pensiero XI (1966) pp. 226-253.

Lehmann, K., "Metaphysik Transcendentalphilosophie und Phanenomenologie in den ersten Schriften Martin Heideggers" in Philosphsches Jahrbuch, 1963-64 (71) pp. 331-57.

Manzano, D., "La Habilitations-schrift de M. Heidegger sobre Escoto" in Verdad y Vida (24) Madrid, 1966, pp. 305-325.

Poeggeler, O., Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, Tuebingen: Pfuellingen, 1963, 407 pp. The first two chapters deal with the young Heidegger.

Vattimo, G., "Problemi della filosofia giovanile Heideggeriana" in Il Pensiero, n. 3 1966, pp. 226-253.

only actual natural reality, but also the extra-sensory logical,

the known as known and consequently everything objective in general

must be understood under the modus essendi. The modus essendi

coincides with the universal domain of the "something in general",

which is circumscribed by the primal category ens. Hence the

theory of meaning has a universal tendency, corresponding to the

function of meaning to touch on everything. This then indicates

that Duns Scotus was clearly aware of the sovereignty of the domain

of the categories of meaning.

To function as the formal differentiation Scotus makes al-

most exclusive use of actual, sensory natural reality in the deduction

of the particular forms of meaning from the modus essendi (This

is to be presented in the next chapter). This is not just a conse-

quence of the strong empirical bent of his thought and its sharp

focus on the logical, but it originates from the very genuine in-

sight to the effect that the forms of meaning are primordially

commensurate to empirical reality in its immediate givenness.

Lotze once made some very to-the-point remarks about

these forms. Their "logical sense is only a shadow of the sense

of their metaphysical concepts (from which they were originally

deduced, auth.). This sense is only a repetition of the formal

determinations which assert them from out of the real. But while

it doesn't limit their application to the real, it causes that aspect

of meaning to fall through which the formal determinations sustain

in this application."17.

Nowhere does Duns Scotus state that the modi significandi

simply render and copy the sense of the valid categories of actual

natural reality, but he only says they take their "origin" from

there. They display vis-à-vis the categories of actual natural

reality a peculiar etiolation, as we will see in the presentation of

the theory of the forms of meanings. It's a singular fact that we

use the same language in treating extra-sensory logical reality as

we do for psychic reality, which are drawn for the most part from

that sensory natural reality consonant with their own content. We

often lack the "language" for those domains; hence it is neither

incidental nor arbitrary if the discussions touching on those

domains often look so ponderous and troublesome because of the

increasing circumscription that is necessary.

It is eminently difficult to adequately conceptualize the

objects inherent in the domains mentioned and the problems that go

along with these objects. This conceptualization would be simply

impossible were it not that the categorial forms of meanings linked

with these expressions bear in themselves etiolation and indeter-

mination so that they can be related to everything objective.

It is doubtlessly true that epistemologists would find un-satisfactory the preceding presentation of the principles for the material determination of forms of meaning. If actual natural reality is to be determinant of the categories of meaning, then I have to _know_ beforehand about this reality and its structure. This reality may be the _ultimate_ principle for the differentiation of forms of meaning, but it cannot be directly related to those forms. Thus there arises a new problem: _A quo modus significandi immediate sumatur?_ What are the forms of meaning _immediately_ derived from and what is it even possible to derive them from?

The _modus essendi_ must surely be given to consciousness. It must be before consciousness in its objectiveness. But I know about an object only in cognition, only as a cognitive object is it truly object. The _modus intelligendi_ is the _ratio concipiendi_, that is, the way by which I conceive of something in its objective-ness and know about it. Thus, the _modus essendi_ can enter into the function of differentiating meaning only to the extent of being given cognitively (_prout ab intellectu apprehenditur_).[18] In another place Duns Scotus discusses the question of whether the meaning of an expression is related to the object as such or to the object given in the _species intelligibilis_. Scotus affirms the latter alternative. The expression is immediately related to the _known_ object. Of

course, there remains a fundamental distinction as regards the concept "consciousness" that has to be examined. For one thing the _species_ _intelligibilis_ as a psychic _reality_ -- that by which the object is present in knowledge -- can be conceived of as a definite occurrence in the soul. Meaning isn't related to the _species_ _ingelligibilis_ so conceived; but it is related to the species to the extent that it has an _objective_ value, that it _represents_ the object to consciousness. Hence, the meaning of an expression is not related to an object to the extent that it exists in and for itself independent of consciousness but to the object in that an object is recognized. Everything that is intentionally meant has to be grasped by meanings; and only that which is somehow objectively there is of intentional consciousness, can be "expressed" in meanings. [19]

The _modus_ _intelligendi_, just like the _modus_ _significandi,_ is distinguished as being active and passive. The active mode brings about objectivization in consciousness. The passive mode is exactly the same as the _modus_ _essendi_ to the extent that it is objectivized in consciousness. Consequently if the forms of meaning have the _ultimate_ _foundation_ of their determinateness in the _modus_ _essendi,_ then the _modus_ _intelligendi_ _passivus_ as _modus_ _essendi_ given objectively first makes formal determination really _possible._ [20]

There has been up to now a peculiar complication taking place, a mutual dependency of the modi essendi, intelligendi, and significandi. This exhibits "noetically" a peculiar interplay of and basis for the different levels of act. So there arises here a further task, that of making clear the reciprocal relations of the noematic spheres pointed out. At the same time, a significant step forward will be made in the characterization of the modi significandi by deciding on the question: Quomodo modus significandi a modo essendi distinguatur? Everything here depends on understanding them more precisely.

The modi essendi, intelligendi passivi, and significandi passivi are considered (materialiter et realiter) identically the same according to their substantial What, their noematic nucleus: namely, they are material specifically determined by form or more exactly material which is thought of separately from formal determination although correlatively associated with form. In general the material is first able to be differentiated through the form. Through it the modes can first be thought as different. Yet it has been said of the form that it itself is determined from the material. Consequently, the form too can only be one and hence we said only one mode could be spoken of. But there does in fact exist a formal differentiation and it can't be possible otherwise

than that the material enters into the function of differentiating
in different respects for form.[21]

The modus essendi is that which generally can be experienced.
It is that which stands over against consciousness in the absolute
sense, "robust" reality which irresistably obtrudes in conscious-
ness and can never be eliminated. To this extent the modus has
to be called absolute and self-centered. In general, this datum
exists not only for realism but also for absolute idealism which
is anxious to reduce all contents into form; and if absolute idealism
has to take note even of the historical factor of science as something
which is its datum, it is "presupposed". Supposing absolute
idealism doesn't grant even that, then at least the "infinite" process
is still always given in which and through which it is claimed the x
of the object is to be radically reduced to form and formal systems.
The modus essendi is the immediately given, empirical reality
sub ratione existentiae. It should be seen as especially signifi-
cant that Duns Scotus also characterizes empirical reality as
subject to a ratio, that is, a point of view, a form, a state of
affairs. Nothing more is stated in this than what has just been
expressed in this regard: Even "givenness" is already exhibiting
a categorial determination. This is a case of the "most elementary
logical problems" which, as Rickert remarked once, "first open

up for the researcher in logic when he draws 'pre-scientific'

cognition into the domain of his investigation too."[22]

The _modus intelligendi passivus_ is the reality which has en-

tered into cognition. The _modus essendi_ is in the formal determi-

nation of cognition. The _modus significandi passivus_ has to be

understood as the _modus essendi_ to the extent that it supplies for

expressions, that is, to the extent it has entered into meanings.

The viewpoint (_ratio_) of the _datum_ is one thing; another is that

of cognition; still another is that of _meaning_. In this way the

modes for which a common, identical material lies at the basis

of the formal distinction (_secundum formales rationes_) are found

to be distinct.[23]

Forms are nothing else than the objective (_objektiv_) expres-

sion of the various _ways_ in which consciousness is _intentionally_

related to the objective.

The act qualities, in which these various ways of intentional

relation retain their actual execution, must now be distinguished

in their own right and submitted to a description.

The _modi essendi, intelligendi activi,_ and _significanci_

activi are distinct _materialiter_ and _formaliter_ insofar as they

belong to different essential regions. It is peculiar that Duns

Scotus again makes reference to the _modus essendi_ which he

had before placed in a line with the modus intelligendi and significandi passivi when he characterized the active modes. He does this without expressly distinguishing a modus essendi activus from a modus essendi passivus. It could be supposed that Scotus didn't have a conclusively clear view of the modus essendi since he in one place explains it as absolute objective reality, not failing to note, however, that it stands under a definite ratio, namely, that of existence, and thus comes close to the nature of a formal determination to which there must correspond an act-character.

The modus intelligendi activus belongs in the region of consciousness and indeed in that of the knower whereas the modus significandi activus is to be incorporated in the region of "expressions". To the extent that acts of knowing, meaning, and those in which immediate givenness is actually known, are distinguished according to their ratio, the sense of their achievement (as far as that is shown in the analysis of a theory of meaning and a logic), they must also be taken as formaliter distinct from each other. [24]

When Scotus describes these acts, he once more refers to the fundamental distinction in acts in general that was touched on at the outset. The act qualities (for acts of cognition and of

meaning) and the material in the act corresponding to the quality inhere _materialiter_ in different structural domains. The distinction between the intentional content (_modus passivus_) and the real components (_modus activus_) is to be made in every intentional experience. However, the _modi activi_ and _passivi_ are _formaliter_ identical because the sense of accomplishment of acts, as it were, represents the intentional content as transposed into the sphere of act. [25]

Meaning can in a certain sense be conceived of as inherent in the objectivity of the world of objects, from where it receives its "content". As an accomplishment, however, of the meaning-bestowing-act, the meaning as _formaliter_ identical with content belongs to expression that is brought to life as meaning. Again to the extent the meaning-bestowing-act is determined from out of the material, that is, for objectivity, it can be said that act is founded in objectivity. Considered as a psychic reality, act has its efficient cause in the act of understanding. In the _constructio_, that is, in the coherence of meaning act is as it were cancelled in its effect (the achievement as in what is achieved). [26]

Thus the forms of meaning (_modi significandi_) are inferred in the guidelines of givenness (_modus essendi_), which on its part is only givenness as known (in the _modus intelligendi_).

Earlier it was possible to make only a preliminary distinction between word sounds and meaning. The inherence of the two phenomena in different domains was only demonstrated in a most general way.

The investigation has now been brought far enough that the structure of expression in general (dictio) lets itself by surveyed at its levels.

The word in itself, as sense perceptible object (Objekt), has no relation to the objects of cognition. It receives it in the first place from meaning: Vox non proportionatur ipsi rei nisi rationem significandi.[27] Husserl states:

> Speech, as expressed does not lie ... in mere words, but in expressing acts. They stamp the correlate acts, which are expressed by them, into a new material. They make of them an expression of thought whose general essence constitutes the meaning of the speech concerned.[28]

The ratio significandi, the "essence of meaning" (Husserl), of the word sounds is grounded, however, in the modus intelligendi, through which the relationship to the object in general is produced. "Talk about cognition of the object and the fulfillment of intentional meaning expresses ... the same state of things from merely different standpoints."[29]

Meaning receives a definite structure in accord with the

kind of intentional attitude from the relationship of the meaning to the objective. For Duns Scotus expressly remarks that it is quite possible that different intentional meanings originate from out of one and the same objective givenness, that is, forms of meaning can be based on this givenness: Non est inconveniens ab eadem rei proprietate modos significandi diversos non oppositos oriri.[30]

> Since the intentional meanings of the expression come to fulfillment in diverse intentions that do not conceptually belong together, the difference of the intentional meanings likewise sharply emerges with the most acute delineation of the direction of fulfillment.[31]

The form of meaning does not come to the actual consciousness of the subject as he lives in meaningful speech and is ceded objects through speech. It is first in reflexion that this subtlety in meanings is to be brought out. This formal content is presented in the modi significandi. These categories of meaning constitute the particular "parts of speech" (partes orationis). It should not be thought that the pars orationis is referred to here as just a form of speech, the forms of words, but as the extrasensorial logical categories of meaning. Duns Scotus characterizes them expressly as such: Partes orationis sunt entia secundum animam.[32]

The categories of meaning are the gestalt ideas of possible concrete meanings. These gestalt ideas determine their

reciprocal relations on the basis of their own content. In the forms

of meaning there is an immanent regulation which rules a priori

the possible interconnection of meaning. Duns Scotus formulates

it thus: <u>Modi significandi sunt principium efficiens intrinsecum</u>

<u>constructionis.</u> [33]

The possible form for the ordering of the concrete com-

plexes of meaning is in the <u>modi significandi.</u> With this is

characterized the essential function of the <u>modi significandi</u>

inside the domain of meaning. In the ingenious manner character-

istic of him Lotze uses a striking image on the first page of his

<u>Logik</u> to describe what the <u>modi significandi</u> accomplish. His

thoughts could at the best only loose by being paraphrased here.

I hope it isn't taken amiss that I quote Lotze's own words:

> The accomplishments of thought are wont to be shown
> us in terms of relations of a manifold. Thus it can be
> believed that also that which is primordial in its acts
> has to be sought in one of the simplest kinds of
> connection for two representations. We are thus
> advised on light consideration to go a step further
> back. A pile can easily be made with just balls if
> it isn't important how they lie. But a building of
> regular proportions is only possible with blocks, each
> one of which has already been made into forms, which
> can be used in ascending layers that securely join and
> stay in place. Something similar has to be expected
> here. As mere excitations of our inner being the
> states that follow on outer stimuli can exist together
> in us without further preliminaries and can so affect
> one another just as the most general laws of the life
> of our soul allow or order it. But in order to be able to

be unified in the determinate form of a _thought,_
each one of them needs a prior structuring
(author's italics). It is first through this structur-
ing into logical building blocks that they go from
impressions to _representations._ There is fundamentally
nothing more intimate to us than this first accomplish-
ment of thought. The reason we are used to overlooking
it is _because it is already realized in the formation of_
the language come down to us. (author's italics)
Hence this accomplishment seems to belong to the
obvious conditions of thought, not to its proper
activity. [34]

The _modi significandi_ must be understood as _teleological,_
that is, their accomplishment must be understood from out of the
concept of _constructio,_ to which they are orientated as to their
principle.

But it is not immediately clear _what_ kind of principles
the _modi significandi_ are as regards _constructio._ In this regard
the re can be distinguished four principles: _principium materiale,_
formale, efficiens, finale.

The _material principle_ is the _constructabilia,_ that is, the
particular meanings as _elements_ ("building blocks" Lotze) of an
inter-connection of meaning. They represent the _materia_ out of
which the complex of meaning is built. Since this complex results
from the dependency of one element on the other, a _constructio_
always has two and only two elements: dependency and determina-
tion. In the sentence: _homo albus currit bene,_ there are several

dependent relationships to be ascertained: the relation of the adjective to the substantive, of the verb to the subject, of the adverb to the verb. Hence, the sentence contains several "constructions".[35]

The formal principle of the complex of meaning is the unification of the existing parts. The function of the form is to give an object its being. This formal function accomplishes in the constructio the unio of the elements.[36]

As to the principium efficiens constructionis there is a distinction that has to be made: The immanent principle, which determines the kind and manner of dependency and hence the connective possibility of meanings. This function belongs to the categories of meaning, the modi significandi. They prepare, beforehand as it were, the constructio in that they outline a priori the direction of the complex at hand. They put the "building blocks" into forms. Duns Scotus assigns them the function of the principium intrinsecum because they remain as it were inside of, better, between the meanings as their forms (quasi inter constructibilia manentes).

The principium extrinsecum of the constructio is the activity of understanding. It actually (aktuell) accomplishes the unification of the existent parts in thinking and in speaking, for in themselves the meanings are not actually (aktuell) connected.

Only on the basis of the categories of meanings do they have specific possibilities of connection.[37]

The principle of finality of constructio is the expressing of what is given in consciousness. What is given is determined categorially as the object of knowledge, that is, presents a related whole.[38]

It is now permissible to give a definition of the constructio as a whole: Constructio est constructibilium unio exmodis significandi et ab intellectu causata ad exprimendum mentis conceptum compositum finaliter adinventa.[39]

We have now clarified the important function of the modi significandi -- this has been the prime consideration here -- by juxtaposing them with the other principles of construction. They are, as it were, the nerve of the complex of meaning. They spell out its make-up. They constitute a domain with its own regularity.

The association of meanings as elements belongs to construction. The constructio debita or congruitas occurs from the regular continuity of the categories of meaning, to which the particular meanings are subjugated. The congruitas doesn't rest on the special, factual content of the particular meanings about to be connected, but it is grounded on the "prior" forms of meaning. Thus congruitas must be understood as constructio, which is

prescribed a priori by the _modi significandi._ Put in normative terms, it represents the rule for the special, concrete connections of meaning. [40]

In our time Husserl has returned the "idea of a pure grammar" to repute and pointed out that there are a priori laws of meaning which are still disconnected from the objective validity of meanings.

> The laws of the complex of meaning determine what the _mere unity of sense_ requires, that is, a priori forms according to which meanings of different categories of meaning are unified in a meaning, instead of yielding a chaotic lack of sense. Modern grammar believes that it must be constructed on psychology and other empirical sciences exclusively. Nonetheless, we recognize that the _old idea_ (author's italics) of a _general,_ more specifically, of an _a priori grammar,_ obtains a twofold foundation because of our demonstration of a priori laws determining possible forms of meaning -- or at any rate, _a_ well bounded sphere of validity. [41]

Husserl has in his _Ideen zu einer Reinen Phaenomenologie und Phaenomenologischen Philosophie_ allotted the domain of meaning its place in the whole of phenomenological endeavors. Hence he has put the theoretical significance of "a priori grammar" in a new light also.

Before we definitively tie down the concept of the theory of meaning and set its limits with logic, yet another way of considering the domain of meaning should be spoken about.

Every more penetrating consideration of meanings, of their
relation to words as well as to the objects intentionally referred
to in them, comes up against the phenomena of univocation,
equivocation, and analogy. Does their treatment, taken in the
strict sense, belong in the theory of meaning, that is, is the above
function **essentially** related to the **modi significandi?**

Duns Scotus remark s that univocation, equivocation, and
analogy are **less** able to be distinguished in their significant con-
tent (**significatio**), that is, in their content and form, than in the
"word" (**vox**).

Duns Scotus makes a distinction in univocation. In it can be
viewed the total nature of univocation:

> Univocationem **completam** dico, quando est similitudo
> in forma et in modo essendi formae, diminutam,
> quando est similitudo in forma, licet haveat alium
> modum essendi, quomodo domus extra est a domo
> **in mente.** [43]

Thus absolute univocation is in question if meanings agree
as regards their content as wel l as their act quality. If I intend
house as meaning (representation) and **house** as a really existing
object, that is, if the meaning act is **positional,** intending a meaning
content as really existing, or if it is **non-positional,** merely en-
compassing a meaning content as such, without making any
further determinations, then the expression, house, can no longer

be used strictly univocally in both cases.

Thus with univocal expressions in the strict sense, there are contained in the _identity_ the _word as language form_, the _meaning_ according to its form and content, and also the _manner of intending_ of the meaning content (positional character). Not only the meaning content must be brought to bear for an essential clarification, but also the language expression, and the object, which proffers the meaning fulfillment. Only where these moments are given, does it make sense to speak of univocation or of one of the other above roles. These moments, however, are only given in the living employment of words. This is formulated by Scotus when he states that univocation is not really something that _primarily_ pertains to meaning, but meaning the concept _to the extent_ it is in _predicative_ application; for, it is first only in the _predication_, that the meaning is applied to the object, that also the _direction of the fulfillment_ becomes _valid_.[44] Ultimately, _univocatio_ is nothing other than _the identical position of the identical meaning coinciding with the one identical word_ (_language form_). The direction of fulfillment is identical insofar as the objects "subject to fulfillment" are given identically according to their whatness.

Identity (_una ratio_) is thus the _characteristicum_ of

univocation; and indeed identity, as it is contained in the particular moments, is essentially inherent in the use of univocal expressions.[45]

What has been said will become clearer when we analyze the concept of equivocation.

In aequivoci nullus est idem sed sola vox.[46] Of the moments that have been presented: language form, meaning, and direction of fulfillment, only the first is retained in equivocation. To the extent that the language form, isolated from the meaning content, isn't understood as expression, but as the unity of word and meaning, it cannot be strictly said that an equivocal expression is one expression, even less that there are many expressions intended in it. On the other hand, this expression may well be referred to as a manifold expression, that is, manifold in respect to the diverse acts of meaning related to the identical word sounds and also in respect to the diverse directions of fulfillment given along with them. In one respect identity is found in the term used equivocally, namely, the identity of the word. But what radically distinguishes it from univocal expressions, is the manifoldness of the acts of meaning and of the directions of fulfillment: aequivocum cum diversis actibus significandi significat multa.[48]

Thus since equivocal expressions are related to many and various objects and are predicated of them, there is the tendency to range them with the universalia. However, this essential difference should be kept in mind. The objective material giving fulfillment to the various acts of meaning, proper in essence to every equivocal expression as such, doesn't exhibit any common viewpoint, any interconnection in content, as can be found in a "general concept": inter significata termini aequivoci nulla est habitudo.[49] However, every universale is characterized precisely by the identity of viewpoint: from this identity predication is made of single objects.[50] Since equivocal expression lacks this general viewpoint, common to most individual objects, it is also impossible to determine it by addition of the moments of meaning. For every species is essentially a species, the determination of a "general" meaning content.[51]

The essence of equivocal expressions can be further explicated, if we decide the question as to whether the association of such an expression with a signum universale, for example, omnis (everyone) distinguishes by division all the single objects touched on by the expression. It can be said that every distinction and division must be made from a uniform viewpoint, to which all the objects to be distinguished are subjugated. However, there is

nothing "general" as far as there is any meaning to be uncovered

in the equivocal expression. Only the word form is common to the

single meanings, and this is a singular reality. Consequently, it

seems impossible for there to be a distributio within these ex-

pressions. Upon closer reflexion, however, one becomes con-

vinced of its possibility, as Duns Scotus proves in a subtle argu-

mentation.

An equivocal expression can be used in a specific meaning,

"as if" no other meaning belongs to it as is the case in fact. So

also the signum universale can form a meaning in relative dis-

tribution by one distributive act of meaning, one meaning by

another.

By distribution is to be understood: the grasping of some-

thing general and its comprehension and positing as of a something

pertinent to the single objects subordinated to it, each of them being

it themselves. But there is in the equivocal expressions -- as

has already been stressed several times -- no such commune,

which admits of this distribution talked about. Hence, distribution

in the expressions we are talking about inheres in the intended

meaning referred to in each and every case, as if distribution

didn't allude to any other meaning, but at the same time, however,

in meanings which belong to the expression as such. This would be,

however, <u>only</u> <u>through</u> <u>one</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>other</u> <u>specific</u> <u>acts</u> <u>of</u> <u>distribution.</u>

And the basis for that is this: Once the <u>signum universale</u> is

posited, it is related to only one meaning. Thus the distributive

position creates an act. However it should be noted that dependent

forms of meaning like the <u>signum universale</u> receive their limita-

tion of functional scope from out of the independent meanings asso-

ciated with them. If several acts of meaning that are unrelated in

themselves belong to them -- as is the case with equivocal expres-

sions -- then there occur also just as many relationless acts of

distribution.

Thus a distribution is also possible with equivocal expres-

sions, but just in <u>several</u> acts. This puts a new light in the essence

of these expressions: The manifoldness of the meanings, unrelated

in themselves, are respectively the acts of meaning, inhering in

identical word sounds. [52]

Analogy, the third of the ways of using expressions belong-

ing here, has already been extensively dealt with in another

context. [53] It needs to be touched on here only to the extent that

the distribution from univocation and equivocation might emerge

more clearly.

The identity of the language expression, of the meaning,

and of the direction of fulfillment is dominant in univocation. But

the identity of meaning and of the direction of the fulfillment disappears in equivocal expressions, so much so that only the identity of the word is retained. Thus as regards the content of the expressions in question, an absolute diversity of the possible acts prevails.

Analogy stands, as it were, "between" univocation and equivocation. It is not completely the one, nor does it coincide with the other. A thorough identity doesn't predominate, nor does a complete diversity: but there is a singular interweaving of both: identity in diversity and diversity in identity. However, it is allowable to say this too of equivocal expressions, if the identity of the word is set off. But in analogy there is not only this external identity of the word form, but also the meaning content comes in; and thus, analogy approaches univocation. To the extent that analogous expressions have several different meanings, they are connected with the equivocal. The diversity is not radical. Meanings are not relationless, but they are subordinate to a general, identical, common meaning. The direction of fulfillment is differentiated in analogous expressions to the extent that it is orientated to diverse domains of reality and hence differentiates the common content of meaning of the expression. The word principle was introduced earlier as an

example of an analogical expression. Applied to logical relations, it implies _ground_; however, in the domain of natural reality it implies _cause_. Similarly the expression _section_ implies something different in medicine, for example, than _section_ in the sense of Dedekind's theory of irrational numbers. And yet both meanings have something common, an identical common meaning as point of reference.

The diverse functional modes of the expressions that have been named could be mathematically symbolized in the following way: The identity of univocation can be represented as _one line_, the total diversity of the acts of meaning in equivocal expressions as divergent, intersecting lines in space, the identity in diversity in analogous expressions as a cone of rays concurrent at a point.

The preponderant role of _reflexive_ categories in the functional modes of the expressions named suggests that they be understood above all in the sense of the common essence of the categories concerned.

The clear, conceptual fixation of their essence, the sharp delineation of reflexive as against the constitutive categories, the certain demarcation of their domain of validity has, it is true, been extensively advanced by the research of Lotze and Windelbrand; but it has first been decisively completed by Lask.

Lask qualifies them as "created through subjectivity" in order to distinguish them from the constitutive categories. This shouldn't be taken to mean that their application and validity is completely arbitrary. On the contrary, they are determined in this respect by the material as are the constitutive categories. Of course, they aren't determined by specific material but by content weakened to its mere being content. This "createdness" of the reflexive categories as regards their stated roles corresponds to their origin from out of the use of the expressions in living thought and cognition. They too are in a certain sense products of subjectivity; but on the other hand, they are still objectively (objektiv) fixated by the objective (objektiv) existence of the language expression, by the meanings, and by the direction of fulfillment. Further, they also have the nature of the general, reserved by Lask for the reflexive categories, to the extent that their application is not determined by particular contents of meaning and forms.

Now the relation of these functional modes to the modi significandi also admits of clarification. The functional modes obtain as objective (objektiv) forms of meaning determined by the material. In the functional modes named, however, the forms of meaning aren't touched at all. As regards the manifold modi-

fications exhibited in the functional modes of the expressions, the forms of meaning stay identically the same. For insofar as the single meanings of an equivocal expression are diversified, the nominal forms of meaning continue to be nominal. The same obtains for analogy. Thus univocation, equivocation, and analogy don't fall in with the meaning as meaning in the manner of the forms of meaning. Rather, they are possible relations instituted by subjectivity inside of the relational whole: language form, language content, full object. This relational whole makes up the existence of the expression in its predicative use. There is revealed in the relational whole a peculiar flexibility -- given in living speech and predication -- of meaning and of their fulfillment in comparison with the singular reality of the word. Duns Scotus saw the diversity of the functional modes under discussion vis-à-vis the modi significandi, to the extent that he thought that they were related to the expression as such and not to the pure, detached meaning.[55]

The modi significandi constitute a determinate order in the domain of meaning.[56] This a priori regulated integration of meanings with complexes of meaning does not yet constitute what we call a valid sense. In the complexes of meaning as such, in that they are regulated by the modi significandi, the validity of truth

is not yet realized -- a validity which is proper only to the <u>sense</u>

<u>of judgment</u>. But to the extent that the sense of judgment that

obtains is able to be expressed in sentences, it is as it were

established by them in its structure; inside of the domain of

meaning too, a value is realized already which can be called,

as Lotze does, "syntactic value".[57]

Thus, the sense of accomplishment of the <u>modi significandi</u>

comes from the syntactic value and that of the <u>modus intelligendi</u>

is to be understood from out of the truth of value. At the very first

the <u>modi significandi</u> constitute the object (<u>Objekt</u>) which is

validated with respect to the truth value. The order prescribed

by the <u>modi significandi</u> is the presupposition for the complex of

meaning, giving access to the nexus of an obtaining sense. The

order of the complex of meaning is also retained in the domain of

the obtaining sense. This is not as an independent construct,

however, but only as a stable component of a higher construct.

They retain a heightened importance, an epistemological dignity,

by this relation of the categories of meaning to the sense of judg-

ment. In this way, the theory of meaning enters into the closest

relationship possible to logic; indeed, it is really nothing other

than a <u>division</u> of it to the extent that logic is conceived of as the

<u>theory</u> of the <u>theoretical sense</u> which in itself comprises the theory

of the stable components of sense (the theory of meaning), the theory

of the structural sense (the theory of judgment), and the theory of

of structural differentiations and their systematic forms (the

theory of science).

The theory of meaning shares in the particular kind of

questioning that logic does by belonging in logic. What is said in

this is that the theory of meaning excludes beforehand every pre-

occupation with psychological problems. Consequently, the con-

cept which is set down here is also much narrower than that to

which the problems of the theory of meanings had at first been

condensed.[58]

A theory of meaning in the sense of the tractatus de modis

significandi thus has to disassociate itself from the not insignificant

problems in themselves, which have to do with facticities, events,

which discuss questions on the expediency of signs, and which answer

questions of the type dealing with the difficulty and facility of

understanding. As little as it's a question of the psychic

dispositions which make a conceptualization, an understanding of

meanings possible, as important as they may also be as the factual

conditions of actual understanding, the logical theory of meanings

is interested neither in the origin of meanings nor in the

physiological-psychological chain of causes that takes place with

sign and meaning. Investigations on the historical evolvement of meanings are also excluded as are such investigations as deal with semantic change. It considers meaning in itself and its structure only. A treatment of the psychological problems of meaning must always remain uncertain without this fundamental realization.

The postulation of a logical theory of meaning, which is erected here in connection with the tractatus of Duns Scotus, seems to want to put back in repute all the errors that "have been charged and still are being charged to logical grammars. The simple truth, that thought in language is a thing in itself, something independent and especially different in essence from logical thought, this simple truth is again and again not seen. Consequently, the hybrid nature of logical grammar has missed its calling, has forfeited its right to exist. "[59]

If the concept "logical grammar" claimed to assert that grammar must be deduced from logic, then we are before an impossibility. But if against this it is pointed out in objection that logically false judgments allow themselves to be expressed in a fully correct grammatical fashion and hence it is concluded that grammar is therefore not logical, then something completely different is understood by the logical or alogical nature of language

than what the logical theory of meaning logically infers in an expression. Logical and logical are not the same in both cases.

The postulation of the logic of a grammar doesn't need to presuppose the theoretical inference that the grammatical use of language allows itself to be deduced from logical laws. The question of how language has come to be, of what creative factors it owes its existence to, is not a problem of logic. No matter what may be thought about the essence, task, and relevancy of linguistics, it must be conceded that the structures of language have meanings. And it is only with meanings that philosophical reflexion begins as the effort to return by reduction to the categorial moments and to evaluate them from the standpoint of the system of the theory of categories. These logical conditions of language, more precisely, the meanings, must not be interpreted as the <u>factual causes</u> of the pure evolvement of language and the only causes of the development of language. The mind of language, the creative factor in the evolvement of language, has as <u>mind</u> also a specific structure which is <u>logical</u> in the stated sense and which -- and <u>only</u> which claims to single out the logic of language.

Thus language is not <u>explicated</u> according to its actual existence by the theory of meaning but only <u>understood</u> in its

rational aspects, that is, in that aspect of language that deals with content.

Werner calls the <u>tractatus</u> of Scotus "the main achievement of the scholastic middle ages in the area of the logic of language, that is, of the attempt at integrating grammar and logic.[60] Scotus doesn't claim "to build grammar into logic," but to understand the logical structure of meanings. Werner neglects the properties of the domain of meaning as a proper "level of expression."

Indeed he doesn't want to commit himself "to a judgment on the factual value" of the <u>tractatus</u>. However, he does remark that "a logic of language, set down from the standpoint of medieval thought cannot pretend to be called a philosophy of language in today's sense of the word." Such has to recognize "the genetic evolvement of language" in its import.[61]

But psychological and historical investigations on language do not directly belong to a philosophy of language. It must investigate its problems in a completely new dimension. It is incumbent on it to set forth the ultimate, <u>theoretical</u> foundations which lie at the basis of language. Without the univocal, conceptual rendering of "meaning in general," of the "object intended in meaning," of the "category of meaning," of the "relation of the forms of meaning" there is no possibility of a certain path in the researches

on language, let alone that the theory of meaning should treat of

a fundamental domain of logic by the solution of the problems

that have just been stated.

Werner's judgment concerning the "logic of language" of

of Scotus indicated, after all, how much evaluative judgments in the

history of philosophy are dependent on one's own systematic

standpoint. If this standpoint isn't theoretically tenable, then

its evaluative judgments on history also must be submitted to a

revision.

How close Duns Scotus gets to the mark in individual elaborations

in his tractatus, will have to be brought out in the chapter which

follows this, where we treat of his theory of the forms of meaning.

Chapter Two

The Theory of the Forms of Meanings

The task of an investigation, which enters into the presentation and characterization of the individual functions of meaning, is necessarily part of the sequence in the general clarification of the sense of meaning and of the function of meaning. The fundamental concepts, necessary for the elaboration of this _special_ task, and the leading points of view have probably undergone in the preceding chapter an ample enough clarification and determination, so that we can choose without danger of obfuscating equivocations a means of elaboration -- one which is perhaps not ideal; we are referring to the _simultaneous_ consideration of the objective and subjective points of view in the explication of the theory of meaning. The sense of accomplishment, the function of the meaning-giving-acts, should also come to be delineated together with the forms of meanings, so that the correlation that exists between the two can constantly be kept in mind. Such a, as it were, mixed method also best corresponds to the manner in which Duns Scotus proceeded in the special section of his theory of meaning. After all that which has preceded, there is probably no longer the danger of a psychologistic deviation from the sphere of the objective content of

meaning into one in which psychic facticities would have to be grasped empirically.

Investigations such as the following easily take on the appearance of an aimless stringing out of phenomena, seized on haphazardly. The logical and the aesthetic demand <u>order</u>. <u>System</u> should be brought about in the fulfillment of this demand. However, a surveyable classification being often insufficient, a further attempt is made by deducing the singular phenomena from the prime phenomenon. It easily occurs in this that very often the objects to be treated "are overpowered" and the content of their concepts is correspondingly blurred.

The extent to which Duns Scotus avoids shipwreck on an a priori systematic which endangers the sense and strives after an order in the forms of meanings, founded on "things" and called for by them, should become apparent in the following presentation.

Objects are expressed by meanings; for their part, objects determine the meanings. A basic distinction in the domain of the objective in general, which meanings also belong to, is that of independent and dependent objects. As a consequence, the meaning-giving-acts permit separation into two main groups: into such whose capability it is to give rise to a construction of <u>independent</u> meaning and into such whose content is identified as <u>dependent</u> form

in need of support. Duns Scotus puts this fundamental distinction of the <u>modi significandi</u> at the top of his special investigaton. The <u>modi significandi essentialis</u> constitute the fundamental forms of the meanings, the parts of speech as essence in direct existence in their genus as well as in their species. Every content of meaning, which is affected by the form of the <u>modus essentialis</u>, is no longer in need of a further formal determination in addition to its constitution. Respecting act, this means that the content requires no further act of meaning supporting and grounding it in order to be what it is. On the other hand, the <u>modus significandi accidentalis</u> essentially <u>belongs</u> (<u>advenit</u>) <u>to the modus essentialis as such</u>, constructs itself on it. The formal determination that the <u>modus significandi accidentalis</u> bestows cannot exist without that the formal determination exists together with an "essentially" independent formal determination. It has about it as such that it cannot exist directly by itself. It is an objective impossibility, which we have to submit to, which does not in any way have its basis in our psychic disposition. [1]

The distinction of independent and dependent objects, which is refracted here in the <u>modi significandi</u>, comes to meet us in empirical reality as the distinction of thing and quality. The distinction of an <u>ens simpliciter</u> and <u>ens secundum quid</u> coincides

with that of _ens primum_ and _ens secundum_. The distinction of

substance and accident, which obtains for actual reality, falls

under this general distinction. The expressions _ens simpliciter_

and _ens secundum quid_ best render the distinction which Scotus

conceives of in its communality of essence and as generally given

with the objects and which he lets come to the fore in the theory of

the forms of meaning.[2]

The two fundamental categories, which we found earlier to

obtain in the domain of actual reality, show themselves in light of the

present distinction as modifications conditioned by the singularity

of the scope of application (reality) inherent in them. If it is thus

asserted that the _modus significandi essentialis_ bestows an _esse_,

then actual existence cannot be intended in this, but the _esse_ which

belongs to meaning and which can be conceived of as "existing".

At the present time Husserl in particular has given his at-

tention to the distinction of independent and dependent objects,

displaying it in the greatest possible theoretical clarity and develop-

ing the lawfulness in essence, which arises from it. The essence

of independent objects "requires in itself, hence a priori, no other

interwoven essence"; "The dependent content (object) is essentially

bound to other contents".[4] These definitions can be easily applied

to the fundamental classification of the modi significandi as Duns

Scotus carries them out.

The modus significandi essentialis can now be specified

further.   As modus generalissimus it has the function of constitut-

ing the essence of a "part of speech", thus of supplying, for

example, the essential form of the noun. In it is revealed the

meaning function of the noun in general. It draws a boundary

around the region of the nouns of which each single one bears the

common essence in itself. From the modus generalissimus the

gradation progresses until the lowest specific differences (the

"eidetic singularities"), the modus specialissimus. It is an ulti-

mate, to the extent that nothing falls under it, whereas it itself

necessarily cancels the modus generalissimus.

This modus essentialis, which is neither the lowe.st possible

difference nor the ultimate genus, obtains fittingly the designation

modus subalternus. The essence "noun in general", which no

longer has any genus above it to the degree that its factual essence

would be contained in it, is necessarily the ultimate genus and as

such it puts the boundaries around a "region".

There needs be a strict differentiation: the proper material

essence of a region and the formal essence, as it were, the "empty

forms", which lie above all regions in a certain way. The modus

essentialis, which is met in all "parts of speech", is of the last kind.

Duns Scotus has with these common determinations of the _modus essentialis_ and _accidentalis_ extracted the formal structure of each region, "the parts of speech", and listed their divisions. He sets this formal device of the "empty form" in parallel with the _linea praedicamentalis_, the gradated sequence from genus in general to species in general to the lowest possible general difference. The word _linea_ shows clearly, moreover, that we find ourselves in the purely formal domain, detached from any facticity.[5] However, it isn't proper to the essence of the _genus generalissimum_ either to have several species _under_ itself or to have _any higher_ genus _above_ itself.[6] However, it is proper to genus to have species under itself: not so to speak, that they really exist, but in the manner that they can be conceptually grasped and are in that the singularities that really exist as the occasion allows are brought to givenness and the essence of the species concerned is discerned.[7]

Duns Scotus distinguishes two species relative to the _dependent_ forms of meaning: the _modus accidentalis absolutus_ and the _modus accidentalis respectivus._

The forms of meaning of the first species merely determine

the independent forms, whereas those of the second species give to independent forms a relation to other meanings. [8]

Duns Scotus has thus laid bare, as it were, the formal frame which the single "parts of speech" are fit into.

To the extent that the single parts of speech are considered purely in themselves, from the viewpoint of the _modi significandi,_ which are constitutive of them, there is fulfilled the task of "etymology". [10]

Duns Scotus takes the sequential order in which he investigates the individual parts of speech in consideration of the _modi significandi_ from the grammarian Donatus. They are presented in the following order: noun, pronoun, verb, adverb, participle, conjunction, preposition, and interjection. [11]

The Noun

The _modus essentialis generalissimus nominis_ has to be investigated in order to bring to the fore the essence of the category of meaning _nomen._ This _modus_ must express what makes every noun a noun, what meaning function is proper to it. The purported general meaning function of the noun is given in the _modus entis et determinatae apprehensionis._ The sense of this general functional mode of the noun is not immediately clear.

However, we know of every form at least one thing -- that it

is determined in its meaning from out of the material. Thus it is

valid to look around in the domain of the actual, in order to search

out the factors which determine the most common sense of the

category of meaning, nomen.

Duns Scotus indicates that in the domain of the actual, cer-

tain most common determinations can be discovered, the most common

ways of being. One such is the modus entis. Everything actual,

whatever of the various domains it may belong to, is a what, an

object. Scotus determines closer still this being-something that

comes to be expressed in the modus entis as a habitus and indeed

as a "perduring" belonging to every object to the extent that it

merely is. It is a primal operative purpose (Urbewandtnis) of all

that which is object and can become object. This primal operative

purpose also determines the sense of the category of meaning nomen.

The meaning function of this part of speech subsequently passes

to expressing an object as object. [13]

However, the most common sense of the function of meaning is

still not exhaustively determined in this. There is intertwined, as

it were, with the modus entis the modus determinatae apprehensionis.

Through it the form of meaning nomen first comes in contrast to the

others as a determinate category. This modus is, as it were, the

the form of the form of meaning. In it the subsequent determina-
tions have to be made and therefore to be differentiated. Through
form an object becomes an object and another object becomes
another object. So it is permissible to say with good sense: Form
is something qualitative; the qualitative in general is found in it.
Thus the most common qualitative moment is found in each object.
And to the extent that precisely the noun in its function of meaning
means the object as object, there must also be contained in
the modus determinatae apprehensionis the determinate's
mode, respectively, the determining signification of the object. [14]

In that the two modes merge into the uniform act, the
general, essential mode of meaning of the noun results.

Duns Scotus seeks to bring his definition into sharper focus
by citing the ancient grammarians: Nomen significare substantiam
cum qualitate. The modus essentialis nominis too is able to make
this assertion in Scotus' opinion. In one respect, however, it as-
serts more than in other respects. This mode means more in that
Scotus conceives of his determination as being as general as possible,
indeed so that the meaning function of the noun does not remain
restricted to natural substances and qualities but is extended over
the world of objects in general. For it is beyond contest that we
also use nouns for expressing non-existent logical and mathematical

objects. In the same way qualitative determinations do not have to

be directly as such from the empirical reality of the senses.

For that matter, too, the definition of the essential mode of

meaning of the noun is of less meaning than the definition of the

ancient grammarians. The concept of an actual natural substance,

like the concept of a quality in which the same domain of reality

inheres, has a much richer content precisely because it is con-

ditioned by inherence in natural reality. In the modus entis et

determinatae apprehensionis these differentiations in meaning

are extinguished. The mode is so general and weakened that

there corresponds to it limitless domain of application. [15]

But surely, it must be conceded that genetically the

occasion for the construction of the category of meaning nomen

lies in empirical natural reality. But we are not interested

here in the question of its origin and occasion. That solely which

is in question here is the establishing of the objective (objektiv),

ideal content and sense of the meaning functions.

At other times too Duns Scotus adheres in his logical

writings to this range of meaning content of the noun and its detach-

ment from specific domains of reality. When he establishes the

meaning of ens, nomen, he states expressly that it doesn't mean

real natural reality, as does the ens participium, but it means

habens essentiam, having an essence, a what, an object-being.

The noun means its object, whether the object presently exists or

not. So the noun Socrates signifies the meaning Socrates, to the

extent that this meaning is still the content of the meaning-giving-

act but not the real Socrates insofar as he exists. Thus the noun

doesn't mean an object as that which is measured by time, that

is, as a perdurant actual object (Objekt) but is applicable to the

what of any object whatsoever (de essentia cuiuslibet). [16]

With this conception of the mode of meaning of the noun,

one that is correctly broad in scope, Duns Scotus doesn't find it

difficult to dismiss an objection already mentioned. It can of

course be said that nouns like nothing, blindness, don't signify

any actual object, that therefore there can't be any meaning function

like that of the noun which obtains its determination from the

material with its intended meaning, that those intended objects can

therefore not be expressed nominally. Duns Scotus concedes without

any further stir that the objects in question obviously aren't realities.

They must in his opinion be still considered as objects. They must

still be the objects (Objekte) for the acts directed to them. Hence

they too are subjected to the most general determinations that are

valid for all objects; and, since it is only from these that the mode

of meaning of the noun retains its sense, they too can be expressed

nominally. [17]

The general mode of meaning of the noun now admits of specification. In the first place there are two modes: the modus communis and the modus appropriati. They are species relative to the essential mode of meaning. On the other hand, they themselves are general in relation to further modes lying "under" them in a gradation.

The modus communis must contain its own meaning function of a particularity of objects, which does not belong to each object as object. There are in fact objects from which a common moment can be detached and made into an object of thought in and for itself and thus also an object of signification. Detachability proves to be in another regard the ability to be distributed into single objects. By virtue of its essence that which is objectively detached may function for the singular objects from which it is detached as a determination belonging to each. Objects thus specified are known to the logician as universalia. [18]

The term general representation, used occasionally in more recent times, is often unclear and confusing. If representation is conceived of here as a psychic act, then it can't be said that a general representation is truly general; acts as realities are always individual. If the expression in question designates, however,

the "representation of something general", the content of the
representation is under consideration. But neither is the latter
general in the strict sense. It can only be called general in view
of its function, of the possibility grounded in it that it can be
said about many singular objects. Duns Scotus even shows ex-
pressly that the universale can be known in itself and its essence
made into the object of cognition. Also he makes the essence of
the universale emerge with full clarity in this demonstration.

If I, for example, seek to gain clarity on the essence "tree",
then I consider that which makes every tree into a tree. I don't
first investigate so much the essence in its whatness as the
moments that obtain for each tree. From a certain viewpoint I
make the essence into the object of my investigation. This view-
point is then accidental to the essence tree as such. I can unequi-
vocally recognize in it the distinctness of my intellectual
orientation which first progresses to the essence in itself, then
to what obtains for the many singular objects concerned. The
mode of this "obtaining for" lets itself then be made into an object
through further reflexion and thus conceived of as the essence of
the universale. This as such dwells within the possibility of being
determined as a singular object. The universale is not a psychic
reality, but an essence (meaning content) comprehended "in

ideation". Occasionally the essence of the existent singular thing
is also designated by the name _universale._ But this as reality is
indifferent to determinations like _universalis_ and _singularis._ [19]

The mode of the "obtaining for" constitutes the meaning
function of the _nomen commune._ [20]

The mode of meaning in the _modus communis_ is able to be
reduced to a peculiarity of the empirically given material of reality
and indeed to such a one that general concepts of essence can be
detached for the material and can in turn be assigned to singular
objects. But these general essences -- no matter how meaningful
a role they play in cognition -- do not contain the whole reality in
themselves and indeed not that which makes empirical reality into an
insurveyable manifold of individual singular objects: _Tota entitas
singularis non continetur sub universale._ [21]

There was given earlier a brief characterization of this
particular aspect that empirical reality presents. In general _essen-
ces,_ living immediate reality becomes lost; if it is to be compre-
hended in its meaning, then new moments of meaning must needs super-
vene in the concepts of essence (as _universalia_). [23] In this case
the singular individual object or the meaning that expresses it in
the mode of singularity can _no more_ be related intentionally to
multiple objects; that would run directly contrary to this content, for

its form of meaning is just expressly not an expression of it:
<u>Singulare</u> <u>enim</u> <u>non</u> <u>est</u> <u>communicabile</u> <u>ut</u> <u>quod</u>. [24]

In a certain respect the <u>singulare</u> and the <u>universale</u> can of course be connected. Singularity can at once be considered as object (<u>Objekt</u>) -- a singular object is the object (<u>Objekt</u>) that is intended. On the other hand, singularity admits to being conceived of as <u>essence</u>. From the latter viewpoint singularity becomes a mode of comprehension, a <u>universale</u>. [25]

As regards the question of the extent to which the individual in general can be known, Duns Scotus rightly holds the view that the individual <u>cannot be known through the lowest specific concept, the one proximate to it</u>.

Precisely as individual it always retains a more still, and the specific concept doesn't predicate anything in this regard. Hence it must be said that the individual as individual is not to be perfectly comprehended. There is left an <u>ineffable</u> reminant, which can at most be more and more closely approached, without ever being exhausted. But that does not imply that the method of generalization is the only one for the presentation of the heterogeneous manifoldness, as if the individual were able to be obtained in thought through mere combination of general concepts. Modern logic has first laid the groundwork for the proper due of the sciences

of the individual and uncovered the problems inherent in them. [26]

There corresponds to the mode of cognition in the singular mode the meaning function, the _modus significandi per modum appropriati._ This and the _modus communis_ discussed before represent in the domain of meaning functions the two fundamental directions in which empirical reality can be considered and accordingly meant. Duns Scotus rightfully introduces them coordinately and classifies them as the most immediate individualizations of the _modus essentialis generalissimus nominis._ [27]

The two species immediately subjected to the essential general nominal mode of meaning, the _modus communis_ and the _modus appropriati,_ represent for their part genera in view of the species falling under them. There is given as the function of the general mode of meaning: to intend an object in general as an object. In this place he is not talking yet of singular objects determinately delimited in some fashion. Indeed, in the first step in differentiating the meaning functions in the mode of the general and of the individual there has to be a return to individual objects. But this occurs using a very determinate viewpoint and indeed using the _modus communis_ in such a fashion that the singular objects are considered as foundation, as the fulfillment at hand of its general abstract essence. Also, this general essence as such is not

intended in the modus communis, but the function basic to it is to be related to many singular objects -- it means them. Similarly, there is in the modus appropriati, taken strictly, nothing said about the individual and the singular as such nor about its constitutive content. Rather there is to be set in prominence only the essence of the individual in general, the mode of intention as relates to an individual object.

A further step in differentiating the meaning function is accomplished in the way that this function is first contrasted with the structural content of objects, in the modus communis. Every object is not just an object in general, but it has as this object a specific content: Every being is a being-such (Sosein), but every being-such needs not exist. If the discussion concerning the modus communis be only about species in general, then we have arrived at a meaning function which has as its aim to mean genera of determinate content by subjecting the species to the modus per se stantis. This mode constitutes the nomen substantivum in the strict sense.[28]

An essence which is determinate in content admits of its own proper distinction: the essence in itself, its "nucleus", and the determinations incidental to it. As soon as the materially de-termined essence is the goal of its orientation, there is given as

well with its _modus per se stantis_ the _modus adjacentis_ which

presents the meaning form of the determinations incidental to the

essence. Other comments, found in Scotus' treatment of the ad-

jective, make it clear that with the _modus adjacentis_ the consti-

tutive form of the _nomen adjectivum_ is touched on. Its meaning

function is: to determine. Thus, the designation _modus adjacentis_

is also clear to the extent that precisely determination is always

determination _for_ something that is to be determined or for

something determinate. Determination needs a _something_ that

belongs to it. [29]

It can be objected, however, that adjectives like _animatum,_

rationale are connected as such with a _nomen substantivum,_ as in

the expressions _corpus animatum_ or _animal rationale,_ and that

they nonetheless present substantives. How can the like be

reconciled? The meaning mode of the _nomen substantivum_ is an

independent mode: it doesn't need a foundation as does the _modus_

adjacentis which is "necessarily dependent". Expressions like

animatum and _rationale_ cannot be at the same time dependent and

independent as regards their form of meaning. It must be said in

response that the use in speech of "independent" and "dependent"

generally make no sense relative to mere words. Of course the

intention can only be of the meaning of words. The meaning

function which animates the word <u>animatum</u> is not to be imputed to it as such. This first occurs if one lives within the meaning of the word, more exactly, within the execution of a nexus of meaning from out of which the meaning function can first be comprehended. And there is seen here the peculiar fact that also the form of meaning of the <u>modus per se stantis</u> can easily be connected with the word <u>animatum</u>, which is used in normal speech as an adjective in the <u>modus adjacentis</u>, the fact that consequently <u>animatum</u> functions as a substantive. "The blue" is produced through <u>nominalization</u> from the adjective "blue", and thus it is in every case. There comes to light in the handling of this objection the eminent importance of a sharp comprehension of the mode of

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meaning of the single words in their specific use.

If we proceed from the <u>modus per se stantis</u> and the <u>modus adjacentis</u> to further differentiations and seek out the <u>modi specialissimi</u>, that is, the lowest differences of the <u>modus essentialis nominis</u>, this means with respect to the material determining the forms of meaning in their function is that the material itself gives occasion for still further specifications <u>vis-à-vis</u> the generic contents. The further away from the general almost empty mode of meaning of the noun that one gets, the more success there is in coming in contact with the properties of the hete-

rogeneous, insurveyably manifold content of reality. Hence it is

not to be wondered that the number of very special modes of

meaning of the nomen substantivum grows with the concrete full-

ness of the noun's mode of meaning.

At the same time it has to be kept in mind that the lowest modes

of meaning for the noun retain within themselves all the generic

essences superjacent to them and the essence of noun in general,

if not explicite, then still in such a way that a theoretical unfurling

of the total sense of the meaning function of a lowest mode must

retrieve the essences inherent in it and their mutual coordination.

According to Duns Scotus there are five very special modes

of meaning which are subjected to the modus per se stantis:

modus generalis, modus specificabilis, modus descendentis ab

altero, modus diminuti ab alio, modus collectionis.

It is worthwhile to once again have recourse to material in

order to understand the specific sense of these modes. [31]

In considering empirical reality we strike on certain determina-

tions, each of which is different from the other and which nonethe-

less has something in common. Blue is different from red, but

both are colors. It is usually said that there exists a specific dif-

ference between them. The substantive "color" is thus predicated

of the single colors in an entirely determined sense. It is proper to

the noun not only to mean an object in general or an essence,

which can be attributed to all possible singular objects, not only even

to have a sharply delimited, special essential content, but besides

the noun means in the sense of a genus, whose singular instances

are specifically different.

This modus generalis constitutes the substantivum generale. It

is the meaning function which immediately retains its sense from the

logical concept of genus.

The general essence of genus represents the universale,

which earlier the modus communis was reduced to. It belongs

to the universale to be predicated of more than one object in

general. Nevertheless, in the genus as a species of the

universale this essential moment of the universale must be specified

in some fashion.

Porphyry defines genus: Genus est, quod de pluribus

differentibus specie in eo quod quid est, praedicatur.

Duns Scotus accepts this definition and demonstrates its cor-

rectness. De pluribus specie differentibus and praedicari in

quid, the predication of the genus to objects different in species

and indeed in essence, these two determinations constitute the

specific differences through which the species "genus" comes to

be from the genus universale. Namely, an universale can be also

predicated of objects, which are different in number; and further-
more, it cannot be predicated as an essential but as a qualitative
determination. [32]

But genus is not predicated of different objects just according
to number and not in quale, but of specific differences and in
quid. Thus both its concept and the sense of the meaning function
of the nomen generale are sufficiently determined. The meaning
of such a substantive has the function of expressing objects that
are specifically different in their essence. [33]

The distinction of the praedicari in pluribus into a predication
which is concerned with objects which are specifically different and
objects which are different only in number allows it to be con-
jectured that a determinate meaning function also corresponds
to the last named possibility of predication. This Duns Scotus
designates as the modus specificabilis. Objects orientated to this
meaning function need to be different only as regards their number
and not as regards their species. [34] The third species of meaning
function, the per modum per se stantis, is the modus descendentis
ab altero. The sense of the patronymic is supposed to be circum-
scribed by it.

Certainly there exists a noteworthy distinction relative to the
meaning function, whether different species of color as expressed

by "color" or different members of a designated lineage by "primogenitor". The members of a lineage are surely each different from each other and still the same in a way. This is also true of the species of color. But in one way they are different, namely, according to their position in the geneological table; in another, they are alike respecting their membership in the same geneological tree.

This unquestionable, internal difference in structure of the respective material comprehended and meant yields sufficient ground for the new differentiation of the modus per se stantis by the modus descendentis ab altero.[35]

Duns Scotus positions the diminutives next to the patronymics and determines their form of meaning to the effect that they intend the object expressed by them in a "diminished form": instead of "flowers", "flowerets", instead of "stone", "little stone" (Steinchen). It is certainly correct that this sense is found in the diminutives; but, it is probably not exhausted with this, as it were, quantitative characteristic. We use diminutives to express joy, humor, sensitiveness, affection, etc. But this is in the end no objection to the formulation of the pertinent meaning function by Scotus. For this predicates nothing of the meaning content, myriad in variation, which can in content exist in one and

the same form. And it can further be put in question whether dis-positions of the soul, acts of feeling, which even by themselves are not so simple, actually belong to the expression of the diminutive, or whether these acts are united in their own way -- a way that hasn't been explained yet -- with the meaning act of the pertinent diminutive and, as a component act, construct a "phenomenological unity" with the meaning act.

This assumption of such a unified act is all the more tenable as the use of the diminutives in the cases designated isn't the type that is purely theoretical in expression. No matter how these complex phenomenological problems come to be solved, the characterization given by Duns Scotus of the meaning function of the diminutive -- a characterization that seems almost trivial in that no consideration is given to the simplicity of the relation which prevails in the domain of the forms of meaning -- is not affected by these problems. [36]

Duns Scotus advances the modus collectivus as the last modus specialissimus of the modus per se stantis. The modus collectivus obtains as the form of meaning for collectives. In every collective there is intended a gathering or a mutual belongingness of singular objects which are separate in themselves. The viewpoint which they construct their unity from doesn't need to be directly a general topical determination as Duns Scotus implies. It is

probably true for meanings like "sandhill", "house block"

whereas there has to be taken into account a "higher" viewpoint

of unity for the meanings like "people", "tribe". It cannot be con-

tested that a gathering of singular members is intended in these

meanings. If consideration is given to the fact that different,

unifying viewpoints make their appearance in the different col-

lectives and that spatial homogeneousness constitutes only one

class of them, then the characterization given by Scotus proves to

be too narrow and one-sided.

With this in mind, it doesn't seem justified to range the

patronymics next to collectives as an especial form of meaning.

Rather it is correct to range them under the collectives since they

share the general function of the collectives in uniting the singular

objects from a determinate viewpoint. To be sure, this viewpoint is

totally special for the patronymics, but not in the way that a mean-

ing function of its own is constituted by it. On the other hand it

indeed obtains still that collectives are distinguished relative to

the unifying viewpoint of the unity of the genus and thus are rightfully

delimited from the modus generalis.[37]

The modus communis of the noun was divided into the modus

per se stantis and the modus adjacentis. We have pursued the first

of these modes out to its most special differentiations. The same

has to be done now with the modus adjacentis.

It's general meaning function is seen in the intending of a determination which is incidental to the object, more exactly, in the intending of the incidence of a determination.

Before enumerating the twenty-four special modes of meaning for the adjective (we are only going to mention the most significant), Duns Scotus sets up a distinction. Namely, the meaning function can directly make sense by intending the appropriateness of a determination as determination without differentiation, that is, without more proximate meaning moments stating in which regard and how specified a determination is appropriate to an object that is to be determined. For this reason, this mode of meaning is more general than those which come after this. In them the modus adjacentis arises under determinate viewpoints.[38]

There also exists with the close relationship between substantives and adjectives an analogous differentiation of the functions of meaning. The adjective can be one which is general, for example, "colored" -- this implies singular determinations, in themselves different in kind and subjected to the same formal determination which is intended in the mode of the adjectivum generale.

There is lacking for the adjectivum speciale this specific

difference of the possible singular determinations appropriate to the object. Duns Scotus expressly remarks that the adjectives that come into question here can easily vary their mode of meaning, the retained identity of the external form of the word being unimpaired. [39]

The adjectivum possessivum represents its own mode of meaning to the extent that it assigns the object a determination which does not merely inhere in it as, for example, "colored" and which means more the substance, the material from which it originates.

The sense of the adjectivum diminutivum follows naturally from what has been said about the substantivum diminutivum. The same holds for the adjectivum collectivum, for which Scotus uses "urban" and "folkish" (voelkisch) as examples. The adjective gentile should be added too just as the patronymics were included among the concepts of the collectives. [40]

Duns Scotus further puts the comparative forms of the adjective in the class of special modes of meaning. He characterizes the comparative forms as excessus citra terminum, as an excession beyond the positive content of meaning of the adjective. [41]

Adjectives like "similar", "like", are further noteworthy: in them the mode of meaning ad aliquid, a mode of relationship,

comes to be expressed. [42]

We only allude here to the <u>adjectivum</u> <u>temporale</u> (<u>diurnus</u>, <u>nocturnus</u>, <u>annuus</u>), the <u>adjectivum</u> <u>locale</u> (<u>vicinus</u>, <u>propinquus</u>), the <u>adjectivum</u> <u>ordinale</u> (<u>primus</u>, <u>secundus</u> ...).

It should be evident already from this enumeration of the different adjectival forms of meaning that the more specifically the content of the pertinent meanings are worked out, the more forms of meaning can be enumerated. It is, however, to be noted that it isn't so much the meaning <u>function</u> that varies as the content made pertinent by it, and thus these modes of meaning come less in consideration for a theory of meaning.

In the first differentiation of the meaning function of the noun, which the object as such is orientated to, two fundamental forms of modes of meaning can be discerned: the <u>modus</u> <u>communis</u> and the <u>modus</u> <u>appropriati</u>. They correspond to the two fundamental directions in which thoughtful conceptualization of reality can move. The generalizing meaning functions of the noun have been demonstrated in the preceding.

With a consideration of the individualizing meaning functions in the <u>modus</u> <u>appropriati</u>, the characterization of the meaning forms of the noun comes to an end.

Special, individualizing modes of meaning are preeminently

proper to proper nouns. They refer to an individual every time and, to be sure, they do this directly. Which side of the respectively named object that is meant is directly the content of meaning_consciousness is not determined by the meaning function. It only asserts that the meaning content of the proper name is "displayed" sub ratione propria, that is, with the consciousness that this content belongs to this and only this individual as the one intended and "presented". This individualizing meaning function is the form which is able to be detached from the manifoldly various material. [44]

The first name receives the task, that is, its general meaning function admits of being understood in such a way as to distinguish individuals who bear the same last name. We seem to experience in this meaning function of the first name that specified individuality is unique individuality. Hence, the meaning function of the pronoun is based on the nomen proprium.

The meaning function of the last name makes a broader contribution to the characterization of the individually named personality meant and it bears within itself an historical moment, namely, as regards its origins.

Obviously, this is also the case with the sobribroquey, only from another orientation. Its form of meaning is determined a

proprietate eventus, that is, from a one-time, especially mean-
ingful event, to which the one who has been so named stands in a
determined relation -- this varies in specific cases according to
the nature of this relation.

It is no coincidence that Duns Scotus uses for an example
Scipio Africanus, an _historical_ personality. For it is precisely
history as the individualizing science of culture that works with
last names, titles, and first names. Thus, this section of the
theory of meaning dealing with individualizing meaning functions
of the noun gives a valuable confirmation to the pertinent character-
istic in the formation of _historical_ concepts and in the fixation of
meaning as individualization.[45]

Until now, only the independent modes of meaning of the noun
have been brought into consideration. In order to make a con-
sideration of the meaning forms of the noun complete, the
dependent modes of meaning must also undergo characterization.

Vis-à-vis the _modus essentialis generalissimus_ of the
noun, which manifests the noun's proper and general essence, the
rest of the specified forms of meaning of the _modus communis_,
appropriati etc. can be conceived of as _accidental modes_, as
already happens, as a matter of fact, in Donatus. However, these
specific modes are still independent even though they bear within

themselves the general essence of the noun; their meaning fun-

ction needs no foundation. What there is in them beyond the general

essence of the noun comes from the specific content which the

forms of meaning modify in a way that the form of meaning is

maintained. On the other hand, the purely accidental modes don't

bear within themselves the essence of the noun. Considered in

themselves, they aren't nouns, specifications of the essence nomen;

but, forms which first receive content on the basis of a noun and

which need the support of nouns since the purely accidental modes

have by themselves no independent meaning. For that reason

Duns Scotus refuses to accept the view of Donatus (the one al-

ready stated) and considers species, genus, numerus, figura,

casus, and persona purely accidental modes of the noun. [46]

Even though they are accidental, as forms of meaning they

are determined by the material just as every form is.

As regards the genus of nouns -- which Duns Scotus re-

duces to the two categories of action and passion -- it can be

rightfully doubted if it is to be counted in with the forms of

meaning. It is a mere modification of the word, which from

considerations of the history of language goes expressly back to

motives from factual cognition. But it doesn't have any compre-

hensive real category as a basis; and consequently, it cannot come

into question for the constitution of the logical sense of a sentence. [47]

Duns Scotus advances as an example of the dependent mode "species": "mountain" and "mountaineer" (mons and montanus). He turns against the opinion which claims to see mere verbal distinctions here and tries to show the material determination of this mode, which divides into a primary and a secondary mode. The primary mode, which is found in the expression "mountain", is related to the absolute existence of the object; The secondary mode is related to conditioned real being. For there can only be talk of a mountaineer insofar as there are mountains in the first place. On the other hand, there can surely be mountains without any mountain inhabitants. To be sure, the expression "mountaineer" is definitely independent as a noun; But it is the noun's meaning function that there is found a moment which is to be understood only on the basis of the meaning "mountain". Such nouns' dependency on primary meanings ought to serve as a basis for the mode of meaning "species". [48]

Similarly, Duns Scotus doesn't take it to be acceptable to interpret the mode figura as only an external distinction of simple and compound words. Nouns like "learned" and "unlearned" display, so he states, material determination to the extent that the noun can be simple, compounded, or multiply com-

pounded. This characterization, however, is a very rough and hardly precise one. But in its indeterminateness it is suited to indicate the approximate peculiarities in those things that incontestably modify meanings like those named. What Scotus presents here are very general and approximative peculiarities in those things that incontestably modify meanings like those named. What Scotus presents here are very general and approximative classifications whose univocal and determinate delimitation needed detailed investigations. What are pure, absolute forms of meaning, determined by objective material as such, and what is, on the other hand, to be charged to the evolution of language (a reality which never lends itself to being an exercise in pure thought) can only be decided on the basis of a theory of meaning which is developed in its particulars.

Just how dependent and in need of support these modes are becomes even clearer if the mode of number is considered than it was in considering the accidental modes of the noun. Plurality and singularity are modifications of meaning which only make sense if a meaning -- in this case a nominal meaning -- is the basis for them. Something must be one or many. Thus this mode determines a meaning to the effect one object or many is intended in the meaning. It is interesting that Duns Scotus doesn't revert in

short order to mathematical and real number in adducing the form

of meaning <u>numerus</u> we are discussing now, but he puts the

<u>unum</u> and <u>multum transcendens</u> together with number proper and

takes the form of meaning to be deduced <u>from out of both.</u> For

the form of meaning is not in actual fact determined by mathema-

tical number alone; and nouns in the plural form are not just

applied to objects actually enumerated but also to <u>manifoldnesses,</u>

to sets. That means to say that the form of meaning of <u>numerus</u>

is just as tailored to the one and the other as to one and enumerated

objects; Thus they reveal their <u>range of validity</u> which extends

<u>beyond</u> the singular domains and for this reason their general

weakening sense, which is proper to the forms of meaning. While

there can exist just doubts concerning the accidental modes first

named as to whether this function is actually appropriate to them

or whether they are to be reduced to factors in the history of

language, which extend beyond the domain of meaning, the mode of

number endures on the basis of its being determined by a category

which dominates everything in the order of objects.[49]

The general essence of the form of meaning of the noun has

been interpreted to the effect that the form of meaning intends an

object as object. The accidental modes of <u>casus</u> (cases) again so

mirror <u>the</u> properties of the objects conceived of that they are

interpositioned in determinate relationships. Inside of the net of

relations that criss-cross between the objects, the objects them-

selves function as the points of departure, "points of extension"

(principle) of the relations or, from another standpoint, as points

of reference(terminus) to which a relation tends. The accidental

forms of meaning of casus are the reflexes of the most general de-

terminations in thought, which are native to the domain of meaning.

Expressed subjectively, the cases derive their sense from the

primordial activity of thought as distinction and comparison.

However, the nature of these forms isn't exhausted with this.

True, this is adequate enough to distinguish the six cases: nominative,

genitive, dative, –. accusative, vocative and ablative. To this ex-

tent, namely, the nominative is distinguished in that it is the

point of departure of a relation, determines the meaning content

of the noun which serves as its foundation; The vocative makes a

meaning serve as a reference; But the other four cases can form

from either viewpoint the meaning contents which are inherent in

them.

Consideration must be paid to an objective peculiarity of

wide import for a more exact, invariable determination of the

formal content of the individual cases. Namely, it is peculiar to

an object that it is in its essence what it is and at the same time,

however, can be something else.[50]

Consequently, the form of meaning of the nominative states: The meaning content of the noun found in it is intended as a point of departure of a determination in the sense that the object intended is still another in its identity. Thus Duns Scotus interprets the sentence: Socrates amat to the effect that Socrates is the principle of the determination "to love", that he is such both in his identity as Socrates and in another which is incidental to him, in that he loves: He is a loving Socrates. Since the sense of the sentence is related directly to natural reality, a further determination in the content of the principle is possible. The point of departure of the determination is likewise an active principle, the fundamental source of an event. On the other hand, the meaning function of the nominative cannot be taken as differentiated in this way -- which is determined from out of natural reality -- in mathematical statements, for example, whose sense is related to an extra-sensorial domain, where it isn't suitable then, on the strength of the singuiarity of the domain of objects, to speak of an event.

Scotus rejects as erroneous the opinion that the nominative transposes the meaning content of the noun, in which it inheres, into the function of an object "of which" something is pre-

dicated or "in which" another exists. The nominative would not be sufficiently distinct from the other cases on the basis of this characterization. For something can also be predicated of the meaning contents which are found in other cases.[51]

The genitive as a form of meaning imparts to meaning the quality of principle or terminus, point of departure or reference, with the more approximate determination that its is something else (ut cuius est alterum). However in light of the above determination, which is supposed to distinguish the genitive as such from the dative, it seems that only a tautology is educed: The genitive means in the form of the genitive. In the sentence: Socratis interest, "Socrates" functions as principle; in the other sentence: Socratis misereor, it functions as terminus. Such is the case too in the sentence: Filius Socratis est.

In any case, the dative posits the meaning as point of departure or of arrival, of a relation with the more approximate determination that with such and such a supposit another is "given", imparted.[52]

The accusative imparts to meaning the sense of being the point of arrival in which an act, as it were, comes to rest and fulfillment. Thus, it is the fulfillment of the act. At times, the accusative also intends the meaning content at its basis directly as

principle without the determination which is proper to the nominative. This is the case with the so-called accusative with the infinitive. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the accusative can show up in sentences either by itself or in conjunction with prepositions: Lego librum, Curro ad campum.[53]

The vocative puts the meaning at its base into the form of a terminus which is dependent on an immediate execution of the act. A more extensive determination, as there was with the three cases already covered, is not to be found here. We have to look at the distinction between actus signatus and actus exercitus as regards acts.

The first of these finds its expression in the verb and participle. For example, nego makes known that I am accomplishing an act of refusal; The act itself is accomplished by and with a "not". The accomplishment of the act is in the 0 in the utterance O Henrice. It isn't made known by it only but acted out. And the construct which is the terminus of an immediate accomplishment of an act like this is the vocative.[54]

Like the genitive and the dative, the ablative gives the meaning the form of the principle or terminus with the determination quo. The thing of value in the whole of this determination of the essences of the cases is that Duns Scotus significantly establishes

their function in general as points of dep -ture or arrival. For this function generally suits every case; more proximate determinations vary with the varied domains of application of the cases and of the expression which are precisely their base. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Duns Scotus doesn't isolate the meanings that exist in singular cases, but investigates them in conjunction with sentences.

The different declensions of the nouns, on the other hand, aren't _modi_ _significandi_, but they rest on the various _inflexions_ _of_ _the_ _word_ _forms._ In general, there exists declension only on the basis of the different cases, and these of course are forms of meaning. To that extent, it can be also said that declension is a form of meaning through which the meaning content is "inflected", that is, is formed as it stands in different relations.[55]

The Pronoun

In establishing the essential form of meaning of the noun it had been stressed that it means the object as object. Likewise it has been noted that this distinction isn't extensive enough to delimit the noun from the other parts of speech. For the "part of speech" which is taken up now, the pronoun, means _per modum entis_, that is, refers to an object as object. The only thing that distinguishes it from the noun is that with the pronoun the object is not determined in content as this and no other object. Thus the meaning function of the pronoun can rightfully be called undetermined, or better, _non-determining_ (_indeterminata aprehensio_). Duns Scotus derives this essential property of the noun from _materia prima_. This of course is undetermined in itself, is deprived of every form, _so much so that it itself is neither inclusive nor exclusive_. _Materia prima_ has no _determinate_ tendency to be determined by a _determinate_ form: It "rests" as it were under any form whatsoever, is accessible to every form. This property isn't "forced on" it but fits it as such and constitutes its essence. It is characterized by a _capacitas quaedam formarum_, a certain accessibility for any formal determination whatsoever.

The essential mode of meaning of the pronoun is derived from this property of _materia prima_ to be undetermined and yet

determinable.

Indeed, this determination by _materia prima_ is not to be understood as if pronouns had _materia prima_ for the object meant and named by them, but _materia prima_ only makes the meaning function of the pronoun understandable.

The ancient grammarians expressed the same state of affairs in that they said that the pronoun means the substance without quality. _Vis-à-vis_ this explication of the meaning function of the pronoun, that given by Scotus proves to be by far more general, that is, not exclusively related to the actual reality of nature.[56]

Against this of course, it can be objected that the meaning function of a part of speech, which itself displays something positive, must be positive as well. According to what has been said, however, the pronoun functions in _privative_ form, as _modus indeterminatae apprehensionis_. Thus, the meaning function of the pronoun cannot be appropriately characterized by this mode.

To this Duns Scotus replies that what is called privative is indeterminate in _such_ a way that it excludes every form and admits in general no formal determination. But whatever is _neither exclusive nor inclusive_ of formal determination isn't privative. However, the meaning function of the pronoun is shown to be _specified in this manner_. But even if it weren't conceded that this meaning function isn't privative, it could be said that the

proper _modus_ _significandi_ of the pronoun, which is one which is

directly appropriate to everything, is circumscribed by this

meaning function as a privative.[57]   Even if it is conceded that

the _modus significandi pronominis_ is in fact privative and not

just circumscribed in privative form, then this mode would still

be delimited from other parts of speech with adequate determinateness.

The parts of speech are, of course, not to be thought of as word

forms but as extra-sensory primal categories of meanings. As

such they are _entia secundum animam_, are hence positive as well

in their species, and can also be positively differentiated.[58]

It has been said that the pronoun confers meaning in the

modus communis and attains the objective as such in every object.

But this also occurs with the noun _ens_: consequently, this is

properly a pronoun. Duns Scotus tries to meet this objection in

that he remarks that the _range_ of validity of the noun _ens_ is narrow-

ed down in relation to the pronominal realm of governance to the

extent that it would not be applicable in its meaning to the trans-

cendentals: _unum_, _res_, _aliquid_ nor moreover, with privations and

negations (_Nihil_ _est_ _non ens_). Hence, it cannot coincide with the

pronoun either and itself have the nature of a pronoun.[59]

However, it is possible that this line of argument is not

sound. Duns Scotus surely explains _ens_ _as_ _convertible_ with the

transcendentals and thus inherent in its domain of validity.

Furthermore he forms a concept of ens, which is so general that

it in fact is convertible with anything that can be known at all

(quaelibet intelligibile). Hence, ens has the same range of possible

applications as the pronoun. In this regard the two are not distinct

and the objection still stands. But this objection holds up only so

long as it is overlooked that the meaning function of the noun ens

is, in all its indeterminateness, other than that of the pronoun.

With the noun I intend an object as object; with the pronoun I intend

a totally determined object, granted that the object has already

been determined in content by the pronoun itself. The meaning

function of the pronoun is contrived for determination (determi-

nabilis), and it is produced in a determinate meaning nexus

(sentence) from out of the specific application of the pronoun.

The meaning function of the pronoun, which in itself isn't

fixed to any determinate object, gains its univocal, direct employ-

ment, which comes to light in the individual cases of application,

from specifically different moments which stand in relation to

the phenomenon of the direction of fulfillment in general. And

different pronouns admit to being locked in, each according to the

species of these moments which condition their fulfillment (deter-

mination in content).

Objects can be "corporeally" present, in immediate view, resulting in there being no possibility of doubt about their existence and their whatness, which can be grasped in content. The demonstrative pronoun has the meaning function of alluding to an object which is corporeally given. The meaning function, which in itself is not determinant but determined in its essence, gets its fulfillment from the objects that are in each and every case "presented" immediately.

Duns Scotus makes an interesting distinction here: The demonstrativum ad sensum means and intends the object which it is also alluding to. In the judgment: ille currit the full datum is grasped: the one running there. True, the demonstrativum ad intellectum alludes as well to an immediately given object, but it doesn't just intend the object as such. In the judgment: Haec herba crescit in horto meo, the haec, it is true, alludes to the grass in my hand, but not only the grass that is found in my hand is intended. Also the grass growing in my garden is. The latter state of affairs is not given to view; thus the haec is used ad intellectum. [60]

With the demonstrative pronoun the fulfillment is one that is direct and immediate (notitia prima). Such is not the case with the relative pronoun. It intends the object in an actus secundus: That is, it isn't related to the immediately given object but to the

object as not given anymore <u>after</u> <u>this,</u> albeit already having be-
come an object. The object is, as it were, "repeated" by the
relative pronoun, and as "repeated" it is intended as not imme-
diately given.[61] Put subjectively, that means that in this pro-
noun there is the moment of recall (<u>recordatio</u>). This is knowing
about something known by the knower <u>as once known.</u>[62] Thus the
relative intends the object intended as already intended.

Characteristic of the personal pronoun (I, you, he <u>etc.</u>)
is the <u>modus per se stantis</u>; It was already referred to in the treat-
ment of the noun as that by which an object existing in itself is
intended as different as such from another object. The <u>I</u> intends
the object that is the most certain and the most immediate and
that actually accomplishes the meaning function. The meaning
function is one which is quite specific; The fulfillment is different
in any given case, as often as another <u>I</u> actualizes <u>the meaning.</u>
Also the <u>you</u> -- however little it intends the object itself which
accomplishes the meaning act of the pronoun -- bears within itself
the relation to the one who is presently speaking to the extent that
the person who is "addressed" at present by the one who is
speaking is the one who is intended. The "you" is an "I" which
is an "it" (Fichte). <u>He,</u> <u>she</u> or <u>it</u> are demonstrative pronouns
which indicate (for the most part <u>demonstrativa ad intellectum</u>)

and give meaning in the _modus per se stantis_. Thus they get mas-sive application in their taking the place of actual nouns. [63]

The _modus adjacentis_, which was already met in the treat-ment of the noun, constitutes the meaning function of the possessive pronoun, which intends that an object belongs to the speaker or to an object which is at least inferred in thought by him. [64]

Duns Scotus doesn't give the accidental modes of meaning any closer treatment. He merely states that they are the same as those that were mentioned and already discussed in the treatment of the noun. [65]

Obviously, the wide range of import of the pronoun inside of the realm of meaning was known to Duns Scotus, or else he would not return to give more extensive coverage to the meaning function of the pronoun (He omitted to do this with the rest of the parts of speech.) after having discussed its different modes of meaning; nor would he secure its established sense against possible objections.

For instance, it is said that a pronoun in itself, taken absolutely, is without meaning, that it has merely a "suitability" (habilitas) for meaning something and that in the sense of demon-strative or relative acts. This opinion finds its support in Priscian who declares that outside of these acts the pronoun is vain and empty. [66]

Duns Scotus demonstrates the error of this opinion by reverting to the essence of the _modus significandi_ and its relation to meaning. There can only be talk of a definitely differentiated meaning function, if meaning in general is there. If there are supposed to be _modi significandi_ in general for the pronoun, so there must be a fundamental, primary meaning that belongs to it. In fact there is something like _modi significandi_ for pronouns, so that a meaning in general, which first and foremost makes the _modi significandi_ possible, also belongs to the pronoun.

Priscian's statement brings to mind the fact that according to Aristotle only that can be called "vain and empty" which is ordered to a determinate end _in such a manner that it doesn't attain this end._ However, the tendency of the pronoun is directed to intend an object _without_ determining _its content._

The "vain and empty" admits to two understandings: First, the pronoun generally doesn't mean anything; Second, it indeed means something but not in a _determinant_ manner. The pronoun is "vain and empty" in the second understanding. To the extent that its meaning function isn't determinant, the function can be called "empty". But even though its meaning function isn't determinant, it is _determined_ and for that reason not empty insofar as it properly belongs to it expressly _to intend something_

<u>indeterminantly.</u> This objection, which Duns Scotus rejects with .

a show of keen sense, can only find support in mistaking the

meaning <u>content</u> -- this varies specifically from case to case and

hence is in itself indeterminate (empty) -- for the determinate

meaning <u>function</u> in general.

Another opinion holds that the pronoun must necessarily

have a determined meaning function or else with a pronoun in

general nothing would come to thought and nothing would be pre-

dicated of it as the subject of a judgment; however, this meaning

would be the <u>determinate</u> <u>concept</u> of being, of objectiveness in

general, which is applicable to each singular, sensory and extra-

sensory object like the concepts: genus, species <u>etc.</u> But this in-

terpretation of the meaning function of the pronoun can't hold up.

That is to say, no actual predicate is permitted to be related to the

pronoun in itself as subject and the judgment "I am a man" would

be impossible; just as impossible as the judgment "The concept

'man' is a living being is contradictory".[67]

Duns Scotus summarizes the essence of the meaning function

of the pronoun in the sentence: <u>Illud</u> <u>est</u> <u>significatum</u> <u>pronominis,</u>

<u>significat</u> <u>a</u> <u>scil</u> <u>essentiam</u> <u>de</u> <u>se</u> <u>indeterminatam</u> <u>determinabilem</u>

<u>tamen.</u>[68]

Werner takes it to be:

striking that for the thought of Duns Scotus, which strives for the conceptualization of the concrete individual ... the concretizing nature of the pronouns was not rendered conspicuous. The medieval logic of language was just as removed from a philosophy of language then as scholastic-medieval philosophy was from a conceptualization of the philosophy of language which penetrates into the concrete essence of things. [69]

It is in the main beyond contest that scholasticism was still far removed from the proximity of the real and intensive, analytical treatment of actual reality as we encounter it in modern empirical sciences. But philosophy is not an empirical science, and that which is dealt with in a theory of meaning isn't the individual singularities and incidences of objects, but the principal, the categorial, the formal content. And where forms of meaning come up, which are determined through individual concepts but are still general in themselves as forms, they are recognized as such by Duns Scotus as has been demonstrated regarding the very special meaning modes of the noun. As surely as the pronouns are applied to individual objects, just as surely their meaning function is a general one which actually belongs to the exposition of the problems of a philosophy of language to the extent that it stays clear of psychologistic aberrations.

An interesting passage in Hegel throws light on how much Duns Scotus is in the right with his interpretation of the meaning function of the pronoun. Hegel's Logik, so rich in productive

distinctions and conceptual determinations, is still not adequately exhausted.

When I say, "The single one, this single one, here, now, all of these are generalities; Every and each are single, this, even when it is here, now, for my senses. Just so when I say "I", I intend me as excluding all others. But what I say is I, is just each I which excludes all others from itself ... I is the general in and for itself ... I ... abstract as such is a pure relation to itself."[70]

The Verb

Along with the noun the verb constitutes one of the most important parts of speech. This preeminent position of the verb inside of a meaningful whole (period) is elucidated immediately from the material determination of its form of meaning. The essence of the noun has been reduced as such to the objective. Every object is one object and distinct from another object. Co-primordial with the object in general is the affair complex of the object (Gegenstands-Sachverhalt). With every object there is a state of affairs even if it is only that it is identical with itself and distinct from the other.

Duns Scotus rightfully designates the object and the affair complex, the modus entis and the modus esse as the most general determinations in the domain of the objective in general.[71]

The modus esse, the affair complex of the object, determines the meaning function of the verb. But this mode does not extend to the univocal determination of the part of speech under discussion, for the modus esse is also proper to the participle. Hence there is need of a further determination to establish the full essence of the verb.

The proper essential form of the verb, which distinguishes it from all other parts of speech, is the modus distantis.

The verb expresses an affair complex; and in this meaning function, it isolates, as it were, the affair complex of the object with the result that it again relates the content to the object in and through this isolation and predicates the content as valid of the object. Now the distinction between verb and participle should also be clear. Although the participle means the same content as the verb, it doesn't mean it in modus distantis nor predicate it as valid of the object. Rather it intends it as somehow put, joined into one.

However, it doesn't seem to be possible throughout to reduce the essential form of the meaning of the verb, the modus distantis, to a "content" different from the object. What would result is that this mode could not be valid as the essential form since it doesn't function for all verbs. In the sentence "Ens est, Being is", the content which is intended by the verb "is" doesn't seem to be distinct from the object, from "being" in the way that at other times the object is distinct from the affair complex of the object. To be distinct from being it would have to be non-being. [72]

How does Duns Scotus solve this difficulty? He concedes that the est here doesn't mean anything essentially different from the object ens. He points out that the subject is to be considered

as the material and the predicate as the form in the judgment in question and that to this extent the _ens_ and the _est_ are _essentially_ distinct.   (At _tamen_ _in_ _ista_ _propositione_ _subjectum_ _accipitur_ _ut_ _materia_ _et praedicatum_ _ut_ _forma,_ _quae essentialiter_ _differunt._). [73]

This short sentence is less significant as a rejection of the objection above than for Duns Scotus' deep insight into the essence of judgment, which is worthy of being ranked with the observations on this fundamental phenomenon of logic expressly made earlier even if it doesn't surpass them. [74]

Duns Scotus has anticipated in principle one of the most modern and profound theories of judgment here.   Lask states:

> There is singly and solely bound up with cognition
> the addition of logical _form_ to the material and
> logically amorphous material.   Thus the material
> is the basis for cognition, that which is "given"
> to it, the substructure for cognition which the
> achievements of cognition have to be performed
> by.   On the other hand, the category presents the
> purely logical supplement, the addition to the
> material substructure.   Hence the true subject
> is the material, the true predicate ...the
> "category". [75]

The almost verbal coincidence of these formulations is interesting by itself.   However, it should especially not be overlooked that Duns Scotus attains the adduced meaning in a proposition that has a meaningful content.   In the sentence "Entities are" (_Das_ _Seiende_ _ist_) there is almost nothing else that he could do but

declare the material to be the subject and the form, the predicate. Thus it is also probable that Scotus coincides with Lask in his manner of extracting and solving the problem to the extent that Scotus has attained his theory of judgment by striving to esta- blish the domain of dominance of the logical form. The question is treated more comprehensively by Lask because his treatment is based more on principle, whereas Scotus attains an insight into the essence of this judgment only when the meaning of the notable sentence "Ens est" comes into question: He has not ex- trapolated this insight -- one that is in itself profound and valuable -- into a general theory of judgment. The reason for that is that is not only his metalogical "standpoint", but first and foremost the lack of free, intellectual flexibility vis-à-vis the bonds of tradition, a lack which can be encountered in him despite his critically independent manner of thought.

The ens and the est are distinct secundum rationem. In other words both of these have a different state of affairs. And this difference in their state of affairs is already sufficient for the distinction between the object and the affair complex of the object.

Every object has two determinations: its what in its con- tent and its being-this and being-distinct from every other.[76]

The _modus esse_, which the verb has in common with the participle, is derived from the phenomenon of _change_ and succession in actual reality, to which is contrasted the constant determination of substance. However, it is evident that the verb brings to expression not only actual happenings but also timeless conditions. Duns Scotus states that not every being has an _esse successivum._ God's being is non-change, and still we say, "God exists." Scotus obviates this difficulty with the explanation: the being of God is successive in _eternal_, not in temporal succession. However, it seems to us that the being of God existing as _if_ it were in eternal succession is only an analogous manner of speaking, suggested by the concept of temporal succession. [77]

Not only matters drawn from the domain of the supra-sensory reality of the metaphysical, but also extra-sensory mathematical and logical relations have their verbal expression. For this reason it seems proper that the meaning function of the verb has a determination which is the most general possible and weakened in _its intending an affair complex of the object._

The relations which exist most generally between the objects as a whole are expressed by the substantive verb. The meaning function of the substantive verb is still not specified by the determinate kinds of being, that vary with the single domains of reality.

If we get down to the objective domain of natural reality where it makes sense to speak of events, occurrences, action and passion, we find that the meaning function of the substantive verb undergoes the corresponding determinations. Thus the distinctions can be made between the active and passive, the intransitive and transitive. The latter appears in the mode of meaning of the active and passive verb; On the other hand, the intransitive verb confers meaning neither in the active nor in the passive form, so that it could be attempted to classify it under the concept of the general mode of meaning of the substantive verb. But this mode of meaning is not determined in itself, whereas it is valid of the mode of the intransitive verb. None the less, verbs such as vivo and sto, which Scotus advances as examples of intransitive verbs, are able in a certain sense to be numbered among the active verbs. Of course, they betray an activity which does not go immediately and as such to an object (Objekt) as is the case with doceo, for example. This distinction, however, is not a categorical one and thus does not form the basis for the separation of the classes mentioned. [78]

What has more significance for the further clarification of the essence of the form of meaning of the verb is that which Duns Scotus teaches concerning compositio. This accidental mode of

meaning of the verb has basically been alluded to above with the remark that the verb not only means an affair complex of the object that is distinct from the object, but it means it as well as <u>inherent in the object</u>. Duns Scotus remarks that the ancient grammarians have not expressly mentioned <u>compositio</u>, but it was in fact known about from a statement of Aristotle concerning <u>est</u> -- a statement to the effect that <u>est</u> shows a certain connection without which the members that are joined are not to be understood.

According to Duns Scotus this <u>est</u> is included in all verbs, as if it were their "root". For that reason <u>compositio belongs</u> to the verb in general and determines its meaning function to the effect that the content is conceived of as being "inclined", intentionally related to the content, as <u>valid of it</u>.

However, Duns Scotus doesn't reckon <u>compositio</u> as the essential meaning function of the verb, for the meaning function is for meaning the affair complex as such. This is the only thing that serves as a basis for <u>compositio</u>.

The <u>modus per se stantis</u> is to the noun what the <u>modus compositionis</u> is to the verb. An object as this determined object is intended by the <u>modus per se stantis</u>. <u>Compositio</u> is the actual principle for the connection of the verb with the noun in a univocal sense.

If the interpretation of the judgment: <u>Ens est</u> (we commented on it above) should be applied to every judgment, then it would have to be said that the function of the <u>form</u> is proper to the verb and the accidental mode of meaning of the verb, the <u>compositio,</u> puts in expression a determined moment in the form, namely, the intentionality (<u>inclinatio</u>) of the material (<u>suppositum</u>) for the "given". A state of affairs is always a state of affairs dealing with, about something; <u>An affair</u> complex <u>is always an affair complex.</u> (<u>Ein Sachverhalt ist immer ein</u> Sachverhalt.)

Thus the <u>modus distantis</u> and the <u>modus compositionis</u> -- even though they seem at first sight to work against and contradict each other -- permit of being unified in the <u>one</u> meaning function of the verb.[79]

The verb can simply express the affair complex, can simply name it; that is, it can predicate of it that it is an affair complex and is, or is not, valid as such of the object. Outside of the acts of predication the subject can have still other kinds of attitudes toward the affair complex; it can be a <u>wished, asked, commanded, doubted</u> state of affairs. And corresponding to these various qualities of act, there accrue various accidental modes for the meaning function of the verb. These modes are various kinds of attitudes on the part of the subject and as such

they modify compositio. Sentences of command, of desire, of questioning, of doubt are not sufficiently and mutually delimited even today yet; especially unclear is their relation to judgment. That Duns Scotus numbers them among the accidental modes, thus among the functions of meaning requiring a foundation, means consequently that he conceives of them not as directly simple acts but acts in which inhere manifold complexities. With full appropriateness, Duns Scotus stresses that the distinction of the act qualities first and foremost carries with it one such of compositio, of the kind and manner of the relation of the affair complex to the object.

The infinitive, which Scotus ranges among the modes that have been mentioned, is the form of the verb in which is directly named the content of the affair complex intended by it. In the infinitive the content is re-presented straightforward. Hence it is also clear that the modes named above all admit of being resolved into the infinitive since they all contain the affair complex in some way by the act quality. [80]

Duns Scotus has a further species of the special modes of meaning based on the form. It is distinguished into the forma perfecta, meditativa, frequentativa, inchoativa, and diminutiva. The modifications which come to expression in these forms, for

all that, touch less on the authentic meaning functions of the verb than on its present content, on the what of the affair complex intended.

Compositio as the moment of the meaning function asserts that the state of affairs named in the verb is one such that it is about an object. A state of affairs can only be thought of as a state of affairs about something. The modus esse of the verb, that is, its essentiality in that the mode intends a state of affairs, analytically requires an object, on which the state of affairs can be supported as it were. At the same time too as the modus esse intends the affair complex, it requires points of support for this affair complex. An affair complex is only to be thought of as a relation between "things", as a relation between the related terms. Hence, objects are given at the same time too with the modus esse. On the basis of these objects there exists the content intended in the mode. [82]

There is along with compositio -- which as it were "forward" joins with the subject of the sentence the affair complex intended by it as belonging to the object -- a further accidental moment of the meaning function of the verb: significatio. It asserts that the affair complex is joined with the objects which are not thought of as the content of the subject of the sentence and hence also are

found in the oblique cases. The term significatio is so explained that a property of the verb comes to expression in it -- a property which is based on the meaning in content of the verb. The content of the verb, which varies from case to case, also conditions the multipleness of the nouns dependent on it and found in the various cases. The determination in content of the state of affairs expressed in the verb has a more or less variegated distinctness, consequently, in its affair complex. [83]

The state of affairs that is intended in the verb can be variously determined by the specific difference of its relation to the objects which don't belong to the subject of the sentence. Significatio, which is to be already conceived of in itself as an accidental determination of the general meaning function of the verb, undergoes then a further specification by the genus accidentale verbi. This is, as it were, a quality of significatio. [84]

However, Duns Scotus remarks concerning the genus verbi that it is segregated into the genus activum, passivum, neutrum, and commune, that it is "preeminently" supported by the distinctions in the word form of the verbs. In this way he shows that the genus verbi doesn't allow of being grasped as purely a meaningful moment and is more to be put into the context of merely grammatical matters. [85]

There still remains to be presented how Duns Scotus

determines the matter of the category "time" in verbs. The English term _temporal_ _expression_ that can be applied to verbs might lie near to including the temporal category in the essence of the part of speech in question. As is evident from what has been already said, Scotus is not of this opinion. For him time is only an accidental mode. It is obviously not a respective mode which is based on a relation of the verb to the subject of the sentence or to the object of the sentence (the objective nouns found in oblique cases), but a mode which is based on the affair complex as such and _hence_ _needs_ _not_ _be_ _given_ _with_ _it_. Logical and mathematical affair complexes are without temporal determinations. [86]

The Participle

The meaning function of the verb has just yielded to being characterized as intending an affair complex and indeed a complex that is <u>valid</u> of an object (<u>per modum distantis</u>).

Now the general function of the participle is to intend an affair complex but <u>not</u> to intend it in the <u>modus distantis</u> but <u>indistantis.</u> That means to say that the meaning of the participle doesn't so much stress the <u>inherence</u> of the affair complex in the object, but rather it stresses the thought that the affair complex is <u>united</u> with the object. The participle is distinguished from the verb by this moment of meaning in which the tension between object and affair complex is suspended and cancelled as it were. [87]

Duns Scotus explains the relationship of the part of speech under discussion to the effect that it, as it were, <u>takes part</u> in the meaning function of the noun and that of the verb. This is not, however, the case relative to its essential moments as if the participle meant an object as object at the same time as it did an affair complex as content. This interpretation would have to be rejected as false; for if the intepretation were justified, the participle would seem to present an <u>independent</u> form of meaning, one that is <u>specifically</u> different from the rest of the parts of speech. The

"participation" mentioned can be related to only accidental
modes to the extent that numerus and casus are proper to the
participle as they are to the noun and tempus and significatio
are proper to it as they are to the verb.[88]

The division of the special modes of meaning of the par-
ticiple runs analogously to that of the verb.[89]

The nominal accidents aren't proper to the participle as
such, but are so on the basis of the juncture with the object,
that is implicit in its essence.[90]

The Adverb

The adverb yields meaning _per modum esse_, that is, the thought of the affair complex is included in the concept of its meaning. Under closer consideration, its function is directed to in some way _determining the compositio_, the moment of inherence of the affair complex in an object. Since the moment of _compositio_ is disconnected from the participle -- a circumstance distinguishing it directly from the verb -- adverbs cannot be spoken of in the proper sense as determinations of the participle. Only to the extent that an affair complex is also intended in the participle, it must also be able to be affected by the determinant form of the adverbial function of meaning. Thus, it happens that nouns and pronouns too can be linked up with adverbs.

This seems to contradict the functional meaning of the adverb that was taken note of at the beginning since it has been said that the thought of the affair complex is conceptually included in its function. However, nouns and pronouns intend objects as objects. It could be replied that also affair complexes admit to being _named_ in nominal and pronominal forms of meaning and thus it's not without rhyme if they are _adverbially_ determined too.

But the difficulty isn't circumvented _in this way_. For if an affair complex is found in the meaning function of the noun or the

pronoun, I intend it no longer as content but as object. In my

opinion the difficulty is to be solved by making clear that the ad-

verbial determinations of the noun and pronoun under discussion

can only and exclusively be "thought of" in complete sentences,

which affair complexes are always intended in, as in the sentence

which Duns Scotus employs: Homo tantummodo legit. Only man

reads. Thus the adverb always has some relationship to the

affair complexes, that is, to the verbs expressing them.[92]

And in the case where the adverb is found not to be in relation

to verbs and participles, that is, not in the function of the deter-

mining affair complexes, then its meaning is "garbled", as Duns

Scotus expressly notes.[93]

The essence of the adverbial meaning function admits of a

specification in which the adverb's proper nature of determination

comes to be expressed. Namely, there are two respects in which

the adverb can determine verbs and participles. First, it can

respecting the verbs' and participles' meaning content in itself,

then in respect to their manner of meaning. These two species of

this determining function of the adverb can be further specified.

By means of this specification the various concrete forms of

adverbs are arrived at.

An affair complex expressed by the verb can undergo more

approximate adverbial determination as regards the categories of

space, quantity, quality; furthermore, the act quality of the mean-
ing _act_ of the verb does the same.

The meaning _function_ of the verb as such, not the content
of the affair complex expressed in the function at any given time,
can be determined as regards the _compositio,_ the time, and the
quality of the verb. [95]

The adverbial determinations, that are possible on the
basis of the differences in affair complexes as accords with the
categories mentioned, need not be gone into in detail here, since
they, strictly speaking, have nothing to do with the meaning
function of the verb but present _material_ differentiations.

Nonetheless, it is interesting to see how Duns Scotus ex-
plains the problems phenomenology is usually aware of, when he
discusses the adverbial determinations which are directed to the
meaning function of the verbs or at least assigns a place to them
inside of his theory of meaning.

It was already indicated in the discussion of the _compositio_
of the verb and of the act qualities modifying them how Duns
Scotus called attention to a domain of problems which had still
not been sufficiently treated. The adverbs which here come into
question only as determinations of _compositio_ retain their specific
nature at any time from the appropriate act qualities as are there:

questioning, doubting, affirming, negating. There also belong to the same line adverbs which are encountered with the indicative, optative, imperative, the act qualities of desiring, requesting being linked with them as their more proximate determinations. The adverbs of time, however, are still to be orderer in the group named before, which deals with the aspect of the <u>content</u> of the affair complexes. [96]

The Conjunction

As the name already indicates, it is the task of the conjunctions to tie together parts. With this very general designation nothing is settled either about the kind of connection or about the nature of the parts to be connected. Two fundamental kinds of connection and, correspondingly, two classes of conjunctions can be distinguished. Possibly a connection of parts, quae inter se dependentiam non habent, that is, the what in content of the parts brought in conjunction does not require as such the connection in question: The connection is forced on them "from outside" as it were. This kind of conjunction is not unsuitably called conjunctio per vim. [97]

To these belong the copulative conjunctions, for example, and. It can join two substantives, adjectives, or whole sentences together, which don't indicate any immanent interconnection according to their content and thus do not require the copulative connection. What is proper to the relation that is found in such conjunctions is that they don't remain restricted to two parts but can be extended to a third and then to any number in succession. Conjunctions per vim are also disjunctions. They only have this peculiar property of connecting two parts in such a fashion that they are different in respect to a third. Duns Scotus cites a sentence of Boethius

who said of the disjunctive conjunction that it brings two parts into relation, at the same time _prohibiting_ them from being both at the same time.[98]

The second kind makes the conjunctions to be _per ordinem_. The parts to be joined _require_ determinate, connective forms in accord with _their meaning content_. As examples Duns Scotus advances the conjunctions which mediate on the one hand between cause and effect (_actual_ objects and affair complexes); and on the other hand between antecedent and consequent (logical objects and affair complexes).[99]

Besides these two kinds of proper conjunctions, whose sense is founded in the essence of discourse, of sentences, there are such that serve _to ornament speech_. Since they don't belong essentially to the forms of meaning proper, a more extensive treatment of them is unnecessary.[100]

The Preposition

The preposition can also be conceived of as a means of connection. However, it is not to be reduced to anyone of the other means that have come up in this relating of meanings and hence presents a new independent form of meaning. The connection is one such that is made with nouns in such a way that the nouns stand in determined cases. The objects intended in the appropriate meanings are thought of as found in determinate relations because of the cases. In the relating of meanings the prepositions have the capability of determining the appropriate relations and thus of enabling further meaning relationships.

If the prepositions are connected with still other forms of meaning, for example, the verb, resulting in their constituting a unity with them in speech, then they lose their meaning function. They no longer present an independent expression, but they obtain the form of meaning of the word in question, which they are connected with in speech. Indeed, they can still determinately influence the content of the meaning too, but not in the specific function of the preposition.[101]

The Interjection

The interjection is understood by Duns Scotus to be a more proximate determination of the verb or of the participle. Hence it could be supposed that it doesn't present an independent meaning function, but it coincides with the adverb. Yet it should be noted that its meaning content always presents emotions and thus is related to <u>emotional acts.</u> Thus the interjection does not likewise determine the meaning content of the verbs as such, that is, the <u>affair complex</u> intended in them. Their determining function refers to <u>the relation the verbal acts of meaning have to consciousness.</u>[102]

The concrete forms of the interjections occur each according to the various emotions as pain, sorrow, joy, wonder, fear and shock. [103]

Conclusion

The Problem of the Categories

The real aim of this investigation -- being an investigation

into problems of historical relevance -- from out of systematic

necessity requires a conclusion that gives a preview of the

systematic structure of the problem of the categories apart

from a review and synopsis which reworks and evaluates the main

points in the result. In this, however, there still cannot be much

more accomplished other than emphasizing the essential possi-

bilities of the problem and its nexus since our work so far has

not provided a basic, overall view which would facilitate under-

standing. This is also the reason why, until now, systems of

categories which have been attempted have not been able to avoid

giving the impression of being, in a certain sense, deadly vacuous.

In the preceding where it was our task to present an

historical expression of the problem of the categories while not

venturing into the systematic, it was not possible to put down

major theses, determined in content from the start. For their

more extensive relation to a special problem structure would

surely have had to remain questionable without a precursory know-

ledge of this structure. And furthermore, the problematic would

have burdened too heavily a presentation aimed at simply coming

to a systematic understanding, by its frequent, extraneous pro-

jections and necessary adherence to a major point of view. It

would have disagreeably disturbed the presentation by constantly

bringing up open questions. On the other hand, this is the appro-

priate place to give expression to the disquiet of mind, previously

restrained, which the philosopher has to experience every time

that he studies the historical evolvement of his world of problems.

The articulation of the essential possibilities of the

problem of the categories can only be so conducted that they be

isolated and analyzed in order. It is imperative to emphasize

anew that these possibilities are mutually interrelated and

that which appears to be immediate and unmediated is always

mediated. Hence that which is set out in particular in what

follows has its full sense only in the whole.

If the categories are conceived of as elements and media

of the sense meaning of that which can be experienced, of the

objective in general, then there arises as a fundamental require-

ment of the theory of the categories: the characterizing delimit-

ation of the various domains of objects in domains that are

categorically irreducible to each other. Throughout the disposition

of the present investigation stress has been put on the accomplish-

ment of this task.[1]   With this we attempted also to bring about

the destruction of former views of medieval logic as meager and

uninteresting.   This was brought about by emphasizing the de-

terminant elements which fundamentally characterize the

single domains of objects.   The extension of the determinant

elements into the ultimate, categorial sphere of the objective

(the transcendentals) then rendered the major, unifying bond

of the domains of diverse application.   For this reason, a

strictly conceptual and in a certain sense one-sided manner of

presentation has been required while consciously excluding

metaphysical problem cases of more profound scope.

These are only to be conceived of as being ultimately

decisive for the problem of the categories when a second basic

task of every theory of the categories is seen: the inclusion of

the problem of the categories in the problem of the judgment and

the subject.   Moreover this aspect of the problem of the categories

is at least touched on in scholastic logic.   True, the presentation

of Duns Scotus' theory of judgment had another purpose in mind:

it was supposed to characterize the domain of the logical in which

for one thing the essential relation of judgment to the category

generally stayed obscure.   On the other hand, the theory of meaning

opened up an access to subjectivity (not in the sense of

individuality, but of the subject in itself).   Duns Scotus' task

of analyzing a determined level of act, the modi significandi, forces him into the sphere of acts in general and to establish principal parts for the individual levels of act (modus significandi, intelligendi, essendi) and their relationship to each other.

Precisely the existence of a theory of meaning inside of medieval scholasticism reveals a subtle disposition to heed with certainty the immediate life of subjectivity and the sense continuity immanent in it without having won an accurate concept of the subject. There is the possible temptation to "explain away" the existence of such "grammars" by indicating the practice of medieval schools and its tradition. Such an "explanation" -- which is for the most part favored in historical science but highly precarious in the realm of the history of thought -- does have a certain degree of correctness to it. When it comes, however, to an active understanding of a "time" and of its real intellectual accomplishments, there arises the need for an interpretation of its sense by adducing it from ultimate goal-orientated thoughts. Such a project is mostly waved aside as unhistorical and thus considered worthless with the deprecating label "construction". Because of an incomprehension in principle of the essence of historical cognition and of the conceptual construction of history, it is not noticed precisely how much the simple transposition and juxtaposition of as much "factual

material" as possible leads away from the vivid existence of the
historical past and markedly approaches being a leveling con-
struction which excludes any sense of unification and finality.

Because of its return to a fundamental, problematic sphere
of subjectivity (the levels of acts), the theory of meaning has es-
pecial import for a philosophical interpretation of medieval
scholasticism in conjunction with the problem of the categories --
despite its immediate schematized character. The investigation
of the relation between the modus essendi and the "subjective"
modus significandi and modus intelligendi leads to the principle
of the material determination of each form. For its part this
principle includes the fundamental correlation of object and
subject in itself. [2] This essential connectedness of the object
of cognition and the cognition of the object receives its clearest
expression in the concept of the verum as one of the transcendentals,
of the determination of objects in general. But still there is
lacking that which is related to the conceptualization of the
problem of cognition itself, a conscious penetration of the problem
of judgment in the subject-object relation first off and then the in-
terrelating of the categories to judgment.

Since even today in those places where realism has the
ascendancy no major insight has been made into these interrelated

problems, this task of the theory of categories ought to be discussed more thoroughly. Along with the delimitation of the domain of the object, it is one that is fundamental. There is here the opportunity of indicating the necessity of a metaphysical solution to the problem of cognition -- at least as regards its most common terms.

The category is the most general determination of the object. Object and objectiveness have, as such, only sense _for_ a subject. In the subject objectivity is built up by judgment. If the category is claimed to be conceived of as decisive in the determination of the _object_, then the category must be brought into essential relationship to the framework on which objectiveness is built. Thus, it is not "accident" but lies at the very inner core of the problem of the categories that it occurs both in Aristotle and in Kant in some way associated with predication, that is, with judgment. Hence, it can be inferred that the categories were had to be reduced to pure _functions of thought_ for which there can be seen no possibility of a philosophy, which has recognized the _problems of sense_. And precisely transcendental idealism (in its present form it should not be identified straightway with Kant's theory of cognition and its formulation) asserts from the beginning that all thought and cognition is always thought and

cognition of <u>an object.</u> Accordingly, the state of affairs of cate-

gories as mere forms of thought must be evaluated. [3]

Also the most general determinations of objects (the re-

flexive categories as weakened as they are in their content) are

not to be fully conceived of without relating them to the <u>judgment</u>

which constitutes objectivity. This means that a merely "ob-

jective" (<u>objektiv</u>) general theory of objects remains :essarily

imcomplete without the inclusion of the "subjective side". Thus

it surely is that each distinction is a distinction of the objective;

nonetheless, it is again only a distinction in cognition and judg-

ment. The foundation for the manifoldness of the <u>domain of</u>

<u>validation</u> inside of the whole of the categories is <u>primarily,</u>

<u>but</u> <u>not</u> <u>exclusively</u> in the manifoldness of the domains of objects:

These always condition any form of judgmental constitution, which

is structured in correspondence with the domains of objects and

out of which the categories can be "read off" first and foremost

according to their <u>full</u> <u>content.</u>

First, it is then from out of judgment that also the prob-

lem of the "immanent and transient (that which lies 'outside of

thought') validation" of the categories is to be solved. It doesn't

even make any sense to speak of <u>immanent</u> and <u>transient</u> valida-

tion without reverting to "subjective logic". Immanence and

transcendence are concepts of relation. They first gain a sure

meaning through the establishment of that to which something im-

manent must be thought of as transcendent respectively. It remains

beyond contest that "all transient validation stands and falls with

the recognition of objects."[4] There is just a problem as to the

kind of objectiveness there can be ever if it is noted that objective-

ness only has sense for a judging subject. Without this subject it

will never come about, either, that there is brought out its full

sense of obtaining. It doesn't have to be decided here as to whether

this obtaining means a peculiar "being" or "ought" or neither of them

or whether, on the contrary, it is first to be conceived of in the group

of problems of profound depth which is included in the concept of the

living mind and unquestionably connected closely with the problem of

value.

Thus, the close relationship of the problem of the categories to

the problem of judgment allows for the hylomorphic relation and the

function of the material in the differentiation of meaning to become

a problem afresh. The hylomorphic duality today a decisive medium

for the treatment of the problem of the theory of cognition, so that a

major investigation of the value and limitations of this duality has be=

come unavoidable.

Of course, a definitive clarification of this question will not

be gained by remaining inside of the logical sphere of sense and

of sense structure. It comes down at least to a potentiation (ac-

cording to Lask a theory of storeys of forms) which unques-

tionably have the most meaningful effe.t in throwing light on the

structural manifoldness of the logical itself. However, this

manifoldness complicates precisely the problem of the function

of the material in differentiating meaning and transposes it into

a new sphere without sufficiently taking into consideration the

fundamental difference of sensory and extra-sensory material.

Logic and its problems generally cannot be seen in their

true light if the relationship which they gain meaning out of does

not become translogical. Philosophy cannot avoid in the long run

its proper optics -- metaphysics. That means that there is for

the theory of truth the task of an ultimate metaphysical-teleological

meaning for consciousness. In this there dwells primordially what

is of value to the extent that it is a living deed which is filled

with sense and actualizes sense and which has not been even

remotely understood if it is neutralized into the concept of a

blind, biological fact.

Within the realm of the structural orientations of the living

mind the theoretical attitude of mind is only one of them. Because

of it it must be called a major and fateful error of philosophy as

"world-view" to consider a spelling out of the real as a sufficient task and not to aim, in accord with its most authentic calling, at an <u>invasion</u> into the truly real and the really true by way of an ever precursory synopsis which pulls together the whole of what can be known. Only with this orientation to the concept of the living mind and its "eternal affirmation" (Friedrich Schlegel) can the logic of theoretical cognition remain safe from exclusive restriction to the study of structures and make logical sense <u>also into a problem according to its ontic meaning</u>. Only then is there the possibility of a satisfactory answer to how the "non-real" "transcendent" sense guarantees for us true reality and objectiveness.

Precisely to the extent that Lask was radical in his presentation of the structural problems in the theory of judg-ment and of the categories, was he ceaselessly driven to re-lating the problems to metaphysical problems, ultimately perhaps without his being fully aware of it. Precisely in his concept of the object as characterized by antitheticalness there is a pro-ductive element in which there can be included the multiple theories of knowledge which are now in contest with each other. In this way the difficulties connected with problems of antithesis and of values, the problem of ontic meaning and of the logical grasping

of the object should not be underestimated. [5]

In a transcendental-ontic grasping of the concept of the object, so specified, the problem of the "application" of the categories looses its sense. This is all the more certain the more that the major significance (not meant "individualistically") of the proposition of immanence is taken more surely and courageously serious. In my opinion the necessary, only metaphysically adducible, ultimate foundation of the proposition of immanence will be effectuated from out of the suggested concept of the living mind. To the extent that it is generally conceded that there is a possible problem, the kind of logical treatment of the problem of the categories, that is only objective (objektiv), is recognized as one-sided precisely in the problem of the application of the categories -- if anywhere. [6]

There isn't explained in the subject of the theoretical cognition the metaphysically most meaningful sense of mind -- not to mention its full content. The problem of the categories first gets its real dimension in depth and richness by incorporating this sense. The living mind as such is according to its essence the historical mind in the widest sense of the word. The true world-view is remote by far from the purely momentary existence of a theory detached from life. The mind is only to be

conceived of, when the complete fullness of its accomplishments, that is, its history, is cancelled out. There is given in the constantly growing fullness of its history, in its philosophical conceptualization, a continuously strengthened means for the active conceptualization of the absolute mind of God. History and its cultural-philosophical-teleological meaning must become an element determinate in meaning for the problem of the categories, unless it is desired to elaborate the cosmos of the categories in order to gain the result of an inadequate, schematic table. Along with the delimitation of the domain of the object and the incorporation of the problem of judgment there is the third fundamental requirement for a hoped-for solution of the problem of the categories. Conversely, the conceptual means and final data can first and foremost be adduced from out of a theory of the categories of such a wide orientation in order to conceive actively of the single epochs of intellectual history. The problem of the "medieval world-view" -- touched on in the introduction -- which has to be of especial interest in connection with the present investigation, is still today without an authentic, conceptual foundation in cultural philosophy, one that can first give clarity, certainty, and unity to the whole, insofar as it is dealt with at all. The peculiar will to live and the subtle, intel-

lectual posture of such a time require the openness of empathetic understanding in conformity with them and a wide, that is, philosophically orientated valuation. For example, the concept of analogy, that has been discussed in this investigation[7] with the problem of metaphysical reality, appears at first to be a quite blurred and not widely meaningful concept of the schools. However, it contains as a dominant principle in the sphere of the categories of sensory and extra-sensory reality the conceptual expression of the experiential world of medieval man, which was qualitatively felt, inhered in values, and related to transcendence. Analogy was the conceptual expression of the specific form of inner existence, which was anchored in the transcendent, primordial relation of the soul to God, as it was experienced in the middle ages with exceptional intensity. The multiplicity of the living relations between the soul and God, this side and the beyond, is varied on the strength of their specific remoteness or propinquity (in the sense of qualitative intensity). Metaphysical compaction by transcendence is at the same time the source of multiple antithesis and thus of the richest experience in the individual life of the immanent personality.

Transcendence doesn't mean any radical remoteness which a subject is lost in; It consists precisely in a living relationship

constructed on correlativity. As such it doesn't have a _sole_, inflexible orientation in its sense, but it has to be compared to the stream of experiences that ebb and mount in kindred individual minds. However, the absolute transvalue of the one member of the correlation is not considered along with this. Thus the positing of value doesn't gravitate exclusively to the transcendent but is, as it were, reflected from its fullness and absoluteness and rests in the individual.

Hence there also is in the whole medieval world-view a total world of multiple differentiations in value since this view is so consciously and radically oriented to the _teleological_. The possibilities and fullness of experience, which result from out of this for subjectivity, is therefore conditioned by the dimension of the life of the soul, which extends to the transcendent, but not as it does today by its _wide range of fleeting content_. The possibilities of an increasing uncertainty and complete disorientation are greater by far and downright boundless in this plain attitude of life. On the other hand, the basic formation of the way of life of medieval man is not at all lost at the very start in the broad expanse of sensory reality and anchored there, but precisely this basic formation itself is subjected to the requirement of a transcendent finality in that it _needs an anchor hold_.

In the concept of the living mind and its relation to the "origin" of metaphysics, a glimpse is caught of its metaphysical foundation, of the singularity, the individuality of _acts_ with their universal validity, which the existence in itself of _sense_ is included with in a living unity. Put objectively, the problem here is that of the relatedness between time and eternity, change and absolute validity, world and God: This is a problem which is reflected upon scientifically and theoretically both in history (the formation of values) and in philosophy (the obtaining of values). [8]

If account is taken of the deeper, cosmic essence of philosophy, then also the viewing of the Christian philosophy of the middle ages as a scholasticism standing in antithesis to the _mysticism_ contemporaneous with it must be shown to be false in principle. In the medieval world-view scholasticism and mysticism essentially belong together. The two "antithetical" pairs: rationalism and irrationalism, scholasticism and mysticism _do not coincide._ And where it is attempted to put them on the same plain, this attempt rests on an extreme rationalization of philosophy. Philosophy is _powerless_ as a rationalistic construct detached from life; Mysticism is _aimless_ as an irrationalistic experience.

The philosophy of the living mind, of love fruitful in

achievement, of reverent intimacy with God, whose most common orientations could only be indicated -- especially a theory of categories derived from their fundamental tendencies -- presents us the enormous task of a major dialog with Hegel's system of an historical world-view since that formidable system of Hegel is a world-view so rich and profound, so abounding in experiential values and conceptualizations that it has absorbed all the previous foundational problematics in philosophy.

Notes for the Introduction

1.   Der Gegenwartswert der geschichtlichen Erforschung der
        mittelalterlichen Philosophie, Akad. Antrittsverlesung,
Wien, 1913 p. 7.

2.   Recently von der Pfordten has undertaken the interesting
        task of presenting the history of philosophy under this
aspect and of working out the fundamental value judgments of philo-
sophers. Vide, Die Grundurteile der Philosophen. Eine Ergaenzung
zur Geschichte der Philosophie, I Haelfte Griechenland Heidelberg
1913.

3.   Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Berlin 1846, p. 197.

4.   Taking no notice of the formulations of problems and only
        setting in contrast ready-made ideas in the context brings
with it what the third part of the inaugural speech of Martin Grabmann,
which we already alluded to, showed dissatisfaction with. In order to
avoid repetition of what I have already said, I refer you to my
review of Charles Sentreul' Kant und Aristoteles (Literarische
Rundschau, published by I. Sauer, XL (1914) Heft 7, pp. 330 ff)
where the relationship between Aristotelian-Scholastic and
modern philosophy is discussed and also the necessary viewpoint
for its treatment.

5.   H. Lotze, Metaphysik, Einleitung, p. 15.

6.   H. Driesch, Ordnungslehre, Jena 1912 p. 34.

7.   Von System der Kategorien, Philos. Abhandl., dedicated to
        Chr. Sigwart, Tuebingen, 1900, p. 45.

8.   Kategorienlehre, Leipzig, 1896 p. vll.

9.   E. Lask, Die Lehre vom Urteil, Tuebingen, 1912, p. 39 ff.
        Next to the employment of a systematically conducted under-
standing of Aristotle that is a definitive history of scholastic logic, there
has to be taken into account the just as forceful historical process
of the influence of Aristotelian philosophy on the philosophical work
of scholasticism. Con. A. Schneider, Die abendlaendische
Spekulation des zwoelften Jahrhunderts in ihrem Verhaeltnis zur

aristotelischen und juedisch-arabischen Philosophie (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. Mittelalters. Bd. XVII, 4) Muenster 1915.

10.   Con. my dissertation Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus, 1914, introduction and pages 86 ff. Here Husserl's decisive explication for the presentation of the ideas of a "pure logic" is pointed to. Its objective domain in regard to its form of reality must above all be still put down as problematic. This can only become possible through the systematic means of a philosophy which is in principle orientated to a world-view.

11.   Citations are made from the Paris edition: Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, 1891-95. Where this newer printing seems to be less reliable, comparison will be made with the Lyonese edition of 1639. The treatise, De Modis Significandi, is more accessible in the separate publication, B. Joannis Scoti Doct. Subtilis, O.F.M. Grammaticae Speculativae Nova Editio Cura et Studio P. Fr. Mariani Fernandez Garcia, Quaracchi, 1902.

Notes for Chapter 1

1.   ... primum objectum intellectus est ens, ut commune
omnibus. <u>Quaest. sup. Meta.</u> lib. IV, qu. I, 148a.
Concedendum est, quod primum objectum intellectus non potest
esse aliquid, nisi quod essentialiter includitur in quolibet per se
intelligibili, sicut primum objectum visus non est aliquid, nisi
quod essentialiter includitur in quolibet per se visibili, ut color
in albo et in nigro. Cum autem quodemque ens sit per se intelli-
gibile, et nihil possit in quocumque essentialiter includi nisi ens,
sequitur quod primum objectum intellectus erit ens. <u>Quaest.</u>
<u>pup. Met.</u> lib. VI, qu. III, 336a.

    ... experimur in nobis ipsis, quod possumus concipere ens,
non concipiendo hoc ens in se vel in alio, quia dibitatio est,
quando concipimus ens, utrum sit ens in se vel in alio, sicut patet
de lumine, utrum sit forma substantialis per se subsistens vel ac-
cidentalis subsistens in alio sicut forma: <u>ergo primo aliquid in-
differens concipimus ad utrumque illorum et utrumque illorum
postea invenimus ita primo, quod in isto salvatur primus
conceptus, quod sit ens.</u> <u>Quaest. sup.</u> Met. lib. IV, qu. I 148b.

2.   Maxime autem dicuntur scibilia dupliciter: vel quia primo
omnium sciuntur, <u>sine quibus non possunt alia sciri;</u> vel quia sunt
certissima cognoscibilia. Utroque autem modo ista scientia
(scil. Metaphysica) considerat maxime scibilia ... maxime
scibilia primo modo sint <u>communissima,</u> ut est ens inquantum
ens et quaecumque sequuntur ens inquantum ens. <u>Quaest. sup. Met.</u>
Prologus, 4b.

3.   <u>Transcendens,</u> quodcumque nullum habet genus sub quo con-
tineatur: sed quod ipsum sit commune ad multa inferiora, hoc
accidit. Non opportet ergo transcendens dici de quocumque ente,
nisi sit <u>convertibile</u> cum prius transcendente, scil. cum <u>ente.</u> <u>Op.</u>
<u>Oxon.</u> I, dist. VIII, qu. III, n. 19.

4.   ... quaecumque autem rationes transcendents, quae sunt
quasi passiones entis, ut verum, bonum etc. sunt poste-
riores primo objecto; et quaelibet earum aeque per se est in-
telligibilis, nec una magis habet rationem subjecti intellectus
quam alia. <u>Quaest. sup. Met.</u> lib. VI, qu. III, 336a.

5. Hegel, G. W. F., Wissenschaft der Logik, Nuremburg, 1812, Vol. I, p. 62.

6. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. V, qu. XII, 293a.

7. Conf. Rickert, H., Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins, Bemerkungen sur Logik des Zahlbegriffes. Logos II (1911/12) Page 26 ff.

8. Conf. De Wulf, M., Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, R. Eisler, translator, Tuebingen, 1913, p. 329, note i.

9. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. X, qu XII, 634a.

10. Notandum, quod haec quaestio de ente et uno habet tot difficutates. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. IV, qu. II, 165a.

11. Dicendum, quod idem et diversum sunt contraria, quia idem est quoddam unum et diversum quoddam multum ... Sed intelligendum quod quia substantia est radix omnium generum, et quia omnia, quae habent rationem entis ad substan= tiam attribuantur, sicut quod ouid est principaliter in substantiis, per posterius in accidentibus, sic identitas et diversitas, sive idem et diversum principaliter insunt substantiis et per attribu- tionem aliis generibus. Et non solum extenduntur ad aliqua alia genera, sed etiam ad negationes et privationes, inquantum rationem entis participant et ideo omne ens comparatum enti est idem vel diversum sibi. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. X, qu. VII, 634 a. Omne ens omni enti comparatum est idem aut diversum; ergo identitas non est tantum in genere substantiae sed in omni genere l. c. lib. V, qu. XII, 294b. Idem et diversum, in omni genere reperiuntur, l. c.

12. Non ... nomen rei secundum usum loquendi determinat se ad rem extra animam. Et isto intellectu communissimo ens vel res dicitur quodlibet conceptibile, quod non includit contra- dictionem. Quodlibet. qu. III, n. 23.

13. Unum est aequivocum ad unum, quod est convertibile cum ente et ad unum, quod est principium numerorum. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. IV, qu. II, 158a. Sciendum est, quod alia est natura unius, qua substantia cuiuslibet rei est una. alia autem unius, quod est principium numeri propire dicti.

Et est (unum) in genere quantitatis, et est unum quod
convertitur cum ente. De re. princip. qu. XVI, 566.

14.   Multitudo absoluta est in plus quam numerus. Sicut enim
unum absolute acceptum (unum transcendens) est in plus
quam unum, quod est principium numeri, sic multitudo, absolute
accepta est in plus, quam multitudo, quae est numerus. Cuaest sup.
Met. lib. X, qu. XIV, 644a.

15.   Cmne quod est, tandiu est, quamdiu unum est. De rer.
princ. qu. XVII, 593b; cf. Oxon. II, dist. III, qu. LV, n. 20.

16.   ... tale unum, quo res dicitur una et convertitur cum ente,
non dicitur rem aliquam super substantiam rei ut albedo
supra subjectum. Et ita substantia cuiuslibet rei est una per se, non
aliquam rem addita super ipsam; ut sic sit verum dicere, quod
omnino eadem est ratio realis rei et unius rei sicut hominis et
unius hominis, sicut dicitur in elenchis, quod eadem est ratio
propositionis et unius propositionis. Huius rei est aperta ratio,
quia, si res esset una per aliquod additum super eam. Iterum
de illa quaererem, utrum sit una per se vel per aliud edt. et
erit processus in infinitum. De rer. princ. qu. XVI, 567b, 568a.

Itelligendum, quod illud, quod per se significatur per ens
dat unum intelligere, non tamquam principale significatum,
sed significat privationem per se, et privatio non est nisi in natura,
ideo dat intelligere naturam ex consequenti. Quaest. sup. Met. lib.
IV, qu. II, 159a.

... Dicendum, quod concedit (Avicenna) convertibilitatem
non essentialem vel essentialiter, sed quod idem sunt
subjecto non secundum essentiam; quia si sic, multitudo secundum
quod multitudo non est una, ita quod sit essentialis praedicatio, sed
unum accidit multitudini; convertuntur ergo non tamen essentialiter
vel secundum essentiam; l. c. 162a.

Nec eius (scil. unius) ratio variatur per se propter diver-
sitatem subjectorum, quibus inest. l. c. 164a.

17.   Conf. note 14.

18.   Est tamen sciendum, quod licet unum non dicat rem
absolutam super ens sive per substantiam rei, tamen unum
istud dicit aliam rationem et alium modum significanda ab ente ...
Modus enim significationis entis imponitur enti a ratione simpliciori
quam modus significationis unius; ita quod, quamvis ens et unum
idem significent, tamen significatio unius praesupponit
significationem entis. Ens enim

imponitur ab actu essendi absoluto et positivo. Unum autem in
suo significato includit rationem entis cum determinatione, non
dico cum determinatione addente rem supra rationem entis, sed
addit quendam modum se habendi. Ille autem modus quem addit,
non est positivus sed privatus solum, non privando aliquid positi-
vum, alioquin unum non dicetur de Deo, sed privat aliquid negative
tantum. De rer. princ. qu. XVI, 568a sqq.

19.   For the understanding of this it must be kept in mind that
   the conviction lying at the very foundations of this order of
things is that the intellectual has greater value and more intrinsic
reality than the material.

20.   Ut igitur videamus, quod est privatio importata per hoc
   nomen multitudo, quam quidem privationem de suo signi-
ficato privat hoc nomen unum ut convertitur cum ente, est sciendum,
quod (ut patuit ex. ---8. Metaphysic.) nullus potest imponere
nomen rei, nisi qui novit rem ... Nunc autem aliquando contingit,
quod nominaliter aliquid multis positivum est, quod secundum veri-
tatem est privatio, quamvis significetur nomine positivo, quia
habitus sibi contrarius dicit naturam positivam. Corporeum
dicit secundum rem privationem, incorporeum positivum; et
cum notiora sint corpora naturaliter quam incorporea, in compositis
ex materia et forma, unum secundum veritatem habitus quidam est
a forma rei partes continente causatus; et ille habitus significatur
nomine unius. Divisio autem secundum eorum veritatem est
privatio illius habitus et significatur nomine multitudinis ...
   Ex quo patet, quod cum multitudo surgat ex diversitate
   unitatis et compositionis, multitudo dicit privationem
habitus importatam per unitatem et compositionem. Et quia (ut
dixi) secundum quod res novimus eis nomina magis nota, ideo
etiam illud, quod importatur nomine multitudinis, etiamsi dicat
privationem respectu illius, quod importatur nomine unitatis, quia
nomina positiva magis sunt nobis nota, ideo illud significamus nomine
positivo, quod est divisio; et illud quod significatur nomine compositi seu unius,
quia est nobis minus notum, significamus nomine privativo per indivisionem; quia
multitudo est quaedam divisio, unitas autem est quaedam indivisio,
sicut iam dixi. Quia substantia incorporea dicit habitum positivum
respectu substantiae corporeae, et haec respectu eius dicit
privationem. Etenim, quia substantia corporea est nobis magis
nota quam incorporea, illam nominamus per modum positivum,
aliam per modum privativum ...
   Patet igitur ex dictis, quod multum etsi significetur nomine
   positivo, quod est divisio, dicit tamen privationem realiter
illius habitus, qui causatur a forma totius, quod partes continet.

Unum autem etsi significatur nomine privativo, quantum ad modum
significandi, quod quidem nomen est indivisum, realiter dicit
positionem, quae positio de ratione sua privat illam privationem,
quae importatur nomine multitudinis; quia indivisio est negatio
divisionis, divisio autem privatio positionis. Sic forte caveatis
totum, et ideo indivisionis ratio, quam includit unum, est ratio
privativa, non privativa affirmationis, quia tunc unum non
diceretur de Deo, sed privativa privationis: et sic secundum rem
unum significat positivum. secundum vero modum significandi,
qui sequitur modum intelligendi, significat privationem. Et
quia unum dicit privationem privationis importatae per multum,
multum dicit privationem habitus importati per unum, habitum est
unum definitur per multa et e contrario. Unum enim est, quod est
principium multitudinis, multitudo item quae numeratur per unu
Quia enim privatio cognoscitur per habitum, cum unum sit privatic
multitudinis secundum rem, et multum sit privatio unius secundum
modum, ideo unum habet per alterum definiri et e contrario. De r
princ. qu. XVI, 568 sqq.

21.   Rickert, Logos, op. cit., p. 36.

22.   Quod enim contradicit alii, opponitur sibi, sed nihil ponit,
         nec subjectum requirit; potest enim dici, quod non ens
non videt et quod lapis non videt. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. X, qu.
XI, 639b.

23.   l. c. qu. V. 630b sq.

24.   ... ens et non ens contradicunt et tamen non differunt nec
         sunt diversa, quia diversitas est differentia entis et differ
similiter ... concedendum, quod contrarietas et relativa oppositi(
essent, intellectu non existente, non autem privativa oppositio nec
contradictio; quia alterum extremum relationis, est tantum ens
secundum rationem; quod de negatione patet, quia, licet illa
dicatur de aliquo ente, ut non-homo dicitur de asino, tamen
secundum rationem; qua contradicit homini non est ens nisi
rationis. Per hoc patet, quod licet contraria maneant, non exis-
tente intellectu, non oportet contradictoria manere, secundum
quod sunt contradictoria; quia negatio albi prout contradicit albo
non est in nigro, quia ut contradicit, est dicibilis de ente et de non
ente. Si dicatur, quod ad nigrum saltem sequatur negatio albi et i(
contradictoria sunt, si contraria sunt, dico, quod non existente
intellectu non est consequentia. Similiter privatio, licet sit
negatio habitus in subjecto, tamen tantummodo opponitur habitui
ratione negationis, et illa non est ens nisi tantum secundum ration(

Quest. in lib. Praed. qu. XXXVIII, 523a sq.

25.　　... neutrum (nec unum nec multum) dicitur de non ente, cuius
probatio satis plana est de uno, cum convertatur cum ente.
Sed quod multum dicatur de ente videtur, quia quaelibet pars
multitudinis oppositae uni, quod convertatur com ente, dicitur
solum de ente ... non potest dici multum nisi de qualibet parte
eius possit dici, quod sit unum, sed unum non de ente; igitur
muitum non reperitur nisi in entibus. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. X,
qu. X, qu. v. 631a.

26.　　... privatio non salvatur nisi in ente, nullam tamen
naturam ponit. l. c. Privatio autem alii contraponitur
tamen naturam nullam ponit et igitur non est in genere; subjec-
tum tamen habile requirit et ideo nec non ens, quia non est sub-
jectum, nec lapis, quia non est aptus, possunt dici caeca, sed
solum animal. l. c. lib. X, qu. XI, 639b, cf. note 24.

27.　　... unum et multum in se accepta sunt absoluta ... non
igitur opponuntur privative nec etiam relative. l. c. qu.
V, 631b.

28.　　... utrumque extremum aliam naturam ponit. l. c. qu.
XI, 639.

29.　　Rickert, Logos, op. cit., p. 37.

30.　　Natorp, P., Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wis-
senschaften, Leipzig, 1910 p. 61.

31.　　Unum principium numeri nihil addit super unum trans-
cendens nisi rationem mensurae ... Sic multum quod
est numerus, nihil addit super multum transcendens nisi
rationem mensurati. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. X, qu. V, 631a.

32.　　De rer. princ. qu. XVI, 588a.
Conceptus unitatis transcendentis generalior est, quia
ex se indifferens est ad limitatus et non limitatum. Quaest. sup.
Met. lib. VI, qu. II, 167a.

33.　　Numerus non solum est unus aggregatione sicut acervus
lapidum. De re. princ. qu. XVI, 589a.

34. Multitudo vel replicatio unitatum differentiam specie
     vel genere numerorum non constituit. 1. c. 589; cf.
Quaest. sup. Met. lib. X, qu. XIV, 644b.

35. Cf. note 37.

36. ... quantitas est domina mensurarum. 1. c. lib. X, qu.
     I, 623a. Mathematicus omnia per rationem quantitatis
ostendit. 1. c. lib. VI, qu. I, 315a.

37. ... dicendum, quod falsum assumit, quod quantitas sit
     subjectum mathematicae, sicut dictum est in solutione
quaestionis, quia tamen quantitas non ostenditur inesse substan-
tiae corporeae, sed quasi medium supponitur; et de substantia
corporea non ostenditur aliquid in Mathematica nisi per naturam
quantitatis, tamquam primae passionis, ideo videtur esse quasi
ratio propria subjecti illius scientiae et quasi positur subjectum,
licet sit ibi passio, quia includitur in subjecto priori, ut ibi dictum
est. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. VI, qu. I 314b.

38. Mathematicus non habet verum conceptum de accidente,
     quia imaginatur de eis, ac si essent res per se existentes.
1. c. lib. I, qu. VII, 390a.

39. Scientia (aliqua) dicitur Mathematica   non quia est de
     rebus abstractis aut insensibilibus, sed quia est de rebus
secundum rationem mensurae et mensurabilis et quia ratio men-
surae et mensurabilis est impertinens ratione motus, ideo dici-
tur, quod Mathematica est de separatis a motu ad istum sensum.
1. c. lib. II, qu. VI, 539a.

40. ... difficultas, in qua discordant diversi, est de unitate
     de forma specifica numeri ... hoc autem difficile est
invenire in numero, quia secundum Avicennam 3. Met. cap. 5,
multitudo inquantum multitudo non est una, numerus essentialiter
autem est multitudo; ideo difficile est videre, a quo numerus
habet unitatem specificam. et ideo circa hoc sunt opiniones diversae.
Reportata lib. I, dist. XXIV, qu. unic. 272a.

41. Quidam dicunt, quod numerus suam habet unitatem speci-
     ficam ab ultima unitate, non autem absolute ab unitate
inquantum unitas, sed secundum quod habet determinatam distantiam
ad primam unitatem et secundum talem distantiam ad primam
unitatem distinguuntur numeri specifie secundum diversas dis-

tantias, unde talis distantia distinguit specifice numeros.

Sed contra, ultima unitas alicuius numeri, si det formam
et speciem illi, aut igitur inquantum haec unitas est,
aut inquantum distans a prima? Non inquantum haec unitas, quia
illud, quod est forma et species alicuius totius, oportet perficere
totam materiam totius, sicut anima quae est forma hominis per-
ficit totam materiam et omnes partes corporis hominis. Sed
ultima unitas non informat omnes unitates praecedentes in numero;
igitur non potest esse forma totius numeri inquantum unitas talis
est.

Praeterea, haec unitas, quae est ultima, est materialis,
sicut et aliae unitates, aliter ternarius esset quarter-
narius, si ultima unitas quartenarii non esset pars totius
materialis sed tantum forma praecedentium; non igitur inquantum
haec unitas est magis forma totius numeri quam alia unitas. Non
potest dici, quod sit forma totius numeri secundo modo, quia
distantia unius unitatis ab alia formaliter est: igitur si
numerus sortiatur suam unitatem specificam ab unitate propter
illam distantiam a prime unitate, sequiter, quod numerus non sit
quantitas, sed reiatio sive respectivum.

Praeterea contra hoc, cum illa distantia ultimae a prima
tantum sit in ultima unitate vel in aliis duabus unitatibus
ultimate distantibus, et non in mediis, sicut distantia, qua disto
a pariete, tantum est in me vel in me et in pariete et non in aere
medio, sequitur, quod illa distantia non potest esse forma totius
numeri, cum non sit forma cuiuslibet partis numeri, et per con-
sequens ab illa distantia non poterit numerus habere suam unitatem
specificam, cum illa distantia sit in uno distante vel solum in duobus,
et non potest esse in omnibus unitatibus ut forma. <u>Reportata</u> lib. I,
dist. XXIV, qu. unic. 272b sqq.

... si prima unitas fiat ultima et ultima prima, nulla fiat
differentia in substantia numeri, quod non staret, si ultima
unitas esset forma completiva et specifica numeri. c. 273 a sq.

42. Alia opinio est, quae videtur esse secundum intentiones
Aristotelis magis quam prior, quod sicut continuitas est
forma et per se unitas continui et partium eius, a qua habent suam
unitatem in toto ...., et partes in continuo, est <u>discretio</u>, ut sicut con-
tinuitas est unitas continui, ita discretio est unitas discreti sive
numeri; et sic per aliam et aliam continuitatem est alia et alia
species continui, ut patet in linea, superficie et corpore, ita secundum
aliam et aliam discretionem est alia et alia species; et sicut partes
continui sunt materiales respectu continuitatis, quarum omnium

continuitas est forma, et per talem discretionem habet numerus
esse in determinata specie et secundum aliam et aliam discretionem
unitatum est alia et alia species numeri.

Secundum hoc etiam patet, quod numerus non componitur
ex numeris, quia una species completa non est pars poten-
tialis alterius speciei. Cum igitur numerus ex hoc quod habet
certam discretionem unitatum sit completa species in unitate
sua specifica, stante sua discretione, quae est opposita discre-
tioni alterius speciei numeri, non poterit esse pars eius, cum
habeat oppositam discretionem et in eadem specie numeri non
possunt complete et actu esse oppositae discretiones, sed tantum
unitates sunt partes numeri et sic numerus componitur ex unita-
tibus et non ex numeris. Sed contra: partes, quae non habent
maiorem unitatem in toto quam haberent, si non essent in toto,
non sunt partes alicuius totius, quod est per se unum ... igitur
unitates prout habent discretionem, non sunt partes alicuius unius
per se; igitur sequitur, quod numerus non sit aliquid per se
unum tantum <u>aggregatione.</u>

Item secundo sic: impossibile est formam absolutam ad-
venire alicui sine sui mutatione; quamvis hoc dicatur esse
possibile de forma respectiva; sed si lapidibus facientibus se-
narium numerum addatur unus lapis per generationem sive creationem,
lapides priores desinunt esse sub forma senarii et incipiunt esse
sub forma septenarii et ab illa forma habent unitatem aliam speci-
ficam. Si igitur forma numeri septenarii sit ab aliqua forma
absoluta et illi sex lapides in nullo mutantur per hoc, quod de
novo generatur alius lapis, sequitur quod forma numeri septenarii
non sit alia forma absoluta extra animam in illis septem lapidibus.
l. c. 273b sqq.

43.   Alia est opinio Gandavensis ... ponentis quod solus
numerus accidentalis non est nisi multitudo ex unitate
profusa per divisionem continui ... Secundum hoc igitur, omnes
numeri de genere quantitatis vel profluunt ab uno continuo ... quantum
est ex parte materiae et formae continuitatis ad numeros? Dicit
quod partium numeri sive unitatum eius non est alia forma essen-
tialis quam sit forma continuitatis in prima unitate, a qua discin-
duntur sive natae sunt discindi.

Hoc autem quantum ad unitatem specificam numeri; sed
si non sit alia forma absoluta in numero a forma continuitatis, quo-
modo ergo differt numerus a continuo? Respondet quod non est
differentia inter continuum et discretum, nisi secundum respectum
quendam et ordinem partium aliter se habentium inter se in continuo
et aliter in discreto, quia in continuo partes copulantur ad terminum

communem, in discreto autem non; et hoc non convenit discreto
ex natura alicuius positivi, quod super continuum addat, set potius
ex natura privativi, in quo deficit a continuo. Numerus enim non
habet esse nec intelligi, nisi ex privatione continui ... sic numerus
sive discreta quantitas nihil addit super continuum nisi rationem nega-
tionis aut respectum partium ad invi em, ex quibus habet aliam rationem mensurandi
quam habet quantitas continua et est altera species quantitatis quam continua.

 ... quod non est alia forma numeri essentialis a forma
  continuitatis primae unitatis sed tantum alia forma acciden-
talis (respondet Gandav.). Quod probat primo per hoc, quod species
unius numeri non differt propter aliam distantiam ad primam unitatem,
quia enim ternarius aliter distat a prima unitate quam binarius,
ideo ternarius differt a binario. Sed talis distantia ad primam
unitatem est accidentalis numero, quia non est ex natura unitatum,
quia si prima fieret secunda, non variaretur et hoc idem probat
secundo sic: sicut magnum et parvum se habent in continuo, ita
multum et paucum in quantitate discreta; sed magnum et parvum
non distinguunt specie quantitatem continuam, igitur nec multum et
paucum quantitatem discretam; igitur sicut aliqua magnitudo parva
cresceret secundum additionem et fieret continue maior et non
esset alia magnitudo specie, ita cum numeri crescunt secundum
unam distantiam, numerus parvus, secundum se non differt specie
a magno nisi accidentaliter propter distantiam ad primam unitatem
et sic numerus non habet aliam formam essentialem a continuitate
primae unitatis.

 ... illa praedicta (de magno et parvo, multo et pauco) pos-
  sunt accipi dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod magnitudo
et multitudo sunt species quantitatis et alio modo secundum quod
sint passiones. Primo modo verum est, quod sicut magnum
parvum se habent in continuis ita multum et paucum in discretis;
et ideo sicut magnitudo est alterius rationis in continuis, ut in linea, et
superficie et in corpore, ita multitudo in numeris variatur secun-
dum species diversas. Si vero accipiantur secundo modo, prout
sunt passiones, sic accipiuntur ut magnum opponitur parvo, et multum
pauco, et sic verum est, quod sicut isto modo magnum et parvum sunt
passiones continui, ita multum et paucum sunt passiones discreti.
Si tamen ex hoc concludatur, quod sicut magnum et parvum sunt
passiones magnitudinis eiusdem speciei, quod ita multum et paucum
erunt passiones eiusdem numeri secundum speciem dicendum,
quod non est simile, quid continua non variantur, nisi penes aliam
et aliam rationem divisibilitatis; magnum vero et parvum non
variantur per discretionem prout opponuntur. Unde quia forma
numeri est magis praecisa, quia omnino indivisibilis ... non
autem sic forma continuitatis, ideo quantumcumque augmentetur

magnitudo, non variatur eius species propter magnitudinem, sed addita unitate variatur species numeri essentialiter; ideo non stant multum et paucum in eadem specie numeri. Reportata lib. I, dist. XXIV, qu. unic. 276 seqq.

44.   Numerus nullam unitatem realem habet aliam a rebus nume-
        ratis sed solum unitatem rationis, quam mens concipit.
De rer. princ. qu. XVI, 585a.

45.   De quantitate nihil est extra animam, nisi quantitas continua,
        cuius partes divisae extra animam non possunt habere
unitatem numeri, nec unum numerum constituere, sed tantum sunt haec, haec, haec, non habentia aliquam unam formam numeralem ... solum numerus habet suam unitatem ab anima ... Reportata l. c. 279b.

        Intellectus primo mensurat intellectualiter aliquam multi-
        tudinem intellectam, quam postea applicando ad alia dis ·
creta, quae sunt extra, mensurat illa multitudine intellecta, a qua ut sic quantitas numeri habet suam unitatem sicut ens formaliter in anima. l. c. 280a.

46.   Numerus mathematicus dicitur multitudo aggregata ex rationi-
        bus unitatis ut participant quantitatem; ut ternarius numerat
tria quanta, sive sint ferra sive lapides sive ligna vel albedines vel quaecumque quantitatem participant: et hic est numerus quo nume-ramus. Numerus naturalis dicitur multitudo aggregata ex ipsis rebus, quibus convenit ratio unitatis; quae sunt ipsae res numeratae ut tres lapides, vel tres albedines: et iste est numerus qui numerat per numerum mathematicum. De rer. princ., qu. XVI, 580a.
        Diversa enim ad se invicem numerantur, numeri autem
        numerant se ad invincem, aut per numerum aut per unitatem.
l. c. 590a.

47.   Ratio mensurae (...) magis inest discretis et continuis non
        nisi inquantum participant quantitatem discretam. Quaest. sup.
Met. lib. V, qu. IX, 251a.
        Ratio mensurae est passio quantitatis et sic non propria ratio
        quantitatis ... dicendum, quod propria ratio (quantitas)
est divisibilitas in partes eiusdem rationis ...
        Divisibilitas fundatur in quantitate et dicit habitudinem ad
        divisionem, et cuicumque inest divisibilitas in partes eiusdem
rationis, hoc est per quantitatem ... Quantitas notificatur per proximam passionem eius et non definitur ... l. c. 252a sqq.

48.   Dico igitur, quod ratio indivisibilitatis in numero uno sicut
        quarternario vel ternario, sub qua uniuntur partes, utpote

quae inter se sunt divisae, sub qua etiam uniuntur numeri materiales
consituentes unum numerum ut sex, quatuor, decem; illa dico ratio
indivisibilis et una quae est ratio formalis unius numeri, est identitas
in specie unitatum replicatarum, illum numerum constituentium, ut
sic dicamus, quod quaelibet species numeri ex so est una, quia constat
ex uno et uno eiusdem rei usque ad certum numerum replicationis
talis numeri; ita quod una species numeri ab alia situ recte dis-
tinguatur propter maiorem vel minorem replicationem talium
unitatum. De rer. princ. qu. XVI, 587b.

      Bis tria non sunt senarius sed quae habent bis tres unitates,
habent senarium et est denominativa praedicatio. Quaest. sup. Met.,
lib. V, qu. IX, 257 sq.

      Duo species numerorum ... non possunt se habere per aequa-
lem immediationem ad unitatem. De rer. princ., l. c. 572a.

49.   ... quando arguitur, quod numeri distinguuntur per aliam et
       aliam distantiam ad primam unitatem, dicendum, quod, licet
illa distantia diversa concomitatur numeros distinctos, non tamen est
prima ratio distinguendi eos, ut probatum est, unde non potest esse
forma numeri, sed concomitatur certam discretionem numeri.
Reportata dist. XXIV, qu. unic. 278b sq.

50.   Haec et illa non faciunt unitatem binarii, sed una praecise
      distincta a se invicem. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. V, qu. IX, 257b.
      Unum quod est eiusdem speciei est mensura unitatum integran-
      tium numerum et est uniformitas unitatis specificae in eis.
De rer. princ. qu. XVI, 587b.
      Unum et numerus sunt unigenea, quia numerus nihil aliud est
      quam plura una. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. X, qu. I, 624a, b.

51.   Materia non potest intelligi nisi sub habitudine ad formam.
      Sup. lib. II, anal. post. qu. VI, 333b.

52.   l. c. qu. IV, 329b.

53.   The fact that time has a decisive function as the determinant cha-
      racteristic of the individual is particularly manifest in the concept
of time as it is found in historical studies. Its categorical structure is
discussed in my article Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft,
Zeitschrift f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik, Bd. 161 (1916) P. 173ff.

54.   Expono quod intelligo per individuationem ... non quidem
      unitatem indeterminatam, secundum quam quodlibet in specie
dicitur unum numero, sed unitatem signatam ut hanc, ut est haec deter-
minata. Oxon. II, dist. III, qu. IV, n. 3; cf. l. c. dist. II, qu. I-VII.

Accipitur individuum substantia et simul totum stricte,
prout includit existentiam et tempus ut hic homo existens
et hic lapis existens. Quaest. in Met. lib. VII, qu. X, n. 76.
Singulare dicit gradum distinctum naturalem unius individui
a gradu naturae alterius individui eiusdem speciei, eo quod
... numquam natura generat duo individua eiusdem speciei secun-
dum eundem modum et gradum participantia illam speciem,
sicut nec duae species nunquam aequaliter participant naturam
generis. De rer. princ. qu. XIII, 501b.
Duo poma in una arbore non habent eundem aspectum ad
coelum. l.c. 502a.
Hic et nunc sunt conditiones concernentes rationem singu-
laris. l.c. 511. comp. part. Part Two, chap. 2.

55.   Comp. besides his major work, Die Grenzen der naturwissen-
schaftlichen, Begriffsbildung, 2nd edition Tuebingen, 1913.
the especially instructive article "Philosophy of History" in Die
Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, 2nd edition,
Heidelberg, 1907 (Festschrift for Kuno Fischer).

56.   Illa ratio a qua imponitur ens non est una sed aequivoca in
diversis sicut ens. Quaest. in lib. Praed. qu. IV, 449b.
... apud Metaphysicum vel Naturalem, qui non considerant
vocem in significando sed ea quae significantur secundum id
quod sunt, (vox entis) est analoga. c. 447b.

57.   Ponitur analogia in voce ... quia significat unam rationem
primo, quae existendo diversimode convenit duobus vel
pluribus, quae dicuntur analogata: sicut hoc nomen "causa" et
hoc nomen "principium" ... significant unam rationem primo,
tamen illa est in diversis secundum ordinem.
... (alio modo) quia vox uni imponitur proprie et propter
aliquam similitudinem ad illud, cui primo imponitur, trans-
fertur vox ad significandum aliud ... et hoc secundum significat
solum propter aliquam similitudinem eius ad illud, cui primo im-
ponitur. l.c. 446.

58.   Sed qualitercumque sit de modo ponendi analogiam, nullus
istorum modorum videtur convenire enti respectu decem
praedicamentorum. cf. Quaest. in lib. Physic. lib. I, qu. VII,
388b. Sec. Op. sup. lib. Periherm. qu. I, 584a.
Concedo quod ens non dicatur univoce de omnibus entibus,
non tamen aequivoce, quia aeque dicitur aliquid de multis,

quando illa de quibus dicitur non habent attributionem ad invicem,
sed quando attribuntur, tunc analogice. Quia ergo (ens) non habet
conceptum unum, ideo significat omnia essentialiter secundum
propriam rationem et simpliciter aequivoce secundum Logicum;
quia autem illa quae significantur inter se essentialiter attribuuntur,
ideo analogice secundum Metaphysicum realem. Quaest. sup. Met.
lib. 1b, qu. I, 153a.

59.   ... quaedam sunt nomina penitus univoca: et illa sunt,
         quorum ratio substantiae eadem est et nomen idem.   Quae-
dam sunt nomina, quae proprie dicuntur aequivoca: ut illa, quae
actu plura significant sub propriis rationibus; et illa sunt quorum
nomen est idem et ratio substantiae diversa; et aliqua sunt nomina
analoga, quae significant aliquid commune, sed tamen illud commune
diversimode reperitur in diversis. Sicut "infinitum" significat
illud cuius non est terminus; sed hoc diversimode reperitur in
magnitudine, in numeris et in continuis et discretis; quia ergo
huiusmodi nomina significant aliquid commune, ideo proprie
non dicuntur aequivoca, et quia illud commune diversimode reperitur
in diversis, ideo talia nomina non dicuntur proprie univoca sed
dicuntur proprie analoga; quia ergo huiusmodi nomina significant
aliquid commune primo, ideo per immediate adjunctum contrahi
possunt. Huiusmodi autem nomina sunt "multum" et "album":
nam multum primo significat excessum in quantitate: et ideo
contrahi potest. Similiter "album" primo significat aliquid
faciliter movens sensum; sed hoc diversimode reperitur in
diversis, scilicet in colore et in voce quia in colore est albedo, et id
etiam in voce reperitur, sumendo albedinem pro alta et clara voce
et huiusmodi, et ideo potest contrahi. Quia ergo multum et album
significant aliquid commune ideo per immediate adiunctum contahi
possunt. Aequivocum autem inquantum aequivocum nihil commune
significat et ideo contrahi non potest. Quaest. sup. lib. elench.
qu. XIII, 17 sqq.

60.   ... constat in omni genere semper imperfectum et diminutum
         oriri ab illo, quod est perfectum simpliciter in illo genere ...
Cum ergo quaelibet res et quidquid est in rebus, quocumque modo esse
vel rationem entis participet, aliquo modo sit imperfectum et admixtum,
opportet, quod omnis res secundum illud totum, quod in ea est, a
primo et perfecto ente oriatur: hoc autem ens non est neque ingel-
ligi potest, nisi unum solum infinitum. Ab hac igitur unitate oritur
totus numerus et omnes unitates creatararum, non per huius uni-
tatis divisionem, ut de ipso uno fiant duo, et pereat eius unitas ex
hoc, quod unitas et numerus exoriantur, sicut in divisione quanti,
ut jam dicetur; hic enim numerus qui procedit ab uno in quantis,
multiplicatur, quia unum fit duo; sed ab ista unitate oritur numerus
et unitates, ut ab ipso principio calidi omnium primo procedit
primum et item secundum et iterum tertium et sic deinceps usque
ad infimam creaturam. Sed praedicta mediatio debet intelligi,
quoad meditationem in genere dignitatis, quia primum causatum
immediate participat divinitatem, secundum non ita immediate ...
ET sic patet quod universalitas rerum est numerus quidam constans
ex unitatibus particularitatis in essentiis, eaeque omnes ortum habent
ab unitate prima Dei, quae non est participata, sed quam omnes
creata unitas participat, per quam dat imitationem, quae totum rerum
numerum et eius unitates virtute continet et potentia activa: quae
unitates oriuntur ab ipsa ... per sui communicabilitatem ...
         Alia est unitas, a qua oritur numerus et omnes eius unitates,
qua ipsa continet potentia et virtute, quasi modo specificato et ex ista
oritur tota multitudo non per suicommunicabilitatem, ut dixi de unitate
divina, sed per sui divisionem, non quidem in partes quantitativas,
sed in partes subjectivas. Et ista est unitas generis metaphysici,
cuius communitas consistit in analogia: ita quod res importata
nomine talis generis, per se principaliter et verciter dicitur solum
de uno; de aliis per quandam attributionem ad illud ...
         Alia est unitascontinens numerum, qui ab ea oritur et eius
unitates secundum substantiam et naturam, ita quod per divisionem
illius unitatis, non in partes subjectivas sed integrales, oritur numerus
ab illa unitate. Et isto modo unum magnitudine habet in se omnem
numerum, qui per divisionem magnitudinis potest inde procedere.
Et talis unitas, quae est quantitas, accidit rebus, quae sunt de genere
substantiae per ipsam quantitatem, quae est accidens substantiae,
ideo omnis talis divisio ... accidit rebus aliorum praedicamentorum,
quibus accidit quantitas ... De rer. princ., qu. XVI, 570b, 571a sq,
572a, 574b.

61.   Et isto modo ens communissime sumptum, est genus meta-
        physicum ad creatorem et creaturam: et eius unitas dividitur
in ens, quod est in _se esse,_ et in ens _habens_ esse, sive cui convenit
esse ens, _quod est in se esse, et in ens habens esse, sive cui_ ...
convenit esse ens, quod est genus commune metaphysicum et dividitur
in decem praedicamenta. Et prima divisione dividitur in ens, quod
est per se secundum quod "per se" opponitur ei, quod est 'aliter
se habere', et in ens quod est alicuius, quod continet novem
praedicamenta accidentis. Et similiter ens, quod est alicuius,
est genus metaphysicum et dividitur in ens quod est alicuius per
se, ut est quantitas; et in ens, quod est alicuius per aliud, qualia
entia sunt omnia accidentia alia a quantitate, quïa mediante quan-
titate insunt substantiae naturaliter. Et quodlibet genus praedicamen-
torum, quae sunt decem, dividitur per subalterna genera et sic
usque ad individuum; et sic causatur numerus ex divisione
unitatis, non in partes quantitativas sed subjectivas. _De rèr. princ._
qu. XVI, 572a.

62.   Omne aliud ens ab ente infinito dicitur ens per _participa-_
        tionem, quia capit partem illius entitatis, quae est ibi
totaliter et _perfecte. Quodlibet._ qu. V, n. 26.

63.   ... esse divinum non potest esse contractum nec ad genus
        nec ad speciem; esse cuiuscumque creaturae potest ad
utrumque esse contractum. _De rer. princ._ qu. VI, 335.

64.   Quaedam est mensura _mensurans per replicationem,_ quae
        aliquoties sumpta reddit totum et tali˜ est propria quantitatis
... alia est _mensura perfectionis_ sive secundum perfectionem. _Quaest._
sup. _Met._ lib. V, qu. IX, 251b.

Notes for Chapter 2

1.   Quarta (difficultas est), an (unum) aliquam rem dicat
        ab ente. Et hoc est commune dubium de omnibus trans-
centibus vero et bono etc. l.c. lib. IV, qu. II, 165a. (The
bonum isn't brought into consideration in this investigation which
which has only to do with theoretical objectivity.).

2.   Primo quia sui manifestativa quantum est de se, cuium-
        que intellectui potenti manifestationem cognoscere.
Secundo quia assimilativa intellectus assimilabilis ... Tertio
quia facta manifestatione vel assimilatione res in intellectu est
sicut cognitum in cognoscente ... si nullus esset intellectus,
adhuc quaelibet res secundum gradum suae entitatis, esset nata
se manifestare; et haec notitia est, qua res dicitur nota naturae,
non quia natura cognoscit illam sed quia propter manifestationem
maiorem vel minorem nata esset quantum est de se, perfectius
vel minus perfecte cognita cognosci. Esse autem assimilativum
dicit rationem activi respectu assimilabilis et sequitur naturaliter
esse manifestativum vel disparatum est non habens ordinem ad
ipsum sed semper assimilativum ... l.c. lib. VI, qu. III, 337b.

3.   Veritas aut accipitur pro fundamento veritatis in re aut
        pro veritate in actu intellectus componente aut dividente.
Oxon. I. dist. II, qu. II, n. 8.

4.   Verum autem in intellectu duplex est secundum eius
        duplicem operationem (simplex apprehensio ... propositio)
... Est autem inter istas veritate differentia una. quod primae
falsitas non opponitur sed ignorantia tantum; et sic intelligitur
illud de anima. quod intellectus circa quod est semper est verus
sicut sensus circa proprium sensibile; et hoc est intelligendum
praecise circa conceptum simpliciter simplicem; nam intellectus
simplex circa conceptum non simpliciter simplicem, licet non
possit esse formaliter falsus, apprehendendo aliquid sub deter-
minatione sibi non conveniente ... ratio in se falsa, non solum de
aliquo falsa simplici apprehensione intelligibilis est, sed illa non
includit vel exprimit aliquod quid, nisi forte quid nominis
Quaest. sup. Met. lib. VI, qu. III, 338.

5.   ... alia est materia complexi et incomplexi. Propria
        materia autem complexi sunt dictiones per se significa-
tivae; sed materia incomplexi sunt syllabae et litterae non per
se significativae. Differunt etiam ex parte formae, nam forma
complexi consistit in unione dictionum quae per se significant.
Quaest. in lb. elench. qu. XIX, 28b.

6.   This _objectively_ logical signification of the sense of the
        copula is gone through in my dissertation (p. 100 ff)
as I have noted above (Intro. note 10). _Geyser's_ meaning runs
more along the paths of "subjective logic". He designates the
copula as "intention to the object". _Vide,_ his _Grundlagen der_
Logik und _Erkenntnislehre_, Muenster 1909. P. 142 ff.

7.   ... verbum _est_ potest notare _qualemcumque_ unionem
extremorum et non oportet quod _semper_ notet praedicatum esse
superius subjecto; sed ad exercendum illud, quod signatur, hic
oportet addere ad compositionem huius verbi _est_ aliquam deter-
minationem ... Quaest. _in_ _lib._ _praed._ qu. XIII, 475a.
        Esse enim, quando praedicatur tertium. praedicat unionem
        extremorum, quae necessaria est substantiae ad substan-
tiam sine existentia extremorum ... Quaest. _in_ lib. _I._ _periherm._
qu. VIII, 554a.
        (compositio) est actus comparativus unius conceptus
        simplicis ad alterum ... hunc autem, necessario sequi-
tur vel concomitatur _relatio_ _rationis_ in utroque extremo ad al-
terum, quam habitudinem videtur signare hoc verbum, _est,_ ut
est nota compositionis, ... esse uno modo significat _verum,_ hoc
est habitudinem rationis inter extrema, quae nata est esse vera
(_esse_ _verum_- obtain). Quaest. _sup._ _Met._ lib. BI, qu. III, 344a.

8.   Verum non est prius actu inteliigendi ... patet quia
        intellectus facit rationem veri. _De_ _anima_ qu. XX, 607b.

        Res non est causa precise veritatis in intellectu _sed_ _intel-_
        lectus _componens_ _praedicatum_ cum _subjecto._ _Queast_ _sup._
Met. lib. VI, qu. III, 334a.

9.   Ista habitudo rationis conformis est rei, non quod oporteat
        in re esse relationem aliquam inter extrema ut in re
similem istius rationis, quae est inter extrema _ut_ _intellecta,_
imo _ut_ _ab_ _intellectu_ _invicem_ _comparata_ ...
        Habitudo correspondet rei, quando est talis, qualem res
        virtualiter continet, sive qualem res de se nata esset
facere _in_ _intellectu,_ si faceret habitudinem illam, sive quae est
signum _non_ _simile_ _sed_ _aequivocum,_ exprimens tamen illud quod
est in re, sicut, circulus non est similis vino, est tamen verum
signum vini, falsum autem lactis vel huiusmodi. 1. c. lib. VI,
qu. III, 344.

10.   Haec igitur correspondentia praedicta huius habitudinis
        ad id quod est in re formaliter, est secunda veritas
(veritas compositionis) et ita illa habitudc, quae dicitur compositio
expressa per est vera est immediate et mediante illa verus est
actus comparativus secundum illam habitudinem ... l.c. 344b.

11.   Contra hoc quod superius dictum est, quod veritas com-
        plexi cognoscitur per hoc, quod intellectus apprehendit
conformitatem actus componendi entitati extremorum istius cor-
plexi, arguitur: quoniam quando comparo actum compositionis
A rei B, hoc facio actu compositionis C; quomodo sciam istam
secundam compositionem C esse veram? Si per aliam composi-
tionem, erit processus in infinitum, antequam cognosatur
veritas compositionis A et ita nunquam cognoscetur ... Item
si debeo cognoscere A esse veram per collationem ad rem, opor-
tet igitur rem cognoscere; quo ergo actu? Si eodem qui est A,
idem cognosco per C, si alio ut ipso D, ergo duo actus simul
de eadem re ... l.c. 339a ff.

12.   ... dico quod illam complexionem cognosco esse veram,
        cognoscendo conformitatem eius ad illam habitudinem virtualiter
inclusam in extremis. l.c. 3416 Objecta conceptus complexi,
quae sunt extrema, aliud esse habent quam ut sunt in conceptu non
complexo et prius naturaliter in se, ut simplicia sunt, secundum
quod esse prius, mensurant illum conceptum complexum, cui
esse priori conceptum complexum conformari est verum esse,
difformari est falsum esse; hoc esse est habitudo virtualiter
inclusa in extremis naturaliter, antequam extrema comparentur
a ratione ... l.c. 340b.

13.   ... ens est duplex, scil. naturae et rationis. Ens autem
        naturae inquantum tale est, cuius esse non dependet ab
anima. Quaest. sup. lib. elench. qu. I, 1b.
        ... quaecumque scientia quae non solum vocatur realis,
        sed etiam quae vocatur rationis, est de ,re sive de ente.
Quodlibet. qu. III, n. 2.

14.   Ens verum est ens diminutum et est ens logicum proprie.
        Quaest. sup. Met. lib. VI, qu. III, 336a.
        ... ens secundum quod abstrahens a sensibili et insen-
        sibili est voce proprium objectum intellectus. l. c. n. 22.
        Ens reale est perfectus ens quam ens, quod est tantum
        rationis. Oxon. I, dist. VIII, qu. IV, n. 10.

Ens rationis est ita diminutum, quod non potest esse
perfectio entis realis. Quodlibet. qu. I, n. 4.
Ens autem diminutum ... non habet esse realis exis-
tentiae; ergo nec in quantum tale potest esse causa
propria alicuius entis realis. Oxon. I, dist. XIII, n. 7. l.c.
III, dist. VIII, n. 19.

15.   Vide. H. Siebeck, Die Anfaenge der neueren Psychologie
        in der Scholastik, Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Philos-
ophische Kritikon, vol. 94 (1888) pp. 167, 178 ff.

16.   Ibid. p. 67 ff.

17.   Ens rationis est praecise habens esse in intellectu con-
        siderante. Quodlibet. qu. III, n. 2.
        ... dicendum, quod universale est in re, ut in subjecto,
        quia illum denominat, non intellectum; sed in intellectu
est veluti in efficiente et ut cognitum in cognoscente. Sup. Qu.
Porph. qu. XI, 136a. (Here is where there is the clearest dis-
tinction between psychic reality which is included in causality and
the intentional content. Conf. Part II, chap. 1, p.   )
        Ens diminutum, quod scil. est ens cognitum. Oxon. I,
        dist. XIII, n. 7.
        Nec intelligo hic ens rationis ... quod est tantum in
        intellectu subjective ... Oxon. IV, dist. I, qu. II, n. 3.

18.   Wissenschaftslehre, Sulzbach 1837, vol. I, p. 83
        (Hauptwerke der Philosophie in originaltreuen Neudrucken,
4 vols., Werke Bernard Bolzanos, published by A. Hoefler,
Leipzig 1914).

19.   Convertitur tamen (ens logicum) cum ente aliqualiter,
        quia Logicus considerat omnia ut Metaphysicus, sed modus
considerationis, scil. per quid reale et per intentionem secundam,
sicut convertibilitas entis simpliciter et diminuti, quia neutrum
alterum excedit in communitate; quidquid enim e : simpliciter
ens. potest esse ens diminitum. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. VI,
qu. III, 346a.

20.   Ens est duplex, scil. naturae et rationis. Ens autem
        naturae inquantum tale est, cuius esse non dependet ab
anima. Sed ens rationis dicitur de quibusdam intentionibus,
quas adinvenit ratio in ipsis rebus, cuiusmodi sunt genus, species,

definitio, et huiusmodi. Ens autem dictum isto secundo modo
aequiparatur, secundum communitatem enti priori modo dicto.
Non enim est aliquod ens naturae, quin possit cadere sub ente
rationis et quin super ipsum fundari possit aliqua intentio, ut puta
generis vel speciei vel differentiae vel proprii vel individui vel
saltem causae vel causati. Quaest. in lib. elench. qu. I, 1b.

    ... quia ergo Logica est de huiusmodi intentionibus,
quae applicabilies sunt omnibus rebus, ideo Logica dicitur
ex communibus. procedere l. c. 2a.

    Dico, quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed tantum
occasio, inquantum scil. movet intellectum, ut actu consideret,
et intellectus est principalis causa; ideo minor unitas sufficit in
re, quam sit unitas intentionis; quia sufficit intellectum ab
aliquo extrinseco moveri ad causandum multa per consideratio-
nem, quibus non correspondent aliqua in re simpliciter.
Quaest. in lib. praed. qu. III, 443.

21.   Dici potest quod hic (in libro de praedicamentis) con-
sideratur de decem praedicamentis, inquantum aliquid a
ratione causatum eis attribuitur, quia aliter non possunt a Logico
considerari et illo modo non habent tantum unitatem analogiae
sed etiam univocationis; et illud univocum istis ... est aliquod
intentionale, quod est hic primum subjectum et illud potest
nominari praedicamentum vel generalissimum; quia omnes pro-
prietates, quae per se de istis determinantur hic, determinantur
de eis, inquantum habent rationem generalissimi vel praedicamenti.
Quaest. in lib. praed. qu. II, 441a.

    ... quae Metaphysicus per se considerat, hic per accidens conside-
eratur, quia hic per se consideratur aliquid intentionale appli-
cabile ei, quae Metaphysicus per se considerat. l.c. 442a. Dico
...Dico quod scientia realis est de universali primo modo, quod
est res, sed Logica est de universali secundo modo, quod
est intentio. Quaest. sup. Porph. qu. VIIII, 121b.

    ... oportet dicere, quod maior est unitas (praedicamento-
rum) in aliqua proprietate ab intellectu causata, quam in-
quantum sunt entia; et ita cum haec scientia (scil. Logica) non sit
una unitate analogiae, opportet assignare aliquid intentionale, quod
sit istis commune et primum subjectum, quia de solo tali per se con-
siderat Logicus. l.c. 440b.

    Aliquid intentionale univocum applicari potest rebus omnium
generum; quia diversitas in rebus intentionis inter se non
impedit ipsas ab intellectu posse concipi per eundem modum concipiendi;
intentiones autem omnes eis attribuuntur, inquantum ab intellectu

concipiuntur et ideo intentiones eaedem specie possunt diversis
rebus attribui.   l.c. qu. II, 442b.

Sciendum est, quod, cum praedicari sit intentio, est in-
tentionem per se, rei vero per accidens. Esse vero est rei per
se ... aliud sciendum, quod esse in rebus primae intentionis illud
exercet, quod praedicari signat in secundis intentionibus. Quaest.
sup. Univ. Porph. qu. XIV, 178a.

22.   E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und
phaenomenologischen Philosophie, Jahrbuch fuer Philosophie und
phaenomenologische Forschung, vol. I, part 1, 1913, p. 256.

23.   Dico quod intellectus dicitur perficere sensum in sua cog-
nitione (comprehension of the object existing actualiter)
eo quod cognitio sensitiva praecise consistit in apprehendo illud,
quod est verum, non ipsam veritatem (this being then nothing sen-
sible) et quia talis cognitio potest perficere, ut id, quod cognitum
est inquantum verum, solum cognoscatur inquantum habet rationem
veritatis, quod fit per intellectum. De rer. princ. qu. XIII, 519 sq.

24.   Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vol.
96 (1888), pp. 161, 163.

25.   Rickert, H., Vom Begriff der Philosophie, Logos I (1910) p. 28.
"Knowledge insofar as it grasps the truth, is thoroughly a sense
concept, the production from out of a sense of logical value." Ebenda
p. 30. Conf. seq. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 3 ed., Tuebingen,
1916, chap. 3 and 4.

26.   Intellectus enim licet in se causet actum suum, circa tamen
objectum non causat realitatem absolutam, sed tantum ens
rationis. Reportata lib. I, dist. XXIV, qu. unic. 271a.
Destructa scientia in actu destruitur scitum in actu. Sed destructa
scientia in actu non destruit scibile in potenita. Quaest. sup.
Met. lib. V, qu. XIV, 298a.

27.   Patet ex dictis, quod (verum)-est mentis aliqua passio realis
... et tunc illa sicut et prima veritas pertinet ad considera-
tionem libri de anima. Ex natura enim actus intellectus congnoscitur,
quomodo est fundamentum talis relationis; vel est relatio rationis
fundata in actu intelligendi aut magis in habitudine rationis quae
est inter objecta comparata per actum intelligendi ... et tunc est
mentis aliqua passio originaliter, sed formaliter pertinet ad

considerationem Logici ... Praesupponit tamen Logicus considera-
tionem de actibus intelligendi, quibus secundae intentiones for-
mantur. Quaest. sup. Met. lib. VI, qu. III, 345b.

28.　　... tantum sunt decem generalissima rerum, quorum dis-
tinctio non sumitur penes aliquod logicum tantum sed penes
ipsas essentias. Ipsa enim intentio "generalissimum" est tantum
variata numero in istis, unde quoad id, quod est difficultatis,
quaestio est magis metaphysica quam logica; ideo sufficienter hic
scitur "quia est", quamvis forte Metaphysicus debeat vel possit
scire "propter quid". Quaest. sup. lib. praed. qu. XII, 468a.

29.　　... intentiones sunt per se intelligibiles, quia definibiles
et in eis manifestum est esse aliquid superius et inferius,
igitur aliquid supremum; illud non habet superveniens genus ali-
quod istorum, quia ens secundum se dividitur in haec decem
(generalissima); est igitur ens in anima, igitur est unum
generalissimum intentionem praeter haec omnia. Item contingit
intelligere non ens quia et significare... et in eis est ratio superioris
et inferioris; ergo aliquid supremum, illud non continetur in aliquo
istorum decem; quia nullum istorum de illo praedicatur; ergo est
distinctum generalissimum non entium, et ita plura genera quam
decem. Item figmenta concipiuntur ab intellectu et in eis est
superius et inferius, ergo supremum; ergo aliquod generalissimum.
Item de omnibus istis scil. intentionibus, non entibus, figmentis
sic potest argui: intellectus componens facit compositiones de
eis, quarum veritatem vel falsitatem judicat, ut patet, igitur et
intellectus simplex ea concipit, igitur sub aliqua ratione conci-
piendi, non singularis; igitur universalis ... igitur est in eis
generalissimum ...
　　Diceretur ad hoc, quod concreta, intentiones, non entia
privationes, figmenta et quaevis huiusmodi, sunt in
genere per reductionem ad abstracta et primae intentionis
entia, quorum sunt figmenta et privationes, quia cum commu-
niora intelligantur prius minus communibus, oportet generalis-
sima esse primo intelligibilia: haec autem non sunt intelligi-
bilia nisi per attributionem ad illa, ad quae dicta sunt habere
habitudinem, ideo, non possunt poni generalissima, sed ponuntur
in genere per reductionem ... Contra hoc in omnibus isitis est
per se praedicatio superioris de inferiori, ergo sub ratione ali-
cuius universalis, quia praedicari proprie est proprium univer-
salis non alterius quam generis. Arguatur de singulis sicut

supra argumentum est de concretis: igitur si non sit in infinitum
procedere in eis, erit aliquod genus non habens supraveniens
genus, igitur generalissimum ... illud nulli istorum decem
est idem, quia non habet easdem species, quia nec de eis
praedicatur per se primo modo, igitur est aliud generalissimum
ab istis decem ...

    Ad omnia objecta de istis quinque: concretis, intentioni-
   bus secundis, privationibus, non entibus et potentiis
posset responderi, quod licet haec possint intelligi sub aliqua
ratione intelligendi et praedicari inter se sub ratione alicuius
universalis et statum esse ad aliquod universalissimum, quod inquantum
attribuitur ei ista intentio, est diversum ab illis decem; tamen
stat tantum esse decem generalissima rerum quia non quodlibet
intelligibile, sed ens secundum se dividitur in haec (5. Metaph.);
et nullum istorum est ens secundum se, distinctum ab illis decem.
Quaest. sup. lib. praed., qu. XI, 466a, b, 467a, b.

Notes for part 1, chapter 3

1.   Iste liber (de Praedicamentis) non est de decem vocibus ut de primo subjecto, nec aliqua pars logicae est de voce, quia omnes passiones syllogismi et partes eius possunt sibi inesse secundum esse quod habent in mente, etiamsi non proferantur; sed est de aliquo priore, quod respectu vocis significativae tantum habet rationem significati. Quaest. in lib. praed. qu. I, 438a.

2.   ... quod impositio ad significandum nullam qualitatem voci tribuit, concedo, nec aliquam intentionem nec aliquem conceptum. Unde nihil valet quod dicunt aliqui, quod vox significativa continet in se conceptum rei, quem causat in anima audientis. Si hoc esset verum, tunc vox significativa audita movere posset intellectum audientis secundum illam intentionem, inquantum scil. est sic significativa; et tunc vox latina significativa moveret intellectum. Graeci audientis eam ad conceptum, quem exprimit, quod falsum est. Unde per hoc quod est significativa, nulla qualitas rei sibi imprimitur nec aliquem conceptum in se continet. Oxon II, dist. XLII, 472b.

3.   Dici potest quod, licet in genere vocis non sit aliquis ordo, inter voces significativas tamen inquantum significant conceptus, inter illas est ordo; sicut omnis propositio in genere propositionum est singularis, tamen aliqua est singularis, aliqua universalis ratione conceptus significati. Quaest. in lib. praed. qu. I, 439b.

    Passiones conceptus insunt voci significativi sicut incomplexum et complexum, significare verum vel falsum ut signo per naturam signati. l. c. 438b.

    ... significare verum et falsum convenit enuntiationi, sed non ut est vox significans conceptum, sed ut conceptus significat rem. l. c. 439a.

    Absoluta confirmatio vel negatio non est antequam denominatur ad rem, quia ante illud quodlibet de quolibet enuntiatur ut solum signum de signo. Signum autem inquantum signum nec verum nec falsum dicitur nisi in comparatione ad significatum. Quaest. in lib. periherm. (op. 2) qu. I, 584b.

    Veritas et falsitas sunt in sermone ut in signo; ergo enuntiatio prolata illud significat, in quo est veritas et falsitas, illud est compositio intellectus ... haec propositio: "homo est animal" scripta non dicitur falsa, licet haec vox "homo"

non sit haec vox "animal" et haec quod litterae non significant
voces ut sunt aliquid in se, sed ut sunt signa aliorum; et ita in
omnibus his semper oportet recurrere ad untimum significatum.
Quaest. in lib. periherm. qu. II, 542.

4.   Vox repraesentatur sensui, significatum intellectui; vox
          enim est signum et signum se offert sensui, aliud dere-
linquens intellectui. Quaest. sup. lib. I anal. post. qu. I, 201a.
          ... passiones inquantum sunt signa et res inquantum
          sunt significata sunt eaedem apud omnes; nam eadem passio
in anima apud quoscumque concipientes repraesentat eandem rem,
quia eadem similitudo in anima semper est eiusdem repraesen-
tativa, sicut est similitudo sensibilis in sensu litterae et voces
in se eaedem non sunt eaedem apud omnes inquantum sunt signa;
quia nec eadem littera apud omnes repraesentat eandem vocem,
sed vel aliam vel nullam, nec eadem vox apud omnes significat
eandem passionem sed vel aliam vel nullam. Ex hoc patet, res
et passiones signa esse naturaliter, quia apud omnes uniformiter
significant et significantur; et quod est a natura, est idem apud
omnes; littera autem et vox non sunt signa a natura, quia non
sunt eaedem apud omnes, inquantum significant aut significantur.
Quaest. in lib. periherm. qu. IV, 546 sq.
          ... in nominibus significativis haec vox "homo" quoties-
          cumque prolata dicitur una vox numero et distingui ab
hac voce "lapis" numero; cum tamen non possit eadem vox numero
bis proferri, ita quod quod sunt prolationes tot sunt voces dis-
tincatae numero, et haec vox "homo" et haec vox "lapis" non
tantum numero sed etiam specie distinguuntur; tamen quia ad
finem vocis, scil. ad exprimendum conceptum per aequivalentiam
sunt idem numero "homo" et "homo", "lapis" et "lapis",
quotiescumque prolata, ideo dicuntur esse una vox numero res-
pectu illius finis. Oxon. II, dist. II, 333a ff.

5.   Vox significativa est signum naturale; ergo idem signifi-
          cat apud omnes. Probatio minoris: cuiuslibet virtutis
naturalis est aliquod instrumentum naturale, sed virtus interpre-
tativa est virtus naturalis hominis, cum homo sit animal sociale,
volens alii exprimere quod apud se est; ergo vox significativa
quae est instrumentum illius virtutis, est signum naturale; ergo
naturaliter significat. Dico quod vox significativa non est instru-
mentum virtutis interpretativae in homine, sed guttur et pulmo,
quae concurrunt ad formationem vocis; sicut si naturaliter homo
velit fugere nociva, non sequitur omne illud esse naturale instru-
mentum, quo fugit nociva, puta vestimenta vel arma vel huius-

modi, sed tantum natura illa dedit ut instrumenta naturalia, quibus
homo haec posset sibi praeparare ut manus; nam per manus homo
potest illa per artem praeparare,   et sic per rationem et instrumenta
naturalia formandi vocem potest homo aliqua imponere, quae
sunt signa ad placitum et non naturalia, sicut conceptus. Quest.
in lib. periherm. qu. IV, 456b, 547b.

6.   .... quidquid est signum signi, est signum signati, ita
            quod signum intermedium non varietur in comparatione ad
primum signum et ultimum signatum. Quaest. in lib. praed. qu.
XXVIII, 504a.

7.   Quaest. in lib. praed. qu. VIII, 459.
            ... Significare est alicuius intellectum constituere; illud
            ergo significatur, cuius intellectus per vocem consti-
tuitur. Quaest. in lib. periherm. qu. II, 541a.
            Significare est aliquid intellectui repraesentare; quod ergo
            significatur, ab intellectu concipitur. Quaest. sup. elench.
qu. XVI, 24 ff.

8.   Et cum signum haec duo importet vel necessario requirat,
            scil. fundamentum et relationem, ex hoc sequitur, quod
ex parte utriusque potest distingui. Ex parte autem relationis, quam
importat signum, distinguitur signum primo in signum naturale, quod
naturaliter significat et importat relationem realem ad signata; tum
etiam in signum ad placitum tantum et non naturale, quod importat
relationem rationis ut sunt voces et nutus monachorum, quia ista
possunt significare alia, sicut ista, si placeret institutionibus.
Reportata IV, dist. I, qu. II, n. 3.

9.   Signum naturale verius significat quam significat quam
            signum ad plicitum. Oxon. I, dist. XXII, qu. II, n. 5.

10.   Alia est divisio signi in signum quod semper habet suum sig-
            natum secum quantum est ex parte sui, et tale signum est
verum et efficax, sicut eclypsis est signum efficax interpositionis
terrae inter solem et lunam et ita est similiter de aliis signis naturalibus.
            Aliud est signum quod non habet suum signatum secum: cuius-
modi signum est propositio quam proferimus, quia non est in potestate
nostra, quod tale signum ut propositio secum habeat rem, quam signi-
ficat; et hoc signum non est semper verum, sed aliquando falsum.
            Tertia etiam est divisio signi in signum rememorativum res-
pectu praeteriti et in prognosticum respectu futuri et in signum demon-
strativum respectu praesentis. Reportata IV, dist. I, qu. II, n. 3.
            cf. Oxon. IV, dist. I, qu. II, n. 4.

11.   Quantum etiam ad suum fundamentum potest signum
       multipliciter dividi.   Potest enim hoc signum
institui in uno sensibili unius sensus ut in re visibili aut audibili
vel aliquo huiusmodi sicut in suo fundamento; vel in pluribus
sensibilibus multorum sensuum ... ut oratio longa, in qua sunt
multa sensibilia et multae dictiones fundantes istam relationem
importatam per huiusmodi signum, potest signum institui in uno
sensibili vel pluribus ut dictum est.   Reportata l.c. n.5.

12.   Quaest. sup. anal. post. I, qu. I, 201.

13.   ... rationes significandi non inducuntur per motum, sed
       sunt intentiones inductae per animam ... potest dici quod
... sunt in signo ut in termino et in anima ut in subjecto.   Quaest.
sup. elench. qu. XV, 20.
       cf. Quaest. in perhirm. I, qu. II, 542a.

14.   ... facta transmutatione in re secundum quod existit
       non fit transmutatio in significatione vocis, cuius causa
ponitur, quia res non significatur ut existit sed ut intelligitur
per ipsam speciem intelligibilem; sive sit sive non sit, cum tam
res ut intelligitur quam species sua maneant intransmutatae facta
transmutatione in re ut existit quia per eandem speciem cognos-
cimus essentiam et eandem scientiam habemus de ea, quando
existit et quando non existit ... res inquantum significantur per
vocem non transmutantur qualicumque transmutatione facta in re
ut existit et per consequens nec vox significans transmutabitur
in significando, concendendum quod destructo signato destruitur
signum, sed licet res destruatur ut existit non tamen res ut intel-
ligitur nec ut est signata destruitur ...
       Res ut intelligitur, cui extraneum est existere secundum
       quod significatur.   Quaest. in lib. periherm. qu. III,
545 sqq.

Notes for part 2

1.   H. Steinthal, Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprach-
        wissenschaft, 1871, p. 44.

2.   De Wulf, Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie,
        Rudolf Eisler, translator, 1913, p. 339.

3.   P. Rotta, La filosofia del linguaggio nella Patristica e
        nella Scolastica, 1909, p. 233-242.

4.   Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissen-
        schaften, philosophischhistorische Klasse, vol. 85
(1877), pp. 545-597.

5.   Notices et extraits de divers manuscrits latins pour servir
        à l'histoire de doctrines grammaticales au moyen-age, 1868.

Notes for part 2, chapter 1

1.　　　... signum perfectionis constructionis est generare
　　　perfectum sensum in animo auditori, De mod. sign. cap.
LIV, 49b.

2.　　　Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 1912,
　　　p. 100; cf. pp. 10, 97, 99, 192.

3.　　　Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung,
　　　2 ed., 1913, pp. 30ff.

4.　　　... notandum, quod cum intellectus vocem ad significan-
　　　dum et consignificandum imponit, duplicem rationem
ei tribuit, scil. rationem significandi quae vocatur significatio,
per quam efficitur signum vel significans, et sic formaliter est
dictio; et rationem consignificandi, quae vocatur modus significandi
activus, per quam vox significans fit consignum vel consignificans
et sic formaliter est pars orationis. De mod. sig. cap. I, 1b sq.

5.　　　R tiones significandi non inducuuntur per motum, sed sunt
　　　intentiones inductae per animam. Quaest. sup. elench.
qu. VIII, 11a.

6.　　　H. Lotze, Logik, Philos. Bibl. Bd. 141　(published by
　　　G. Misch) 1912, p. 17.

7.　　　... est sciendum quod modus significandi duo importat
　　　aequivoce. Dicitur enim de modo significandi activo et
passivo. Modus significandi activus est modus sive proprietas
vocis ab intellectu sibi concessa, mediante qua vox proprietatem
rei significat. Modus significandi passivus est modus sive pro-
prietas rei prout est per vocem significata. Et quia significare
et consignificare est quoddam modo agere et significari et con-
significari est quoddam modo pati; inde est quod modus vel
proprietas vocis mediante qua vox proprietatem rei active signi-
ficat, modus significandi activus nominatur. Modus vero vel
proprietas rei prout per voces passive significatur, modus sig-
nificandi passivus nuncupatur. De mod. sig. cap. I, 1b.

8.　　　E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und
　　　phaenomenologischen Philosophie, Jahrb. f. Philos. u.
phaenomenolog. Forschung, Bd. 1 1. Teil, 1913, p. 257.

9.   E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd ed. 1913, vol. 2, part 1, p. 384.

10.   ... notandum, quod cum huiusmodi rationes sive modi significandi non sint figmenta, oportet, omnem modum significandi activum ab aliqua rei proprietate radicaliter oriri. Quod sic patet: quia cum untellectus vocem ad significandum sub aliquo modo significando activo imponit, ad ipsam rei proprietatem aspicit, a qua modum significandi originaliter trahit; quia intellectus, cum sit virtus passiva, de se indeterminata, ad actum determinatum non vadit, nisi aliunde determinetur. Unde cum imponit vocem ad significandum sub determinato modo significandi activo, a determinata rei proprietate necessario movetur; ergo cuilibet modo significandi activo correspondet aliqua proprietas rei seu modus essendi rei. De modi sign. cap. II, 2a.

11.   Conf. the preceding note.

12.   Sed contra hoc objicitur; quia haec vox significativa scil. deitas habet feminum genus, quod est modus significandi passivus; tamen in re significata sibi proprietas non correspondet, quia est proprietas patientis, a qua sumitur feminum genus. De mod. sig., cap. II, 2b. Conf. above.

13.   Item privationes et figmenta sub nullis proprietatibus cadunt, cum non sint entia, et tamen voces significativae privationum et figmentorum modos significandi activos habent, ut caecitas, chimera et similia. De mod. sig. cap. II, 2b.

14.   Dicendum quod non oportet, quod semper modus significandi activus dictionis trahatur a proprietate rei illius dictionis, cuius est modus significandi; sed potest accipi a proprietate rei alterius dictionis et rei illius dictionis tribui et sufficit quod ipsi ex istis sensilibus, ideo sub proprietatibus sensibilium eis nomina imponimus et nominibus eorum modos significandi activos attribuimus. Unde licet in Deo secundum veritatem non sit proprietas passiva, tamen imaginamur ipsum tanquam patientem a nostris precibus. l. c. 2b.

Similiter privationes intelligimus ex suis habitibus, sub proprietatibus habitum eis nomina imponimus et nominibus eorum modus sig. activos attribuimus. Similiter in nominibus figmentorum sumuntur modi sig. activi ex proprietatibus partium, ex quibus imaginamur chimaeram componi quam imaginamur ex

capita leonis cauda draconis, et sic de aliis. l.c.

15.   Et si instetur: si modi sig. activi in nominibus priva -
        tionum sumuntur a modis essendi habituum, tunc nomina
essendi habitus et non privationis designabunt; et hoc posito,
nomina privationum per suos modos sig. activos erunt consigni-
ficative falsa l.c. 2b.

16.   Dicendum quod non est verum; imo nomina privationum
        per suos modos sig. activos designant circa privationes
modos intelligendi privationum, qui sunt eorum modi essendi.
Juxta quod sciendum, quod licet privationes non sint entia positiva
extra animam, sunt tamen entia positiva in anima, ut patet IV,
Met. Text. 9, et sunt entia secundum animam; et quia eorum
intelligi est eorum esse, ideo eorum modi intelligendi erunt
eorum modi essendi.. Unde nomina privationum per suos modos
sig. activos non erunt consignificative falsa, quia cum modi in-
telligendi privationum reducantur ad modos intelligendi habitus
(nam privatio non cognoscitur nisi per habitum), ideo modi
essendi privationum tandem ad modos essendi habitus reducuntur.
l. c. 2 sq.

17.   Logik, p. 19.

18.   ... notandum, quod modi significandi activi immediate a
        modis intelligendi passivis sumuntur. Juxta quod
sciendum est, quod sicut est duplex modus significandi, scil.
activus et passivus, ita duplex est modus intelligendi, scil.
activus et passivus. Modus intelligendi activus est ratio con-
cipiendi, qua mediante, intellectus rei proprietates significat,
concipit vel apprehendit. Modus autem intelligendi passivus est
proprietas rei prout ab intellectu apprehensa.
        Dicatur ergo, quod modi significandi activi sumuntur im-
        mediate a modis intelligendi passivis; quia modi signifi-
candi activi non sumuntur a modis essendi, nisi ut hi modi essendi
ab intellectu apprehenduntur ... l.c. cap. III, 3a.

19.   ... species intelligibilis immediate significatur per vocem,
        sed illa dupliciter consideratur, aut in quantum est quid in se
accidens, scil. informans animam, aut in quantum repraesentat rem.
Primo modo non significatur per vocem ... sed secundu modo.
Quaest. sup. lib. perih., qu. II, 541b.
        Res non significatur ut existit sed ut intelligitur. l. c.
qu. III, 545a.

20.   ... modi autem essendi prout ab intellectu apprehensi,
     dicuntur modi intelligendi passivi; ergo modi sig.
activi sumuntur a modis essendi mediantibus modis intelligendi passivis;
et ideo immediate modi signativi in modis intelligendo passivis summuntur
    l. c. cap. III, 3a.

21.   ... notandum, quod modi essendi et modi intelligendi
     passivi et modi significandi passivi sunt idem materialiter
et realiter, sed differunt formaliter. l. c. cap. IV, 3b.

22.   Conf. the article "Geschichtsphilosophie" in the Fests-
chrift fuer Kuno Fischer: Die Philosophie im Beginn des 20.
Jahrhunderts, 2nd ed., 1907, p. 333; then, Die Grenzen der
naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 2nd ed. 1913, pp. 31,
36 f. note 1; The problem is treated more extensively in the book:
Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 3rd ed. 1915, p. 376 ff.

23.   ... modus essendi est rei proprietas absolute; modus intel-
     ligendi passivus est ipsa proprietas rei prout ab intel-
lectu apprehensa; modus sig. passivus est eiusdem rei proprietas
prout per vocem significatur. Et sunt eadem materialiter et
realiter, quia quod dicit modus essendi absolute, dicit modus in-
telligendi passivus, dicit modus sig. passivus prout refertur ad
vocem, ergo sunt eadem materialiter. Sed differunt formaliter,
quod sic patet: quia qui dicit modum essendi dicit proprietatem
rei absolute sive sub ratione existentiae; sed qui dicit modum intel-
ligendi sive concipiendi ut formale; sed qui dicit modum sig.
passivum, dicit eandem proprietatem rei ut materiale et dicit
rationem consignificandi ut formale, et cum alia sit ratio
essendi, alia intelligendi, alia significandi, differunt secundum
formales rationes. l. c. cap. IV, 3b.

24.   Item sciendum, quod modus essendi et modus intelligendi
     activus et modus significandi activus differunt formaliter
et materialiter; quia modus essendi dicit proprietatem rei absolute
sive sub ratione existentiae, ut dictum est supra; sed modus in-
telligendi activus dicit proprietatem intellectus, quae est ratio
intelligendi sive concipiendi; modus significandi activus dicit pro-
prietatem vocis, quae est ratio consignificandi. Sed alia est
proprietas rei extra animam et alia intellectus et alia vocis; ita
alia est ratio essendi, alia intelligendi alia consignificandi; ergo
modus essendi et modus intelligendi et modus significandi activus
differunt in utroque. l. c. 3b sq.

25.   ... sciendum, quod modus intelligendi activus et modis
         intelligendi passivus differunt materialiter et conveniunt
formaliter. Nam modus intelligendi passivus dicit rei proprietatem
sub ratione intelligendi passiva; sed modus intelligendi activus
dicit proprietatem intellectus, quae est ratio intelligendi activa;
sed eadem est ratio intelligendi, per quam intellectus proprie-
tatem rei intelligit active et per quam rei proprietas intelligitur
passive, ergo proprietates sunt diversae et ratio est eadem,
ergo materialiter differunt et formaliter sunt idem. Item sciendum,
quod modus significandi activus et passivus differunt materialiter
et sunt idem formaliter. l. c. cap. IV, 4a.

26.   ... notandum, quod modus sig. passivus materialiter est
         in re, ut in subjecto, quia materialiter est proprietas
rei: rei autem proprietas est in eo, cuius est ut in subjecto.
Formaliter autem est in eo subjecto, in quo est modus signifi-
candi activus, quia formaliter a modo significandi non discrepat.
         Modus autem significandi activus, cum sit proprietas
         vocis significativae, materialiter est in voce significa-
tiva ut in subjecto, in proprietate autem rei sicut causatum in
causa efficienti radicali et remota; et in intellectu sicut causatum
in causa efficiente proxima; et in constructione ut causa efficiens
in suo effectu proprio. l. c. cap. V, 4.

27.   Quaest. sup. elench. qu. X, 15a.
         Quamlibet essentiam contingit intelligere sub ratione propria
         et etiam significare, et tali modo intelligendi correspondet
modus significandi abstractus. Quaest. in praed. qu. VIII, 457b.

28.   Logische Untersuchungen, 1st ed., 1901, vol. II, pp. 481,
         489.

29.   loc. cit. p. 505
         "The red object is known as red and is called red by means
         of this knowing."

30.   De mod. sig., cap. XXXVI, 32a.

31.   Husserl, op. cit., p. 71f.

32.   De mod. sig. cap. XXI, 18a.

33.   l. c. cap. XLV, 38a; conf. note 1

34. _Logik_ p. 14. _Conf._ _Mikrokosmos_, 5th ed. 1905, vol. II, p. 240ff.

35. Primo earum principia in generali videamus. Sunt autem quatuor principia essentialia construendi sermonem congrue et perfecte silicet: materiale, formale, efficiens et finale. Principium materiale construendi sunt construcibilia; quia sicut se habet subjectum ad accidens, sic se habent construcibilia ad constructionem; sed subjectum est materia accidentis; nam accidens non habet materia ex qua sed in qua; ergo constructibilia sunt materia constructionis. Et unius constructionis non sunt plura vel pauciora duobus, quia, ut patebit, constructio causatur ex dependentia unius constructibilis ad alterum; sed una dependentia non est nisi duorum, scil. dependentis et determinantis; ergo unius constructionis non sunt nisi duo constructibilia principalia, scil. dependens et terminans. Et ex hoc patet error dicentium hanc constructionem esse unam: "Homo albus currit bene." Nam hic sunt diversa dependentia: una, qua Adjectivum dependet ad Substantivum, alia, qua Verbum dependet ad suppositum, tertia, qua determinans dependet ad determinabile; ergo non erit hic una constructio. De mod. sig., cap. XLV, 38a.

36. Principium formale constructionis est unio constructibilium; hoc enim est forma rei, per quod res habet esse. Sed constructio habet esse per constructibilium unionem; ergo constructibilium unio est forma constructionis. l. c. 38b.

37. Principium efficiens constructionis duplex, scil.: extrinsecum et intrinsecum. Intrinsecum sunt modi significandi respectivi, ratione quorum vel unum constructibile est ad alterum dependens vel alterius dependentiam determinans; a quibus modis sig. respectivis abstrahuntur duo modi sig. generales: modus dependendi in uno constructibili et modus dependentiam terminans in altero constructibili. Et hi modi sig. discuntur efficere constructionem pro tanto quia praeparant et disponunt constructibilia ad actualem unionem, quae fit per intellectum ...
Sed principium efficiens extrinsecum est intellectus qui constructibilia per modos sig. disposita et praeparata actu unit in constructione et sermone. Constructibilia enim, qualitercumque summe disponantur ad unionem per modos sig. numquam tamen unum constructibile actu se altero unit, sed hoc fit per intellectum, ut dictum est. Et dicitur intellectus prin-

cipium extrinsecum, quasi extra constructibilia manens. l.c.
38b.

38.   Principium finale est expressio mentis conceptus com-
             positi. l.c. 38b.

39.   De mod. sig. cap. XLVI, 39a.

40.   ... sicut constructio requirit constructibilium unionem
             absolute, sic congruitas requirit constructibilium
unionem, non quamcumque sed debitam. Et haec debita unio
potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo ex convenientia signifi-
catorum specialium, et per oppositum unio indebita ex repugnantia
ipsorum. Alio modo potest contigere ex conformitate modorum
sig. et per oppositum indebita ex indebita modorum sig. dis-
crepantia. l.c. cap. LIII, 47a.

41.   Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd ed., 1913, vol. II, part
             1, p. 295. Conf. in general the fourth investigation, pp.
294-342: the distinction of independent meaning from dependent
meaning and the idea of a pure grammar.

42.   Conf. Ideen no. 118ff, p. 245 ff -- p. 25 note. Here Hus-
             serl already   makes mention of a more extensive, special
article on pure grammar.

43.   Op. Ox. Prol. qu. IV, n. 45.

44.   Univocum et denominativum primo sunt differentiae
             praedicati, quod secundum se inest conceptui, non primo
voci significanti. Sup. praed. qu. VI, 452b. sqq.

45.   Univocum apud logicum dicitur omne illud, quod per
             unam rationem devenit apud intellectum secundum quam
dicitur de multis. Sup. praed. qu. VII, 455a, b.

46.   l.c. qu. IV, 443a.

47.   Nomen aequivocum nec debet dici simpliciter unum nomen
             nec plura nomina sed nomen multiplex quasi ab uno multi-
plicans. Hoc est manifestum: nam nomen dicitur tale eo quod
sic per intellectum imponitur, unde intellectus est principium
nominum. cum sit imponens as placitum: nomen ergo est quoddam
artificiale, sed in artificialibus tota sibstantia est ipsa materia ...

ipsa vox est substantia et materia nomin.iis: namente ergo unitate
vocis non dicetur illud nomen plura nomina, sed in termino
aequivoco vox est una ... nec simpliciter debet dici unum
nomen, nam ibi sunt plures rationes significandi. Relinguitur
ergo dicendum, quod sit nomen multiplex ... Si autem pluribus
rebus imponitur una vox, illa dicetur nomen multiplex. Sup.
elench. qu. VIII, 10b.

48.   Op. I. perih. qu. II, 443a.

49.   Sup. elench. qu. X, 13b.

50.   ... Licet vox aequivoca in eo quod secundum aliud et aliud
         respicit aliud et aliud significatum conveniat cum univer-
sali, quod secundum aliud respici; sua supposita -- in alio tamen
est differentia, nam in termino aequivoco non contingit considerare
aliquam rationem communem, in qua significata conveniant praeter
solam vocem; sed in toto universale contingit considerare aliquam
rationem in qua supposita univocantur et ideo non est simile. In
alio etiam est differentia, nam omnis ratio significandi actu importatur
per terminum aequivocum; sed nullum suppositum importatur
actu per terminum communem, ideo non est simile. Sup. elench.
qu. X, 12b.

51.   ... intelligendum est, quod terminus aequivocus proprie
         loquendo non potest contrahi per immediate sibi adjunc-
tum nec per immediate. Nam contractio est determinatio alicuius
communis, ita quod aggregatum ex contrahente et contracto necesse
est repraesentare intellecum determinatiorem, quam sit intellectus
ipsius contracti de se. Sed in termino aequivoco non est intellectus
communi omnibus significatis. Cuia cum aequivocata per terminum
aequivocum significentur sub propriis rationibus, nihil est eis com-
mune praeter solam vocem, auqe contrahi non potest, cum sit
singularis. Sup. elench. qu. XIII, 17a sq.

52.   ... Dicendum quod signum universale (omnis) adveniens ter-
         mino aequivoco potest distribuere ipsum pro omnibus
suppositis cuiuslibet significati. Sed intelligendum est, quod sicut
terminus aequivocus significat unum significatum ac si aliud non
significaret, et unum repraesentat respectu praedicati ac si aliud
non repraesentaret, representat respectu praedicati ac si aliud
non repraesentaret, hoc est sub nulla habitudine, sic etiam signum

universale distribuit unum significatum ac si aliud non distri-
bueret, hoc est, unum distribuit sub uno actu distribuendi et aliud
sub alio. Et huius ratio est: nam distributio est acceptio alicuius
communis pro quolibet eius supposito, quorum quodlibet est ipsum;
nunc autem in termino aequivoco non est aliquod commune, super
quod possit cadere distributio, quai nihil est ibi commune sed sola
vox. Et ideo distributio cadit super uno significato ac si super aliud
non caderet, et super quodlibet, sed hoc est alio actu distribuendi
et alio ...

> Signum universale potest distribuere terminum aequivocum
> pro omnibus suis significatis ... sed non unico actu.

Contra hoc potest argui sic: Signi semel positi est unum significatum
et unus modus significandi ergo et unus actus distribuendi. Dicendum
quod syncategorematica finitatem suae significationis trahunt ex ad-
junctis, cum ergo hic sunt actu plura significata, quorum nullum ad
aliud habet habitudinem, ut dictum est, diversi hic erunt actus
distribuendi, quorum nullus ad aliud habet habitudinem ... Patet
quod causa apparentiae in aequivocatione est unitas actualis vocis
incomplexae secundum materiam et formam. Sup. elench. qu.
XIV, 19.

53.   Conf. Part One, Chap. 2.

54.   H. Lotze, Logik, Book 3, chap. 4.
        W. Windelband, Vom System der Kategorien, pp. 41ff.
        E. Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre,
1911, pp. 148ff.

55.   Conf. division II, chapter 3, Content and Form of Language.

56.   Modi significandi respectivi sunt principia ordinandi
        dictionem cum alia ... significata est modi significandi
sunt essentialia dictioni. Sup. elench. qu. XVII, 27a, 30b.

57.   Mikrokosmos II, p. 239.

58.   Conf. E. Martinak, Psychologische Untersuchungen zur
        Bedeutungslehre, 1901.

59.   K. Vossler, "Grammatik und Sprachgeschichte oder das
        Verhaeltnis von 'richtig' und 'wahr' in der Sprachwis-
senschaft," Logos I, 1910, p. 86.
        "All speech in and for itself is alogical." --"Logic first
        begins behind language and by means of language, but not
before it or without it."

Vossler, _Positivismus_ _und_ _Idealismus_ _in_ _der_ _Sprachwis-_
senschaft, Heidelberg, 1904, pp. 24, 26.
The same author writes the following in the conclusion of the
treatise "Das System der Grammatik" (_Logos_ _IV,_ 1913,
pp. 203 ff.) where it is established that "language detached from
all the more intellectual activities and from all intellectual life is the
essential object of grammar":

There are again today philosophers of language, who are
requiring an independent, common, pure, speculative, and
universal grammar, a grammar of grammarians (_sic_). My ob-
servations have been that these neo-Platonists and neo-Scholastics
are becoming just so wise as I am from their observations.

It is probable that the possibility and the necessity of
both "standpoints" have been hardened by what has been
said in the text.

60.   Die _Sprachlogik_ _des_ _Duns_ _Scotus,_ p. 549.

61.   _loc._ _cit._ p. 550.

Notes for part 2, chapter 2

1.   _De modis significandi_, cap. VII, 5a, n. 1.

2.   Accipiendo _esse_ _simpliciter_ prout dividitur contra secun-
      dum quid, dico, quod sicut ens dividitur in prius et
posterius vel primum et secundum, et prius continet sub se sub-
stantiam et posterius accidens, ita simpliciter in isto intellectu
aequivalet ei quod est primum naturaliter et secundum quid
aequivalet ei quod est posterius naturaliter. _Op._ _Ox._, dist. IV,
qu. III, n. 43.

3.   _Conf._ part 1, chap. 1

4.   _Logische Untersuchungen_, second edition, II Untersuchung:
      Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen, especially p. 236.

5.   _De modis significandi_, cap. VII, 5a, n. 1.

6.   De ratione generis generalissimi non est habere plures
      sub se species sed _non_ _habere_ _aliud_ _supraveniens_ _genus_.
_Op._ _Ox._ I, dist. VIII, qu. III, no. 19.

7.   Ad rationem generis requiritur, quod multas habet actu
      species non quae _existant_ actu vel potentia, sed quod
tantum ab actu _concipiantur_ per speciem intelligibilem ab indi-
viduis acceptam quandoque existentibus, et quod actu habeant
aptitudinem _participandi_ _genus_, quia talis actualitas est illorum,
inquantum dicuntur species generis. _Sup._ _Univers._ _Porph._ _qu._
XVIII, 250a.
      Quanto genus communius tanto minor in re est unitas et ita
      nomen generis de suo primo intellectu importat aliquid, quod
est materiale in speciebus. 1. c. qu. VII, 455b.

8.   _De modis significandi_, cap. VII, 455b.

9.   loc. cit. 5b, n. 2.

10.   loc cit. 5b, n. 3.

11.   loc. cit.

12.   loc. cit. cap. VIII, 5b, n. 4.

13.   loc. cit. 5b, sq. n. 5; _conf._ part 1, chap. 1, p

14.   loc. cit. 6a, n. 7.

15.   loc. cit. 6a, n. 8.

16.   Solet antiquitus dici, quod ens potest esse participium
           vel nomen. Ens participium significat idem, quod
existens; quia tenet significatum verbi a quo descendit ... Ens
nomen significat habens essentiam. Sup. Perhi., qu. VIII, n. 10.
           Nomen significat univoce rem remanente vel existente
           vel non existente. Ad quod sciendum, quod hoc nomen
"Socrates" significat "Socratem" secundum quod est in actu,
non tamen, "Socratem existere." II Sup. Perhi., qu. II, 586a.
           Ens nomen non significat rem ut tempore mensuratam.
           Anal. post II, qu. IV, n. 2.
           Ens nomen est de essentia cuiuslibet. loc. cit. n. 3.

17.   De mod. sig., cap. VIII, 6a sq. n. 9; conf. part 2, chap. 1.

18.   De mod. sig., cap. IX, 6b, n. 1-3.

19.   Dicendum, quod universale est per se intelligibile, quod
           patet sic: primum objectum intellectus scil. quod quid est,
intelligitur sub ratione universalis; illa vero ratio non est idem
essentialiter cum quod quid est, sed modus ejus accidentalis,
ergo intellectus potest cognoscere differentiam inter sum objectum
primum et illum modum, quia potest distinguere inter omnia quae
non sunt essentialiter eadem ... igitur intellectus potest cog-
noscere modum sive rationem universalis; hoc enim modo
reflectendo cognoscit intellectus se et sui operationem et
modum operandi et caetera, quae sibi insunt. Sup. Univ. Porph.,
qu. V, 106a.
           ... universale ex hoc quod universale natum est determi-
           nar. ad suppositum. Reportata I, dist. XIX, qu. V,
n. 11.
           Universale est ab intellectu. Sup. Univ. Porph., qu. IV, n. 4.
           Aliquando autem universale accipitur pro re subjecta in-
           tentioni secundae, id est pro quidditate rei absoluta, quae,
quantum est de se, nec est universalis nec singularis, sed de se
est indifferens. De Anima, qu. XVII, n. 14.

20.   De modis significandi, cap. IV, 6b, n. 2.

21.   Op. Ox. II, dist. III, qu. XI, n. 9.

22.   Conf. part 1, chap. 1.

23.   ... singulare addit aliquam entitatem supra entitatem universalis. <u>Op. Ox.</u> II, dist. IX, qu. II, n. 10.

24.   <u>loc. cit.</u> III, dist. I, qu. 1, n. 10.

25.   Aliud est singularitatem esse conceptam <u>ut objectum</u> vel ut partem objecti, aliud est singularitatem esse praecise <u>modum concipiendi,</u> sive <u>sub quo</u> concipitur objectum ... Ita in intentionibus logicis, cum dico: singulare est universale, <u>quod</u> concipitur est singularitas, sed <u>modus concipiendi,</u> sub quo concipitur, est <u>universalitas,</u> quia quod concipitur habet in-differentiam ad plura. <u>Op. Ox.</u> I, dist. II, qu. III, n. 7.

26.   Cum dicitur, singulare non est intelligibile nisi in universali, dico, quod sicut in communiori non con-tinetur perfecte quidquid est entitatis in inferiori, sic nec cog-nosci vel intelligi. Ideo dico quod in nulla specie, inquantum talis perfecte potest cognosci objectum suum per se singulare, quia <u>aliquid includit, quod non species et quantum ad hoc non ducit species in eius cognitionem; et ideo</u> dico, <u>quod singulare non est per se intelligibile sub propria ratione perfecte.</u> <u>Reportata</u> II, dist. III, qu. III, n. 15.
      De singularibus non est facta scientia isto modo, quo scientia accipitur I, Metaphysicae, prout distinguitur contra experimentum, sed accipiendo scientiam pro <u>certa notitia bene est scientia singularium.</u> Miscell. qu. III, n. 13.
      re: the proper due of the sciences of the individual, <u>conf.</u> the works of Dilthey, Rickert, and Simmel.

27.   <u>De modis significandi,</u> cap. IX, 6b seq. n. 3.

28.   Deinde sub his modis descendamus ad alios modos signi-ficandi subalternos minus generalis istis, et primo sub modo significandi per modum communis; secundo sub modo signi-ficandi per modum appropriati.
      Circa primum notandum, quod modus significandi per modum communis, habet duos modos sub se, qui sunt minus generales eo, silicet modum per se stantis et modum ad-jacentis. Modus significandi per modum per se stantis sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas essentiae determinatae. Sicut enim modus significandi generalissimus sumitur a proprietate

essentiae absolutae: sic modus significandi per modum per se stantis
sumitur a proprietate ipsius essentiae determinatae: et hic modus
constituit nomen substantivum. Nomen ergo substantivum signi-
ficat per modum determinati secundum essentiam. loc. cit. cap.
X, 7a, n. 4, 5.

Essentia variis modis dicitur de creatura: uno modo
secundum rationem determinatam alicuius generis secundum
quem modum dicimus hic est homo vel corpus vel albedo vel quan-
titas; et hoc convenit cuilibet enti sive existat actu sive in potentia
sive per suam essentiam; nam quaelibet res reponitur in deter-
minato genere per suam essentiam non per suum actum existentiae.
De rer. princ., qu. VIII, n. 1.

29.   Adjectivum formaliter significat formam ut forma est
        eius de quo dicitur; propter istam proprietatem ad-
jectivum non potest praedicari nisi praedicatione formali. Quod-
libet., qu. V, n. 6.
        Adjectiva si praedicantur, de necessitate formaliter
        praedicantur et hoc quia sunt adjectiva. Nam ex hoc
quod sunt adjectiva significant formam per modum informantis,
de quo videlicet formaliter dicuntur. Op. Ox. I, dist. V, qu. I,
n. 7.

30.   De modis significandi, cap. X, 7a, b, n. 7.

31.   loc. cit., cap. XI, 7b, n. 9.

32.   Dicendum, quod est vera definitio (generis), quod sic
        ostenditur: ratio universalis est praedicari de pluribus,
cum ergo in definitione generis ponatur praedicari de pluribus,
ponitur genus ejus postea ponitur "differentibus specie"
et "in quid" quae sunt per se differentiae generis. Probatio:
quia per se dividunt superius, scil. praedicari de pluribus, ergo
sunt per se constitutione inferioris, ad quod superius per illa
appropriatur. Dividitur enim per se "praedicari de pluribus"
in "differentiabus specie" et "differentibus numero" ...
Dividitur etiam in "praedicari in quid" et "in quale." Sup.
univ. Porph., qu. XV, n. 4.
        Convenienter ponitur"differentibus specie" quia praedicari in
quid" et "in quale," tamquam per primos praedicandi modos;
igitur per illa descendit universale in species: genus autem non
praedicatur "in quale," igitur "in quid." loc. cit., qu. XIX, n. 2.

Nihil praedicatur in quid de illo respectu cuius est
accidens, sed respectu cuius est genus: ut "color" non
praedicatur de substantia in quid sed de albedine respectu cuius
est genus. loc. cit. n. 4.

33.   Sicut enim a proprietate rei, quae est communicabilis
pluribus, absolute sumitur modus significandi per modum
communis absolute, sic ab eadem proprietate strictius sumpta,
scilicet a proprietate communicabili pluribus specie differentibus,
sumitur modus generalis. Ab hac autem proprietate, apud Logicum
sumitur secunda intentio generis, et sic iste modus constituit
Nomen substantivum generale, ut animal, color, et sic de aliis
generibus. Nomen ergo substantivum generale est, quod signi-
ficat per modum communicabilis pluribus, non solum numero, sed
specie differentibus. De modis significandi, cap. XI, 7b, n. 9.

34.   Secundus modus per se stantis, est modus significandi
per modum specificabilis, sumptus a proprieatate rei,
quae est proprietas communicabilis pluribus non absolute sed
solum numero differentibus. loc. cit. cap. XI, 7b sq., n. 10.

35.   Tertius modus per se stantis, est modus significandi
per modum descendentis ab altero; ut ab avo, vel a
patre: et hic modus constituit nomen substantivum patronymicum,
ut Priamides. Et quia nomen patronymicum a propriis nominibus
patrum vel avorum derivatur, ideo merito patronymicum nomen
nuncupatur. Nomen ergo patronymicum est quod a propriis
nominibus patrum vel avorum derivatur, significans per modum
descendentis ab altero, ut a patre vel ab avo. loc. cit. n. 11.

36.   loc. cit., n. 12.

37.   loc. cit., n. 13.

38.   Deinde sub modo adjacentis alteri ad modos specialissimos
descendamus: qui continet sub se viginti quatuor modos;
quorum:
Primus est modus significandi per modum adjacentis
alteri, seu denominantis ipsum simpliciter et absolute,
speciali ratione non superaddita, et hic modus constituit nomen
adjectivum denominativum, et albus, niger, croceus. Nomen ergo
Adjectivum denominativum significat per modum adjacentis alteri,
sive denominantis alterum simpliciter et absolute. Et iste modus

est generalior omnibus modis sequentibus, qui dicuntur modi
adjacentis alteri, sive denominantis alterum, superaddita ratione
speciali, ut postea patebit.

Secundus modus adjacentis est modus significandi per
modum denominantis alterum, sub ratione communica-
bilis pluribus specie differentibus, et iste modus constituit nomen
adjectivum generale significans sub ratione communicabilis
pluribus specie differentibus, ut coloratus. Nomen ergo
Adjectivum generale est, quod significat per modum denominantis
sub ratione communicabilis pluribus specie differentibus. loc. cit.
cap. XII, 8a, b, n. 1, 2.

39.   loc cit., 8b, n. 2, 3.

40.   loc. cit., 9a, n. 5, 6, 8.

41.   loc. cit., 9b sq., n. 16, 17, 18.

42.   loc. cit., 10a, n. 19.

43.   loc. cit., 10b, n. 21, 22, 24.

44.   Nomen quodcumque aliquid significans quod huic soli
        potest inesse, potest dici proprium nomen huic, sed
simpliciter nomen huius non est nisi quod primo significat hoc sub
ratione propr , quia solum illud est proprium signum vocale
huius. Op. Ox. I, dist. XXII, qu. II, n. 7.

45.   Consequenter sub modo appropriati, qui ex opposito
        dividebatur contra modum significandi communis, ad
modos specialissimos, quorum:
        Primus est modus propriae denominationis, sumptus a
        proprietate individuationi absolute; et hic modus con-
constituit Nomen proprium individui, et absolute impositum ut
Socrates, Plato. Nomen ergo proprie proprium est, quod signi-
ficat rem sub proprietatibus individuationis absolute.
        Secundus modus appropriati est modus significandi per
        modum praenominationis, sumptus a proprietate differen-
tiae, quae est facere differre: et hic modus constituit Nomen
proprium praenomen, ut Marcus Tullius. Nomen ergo proprium
praenomen est, quod impositum est rei individuae sub ratione
differentiae.
        Tertius modus appropriati est modus significandi per

modum cognominis vel cognationis, sumptus a proprietate
parentali, quae est unum nomen pluribus commune; et hic modus
constituit Nomen proprium cognomen, ut omnes de parentela
Romuli dicuntur Romuli: et dicitur cognomen, quia pluribus cog-
natis est nomen commune. Nomen ergo proprium cognomen est,
quod impositum est rei individuae sub proprietate parentali.

Quartus modus appropriati est modus significandi per
modum agnominis, sumptum a proprietate eventus et
hic modus constituit Nomen proprium agnomen, ut Scipio Africanus
nominatus est, quia ex eventu devicit Africam. Nomen ergo
proprium agnomen est, quod impositum est rei individuae,
sub proprietate eventus. Patet ergo, qui et quod sunt modi
significandi Nominis essentiales generalissimi, specialissimi et
subalterni, et quae et quod sunt species Nominis per eosdem
modos constitutae. De Modis Significandi cap. XIII, 11a, n. 1-4.

46.   loc. cit., cap. XIV, lib sq., n. 1, 2.

47.   loc. cit., cap. XVI, 12b, 13a, n. 1-5.

48.   loc. cit., cap. XV, 12a, b, 3-5.

49.   loc. cit., cap. XVII, 13a, b, n. 6, 8.

50.   loc. cit., cap. XIX, 14b, n. 1-16b, n. 12.

51.   loc. cit., n. 3.

52.   loc. cit., n. 6.

53.   loc. cit., 16a, n. 8-9.

54.   loc. cit., n. 10.

55.   loc. cit., cap. XX, 17a, b, n. 3.

56.   Modus significandi essentialis generalissimus Pronominis
est modus significandi per modum entis et indeterminatae
apprehensionis; a qua vero proprietate modus significandi per modum
entis sumitur, prius dictum est, nam in hoc modo Pronomen a
Nomine non distinguitur, ut dictum est.

Modus vero indeterminatae apprehensionis oritur a
proprietate seu modo essendi materiae primae. Materia
prima in se indeterminata est, respectu cojuslibet formae naturalis,
quae inest de se, ita quod nec includit formam, nec determina-
tionem formae. Ab ista ergo proprietate materiae primae, quae

est proprietas   de se indeterminata, determinabilis tamen per
    formam, sumitur modus significandi per modum indeterminati, qui est
modus significandi essentialis generalissimus Pronominis, non quod
    Pronomen materiam primam significet tantum, sed ex modo
    essendi reperto in materia prima, intellectus movetur ad con-
    siderandum aliquam essentiam sic indeterminatam et ad im-
    ponendum sibi vocem sub modo significandi per modum inde-
    terminati.   Et hunc modum generalissimum essentialem
    Pronominis Grammatici expresserunt dicentes, <u>Pronomen significare
    substantiam meram, vel substantiam sine qualitate;</u> dantes intelligi
    per substantiam modum entis, qui in substantia principaliter
    reperitur, ut dictum est: per meram, vel sine qualitate, modum
    indeterminatae apprehensionis. <u>loc. cit.</u> cap. XXI, 17b, n. 5, 6.
              Materia prima ad nullam determinate inclinatur et
              ideo sub quacumque quiescit, <u>non violenter sed
    naturaliter</u> quiescit propter indeterminatam inclinationem ad
    quamcumque. <u>Op. Ox.</u> I, dist. I, qu. I, n. 6.

57.   <u>De modis significandi,</u> cap. XXI, 17b sq., n. 7, 8.

58.   <u>loc. cit.</u>, 18a, n. 10.

59.   <u>loc. cit.</u>, 18a, n. 9.

60.   Modus ergo significandi, qui vocatur <u>demonstratio,</u>
              sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas certitu-
    dinis et praesentiae seu notitiae primae intellectus, et hunc
    modus Donatus vocat <u>qualitatem finitam</u>: et hic modus constituit
    Pronomen demonstrativum.
              <u>Pronomen ergo demonstrativum significat rem sub
              ratione vel proprietate praesentiae seu notitiae primae.</u>
    Semper enim Pronomini sex demonstationes correspondent
    praesentiae, sive ad intellectum, differentur tamen, quia Pronomen
    demonstrativum ad sensum hoc quod demonstrat, significat, ut <u>ille</u>
    currit. Sed Pronomen demonstrativum ad intellectum hoc quod
    demonstrat, non significat, sed aliud: ut si dicam de herba
    demonstrata in manu mea, <u>haec herba crescit in horto meo,</u>
    hic unum demonstratur, et aliud significatur: et hunc modum
    demonstrandi habent propria nomina: ut si dicam demonstrato
    Joanne, <u>iste fuit Joannes,</u> hic unum demonstratur et aliud in
    numeros significatur. Et sic contingit dare diversos modos
    certitudinis et praesentiae: et secundum hoc erunt diversi modi
    demonstrationum: et ex consequenti diversa Pronomina
    adjectiva. Contingit enim rem esse praesentem et certam et
    maxime certam vel praesentem, et sic demonstratur per hoc
    Pronomen <u>ego,</u> vel non maxime esse certam et praesentem, et
    sic demonstratur per hoc Pronomen <u>tu,</u> et alia similia. loc. cit.
    cap. XXII, 18b, n. 2, 3.

61.   loc. cit., 19a, n. 4.

62.   Recordatio est cognitio seu cogitatio actus alicuius
praeteriti ipsius recordantis et hoc inquantum
praeteriti. Op. Ox. IV, dist. XLV, qu. III, n. 5.

63.   De modis significandi, cap. XXII, 19b, n. 6, 7; ibid.
18b, n. 3.

64.   loc. cit., 19b, n. 8.

65.   loc. cit., cap. XXIII, 20a, n. 2.

66.   loc. cit., cap. XXIV, 20a, n. 3.

67.   loc. cit., 20a, b, n. 4, 5, 6.

68.   loc. cit., 20b sq., n. 9.

69.   Werner, Die Sprachlogik des Duns Scotus, op. cit., p. 560.

70.   G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen
Wissenschaften, G. Lasson, publ., Philos. Bibl.
vol. 33 (1911), p. 55f.

71.   Et ut sciamus a qua rei proprietate iste modus signi-
ficandi sumatur, notandum est, quod in rebus invenimus
quasdam proprietates communissimas, sive modos essendi
communissimos, scilicet modum entis et modum esse. Modus
entis est modus habitus et permanentis, rei inhaerens, ex hoc
quod habet essentiam. Modus esse est modus fluxus et suc-
cessionis, rei inhaerens ex hoc quod habet fieri.
Tunc dico, quod modus significandi activus per modum
entis, qui est modus generalissimus Nominis, trahitur
a modo essendi entis, qui est modus habitus et permanentis. Sed
modus significandi activus per modum esse, qui est modus essen-
tialis generalissimus Verbi, trahitur a modo essendi ipsius esse,
qui est modus fluxus et successionis, ut postea patebit. De Modis
Significandi cap. VIII, 5b sq. n. 5, 6.

72.   loc. cit., cap. XXV, 21a, n. 1, 9, 10, 11.

73.   loc. cit., n. 11.

74.   <u>Conf</u>. part one, chapter two,

75.   E. Lask, <u>Die Lehre vom Urteil,</u> 1912, p. 58.
          Rickert writes in his essay on number that we have already men-
tioned several times: The form which the act of judgment ascribes
the content to is to be understood along with the predicate. Ac-
cordingly the subject is just the content that has been informed.
Actually we have the simplest judgment in this primal connection
or "synthesis" of subject and predicate as the connection of
form and content.
          <u>Logos,</u> 1911, p. 48.

76.   Vel dicendum est, quod licet non sit dare ens praeter hoc,
          vel illud: et cum omne quod est, sic hoc vel illud,
quia ens est concretum et significat duo, scilicet rem et esse, et
illud esse non est ens; ideo hoc verbum <u>est</u> significat aliquid
essentialiter distans <u>ab</u> ente.
          Vel aliter, licet in ista propositione significatum Verbi
          non differat essentialiter et secundum rem a significato
suppositi, differt tamen ab eo secundum rationem: et hoc suffi-
cit ad distantiam et diversitatem Verbi a s·pposito, quae sunt
entia secundum rationem; <u>Verbum</u> ergo <u>est pars orationis sig-</u>
<u>nificans per modum esse distantis a substantia.</u> <u>De Modis Signi-</u>
<u>candi</u> cap. XXV, 22b, n. 12, 13.

77.   <u>loc. cit.</u>, 21b, n. 2, 3, 4.

78.   <u>loc. cit.</u>, cap. XXVI, 22a-23b.

79.   loc. cit.; cap. XXVII, 24a, b.
          Compositio est modus significandi mediante quo verbum
          primum et principaliter <u>dependet ad quemlibet supposi-</u>
<u>tum ante se.</u> loc. cit. cap. XXIX, 26a, n. 3.

80.   <u>loc. cit.</u>, cap. XXVIII, 24b sq., n. 2, 3, 4.

81.   <u>loc. cit.</u>, 25b, n. 6.

82.   Item sicut Verbum per modum <u>distantis</u> exigit modum
          per <u>se stantis</u> pro supposito, ita per eundem modum
<u>esse</u> exigit modum <u>entis</u> esse in obliquo. Et sicut Verbum per
modum <u>compositionis</u> exigit modum <u>entis per se stantis</u> in ratione
principii in supposito; sic per modum <u>generis</u> exigit modum

entis per se stantis in ratione termini in obliquo. Item sicut Verbum
per modos proportionales casibus modo Verbi superadditos
exigit in supposito rationem principii, aliter et aliter conjunctam,
et ex consequenti aliud et aliud suppositum; sic etiam Verbum
per modos proportionales casibus generi Verbi superadditos
Verbum exigit in obliquo rationem termini, aliter et aliter
conuunctam: et ex consequenti alium et alium obliquum. loc.
cit. cap. XXX, 27b, n. 11.

83.   loc. cit., cap. XXIX, 26a, n. 3.

84.   Consequenter de Genere fideamus. Genus in verbo sumitur a
        proprietate rei Verbi, quae est proprietas dependen-
tiae rei Verbi post se ad obliquum sub ratione termini non con-
tracti sed contractibilis. Genus ergo in Verbo est modus sig-
nificandi accidentalis Verbi, mediante quo proprietatem depen-
tiae rei Verbi post se ad obliquum sub ratione termini significat.
Et hoc patet per Petrum Heliam, qui diffinit Genus per significa-
tionem accidentalem, sic dicens: Genus est significatio acciden-
talis cum determinatione in o vel in or: dans intelligere per
significationem accidentalem modum significativum transeuntis,
ut dictum est, id est, dependentiae ad quemlibet obliquum post se. Per
terminationem in o vel in or dat intelligere species generis,
quarum diversitas maxime attenditure pene vocis terminationem
secundum Grammaticos, ut patebit. loc. cit. cap. XXX, 26b, n. 1.

85.   loc. cit., 27a, n. 4.

86.   loc. cit., cap. XXXII, 28b sq., n. 3, 4, 6.

87.   Modus significandi essentialis generalissimus Participii
        est modus significandi per modum esse indistantis a
substantia, circa quod notandum quod modus esse in Participio et in
Verbo ab eadem rei proprietate oritur, quae est proprietas
fluxus et successionis; et in hoc modo Participium a Verbo non
discrepat.
        Modus autem indistantis a substantia seu modus uniti
substantiae, sumitur ab eadem rei proprietate in Participio, a
qua sumitur modus adjacentis in Nomine: et compositio in Verbo:
et haec est proprietas inherentis alteri secundum esse. Et non
est inconveniens ab eadem rei proprietate modos significandi
diversos, non oppositos, oriri: cum modi significandi oppositi
in eadem voce possint fundari. Et per hunc modum significandi

Participium a Verbo distinguitur, et per ipsum Participium in
suum suppositum in constructione et in situ collocatur.

Participium ergo est pars orationis significans per
modum esse indistantis a substantia, sive uniti cum substantia
quod idem est. Et dicitur Participium quasi partem Nominis
et quasi partem Verbi capiens non partem essentialem id est
modum essentialem utriusque. Et quidam dicunt, quod Participium
significat per modum entis et per modum esse, quod falsum est:
quia tunc Participium non esset ab utroque distinctum specifice,
quod est inconveniens. Sed pro tanto dicitur Participium capere
partem Nominis et Verbi: quia habet quosdam modos significandi
accidentales modis accidentalibus Nominis et Verbi consimiles,
ut statim apparebit. loc. cit. cap. XXXVI, 32a, b.

88.   loc. cit., cap. XXXVIII, 33a, n. 1-3.

89.   loc. cit., XXXVII, 32b, n. 4-6.

90.   loc. cit., cap. XXXVIII, 33b, n. 3.

91.   Modus significandi essentialis generalissimus Adverbii
         est modus significandi per modum adjacentis alteri per
modum esse, significans ipsum simpliciter, id est: absolute
determinans. Et quia Participium significat per modum esse
sicut Verbum, ideo Adverbium determinat Participium sicut Verbum:
licet Adverbium dicatur Adjectivum Verbi secundum Priscianum.
Hoc est ideo, quia adverbium secundum omnes species eius
determinat Verbum sed non Participium: quia Adverbia deter-
minantia Verba genera compositionis et genera sui modi,
qui est qualitas compositionis, Participia determinare non
possunt, cum Participium compositionem et modum Verbi non
habeat. Et sumitur iste modus determinantis a proprietate
terminantis in re.

         Adverbium ergo est pars orationis significans per modum
         adjacentis alteri, quod per modum esse significat, ipsum
esse absolute determinans.

         Et notandum, quod Adverbium de suo modo significandi
         essentiali generalissimo tantum determinat ea, quae
per modum esse significat: licet de aliquo modo essentiali
speciali et accidentali possit alia determinare, ut patet de
Adverbiis exclusivis, quae sunt tantum modo, solum modo et
huiusmodi; quae propter modum significandi per modum ex-

cludentis possunt determinare omne illud, quod habet se per modum
exclusibilis. loc. cit. cap. XXXIII, 29a, n. 1,2.

92.   loc. cit., n. 2.

Adverbium licet sit adjectivum verbi non tantum habet
modos significandi speciales, quibus ipsi soli verbo
proportionatur. Unde quia habet modos significandi generales,
ideo determinare potest participium, pronomen et ipsum nomen.
Sup. elench. qu. XXXIII, 48a.

93.   Adverbium enim nisi habeat participium vel verbum,
semper est truncata locutio sive incongrua. Op. Ox.
IV, dist. L, qu. VI, n. 10.

94.   De modis significandi, cap. XXXIV, 30a, n. 5: cap.
XXXV, 30a, n. 7.

95.   loc. cit., cap. XXXV, 30b, n. 13.

96.   loc. cit., cap. XXXV, 30b sq., n. 14-19.

97.   Modus significandi essentialis Conjunctionis generalissimus
est modus significandi per modum conjungentis duo
extrema. Et sumitur iste modus significandi a proprietate con-
jungentis et unientis i. bus extra. Conjunctio ergo est pars
orationis per modum conjungentis duo extrema significans.

Sub modo essentiali generalissimo Conjunctionis ad
modos sub alternos per divisionem descendamus.
Dividitur autem iste modus conjungentis duo extrema in modum
conjungentis due extrema per vim et in modum conjungentis duo
extrema per ordinem. Et hos duos modos Donatus appelat
potestates. Et habet se similiter potestas in Conunctione sicut
significatio in Adverbio. Nam sicut significatio in Adverbio
in speciali modo determinandi: sic potestas in Connunctione con-
sistit in speciali modo conjungendi. Et istius modi est modus
conjungendi per vim et per ordinem. Ex hot patet quod potestas
in Connunctione non est modus significandi accidentalis, nisi pro
tanto, quia est extra rationem Conjunctionis simpliciter et absolute
sumptae, ut dictum est de significatione in Adverbio. loc. cit. cap.
XXXIX, 33b sq., n. 5. 6.

98.   loc. cit., cap. XXXIX, 34b, n. 7.

99. loc. cit., cap. XXXIX, 34a, b, n. 8, 9.

100. loc. cit., 34b, n. 19.

101. loc. cit., cap. XLI, XLII, 35a sqq.

102. loc. cit., cap. XLIII, 36b, n. 10.

103. loc. cit., cap. XLIV, 37a sq.

Notes for the Conclusion

1.   Also O. Kuelpe asserts "the distinctness of the validity
        of the categories." Conf. Zur Kategorienlehre,
Sitzungsberichte der kgl. Bayr. Akad. d. Wissensch. philos.-
hist. Klasse, 1915, pp. 46ff. This last and extremely valuable
work of Kuelpe first appeared only after the completion of our
research here. The significance of Kuelpe's treatise and the
general philosophical position that he arrived at before his pre-
mature death entitle his scholar to recognition at least to the
extent that the following thoughts attempt to do so. In any case we
would like to point out that our admiration of this author isn't
dimmed in the least by what we have here.

2.   I hope to show on some other occasion how the mysti-
        cism of Eckhart first gets its philosophical significance
and value for the metaphysic of the problem of truth that is to be
touched on in the context of what is below.

3.   The non-observance of the fundamental meaning of the
        problem of judgment for the foundation of objectivity
is also the reason why Kuelpe didn't -- and couldn't -- succeed in
refuting transcendental idealism in his Realisierung (1912),
equally not in the work already named, Zur Kategorienlehre.
Kuelpe makes use of the argument that transcendental idealism
consciously moved into the focal point of the problem. Directly
at that crucial point he rejects as not admissible for critical
realism the designation "copy theory" and emphasizes that:
            the objects of the real world, which are to be represented
            and determined (sic) in cognition, are not existing
elements in perception that can be encountered, are not simply
given in consciousness, but they are only to be conceived of by
a process of cognition, especially by scientific research. (italics
by the author; Zur Kategorienlehre, p. 42)
            If critical realism can be brought to take account
            mainly of judgment in treating of the problem of cog-
nition and also succeed, as transcendental realism does, in
incorporating into its fundamental position the principle of the
material determination of the form, then it has to arrive at a higher
point of convergence for these two "directions" that are at
present most significant and productive for the theory of cognition.

4.   Conf. Kuelpe, op. cit., p. 52. At the present time H.
Rickert especially has brought to notice by his "object
of cognition" the necessity of this co-relation of the logical subject
which judges. The first division on the "judging consciousness in
general" as well as of the "indubitable yes" (op. cit. 318ff and
334ff) has to be postponed until we have available to us the neces-
sary common foundations for the theory of value which is in the
process of development. Similarly, E. Husserl's valuable
assessments of "pure consciousness" (Ideen p. 141ff) fit in here.
They give a decisive look into the realm of "consciousness" and
destroy the oft-repeated opinion that consciousness in general is
empty.

5.   The author hopes to be able in the very near future to
present some major assessments on being, value and
negation in a more extensive work.

6.   Unfortunately, Kuelpe has never inquired into Lask's
Lehre vom Urteil as regards this problem -- or any
other for that matter. I feel it necessary to still give Lask's
investigation more importance for the theory of the categories than
the "logic of philosophy." (This becomes understandable in view
of Kuelpe's overall preference for "objective logic.") This book
on judgment is extraordinarily rich in fruitful perspectives. This
is why it has to be even more regretted that it is no longer pos-
sible for Kuelpe with his exemplary and noble manner of exposition
to compare his view with that of Lask in the technical circles on
what I think is the all decisive problem, that of judgment. And
that which Lask wrote in his last work holds for Kuelpe too:
        Certainly this highly gifted researcher would not
        have evaded this consequence of his penetrating
reasoning (on the problem of formal differentiation, the author)
in the further course of his development if he had not been taken
from us all too early by a harsh fate. Zur Kategorienlehre, p.
26, note 2.

7.   Conf. above.

8.   The concept of the philosophia perennis can be analyzed
and assessed at this point scientifically. This has not
been done even today in a satisfactory manner. The problem that
is closely connected with what has been said of a consideration of

Catholic theology from a scientific standpoint hasn't even been
caught sight of today, not to mention an attempt at solution of
the problem by what has been in fact the foundation of a manner
of treating logic which is all too traditional and blind to problems.
Geyser has undertaken the first by and large conscious re-
orientations in this area in his Grundlagen der Logik und
Erkenntnislehre (1909) which was mentioned earlier.
(Conf. my article "Neuere Forschungen zur Logik" in the
Literarische Rundschau, J. Sauer ed., XXXVIII (1912),
number 11, p. 522ff.

The following is a review by Heidegger in the Kantstudien

(21) Berlin, 1917, pp 467-8:

> Dr. Martin Heidegger, associate professor at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau, Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning, J.S.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tuebingen 1916 (IV and 245 pp.)

The historical problematics investigated here has ultimately a systematic purpose: the theory of categories, whose principal foundation and organic structure have become one of the clearly recognized tasks of philosophy today. In being an investigation into historical problematics, it took for its object the philosophy of the scholastic Duns Scotus in order to attain a deeper understanding of one of the examples of medieval-scholastic thought -- one that is most accomplished and profound -- and of this thought itself as regards the problematics of the categories and of logic in general. Thus, access is gained to the common valuation of medieval scholasticism and its logic. For this reason, the main stress in the first part of the work (the theory of the categories) is on fulfilling the basic requirement for any treatment of the problem of the categories: the delimitation of the different domains within the realm of the objective in general. First, the most generally common objective determinations and then the individual domains (logical, mathematical, physical, psychical, and metaphysical reality) had to be subjected to

explanatory characterization. The second part (the theory of meaning) presented the possibility of elaborating in detail a specific sphere, that of meanings, and thus of working out the main theses on act and the sense of act in acts of meaning and cognition, further the fundatmental forms of meaning in general (the "categories of meaning") in their relationships. The conclusion attempts to make some preliminary conclusions on the structure of the problem of the categories and on the possible way of solving it.