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CONTINENTAL
THOUGHT

Martin Heidegger
BASIC CONCEPTS
OF ARISTOTELIAN
PHILOSOPHY

TRANSLATED BY

Robert D. Metcalf AND Mark B. Tanzer



Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

Studies in Continental Thought

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Martin Heidegger

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Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer

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Translators' Preface

Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy is a translation of a lecture course given by Martin Heidegger at the University of Marburg in the summer semester of 1924. The original German text, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, appeared in 2002 as volume 18 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*. The lecture course took place during Heidegger's first year at Marburg, and three years before the publication of *Being and Time*.

During his years at Marburg, Heidegger's courses typically examined historical figures in the context of the main issues treated in *Being and Time*, issues such as the meaning of being, the understanding of being, temporality, and the adequacy of phenomenology as a way of addressing these problems. Heidegger's Marburg lectures, then, are particularly instructive for the student of *Being and Time* insofar as they show how the key concepts of Heidegger's groundbreaking work were developed as critical, phenomenologically determined interpretations of familiar philosophical notions that were introduced and elaborated by such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl. In this way, Heidegger situates his own thought within the trajectory of the history of philosophy and its well-known problems, thereby giving his audience many possible points of entry into Heideggerian philosophy.

In our lecture course, the point of entry is Aristotle, as Heidegger continues his pursuit, already begun in the 1922 essay "Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle (Indications of the Hermeneutical Situation)," of the Aristotelian roots of *Being and Time*'s conception of Dasein. Here, the analysis centers on being-in-the-world as speaking-with-one-another, yielding characteristically Heideggerian interpretations of such Aristotelian notions as λόγος, οὐσία, ἐντελέχεια, ἐνέργεια, and κίνησις.

Heidegger's innovative translations of these and other Aristotelian concepts into German provide a challenging model for an English translation of this lecture course. For example, on ἐνέργεια, Heidegger says that the German word *Wirklichkeit* would be an excellent translation if it weren't so worn out as a term. The same could be said about the customary English renderings of so many of Heidegger's key concepts. The challenge for the translator is to be faithful to the thinking at play in Heidegger's text: to render his German into English in a way that will live up to the demands of his thinking. This is not an easy challenge to meet.

With respect to some of Heidegger's concepts, it would almost be preferable to leave them untranslated, particularly concepts familiar to readers of *Being and Time*, such as Dasein and Das Man. We, however, decided to translate these and other Heideggerian concepts and in such a way as to be responsive to the thinking which calls for them in the text. For example, Heidegger

introduces the concept of *Das Man* by arguing that rather than saying “I am [ich bin],” it would be more appropriate to say “I am one [ich bin man],” since this One [dieses Man] is the genuine how of everydayness: “one is,” “one sees things this way or that way.” Accordingly, we have translated *Das Man* as “The One” to capture Heidegger’s thought of this undifferentiated how of everydayness.

On *Dasein*, which is central to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle throughout this text, we have decided to translate it as “being-there,” and as “being there” for those less frequent instances when Heidegger hyphenates it as *Da-sein*. The importance of translating *Dasein* in this literal fashion is that so often in this text, Heidegger is focusing the reader’s attention on the “there” [Da] to unpack basic Aristotelian concepts. To give but one example of this, Heidegger writes: “in [θεωρεῖν] being-there reaches its end in such a way that it is transposed into its most genuine possession, into its ownmost there, as θεωρεῖν constitutes the most genuine ἐντελέχεια of the being of human beings.” Thus, it was for the sake of making the there-character of *Dasein* salient throughout that we decided to translate it as being-there.

Along the way we benefited a great deal from the help on translation issues offered by William McNeill, Rodolphe Gasché, and Steven Fowler. Furthermore, we were blessed with an excellent assistant, Seth Christensen, to help us with various technical matters we encountered along the way. This translation is a better finished product thanks to their various contributions.

Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer

Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

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I.

The Text of the Lecture on the Basis
of Student Writings

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INTRODUCTION

The Philological Purpose of the Lecture and Its Presuppositions

§1. The Philological Purpose of the Lecture: Consideration of Some Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy in Their Conceptuality

The purpose of this lecture is to gain an understanding of *some basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy*, specifically through an engagement with the *text* of the Aristotelian treatises.

Basic concepts--not all, but *some*, and so presumably the *primary matters* with which Aristotelian research is occupied. As for the *selection* of these basic concepts, we are in a favorable position since a treatise has come down to us from Aristotle himself that consists simply of definitions of these basic concepts: the treatise has come down to us as Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*. Still, we cannot depend on this favorable situation as we are not in a position to understand Aristotle in the way that his students did.

The following enumeration is given in order to provide a preliminary grasp of the basic concepts treated in Book 5. The first chapter concerns ἀρχή. The second chapter treats of αἴτιον, and the third of στοιχεῖον, or “element.” The fourth chapter deals with φύσις, the fifth with ἀναγκαῖον, or “necessity” as a determination of being; and the sixth with ἔν, the seventh with ὄν, and the eighth with οὐσία, or “being-there.” The ninth chapter is concerned with ταῦτά, or “sameness,” and the tenth with ἀντικείμενα, or “being-other.” The eleventh chapter treats of πρότερα and ὕστερα, not only in a temporal sense but also in a concrete sense--the concrete πρότερον being that which goes back to the “origin” (γένος), and the concrete ὕστερον being “that which is added on later,” for example, συμβεβηκός. The twelfth chapter concerns δύναμις, the thirteenth concerns ποσόν or “how many,” the category of “quantity,” and the fourteenth concerns ποιόν, the category of “quality.” The fifteenth chapter deals with πρὸς τι, “modes of relation,” and the sixteenth with τέλειον, “completedness,” that which determines beings as “the completed” in their “being-completed.” The issue in chapter 17 is πέρας, while that of chapter 18 is τὸ καθό, or “the in-itself.” Chapter 19 treats of διάθεσις, “position,” “occasion”; and chapter 20 treats of ἔξις, “having-in-itself,” or “being positioned thus and so” toward something. Chapter 21 is concerned with πάθος, “condition,” “disposition,” and chapter 22 with στερήσις, the determination of a being that is fulfilled by what the being does not have. This στερήσις, “not-having,” determines a be-

ing in a fully positive manner; that it is not thus and so, is constitutive of its being. Chapter 23 deals with ἔχειν, and chapter 24 with ἐκ τινος εἶναι, or “that from which something arises or of which it consists.” Chapter 25 is concerned with μέρος, “part” in the sense of aspect, chapter twenty-six with ὅλον, the “whole,” chapter 27 with κολοβόν, “the mutilated,” and chapter 28 with γένος, “lineage,” “descent.” Chapter 29 concerns ψεῦδος, and chapter 30 concerns συμβεβηκός, that “which is added on to something,” that “along with which something is.”¹

We must see the *ground* out of which these basic concepts have arisen, as well as *how* they have so arisen. That is, the basic concepts will be considered in their *specific conceptuality* so that we may ask *how the matters themselves meant by these basic concepts are viewed, in what context they are addressed, in which particular mode they are determined*. If we approach the matter from this point of view, we will arrive at the realm of what is meant by concept and conceptuality. The basic concepts are to be understood with regard to their conceptuality, specifically, with the purpose of *gaining insight into the fundamental exigencies of scientific research*. Here, we offer *no philosophy*, much less a history of philosophy. If *philology* means the *passion for knowledge of what has been expressed*, then what we are doing is philology.

As for *Aristotle*, his philosophy, and its development, you will find everything you need in the book of the classical philologist *Jaeger*.² In this work, Jaeger distinguishes himself by claiming that Aristotle’s writings are not books, but rather summaries of treatises that Aristotle did not publish but only conveyed as lectures. (Jaeger’s interpretation has been known for quite some time, since it was explicitly articulated in an earlier work on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.)³ Thus, from now on, any attempt to treat the fourteen treatises of the *Metaphysics* as a single work and to see in them a unified presentation of the Aristotelian “system” must be curtailed. Regarding the personality of a philosopher, our only interest is that he was born at a certain time, that he worked, and that he died. The character of the philosopher, and issues of that sort, will not be addressed here.⁴

§2. *The Presuppositions of the Philological Purpose: Demarcation of the Manner in Which Philosophy Is Treated*

The lecture has no philosophical aim at all; it is concerned with understanding basic concepts in their conceptuality. The aim is *philological* in that it intends

1. Aristotelis *Metaphysica*. Recognovit W. Christ. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1886. Δ 1–30, 1012 b 34 sqq.

2. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*. Berlin 1923.

3. W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*. Berlin 1912, p. 131 ff.

4. See Hs. p. 333.

to bring the *reading* of philosophers somewhat more into practice. Such a purpose naturally brings with it a number of *presuppositions*. But it is questionable whether one can really get into presuppositions of this sort in a lecture.

1. Presupposition: that *Aristotle* in particular actually has something to say; that for this reason it is precisely Aristotle and not *Plato*, *Kant*, or *Hegel* who is selected; that to him there belongs a distinctive position not only within Greek philosophy, but within Western philosophy as a whole.

2. That we are not yet so advanced that there is not something about which we would have to admit that *we are wrong in some respect*.

3. That *conceptuality* constitutes *the substance of all scientific research*; that conceptuality is not a matter of intellectual acumen, but rather, that *he who has chosen science has accepted responsibility for the concept* (something that is missing today).

4. *Science* is not an occupation, not a business, not a diversion, but is rather the *possibility of the existence of human beings*, and not something into which one happens by chance. Rather, it carries within itself definite presuppositions that anyone who seriously moves in the circle of scientific research has to bring along with him.

5. Human life has in itself the *possibility of relying on oneself alone*, of managing without faith, without religion, and so on.

6. A *methodological* presupposition: *faith in history* in the sense that we presuppose that *history and the historical past have the possibility, insofar as the way is made clear for it, of giving a jolt to the present or, better put, to the future*.

The six presuppositions are very demanding even though we are only pursuing philology. *Philosophy* is better situated today insofar as it operates outside of the basic presupposition that everything is just as it should be. For the demarcation of the manner and mode in which we are treating philosophy here, I would like to call Aristotle himself as witness. We are indeed providing a treatment of philosophy, but for the purpose of implanting the *instinct for what is self-evident* and the *instinct for what is ancient*.

Aristotle makes a distinction in *Metaphysics* Book 4, Chapter 2 between *διαλεκτική*, *σοφιστική*, and *φιλοσοφία*.⁵ He says: “σοφιστική and διαλεκτική are concerned with the same issues as is φιλοσοφία,”⁶ but φιλοσοφία distinguishes itself from both of them in its way of approaching these issues, namely, in the way it deals with the same object. It differs from διαλεκτική “in the mode of the possibility”⁷ to which it lays claim. “Διαλεκτική makes a mere attempt”⁸ to ascertain that which could be meant by the λόγοι, a διαπορεύεσθαι

5. Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 17 sqq.

6. Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 22 sq.: περί μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ.

7. Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 24: τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως.

8. Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 25: ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ.

τοὺς λόγους,⁹ as *Plato* says, a “running through” of that which could perhaps be meant. That is the sense of Greek dialectic. The δύναμις of διαλεκτική is, in contrast to philosophy, a limited one. Still, διαλεκτική is geared toward the matter, toward the laying out of that which is meant; as σοφιστική speaks about the same matter, “it appears” to be philosophy “but it is not.”¹⁰ Indeed διαλεκτική is serious, but it is only the seriousness of an attempted investigation of what ultimately could be meant. In this sense, we are treating of philosophy *in the mode of investigating what ultimately could be meant*. What is decisive is that we come to a preliminary understanding of that which is meant by philosophy.¹¹

9. Cf. *Plato*, *Sophist* 253 b 10.

10. *Met.* Γ 2, 1004 b 26: φαινομένη, οὔσα δ’ οὐ.

11. See Hs. p. 333 f.

FIRST PART

**PRELIMINARY UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE
INDIGENOUS CHARACTER OF CONCEPTUALITY
BY WAY OF AN EXPLICATION OF
BEING-THERE AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD:
AN ORIENTATION TOWARD
ARISTOTELIAN BASIC CONCEPTS**

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CHAPTER ONE

Consideration of Definition as the Place of the Explicability of the Concept and the Return to the Ground of Definition

§3. *The Determination of the Concept through the Doctrine of Definition in Kant's Logic.*

“Logic” answers the question: what is meant by *concept*? There is no “logic” in the sense that one speaks of it simply as “logic.” “Logic” is an outgrowth of Hellenistic scholasticism, which adapted the philosophical research of the past in a scholastic manner. Neither Plato nor Aristotle knew of “logic.” Logic, as it prevailed in the Middle Ages, may be defined as a matter of concepts and rules, scholastically compiled. “Logical problems” emerge from the horizon of a scholastic imparting of issues; its interest lies not in a confrontation with things, but rather with the imparting of definite technical possibilities.

In this logic, one speaks of *definition* as the *means by which the concept undergoes determination*. We will, therefore, be able to see, in the consideration of definition, what one properly means by concept and conceptuality. We wish to keep to the *Kantian Logic* in order to see what is said about definition in the context of actual research, that is, in the only one since Aristotle. *Kant* is the only one who lets logic become vital. This logic operates in its entirely traditional form afterward in the *Hegelian* dialectic, which in a completely uncreative way merely adapts traditional logical materials in definite respects.

When we consult Kant's characterization of definition, we are struck by the fact that definition is treated in the chapter entitled “General Doctrine of Method.”¹ Definition is a *methodological* issue, designed to lend precision to knowledge. It is treated as the means for conveying the “precision of concepts with regard to their content.”² Through definition the *precision of concepts* is conveyed. However, definition is, at the same time, a concept: “The definition alone is [. . .] a logically complete concept.”³ Therefore, we do not discover,

1. *Vorlesungen Kants über Logik*, edited by A. Buchenau, in Immanuel Kant's *Werke*, edited by E. Cassirer, Volume VIII, Berlin 1923, II. *Allgemeine Methodenlehre*, §§99–109, pp. 323–452.

2. A. a. O., §98.

3. A. a. O., §99 note.

fundamentally, what a concept is without going beyond the definition, and so we must take up what Kant himself says about the concept.

Every *intuition*, he says, is a representatio singularis.⁴ The *concept*, however, is also a representatio, a “self-presenting,” but, in this case, a representatio per notas communes.⁵ The concept is distinguished from intuition by the fact that, as a *presenting*, it presents something that has the character of *generality*. It is a “general representation.”⁶

To better understand this, Kant quite clearly says, in the introduction to the *Logic* that in every cognition, *matter* is to be distinguished from *form*, “the manner in which we cognize the object.”⁷ A savage sees a house and, unlike us, does not know its for-what; he has a different “concept” of the house than we who know our way around in it. Indeed, he sees the same being, but the knowledge of the *use* escapes him; he does not understand what he should do with it. He forms no concept of house.⁸ We know *what* it is *for*; and thus we represent something general to ourselves. We who know the use that one could make of it have the concept of house. The concept goes beyond answering the question of *what* the object is.

The conceptuality and the sense of the concept depend on how one understands, in general, the question concerning *what* something is, where this question originates. The concept yields *what* the object, the res, is in the explicitness of the definition. Therefore the genuine definition is the so-called “real definition,” which thus determines *what* the res in itself is.⁹ Definitio is fulfilled through the specification of differences in genus and species. At first glance, this procedure seems odd in this context; one does not immediately understand why in particular the genus and the species should determine the object in its What. It is noteworthy that Kant now says that, to be sure, the real definition has the task of determining the What of the matter from the “first ground” of its “possibility,” or of determining the matter according to its “inner possibility.”¹⁰ But the determination of the definition, as occurring through genus proximum et differentiam specificam, only counts for the “nominal definition” that is generated by comparison.¹¹ And precisely in the case of the definition of the res, this way of determining does not come into play.

For *Kant’s position*, the two characteristic aspects are (1) that the definitio is *discussed in the doctrine of method* and (2) that he determines the basic procedure of the definitio in such a way that it *does not come into play for genuine definition*.

4. A.a.O., I. *Allgemeine Elementarlehre*, §1.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. A.a.O., Einleitung, S. 350.

8. Cf. a.a.O., S. 351.

9. A.a.O., II. *Allgemeine Methodenlehre*, §106.

10. A.a.O., §106 Anm. 2.

11. A.a.O., §106 Anm. 1.

We will inquire back so as to ask ourselves the following: How does it really come about that the definitio determines *the being in its being*? How does it come about that a definitio, which is genuine *knowledge of the matter*, becomes a matter of *logical perfection*? In this, Kant's position on definitio, lies the fate of Aristotelian research.

We therefore inquire back: definitio is ορισμός, ορισμός is a λόγος, a “self-expression” about being-there as being. Ορισμός is not a way of apprehending through sharp determination, but rather the specific character of ορισμός ultimately arises from the fact that the being itself is determined in its being as circumscribed by the πέρας. Being means being-completed.¹²

§4. *The Aspects of the Conceptuality of Aristotle's Basic Concepts and the Question Concerning Their Indigenous Character*

What authorized the return to definition was the fact that, according to traditional logic, the concept is expressed in the genuine sense through definition, that in the definition the concept comes to itself. The concept is, for Kant, distinguished from intuition insofar as intuition simply sees an individual in its being-there, while the concept sees the same object but, so to speak, understands it. In the representatio of the concept, I know what one understands by it, and another also knows. That is, the concept makes the represented intelligible for others too, and thus it is a general representation. The concept of a represented res makes the represented matter intelligible to others also; it represents the matter with a certain bindingness. In the definition, the concept is to come to itself. The definition should yield a matter in such a way that it is represented and understood in the ground of its possibility, that I know whence it comes, what it is, why it is that. The genuine definition is that of the matter, the real definition. In the Middle Ages, genuine definition is the real and essential definition. It is genuine and is accomplished insofar as the basic procedure of definition is satisfied, insofar as one specifies the penultimate type or genus of an object, as well as its specific difference. Thus, for example, a circle is a closed, curved line (genus), on which every point is equidistant from the center (specific difference). Or, homo animal (genus) rationale (specific difference).

We go back to Aristotle in order to show that what, in traditional logic, is treated as definitio has a *fully determinate origin*, that definition is a symptom of decline, a mere thought technique that was once the *basic possibility of human speech*. In the definition, the concept becomes explicit. Still, what the concept itself is in its conceptuality is not yet visible. We do not want to merely become acquainted with Aristotelian basic concepts, a mere acquaintance which would lead us to ask such questions as: What did Aristotle mean

12. See Hs. p. 335 ff.

by movement? What view of movement did he hold as opposed to the Platonic or modern conceptions? Rather, this concept interests us in its conceptuality.

1. We must, therefore, ask what is meant by the concept of movement, in the sense of that which is *concretely experienced* in the concept as it is meant. What did Aristotle have in mind when he thought of movement? Which moving phenomena did he have in view? Which sense of being did he mean in speaking of a moving being? We do not ask these questions with the aim of gaining knowledge of a conceptual content, but rather we ask how the matter meant is experienced, and, therefore, how:

2. That which is originally seen is *primarily addressed*. How does Aristotle take the phenomenon of movement? Does he clarify movement by way of concepts or theories that are already available, and that, perhaps Platonistically, lead him to say that movement is a transition from a nonbeing to a being? Or is it that those determinations that arise for him lie in the phenomenon itself? In what way is a phenomenon like movement addressed so as to accord with the *guiding claim* of the matter seen?

3. How is the phenomenon thus seen *unfolded more precisely*; into what sort of conceptuality is it, as it were, spoken? What *claim of intelligibility* is demanded of that which is thus seen? This leads to the question concerning the *originality of the explication*: Is the explication proposed to the phenomenon, or is it measured by the phenomenon?

These three aspects *point to* conceptuality without exhausting it, (1) therefore the *basic experience* in which I make the *concrete character* accessible to myself. This basic experience is primarily not theoretical, but instead lies in the commerce of life with its world, (2) the *guiding claim*, and (3) the specific character of intelligibility, the specific *tendency toward intelligibility*.

We will interrogate Aristotle's basic concepts from these three points of view. We will see whether the matters meant by these basic concepts are thereby genuinely understood. The purpose of focusing on conceptuality is to *notice* that in conceptuality what constitutes the *fulfillment of the questioning and determining* of all scientific research is set in motion. It is not a matter of cognizance but of *understanding*. You have a genuine task to carry out: not of philosophizing but rather of becoming *attentive*, from where you are situated, to the conceptuality of a science, to really come *to grips* with it, and to pursue it in such a way that the *research fulfillment* of conceptuality becomes *vital*. It is not a matter of studying all of the scientific theories that periodically appear! By paying attention to the proper fulfillment of a specific science, you attain *a legitimate, proper, and serious relation to the matter of your science*. Not in such a way that you can apply Aristotelian concepts, but rather in doing for your science what Aristotle did in his place and in the context of his research, namely, *to see and to determine the matters with the same originality and legitimacy*. I simply have the task of providing the opportunity for Aristotle to put the matter before you.

Thus if we interrogate Aristotle's basic concepts according to their con-

ceptuality, it is necessary that we understand how this conceptuality holds the aforementioned aspects together, where they genuinely belong; where basic experience, claim, and tendency toward intelligibility are *indigenous*. We will have to seek out the *indigenous character* of conceptuality—for we want to understand not just any basic concepts, but *Aristotle's*. We will have to consult the way that *Greek* conceptuality and its indigenous character look. Only then can we securely pursue the scientific explication as Aristotle conducted it.¹³

§5. Return to the Ground of Definition

By going back to what definition originally was, we might also learn what it originally was that one today designates as concept.

a) The Predicables

Genus and *species* are characteristics that determine every definition. However, they are not the only determining factors. These factors include the further moment of *proprium* and of *differentia specifica* as such. These aspects, which guide concept-formation, are called *predicables* or κατηγορήματα. These κατηγορήματα were systematically treated for the first time by *Porphiry* in his introduction to Aristotle's Κατηγορίαι. This Εισαγωγή was then translated into Latin by *Boethius* and became the basic text on logical questions in the Middle Ages. The so-called *controversy over universals* of the Middle Ages developed in connection with this Εισαγωγή. There are five predicables:

1. Genus est unum, quod de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quid est praedicatur. “Curved, closed line”—the genus of the circle—is predicated of many things that are distinct in species (ellipse). Still, the predicate captures what the circle in itself is.

2. Species est unum, quod de pluribus solo numero differentibus in eo quod quid est praedicatur. The individual circle solo numero differunt.

3. Differentia specifica aut διαφορά est unum, quod de pluribus praedicatur in quale essenziale, “with respect to that which belongs to what they are,” such as the rationality of the human being.

4. Proprium est unum, quod de pluribus praedicatur in quale necessarium, a “necessary” determination that belongs to the thing, but also lies outside of the essential context of genus and species.

5. Accidens est unum, quod de pluribus praedicatur in quale contingens, insofar as that which is addressed is “haphazard” (συμβεβηκός).¹⁴

These praedicabilia are also called *universalia*. The precise distinction con-

13. See Hs. p. 337 ff.

14. Cf. Porphyrii Introductio in Aristotelis Categorias a Boethio translata. In: Commentaria In Aristotelem Graeca. Editum consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae. Voluminis IV pars I. Berlin 1887. pp. 23–51, here pp. 26–39.

sists in the fact that universale means: unum quod *est* in pluribus, as opposed to praedicabile: unum quod de pluribus *praedicatur*. Hence the question of whether the general actually exists in the things or is only the generality of apprehending thought (Realism—Nominalism). This question also has its origin in determinate concrete contexts of Greek philosophy, or better in scholastic misunderstandings thereof.

b) The Aristotelian Determination of ὀρισμός as λόγος οὐσίας

We are now investigating conceptuality and its indigenous character by going back from definitio as technical instrument to ὀρισμός, “limitation.” ὀρισμός is a λόγος, a “speaking” about something, an addressing of the matter “itself in that which it is,” καθ’ αὐτό.¹⁵ Α λέγειν καθ’ αὐτό: the matter “in itself,” and only it, is and should be addressed. Thus the ὀρισμός is determined as οὐσίας τις γνωρισμός.¹⁶ Γνωρισμός means: “making known with . . . ,” “making familiar with . . . ,” presenting a matter. ὀρισμός is making one familiar with a being in its being. What does λόγος οὐσίας say? (1) λόγος, (2) οὐσία?

Λόγος: “speaking,” not in the sense of uttering a sound but speaking *about something* in a way that *exhibits the about-which* of speaking by showing that which is spoken about. The genuine function of the λόγος is the ἀποφαίνεσθαι, the “bringing of a matter to sight.” Every speaking is, above all for the Greeks, a speaking *to someone* or *with others, with oneself* or *to oneself*. Speaking is in concrete being-there, where one does not exist alone, speaking *with others about something*. Speaking with others about something is, in each case, a *speaking out of oneself*. In speaking about something with others, I express myself (*spreche ich mich aus*), whether explicitly or not.

What is this λόγος? It is the *fundamental determination of the being of the human being as such*. The human being is seen by the Greeks as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον, not only philosophically but in concrete living: “a living thing that (as living) has language.” This definition should not be thought in biological, psychological, social-scientific, or any such terms. This determination lies before such distinctions. Ζωή is a *concept of being*; “life” refers to a *mode of being*, indeed a mode of *being-in-a-world*. A living thing is not simply at hand (*vorhanden*), but is in a world in that it has its world. An animal is not simply moving down the road, pushed along by some mechanism. It is in the world in the sense of having it. *The being-in-the-world of the human being is determined in its ground through speaking*. The fundamental mode of being in which the human being is in its world is in speaking with it, about it, of it. Thus is the human being determined precisely through the λόγος, and in this

15. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 22: οὗ ὁ λόγος ὀρισμός. H 1, 1042 a 17: τούτου δὲ λόγος ὁ ὀρισμός.

16. Aristotelis Organon Graece. Novis codicum auxiliis adiutus recognovit, scholiis ineditis et commentario instruxit Th. Waitz. Pars posterior: Analytica posteriora, Topica.

Lipsiae 1846. An. post. B 3, 90 b 16.

way you can see where, if definition is a λόγος, the matter of definition has its ground insofar as λόγος is the basic determination of the being of the human being. The λόγος as ὀρισμός addresses beings in their οὐσία, in their being-there. Therefore, we must gain an understanding of οὐσία.¹⁷

§6. Preliminary Clarification of λόγος

The conceptuality meant in the basic concepts is a concretely giving basic experience, not a theoretical grasping of the matter. That which is so experienced is addressed to something. What is thus experienced and posited in this regard becomes explicit and becomes vital in the address. What is the concretely giving basic experience, and in what regard is it addressed? We must recover the indigenous character as it became vital in Greek science. In the definition, the concept becomes explicit; it comes to light. Definition: proximate genus and specific difference. We want to understand what definition means by questioning back to what it meant for the Greeks, for Aristotle. Ὄρισμός: “circumscription,” “delimitation.” Ὄρισμός: λόγος οὐσίας. What is meant by λόγος, by οὐσία, by λόγος οὐσίας? By clarifying that, we will find the indigenous character of the concept.

In traditional scholastic language, concepts are (1) notio, (2) intentio, (3) conceptus, (4) species.

Ad 1. notio: In the concept lies a definite “acquaintance” with the matter meant by it, that is, the concept is transposed within a being-acquainted.

Ad 2. intentio: In the concept lies an “aiming” at, an intending of something. Intending a matter is an essential structural aspect of the concept (“matter” always used generally in the sense of a mere something).

Ad 3. conceptus: The “grasping.” The matter is not only intended, not only something with which one is acquainted; one does not only know about it. Rather, one intends it and is acquainted with it in the mode of its being-grasped, so that what lies in it is embraced, gathered.

Ad 4. species: εἶδος, “look”; this leads back to notio. If I am acquainted with the matter, I know how it looks, how it appears as such among others.

These designations have acquired a customary meaning in their scholastic application, so that they are uniformly translated as “concept.”

Definition should be viewed with regard to its origin: λόγος οὐσίας. Λόγος, for the Greeks, is the “speaking” and at the same time the “spoken”—speaking in the basic function of ἀποφαίνεσθαι or δηλοῦν, “a bringing-a-matter-to-self-showing” in *speaking about something*. This speaking about something is its tendency toward *speaking with others, self-expressing*. In speaking with others and with myself, I bring what is addressed to givenness for me in such a way

17. See Hs. p. 340 f.

that I experience, in speaking, how the matter looks. Speaking is not a mere occurrence that occasionally takes place. This speaking about something with others is at the same time a self-expressing. These are inseparable structural aspects of the λόγος. Later we will have to consider this structure in order to show where that which is designated as speaking has its genuine home.

The expressed “lies fixed,” is a κείμενον. The κείμενα ὀνόματα, precisely as κείμενα, as “fixed,” are available to others; they are κοινά, they belong to each.¹⁸ When a word is expressed, it no longer belongs to me, and thus language is something that belongs to everyone; specifically, in such a way that a fundamental possibility of life itself is vitally given in precisely this common possession. Often the expressed is still only spoken—consumed in mere words without an explicit relationship to the matters spoken about. Therein lies an intelligibility that is common to all. In growing into a language, I grow into an intelligibility of the world, of language, that I have from out of myself insofar as I live in language. A *common intelligibility* is given, which has a peculiar character of *averageness*. It no longer has the character of belonging to an individual. It is worn out, used, used up. Everything expressed harbors the possibility of being used up, of being shoved into the common intelligibility.

This speaking, then, that I have comprehensively determined here, is utilized by the Greeks in order to determine the being of the human being itself in its peculiarity, and not only in the explicit consideration of the life and the being-there of humanity as they are put forward in philosophy, but also in the natural view of them. The human being is determined as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον, a “living being,” though not in accordance with the modern biological concept. Life is a *how*, a *category of being*, and not something wild, profound, and mystical. It is characteristic of the “philosophy of life” that it never goes so far as to inquire into what is genuinely meant by the concept “life” as a category of being. Life is a being-in-a-world. Animals and humans are not at hand next to one another, but are with one another; and (in the case of humans) they express themselves reciprocally. Self-expressing as speaking about . . . is the *basic mode of the being of life*, namely, of being-in-a-world. Where there is no speaking, where speaking stops, where the living being no longer speaks, we speak of “death.” The being of life is to be generally understood, in its ultimate ground, through this basic possibility of life. Speaking, then, refers to the being-context of the life of a specific way of being.

Ἐχον is to be understood in the determination ζῶον λόγον ἔχον in a fully fundamental sense. Ἐχειν is determined in Book Δ, Chapter 23 of the *Metaphysics* as ἄγειν, “to conduct” a matter, to be in a way because of a “drive” that originates from this way of being.¹⁹ Language is possessed, is spoken, in such a way that speaking belongs to the genuine drive of being of the human being. Living, for the human being, means speaking. Thus this preliminary clarifica-

18. Met. Z 15, 1040 a 11: τὰ δὲ κείμενα κοινὰ πάνσιν.

19. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 8 sq.: τὸ ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὁρμήν.

tion of λόγος refers to a being-context that is preliminarily described as the life of the human being.²⁰

§7. Οὐσία as the Basic Concept of Aristotelian Philosophy

The basic function of λόγος is the bringing-to-self-showing of beings in their being, of οὐσία as the “being” of beings or as “beingness.” By this is meant that the being of a being itself has determining aspects, and so something can still be discovered about the being in the how of its being. But οὐσία, as the “being in the how of its being,” is itself ambiguous in Aristotle; it has various meanings. At the same time, οὐσία is the title of the concrete context that constitutes the topic of Aristotle’s fundamental research. Οὐσία is the expression for the *basic concept of Aristotelian philosophy*. On the basis of οὐσία, we will come to know not only what the ὀρισμός is, but we will also acquire a ground *on* which to place other basic concepts.

a) The Various Types of Conceptual Ambiguity and the Coming to Be of Terms

Οὐσία is *ambiguous* for Aristotle. That could immediately interrupt the application of the expression since an *ambiguity* in the basic concept of research poses a danger. But not every ambiguity is of the same type. There are the following types.

1. Ambiguity of *confusion* arises when a word is being used in a certain way but still has various meanings that are already clarified, and these meanings are conflated through a lack of knowledge of the matter at issue. The ambiguity of confusion sets in subsequently and obscures that which came to light in explicit research.

2. Ambiguity can be, and can arise from, an inability to see certain concrete contexts in terms of their possible differences, from an *insensitivity to difference* in conceptual apprehension and determination.

3. Ambiguity can be the index for the fact that the scope of a word in its ambiguity arises from a *legitimate relation to*, a *legitimate familiarity with*, *the matter*; that the multifariousness of meaning is *demanded by the matter*; an *articulated manifoldness of distinct meanings*; that the matter is such that it demands, *from out of itself*, the same expression but with various meanings.

Thus is the situation for Aristotle—for example, in Book Δ of the *Metaphysics*. The fact that Aristotle is not concerned with removing this ambiguity, by leveling it out through some fanciful systematization, shows his *instinct for the matter*. He lets the meaning stand in the face of the matters.

Consequently, multifariousness of meaning is an index of variation. It is advisable not to mistake one’s own confusion for the multifariousness of

20. See Hs. p. 341 f.

meaning in Aristotle. One must see whether the ambiguity in fact comes from the matters.

Ὀὐσία belongs among these ambiguous basic concepts. Thus we will examine that from which its various meanings take their bearings. I already said that οὐσία is the basic concept of Aristotelian research. Such expressions, which have the character of emphasized expressions, are also designated as “terms.” And the meaning that expressly accrues to them within a scientific context of questioning is the “terminological” meaning of the expression. There are different possibilities regarding the *coming to be of terms*.

1. A determinate concrete context is discovered, seen anew for the first time—the word is missing, the word is *coined together with the matter*. An expression that was not at hand may immediately become a term, which later dissipates by entering into the general currency and ordinariness of speaking.

2. Second, education can proceed in such a way that the term is *fixed to a word that is already at hand*, and such that an aspect of meaning that was co-intended with the ordinary meaning, though not explicitly, now becomes thematic in the terminological meaning.²¹

b) The Customary Meaning of Ὀὐσία

The expression οὐσία, as the fundamental term of Aristotelian research, stems from an expression that has a *customary meaning* in natural language. The customary meaning is that which a word has *in natural speaking*. *Natural speaking* means speaking as it always takes place *initially and for the most part*, and where another mode of speaking with the world is at hand, namely, the scientific mode. The *customariness* of meaning and of expressing means, further, that it operates in the *averageness of understanding*. It is suitable for being circulated as self-evident; it is understood “without qualification.” “People” understand an expression that has the character of the customary without qualification; it exists in the common store of language into which every person is brought up from the start.

However, with οὐσία it is not the case that the terminological meaning has arisen out of the customary meaning while the customary disappeared. Rather, for Aristotle, the customary meaning exists constantly and simultaneously alongside the terminological meaning. And, according to its customary meaning, οὐσία means property, possession, possessions and goods, estate. It is noteworthy that *definite* beings—matters such as possessions and household goods—are addressed by the Greeks as *genuine* things. Thus if we examine this customary meaning, we may discover what the Greeks meant in general by “being.” Still, we must be careful not to arbitrarily deduce the terminological meaning from the customary. Rather, the customary meaning must be under-

21. See Hs. p. 342 ff.

stood in such a way that we are *directed* toward the terminological by way of the customary.

The customary meaning of οὐσία designates a definite being, and not, say, mountains or other humans. Οὐσία is, terminologically, “a being in the how of its being.” (Usually translated as “substance,” it remains undecided whether more can be represented by “substance” than by “a being in the how of its being.”) In the customary meaning, this “in the how of its being” is not emphasized. But the German expressions also have certain meanings that do not only intend a being, but also intend that being in the how of its being: estate, property, goods and chattels. Οὐσία is a being that is *there for me in an emphatic way*, in such a way that I can use it, that it is at my disposal. It is that being with which I have to do in an everyday way, that is there in my everyday dealings with the world, as well as when I engage in science. It is a privileged, fundamental being considered in its being, in the how of its being, and in the customary meaning the how of being is co-intended. The how of being refers to *being there in the manner of being-available*. This suggests that from the outset being, for the Greeks, means *being there*. The further clarification of beings in their being has to move in the direction of the question: what does *there* mean? The being of beings will become visible through the clarification of the *there-character* of beings.

We can now see how the terminological meaning of οὐσία is derived from the customary. Οὐσία customarily is a definite being in the how of its being; the how is only *co-intended*. The terminological meaning, on the other hand, *thematically* yields the how of being that was previously only intended implicitly. And this holds not only for the how of this way of being, but for every being. Οὐσία can mean (1) the being directly (the how is co-intended) and (2) the how of a being directly (this being itself is co-intended). Therefore, οὐσία means (1) a being and (2) the how of being, being, beingness, being in the sense of being-there. Οὐσία in the sense of being-there contains a double meaning: (1) the being that is there and (2) the being of the being that is there.

It is no accident that the Greek designation for the things that they first encounter is *πράγματα*, “beings with which one constantly has to do,” and *χρήματα*, “what is taken into use.” They refer to the basic meaning of οὐσία.

Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics* that the old question: τί τὸ ὄν, “what is the being?” is really the question concerning the being of beings: τίς ἡ οὐσία.²² Aristotle brings scientific research, for the first time, to this ground, a ground that even *Plato* never noticed.²³

c) The Terminological Meaning of Οὐσία

Οὐσία is the *title of the object of genuine fundamental research* for Aristotle

22. Met. Z 1, 1028 b 2 sqq.

23. See Hs. p. 345 f.

and for Greek philosophy in general. If one gives himself the task of clarifying the meaning of such a term, one is obliged to keep in sight the concrete context to which it refers. The term οὐσία arises in several ways. The expression οὐσία arose, as a term, out of an expression that was prevalent in everyday language and meant a definite being, namely beings with the character of property, possession, estate, etc. We want to take this customary meaning of οὐσία as a clue insofar as we are asking whether, in any sense, aspects of the customary meaning are already contained in the terminological meaning. But only as a *clue*. By means of it, we will inquire into the terminological meaning according to its meaning-aspects, rather than deduce the terminological meaning from the customary.

What is characteristic of the customary meaning is that not only does it express a being, but a being *in the how of its being*. By household, I mean a being that is there in an explicit sense: that being which initially and for the most part is there in life, within which life for the most part factually operates, out of which life so to speak scrapes out its existence (*Dasein*). Thus, in the customary meaning of οὐσία lies a doubling: a being, but at the same time in the how of its being. The terminological meaning is distinguished by the fact that it focuses on precisely this how of being, that οὐσία does not primarily designate a being, but the how of being of this being with which a definite being is co-intended. When one uses the term οὐσία, still in its customary meaning, a *definite concept of being* is meant. Οὐσία as εἶναι, “being,” has its fully determinate meaning of being that arises out of the primary comprehension that the Greeks have of the beings that they initially encounter. And this primary sense of being is that which still resonates in the terminological meaning.

In any case, we have gained an orientation to the multifarious meanings of this expression insofar as it means (1) *beings* in the how of their being and (2) the *how of being* of beings. In each case, the emphasis is set in another direction. We are now interested only in the terminological meaning. The multifariousness of the terminological meaning must be determined more precisely. We are treating οὐσία with the aim of seeing what is genuinely addressed by λόγος, by ὀρισμός; what is originally and genuinely said by defining them.

Οὐσία in the terminological meaning is itself treated in view of the multifariousness of its meanings. And in the terminological meaning οὐσία means (1) beings or various beings, such that the how of their being is not directly emphasized and (2) precisely the being of beings. Within both of these basic directions of meaning of the term οὐσία, we meet with a multiplicity of meanings that we will now study more closely. Should there be a type of research that takes being as its topic, then this type of research that has the being of beings as its topic, will be somehow obliged to also keep beings in sight. For, in the end, it is only from beings themselves that the character of their being can be gleaned. Thus beings must necessarily be taken into account. Within such research, every concept of being has a *specific double-character to its meaning*.

α. Οὐσία as Beings

From the basic directions of meaning of the term οὐσία, we initially choose that which intends *beings themselves*. In this use, the expression appears. Οὐσία is said of various “beings” since they have various being-characters. Beings themselves are always primarily discovered prior to being. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book 7, Chapter 2: δοκεῖ δ’ ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν,²⁴ “the being of beings shows itself openly in σώματα.” If we translate σώμα as “body,” we must note that *corporeality* for the Greeks does not mean materiality or having-the-character-of-stuff. Rather, σώμα means a characteristic *obtrusiveness* of a being, of a being that is there, such that later τὸ σὸν σώμα, “your σώμα,” is the same as σύ; and later σώμα means “slave,” “prisoner,” a being that belongs to me, that is at my disposal, what is there for me in this obtrusiveness and self-evidence. This meaning is to be heard also. Such σώματα are, accordingly, not only bodily things but also animals, trees, earth, water, air, τὰ φυσικά, and even the οὐρανός; not only dead things but beings that, initially and for the most part, are there in the everydayness of life.²⁵ Aristotle says of these beings that to him δοκεῖ ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα; directly and initially the οὐσία shows itself therein. Whether there is yet another kind of being that would qualify as οὐσία is an open question.²⁶ Οὐσία [. . .] ὁμολογούμεναι: Each says the same as another, without qualification, namely, that these beings are.²⁷ These beings are addressed in the genuine sense as beings in the self-evidence of natural being-there.

Therefore, for Aristotle and for all research that investigates being, and thereby wants to have a ground to stand on, it is self-evident that it proceeds from the consideration of being (and the being-structure) that is initially there in this manner; that it proceeds from a sense of being that naturalness understands without qualification. Life moves in a *natural intelligibility* of that which is immediately meant by “being” and “beings” in its speaking. *Metaphysics*, Book 7, Chapter 3 (end): ὁμολογοῦνται δ’ οὐσῖαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινές,²⁸ “it is agreed that beings in the genuine sense belong to that which is perceived in αἴσθησις.” When Aristotle speaks of the αἰσθητόν, he never means something objective with the character of sense-data which are present through “sensations.” By αἴσθησις, he means the “perceiving” of beings in the natural mode, a perceiving distinguished by the fact that the senses are implicated in it by providing its access. It is the natural mode of seeing and speaking about things such as trees and the moon. There is a prevailing agreement that beings which

24. Met. Z 2, 1028 b 8 sq.

25. Met. Z 2, 1028 b 9 sqq.

26. Cf. Met. Z 2, 1028 b 13 sqq.

27. Met. H 1, 1042 a 6.

28. Met. Z 3, 1029 a 33 sq.

are accessible through αἴσθησις have the character of οὐσία. Therefore, in the field of these beings the investigation to engage in *primarily* is the investigation of the structure of οὐσία itself.

β. Οὐσία as Being: Being-Characters (*Metaphysics*, Δ8)

At this point, we cannot pursue in detail what such research of the being of beings in their being-characters shows. For the sake of orienting ourselves, we want to bring out a few being-characters, and then the multifariousness of the meanings of οὐσία, where οὐσία means the being of a being. We will take Chapter 8 of Book 5 of the *Metaphysics* as the basis of orientation concerning the being-characters that Aristotle’s research into being exhibits. We will consider the being-characters enumerated there, with a view toward whether and how the sense of being that we have discovered in the customary meaning of οὐσία, namely, “household,” in any mode also speaks in these being-characters; also whether various aspects of beings in the sense of characteristic beings that are there, come to expression in the being-characters, in the way that the estate, the household is initially and for the most part there in a pressing manner. We are questioning being-characters to see whether they are also characters in the sense of the there.

Aristotle introduces Chapter 8 with the enumeration of σώματα.²⁹ With this, he wants to show the ground from which the entire investigation of the being of beings is initiated.

1. He designates the ὑποκείμενον as the first being-character.³⁰ Beings like animals, plants, humans, mountains, and the sun are such that they already “lie there,” “in advance,” ὑπό. When I speak about them, express something about an animal, describe a plant; that about which I speak, the discussed, what I have there in speaking, is in such a way that it is at hand, already lying there in advance. The being of beings has the character of *being-at-hand*.

2. Αἴτιον ἐνυπάρχον: “That which is also at hand therein” in such a way of being, in the function of the αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι.³¹ The ψυχή is such a being-character.³² To say that the soul is οὐσία is to say that it is a being-character that is at hand in a being in the aforementioned sense. The soul is also at hand therein in such a way that it also constitutes the specific being of that which we call living. It is responsible for, or constitutes, the specific being of a living thing, namely, of a way of being in the sense of being-in-a-world. The two basic aspects are κρίνειν and κινεῖν.³³ A living thing is not simply at hand (as

29. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 10 sqq.

30. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 13 sq.: καθ’ ὑποκειμένον.

31. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 15: αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, ἐνυπάρχον.

32. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 16.

33. Aristotelis de anima libri III. Recognovit G. Biehl. Editio altera curavit O. Apelt. In aedibus B.G. Teubneri. Lipsiae 1911. Γ 2, 427 a 17 sq.: Ἐπει δὲ δύο διαφοραὶ ὀρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν, κινήσει τε τῇ κατὰ τόπον καὶ [. . .] τῷ κρίνειν.

accessible to everyone), but is *there* in its being-at-hand in an explicit mode. It can see, do, move itself. The two aspects of this οὐσία are κρῖνειν, “separating” from something other, orienting itself in a world; and κινεῖν, “moving itself therein,” being-involved-therein, going-around-and-knowing-its-way-around-therein.” Thus, when one speaks of Greek philosophy, one must be careful with the famous “substantiality” of the soul. Οὐσία means a mode of being, and if the soul is called οὐσία, it refers to a distinctive mode of being, namely the being of the living.

3. Μόριον ἐνυπάρχον:³⁴ This character is represented, for example, by the surface of a body. If I remove the surface of a body from the there, the body is thereby taken away. It is no longer there. The surface, then, constitutes the being-there and possible being-there of a body, just as the line constitutes the possible being-there of a surface. Accordingly, the surface, as an aspect of a body, is the type of being-character that Aristotle also designated ὀρίζον,³⁵ “the circumscribed.” Body is *circumscribed* by the being-character of μόριον ἐνυπάρχον, that is, beings are determined in their being. This is possible only because *limit*, for the Greeks, is a completely fundamental character of the being-there of beings. *Limitation* is a fundamental character of the there. This aspect of ὀρίζον is σημαῖνον τόδε τι.³⁶ It “designates” the being, insofar as it is at hand, as a “that there” such that this “that there” is visible, determinable, apprehensible, in its beingness. Since circumscription plays the peculiar role of determining beings in their being, it follows that some had the idea to describe as the οὐσία, the limit “in general,” or “number” in the broadest sense.³⁷ The *Pythagoreans*, as well as the *Platonists*, saw in number the genuine οὐσία, numbers as οὐσίαι. Something numerical, or quantitative, circumscribes beings as such; they are not substances, daimons that exist around us.

4. τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.³⁸ Aristotle did not invent this term; rather, it was handed down to him by tradition. Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is a character of being, specifically that character on the basis of which λόγος as ὀρισμός addresses beings.³⁹ The τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is in particular the topic of ὀρισμός. An extensive understanding of this being-character is not to be expected here, but perhaps it will appear to us at the end of the lecture. I will only characterize the meaning of this being-character and its context in an entirely superficial way with the following. It refers to “being,” that is, the “what-being as it was already.” It means a being in itself, that is, with respect to what it was already, from which it stems in its being, with respect to its *descent*, its having come into being there. There-

34. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 17: μόρια ἐνυπάρχοντα.

35. Ibid.

36. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 18.

37. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 20: καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς δοκεῖ τισι τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

38. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 21 sq.

39. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 22.

fore, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is the “being of a particular,” οὐσία ἐκάστου,⁴⁰ which is not “everything,” or even “what is singular” or “what is individual.” With such translations, one has gone astray. Ἐκάς means “far”; ἐκάστου means “what is particular” insofar as I linger with it, insofar as I see it at a certain distance. What is particular is precisely not what is seen initially and directly, but is accessible only when I take a certain distance from it, and it presents itself to me in this way at this distance. Τὰ καθ’ ἑκάστα are the aspects that constitute the particularity of a being. They become present only insofar as I occupy a distance from it. In natural dealings, familiar objects are not really there for me; I overlook them in seeing beyond them. They do not have the character of presence; they are altogether too everyday. They, so to speak, disappear from my everyday being-there. Only with some event of an unusual sort can something with which I deal on a daily basis become suddenly objectified for me in its presence. Particularity is not initially and directly given. Taking a distance is required to see everydayness in its being-there, to have it present; and the being-characters that explicitly show the being that is there in its being-there, that constitute the there-character of being, are determined in the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of Aristotle.

Aristotle now distinguishes as follows two τρόποι, “basic modes,” in which οὐσία is used: (1) the ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατον, that which is already there for every dealing with it and (2) beings in the character of τόδε τι ὄν, about which I say “that there,” χωριστόν, standing “in its own place,” being at hand “independently.”⁴¹

5. This independence is expressed by the εἶδος,⁴² “that which is seen, sighted,” the “look,” the “appearing” of a being. What I see here, and identify as being-there at hand independently, appears as a chair, and therefore is, for the Greeks, a chair.

γ. Οὐσία as Being-There: Being-Characters as Characters of the There

As we are in the process of an enumeration of being-characters, it behooves us to now see how a *determinate conception of the there* is expressed in these various being-characters, and thus how these various being-characters are *fully determinate characters of the sense of the there* as the Greeks understood it. We already have a clue for carrying this out in the customary meaning of οὐσία in the sense of the “available,” the “present,” that which is at hand in the sense of “estate,” or “possession.”

We are trying to attain a basic orientation toward being-characters by examining the extent to which all of these apparently different characters of being are linked as characters of the there. Οὐσία means “being-there,” and it does

40. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 22 sq.

41. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 23 sqq.

42. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 26.

not have an indifferent sense of being, as, ultimately, there is no such thing. Οὐσία is the abbreviation for παρουσία, “being-present.” Usually the opposite is ἀπουσία, “absence,” not simply nothing but something there, although there as a lack. Squinting is a matter of seeing in the mode of ἀπουσία. Ἀπουσία is the ontological basis for the basic category of στέρησις. We want to try to bring the aforementioned characters of the there to a basic orientation.

1. Ὑποκείμενον,⁴³ “being-at-hand,” the “at-hand-ness” of something. This being-character is connected with being in the sense of the customary meaning. It means what is there not only as being-there, but it also means what is there in the sense of that upon which the estate rests, for example, land, earth, sky, nature, trees, what is at hand in the sense of the beings with which concrete life scrapes out its existence (*Dasein*). Οὐσία—thus at-hand-ness, without I myself needing to do anything vis-à-vis the being of these beings that are there.

2. Αἴτιον (τοῦ εἶναι) ἐνυπάρχον,⁴⁴ for example, ψυχή.⁴⁵ The “soul” is οὐσία in the sense that it constitutes the being-there of the beings that have the character of living. A living thing has an entirely characteristic being-there: (a) It is there in the sense of the ὑποκείμενον; it is at hand as are stones, tables. (b) But the human being is not there in the path in the way that a stone is; rather, a human being goes for a stroll under the trees. I encounter a human being somewhere, but this, his being-there as occurring, as “world,” is characterized by the fact that his being-there *is in the mode of being-in-the-world*. It is by having an orientation. The human being is there in such a way that he is in the world, in the sense that he has his world; he has his world insofar as he knows his way around in it. Ψυχή, as a being-character, is distinguished by comprising in itself being as ὑποκείμενον.

3. Μόριον ἐνυπάρχον,⁴⁶ that which constitutes the possible being of something: for example, the point, the line, the number as genuine being-character since number is limitation. But number, point, etc. are being-characters only inasmuch as it is demonstrable that, for the Greeks, limit and being-limited are genuine being-characters.

4. Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.⁴⁷ this combination already points to the fact that here we are dealing with an entire complex of being-determinations, which we will sort out later. Being in the character of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is the genuine topic of that λόγος that we are now discussing as ὀρισμός. This being-character is that of ἕκαστον. Every being that is there in its particularity is determined through the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

In the summation of being-characters, there is yet a fifth: εἶδος.⁴⁸ Already,

43. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 13 sq.

44. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 15

45. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 16.

46. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 17.

47. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 21 sq.

48. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 26..

for Aristotle, εἶδος has “species” as its meaning. Why it means “species,” and why γένος means “genus,” is not understood if one does not know that εἶδος is an entirely determinate being-character. Initially, it means the being that is there in its “appearing.” As a master-builder builds a house, so he lives and operates initially in the εἶδος of the house, in the way it looks.

The τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι has in itself the determination of the ἦν: the being-there of a being, and indeed with an eye to *what it was*, to its *descent*. If the human being is determined as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον, the speaking *comes* in this way from its ζῶον-, being a “living thing”; this is its γένος. I see a being that is there with respect to its being, in the way that it is there as *coming from out of*. . . I see a being that is there genuinely in its being when I see it in its *history*, the being that is there in this way coming from out of its history into being. This being that is there, as there in this way, is *complete*; it has come to its *end*, to its *completedness*, just as the house is complete in its εἶδος as ποιούμενον. The ὑποκείμενον is already complete; I need not produce it. The body has its completedness through the surface.

Therefore, being-there means, in summary: 1. primarily *presence, present*, 2. *being-complete, completedness*—the two characters of the there for the Greeks. In these two characters, all beings with regard to their being are to be interpreted.⁴⁹

§8. Ὁρισμός as Determinate Mode of Being-in-the-World: The Task of Fully Understanding the Basic Concepts in Their Conceptuality in Being-There as Being-in-the-World

Λόγος as ὀρισμός is the type of “speaking,” of “addressing” the world, such that beings are addressed *with regard to their completedness*, and this completedness is addressed *as present*. Ὁρισμός is λόγος οὐσίας in the sense that οὐσία designates τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Thus the λόγος is, as ὀρισμός, a completely distinctive λέγειν; it is a determinate possibility within λέγειν. The λέγειν is not primarily accomplished in such a way that it is a ὀρίζειν, but instead the world is primarily given in its immediacy as συγκεχυμένον,⁵⁰ “obscured,” “covered over,” “unarticulated.” A particular organizing is required, a particular opening of the eyes, in order to see that which is there in its being.

Aristotle was explicitly aware of the fact that, in the everyday, λόγος is not ὀρισμός. He formulated this in the introduction to the investigation of οὐσία, *Metaphysics*, Z3: “Learning, becoming acquainted with something, is accomplished for everyone by proceeding from what is less familiar to what is more

49. See Hs. p. 346 ff.

50. Aristotelis Physica. Recensuit C. Prantl. Lipsiae in aedibus B. G. Teubneri 1879. A 1, 184 a 22: συγκεχυμένα.

familiar.⁵¹ When I learn something, I have something given in advance, and that which is given in advance is only known in the averageness of being-there; I am thereby oriented in a superficial way. By virtue of this process of learning, I am preparing the way for what can genuinely be known. “Just as in concern it is manifest that one advances from that which is initially encountered as good in each particular case to that which is genuinely good, and adopts this genuine good as the good for oneself, so is the relation between becoming-acquainted and being; that which is for the moment is known initially,” but “often vaguely (ἡρέμα).”⁵² I do not have the time, the occasion, to look with greater precision at the being that is there. This being that is there “has little or nothing at all of being.”⁵³ It is so self-evidently there that I see beyond it; I do not notice it. Precisely in this not-being-noticed, the self-evidence of the being-there of the world shows itself. But I must proceed precisely from what is *ungenuinely* there to what is *genuinely* passed over in acquaintance. These principles are programmatically the genuine *counter-thrust to Platonic philosophy*. Aristotle says: I must have *ground* under my feet, a ground that is there in an immediate self-evidence, if I am to get at being. I cannot, in fantasy, hold myself to a definite concept of being and then speculate.

The methodological stance is already seen in principle at the outset of the *Physics*, which is one of Aristotle’s earliest investigations and seems to have been worked out at the time that he was still in the Academy, collaborating with *Plato*. That which is initially known, from which I proceed, is the καθόλου, “something that I have there in a general way.”⁵⁴ I am superficially oriented in my surrounding world, without being able to give an immediate answer to the question regarding what that surrounding world is. Seeing genuine beings depends on the καθόλου.⁵⁵ This can be seen in the relation between *customary* speaking and *terminological* usage. The word, as used in natural speaking, refers to a being that is there, enclosed within itself, and yet without this being that is addressed being set into its limits. If, on the contrary, the meaning and the word use are fulfilled in a λόγος that is ὀρισμός, then it takes that which is there in this manner apart into its moments, what constitutes the genuine “particularity” of such an object. Τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα are those moments that bring me the initial, superficial thing meant in the requisite distance, so that I see it genuinely in its articulatedness. “Children (who, as such and in a fully distinctive sense, live in their world and possess it in an unarticulated

51. Met. Z 3, 1029 b 3 sqq.: ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἥττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον.

52. Met. Z 3, 1029 b 5 sqq.: ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῆ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῶ γνώριμα. [. . .] πολλακίς ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα.

53. Met. Z 3, 1029 b 9 sq.: μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος.

54. Phys. A 1, 184 a 23.

55. Phys. A 1, 184 a 23 sq.: διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι.

way) are accustomed to addressing all men as father and all women as mother; only later does διορίζειν occur to them.”⁵⁶ For the child, the first and average interpretation of the being-there of humans is father and mother; this interpretation is immediately accessible. The child applies it to every man and woman. This indeterminacy of the usual gives the child, precisely, the possibility of being oriented to humans among the things that are there. One must proceed from here, from what is immediate, to see this ground explicitly. On the basis of this natural way of being in the everyday, arises the characteristic possibility of a peculiar speaking that addresses being-there in its genuine presence, in the character of its πέρας. It addresses it in such a way that being-there is addressed in its limitedness.

This addressing of being-there in its limitedness is a λόγος as ὀρισμός. For the Greeks, a limiting speaking means an addressing of genuine being-there. That having limits, limitedness, constitutes the genuine there-character, we see in *Metaphysics Δ*, Chapter 17: πέρας is the ἔσχατον, “the outermost aspect of what is there at the moment, outside of which, at first, nothing more of the matter encountered is to be found; and within which the whole of the beings encountered are to be seen.”⁵⁷ This character of the πέρας is then determined, without qualification, as εἶδος. The having-of-limits is the genuine “look of a being that has any kind of range.”⁵⁸ Πέρας is, however, not only εἶδος but also τέλος.⁵⁹ Τέλος means “end” in the sense of “completedness,” not “aim” or even “purpose.” That is to say that completedness is a πέρας such that “movement and action go toward it”⁶⁰—κίνησις and πράξις, the being-occupied with something where a movement or action finds its end (no idea of a purpose!) There are, indeed, beings that have both of these limit-characters. The character of πέρας also has something to do with the οὐ ἕνεκα, the “for-the-sake-of-which.”⁶¹ The genuine, ultimate character of being in the εἶδος and τέλος is the character of the πέρας. For recognizing, limit is the having-of-limits only because it is the having-of-limits of the matter, the πράγμα determined in its limits.⁶²

From the above, we can infer the meaning, for Aristotle and the Greeks, of the maxim of theoretical research: μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι.⁶³ Εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι is a going toward something that no longer is since it lacks limit. This maxim to

56. *Phys. A 1*, 184 b 12 sqq.: τὰ παιδιά τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

57. *Met. Δ 17*, 1022 a 4 sq.: τὸ ἔσχατον ἐκάστου καὶ οὐ ἕξω μηδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν πρώτου, καὶ οὐ ἔσω πάντα πρώτου.

58. *Met. Δ 17*, 1022 a 6: εἶδος [. . .] ἔχοντος μέγεθος.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Met. Δ 17*, 1022 a 7: ἐφ’ ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ πράξις.

61. *Met. Δ 17*, 1022 a 8.

62. *Met. Δ 17*, 1022 a 9 sq.: τῆς γνώσεως γὰρ τοῦτο πέρας· εἰ δὲ τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράγματος.

63. *Phys. Θ 5*, 256 a 29.

avoid a *regressus ad infinitum* has a definite sense and weight for the Greeks, and it is not to be carried over into current investigations, because it exhibits a completely different sense of being-there. In order to use the maxim more broadly, one must be justified with regard to what one calls being. The being-characters carry in themselves the there-moment of the πέρας. The presence of a being in its completedness determines a being in its there, that is, it simply characterizes it. This sense of being is not anything invented by the Greeks, but arises from a definite experience of being. That is to say, insofar as humanity lives in a world, and the world is overarched by οὐρανός, “heaven,” insofar as the world is οὐρανός, which is enclosed within itself and is completed in itself. Being is interpreted by the Greeks through being-there—in this, the only possible way. A *definite experience of the world* is the *clue for the explication of being* of the Greeks.

You see that what we have found to be the upshot of our considerations, as a technical issue of thinking and intellectual tidiness, is manifest as ὄρισμός. The ὄρισμός is a λόγος, a *definite being-in-the-world*, which meets with the world that is there in its genuine there-character, that addresses it in its genuine being. We have a concrete reference to that place where the genuinely indigenous character of the concept is to be sought. Conceptuality is no arbitrary matter, but rather an *issue of being-there* in a decisive sense, *insofar as it has resolved to speak radically to the world*—to question and to research. So, λόγος, “speaking,” is to exhibit beings in themselves, if this speaking is of such a character that it shows beings in their *having-of-limits*, that it *limits* beings *in their being*. That λόγος which is ὄρισμός is the *genuine mode of entry into beings*; speaking as ὄρισμός is the genuine addressing of the world. One can designate this λόγος as the genuine mode of entry into beings insofar as πέρας is the basic character of the there. Ὀρισμός is the speaking to beings that are *in the mode of presence* and are *limited* in this way, since ὄρισμός pertains to them as something limited.

When οὐσία was later translated as “essence,” which is still done today to an exceptional extent and is recalled more or less explicitly, one had to be clear about what was understood in using the determinations “essence,” “intuition of essence,” “essential context”; one must be clear as to whether or not one wants to exhibit beings with the same sense of being meant by the Greeks. If that is not the case, what one means by being must be exhibited; to the extent that this does not happen, all intuition of essences is suspended, which indeed is the case. The Greek being-concept did not fall from the sky, but had its definite ground.

If we question basic concepts in their conceptuality, we see that the ὄρισμός is an issue of being-there, of being-in-the-world. *In concrete being-there, we must understand the basic Aristotelian concepts*, and we must do so *in their basic possibilities of speaking to their world*, in which being-there is.

That, in fact, all clarification of concepts in their conceptuality proceeds in this way can be demonstrated by a consideration of the concept οὐσία. What

happened when we returned to the customary meaning in order to gain direction regarding the meaning of οὐσία, there, “being-there?” This regression is nothing other than the *overhearing of the speaking of natural being-there* to its world, of the way the communication of being-there speaks with itself about beings that are there, of what being means in this natural intelligibility.

If we more explicitly give ourselves the task of apprehending basic concepts in their conceptuality, then we must come to a better understanding of what Aristotle understands by *being-there, the being of humans in the world*; of how he *experiences* being-there, in what sense of being he *addresses* it, *interprets* it. Only when we are assured of this, will we have a possibility of understanding the basic concepts in their raw, native character.⁶⁴

64. See Hs. p. 351 f.

CHAPTER TWO

The Aristotelian Definition of the Being-There of the Human Being as ζωή πρακτική in the Sense of a ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια

Aristotle defines the being-there of human beings as a ζωή πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος,¹ “a life, specifically one that is πρακτική, of such a being as has language.” We must attempt an interpretation of this definition in order to procure a concrete view of what Aristotle understands by the being and being-there of human beings. It must proceed in a double direction. Insofar as ζωή πρακτική is determined as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια,² we will (1) pursue the meaning and the concrete context which is meant by ἐνέργεια as well as (2) the context meant by ψυχῆ.

Ad 1. Ἐνέργεια is perhaps the *most fundamental being-character* in Aristotle’s doctrine of being. It contains the root word ἔργον. We will go back from ἐνέργεια to the ἔργον, and ask: What is the ἔργον of human beings, the “genuine achievement” and the “concern” in which human beings as human beings live in their being-human. From there, we will read off the mode of its being, since every ἔργον has, as ἔργον, a definite limitation that is in accordance with its being. Its πέρας is constituted by its ἀγαθόν (not value!). From this ἀγαθόν, as the πέρας, we are led to the distinctive limit that is determined as κίνησις. The limit of such a being is τέλος. We are led to the determination of εὐδαιμονία as this τέλος, to the determination of that which beings with the character of life carry within themselves as their basic possibility. Life is (1) a way of being characterized by its *being-in-a-world* and (2) a being for whom, *in its being as such, this very being is a question*, a being that *is concerned with its being*. The genuine being of life is posited in a certain way in its ἔργον as τέλος. Aristotle seeks *basic possibilities* within this concrete possibility of being-there, according to which every concrete being-there decides itself. We designate as *existence (Existenz)* the *ultimate basic possibility* in which being-there genuinely is. Existence in the radical sense is, for the Greeks, precisely that way of being-in-the-world, whiling one’s time in it, on the basis of which the ὀρισμός, as speaking with the world, is motivated. Existence, the radical

1. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Recognovit F. Susemihl. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1887. A 6, 1098 a 3 sq.

2. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 7.

basic possibility of being-there, is, for the Greeks, βίος θεωρητικός: the life whiled away in pure contemplation.

Ad 2. Ontologically, the second direction runs opposite of the clarification of ψυχή. Ψυχή is an οὐσία whose basic aspects, for Aristotle, are κρίνειν and κινεῖν³—the “setting apart and determining” and the “moving-itself” in the world, the moving-about-within-the-world. They provide the ground for the further concrete distinguishing of being-in-the-world, in the further development of the possibility of ἐρμηνεύειν. “Hearing,” ἀκούειν, which corresponds to speaking, is the fundamental mode of “perceiving,” the genuine possibility of αἰσθησις. In hearing, I am in communication with other human beings insofar as being-human means speaking. The explicit emphasizing of ἀκούειν is noteworthy because otherwise the basic possibility of existence, for the Greeks, is located in θεωρεῖν, in ὄρᾶν. Later, we will take up how these go together.⁴

We are pursuing, in these two directions, the clarification of the being-structure of the being-there of human beings, for Aristotle. In his explication, that which was already vital in the history of the Greek interpretation of being-there explicitly comes to fulfillment. Aristotle’s tendency is only to say what is ἐνδοξον, what lies in the natural being of being-there itself, what is self-evident. But that is, precisely, what is often the most difficult to say. In a certain way, we are already prepared for this consideration of the being-character of being-there. For I have intentionally sketched out a preliminary characteristic of its being-character. Presumably, these characters will also take effect in the determination of the human being. Therefore, we already have a clue to the being-character of being-there; we are already oriented in some way regarding the λόγον ἔχον.

§9. The Being-There of Human Beings as ψυχή: Speaking-Being (λόγον ἔχειν) and Being-with-One-Another (κοινωνία) (Politics A 2, Rhetoric A 6 and 11)

We must now come to an understanding of λέγειν. We do not yet have clarity about “speaking” as what constitutes the genuine being of human beings.

a) The Determination of Human Beings as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον:
The Task of Setting λόγος Apart from φωνή

Let us consider Book 1, Chapter 2 of the *Politics*. The determination of human beings as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον appears here with an entirely definite aim in the context of demonstrating that the πόλις is a being-possibility of human life, a

3. De an. Γ 2, 427 a 17 sq.

4. See p. 104 f.

being-possibility that is φύσει.⁵ Φύσις is not to be taken in the modern sense of “nature” as opposed to “culture,” whereupon one then polemicizes against Aristotle. That is a superficial way of viewing it. Φύσει ὄν is a being that is what it is from out of itself, on the basis of its genuine possibilities. *In the being of human beings themselves, lies the basic possibility of being-in-the-πόλις.* In being-in-the-πόλις, Aristotle sees the genuine life of human beings. To show this, he refers to the fact that the being of human beings is λόγον ἔχειν. Implicit in this determination is an entirely peculiar, fundamental mode of the being of human beings characterized as “being-with-one-another,” κοινωνία. These beings who speak with the world are, as such, through *being-with-others.*

λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνή τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δίκαιου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.⁶ “In the mode of speaking about . . . human beings uniquely have their being-there among that which lives. Vocal announcing (φωνή) is an indicating (σημεῖον) of ἡδύ and of λυπηρόν, of what is pleasing and of what is distressing, of what supports and upsets being-there, and therefore it (φωνή) is at hand as a mode of living alongside other living things (human beings possess this announcing as well, but it is not the ἴδιον, the ‘peculiarity,’ that constitutes the being of human beings). The being-possibility of animals has of itself reached this mode of being, having perception of what constitutes well-being and being-upset, being oriented toward this and indicating this to one another. However, speaking is, as such, more than this, having in itself the function of making manifest (δηλοῦν) (not simply referring, but being such that what it refers to is made to speak), making manifest the beneficial and the harmful, and thereby the proper and improper too. That is, what distinguishes the being of human beings from that of other living things is their unique aptitude for perceiving what is good and evil, what is proper and improper, and so on. The being-with-one-another of such beings (i.e., beings that are in the world in such a way that they speak with it) makes for household and πόλις.”

So, you see that in this determination (λόγον ἔχον), a fundamental character of the being-there of human beings becomes visible: *being-with-one-another.* This is not being-with-one-another in the sense of being-situated-alongside-one-another, but rather in the sense of *being-as-speaking-with-one-another* through communicating, refuting, confronting.

Taking up the position in question, we want to set λόγος apart from other modes of being-in-the-world, from φωνή—which is what Aristotle consciously

5. Aristotelis Politica. Tertium edidit F. Susemihl. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1894. A 2, 1252 b 30.

6. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 9 sqq.

did. What does this “announcing” genuinely mean, this σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις? It constitutes the being-with-one-another of this living being. We will, therefore, consider something that is doubled, with respect to φωνή, as well as with respect to λόγος.

1. In φωνή, just as in λόγος, a *definiteness of being-in-the-world* appears, a *definite manner in which the world encounters life*. This occurs, first, in the character of ἡδύ and of λυπηρόν, and in the second case in the character of the “beneficial and harmful” (συμφέρον, βλαβερόν). These are fundamental determinations: the world in natural being-there is not a fact that I take notice of; it is not an actuality or a reality. Rather, *the world is there for the most part in the mode of the beneficial and the harmful, of that which uplifts or upsets being-there*. And these characters of access are there at once in “announcing” and then in “speaking,” in φωνή and in λόγος. At once we witness how announcing and speaking appropriate the world as encountered in its original and immediate character of being-there; and they communicate with others in such a way that these beings are with one another. The world’s character of being-there is such that the relationality of its there is precisely toward several that are with one another. This world that is initially being there for several that live with one another, we designate as *surrounding world*, the world in which I am involved initially and for the most part.

2. We are witnessing how these two possibilities in which the world is encountered in its initial being-there are, as such, the *modes in which living things are with one another*, in which the κοινωνία is constituted. Thus our next task is to clarify that, in fact, what is meant by these determinations of the ἡδύ and the λυπηρόν are aspects of the encounter with the world that address themselves to being-in-the-world, to living, in such a way that what is there in the character of the ἡδύ and λυπηρόν, as such and in their actuality, is not at all explicitly grasped. The world, in the character of the ἡδύ and λυπηρόν, is nonobjective; animals do not have the world there as objects. The world is encountered in the mode of the uplifting and the upsetting; it is encountered in this character by virtue of the fact that living things speak these characters directly into beings that are there.

This context becomes plain, without qualification, when we look at a determination that Aristotle gives in Book 1, Chapter 11 of the *Rhetoric*—the determination of the ἡδονή, a determinate mode of being-in-the-world, of “one’s-well-being.” “It is established for us that something’s well-being is a certain movement of the being of the living in its world, and indeed κατάστασις ἀθρόα, a transposing-of-oneself-all-at-once εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, into the genuinely available possibility of the being-there in question, in such a way that it is thereby perceived.”⁷ This κατάστασις refers to nothing other than well-being:

7. Aristotelis Ars rhetorica. Iterum edidit A. Roemer. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1914. A 11, 1369 b 33 sqq.: ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.

being-uplifted in one fell swoop, a specific lightness of being-in-the-world that lies in joy. “Λύπη is the opposite.”⁸ From this determination of the fundamental character of the ἡδονή as such, you can see that “if, then, ἡδονή is something like (a movement, a reversal of the being of living), then the ἡδύ is obviously the uplifting (in opposition to λυπηρόν, “oppressing”). It is the ποιητικόν, that which can make or produce something like the aforementioned disposition (διάθεσις), position, mode of finding oneself.”⁹ Therefore the ἡδύ is an ability-to-aright-itself. “What destroys the ἡδονή, the opposed disposition arights: the λυπηρόν, the upsetting.”¹⁰ What is to be seen here is that which is genuinely accomplished for being-in-the-world as being-with-one-another by the ἡδονή, that which relates itself to an encountered ἡδύ and to another, and indicates it to another. We will carry out a corresponding consideration for the λόγος.

b) The λόγος of Human Beings and the φωνή of Animals as Peculiar Modes of Being-in-the-World and of Being-with-One-Another

We are seeking the realm of conceptuality, and are thus led back to the determination of the being of human beings, which is characterized as the sort of life that speaks. We must ascertain the nature of speaking in order to see which being-determinations of human beings are contained in λόγος. Aristotle has recourse to the being-determination of human beings as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον. He wants to show that the πόλις, a characteristic way of being-together, is not brought to humans by chance, but rather that the πόλις is the being-possibility, φύσει,¹¹ that itself lies enclosed and traced out in advance in the human being’s genuine being. Consequently, the πόλις arises out of a definite being-with-one-another that, for its part, is grounded in a having-with-one-another of something, in the specific sense of a κοινωμία of συμφέρον and of ἀγαθόν. The definite, circumscribed possibility of a distinctive being-with-one-another that is expressed through the πόλις is grounded in the having-with-one-another of the world with these determinations. And Aristotle endeavors to make precisely the κοινωμία ἀγαθόν itself intelligible on the basis of the being of human beings. Therefore, the κοινωμία ἀγαθόν must be led back to the being of human beings. This referring back directs Aristotle in such a way that he goes back to the phenomenon of λόγος. It is shown that the κοινωμία which forms the household (οἰκία) is only possible on the ground of λέγειν, on the basis of the fact that the being of the human being is speaking with the world—expressing itself, speaking with others. Speaking is not primarily and initially a process that other human beings may join in on later, so that only then would

8. Rhet. A 11, 1369 b 35: λύπην δὲ τούναντιον.

9. Rhet. A 11, 1369 b 35 sqq.: εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως.

10. Rhet. A 11, 1370 a 2 sq.: τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.

11. Pol. A 2, 1252 b 30.

it become a speaking with others. Rather, speaking is, in itself and as such, self-expressing, speaking-with-one-another where others are themselves speaking; and therefore speaking is, according to its being, the fundament of *κοινωνία*. We must come to a better understanding of this by clarifying how it comes about that, in fact, *λόγος* is that which is able to constitute the having-with-one-another of the *ἀγαθόν*.

Aristotle touches on this in a context where he wants to establish that the human being is a *ζῷον πολιτικόν*. In this context, he has recourse to the being of animals, and posits the *ζῷον λόγον ἔχον* as compared with a *ζῷον* that has only *φωνή*. He endeavors to show that life is already constituted through *φωνή*; that, furthermore, what is living in this way has a being that is fundamentally determined as being-with-one-another; and that animals are already, in a certain way, *ζῷα πολιτικά*. Human beings are only *μᾶλλον ζῷον πολιτικόν* than are (e.g., bees).¹² By virtue of this demarcation from the being of animals, constituted through *φωνή*, the peculiar way of being that is determined by *λόγος* will become more precisely characterized.

α. Orientation toward Phenomena That Lie at the Basis of the Separating of *λόγος* from *φωνή*

To facilitate our understanding of this comparison and, at the same time, to come to grips with the separating of *λόγος* from *φωνή*, we want to orient ourselves in a general and brief way to the phenomena that lie at the basis of the comparison.

What is set in view in both cases are living things, living as being-in-the-world. Thus the world is there for this being-in-itself, not just occasionally nor for a while, but it is constantly there. The question is only *how* this being-there of the world is primarily determined. The world is there in living in such a way that living, being-in-itself, always *matters* to it in some way. The world in which I find myself matters to me. This *mattering*, or this fact, that the world in which living is *matters* to it, we characterize as a *definite mode of the world as encountered in living*.

The world, as mattering to a living thing, is encountered along the lines of being-in-the-world. That is, it is encountered, it befalls the being-in-the-world of living things. When we say that the character of the world as encountered is mattering, it must be emphasized that, for the most part, many things are encountered that do not matter to me, that, particularly in everyday life, the world is there in such a way that it is *without consequence* to me, to my way of being-in and with the world. It is *of no consequence to me, inconsequentiality* as a character of the being-there of the surrounding world. This inconsequentiality is a specific character of mattering. If I say: “that does not matter to me,” that

12. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 10: διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος πάσης μελίτης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον.

does not mean that what does not matter to me is not there, but rather, precisely then, I admit that the world is there. This is the specific character of *everydayness*. Therefore, if inconsequentiality is a character of the everydayness of living, which determines the world in its being-there, and if inconsequentiality is itself intelligible as something that does not matter to me, then it appears that being-there interprets the world as something in the character of something that matters.

The world matters to living-in-the-world. The manner and mode in which the world is there, the possibility of the being-there of the world in a living thing, depends on the basic possibility of the extent to which this living is *closed up* in itself or is *awake*, the extent to which being-in-the-world is *uncovered* or has the character of the *uncovered there*, and thus the extent to which the world itself and being-in-the-world are *discovered*. Here, there are different gradations and levels. Aristotle sees precisely this peculiar phenomenon, when he says: μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος,¹³ “the manner of its being reaches up to its being-possibility (the animal); the being of the animal is so extensively disclosed as to have a perception of the ἡδύ and the λυπηρόν, of the determinations of what supports and what depresses.” Αἴσθησις is not to be translated as “sensation,” for it simply means the “perceiving” of the world, the mode of having-it-there. The possibility of the extent to which the world matters to a being depends on this peculiar *disclosedness*. This disclosedness of the life of animals (i.e., the mode of cultivation, of cultivatedness, and manifestation of this disclosedness) is, for animals, characterized through φωνή, and for human beings through λόγος. For Aristotle, the disclosedness of the being of the world has its genuine basic possibility in λόγος, in the sense that, in λόγος, what is living-in-a-world appropriates the world, has it there, and genuinely is and moves in this having-it-there.

With the consideration of these basic modes, we are to see (1) how animals, whose living is characterized through φωνή, encounter the world; what are the encounter-characters; what, for animals, is the indicator of the world as encountered; what is the basic mode of the there, of being-in-the-world. (2) The corresponding mode of considering the being of human beings in the world through λόγος. In what sense is the world there for humans; how is it brought to self-showing through λόγος? How is the world there in the encounter-character of the συμφέρον and the ἀγαθόν?

The encounter-character of the world for the life of animals is the ἡδύ and the λυπηρόν; its encounter-character for the being of human beings is the character of the beneficial and the harmful, taken together: what is conducive and what is good. If one follows this demarcation through, one must remember that the determinate being-possibilities that animals reach are, as Aristotle’s

13. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 12 sq.

De Anima shows in its investigation of the being-characters of the living, not simply situated *beside* those of humans. Rather, like all possibilities that animals possess, they are *also there in* humans; not lying beside each other, but determined by the οὐσία of humans, their mode of being in the world, so that the character of the ἡδονή undergoes a fully determinate modification, in accordance with the mode of being of human beings in the world. Here, however, Aristotle makes use of the opposition between the respective levels of discoveredness in which each way of living moves.

β. The Encounter-Characters of the World of Animals: ἡδύ and λυπηρόν
Φωνή as Indicating, Enticing, Warning

In Book 1, Chapter 11 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle provides a definition of ἡδονή. It is important that we come to a better understanding of it. Ἠδύ and λυπηρόν are ποιητικά ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης.¹⁴ “That which is able to cultivate what is encountered in the world as pleasing” need not be directly present. It may announce itself; the λυπηρόν is able to threaten. This character of the “is able to” is further determinative of the being-there of the world, a character that I cannot now go into at further length. The ἡδύ, the “supporting” is encountered by way of διάθεσις,¹⁵ “disposition,” in such a way that it cultivates a definite disposition: εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.¹⁶ By way of the disposition, which is in such a way that it is there, beings, in their ownmost being-possibility, are with themselves, with that which belongs to animals, according to their being. Being-there is supported, is light, is genuinely itself.

So, in order to understand the concrete context, we must note the following: if the ἡδύ is encountered and cultivates disposition, then the ἡδύ is encountered by an animal that already is in the mode of finding-itself in the world. A definite disposition already is there in advance, such that the cultivation of a definite disposition means, from the side of the ἡδύ, that way of being disposed to which something matters through the ἡδύ, transposes itself dispositionally into a new way of being disposed determined through the ἡδύ—κατάστασις: (1) “transposing itself” into a disposition; (2) this “disposition” itself, into which it is brought. The justification for this dual translation, I take from a *basic context of living*. All modes of living are characterized by the fact that, here, the mode of being is a matter of finding-oneself in the mode of being-in-a-disposition-and-bringing-oneself-therein. I only find myself disposed in the genuine sense by bringing-myself-there, and thus this *dual-character* must be brought to expression. I enter into gladness only by virtue of the fact that I am glad. There can only be so many things around me that are gladdening, on the condition that I am glad, that I obtain genuine gladness. This holds for every

14. Rhet. A 11, 1370 a 1 sqq.

15. Rhet. A 11, 1370 a 2.

16. Rhet. A 11, 1369 b 34 sq.

phenomenon of living, insofar as one is determined in this manner.

Living as being-in-a-world finds itself characterized by ἡδονή insofar as the ἡδύ is *there*. For animals, encountering the world in the character of the ἡδύ is, for example, encountering a favorable feeding place and not a symphony. It is always something that is in the animal's surrounding world. This being that is there in the character of mattering-to-animals is *indicated*, animals give a “sign,” σημεῖον. It *indicates* beings that are there with the character of the ἡδύ. The indicating gives no report about the being-at-hand of what is pleasing outside in nature, but rather this indicating and crying out is itself an *enticing* or a *warning*. The indicating of the being that is there is an enticement, a warning. Enticement and warning have, in themselves, the character of *addressing itself to*. . . . Enticing means to bring another animal into the same disposition; warning is the repelling from this same disposition. Enticing and warning as *repelling* and *bringing*, in themselves, have in their ground *being-with-one-another*. Enticing and warning already show that animals are with one another. Being-with-one-another becomes manifest precisely in the specific being-character of animals as φωνή. It is neither exhibited nor manifested that something as such is there. Animals do not subsequently come along to ascertain that something is at hand; they only *indicate* it within the orbit of their animalistic having-to-do. Since animals indicate the threatening, or alarming, and so on, they signal, in this indicating of the being-there of the world, their being in the world. The world is indicated as ἡδύ and, at the same time, it is a signaling of being, being-threatened, having-found, and so on.

γ. The Encounter-Characters of the World of Humans Beings: συμφέρον, βλαβερὸν, and ἀγαθόν. Λόγος as Self-Expression with Others about What Is Conducive to the End of Concern

We must pursue, through λόγος, the dual-character that arises from the fact that the indicating of the world as encountered in φωνή is also the signaling of being-in-the-world. We must clarify how speaking, insofar as it is a basic phenomenon of being, is itself derived from the basic mode of being as being-with-one-another. How is being-in-the-world through λόγος distinguished from being-in-the-world through φωνή?

It will be shown here how φωνή is a fundamental being-determination of animals, like λόγος is for human beings, and that it has a dual function: (1) the indication of something, of the world as ἡδύ and λυπηρόν, (2) which, as signal, constitutes that which is seen as characteristic of the being-with-one-another of animals. In this being-in-the-world of animals, the peculiar being of animals as such—being-with-one-another—manifests itself. Aristotle supplies the reference to φωνή and ζῷα as θηρία at the outset, in order to give the correct background for the further being-characteristic of human beings in the world, for the λόγος-investigation. We will now investigate how the characteristic being of human beings in their world as being-with-one-another becomes visible in λόγος, how it is precisely in λόγος that κοινωνία is consti-

tuted, the having-there-with-one-another of the world in which human beings are. If λόγος constitutes the having-there-with-one-another of the world, the determination of being-with-one-another is constituted in it. And the determination of the ζῶον λόγον ἔχον must then, at the same time, contain within itself the determination of the ζῶον πολιτικόν. This means that human beings are the sort of living thing that can be φύσει by way of the πόλις: this distinctive being-with-one-another is not something that is brought to human beings, but is rather *the* being-possibility. For the Greeks, it is insofar as human beings live in the πόλις that they are genuinely human. Being-with-one-another, as a fundamental determination of the being of human beings should become evident through closer consideration of λόγος as that mode in which human beings have their world there.

In order to see what is at issue, one must set aside, from the outset, a prejudice that, now more than ever, we are inclined to bring to bear on our consideration. One could apprehend the matter in such a way that, in φωνή and in λόγος, actuality is grasped in a definite respect, namely, that the world is there from a definite “point of view,” from a point of view relative to the “subject,” that is, the world is encountered only from a “subjective point of view,” not genuinely in itself, as if it were a matter of a definite mode of apprehending the world. This orientation toward subject and object must be fundamentally set aside. Not only is it the case that these basic concepts, subject/object, and what they mean, do not appear in Greek philosophy, but even the orientation of subject/object in Greek philosophy is meaningless insofar as they are not concerned with characterizing a *mode of apprehending* the world. Instead, their concern is characterizing *being* in it. And furthermore, one may not approach the entire analysis of the encounter-characters of the world as though there were a world in itself, and animals and human beings would have a definite portion of that world, which they always see from their own definite point of view. It is also incorrect to speak of a “world of animals” and a “world of human beings.” The issue is not *modes of apprehending actuality* according to definite points of view; rather the issue is *being-in-the-world*. Thus, since the world is encountered through a definite disposition of living things, animals and human beings are in their world. The relatedness of animals to the world is precisely that which brings animals in their being genuinely into being-there. Insofar as one takes apprehending, grasping the world as a general topic of investigation, one must be clear about the fact that grasping, and apprehending the world *presuppose* a being-in-the-world. Apprehending the world is a definite possibility of being in it; only by being in the world can one apprehend it. With the subject/object distinction, one does not get at the facts of the matter; the basic phenomenon of being-in-the-world does not come into view. For we must always keep in mind that one must set oneself free from the traditional ways of posing philosophical questions.

The question now is how λόγος is the characteristic of being-in-the-world wherein the world is there for human beings. In which character, we ask, is the

world encountered by human beings, according to Aristotle? What is the disclosedness reached by human beings? The ἴδιον of human beings is τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δίκαιου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν,¹⁷ “that he alone (as human) has αἴσθησις, lives in the perception of good and evil, of proper and improper,” of συμφέρον and βλαβερὸν.¹⁸ Therefore, we will ask initially: what does it genuinely mean that the world in which human beings move themselves is encountered in the character of “what is conducive,” in the character of the συμφέρον?¹⁹

The συμφέροντα, the “characters of what is conducive” are:

1. τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος,²⁰ “that which, in itself, is toward the end.”
2. κατὰ τὰς πράξεις,²¹ “within the purview proper to πράξις.”
3. σκοπὸς πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλευόντι,²² “the fact that what one looks toward lies before the one that reckons.”

On this basis, we will characterize the συμφέρον as well as the ἀγαθόν. The συμφέρον is the manner and mode in which the world, as mattering to human beings, is there for us. The connection with the ἀγαθόν, will come out of the matter itself.

Ad 1. Συμφέρον is “that which is conducive to . . . ,” toward the end. *Something that is conducive* is, in itself, a being that has a *reference to something*. This referring to something is not accidental to that which is conducive, but constitutes its very conduciveness. That to which what is conducive as such refers is designated as τὸ τέλος. What we are to understand by τέλος is found in the second determination.

Ad 2. Πράξις is “concern,” and as such it means nothing other than bringing-something-to-its-end. Therein lies the fact that *concern has in itself an end*, specifically an end as that toward which concern as concern moves. The συμφέρον is the referring to the end of a concern; it carries with it, and is conducive to, the bringing-to-an-end of something.

Ad 3. The συμφέρον is σκοπός. Aristotle characterizes the συμβουλευέσθαι in Book 6, Chapter 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as ζητεῖν τι καὶ λογίζεσθαι,²³ a “searching for something in the mode [καί is explicative here] of deliberating”—λογίζεσθαι. It is in this way that I “bring to language” that which I look toward in deliberating, that which is conducive to the end of concern. In πράξις there is an end, that which is conducive is brought to its end, in every concern an end is fixed in advance. The λογίζεσθαι is the genuine mode of the fulfillment

17. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 16 sqq.

18. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 14 sq.

19. Rhet. A 6, 1362 a 18.

20. Rhet. A 6, 1362 a 19.

21. Rhet. A 6, 1362 a 19 sq.

22. Rhet. A 6, 1362 a 17 sq.

23. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 a 31 sq.: τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. Z 10, 1142 b 1 sq.: ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται.

of deliberating, of the bringing-to-language of the *συμφέρον*. Thus, when that which is conducive is brought to language, this means that the *τέλος* is also there in this bringing-to-language. That which is conducive has in itself the reference to the end. The *λόγος*, the *λογίζεσθαι* is fulfilled in the basic structure of the “if-then”; *if* such and such is the end of a concern, *then* such and such must be undertaken, brought to language. The manner of fulfillment of this “if-then,” the talking-through of the *συμφέρον*, is the *συλλογισμός*. It is *λόγοι* together, fastened to one another. And, indeed, *τὸ ὠφέλιμον*, which here means the same thing as *τὸ συμφέρον*, is brought more precisely to language. That is, *κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε*;²⁴ that which is conducive is talked through with respect to “what is required” for the bringing-to-the-end of a concern, as well as “how” and “when” the concern is to be carried through. In this bringing-to-language of the *συμφέρον*, of the world insofar as it is concretely there, the world is first brought genuinely into the there. The here and now of the being of human beings becomes explicit in a determinate deliberating; through this deliberating, the human being—in modern terms—is in the concrete situation, in the genuine *καιρός*. The being of human beings is in this *λόγος*, *λέγειν* as *λογίζεσθαι* is a having-there of the world in such a way that I am in the world in a position determined by a here and now.

What does it mean to say that the *λόγος* expresses the *συμφέρον*? *Λόγος*, as opposed to *φωνή*, is *ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν*.²⁵ It has the task of “revealing” the world in a character that is fulfilled in *λογίζεσθαι*. The “if” indicates that the end is fixed for the deliberating. There is no deliberating about the end; it is fixed from the outset. The “if” is the primary deliberative grasp of the *τέλος*. I want to give my friend a gift, to give him joy; this is the *τέλος*—joy. The *τέλος* is anticipated. The “anticipation” of a *τέλος*, of an “end” of *πρᾶξις*, is *προαίρεσις*. If I want that, if it is to be brought to its end, if the other is to be pleased, what then? Now begins the deliberating: how is joy to be brought about for the one concerned? The deliberation yields that I want to give him a book. In this deliberating, my being-there orients itself in this moment through this *προαίρεσις*. The surveying look in which deliberating moves has its world there. Thus I go to a book dealer, and indeed to a definite one, in order to get the book quickly, so as to bring to its end the concern with joy as its *τέλος*. It is not through the deliberation that the bookstore becomes a bookstore. The world is at hand in the character of *συμφέρον* for beings who are in their world in the mode of *πρᾶξις μετὰ λόγου*. Their being, characterized as being-there, is primarily in this way. The stick that I take in hand, the hat that I put on, are *συμφέροντα*. The stick is not primarily a piece of wood, or some such thing, but a stick. In this deliberating, the world explicitly keeps to its primary character of *as* such and such, *as* conducive to . . . , and precisely because *λέγειν* in its primary

24. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b 28.

25. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 14.

manner and mode addresses the world *as* something: λέγειν τι κατὰ τινας. In speaking about something, I make it present, I bring it into the there, *as* this or that, in the character of *as*. It is the primary function of λόγος, and one that is fitting at every step, to explicitly separate, and bring into the there, the world in this character of referring to. . . . Thus it becomes clear that speaking in the world is, for human beings, the δηλοῦν τὸ συμφέρον.²⁶

This speaking about . . . is deliberating, συμβουλευέσθαι, “bringing to language with itself.” With oneself, one comes to take counsel about something. That is merely an altogether definite possibility of something much more originary—counseling *with others*. This bringing-to-language-thus as expressing is speaking *with another* about something, a *talking-through*. Speaking is exhibitiv self-expressing *to* . . . It is not a matter of speaking so as to establish, but rather *discussing* the συμφέρον. The συμφέρον stands in view. The λόγος, which has this function of exhibiting, has the character of a definite *communicating*. I *communicate* with others; I have the world there with the other and the other has the world there with me, insofar as we talk something through—κοινωνία of the world. *Speaking is, in itself, communicating*; and, as communication, it is nothing other than κοινωνία.

There may seem to be a gap in this account if we do not see why speaking is speaking-with-others. But the Greeks saw λόγος in an original way. Today we have a primitive notion of language or none at all. The concrete document for the originality of the Greek view is the entire *Rhetoric*. Speaking is deliberative speaking about that which is conducive, speaking-with-one-another; λόγος is the mode of being of human beings in their world, such that this being is, in itself, being-with-one-another. This κοινωνία is not only determined through λόγος itself, but also through the fact that the λόγος is a deliberating within the surveying look of concern. Concern is μετὰ λόγου. Here μετὰ means “right in the midst of.” Λόγος belongs to concern; concern is in itself a speaking, a discussing.

Thus far, we have suppressed a further character of the world as encountered, the ἀγαθόν, although Aristotle ultimately characterizes the συμφέρον as ἀγαθόν. We are now prepared to understand what the ἀγαθόν means. Aristotle gives a description thereof at the aforementioned place in Book 1, Chapter 6 of the *Rhetoric*, precisely in connection with the definition of the συμφέρον.

Ἀγαθόν is:

1. αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα αἰρετόν,²⁷ that which is “graspable in itself and for its own sake”—hence the determination of ἀγαθόν as οὐ ἕνεκα, “for-the-sake-of-which,” “for-the-sake-thereof.”

2. καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ἄλλο.²⁸ The reference runs, in the reverse order from before, from τέλος to συμφέρον. To see the fundamental context, one must note

26. Ibid.

27. Rhet. A 6, 1362 a 22.

28. Ibid.

that the ἀγαθόν has primarily the character of an end only because it can be a for-the-sake-of-which, a for-the-sake-of-another.

3. Further, the ἀγαθόν is determined as οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα,²⁹ “that toward which everything maintains itself, that toward which it is under way”; specifically,

4. οὗ παρόντος, and this “insofar as it is present,” εὖ διάκειται.³⁰ If the ἀγαθόν is there as such, if concern is brought to its end, then the one who is concerned εὖ διάκειται is in a disposition that is characterized as εὖ. Εὖ is a definite how of finding-oneself-disposed, which is cultivated insofar as it is settled for the one concerned. The εὖ is dependent upon the manner and mode of concern for the end.

These various determinations of ἀγαθόν all run together in that the ἀγαθόν is primarily end, τέλος, or more precisely, πέρας. We have already seen πέρας as a fundamental determination of being.

c) The One (*Das Man*) as the How of the Everydayness of
Being-with-One-Another: The Equiprimordiality of
Being-with-One-Another and Speaking-Being

Being-with-one-another was set forth as a novel character of the being of human beings. It appears in the concrete structure of λόγος itself—λόγος as “speaking,” as it is alive in *everydayness*; that speaking which is the mode of fulfillment of deliberation, of taking-counsel-with-itself at the time, of concern. As deliberating, an involving oneself in the world is fulfilled, a world that is there in the character of ἀγαθόν, that is, of συμφέρον. In the συμφέρον, the for-which is co-given, the τέλος as something at which and in which concern comes to its end. This συμφέρον is encountered in λογίζεσθαι; λογίζεσθαι has the fulfillment-form of the συλλογισμός, of the conclusion, namely, as ‘if-then.’ In this way, the world is there as the surrounding world of human beings, wherein they move. It is precisely λόγος that exhibits, makes explicit, conduciveness as such and, on the other hand, the οὗ ἕνεκα. Λέγειν τι κατά τινος, something is meant “as something”; the world is possessed there in the character of the as, posited in a definite respect. On this basis, Aristotle can also say in the same passage: αἰσθησιν ἔχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.³¹ We designate this sight of concern as *looking-around*. In deliberating, *I take a look around myself*. However, this looking-around, and what is there in it, are exhibited precisely through the λόγος that is in fact ἀποφαίνεσθαι. The characters of the ‘as such and such’ are brought explicitly into the there. Thus we see here that λόγος fulfills its basic function: ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν;³² it is “to thereby *make manifest*” the world. This

29. Rhet. A 6, 1362 a 23

30. Rhet. A 6, 1362 a 26 sq.

31. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 14 sqq.

32. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 14.

making-manifest as fulfilled through speaking is a *communicating*, making-manifest-to-another, the mode of having-there-explicitly-with-one-another of the world—basic determination of the being of human beings in the world. It is a basic mode in which the being of the human being as with-one-another is revealed. The human being is the type of being that is a ζῶον πολιτικόν, that has, in its structure, the possibility of a cultivated being-in-the-πόλις.

We can grasp this determination, which has now come to the fore in view of the being of human beings, still more precisely. It should be noted that, with this determination, what is established is not a factual claim that human beings are never alone but are with several others. Rather, this being-with-one-another means a *how of being*: the human being is *in the mode* of being-with-one-another. The basic assertion that I myself make about myself as a living human being in my world, the primary assertion: “I am,” is genuinely false. One must say: “I am one (*ich bin man*).” “One” is, “one” undertakes this or that, “one” sees things in such a way. This *One* is the *genuine how of everydayness, of average, concrete being-with-one-another*. From out of this One, arises the manner and mode in which human beings see the world initially and for the most part, in which the world matters to human beings, in which human beings address the world. The one is the genuine how of the being of human beings in everydayness, and *the genuine bearer of this One is language*. The One maintains itself, has its genuine dominion, in language. With a more precise apprehension of the One, you can see that it is at the same time the possibility from which a genuine being-with-one-another in determinate modes arises. The basic determination of the being of human beings as ζῶον πολιτικόν is to be adhered to also in the subsequent explication concerning the “looking out,” θεωρεῖν, on the world, concerning that which is there in this looking out, the εἶδος, the “look” of the world as one customarily sees it. In the εἶδος, there lies a so-called universality, a universal validity, a claim to a definite averageness. This is the root of the basic determination of the *universal* that one so readily apprehends as the basic determination of the Greek concept of knowing. Therefore, we must keep in view, primarily and constantly, this one as a basic determination of the being of human beings. That is, in a certain sense, the result of the interpretation of the passage in *Politics*, Book 1, Chapter 2.

We will come to understand that the determination of being-with-one-another is *equiprimordial* with the determination of speaking-being. It would be altogether wrong to deduce one from the other; rather, the phenomenon of the being-there of human beings as such possesses *equiprimordially speaking-being and being-with-one-another*. These characters of the *equiprimordiality* of the being of human beings must be maintained uniformly if they are to actually hit upon the phenomenon.³³

33. See Hs. p. 353 f.

§10. *The Being-There of Human Beings as ἐνέργεια: The ἀγαθόν*
(Nicomachean Ethics A 1–4)

Why does the being of the being-there of human beings interest us? Why have we come back around to it? Because we discerned earlier that conceptuality points back toward the being-there of human beings. Conceptuality is a concern of a definite being-possibility of the being-there of human beings. Insofar as we want to grasp Greek conceptuality, we must make being-there intelligible and accessible to us, in its Greek, Aristotelian interpretation. In pursuit of the task of uncovering the being-there of human beings, we have already encountered some being-determinations; we have found the new being-determination of being-with-one-another. We will proceed until we encounter the genuine being-character, the πέρας. We have already encountered this πέρας in the analysis of being-with-one-another. The being of human beings is determined as concern; every care as concern has a definite end, a τέλος. Insofar as the being of human beings is determined through πράξις, every πράξις has a τέλος; insofar as the τέλος of every πράξις, as πέρας, is ἀγαθόν, ἀγαθόν is *the genuine being-character of human beings*. The ἀγαθόν is a determination of the being of human beings in the world. Therefore, through this analysis of the ἀγαθόν, we will acquire a new clarification of the being-there of human beings, specifically by referring this back to the πέρας, which is to say, to the genuine being-character itself. On the basis of these findings, we will investigate the ἀγαθόν more closely as a being-determination of human beings, a being-character of concern, and so of being-there itself.

In this way, we are investigating the being of the Greek ἀγαθόν. With this purpose in mind, we are taking up particular passages of Aristotle himself, specifically, Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

We are asking four questions:

1. Where is the ἀγαθόν *explicitly visible* as ἀγαθόν? In which mode of being-related to the world is it there explicitly? We are asking about the field in which we see it originally and concretely.

2. Where is the ἀγαθόν of πράξις—the ἀγαθόν of concern as a *determination of human beings*, the ἀγαθόν of that way of being that is determined as ζῶον πολιτικόν? Where does the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν show up?

3. We are asking about the *basic determinations* of the ἀγαθόν as such.

4. We are asking about the way of being and the *being-possibility of human beings* that is sufficient for the structure of the ἀγαθόν to be set forth.

Thus, in short, we are asking: (1) Where do we meet with something like ἀγαθόν? (2) We are asking about the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. (3) We are asking about the general determinations of the ἀγαθόν as such (and so, of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, as will be set forth). (4) Which way of being, which being-possibility of human beings, is sufficient for the ἀγαθόν?

To properly prepare for this consideration, it is important that we remind

ourselves of the determinations of the being of human beings that we have acquired thus far:

1. Ζωή: the being of human beings is *being-in-a-world*. (You may suppose that this is intimated in Aristotle, but perhaps you will see only later on that interpretation is nothing other than setting forth what is not prominently there.)

2. This being-in-a-world is characterized by λόγος.

3. This speaking is itself the mode of fulfillment of a *concern*, of a concerned mode of *involving oneself* in the world. Being-in-a-world is equiprimordially concern.

4. This concern itself always has an end securely in place, toward which concern reckons that which is conducive; it possesses that which it approaches in a definite anticipation. Αἴσθησιν ἔχει: concern is characterized as *looking-around*. From here there arises, in everydayness, the possibility of “mere looking-out toward . . .,” of θεωρεῖν.

5. This being is, explicitly speaking, in itself *being-with-one-another*, being-in-the-πόλις.

We must now hold fast to this basic structure. You must familiarize yourselves with it, not by learning it by heart but so that these things show up in your concrete being-there, so that they make themselves clear therein.

a) The Explicitness of the ἀγαθόν

α. The Explicitness of the ἀγαθόν as Such in τέχνη

Where do we find the ἀγαθόν explicitly? The first sentence of the *Nicomachean Ethics* throws light on this: Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθόν τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ.³⁴ “It appears that every τέχνη (knowing-one’s-way-around something, in a definite mode of concern; the shoemaker understands how one makes a shoe, he knows his way around in it), every knowing-one’s-way in a concern, every μέθοδος, every pursuing-of-a-matter, being-on-the-way after a matter (yet again, a mode of being-oriented, of knowing-one’s-way-around)—in the same way, the concern and the occupying oneself with something that is to be settled, that is to be brought to an end through concern—all these modes of knowing-one’s-way-around and of concern about something, appear to be after some good.” This ἐφίεσθαι, this “being-after,” belongs to its being itself. As knowing-one’s-way-around, concern about something has an ἀγαθόν within itself, explicitly there. Concern is not something different than, and so only accidentally, a being-after. These characters of τέχνη, πράξις, μέθοδος, and προαίρεσις are phenomena that we already know; they appear again later in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in the combinations τέχνη/πράξις,³⁵ προαίρεσις/γνώσις.³⁶ This doubling of determinations

34. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 1 sq.

35. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 16: πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ.

36. Eth. Nic. A 2, 1095 a 14: γνώσις καὶ προαίρεσις.

relates to being-in-the-world in the mode of the concern that looks around, sees something, knows its way around somehow in what it has beforehand. Now τέχνη, the “knowing-one’s-way-around the concern at the moment,” is that mode of being-in-the-world in which *the ἀγαθόν becomes explicitly visible*. Τέχνη makes the τέλος explicitly visible. With that, we have an initial and quite general answer to the foremost question.

β. The Explicitness of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν in the πολιτική

What has now been shown is that if we seek the ἀγαθόν of the being of the human being as a ζῶον πολιτικόν we must take up that knowing-the-way-around that is appropriate to the being of human beings as thus determined, the knowing-the-way-around that makes the being of human beings explicit as being-with-one-another in its τέλος—more precisely, the knowing-the-way-around that makes this being-with-one-another explicit as this concrete way of being in its πόλις. The τέχνη, the μέθοδος, that is related to beings as ζῶον πολιτικόν, is the πολιτική, this knowing-one’s-way-around in the being of human beings that is determined as being-with-one-another. *Politics*, as a determinate mode of knowing-one’s-way-around, of cultivating this knowing-the-way-around, is that by which we will come to know something about being-a-τέλος. If we aim at understanding the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, that being-determination that the being of human beings constitutes in its genuine being-in-its-world, we must look to the being of human beings itself. We must keep the basic determination of the human being as ζῶον πολιτικόν in view, and look at the human being itself as it is concretely there in the πόλις, how it stands out in its being-with-one-another.

This standing-out of the human being, this “comporting-oneself” in the world, this “comportment,” is τὸ ἦθος. Therefore, politics, as knowing-the-way-around the being of human beings in its genuineness is ethics—ἡ περὶ τὰ ἦθη πολιτική.³⁷ Ethics as a *part* of politics is a misunderstanding. Aristotle says explicitly: ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὕσα,³⁸ “this investigation [in Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*] is an investigation that moves in the direction of [cultivating knowing-the-way-around the being of human beings in its genuineness].” Insofar as this consideration is πολιτική, a basic determination found in all considerations of the ἀγαθόν lies hidden therein.

b) The Basic Determinations of the ἀγαθόν

We are now asking about the *determinations of the ἀγαθόν as such*. We know that ἀγαθόν is τέλος. Therefore, what is presumably asked about is the *character of being-an-end*, of finitude (*Endlichkeit*), the τελειότης, insofar as the ἀγαθόν is τέλειον, insofar as it constitutes being-completed. The ultimate ques-

37. Rhet. A 4, 1359 b 10 sq.

38. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 b 11.

tion is: which way of being of human beings is it that suffices for the τέλειον ἀκρότατον? Ἄγαθόν is not an objective thing buzzing around, but instead is a *how of being-there itself*.

With the investigation of the ἄγαθόν as our purpose, and in order to gain a more precise insight into the structure of being, four stages of the discussion of the ἄγαθόν have resulted:

1. Where is something like the ἄγαθόν generally visible?
2. Where, exactly, do we detect a corresponding ἀνθρώπινον ἄγαθόν?
3. What are the general determinations of the ἄγαθόν?
4. What is sufficient for the ἄγαθόν thus characterized, what constitutes the being-there of human beings in its completedness?

With regard to the context in which the ἄγαθόν becomes visible, we must go back to the first sentence of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where it is shown that ἄγαθόν is related to τέχνη, πρᾶξις, προαίρεσις, and γνῶσις. The ἄγαθόν is met in a knowing-the-way-around something where there is no question of τέχνη happening occasionally alongside a concern. Τέχνη belongs to the sense of concern. “I am concerned about something.” It is said, thereby, that I know my way around within the context of that which I anticipate, that the what of concern is in sight, is explicitly there, that I know my way around in that which is conducive. The ἄγαθόν as such is encountered in τέχνη, specifically in such a way that it is explicit. That is an indication that, as ἀνθρώπινον ἄγαθόν, it deals with a τέχνη to which a concern belongs, which concern constitutes the being of human beings. It is an indication that we will find the ἀνθρώπινον ἄγαθόν in a characteristic knowing-the-way-around of living itself. Aristotle designates this τέχνη as πολιτική. Therein lies the fact that he sees the knowing-one’s-way-around of living itself as πολιτική, being-there as being-with-one-another.

α. Manifoldness and Guiding Connectedness of the τέλη and Necessity of a τέλος δι’ αὐτό

In relation to this being-there of human beings which is posited in this field of vision from the outset, there are various things to figure out in the described manner—namely, that a *manifoldness of concerns* is given. In being-with-one-another, there lies a manifoldness of concern, not a mere aggregate but rather a multifariousness that has a connectedness that is determined by the character of being-with-one-another. Furthermore, with this manifoldness of concerns, there will also be a *manifoldness of τέλη* at which concern reaches its end.

In relation to the τέλη, Aristotle makes some fundamental distinctions. Right at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he says: διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργεια, τὰ δὲ παρ’ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.³⁹ “It appears that there is a certain distinction among the τέλη. Some are ἐνέργεια [ἐνέργεια in an entirely distinctive sense, perhaps the fundamental character of

39. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 3 sqq.

being, a how of being in an entirely distinctive sense. He means the ‘being-at-work’ itself. If our expression ‘actuality (*Wirklichkeit*)’ were not so worn out, it would be an excellent translation. Ἐνέργεια, a how of being, such a way of being that has the being-character of πράξις, thus the how of concern], the other τέλη are παρ’ αὐτάς, along with the concerns, specifically ἔργα, works.” These τέλη are the sort that come about from a concern. Along with the completing of the shoe, the shoe comes about. The παρά is meant to suggest that the τέλος of concern is something independent of it. For the most part, this belongs to the character of that which is conducive. By contrast, there is going for a walk—as opposed to shoemaking, which reaches its end through something that has in itself its genuine being—whose τέλος is reached in that I go for a walk; not that I go here or there, or traverse a definite distance, but that I am out in the air, that I have gone for a walk. The τέλος lies in the πράξις. Just through my staying within the concern, this being concerned reaches its end, its τέλος. The genuineness of being-completed, of going for a walk, is grounded in the way that I go for a walk. There are two different modes of concern, distinguished according to the being-character of that which constitutes the τέλος.

πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη.⁴⁰ “As there is a manifoldness of concerns and a manifoldness of sciences and kinds of knowing-the-way-around, so there is also a manifoldness of τέλη.” ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος.⁴¹ “For the art of medicine it is health, for shipbuilding the ship, for generalship victory, for economic operation wealth or means.” In this way, there appears a manifoldness of concerns, and their relation to one another is questionable. The concrete aspect of the being-there of human beings in this relating to one another shows itself at the same time that, among these concerns, a certain *guiding* appears. The one guides with respect to another. In this way, for example, “the raising of horses” for military service (ἵππική) is authoritative for the saddler, who makes saddle equipment,⁴² and he is authoritative for the tanner. The ἵππική is led by the war planning itself, the στρατηγική, which is subordinate to the “administering of war,”⁴³ in such a way that this latter is authoritative for the tanner in a definite respect. Thus the στρατηγική is a δύναμις that, *in guiding, reaches through* an entire manifoldness of concerns.⁴⁴ The στρατηγική is subordinate to a characteristic interest in the being-there of human beings as being-with-one-another in the πόλις. With this example, it appears that a *guiding connectedness* is presupposed by the manifoldness of concerns, that there is thus one entire manifoldness of concerns that are “on account of one another,” δι’ ἕτερον.⁴⁵

40. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 6 sqq.

41. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 8 sq.

42. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 10 sq.: ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν χαλινοποιητικῆ.

43. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 12 sq.: αὐτὴ δὲ [. . .] ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν.

44. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 9 sq.: ὅσαι δ’ εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μιᾶν τιᾶν δύναμιν.

45. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 20.

On this point, Aristotle says that there must be, in this manifoldness of concerns, such a τέλος that is δι' αὐτό.⁴⁶ It is impossible that we, within the circle of all possible concerns in relation to one another, “take hold of one on account of another. For, in this way, one goes into the unlimited; in this manner, one obtains no πέρας, and so the ὄρεξις, being after something, becomes κενὴ καὶ ματαία, empty and vain.”⁴⁷ Πέρας determines the being-there of what is concerned. In concern about something, there is already implicit the fact that it concerns something. *The completion of concern is only possible in that what is concerned is there, that the concern is not grasping at straws, that concern has the character of the πέρας.* Only in this way is it possible for a concern in general to come into its being. This is what was meant previously in the sense of being: being-there is being-limited. About this, Aristotle said that the manifoldness of concerns that constitute the being-there of human beings as being-with-one-another must have a πέρας. But this means that insofar as the concerns are related to each other in a guiding context, the πέρας is constituted through a τέλος δι' αὐτό, a τέλος with which we are concerned “for its own sake.”

What we should take away from this general consideration of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν is this: it is that which is there as the τέλος δι' αὐτό in the consideration of the being-there of human beings, what περιέχει ἀν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων [τέλη].⁴⁸ The τέλος that is made a topic in πολιτική must be in such a way that it “encompasses the others, encloses them in itself.” You see from this type of consideration that it immediately provides no specific determination whatsoever with respect to what the τέλος of human beings is. Aristotle only says that it follows from the being-structure of being-with-one-another that there must be a τέλος δι' αὐτό. This τέλος δι' αὐτό is necessarily the topic of πολιτική. The question is: what are the characters of this τέλος, this ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν as τέλος δι' αὐτό? What belongs to the character of the ἀγαθόν as τέλος δι' αὐτό for the being-with-one-another of human beings?

β. The βίοι as τέλη δι' αὐτά. The Criteria for the τέλος δι' αὐτό: οἰκεῖον, δυσσφαίρετον, τέλειον, and αὐταρκες

With this apparently formal-universal consideration, you see that Aristotle keeps *concrete being-there*, determined as being-with-one-another, constantly in view. The further consideration, the laying out of the basic determination of the ἀγαθόν, and likewise of what suffices for this ἀγαθόν, is oriented toward concrete experience itself, and indeed in such a way that not only is *present being-there* posited in the investigation, but at the same time there is a questioning of the *meanings* that this present being-there has of itself with respect to what its ἀγαθόν is. That is Aristotle's orientation. Concrete being-there does not first acquire an interpretation through him, but rather *it belongs to being-*

46. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 19.

47. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 19 sqq.: μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόρρισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὅστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν).

48. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 b 6.

there itself to have an interpretation of itself that, to a certain degree, is always already carried along with it. The intelligibility in which being-there moves, the One, is grounded ultimately in δόξα, in the average meanings of things and of oneself. This self-evident meaning that being-there has regarding itself is, in the first place, the source on whose basis Aristotle explicitly orients himself to the question of how being-there itself thinks concretely about that in terms of which it has its genuine completedness. For this reason, Aristotle characterizes his method as investigating λόγοι ἐκ [. . .] [τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων] καὶ περὶ τούτων.⁴⁹ What he makes out about being-there is drawn from how being-there speaks about itself, and indeed with respect to the “tending of life.” Βίος: a new concept of “life,” and not the same as ζωή. Modern biology does not have the Greek βίος in mind. Βίος is the “tending of life,” “course of life,” the specific temporality of a life from birth to death, “the run of one’s life,” so that βίος also means “life-account.” The how of a ζωή is the βίος, history of a life. What life makes of itself is drawn from the concerns in the vicissitudes of life, and this conception of life, drawn from the concerns in a determinate tending of life, is at the same time περὶ τῶν πράξεων, interpretation of the concerns themselves from which it is drawn. That is the methodological clue that Aristotle takes from the consideration of the βίοι, in order to see, on the basis of this consideration, what life has grasped as τέλος καθ’ αὐτό itself. He lays out three such βίοι:

1. βίος ἀπολαυστικός, “the life of pleasure, enjoyment”
2. βίος πολιτικός, the mode of experiencing life that arises in the concern within concrete being-there
3. βίος θεωρητικός, the mode of being-there that is characterized by contemplation⁵⁰

From these βίοι, Aristotle initially sets forth various τέλη, and shows that they are of concern δι’ αὐτό. At the same time, he asks the critical question of whether these are sufficient for the sense of the δι’ αὐτό as the τέλος of being-with-one-another. The κριτήριον for determining whether these τέλη are sufficient must become visible. The τέλος must be:

1. οἰκεῖον,
2. δυσσφαίρετον,⁵¹ in such a way that this τέλος is “at home” in being-there itself, not brought in from without in the sense that it comes to it “inevitably.”
3. However, the determination of the δυσσφαίρετον is insufficient. It must be τέλειον,⁵² “what constitutes completedness in the genuine sense.” Ἡδονή can also be pursued for the sake of my being-there as such and not for its own sake. Therefore, the τέλειον must be determined.
4. The τέλος must be αὐτάρκης,⁵³ “self-sufficient.” It will be seen, in the

49. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1095 a 3 sq.

50. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 17 sqq.

51. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 26.

52. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 33.

53. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 b 8.

interpretation of the αὐταρκες, that the τέλος is such as to determine a being-there as being-with-one-another. The τέλος must be self-sufficient for determining being-with-one-another.

We want to consider these four determinations more closely. The τέλος determined formerly as δι' αὐτό is what one quite generally designates as εὐδαιμονία,⁵⁴ and this is generally translated as “happiness.” The consideration of the βίοι begins in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 1, Chapter 3: “It seems that what one understands by ἀγαθόν, by εὐδαιμονία, that which constitutes the genuineness of the being-there of human beings, has been taken οὐκ ἄλόγως from the βίοι (not in such a way that nothing is thereby exhibited, but rather in precisely such a way that something comes to appearance.)”⁵⁵ Οὐκ ἄλόγως means, then, that this determination of the τέλος-being of the βίος is on the right path since, in fact, something substantial is exhibited. Aristotle says of the βίος ἀπολαυστικός that it has its τέλος in ἡδονή, and in such a way that those who are resolved to it τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου,⁵⁶ “come into conversation.” One speaks of them; one joins in; one equates what is common with what is right; and they have the approval of the crowd. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμῆν.⁵⁷ “By contrast, the educated and those who go into practical affairs, into a profession, posit the τέλος in τιμῆ.” They say that in concrete being-there as being-with-one-another, what one ultimately depends on is the “reputation” one has vis-à-vis others. On this point, Aristotle says that with the determination of the τέλος as τιμῆ, the ἀγαθόν is not with the one who is after reputation, but rather is with those who esteem the others; for they are the ones who have the ἀγαθόν at their disposal, while the others are after τιμῆ “in order to secure and convince themselves that their being-there is an ἀγαθόν.”⁵⁸ Thus τιμῆ is not at all something in my own being-there as such; τιμῆ is not οἰκεῖον ἀγαθόν. I have τιμῆ by the grace of others. This is even more transparent in the case of ἡδονή, where Aristotle is not showing that this ἀγαθόν is brought to human beings from without; it is no δυσσφαιρέτον, nothing “inevitable.” Even this higher τέλος as τιμῆ is not a τέλος that would be seen as an ultimate possession in being-there itself. But even the further determination as ἀρετή is κατὰ τοῦτους.⁵⁹ “It is possible to be a competent fellow and yet sleep through one’s being-there, have bad luck, fail to succeed”⁶⁰—two determinations: *being-awake and succeeding*. Thus further determinations are required if one is to flesh out ἀρετή, “competence.” The possibility that one sleep through one’s life or suffer bad luck requires that ἀρετή be ἐνέργεια, a matter that shows itself

54. Eth. Nic. A 2, 1095 a 17 sq.: τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν.

55. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 14 sqq.: τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἄλόγως εἰκόσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν.

56. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 21.

57. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 22 sq.

58. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 27 sq.: ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοῦς ἀγαθοῦς εἶναι.

59. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 29 sq.

60. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1095 b 32 sqq.: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεῦδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα.

in deeds, that has its being in *genuine, concrete being-there in every situation*. “Turning-out-well,” εὐτυχία, is one determination among others of the genuineness of a concern. In εὐδαιμονία, εὐτυχία is also found. Why that is taken up by Aristotle, among others, can be understood only by keeping the Greek determination of being in view. The Greeks have the fully concrete sense of being-there as being-in-a-world, of being-there in its concretion, that being-there is to be seen in the vitality of the fulfillment of concern.

What life has expressed concretely about itself is something that carries within itself its reasons. Aristotle says at the end of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 1, Chapter 2: καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἄρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι,⁶¹ “when I am oriented to that [what life says about itself], no reference is needed to the διότι—for this reason, because, since.” Life has spoken thus. Aristotle takes up the interpretation of the being-there of life in such a way that he takes it in a positive sense. On account of the fact that being-there, in how it speaks about itself, has addressed itself thus, it already carries its reasons. If I keep my attention fixed to the ὅτι, “that” life has spoken thus, and have understood it, then it requires no further διότι. Life has appropriated its possibilities and made them explicit, and specifically in three respects—the three βίοι. Aristotle explicitly postpones the discussion of the βίος θεωρητικός (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 10).⁶² He explicates this βίος as the genuine possibility of human existence. The two other βίοι give him the opportunity to establish two types of τέλη: (1) ἡδονή, (2) τιμή.

Ad 1. The consideration of ἡδονή is kept short since it is clear without qualification that such an ἀγαθόν steers being-there away from itself and turns it toward the world. In ἡδονή, being-there does not come to itself; life is lived by the world in which it moves, fully dependent on the world, not living its own being.

Ad 2. The second candidate already has more going for it, insofar as it appears that in τιμή there is a distinctive possibility of being-with-one-another, of finding-oneself-among-others, insofar as I, particularly when I have a reputation vis-à-vis others, occupy a distinctive position in the world. Having a reputation vis-à-vis others is a distinctive disposition, which is, however, dependent on others. It is up to those with respect to whom I have a reputation whether to lend me a reputation or not. The others have the ἀγαθόν and give it to me as a present, but could just as well refuse it to me. It does not belong to my being as such. Thus insofar as it belongs to others, τιμή is not ἀγαθόν οἰκεῖον, not such as to “be at home” with my being and because of my being. Thus because the others are able to refuse it just as well, it is detachable; not only is it not at home with being-there, it also is not δυσσφαίρετον. An ἀγαθόν that is, in the genuine sense, the ἀγαθόν of being-there, must be at home in this being as such, and cannot be detachable.

61. Eth. Nic. A 2, 1095 b 6 sq.

62. Cf. Eth. Nic. A 3, 1096 a 4 sq.

Ἄρετή appears to be such an ἀγαθόν, the manner and mode of being-there that we speak of when we say that one is a competent fellow, “competence,” the way of having the possibility of one’s own being at one’s disposal at each moment. The ἀρετή of the flute player consists of having the possibility of flute playing at his disposal in a distinctive sense. Such a way of being and living can, however, sleep itself away in a certain sense. One can be competent, and still sleep one’s life away. If this way of having the genuine being-possibility at one’s disposal is to be an ἀγαθόν, then it must be in the mode of being-awake, and it must itself fulfill the possibility of having it at one’s disposal, πράξις. For this reason, the genuine ἀγαθόν of human being-there is, in the end, εὐπραξία or εὐζωία.⁶³ The εὖ is not something available out in the world, but rather is a how of living itself. From the determination that the ἀγαθόν is itself a how of concern itself, we have a series of aspects that define the ἀγαθόν, and so offer a precursor of what alone can satisfy so definite a sense of ἀγαθόν. It belongs to this sense of ἀγαθόν that whoever finds himself in εὐζωία has εὐτυχία. Concrete being-there can fulfill itself in such a way as to nevertheless suffer bad luck. This εὐτυχία, as a further aspect of the εὐδαιμονία of the ἄριστον, marks the point at which εὐζωία is being-in-a-world with its determinate conditions and possibilities; and that the εὐτυχία is included shows that this ethic is not a fantasy, but rather seeks the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν in its possibility.

In Chapter 4, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that there cannot be a good in itself. Ἀγαθόν is in itself always πέρας of a πράξις, and this πράξις is, however, here and now, going toward what is here and now. Πράξις is always περὶ τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα,⁶⁴ “going toward the outermost, toward the ultimate here and now,” καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, toward “the particular as such in its definiteness.” For this reason, the idea of an ἀγαθόν καθόλου⁶⁵ is senseless, as it misjudges the being-character of the ἀγαθόν itself.

Against this, and in order to more sharply determine the ἀγαθόν καθ’ αὐτό, Aristotle blazes a new path, namely by carrying through an investigation of the being-character of the ἀγαθόν. The ἀγαθόν is πέρας or τέλος, “end” in the sense of constituting a completedness. In Chapter 5, he defines the ἀγαθόν as τέλος, more precisely as τέλειον.⁶⁶ In preparation for considering the end in its character as end, I will interpret Chapter 16 of Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*.

§11. The τέλειον (Metaphysics Δ16)

As with the terms ὄν and ἀγαθόν, τέλειον has an *ambiguity*.⁶⁷ Just like οὐσία, ἀγαθόν means (1) something good, a being that is good; (2) being-good, good-

63. Eth. Nic. A 8, 1098 b 21 sq.

64. Eth. Nic. Z 12, 1143 a 32 sq.: ἔστιν δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά.

65. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 a 11.

66. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 33.

67. Cf. Met. Z 6, 1031 a 28 sqq.

ness. In the same way, τέλειον means (1) something that is completed; (2) what constitutes being-completed, the definite way of being in which something completed must be in order to be completed, the mode of being of what is completed.

a) Translation of the Chapter

τέλειον λέγεται ἔν μὲν οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω τι λαβεῖν μηδὲ ἔν μόριον, οἷον χρόνος τέλειος ἐκάστου οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω λαβεῖν χρόνος τινὰ ὅς τοῦτου μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ χρόνου.⁶⁸ “What is addressed as complete, first of all, is a being no part of which still remains to be encountered (since this part also constitutes the being in question), so the time for what exists in the moment, is completed in the sense that outside of this time there is no further bit of time to come that also constitutes that thing.” When we say, “everything has its time,” we mean something like what Aristotle has in view, a definite limitation of time, outside of which there is no temporal being. When something has had its time, it is in a mode that constitutes its being-completed; it is τέλειον (compare the analysis of time in Book 4 of the *Physics*, Chapters 10–14).

καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος, οἷον τέλειος ἰατρός καὶ τέλειος ἀυλιητής, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκειίας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπωσιν. οὕτω δὲ μεταφέροντες καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν λέγομεν συκοφάντην τέλειον καὶ κλέπτην τέλειον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀγαθοὺς λέγομεν αὐτούς, οἷον κλέπτην ἀγαθόν καὶ συκοφάντην ἀγαθόν. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τελειώσις τις.⁶⁹ “Further, what is addressed as complete is that which has nothing left in the context of having a genuine being-possibility at one’s disposal in its true line of descent. We speak of a consummate doctor or a consummate flute player. A doctor or flute player, is consummate when, with respect to how they have their being at their disposal in a way proper to them, they are not wanting in any way (thus, when the flute player’s ἀρετὴ is not wanting in any way with respect to its possibility). In this sense, however (as given in this definition), we speak also of a sycophant (a show-off) or a thief as consummate, in the sense that we are carrying over the how of what is meant (the τέλειον), μεταφέροντες; for example, we call someone a good thief or a good show-off. Having one’s being-possibility at one’s disposal is a certain mode of constituting-the-completedness-of-the being-in-question (of this definite being that is in ἀρετῇ).”

ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τέλεια, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκειίας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπη μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους.⁷⁰ “For each moment, then, something is completed and each being is there in the how of its being, if, with respect to ἀρετῇ, nothing is left out from that which relates to the extent of the possible ability-to-be of the being in question.”

ἔτι οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος σπουδαῖον, ταῦτά λέγεται τέλεια· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ

68. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 12 sqq.

69. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 15 sqq.

70. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 21 sqq.

ἔχειν τὸ τέλος τέλεια. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν ἐσχάτων τί ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φαῦλα μεταφέροντες λέγομεν τελείως ἀπολωλέναι καὶ τελείως ἐφθάρθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐλλείπη τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ᾗ.⁷¹ “Further, τέλειον is **being in the how of being-completed, the being in which, as such, its completedness is at hand in a serious way. Indeed, such a being as τέλειον is addressed** with respect to the having of the end in the sense of completedness. Thus, since the τέλος belongs to what is outermost, we have carried over the how of what is meant also to what is bad. We speak of a full being-annihilated if there is nothing left upon extinction, but there is a full, entire extinguishing at what is outermost.”

διὸ καὶ ἡ τελευτὴ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγεται τέλος, ὅτι ἄμφω ἔσχατα.⁷² “On this account, even the end of life, death, is called consummation in view of a carrying-over constituting a being-completed of life.” The carrying-over is grounded in the fact that the end of life has the character of what is outermost, τελευτὴ is τέλος.

τέλος δὲ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἔσχατον.⁷³ “Τέλος, constituting the end as being-completed, means also that for the sake of which something is, the for-the-sake-of-which as what is outermost.” Finally, there follows a comprehending structure of the foregoing meanings, a division from the point of view of the categories to which we will return, in order to see how, in particular, τέλος is a basic category of beings.

One must be cautious with the concept of “teleology.” Aristotle had no “teleological” worldview. Even a superficial understanding shows that τέλειον and τέλος do not mean “aim” or “purpose.” It is explicitly formulated as τῶν ἐσχάτων τι; it has the character of “what is outermost.” The primary basic determination is *being-an-end*. That one translates τέλος as “purpose” or “aim” has its ground, of course, and does not appear out of thin air. It is a question of whether these translations are primary and whether one may, at this level of being-investigation, indiscriminately toss about primary and derivative meanings. Purpose is the for-what; aim is that toward which something is. The end can be encountered in the character of purpose or aim, but only because τέλος is end. It is aim or purpose with respect to a definite looking-toward . . . , keeping-in-sight. At the level of this investigation, being purposeful or having an aim is an utter misinterpretation, and leads to the impression that Aristotle too was one of those primitive people who lived in the nineteenth century.

b) Arrangement of the Chapter

α. The First Two Points of Arrangement. The Method of Carrying-Over

Metaphysics Δ16 may be arranged as follows:

71. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 23 sqq.

72. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 28 sq.

73. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 29 sq.

1. χρόνος τέλειος: τέλειον characterized as that *beyond which nothing is there*, beyond which there is nothing—nothing that would co-constitute the being of beings whose character is τέλειον. Here, the τέλειον (πέρας) is said initially of beings insofar as they are understood in their being-at-hand.⁷⁴

τὸ κατ' ἀρετήν: beings are given already in an entirely peculiar character, namely, as what *has its most genuine being-possibility at its disposal*. In this case, τέλειον means: beyond which there is nothing there that, as this possibility, makes the being even more genuine. For the consummate flute-player, there is no beyond which (ὑπερβολή) in the sense of the possibility of its most genuine being. With respect to his most genuine being-possibility, there is nothing beyond what he himself is. In this basic determination, there is grounded the possibility of a “carrying-over,” a μεταφέρειν, such as our speaking of a “good thief.” A “good thief” is not a matter of his being a good human being, but rather the meaning of a consummate thief is one who, in his being, has come into his rightful being-possibility, has brought this possibility to its end.⁷⁵

Aristotle explicitly mentions μεταφέρειν;⁷⁶ he himself invokes the *carrying-over* for a definite purpose. In a carrying-over of speaking, we glean from the immediate and originary addressing, from the immediate and originary meaning of τέλειον, a meaning that is there with it (μετά), and carry it over to what is newly addressed. With this carry-over, in which we carry away a meaning, that which we carry away in particular becomes visible. And, therein becomes visible what was already meant in the basic meaning from which we carried it away. It is not that with the consummate doctor something morally good is meant, but rather in this τέλειος lies the bringing-to-an-end. The μεταφέρειν makes what is genuinely meant by τέλειον visible, whereby the doctor is ἀγαθός, and the thief also is ἀγαθός qua thief, being in another sense κακός. It is no accident that Aristotle, not only here but in a whole series of analyses, always carries out the considerations in this sense of μεταφέρειν.

β. Presentation of the Context of the Treatment of τέλειον

The τέλειον is a determination of the ἀγαθόν, and so has, as with ἀρετή—which we will later also come to know as a fundamental determination of the being of life—a peculiar relation to being-completed. In having something at one's disposal, having a definite possibility of one's being at one's disposal, this being is already held in its end, and I have my genuine being-possibility already in hand as my possession. Τελείωσις:⁷⁷ this peculiar phenomenon of ἔχειν τὸ τέλος is what Aristotle comes to speak of explicitly.

The context is that of Aristotle attempting to explain the character of the

74. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 12–14.

75. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 15–17.

76. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 17 sq.

77. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 20 sq.

ἀγαθόν as τέλειον more precisely, after discussing the individual βίοι as ἀγαθὰ δι' αὐτὰ and τέλη, and after explaining the characteristic moments of the ἀγαθόν. This consideration of the τέλος as τέλειον precedes the discussion with *Plato*, to which we will return later.⁷⁸

What does this mean for the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν if one apprehends it as τέλος? It has to do with the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, which relates to the being of human beings that we have come to know as being-with-one-another. This is determined by a manifoldness of πράξεις, which have a guiding connectedness among them, so that one finds an ἀκρότατον ἀγαθόν, “highest good,” implicit in them, an ἀγαθόν that is δι' αὐτό. Aristotle indicated such ἀγαθὰ δι' αὐτὰ in the βίοι. Two possibilities were indicated with the second βίος, the βίος πολιτικός: τιμὴ and ἀρετή, ἀρετή—to give a preliminary interpretation of what Aristotle himself sets forth.

With the discussion of the τέλειον, we acquire a foundation for the discussion of the *fundamental concept of the Aristotelian doctrine of being, ἐντελέχεια*. Τέλος is not “aim” but rather ἔσχατον, having the character of limit, “what is outermost.” Aim and purpose are definite modes in which τέλος is an “end,” but they are not primary determinations. Instead, purpose and aim are founded upon τέλος as “end,” which is the originary meaning.

γ. Revised Arrangement of the Chapter

Metaphysics Δ16 may be arranged according to eight points.

1. The character of τέλειον as that *beyond which there is nothing else there*.⁷⁹

2. A beyond-which-nothing that, as a definite being-possibility of a being, *determines it genuinely in its being*; the beyond-which-nothing in the sense that, for a being, there is no further being-possibility beyond the τέλος, that a being has *come to its end with respect to its being-possibilities*.⁸⁰

3. In this determination of the having-come-to-its-end of a being, there is the possibility of the *carrying-over* of the τέλειον. Insofar as we speak of a “good thief,” what becomes visible in this carrying-over is that which is genuinely meant by τέλειον when we speak of a “good doctor.” The predicate “good” has the additional meaning of exceptional, valuable. Τέλειον does not mean this when we are speaking of a “consummate thief,” and so the meaning of τέλειον constitutes a being-character that is not bound to a specific meaning of ἀγαθόν, such as usually is expressed in a determinate quality of a being.⁸¹

4. Furthermore, τέλειον relates to ἀρετή. Insofar as ἀρετή means having something at one's disposal, having a definite being-possibility at one's dis-

78. See p. 305 ff.

79. *Met.* Δ 16, 1021 b 12–14.

80. *Met.* Δ 16, 1021 b 15–17.

81. *Met.* Δ 16, 1021 b 17–20.

posal, the determination of τέλος or τέλειον is already implicit. The ability to have a being-possibility at one's disposal means that a being that has an ἀρετή already *has its end in this ἀρετή in a definite manner*. The ἀρετή is a definite way of being, which in itself is directed to the τέλος, an ability to have at one's disposal, an ability which need not explicitly reach its τέλος.⁸²

5. The further determination is already indicated in this concept of ἀρετή as τελείωσις, insofar as there is a being which has its τέλος in the genuine sense, so that its τέλος “is at hand” in it, a being in which ὑπάρχει⁸³ τέλος, so that it *has its end in an initial mode*. Ἐχειν is meant in an entirely distinctive sense. One speaks of “having” in a double sense: (a) as the *happening of something*, something happens in such and such a way, having this or that determination—“the table has a crack.” That which is had in this case is happening to a definite being. (b) “having” can mean a direct, explicit *concern about something*, having presently what is had, having to do with it. There are fully determinate gradations here. “The tree has blossoms.” This context of having is not strictly identical with the context of being that is brought to expression with “The table has a crack,” “The person has a toothache,” “The person has a case of boredom.” Also, this having is something different when we say, in an ordinary way, that this having and what is had are themselves conscious. “The person had the thought of running away.” This *double meaning* of having is to be kept in view, and the latter is meant when the discussion is, in this case, one of ὑπάρχειν τέλος σπουδαῖον.⁸⁴ The τέλος is there “in a serious manner,” is had “in a serious manner,” by which it is not meant that someone is addressed as “serious,” σπουδαῖος, whenever they have an angry look. Σπουδαῖος designates the mode of being-there in which I am serious about a matter, that is, not making a game of it—being with a matter, taking it up in such a way that everything rides on it. The matter about which I am serious need not be something extraordinary. Indeed, the less extraordinary that about which one is serious is, the less possibility there is for deception about one's seriousness. Σπουδαῖον is a determination of the how: a possibility of one's being must be taken seriously.⁸⁵

6. The sense in which the τέλειον is a being-character is only made genuinely clear in the further determination of the τέλειον. There is mention of a τελείως ἐφθάρθαι.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the τελευτή, “death,” is designated as τέλος.⁸⁷ What becomes visible in this carrying-over? We say of a human being: “He is finished, used up, entirely completed.” Here it means that he is no longer what he was earlier; the one that he genuinely was earlier is no longer there. Being-completed is *being-gone-from-being-there*. What is the sense of

82. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 20–23.

83. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 23.

84. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 23 sq.: ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος σπουδαῖον.

85. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 23–25.

86. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 27.

87. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 28 sq.

the carrying-over when *τελευτή* is designated as *τέλος*? With death, life is at its end; death makes life complete in that it takes being away from the there, life disappears. With this carrying-over, *τέλειον* shows itself, *τέλος* as a character of being-there, insofar as τὸ τέλος, τέλειον, designates that being-there which we designate as no-longer-being-there, being-gone. *Being-gone is a distinctive mode of being-there.* Precisely in this carry-over from τέλος and τέλειον to death, the distinctive function of τέλειον shows itself to be the character of being-there in the distinctive possibility of disappearing.⁸⁸

7. The determination of the τέλειον is assigned to οὐ ἔνεκα, οὐ χάριν; specifically, this is τέλειον when it is ἔσχατον.⁸⁹ The οὐ ἔνεκα is that being which stands in a willing, with which I have to do willingly, that which I am after in a certain mode of ὄρεξις, characterized as the end, the ultimate, something that is ultimately τέλος. Οὐ ἔνεκα acquires the τέλος-character of the determination of ἔσχατον. Οὐ ἔνεκα is not aim, that toward which I am looking; that is σκοπός.⁹⁰

8. In the conclusion of the chapter, Aristotle divides the various meanings into two different groups: (a) insofar as τέλος is genuinely asserted about something,⁹¹ then: (b) meanings that mean τέλος as τέλειον refer to τέλειον in sense ‘a.’⁹² Τέλειον is thus brought to the schema of categories. This points to the fact that, insofar as τέλειον allows such a division, it is in itself a *fundamental being-character*. Τέλειον shows itself to be a *distinctive character of being in the sense of being-there.* (On this point, see *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book A, Chapter 5.)⁹³

c) The τέλειον as Limit in the Sense of the Genuine There of a Being

To summarize, we must hold primarily in view the fact that τέλος has the determination of *limit*. This *limit-character* is to be apprehended as that beyond which there is nothing further, the end at which something stops. But here we must be careful. A path through a meadow stops at a garden fence. But the garden fence is not τέλειον. Being-the-path is not as such determined by the garden fence. That at which the path stops is itself a being which, in the same manner, is like that which stops at it. Presumably, τέλειον is not a being, or a piece of a being, whose end it constitutes. Rather, τέλειον is a *way of being*, a *mode of being itself*. Τέλειον is limit, but not as a being in relation to another being whose limit it is. In this sense, a thief is completed insofar as the limit is not outside of him. The how of his being, stealing itself, has come to its definite possibility. He is not a good thief for having come across a great stash of money. The τέλειον is a *determination of the being of beings*, and not some

88. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 25–29.

89. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 30.

90. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 29 sq.

91. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 30: τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὐτὰ λεγόμενα.

92. Met. Δ 16, 1022 a 1 sqq.: τὰ δ’ ἄλλα [. . .] πρὸς τὰ πρότως.

93. Met. Δ 16, 1021 b 30—1022 a 3.

property such as the white or black of something. The beyond-which-nothing has the character of limit in the sense of a determination of being.

This limit-character of the τέλειον, as a determination of being, becomes clear in the further carrying-over: death—a mode of being-there, being-there-no-longer, being-gone, ἀπουσία. Being-there-no-longer is a character of the there insofar as τελευτή is addressed as τέλος, but where it is a matter of carrying-over. In this case, what is meant is that in addressing death as τέλος, the genuine meanings of τέλος and τέλειον are lost in a certain sense, insofar as τέλος is meant as an end that does not simply allow the thing in question to disappear. Such an end does not take the thing in question out of the there, but instead keeps it in the there, determines it in its genuine there. Τέλος thus means, originally: *being-toward the end in such a way that this end constitutes the genuine there, determining, in a genuine way, a being in its presence*. Since this is the basic determination of τέλος, one is able to speak of τέλος in the sense of death, in a mode of carrying-over. Here, there is a fundamental context, namely that not-being or not-being-there can be interpreted only when one has positively explicated being-there itself in a genuine way. One cannot see, and make intelligible, the being of beings by saying that a being is also when it is not—that is to say, when one does not grasp it. This is only a negative determination which means nothing, and which suggests the perverse belief that one could subscribe to this mode of clarifying the sense of being. Being-gone is the most extreme mode of being-there, such that the interpretation of being is thrown back upon the explication of the there. Τέλος, τέλειον have the character of limit, specifically limit in the sense of being, such that this limit determines beings in their there. The end of such things is in the sense that τέλος reaches back to that of which it is the end and determines it in its there—the character of including by reaching back. A consummate violinist is, by being consummate, in his genuine being.

From this standpoint, we may judge the meaning, for Aristotle, of the fundamental concept ἐντελέχεια. A being determined by ἐντελέχεια means fundamentally *the type of being that maintains itself in its genuine being-possibility so that the possibility is consummated*. If the being is such that it can possess its τέλος, then the τέλος stands in view so that it can be spoken about. In this concept of ἐντελέχεια, the most fundamental character of the there comes to expression. This determination of the τέλος can now become of fundamental significance insofar as the being of beings can become *explicit* for this being itself, and this possibility of *being explicit* of the genuine being for a being remains for a being that we characterize as living, being-in-a-world. On this account, then, the soul is, for Aristotle, “the ἐντελέχεια ἢ πρώτη of a body which carries in itself the possibility of living.”⁹⁴ Here, you see where the detailed discussion of this basic concept of τέλειον is grounded. Once we secure this determination, we will be in a position to understand more precisely the further discussion of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν as ἀγαθόν δι’ αὐτό.

94. De an. B 1, 412 a 27 sq.: ἐντελέχεια ἢ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος.

§12. Continuing the Consideration of the ἀγαθόν
(Nicomachean Ethics, A 5–6)

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 1, Chapter 5, Aristotle briefly resumes his consideration, up to his critical engagement with Plato. He points out that a manifoldness of concerns faces us, this manifoldness itself encountered not as an aggregate but in a definite manner, a manifoldness of τέλη among which individual concerns reach their end at each moment. A manifoldness of τέλη appears there with concrete regard to the being-there of human beings, and ones that are δι' ἕτερα are also given in a way that they cannot all be τέλεια. Here, not every τέλος is already τέλειον, a genuine end for the being that maintains itself in concern. If individual concerns are τέλη, they are not genuine ends of being-there. Work tools are τέλη alongside of which a definite πράξις reaches its end, but a πράξις in relation to which the ἔργον is παρά. The shoe is the τέλος in the sense that when it is completed, it has its own existence in the world “alongside” (παρά) the being of the shoemaker as a mode of concern in itself. The shoe has its own existence in the world as τέλος. In the same way, an instrument is the τέλος for the instrument-maker. These τέλη are not themselves τέλεια, but instead have within themselves the character of *conduciveness*. The hammer is, precisely, the τέλος of the hammersmith, in the sense that it does not occur in the way a stone does, but rather in such a way that I can hammer a nail with it. This conduciveness, its usability, constitutes its existence. In itself, it is τέλος with respect to its completedness, but not τέλειον; it points away from itself toward another mode of concern made possible by it. So, in the world there is a manifoldness of τέλη that are not themselves τέλεια at every moment.

a) Continuing the Discussion of Basic Determinations of the ἀγαθόν:

The ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν as the ἀπλῶς τέλειον

It has already been said of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν that it is δι' αὐτό, “on account of itself,” and it is the ἄριστον, ἀκρότατον ἀγαθόν, the ἀγαθόν than which there is no going further, so that, presumably, this ἄριστον is a τέλειον. But already the result of the consideration of the βίοι was that there is a manifoldness of τέλη δι' αὐτά. Thus, if there is a manifoldness of τέλη δι' αὐτά, τέλεια, then there must be a τελειότατον among these. But if there is, then there is also a τελειότερον. This consideration shows how the interpretation of the ἀγαθόν, in the preceeding, aims at a *radical carrying through of the idea of the τέλος, πέρας*. For the being-determination of the being-there of human beings, the basic Greek determination of being is to be radically and consistently laid claim to, and it is to be shown in this way that ἀγαθόν is τέλος in the sense that it is ἀπλῶς τέλειον, τέλειον in the strict sense.

In this rather formal consideration of structure, the consequences are not yet seen without explanation. However, we will see, from here on out, how in particular the Aristotelian determination of the *basic possibility of the being-*

there of human beings, the *θεωρεῖν*, becomes intelligible. *Θεωρεῖν* is being-there's ownmost possibility since in it being-there reaches its end in such a way that it is transposed into its most genuine possibility, into its ownmost there, as *θεωρεῖν* constitutes the most genuine *ἐντελέχεια* of the being of human beings. What was concrete in Greek existence as an *existence-tendency* is here brought to its most genuine expression, and in such a form that Aristotle makes this *existence* intelligible on the basis of its genuine sense of being and being-there, and grounds it therein.

The most general and immediate determination of the *τέλειον* is that beyond which there is nothing to apprehend, in the sense that a *being-character* comes to expression therein. *Τέλειον* is not a being as a being, but rather as *way of being*. Shoes, work tools, and so on, *ὑποκείμενα*, all of these beings are *τέλη* only when their *being-character* is thereby made explicit; that by which a definite handiwork reaches its end genuinely is. The beyond-which-nothing is not being-completed in a negative sense of being-toward-the-end, but is to be taken in the positive sense as *constituting the genuine there*. The *τέλος* is in such a way that it *maintains* the being *in its presentness*. The sense of being is determined by this *being-present*.

With this clarified concept of *τέλειον*, we come to Aristotle's further consideration with respect to the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*. The *ἀγαθόν* of human being-there must be a *πέρας* because every being is determined as limit-being. Thus the question is: which character does the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* have qua *τέλος*? Which determinations arrive at this *τέλος* itself?

This discussion is carried out on the concrete basis of the being-there of human beings, in the way that it is seen in natural experience, specifically, human being-there as being-with-one-another in the *πόλις*, being-with-one-another in concern. Human concerns proceed in a guiding connectedness. The *τέλη* refer, in themselves, to one another, that is, the *τέλη* are at every moment *δι' ἕτερα*. This is a being-determination of the *τέλη*. It is not as though the *τέλος* is something lying before one, that then finds a definite use. Already, that which the instrument-maker is after has in itself the character of usability for . . . This concern to produce a shoe is determined in itself by the fact that the *τέλος* is the ability-to-be-worn of the shoe. "Not all *τέλη* are *τέλεια*"⁹⁵ in the way that they are encountered in concrete being-there. Not everything with which a concern reaches its end is *τέλειον*. The *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* becomes *τέλειον* only in the genuine sense.⁹⁶ It is said of it that it does not go *εἰς ἄπειρον*,⁹⁷ that the guidedness of the *τέλη* of *πράξεις* does not lose itself in the infinite. The discussion of the *βίοι*, of the *τέλη καθ' αὐτά*, concluded that there is a manifoldness of *τέλη καθ' αὐτά*, so that the *ἄριστον* must be that which is *τελειότατον* in relation to

95. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 27 sq.: οὐκ ἔστιν πάντα τέλεια.

96. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 28: τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται.

97. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 a 20.

the τελειότερον among these τέλη καθ' αὐτά⁹⁸—that which has the character of end more genuinely and to a greater extent. From this, arises the question of the τελειότερον and of the τελειότατον, since there is presumably a manifoldness of τέλη καθ' αὐτά.

What belongs to a ἀπλῶς τέλειον?⁹⁹ At first, Aristotle gives the definition of the τελειότερον: τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον.¹⁰⁰ “The τελειότερον is that καθ' αὐτό, which διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον, which is pursued, taken hold of, by something that is on account of another (i.e., on its account).” This definition of the τελειότερον with respect to a δι' ἕτερον, “something that is for the sake of another,” is indeed a necessary but not a sufficient definition.

With respect to the καθ' αὐτό, that τελειότερον which μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο¹⁰¹ and αἰεὶ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν,¹⁰² is such a δι' αὐτό that “constantly,” “always,” is what it is. The τέλη καθ' αὐτά: ἡδονή, τιμῆ, ἀρετή, “can in the end and for the most part be appropriated for the sake of εὐδαιμονία”: τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ [. . .] ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά [. . .], αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν.¹⁰³ These τέλη can also have a different τέλος in the background, whereby it *genuinely depends on human beings*. In the end, this τέλος is *being-there itself*. That is to say, should the ἀπλῶς τέλειον be something that is constantly and always καθ' αὐτό, then there is the possibility, for the being-there of human beings, of something that applies to this being-there as such. The αἰεὶ is not meant in the Platonic sense, but is related to the being of human beings. The being *on which it ultimately depends* can, for being-there, only be *its way of being*, so that here a fundamental determination of being-there shows itself: *such a being that, in its being, depends upon its being, explicitly or inexplicitly*. Consequently, the ἀπλῶς τέλειον is that which constitutes, per se, the being-completed of being-there, the *very being-possibility of being-there itself*. If being-there as being-in-the-world were determined by the τέλη (ἡδονή, τιμῆ) as a *disposition*, then the being-possibility would be designated as a *disposition*, the way of being-there as διαγωγή,¹⁰⁴ as “whiling” in a world. This being-there in the most genuine sense has its possibility of fulfillment in θεωρεῖν.

This determination, that ultimately the being of being-there is that which constitutes per se being-there in its there, is echoed in the *Kantian* definition of the human being: the rational essence exists as an *end in itself*. This definition is, at the same time, the ontological condition of the possibility of the *categori-*

98. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 30.

99. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 33.

100. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 30 sq.

101. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 31 sq.

102. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 a 33: καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν αἰεὶ.

103. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 b 2 sqq.

104. Eth. Nic. K 7, 1177 a 27.

cal imperative. Insofar as the rational essence is something that is open to law in the basic determination of *respect*, and at the same time is in such a way that its being is by itself oriented toward the end to a certain extent, and so has no further why, this law is in itself the ultimate; the ought is *categorical*, not hypothetical. For the being of human beings, there is no if, but rather an *ultimate then*. Since the *idea of law* comes into play, the foundation and opening up of this context has a different look. The idea of law is oriented toward *the lawfulness of nature*, by which law is yet further apprehended. However, nature is, here, the manner of being-there, and thus in the sense of φύσις (Aristotle). It is remarkable to observe that *Kant* apprehends the concept of the law of nature in the further, almost Aristotelian, sense. “Act in such a way that the maxim of your action could be a universal law of nature.”¹⁰⁵ The maxim is not supposed to be a law of nature as explicit law, but rather as a *mode of being-there per se*.

Thus the *being itself of human beings* is what, in the end, constitutes the ἀπλῶς τέλειον of a being that is there. And this ἀπλῶς τέλειον is what one means by the expression εὐδαιμονία. Aristotle gives this popular, ordinary concept a specifically philosophical sense by determining the meaning of εὐδαιμονία on the basis of being-there itself. In the context of this clarification of εὐδαιμονία as ἀπλῶς τέλειον, Aristotle fleshes out this τέλειον in such a way that it is determined as τέλειον of the being-there of human beings. This relatedness that is constitutive of the τέλειον as being-completed comes to expression in the determination of the αὐταρκες: “that good which makes the being-there of human beings completed shows itself to be self-sufficient. [Since the human being, in accord with its own being-possibility, is a living thing that lives in terms of being-with-one-another, a ζῶον πολιτικόν] the determination of the τέλειον as self-sufficient cannot be related to individuals, nor does it apply primarily to those who maintain a solitary life. Instead, being with one’s parents, with children, with one’s wife, friends, and those who are in the πόλις with one, is implicit in being-there itself. A ὄρος must be won from this determinate being-with-one-another, insofar as it is supposed to be a being-there. For if one extends being-with-one-another to friends of friends, and relatives of relatives, and so on, one loses it, goes εἰς ἄπειρον.”¹⁰⁶ Genuine being-with-one-another loses itself if it is a reckless being-with-all-human-beings. It is legitimate when it has its definite limit in itself. In this way, the further determination shows

105. Cf. I. Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, in Immanuel Kant’s *Werke*, edited by E. Cassirer, Volume IV, Berlin 1913. p. 279: “Handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden sollte.”

106. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 b 8 sqq.: τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δὲ αὐταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναίκεσσι καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὄρος τις ἐπεκτείνονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν.

how the τέλειον ἀγαθόν is seen from the outset, a role that being-with-one-another plays in the τέλειον as αὐταρκες.

A definition of εὐδαιμονία: it is not somehow συναριθμουμένη,¹⁰⁷ “added together,” a sum. Aristotle says that if, as the determination of the αὐταρκες suggests, a manifoldness of relations constitutes the being-completed of being-there, then it must be observed that it does not depend on a sum, on a how much, nor is the τέλειον to be taken in this way, nor is the manifoldness of relations to be understood in the sense of a sum. Instead, they are to be understood on the basis of the being in which τέλειον is εὐδαιμονία, on the basis of πράξις. The τέλειον of being-there itself is not a summative ‘what’ that one could assemble (μὴ συναριθμουμένη), but rather a how of the εὖ, εὐζωία, that which constitutes the genuine τέλειον of being-there itself.

Thus we have an entire series of characters of the ἀγαθόν. If we recall the discussion of the βίοι, the results are as follows: (1) the οικεῖον and (2) the δυσσφαίρετον are basic determinations of the ἀγαθόν. 3. The being of being-there itself as ἀπλῶς τέλειον is that which is at home in the most genuine sense in being-there. 4. The determination of the ἀγαθόν as αὐταρκες.

b) The ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν as the Being-Possibility of Human Beings Which Is Sufficient for the Sense of ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν

After this consideration, Aristotle poses a further question concerning what this ἀγαθόν genuinely is, what it genuinely is for the being of human beings that is sufficient for this sense of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν so determined. ποθεῖται δ’ ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστὶν ἔτι λεχθῆναι [ἀγαθόν].¹⁰⁸ “One wishes that a more precise, conclusive answer be given to the question of what ἀγαθόν is.”

Aristotle provides general guidance for investigating the ἀγαθόν: I discover the ἀγαθόν of a being when I see it in its ἔργον.¹⁰⁹ There is always an ἔργον in every kind of πράξις. In *working* itself, the ἀγαθόν as such appears to be discoverable. When I thus inquire into the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, I must direct my view at what the ἀνθρώπινον ἔργον for the being-there of human beings is,¹¹⁰ that concern of human being-there which constitutes the being-there of human beings as such. Is there such an ἔργον ἀνθρώπινον at all?

When we look around at the concrete being-there of human beings, we see definite professions, concerns: builder, shoemaker, and so on. They are the determinations of human being-there that do not apply to every human being as human. In these concerns, human beings are occupied with their hands, they go on foot, in the sense that they see and apprehend that certain parts of this being-there have, at each moment, their definite tasks and being-possibility.

107. Eth. Nic. A 5, 1097 b 17: μὴ συναριθμουμένην.

108. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1097 b 23 sq.

109. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1097 b 26 sq.: ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθόν εἶναι.

110. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1097 b 24 sq.: τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

The question is whether, in addition—beside the ἔργον of the shoemaker, carpenter, etc.—there is yet another ἔργον of human beings that would be ἴδιον¹¹¹ to human beings as human, “proper” to them. Aristotle answers this question decisively, not in the realm of fantasy, but in such a way as to open our eyes. It is a matter of *seeing* the ἴδιον, of “excluding,” ἀφορίζεσθαι,¹¹² everything that human life shares with other living things. Thus all possible life is brought within the investigation’s field of vision. In the concrete presentation of the life of human beings, everything that is given as discoverable in other living things as well, is thereby removed.

The investigation’s field of vision is the being that is there in the sense of living. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζῶην.¹¹³ “Living appears also to be shared with plants, but the ἴδιον is what is to be sought. Thus the mode of living that we designate as getting nourishment and growing is to be excluded [as a distinctive possibility of life].” In taking in nourishment, a living thing is in its world in an entirely definite mode. This being-in-the-world can refer back to the manner of bringing into the world, generating and bearing offspring. We have the specific expression “coming into the world.” Getting nourishment and growth are only definite being-possibilities of living, in which this basic possibility, the γεννᾶν, is developed. However, it is nothing specifically human.

In the being of human beings as being-in-the-world, we observe αἴσθησις.¹¹⁴ Animals perceive the world within definite limits; they are in the world in such a way that they have the surrounding world there; they have a definite orientation in it. Therefore, this being-oriented in the world, this somehow-having-it-explicitly-there, is not proper to human beings as such.

We must always have our view concretely directed upon human beings. Other ways of living are seen along with it. λείπεται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.¹¹⁵ Yet “there remains,” for human being, still another mode of being-in-the-world, which is to be in it in such a way as to be able to be concerned about something, and “the concern of a being that speaks.” The ἴδιον ἔργον, the genuine mode of human beings, is πρᾶξις, determined as a mode of being-in-the-world precisely through speaking, μετὰ λόγου,¹¹⁶ κατὰ λόγον.¹¹⁷

On the basis of the preceding, we know that it is a matter of what constitutes the genuine being-possibility. However, concern can *be at rest*; a human being can even sleep away his existence. It depends upon the genuine manner

111. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1097 b 34.

112. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1097 b 34 sq.: ἀφοριστέον.

113. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1097 b 33 sqq.

114. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 2: αἰσθητικὴ τις.

115. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 3 sq.

116. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 14.

117. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 7.

of being-there, so that the ἔργον is *there* for the one who in concern is *present in himself*, so that the human being is *in* ἔργον, κατ' ἐνέργειαν.¹¹⁸ The human being may be defined with respect to *genuine living and rising up into concern*.

And this κατ' ἐνέργειαν admits of a further being-determination. We know that the being of human beings is determined through ἀρετή, the mode of being in which the τέλος is possessed—τέλος as the beyond-which-nothing. So, ἐνέργεια is: προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς,¹¹⁹ with respect to the fact (ὑπέροχος from ὑπερέχω) that ἔργον is taken in its ownmost being-possibility, namely *as fulfilling itself in ἀρετή*, as actually there. For example, in the case of the violin player, we distinguish between violin players. A bad one is distinguished from one who is σπουδαῖος, a “serious” κιθαριστής,¹²⁰ who has taken his being-possibility seriously, who has genuinely put into work his having what he is at his disposal.

In this way, it appears that the ἔργον of human beings is πρακτικὴ ζωή. Thus, insofar as the τέλος of human beings does not lie outside itself but rather *in itself as its being-possibility*, the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν is ζωή itself, “living” itself. The ἔργον is living itself, apprehended in the sense of being-in-the-world μετὰ λόγου, in such a way that it is thereby spoken. Thus the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν is ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν.¹²¹ The ψυχή is determined as constituting the being of living things. This being-in-the-world as ἐνέργεια is a definite possibility of concern, of πράξις, as put into work; and this setting-into-work as εὖ, taken hold of seriously (σπουδαῖον), so that the ultimate being-possibility is grasped in its end.

We will not follow more closely Aristotle's detailing of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. In Chapters 7–12 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he discusses, in connection with the tradition, the concrete context of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, so defined, with the possibilities of being-there in the πόλις. As to conceptuality as an affair of the being-there of human beings, we need to see this basis, being-there itself, more sharply. In connection with the discussion of the ἀγαθόν, we have succeeded in defining being-in-the-world, one aspect of which is ψυχή, the ontologically basic determination of living, ψυχή as πρακτικὴ ἐνέργεια. As a result of the investigation, we find the guidance that Aristotle himself offers, when he says that knowing-the-way-around, which constitutes the being-there of human beings as being-with-one-another, must be instructed περὶ ψυχῆς.¹²² That does not mean that a politician must also be a psychologist, but that he has to be involved with the genuine being of living things in its basic structure. *Psychology* has nothing to do with “consciousness” or “experiences,” but is rather only the *doctrine of the being of living things*, the ontology of the way of

118. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 6.

119. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 10 sq.

120. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 11 sq.: κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ.

121. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 16.

122. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1102 a 18 sq.: δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν.

being characterized by living. Being oriented *περὶ ψυχῆς* means nothing other than being clear about the genuine determinations of living according to being. For the *πολιτικός*, the task has definite limits. Aristotle carries out the more focused orientation toward *ψυχῆ* by way of the average meanings that living has about itself. Such meaning is the determination of human beings as *ζῶον λόγον ἔχον*. The further determinations move in this direction.

CHAPTER THREE

The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings with regard to the Basic Possibility of Speaking-with-One-Another Guided by Rhetoric

§13. Speaking-Being as Ability-to-Hear and as Possibility of Falling: The Double-Sense of ἄλογον (Nicomachean Ethics A13; De Anima B4)

So far, this consideration came to a preliminary end when we set forth the basic determinations that pertain to this being of human beings. We reached the definition of the being of the ζωή of human beings. Aristotle defines it as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.¹ Ἐνέργεια is a character of those beings that are ensouled, that are in the mode of being in a world. Ζωή is a type of living that is there in an active mode, such that this being-there lives genuinely in concern, so that it has its τέλος in such a way that it brings the being-there of the human being to its genuine end. In the concrete elaboration of the being of human beings, ἀρετή must now be dealt with. This also coincides with Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the detailed consideration of the ἀρεταί. You can see from the preceding what this topic genuinely means by keeping the aim of the consideration in view.

We will not follow out the consideration of the ἀρεταί. Here, we are not interested in the concrete elaboration of the interpretation of being-there, but rather in another aspect that is found here, namely, that the being of human beings, ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν, has the *character of speaking*: πρᾶξις μετὰ λόγου. In a certain sense, this consideration goes together with the others (κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν). Here, we put the emphasis on the μετὰ λόγου insofar as we are always inquiring into the λόγος, into that speaking about, and addressing of, the world, wherein concept and conceptuality are at home. We are seeking the basis, the indigenous character, of concept formation in being-there itself. Concept formation is not an accidental affair, but a basic possibility of being-there itself insofar as being-there has made a decision in favor of science.

The preliminary determination of ζῶον λόγον ἔχον already showed that a basic character of being-there as ζῶον πολιτικόν is revealed therein: the human being is in the mode of being-with-one-another; the basic determination of

1. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1102 a 5 sq.

its being itself is being-with-one-another. This being-with-one-another has its basic possibility in speaking, that is, in speaking-with-one-another, speaking as expressing-oneself in speaking-about-something. Λόγος comes into play not only with this fundamental determination, but also precisely where Aristotle poses the question concerning the possible ἀρεταί. The investigation thereof is divided according to the investigative clue that Aristotle himself carries through with regard to the λόγον ἔχον. The λόγον ἔχον is only superficially clarified. An entire series of determinations is found therein.

The being-there of human beings, characterized as λόγον ἔχον, is more precisely determined by Aristotle in such a way that in the human being itself, its speaking-being still plays a fundamental role. In being-with-one-another, one can be the one speaking and the other the one *hearing*. Ακούειν, “hearing,” is genuine αἴσθησις. Whether or not seeing in connection with θεωρεῖν reveals the world in the genuine sense, it is still *hearing* because it is the *perceiving of speaking*, because it is the *possibility of being-with-one-another*. The human being is not only a speaker and a hearer, but is for itself such a being that *hears itself*. Speaking, as self-expression-about-something, is at the same time a speaking-to-oneself. Therefore, the definition of λόγον ἔχον further contains in itself that the human being also has λόγος in the mode of *hearing this, its own speaking*. In human beings, there is a being-possibility that is to be characterized as ὑπακούειν. Aristotle exhibits this basic phenomenon through concrete contexts of being-there themselves, through peculiar phenomena that are touched upon in Book 1, Chapter 13 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and that Aristotle designates as παράκλησις, “incitement,” νουθέτησις, “making notable,” ἐπιτίμησις, “reproach.”² All of these modes of natural speaking-with-one-another carry in themselves the claim that the other does not merely take notice of something, but *takes something up, follows something, reflects* on something. The other *repeats* that which is spoken in such a way that in repeating he *listens* to it, such that the following results: *in the being of the human being as concerned lies the possibility of listening to its speaking*.

This possibility of hearing, this ἀκουστικόν,³ is more precisely found together with the mode of being that is fundamentally found in πράξις, with ὄρεξις.⁴ Every concern has *tendency* in itself; it is *after something*, directed at an ἀγαθόν that is always there as λεγόμενον, as “something addressed.” This *being-after* listens to what is spoken, to what is given in advance of that with which it should be concerned and how it should be concerned. We are seeing more clearly that concerned living, within which there is also the speaking that speaks in such a way that it thereby listens to itself. Ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου speaks in such a way that it listens to itself. This concerned listening to the

2. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1102 b 34 sq.

3. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1103 a 3.

4. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1102 b 30 sq.: τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πῶς [λόγου].

speaking itself is not, as ὄρεξις, genuine speaking; it is only speaking insofar as it listens to the speaking. To the extent that it is not genuine speaking, Aristotle designates it as ἄλογον.⁵ That does not mean that it lacks any relation to speaking, but that it is just not κυρίως;⁶ ὄρεξις is not primarily speaking. Ἄλογον has a double-meaning in the full determination of the being of human beings:⁷ (1) not to be speaking in the sense of listening to speaking, (2) not to stand in the context of speaking at all, as θρεπτική, nourishing, reproducing are unrelated to λόγος and are unrelated to it in an entirely fundamental sense. The function of gastric juices has absolutely no relation to the speaking of human beings. Ἄλογον is therefore, on the one hand, determined with regard to θρεπτική; but then it is a being-possibility characterized by the ability-to-listen to speaking itself. Genuine speaking is being λόγον ἔχον κυρίως.

This is the clue to the partitioning of the possible ἀρεταί. There are ἀρεταί, modes of possibilities of being, that are oriented by genuine speaking, deliberating, concrete grasping. Then there are modes of being able to have being at one's disposal, in which λόγος is also there, but in which the deciding factor lies in the "taking hold," the προαίρεσις. The first are the ἀρεταί διανοητικά; the second are ἀρεταί ἠθικά.⁸ διανοεῖσθαι: "to think through," "to suppose in a thorough manner," "to reckon through." Ἡθικός does not mean "moral"; one must not superficially hold oneself to words when considering the "ethical virtues." Ἡθος means the "comportment" of human beings, how the human being is there, how he offers himself as a human being, how he appears in being-with-one-another—the way that the orator speaks, has a comportment in the way he stands with respect to the matters about which he speaks. The partitioning of the ἀρεταί cannot be followed more closely now. Later, we will examine the ἀρεταί διανοητικά⁹ since the basic possibility of considering, of scientific research, of the βίος θεωρητικός, and therewith the basic possibility of human existence, is found in their domain. For us to get λόγος in view, it is important that this fundamental division of human being-possibilities, among orientations to λόγος, is seen in its basic possibility of λόγος.

The human being is a being that speaks. This definition is not invented by Aristotle. He says explicitly that with this definition he repeats an ἔνδοξον, a δόξα, that has authority in Greek being-there itself. Already before Aristotle, the Greeks saw the human being as a being that speaks. Even the distinction between λόγον ἔχον and ἄλογον goes back to the ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι.¹⁰ Ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι: for a long time, one puzzled about what that really means. The opinion

5. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1102 b 29, 34.

6. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1103 a 2.

7. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1102 b 28 sq.

8. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1103 a 4 sq.: λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς.

9. Editor's note: A detailed interpretation of ἀρεταί διανοητικά is not found in this lecture. But see the reference to the ἔξις of ἀληθεύειν at p. 263 ff.

10. Eth. Nic. A 13, 1102 a 26 sq.: λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.

that was developed and propagated was that it referred to Aristotle's dialogues since those writings were made public. This opinion did not last. The real sense of ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι was put forth for the first time by *Diels* in 1883, in the proceedings of the Berlin Academy.¹¹ Jaeger adopted this meaning and made it fruitful for the determination of the literary character of Aristotle's writings.¹² Ἐξωτερικός λόγος is the mode of speaking *outside of science*, "how one carries on discourse," and what is suppressed in this discoursing. Aristotle explicitly refers to this when he takes up the ἄλογον as the basic determination of human beings. That gives us an essential indication of the fact that, ultimately, if the determination of ζῶον λόγον ἔχον is so fundamental, then this investigation of Aristotle's must have an actual basis. It is not accidental that, in their natural self-interpretation, the Greeks defined the being-there of human beings as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον.

We do not have a corresponding definition. At best, an approximately corresponding definition would be: the human being is a living thing that reads the newspaper. At first, that may sound strange to you, but it is what corresponds to the Greek definition. When the Greeks say that the human being is a living thing that speaks, they do not mean, in a physiological sense, that he utters definite sounds. Rather, the human being is a living thing *that has its genuine being-there in conversation and in discourse*. The Greeks existed in discourse. The orator is the one who has genuine power over being-there: Ῥητορικὴ πειθοῦς δημιουργός,¹³ the ability-to-discourse is that possibility in which I have genuine dominion over the persuasion of human beings in the way that they are with one another. In this basic Greek claim, the ground for the definition of the human being is to be sought. In addition, when the Greek reads, he also hears, and it is no accident that all of the texts that we have from Aristotle are lectures, the spoken word.

One must take fully into account that the Greeks lived in discourse, and one must note that if discourse is the genuine possibility of being-there, in which it plays itself out, that is, concretely and for the most part, then precisely this speaking is also the possibility in which being-there is *ensnared*. It is the possibility that being-there allow itself to be taken in a peculiar direction and become absorbed in the immediate, in fashions, in babble. For the Greeks themselves, this process of living in the world, *to be absorbed* in what is ordinary, *to fall* into the world in which it lives, became, through language, the *basic danger of their being-there*. The proof of this fact is the existence of *sophistry*. This predominant possibility of speaking is taken seriously by sophistry.

11. H. Diels, *Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles*. In: Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Jahrgang 1883. Berlin 1883. pp. 477–494.

12. W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*. Berlin 1912. p. 134 ff.

13. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 453 a 2.

Protagoras's principle: τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν¹⁴—to discuss geometry with a geometer, even if one understands nothing about geometry, to guide the conversation in such a way that I conquer the other without knowledge of the matter discussed. Sophistry is the proof that the Greeks fell prey to the language that *Nietzsche* once named “the most speakable of all languages.”¹⁵ And he had to know, ultimately, what the Greek world was. It must be noted that, in the fourth century BC, the Greeks were completely under the dominion of language.

We must take measure of what it means to retrieve speaking from this alienation of Greek being-there, from conversation and idle chatter, to bring speaking to that place in which Aristotle can say that λόγος is λόγος οὐσίας, “speaking about the matter as to what it is.” Aristotle stood in the most extreme opposition to that which was vital around him, to that which stood against him in the concrete world. One must not imagine that science had fallen into the laps of the Greeks. The Greeks were completely absorbed in the outward. At the time of Plato and Aristotle, being-there was so burdened with babble that it required the total efforts of them both to be serious about the possibility of science. What is decisive is that they did not take up a new possibility of existence from just anywhere, such as from India and thus from the outside, but rather *from out of Greek living itself. They were serious about the possibility of speaking.* That is the *origin of logic*, the doctrine of λόγος. The current interpretation is unsuitable for gaining an understanding of logic.

The current way of considering rhetoric is equally a hindrance to the understanding of the Aristotelian *Rhetoric*. In the Berlin Academy edition, the *Rhetoric* has been put at the end.¹⁶ They did not know what to do with it, so they put it at the end! It is a sign of complete helplessness. The tradition lost any understanding of rhetoric long ago, since it had become simply a school discipline even in the time of Hellenism and in the early Middle Ages. The original sense of rhetoric had long disappeared. Insofar as one forgot to inquire into the concrete function of Aristotelian logic, one gave up the basic possibility of interpreting this so that it would thereby become clear that rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of being-there is explicitly fulfilled. *Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there, the hermeneutic of being-there itself.* That is the intended sense of Aristotle's rhetoric. Speaking in the mode of speaking-in-discourse—in public meetings, before the court, at celebratory occasions—these possibilities of

14. Rhet. B 24, 1402 a 23 sq.

15. Cf. F. Nietzsche, “Geschichte der griechischen Beredsamkeit,” in Nietzsche's *Werke*, Volume 18, Part Three: *Philologica*. Second Volume: *Unveröffentlichtes zur Literaturgeschichte*, edited by O. Crusius, Leipzig 1912, pp. 199–236: “Das Volk, das sich an solcher Sprache, der sprechbarsten aller, ausbildete, hat unersättlich viel gesprochen . . .,” p. 202.

16. Aristotelis opera. Ed. Academia Regia Borussica. Volumen secundum: Aristotelis Graece ex recognitione I. Bekkeri volumen posterius. Berlin 1831. pp. 1354–1420.

speaking are definitively expounded instances of customary speaking, of how being-there itself speaks. With the interpretation of the *Rhetoric*, one aims at how basic possibilities of the speaking of being-there are already explicated therein. But if we present ourselves with this ground of Greek being-there, we will understand that the definition of the human being as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον is not an invention, is not arbitrary, but reproduces the way that the Greeks primarily see their being-there. Therefore, we must briefly examine the main definitions that Aristotle gives of λόγος as discourse. Here, an interpretation of the *Rhetoric* cannot be carried out. It is a matter of understanding the definition ζῶον λόγον ἔχον more precisely, in order to better apprehend where the definition λόγος οὐσίας, ὀρισμός, theoretical speaking with the matter itself, has its ground.

With regard to ἀρετή, with regard to the ability to have the being-possibility of the beings in question at one's disposal εὐδαιμονία is a definite way of being-actual of living as such. But there is a manifoldness of such possibilities of being of a living thing, and so the question arises as to how this manifoldness should be articulated. With regard to what are these various ἀρεταί being-possibilities of human beings? The articulation needs a ground that is taken from the being of human beings. For the partitioning of the basic possibilities of the being of human beings, Aristotle also refers back to the basic definition of the being of human beings as λόγον ἔχον. That is, this definition must be shown in its breadth, so that thereby we do not just understand λόγον ἔχον in the genuine sense, but also that the human being is a being that says something to others and therefore *lets something be said*. This is the fully primary meaning of speaking in the sense of *letting-something-be-said-by-others*. Insofar as the human being is the one that speaks, he can say something to himself; as the one that speaks, he has the possibility of *letting-something-be-said-by-himself*. This possibility is revealed by the fact that human beings are with one another in the mode of encouraging, of persuading, of exhorting. Insofar as the human being lets something be said, he is λόγον ἔχον in a new respect. He lets something be said insofar as he *hears*. He does not hear in the sense of learning something, but rather in the sense of having a directive for concrete practical concern. This ability-to-hear is a determination of ὄρεξις. Aristotle designates λόγον ἔχον in this second sense as also ἄλογον. The ὄρεξις is not speaking without qualification, but hearing. Ἄλογον is made use of (1) for λόγον ἔχον in the mode of hearing, (2) for a how of being of living things that have no relation to speaking. Thus it must be kept in mind that the determination of θρεπτικόν and of ἀξητικόν are also fundamental being-determinations as is αἰσθησις. Even taking in nutrition would be viewed in a skewed manner if one were to apprehend it as a physiological process. Reproduction is bringing into the world; taking in nutrition is maintaining oneself in the world.

The vital strength of the being-character of θρεπτικόν and of ἀξητικόν is shown in *De Anima* β, chapter 4: ὥστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἢ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ

κοινοτάτη δύναμις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.¹⁷ “The mode of the ability-to-nourish-oneself is there from the outset, even in other living things, and it is the first and most immediate manner of being-in-the-world. And it is with regard to it that living is there in opposition to all other being-possibilities that are founded in the aforementioned mode.” ἥς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῆ χρῆσθαι.¹⁸ “That which comprises this possibility as accomplishment is procreation and τροφῆ χρῆσθαι.” In χρῆσθαι, the relation to the world comes to expression, just as the things of the world are addressed by the Greeks as χρήματα. φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό, ζῶον μὲν ζῶον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχωσιν ἢ δύνανται.¹⁹ “This being-possibility of bringing into the world is one that belongs most genuinely to the mode of being of living things, to produce another, and precisely in the way that it is, in the mode of its own living, an animal as an animal, a plant as a plant, so that it partakes in being-always and in divinity to the extent that its being-possibility allows this.” Bringing into the world is a determinate mode of being, namely the one that is oriented by the basic idea of being in the Greek sense. In reproduction, a living thing maintains itself in its being by bringing another of its kind into the world. The mode of reproduction is the living thing’s type of always-being-there since being, for the Greeks, means being-present, namely, always-being-present. This passage shows that μετέχειν τοῦ θεοῦ does not mean standing in some religious relation to God. It shows that θεῖον has nothing to do with religion, but is instead a paraphrase of the concept of being in the mode of being-always. Translating θεῖον as “religiousness” is a pure invention.

I have pulled this passage out to make it clear that what we call physiological processes are modes of being that make it possible to genuinely be, to always be there. These being-determinations (θεραπευτικόν, γεννητικόν, αισθητικόν, νοητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν) are divided up according to λόγον ἔχον—ἄλογον. The definition of the human being as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον turns out to be of much wider significance than it seemed at first:

1. In the definition itself: ζῶη πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου.

2. The being-possibilities that human beings can have at their disposal are divided up in accordance with this definition.

3. Genuine speaking with the world, the ὀρισμός, is designated as λόγος.

We must try to approach the concrete ground from which this character of λόγον ἔχον springs. We must not be permitted to assume that speaking was fundamental for the Greeks; it must be exhibited concretely. In addition, the λόγον ἔχον is twofold: (1) ἐπιστημονικόν, (2) λογιστικόν;²⁰ that is, speaking in

17. De an. B 4, 415 a 22 sqq.

18. De an. B 4, 415 a 25 sq.

19. De an. B 4, 415 a 26 sqq.

20. Eth. Nic. Z 2, 1139 a 12.

the sense of theoretical considerations, and speaking in the sense of λογίζεσθαι, of “deliberating” (discussed in Book 6, Chapters 1–2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*).

§14. *The Basic Determination of Rhetoric and λόγος Itself as πίστις*
(Rhetoric A1–3)

How, from Aristotle himself, can we get the idea that speaking-being was the basic phenomenon of Greek being-there and in what way it was? We are in a favorable situation since we possess a *Rhetoric* of Aristotle’s, which surveys the phenomena that are assigned to speaking. Here, it must be noted that rhetoric, as a reflection on speaking, is older than the Aristotelian *Rhetoric*. In Aristotle’s works, there is also handed down to us the rhetoric *ad Alexandrum*. It does not come from Aristotle. The most likely supposition is that it is pre-Aristotelian, and it is attributed to *Anaximenes* by *Spengel*.²¹ Genuine reflection on speaking is traced back to two Sicilian orators, Teisias and Korax. Aristotle was the first to carry out such a reflection. That is no accident, but is grounded in the fact that Aristotle has at his disposal the right concrete view and the cultivated conceptuality for λέγειν itself, and for all phenomena that come to language therewith. The question is: *In what way is λέγειν the basic determination of being-there itself in the concrete mode of its being in its everydayness?* We will take up a few characteristic chapters of the *Rhetoric*, and thus inquire back as to what is shown, on this basis, regarding being-there itself insofar as it does not explicitly reside in discourse. For these ways of discourse, which are expounded there, are only determinate possibilities that are already traced out in the everydayness of being-there.

a) The Basic Definition of Rhetoric as the Possibility of Seeing What
at Each Moment Speaks for a Matter

What does rhetoric mean, generally speaking? In what sense does rhetoric have to do with λέγειν? Aristotle defines rhetoric in Book 1, Chapter 2 as a δύναμις.²² This definition is asserted despite the fact that Aristotle more often designates it as τέχνη. This designation is ungenue, while δύναμις is the genuine definition. “Ρητορική is the *possibility* of seeing what is given at the moment; what speaks for a matter that is the topic of discourse, the possibility of seeing at each moment what can speak for a matter.”²³ A δύναμις; I already said that the

21. Cf. *Anaximenes Ars rhetorica: quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis ad Alexandrum*. Recensuit et illustravit L. Spengel. Turici et Vitoduri 1844; L. Spengel, *Die rhetorica (des Anaximenes) ad Alexandrum* kein mach werk der spätesten zeit. In: *Philologus* 18 (1862), pp. 604–646.

22. *Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 25*.

23. *Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 25 sq.*: ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρησάτου ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

expression τέχνη, which is used from time to time, does not come into play as the basic definition. Rhetoric is δύναμις insofar as it sets forth a “possibility,” a possibility to speak in definite ways. Rhetoric as such does not have the task of πείσαι.²⁴ It does not have to cultivate a definite conviction about a matter, to set it to work with others. Rather, it only sets forth a possibility of discourse for those that speak, insofar as they are resolved to speak with πείσαι as their aim. The ρήτωρ is a δυνάμενος, specifically, a δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν—and not πείσαι—“to see” περι ἕκαστον τὸ πιθανόν. Just as the thief is one that can λάθρα λαμβάνειν.²⁵ But βούλεσθαι belongs to the genuineness of the way of being of a thief, namely, that a thief chose to steal. Still, the δύναμις of ῥητορικὴ is different from that of σοφιστικὴ. Σοφιστικὴ is also a mode of knowing-one’s-way-around discourse, but it is not ἐν τῇ δυνάμει. Instead, it is ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.²⁶ Ῥητορικὴ is maintained ἐν δυνάμει. It cultivates a possibility for the one who wants to convince, a possibility that cultivates in itself the ability-to-see that which speaks for a matter; while it belongs to the sense of σοφιστικὴ to convince another unconditionally. This definition, in contrast with the old definition, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, is much more cautious. It does not include reaching the τέλος of speaking. “Even medicine as such does not make one healthy”;²⁷ instead, it only sets forth a particular possibility for whoever decides to heal someone. The possibility leads up to a certain limit. It puts one in a position “to advance [healing] as far as the possibilities of medicine allow. Thus one can treat those who are hopelessly sick, according to medicinal prescriptions.”²⁸

This comparison of ῥητορικὴ with ἰατρικὴ provides the ground for distinguishing all possible τέχναι from ῥητορικὴ. Medicine includes a determinate knowledge of the matter, and when it is conveyed to others it is a διδασκαλική.²⁹ It teaches; it imparts, within the scope of a *determinate subject area*, that which is given to it in advance, and from the outset, as its topic. Medicine deals with healthy and sick human beings, ἀριθμητικὴ deals with numbers, and every knowing-one’s-way-around deals with a determinate subject area.³⁰ Ῥητορικὴ has *no subject area* that can be demarcated in any way. Because it does not, it should not be designated as τέχνη. Ῥητορικὴ is not τέχνη, though it is τεχνικόν.³¹

24. Rhet. A 1, 1355 b 10: οὐ τὸ πείσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς.

25. Aristotelis Topica cum libro de sophisticis elenchis. E schedis Ioannis Strache edidit M. Wallies. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1923. Z 12, 149 b 26 sqq.: ἐστὶ ρήτωρ μὲν ὁ δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ πιθανόν θεωρεῖν [. . .], κλέπτῃς δ’ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων.

26. Rhet. A 1, 1355 b 18.

27. Rhet. A 1, 1355 b 12: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι.

28. Rhet. A 1, 1355 b 13 sq.: μέχρι οὐ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν. ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγείας ὁμοῦς θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς.

29. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 28.

30. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 28 sqq.

31. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 33 sq.: διὸ καὶ φαμεν αὐτὴν οὐ περὶ τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφορισμένον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικόν.

It gives an orientation with regard to something, *περὶ ἕκαστον*. It goes “beyond what is simply given,” the beings that are there in the given case.³² And it does not deal with this through description, by describing the matter that is given in a certain situation. It does not deal with the matters themselves, but with the *concrete situation* insofar as something can be extracted from it; that which speaks for something speaks for the conviction that the one discoursing wants to cultivate in others, with respect to this discourse. Thus it deals not with the matter itself, but with the circumstances regarding a definite conduciveness *insofar as it can speak for something*, for the *πιστεύειν*. To get a concrete idea of what rhetoric deals with, we must ask ourselves what in general can come into question *for* a matter. Aristotle distinguishes three types of *πίστεις*, one of which is *λόγος*.³³ *Λέγειν* itself is, correctly understood, a *πιθανόν*.

Up to this point, our consideration has made the basic function of *λόγος* explicit: (1) as determination of the *ζωὴ πρακτική*, (2) as the character of the *ἀρεταί*, (3) *λόγος* as the manner in which beings become accessible in their being—*λόγος οὐσίας* as *ὄρισμός*. Concept formation is characterized by the fact that the beings are determined, abstracted, graspable in their being. We want to learn to understand this possibility as a possibility that is grounded in being-there itself. What is it that constitutes conceptuality itself? We have a guide for this in *λόγος* itself. Insofar as *λέγειν* is the basic mode of being of human beings in the world, it makes possible something like the world’s being kept graspable, determinable in concepts. In *λέγειν*, we will come up against a basic phenomenon of being-there itself (the expression “phenomenon” has the completely ordinary meaning of something that appears in a definite kind of seeing and accessing). As the basic phenomenon of being-there, *λόγος* is such that through it itself a yet more ordinary type of human living becomes visible. The consideration of *λόγος* has shown that, for the Greeks, this basic determination of being-there is an *ἔνδοξον*. Seeing being-there primarily in this way is determined by Greek culture. In what sense does *λόγος* constitute the concrete everyday being-there of the Greeks?

We are better off since we possess the Aristotelian *Rhetoric* rather than a philosophy of language. In the *Rhetoric*, we have something before us that deals with speaking as a basic mode of the being of the being-with-one-another of human beings themselves, so that an understanding of this *λέγειν* also offers the being-constitution of being-with-one-another in new aspects. Since the *Rhetoric* thus gives access to this original phenomenon, it is important to understand what Aristotle designates as *ῥητορικὴ*. *Ῥητορικὴ* is a *δύναμις τοῦ θεωρῆσαι*, “the possibility of seeing”; specifically, of seeing *περὶ ἕκαστον*, seeing at each moment into what, exactly, speaks for a matter that is up for discussion, that is in conversation.³⁴ By way of speaking itself, a definite opinion is to

32. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 32: *περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος*.

33. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 1 sqq.

34. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 25 sq.

be cultivated with others. Whoever appropriates rhetoric, thereby places himself within the possibility of seeing, at each moment, what speaks for a matter. What is suggested by this determination is that rhetoric provides a particular knowing-the-way-around, but in such a way that rhetoric does not deal with a definite subject area, as does, say, arithmetic. It has no underlying matter, no *ὑποκείμενον*, that it itself is to cognize. It has a *τεχνικόν*,³⁵ the possibility of providing a knowing-the-way-around, but not about a determinately demarcated region of beings. Instead, its cultivating of *πιστεύειν* in an audience involves as many various matters as does language. A definition of rhetoric: to see that which speaks for a matter; to cultivate, in speaking itself, *πιστεύειν* with those to whom one speaks, specifically, about a concern that is up for debate at the time; to cultivate a *δόξα*. *Πιστεύειν* is a “view,” *δόξα*, on which speaking depends, and which, therefore, is presumably something that governs, or guides, the everydayness of being-there, the being-with-one-another of human beings. Being-with-one-another moves in definite, always modifiable views regarding things; it is not an insight, but a “view,” *δόξα*. It is a *δόξα* regarding things, but not such that things which are brought to language are themselves thematically investigated. This *πιστεύειν*, “holding in a view” within being-with-one-another, is that upon which discourse itself depends.

Rhetoric has a definite possibility of setting forth, which puts one in a position to see the *πιθανόν*, what is conducive to the cultivation of a *πιστεύειν*. Aristotle also designates this as *πίστις*.³⁶ Here *πίστις* is not “belief” or “opinion,” but that which speaks for a definite matter in relation to which a *πιστεύειν* is to be received. The relation between *πιστεύειν* and *πιθανόν* is analogous to that between *ἀληθεύειν* and *ἀληθές*—the unconcealable-being-that-is-there, which has the possibility of being conducive to *ἀληθεύειν*. *Ἀληθεύειν* is a mode of being-in-the-world, such that one has unconcealed it there just as it is. This *ἀληθεύειν* is the basic phenomenon toward which we are headed. We will come back to this on another occasion.³⁷ It also underlies *λέγειν* insofar as *δόξα* is a definite manner of appropriating beings as they show themselves. *Πίστις* is that which is conducive to the cultivation of a *πιστεύειν*. One should be able to see and learn about the *πιθανόν* through rhetoric. Thus we must first gain an orientation regarding *πίστις*.

b) The Three *πίστεις* *ἔντεχνοι*: *ἦθος*, *πάθος*, and *λόγος* Itself

Aristotle provides a partitioning of the *πίστεις*: (1) *ἄτεχνοι*, (2) *ἔντεχνοι*.³⁸ First, we will consider the *πίστεις* *ἔντεχνοι*, that which speaks for a matter *that we can have at our disposal*, what we ourselves can accomplish by ourselves. We ourselves have the possibility of being something that speaks for a matter.

35. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 34.

36. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 35.

37. See p. 263 ff.

38. Rhet. A 2, 1355 b 35.

For such a speaking-being to be a *πίστις*, means that we become, in ourselves, *πίσταις* as *ἐντεχνοί*, accomplished by ourselves. *Πίσταις ἄτεχνοι*: what speaks for a matter, *what cannot be brought about on account of us*, but rather is there already, which we, therefore, can *put to use*—“witnessing,” “torturing,” “documenting.”³⁹ These *πίσταις* are discussed in Book 1, Chapter 15. There, we find five *πίσταις ἄτεχνοι* in all: νόμοι, μάρτυρες, βάσανοι, συνθήκαι (“agreements”), ὄρκος⁴⁰—in connection with a definite type of discourse, in speaking about what is *δίκαιον*, in juridical proceedings. These *πίσταις* are ways of speaking for a matter that is at issue (in such a proceeding), which lies before us.

In contrast to these, there are the *πίσταις ἐντεχνοί*. Of these ways of speaking-for-something that can be imparted through discourse itself, there are *three types*, in accordance with a three-fold possibility of taking *λόγοι*.

1. ἐν τῷ ἦθει τοῦ λέγοντος,⁴¹ “in the comportment of the speaker,” in the manner by which the speaker offers and comports himself in his discourse. In this, there is something that can speak for the matter. The one giving the discourse is himself a *πίστις* in his ἦθος, in his “comportment.”

2. ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς,⁴² “in the bringing-into-a-disposition,” “in the manner by which the hearer is brought into a definite disposition,” the hearer who also belongs to *λέγειν*. How the hearer is thereby positioned toward the matter, which position he is in, the manner and mode of bringing-the-hearer-into-a-disposition. In this there lies a *πίστις*—something that can speak for the matter. The *διάθεσις* of the hearer determines his *κρίσις*, his “view,” which he ultimately cultivates as he apprehends the matter.

3. ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ:⁴³ *λέγειν* itself is *πίστις* as the basic function of being-there itself. In this way, as was said, information is given about the matter itself. *διὰ τὸ δεικνύναι*:⁴⁴ the manner and mode, as was said, the matter-of-factness, or lack thereof, of the speaker himself.

These determinations must be presented more precisely.

Ad 1. Aristotle says that *λόγος* must be in such a way, discourse must be maintained in such a way, “that it turns the speaker into someone who is trustworthy,”⁴⁵ who thus has influence in saying that the matter is such and such, that it is so. And Aristotle says explicitly that through the discourse itself, through the manner and mode in which the one who discourses himself speaks, ἦθος must become visible, *πίστις* must arise out of discourse itself. If we have firm views, then “we trust all the more quickly, and to a greater extent, the decent human beings who make a good impression, *περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς*,

39. Rhet. A 1, 1355 b 37.

40. Rhet. A 15, 1375 q 24 sq.

41. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 2.

42. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 3.

43. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 3 sq.

44. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 4.

45. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 5 sq.: ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα.

and above all when the matter is controversial, where there can be arguments on this side and that side, where the matter remains unsettled. It is only settled by the manner and mode in which the speaker offers himself.⁴⁶ The previous treatises held the opinion that ἦθος “contributes nothing to what is πιθανόν.”⁴⁷ People had maintained this view before Aristotle—a point against sophistry. One’s comportment, how one behaves oneself, is the “most excellent” πίστις,⁴⁸ the most excellent way for the one discoursing to speak for a matter.

Ad 2. How the hearer is disposed toward what is said of the matter, what mood he is put in, what the διάθεσις of the hearer is. Aristotle offers a clue regarding this, that all judgments are not made in the same manner, for example, “when we are sad or are happy.”⁴⁹ It depends upon whether we are sympathetic toward what is heard or stand opposed to it, ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες.⁵⁰ The διάθεσις of the hearer is decisive. The one discoursing must himself, in his discourse, have his eye toward transposing the ἀκροατής into a definite πάθος, toward inspiring the hearer as to a matter. This πίστις, lying on the side of the hearer, is treated in a detailed way in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Book 2, Chapters 2–20. This investigation into the πάθη was historically quite efficacious. Its influence on the Stoa is evident in the whole doctrine of affects, as they have been handed down to us today. These πάθη, “affects,” are not states pertaining to ensouled things, but are concerned with a *disposition of living things in their world*, in the mode of being positioned toward something, allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects play a fundamental role in the determination of being-in-the-world, of being-with-and-toward-others.

Ad 3. Πίστις, “what is able to speak for a matter,” is speaking of the matter itself. In speaking, the ἀληθές⁵¹ should be exhibited, what is “unconcealed” in the very way that the matter is, free of all determinations. And in particular, this ἀληθές should be shown “on the basis of the occurrences and circumstances that speak for the matter”⁵²—an ἀληθές that is not opened up through θεωρεῖν, but rather makes the true visible in what is probable.

The ἄτεχοι have their sense as πίστει only insofar as they are oriented

46. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 6 sqq.: τοῖς γὰρ ἐπεικέσει πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάπτον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς.

47. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 12: τὴν ἐπεικειαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν.

48. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 13: κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος.

49. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 15 sq.: οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες.

50. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 16. Editor’s note: The notes of Broecker and Schalk cite here ἢ φιλοῦντος ἢ μισοῦντος and the notes of Broecker add in brackets: ‘to remain neutral, μεσεῖω.’ This variant reading, which could be concealed by Heidegger’s previous paraphrase in the grammatical variant ἢ φιλοῦντος ἢ μισοῦντος, finds no support in Heidegger’s handwritten copy. Furthermore, Aristotle treats φιλεῖν together with μισεῖν in the course of his detailed discussion of the πάθη—to which Heidegger himself refers in the margin of his handwritten copy.

51. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 19.

52. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 20: ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν.

toward the τέλος of a definite λέγειν, judicial discourse. At each moment they are put into use. We must get clear about the determination that characterizes ῥητορική as δῶναμις. It will be evident that rhetoric does not offer information about every concrete situation and circumstance, just as medicine does not give information about the medical treatment of Socrates and Callias.⁵³ Rhetoric does not know its way around within a particular case, but rather with regard to cases of this or that type, looking to be this or that way. Rhetoric that analyzes judicial discourse treats cases of this type. Rhetoric itself treats what one debates in life in a customary way, and the manner and mode of talking it through. Its orientation is toward the definite urgency of everyday being-with-one-another, not with regard to every case, but rather with regard to what has a definite standing or prestige: judicial meetings, assemblies, glorification of a hero, and things of that sort.

c) Λόγος Itself as πίστις

α. The Three Forms of Hearer and the Three Types of λόγος to Be Determined from Them: Deliberative Discourse (συμβουλευτικός), Judicial Discourse (δικανικός), and Eulogy (ἐπιδεικτικός)

In Book 1, Chapter 3, Aristotle comes to the basic determination of λόγος that we have learned thus far. He proceeds from the general orientation that speaking has its τέλος in the “hearer,” in the ἀκροατής. Therein lies the fact that speaking is *communication*. A discourse has reached its end only when it is taken as communication. On the basis of *the distinct ways that a hearer can be*, Aristotle determines *three distinct types of λόγος*. The general structure of λόγος itself is such that discourse consists of three aspects: (1) “the speaker” himself; (2) “that about which” there is speaking, what the speaker exhibits; (3) the πρὸς ὄν, the hearer “to whom” he speaks. “The τέλος is in the hearer.”⁵⁴ The λόγοι are to be distinguished by the modes in which, in concrete being-with-one-another, the human being in the πόλις can be a hearer. We must examine how πιστεύειν is cultivated through the various types of discourse. What does πιστεύειν mean for the being-with-one-another of human beings? We must get the context in view. The basic determination of the being of human beings is being-with-one-another, borne by λόγος. But what about λόγος as ὀρισμός, the scientific formation of concepts in the being-there of human beings? The *Rhetoric* serves as a guide for this. We will take up some of its passages.

In rhetoric, the aim is to enter into the possibility of seeing what speaks for the issue in deliberating about something, to be able to see the πίστις. Aristotle distinguishes πίστεις ἄτεχνοι and πίστεις ἔντεχνοι. First, we will treat

53. Rhet. A 2, 1356 b 30 sqq.: οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ υγιεινὸν ἐστὶν ἢ Καλλίᾳ [. . .] οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει.

54. Rhet. A 3, 1358 a 37 sqq.: σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὄν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.

the ἔντεχνοι: that which speaks for something about which we know our way around, which we have appropriated and have at our disposal. These πίστεις touch upon λόγος insofar as λέγειν is that which is in our power. The correctness of this speaking is determined on the basis of that wherein this speaking itself operates. In relation to λόγος, the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι are to be called forth. Speaking is (1) to anyone, with someone; (2) about something, “exhibitive,” δεικνύναι; (3) fulfilled by a speaker. That a person speaks to anyone about something is the phenomenal state of affairs. From this, the three characters of the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι are to be seen: (1) πάθος; (2) contextualized speaking is designated as συλλογισμός, or here as ἐνθύμημα (ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντος ἢ ἐνθυμήματα);⁵⁵ (3) ἦθος. These three πίστεις are at each moment distinguished according to the type of speaking, and the speaking is distinguished relative to the hearer, and in relation to the πιστεύειν, by what is to be achieved with the hearer.

There must, necessarily, be *three forms of hearer*: the θεωρός⁵⁶—terminus technicus for the one who attends a festival, the “onlooker” though not in the sense of one who just sits there, stupidly looking. Rather, it is the one who, at the same time, is κριτής with respect to what he sees, forming an opinion of it: κριτήν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων.⁵⁷ This κριτής is able to form an opinion “as to what is happening or what should come.” ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων οἶον ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων οἶον δικαστής.⁵⁸ “Such a person who forms a judgment about something that is to come is the ἐκκλησιαστής, the one who takes part in the people’s gathering [where that about which there is deliberating has the character of the ‘not yet’, but at the same time the character of an ability-to-be; not in the sense of a pure possibility, but within the circle of concrete possibilities for the one deliberating and for the circumstances.] The judge is to form a view as to what has happened,” ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός,⁵⁹ “the θεωρός about what now is.”

Consequently, *three distinct λόγοι*: (1) συμβουλευτικός, “deliberative speaking,” speaking on this side and that side in the people’s gathering; (2) δικανικός, “judicial discourse,” the discourse of accuser and defendant; (3) ἐπιδεικτικός, a “eulogy,” an “exhibiting” that lets the human being be seen in his life, where it is not a matter of judgment in the sense of a court judgment, but rather where the seeing itself has the tendency of exhibiting.⁶⁰

All three λόγοι have the peculiarity of *operating in two directions*. (1) Deliberative discourse can be (a) προτροπή, (b) ἀποτροπή,⁶¹ “discourse in

55. Rhet. A 2, 1356 b 1 sqq.

56. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 2.

57. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 3.

58. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 4 sq.

59. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 5 sq.

60. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 7 sq.

61. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 8 sq.

the affirmative” or “discourse in the negative,” for or against. ἀεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιούσιν.⁶² “Both those who are deliberating about what concerns themselves, as well as those who take counsel about public matters, remain within these two possibilities.” (2) In judicial discourse: (a) κατηγορία, (b) ἀπολογία.⁶³ Κατηγορεῖν: “to blame a matter on someone,” “to say that he has it on his conscience,” “to accuse”; or ἀπολογεῖν: “to acquit oneself of,” “to defend oneself.” (3) In exhortive λόγος: (a) ἔπαινος, (b) ψόγος,⁶⁴ “praise” or “rebuke.”

The three distinct εἶδη along with their possibilities of outcome are summarily characterized with respect to χρόνος; they are distinguished by the *time-character* of that about which they speak. (1) The χρόνος for deliberation is ὁ μέλλον,⁶⁵ “the near future,” “the upcoming,” “what will be,” at which deliberation aims; (2) the χρόνος of the δικαζόμενος is ὁ γενόμενος,⁶⁶ “what has happened.” (3) ὁ παρών,⁶⁷ “what is present.”

Accordingly, there are domains spoken of that succinctly characterize the aspects that we have already recognized. Ὁ μέλλον χρόνος is something that is conducive to the why of being of being-with-one-another, to being in the πόλις. The being-character of the about-which of the συμβουλευτικός is the συμφέρον as opposed to βλαβερόν,⁶⁸ of the λόγος δικανικός, the δίκαιον as opposed to the ἄδικον;⁶⁹ the about which of the λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός is the καλόν as opposed to the αἰσχρόν.⁷⁰

Every λόγος has, in various modes, these three πίστεις. Aristotle begins the more precise explication of the πίστεις with the ἐνθύμημα, with the “exhibiting of something.” He summarizes the characters thus: ταύτας ἐστὶν λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἦθη καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη.⁷¹ The πίστεις become present in these aspects. Accordingly, a δυνάμενος who wants to dedicate himself to rhetoric must apprehend these three. The συλλογίσασθαι emphasizes more explicitly another possibility beside the θεωρῆσαι. Precisely, the contextualized-ability-to-discourse requires a seeing, an understanding of what speaks for the matter.

β. Rhetorical Speaking with παράδειγμα and ἐνθύμημα as Paralleling Dialectical Speaking with ἐπαγωγή and συλλογισμός

Because the various λόγοι are oriented toward being-with-one-another, “one can treat rhetoric as παραφυῆς of διαλεκτική and περὶ τὰ ἦθη πραγματεία,

62. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 9 sq.

63. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 11.

64. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 12 sq.

65. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 14.

66. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 15 sq.

67. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 17 sq.

68. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 22.

69. Rhet. A 3, 1358 b 25.

70. Ibid.

71. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 20 sqq.

an investigation that one can fairly designate as πολιτική”: ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἦθη πραγματείας, ἣν δικαίον ἐστὶ προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν.⁷² Rhetoric is παραφυές, “what grows up alongside that which is there with discussion of the ἦθη, which one can fairly designate as πολιτικὴ.” Ethics belongs within politics. Here, we must leave aside other modern concepts of ethics and politics, and understand the investigation as one that is primarily oriented toward being-along-with-others, that above all considers individuals being-positioned in relation to others. “Together,” παραφυές, with this investigation is διαλέγεσθαι since being-with-one-another is determined by discoursing-with-one-another. The determination of being-with-one-another in the πολιτικὴ touches upon what is brought to language in rhetoric.

Together with this, there is also the connection with διαλεκτικὴ: that discipline which cultivates the possibility of διαλέγεσθαι, the ability-to-run-through the λόγοι, the possibility of being able to see what genuinely is meant in this discourse, how they appear as opposed to how they should be. Ῥητορικὴ is ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ;⁷³ it is “turned against dialectic.” As opposed to διαλεκτικὴ, ῥητορικὴ is connected with πρᾶξις, “concern.” However, it is not a matter of knowing-the-way around a definite subject-area, any more than διαλεκτικὴ is. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is an ἐπιστήμη, “concrete knowledge”; instead, they are possibilities of “furthering,” “procuring,” the discourse that is properly required at each moment.⁷⁴

Aristotle approaches the third πίστις, λέγειν, more closely insofar as it is an exhibiting of something. He distinguishes definite possibilities within λέγειν itself. I can exhibit something by *adding an example* or by *substantiating a definite thesis*. Δεικνύναι through λόγος is something dual: (1) παράδειγμα, (2) συλλογμὸς ῥητορικὸς as ἐνθύμημα.⁷⁵ This distinction is found, correspondingly, in the διαλεκτικὴ that deals with those λόγοι in which the aim is not a matter of concern, but rather of speaking-with-one-another about a scientific question. The dual sort of showing is also there in διαλεκτικὴ, namely, (1) ἐπαγωγή, (2) ἀπόδειξις (συλλογισμὸς).⁷⁶ Ἐπαγωγή corresponds to παράδειγμα, ἀπόδειξις to ἐνθύμημα. What is meant by ἐνθύμημα? Ἐνθυμεῖσθαι is “to take something to heart,” “to weigh something for oneself,” “to think something over”; ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, μὴ: “to see that something not occur; to be concerned that something does not happen.” Ἐνθύμημα is applied to a definite λέγειν that has in itself the aim toward a concern, a discourse with another about something in which, according to its own tendency, there is a matter of concern. Ἀπόδειξις signifies not merely speaking through matters of fact as to what they are, but

72. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 25 sqq.

73. Rhet. A 1, 1354 a 1.

74. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 32 sq.: περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὀρισμένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους.

75. Rhet. A 2, 1356 b 3 sqq.

76. Rhet. A 2, 1356 b 1 sq., 1355 a 5 sq.

rather speaking in such a way that πιστεύειν grows up by way of the speaking. Those are the two possibilities lying within λόγος itself insofar as it has the task of letting see. Παράδειγμα is a leading-to-something, and it occurs in discourse as it relates to the topic through the use of an example, a concrete case. Παρά means what is present, that which stands before one, what is shown, directly put forward, demonstrated by example.

Aristotle differentiates the parallel forms of the λέγειν of dialectic, ἀπόδειξις and ἐπαγωγή, in the *Topics*, one of his earliest writings.⁷⁷ It treats of the particular λέγειν that is not ἀπόδειξις in the sense of the “scientific discussing” of a matter. The difference between scientific discussing, proving, and συλλογίζεσθαι, as διαλεκτική studies it; and, on the other hand, the connection of the συλλογίζεσθαι of διαλεκτική with that of ῥητορική, become clear when one considers whence, in rhetorical discourse, it issues, whence it is spoken. That from which a συλλογίζεσθαι is spoken, we tend to designate as “premise.” On account of this designation, which orients everything toward the proposition, the genuine sense of speaking is lost.

That from which speaking proceeds in a science must have the character of ἀληθές, must lie open in its being-thus, so that nothing further can be asked about the why. It must be reasonable in itself, for only in this way is it the possible ground from which I can proceed to demonstrate something. In the *Topics*, Aristotle defines συλλογισμός as a “λόγος [an ἀποφαίνεσθαι, a kind of speaking “letting-see”] in which something else comes about, results in addition [something else results in the sense of speaking, is seen, exhibited], something other than that which lies before us from the outset [something other than that which is presupposed as known, from which one proceeds in exhibiting.]”⁷⁸ In this συλλογίζεσθαι, something is introduced, something other than that from which it proceeds, becomes visible. Something else becomes visible precisely “by way of that from which it proceeds.” In “scientific speaking,” ὑπόθεσις is that from which ἀπόδειξις proceeds in the character of the ἀληθές, and is at the same time a πρῶτον.⁷⁹ It is something that is not in need of anything further to-be-discussed or exhibited. That from which it proceeds speaks in itself, for itself, has πίστις on account of itself, so that there is no sense in procuring a πίστις for it.

The συλλογίζεσθαι of διαλεκτική is distinguished from scientific speaking inasmuch as that from which it proceeds, what lies before, has the character of the ἔνδοξον,⁸⁰ is “in δόξα.” Aristotle defines the ἔνδοξον in such a way that it is that “which appears this way or that way to everyone or to most, to most or to

77. Cf. *Top.* A 1, 100 a 25–b 23.

78. *Top.* A 1, 100 a 25 sq.: Ἔστι δὴ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων.

79. *Top.* A 1, 100 a 27 sq.: ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾗ.

80. *Top.* A 1, 100 a 29 sq.: διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἔνδοξων συλλογιζόμενος.

the intelligent among them, those who are recognized among them to the highest degree and have a reputation.”⁸¹ What is characteristic is that the ἐνθύμημα proceeds from an ἔνδοξον, and indeed not only proceeds from it but also refers back to it again, precisely in the way that the scientific result proceeds from something that is in itself self-evident, and again refers back to a fact that has the same evidence as that from which it proceeds. That which comes forth in the ἐνθύμημα has the same character as that from which it proceeds: it is ἔνδοξον.

Ῥητορικὴ has a kinship with the συλλογισμὸς of διαλεκτικὴ insofar as the ἔνδοξον are, here, entirely determinate. The ἔνδοξον of ῥητορικὴ pertains to what is of the future, what has already happened, what is present, what is conducive, what is fitting and what is not fitting, the beautiful and the ugly. About such things, people have definite points of view. There are definite δόξαι on the basis of which he who speaks in the assembly speaks, and speaks in such a way that he offers yet another δόξα, in such a way that there emerges a definite δόξα along with the others. For this task of proceeding from the ἔνδοξον and acquiring an ἔνδοξον, there are the two paths of παράδειγμα and of ἐνθύμημα.

We must be cautious with Δεικνύναι, as it is no proof but rather a definite manner and mode of fulfilling speaking. It is *putting the matter before one's eyes*. To understand the manner and mode in which λέγειν is itself a πίστις, in which it itself can speak on behalf of itself, it is important to observe the *concreteness* with which λόγος is employed as deliberative, as judicial discourse and eulogy.

What will become evident are the peculiar aspects of beings: συμφέρον, δίκαιον, καλόν,⁸² all three with an oppositionality: beneficial or harmful, and so on. Discourse itself moves within an oppositionality. These aspects are determinations of beings, as they are brought to language in an everyday manner. In everyday concern, the συμφέρον, the δίκαιον, and the καλόν come to language—the peculiar characters of encountering what becomes the topic in λόγος ῥητορικῶς.

At the same time, a definite aspect of temporality appears in these aspects themselves. The one who is deliberating about what is encountered in the environing world is concerned with the μέλλοντα χρόνον, what is not yet there; and specifically what is not there in relation to what is posited in a definite care, but is to be made available within everyday life. Then, what has already happened is at play in discourse: for example, it is brought to language that someone has committed an injustice. And what is there now is at play in discourse. The characters of the being-there of the environing world, how they come to language in everydayness, are characterized, at the same time, in relation to temporal-

81. Top. A 1, 100 b 21 sqq.: ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τοῦτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις.

82. Rhet. A 3, 1358 22 sqq.

ity. Everydayness itself is manifested within a fundamental basic-structure: its *temporality*. Being in itself as concern and concerned speaking is *temporal*, concerns the *not-yet-present*, speaks about what *has-happened-already*, treats the *existing-there-right-now*.

Aristotle then goes further. This peculiar stretching in temporality is manifested in the beings that rhetoric takes up. Aristotle apprehends in an ontologically more precise way, in a certain sense in a more formal way, the characters of the being-there of the enviroing world with the aspects of their temporality. What is spoken of as being-thus has the character of “more or less,” is characterized by a μέγεθος,⁸³ a definite “extending” that is defined by the character of indefiniteness. This “more or less” is a basic character of the being of beings, as it is nearly this way and nearly that. Along with this is the aspect of δυνατόν and ἀδύνατον.⁸⁴ These are fundamental determinations of being that come to language in a λόγος: that which is thus, which has such being, that in itself also “can be otherwise,” ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν,⁸⁵ which is already different in the next moment, no longer what it was before.

According to this being-structure of everydayness, λέγειν is also something peculiar. It cannot be “scientific proving,” ἀποδείξις, but rather the being of which we say that it happens day-by-day, does not stand under theoretical axioms but consists of basic opinions, views that have arisen not from a theoretical treatment, but those that life itself has cultivated in everydayness. We will discuss ἔνδοξον and we will do so on the basis of ἔνδοξον. Thus there result definite conditions for how λόγος itself must be with respect to its *exhibiting-character*, its *concreteness*. It must be able to show this everydayness, must be able to exhibit *simply*, without complexity, in such a way that it does not require more detailed arguments: (1) through a definite type of “leading-up,” ἐπαγωγή; (2) insofar as something is spoken of and a conviction is supposed to result from it, συλλογισμός must be a sharpened form of inferring,⁸⁶ since the hearer to whom one speaks in the public assembly is “simple,” ἀπλοῦς.⁸⁷ He cannot “follow a long chain of inference”; he has short-winded thinking; he cannot piece together a connection of thoughts reaching very far; he cannot “piece together very much,”⁸⁸ and therefore the type of exhibiting must also be something different: ἐνθύμημα, such that the proof is taken more to heart for him.

83. Rhet. A 3, 1359 a 22 sq.: δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἄν και περι μεγέθους και μικρότητος και τοῦ μείζονος και τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις ἔχειν.

84. Rhet. A 3, 1359 a 14 sq.: ἀναγκαῖον [. . .] ἔχειν προτάσεις περι δυνατοῦ και ἀδύνατου.

85. Rhet. A 2, 1357 a 13 sqq.: ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι και τό παράδειγμα περι τε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τά πολλά ἔχειν ἄλλως.

86. Rhet. A 2, 1357 a 15 sqq.: τό μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγῆν τό δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, και ἐξ ὀλίγων τε και πολλακτικς ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός.

87. Rhet. A 2, 1357 a 12.

88. Rhet. A 2, 1357 a 3 sq.: οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογιζεσθαι πόρρωθεν.

The distinction between *ἐπαγωγή* and *συλλογισμός* was already set up and clarified by Aristotle in the *Topics*, where preference is given to *ἐπαγωγή* over *συλλογισμός*. *Ἐπαγωγή*, the “leading-up-to,” is a “path toward . . .,” *ἔφοδος*, *ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον*,⁸⁹ “through what is at each moment,” what is there immediately, “to what is ‘on the whole.’” With an example, I want to exemplify something, to make it clear—not the particular case of the example itself, but rather for the sake of what is ‘on the whole,’ *καθόλου*. *Καθόλου* is not general validity, but simply what is ‘such on the whole.’ I say, for example: “If the helmsman is the one who understands his matter best, and the wagon driver is he who does his matter well, then he who in each case understands his matter is the best and the genuine one.”⁹⁰ The advantage of *ἐπαγωγή*: (1) *πιθανώτερον*, a mode of exhibiting that “speaks more for itself”; (2) *σαφέστερον*, it makes no special demands in the mode that the contexts extend; I demonstrate through the example itself; it speaks more for *ἐπαγωγή* since it is “more perspicuous” with respect to grasping; (3) *κατὰ τὴν αἴθησιν γνωριμώτερον*, “more familiar with respect to direct perceiving, with respect to customary apprehending”; it is always something that I can directly bring before me; (4) *τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν*, something that is “common to most, to the average among human beings,” that is more accessible.⁹¹ *Συλλογισμός* too has its advantages, insofar as it (1) is *βιαστικώτερον*, it “has more penetrating power,” and in the end convinces more than mere references to a definite case; that is something varying according to the aim of the discourse; (2) *πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐναργέστερον*. In particular, *συλλογισμός* is more suitable when it is a matter of speaking and questioning as to things, “speaking to them,” where there is no help to be gained by an example.⁹² Both *ἐπαγωγή* and *συλλογισμός* have their positive possibilities. In the *Problemata*, Chapter 18.3, Aristotle treats more extensively the reason why the *συλλογισμός* has this particular penetrating power.

According to the being-character of the way of being of everydayness, speaking and exhibiting are also of an entirely peculiar type. Thus, that from which a *συλλογισμός* proceeds, and which Aristotle designates in the *Analyt-ics* as *πρότασις*, “premise,” always has the character of an *ἔνδοξον*. It contains something about which one has an opinion. Such an *ἔνδοξον* must serve as statement for every *συλλογισμός* that has the character of *ἐνθύμημα*.

Rhetoric is thus itself no purely formal discourse, but instead it appears that it *is related to the being of the being-with-one-another of human beings*. One can only understand the explicit emphasis on the connection between politics and rhetoric when the historical background is presented. Rhetoric is not a *τέχνη* posited by itself, but stands within that of *πολιτική*. The distinctive

89. Top. A 12, 105 a 12 sq.: *ἐπαγωγή δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου ἔφοδος*.

90. Top. A 12, 105 a 14 sqq.: *οἷον εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κράτιστος καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἔστιν ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος*.

91. Top. A 12, 105 a 16 sqq.

92. Top. A 12, 105 a 18 sq.

mode of being in being-with-one-another is in speaking-with-one-another. To set forth the possibilities of being-with-one-another is the *ἔργον* of rhetoric, and because it treats of *λέγειν* in the mode of *ἐνθύμημα* and of *παράδειγμα*, of *συλλογισμός* and the *ἐπαγωγή* of dialectic; it approaches dialectic. These assignments show their character of *dependence*, together with the peculiar being-character in which they operate. One sees how strong the ability-to-see was for the Greeks with respect to the peculiar fact of *everydayness*. In the time of Aristotle, and before him, rhetoric was assessed entirely differently within the being-with-one-another of human beings. It “disappears, is hidden in the shape of politics.”⁹³ Rhetoric makes the claim to be itself politics, and even “those who speak against politics” say that, for they want to set *ῥητορικὴ* in the place of *πολιτικὴ*, “partly out of lack of education, partly out of boasting.”⁹⁴ The genuine business of *πολιτικὴ*, legislating, need not be necessary. In opposition to this, Aristotle emphasizes, in Book 10, Chapter 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that the whole can be carried out only on the basis of a *concrete experience of being-there itself*, that one does not come close to this being-there by passing off the formal discipline of rhetoric as what is decisive.⁹⁵ Thus it requires *knowing-the-way-around in everyday being-there* for those who wish to be occupied within the circle of the *πόλις*. The sophists, on the other hand, who also pose as if they want to ascertain something like the possibility of the rightful being-there of the *πόλις*, “appear to be very far from teaching such a thing. For they do not even know that about which politics is concerned; otherwise, they would not have put rhetoric at the same level as politics or placed it higher than politics, nor would they have come to the opinion that legislating is accomplished by simply culling together what appears good to most people.”⁹⁶ Here, it thus appears that, in fact, the attempt to give rhetoric the basic function of *the genuine understanding of being-there itself* was vital. For this reason, sophists are connected with, and in conflict with, philosophers, and philosophers are the rightful sophists—this is what Plato wants to show in his *Sophist*.

The peculiar position of rhetoric with respect to politics and dialectic is an indication of the peculiarity of that about which it is concerned, and which is not to be taken in the sense of a discipline or *τέχνη*. Here, it is an involving-oneself, something about-which-we-deliberate. The about-which of rhetoric is the speaking-with-one-another-in-a-deliberative-mode for which there is no *τέχνη*. That which occurs to everyone in an everyday and accustomed manner is not specific to a trade or occupation. Everyone is in the position of being able to speak with others in the people’s assembly, and everyone has the possibil-

93. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 27 sq.: ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς.

94. Rhet. A 2, 1356 a 28 sqq.: καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιοῦμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι’ ἀπαιδευσίαν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀλαζονείαν.

95. Eth. Nic. K 10, 1180 b 35 sqq.

96. Eth. Nic. K 10, 1181 a 13 sqq.: λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἔστιν ἢ περὶ ποία ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ’ ἂν ᾗοντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων.

ity of being brought into court. Everyone has the opportunity to hear a eulogy, for example at the Olympic games. This peculiar region, the *everydayness of being-there*, becomes manifest through the right interpretation of the *Rhetoric*, and in fact is manifest as already conceptually explicated in a detailed way.

§15. Δόξα (Nicomachean Ethics, Z10 and Γ4)

In order to make intelligible the *basic phenomenon of everydayness*, the phenomenon that underlies this speaking itself, it is necessary that we come to understand beforehand the sense of ἔνδοξον, of δόξα. Δόξα designates, first of all, the “view of something,” but at the same time it means, for the most part, “to have a view.”

a) Demarcation of δόξα in Contrast with Seeking (ζήτησις), Knowing (ἐπιστήμη), and Presenting-Itself (φαντασία)

1. According to Aristotle, δόξα is οὐ ζήτησις, “not a seeking,” but rather φάσις τις ἤδη.⁹⁷ I have “a view already.” I do not seek first; I am not, at first, on the way to the ascertaining of the structure of a matter, but I am situated thus and so toward the matter. Φάσις: a certain λέγειν, a certain *yes-saying* to that of which I have a view. Insofar as δόξα is characterized by its being a certain yes-saying and not an investigating, a reflecting, a coming-first-to-a-view, it is in the context of ἐπιστήμη. That is, if I possess a knowing of something, in the sense that I know exact information about it, that I can say something about the matter—even if I do not have it before my eyes—this knowing as ἐπιστήμη does not have the character of a ζήτησις, but one knows, thereby, a yes. Δόξα is also a certain yes, a being-situated toward the matter, but it is distinguished from ἐπιστήμη insofar as the following belongs to δόξα.

2. Ὁρθότης.⁹⁸ If I know definite information about something, it belongs to the sense of this knowing that what is known cannot be “false,” cannot be ψευδές, since in that case it would not be ἐπιστήμη. Δόξα must possess ὀρθότης, to which belongs “direction” toward, “being-directed” toward ἀλήθεια.⁹⁹ Having-a-view is thus *only* a view; it could also be otherwise. In itself, δόξα is true and false. It could be thus, and could also be otherwise. Being-directed toward ἀλήθεια is constitutive of δόξα, and therefore the possibility of ψεῦδος belongs to it. *Plato* (*Theatetus*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*) could not yet see that this “it could be otherwise” also belongs to the view itself. This implies that I do not claim absolutely that “it is so,” but instead that it could be otherwise; *we suppose* within a certain φάσις.

3. Therefore, δόξα is also distinguished from φαντασία. Φαντασία: the

97. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b 14.

98. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b 11.

99. Ibid.

“having-present” of something without perceiving it directly, the mere “presenting-itself.” It can be true or false like δόξα.¹⁰⁰ It has both possibilities, but it has them, in a certain sense, only *from without*, while δόξα has the possibility *in itself*. Within the sense of opining itself lies the “can”—true or false. Δυνατόν—ἀδύνατον.

Ἐνδοξον is the manner of being-oriented in which one is oriented toward beings *that can also be otherwise*. There is the possibility of the view being *revised*. With respect to beings that always are how and what they are, with regard to ἐπιστήμη, there is no revision. On the other hand, *revisability* belongs to δόξα in itself; it is assumed of itself. Δόξα is the mode in which the world of being-with-one-another is there. The possibility of a *speaking-against-one-another* in being-with-one-another is thereby brought about. That one has this view and another has that view, since beings can be otherwise, is the basic possibility of *being-against-one-another*. Δόξα is the mode in which we have living there in its everydayness. Living knows from out of itself, not in the way of science, theoretically; that is only a distinct possibility. Δόξα is the mode in which living knows from out of itself. The aim of λόγοι ῥητορικοί, the cultivation of πιστεύειν, is nothing other than the cultivation of a δόξα, of the right view of a matter. For the characteristic aspect of πιστεύειν belongs to δόξα; a certain πίστις, a φάσις, accompanies δόξα itself. Therefore, animals have no δόξα since they have no λόγος; a φάσις is impossible for them. The there for such a being is different.

b) Making-Present of the Context for the Treatment of δόξα

It is important for this consideration that the context of the foregoing be kept in sight, not in the sense of noting the construction of the lecture, but in such a way that the direction of vision toward the appearing phenomena is guided and defined. Human being-there should be made visible on the basis of the basic structure of its being, in order to see the possibility of concept formation on this basis. We determine being-there itself according to its being-character as being-in-a-world, more precisely as being-with-one-another, the having-with-one-another of the world, in which one is. This having-with-one-another is a dealing with the world as concern for the world. This dealing has the character of depending on being itself in this being-in-the-world. Εὐδαιμονία is taken into concern. In concern for that with which living deals, it has concern for its own being. Being-with-one-another in the mode of concern possesses the basic determination of speaking-with-one-another; λόγος is a basic phenomenon of κοινωνία. Λόγος has the basic function of making-manifest that within which living as being-in-a-world maintains itself: δηλοῦν. Being-in-the-world is a way of being that has uncovered the world; being-in it is oriented, the in-which is uncovered. Being-in maintains itself in a definite familiarity, on whose basis it constructs its orientation. *Ultimately, we want to set forth the phenomenon*

100. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 18 sq.

of being-in in order to understand, on this basis, conceptuality as a basic possibility. Being-in-the-world is the basic character of being-there with regard to its discoveredness: the world as that with which living deals within a certain familiarity in a concerned, speaking way. This familiarity regarding the world, and dealing and living in it, is borne by speaking as the peculiar exhibiting of that to which one is oriented. At the same time, this familiarity is the mode in which views and orientations are cultivated. Views are cultivated, renewed, established, hardened in speaking. Speaking-with-one-another is, accordingly, the clue to the uncovering of the basic phenomenon of the discoveredness of being-there itself as being-in-a-world. We take *rhetoric* as a *concrete guide* insofar as it is nothing other than the *interpretation of being-there with regard to the basic possibility of speaking-with-one-another*.

Rhetoric has the task of setting forth that which speaks for a matter, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.¹⁰¹ There are three aspects of beings-that-speak-for-something, three πίστεις, analogous to the structure of speaking itself. (1) Speaking about something, περί τινος δηλοῦν, δεικνύναι; (2) Speaking to someone, πρὸς τινα; he who is spoken to is the ἀκούων (πάθος); (3) Speaking-being itself, λέγων (ἦθος). In all of these, what is spoken about shows itself, with the basic determination that it could be otherwise; from time to time it differs. The being that is under discussion in everydayness is not the αἰεὶ ὄν, but rather the ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, defined as that which can simultaneously be more or less what it precisely is. Aristotle defines the τέλος of πράξις as a τέλος κατὰ τὸν καιρόν.¹⁰² One sees “in the moment” how, where, when, to whom, in the fixing of dealings according to being. A characteristic of concern appears in view of the καιρός—it always vacillates; it does not stand fast. Regarding these beings, it is valid to state definite views, to cultivate others, to bring being-there into δόξα, to carry an ἔνδοξον about the world forward.

Thus we come up against the basic mode in which the world of such concern is possessed: δόξα, translated as “having a view about something,” “about that, I am of the view,” “I am for . . .” Aristotle dealt with this basic phenomenon of δόξα quite often and in various ways. It is the phenomenon that is widely discussed in the late Platonic dialogues, above all in the *Theatetus*, *Philebus*, and *Sophist*. It is a self-evident, hermeneutical rule that these phenomena discussed by *Plato* can be approached through Aristotle, where they are extended further and become clearer than they are in *Plato*. The perspective is opened up for that which *Plato* did not see, a perspective that has a fundamental significance for a basic part of Platonic philosophy.

c) Repetition and Continuation of the Demarcation of δόξα: δόξα and Being-Resolved (προαίρεσις)

I will characterize δόξα more schematically, without going into a genuine in-

101. Rhet. A 1, 1355 b 26.

102. Eth. Nic. Γ 1, 1110 a 13 sq.

terpretation of the section in question (*Nicomachean Ethics Z*, Chapter 10). Three aspects of δόξα stand out as demarcated in opposition to three related phenomena. Δόξα is contrasted with:

1. βουλευέσθαι. This is a “seeking,” a ζήτησις,¹⁰³ a being-after a definite view that I want to achieve. Through deliberating, I want primarily to come to the τέλος of a δόξα; it is not a yes. I only want to appropriate a definite view regarding a set of facts, whereas δόξα is no longer a seeing, but stands at the end of seeing; it is a φάσις.¹⁰⁴ But although it is a yes, it is still not a knowing.

2. Demarcation in opposition to ἐπιστήμη: “knowing information” regarding a matter is characterized by the knower’s being situated with regard to the matter such that he is oriented to it, even if it is not there. I know information about a matter; that means that I am securely situated in relation to the matter. Therefore, I only have ἐπιστήμη about beings with the character of ἀεί. The basic presupposition for the possibility of knowing is a presupposition regarding the being which is known—that it is always the same as it is, that it cannot change. Something that is not ἀεί can change. In ἐπιστήμη, I do not need to have the matter actually there. Regarding the ἐνδεχόμενον, there is no ἐπιστήμη, but only δόξα. Still, δόξα is akin to ἐπιστήμη since it is a yes-saying, a φάσις. It is determined in opposition to ἐπιστήμη through the ὀρθότης.¹⁰⁵ In δόξα, I do not have the being itself, but rather an orientation in relation to it, which is directed to the ἀληθές. The view has the tendency to intend the being unconcealed in itself. But it is found in δόξα itself that it is only a conception that, as conception, is likely false. With δόξα, the matter can indeed be false—it is not an absolute claim. In the being of being-a-view is found the concession that it can be this way or that way; it can also be otherwise. Δόξα with its ὀρθότης is thereby distinguished from:

3. φαντασία, a determinate “making present” of something that can also be true or false, but in a different sense than δόξα. Aristotle treats of the difference in Chapter 3 of Book 3 of *De Anima*.¹⁰⁶ Since φαντασία can also be false, it is related to δόξα. But how can it be false? Because its turning out to be in fact true or false is added to it, while in δόξα the being-able-to-be-true-or-false is already contained in the formation of the view. Φαντασία is simple having-present. Therefore, animals possess φαντασία too, while δόξα is only there where λόγος is. In every view-formation, in every having-a-view, the fact that something speaks for the view is co-given (ἀκολουθεῖν¹⁰⁷ and ἔπεσθαι,¹⁰⁸ as belonging to the phenomenon). ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἅπα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα: γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθής καὶ ψευδής. ἀλλὰ δόξη μὲν ἔπεται

103. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 a 31 sq.: τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν.

104. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b 13 sq.

105. Eth. Nic. Z 10, 1142 b 10 sq.: ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης [. . .], δόξης δ’ ὀρθότης.

106. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 1 sqq.

107. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 22: δόξη ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις.

108. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 20: δόξη ἔπεται πίστις.

πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δ' ἐν πολλοῖς.¹⁰⁹ In δόξα, the being-oriented is toward the ἀληθές. It could be this way, it appears that it would have to be this way—the speaking-for-something of that about which δόξα speaks. To opining, having-a-view about something, belongs a “being-convinced” of this opinion, a πεπεισθαί. Λόγος belongs to being-convinced of something, an “expressing” of that about which I have a view. ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίσκει δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ' οὐ.¹¹⁰ Δόξα is characterized such that something is present to me with the character of the as such and such; it is spoken of. Δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου τίνος ἐστὶν ἢ δόξα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἐστὶν οὐ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις.¹¹¹ With this statement, Aristotle sets up a confrontation with *Plato* (*Sophist* and *Philebus*). The manner and mode in which φαντασία is distinguished from δόξα lies in the way that the ἀληθές and the ψευδές are themselves co-meant.

4. The decisive distinction, then, lies in the fact that δόξα is demarcated in opposition to to προαίρεσις. Aristotle draws this distinction in Chapter 4 of Book 3 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. At first glance, this juxtaposition of δόξα and προαίρεσις is surprising. One does not immediately see that being-resolved about something and having-a-view about something have anything to do with each other. It should be noted that προαίρεσις had been interpreted by previous philosophy, by *Plato*, as a certain kind of δόξα. Therefore, there must be certain aspects of the phenomenon of προαίρεσις that allow this interpretation. This becomes clear when we translate δόξα correctly: “I am for maintaining that the matter is thus and so.” But *being-for-something* can, then, also mean: I am for a matter being done thus and so. But that I am resolved that a matter be done thus and so is προαίρεσις. Aristotle demarcates προαίρεσις itself in four directions: (a) in opposition to ἐπιθυμία, “being-inclined” to something, “having-an-impulse” for something, “being-impulsive” about something; (b) in opposition to θυμός, “being-in-excitement,” “being-aroused” about . . . , “having-passion” for . . . ; (c) in opposition to βούλησις, “wish,” “wishing-for-something”; (d) in opposition to δόξα.¹¹² The three phenomena mentioned first are only briefly characterized for the purpose of understanding προαίρεσις¹¹³ since προαίρεσις is, indeed, a determination of ἀρετή. Ἀρετή as disposal over a being-possibility is further explicated as ἕξις, a “having-alongside-oneself” of a definite possibility to be thus and so; ἕξις προαιρετική, “possibility of being-resolved to . . . ,” being able to thus resolve oneself in a definite moment. ἐστὶν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα,¹¹⁴ a ἕξις “that is found in the μεσότης, that has

109. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 18 sqq.

110. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 22 sqq.

111. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 27 sq.

112. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 10 sqq.: οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εὐκαίρως λέγουσιν.

113. Cf. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 12 sqq.

114. Eth. Nic. B 6, 1106 b 36.

the mean there”; ὀρισμένη λόγῳ,¹¹⁵ the mean as “delimited by λόγος,” “determined by the deliberating that talks something through.” The μέσον for πράξις is the καιρός. This definition becomes essentially clearer when we look more precisely at προαίρεσις, and, in that context, attempt to explicate δόξα more precisely in regard to it.

Why is προαίρεσις generally set in opposition to the four above phenomena? This question must be posed in every interpretation of an Aristotelian analysis because it clarifies the basic character of the phenomenon. Grouping together such phenomena that possess in themselves such concrete aspects depends on their having a definite kinship by virtue of these aspects. The four phenomena must have some concrete content that recommends grouping them together with προαίρεσις. The five phenomena are fully characterized as *being-after something, with the character of having-in-advance*, so that what one is after is there in advance in a particular way—προαίρεσις. The toward-which is there from the outset. This being-after something with the character of the in-advance is found in ἐπιθυμία exactly as it is in θυμός. It is fully explicit in the case of wish. A being-after something in the direction of the ἀληθές is also found in δόξα. To opine that the matter is thus and so lies in the view itself. This being-after something—something that I do not yet generally possess, but which already occupies me nevertheless—is the phenomenon that motivates bringing these various phenomena together with προαίρεσις.

We want to briefly carry out the demarcation of the first three phenomena in opposition to προαίρεσις. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός.¹¹⁶ “There is no προαίρεσις, no being-resolved, for living things that do not speak.” Speaking, deliberating, belong to προαίρεσις. Only a resolution that passes through deliberation is a genuine resolution. In Book Z, Chapter 2 resolution is characterized as ὄρεξις διανοητική,¹¹⁷ “considering being-after,” a being-after that is determined by thorough consideration, by deliberation. Ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are also found in animals; they are not the same as προαίρεσις since the latter only occurs in living things that speak. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ’ οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δ’ ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ’ οὐ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἠδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου.¹¹⁸ “He who lacks self-control acts ἐπιθυμῶν such that he goes off after the matter. But this going-off is not a resolute acting. The self-controlled acts resolutely, but he does not need to be ἐπιθυμῶν. Ἐπιθυμία and θυμός go after a ἠδύ and a λυπηρόν that disposition supports and tones down.” Προαίρεσις goes after the πρακτόν, that which is decisive for a concern in the moment, that which comes into question for it. That is what the resolution brings together. Orientation toward the whole moment belongs to προαίρεσις. Προαίρεσις is not a so-called act; it is a genuine possibility of being in the moment. θυμός δ’ ἔτι

115. Eth. Nic. B 6, 1107 a 1.

116. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 12 sq.

117. Eth. Nic. Z 2, 1139 b 5.

118. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 13 sqq.

ἦττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.¹¹⁹ Aristotle says about θυμός, “that which is grasped in a state of arousal, in blind passion, has little to do with that which is grasped in clear, lucid resolution.” προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαρεῖσθαι, δοκοῖη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ’ ἐστὶν τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας.¹²⁰ Furthermore, προαίρεσις is not a βούλησις although it looks that way. The difference lies in that to which they are related. “Προαίρεσις never goes after something that is impossible. [I am resolved to something of which it is certain that it is possible.] If someone wanted to say that he is resolved to an impossibility, we would say that he is foolish. Wishing, on the other hand, can be directed at something that is impossible.” Προαίρεσις is always after the possible, specifically, after something determinately possible that we take up and are able to carry out in the moment. βούλησις, on the other hand, goes after something that is impossible. It can go after the possible too, not if it depends on us but rather on others. For example, we wish “that the actor, or such and such a person, that takes part in a competition, receive the prize.”¹²¹ That is possible but is not under our control. Προαίρεσις always goes after something that is under our control. Προαίρεσις leads to the ἔσχατον, to the point that I grasp, that I genuinely institute through action.

We approach the demarcation of δόξα by opposing it to related phenomena: ἐπιστήμη, φαντασία, βουλευεσθαι, προαίρεσις. We are trying to carry out this demarcation through the contrast with προαίρεσις, which is concretely of fundamental meaning. Such a demarcation presupposes that the phenomena in question have a character that motivates their being brought together. This character is being-after something; that which one is after is anticipated. Δόξα: being-for-something. A particular orientation is found in being-for. This being-after in δόξα does not have, say, the character of ὄρεξις, of a “striving.” Δόξα is more of a certain yes; it comes to an end and stops. Aristotle brings forward seven differences between προαίρεσις and δόξα:

1. Προαίρεσις and δόξα are distinguished by that *toward which they are directed*. Προαίρεσις, “resolving-onself” to something, is only directed toward beings *with regard to which I can accomplish something*. The ἀρχὴ πράξεως must be up to me. *Such* a being is the theme of προαίρεσις: a συμφέρον, something that comes into question as “conducive” to concern, as dealt with in such a way that I can take it in hand. Δόξα, by contrast, is not only directed toward συμφέροντα, that which can be changed, but also toward that which is ἀεί. I can have a view regarding that which is “always.”¹²² This distinction is important. It remains to be noted that δόξα is also directed at beings *that are always such as they are*. Such δόξαι are the basis from which science in general arises.

119. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 18 sq.

120. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 20 sqq.

121. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 24: οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν.

122. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 31 sqq.: ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.

That about which I have a view, and to which I am resolved, is distinguished with regard to the extent of the region of being to which it can be directed.

2. Δόξα goes after the ἀληθές and the ψευδές.¹²³ Δόξα depends upon *grasping in its being* that which a view is about. Προαίρεσις depends upon *how it should be done*, what should happen with it, that which is posited in a resolution. Προαίρεσις always aims at a πρακτόν ἀγαθόν. What is posited in a προαίρεσις is πρακτόν according to its essence.

3. Whoever has a view is not otherwise determined in their ἦθος by this having-a-definite-view. This having-a-view about a definite matter is not an “ethical” determination; it *does not pertain to changing the general comportment of human beings according to their being*. Alternatively, the manner and mode in which I am resolved, that to which I am resolved, what stands in προαίρεσις, is *decisive for my being*, for the manner and mode in which I am, for my ἦθος.¹²⁴ Thus δόξα points to a certain *indifference with relation to being*. Having-a-view presupposes a certain disinterestedness with regard to that which the view is about. This is important for the Greek conception of science.

4. Corresponding to the peculiar being-character of that to which δόξα and προαίρεσις are directed—in the one case the ἀληθές and in the other case the πρακτόν—having-a-view as comporting itself points to a definite seeing, to the *manner and mode in which beings are there*, in which it deals with beings as beings. Προαίρεσις is directed at the “seizing” and “renouncing” of a matter; δόξα is directed at ἀληθεύειν.¹²⁵

5. Δόξα and προαίρεσις are distinguished by that which constitutes their *genuineness*. Δόξα depends on the ὀρθότης, by its *approaching the ἀληθές*, the being as it is. Προαίρεσις, on the other hand, is not concerned with setting forth beings in their being. It is decisive for προαίρεσις that it be *suitably reckoned*.¹²⁶ It does not depend on setting forth all of the being-aspects of a concrete situation, on theoretically describing them; but instead προαίρεσις depends on deliberating correctly, on keeping an eye on what comes into consideration for the πρακτόν. Indeed, that is also an ἀληθεύειν, but one that is essentially distinct from δόξα. Its correctness is oriented to the πρακτόν, while the correctness of δόξα is oriented to the ἀληθές.

6. Δόξα and προαίρεσις are distinguished by their way of standing toward *knowing*. Δόξα is related to what one does not know precisely, to beings that are still concealed. The point is that δόξα is directed at “what we do not yet

123. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 33: καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαίρεται.

124. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 1 sqq.: τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τάγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κατὰ τοιοῦτοι τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ.

125. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 3 sqq.: καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τίμη συμφέρει ἢ πῶς; λαβεῖν δὲ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πᾶν δοξάζομεν.

126. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 5 sqq.: καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινείται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς.

genuinely know”; προαίρεσις is directed at “what we know most of all” in the sense of cognition, what we have clearly reckoned about, what corresponds to the circumstances on which it depends.¹²⁷

7. One can very well have the best view and yet come to, or be resolved to, a κακόν. Δόξα and προαίρεσις are distinguished in themselves. In the best case, being able to construct views about something and being able to be resolved in the right way are not conflated.¹²⁸

Δόξα and προαίρεσις approach each other precisely when one takes δόξα in the narrow meaning of being directed at “that which can be otherwise,” the ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως, insofar as it is a συμφέρον. I can have a definite view about a matter in light of its conduciveness; I can be for maintaining that it is better than the others.

d) The Character of δόξα as the Orientedness of Average Being-with-One-Another-in-the-World

We want to gather the entire analysis together and orient it, with regard to its content, to the question that genuinely interests us: the peculiar phenomenon of *being-oriented in the world*, how human being-there *initially has its world there in an average way*, how orientedness is in the having-there of the world. What do we find in relation to this phenomenon of discoveredness on the basis of the analysis of δόξα?

Δόξα is the *genuine discoveredness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world*. The world is there for us as what-is-with-one-another in discoveredness, insofar as we live in δόξα. Living in a δόξα means having it *with others*. That *others also* have it belongs to opinion.

The next thing to notice is that the realm of δόξα is *πάντα*. Even in everydayness, being-oriented in the world is not only directed to πρακτά; discoveredness does not only exist with regard to πρακτά. I do not only know information about my concrete task, about what I have to do in my immediate surroundings. Instead, I also have a definite view of the way that the world and nature are, of that in which there are πρακτά—of the moon, of the stars, of what is αἰεὶ for the Greeks. Δόξα reaches out to *the entire world*; for the πρακτόν with which I deal is not a determinate realm of beings, but is that with which I have to do as beings, that which is itself in the world, in the being of nature. Thus there are determinate being-relations between the πρακτόν and nature, the αἰεὶ ὄν.

The manner and mode in which this world is possessed as uncovered to a certain degree is this being-for, maintaining that it is thus. In this being-for as

127. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 7 sq.: καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν.

128. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 8 sqq.: δοκοῦσι τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἐνίοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ’ αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ.

the character of δόξα, lies the determination of *going-along with the way that the world initially shows itself*, the moment of *trust in the immediate aspect*. Nothing other than this is *Thales'* opinion, that ὕδωρ is the πρῶτον, that the genuine ἀρχή of being is “water.” Such a determination is intelligible on the basis of the prevalence of a thoroughgoing trust in that which initially shows itself. That which initially shows itself is taken as what the world initially is, according to Thales.

The one who possesses δόξα belongs necessarily to the determination of δόξα. With an ἐπιστήμη, it does not matter *who* has it. For a valid proposition, it does not matter *who I am*; that contributes nothing to the elucidation, to the being-true, of what is known. By contrast, *the one having the view* is, as such, co-decisive for δόξα. *Who* has it is of great importance. The matter in itself cannot speak purely for itself. It is concealed; I have a view of it. In δόξα, the matter itself does not only speak for itself to the extent that it is uncovered, but it also speaks for he who has the view, for whom the φάσις, the yes of δόξα holds. Accordingly, the stability of a δόξα is not exclusively grounded in the state of affairs that it conveys, but in him who has the δόξα.

In this structure of δόξα, lies the possibility of its reaching a characteristic *authority and stubbornness*. One repeats the opinions to others. Repeating does not depend on investigating *what* is said. What is said is not decisive, but rather that it is *he* who said it. Behind the authority of δόξα, stand other people, who are peculiarly indefinite, whom one cannot get a hold of—*one* has the view. This is a characteristic authority, stubbornness, and a force that is found in δόξα itself.

Δόξα is the genuine orientedness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world, that is, of *average* being-with-one-another. Average: the task of investigating the world is not posited. In δόξα, and on its basis, one has to do with the world in the way that one lives in the world in an everyday manner and has to do with things. One does not have to investigate everything with regard to its concrete content; what others say about it is what one thinks about it.

Thus δόξα is simultaneously set forth as the *basis* and the *motive of discursing-with-one-another; of negotiating-with-one-another*. For although δόξα possesses a kind of stability, that about which one has a view can indeed always still be discussed. It could also be otherwise. Its sense is to leave a discussion open. Λόγος, negotiating something, is constantly latent; in δόξα, bringing-to-language is constantly on the alert. Δόξα is precisely that from which speaking-with-one-another arises, by which it is motivated; and, at the same time, it is also that with which it negotiates. Thus δόξα is the basis, source, and motive for discursing-with-one-another, in such a way that what is yielded by negotiating itself has the character of a δόξα and therewith takes over the very function of δόξα. Δόξα has the authority and guidance of being-with-one-another in the world.

I have emphasized that the region of being of δόξα is not limited to that which can also be otherwise; it is *also the basis for the mode of grasping*

beings that we designate as ἐπιστήμη, as θεωρεῖν. Even beings with which I negotiate, not in the sense of concern but in the sense of setting forth facts in the way that they are, are initially there in a δόξα. From there, Aristotle consciously refers back to the history of philosophy. He initially reviews every fundamental problem with regard to the way one thought about it, on the basis of the positive understanding of the fact that the matter must have somehow come into view in such a δόξα. Indeed, δόξα is the characteristic trust in that which shows itself initially. And that which shows itself initially is the basis of the investigation of the matter itself.

e) Δόξα as the Basis of Theoretical Negotiating

α. Pre-given (πρότασις) and Project (πρόβλημα) as From-Which and About-Which of Theoretical Negotiating (*Topics* A4 and A10–11)

In order to see precisely that δόξα also controls theoretical λέγειν, λόγος in the sense of the “treatment” of something, of theoretical explication and thorough consideration as opposed to practical negotiating, such as a trial—“treating” in the sense of διαλέγεσθαι, the way that one speaks about a matter—the aim of accomplishing something by its means has to be abandoned; λέγειν itself is that which is now of concern. In order to see this basic meaning of δόξα, I briefly refer to what is set in opposition in Book 1 of the *Topics* (which deals with διαλέγεσθαι), where Aristotle shows quite clearly the types of λόγοι that arise from δόξα. He shows how it always has the character of δόξα, which I refer to as speaking, speaking-with-one-another. That is important because it is from here that the understanding of the συλλογισμός is to be obtained, as well as the understanding of logic. That there is a logic is not accidental, but must be understood on the basis of fully determinate basic phenomena of being-there itself.

In Chapter 4, Book 1 of the *Topics*, Aristotle shows “that with regard to which everything, according to its measure and according to how it is structured and from where,” discourse and speaking-with-one-another arises in διαλέγεσθαι.¹²⁹ ἔστι δ’ ἀριθμῶ ἴσα καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐξ ὧν τε οἱ λόγοι καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ συλλογισμοί. γίνονται μὲν γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων· περὶ ὧν δὲ οἱ συλλογισμοί, τὰ προβλήματα ἔστι.¹³⁰ “The wherefrom, on the basis of which discourse is, and that about which there is discourse, are numerically equal and the same. That about which there is discourse are the προβλήματα, that on the basis of which discourse is, the πρότασις.” In accordance with what is presupposed, it must be shown that both of these phenomena themselves arise from δόξα, that they are ἔνδοξα, expressings that stand in some sort of connection with δόξα, that come out of δόξα and maintain themselves in relation to it.

129. Top. A 4, 101 b 12: πρὸς πόσα καὶ ποῖα καὶ ἐκ τίνων οἱ λόγοι.

130. Top. A 4, 101 b 13 sqq.

They are distinguished by the *τρόπος*, the “manner and mode.”¹³¹ We will see what that means by an example. *Πρότασις*: “to put beforehand,” “what is given in advance.” *Πρόβλημα*, from *προβάλλω*, “to project”: “projection” insofar as it concerns the raising of an opinion, raising it for a discussion, such that it contrasts with the dominant opinion; such that the uncertainty, the “problematic” character that is found in it, is shown, such that one has not yet reached a resolution with regard to it. In *πρότασις* is found the character of *διαλέγεσθαι*, that which is given in advance in the sense that *διαλέγεσθαι* refers to a fixed opinion, that it lays claim to the basis for the advance giving of something that is not to be discussed further, that is requested from others as the common basis. *Πρόβλημα* is the *πρό*; *πρότασις* is the *ἐξ*. *Πρόβλημα* is translated as “projection.” The following are examples.

1. For *πρότασις*—the question of *πρότασις* is: ‘ἄρά γε τὸ ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν ὀρισμὸς ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου; ‘καὶ’ ἄρά γε τὸ ζῶον γένος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.’¹³² “It is, indeed, well expressed: the human being is a bipedal living thing, the definition of the human being! Of course, living thing is the genus of the human being!” Ἄρά γε: You also hold the opinion that this and that are thus, which we want to take as a ground!

2. For *πρόβλημα*, the question is: ‘πότερον τὸ ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν ὀρισμὸς ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ἢ οὐ.’¹³³ This question begins with *πότερον*—“Is the determination, the human being is a bipedal living thing, the definition of the human being? [Question:] Is it or is it not?” *Πρόβλημα* requires a fully determinate, clear definition. *Θέσις* is a characteristic *πρόβλημα*.¹³⁴

We have brought the consideration of *δόξα* to a certain conclusion. The specific orientation of being-in-the-world is in *δόξα*; the world is present in *δόξα*. Here, we have passed over a definite context of *δόξα* that tends toward a view of something, and in which view a *φαινόμενον* is given in advance. This structural aspect of *δόξα* will be focused on later, in the consideration of *ἀλήθεια*.¹³⁵ Now it is a matter of understanding *how the individual possibilities within which the world is negotiated arise from this δόξα*. This sense of *δόξα* is apt for making a discussion possible. That over which the view has authority is such that it still allows there to be discourse about it. The possibility of negotiating-with-one-another is implicit in *δόξα*. *Κοινωνία* is fulfilled in this way. All coming-to-an-understanding in being-with-one-another is a coming-to-an-understanding on a particular basis of being-trusted with regard to something, a basis for discussion that is itself not discussed. This intimate trust is that from out of which and into which speaking occurs insofar as the result of negotiation itself again has the character of *ἔνδοξον*. That from out of which speaking

131. Top. A 4, 101 b 29: τῷ τρόπῳ.

132. Top. A 4, 101 b 30 sq.

133. Top. A 4, 101 b 32 sq.

134. Cf. Top. A 11, 104 b 19 sq.

135. Editor’s note: Such consideration of *ἀλήθεια* does not appear in this lecture.

occurs is not explicitly there. To the extent that it is explicit, it yields the phenomenon of πρότασις, “pre-giving” of that from out of which one speaks, but which does not come to language in discussion. This “from out of which the discourse occurs” is designated in a theoretically fixed way as ἀρχή, insofar as it deals with a fully precise speaking in the sense of theoretical exhibiting and proving, where the phenomenon of speaking-to-one-another is indeed there but not explicitly. The treatment too is directed to an addressee—the context of συλλογισμός. Here, πρότασις is designated as ἀρχή. The principles that are presupposed, and from which the proof proceeds, are a fully determinate case of the original context that is spoken on the basis of something familiar.

We want to examine how the phenomenon of the “pre-given,” the πρότασις, explicitly follows from ἔνδοξον, δόξα, and how, furthermore, that which is spoken about, the genuine thematic, the πρόβλημα, follows from δόξα. These are two pieces of philosophical discussion that depend on the setting-forth of a definite concrete context, when viewed immediately with regard to the speaking-with-one-another of διαλέγεσθαι. Not until later will we treat speaking-with-one-another in the sense of everyday discoursing-with-one-another, as set forth in the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle deals with this in Book 1 of the *Topics*, Chapter 10: πρότασις, Chapter 11: πρόβλημα.

ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐπώτησις ἔνδοξος:¹³⁶ the πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ is characterized as ἐπώτησις ἔνδοξος, “a questioning that maintains itself in the vicinity of that which a fixed view is about”—μὴ παράδοξος.¹³⁷ That which is expressed in the πρότασις is spoken “not against the general opinion.” Ἐπώτησις ἔνδοξος: “a questioning that maintains itself in that which a general opinion is about.” Questions that are introduced with ἄρα γε, “it is indeed true,” request an agreement. Ἐπώτησις is ἀποκρίσεως αἴτησις,¹³⁸ the “requesting an answer.” In the πρότασις, one is requested to agree with what is said, a concession in the sense that one then stands on common ground for further discussion. This αἴτησις ἀποκρίσεως, as the advance laying of the ground on which further discussion is to proceed, is directed toward what appears to be in a certain way “to everyone, to most, to the informed.”¹³⁹ The content of a πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ can also be that which belongs to δόξα. Furthermore, that which is familiar to one within their area of expertise, that speaks out from their experience, as in the case of a scientist and the area of his discipline, without being proven, has the character of ἔνδοξος μὴ παράδοξον.¹⁴⁰

The πρόβλημα is not concerned with giving something in advance in the

136. Top. A 10, 104 a 8 sq.

137. Top. A 10, 104 a 10 sq.

138. Aristotelis Organon Graece. Novis codicum auxilii adiutus recognovit, scholiis ineditis et commentario instruxit Th. Waitz. Pars prior: Categoriae, Hermeneutica, Analytica priora. Leipzig 1844. De int. 11, 20 b 22 sq.

139. Top. A 10, 104 a 9: ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς.

140. Cf. Top. A 10, 104 a 33 sqq.

sense of a ground. Rather, Aristotle designates the πρόβλημα as θεώρημα,¹⁴¹ “something to be examined,” that which is to be the object of speaking. The question-character of the πρότασις is such that it requests agreement, while θεώρημα means something whose investigation is to be carried out in negotiations. It is something that is συντεῖνον ἢ πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν, “that is subject to being grasped, that I either resolve to or renounce,” ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν, “that something is uncovered and brought to knowledge.”¹⁴² It becomes something opened up, encountered in the discussion; and what is raised in discussion has, in itself, the claim to be discussed. The relation of πρόβλημα to ἔνδοξον: it is something opened up in such a way that no agreement between them occurs. περὶ οὗ ἢ οὐδετέρως δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἐναντίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἢ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ ἐκάτεροι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς,¹⁴³ “with regard to them, there is no aspect from which one came to a determinate view; according to its character, it is open in a way that is debatable, or it is such that with regard to them the many think otherwise than those who understand, or with regard to them they are in disagreement with each other.” What is to be investigated has the character of the debatable. A particular form of the πρόβλημα is the θέσις. Not every πρόβλημα is θέσις, but every θέσις is πρόβλημα. θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν,¹⁴⁴ “a taking-for [ὑπόληψις is another word for δόξα], the—παράδοξος—next to, outside of, stands next to δόξα.” Such a ὑπόληψις is not an arbitrary particular case that anyone would have thought up, for it belongs to δόξα as constitutive of the possessor. Θέσις is a δόξα such that “the one who has it belongs to those who are entrusted with φιλοσοφία,” in the sphere of those who deal with the genuine consideration of beings. Κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν: a view opened up by one who concretely moves in the region of research—φιλοσοφία in opposition to sophistry. οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης: ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὄν, καθάπερ Μελισσός φησιν.¹⁴⁵ “Such a θέσις is, for example, the δόξα of Antisthenes, in which there is no controversy [a δόξα παράδοξος. It goes against the average opinion, but is not proposed by just anybody, but rather by one who is familiar with the average opinion.] Another example is Heraclitus’s saying that everything is in motion, or Melissus’s saying ἐν τῷ ὄν.” These are not the ἐναντίον τοῦ τυχόντος,¹⁴⁶ “of some arbitrary person,” but of someone who has investigated, of someone who has knowledge of the matter. Θέσις is distinguished from πρόβλημα by speaking explicitly against the dominant opinion, while there are many προβλήματα that do not speak against the dominant opinion in a pointed way. They are, however, debatable; they leave something open.

141. Top. A 11, 104 b 1.

142. Top. A 11, 104 b 1 sq.

143. Top. A 11, 104 b 3 sqq.

144. Top. A 11, 104 b 19 sq.

145. Top. A 11, 104 b 21 sq.

146. Top. A 11, 104 b 23 sq.

β. Inability-to-Get-Through (ἀπορία) as the Topic of Theoretical Negotiating
(*Metaphysics* B1)

On the basis of the characterization of that from where and that about which διαλέγεσθαι speaks, we are to infer what can, in general, be a possible *topic* for negotiation. It allows its distinction from the discourse of rhetoric to stand out more precisely. Aristotle characterizes discourse, the topic of rhetoric, as τὰ ἤδη βουλευέσθαι εἰωθότα,¹⁴⁷ that which is treated in scientific discussion as τὰ λόγου δεόμενα,¹⁴⁸ λόγος meant in the sense of διαλέγεσθαι. That which is dealt with in διαλέγεσθαι is such as to “require” (δέομαι) that speaking which has no further aim, which does not follow from the natural function of practical speaking. Here, λόγος is separated from the πρακτόν; λόγος has become πράξις. Here, λόγος appears as negotiating in its pure function, as the exhibiting of that about which there is negotiation, with regard to how and what it is. Discussion proceeds with regard to what requires λόγος, and therefore what is not clear without qualification, what is not brought to intelligibility in another way, what cannot be imparted in another way. A λόγου δεόμενον is not simply the matter of a “reprimand” (κολάσεως) or of a “direct, simple perceiving.”¹⁴⁹ “Those that have difficulties, whether honoring the gods or loving their parents, need to be reprimanded”;¹⁵⁰ as we would say, they need a smack upside the head. Here, it would not make sense to undertake the writing of a treatise about “whether the snow is white or not”;¹⁵¹ here, it is simply a matter of opening one’s eyes.¹⁵² It is becoming clear, now, that a basic requirement of conversation is that one agree on the topic of conversation, whether the topic allows its concrete sense to be discussed, or whether the topic does not lie outside of all discussion. However, not just anything that requires a particular grounding, that is not settled by a reprimand or by direct perception, is a λόγου δεόμενον. οὐδὲ δὴ ὧν σύνεγγυς ἢ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲ ὧν λίαν πόρρω,¹⁵³ “even that for which a proof is available, whose exhibiting can be easily put forward, and whose proof is all too remote,” is not a possible topic of such a conversation. That too has no *aporia*. It is more difficult than that which could be sufficient for the δύναμις of the conversation. The possible topic of διαλέγεσθαι is limited and indicated—the topic must have an *aporia* in itself.

Aristotle offers an extensive treatment of ἀπορία in Book 3, Chapter 1 of the *Metaphysics*. It must be kept in mind that ἀπορία makes its appearance in the context of λέγειν, of independent λόγος; not in a πράξις, but rather that through

147. Rhet. A 2, 1356 b 37 sq.: ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλευέσθαι εἰωθότων.

148. Rhet. A 2, 1356 b 37: ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεομένων.

149. Top. A 11, 105 a 4 sq.: μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως.

150. Top. A 11, 105 a 5 sqq.: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὐ’ κολάσεως δεόνται.

151. Top. A 11, 105 a 7: πότερον ἢ χιῶν λευκὴ ἢ οὐ.

152. Ibid.: [δέονται] αἰσθήσεως.

153. Top. A 11, 105 a 7 sq.

which λέγειν itself is πρᾶξις. In relation to ἀπορία, Aristotle is himself aware of a series of characteristic expressions. He speaks of ἀπορεῖν,¹⁵⁴ εὐπορεῖν,¹⁵⁵ διαπορεῖν,¹⁵⁶ προαπορεῖν.¹⁵⁷ Πορεῖν meant “running,” “going,” in the sense of λέγειν, in a discursive mode, λέγειν in the function of ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Απορεῖν: “to not get through” in this being-in-progress, in running-through, in the course of this exhibiting. The α-privative shows that one must πορεῖν in general. To ἀπορία belongs πορεῖν, that one is in progress in general, that one maintains oneself in an exhibiting. The τέλος is εὐπορεῖν, getting-through-well. Απορία is not itself a τέλος, but is at the service of a determinate getting-through; it is always the on-the-way to . . . , with regard to which one initially does not get through. The function of ἀπορεῖν is δηλοῦν in the mode in which one exhibits “knots” in the πρᾶγμα.¹⁵⁸

Απορεῖν is fulfilled in the way that one calls upon the prevalent opinions about a matter.¹⁵⁹ Prevalent opinions should be thoroughly considered to see how far the matter is shown in them. Απορία has the positive sense of disclosing the matter in advance according to determinate characteristics. Only when I have gone through a preliminary inability-to-get-through, specifically exhibiting *where* I have gotten through, do I genuinely possess the τέλος of the investigation. I can then decide, at the end of the investigation, whether or not I found what I was seeking.¹⁶⁰

Απορία has the sense of the cultivation of an interrogatory stance of scientific research. The cultivation of the interrogatory stance means nothing other than fixing the matter that is spoken about according to basic determinations, leading the questioning in definite directions. The classic example of this is Book 1, Chapters 2–9 of the *Physics*, in which Aristotle goes through the aporias of beings with regard to their being-in-motion. The matter itself becomes ever more visible in going-through. The corresponding aporias of being qua being, as the possible topic of a science, are found in *Metaphysics*, Book 2, Chapters 1–6. The basic presupposition is that one gains an orientation from a definite fundamental experience of the matter. Only, then, if I already have the matter in a legitimate way, can I venture to approach aporias. This is not a seizing of arbitrary difficulties and contradictions. Απορία is the way to cultivate actual questioning with the possible aim of εὐπορεῖν.

154. Met. B 1, 995 a 25.

155. Met. B 1, 995 a 27.

156. Met. B 1, 995 a 28.

157. Met. B 1, 995 b 2.

158. Met. B 1, 995 a 29 sqq.: λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν. ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τούτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος.

159. Met. B 1, 995 a 25 sq.: ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπεκλήφασί τινες.

160. Met. B 1, 995 a 33 sqq.: διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τε θεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἀνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὐρηκεν ἢ μὴ γινώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προσηπορηκότι δῆλον.

§16. ἦθος and πάθος as πίστεις (Rhetoric BI, Nicomachean Ethics B4)

a) Theoretical and Practical Negotiating

By contrast, the topic of everyday discourse in the assembly, before the court, and so on, is that “which always already habitually an object of deliberation,”¹⁶¹ about which one has conversed from old, in being-with-one-another in the πόλις. Because of this, there is a definite concrete orientation toward that which is the topic of conversation. Insofar as it concerns βουλευεσθαι, concerns πρακτόν, and insofar as it concerns ἔνδοξον, insofar as there is discourse of general opinions in opposition to general views for the purpose of cultivating a definite view, this discoursing is not situated in the realm of διαλέγεσθαι. In this discoursing, concerned as it is with such objects, the speaker and the one who is spoken to are fundamentally important. In διαλέγεσθαι, on the other hand, it is to a certain degree a matter of indifference to whom it is spoken, and a matter of indifference who I am, how I operate therein. In speaking in the previously mentioned sense, the ἦθος of the speaker and the πάθος of the one spoken to, are relevant. For both of these determinations ground the manner and mode in which δόξα is possessed, the way in which he to whom the view is to be imparted stands with respect to the view. From the context of speaking-with-one-another, we must briefly come to an understanding of the ἦθος of the speaker and the πάθος of the hearers, that is, with respect to how the speaker and the addressee conduct themselves toward the δόξα of which there is speaking, and toward the δόξαι on whose basis there is speaking. From there, we will specifically select the πάθος of “fear,” of φόβος, treated in Chapter 5 of the second Book of the *Rhetoric*.

A basic determination of a topic of a conversation, namely that it is ἀπορίαν ἔχον, follows as a basic condition for the discussion of a problem that aims at the exhibiting of definite concrete contexts in what is spoken about and of which evidence is given. The aspect of ἀπορία is in itself related to a πορεῖν, “running”: speaking in the sense of exhibiting, being underway in exhibiting. Πορεῖν has for its aim εὐπορεῖν, “coming-through-in-the-right-manner” to that which is questioned. Accordingly, πορεῖν/ἀπορεῖν is a προαπορεῖν that forgoes in advance a εὐπορεῖν. In relation to λέγειν, it is δηλοῦν, “making manifest” that which is questioned. In relation to questioning itself, it is a mode of cultivating the question as such in the right way. Through the exhibiting of definite concrete characters of the matter in question, the end of examination becomes manifest, and through this it is possible to bring the examination onto the right track; and at the end of the examination it is possible to decide whether what is sought was found, whether what is set forth at the end of the examination is a concrete result. With Aristotle, ἀπορία is taken up and narrowed. That which

161. Rhet. A 2, 1356 b 37 sq.: ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλευεσθαι εἰωθότων.

falls to scientific investigation must have the character of an ἀπορίαν ἔχον, must have difficulties. This is the basic condition for something being a λόγου δεόμενον—and then πρότασις and πρόβλημα.

The second mode of what is spoken of is the sort of thing that one is accustomed to deliberate about, that is brought to language in a definite being-context of life, that cannot be carried through once and for all by way of concrete deliberations but rather always recurs according to circumstances and situations. The topic here is not an identical fact of the matter that would be transmitted within a science. It is something which itself differs according to the circumstances of being-there, affairs specific to the circumstances of being-there itself, change in mood, and accordingly, change of view. It is what is treated in the *Rhetoric*. It is not a theoretical fact of the matter, but rather something that differs according to views. The situation, at each moment, of things and humans speaks also. Accordingly, “accepting the premises,” λαμβάνειν τὰς προτάσεις,¹⁶² is something different here. Alongside the premise, something else must be placed in view—calculation must be carried out as to the mood of those spoken to, the situation at each moment of things, the manner and mode in which one stands toward the matter. For this reason, we must concretely consider the following: (1) ἦθος, the “comportment” of the speaker; (2) πάθος, the “disposition” of the hearers.

In Chapter 1 of the second Book of the *Rhetoric*, the content of Book 2 is summarized and the topic of Book 2 is given. Rhetoric’s manner of treating speaking takes conversation in such a way that it aims in itself at constructing-a-view: a δόξα is to be cultivated. “But since, ultimately, rhetoric has its sight on κρίσις, view-construction, a definite decision in the sense of a δόξα, not only must attention be necessarily directed to discourse as such, to the function of discourse as δεικνύναι, δηλοῦν, but the speaker must bring himself, and those with whom the decision will lie, into a corresponding frame of mind [specifically, bring them into a frame of mind through discourse itself]. For it makes a great difference in the conveying of what speaks for something, especially in deliberations, but also in the judicial court, how the speaker appears and accordingly how the hearers consider his disposition, and also whether they themselves [the hearers] acquire, at that time, the right disposition [i.e., attitude toward the discussed matter]. The manner and mode in which the speaker appears is weightier in deliberation, and the disposition of the hearer at that moment is weightier above all in the judicial court. The matter at issue in discourse at each moment appears not to be the same for those who have a preference for the speaker—the φιλοῦσιν—and for those who have an aversion to him—the μισοῦσιν. That the matter shows itself in various modes holds also for the ὀργιζόμενος, the one who is infuriated about something, or for the πρώως ἔχων,

162. Cf. Top. A 13, 105 a 22 sq.: ἐν μὲν τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν.

the one who is calmly attuned to something.”¹⁶³ ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα [φαίνεται].¹⁶⁴ “The matter appears either completely differently or differently to a great extent.” τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι, περι οὐ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τὸνναντίον.¹⁶⁵ To the one who is already well-disposed toward another, this other person will appear either to be not at all at fault or only at fault in an insignificant way; conversely when someone has something against another, this other person will appear in just the opposite way.” To him it will be obvious that the person in question committed an offense. καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ἢ τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσσεσθαι καὶ ἀγθὸν ἔσσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ δ’ ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τὸνναντίον.¹⁶⁶ “And whoever is, from the outset, for a matter that is up for negotiation, who sympathizes with it, will take what should happen as what, in fact, will happen, and at the same time what is conducive [the optimist, as we say]. On the other hand, to the one who is indifferent and to the ill-humored pessimist, things appear, from the outset, in a different light”; and correspondingly he will also stand very differently in relation to deliberation.

b) ἤθος as πίστις

The ἤθος and πάθη are constitutive of λέγειν itself. First of all, we will consider ἤθος, the “comportment” of the speaker: in what manner the speaker offers himself to his hearers in discourse, how this offering of himself contributes to the cultivation of the πιθανόν, how this ἤθος acquires the possibility of co-speaking, of co-mattering. How is it with speaking that we as hearers take the speaker to be *himself* what bears witness to the matter that he represents? What is it about speaking that the speaker speaks for the matter *with his person*, leaving aside what he says, the concrete arguments that he has brought to bear on something?

As to the *cultivation* of ἤθος, there are *three aspects* that come into question: (1) φρόνησις, “looking around”—the speaker must appear to be someone who looks around in discourse itself; (2) ἀρετή, “seriousness,” transcribed earlier with σπουδαίως; (3) εὖνοια, “good attitude,” “good will.”¹⁶⁷

163. Rhet. B 1, 1377 b 21 sqq.: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ [. . .], ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὄραν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν: πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τὸ τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πῶς διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακεῖμενοι πῶς τυγάνωσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πῶς τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας: οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδ’ ὀργιζομένους καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν.

164. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 1.

165. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 1 sqq.

166. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 3 sqq.

167. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 9.

Aristotle exhibits the concrete meaning of these three aspects of ἦθος by pursuing the *opposite course*, in asking about the opposite situation: how is it, in the manner and mode in which the speaker offers himself, that we acquire the opinion that he *deceives*, that he *misleads*? Aristotle examines the conditions of the possibility of showing oneself to be one who deceives. What is missing in the manner and mode in which he offers himself, so that we do not take him for someone who in fact has the right ἦθος?

1. In his discourse, the speaker can appear as an οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζων,¹⁶⁸ “one who does not form his views in the right manner.” In the course of the discourse, the speaker appears as one who *does not have the right perspective on the matter* about which he speaks; the one in question *does not entirely see the matter*. The view that he conveys is not oriented toward what the matter genuinely is, it is missing the ὀρθότης. As soon as the hearer notices the flaw, the speaker loses πίστις; he no longer is in consideration as to the matter for which he speaks.

2. Certainly, the first aspect can belong to the speaker, for he can have the right φρόνησις; the speaker can appear as one who looks around, but nonetheless as one who *is not willing to say*¹⁶⁹ what appears to him to be the case, about which he has this or that view. The hearer can notice, in the course of the discourse, that the speaker is well-versed but does not say everything; the speaker screens his own position and view of the matter. He *is not properly serious* in what he says to his audience, as he knows still more. As soon as the hearer notices this, he withdraws his trust from the speaker, does not take him seriously, since the speaker does not seriously present himself in what he says.

3. The speaker can offer himself as one who looks around and as one who is serious in what he says, and still the hearer can notice that *he is deficient in the requisite good will*. He can counsel something, recommend something as συμφέρον that he believes is συμφέρον, and yet despite the fulfillment of these two aspects, the hearer can notice in the course of discourse that the speaker does not bring himself to say what is best—he withdraws the best counsel for want of good will since the people are not interested in it. In the counsel he delivers, he can withhold the most decisive positive possibility that his φρόνησις has entirely at his disposal. He is satisfied with presenting before the assembly a serious proposal, though not the best one.¹⁷⁰ Even then the hearer loses real trust.

Alternatively, a speaker who shows himself to be one who speaks out for the matter *out of good will, with seriousness, and in a way that looks around,*

168. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 11 sq.: οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν.

169. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 12 sq.: ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν.

170. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 13 sq.: ἢ φρόνημοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ εὖνοι, διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γινώσκοντας.

will thus have real trust—he will himself be a πίστις in his λόγος.¹⁷¹

Aristotle considered the two aspects of φρόνησις and ἀρετή already in Chapter 9 of Book 1 of the *Rhetoric*.¹⁷² The third aspect, εὐνοία, is one that he treats in the context of analyzing the πάθη.

c) πάθος as πίστις

Πάθος, the second aspect that is a consideration for πίστις, is treated extensively by Aristotle in the subsequent chapters of Book 2. The expression πάθος has multiple meanings at the same time; it has fundamental significance within Aristotelian philosophy. We can list *three basic meanings* of this expression, and accordingly three concrete contexts that it designates: (1) the *average, immediate* meaning is that of “variable condition”; (2) a *specifically ontological* meaning, which is important for the understanding of κίνησις: πάθος in connection with πάσχειν, what one most often translates as “suffering”; (3) a *resulting* meaning: variable condition in relation to a definite concrete context, variable condition within a definite being-region of life: “passion.” Πάθος in this last sense is the topic of the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*.

At first, we will take up the last meaning and, at the same time, the proper context in which the phenomenon designated as πάθος is discussed. The context becomes visible in Chapter 4 of Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In this chapter, Aristotle begins the investigation into what ἀρετή genuinely is. The aim of the investigation into the being-character of ἀρετή has, for its immediate task, to set forth what in general ἀρετή is to be understood as, and out of which being-contexts it appears: γένεσις of ἀρετή. Aristotle introduces this investigation with a discussion that is important for us: ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστίν, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἢ ἀρετή.¹⁷³ Πάθος belongs, therefore, to that “which comes to be in the soul.” Ψυχή is the οὐσία of a ζῷον, it constitutes the being of those beings that are characterized as being-in-their-world. Thus it has *being in three distinct modes of its coming to be*: πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἕξεις.

λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος, and so on, “as a whole, the sort of thing with which ἡδονή and λύπη are co-given”¹⁷⁴ a definite finding-onself, “being-elevated,” “being-depressed.”

On the other hand, ἕξις is, at first, something which characterizes the manner and mode in which we are in such a πάθος.¹⁷⁵ Ἐξις is that in relation to

171. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 15 sq.: ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν.

172. Cf. Rhet. A 9, 1366 a 23 sqq.

173. Eth. Nic. B 4, 1105 b 19 sqq.

174. Eth. Nic. B 4, 1105 b 21 sqq.: ὅλως οἷς ἐπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη.

175. Eth. Nic. B 4, 1105 b 25 sq.: ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἕως πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς.

which we are praised or blamed. With respect to the passion, for example, with respect to the fact that we are in a rage, “we are neither praised nor blamed.”¹⁷⁶ The manner and mode in which I am in a rage, in what situation, on what occasion, against whom—that is what underlies praise or blame, the πῶς. “Ἐξίς relates to the πῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὰ πάθη, “how we carry ourselves,” “what composure we have,” with such a πάθος. Πάθος is a determinate losing-one’s-composure.

The δυνάμεις relate to those being-determinations of living things that Aristotle too characterizes as φύσει ὄν: in the possibility of our factual being-there, there are co-given the possibilities of being enraged, of being sad, of being happy, of hating, and so on¹⁷⁷ These δυνάμεις are also γινόμενα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

The being-co-given of πάθη as γινόμενα is important *as modes of being itself*, and insofar as we are living, *as modes of becoming*, relating to being-in-a-world, as well as the fact that the πάθη have a possible connection with ἔξις. On the basis of a more precise understanding of what is meant by ἔξις, we will understand the analysis of the πάθη, seeing *how what is designated as πάθος defines being-in-the-world in a fundamental sense*, and how it comes into consideration as such a basic determination of being-in-the-world with the cultivation of κρίσις, of “taking-a-position,” of “deciding” a critical question. By showing this fundamental role of πάθη in κρίνειν itself, we will also gain the possibility of seeing the basis of λόγος itself more concretely.

The ἦθος of the speaker must be something altogether determinate with which he appears to the audience as one who, as a person, in fact speaks for the matter that he represents. The ἦθος must satisfy the definitions of ἀρετή, φρόνησις, and εὐνοία. The ἦθος is nothing other than the manner and mode in which is revealed what the speaker wants—willing in the sense of the προαίρεσις of something. In this way, Aristotle also determines the role of ἦθος in the *Poetics*: ἦθος “makes manifest, at the moment, the being-resolved of the speaker.”¹⁷⁸ There is no ἦθος in the sort of discourse whose sense does not depend upon being resolved about something or bringing others to a definite resolve. Rather, such discourse depends on διάνοια: that which is necessary in order to be able to exhibit something with respect to its being-character. Setting down these conditions of discourse at each moment is not something that has been exhausted up to now, as one can ask to what extent, in scientific and philosophical accounts, λόγος is to be taken simply as δεικνύναι, and to what

176. Eth. Nic. B 4, 1105 b 31 sqq.: κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτε ψεγόμεθα [. . .], κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.

177. Eth. Nic. B 4, 1105 b 23 sqq.: δυνάμεις δὲ καθ’ ἕως παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ’ ἕως δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι.

178. Aristoteles, *Über die Dichtkunst*. Griechisch und Deutsch. Mit sacherklärenden Anmerkungen, edited by F. Sussehl, second edition, Leipzig 1874. 1450 b 8 sq.: ἔστιν δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὅποια τις.

extent there is a προαιρεῖσθαι in them. This is not the place to explain these connections more precisely. I am merely pointing out that it would perhaps be in order if philosophers were resolved to reckon what it actually means to speak to others.

The second condition is the “disposition” of the hearer himself at each moment, which Aristotle sets down in writing as πάθος. Accordingly, among the tasks of rhetoric is that of setting forth the possible situations in which the hearer can find himself attuned, his frames of mind—setting forth these determinations with respect to their various aspects, in order to direct the speaker as to what is to be taken into consideration when he chooses the προαίρεσις. The *Rhetoric*’s analysis of the πάθη has this intention: to analyze the various possibilities of the hearer’s finding himself, in order to provide guides as to what must be cultivated on the part of the hearer himself.

The first determination: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.¹⁷⁹ (1) Μεταβάλλοντες: something along the way with respect to which “a change sets in for us,” through which “we change” from one disposition to another. (2) Combined with this change, διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, we “differentiate ourselves” from ourselves before the change in that which is the hearer’s task: “to take a position,” “to form a view.” The formation of a view involves the manner and mode in which we change. (3) οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή:¹⁸⁰ not “following,” but rather “co-given” in combination with the πάθη is a “being-disposed-as-higher-or-lower” of the being-there in question. These are the constitutive aspects, as set down by Aristotle with respect to the πάθη, given the special aim of analysis in the *Rhetoric*.

The manner and mode in which we are in a frame of mind also constitutes how we stand with respect to the matters, how we see them, how extensively and in what respects. Coming-out-of-one-definite-frame-of-mind-into-another relates primarily to the mode of taking-a-position toward the world, of being-in-the-world. Herein lies the possibility and danger of shifting relations. The right frame of mind is nothing other than being-in-the-world in the right way as having it at one’s disposal. The world, initially and for the most part, is there in πράξις, with the character of ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως, and at the same time with the determinations of “more or less.” The world is there as ἀγαθόν or συμφέρον, and that as “more or less.” Thus our comportment toward it is also more or less; we comport ourselves by these degrees in a more or less average way, in order to operate in the world. The manner and mode of the perspicuousness of the world is more or less. For this reason, one understands that “coming into the genuine frame of mind” means: *coming into the mean*, coming from the aforementioned degrees into the mean. The mean is nothing other than the καιρός, the entirety of circumstances, the how, when, whither, and about which.

179. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 20 sq.

180. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 21 sq.

The question is, therefore, how πάθος is to be understood more precisely according to its structure. We have to examine it according to the being-determinations of πάθος itself, as Aristotle defines πάθος. Most generally, πάθος is characterized as γινόμενον τῆς ψυχῆς,¹⁸¹ “soul” taken as οὐσία. Μεταβολή and γένεσις are used with the same meaning: πάθος is a “changing,” and accordingly a determinate “coming to be . . .” out of an earlier situation, but not a changing that would have its course set for itself. Rather, it is a mode of finding-oneself in the world that, at the same time, stands in a possible relation to ἔξις. This changing into another frame of mind, and being in the new one vis-à-vis the old one, has in itself the possibility of being-seized, being-overcome. The manner and mode of losing-composure, being-brought-out-of-composure, is, according to its sense, such that it is able to be composed once again. I can regain my composure once again. I am, at a definite moment, in a dangerous situation, in a moment of terror, in a state of composure. I can relate the disposition characterized by terror to a possible being-composed with regard to it. Thus πάθος already has within itself the relation to ἔξις. These two concepts lend themselves to being characterized by Aristotle as *fundamental concepts of being*. In this way, πάθος is already indicated as a being-concept since πάσχειν, in contrast to ποιεῖν, represents a basic aspect of the analysis of κίνησις, of being in the sense of being-moved. Ἔξις refers back to ἔχειν, “having.” Ἐχειν is recognized by Aristotle as a mode of being, and it is not so puzzling that ἔχειν also appears among Aristotle’s ten categories. It is the being-structure to be set forth in the two salient phenomena, πάθος and ἔξις.

§17. Ἔξις (Metaphysics Δ23 and 20, Nicomachean Ethics B 1–5)

a) ἔχειν and ἔξις

We are beginning with ἔξις and ἔχειν. Aristotle treats them in Chapter 23 of Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*. He says, by way of introduction, that τὸ ἔχειν λέγεται πολλαχῶς,¹⁸² that is, the expression in question is addressed to various beings, and with various meanings, such that it is not an arbitrary jumble, but rather relates to a basic meaning, which comes into view by showing the individual meanings. We must see where there is a point of agreement among the manifold meanings of ἔχειν, to what extent ἔχειν expresses being.

1. τὸ ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὀρμὴν, διὸ λέγεται πυρετός τε ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ οἱ τύραννοι τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ ἀμπερόμενοι.¹⁸³ Ἐχειν in the sense of ἄγειν, as “leading the way according

181. Cf. Rhet. B 4, 1105 b 20.

182. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 8.

183. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 8 sqq.

to its own fully determined possibility of being-there—φύσις—or according to the impetus that is lying within the beings in question as such. Thus one says, fever has the person [sickness has the person; it has attacked him “whom it has” or “whom it has seized”]; the tyrants have the towns [they rule over them]. Further, the ones who are dressed have clothes (on). Ἐχειν in the sense of ἄγειν.

2. ἐν ᾧ ἄν τι ὑπάρχη ὡς δεκτικῶ, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ τὴν νόσον τὸ σῶμα.¹⁸⁴ “The metal has the look of a statue [has the look, *is* a statue]. The body has the illness [it *is* sick].” The more precise determination of this having is to be a being in the sense that “in itself something is present, for which being-present the being in question itself has the readiness (δεκτικόν).” The metal is determined as metal on account of the δεκτικόν. The metal is determined in its being such that it can become a statue. The metal is determined as ὕλη. In this context, ὕλη does not mean an indeterminate “material,” but rather a positive character of a mode of being-there. Being in preparedness for . . . is a positive determination of a being. Having means nothing other than being the wherein of a being-present of something out of preparedness.

3. ὡς τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιεχόμενα· ἐν ᾧ γάρ ἐστι περιεχόμενόν τι, ἔχεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου λέγεται, οἷ τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἔχειν τὸ ὕγρον φαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὴν ναῦν ναύτας· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἔχειν τὰ μέρη.¹⁸⁵ “The enclosing has that which is enclosed [in the sense of containing, of being all around it]; wherein something is as contained therein, of which we say that something is had from the start, as the basin has, or contains, water, the town has people, the ship has sailors. In this way too the whole has parts.” Being-part is always being-part-of-something, part of a whole, belonging to something. The whole is the wherein of the determinate belongingness of a part.

4. ἔτι τὸ κωλύον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντ’ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φυσιολόγων τινές φασι.¹⁸⁶ “Pillars hold, have the weight lying upon them, and, as the poets say, Atlas holds the vault of heaven”: having in the sense of holding, and indeed as κωλύειν, “holding off” another being, hindering it from being as it would like to be according to its own being, “according to its genuine ὁρμή.” This is holding in the sense of not allowing another being to be as it would like to be. The ὁρμή of the weight is to fall downward; the vault of heaven “has the tendency to fall down upon the earth.” Having in this sense of holding as the holding off of another from its determinate being-possibility, which lies in its ὁρμή, is the συνέχον, “holding-together.” τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ συνέχον λέγεται ἂ συνέχει ἔχειν, ὡς διαχωρισθέντα ἂν

184. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 11 sqq.

185. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 13 sqq.

186. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 17 sqq.

κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὁρμὴν ἕκαστον.¹⁸⁷ This concept, as constitutive for understanding the concept of movement, must be understood on the basis of this ἔχειν. Συνεχές, “continuum,” “constancy,” is a basic aspect of the being of things moved (*Physics*, Book 5).¹⁸⁸

These four kinds of ἔχειν always mark beings with the being-character of *being after a definite being-possibility*, or its negation, which, in the case of negation, is the same as that of *holding off something from being genuinely as it would like to be*. It is no accident that Aristotle says in conclusion: καὶ τὸ ἔν τινι δὲ εἶναι ὁμοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἐπομένως τῷ ἔχειν.¹⁸⁹ “Having is said in the same way as being-in-something.” Ἐπομένως: this meaning of being-in-something is already co-given with having; the character of having and being had as that of being-in-something.

Thus in this way it is justifiable when ἔχειν appears among the categories alongside κείσθαι. For its part, ἔξις is related to this ἔχειν, taken as a mode of being-there (Chapter 20): ἔξις δὲ λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἔχομένου, ὡσπερ πρᾶξις τις ἢ κίνησις.¹⁹⁰ “Ἐξις is the ἐνέργεια, “the genuine there, the being-present of the having and of what is had.” The there is related to having, having as the having of what is having and of what is had. Within this being-context, ἔξις means the genuine being-present of having as such.

ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποιήσις μεταξύ· οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξύ ἔξις. ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν τὴν ἔξιν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ βαδιεῖται εἰ τοῦ ἔχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν ἔξιν.¹⁹¹ “When the one does something, the other is done; thus the doing as such is the μεταξύ, the between. There is also a between in the case of having clothes on, having-on on the one side, the clothes that are put on on the other side.” The having-on as such is the ἔξις. This having is something ultimate, as nothing more can be had on its part. The having of this having is not a new being-determination, but rather simply the there, the being-present. In having on the clothing that is put on, it is genuinely there as put on. It is the same with the being-there of clothes. An article of clothing is not there when it is hanging in the closet, but when it is put on; it is in its τέλος. In being put on, the clothes *are* what constitutes the genuine there of the clothes, both put on and worn: the ἔξις.

Aristotle further characterizes this ἔξις as διάθεσις καθ’ ἣν ἢ εἶ ἢ κακῶς διάκεται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἢ ὑγεία ἔξις τις· Διάθεσις γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη.¹⁹² In relation to the being-contexts that we are treating, διακεῖσθαι is related to μεταβάλλειν, which happens through the πάθη.

187. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 21 sqq.

188. Cf. Phys. E 3, 226 b 18 sqq.

189. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 23 sqq.

190. Met. Δ 20, 1022 b 4 sq.

191. Met. Δ 20, 1022 b 5 sqq.

192. Met. Δ 20, 1022 b 10 sqq.

Διακεῖσθαι in Chapter 19: having is a τάξις,¹⁹³ allotment of parts in various respects, an allotment that has the character of θέσις.¹⁹⁴ Thus it is a posited allotment, not a merely accidental being-thrown-together, but a being-posed. The ἔξις as διάθεσις, as τάξις, springs from προαίρεσις: the proper finding-oneself in the being-allotted of the moment.

"Ἐξις is the *determination of the genuineness of being-there in a moment of being-composed as to something*: the various ἔξεις as the various modes of being able to be composed. "Ἐξις is, in an entirely fundamental way, the being-determination of genuine being, here in relation to human πράξις. Πράξις is characterized through ἀρετή, and ἀρετή is characterized as ἔξις προαιρετική. Πράξις, as the how of being-in-the-world, appears here as the being-context that we can also designate in another sense as *existence*. Being-composed is not something optional and indeterminate, for in ἔξις lies the primary orientation toward the καιρός: "I am there, come what may!" This being-there, being-on-the-alert in one's situation, in relation to its matter, characterizes ἔξις. "Ἐξις is, therefore, a being-possibility that is *related in itself to another possibility*, to the possibility of my being, *that within my being something comes over me, which brings me out of composure*.

b) Presentation of the Context of the Treatment of ἔξις

In the last meeting, we clarified an ontologically basic concept of Aristotle's: ἔξις, which plays a fundamental role in the Aristotelian analysis of the being of human beings, but which also becomes important for another basic determination, since Aristotle discusses στέρησις in opposition to ἔξις and in detail with κίνησις. At this point, we already know enough to say that the concept of στέρησις too has a basic relation to being. We must closely consider the context in which we have come upon ἔξις. The task is to understand the πάθη as those determinations that characterize the audience. The audience is in a definite situation over against the speaker, such that the situation becomes co-determinative of the manner in which the audience understands. Through speaking-with and repeating, the audience appropriates that which the speaker wants to exhibit in his speaking. The πάθη are topics insofar as they are co-decisive for the manner and mode of λέγειν, how the λόγος has its basis in the πάθη themselves. To take hold of what is meant by πάθη in the right way, we are choosing a roundabout path toward ἔξις, by way of a general hermeneutic guide. For it appears that what is evident, according to its structure, sheds light upon what is not evident.

The πάθη can be *had*; in *having* there lies a relation to being. With the orientation of πάθη toward ἔξις, the πάθη are themselves oriented toward being-there as being. This basic orientation, which is indicated in relation to ἔξις, is important for an understanding that is opposed to the traditional conception of

193. Met. Δ 19, 1022 b 1.

194. Met. Δ 19, 1022 b 2.

the affects, which is used to taking them as states “of the soul,” and possibly in connection with “bodily symptoms.” One partitioned the phenomenon into bodily states and states of the soul—states that stand in some connection. On the other hand, it must be noted that Aristotle, in accordance with his orientation of treating the ensouled as the mode of being of living things, emphasizes that the πάθη express the *being of human beings*, so here there is from the beginning an entirely different basis. The originary unity of the phenomenon of the πάθη lies in the being of human beings as such.

The Aristotelian doctrine of the πάθη had quite an effect on subsequent philosophers and theologians (e.g., *Thomas’* doctrine of affects), both for its fundamental orientation and its selection of phenomena. Generally, the πάθη are a basic question of theology. Here in particular, I should mention that the doctrine of affects within the basic questions of medieval theology and philosophy is also relevant for *Luther*. Above all, it is *fear* that plays a special role in the Middle Ages since the phenomenon of fear has a special connection with sin, and sin is the counter-concept to faith. Even Luther wrestled with fear in his early writings, particularly in his *Sermo de poenitentia*. The discussion of φόβος, of *timor*, is connected with *timor servilis* and *timor castus*, and therefore with repentance, where *attritio* and *inritio* are distinguished. *Timor castus* is “pure fear” in the presence of God; *timor servilis* is fear of punishment, of hell, just as with repentance *attritio* and *inritio*. These distinctions go back to *Augustine*, as he treated them extensively in *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, quaestio 33, De civitate Dei*, Book 14, Chapter 5 ff., and in the writings on Pelagianism. Aside from this, these phenomena were treated generally in some detail: the medieval treatment of the πάθη goes back to *Johannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa*, Book 2, and further to its source in *Gregory of Nyssa*. More precisely, the medieval era quoted from his writing *Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου*, which itself is a writing of *Nemesius* (Gregory wrote something with a similar title: *Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου*). This latter text contained the doctrine of the πάθη from the *Stoa*, and it is one of the primary sources for the medieval era. There is, still further, the question of *Dionysius the Areopagite’s De divinis nominibus*. The whole development of the doctrine of the affects, up to the present, has not been analyzed philosophically. Only *Dilthey*, in his “The Worldview and Analysis of Human Beings since the Renaissance and Reformation,” has given thorough treatment to the πάθη and characterized their significance for psychological states.¹⁹⁵

The πάθη, in an entirely general way, are characteristic of a disposition of human beings, a how of being-in-the-world. Accordingly, Aristotle provides,

195. W. Dilthey, *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, in Wilhelm Dilthey’s *Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by G. Misch, Volume 2, Leipzig & Berlin 1914. Cf. p. 416 ff. (“Die Function der Anthropologie in der Kultur des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts”).

beforehand, a guide for the analysis that he carries through in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*. He considers the affectus in three respects:

1. In relation to every πάθος the question arises: πῶς διακείμενοι εἰσί: ¹⁹⁶ How do we find ourselves genuinely, of what sort is our being-in-the-world, when we are in a rage, when we are in fear, when we feel pity?

2. ποῖα: ¹⁹⁷ About what do we get angry, lose composure?

3. ἐπὶ ποίοις: ¹⁹⁸ In relation to whom, in encountering which sort of human beings, are we there in this way? In the basic structure of the πάθη, we find, once again, the orientation to the being-with-one-another of being-there as being-in-the-world.

Presumably, it is the manifoldness of these relations, which are expressed through the πάθη, which are then seized by ἐξίς, and in relation to which ἐξίς expresses a being-composed. In order to see the context of the πάθη as possibilities of finding-oneself and possibilities of being-seized, we must look more closely at ἐξίς itself, insofar as it is a basic determination of the being-there of human beings.

c) ἐξίς and ἀρετή

We are considering ἐξίς insofar as it is related to the ζωὴ ἀνθρώπου, to πρᾶξις μετὰ λόγου—ἐξίς as the γένος of ἀρετή: ¹⁹⁹ πρᾶξις has its genuine how in the σπουδαίος. Seriousness is expressed by ἀρετή. From the connection between ἐξίς and ἀρετή, we will see the orientation of ἐξίς toward the being-there of human beings in its concrete possibilities.

Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chapters 1–5: only that which is most important for demonstrating ἐξίς to you and, at the same time, for clarifying a basic concept of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the μεσότης. Μεσότης is not some kind of “mediocrity,” not a determination of human actions in which it would amount to mediocrity, not a so-called “bourgeois morality,” not a principle of “ranking values”; but rather a basic relation to ἐξίς, and so to the being-there of human beings, to πρᾶξις, and so to the καιρός. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is altogether different from the ethics of a mediocre averageness and from the conventional.

From insight into the connection between ἐξίς and ἀρετή, *four basic aspects of being-there* result:

1. That “action,” πρᾶξις, concern is in itself the concern of the being-there which is concerned. In being involved in the world, in dealing with it, in occupying oneself with other human beings, being-there itself, which is involved in this way, is concerned with itself, with its being. *Being-there as concern is*

196. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 24 sq.: τῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί.

197. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 25: τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι.

198. Ibid.

199. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1105 b 19 sqq.

care about itself, for the most part inexplicitly. This basic phenomenon is hidden in the concept of ἔξις—ἔξις as the having of something, the mode of being in having, the mode of being-positioned in relation to what is had.

2. In ἔξις, being-there will show itself more precisely in its *particularity*. The being of human beings, human being as being-there is *particular*, *at the moment*: ἔξις is a being-composed of being-there, oriented toward the moment.

3. This being-composed, this being-oriented toward the moment, is the sort of possibility that has seized being-there itself *on the basis of its particular situation*. In an average way and for the most part, being-there stays within the degrees of “more or less,” too much and too little.

4. On the basis of this three-fold basic structure, it is also evident, at the same time, that ἔξις is a basic determination of being-there itself, that the γένεσις of this ἔξις, the manner and mode in which being-there itself comes to a being-composed in relation to itself, can have the opportunity and the type of its cultivation only, again, *in being-there itself*. Being-there must, *for itself*, take the opportunity to cultivate this being-composed as a possibility.

α. The γένεσις of ἀρετή

As to the connection between ἔξις and ἀρετή: we will begin with the γένεσις of ἀρετή. We are treating ἔξις only in order to see the πάθη themselves more precisely. Ἀρετή as ἔξις is not a property, not a possession brought to being-there from without, but is rather a *mode of being-there itself*. We are encountering once again, as always, the peculiar category of the *how*. Ἀρετή is a how of being-there, not as a fixed property, but rather as the how of being-there *determined by its being*, characterized by *temporality*, by the stretching across time. For this reason, ἀρετή is and comes to be δι’ ἔθους,²⁰⁰ “through habit.” The possibilities of being-composed in relation to various dispositions that are characterized by not being composed or losing my composure are graspable only by way of *undergoing* various situations involving risk. The opportunity of cultivating this how of being-there itself is called for only by way of not retreating from life’s possibilities and risks. In the manner and mode that we, correspondingly, are present to our being in the full presence of the situation encountered, we grasp ἔξις. Since we make use of possibilities of action and of concern in the manner and mode of finding, first and foremost we appropriate ἔξις, and not the other way around, having it as a possession so as to then make use of it, but rather *χρησόμενοι ἔσχομεν*.²⁰¹ This undergoing, taking-opportunities or seeking-out-opportunities, is a process. Since we are with-one-another, in the process of dealing with human beings, we come to be steady and level-headed. Since we bring ourselves into situations involving risks, we have the possibility of learning courage, of leaving cowardice behind, not in a

200. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 25 sq.: διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.

201. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 30 sq.

fantasized reflection upon being-there, but rather in *venturing-out into being-there* according to the possibilities of existence as encountered. For this determination should not be conceived as though there were a τέχνη for this taking-opportunities and venturing-out into the δεινά of life. οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν.²⁰² Nor is there a παραγγελία for this, something like a universal military field order, an a priori ethics, by which humanity becomes better *eo ipso*. Everyone must have, for himself, his eyes trained on that which is at the moment and which matters to him.

Thus it follows that the how of being-composed is to be cultivated in relation to being-there, as ἐξίς is oriented in this way. However, there is a difficulty in this formulation of the γένεσις of ἐξίς, insofar as the question arises: what, in general, does it mean to become just through acting justly? Of course, I must already be just to act justly.²⁰³ Aristotle discusses this difficulty in Book 2, Chapter 3, of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He resolves this difficulty by recourse to relations of a different sort, in τέχνη.²⁰⁴ In τέχνη, it depends upon the γινόμενα behaving in the right manner. Shoemaking depends upon the shoe, the τέλος, the ἔργον, behaving in the right manner, and thereby being a good, suitable shoe. Nothing further comes into question here. By contrast, we know that the being of human beings is determined in its ἔργον as πράξις. This has the τέλος in itself, comes to its end through itself. For this reason, the basic conditions governing the ἔργον of human beings are entirely different than those in the case of a τέχνη. For this πράξις, it depends on how the one acting, as such, behaves toward himself. It depends on ἐξίς, being-composed and this πῶς ἔχων of the πράττων,²⁰⁵ the “how” of the “one acting” is defined in accordance with three aspects:

1. εἰδώς²⁰⁶—φρόνησις: he must be “knowing,” must act in the right “condition of looking around,” which is oriented toward the καιρός with respect to the subject matter.

2. προαιρούμενος,²⁰⁷ he must act from out of himself “on the basis of an actual being-resolved to . . .”

3. Acting in such a way that he is thereby βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων,²⁰⁸ “stable and not to be brought out of composure.” This recalls the determination of πάθος as δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες,²⁰⁹ we are brought out of one frame of mind into another. What is characteristic is not the resulting condi-

202. Eth. Nic. B 2, 1104 a 7 sqq.

203. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 a 17 sqq.: ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι [. . .] εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια [. . .], ἤδη εἰσὶν δίκαιοι.

204. Cf. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 a 26 sqq.

205. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 a 30 sq.

206. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 a 31.

207. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 a 31 sq.

208. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 a 33.

209. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 20 sq.

tion, the having-come-into-another-frame-of-mind, but rather the having-lost-composure, being on the way from one state to another, the peculiar unrest that is given with πάθος itself in relation to φόβος characterized as ταραχή,²¹⁰ “tumult,” “getting mixed up.”

These determinations, and particularly the last—that προαίρεσις is βεβαίως—are “not ascribed” to a τέχνη.²¹¹ Only real concrete knowledge comes into play in τέχνη. What I am as far as being a decent guy plays no role in shoemaking. In relation to a certain commonality between τέχνη and πρᾶξις on account of the determination of the εἰδέναι,²¹² Aristotle stresses the preeminent significance of προαίρεσις and of βεβαίως. “The πράγματα that a σώφρων or δίκαιος should have been able to do are addressed as proper and composed πράγματα [we do not have categories for this: the new concrete situation that I created through my πρᾶξις—phenomenon of the *concrete situation*—the new being-positioned toward something that Aristotle designates as πράγματα]. However, proper and σώφρων is not he who [because of some accident] does what is proper and just, but rather he who shows concern for the concrete situation in the same way as do those who are just and composed.”²¹³ This is a jab at the sophists and the greater part of human beings, who believe that one accomplishes something for ethical action by hashing over ethics-related conflicts or by moralizing. ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὁμοίον τι ποιῶντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ’ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκείνοι εὖ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ’ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.²¹⁴ “Most do not show concern for this [being-προαιρούμενος-βεβαίως], but instead they resort to babble and believe themselves, thereby, to philosophize and to be serious in the right manner. They resemble those who, while listening carefully to the doctor [and talking things over with him], nonetheless do nothing to follow his orders. Just as these others do not become healthy by sharing concern in this manner, neither do they who only moralize appropriate genuine existence for themselves [except in conversation].” What is characteristic is the sharp contrast between λέγειν about ethics-related problems and real philosophizing—an advance against the misuse of Socratic method in the claim that he understood Socrates correctly, and this will not easily be contested.

β. Ἀρετή as μεσότης

The relation of ἔξις and ἀρετή will be made clearer in order to understand, on that basis, how ἔξις itself can be the how of our comportment toward the

210. Rhet. B 4, 1382 a 21.

211. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 b 1: οὐ συναριθμεῖται.

212. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 b 1 sq.

213. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 b 5 sqq.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ τοῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτως πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.

214. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 b 12 sqq.

πάθη. How can ἔξις be πῶς ἔχομεν? "Ἐξίς is nothing other than a how of πάθος, being-out-of-composure, in relation to being-composed-as-to . . . Insofar as we can define ἔξις according to its basic structure, we will also clarify the possible-structure of πάθη. "Ἐξίς is itself a basic determination of ἀρετή. Aristotle says, in Chapter 5 of Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "according to its being-origin," ἀρετή is a ἔξις, a being-composed as to . . .²¹⁵ "Ἐξίς is to be understood *in relation to the concrete being of human beings*. "Ἐξίς also has the further meaning that is the same as the δύναμις of any being at all. Here, ἔξις has the definite orientation toward the being of human beings. In itself, ἔξις is related to the ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου, the sort of being-in-the-world in which the world is encountered in the character of συμφέρον, βλαβερὸν, ἡδύ, and λυπηρόν. Our being-in-the-world is always characterized by this disposition of being-elevated and being-burdened, specifically in a way that we find ourselves within the degrees of a bad mood or an elevated mood. "Ἐξίς is the determinate being-composed within this way of being. In this way, ἀρετή is determined in its being-character.

Aristotle seeks to sharpen the being-determination of ἀρετή by taking it as μεσότης, by taking the οὐσία of ἀρετή as μεσότης. In the expression μεσότης, μέσον comes from medicine, which aims at grasping the healthy condition of human beings as a μέσον, and orients medical concept formation toward this. Aristotle transposed this basic concept of medicine to ethics, with a concrete glance toward the specific difference in the basic sense of being dealt with. In previous ethical questioning, the concept of the μεσότης did not come up.

Aristotle tries to approach the phenomenon of the μεσότης, of maintaining-the-mean, by proceeding from the definition of the μέσον as some kind of πράγμα: ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἔστιν λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον.²¹⁶ "In all that holds together in itself, in all that is stable, the more or less and correspondingly the equal can be distinguished." And these distinctions are (1) κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα, (2) πρὸς ἡμᾶς,²¹⁷ "with regard to the matter itself" and πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.²¹⁸ Μέσον is that equal that we apprehend as being-equally-far-away from the ends. "That which is equally far removed from both ends is addressed as μέσον of the matter itself."²¹⁹ In this way, one can determine the mean of a thing geometrically. But insofar as the μέσον is to be related to the interpretation of the being of human beings, it does not pertain to a πράγμα in itself, but rather insofar as it is πρὸς ἡμᾶς, insofar as we are related to it, insofar as it means something to us in the sense that the matter "is not too much nor too little"²²⁰ to us. With the μεσότης, the world also comes into question, but not alone; in-

215. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 a 13: τῷ γένηται.

216. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 a 26 sq.

217. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 a 28.

218. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 a 28 sq.

219. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 a 29 sq.: λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων.

220. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 a 31 sq.: πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει.

stead, the mode of being-in-the-world is, as such, determined by the μεσότης. Correspondingly, it must be noted that there is no μέσον in accordance with this way of being that would be ἐν and ταῦτόν πασιν.²²¹ On the other hand, with a πρᾶγμα καθ’ αὐτό, for example, a line or two numbers, one and the same μέσον remains, just as four is always the double of two, and is equally distant from two and six. In this sense, there is no μέσον for the being of human beings because everything human is μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. *For our being, characterized by particularity, no unique and absolute norm can be given.* It depends on cultivating the being of human beings, so that it is transposed into the *aptitude for maintaining the mean*. But that means nothing other than *seizing the moment*. It depends on ὅτε [δεῖ] καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ.²²² In relation to this manifoldness of being-determinations, maintaining the mean is what counts—not an arithmetical or geometrical mean, but mean now taken in the sense of ἕξις as τάξις, the “being-appportioned” of that which comes up for a decision. Appportioning is a matter that arises from the resolution itself: the mean is, here, not a fixed property, but is a way of comporting oneself in the world. Aristotle designates ἀρετή as τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική,²²³ it “aims” as what maintains the mean, as being-oriented to the right appportioning, the right seizing of the moment. Μεσότης: ἕξις βλέπουσα,²²⁴ the “being-composed that sees” and is open to the situation. In this sense, the mean must be understood on the basis of the being-character of that for which it comes into question as mean; in this sense, it is related to the being of human beings as being-oriented to something.

In Book 2, Chapter 11 of *De Anima*, in his interpretation of αἴσθησις, Aristotle characterizes αἴσθησις itself as a μεσότης, that is, perception as a μέσον with the character of κριτικόν, of the “ability-to-separate” one thing from another.²²⁵ This conception arises from the fact that Aristotle recognizes that the seeing of colors is always separating one definite color from another. The ability-to-see must be a possibility that is not related to *one* object in its vicinity, but a possibility that can see both ends, dark-light, and therefore the entire range of the color manifold. It is a being-positioned toward possible objects, which is a δύναμις in the sense of κριτική. Perception is related to objects in the peculiar position of being-open to them. In this being-open, there is a definite being-oriented with regard to both ends. On the basis of this application of the μέσον, it becomes clear that we are not dealing with a precisely defined property, but with that which is primarily related to being-oriented in the world.

γ. The Orientation of ἀρετή toward the Moment (καιρός)

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὀρισμένη

221. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 a 32.

222. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 b 21 sq.

223. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 b 28: στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.

224. Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106 b 9.

225. De an. B 11, 424 a 4 sqq.

λόγω.²²⁶ In this sense, ἀρετή as μεσότης is such that it is “delimited,” that it delimits itself “through speaking” with the world in the mode of a deliberating in advance of the moment, through the how of talking through the circumstances, so that in this delimitation the right apportionment of the moment results. For example, in this moment, this comes into question in relation to this definite human being. On the basis of μεσότης and ἀρετή, thus understood, it can be made clear that it is a mistake to conceive of ἀρετή as completedness, as this contradicts the sense of ἀρετή.

What does it genuinely mean to come into a determinate ἔξις? Ἐξίς are certainly not properties that we bring along with us due to our nature; rather, they have a definite γένεσις: δι' ἔθους. “Habituation” is the path on which we come to ἔξις, to ἀρετή. Right at the beginning of Book 2, Aristotle draws the essential distinction within the manifoldness of the ἀρεταί: ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ [ἀρετὴ] τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει [. . .], διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου.²²⁷ “Those possibilities of comportment that also cultivate διανοεῖν have that which is more on the basis of communication; therefore, they require experience and time.” ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται.²²⁸ “On the other hand, being-composed in a determinate passion is made our own through habituation.” It is important to clarify the character of the γένεσις of ἀρετή on the basis of habituation. Ἐθίζειν: *bringing-oneself-into-a-determinate-possibility by way of frequently-undergoing-it*. The possibility is thus, in each case, a determinate possibility, for example, for a ποίησις: the appropriation of the possibility of a completion, technique. The possibility for πράξις, πράξις not taken in the wide sense of “action” as such, but as determination of the being of human beings. Ποίησις and πράξις are two possibilities that, perhaps, only designate two distinct modes of appropriation.

Aristotle speaks of the γραμματικὸς.²²⁹ He says: one can write correctly, at first by chance or with outside help. But whoever writes by chance cannot simply write. He must write in the way demanded by τέχνη. He must write, not by chance, but according to a prescription; and without outside help, but he must be able to write from out of himself. Through *practice*, by frequently-undergoing, it comes about that being-oriented puts the prescription further and further out of play. Training has the precise sense of reducing deliberation insofar as it is through training that the completedness of attaining a *result* comes about. With τέχνη, the ἔργον is decisive. Concern for this ἔργον brings it correctly to an end, allows its production to proceed smoothly.

In the case of an *action*—in the narrow sense in which it is opposed to ποίησις—it does not, according to its sense, depend on the action simply ending, on a result coming about; instead, προαίρεσις is decisive, the manner and

226. Eth. Nic. B 6, 1106 b 36 sq.

227. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 15 sqq.

228. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 17.

229. Cf. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 a 22 sqq.

mode of “resolving oneself.” It belongs to action that it arise in each case out of a *resolution*. Action itself has its τέλος in the καιρός. Therefore, it belongs to action that it *proceed by way of deliberating and as such be fulfilled*. In ὀρθότης, the action is fulfilled in the “correctness” of deliberation. With training, the possibility of action is put out of play, deliberating and resolving, the how of action—precisely that on which it depends. Therefore, to be able to be brought into the possibility of right action does not mean to appropriate a completedness. The manner and mode of habituation, in the case of action, is not practice but *repetition*. Repetition does not mean the bringing-into-play of a settled completedness, but rather *acting anew in every moment on the basis of the corresponding resolution*.

Cultivating ἕξις never depends on an operation, a routine. In an operation, the moment is destroyed. Every completedness, as settled routine, breaks down in the face of the moment. Appropriation and cultivation of ἕξις through habituation means nothing other than correct repetition. Therefore, in Chapter 3, Aristotle also sharply distinguishes ἀρετή and action from τέχνη, although he initially groups them together, when demarcating them in opposition to ἐπιστήμη. To appropriation ἐκ διδασκαλίας belong ἐμπειρία and χρόνος.²³⁰ For Aristotle, “science,” ἐπιστήμη, is a determinate ἕξις, a determinate being-positioned toward the matter that is there as such, in such a way that I have information about it. This ἕξις carries in itself a measure for concrete knowing. According to its content, this concrete knowing can only be brought forward little by little. It is dependent upon the extent of knowing. It requires in itself a fully determinate duration. By contrast, πράττειν, “action,” as well as “completing,” ποιεῖν, must be cultivated as such in πράξις and τέχνη. They do not take up a definite material, but rather *cultivate the how of dealing itself*. The distinction lies in the fact that πράξις depends on the *how*. The how is only appropriated in such a way that the human being enables himself *to be composed at each moment*; not routine but holding-oneself-open, δύναμις in the μεσότης. All of human living cannot be there constantly. The possibilities that a human existence has at its disposal are not constantly there within the stretching of being-there; it loses itself. The possibility deteriorates, and being-there requires ever new and constantly repeated appropriation. The peculiarity of that upon which it depends in repetition as a determinate practice can be characterized by the fact that all action, and all non-action, is oriented toward the μεσότης. Aristotle emphasizes, again and again, that the μέσον is hard to find and easy to miss; errors are easy. To fly off the handle is easy, but to be angry at the right moment is difficult. This requires the possibility of being able to seize the moment as a whole. Therefore, acting seldom occurs on the basis of the μεσότης and in the μεσότης.²³¹

230. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 15 sqq.

231. Eth. Nic. B 9, 1109 a 26 sqq.: οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντός καὶ ῥάδιον [. . .] τὸ δ' ἢ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντός οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὐ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν.

The whole question of self-habituating must be seen from the look of the possibility on which appropriation depends. It depends on being-resolved at each moment, and on the appropriating of the moment. Aristotle's saying "on the basis of acting-frequently"²³² is also to be understood in this way. Here, this acting-frequently does not mean often in the sense of a duration, such that it would have ultimately become routine after a determinate amount of time. Rather, it is related to *πρᾶξις* as *προαίρεσις*: continual-repeating of *προαίρεσις*. The frequently is, precisely, that which characterizes the temporality of being-there. Aristotle cannot say *αἰεί* insofar as human being-there does not so comport itself constantly and always. It can constantly be otherwise. The *always* of a being like being-there is the *frequently of repetition*. It is the being-there of human beings, as determined by *historicality*, to see entirely different time-contexts in relation to which the remaining time-determinations break down.

§18. Πάθος. Its General Meanings and Its Role in Human Being-There
(Metaphysics Δ21, De Anima A1)

a) Ἐξις as Clue to the Conception of the Being-Structure of πάθος

For the understanding of *ἔξις* itself and the understanding of its *γένεσις*, we infer that it cannot be understood as completedness in the sense of routine. From there, we already see something more clearly, which now comes into question along with the *πάθη* themselves. The *πάθη* are also characters that, in their way, more proximally determine being-in-the-world, being-in-the-moment. It does not concern "spiritual states" with "bodily symptoms"; instead, the *πάθη* characterize the entire human being in its *disposition in the world*. The entire human being is the primary object dealt with in the Aristotelian psychology of *De Anima*, Book 1. The entire human being must be understood with regard to its being as *ζωή*, as being-in-a-world—thus grasped as a genuine topic not of psychology but of the *discussion of the being of this being*. *Πάθη*: we will take the analysis of *fear* as an example. For the Greeks, fear as anxiety is co-constitutive of the manner and mode of grasping what is and what is not. Thus Aristotle views the phenomenon of fear so broadly that he also becomes attentive to the fact that there is fear even if nothing is there that would be the direct inducement of a fear—*fear in the face of the nothing*. From here, the way that the Greeks view being as genuinely in the *present*, being as cared for in the mode of *presentness*, becomes intelligible.

By orienting the definition of the concept of *ἀρετή* to the fundamental concept of being, Aristotle defines *ἀρετή*, at the beginning of Chapter 6, Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as *ἔξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὐσα τῆ πρὸς ἡμᾶς*,

232. Eth. Nic. B 3, 1105 b 4: ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν.

ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειε.²³³ Ἄρετή is a “being-composed in the ability-to-resolve-oneself.” Ἐξις, as defined in terms of προαίρεσις, in terms of the moment, is better interpreted as μεσότης. “Mean,” as determination of ἔξις, μεσότης as πρὸς ἡμᾶς: the way that the world itself stands to us, or how we are in it—being able to maintain the mean in resolving-oneself, having-there-present of the decisive moment. In talking-through, this situation is still itself delimited in various regards. Even in ἀρετή itself, as being-composed, the determination of λέγειν comes up. In order to ward off a confusion, this ὀρίζεσθαι λόγῳ is better defined through a theoretical determining of a matter. It is the kind of ὀρίζεσθαι that a φρόνιμος would do, λέγειν as λέγειν of the φρόνιμος; seeing not only as looking-toward that brings facts of the matter into relief, but seeing of the world as looking-around, looking-around-oneself in the world, primarily as looking-around in resolving-oneself. Being-in-care about being-there has its mode of sight in φρόνησις. Therefore, λέγειν corresponds with φρόνησις, in relation to which it is μετά. If one considers ἀρετή like this, then one characterizes it as οὐσία insofar as its being constitutes the being-there of human beings. In relation to the possibility of action, of comporting-oneself, that is expressed in ἀρετή, ἀρετή is not a μεσότης, but is rather a pinnacle, the highest, ἀκρότης. Taken purely ontologically, the ἀρετή μεσότης is in οὐσία, with regard to the possibility itself that carries it in itself; with regard to the εἶ, it is ἀκρότης.²³⁴

Ἄρετή, which goes toward ἦθος, ἀρετή ἠθική, has a fully specific γένεσις corresponding to its being-character, which Aristotle characterizes, at the beginning of Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, separately from ἀρετή διανοητική, the ability-to-be-composed in the world, as further clarified in relation to looking-around-oneself in the world. Ἄρετή is related to πρᾶξις, ἀρετή ἠθική is related to ἔθος. Its γένεσις is “habituating-oneself” in the sense of frequent working-through.²³⁵ Insofar as one considers the other ἀρετή, ἀρετή διανοητική, in its γένεσις, perhaps science as possessing a determinate subject-matter, it is to be said that ἀρετή “requires experience and time.”²³⁶ That is not to say that the cultivation of ἀρετή ἠθική does not require time, but χρόνος is here taken as *duration*. Duration as such, in which I appropriate my concrete knowledge, is co-constitutive of the cultivation of being-composed as knowing information about something. The time-character of ἠθική lies in πολλακίς. Aristotle brings ἀρετή ἠθική etymologically together with ἔθος.²³⁷ Therefore, ἔθος, here, expresses γένεσις at the same time. That time, not as duration, is precisely constitutive of ἀρετή as ἠθική is shown by Aristotle’s emphasizing that genuine being-composed within being-there is gained by the human being

233. Eth. Nic. B 6, 1106 b 36 sqq.

234. Eth. Nic. B 6, 1107 a 6 sqq.: κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὀριστον καὶ τὸ εἶ ἀκρότης.

235. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 17: ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται.

236. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 16 sq.: ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου.

237. Cf. Eth. Nic. B 1, 1103 a 17 sq.

as a man, and so not during youth and not during old age, when indeed the longest time has elapsed. Aristotle treats life-stages extensively in *Rhetoric*, Book 2, Chapters 12–15. It is to be noted that it is not the case that the oldest, simply by virtue of their temporal span, have the possibility of being genuinely in the ἔξις, while in the case of ἐπιστήμη, this is already possible. Ἐξις, in relation to the πάθη, is to be our clue to the more precise conception of the being-structure of the πάθη themselves.

b) The Four General Meanings of πάθος

For the definition of πάθος, we search the books of definitions, *Metaphysics* δ, Chapter 21.

1. πάθος λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ποιότης καθ' ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν, καὶ βαρῦτης καὶ κουφότης, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.²³⁸ The primary and initial definition of πάθος is “being-constituted, ποιότης, regarding which something underlies alteration [therefore not just any endowment as such, but one that is characterized such that in itself it offers the possibility of what was thus constituted being reversed] white-black, sweet-bitter . . .” This definition characterizes a being as something that can in some way be affected by something. Something can *happen* to such a being. “To happen” touches upon what is meant by πάσχειν and πάθος in the genuine sense. In πάθος, Aristotle sees, with the facts regarding *motion*, not so much the passive, but that something *occurs for me*. Here, πάθος is taken in the broadest and the plainest meaning: possibility of ἀλλοιώσις, of “becoming-otherwise.” Πάθος is a determination of beings with the character of alterability.

2. ἓνα δὲ αἱ τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη.²³⁹ These beings are characterized such that they carry in themselves the possibility of something occurring to them in the circle of their constitution, perhaps in relation to a color. For now, occurring itself is taken as πάθος in its being-there itself. Ἐνέργεια: the “being-there” of such a shifting occurring-to-one.

3. ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι.²⁴⁰ The definition of πάθος becomes more and more narrow: πάθος as the occurring-to-one that has the character of the unpleasant, of the βλαβερόν. That which happens to me is harmful to me in its happening. This is, indeed, the way that we use the expression “to happen.” But πάθος is defined still more precisely: harmfulness is related mostly to λύπη, so that, as a result, *my attunement to this occurring affects me*. It is a becoming-relevant of something, which aims at my attunement, a becoming-otherwise in the sense of becoming-depressed.

4. ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται.²⁴¹ In a pointed

238. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 15 sqq.

239. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 18.

240. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 18 sqq.

241. Met. Δ 21, 1022 b 20 sq.

sense, then, πάθος designates the “size,” the “measure,” of that which happens to me, that which occurs to me in a harmful way. We have a corresponding expression for that: “that is a blow to me.”

From these four meanings, the *genuine relatedness* of πάθος becomes visible; it is related to the *being of living things*, which is characterized by a thus-finding-oneself-again-and-again. The occurring to one befalls and strikes one in this disposition. This occurring has in itself the character of the *harmful*. The occurring itself, as happening, does not need, without qualification, to have the character of the harmful, that of φθορά. Rather, Aristotle recognizes a μεταβολή, κίνησις, ἀλλοίωσις, in which πάσχειν has the character of σωτηρία.²⁴² Something occurs to me such that this experiencing or undergoing has the character of σώζειν. By way of something encountering me, occurring to me, I am not annihilated, but instead I myself first come into the genuine state, namely, the possibility that was in me now becomes genuinely real. *Hegel* took the phenomenon of σώζειν from Aristotle in the expression “sublation (*Aufhebung*).” I emphasize this here, so that the context, along with the phenomenon, of motion becomes clear. Aristotle touches on the distinction in a characteristic context: If one who has information about a definite matter, who is in possession of a knowing, actually presents the subject matter in question to himself on the basis of this knowing, of the being-composed, by being-able-to-see, to see the subject matter in person; then a particular κίνησις, a μεταβολή, is to be ascertained—a “reversing,” though one that cannot be properly designated as “becoming-otherwise.” Or if one wanted to designate it generally as “becoming-otherwise,” one must introduce a new γένος of ἀλλοίωσις. For it is not the case that a builder becomes another through building, when he builds a new house. Rather, he becomes precisely that which he is.²⁴³ As opposed to this μεταβολή through which the ἕξις is saved, is brought precisely to that which it should be, there is a kind of πάσχειν that has the character of στερητικόν. Something happens to me, by which I lose the ἕξις, for example, becoming-old. Πάθος is, therefore, that which deprives me of a matter, and a preserving, a saving—preserving in the sense of safekeeping, of raising to a higher, genuine being of ἐνέργεια.²⁴⁴

c) Πάθος as the Being-Taken of Human Being-There in Its Full Bodily Being-in-the-World

Πάθος, in relation to the ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου, is thus a *being-taken* of being-there. Being-there is taken with that which is there in the world with

242. De an. B 5, 417 b 2 sqq.: οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος.

243. De an. B 5, 417 b 5 sqq.: θεωροῦν γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι [. . .] ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. Διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονη, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομή.

244. De an. B 5, 417 b 14 sqq.: δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως, τὴν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν.

being-there itself—from without, but from without *in the sense of the world as the wherein of my being*. The possibilities and ways of its being-taken follow from being-there itself. Thus, this being-taken of being-there as being-in-its-world does not involve anything like what we could designate as the “spiritual,” which invites the conception of πάθος as affect. Instead, it is always a being-taken of beings as living things as such. Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say that the human being hopes, is brave. τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοιον κἄν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνεν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ.²⁴⁵ “To say that the soul gets angry is the same as wanting to say that the soul builds a house. It would be better to say not that the soul has pity or learns or believes something, but that the human being does τῇ ψυχῇ.” Soul is here conceived as οὐσία, insofar as the being-taken of beings as living things is expressed in the πάθη. The topic that Aristotle refers to as Περὶ ψυχῆς, the ontology of beings, is precisely the human being. Therefore, the πάθη are not “psychic experiences,” are not “in consciousness,” but are a being-taken of human beings in their full being-in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that the whole, the full occurrence-context, which is found in this happening, in being-taken, belongs to the πάθη. The so-called “bodily states” of anxiety, joy, and so forth, are not symptoms, but also belong to the characteristic being of beings, of human beings.

In Book 1, Chapter 1, of *De Anima*, Aristotle discusses the genuine object of such an investigation Περὶ ψυχῆς—the role played by the πάθη. Thus he discusses the πάθη along with the ways in which a living thing is taken: ἀπορίαν δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστὶ τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥάδιον δέ. φαίνεται δέ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. μάλιστα δ’ εἰσὶν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχουτ’ ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι.²⁴⁶ Regarding the πάθη, he asks “whether they are all common to that which possesses them [to the ἄνθρωπος; here κοινὰ means all human beings], or if there are πάθη that are cut off from the soul. It is urgent that this be clarified [noteworthy use of λαβεῖν], but it is not easy. Most people [invocation of the average experience of human beings regarding being-there itself] believe that the body somehow takes part in all having-courage, and so on, and in all perceiving in general. [The expression αἰσθάνεσθαι—having-courage toward . . . , being-inclined, and so on—is not used in the narrow sense of perception, but as awareness in the sense of having-there of the world. It is not theoretical considering, but being-open for something that is around me.] To most, even νοεῖν seems to be an ἴδιον of the soul. [To most, pure considering—for example, pure mathematics—seems to

245. De an. A 4, 408 b 11 sqq.

246. De an. A 1, 403 a 3 sqq.

be the sort of thing in which the body does not take part.] If, however, even νοεῖν [the thorough deliberating of a matter, when I do not have it perceptually present] is something like a φαντασία or cannot be without φαντασία, then thinking too could not be without standing in the context of the entire life of a human being.” *Thinking*: this is not an appeal to a brain process, but to φαντασία, the “making-present-to-itself” of the world, in which what is made present is not actually there, but instead is, say, in memory or in a merely faint making-present. Even in thinking about something, the matters are there in the making-present. Φαντασία is the ground for νοεῖν. Insofar as νόησις is the highest possibility for the being of human beings, the entire being of human beings is determined so that it must be apprehended as the *bodily being-in-the-world* of human beings.

What was, here, provided by Aristotle, is still not taken advantage of today. Only in *phenomenology* has this begun. No division between “psychic” and “bodily acts”! This is to be seen practically, for example, in the way that I move my hand, the way that I make a movement with it. *One must note that the primary being-there-function of bodiliness secures the ground for the full being of human beings.* The beginnings of the entire tradition’s erroneous orientation toward the biological (*Descartes’s res cogitans—res extensa*) is also found in Aristotle.

Aristotle proceeds from four general meanings of πάθος: (1) changeable constitution, (2) of which there is a special meaning, (3) as that which tones life down, (4) πάθος, especially as harmful: adversity, a blow. It must be shown to what extent phenomena like fear, anger, and so on, live up to what we have set forth as general determinations of πάθος; and also in what sense the πάθη are to be considered as γινόμενα τῆς ψυχῆς.

Aristotle begins *De Anima* with the question of how what is meant by ψυχή is to be understood and determined, in order to gain the correct προτάσεις from which the scope of the being-contexts of living things is to be constituted. Ψυχή means all that constitutes the being of a living thing, as that which constitutes being, that is itself something. Thus the manifoldness of being-contexts is subordinated to a determinate manifoldness of determinate object-categories. The question in relation to which Aristotle discusses the πάθη is: How can something occur to a living thing regarding its being? And is everything that can occur to living things to be taken as belonging to their way of being as such? Or are there also determinations of the ability-to-occur to living things that befit, in a peculiar sense, a way of being of living things themselves—ψυχή and ἄνθρωπος?

In the background of this altogether general question stands the phenomenon that Aristotle designates as νοῦς. The concrete question (which Aristotle addresses, but does not fully answer, in *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapters 4–5) is how the being of the human being is determined in the genuine sense as being-in-the-world. It asks whether the being of human beings as having-the-world-there-opened, discoveredness, openedness of being-in-the-world; whether and

how this is determined by νοῦς; whether this being-determined of openedness by νοῦς is to be apprehended in such a way that νοῦς as such also belongs to the being of human beings, in such a way that it *arises in the being of human beings*; or whether this being of human beings, openedness, is determined by νοῦς such that νοῦς *enters into human beings from outside*, so that the being of human beings is only a determinate possibility of openedness, which νοῦς as such guarantees. Therefore, the question is whether there are πάθη that have, beyond the concrete being of human beings, a characteristic way of being in themselves. These contexts will become intelligible if I underscore some of the basic determinations of νοῦς.

Aristotle likens νοῦς to φῶς.²⁴⁷ Just as it is through light that a color first comes to its being-there, is in its there insofar as it stands in illumination—being-there as the characteristic illumination, so *every being that is there as a being requires a fundamental illumination in order to be there*. Beings themselves, as beings that are there, must possess the possibility of being-opened-up. This possibility is nothing other than νοῦς. The basic determinations of νοῦς, the “supposing” of something, is the δυνατόν,²⁴⁸ the “possibility” of simply being-opened-up, of the there of something; every concrete grasping operates and maintains itself therein. As such, νοῦς is ἀπαθές,²⁴⁹ “that which nothing can touch”; instead, it is the *condition of the possibility for something in general to be encountered by living things*, for something to be there for living. Thus νοῦς, in relation to the being-opened-up of being-in, is more than the human being can be since the way that the human being takes up this possibility, νοῦς, is διανοεῖσθαι.²⁵⁰ Insofar as νοῦς constitutes the being-opened-up of the human being, it is a διά, insofar as living is determined by λύπη and ἡδονή. Νοῦς is the *basic condition of the possibility of being-in-the-world*, which as such stands out beyond the particular concrete being of individual human beings.

It should be noted that in this explication of Chapters 3–5, Aristotle stays completely within the realm of description; this doctrine of νοῦς is not some theory, but arises out of concrete experience. Aristotle only pursued this doctrine to the extent that he in fact saw the matter. He allowed the investigation of νοῦς to stand because he went no further with respect to the matter.

As this δυνατόν, νοῦς is better defined as δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἶδους,²⁵¹ as “being-able-to-take-up” the εἶδος at the moment, the “look” of a being. Accordingly, νοῦς is the light in which the look of something is seen. What is said of illumination in relation to color (αἴσθησις) is said fundamentally of νοῦς, with regard to the being-determinations of every being as such.

247. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 14 sqq.

248. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 22.

249. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 15.

250. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 23: νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται [. . .] ἡ ψυχῆ.

251. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 15 sq.

By way of introduction, Aristotle poses this concrete question: to what extent does νοῦς belong or not belong to the concrete being of human beings? He asks whether there is an ἴδιον πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς; whether νοῦς constitutes the being of living things, such that this determination characterizes the being of living things as proper to such a being; whether νοῦς is as μέρος ψυχῆς χωριστόν.²⁵² Aristotle answers this question on the basis of the evidence. The evidence says that a living thing as a being in the world, insofar as it is encountered by the world, *is also encountered with a view to its corporeality*, that everything aims at the living thing *in its full being-there*. He shows this in relation to the being of human beings, that which is determined by νοῦς. The νοεῖν of human beings is not pure. The supposing of something that I do not actually have there is grounded in φαντασία; it is only possible on the basis of making-present, and making-present is, as such, nothing other than the retrieval of that which was at one time present, the retrieval of a past present. Φαντασία is not necessarily recollection—that is a special making-present. Recollection is a making-present within which lies the knowing of the having-once-experienced of that which is retrieved. In this way, the νοῦς of human beings is related to φαντασία, and so is related to the αἴσθησις and the πάσχειν of the σῶμα.

We are now concerned with the question of how Aristotle characterizes the peculiar interlacing of the being of the human being, in its full being-there, with the σῶμα. This question determines the type of treatment to which the πάθη as such are subjected. The type of analysis of the πάθη that is carried out in the *Rhetoric* is one that makes the εἶδος of the πάθη visible without acknowledging their peculiarity: that as κινήσεις τοῦ σώματος they look the way that they do, they are a kind of occurring to a living thing, and so an occurring that also lays claim to corporeality.

Initially, Aristotle leaves open the question as to whether there is an ἴδιον πάθος of the soul as such. Instead, he goes beyond that to show that all πάθη are μετὰ σώματος.²⁵³ He shows this in two ways: all being-angry about . . . , being-kind to . . . , fear for . . . , and so on, in a certain sense also concerns the body.²⁵⁴ The peculiar fact appears, that we are concerned with παθήματα, with occurrences, situations in the world, that are very powerful; and that we, nevertheless, are not gripped by fear because of them. Sometimes the opposite is shown; we are excited by altogether weak provocations.²⁵⁵ Therefore, our being gripped by such and such a πάθος does not come exclusively from what befalls us, but the γένεσις of πάθη is also given by corporeality. The γένεσις of πάθη is still more clearly shown by the fact that we are sometimes gripped by fear without something fearsome meeting us,²⁵⁶ so that to a certain degree the

252. De an. A 1, 403 a 8 sqq.

253. De an. A 1, 403 a 16 sq.: εἴκοι δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος.

254. De an. A 1, 403 a 18 sq.: ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τὸ σῶμα.

255. De an. A 1, 403 a 19 sqq.: σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι.

256. De an. A 1, 403 a 22 sqq.: ἐτι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν: μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαινόντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου.

fearing rises up in ourselves; the possibility of fear and of anxiety is co-given in our being. But that shows that, in fact, corporeality also speaks in the γένεσις of πάθη. “If that is so, then it is clear that the πάθη are λόγοι ἔνυλοι.”²⁵⁷

d) The Double-Type of Consideration of πάθος according to εἶδος and ὕλη, and the Question Concerning the Task of the φυσικός

The addressing of this phenomenon, which should hit upon the πάθη as to what they are, must proceed toward that on the basis of which the πάθη are, that wherein they are found. Their ὕλη is nothing other than σῶμα, the corporeality of the human being. Therefore, since the investigation of the πάθη is of this sort, the ὅροι that circumscribe in themselves the phenomenon at each moment must, accordingly, fall out.²⁵⁸ Thus the ὅροι is of the ὀργή. “Being-angry is something like a being-in-motion of the body constituted thus and so, of a corporeality that finds itself in a fully determinate mode, or a body part, and thus it is a fully determinate motion under pressure from this and that, from definite circumstances because of this and that occasion.”²⁵⁹ At once, the ὕλη is seen; it lies in τοιουδὶ σώματος. At the same time, the εἶδος is in the being-so of being-of-concern: ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἔνεκα τοῦδε.²⁶⁰ With that, λόγος is simultaneously addressed. From this, a *fundamental epistemological definition* follows, for Aristotle: “Therefore, it is already a matter of the φυσικός to take into view that which lies within the thematic circle of the being of living things.”²⁶¹ Φυσικός: he who examines nature in the widest sense. In the phenomenon of πάθος, σῶμα is co-constitutive, specifically as something that carries in itself the possibility of being-in-a-world. There, σῶμα characterizes a fully determinate ὕλη that makes living possible. It thus follows, for Aristotle, that the φυσικός considers the πάθη in a different mode than does the διαλεκτικός. They “circumscribe the πάθη in ever different modes, for example, anger. The one [the διαλεκτικός, who deals with rhetoric] considers anger as ὄρεξις ἀντιλῆψεως, being after pay-back [a certain implacability as a mode of being-toward-others]; the φυσικός defines anger as a determinate boiling up of blood in the heart and of the temperature.”²⁶² The first λόγος yields the genuine εἶδος,²⁶³ that which genuinely is. But, as determination of the being of human beings in the world, it is necessarily co-determined by the fact that it is a ζέσις, a “boiling up” of the blood.

257. De an. A 1, 403 a 24 sq.: εἰ δ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοι εἰσιν.

258. De an. A 1, 403 a 25.

259. De an. A 1, 403 a 26 sq.: τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κινήσις τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἔνεκα τοῦδε.

260. Ibid.

261. De an. A 1, 403 a 27 sq.: διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς.

262. De an. A 1, 403 a 29 sqq.: διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὀρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικός ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργή τι ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλῆψεως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ.

263. De an. A 1, 403 b 2.

There is, therefore, a *double type of consideration* and the question is what the task of the φυσικός, with regard to the ψυχή, genuinely is. For example: λόγος οίκιας²⁶⁴—how does a “house” look? “We can address it as shelter, protection that keeps away the possibility of being harmed, damage by the wind, rain and heat [the shelter in which we seek and have protection]. Another will say: stones, brick, wood. A third will say: the look, εἶδος, of this house in wood, stones, bricks, and this because of the production of the needed protection, of shelter [a being-built that is guided with a view to the fact that the σκέπασμα should be there]. Who, then, is the φυσικός? Is it he who simply speaks about material (who says that what stands here is stone and wood), and gets no knowledge of how the material in question is genuinely selected? Or is it he who only speaks about the εἶδος? Or is it he who speaks ἐξ ἀμφοῖν?”²⁶⁵ The real φυσικός is he who addresses the house in terms of the look that in itself is related to what the house consists of; he who aims primarily at what the house is, how it is constituted in itself. Aristotle gives this decision a fundamental priority over all previous considerations of nature. The *being of nature* is determined in its look not simply by ὕλη, but *primarily by being-moved*. Only beings determined thus are the genuine and definite topic of the φυσικός. He interrogates σώματα in view of their ἔργα and πάθη²⁶⁶—πάθη in the very broad sense, in the first sense of Chapter 21 of *Metaphysics* Δ. The φυσικός takes σώματα as constituted thus and so. He considers, for example, wood, insofar as it comes into question as the being-determination of trees, co-determining the being of plants. The τεχνίτης,²⁶⁷ on the other hand, considers wood, say, a rudder, not as co-determining the tree, but insofar as it possesses hardness, with a definite view toward its aptitude to be judged a rudder. The doctor considers σώματα differently than does the φυσικός; namely, in accordance with that which he holds in advance in his τέχνη, in his manner and mode of dealing with the body. A broader way of considering σώματα: wood, not insofar as it is constituted thus and so, not as tree-trunk, as the stable part of a plant, not as material; but solely insofar as it is extended. When it is thus considered, it is the possible object of the μαθηματικός.²⁶⁸ Beyond these ways of considering, there is yet another way, which takes every being with a view to its being-determinations; not with a view to, say, being-extended alone, but taking all possible beings together in the fundamental question concerning being as such. This is the object of the πρώτος φιλόσοφος.²⁶⁹

264. De an. A 1, 403 b 3 sq.

265. De an. A 1, 403 b 4 sq.: ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμων καὶ ὀμβρῶν καὶ κανυμάτων· ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ζύλα, ἕτερος δ’ ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος ἔνεκα τῶνδ’. τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικός τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον; ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.

266. De an. A 1, 403 b 11 sq.: ὁ φυσικός περὶ ἅπανθ’ ὅσα τοῦ τοιοῦτοῦ σώματος καὶ τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη.

267. De an. A 1, 403 b 13.

268. De an. A 1, 403 b 15.

269. De an. A 1, 403 b 16.

For the being-determination of the πάθη, it is important that they be understood in themselves only when they are taken as the πάθη of σώμα; their εἶδος is primarily determined as *determination of living things in relation to being-in in the world*. Θυμός and φόβος are suited to an altogether determinately constituted body; they are “not separable.”²⁷⁰ There is nothing like a pure fear in the sense of an abstract comporting-oneself toward something. In itself, it is a comporting of the full human being in its corporeality. But this inability-to-be-abstracted is different than that of mathematical objectivities. The πάθη cannot be identified with the lines and surfaces of bodies in the mathematical sense.²⁷¹ The Greek does not see a line primarily in itself, but instead γραμμὴ is always the limit of a surface, and surface the limit of a body. The surface has no being without the body—thus, here too, an inability-to-become-separated. In this way, the εἶδος of fearing also has the primary relatedness to a finding-oneself of the body. The difference lies in the fact that the determinate constitution of σώματα plays no role in mathematical inseparability, for instance in the being-brown or being-scratched of the body; while, for the πάθη, the thus and so constituted way of being is essential. Both are λόγοι ἔνυλοι, but in an entirely different sense.

This is the ground for the type of consideration of the πάθη, with a view to the εἶδος, which is found in the *Rhetoric*. It is important that Aristotle does not obtain a basic determination of a living thing from physiological considerations. The εἶδος of the πάθη is a comporting-oneself to other human beings, a being-in-the-world. Only from this standpoint can the ὕλη of the πάθη be genuinely examined.

Book 1, Chapter 1 of *De Anima* investigates the extent to which νοῦς, as a basic determination of the being of human beings, is a basic characteristic of this way of being; and the extent to which the human being only constitutes a definite possibility of the being of νοῦς. The ground lies in the fact that Aristotle sees that νοῦς, “supposing,” in contrast with all other ways of grasping, is a possibility of grasping that is not limited to a determinate region of being, as is hearing, seeing, and so on. Instead, νοῦς goes toward τὰ πάντα; it is a possibility of grasping that grasps all possible beings, so that the being in question need not necessarily be present. This universality of the possibility of grasping is something that is not to be equated with the concrete being of the human being, which is always at the moment. What grounds this possibility of grasping everything, which grows out beyond the human being and its concrete being? In connection with this question, Aristotle discusses the πάθη as those phenomena in which it is shown that the concrete being of human beings can only be understood if one takes it in its fullness, and this on the basis of various considerations. It is, above all, decisive that we lose composure, as in the case

270. De an. A 1, 403 b 17 sq.: τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ πως χωριστὰ τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζώων ἢ δὴ τοιαῦθ' ὑπάρχει, θυμός και φόβος.

271. De an. A 1, 403 b 19: οὐχ ὅσπερ γραμμὴ και ἐπίπεδον.

of fearing without encountering something in the environing world that could be the direct occasion of fear. In this being-a-matter-of-concern of the πάθη, corporeality is co-encountered in some mode or other.

If that is the case, then the question is: in which field of investigation do beings with the character of living things belong? Is it not the φυσικός that also has the ψυχή as his topic? That is, in fact, the case to the extent that, fundamentally for the φυσικός, every σῶμα is a τοιοῦτον, determined thus and so, from which it follows that the φυσικός is obligated to determine this τοιοῦτον from the outset, to determine the ὕλη in its positive sense. And it is precisely this task of the basic determination of beings that the early φυσιολόγοι have left unheeded. We must approach this state of affairs from the opposite side, and show *the extent to which the φυσικός must draw the ψυχή into consideration within certain limits*. A reason for this digression is the context of the analysis of motion in Chapters 1–3 of Book 3 of the *Physics*.

§19. *The φυσικός and His Manner of Treating ψυχή (De Part. An. A 1)*

How ψυχή in general came into view is evident from Book 1, Chapter I of the investigation Περὶ ζῶων μορίων—which is simultaneously a concrete example of the manner and mode in which Aristotle genuinely carries out theoretical λόγος. The treatise is called “On the Parts of Animals,” but not much can be gathered from it, taken in this way. It should be observed, however, that ζῶον is, here, taken in the broadest sense as “living thing.” Μόριον and μέρος have a much broader sense than simply “part,” in the sense of quantitative piece: μόριον also has the sense of “function,” “capacity,” “structural aspect.” The μέρη are all that constitutes the jointure, the being-joined, of a definite being. Περὶ ζῶων μορίων means: “On the Connection of Capacity and Jointure of Living Things as Determinate Beings.”

a) The Two Types of ἔξις θεωρίας: Concrete Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and Assurance of the Manner of Treatment (παιδεία)

Aristotle begins the investigation with a fundamental deliberation as to the conditions of scientific research. We will, here, become acquainted with that which corresponds to what we learned in the discussion of ἀρετή. There, we defined ἀρετή as ἔξις προαιρετικῆ μετὰ λόγου, specifically as the φρόνιμος carries it out. Here, Aristotle points to the ἔξις θεωρίας, “the ability to have scientific research at one’s disposal.” He determines this ἔξις from two sides: (1) ἐπιστήμη and (2) παιδεία τις.

Ad 1. The first is *concrete knowledge*; concrete knowledge about a subject belongs to the very possibility of a researcher.

Ad 2. Much more decisive, and more essential for Aristotle, is παιδεία, the *assurance of the manner of treatment*.

Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν,

δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδεῖαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων.²⁷² Here, λέγων is used in the sense of what is conveyed in the lecture. Over against this, the one who has the ἔξις of παιδεῖα is “to decide” and can “judge,” indeed “assuredly,” that which “he delivers in the proper way and that which he does not,” regarding the matter of which he speaks. He can judge *how* the speaker treats the matter that is the topic. The πεπαιδευμένος has the *how of the manner of treatment* at his disposal: whether it is spoken of *from the proper basic relation to the matter*. The decision lies in the παιδεῖα, whether the access is *originary* or whether the speaker has access to it only from hearsay or has acquired it. And correspondingly, theoretical dealing, which has παιδεῖα at its disposal, is able to advance with the *proper methodological instinct* in all possibilities or definite possibilities of research. What is meant here is not arriving at a definite method, already given in advance, as technique, but rather the ἔξις, *being-free*, the peculiarly reflective *being-open for a definite concrete content*, and a definite objective subject area. He who has the right instinct, the right παιδεῖα, will be able to decide whether it makes sense to treat logic mathematically or to set up the history of Christianity with categories from art history, and thereby set up the types of piety. Rather will he see that the one in question has still understood nothing of Christianity. Today, this ἔξις is entirely neglected; it is also difficult to appropriate, and even more difficult to obtain. Precisely this definition of the ἔξις of παιδεῖα shows the absolute assurance with which Aristotle presents his research, and the way in which he proceeds in relation to the tradition.

b) The Decisive παιδεῖα for Investigating the φύσει γινόμενα:
The οὗ ἔνεκα as λόγος in the Primary Respect

What is the *decisive παιδεῖα for the investigation of φύσις*? τοιοῦτον γὰρ δὴ τίνα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἴομεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδευθῆναι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον.²⁷³ As to the πεπαιδευμένος, we are to distinguish one who is ὅλως πεπαιδευμένος, who “simply” has instinct and is so far in παιδεῖα that he notices, even without concrete knowledge of the issue, whether the speaker repeats something or whether he stands in relation to the matter; and alongside the one who is ὅλως πεπαιδευμένος, there is one who is confined to a particular subject area, who has the corresponding assurance in his area of expertise.²⁷⁴ Aristotle discusses, initially, the definition of παιδεῖα inasmuch as it is related to the ἱστορία περὶ φύσιν.²⁷⁵ Ἱστορία means orienting oneself,

272. Aristotelis opera. Ed. Academia Regia Borussica. Volumen primum: Aristoteles Graece ex recognitione I. Bekkeri volumen prius. Berlin 1831. De part. an. A 1, 639 a 1 sqq.

273. De part. an. A 1, 639 a 6 sqq.

274. Cf. De part. an. 639 a 8 sqq.

275. De part. an. A 1, 639 a 12: τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας.

the primary looking-around to see how φύσις genuinely looks. Insofar as this ἔξις is tailored to natural occurrences, a manifold of questions results. We will discuss only the main questions.

There is the question of whether, in investigating a subject area, one must at first take notes to a certain extent, whether one must first deal with the φαινόμενα, how things about which one speaks about look, what they give themselves as in a primary way; and whether one should then pose the question, asking the manner in which they are precisely such and such, behave as such and such; or whether the order of questioning should be different than this.²⁷⁶ The question is whether—as with the ancients, who speculated about the ἀρχαί of the world without knowing what they meant by the world—one should begin with theory, with that which one has rather superficially thought up about a matter, or whether one should first examine the matter itself. Then there is the further question to resolve: insofar as the posing of the διὰ τί belongs to every investigation, it is to be observed that there are two possibilities of the διὰ τί in relation to the beings one designates as “nature”: (1) the οὐ ἔνεκα, (2) ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως.²⁷⁷ “That on account of which and that whence movement is.” These two causes are respects in which a being, which at first is clarified in its being-there, can be taken. Thus we have two questions: (1) whether, in general, the phenomenon should first be studied and then the in-what-manner; (2) which of the causes is the primary one with respect to the in-what-manner.

From looking at the matter itself, I can decide in what manner and with which posing of the question, I can approach the matter. From the matter itself, the second question also must be decided, which is the first respect according to its sense within the beings spoken of here, φύσει ὄν. Aristotle makes the decision in relation to φύσει ὄντα as ζῶα. It appears from the matter itself that the *wherefore* is the first διὰ τί, that I must therefore raise the first question, toward the οὐ ἔνεκα, upon the basis of the setting-forth of the look of the being of living things. The reasoning for this runs: the οὐ ἔνεκα is a λόγος, λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δ’ ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν.²⁷⁸ “For λόγος is, in the domain of beings, what exists, what is there, in like manner within the orbit of beings of production, as within the beings that are there as φύσει ὄν, the ἀρχή.”

The question as to the basis from which beings are determined, the question as to the respect in which beings are to be first taken, is decided by the return to λόγος. Λόγος means “speaking” as well as “what is expressed”—basic determination of ἀποφαίνεσθαι: what is expressed is that which is exhibited by the thing addressed, namely, in λόγος, the thing addressed, this being, is there

276. Cf. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 14 sqq.

277. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 10 sqq.

278. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 14 sqq.

uncovered, exhibited. The expression λόγος is taken with this ambiguity, for definite reasons, first, λόγος, λέγειν in the sense of accessing something and exhibiting its λόγος in the sense of access; λόγος also means what is expressed as such, the being that is addressed lies therein. In translating it as “address,” we are taking λόγος in this second sense. Even in German, the expression “addressing” [*Ansprechen*] is used with a definite meaning, as when we say of an instrument “it addresses” [*er spricht an*], “it answers,” “restores” in the sense of restoring something to its call. Λόγος in the sense of access: to exhibit a matter in such and such a way, to call it in such and such a way. In addressing, the matter thus called addresses; in exhibiting, it appears as it is. It depends on how a matter is called, so that it addresses itself from itself in the right mode. Λόγος taken with this second meaning is the address, the concrete content that a matter yields to a call. Thus, very often λόγος will be identical to εἶδος. Λόγος means address, that which the matter yields, and in the right addressing the matter yields that which it is, how it looks.

The wherefore is λόγος, and since it is this, and since λόγος is the ἀρχή, the wherefore is the first in-what-manner. If it is said that the wherefore is the λόγος of a matter, this is meant from a determinate type of encounter: the τέλος. Τέλος is the genuine λόγος. Τέλος is not “purpose,” but rather “being-completed,” “end.” The συνεσθηκός, what is “standing there” as completed, is the genuine sense of the being-there of a being. When something is addressed in its being-completed, the address is proper. The τέλος, as being-completed, is that whereby production has its end. Being-completed as such is that with which production, making-complete, comes to its end. Τέλος, as the completed state of production, is that wherefore production is thus and so. Seen from the path of the coming-into-its-being of a being, the τέλος is the οὐ ἔνεκα.

Aristotle carries these connections through in an entirely concrete way. We want to follow him in this, and at the same time procure for ourselves the foundation by which this being-consideration is made intelligible, how τέλος is the λόγος of a being, how the sort of research pursued by the ancient physiologists went astray. The entire mode of treating φύσει ὄντα is directed from that standpoint. At the same time, we can see how the τέλος, as the genuine λόγος of the φύσει ὄντα, specifically of the ζῷα, is precisely nothing other than ψυχή, so that the physicist must treat the τέλος πρώτον. Τέλος is not “aim-directedness,” τέλος is a φαινόμενον; not an instrument, but rather “being-there-completed,” in the way that the animal moves itself. With respect to τέλος, the primary thing to learn is that it comes to its being in being-there itself.

The consideration of Περὶ ζῳῶν μορίων, Book 1, Chapter 1, has several purposes: (1) discussion of φύσις, (2) in what manner does ψυχή fall within the field of investigation of the φυσικός? (3) an orientation toward the concrete fulfillment of the λόγος θεωρητικός—ἀλήθεια, (4) to obtain insight into that toward which the entire lecture is aiming: what do οὐσία and ὄν mean?

Οὐσία—previously, we proceeded from the customary meaning: οὐσία as the “present-being-that-is-there,” “what is at one’s disposal,” “possessions and

goods”—as they lie at the basis of the fundamental discussions. Meaning of being as *being present*; being: *being-there in the present*. In the context of the fundamental discussion, the meaning of being as being-present receives a more precise elucidation, insofar as we manage to show what the *there* means for the Greeks: *having-come-into-the-there*, and specifically *through pro-duction*; pro: there, pro is toward a determinate there; pro-*ducing*, bringing into the there, into the present. That is the genuine sense of ποίησις. Being-there is, in the genuine sense, *being-pro-duced*: *being-there-completed*, *having-come-to-the-end*. Τέλος = πέρας. These are *clues for the basic sense of Greek ontology*, as it was then later effective in the legacy of the Greeks, such that the originary sense of being conceals itself and becomes a matter of mere words. The primary sense of οὐσία, being, from which we have proceeded, is “possessions and goods”: that which is produced from wood, stone, and set upon the ground (which also is φύσει ὄν), is τέχνη ὄν: (1) thus πράγματα and χρήματα, with which I have something to do, what is at my disposal, what is in use in practical life; 2. the φύσει ὄντα as γινόμενα; 3. the φύσει ὄντα as ἀεί. The being-character can be made intelligible only from the sense of being-there as being-produced. The πράγματα are there insofar as they are produced in τέχνη. The φύσει ὄντα are that which is there in the producing of itself, what does not require production by others. They are there precisely as the πράγματα are. But their γένεσις has, once again, the character of the there: a plant grows up and brings forth another. And, finally, there is that which is there, being φύσει ὄν as ἀεί, which does not require production, which is there in such a way that it does not need to be produced. It is there in the genuine sense, but is intelligible only from the standpoint of production. The ground of beings is producing. What is to be seen is how λόγος is the possibility for obtaining access to being in this sense of being-there-completed, having-come-to-an-end.

The consideration that Aristotle carries through, here, begins with a division of ἔξις: (1) concrete knowledge, (2) assurance of the methodical treatment of a determinate being through research: παιδεία. It employs deliberations that do not touch upon concrete knowledge, which stand for themselves, which are separate from the question, πῶς ἔχει τ’ ἀληθές, “how beings comport themselves in their being-uncovered.” Apart from this question, we should discuss the right mode of access to a being with which research genuinely should begin, and what is the ordering of its individual steps. Aristotle orients this reflection schematically through two questions: (1) whether, above all, the φαινόμενα should be brought into view and then the διὰ τί; (2) if the διὰ τί, then which in-what-manner: in what respect must I primarily posit the being thus made present? We know of two respects: the οὐ ἔνεκα and the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. The question as to which of these two respects is more originary is to be decided on the basis of beings themselves. I cannot answer the question by thinking up something systematically. I can only decide it on the basis of the matter itself. The discussion of, and the proof that, the οὐ ἔνεκα is the primary respect, that it is the aspect that takes precedence, is to be fulfilled only in such a way that

I return to the φαινόμενα, to being itself. The legitimacy of this respect is to be derived only from the matter itself. However, insofar as these beings are the φύσει ὄντα, beings characterized by coming-into-the-there, by γένεσις, the question is whether the οὐ ἔνεκα is the first or the ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, whether one is to consider the discussed subject area in its what—whether one is to be concerned with beings with respect to *what they are*, what they are as beings-that-are-there—or *how they come to be* with respect to γένεσις.

Since it is already decided that the question of the τί is the primary one, we will understand οὐσία on that basis, and we will understand γένεσις accordingly. Presumably, then, the οὐ ἔνεκα will give the answer to the τί question. The manner in which the οὐ ἔνεκα is primary is to be made intelligible. This is the basis for the way that beings are to be determined in their genuine being. The purpose is to then set down in writing the basic respect of that which is to be dealt with, to set forth the way of being of ζῶα. In other words, what must be set forth is the basic determination of beings that live, namely, ψυχή. What matters, in the context of this consideration, is seeing how Aristotle sets forth the character of the ἔμψυχον in a phenomenal manner, on the basis of how beings appear. At the same time, we will secure the ground for our main point, that ζωή as ψυχή means a being as being-in-the-world. It will be shown that the point is in the text itself and is not invented by me.

The answer to the question that the παιδεία of this discipline poses is given by Aristotle as follows: primarily, the respect that beings promote is the οὐ ἔνεκα. In the “wherefore” of what is questioned in this respect, beings must show, by way of this respect, how they themselves are. Here, it is a question of the φύσει ὄντα, specifically, a question of the γινόμενα, not of the ἀεὶ ὄντα, the οὐρανός, which likewise is φύσει ὄν. Instead, it is a question of the γινόμενα that are ἔμψυχα. The question, furthermore, is how this sense of being—in the sense given at the beginning—becomes decisive for the interpretation, insofar as it is a question of the being of human beings as πρᾶξις. The direction of being-interpretation runs through the categories of ἔξις, being as determinate “having,” “having something at one’s disposal.”

Initially, Aristotle grounds the claim that the οὐ ἔνεκα is the primary respect, by saying that the οὐ ἔνεκα is the λόγος. Why is it the primary respect for this reason? What, above all, does λόγος mean in this context? (1) Λόγος in the *sense of access*, ἀποφαινέσθαι of beings as φαινόμενον. (2) Λόγος in the *sense of answer*, as address, how beings address themselves to a call; it restores beings to their look. In the first sense, beings are, through addressing, posited as something in a respect, this there as this or that, as a chair, for example. The λόγος fulfills this standing-out τὶ κατὰ τιος, something as something. In this aspect of λόγος, there arises the further possibility of λόγος as standing-out, articulating, λόγος as τὶ κατὰ τιος. Derived from this is the possibility of λόγος qua relation, for example, ἀνάλογον. Λόγος is the possibility of uncovering a relation; it is not itself a relation. Apart from this dual meaning of λόγος, there is yet a third. The genuinely average meaning, (3) where λόγος means *both*, ex-

hibiting and what is expressed, what is expressed in such a way that I thereby *do not genuinely* bring expressing to completion, or exhaust it. However, what is said in this process has, latent within itself, the possibility of *originary appropriation*, as I can be serious about what is said merely thus. This λόγος is the average discoursing about matters with respect to which one knows his way around to a certain extent, without making it present to himself. From this, the possibility arises for a pure completion and for proper exhibiting.

c) The Determination of Independent λόγος in Relation to φύσει γινόμενα

Λόγος is precisely this: the mode of the exhibiting of beings, the possibility of deciding what the primary access is and what primarily is to appear. For this reason, the entire discussion turns to the question, πῶς λεκτέον?²⁷⁹ The λεκτέον takes up the main point set forth at the beginning, namely, that the οὐ ἔνεκα is the πρῶτον since it is the λόγος. Here, it is a question of a genuine λόγος, the λόγος of θεωρία. From the earlier sections,²⁸⁰ we already know that λόγος has a fundamental meaning for the being of human beings: ζωῆ πρακτικῆ μετὰ λόγου. The λόγος is fulfilled in the addressing of the world and in the discussing of it. In λέγειν, the world's beings that are there, and being-there itself as living come to interpretation, to the degree that beings move themselves in the world. Speaking is the constitutive mode of fulfillment for concerned dealing. For the being-there of human beings, there remains the possibility of that determinate λέγειν in this concerned dealing looking away from concern in the sense of ποίησις, of directed having-to-do. Πράξις can lose the character of ποίησις; it does not also need to have the character of acting. It can take on the character of the mere treating of something in the sense of debating it. The λόγος becomes independent; it itself becomes πράξις. This mode of dealing is θεωρία, no longer looking-around with the purpose of . . . , but rather looking to grasp things in their being and being-there. In this way, the theoretical arises, science as a possibility on the basis of being-there itself. This basic fact of the matter must be kept in view.

Insofar as λόγος becomes independent, in the sense of debating (λόγος used in the sense of “debate”), the question is how λόγος looks as to its particular implication for the being-region of the φύσει ὄντα as γινόμενα. Aristotle proceeds cautiously, and while he does not discover the species of λέγειν, he does discover what is most proximate to it. Here, he attempts to clarify the peculiar λόγος of θεωρία. A context must be pointed out that has a definite kinship with the λόγος of θεωρία. This familiar way of dealing with things, which is akin to θεωρία, is τέχνη, a form of ποίησις, the “production” of something as guided by a knowing-the-way-around. The construction of a house is guided by construction supervision. And why, precisely, this being by this dealing? It is clear without further remark that ποίησις is what is known proximally. However,

279. Cf. De part. an. A 1, 640 a 33, 641 a 15, 641 a 29.

280. See S. 45 ff.

one must clarify the fact that the being of ποιήσις has a peculiar kinship with the φύσει ὄντα as γινόμενα. The φύσει ὄντα are only what we do not produce, but rather are what is *already there for us*, already there in the world, but in such a way that it has to do with producing, that it is a self-producing and thus is there in self-producing. That is an altogether primary finding. Now Aristotle poses the question: how does λόγος look in τέχνη, and how, accordingly, will λόγος look as mere considering? What is to be seen is the following:

1. how Aristotle characterizes τέχνη in relation to the ἔργα τέχνης, what-is-there-specifically for τέχνη, as well as the λόγος τέχνης.

2. [whether] the φύσει ὄντα as γινόμενα are what show themselves primarily as φαινόμενα.

3. How did the ancients see the φύσει ὄντα as opposed to what they did not see in them? What did they miss in terms of what is to be set forth? On the basis of what Aristotle set forth as missing, what is at stake for him will become evident.

α. The ἔργα τέχνης and the λόγος of τέχνη

How does τέχνη look, the ἔργα τέχνης and the λόγος of τέχνη?²⁸¹ ἢ γὰρ τῆ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῆ αἰσθήσει ὀρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρός τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόσιν τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὗ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως.²⁸² “Whether the doctor or the building-supervisor be through deliberating [through the reflective making-present to himself of the beings with which he has to do] or through αἴσθησις [concrete exemplification because he has already seen a house], which is present in their type in both cases, they deliver the λόγος [the manner in which the matter addresses, the way it looks], the λόγος of whatever in particular they do, what they have to do, and [insofar as they deliver the address] that which they deliver, that thing in question is to be effectively thus and so.” The house that I want to build for myself: if it looks thus, I must build it thus, must take the material. Set forth from the λόγος is the on-what-account—the λόγος—which is the wherefore; since it is such and such, it must be effected thus and so γένεσις is to be understood only on the basis of the τέλος.

It will depend on understanding the φύσει ὄντα on the basis of its λόγος. In this context, ψυχή emerges as the topic of the φυσικός. These two determinations, *being-present* and *being-produced*, are what make the Greek concept of being-there intelligible. These two aspects must be pursued more precisely within Greek being-there itself. It must be made intelligible how the being-there of the Greeks is such that world and living are experienced in this *completeness*, and why precisely this experience of being is explicated by these conceptual means. This last question with respect to Greek ontology is not

281. Cf. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 26 sqq., 640 a 16 sqq., a 31 sqq.

282. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 16 sqq.

something we are posing here. We are striving to make intelligible some basic determinations of this being as *being-in-movement*, and thereby being-produced, having-become. More concretely, the context is one in which Aristotle attempts to unpack the *characters-of-being-there*, the type of presence and the type of being-produced, setting forth the *characteristic being-aspects of being as living things in nature*. For such a setting forth, the phenomenal fact of the matter that the Greeks designated as ψυχή must become visible—whether soul belongs to beings, i.e. what is in the world: φαινόμενον ψυχής. The structure of this consideration is oriented toward the question: what belongs to the *right type of methodical treatment* of the φύσει ὄντα? We will arrange the investigation into three parts:

1. we are considering the basis on which Aristotle investigates the characters-of-being-and-presence of the φύσει ὄντα, the field of what is known on the basis of which the unknown becomes intelligible. This field is the ἔργα τέχνης, what is there at one's disposal, to hand, produced for definite action and treatment by another.

2. How do the φύσει γινόμενα, living nature, appear?

3. How did the ancient physiologists see the being of φύσει γινόμενα? The aim of the critical consideration of forerunners is to set forth their characteristic lapses, misguided searches.

Ad 1. We have begun with the first point, namely, presenting the ἔργα τέχνης to ourselves. In its primary deliberating, τέχνη provides that look which the thing to be produced should have, the ποιητέον, the working pace of producing. In the second cited passage,²⁸³ Aristotle makes the connection between the addressed look of production and the production itself explicit. The connection is constituted by a definite type of speaking; the λόγος is characterized by the 'if-then': *if* such and such is to be completed, *then* such and such must occur. Implicit in this 'if-then,' is the fact that a definite out-of-which of producing, a definite ὕλη, is required by the look of the thing to be produced. For the production of a shoe, I need this or that leather—the out-of-which of a coming into being, lasting. It is necessary that a such and such, a ὕλη, be procured, that such an out-of-which be present in advance, be at one's disposal. The out-of-which of producing is itself there in this definite disposability. This disposability is indicated on the basis of what is to be there as completed. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιάνδε τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται οἰκία ἢ ἄλλο τι τέλος· καὶ γενέσθαι τε καὶ κινηθῆναι δεῖ τόδε πρῶτον, εἶτα τόδε, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐφεξῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα γίνεται ἕκαστον καὶ ἔστιν.²⁸⁴ "It is necessary that a ὕλη, thus procured, be present if a house or another being is to be in its being-completed. And the coming to be and the being-moved [i.e., the working pace of producing] must be, first and foremost, the first step of working, must be this or that,

283. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 26 sqq.

284. Ibid.

then that, and in this manner until the end, μέχρι τοῦ τέλους.” From the how of the look of the completed being in its being anticipated, the working pace, the order and direction of the course of production, are marked out in advance. At the same time, it is thereby said that γένεσις is in itself founded in the τέλος. It has in itself, just as at every moment, its being-possibility in being-completed, so that the how of τέχνη is anticipated, in a peculiar way, through λόγος. ἐπεὶ τοιόνδ’ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας, ἢ τοιόνδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία, ὅτι γίνεται οὕτως. ἢ γὰρ γένεσις ἔνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἔνεκα τῆς γενέσεως.²⁸⁵ “Since the look of the house [which should stand there and in such and such a way, in the anticipatory deliberating of the master builder] is of such a sort, then the producing must be of such a sort. For the coming-to-be is on account of the being-present [on account of the present as the being-completed of what is to be produced], and not the present on account of production.”

A short summary in which it becomes clear how the λόγος of τέχνη looks: ἡ δὲ τέχνη λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ὃ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν.²⁸⁶ “The τέχνη [not producing itself, but rather a kind of ἐπιστήμη as knowing-one’s-way-around with respect to what is to be produced] is a λόγος of what is to be made, of the ἔργον, an addressing that is without ὕλη, without stuff,”²⁸⁷ for example, for a house, an addressing that is without stone, brick, wood. We have already heard that the εἶδος is, precisely, what answers to the addressing, that the εἶδος indicates from out of itself, that a determinately procured material comes into play. Accordingly, λόγος ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης cannot mean that the ὕλη is not addressed at all. Precisely the co-addressing of ὕλη as something entirely determinate belongs to the λόγος. Producing is itself in relation to that toward which τέχνη is ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. Here, ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης means that it is a deliberating that does not possess in itself the dealing that corresponds to the ὕλη. The primary comportment toward the out-of-which of producing is the engaged producing itself. This producing does not lie within λόγος. This means that λόγος emerges for producing to a certain extent beforehand, and only insofar as it does this is it the indication of the working pace and course of direction itself, bringing production into its proper possibility.

Precisely because being-there means being-completed, means being-produced, every production must be founded in εἶδος. This “appearing” that is anticipated in τέχνη is what determines the being-there-completed in its being-there, characterizes it in its being-there-as-house. In other words, the being-there of a being is co-determined in itself by *what* it is. The Greeks determine being in the sense of being-there fundamentally through *what-being*, not as a way of being for itself, but rather in the way that Aristotle takes what-being

285. De part. an. A 1, 640 a 16 sqq.

286. De part. an. A 1, 640 a 31 sq.

287. Editor’s note: Heidegger’s translation accidentally refers the neuter ὄ to λόγος. For his own correction of this in the subsequent meeting, see p. 226 ff.

as constitutive for the being itself that is there. Insofar as one sees the house in the way that it appears, one sees it not in an isolated way, one respect at a time, according to the time of day, in illumination, occupied by so and so; but instead one sees this being that is there in the way that one sees it, as house, in the average way, in the way one lives in it every day, and sees it as this what in the averageness of this being's present in dealing. What is encountered in an average way in its look constitutes being-there. It is senseless to ask in what way the Greeks conceived of the "individual" way of being as a concrete determination of being-there. It did not occur at all to the Greek to see the genuine there in this *hic et nunc*.

β. The Being-Characters of the φύσει γινόμενα

How does Aristotle see and determine the φύσει ὄντα as living things following the guide of the ἔργα τέχνης?²⁸⁸ The first question concerns how the φύσει ὄν shows itself. What is the primary aspect in which these beings show themselves? πανταχοῦ δὲ λέγομεν τόδε τοῦδε ἔνεκα, ὅπου ἂν φαίνηται τέλος τι πρὸς ὃ ἡ κίνησις περαίνει μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος. ὥστε εἶναι φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν.²⁸⁹ "We always address something encountered as τόδε τοῦδε ἔνεκα, this there on account of this." A fact is, as it is encountered, addressed looking thus and so with respect to the ἔνεκα τοῦδε. Where does this type of addressing fulfill itself, and how must something be encountered in order to be addressed in this way? What is the primary finding as to the phenomenal fact of the matter, as to the thing encountered itself, that we can address it in this way? It is always the case that "wherever something like a being-completed shows itself, something like a coming-to-the-end, to which as end the movement comes, such that nothing happens to trip it up, such that it is thus unhindered." The primary experience is the seeing of a *self-moving being-completed*. The constitutive aspect is that *something is in movement in such a way that it comes to an end*. "Accordingly, it is clear that this is the sort of thing that we address as φύσις." It is always the case that where we see something like this, we need this type of addressing: τόδε τοῦδε ἔνεκα. Insofar as something is encountered by us in this way, being something of this sort, it is what we address manifestly as φύσις. The basic fact of the matter that characterizes the sense of φύσις as a mode of being-there is *a being-that-is-complete, whose being-completed or having-become is sublated in its having-come-out-of. . . as self-producing*. This is the fact of the matter that establishes this address of the ἔνεκα.

μᾶλλον δ' ἔστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ὁμοίως, εἰς ὃ πειρῶνται πάντες σχεδὸν τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγειν οὐ διελόμενοι ποσαχῶς λέγεται

288. Cf. De part. an. A 1, 641 b 23 sqq., 639 b 19 sqq., 641 b 12, 639 b 30 sqq.

289. De part. an. A 1, 641 b 23 sqq.

τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὑπάρχει δὲ τό μὲν ἀπλῶς τοῖς αἰδίοις, τὸ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσει πᾶσιν.²⁹⁰ “This fact of the matter is found, in particular, more in the field of beings that we designate as Nature than within the realm of objects that are there in the field of being-produced, that have the specific character of making in the sense of a τέχνη: the οὐ ἔνεκα and the καλόν.” The sense of καλόν is related to the μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος—καλόν: the “beautiful,” that which succeeds and is there in this way in its being-successful, such that there is no failure to be found. Since precisely τέχνη in the sense of making handiwork is characterized by the fact that something must be tried, material can be unfit, it requires such and such circumstances and accidents for success. By contrast, beings with the character of φύσει ὄντα go smoothly, and are there in this having-gone-smoothly, καλόν. It was this experience of the καλόν that led the ancients to address this φύσει ὄν, which always “works well,” as ἀναγκαῖον, that which is such that fundamentally nothing can interfere with it.

Nonetheless, there is a distinction with respect to necessity since there is a dual sense of ἀναγκαῖον: (1) ἀναγκαῖον ἀπλῶς, (2) ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.²⁹¹ (1) “Simply necessary” is that “which always is”; it excludes in itself the possibility that it ever became. That which always is excludes having-become. It is a way of being-there that has no need of having-become, which is incompatible with it. And this being-that-is-always-thus is simply necessary. (2) Beside this, there is a necessity in beings that are precisely on account of having-become. This context of necessity occurs in the structure of the “if-then,” ἐξ ὑποθέσεως: *if* such and such is to come to be, *then*, according to this presupposition, this or that must happen necessarily.

Aristotle summarizes these thoughts succinctly: ἡ φύσις ἔνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖ πάντα.²⁹² “The being that is there that is characterized as nature does everything that it itself is on account of something”—always in the dimension of the type of consideration that was exhibited previously. Something is completed along the course of a movement, which does not refer to some sort of dark “teleology!” Thus Aristotle can determine the φύσει ὄν as an ἐσόμενον, a being that has its being in coming-to-be-thus, such that, to a certain extent, it runs ahead of itself.

γ. Criticism of the Type of Consideration of the Ancient Physiologists

These basic determinations of the φύσει ὄν, as they emerge from the discussion of the aforementioned passages, are what *the ancients initially missed in their consideration of nature*. Corresponding to these mistakes, the ancients were also not able to see, in the right way, the special being of nature as living. The primary view, or that which they primarily saw, was: beings that are

290. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 19 sqq.

291. De part. an. A 1, 639 b 24.

292. De part. an. A 1, 641 b 12.

there move themselves. However, the fact that I see a *thing that is moved*, and address it as moved, does not mean that I see the *movement*; the possibility is not yet, thereby, given of bringing to the fore the movement of this thing that is moved as a *being-determination*.

οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι καὶ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφῆσαντες περὶ φύσεως περὶ τῆς ὑλικῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἐσκόπουν.²⁹³ “The ancients philosophized about nature in such a way, inquiring into the basic determinations of its being, that they addressed the ὑλικὴ ἀρχή, the from-out-of-which, addressed as a ὑλικόν determined by ὕλη.” If we clarify this in the field of τέχνη, then a table is as it is there present at hand, addressed by the ancients insofar as it is questioned according to its being-there as wood. This being that is there, the table there, is being-wood. This means that they primarily saw beings that are there with respect to what they consist of, and they cultivated the manner and mode of further questioning corresponding to that in relation to which they addressed being-there itself. Determination of the character of the αἰτία: when they inquired into that from which movement proceeds, they asked: what sets into movement? Answer: this being-wood. They believed that this was an answer to the question: what is being-there? So, they could never get an answer to the question concerning being-there and the being-character of the table. This is analogous with nature. They still have not inquired into the *being* of the table, for being-wood also determines, for example, the chair or cupboard.

Aristotle is so well-versed in the type of consideration of the ancients, that he approaches, more and more, the proper respect in which to discuss the φύσει ὄν. Within the genuine regard and that which it yields, we come across ψυχή. From there, it can be seen that the φυσικός, properly speaking, if he wants to see living things as living things, also considers ψυχή. If being in a σῶμα also belongs to living things, then the σῶμα also belongs to the correct grasping of the basic phenomenon of the πάθη, and the φυσικός participates in this setting-forth.

I have to call attention to an oversight from last week. I went into the determination of τέχνη as λόγος τοῦ ἔργου in order to show, on that basis, that this λόγος as τέχνη is something entirely determinate, on account of the fact that relatedness to ὕλη, relatedness to that out-of-which the ἔργον is produced as such, is absent from it. The genuine relation to ὕλη is producing. The ἄνευ ὕλης is, therefore, clarified on the basis of λόγος. However, I forgot to say that in the text it reads: ὁ ἄνευ ὕλης,²⁹⁴ and thus, in the text, ἄνευ ὕλης refers genuinely to the ἔργον. The ἔργον is seen beforehand. Insofar as it is seen beforehand, it is not yet produced; it is to be observed that λόγος is λόγος ἔργου, that is, the work is discussed in the anticipation as completed. Implicit in this is that the entire context of producing is discussed. Thus in this λόγος, precisely ὕλη

293. De part. an. A 1, 640 b 4 sqq.

294. De part. an. A 1, 640 a 31 sq. See p. 222.

is also discussed in a definite way. The ἄνευ ὕλης should not mislead us into thinking that εἶδος is seen as something non-sensible. The ὕλη is in the ἔργον, but not in the genuine relation. In the εἶδος, which is the anticipation of the ἔργον, that which, taken roughly, one designates as the purpose of a thing to be produced or a thing completed, is anticipated. The house as σκέπασμα is for occupying; the occupying of it is anticipated in the εἶδος of the house. The whither of the house is tied up in the house's standing-out-in-such-and-such-a-way. For this reason, the εἶδος is that which constitutes the genuine being-there of a being in its being-completed, so that producedness, as a mode of being-there established by εἶδος, belongs to the full determinateness of being-there as being-present-at-hand.

The determinate manner and mode in which ὕλη itself is determined is to be learned on the basis of this connection of ἔργον with ὕλη vis-à-vis λόγος and ποίησις. In no way is ὕλη mere not-being, μὴ ὄν, indefinite stuff or limit of form, in which case ὕλη would be the indeterminate. "Υλη is, precisely, the *determinate*. This wood has, precisely, this or that suitability, on whose basis it comes into consideration as ὕλη, for application there. "Υλη is δύναμις, the positive "possibility" of this or that, which only becomes visible from the εἶδος. On this, Aristotle says: λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἢ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δ' ὕλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ' αὐτὸ λεκτέον.²⁹⁵ "Therefore, that which is to be addressed is primarily the look of a being that is there at each moment, and that has its look, insofar as it has a look. The stuff-matter, that which the being that is there and that is in question consists of, is never to be addressed in itself." Thus, with respect to λόγος, ὕλη is dependent; it must first be opened up by way of εἶδος. This λεκτέον is also authoritative for the present consideration. It depends on showing that, if nature is to be researched, it must be examined primarily according to its look. Only when the εἶδος is made visible is it possible to investigate the out-of-which of lasting in relation to the whence of coming to be, and therefore γένεσις. Thus the εἶδος, the οὐσία, is the establishment of γένεσις.

Following the guide of this fundamental consideration, that the εἶδος is the primary thing, Aristotle discusses the ancients more precisely, with respect to how widely they themselves had brought the φύσει ὄντα into view—the being of nature as living things, the beings that they have, and that we have, before our eyes—and specifically by posing the critical question: how are beings to be genuinely addressed? How do the tendencies with which the ancients were occupied earlier reach proper fulfillment? It is to be held concretely in view that the ancients too saw nature in movement. When *Parmenides* says that all being is ἔν, without movement, he must have been acquainted with movement.

Exposing nature in its being-there depends upon our way not being blocked by presupposed opinions and theories. The ancients also saw the nature that is

295. Met. Z 10, 1035 a 7 sqq.

there in its alteration, in emerging and disappearing, and hence their question as to the whence. In *Metaphysics*, Book 1, Chapters 1–2, Aristotle discusses the riddle of the δῖοτι.²⁹⁶ In everyday practical concern and living, human beings operate only inexplicitly within the why and wherefore. This is made explicit in λόγος, which is the basic mode of being-in-the-world. For the ancients, the being that is there was the leading respect, apprehended as *consisting of*. . . . That is the immediate way of responding to the question concerning the what of the being-there of a chair or table, in that one says, this is wood. That is an answer, but not an answer to the genuine being-there of the being qua table. Insofar as *appearing* as table is not also taken as a basis for the discussion, the question as to the whence of beings must be forgone. Through researching this question, and considering nature in relation to it, one learns to answer the question concerning the being of beings that are there as tables.

Accordingly, the φύσει ὄντα are to be researched there in such a way that the εἶδος also comes into consideration, so it is not sufficient to question the φύσει ὄντα according to what they consist of, τὸ ἐκ τίνων,²⁹⁷ fire, water, earth, air. Taking hold of stuff is not adequate; rather, we must question the εἶδος too, just as in τέχνη. If we are producing something, it is not sufficient to simply take hold of materials; instead, it requires the advance indication of materials from the standpoint of the εἶδος. It looks thus and so, and consists of this or that material. κλίνη γὰρ τόδε ἐν τῷδε, ἢ τόδε τοιόνδε, ὥστε κἂν περὶ τοῦ σχήματος εἶη λεκτέον, καὶ ποῖον τὴν ιδέα.²⁹⁸ “For a matter like a bed-frame is a thing looking thus ἐν τῷδε, in such a thing.” Σχήμα is the “outline,” “figure.” Specifically, it is to say, ποῖον τὴν ιδέα. “The σχῆμα is to determine what sort of thing it is in the look.” Ἰδέα: the single use of the word that appears in Aristotle is ιδέα and εἶδος. Ἰδέα means nothing other than “look” (a front against *Plato*): “The outline of a being, in the way it is furnished with respect to its look”—outline of a being that is there, not merely a mass of wood and stone, not as though it exists somewhere in a supersensory way, but rather the outline as it shows itself. “For φύσις, the being-there of natural things, taken with respect to μορφή [the same as σχῆμα], is superior to the beings of natural things, taken with respect to the out-of-which of their lasting, τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως.”²⁹⁹ In μορφή, in σχῆμα, I obtain the being of natural things genuinely.

On this issue, Aristotle points out that in fact, among the ancients, *Democritus* posed this question, that he was the first to arrive at the σχῆμα, the “figure” of things. Democritus emphasizes that σχῆμα and χρώμα (optical determination of being) are what determine a being as φύσει ὄν in its being. “It should be, then, that Democritus speaks correctly, when he exhibits the figure and color of living being. In particular, he says that it is manifest to everyone that the human being is what he is with respect to his look, since the human being is known

296. Cf. *Met.* A 1, 981 a 28 sqq.

297. *De part. an.* A 1, 640 b 22.

298. *De part. an.* A 1, 640 b 26 sqq.

299. *De part. an.* A 1, 640 b 28: ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφήν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως.

and familiar to us according to his color and figure.”³⁰⁰ Yet Aristotle says “that the deceased also has the same look and figure but is not the human being.”³⁰¹ Thus it appears that this determination of the look is not quite sufficient in the end, that the look is not yet fully grasped as σχῆμα and χρώμα. “Furthermore, a hand cannot possibly be what it is if it comes to be out of just anything, for example, out of metal or wood.”³⁰² A hand made out of wood is no hand. To be sure, it looks just like one, and would have to be one according to Democritus’s determination of the being of the hand. However, it cannot fulfill its specific function, just as a flute made out of stone is no flute, since one cannot play it.³⁰³ A hand made out of wood is not alive; it is not there as hand. Thus the ἔργον and the δύναμις belong to the εἶδος. A being that looks thusly, that shows itself as such and such—the constitutum for the there-character of the living thing, is function, the ἔργον, by which function the out-of-which of lasting is determined. A hand cannot consist of wood; it requires a σῶμα τοιοῦτον. The ὕλη has to satisfy the characteristic function of the hand as μόριον of the ζῶον.

Thus Aristotle says: *λίαν οὖν ἀπλῶς εἴρηται*.³⁰⁴ “It is said too simply,” as Democritus and the ancients said it. In this way, the ancients who spoke about nature oriented being merely toward the σχῆμα alone (Democritus), and Democritus believed himself to have given, thereby, the correct determination of being. In fact, however, he did not get any grasp on the being-there of living things. It is precisely “as if a τέκτων, a carpenter, were to speak about a wooden hand,” to deal with something that looks like a hand but is not. *λίαν οὖν ἀπλῶς εἴρηται, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τέκτων λέγοι περὶ χειρὸς ξυλίνης. οὕτως γὰρ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ σχήματος λέγουσιν· ὑπὸ τίνων γὰρ ἐδημιουργήθησαν δυνάμεων. ἀλλ’ ἴσως ὁ μὲν τέκτων ἐρεῖ πέλεκυν ἢ τρύπανον, ὁ δ’ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν, πλην βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων. οὐ γὰρ ἰκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὄργάνου τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγένετο τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον, ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἔνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ποτὲ τὴν μορφήν γένηται*.³⁰⁵ If a carpenter is asked about the γενέσεις of what he produced, “from what possibilities,” and with what means the being was produced in such and such a way, “it is not sufficient to answer thus: since the work implement [a hammer] fell on it,” it looked thus and so. Hence, the ancients speak about nature as follows: since things looking thus are thrown together, they came to be thus. The τέκτων understands his being much better; he is much more likely

300. De part. an. A 1, 640 b 29 sqq.: εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τε ζῶων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὁρθῶς ἂν δημόκριτος λέγοι [. . .]. φησὶ γοῦν παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι οἶόν τι τὴν μορφήν ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ τε σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι γνωρίμου.

301. De part. an. A 1, 640 b 34 sq.: καὶ ὁ ταθνεῶς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματι μορφήν ἀλλ’ ὁμῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.

302. De part. an. A 1, 640 b 35 sq.: ἔτι δ’ ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκὴν ἢ ξυλίνην.

303. Cf. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 2 sq.

304. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 5.

305. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 5 sqq.

to say, “why he hammers in such a way and for what reason [the purpose for which he wields the hammer thus], he will speak of the causes, wherein the μορφή was determined thus and so.” The τέχνη will determine its ποιησις, and the τέχνη has its ground in the anticipation of the εἶδος.

Even in the case of living things, questioning must be carried out in the right manner as to the τέλος. For this, questioning must be carried out with regard to the δύναμις and the ἔργον. Thus it is true that the ancients did not address what is living in the right manner. “If that [which genuinely determines the look of a living thing, which determines the look in such a way that a hand is as hand], if that is, in the end, what we designate as soul, then the φυσικός [if he wants to treat living things as beings that are there] must necessarily deal with the soul.”³⁰⁶ The question is simply whether it is the entire soul, or only a definite part of the soul that must be dealt with.

We will finish and then return to the πάθη. If the πάθη are to be the object of investigation, then it appears that with the πάθη, as disposition of living things, in which corporeality is at the same time a concern, the εἶδος must first be kept in view. Genuine being-there must be set forth, in order, if possible, to study even what is “physiological,” the “bodily conditions.” Thus in the consideration of the somatic, orientation is given by the εἶδος of human living, characterized as ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου.

d) The Dual Proof of the Restricted Scope of the φυσικός

We have seen how Aristotle worked out basic determinations in the criticism of the natural philosophy of his predecessors—those basic determinations that are decisive for natural beings with the character of living. Specifically, he says that it is not sufficient to advance from ὕλη to a grasp of the σχῆμα, which in a certain sense is already the ἰδέα, but insofar as one remains there, one genuinely fails. In ἰδέα, living is characterized as δύναμις, that which *is able*, and on account of this fact, ὕλη, as co-determining being, contains the corresponding characterization and determination. The hand is only hand as living, insofar as it can grasp and feel, and a hand being thus requires that its ὕλη be something *determinate*, that it be *organized, characterized by the determinate being of being-able*. The ὕλη is the “flesh,” σάρξ. Thus, what hitherto had been not observed by the ancients appears as a *being-able*, which determines the being of ὕλη, what we designate as soul.

The question now is: does the φυσικός have to research the being of life *in all its possibilities and its entire extent*, or is the topic of the physicist only a *determinate extract* of life with respect to its being?³⁰⁷ Aristotle answers this question in two ways: (1) indirectly and (2) on the basis of the finding of how natural beings show themselves as living. In both cases, he has recourse to the same finding of the self-showing of the beings in question.

306. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 17 sqq.: εἰ δὴ τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχὴ [. . .], τοῦ φυσικοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς ἂν εἶη λέγειν.

307. Cf. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 32 sqq.

α. Indirect Proof

He leads up to the *indirect proof* of the *restricted scope* in the following way: if the φυσικός were to research all living things that he encounters, in general, with regard to their being-living, “then there would be no philosophy beside this science, the φυσική.”³⁰⁸ That is unintelligible at first. This train of thought is grounded in a definite presupposition. “For supposing and understanding [roughly, thinking] are directed at the thinkable,”³⁰⁹ at that which is the possible object of thinking and supposing. The thinkable, the entire field of possible perceiving, is πάντα. Everything that in any sense *is* is νοητόν. “Accordingly, the object of φυσική ἐπιστήμη would be all beings in general.”³¹⁰ We are asking: under what assumption does this train of thought follow? Only if, for Aristotle, the consideration of beings in their being also necessarily belongs to the consideration of beings with the character of living, in which case the living thing in question is grounded in its being-possibility, to which it is related as the with-which of dealings. Only if living originally means being-in-a-world, being-in the mode of being-by-something, of being-by, and the there-by is the world, in which a being that is there-by is as living; only then does this consideration follow. If νοῦς were to fall within the scope of the consideration, if νοῦς were an object, then all νοητά would also have to be objects of φυσική ἐπιστήμη. “It is the interest of the same science to deal with being in the sense of perceiving, thinking, deliberating, and so on, and to deal with being in the sense of the thinkable, provided that thinking and the thinkable are toward each other, πρὸς ἄλληλα.”³¹¹ (Πρὸς with the accusative: “toward” something, “in relation to” it.) Thinking is nothing other than this πρὸς. Thinking demands, in accordance with its being, *to be open to the other*; its being cannot be understood, seen primarily, if the *toward-which* is not there, which it in itself is after, as perceiving, fearing. The basic determination of beings as living things is visible here as πρὸς ἄλληλα, to be “before another,” to be open “for another.” “It is always one and the same research (in all cases) where it deals with determining the character of the πρὸς ἄλληλα.”³¹² *The living thing can only be determined in its being if the being that it is with is understood in its being.* Living is being-by. Only under this assumption does the train of thought follow.

Aristotle himself does not further pursue the result of the indirect proof. He would have to continue thus: the φυσικός only deals with beings, φύσει ὄν, that are κινούμενον. But there are also beings-in-movement that are not in the mode of living, insofar as νοῦς is the decisive possibility. To the extent

308. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 34 sqq.: εἰ γὰρ περὶ πάσης, οὐδεμία λείπεται παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην φιλοσοφία.

309. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 36: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν.

310. De part. an. A 1, 641 a 36 sq.: ὥστε περὶ πάντων ἡ φυσικὴ γνῶσις ἂν εἴη.

311. De part. an. A 1, 641 b 1 sq.: τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς περὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ θεωρήσαι, εἴτε πρὸς ἄλληλα.

312. De part. an. A 1, 641 b 2 sq.: ἡ αὐτὴ θεωρία τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων.

that νοῦς, the νοητά, are excluded by the indirect proof, these φύσει ὄντα that are in the mode of living can only be treated as living things, things that are ἀνόητον, that are not in such a way that they think about their being, so that their being is guided by thinking and considering. It follows that only living things that possess the character of the ἀνόητον come under consideration. Aristotle contrasts the ἀνόητα with those beings that possess φρόνησις, φρόνησις as διανοεῖσθαι: ἀνόητα—φρόνιμα, ἄλογα—ἔλλογα.³¹³ Ἐλλογα: that in which λόγος is in the mode of λόγον ἔχον in the primary sense. Aristotle uses these expressions interchangeably. He says about the occasion of the development of science that animals too possess a φρόνησις in a certain way: φρόνησις, here, as orienting-oneself, αἰσθησις; here, φρόνησις is not determined by νοῦς, not in the genuine sense.

The living thing is distinguished, with regard to its being, by *being-by*. Aristotle has this basic determination so keenly in view that he can indicate in advance, on the basis of this meaning of being, the mode of access, and the construction of the individual steps of all research concerning living, of this fundamental determination.³¹⁴ This methodological meaning is important for seeing how research into the so-called psychic has to be instituted. The question is whether a living thing, insofar as it lives, possesses various being-possibilities,³¹⁵ that it can perceive something (αἰσθησις), that it is after something (ὄρεξις), that it can move toward it, and so on, or that it possesses the world in such a way that it thinks about it. “The difficulty is how one brings these separate being-possibilities of a living thing to the fore, how they are in their with-one-another, which among the being-possibilities is to be researched first. The question is whether the being-possibilities of living are to be researched in themselves or by their fulfillment, whether I can study, primarily, the *ability-to-perceive* in this way. And if it happens that one must, in fact, study the ἔργα first, whether the ἀντικείμενα are, then, to be studied first; that which at any time is over against a definite being-possibility of living, over against, say, αἰσθησις, perceiving as such [in the case of the ὄψις, the world in the character of being-colored.]”³¹⁶ In fact, we must proceed with the ἀντικείμενα; the ἔργον can only be grasped along with it. “It must first be said what thinking itself is in its fulfillment.”³¹⁷ πρότεροι γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ τὸν λόγον.³¹⁸ “For actual beings that are there, that are present prior to possibilities, are earlier with regard to addressing.” I only acquire a possibility to apprehend, I only catch sight of something, by catching sight of it, so to speak, in

313. Eth. Nic. K 2, 1172 b 10, 1173 a 2 sq.

314. De an. A 1, 402 b 9 sqq. and correspondingly B 4, 415 a 16 sqq.

315. De an. A 1, 402 b 9: εἰ [. . .] μόρια.

316. De an. A 1, 402 b 10 sqq.: χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πρότερον τὰ μόρια χρῆναι ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον [. . .] τὸ αἰσθητικόν· [. . .] εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἂν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν [. . .] καὶ τὸ νοητόν.

317. De an. B 4, 415 a 18: πρότερον ἐτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν.

318. De an. B 4, 415 a 19 sqq.

its there, as ἐνέργεια. “If that is so, then the ἀντικείμενα are to be considered still earlier.”³¹⁹ And thus it also is with the most primary possibilities of being of a living thing, with αὔξησης, which Aristotle groups together with γέννησις, “growth” and “bringing into the world.” To be studied first, here, is being-by-nourishment, and in connection with it, the bringing of another into the world, another just like the living being itself. Γέννησις: this becoming means nothing other than coming into the world; not simply that something lies before us, a still-born, but that the being is there in such a way that it is in its world. On this basis, you see that the basic determination from which I set out in the first lectures, that living means being-in-the-world, and always has its ground in accordance with a definite possibility.

β. Proof from the Character of Being-Moved Itself

The second proof proceeds directly *from the study of becoming, from the character of being-moved itself*. We have seen, on the basis of the indirect proof that has been carried out, that only ἀνόητα come into consideration. For the φυσικός, this being that is moved is the primary topic with regard to the basic determination of its being as being-in-the-world. Three modes of moving-oneself in the world: (1) αὔξησης, (2) ἀλλοίωσις, (3) φορά.³²⁰ These three possibilities of being-in-the-world, characterized by movement, are to be studied with regard to the ἀρχή, in accordance with the “whence” of this being, in accordance with the being-character of the genuine possibility of being-in-the-world.

Specifically, αὔξησης is characterized solely in the special sense that is limited to plants and the being of plants.³²¹ Plants have no αἴσθησις. They are in the world in such a way that they do not perceive the world in which they are, that they do take nourishment from it, and that in taking nourishment they move themselves in distinctive ways. One would like to say that the way Aristotle primarily sees the genuine being-moved of plants is almost phenomenological, as is shown by *De Anima* 413a26 sqq. Plants, which he speaks of here, have this distinctive being-possibility of being-in-the-world—that they grow “out toward opposed places, directions.” φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι’ ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσειν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους.³²² Plants move themselves, in their growth, out toward all sides, and they nourish themselves from all sides, and thus they live. Αὔξησης is the primary and only determination of the living of plants.

Aristotle characteristically apprehends αἴσθησις as ἀλλοίωσις.³²³ For a being that is in the world in the mode of perceiving-the-world, something other is there and is encountered from out of the world at each moment. Living is with-another; it itself becomes other. That can only make sense if it is itself

319. *De an.* B 4, 415 a 20 sq.: εἰ δ’ οὕτως, τούτων δ’ ἐτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δεῖ θεωρηκέναι.

320. Cf. *De part. an.* A 1, 641 b 5 sqq.

321. *De part. an.* A 1, 641 b 5 sq.: αὐξήσεως μὲν ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς.

322. *De an.* B 2, 413 a 26 sqq.

323. *De part. an.* A 1, 641 b 6: ἀλλοιώσεως δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν.

determined in its being such that this way of being means being-in-the-world.

For most animals, the further possibility of φορά is added on “of being-able-to-move-itself from one place to another.”³²⁴ That is not thought up abstractly, but comes into view concretely. Specifically, in the treatise *De Partibus Animalium*, Aristotle treats the various possibilities of the “being-able-to-move-oneself,” of φορά: πτήσις, “fleeing,” νεύσις, “swimming,” ἔρπσις, “crawling,” βάδισις, “going.”

Now, the proposition that Aristotle seemingly sets forth dogmatically, which says that the λόγος of the οὐ ἔνεκα is the primary one, becomes intelligible. In the οὐ ἔνεκα, the genuine being-character of the being of living things comes to light. Living is always related to the “wherefore,” τέλος, “being-there-complete” in the sense of being-in-the-world. All being-determinations of living things are oriented primarily to this way of being as being-by. Only on this basis does every being first get its determinate character in its look.

In this way, we can also grasp ὄλη in its characteristic being. Σῶμα, the ὄλη of a living thing, is not simply stuff that looks differently due to its contours, but rather the σῶμα of the living thing is ὄργανον. The stuff of living things has the primary character of being toward . . . , of being-by, of being-in. ὄργανον means: a being that has the character of accomplishment, that in itself is oriented to being-toward-the-end. Since every aspect of the full-being of living things has, with regard to ὄλη, this full character, the interpretation of this being must proceed from the primary character of being-in: in the case of plants, from αὐξήσις; in that of animals, from αἴσθησις and φορά; in that of humans, from νοῦς. Only from νοῦς are the other being-possibilities to be understood in their being. Aristotle refers again to the analogy with τέχνη, where this connection exists: if it is necessary to split something, that which splits it must be hard. If it must be hard, then it must be made of iron. That is how this necessity, this accomplishment, traces out the being-character of ὄλη. In living things, all ὄλη is ὄργανον, determined by the possibility of living things, traced out by accomplishment. The being-possibility of φύσει ὄντα has its limits in αἴσθησις and φορά. Both of these causes show the οὐ ἔνεκα, in which the second question is founded: ὄθεν ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, in connection with which the πάθη stand. They are co-determined by σῶμα. The πάθη are determinations of the being-possibility of human beings.

Aristotle addresses movement in *De Motu Animalium*. For a long time, this treatise was not considered to be Aristotelian, until *W. Jaeger*, on the basis of his study of manuscripts in Rome, found evidence that this treatise is in fact Aristotelian. He then re-edited it accordingly.³²⁵ The treatise is of fundamental significance for the basic question concerning the movement of living things in its fundamental meaning. An essential aspect is that it points to how movement as such is at all possible if something is at rest.

324. De part. an. A 1, 641 b 7 sq.: ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἡ φορά καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις τῶν ζώων.

325. Aristotelis de animalium motione et de animalium incesso, Ps.-Aristotelis de spiritu libellus. Ed. V.G. Jaeger. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1913.

e) The Definiteness of the History of the Study of
Nature by Way of Truth Itself

The critical consideration of previous studies of nature yields a peculiar insight into the historical course that such research can take. It turns out that a science can already be operating for a long time, that material is collected and certain properties and theories are unearthed; and yet this science does not at all need to be by its object, and the advancement of a science is not at all dependent upon the degree of acuity or argumentative skill that instead depend upon it. Science is a matter of the *correct relationship to the matters*. That cannot be forced, but is something that depends on ourselves, above all with regard to preparations. However, it is, in its ground, a matter of fate to what extent those that make this basic relationship vital come along and are there. Despite these theories, the researcher gradually became *compelled by truth itself to see beings*.

In the same context, Aristotle uses two characteristic expressions that are important for what he understands by truth. Of *Empedocles*, he says: ἐνιαχοῦ δέ που αὐτῇ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς περιπίπτει, ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας.³²⁶ He was “led by truth itself,” which in a certain sense allowed his theory to collapse. And of *Democritus*: ἀλλ’ ἦψατο μὲν Δημόκριτος πρῶτος, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαίου δὲ τῆ φυσικῆ θεωρία, ἀλλ’ ἐκφερόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος.³²⁷ He was “borne by the matter itself,” and led to the discovery that beings must be apprehended not merely with regard to ὄλη, but also with regard to their σχῆμα. Here, ἀλήθεια and πρᾶγμα are employed in the same sense, that is, ἀλήθεια is not “validity,” which adheres to the proposition, or something like that (as is meant by an erroneous logic). Instead, πρᾶγμα is nothing other than *the being in its being-uncovered*, insofar as the being with which I have to do is there in a certain discoveredness. Access to the matter was hindered because the question concerning the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι was denied, insofar as all research in the narrow sense, regarding the what and the how, was to ask: ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἠϋξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσιμον ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες.³²⁸ Socrates promoted the task of being occupied with the matter itself. However, at that time, the ζητεῖν περὶ φύσεως was left behind. One turned toward πολιτικῆ, and the φύσει ὄντα receded into the background. That is not an incidental omission, perhaps due to their having pursued the human sciences more than the natural sciences. Instead, it is a fundamental oversight. Even the concepts of being-in-the-πόλις have their foundation in concepts of nature. Aristotle saw that and shifted the weight of his work primarily onto the examination of φύσις as being. From there, he attained the ground for the study of being as such.

326. De part. an. A 1, 642 a 18 sq.

327. De part. an. A 1, 642 a 26 sqq.

328. De part. an. A 1, 642 a 28 sqq.

§20. Πάθος as ἡδονή and λύπη (Nicomachean Ethics, K1–5)

From this consideration of the being-character of living things, we have seen that living means *being-in-a-world*. This determination now becomes *ambiguous*:

1. The being of this living nature is determined in its εἶδος as this δύναμις of being-in-the-world—thus, on the one hand, as εἶδος, as *the being-determination itself of beings*.

2. As *encountering from out of the world*: the living thing is in the world in yet a second sense, in the sense of *belongingness-to-the-world*. At the same time, my being is being-in-the-world, in the world in the second sense, as belonging to it in such a way that I can be encountered by another within the world, like a chair.

For the Greeks, both are εἶδος, as the Greeks do not recognize the distinction between the external and internal. This yields fundamental connections regarding the being of living in a wider sense. I mean to point out that *being-with-one-another* now undergoes a *sharper determination*:

1. In being-with-one-another, those beings, each of which is for itself being-in-the-world, are with one another. *Encountering-one-another is being-there-for-one-another, such that every being that is for another is in the world*. Such a being is in the world of things encountered, is there for another way of being.

2. In being-with-one-another, we have the same world with one another. Being-with-one-another is, at the same time, *having the same world with one another*.

This is presupposed if one is writing a book on the theory of knowledge. Whether or not the questions can then still be posed in the usual way, one can leave to the theorists of knowledge to decide. Then again, one hears today that there holds sway a great schism among philosophers as to whether philosophy should be “life-philosophy.” On one side, it is asserted that philosophy cannot be life-philosophy; on the other side, that it indeed must be. “Life-philosophy” is like “plant-botany”! The emphatic assertion that botany has to do with plants is as comical and senseless as the other assertion.

We now summarize the results of the overall consideration of the πάθη. The πάθη are the sort of thing that occurs *in the soul*, the sort of thing that is *in living-being*, and that means more precisely *being-taken, losing-composure, κινεῖσθαι*, which aims at the genuine being of living things, being-in-a-world. Πάθη are *modes of being-taken with respect to being-in-the-world*; through the πάθη, the possibilities of orienting oneself in the world are determined essentially. Being-out-of-composure *is in itself related to being composed, ἔξις*. We are taken in an average and everyday way; we move ourselves within parameters in relation to which there is a being-composed. Since the πάθη are characterized in this way, as a mode of being of living things whose basic structure is being-in-the-world, dealing with the world, dealing with others, there results

the preliminary indication for the analysis of individual πάθη themselves, insofar as these are to be considered: (1) with respect to the world in which the one in question finds himself, the *environing world* of living things; (2) with respect to the mode of disposition, comporting oneself toward the *shared world*; (3) how one *oneself* must be, in what state of mind one *oneself* must be, in order to be befallen by these or those πάθη.

A characteristic determination of the πάθη that we have not discussed hitherto is that every πάθος, every being-taken “follows,” ἔπεται, a definite disposition, but not in the temporal sense. *A ἡδονή or λύπη is there, at one with the πάθος at each moment.* This determination of the being-co-given of this disposition at each moment is so fundamental that Aristotle says that πάθος itself is a ἡδονή or λύπη. We must flesh out this determination more completely.

Aristotle treats ἡδονή in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 7 (H), Chapters 12–15, and in Book 10 (K), Chapters 1–5. There is also *Rhetoric*, Book 1 (A), Chapter 11. I will keep to the part in Book 10 for this interpretation. Here, I will only give the main theses of this analysis of ἡδονή.

The basic determination of ἡδονή is seen in Book 10, Chapter 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστιν τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ’ αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.³²⁹ “Perhaps there is a being-possibility, τι φυσικὸν, even in foul beings, in what is inferior, which belongs to their being, that is better than they are in themselves [namely, the φαῦλοι], which they are after as οἰκείον ἀγαθόν, the being with which they genuinely find their end.” This means nothing other than that in all beings that are alive there lies the determination that *it is after genuine being-there-completedness*. Every living thing is to a certain degree *tendentious*; it has the *tendency toward being as being-completed*.

ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὐθ’ ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ’ ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ’ ἡδονὴν διώκουσιν τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἦν οἶονται οὐδ’ ἦν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον.³³⁰ “All things pursue a ἡδονή,” a disposition, and for the most part, “not those things that they believe they are striving for, not what they say matter to them, but rather they are all after the same thing.” What matters to them is to live. Beings, as living, are the sort of beings in whose being being-there matters to them. Θεῖον, for Aristotle, is nothing religious: θεῖον as the *genuine being of being-always*. Thus it can already be seen that ἡδονή is a determination of living things that *is given with living-being as such*. More precisely, ἡδονή is nothing other than a *fundamental determination of being-in-the-world*, insofar as being-in-the-world is the sort of being that I at the same time *have*—“having” is a pale expression for “being aware of.” Ἠδονή, finding oneself, is that in which I *have an explanation* as to my being-in-the-world: I

329. Eth. Nic. K 2, 1173 a 4 sq.

330. Eth. Nic. H 14, 1153 b 29 sqq.

have my being-in-the-world. I *have* at the same time a *determination of my being*, a *mode of my being*. This phenomenon is nothing other than what we mean when we say, asking, “How is it going?” Ἡδονή is no so-called pleasure, but a *determination of being in itself as living*. To this extent, we can successfully follow out ἡδονή as a basic determination.

Aristotle clarifies ἡδονή in Book 10, Chapter 3, by way of comparison with αἴσθησις: δοκεῖ κεῖ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ὄρασις καθ’ ὄντινον χρόνον τελεία εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνδεῆς οὐδενός ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος).³³¹ The “seeing,” “having-in-view,” “active looking-toward,” is in itself “completed,” τέλειον; which means that there is nothing “that could still be added in order to make seeing more complete in what it is.” Rather, it is always the case that if I see, seeing is there in itself all at once. This has to do with the fact that seeing is nothing other than a currently-actuated mode of being-present-in-the-world in the mode of having-the-world.

τοιούτῳ δ’ ἔοικεν καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γὰρ τι ἐστίν, καὶ κατ’ οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. Διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστίν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική. τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται.³³² It is in itself completed, has no movement; its way of being is not such that it would only reach completion in the course of a definite period of time. A house is completed due to the fact that it has its determinate time in its being-produced, due to the fact that it passes through time by way of a movement; it was, at one point, not yet at the end—ἀτελής.³³³ By contrast, ἡδονή is just like αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ νῦν,³³⁴ it is what it is “in the moment,” μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ,³³⁵ “not in time” in the sense of a determinate span. It does not first come to being-completed within time. This character, that it is no κίνησις, characterizes it as a *determination of the presentness of being-there as such*. In Chapter 11 of the *Rhetoric* (A), Aristotle says that ἡδονή is κίνησις, κίνησις τις³³⁶ (just like φρόνησις above, in the case of animals),³³⁷ insofar as it also has the determination of πάθος, the determination of the being-taken-at-the-moment. Therein lies the determination of the change from . . . to. . . . In relation to this, ἡδονή is also in a certain sense a κίνησις, μεταβολή. However, ἡδονή itself is not a mode of being that appears occasionally, which could also occur along with another mode of comportment; ἡδονή is in itself *already there with being as living*. It is not something like a possibility in the particular dealing itself; it is no ἕξις of αἴσθησις such that because of my seeing in the right way and my seeing the fitting object, ἡδονή occurs through the

331. Eth. Nic. K 3, 1174 a 13 sqq.

332. Eth. Nic. K 3, 1174 a 16 sqq.

333. Eth. Nic. K 3, 1174 a 26.

334. Eth. Nic. K 3, 1174 b 9.

335. Eth. Nic. K 3, 1174 b 8.

336. Rhet. A 11, 1369 b 33: εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα.

337. See p. 235.

fulfillment of seeing—it is not a result of these circumstances, but rather the other way around. *This possibility of finding-oneself-thus-and-so is grounded in my being as being-in-the-world*, not a result of determinate circumstances, and consequently in his determination of ἡδονή, Aristotle can directly identify it with ζωή, “living.” The sentence, πάντες ἐφίενται ἡδονῆς, means nothing other than πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ ζῆν,³³⁸ so that in its being it depends on being-there. And so, finally, the question arises as to “whether we grasp life on account of finding-ourselves, or we grasp finding-ourselves, ἡδονή, on account of life; at the moment, this question is set aside.”³³⁹ Aristotle resolves this in the subsequent chapters of Book 10.

The genuine being of human beings, the highest being-possibility, lies in θεωρεῖν—the possibility of being there in the most radical sense.³⁴⁰ Ἡδονή is, put succinctly, nothing other than the determination of the presentness of being-in-the-world, which is there in finding-oneself as such. In connection with this determination of ἡδονή, I will briefly discuss how what is said about θεωρεῖν is to be understood. One must give up the definition of traditional psychology, which apprehends λύπη and ἡδονή as annexed to psychological processes. Ἡδονή is always aimed at living as being-in-the-world. Only in this way is it intelligible how Aristotle characterizes the various πάθη. With what justification is φόβος apprehended as λύπη, as a determinate disposition that is determined by being-toned-down-in-attunement? We have a distinctive basic structure: being-there, insofar as it is living, is always being-there *at the moment*; there is no being-there *in general*. Being-there is always: *I am*, not a being *that is*, but rather one that *I am*, and which at the same time has the possibility of being the sort of being that *one is*. Corresponding to the particularity of being-there, every disposition is always a *definite* one, for there is no finding-oneself *in general*; every finding-oneself is thus and so. Every ἡδονή is a definite one, as is every λύπη.

In the context of the definition of the πάθη, it is notable that ἡδονή is said to “be there also,” ἔπεται.³⁴¹ Closer consideration shows that the *co-being-there of ἡδονή* means nothing other than the *co-being-there of being-there itself* that is befallen by a definite πάθος. The ἡδονή as disposition is the *mode of having-itself of a being that is there*. Already, living is thereby characterized as being-in-the-world, living as being-in. The possibility arises that such a being that orients itself also has itself in a certain way. We must refrain from orienting the having-itself toward reflection. Reflection is but a certain outré form in which being-there is conscious of itself. From that perspective, one can never come

338. Eth. Nic. K 4, 1175 a 10 sqq.: ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθεῖται τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται [. . .]. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται.

339. Eth. Nic. K 4, 1175 a 18 sq.: πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι.

340. Cf. Eth. Nic. K 7, 1177 a 12 sqq.

341. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 20 sqq.

to understand the primitive mode of disposition. The affective as such already has the character of having-itself. Ἡδονή reaches into the being of being-there so originarily that it can be identified with ζῆν. Ἡδονή belongs to being-there itself.

This disposition, expressed through ἡδονή, has a dual possibility: (1) insofar as this finding-itself has the character of αἵρεσις, (2) insofar as it is φυγή.³⁴² The disposition is characterized, at the same time, as “going toward,” “seizing,” going toward being-there itself; or a disposition whose character “recoils from” being-there, “flees” from it in a certain respect. This is given in ἡδονή vis-à-vis λύπη. Αἵρεσις and φυγή are the characteristics that characterize the basic possibility of living as a way of being with itself. Αἵρεσις and φυγή are the *basic motivations of being-there*. It is no accident that αἵρεσις and φυγή appear where it is a question of the ultimate ontological interpretation of being-there.³⁴³ Since ἡδονή vis-à-vis λύπη is apprehended originarily with the being-there of living things, and constitutes the basic disposition—the mode in which being-there to a certain extent affects itself—ἡδονή can be characterized as πάθος, a πάθος of the sort that Aristotle says is ἐγκεκρωσμένον,³⁴⁴ “colored through and through,” the sort of πάθος that completely colors, or permeates, βίος, “being-there.” βίος, not ζωή: βίος as “existence,” “living” in the emphatic sense of human beings taking hold of themselves in προαίρεσις. Another closer form is seen when Aristotle constantly says that with every concern, ἡδονή and λύπη are co-given; with every πάθος, but equally with every perceiving, every thinking, considering, with θεωρία, to the extent that they are basic modes of living, ἡδονή is an inseparable companion.³⁴⁵

I will succinctly summarize the determinations of πάθος. The digression that we have pursued (with consideration of *De Partibus Animalium*) showed that πάθος, insofar as one characterizes it according to its εἶδος, is determined as being-in-the-world: determination of the πρὸς ἄλληλα. Insofar as ἡδονή is co-given with every πάθος, being-in is itself possessed, possessed in the two possibilities of αἵρεσις and φυγή. The being of living things as πάθος is a being that has the character of coming-to-be-taken and of being-taken. Therein lies the aspect of μεταβολή, of losing-composure and being-out-of-composure—change from . . . to . . . A further determination of πάθος in *Rhetoric*, Book 2, Chapter 1, the aspect of the changing of κρίνειν: in this losing-composure, κρίνειν,³⁴⁶ “distinguishing,” “taking a position,” is undergone as well; the manner and mode of being oriented toward the world or in the world is also

342. Eth. Nic. B 2, 1104 b 30 sq.: τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς. K 2, 1172 b 19 sqq.: τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσιν φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον αἰρετόν. [. . .] τοιοῦτο δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

343. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 9 sqq.

344. Eth. Nic. B 2, 1105 a 3.

345. Cf. Eth. Nic. K 4, 1174 b 20 sqq.

346. Rhet. B 1, 1378 a 20 sq.: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

laid claim to in this being befallen by a πάθος. Thereby, the inner connection between πάθος and λόγος is set forth—λόγος as a mode of fulfillment of κρῖναιν.

§21. Φόβος (Rhetoric B 5)

We are transitioning to the characteristic of fear, which Aristotle treats along two directions in *Rhetoric*, Book 2, Chapter 5:

1. φόβος as πάθος: the way that “being-afraid” represents a fully determinate concretion of “being-out-of-composure.”

2. φόβος as πίστις—genuine clue to the interpretation of the *Rhetoric*: to what extent “being-afraid,” as a basic determination of the being-there of the other, of the hearer, co- speaks in deliberating, becoming-conclusive about an affair that is to be settled.

a) Schematic Outline of the Characterization of Fear

I will offer an entirely schematic outline of how fear is to be characterized in this chapter:

At 1382 a 20–27, Aristotle provides (1) topic, (2) definition, (3) basic determinations in their initial description.

At 1382 a 27-b 2, Aristotle characterizes the φοβερόν, or more precisely: the φοβερὰ,³⁴⁷ the “fearsome,” the “frightful,” in the sense that designates what sends me into fear upon meeting it. The consideration of σημεῖα,³⁴⁸ of the encounter-characters of the fearsome, that the fearsome announces, is also contained in the consideration of the φοβερὰ. Φοβερὰ are objects, circumstances, and so on.

At 1382 b 2–22, Aristotle deals with the φοβεροί,³⁴⁹ φοβερὰ with the character of living, other humans, inasmuch as other humans with whom I live are, for me, in the character of the φοβερόν.

At 1382 b 22–27, Aristotle gives the thoroughgoing determination of the φοβερόν: the aspect that constitutes the givenness of the fearsome refers to both φοβερὰ and φοβεροί.

At 1382 b 28–1383 a 8: the disposition of fear, the manner and mode of how I must find myself in order to be in fear, or the ability to be sent into fear. Only with this aspect does the genuine interpretation come to its end. Only here is the phenomenon of fear genuinely visible.

At 1383 a 8–12, Aristotle characterizes the clue to the cultivation of πίστις on the basis of the phenomenon of fear determined in this way. Φόβος and

347. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 28.

348. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 30 sq.

349. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 7.

other πάθη are determinate dispositions in which the hearer finds himself, or should find himself. The one discoursing must notice that he might frighten others through his discoursing. He must be oriented toward the phenomenon so that he can correctly captivate others, in order to be able to frighten others.

b) The Topic, the First Definition, and the First Determinations

First of all, Aristotle offers the *topic* and *first determinations*: ποῖα δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες,³⁵⁰ “how something of a given type is feared, which human beings, and the how of having-oneself,” the disposition of fearing. You see the basic orientation toward the sense of πάθος as being-in-the-world, standing-toward-others and finding oneself with them. Those are the relations in which every πάθος stands.

On that basis, Aristotle seeks to give the *first definition*. Fear, however, is only genuinely intelligible when Aristotle supplies the πῶς ἔχοντες. In the first definition, only a *formal structure* of fear is offered; it is not explicitly set forth that such a finding-oneself is a fearing. Aristotle characterizes φόβος as λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ.³⁵¹ It is not so much a ἔπεται, but directly φόβος λύπη τις: “fearing is something like a being-toned-down,” a disposition that is characterized as φυγή, “fleeing,” so to speak from my being-there. It is a αἴρεσις, not an elevated being-there, but instead it recoils from it. . . . ἢ ταραχὴ, “confusion”: λύπη more precisely characterized as “being-led-by-another,” “being-through-another.” This being-through-another is more clearly determined when I stand toward myself in the mode of recoiling from myself, namely, from my being-there. . . . ἐκ φαντασίας, “from something that shows itself”; φαντασία (in the fully original sense): “that which shows itself,” “the self-showing”; ἐκ φαντασίας = ἐκ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι. What is expressed in this way is that what shows itself is not yet genuinely there; it is not there in αἴσθησις. It is there in such a way that it is not yet there in a certain mode. A being-led-by-another on the basis of the seeing-before-oneself of a being that is not yet there, not yet there so that it has the character of that which wants to arrive or should arrive. . . . μέλλοντος, “not yet there” in the sense of standing-before, coming-toward-me. Such a μέλλον as κακόν, φθαρτικόν: what comes toward me “in the mode of harmfulness,” comes toward me in the sense of that which could be “harmful” to my being-there, that which could “do damage to it,” “something harmful” to me. In short, a *disposition that is set before an approaching possibility that pertains to me, comes toward me, and as such announces itself, specifically through the announcement.*

It is to be noted, from the outset, that that before which I am afraid, that by which I am characterized in my being-in-fear, is determined so that it matters

350. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 20.

351. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 21 sq.

to me thus and so, a λυπηρόν that can *bring me out of composure*. Not every κακόν is an object of fear.³⁵² The κακόν must be one that drives at my being-there, so that I am *led-by-another*. In the preceding chapter, Aristotle says that the λυπηρά, what brings me into the peculiar disposition in which I recoil from myself, are αἰσθητά. I follow the track of this being-what-matters, so I am then led-by-another in relation to which I do not really fear an impending injustice that touches me, or the possibility that I may become an imbecile. Rather, I hate it to the highest degree.³⁵³ With it, I am not led by another; such an impending thing leaves me cold, cold in the chill of hate. To fear belongs this peculiar type of encounter, which arouses that which leads one into fear.

That which is encountered must be further determined as σύνεγγυς,³⁵⁴ that which is not very far away; it must be “in proximity.” “We have no fear before that which is in the distance. Indeed, everyone knows that they will die, that death is imminent; but since it is not near, they are not at home with it in their φρόνησις. They do not turn toward it; they do not look around and see it after them.”³⁵⁵ That before which I am led into fear must have the character of the *near*; something impending that, as such, *forces itself into proximity*. This definite way of encountering the enviroing world is constitutive of the possibility of being-afraid. That which is encountered in the enviroing world must have the character of *threat*. That which has this way-of-being-in-the-world is a *being-threatened*. Here, it should be noted that being-threatened is not already being-afraid. In every fearing lies a being-threatened, but not vice versa. Fear is, precisely, a definite finding-oneself, a behaving with respect to oneself in being-threatened.

c) The Threatening (φοβερὰ) and the Encounter-Characters That Announce (σημεῖα) It

From there, Aristotle proceeds to the characteristic of φοβερὰ and of σημεῖα. We will briefly summarize the three aspects of the “threatening” under the title of *threateningness*:

1. φαίνεται,³⁵⁶ it must “show itself” as thus and so, and yet as not genuinely there. The fearsome is characterized by *possibility, being-possibility*, but in the sense of the *indeterminate*. The aspect of indeterminacy enhances, in particular the possibility, that it *can* with regard to the possible disposition of fearing. The indeterminate also enhances the threateningness.

352. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 22 sq.: οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται.

353. Rhet. B 4, 1382 a 9 sqq.: ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρά αἰσθητά πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἢ παρουσία τῆς κακίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ' οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὐ.

354. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 25.

355. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 25 sqq.: τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σπόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασιν γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

356. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 29.

2. The determination of δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην:³⁵⁷ that which comes toward me with the character of “powerfulness,” in opposition to which I find myself in a definite weakness, can do me harm. It is constitutive of threat. Something about which I have reckoned from the outset, that can do me no harm, is not able to threaten me, if it is also undetermined whether it touches me or not.

3. That which is thus powerful in the possibility of being-able-to-arrive, “being brought into proximity,” πλησιασμός, turns the threat into “danger.”³⁵⁸ Something threatening in the greater distance is not danger. Threat becomes *danger* when it *draws nearer to me* as such. From here, the distinctive aspect of fear becomes intelligible, with which we are familiar on the basis of the somatic, on the basis of *restraint*. That which threatens is the indeterminate possibility of something that can pertain to me, that is more than a match for me, that is concentrated on me, not factually but in the peculiar character of forcing-itself-into-my-proximity, such that the φοβερόν is *announced*, such that this φοβερόν is then, so to speak, represented by the σημεῖα.³⁵⁹ The σημεῖα take over the cultivation of the peculiar there-character of the φοβερόν: taking over the function of the there, to be a not-being-there-in-approaching. Three σημεῖα: (1) ἔχθρα, ὀργή,³⁶⁰ “hostile attitude,” “rage”; (2) ἀδικία,³⁶¹ “unjust attitude”; (3) ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη,³⁶² “seriousness that ridicules is provoked.” We will have to consider how these σημεῖα are precisely σημεῖα by virtue of the fact that they cultivate the possibility in its very indeterminacy.

For the intelligibility of the explication of fear, it is instructive to see how one, in fact, cannot yet fully define being-brought-into-fear on the basis of that which can excite fear. Therefore, not all of the aspects of the frightening are contained therein—there is *no parallel* between the *frightening* and *being-afraid*. What is, here, claimed in phenomenology does not correspond with the facts.

The characteristic aspect of that before which being-afraid stands must be grasped as what is *possible*. What is traced out therein is the mode in which the frightening itself genuinely becomes what it can be, the enhancement of what is possible as such a thing that *is to come*, that comes *toward me* in the character of the *harmful*. What is possible is enhanced in its possibility in that it is *there and not there*, in that it therefore *announces* itself in its being-there in a certain manner. But in the announcement lies its not yet being itself there. The manner in which the frightening is present as such is φαντασία, not αἴσθησις. The aspect that constitutes proximity is the πλησιασμός. Finding-oneself in the face of something threatening becomes a situation of *danger* through the πλησιασμός. The function of approaching, of announcement, the characteristic

357. Ibid.

358. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 32: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός.

359. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 30 sq.

360. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 33.

361. Rhet. B 5, 1382 34.

362. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 35 sq.

enhancement of the possibility that lies in the frightening, is taken over by the σημεῖα: (1) ἔχθρα, ὀργή; (2) ἀδικία, “unjust character,” specifically of a δύναμιν ἔχοντος,³⁶³ “of one that has power,” namely, to that which he is possibly resolved; (3) ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη.

Ad 1. The question is, to what extent is the threatening brought into proximity, specifically, to what extent is danger constituted, by ἔχθρα, ὀργή, “hostile attitude,” and “rage.” Hostile attitude and rage are characterized by προαίρεσις. Rage and malevolent character are encountered as modes of being-there that can explode at any moment. Whether it does so is uncertain, but it can. Rage brings precisely this “can” to a head.

Ad 2. Ἀδικία: one who has the proclivity for injuring others, and the power to do it. Here, again, is the determination of προαίρεσις that brings the can into dangerousness. It has to do with ‘can’ in a double sense: (a) insofar as he has the power to carry out what he is up to—he can; (b) insofar as this having-power is in προαίρεσις, it is shifted into a second ‘can’ such that behind this ‘can’ (in the first sense) stands the second ‘can’ of προαίρεσις, of “being-able-to-resolve-oneself.” δύναμις is set into the proper possibility through the sense of ἀδικία. The threatening becomes the dangerous. With the shifting-into-one-another of the senses of ‘can,’ the uncertainty of that which is impending for me is enhanced.

Ad 3. Ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη, “provoked seriousness.” The provoked is constantly at the ready. Without my knowing, he can become danger, he can harm me. Insofar as he can injure me by surprise, he is dangerous.

All of these aspects, as σημεῖα, *themselves take over the character of that which they indicate*. They are the *announcing* of these threatening things, and while they announce, *they themselves* become frightening. The toward-which of reference conveys its being-character, as threatening, to the referring itself. That which is announced by the σημεῖα shifts, for its part, the characters into the character of the threatening. Through the announcement, the threatening becomes the dangerous. The σημεῖα cultivate the dangerousness of the threatening, and so themselves become dangerous.

d) Human Beings Themselves insofar as They Are Frightening (φοβεροί)

In accordance with this consideration of φοβερά and their peculiar character of announcing, through which they come into my proximity, Aristotle discusses φοβεροί, i.e., *human beings themselves insofar as they are frightening*. He begins this consideration by making a general claim. The possibility that human beings be frightening to one another lies (1) in the fact that human beings are “of bad character,” that they are after bad things; (2) that they are “after their own advantage, after profit”; (3) that they are mostly “cowardly,” they do not stand up for anything, you cannot count on them.³⁶⁴

363. Rhet. B 5, 1382 a 34 sq.: ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα.

364. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 4 sq.: ἐπει δ’ οἱ πολλοὶ χείρους καὶ ἥττους τοῦ κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις.

But thus determined, human beings are found to be characterized by the ζωή πρακτική, by προαίρεσις. All of these aspects are plainly there in προαίρεσις, in the possibility that human beings be resolved thus and so with these aspects and on their basis.

Aristotle enumerates *nine different characters* that characterize different situations in which a human being can encounter others as frightening.

1. He to whom I am compromised is frightening, for example, “for someone who has committed some crime, his accessories are frightening”; for they are mainly greedy and are after harm, with them is the danger that they will betray him.³⁶⁵ Being-compromised to definite human beings is a definite possibility having to do with what is frightening.

2. “The powerful” are frightening to those who are inferior to them.³⁶⁶ For the powerful, there is the dual possibility of the ‘can’ that we have already characterized.

3. “Those who are injured or believe themselves to have been injured,” to have been insulted, are frightening insofar as they are out to avenge the injury or insult. One expects something from them.³⁶⁷

4. “Those who have injured another and now fear revenge”³⁶⁸ are frightening. They take precautions against being injured in return by the other whom they have injured.

5. Those who are “competitors in one and the same matter”³⁶⁹ are frightening to each other insofar as the other is capable of anything in order to gain the advantage. This being-capable-of-anything carries with it the possibility of threat.

6. “Those who are a threat to whoever can themselves obtain more than we can; if the ones that are more powerful than we are are vulnerable, then we are even more so.”³⁷⁰ Here, the possibility of coming-into-danger again appears through the peculiar detour of others—a characteristic enhancement of the possibility through the *detour*.

7. “Those who are superior to us, and have already ruined us”³⁷¹ are frightening.

8. Frightening are “those who are weaker than we are, and are out to ruin”; for it can be expected from them that one day they will attack us.³⁷²

365. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 6 sq.: οἱ συνειδότες πεποιηκῶτι δεινὸν φοβεροὶ ἢ κατεπειν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν.

366. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 8: οἱ δυνάμενοι ἀδικεῖν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι.

367. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 10 sq.: οἱ ἡδικημένοι ἢ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι· αἰεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρὸν.

368. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 11 sq.: οἱ ἡδικηκότες [. . .] δεδιότες τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν.

369. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 13: οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνταγωνισταί.

370. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 15: οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν φοβεροὶ· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο βλέπειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τοὺς κρείττους.

371. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 17 sq.: οἱ τοὺς κρείττους αὐτῶν ἀνηρηκότες.

372. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 18 sq.: οἱ τοῖς ἥττοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι· ἢ γὰρ ἤδη φοβεροὶ ἢ ἀξήθηντες.

9. “Among enemies and opponents, those that plainly attack, that wear their heart on their sleeve and speak out plainly about everything that they are thinking, are not very frightening. Much more frightening are the *πρᾶοι*, the reserved, the *εἰρωνες*, the ironic [those who act as though the things they deal with are not as important as they are considered to be], the *πανοῦργοι*, the slick ones. [One does not know where one stands with them—distinctive uncertainty. One does not know whether everything is all right with them, or whether they only act as though it is.] With them, it is not manifest whether a threat is near [whether they are planning something], so it is never clear that, in fact, no danger is present³⁷³—enhancement of the uncertainty through the *indeterminacy of proximity*.

You have seen, through the examples by which Aristotle characterizes the *φοβεροί*, that what is at issue here, according to the entire context, are the relations between one *πόλις* and others, and the relations among individuals within the *πόλις*—the *φοβεροί* seen according to this orientation of *being-with-one-another*.

e) The Genuineness of the Frightening (*φοβερόν*)

Here, Aristotle gives a *genuine characterization* of the *φοβερόν*. The sort of thing that one has missed and can no longer put right, what one has been able to evade but is now unavoidable—that is frightening to the highest degree. It is unavoidable, not in an absolute sense, but for me; the unavoidability is there with the opponent.³⁷⁴ Such a situation presents *what is frightening in the highest sense*. The *unavoidable*, not in an absolute sense, but *only for me*. The possibility of unavoidability is there *with another* who is hostile to me. Insofar as unavoidability is not absolute, but is there with another, and the other possesses *προαίρεσις*, it is characterized as threat. This being-threatened is determined through the *ἐλπίς* of the one threatened. Even what is threatening to the highest degree must, in a certain sense, hold out the *prospect of remaining absent*. The frightening becomes more genuine, the more the prospect of help disappears. Where there is no help, and yet it is still expected by the one threatened, the prospect of it remaining absent must still persist.

f) Disposition in Being Afraid

Being afraid must be characterized as an *οἶσθαι*. The one who is brought into fear must once “believe” that the definite thing that threatens, threatens *him*, and further, that what is threatening proceeds *from this definite human being*,

373. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 19 sqq.: τῶν [. . .] ἐχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλὰ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἰρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι· ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς, ὥστε οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω.

374. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 22 sqq.: πάντα δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερότατα ὅσα ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἐπανορθώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὄλωσ ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

and that he threatens him *now*.³⁷⁵ What is threatening must be there not only in the sense that I know that one day it could befall me—not being oriented toward the possibility of threat, but rather *being-for*, *believing*, that I have to expect this or that, that something is now happening to me by this person. Characteristic of the manner and mode in which the φοβερά are there for me is οἶεσθαι. Where this distinctive οἶεσθαι is wanting, one can perhaps be aware of a threatening thing, but it cannot be feared. This being-for remains absent from those for whom it goes swimmingly, who regard themselves as safe from every threat, those who have riches, physical strength, followers and influence at their disposal. These are never brought into fear; with them there arises a distinctive disdain, arrogance, and impudence.³⁷⁶ Furthermore, fear is absent from those who have a different οἶεσθαι, for those who believe that nothing more can happen to them since they have already been through everything. The “hardened” stand outside the possibility of fear.³⁷⁷ This type of appropriating genuine being-there into one’s beliefs about it must be shifted; it must come into a definite οἶεσθαι, so that what is frightening in general can come into my proximity.

This believing oneself to be in danger is, at the same time, the sort that operates in an ἐλπίς: what is threatening is appropriated as mattering to one, even when, *at the same time, one hopes to escape*. The ἐλπίς σωτηρίας is as constitutive of being afraid as believing is for being threatened.³⁷⁸ In this “hope of being saved,” the peculiar disposition in which I am concerned with what I fear is manifest. *It must matter to me*. It cannot be something of indifference.

Accordingly, only now is the distinctive ταραχή, “disquiet,” intelligible. The *disquiet* is nothing other than the *opposedness of οἶεσθαι and ἐλπίς*: believing oneself to be lost, and hoping nonetheless. The possibility of salvation must be held fast, and in the expectant holding fast of the possibility of not-being-annihilated, the peculiar “recoiling” from that which threatens me operates—λύπη as φυγή. The possibility of being saved—in short, of *being*, is there, but nonetheless *I recoil from being*. That is the basic sense of ταραχή. Being-there does not depart from itself, but rather holds fast in hope of the possibility of salvation. In this way, there appears in ταραχή the two aspects of δίωξις and φυγή: both *basic determinations of the genuine being-moved of being-there*.

375. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 34 sq.: ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε.

376. Rhet. B 5, 1382 b 35 sqq.: οὐκ οἴονται δὲ παθεῖν ἄν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίας μεγάλαις ὄντες καὶ δοκοῦντες, διὸ ὕβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς (ποιεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτους πλοῦτος ἰσχύς πολυφιλία δύναις).

377. Rhet. B 5, 1383 a 3 sq.: οὔτε οἱ ἤδη πεπονθέναι πάντα νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπευνηγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.

378. Rhet. B 5, 1383 a 5 sq.: ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινὰ ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας.

g) Fear as πίστις: Courage as the Possibility of Being-Composed in Relation to It: The πάθη as Ground of λόγος

Aristotle says that insofar as human beings come into this disquiet, which is determined by οἶσθαι and ἐλπίς, they become ready to *deliberate*.³⁷⁹ Human beings who are brought into fear run to another in order to confer, to get counsel. If I allow people to be brought into fear, if I make out political events as dangerous, I thereby make people ready for, and inclined toward, conferring. I make them into those who contribute to the realization of an intended decision; I do this for the purpose of their becoming themselves πίστις.

Referring back to speaking-with-one-another in everydayness, fear shows itself to be that disposition that *brings to speaking*. What appears here in the circle of everydayness is a phenomenon that has a much more originary foundation, insofar as, in the being-there of human beings, it can be a question of fear in yet another sense, what we designate as *anxiety* or *dread*: where it is *uncanny* for us, where we do not know what we are afraid of. If it is uncanny for us, we begin to discourse. That is an indication of how the *γένεσις of speaking is measured by being-there*, as speaking is connected with the basic determination of being-there itself, which is characterized by *uncanniness*.

The fear that Aristotle characterizes here itself has the possibility of being taken hold of by human beings in a decisive manner. Fear has, as a determinate πάθος, the possibility of a ἔξις. Such a possibility is *courage*. However, it is evident that I can only be courageous in the right sense if I am afraid. *Fear is the condition of the possibility of courage*. Whoever is not afraid vis-à-vis persuading himself not to be afraid (which is the case most of the time), does not yet get around to making a decision in the right sense, and being courageous. It is a question of *taking hold of courage*. It is a question of *being afraid in the right manner*, and thereby coming to resoluteness. Connected with this is *Augustine's* thesis: *initium sapientiae timor Domini*,³⁸⁰ which makes the fundamental relevance of fear for being-there visible. Possibilities of being-composed in relation to fear: *Rhetoric*, B5, and in greater detail, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Γ, Chapters 9–10.³⁸¹

At the same time, ἐλπίς σωτηρίας indicates that fearing, in the context of σωτηρία, stands in a distinctive connection with being-there itself. At one point, Aristotle says of ἔξις—more precisely of the ability to have the moment at one's disposal in the proper mode—that it σώζει μεσότητα,³⁸² that it “preserves the mean”; it brings me into the genuine being that corresponds

379. *Rhet.* B 5, 1383 a 6 sq.: ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικούς ποιεῖ.

380. Aurelius Augustinus, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, qu. 36.

381. Cf. *Rhet.* B 5, 1383 a 13 sqq.; *Eth. Nic.* Γ 9–10, 1115 a 6 sqq.

382. Editor's note: Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1104 a 25 sqq. or b 11 sq., where the μεσότης preserves in all cases, namely σωφοσύνη and ἀνδρεία, also the εὖ.

to the circumstances. Furthermore, σώζειν is used in a metaphorical sense: ὁ θεὸς σώζει τὸν οὐρανόν, “God preserves the heavens.” “Preserve” is meant in the sense of not-letting-perish, maintaining-in-being-there. Σώζειν, σωτηρία: counter-concepts to φθορά, to “disappearing-out-of-being-there.”

We still have to come to an understanding in what follows as to how fear and the πάθη stand in connection with λόγος, insofar as λόγος is taken as speaking-with-one-another, which has the function of working out the interpretation of being-there in its everydayness. Insofar as the πάθη are not merely an annex of psychical processes, but are rather *the ground out of which speaking arises, and which what is expressed grows back into*, the πάθη, for their part, are *the basic possibilities in which being-there itself is primarily oriented toward itself*, finds itself. The primary being-oriented, the illumination of its being-in-the-world is not a *knowing*, but rather a *finding-oneself* that can be determined differently, according to the mode of being-there of a being. Only within the thus characterized finding-oneself and being-in-the-world is it possible to speak about things, insofar as they are stripped of the look they have in immediate relations. Now the possibility arises of coming to a definite *concreteness* that, in a certain sense, sets back in place the mode of seeing the world as it is indicated in advance by the πάθη. Only if one sees being-there in this way can one set the πάθη back in place. Only from this standpoint can one understand what was a strain for the Greeks, who were to a certain degree in love with λόγος: to work their way out toward a concreteness, from out of discussion and idle chatter. Only thus can we understand that it is false when one holds Greece in general to be a fantastical place, as if things just fell into the lap of these distinguished men.

§22. Supplements to the Explication of Being-There as Being-in-the-World

a) The ἔξις of ἀληθεύειν (*Nicomachean Ethics* Δ12–13)

We have brought the consideration of fear to a certain close. It is necessary to remember that πάθη are apprehended in the *Rhetoric* as πίστεις, insofar as they speak for a meaning that leads the living-with-one-another of human beings in the πόλις. These πίστεις are that ἐξ ὧν ἡ πρότασις, “that from which and on the basis of which, from whose particular givenness what is known is taken.” All argumentation speaks from out of something self-evident. The πάθη are determined by ἡδονή; they are characteristic of the finding-itself at each moment of being-there in its world. In the case of the consideration of φόβος, and of the πάθη in general, these are considered insofar as they are determinations of the hearer. However, everyone is with other beings in being-there, hearer and speaker equally. Thus the δόξα in whose cultivation the πάθη participate characterize the interpretedness of being-there in everydayness. The κοινωνία, “being-with-one-another,” is in the having-the-world-there-with-one-another,

a having-with-one-another of definite δόξα, which is oriented by how being-there itself speaks about itself at the moment.

This κοινωνία still has the special possibility of humans being-with-one-another reciprocally: of ὁμιλία or of συζῆν.³⁸³ This “living-with-one-another” is, however, characterized in an average and everyday way by δόξα. Being-there in everydayness maintains itself in the “more or less”; it operates in degrees. With regard to itself, it is not so exacting; it is *non-concrete* to a certain extent. A human being is non-concrete in relation to himself. Insofar as he is this, and at the same time has the possibility of deciding something genuine for himself, that is, is in the possibility of προαίρεσις, he also has a ἕξις with respect to the uncoveredness of his being. There is also a ἕξις in relation to ὁμιλία, συζῆν. It is *having the legitimacy of compartment toward others and toward oneself at one’s disposal*. Whoever is defined by this ἕξις is designated by Aristotle as the ἀληθευτικός,³⁸⁴ which means having being-there with respect to discoveredness at one’s disposal, presenting oneself so that one’s self-presentation and being with others is not a self-concealing, feigning, *presenting oneself as one is and as one thinks*.

The συζῆν is characterized by ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου. This ἕξις occurs ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι.³⁸⁵ Προσποίημα: asserting about oneself in the sense of talking oneself into that which one asserts of oneself, that which one claims about oneself in the sense that one talks oneself into it, what is asserted about oneself. This προσποίημα, προσποίησις is for the most part in degrees. Customarily and for the most part human beings are, hiddenly or evidently, in ὁμιλία (1) in the character of the ἀλαζών, or (2) in that of the εἴρων. Αλαζών is he who makes something up about himself, who discourses grandly about himself: δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζών προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει,³⁸⁶ “he who says about himself what universally enjoys reputation.” That is a ἕξις: initially and for the most part, the human being maintains himself as ἀλαζών; he sticks to speaking the sort of thing that universally enjoys reputation, vis-à-vis asserting about oneself the sort of thing “that is not at all at one’s disposal,” or that is “greater or more significant than what one is oneself”—making something up about oneself, so that one conceals one’s genuine being, not the sort who presents his being undisguisedly. The other possibility is characterized by the εἴρων: ἀρνεῖσθαι [δοκεῖ] τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,³⁸⁷ “who denies what he is, who does not present his being in the way it shows itself immediately, who makes his being less important”—Socrates, who passes himself off as one who

383. Eth. Nic. Δ 12, 1126 b 11: ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν. Δ 13, 1127 a 18 sq.: ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἶρηνηται.

384. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 24.

385. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 20.

386. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 21 sq.

387. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 23.

knows nothing and yet knows more, indeed, than others. The εἶρων has good and bad possibilities. The mean is the ἀληθευτικός: being “truthful,” being “undisguised”—each speaks and behaves in the way that he is.³⁸⁸

You see the accomplishment of λόγος in being-in-the-world, and thereby the apprehension of λόγος internal to being-in-the-world; and, at the same time, you see that the uncoveredness, the disclosive being-oriented in being-toward-oneself and in being-toward-others, is characterized by ἀλήθεια, more precisely, by ἀληθεύειν as a ἔξις, this ἀληθεύειν in the mode of being-able-to-be-there-unconcealed. Aristotle treats the various possibilities of ἀληθεύειν thematically in Book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: the manifoldness of such ἔξεις. Two are the highest: (1) σοφία, (2) φρόνησις—“looking-around” in the moment and θεωρεῖν, that unlocking of the world, opening up of being, with which no practical secondary object can come into play, that ἀληθεύειν as βίος θεωρητικός which presents the genuine and highest possibility of Greek existence.

b) The World as World of Nature

Previously, we characterized the being-there of human beings as being-in-the-world, and defined the world, initially, by the encounter-aspects of the ἀγαθόν. The being-character of the world with which we have to do is determined as ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως; it is more or less the way that change assigns it. In this *environing world*, the world with which we have to do in our concerns appears unified with the world as *nature*. Nature is not a being-region standing alongside this world, but rather is the world itself such as it shows itself in the enviring world in a definite way, characterized by the fact that the world is, as nature, that way of being showing itself for our being-in-the-world in daily dealings as *being-there-always-already*: sailing in the sea, fish are caught in the stream. The everydayness of producing is always producing from something that is related, for example, from the mine, from the forest, and so on. Everything that everydayness needs, it has and is there in nature. It is important to see that nature is primarily not something like an object of scientific consideration. Nature is the *always-already-being-there of the world*. As it is seen primarily, world is an aspect of the enviring world itself. The change from day to night is always repeated, as is the course of the sun and of the stars. In the enviring world that I possess, there is the ground on which I stand, air whose presence waits on me in a certain respect. The world must be understood in this way if one defines being-in-the-world as dealing with the world. The world is seen, in this experience of being-there, as that which always is and also can be otherwise.

What genuinely-is-always, what need not be sought long for natural ori-

388. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 23 sq.: ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀuthέκαστος τις ὢν ἀληθευτικός καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ.

entation in the world, is the heavens. The Greek heavens and the world must be understood as a vault on which the sun rises and descends. The practical concern of human beings occurs in the middle, in the μέσον. The earth is the center of orientation for orientation in the world, an orientation that need not be at all theoretical nor natural-scientific. This system of orientation is absolute. There is nothing in terms of which my being-there would be relative. There is only a being-there, being-there upon the earth as the absolute center of orientation. For Aristotle, there are three basic movements: (1) away from the middle, ἄνω; (2) toward the middle, κάτω; (3) around the middle, κύκλος—three movements in which being-there stands as being-in-the-world. Everything that is in the world itself is the κόσμος. Beings as κόσμος are characterized by the presence of what is always already there, παρουσία. Every being is determined in its being by the fact that it is πέρας, the having-become-complete that has its limits. “Limit” is not somehow determined by the relation of one being to another, but rather the limit is itself a *being-aspect in beings*; πέρας is its *site*, its *place*, its *being-produced*, *being-in-its-place*. In this way, beings that move themselves in the κόσμος always have a determinate limit of their movement—their site. *Site is a positive determination of being*. The site belongs to beings as such. Contemporary physics has returned to this standpoint with the concept of “field.” To the degree that the character of the world is considered, it is considered as the *world of nature*. This nature is not somehow alongside, not first of all nature and then a good deal in addition; instead, if one wants to see the *things of nature* with respect to their being-there, one must see them *through the enviring world*, vis-à-vis how it is there as enviring world. Only then does one have a proper basis for grasping the mode of being-there of the beings of nature.

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SECOND PART

RETRIEVING INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN BASIC CONCEPTS ON THE BASIS OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE INDIGENOUS CHARACTER OF CONCEPTUALITY

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CHAPTER ONE

The Being-There of Human Beings as the Indigenous Character of Conceptuality

§23. *Showing of the Possibility of Conceptuality in Being-There according to Concretely Giving Basic Experience, Guiding Claim, and Prevailing Intelligibility*

The consideration of the *being-there of human beings as being-in-the-world* has been brought to a certain conclusion. This being-in-the-world has the *basic character of its being* in λόγος. Λόγος pervades being-in. What is preserved in λόγος is the manner and mode in which the world and the being-there that is itself discovered therein are opened up. Λόγος disposes over the particular discoveredness and openedness of the world. It allows us the directions in which being-there can interrogate the world and itself.

Toward what purpose did the interrogating of the world and of the being-there of the human beings in it strive? It was examined with respect to the *indigenous character of conceptuality*, specifically with the purpose of understanding *conceptuality itself*. And that because only in conceptuality is every concept to be understood as what it is. Insofar as conceptuality is understood, the *guiding clue to seeing concrete concepts* is given. It had the purpose of setting forth basic concepts, of making conceptuality visible, and appropriating it for the understanding thereof. It sought conceptuality where conceptuality itself is at home and as such, from where it arises: that being in which something like conceptuality can be. With the emphasis on the indigenous character of conceptuality—on its indigenous Greek character—we have fulfilled a task that is placed before every *interpretation*, insofar as interpretation needs to be oriented by that of which it speaks.

We have characterized conceptuality according to *three aspects*: (1) *concretely giving basic experience*, (2) determined by the *guiding claim*, and (3) by the *prevailing intelligibility*. The question concerning the indigenous character of conceptuality is the question as to *where* and *how* the three above-named characters possess their *being*, such that they are *possible* in this being itself, such that they grow out of it, and even constitute a possibility of this being. The answer to the question concerning the indigenous character of conceptuality

must exhibit a being that has the being-character that in itself presents these three characters.

With this purpose, *being-there* was explicated, being-there *with respect to its being*. This explication was laid out so that *basic concepts would come to language*. These basic concepts came to language with the purpose of immediately serving to make being-there visible and intelligible as the possible ground of basic concepts themselves. The *genuine interpretation* occurs in the right way, then, only if it is fulfilled *on the ground of explicit conceptuality*, if the interpretation is retrieved, is understood in accordance with the ground. Therein, a *general hermeneutical principle* appears, that *every interpretation is only genuine in retrieval*. Only then is it a putting-forward of that which no longer stands there.

Being-there was characterized for the purpose of setting forth the indigenous character of conceptuality:

1. Is the being that is thus characterized, *in its being, the possibility of the conceptual?*
2. *How* is the being-there of human beings, as being-in-the-world, this possibility?

Ad 1. “Possibility” must, then, be understood as being-possible in the sense of the being-character of the beings that are spoken of, not in the sense of the empty possibility that is brought to being-there, so that it is maintained beforehand for being-there whether or not it is possible. If conceptuality is indigenous to being-there itself, *being-there itself must be conceptuality in a certain way*—in which case it is not necessary that conceptuality as such has already *come forward* in its aspects; it can be there *inexplicitly*. We want to first show that, in fact, conceptuality lies in being-there itself.

(a) With regard to the *concretely giving basic experience*: the experience in which a being is determined with regard to its primary look, such that all else is derived and is characterized in its being on the basis of this basic view. Every being, as being-there, is a being that shows itself as there. Being-in-the-world means: having a being there that is disclosed in its look and having to do with it as disclosed. Being-in-the-world means *having the world there* in a certain way. Not only is the world had, but being-there *has itself in disposition*. Being-in-the-world is characterized by disposition. Being-there has itself: not in reflecting, as the primary mode of having-itself-there is in finding-oneself. This having-there is the possibility of having a being determined in advance as thus and so in its look. So, therein lies the possibility of genuinely seeing that which is had in natural dealing, of taking a distance from concerned dealing and residing within merely looking at it. Insofar as being-there is characterized as being-in, as being-in-the-world, and this being-in-the-world is characterized as disposition, the world and living are already there in a way, so that concretely giving basic experience, as already there itself, has the possibility of giving-itself.

(b) The *guiding claim*: this refers to that *in terms of which* a being is ad-

dressed. The being is, ultimately, always addressed in terms of *its being*. A *definite sense of being* guides every natural interpretation of beings. This sense does not need to be made categorially explicit, and precisely when it is not, it possesses its genuine being and its authority. In *this* interpretation of being-there, being means *being-present, being-completed*. The being is not only there in its look; the being-character is itself explicitly there, in the sense of the explicitness of everyday seeing, considering, discussing.

(c) The *prevailing intelligibility*. Being-with-one-another is thoroughly governed by δόξα. All speaking is oriented toward bringing the questionable, the unintelligible, into a *definite familiarity*. Being-there has, in itself, a definite claim on that which is familiar in a genuine sense. Being-there, in its interpretation, is thoroughly governed by a *definite idea of evidence*, which is sufficient for being-there as such, an evidence from which the scientific sense of evidence takes its standard, the various proofs, the rigor of proofs. Familiarity is the standard of intelligibility that λόγος possesses, that proceeds from the ἔνδοξον and returns to it.

Ad 2. We have to ask more precisely *how* the being thus characterized can be cultivated as being-there itself, in such a way that conceptuality comes forward. We already know that the being-there of human beings is characterized by προαίρεσις. A “resolving-oneself” is always determined by the fact it that resolves itself *in opposition to something*. Accordingly, the cultivation of conceptuality also presumably arises from such a way of being of being-there, which *runs precisely counter* to this conceptuality, so that the being of the being-possible of conceptuality can be characterized as *possibility in a double-sense*: (1) in the sense of the possibility of that *on the basis of which* conceptuality can be cultivated, as *from its contrary* and (2) *for-what* and *upon what*, being-there can be cultivated in the conceiving of conceptuality.

On the basis of this orientation, we will have to characterize *movement* since we will come to know it as a determination of beings, namely, of being-alive, *from which all further consideration of being is developed*. Κίνησις: *guiding clue for the explication of the being of the being-there of human beings*.¹

§24. *The Double Sense of the Possibility of Conceptuality in Being-There*

I have attempted to establish the connection: to make conceptuality itself intelligible on the basis of being-there as such, to exhibit being-there according to a basic possibility of its being. This being has the possibility of carrying in itself the basic determinations of conceptuality. The fact of the matter is that, in human living, something like science and scientific research is possible. There

1. See Hs. p. 354 ff.

are three aspects: concretely giving basic experience, guiding claim, prevailing intelligibility.

1. Concretely giving basic experience: we must understand that this being, which is called human being-there, has the possibility of carrying in itself the conceptual. How is conceptuality itself possible in being-there? Being-there is being-in-the-world. Insofar as it is, it stands in experience. Being-there has itself, finds itself in relation to itself, even if it often does so in such a way that being-there has itself in the world, and on the path beyond the world, in which it lives. I *am* in certain possibilities: my job, my occupation.

2. The guiding claim: this being-there has, in itself, a definite sense of being and, corresponding to that, what it is not.

3. Being-there has a definite standard of intelligibility, as in the way it speaks of and about itself, and about the manner and mode in which it deals.

How is conceptuality itself possible in a being-there thus characterized? We must distinguish two possibilities. If science is something to which being-there can resolve itself, ἔξις, then this ἔξις is characterized by its being: πῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ἄλλων—πῶς, that which it is πρὸς, “against,” “in relation to” something, from which it extricates itself. Therefore, the first possibility *in the sense of the arrangement against which ἔξις is cultivated*; the second possibility, then, *in the positive sense*.

a) The Possibility of Conceptuality in the Negative Sense of
That in Relation to Which Conceptuality Is Cultivated

α. The Interpretedness of Being-There in Fore-Having,
Fore-Sight, and Fore-Grasp

Initially this conceptuality is not there in an original way; the possibilities of the conceptual are initially cut off by being-there. Being-there as being-in-the-world is primarily governed by λόγος, operates in word-thinking, hearing-saying, reading-learning; and that with respect to three aspects. Being-there as being-in-the-world is always a being in what is already familiar, what is already interpreted thus and so; being-there is already apprehended as thus and so. Coming into the world, one grows into a determinate tradition of speaking, seeing, interpreting. Being-in-the-world is an already-having-the-world-thus-and-so. This peculiar fact, that the world into which I enter, in which I awaken, is there for me in a determinate interpretedness, I designate terminologically as the *fore-having*.

The world is there as already thus and so, and with it my being-there in the world too; and in dealing with it, a definite way of addressing, in which the world is cared for, is discussed. This circumscribes a definite possibility of conceiving, of posing questions, that is, the respects are already there in relation to which the world is cared for. The fore-having is already posited, at the outset, in a definite *fore-sight*. The being that is already there stands in a definite respect; all seeing, all taking-in-some-respect, is determined in the

concrete sense. Beings, namely, the world and living, are cared for under the guidance of a definite sense of being: being-produced, being-present, in which, precisely, this sense of being does not need to be explicit. Precisely by its being inexplicit, it possesses a peculiar stubbornness in the guidance and leading of the taking-in-some-respect.

That which is thus already possessed at the outset—the world and living, and together with them, that which is already set in this definite fore-sight and is explicated under its guidance—is at the same time expressed for the most part and in an average way: ἀποφαίνεσθαι—“exhibited,” articulated. Under the guidance of the respect, the look is now explicated more precisely, that is, to the extent that the claim to intelligibility governs, a definite idea of a proof and of conduciveness is guiding. If we recall the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we know that the mathematical disciplines guided the manner and mode of the conceptual, the claim to scientific rigor. Definite possibilities of conceiving can gain dominance; all others must be assimilated to the dominant one. This was the tendency, as it was in the nineteenth century: since the mathematical sciences are *the* rigorous sciences, the historical sciences must proceed in precisely the same way. That was a misunderstanding, as in all such cases. The governing intelligibility, which includes expressing as articulation, I designate as *fore-grasp*.

These three aspects are connected in themselves as *having*, *sight*, and *grasp*. Every having stands in a definite regard, and is articulated by the expressed—grasp—and this whole is characterized as *fore*: at the outset, already prevailing in the being-there into which I grow. These three aspects characterize in their unity that which I designate as *interpretation of being-there*, *being-transparent*.

β. Λόγος as the Possibility of Error and Dissimulation

Λόγος possesses the *mastery* of interpretedness. Λόγος is the *genuine bearer* of interpretedness, λόγος as the mastery of interpretedness. Insofar as this λόγος is that in which all that is conceptual occurs, *it* is also that which constitutes the *possibility of error* in being-there as thus characterized. The experienced and the seen is, for the most part, what is *expressed*. In expression, it is communicated to others, and through this *communication* comes into circulation: what is repeated. In this speaking-around-us, *idle chatter*, what is expressed increasingly loses its ground. Through this idle chatter, this being-further-spoken without recourse to the expressed matter, idle chatter comes to cover up and dissimulate that which is genuinely meant. What is expressed carries in itself the possibility of *dissimulation* in the literal sense. Communicating already is, in a certain sense, a *leading astray*, even if it does so implicitly and not deliberately. Insofar as this leading astray is grasped as purposeful, it yields the possibility of *deception* and of being-deceived—dominance of the *false*, of the ψεῦδος. From there, we also see the connection between λόγος and εἶδος. Εἶδος: look, in the way that it is. Λόγος: what is expressed, the address. Insofar

as λόγος is what governs, I draw my knowledge from hearing-saying. It is also through this λόγος that εἶδος becomes a look, but in the *as*; it looks *as* though it is such and such . . . , but is not so. Something looks *like* gold, but is not; something that is taken to be the case—seeming, εἶδος, as look in the sense of only-looking-thus.

That refers not only to the everyday, that being-there with which one has to do, but in a much more precise measure pertains to that interpreting of being-there that is made into the explicit task of being there: research and philosophy. Definite λόγοι that, once expressed, precisely at times when research activities are young and vital, can assume such a dominance, that for a long time they render the beings that they refer to inaccessible. The λόγος of *Parmenides*, that “beings are one,” ἐν τὸ ὄν,² possesses such a dominance within the interpretation of being-there. This λόγος was also a positive motive for posing the being-question in the genuine sense, and to solve it in terms of the standards of Greek possibilities. One can see in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, H 14, that Aristotle had a keen understanding of the dominance of λόγος: κληρονομία ὀνόματος, the “heritage of the word,” word-meaning—that these κληρονομία ὀνόματος, specifically of ἡδονή, were taken over early on from a definite interpretation of being-there—ἀλλ’ εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἰ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν.³ The feeling that lies closest is sensory pleasure, enjoyment; this feeling-oneself, interpreted in the horizon of the average feeling of the crowd, took over the heritage of the word ἡδονή. Ἡδονή need not originally mean what it means in the interpretation of the being-there of the many. This everyday meaning seizes hold of the interpretation.

Since the everyday can seize hold of heritage, it follows that being-there has the possibility of tearing heritage away from the everyday, and bringing it to an *original interpretedness*, that is, out of everydayness, and in opposition to it in the ἔξις to *appropriate* the conceptual *in the genuine sense*. Fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-grasp are, at the same time, *possibilities of something genuine: to explicitly appropriate* the fore-having, *to cultivate* the fore-sight, and *to carry through* the fore-grasp, *following this that is secured*. The conceptual is not something that comes forth from out of being-there and is somehow discovered in addition to it, but rather the proper possibility of the conceptual is just the conceptual as apprehended interpretation of being-there itself.

b) The Possibility of Conceptuality in the Positive Sense of the Possibility of That for Which Conceptuality Is Cultivated: Νοῦς as διανοεῖσθαι

We must still, at least briefly, come to an understanding of *possibility in the*

2. Parmenides, fr. 8, 3 sqq. in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und Deutsch*, edited by H. Diels, fourth edition, Volume I, Berlin 1922, 18 B: ἐὸν [. . .] ἔν. Aristoteles, *Met.* A 5, 986 b 29: ἐν οἶεται εἶναι τὸ ὄν.

3. *Eth. Nic.* H 14, 1153 b 33 sqq.

positive sense. Being-there operates in a *prevailing interpretedness*, which Aristotle designates as ὑπολήψεις: living, being-with-one-another, holds opinion, namely with regard to definite basic facts of the matter; it has definite “holding-of-opinions.” Ὑπολήψεις are the primary contents of the interpretation of being-there; we must inquire into what they mean. They must be liberated from that which has been accumulated through idle chatter and pointless discussion of it. Insofar as such a task is grasped, being-there no longer operates in specifically practical activity—λόγος is its *independent* accomplishment as ἀποφαίνεσθαι: to clarify dealing with the world, with living no longer as an acting, a managing in the sense of practical concern, but rather *debating*, that which itself becomes visible in the expressed, and to clarify this apart from any application. Insofar as λόγος is independent, it depends solely upon speaking in the sense of exhibiting. The question is: wherein does independent speaking operate? If λόγος is no longer μετά for πράξις, then for what is it μετά? Insofar as πράξις is now given up, λόγος becomes independent, and the question is: to what is the μετά related? Accordingly, λόγος is not simply no longer μετά; the accomplishment of λόγος is ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Even here, in its pure function, it is related to bringing-to-seeing as mode of fulfillment of looking-out as such. We now possess διανοεῖσθαι, ἐπιστήμη μετά λόγου. Independence of λόγος means that it is μετά for νοεῖν and διανοεῖσθαι. “Supposing,” “perceiving,” are characteristics that determine being-in-the-world more precisely with regard to being-oriented.

Aristotle, *De Anima*, Γ 4: νοῦς is that ὃ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ.⁴ “Supposing” is the genuine being-possibility of being-in-the-world, of “being-familiar-with . . .” as well as of φρονεῖν, “looking-around-oneself.” *The two possibilities of being-oriented* are (1) *mere taking-into-acquaintance* without any practical aim and (2) *looking-around-oneself*. Therefore (1) being-oriented *toward* something, (2) being-oriented *for* something.

Insofar as νοῦς is a basic determination of being-in-the-world, it characterizes the being of being-there as being-oriented. Νοῦς, orientation, has a genuine character in human being-there: ὁ καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς.⁵ Aristotle speaks of “so-called” νοῦς, never simply of νοῦς, but of νοῦς in the way that it is familiar in everydayness, in the way that one speaks of it and the only way that one can speak of it initially. This καλούμενος νοῦς, not genuine νοῦς, is characterized as διανοεῖσθαι.⁶ We must ask: how does this happen? Why is supposing, insofar as it is fulfilled in human being-there, a διανοεῖσθαι?

The context of Book 3 of *De Anima* is: origin of διά, of the fact that the νοῦς of human beings is a δια-νοεῖσθαι. “Perceiving and supposing are equally the simple calling of something.”⁷ To perceive something: to see, in one

4. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 10 sq.

5. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 22.

6. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 23: λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται [. . .] ἡ ψυχὴ.

7. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 8: τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁμοίον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν.

stroke, as there. To suppose something: a naming or calling, to call something by a name, to name or call in simply having-there. Closer connection between speaking and seeing, αἴσθησις and φάσις apart from any broader structure—voeiv, which has the structure of simply having-there. How does it come about that this supposing is a δια-voeivethai? Insofar as νοῦς is νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς—ψυχὴ which constitutes genuine being-in-the-world. For Aristotle, ζῆν, ζωή is plainly identified with ἡδονή, disposition. All finding is a finding-oneself with and toward a ἡδύ and a λυπηρόν, in short, a συμφέρον. Disposition, ἡδονή, has the two possibilities of δίωξις and φυγή, “going-toward” the συμφέρον and “shrinking-back before it.” Δίωξις and φυγή are basic ways of being moved for ψυχὴ, for being-there. Insofar as νοῦς is the possibility of orientation of being-there thus determined, it is a διά. Every “going-toward . . .” as δίωξις is going toward something *as* something. The world, insofar as it is primarily encountered for the disposition of gladness, or alternatively, being-toned-down, is there *as* conducive, as opposed to harmful insofar as αισθάνεσθαι is characterized as “perceiving” in disposition. ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἶον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, διώκει ἢ φεύγει.⁸ Mere naming or calling is not the way in which everyday, average perceiving is fulfilled. Perceiving, as a mode of disposition, is the perceiving of something *as* something; addressing is not a simple naming or calling, but addressing *as* something, κατὰ and ἀπό. Every λόγος is characterized by κατὰ and ἀπό: every λόγος is σύνθεσις or διαίρεσις; every λέγειν is λέγειν τι κατὰ τινοσ. Therefore, λόγος is, at the same time, the positive possibility of error. Only because speaking is addressing something *as* something, is there the possibility of seeing the addressed as other than it is. The ‘as something,’ σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, is the possibility of ψεῦδος.⁹ If orienting-oneself were a simple having-there and giving-back-in-the-same-way, there would be no ψεῦδος in the being-there of human beings. Addressing *as* something, διά, the fragmenting of that which is simply had into its possible determinations *as* this or that—this fact of the matter is originally given with the basic determination of being, ἡδονή. That is, being-there is in itself, and in its everydayness, concretely fallen into error and into the possibility of error.

Since this possibility of error exists, the fall from the genuine possibility of exhibiting and having-there of beings, and insofar as living is in turn determined by προαίρεσις, living can *positively grasp the possibility of determining the being that is there in the way that it is*. This διανοεῖσθαι as λέγειν τι κατὰ τινοσ can be fulfilled so that it becomes a λέγειν καθ’ αὐτό in *adapting to that which is genuinely present*, to that which is posited in the right regard, and so that the λόγος that unconcealedly yields beings in their being, the *concept*, springs from it.

The structure in which the consideration moves is that the conceptual,

8. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 9 sq.

9. De an. Γ 6, 430 b 1 sq.: τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει αἰεί.

λόγος, is set up in being-there itself as possibilities for and against. We want to see how the *cultivation of the concept κίνησις* is fulfilled as the *radical grasping of the interpretedness of being-there, in accordance with these three aspects*.¹⁰

10. See Hs. p. 357 ff.

CHAPTER TWO

Interpretation of the Cultivation of the Concept of κίνησις as a Radical Grasping of the Interpretedness of Being-There

§25. *The Aristotelian Physics as ἀρχή-Research: Orientation toward the First Two Books*

The interpretedness that itself prevails in being-there, where the latter is determined by προαίρεσις, stands under the possibility of being grasped, in the sense that the world is genuinely considered in its being-there, and being-in-the-world can be examined with respect to what it is. In relation to the interpretedness of being-there itself, there is a ἔξις of ἀληθεύειν, a possibility of existing truthfully, implicit in which truthfulness is the interpretedness and transparency of being-there itself. The interpretedness of being-there is conveyed by λόγος: idle chatter, the “way in which one speaks about things,” is authoritative for the world-conception itself. We have attempted to understand why speaking is characterized as διανοεῖσθαι, διαλέγεσθαι: since being-there is determined by ἡδονή, everything is apprehended *as* this or that, as “conductive to . . .,” συμφέρον—apprehended in a primary way, not theoretically. The average way of speaking and apprehending is διανοεῖσθαι. Only in contrast to this average speaking (λέγειν τι κατὰ τινος), can the ἔξις as ἀληθεύειν assert itself. The λόγος καθ’ αὐτό addresses beings “in themselves.” It posits the beings that are there, not in some alien respect, but rather derives from itself the respects in which the beings that are there are to be considered. *This λόγος that addresses from itself the beings in their being is the ὀρισμός.* According to the basic determinations of being as being-produced and look, it has the following structure: *beings are addressed in themselves with respect to that from which they have descended, γένος, and within their descent, they are addressed with respect to what they are, εἶδος.* The entire being-context of the γένος and εἶδος is the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: τί ἦν = γένος, τὸ εἶναι = εἶδος. Insofar as beings are posited in the respects from which they are determined, research is thereby bound to set forth this from-out-of-which. This from-out-of-which is the ἀρχαί. The ἀρχαί are the basic respects in which concrete being-there is seen in itself and made explicit. Insofar as the ἔξις of ἀληθεύειν is put into effect, this means that

λόγος becomes such that it advances to the ἀρχαί. The concrete fulfillment of the ἔξις is ἐπιστήμη, and the “science” that has to do with the ἀρχαί is πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or more concisely: σοφία. A distinctive research that does not scrutinize beings as to their concrete determinations but rather sets forth the basic respects, is guided by the question: τί τὸ ὄν? “What are beings as beings? What is being?”

Such an ἀρχή-research as a possibility in being-there itself lies before us in that which we know as the Aristotelian *Physics*. In Book 3, Aristotle characterizes this research as μέθοδος περὶ φύσεως.¹ The investigation is περὶ φύσεως, not περὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, not “about those beings that are determined by the way of being of φύσις,” but rather about φύσις itself, about the *being* of these beings. In order to understand the context of the *Physics*, by way of Aristotelian ontology, the following must be held to from the outset: research that treats of φύσις is nothing other than the *obtaining of the primary categories* that Aristotle subsequently develops in his ontology. Φύσις is characterized as ἀρχή κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς.² It is appropriate to make use of the more precise expression, μεταβολή. If φύσις is to be clarified, then that of which it is ἀρχή must itself be clarified. “What movement itself is is not to be concealed.”³ Here Aristotle speaks from the recollection of the preceding books of the *Physics*, to which we must briefly orient ourselves, and whose context I am supplying.

At the moment that Aristotle begins the investigation of φύσις, he is already operating within a determinate interpretedness of nature. During the years of his studying and teaching, there were definite conceptions of nature known to him, which he believed did not hit upon the beings that they interpreted. If these beings are to be interpreted, it depends upon deconstructing the interpretedness that disguises them, exposing them in the way that they are themselves intended, even in earlier conceptions. In other words, the first step of such ἀρχή-research is *critique*, in the sense that what was always already interpreted, what was already seen in early conceptions, is to be brought to its genuine rightfulness, to transparency. *Critique is nothing other than the bringing-to-itself of the past*. Thus ἀρχή-research is at once *research about access*: it opens the path to what is intended.

Aristotle carries through this ἀρχή-research itself in Book 1 of his *Physics*. This critique appears immediately to be pressed into an entirely peculiar form, insofar as Aristotle discusses the question as to whether, in relation to these beings, there is one ἀρχή or several ἀρχαί. We must come to an understanding of what this question genuinely means. We will achieve some clarity if we present the first stage of the critique, the critical encounter with the *Eleatics*. This critique of the Eleatics is touched upon often enough. People have said

1. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 13.

2. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 12 sq.

3. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 13 sq.: δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τί ἐστὶ κίνησις.

that Aristotle uses the Eleatics only in order to have an easy object of criticism, insofar as Aristotle himself says that they do not really belong here.⁴ He did this because he saw that *Parmenides*, with the determination ἐν τῷ ὄν, “being is one,” had seen a fundamental determination of being, but came, thereby, to a standstill. Because the being of κίνησις was denied from then on, he draws the Eleatics into the circle of his critique. One can hardly determine beings in their being if one insists that there is only *one* ἀρχή. This claim mistakes the sense of ἀρχή as such, insofar as there are already πολλά in the articulation of beings in one respect. If I articulate something with respect to one ἀρχή, I already have a doubling.⁵ I have presupposed something, and it should be posited in one respect: something *as* something. One cannot articulate beings with respect to their being if one does not concede, from the outset, the possibility of a manifoldness of ἀρχαί. In the course of his critique, Aristotle shows that there must be more than one ἀρχή, but not more than three. The being of nature, the φύσει ὄντα, lead of themselves to this number of ἀρχαί.⁶ In the course of the interpretation, we will see the extent to which this is the case.

This critique, in *Physics*, Book 1, is nothing other than the question of the basic formal structure of these beings whose being must be determined as being-moved. Insofar as the φύσει ὄντα are κινούμενα,⁷ and thus “beings in movement,” they must be determined with respect to their ἀρχαί; the number of ἀρχαί must make κίνησις intelligible as a mode of being. Insofar as κίνησις is determined by δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, these two constitute two ἀρχαί.⁸ The third is a peculiar unification of the two. In the question of the number of ἀρχαί, there is already a fore-look on κίνησις.

The κινούμενον is not provable in the sense of ἀπόδειξις. This basic character of beings is attainable in ἐπαγωγή.⁹ It depends on seeing beings themselves, so to speak, through talk and through the theory that conceals the way of being of nature. The primary step is opening one’s eyes, apprehending the fact of the matter in itself, and, on the basis of this fore-having, explicating what shows itself, κίνησις itself.

In Book 2, a new beginning. Aristotle secures the formal respects along which the questioning of nature runs: he discusses the *causes*. Only on the basis of these two considerations does the genuine investigation begin—making κίνησις explicit. A first step is that κίνησις constitutes the *genuine there-character of being*. The interpretedness of being determines itself already in a defi-

4. Cf. Phys. A 2, 184 b 25 sqq.: τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἐν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὄν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν.

5. Phys. A 2, 185 a 4 sq.: ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν.

6. Phys. A 6, 189 b 27 sq.: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε ἐν τὸ στοιχεῖον οὔτε πλείω δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν, φανερόν.

7. Phys. A 2, 185 a 13: τὰ φύσει [. . .] κινούμενα.

8. Phys. A 8, 191 b 28: ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα λέγειν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

9. Phys. A 2, 185 a 13 sq.: δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

nite basic conception of being: presumably the being-character of movement will also have to be interpreted on the basis of this basic sense of being.¹⁰

§26. Movement as ἐντελέχεια τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος (Physics, Γ1)

a) Outline of the Chapter

We proceed to Book 3. Outline of Chapter 1:

200 b 12–25: Basic topic of μέθοδος,¹¹ at the same time, what is given along with this topic.

200 b 25–32: Reference to the various modes of being, from which movement is to be apprehended, so to speak, as a definite type of being: (1) ὄν δυνάμει—ὄν ἐντελέχεια,¹² (2) ὄν of the categories,¹³ (3) a definite category is discussed, the πρὸς τι,¹⁴ since movement, apparently, belongs in this category.

200 b 32–201 a 3: Evidence that κίνησις is not something παρά τὰ πράγματα,¹⁵ not something “alongside the beings that are there” of the world, of nature. This ‘not παρά’ means, in a positive sense: κίνησις is a mode of the being of beings that are themselves there. This determination is directed against Plato, who even in the *Sophist* says that a thing moved is characterized in its being by the fact that we apprehend it as taking part in κίνησις; κίνησις itself is an *idea* like all others—it is παρά and, through the μέθεξις in it, the moved thing must be made intelligible in its being. In this way, the movement of moved things occurs.¹⁶

201 a 3–9: In having recourse to the categories, it is shown how there is an entirely determinate “twofoldness,” which admits of a διχῶς.¹⁷ This “ability-to-be-thus-and-so” is the ontological condition of the fact that the beings that are determined by these categories are possible beings in movement. Διχῶς: referring back to the multiplicity of ἀρχαί.

201 a 9–15: genuine definition of movement.

201 a 15–19: concrete illustration of this definition in definite types of movement.

201 a 19–27: Reference to the peculiar fact of the matter, that one and the same being can be determined both as δυνάμει ὄν and ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν:¹⁸ a definite being is at the same time a present being, ‘cold,’ and as a being present in this

10. See Hs. p. 365 f.

11. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 13.

12. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 26 sq.: τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχεία μόνον, [. . .] τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεία.

13. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 28: τῶν τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν.

14. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 28 sq.

15. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 32 sq.

16. Cf. Plato, *Sophist* 248 e sqq.

17. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 3.

18. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 19 sq.: ἕνια ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεία ἐστίν.

way, it is the possibility of the ‘warm.’ Only what is cold has the possibility of the warm, not what is hard or red. Only a definite, distinctive presence of a being has at the same time the possibility of the warm. The possibility is not just any arbitrary one, but rather one that has a definite direction. This fact of the matter is the condition of the possibility of there being something like movement, connections in nature, working in relation to one another. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether every moving thing is itself in movement, whether every being is also in itself δυνάμει, or whether there is a way of being that is excluded by every possibility, that simply is ἐνεργεία: πρῶτον κινουὺν ἀκίνητον,¹⁹ indeed “moving,” but itself “no possibility of being moved.”

201 a 27–b 15: more precise discussion of the definition of movement—this section is the most important.²⁰

b) The Role of Fear in ἀρχή-Research

The ἀπορήσαι of the ἀρχαί, going through the difficulties that the ancients had in opening up that region that they had constantly before their eyes without genuinely knowing it—Aristotle offers, in Chapter 8 of Book 9 of the *Metaphysics*, a peculiar remark, according to which the discussion of the ancients is, at its basis, guided by *fear*: διὸ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὄλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στηῖ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως.²¹ Those who previously discussed the being of nature, the being-there of the world, and determined the world accordingly, were genuinely guided and led in their framing of the question by φόβος, by “fear” in wanting what-is-there-always—thus, the constant rotation of the stars, what “for once stands still”—the discussion of the being of beings out of fear that it would, at some point, no longer be. By now, we have learned that fear as such is possible only insofar as the ἐλπίς σωτηρίας is alive in it. Being-afraid is only possible in a still-holding-to another possibility, namely, that what is impending might stay away. The fear that, here, leads the analysis of being, lives from the hope or conviction that beings, genuinely speaking, may and should have to be being-there-always. For *the fear of the disappearing-at-some-point-from-the-there presupposes the holding-fast to the sense of being as being-always-present*. This sense of being is, therefore, implicitly at the basis of all of the ancients’ discussions—discussion that took place after setting forth definite ἀρχαί at any price. The interpretation of the ἀρχαί, and thereby of beings themselves, is conveyed in a determinate *being familiar* with the being-there of the world itself. The fear that it could disappear is eliminated in that being-there is conveyed in a determinate familiarity. What is genuinely threatening to being-there is thereby abolished. For this reason, the genuine possibility is διαγωγή,²² the “stay” in

19. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 27: ἔστι γάρ τι κινουὺν καὶ ἀκίνητον.

20. See Hs, p. 366 f.

21. Met. Θ 8, 1050 b 22 sqq.

22. Eth. Nic. K 7, 1177 a 26 sq.: εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδῶ τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

pure consideration of the world, in which nothing more can occur, διαγωγή is a ἡδονή. The interpretation of being tends to eliminate fear of being-there by carrying over what is enigmatic into the familiar. Title of διαγωγή: from this basic determination, there is also encountered the interpretation of the being of human beings, in such a way that the self-interpretation of being-there also aims at making transparent the interpretation of being-there as existence. The highest possibility of existence, such that the threat no longer menaces, is pure θεωρεῖν, and with it the real ἡδονή, science—an interpretation that we, today, no longer embrace insofar as, today, there is no interpretation on the basis of ἡδονή or λύπη, but instead everything is interpreted on the basis of the *system*.

In Book 1 of the *Physics*, Aristotle works from out of the traditional manner of treating the question as to what beings are, by laying down the ground upon which all further discussion has to operate: ὄν κινούμενον. The determination of the ὄν as κινούμενον was always noticed, but not in the sense of being considered as the more proximate characteristic of being. The possibility of discussing movement was not such that movement itself would be recognized as the distinctive mode of the being-there of a definite being.

What matters is setting forth the basic respects in terms of which beings in general are to be posited. The discussion of the four causes is nothing other than the discussion of the respects in which being can be posited, the possibility within which beings can be examined with respect to their being. The respects are motivated by the guiding concept of being as being-produced. In Book 1 of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle provides the pre-history of these four respects, which did not enter into the consciousness of the time all at once; one after another, these four causes were brought before the eyes of the ancient physiologists, the last of the causes being the most difficult: before one poses any further questions, one must know what the being is, τί τὸ ὄν. This cause was first seen by *Plato*,²³ even though he did not understand its ontological meaning.²⁴

c) The Topic and What Is Co-Given with It

The third Book and those that follow are the fixed foundation for discussing the ὄν κινούμενον through the guidance of the ἀρχαί, such that beings themselves are set free, and the specific being-characters are made to stand in relief. The being-characters are derived from beings themselves: περὶ φύσεως, not περὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων—an investigation of *being*, not of *beings*; not an investigation of the *ontic*, such that it would be pursued with respect to individual beings, but rather an investigation into the *ontological*, insofar as beings are *addressed in their being*.

“Insofar as we are explaining movement, delimiting it or rather having

23. Cf. *Met.* A 6, 987 a 29 sqq.

24. See *Hs.* p. 367.

thoroughly demarcated it, an attempt must be made to proceed with the same methodological comportment toward what comes next in order. [Also, it is to treat that which is co-given with beings as being-in-movement: it is that which the phenomenon of movement comprises in itself.] Movement appears to be something that belongs to the sort of thing that holds itself together in itself—the constant. The limitless shows itself above all in the constant [insofar as the constant shows itself as that which does not come to an end for a διαίρεσις; the positive determination of the συνεχές is precisely that it is ἄπειρον.] Whenever one wants to define the constant, it follows that one also has to intend along with it the λόγος of the ἄπειρον [if one speaks of the constant, one thereby addresses a determinate limitlessness], just as if the συνεχές were nothing other than the εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετόν. Furthermore, it is impossible to address beings that are moved without the site, the void, and time. [They are co-given with the ἄπειρον itself in the phenomenon of movement.]²⁵ This list of the last three characters provides the sequence in which Aristotle discusses these determinations: τόπος, κενόν and χρόνος. Τόπος: *Physics* Δ 1–5; κενόν: Δ 6–9; χρόνος: Δ 10–14. Ἄπειρον: Book 3, Chapters 4–8. The consideration is taken up so as to return to movement once again in the discussion of time. Χρόνος is “ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως with an eye to the before and after.”²⁶

Now he says that these determinations are themselves κοινά: κοινὰ πάντων φυσικῶν σωμάτων.²⁷ For all beings that are κινούμενον, these characters are κοινά, and for every being they are καθόλου,²⁸ which means nothing other than “taken as a whole.” Insofar as a being is taken as a whole, these characters always lie within it as μέρη. For this reason, then, καθόλου is apprehended by Aristotle as a ὅλον whose μέρη are just not explicit. “It is to be examined in the sense that we attend to every case, and consider each thoroughly. The consideration of beings in every case as genuine beings [insofar as they belong with a definite region of being: the φύσει ὄντα as ζῷα, or in the sense that they are ἄψυχα] is to be completed later.”²⁹ Insofar as one enters into this discussion, thus dividing up beings as φύσει ὄν, the κοινόν must, above all, be subordinated to θεωρεῖν.

d) The Modes of Being from Which Movement Is to Be Apprehended

For the understanding of the following considerations of κίνησις, one must be clear as to:

25. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 15 sqq.: διορισμένοις δὲ περὶ κινήσεως πειρατέον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπελθεῖν τρόπον περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀριζομένοις τὸ συνεχές συμβαίνει προσχρησασθαι πολλακίς τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπειροῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετόν συνεχές ὄν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

26. Phys. Δ 11, 219 b 2: ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

27. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 22: διὰ τὸ πάντων εἶναι κοινά.

28. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 22 sq.

29. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 23 sqq.: σκεπτέον προχειρισσάμενοις περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων· ὕστερα γὰρ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρία [. . .] ἐστίν.

1. The fact that previously the decisive categories were not yet familiar. For us, the concepts δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια are so worn out that one is not at all capable of seeing what was at stake in the fundamental meaning of these concepts. We must work to insert ourselves around into the time when the concepts δύναμις and ἐνέργεια were cultivated.

2. Here, it is really not a question of *defining* movement in some sense, but of *making* beings as moved *visible* in their being-there and holding fast to them. If one says that the principal considerations that modern physics has employed are much more determinate, it must be said that the definition of movement (movement as uniform speed): $c = s/t$, itself already *presupposes* everything that Aristotle said about movement. No later consideration comes into this discussion at all. What was set up in modern physics (*Galileo, Copernicus*) in a genuinely fundamental way is the question of the *system-of-relations* of movement, not the question of movement itself, but rather movement itself with a view to the system-of-relations from which it is to be *measurable*. More precisely, it is the question of whether there is an *absolute* system-of-relations or only a *relative* one. Here movement is already presupposed, not discussed, and is taken in an entirely determinate sense: *change of place*, change of position—φορά. However, it is here a question of a κοινόν of beings, for Aristotle, insofar as it is φύσει, and lives such that movement includes all that falls within the region of *change*: taking κίνησις as μεταβολή. Propulsion across space is but an entirely determinate change: constant change of place. This concept of movement is fixed already in the basic formula of movement: $s = c \cdot t$, $c = s/t$. Speed itself is not discussed. Aristotle already knew the phenomenon of *speed*, when he discussed time and the faster and the slower of movement, and he shows that, indeed, a movement can be faster and slower, but not time. Precisely, the fundamental determinations that are not discussed proceeded from Aristotle. They make it possible to see ahead in the direction of a genuine consideration of being: *change as a mode of being of being-there itself*.

“The consideration of the beings of specific regions is subsequent to that of the κοινά.”³⁰ It is not thereby said that characters such as κίνησις, τόπος, χρόνος, the ἀρχαί, were also already present at first. Precisely these ἀρχαί, that from which a being is seen, are concealed, dissimulated. The δεῖ μὴ λαμβάνειν τί ἐστὶ κίνησις,³¹ only has sense because it is, in fact, concealed. This fact of the matter is grounded in that the consideration of the world and of beings is maintained in a certain universality. In the natural pre-scientific consideration, there is already a καθόλου, by whose guidance I orient myself toward the world. In Book 1, Chapter 1, Aristotle refers to the fact that children address all men as father and all women as mother.³² What is immediately familiar to the child is father and mother. Because they are so, they are taken by the child in an aver-

30. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 24 sq.

31. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 13 sq.

32. Phys. A 1, 184 b 3 sqq.

age way into a καθόλου, such that other men are only other fathers. Opposed to this immediacy of the καθόλου, an entry must be made into what is ἀρχή in the genuine sense—the primary determination of beings as to what they are. From this genuine ἀρχή, a return must be made to concrete being-there itself (Methodology of ἀρχή-research: *Metaphysics*, Book 3).

It is therefore manifest (1) ἐντελεχεία μόνον,³³ “as pure presence,” (2) “as possibility *and* presence.”³⁴ It is a question of the beings of φύσει ὄντα, that in themselves already are, that would not be merely δυνάμει. A being that is present is still δυνάμει in this being-present. In the context of what is being discussed, δύναμις always means δύναμις of an ἐντελεχεία ὄν. Thus the third member considered δυνάμει is superfluous.³⁵ The being that is there is characterized according to two possibilities: on the one hand, as *pure* presence, on the other hand as ἐντελεχεία and *in addition* δυνάμει ὄν.

α. ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια

Beginning with the investigation of ἐντελέχεια: (1) clarification of its meaning with regard to its content, what it means; (2) the word-formation itself, which immediately stands out.

A passage from *Metaphysics* Θ 3 is instructive for the clarification of the meaning: ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦνομα, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἢ κίνησις εἶναι.³⁶ “It happened that the name ἐνέργεια also came to be carried over to the other, to what contrasted with determinations of movement; ἐνέργεια, specifically, is *related in itself* πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν” (to replace συντιθεμένη with συντινομένη, compare διὸ καὶ τοῦνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον, καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν).³⁷ Here, is the distinction between ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια:

1. Ἐντελέχεια: “presence, being-present of a being as end,” in the sense of the final point that is completed, that has itself in itself in its “end”—τέλος as character of being-there, which constitutes being-completed; ἐντελέχεια: that which maintains itself in its being-completed, what is there in the genuine sense.

2. Ἐνέργεια, on the other hand, συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν, “stretches itself out to the end”—also a character of being-there, but such that it determines beings in their being-there so that they are *not there in their being-completed*; ἐνέργεια: the being-character of *being-grasped in becoming-completed*. In

33. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 26.

34. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 26 sq.: δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεία.

35. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 26.--Anm. d. Hg.: Bei der Ergänzung des “dritten Gliedes” τὸ δὲ δυνάμει zwischen ἐντελεχεία μόνον und τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεία handelt es sich um eine Konjektur von Spengal und Bonitz, die Prantl in den Text seiner Ausgabe aufgenommen hat.

36. Met. Θ 3, 1047 a 30 sqq.

37. Met. Θ 8, 1050 a 22 sq.

producing, having-been-produced is a determinate mode of being-there—only when one sees that it is possible to see what movement is: the being-there of a being that is in its *becoming*-completed, but *is* not completed yet. Ἐνέργεια is κίνησις, but not ἐντελέχεια. Κίνησις is a mode of being-there displayed in ἐνέργεια.

The expression ἐντελέχεια can be broken down into ἐντελές and ἔχειν (just like βουνέχεια, βουνεχής, νοῦν ἔχειν). Ἐντελές ἔχειν—with the suffix –εσ omitted, ἐντελ(εσ)έχεια. The peculiar thing is that the suffix is left out. Diels pointed out an analogous word-meaning: ἐντελόμισθος, in *Demosthenes*, “he who receives full pay”—ἐντελέχεια translated as “possession of completion.”³⁸

It is important to bring the meaning of the expression back to the context in which it functions: clarification of beings with regard to their being. Ἐντελέχεια, the mode of being-there as maintaining-itself-in-being-completed. Ἐντελέχεια μόνον: that which *only* maintains itself in being-completed, such that it is *what excludes every δύναμις*; a completed being that is there, which is *always already completed*, which was never produced, which never would be but is *simply present*. That which excludes the possibility of having not been also excludes the possibility of ever *disappearing*. The present of such a being is not thought up, but is seen in the movement of the heavens, indeed *seen*; yet not simply in mere observation, but *experienced* in fear, even if, in the end, this being-that-is-always-there did not remain standing, vanished from the there.

β. στέρησις

Aristotle previously named both of these characters in Book 1, Chapter 8 of the *Physics*.³⁹ At the same time, we see here the context in which both of these determinations, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, stand with regard to the question concerning the number of ἀρχαί. Within this discussion, he finds that there must be three ἀρχαί. And he also discusses movement, saying that the definition of movement must come about without δύναμις and ἐνέργεια; and only by way of the ἀρχαί, just as *Plato* had defined it, but carried through in a fundamentally different way than *Plato*, with the help of *στέρησις*.⁴⁰ Taking the consideration of this passage as an opening, we want to see the extent to which the category of στέρησις is, according to the origin of its meaning, caught up in the basic categories of movement, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. (Book 1, Chapter 4 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: discussion of the ἀγαθόν and the categories.)

Aristotle introduces the pre-giving of the being-characters with: ἔστι δὴ τι τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχεια μόνον.⁴¹ “It is a way of being of one, in the sense of a pure being-present.” This must be translated: “It is in its genuine being.”

38. H. Diels, *Etymologica*, in *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 47 (1916), pp. 193–210, here p. 203.

39. *Phys.* A 8, 191 b 27 sqq.

40. *Phys.* A 8, 191 a 12 sqq.

41. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 26.

That which never possesses a possibility, what did not arise, is already there in a distinctive sense, completed such that it does not need to be produced at all. We must understand the way of being that is characterized as δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ.⁴² In *Physics* A, 8, Aristotle exhibits the being-characters of δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια,⁴³ without going into them fully. He notes that one could also explicate the phenomenon of movement by referring back to δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια, whereas he seeks to make it intelligible, at first, in connection with the critique of *Plato* (being and non-being). He refers to a new phenomenon of being, στέρησις.⁴⁴ He obtains it from beings that are characterized as being-absent, and that are “in themselves non-being.” This non-being is a being καθ’ αὐτό μὴ ὄν.⁴⁵ Negation is a position. When we say that non-being is a way of being, it sounds formal-dialectical. But one must see that it is interpreted on the basis of the sense of being: non-being in the sense of a *definite there*, the *there of absence*. On the basis of this being-that-is-not, the there is in the character of a determinate being-absent, from which “something can become,”⁴⁶ that is, with the help of this peculiar non-being, “becoming,” μεταβολή, can become intelligible. Aristotle himself sees that this is a surprising claim by contrast with the previous one. He says: “One is surprised by it, and maintains that it is impossible for something to come from out of non-being,”⁴⁷ insofar as one initially says that non-being is nothing, and from out of nothing, nothing can come.

“That is *one way*”⁴⁸ of making intelligible γένεσις, that is μεταβολή. ἄλλος δ’ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταῦτὰ λέγειν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις διώριστα δι’ ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον.⁴⁹ Another way [of clarifying μεταβολή] can say the same thing by looking back to δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. That is already strictly delimited in another context.” What is referred to, here, is initially indefinite. One is inclined to relate this passage to Book 9 of the *Metaphysics*. The other possibility is that *Physics* Γ, 1–3 is intended. This is not decisively agreed upon. In any case, one cannot lay claim to such vague suppositions for the purpose of dating texts, and, from the relations between them, writing a history of Aristotle’s development. It is my conviction that this is a completely hopeless effort. In the *Physics*, things are said regarding ὄν and ἔν that are at the level of what is said in the *Metaphysics*. The remark that Aristotle adds, here, characterizes the meaning that he assigns to this investigation: “In this way [through the reference back to στέρησις, that is, to δύναμις and ἐνέργεια] the difficulties are resolved, under the constraints that our predeces-

42. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 26 sqq.

43. Phys. A 8, 191 b 28 sq.

44. Phys. A 8, 191 b 15.

45. Phys. A 8, 191 b 15 sq.

46. Phys. A 8, 191 b 16: γίγνεται τι.

47. Phys. A 8, 191 b 16 sq.: θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ, γίγνεται τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.

48. Phys. A 8, 191 b 27: εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος.

49. Phys. A 8, 191 b 27 sqq.

sors, in agreement with what was said, have raised. [Since they could not be done with being, they came to say, simply: there is no movement.] Therefore [since this possibility of explication did not come into view] they were driven so far from the path toward coming to be and passing away, the path toward μεταβολή [that they constructed theories about being, and did not come to see μεταβολή as such.] If this way of being would have become obvious to them, then every unclarity about these beings would have vanished for them.⁵⁰ That explicitly shows how clearly Aristotle valued his own discovery, and how fundamental the being-characters of δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and στέρησις are.

γ. δύναμις

We must try to bring the second determination still closer to us, in order to understand beings in their dual character. What he says about στέρησις is the condition for the fact that the δυνάμει concern a being-character that befits a *being-that-is-there already*. Δύναμις does not have the sense of the ‘possible’: that which at some time can be there at all. Δύναμις is already the determination of an ἐντελεχεία ὄν, that is, of a being-that-is-there already. A tree that stands in the forest is ἐντελεχεία, present there for me as a tree. Or it can also be there as fallen tree, tree trunk. This tree trunk can be encountered by me in the character of serviceability for . . . , of availability for shipbuilding. The tree trunk has the character of *being-serviceable for . . .*, of *usability for . . .*, not in such a way that I thus apprehend it as first, but rather it is the *mode of its being*. It is encountered such that it is not mere wood, as a thing called wood. The being that is there in the surrounding world has the character of συμφέρον; it refers to something. This character of being-referring in the sense of being-serviceable for . . . determines this being that is there, this trunk, that is there ἐντελεχεία and together with it as δυνάμει. Δυνάμει-being is a *positive determination of the mode of its there*. For a long time, I have been designating this being-character of being-there as *meaningfulness*. This being-character is the primary one in which the world is encountered.

That δυνάμει is not empty and formal, but determinate with determinate conditions, that it characterizes beings only at times and always in accordance with circumstances, becomes visible on the basis of *Metaphysics* Θ, Chapter 7. At the beginning of the chapter, the question: πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὐ, διοριστέον.⁵¹ “When a being that is there at the time is δυνάμει and when it is not is to be delimited. It is not δυνάμει at every given time [although it is already there]. Is the earth in its ability-to-be something like a human being? Only if it were something like a σπέρμα, but perhaps not even then.”⁵²

50. Phys. A 8, 191 b 30 sqq.: ὥσθ’ [. . .] αἱ ἀπορίας λύονται δι’ αὐτὴν ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀναιροῦσι τῶν εἰρημένων ἕνια: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον καὶ οἱ πρότερον ἐξετράπησαν τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἐπὶ γένεσιν καὶ φθορᾷ καὶ ὅλως μεταβολῆν: αὐτὴ γὰρ ἂν ὀφθεῖσσι ἢ φύσις ἔλυσεν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀγνοίαν.

51. Met. Θ 7, 1048 b 36 sq.

52. Met. Θ 7, 1048 b 37 sqq.: . . . οὐ γὰρ ὅποτε οὖν. οἷον ἢ γῆ ἢ ἄρ’ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος δυνάμει ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως.

If a being has the character of σπέρμα, it is already δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος, “for the seed must still pass over into another and there change”;⁵³ only then is the σπέρμα a human being, in accordance with possibility.

The question now arises for Aristotle: How is it that what we designated as δυνάμει, that from which something changes over into another, how is this to be apprehended as *constituting along with being* that through which it is? If wood changes over to the being-there of a chest, in what way is wood, being-wood also constitutive of the being of the being-there of the chest? *Plato* and all who preceded him were unable to give an answer to this question because the ground was not secured. Aristotle posed the question of what that is, that about which we say, it is there. The chest is not the wood; the statue is not the bronze. The chest is not the wood in the sense of the τόδε τι. *Plato* says: The chest *has* wood; wood is an Idea. Therefore, the chest *participates* in the wood. The chest is not wood insofar as one addresses its what-being as being-present, looking thus-and-so. The chest is not τόδε, namely the wood, οὐ τόδε ἀλλ’ ἐκείνιν;⁵⁴ the chest is *co-related* to the wood. The chest is not wood, τόδε τι, not wood and *yet* a chest. In relation to the wood, the chest is not ἐκείνο, but rather ἐκείνιν. Ἐκείνιν is to be referred to something further away: ἐκείνιν, “remotely”—primarily in the immediate present, the chest is not wood. “The chest is not wood, but wooden,”⁵⁵ remotely. Being-wooden is another mode of being-there as being-wood. The out-of-which of the being-made of a chest, the out-of-which of consisting, is not itself there in itself, ἐνεργεία. Presence is determined by its being-at-hand, its chest-being, in which the out-of-which of consisting is foregrounded in this peculiar mode.

This consideration is thus fundamental since it yields an important key to the apprehension of a being of which we say that it is a κινούμενον: κινούμενον, ὡς τὸ ἐκείνιν,⁵⁶ the mode of being-there that we fix upon with the expression κινούμενον is always to be ontologically apprehended as ἐκείνιν. In the case of that which is moved, the being that is moved is itself always immediately there; correspondingly, in the case of the being-there of the chest, it is not the wood but the chest. A stone that falls, a plant that grows: in this looking-thus, κίνησις is there in a certain mode. The chest is not chest and *in addition* wood; the stone is not stone and *in addition* movement. The stone *does not participate* in the movement that is itself a way of being (*Plato*), but instead movement *is in the being that is there*, in the sense that it is characterized as ἐκείνιν. The stone is mobile like the chest is wooden. By contrast, κίνησις, unlike wood, is not a being, is not there in the mode of ὄλη. That is the fundamental clue to the fact that the phenomenon of movement can only be approached by way of the being-that-is-moved.

53. Met. Θ 7, 1049 a 14 sq.: δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ μεταβάλλειν.

54. Met. Θ 7, 1049 a 18.

55. Met. Θ 7, 1049 a 19: τὸ κιβώτιον οὐ ξύλον ἀλλὰ ξύλινον.

56. Met. Θ 7, 1049 a 33.

δ. Being in the Sense of the Categories

Therefore, it can now be said of this being that can stand within both conditions, within constancy and δυνάμεις—being-there-character of meaningfulness: “As far as it is concerned, it is, on the other hand, a ‘this here’ or a ‘so much’ or a ‘such’ or, in the same way, another of the categories of being.”⁵⁷ Τοιόνδε, τοσόνδε, and so on: -δε proceeding from δῆ, “manifestly there,” “present”—ways of being-present, by which the presence of beings themselves is determined, according to the possibilities of their looking. These characters, τότε τι, and so on, are designated as *categories*. The categories are simply introduced as though self-evident. No discussion of a system of categories! Wherever they are spoken of in the writings handed down to us, they are spoken of in this way. Thus Aristotle’s categories have been criticized as being empty, that he did not set up a principle for deriving them, and that he had no definite number of categories, that his workmanship was shoddy. But in such criticisms, one exempts oneself from asking what the categories genuinely are.

In previous considerations, the emphasis was put on λόγος, and this of course with the purpose, from the beginning, of interpreting being-there and the conceptual: λόγος as the mode of being-in-the-world, such that this mode constitutes the discoveredness, uncoveredness, the being-present of the world. That which is, here, designated as ‘category’ is designated by an expression that stands in the closest relation with λόγος; κατηγορεῖν stands in the closest connection with λέγειν. Ἀγορεύειν is not simply “to talk about something,” “to assert,” but rather “to talk in the market-place,” “to talk publicly,” where being-with-one-another takes place, there, where everyone understands it. Κατηγορεῖν means: “to publicly reply to each about something,” that it is this or that, “to accuse it,” “to draw out” a definite fact. Κατηγορία is a speaking insofar as I speak of κατηγορία τοῦ ὄντος, that which addresses a being to each in a certain way, such that it speaks of it, that it is this or that, specifically that it *is*. Κατηγορία: *modes of addressing beings in their being*. Therefore, the categories are the basic modes in which beings that are there are uncovered there, with regard to definite possibilities of being-there and modes of being-there. This is not to say that the categories are already explicit in natural speaking, in the λόγος of the everyday. Rather, the fact of the matter is such that all λέγειν already operates in, and is guided by, definite categories. They do not mean just any forms that I can bring into a system, nor principles for the classification of statements, but they must be understood in accordance with what their name means, on the basis of what λόγος itself is in its distinctive mode: *the being-discovered of the world, which is constitutive in such a way that this discoveredness shows the world in its basic respects*. If one has, to a certain extent, a

57. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 27 sq.: τὸ μὲν τότε τι, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως.

vital understanding of the being-there of the world, one will be cautious about laying down a definite number of categories.

From the preparation of a definition, through the reference to the various aspects of beings with regard to their being, it can already be seen that movement itself is a *mode of the being-there of the world*. Insofar as this is the case, it conversely becomes the means by which the being of the world becomes intelligible in an ultimate sense. Insofar as movement is a mode of the being-there of beings, it is possible that what we understand, in a fully well-worn sense, by ‘reality,’ is in fact to be fully determined. That which is designated by movement must be genuinely named: κίνησις. In fact, Aristotle also uses the expression ἀκίνησις = ἡρεμία,⁵⁸ “rest.” Κίνησις is not referred to by Aristotle, but, to be sure, the fact that Aristotle divides κίνησις thus and so is spoken of in the collection of fragments.⁵⁹ For concrete understanding, it must be kept in mind that with κίνησις is meant: being-moved as a *mode of being*. We will presumably have to delve into the explication of the being of being-moved in the context of being with which we have been dealing repeatedly until now.

The first determinations, and the fundamental ones, those that convey Aristotle’s discovery, are the determinations ἐντελέχεια and δύναμις. The present-being-that-is-there itself is now explicated in another direction, and Aristotle designates these modes of the world’s being-there as the categories. We have begun to make these being-characters more intelligible. Κατηγορία: a definite manner of speaking. Categories are such modes of distinctive speaking as are to be implicitly found in every concrete λόγος. Λόγος as λέγειν—λόγος as λεγόμενον. Also, κατηγορία with this dual meaning. The expression κατηγορήματα, in which this other side of the meaning is explicit, also stands for κατηγορία. That is, the categories are modes of the addressing exhibiting of beings, understood as beings of the surrounding world, in the way that the world is in the ζώη πρακτική. The ζώη πρακτική is μετὰ λόγου. In this μετὰ λόγου, lie distinctive λόγοι, the categories. As πράξις, the ζώη πρακτική is the type of being that, at each moment, has its end with πρακτόν: ἐφίεται toward the ἀγαθόν⁶⁰—the ἀγαθόν is πέρας of πράξις, the ἀγαθόν κατὰ τὸν καιρόν,⁶¹ “at each moment in the definite situation.” Accordingly, the λόγοι of the categories are such that they address the beings of the surrounding world with regard to the possibility of their being-there, insofar as this being-there is understood as the world of concern. In other words, the categories are initially the modes of being-there of the world as συμφέρον. Earlier, we heard that the things of the world are there in the character of being-what-is-conducive-to . . . We will see

58. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 4.

59. Aristotelis opera. Ed. Academia Regia Borussica. Volumen quintum: Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta. Collegit V. Rose. Berlin 1870. Fr. 586, 1573 b 28 sq.: ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ταῖς διδασκαλίαις δύο φησι γενονέναι [κίνησις].

60. Eth. Nic. A I, 1094 a 1 sq.: πράξις [. . .] ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ.

61. Eth. Nic. Γ 1, 1110 a 13 sq.

that, in fact, the aspect of the ‘usable for . . .’, on the basis of which it is referred to something, this ‘to . . . for . . .’ of beings, whose being the categories express, is constitutive; and that, on account of this, because the being-determination of ‘from . . . to . . .’ lies in the being-there of the world, in this being lies the possibility of being altered, of passing over from this to that, of changing.⁶²

e) Movement as the Being of Beings of the World Itself: Critique of the Platonic Discourse on the ἀγαθὸν καθόλου (*Nicomachean Ethics* A 4)

Since, accordingly, the ἀγαθὸν itself, as πέρασ of πράξις, characterizes the being of the world as being-there thus and so at each moment, the discourse of an ἀγαθὸν καθόλου, of a “good in general,” makes no sense. Not only does ἀγαθὸν not mean something like “value” (if one understands its genuine sense, it cannot mean an ideal way of being of values and value-contexts) but rather a particular mode of the being-there of those beings with which we have to do in πράξις, oriented to the καιρός. Thus it is self-evident that, in the discussion of the ἀγαθὸν καθόλου in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (critique of Plato), Aristotle refers to the categories.⁶³ Since the ἀγαθὸν is being-determination of the surrounding world, the mode of being of the world that primarily characterizes it, the categories must be brought into play, insofar as the being-character of the ἀγαθὸν is to be clarified now. With an appeal to the categories, Aristotle says: there is no ἀγαθὸν καθόλου; ἀγαθὸν is what it is always as πρακτόν.⁶⁴ The πρακτόν is characterized through the categories of τόδε τι, of ποσόν, of πρὸς τι as χρήσιμον,⁶⁵ in relation to time as καιρός.⁶⁶ There is no good that hovers over being, insofar as ‘good’ is the determination of the world’s being-there, the world with which I have to do. The ἀγαθὸν καθόλου would, accordingly, be a good that has no being at all.

Thus Aristotle shows, in Book 1, Chapter 4 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that there is no good in general, insofar as ἀγαθὸν is πέρασ, and πέρασ is πέρασ of πράξις, and πράξις is always ‘this here’ as at each moment. Also, the ἀγαθὸν καθ’ αὐτό, which does not have the character of conduciveness, the “good in itself” at which we stop, is not to be understood as ἀγαθὸν καθόλου.⁶⁷ Here, Aristotle raises an objection against himself. That is, one could say: there is no ἀγαθὸν καθόλου insofar as the συμφέροντα come into consideration. But perhaps it is different in the case of the ἀγαθὰ καθ’ αὐτά. For example, φρονεῖν, ὀρᾶν, ἡδοναί τινες, τιμαί,⁶⁸ are the sorts of things that we put under our care for their own sakes. Aristotle, for his part, poses the question: if there, in fact, be-

62. See Hs. p. 367 ff.

63. Cf. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 a 11 sqq.

64. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 b 34.

65. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 a 26.

66. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 a 26 sq.

67. Cf. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 b 8 sqq.

68. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 b 17 sq.

ing ἀγαθὰ καθ' αὐτά already means that there is nothing contained in it but an Idea,⁶⁹ does καθ' αὐτά already mean καθόλου? Were it ὅστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος,⁷⁰ “then the look would be empty.” That is, were this ἀγαθὸν καθ' αὐτό a way of being in itself in the sense of an Idea, a γένος, a “universal,” then there would be nothing there for πρᾶξις to be concerned about, whereas the view of πρᾶξις goes right to the “outermost,” ἔσχατον, to the καιρός, to the ‘here and now’ under such and such circumstances. Πρᾶξις needs something definite. The being-character of the ἀγαθόν is oriented to the καιρός, determined by its position. The ἀγαθὸν καθ' αὐτό as Idea would be empty if it had no εἶδος. One can see how sharply Aristotle sets apart ἰδέα and εἶδος. By εἶδος, he understands the “appearing” of a being of the world, here and now, as πρακτόν. Therefore if the ἀγαθόν is an Idea, then the sense of its being is straightforwardly πρᾶξις, which possesses it as τέλος, incommensurately. Furthermore, it is shown that these various ἀγαθὰ—φρόνησις is in another regard ἀγαθόν, as is ἡδονή—cannot be situated in a universal γένος.⁷¹ Indeed, language has a certain κοινόν, in the sense that it addresses various beings with one meaning-content, but the meaning-character of κοινόν is not universal, not γένος, but rather κατὰ ἀναλογία.⁷² Besides that, Aristotle left us nothing about analogy.

In the same way that he characterized the ἀγαθόν as a being-determination of the surrounding world, Aristotle, from the outset, determined the being of beings-that-are-moved with regard to their being-character. Κίνησις too is no γένος, “is not παρὰ τὰ πράγματα.”⁷³ Κίνησις is not a way of being *alongside* beings-in-movement. Just as ἀγαθόν explicitly determines beings of the surrounding world in their being-there for πρᾶξις, so too κίνησις is a *being-determination of the beings of the world, insofar as they always are determined as these*. If, then, movements that are divided into various possible movements under the guidance of fully determinate categories refer to this possibility of division: *the possibilities of being-moved are primarily determined by the characteristic being-there of the world*. That is the role that categories play in the preparation for the definition of κίνησις.

I want to specify some aspects of the categories. At one point, they are designated as simply διαίρεσις.⁷⁴ Διαίρειν, a determination of λέγειν: a speaking of something that divides. Speaking is always speaking in the having-there of something, is always the discussing of a being that is there. The mode of discussing is characterized by διαίρεσις. Every speaking about something is initially a speaking of it *as this or that*, λέγειν τι κατὰ τινος, “addressing some-

69. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 b 19 sq.: οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας.

70. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 b 20.

71. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 b 23 sqq.: τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτη ἢ ἀγαθὰ.

72. Eth. Nic. A 4, 1096 b 28.

73. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 32 sq.: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα.

74. Cf. Top. Δ 1, 120 b 36.

thing as something.” In this “as something,” the being that is there is explicated on the basis of that which is not explicated in a definite regard. When Aristotle designates the categories simply as διαρέσεις, he means that they are that speaking that makes the beings that are there of the world visible in basic possibilities, as what can show itself.

As that which primarily shows the beings of the world: this ‘as what’ in the originary sense is itself not what is meant, when I live in a concrete λόγος. The concrete λόγος always means, for example, the being-red of this garment, and only when I inquire back into the how of the being-there of the being-red, do I come upon the ποῖόν. Accordingly, the ποῖόν, thus seen, is the stem, in a certain sense the kind, from which every property is derived with regard to its being. Thus the categories are also γένη,⁷⁵ the “stems” of that which I assert of a concrete being as being according to various possibilities.

Aristotle also designates the categories as the ἔσχατα κατηγορούμενα,⁷⁶ the “outermost,” in the sense of the “ultimate.” If I follow a being back to the end, to its being, to what it genuinely is, then I come upon the categories; in fact, these categories are ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων [εἰδῶν]:⁷⁷ the εἶδος as that which cannot be gone beyond, as that which is not analyzable through words, the εἶδος that λόγος as διαίρεσις comes up against, where natural speaking with the world is primary, so that the εἶδος is itself not further analyzed into an ‘as what’; what in a certain sense resists διαίρεσις. Appearing itself cannot be analyzed in λόγος if λόγος still wants to have anything there at all. This ἄτομον εἶδος means nothing other than the closest there of the look of the world, which are the things that I possess in use, οὐσίαι. If I would like to analyze the appearing of a chair or a table in a certain sense, then I no longer have the primary being that is there, the chair, but a piece of wood. Therefore, in order to understand these being-categories, one must, from the beginning, bring it about that one sees that the beings that are meant here are the beings of the surrounding world.

Furthermore, Aristotle designates the categories as the πτώσεις⁷⁸—the Latin casus, but with a narrower meaning. Πτώσις has the still wider meaning: every linguistic modification and change of meaning. The κατηγορίαι are simply the πτώσεις, the primary inflections of speaking in the world.

De Anima A, 1 shows that, for Aristotle, these categories are not simply fixed schemata that in themselves would already be exempted from investigation, but instead the categories only *indicate* in a certain way one of the closest characters of the being of beings that are there.⁷⁹ In relation to the topic of *De Anima*, ψυχή: for the answer to the question thereof, one can simply refer to the categories, and inquire with the categories as guiding clue. But with

75. Met. B 3, 998 b 28.

76. Met. B 3, 998 b 16.

77. Ibid.

78. Met. N 2, 1089 a 26.

79. Cf. De an. A 1, 402 a 11 sqq.

that nothing is accomplished. It depends on taking the categories themselves as *indicating*, and taking the indicated phenomenon from out of itself into the genuineness of its being. Beings like tables and chairs stand under the category of τόδε τι. With this, it is not yet said that ψυχή would have the same being as the being of the table.

These categories should now yield a clue for the further characteristic of κίνησις, specifically in the particular sense that *four* of the categories determine the number of possible movements. That means: there are only movements in relation to the τόδε τι, to the ποιόν, to the ποσόν and the κατὰ τόπον. Thus Aristotle says: μεταβάλλει γάρ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἄει ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσόν ἢ ποιόν ἢ κατὰ τόπον.⁸⁰ This establishing is not at all arbitrary, but Aristotle grounds this number of different ways of movement in *Physics* E, Chapter 1.⁸¹ He grounds it by referring to ἐπαγωγή.⁸² One cannot deduce the various ways of being-moved through ἀπόδειξις, but must hold to the being-there of the world.

I will go directly over to the wider determination: ὅστ' οὐδὲ κίνησις οὐδὲ μεταβολὴ οὐθενὸς ἔσται παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, μηδενὸς γε ὄντος παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.⁸³ Next semester, we will try to see what legitimate motive lies in this fixing of the being of the Idea for *Plato*, and what he had in mind in this regard.⁸⁴ One can only survey that backwards from Aristotle. Plato inquires into that which Aristotle has answered.⁸⁵

f) The διχῶς of the Categories

Every one of the categories ὑπάρχει διχῶς,⁸⁶ “is there in a twofold manner”: the being of the categories, every category as a mode of being-there of the world, of encountering the world, intends, contains in itself a διχῶς: τὸ μὲν γὰρ μορφή αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ στέρησις.⁸⁷ A being that is there, that I characterize in its being as this there, as encountering me in itself, this has a διχῶς in itself. As thus a being that is there, it is determined as εἶδος; it appears thus and so. But it can also be, and is at the same time characterized by, στέρησις, by an “absence”: a being-present of something of whose presence an absence is constitutive, absence in the sense of deficiency, of lack. This being-there in the sense of lack is completely peculiar and positive. If I say of a human being: “I miss him very much, he is not there,” I, precisely, do not say that he is not at hand, but assert a *completely determinate way of his being-there for me.*” Most things, insofar

80. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 33 sq.

81. Phys. E 1, 224 b 35 sqq.

82. Phys. E 1, 224 b 30.

83. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 1 sqq.

84. M. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, Marburg Lecture Course, Winter Semester 1924–25. *Gesamtausgabe* Volume 19, edited by I. Schübler. Frankfurt am Main. 1992.

85. See Hs. S. 374 ff.

86. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 3 sq.: ἕκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν.

87. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 4 sq.

as they are there, are never *fully* there for me, but are always characterized by *absence*, by *not-being-thus as they genuinely could and should be*. The being of the being-there of the world maintains itself in the ‘more or less;’ things are more or less like this or like that. In relation to the ποιόν: λευκόν and μέλαν.⁸⁸ As colored, things are not purely white and purely black; instead, the genuine there is light and dark, the *averageness* that is not in the genuine degrees, but maintains itself *between the degrees*. This determination of διχῶς belongs to the basic categories themselves. This possibility is itself fundamental for movement. With this, we see not only that the categories must be understood on the basis of being-the-surrounding-world, but that, at the same time, a being, insofar as it is determined as this διχῶς, shows in itself being-possibility, to be something that is ‘from . . . toward . . .’ Since it is the possibility of the ‘from . . . toward . . .’ of something like a change, it can be in movement.

Since Aristotle emphasizes that this important point in the preparation of the definition of movement, that in the categories themselves, in accordance with their structure, a doubling is meant, it becomes visible that beings themselves are grasped in their ability-to-be as ‘from . . . toward . . .’; and in accordance with the four possibilities of τόδε τι, ποιόν, ποσόν, and κατὰ τόπον. Aristotle explicates this ‘from . . . toward . . .’ in Book 5, Chapter 1: being of the ὑποκείμενον, not in the sense of metaphysical ontology, but ὑποκείμενον is that which becomes visible in assertion, not “substance”; being of the ὑποκείμενον is obtained from the λόγος: the δηλούμενον in κατάφασις.⁸⁹ It can convert a ὑποκείμενον into a non-ὑποκείμενον, and vice versa.⁹⁰

g) The First Definition of Movement and Its Illustration

Aristotle takes up the concluding consideration of the fundamental being-determination in preparing for the definition of κίνησις in 201 a 9. He has recourse to the first determination, that a being as being-there is there in such a way that it *can* be something. A piece of wood *can* also be a chest. Aristotle has recourse to this determination when he says: διηρημένου δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν ἐντελεχία, τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, ἢ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελεχία, ἢ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστίν.⁹¹ He thereby brings the consideration into the right position: the making-present of a being that is at hand characterized as being-able-to-be-something, being apprehended as the being-there of the world. Being-there: (1) as *presently there*, (2) in the sense of *being-from-out-of* . . . The determination of the τέλειον comprises both aspects of being within it: *there* and *being-from-out-of* . . .

In this being-there itself, as *presence*, there lies an aspect about which we have kept silent so far, but which jumps out at us: being-there means being-

88. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 5 sq.

89. Phys. E 1, 225 a 6 sq.: λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ καταφάσει δηλούμενον.

90. Phys. E 1, 225 a 3 sqq.—See Hs. p. 376 f.

91. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 9 sqq.

there-*now*. We use “presence” in this peculiarly indistinct way as *praesens*, which means both “spatial presence” and “now,” insofar as αἴσθησις is always in the now.

A being thus in the world is there and can, as δύναμις, at the same time be something usable. Δύναμις, ‘not yet,’ can mean: is usable for . . . , transformable into . . . This being that is there thus, as there completed and usable for . . . is characterized by the διχῶς as a being. It is for the most part, and on the average, not absolutely white or black, but rather for the most part things are encountered as being-there colored more or less black or white. Even a house is for the most part there in everydayness in such a way that something is lacking in it, characterized by στέρησις. Aristotle proceeds from this point in determining movement.

One must consider such a being: a piece of wood that lies at hand is there in a workshop with the cabinet-maker; as wood, it lies there with the determination of usability for . . . “Movement is ἐντελέχεια, presence of beings that are there as beings able to be there, indeed presence insofar as they can be there.”⁹² Movement is the presence of the ability-to-be-there as such. The wood can be a chest; it is now thought immediately and simply. This ability-to-be a chest is thought in this ability-to-be of the wood. Insofar as it is there, the wood is in movement. Insofar as the wood is there as being-able-to-be-a-chest in the genuine sense, there is movement. Whenever the cabinet-maker is at work on it, it is there in its ability-to-be. The ability-to-be is present in the being-at-work insofar as the cabinet-maker has it in hand. Accordingly, Aristotle can also define movement in what follows as ἐνέργεια. Ἐνέργεια as a mode of being-there means nothing other than the being-at-work of something. The wood as a thing lying there is there, and is at the same time usable for a chest. As wood, being there and being usable for . . . are not the same. Moreover, usability itself, as the being-character of beings that are there, does not yet characterize them as being found in movement. From this, one could infer that meaningfulness, as the determination of the beings that are there in the being of the world, is not genuinely apt here since usability is genuinely there only insofar as wood is at work. But this is a deception.

Closer consideration leads us to see that we have here come up against an aspect of the being-character of being-there that we have not noted. If the cabinet-maker is gone from the workshop, the chest that was begun lies there, and the wood is not at hand in movement, but it is also not how it was before the work—which is to say, merely δυνάμει in the first sense—rather it is at hand *in rest*. Rest is only an *extreme case of movement*. Resting is only possible for something that in itself has the being-determination of being in movement or being able to be in movement. We encounter many things of the world—most of those with which we have to do—for the most part as resting. I do not know

92. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 10 sq.: ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἣ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστίν.

of anyone who has taken account of this aspect of rest. One cannot understand the being of beings at all if one does not take into account (1) the *averageness* of the being-there of the world, (2) the character of the *for-the-most-part-being-at-hand-as-resting*. Rest is a basic character of the being-there of the world in which I operate. Rest is only a *determinate* ἀκίνησία. Not every ἀκίνησία is already ἡρεμία. A geometrical figure, whose being is already characterized by ἀκίνησία, is not at rest, for it cannot move itself. Rest is a *distinctive* ἀκίνησία. The assertion of rest only has meaning for a being that *can move itself*. This phenomenon has been neglected in the customary interpretation, in the interpretation of what Aristotle is here interpreting as movement: movement as the distinctive mode of the being-present of a being that appears in the world. With mere verbal concepts of actuality and non-actuality, one does not approach movement.

In the following passages from Chapter 1, Aristotle further clarifies movement. “When we say about what is constructible, about it insofar as it is this, that it is as such presently there, then it is under construction”⁹³—the building-logs at hand, and so on. If we address it in itself as constructible (οικοδομητόν), then we are saying: “it is being constructed.” The being-under-construction is κίνησις as οἰκοδόμησις.⁹⁴ Insofar as κίνησις is the presence of this being-from-to, it is important to establish the categorial grasping of beings with respect to its διχῶς. Presence, which movement is determined as, is not the actuality of non-actuality in a determinate sense.⁹⁵

§27. Movement as ἀόριστον (Physics Γ2)

We are proceeding to Chapter 2: clarificatory distinction between ἐντελέχεια and δύναμις. *De Anima* B 7: determination of color simply as ὁρατόν,⁹⁶ “that which becomes accessible through seeing.” Color is what has, in itself, this state, according to its being, of being perceived only through sight. As color can be present as color only through the διαφανέζ,⁹⁷ so is light, the light of the sun, defined here as ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἢ διαφανέζ.⁹⁸ Ἐνέργεια determined as παρουσία, darkness determined as στέρησις,⁹⁹ absence of light that itself can be understood only on account of the presence of the transparent. Although χρῶμα is to be apprehended as ὁρατόν, color-being and the ability-to-be-seen are not the same.

93. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 16 sq.: ὅταν γὰρ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, ἢ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ἐντελεχέει ἢ οἰκοδομεῖται.

94. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 18.

95. See Hs. S. 378 ff.

96. *De an.* B 7, 418 b 29.

97. *De an.* B 7, 418 a 31 sq.: πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς.

98. *De an.* B 7, 418 b 9 sq.

99. *De an.* B 7, 418 b 19sq.

a) Outline of the Chapter

In Chapter 2, Aristotle offers a confirmation, in a certain sense, of what he put forward as a definition in Chapter 1. Division of the chapter:

201 b 16–18: Topic: the consideration of what earlier philosophers decided about movement, and how they defined it—in the sense of a critique, in order to show that movement cannot be defined in the way the ancients did, and that, on the other hand, the phenomenon of movement becomes accessible in no other way than Aristotle’s.

201 b 18–24: closer discussion of the ancient theories: in which γένος did the ancients put movement, in which “descent” according to its being? The way of being from out of which the ancients wished to determine movement is the ἑτερότης, “being otherwise,” ἀνισότης, “being dissimilar,” μὴ ὄν, “non-being”—definite increasing formalization.

201 b 24–27 asks why the ancients developed this determination of movement. Movement itself shows itself as something that is “not determinable, delimitable,” ἀόριστον. It is asked: why? What did they see in movement, that they came to explicate movement in this way?

201 b 27– 202 a 3: It is questioned back further why it genuinely is that movement shows itself as an ἀόριστον.

202 a 3–12: Aristotle treats the fact that what is moved is also for the most part in movement. The conclusion is unclear, cf. Books 5–6.¹⁰⁰

b) Critique of the Earlier Determination of Movement through ἑτερότης, ἀνισότης, and μὴ ὄν

We want to look more precisely at the consideration of Chapter 2. What was explicated by the earlier categorial determinations, ἑτερότης, ἀνισότης, μὴ ὄν,¹⁰¹ determines a being that, according to these determinations, is genuinely not *necessarily* in movement. Beings determined by being otherwise *can* indeed be what is moved, but the predicates ἕτερον, ἄνισον, μὴ ὄν, as such do not determine beings with respect to their being in movement.¹⁰² In the definition, being-characters are brought into relief, so that they determine the beings that they intend as what must *necessarily* be found *in movement* with these characters. Ἐτερότης and ἀνισότης do not satisfy this determination. Many beings that we encounter in the world are given to us as *other*, but *for this reason* not yet in movement. I myself am a ἕτερον, an “other” like a dog—through this being-ἕτερον, I am not necessarily in movement. Furthermore, the number 10 is dissimilar to the number 5. However, this dissimilarity does not mean that they are in movement, or that there is a movement between them.

100. See Hs. p. 382 f.

101. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 20 sq.: ἑτερότητα καὶ ἀνισότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν.

102. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 21 sq.

At this point, it could be said that the *ἐτερότης* is not at all intended in this way, but rather *ἐτερότης* as a determination of beings themselves, such that being–otherwise lies in beings themselves, that beings have in themselves the possibility of being from . . . to . . . , of being characterized in relation to a determination through the absence of this determination. But then is it not the case that the *ἐτερότης* determines being as being-in-movement? In a being that has various determinations, these determinations are distinct from one another without the being needing to be in movement. One can say in Aristotle’s sense, a being is at once determined as *ἐντελέχεια*—the wood is present as wood—and yet it is something else insofar as it is *δυνάμει*—namely, that it can be a chest. This is a positive determination of itself, and although this otherness lies in the wood itself, it is not necessarily in movement, but rather it is moved only when this *δυνάμει ὄν* is present. The *ἐτερότης* is not sufficient. And one can even interpret the *ἐτερότης* in the active sense: perhaps the ancients meant this being–otherwise as *ἐτεροίωσις*, “becoming–otherwise.” In this case, then, *κίνησις* is *ἐτεροίωσις*, *ἀλλοίωσις*, defined by a determinate movement, and therefore this movement is already presupposed.

In no sense, then, does the *ἐτερότης* suffice for the task of genuinely defining beings-in-movement. This determination of the *ἐτερότης* does not include the fundamental ontological respect of *presence*, of *being-present*, and of *disappearing-from-presence*. Yet, this ability-not-to-approach the phenomenon of movement means, at the same time, that this theory virtually obstructs the possibility of seeing movement. One can always say, in a formal manner, that a movement, *μεταβολή*, is in becoming. This aspect is the ground for determining the way of being of movement as *ἐτερότης*. But it is a rash determination that does not take into account precisely the fundamental meaning.¹⁰³

c) The Ground of This Determination: The *ἀόριστον* of Movement

The ancients arrived at this peculiar determination only because they said: movement is an *ἀόριστον*.¹⁰⁴ I determine an “indeterminateness” appropriately only if I determine it through a category that touches on indeterminateness. “If I determine, *ὀρίζω*, movement, movement ceases.”¹⁰⁵ Being–there is being–there–completed in its place, limit. If it is moved, it is something that changes its site; it is such a thing that is in no determinate place. If I determine such a thing that constantly changes site, and therefore does not remain in its *πέρας*, then it stands still; it no longer is the indeterminate thing that is not in its place. I cannot determine it through a *πέρας*; instead, I must take the categories pertaining to it from among those categories that define the indeterminate. Of course, *Plato* and the *Pythagoreans* specified such a group (*διάγραμμα*) of cat-

103. See Hs. p. 383 f.

104. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 24.

105. Themistii in Aristotelis Physica paraphrases. Consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae ed. H. Schenkl. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Voluminis V pars II. Berlin 1900. 211, 12: *ὅταν γὰρ ὀρίσῃ, παύεται*.

egories. It can be characterized in two rows, the first of which is the συστοιχία of the εἶδος:

1. περιττόν	ἄρτιον
2. πέρας	ἄπειρον
3. δεξιόν	ἀριστερόν
4. ἄρρεν	θῆλυ
5. ἡρεμοῦν	κινούμενον
6. εὐθύ	καμπύλον
7. τετράγωνον	ἑτερόμηκες
8. νοῦς	δόξα
9. ἔν	πολλά
10. φῶς	σκότος ¹⁰⁶

Remark on 1: It is to be observed that the genuine determination of beings themselves is the ἔν. The two follows as the particular; the particular is therefore an indeterminate thing with respect to the ἔν.

It is not accidental that the determination φῶς—σκότος also emerges here. The entire listing of the categories is in itself transparent, a Greek ontology in nuce, on the basis of which Aristotle worked, and which becomes vital on the whole through the fundamental discovery of being as being present, of ἐντελέχεια, of being-produced.

Chapter 2 has the task of showing how the previous attempts to master κίνησις failed, insofar as they seized upon determinate being-aspects of what is moved, but not the basic character of beings as moved. Why did the ancients attempt to apprehend movement in this way? Since movement shows itself as something that is *indeterminate*, it is therefore necessary that this being-indeterminate be apprehended, that a *category of indeterminateness* be selected to determine beings properly. From this consideration, it came about that movement was apprehended with categories like ἑτερότης, ἀνισότης, μὴ ὄν. Although, in a certain sense, the μὴ ὄν appears to be the most remote, with respect to movement it is instead the closest, insofar as one apprehends μὴ ὄν not as not being-there-at-all, but rather μὴ ὄν apprehended in the sense of a *determinate* not-being. In his *Sophist*, Plato advanced to this character of beings in relation to an other of the surrounding world, when he says: even the μὴ ὄν is in a certain sense, a way of being.¹⁰⁷ This determination of the μὴ ὄν, apprehended also as στέρησις, is for this reason not sufficient since, if one wanted to define movement, he would have to say that *everything* is in movement since every being is *not* in a determinate sense, namely, it is not the other with which it is.

For the Greeks, movement shows itself as a ἀόριστον. From the peculiar character of the indeterminateness of movement, it is seen that one cannot

106. A.a.O. 211, 19 sq. und kritischer Apparat zu 211, 17.

107. Plato, *Sophist* 256 d sqq.

ἀπλῶς θεῖναι the categories: δυνατόν ποσόν—on the basis of this ability-to-be as μὴ ὄν, στερησις—movement is not yet necessary.¹⁰⁸ One may not simply say: κίνησις is, absolutely, the ἐνέργεια of something able-to-be. Something able-to-be is not, without further qualification, moved.¹⁰⁹

d) Movement as ἀτελής in Relation to the ἔργον

Κίνησις is defined as a being-present that has the character of the ἀτελής,¹¹⁰ of the “not at the end.” What is able-to-be (the wood lying before in the workshop), that is in work, is there as able-to-be precisely when it is taken up into work. In this sense, one can say that maintaining-in-work is the τέλος of the δυνάμει ὄν ἢ τοιοῦτον. The being-in-the-possibility comes into its end in the being-in-work, and then is genuinely what it is, namely, ability-to-be. But it is not completed in relation to the ἔργον of ποιήσις. Insofar as being ultimately means being-in-its-end, maintaining-itself-in-its-end in a conclusive sense, ἐντελέχεια, Aristotle must, if he is to speak cautiously, designate the being-there of beings-in-movement as ἐνέργεια.¹¹¹ Ἀτελής is the δυνατόν as such, not at the end, but it is right there through ἐνέργεια. At this point, Aristotle emphasizes that this peculiar ontological fact of the matter “is difficult to see, but can be,”¹¹² and in fact is, insofar as we see something moved (primary reference to ἐπαγωγή!).¹¹³

§28. Movement as ἐντελέχεια τοῦ δυνάμει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ (Physics Γ3)

a) Outline of the Chapter

In Chapter 3, the genuine definition and determination of movement first reaches its aim. First, the synopsis of the chapter, which is not simply transparent in its structure.

202 a 13–21: Topic: recalling the character of moving, namely, the presence of the *movable* and of *what moves*.¹¹⁴ Up to this point, we found that this distinction was not treated thematically in an explicit way. The question is posed: ἐν τίνι ἢ κίνησις; “where is movement?” Is movement the determination of what moves or of what is moved? The answer reads: μία ἀμφοῖν, that is, μία ἐνέργεια,¹¹⁵ “one and the same mode of being-present for both.”

108. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 29 sqq.

109. See Hs. p. 384 ff.

110. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 32.

111. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 31.

112. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 2 sq.: χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ' εἶναι.

113. Phys. A 2, 185 a 13 sq.: δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

114. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 14: ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τοῦτου [τοῦ κινητοῦ] ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ.

115. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 18: μία ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια.

202 a 21–b 5: a development of the difficulty that arises from the fact that one sees that movement is always movement of a thing moved, which is movement by something else that moves. The being-context about which I say, “the being is in movement,” is determined by the category of the πρὸς τι, the “being-in-relation-to-an-other,” namely, the moving thing characterized by ποίησις, the moved thing by πάθησις.¹¹⁶ Accordingly, there are two modes of being-present in relation to movement: ποίησις and πάθησις. But fundamentally we always speak of “a” movement,¹¹⁷ though we have the possibility of speaking according to both of these possibilities. Hence, there arises an ἀπορία λογική,¹¹⁸ an “ability-to-reach-impasse in addressing what is intended.” Experience is a movement, but at the same time I can address ποίησις and πάθησις. Aristotle discusses this ἀπορία from 202 a 21–28, specifically in terms of three possibilities: (1) it is asked whether ποίησις and πάθησις are both together in the πάσχον and κινούμενον;¹¹⁹ (2) whether ποίησις is the determination of the κινουῶν, and πάθησις the determination of the κινούμενον;¹²⁰ (3) the possibility that ποίησις is the determination of the κινούμενον, πάθησις the determination of the κινουῶν.¹²¹ 202 a 28 sq.: discussion of these possibilities. a 28–31 discusses the third of the aforementioned possibilities—he criticizes them afterward. At a 31-b 5, he discusses the first possibility, whether ποίησις and πάθησις are both in the κινούμενον. The second possibility—ποίησις in the κινουῶν, πάθησις in the κινούμενον—he takes up as the positive one, and he discusses it.

202 b 5–22: as to the solution of the difficulty. In this section, Aristotle points out that there is in fact a doubling of respects, but that, on the other hand, the selfsameness of one fact of the matter obtains: a being-in-movement.

202 b 22–29: conclusion of the consideration and of auxiliary aspects; new definition of movement of the sort that incorporates the aforementioned two.¹²²

b) The πρὸς τι as Character of Being-in-the-World

We want to thoroughly discuss what is essential in this chapter. It is important that you have a grasp of the context. In preparation for the definition of movement, Aristotle pointed, in Chapter 1, toward (1) the “being-present” and the “ability-to-be,” δύναμις-ἐντελέχεια; (2) the modes of encountering the world, the categories. These categories make being as such manifest as characterized by the διχῶς. They are there in being-able-to-be-from . . . to . . . , in being-encountered in degrees.

116. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 23 sq.

117. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 36: ἀλλὰ μία ἔσται ἡ ἐνέργεια.

118. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 21 sq.: ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν λογικὴν.

119. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 25 sq.: ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ κινουμένῳ.

120. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 26 sq.: ἢ ἡ μὲν ποίησις ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἢ δὲ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι.

121. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 27 sq.: εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταύτην [τὴν πάθησιν] ποίησιν καλεῖν.

122. See Hs. p. 388 f.

Up to this point, we have passed over a determination, namely, the determination that Aristotle gives from 200 b 28 on. First, he lists the categories. (*Metaphysics* K 9, where the whole section of *Physics* Book 3, Chapter 1, is repeated, omits precisely this part of b 28–32. As you know, the source of the Aristotelian character of book K of the *Metaphysics* is contested. Jaeger attempts to rescue it against Natorp.)¹²³ Here, along with the ontological preparation of movement, according to its list of categories, a special category is once again taken up, the *πρός τι*. This emphasis on the *πρός τι* is the ontological preparation for the discussion in Chapter 3. This category of the *πρός τι* means that beings are determined as *being in relation to another*. However, as being in relation to another, they cannot supply the foundation for a new type of movement, since the four types of movement are comprised in the four categories already listed. Οὐσία corresponds to the mode of movement of γένεσις and φθορά, for τόπος there is φορά, for ποσόν there is φθίσις, for ποιόν there is ἀλλοίωσις.¹²⁴ There are no other types of movement—greater evidence of this is found in Book 5 of the *Physics*.¹²⁵ So, the explicit statement of the *πρός τι* must have another sense, not a fore-indication of the type of encountering the world in a determinate movement, but rather the *character of every being that is in movement*. *Πρός τι* characterizes beings that are there of the world in their manifoldness, manifoldness of beings as being “in relation to one another,” *πρός ἄλληλα*.

The *πρός τι* is defined in the *Categories* as follows: “Everything that is characterized in its being as *πρός τι*, that is at each moment, only is in relation to another.”¹²⁶ Thus every ἕξις is a ἕξις τινός, for example, every ἐπιστήμη is, as a being, always ἐπιστήμη τινός,¹²⁷ ἐπιστήμη “of something.” I do not at all understand the being-character of ἐπιστήμη if I do not take into consideration the of-what. Then, every μείζον is μείζον τινός, every “being-greater” is “being-greater-than-something.”¹²⁸ Every μᾶλλον and ἥττον, every “more” or “less,” that we have come to know as a determination of the world, is ontologically characterized as *πρός τι*—the beings that are there of the world as being in relations. In Chapter 7 of the *Categories*, Aristotle offers a detailed consideration of the *πρός τι*. He also shows the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to genuinely apprehend the *πρός τι*. *Πρός τι* as determination of the being of the world: *πρός ἄλληλα*. As characters of the *πρός τι*, Aristotle lists the following: τοῦ δὲ *πρός τι* τὸ μὲν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν λέγεται καὶ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν [a different formulation of the ‘more or less’], τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ

123. W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*. Berlin 1912. S. 63 ff.

124. *Phys.* Γ 1, 201 a 12 sqq.

125. Cf. *Phys.* E 1, 225 a 1 sqq.

126. *Cat.* 7, 6 a 36 sq.: *Πρός τι* δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὸ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως *πρός* ἕτερον.

127. *Cat.* 7, 6 b 5.

128. *Cat.* 7, 6 a 38 sq.: τὸ μείζον [. . .] τινός γὰρ λέγεται μείζον.

παθητικὸν, καὶ ὅλως κινητικὸν τε καὶ κινήτῳ.¹²⁹ “The one is addressed with respect to the going-beyond-it and the falling-short . . . , the other as ποιητικὸν and παθητικὸν [the ποιεῖν is a ποιεῖν τι], beings in the sense of making-themselves-produce something, and that with which a making-themselves-produce makes produce [which is in itself a παθητικὸν.]” If a being in its being-there is characterized by ποιήσις, there is a being there with it that has the determination of πάθησις.

Earlier, we pointed out that there are given in the world itself beings with which we have to do, but also human beings, in the sense that we directly experience, that this one appearing lives in a world.¹³⁰ The being-at-hand of a living thing is a being-in-the-world of the living thing. I am myself something that appears in the world, that occupies itself with something—we can also say of an animal that it flees from a threat, and so on. Beings with the character of living are at hand in the world, and this is at the same time a way of being-in-the-world. An animal is there, an ant crawls up the trunk so that it has the trunk in a certain way as its obstacle, so that the trunk with which it is there is nonetheless there for it as διακείμενον, ἀντικείμενον for the animal through ἀφή, through “contact.” This being, as animal, has that with which it is still *there*; the πρὸς τι is characterized by the ἀντί . . . such that what the living thing is related to is there as uncovered, perceived, seen, or thought. The πρὸς ἄλληλα has a distinctive possibility that is characterized by δέχεσθαι, “ability-to-take-in,” having-it-there-explicitly-in-uncoveredness. Such a being is the living thing that is characterized by this determinability, a *finding-oneself*: not merely being-at-hand with others, but rather *maintaining oneself with it, being open to the world* of itself as living thing, through the keeping-oneself.

The primary openness of human beings is grounded in νοῦς. Νοεῖν, “supposing,” is not limited to determinate regions of being as is αἴσθησις. However, νοεῖν is also possible for that which is not corporeally present. In this thinking-of-it, I am with it. Supposing can suppose *everything*: it is the mode of openness to *everything*. The uncoveredness of the being of human beings as being-in-the-world is characterized by νοῦς. This νοῦς is always a νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς, a διανοεῖσθαι, supposing something as something. Just as αἴσθησις is, for the Greeks, a *being approached* by the world—something comes toward—so also is διανοεῖσθαι a δέχεσθαι, a “perceiving”—the world is encountered by me. Νοεῖν is, in a certain sense, a πάθος, a *being-approached* by the world. This being-thus-in-the-world, characterized by the uncoveredness of νοῦς, is possible only because the world is generally open, that νοῦς is determined by a νοῦς that uncovers the world in general. I can suppose only if this that is thinkable is opened up in general. The νοῦς παθητικός,¹³¹ through a νοεῖν that uncovers the world. The determinations

129. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 28 sqq.

130. See S. 241

131. Cf. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 10 sqq.

of ποίησις and πάθησις reach into the genuine center of the Greek consideration of world and living. Therein lies the fact that all understanding of how the Greeks conceived being depends upon how one understands κίνησις.¹³²

c) The Genuine Definition of Movement through ποίησις and πάθησις

The possibility of understanding, from the ground up, that on which the Greeks carried out research is grounded in κίνησις and its interpretation. Living, as a definite type of being-in-the-world, is characterized by the πρὸς τι. From this it follows that the consideration up to this point, in Chapters 1–2, was incomplete insofar as it considers only beings as what is moved, yet does not say that every being that is moved is there only *in the being-there-with as such, which moves*. What is the determination of κίνησις as a definite type of being-present, κίνησις as ἐνέργεια, related to?

The whole being-context: every moving thing is the moving of something moved, and every moved thing is the moved of something moving. One may not tear these determinations apart, οὐκ ἀποτετμημένη,¹³³ so that I now have two movements, and then pose the question: how do I bring them together? The moving thing is a being characterized by ποίησις; the moved thing is characterized by πάθησις. This becomes visible in the discussion of teaching and learning.¹³⁴ After all, according to its sense teaching means: speaking to another, approaching another in the mode of communicating. The genuine being of one who teaches is to stand before another, and speak to him in such a way that the other, in hearing, goes along with him. It is a unitary being-context that is determined by κίνησις.

For this reason, Aristotle also concludes the definition of movement at the end of Chapter 3 by saying: κίνησις is ἐντελέχεια [. . .] τοῦ δυνάμει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ, ἧ τοιοῦτον.¹³⁵ Thus the determination of the ποιητικόν and of the παθητικόν finally enters into the very definition of movement, without Aristotle running the risk of defining movement by way of movement, since ποίησις is not yet movement, just as πάθησις is not. Ποίησις and πάθησις are determinations of a unitary being that is there in the mode of being-in-movement. Over against this definition, there is the first definition: “Κίνησις is the presence of an ability-to-be”,¹³⁶ the second definition: “Κίνησις is the ἐντελέχεια of something moveable, insofar as it is moveable.”¹³⁷ Here, already with the κινητόν, there is reflection on the κινητικόν. Κινητικόν is itself explicable as ποιητικόν in relation to the παθητικόν. It is wrong to say that Aristotle has here defined movement by way of movement.

132. See Hs. p. 389 ff.

133. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 7 sq.

134. Cf. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 4 sqq.

135. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 25 sqq.

136. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 10 sq.: ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια [. . .] κίνησις ἐστίν.

137. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 7 sq.: ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ἧ κινητόν.

How the context is to be apprehended with respect to the dual respects of ποίησις and πάθησις, and this despite the fact that *one* movement is there, Aristotle demonstrates in the case of διάστασις: it is, as the so-far as such, from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes, the same.¹³⁸ The being-distant, determined as such, can be taken by me as such, nonetheless, in a dual respect: I can go from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes. Both respects underlie the being-equally-far-in-distance: διάστασις μία¹³⁹—διάστασις a something doubled. Κίνησις as *one* is the primary thing that I can apprehend in the dual respect of ποίησις and πάθησις.

This Aristotelian investigation into movement has a *fundamental significance for the whole ontology*: basic determination of beings as ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια, and δύναμις.

Concept-formation is a matter of characterizing determinate concepts. The primary thing is to determine the respects according to fundamental characters. Every concept formation is, insofar as it is genuine, distinguished by the fact that, in the cultivation of the concept, it opens up anew the subject-matter in the fundamental character of its being. *Genuinely productive concept-formation* lies in *the opening up of the concrete character of the subject-matter*, so that the entire conceptuality of the region of being becomes visible, not only in such a way that touches on the *matter*, but also the *how*.

The question concerning the τί τὸ ὄν is derived from the determinateness of ποίησις and *being-there-present*—ποίησις as primary being-in-the-world, πράξις. It gives rise to, as well as the closest view of, Greek ontology—not the ontology of nature! The later history of philosophy neglects to look toward being-in-the-world. The discovery of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια takes seriously what *Plato* and *Parmenides* wanted. What counts is not to say something new, but to say what the ancients already intended.¹⁴⁰

138. Cf. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 18 sqq., b 13 sq.

139. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 17 sq.

140. See Hs. p. 392 ff.

II.

The Text of the Lecture Course
on the Basis of the Preserved Parts of
the Handwritten Manuscript

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On §1

The purpose of this lecture course is to bring to understanding *some basic concepts from out of the circle of Aristotelian research*. More precisely, it is to give direction as to *listening* for what Aristotle has to say. And this direction is to be conveyed by way of our attempting listening in *concrete examples*.

Basic concepts: some. The selection is favorable: *Metaphysics Δ*: examples. Some of these and others: life, movement, knowledge, truth.

To examine which matters are meant in these concepts, how these matters are *experienced*, toward-which they are *addressed* and, accordingly, how they are *expressed* (significantly). Thus the *full conceptuality* as such: *matters in the how and the how itself*.

With the understanding of conceptuality there is to emerge *insight and familiarity with the exigencies and possibilities of scientific research*. Therefore a philosophy is not to be taught and learned. Accordingly, the purpose is not to render a portrait of Aristotle's system nor to characterize the personality and the overall manner of the philosopher. No history of philosophy and philosophy of problems. Only to listen for what Aristotle perhaps has to say. If philology means the passion for knowledge of what has been spoken and of self-expression, then the purpose and procedure is *purely philological*.

Literature—secondary material

On §2

Purpose: to bring *proper reading* somewhat into practice in such a way that we thereby attend to conceptuality. The provisionality of the undertaking comes to light by its standing under *presuppositions* that are not to be discussed:

1) That in particular *Aristotle* has something to say with respect to the aim of the lecture (and not *Plato* or *Kant* or *Hegel*).

2) That we admit to ourselves that we are not yet so advanced that there is nothing more to say to us in this particular respect.

3) That conceptuality, properly understood, is the genuine substance of any scientific research (not an affair of formal thought-technique). *Whoever has chosen science has taken over responsibility for the concept*.

4) That scientific research, science, is no occupation, but is rather a *possibility of human existence*, accordingly, a choice and decision.

5) That there is, in being-there, a possibility in which alone a stand is taken with respect to the possibilities of one's interpretation and determination.

6) Methodological presupposition: that history and the past can have impact insofar as one clears the path for it—today, the strongest demand, but the air in which philology lives and breathes.

Many presuppositions, but only philology. *Philosophy*, by contrast, especially today, does not need them, since it lives from out of the basic presupposition that everything is as it should be. Indeed, the consideration treats of matters that are designated as belonging within philosophy, but *our kind of treatment is nothing philosophical, its results are no philosophy*.

Aristotle can offer us a pointer in the demarcation: φιλοσοφία and διαλεκτική and σοφιστική.¹

On §3

Purpose: to understand some basic concepts, to attend to conceptuality. What is to be understood by this? This must go to prove wherein we have to transpose ourselves in order to be able to pursue concept-formation and to understand conceptuality in the concrete.

Things to be shown:

1. *Where* we encounter the concept *exposed*?
2. What that means, *why* in this case in particular it is determined in this way, and why the *definition* according to the decisive experience?
3. The *enrooting* of the conceptual *wherein*?
4. From there the next course of the consideration.

According to tradition, “logic” treats of the *concept*. “Logic” as *discipline*—determinate type of treatment of a delimited realm of objects—arose only when logical research had run itself into the ground. Plato and Aristotle know nothing of “logic”—an outgrowth of philosophy in the Hellenistic schools. What was here collected in a scholastic way passed into medieval and modern logic as a fixed inventory and was at the same time handed down, as “logic,” as a fixed inventory of questions and problems.

Logic knows, on the authority of Aristotle, something like *definition*: definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. Reflected in this rule is the fate of Aristotle’s researches.

Definitions:

- a) homo animal rationale.
- b) The circle is a curved, closed line, all of whose points are equidistant from a point within it.
- c) The clock is a machine put together from various wheels, whose coordinated movement indicates the time.

Ad 1. we encounter the concept *exposed* in the *definition*. What the logic of the schools says about it is shown in *Kant*. It is evident thereby how the tradition becomes relatively vital and determines research and how, at the same

1. Met. Γ 2, 1004 b 22 sq.: περί μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῆ φιλοσοφίας.

time, the old inventory so to speak merely runs alongside (cf. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Book 3, Section 3, Chapter 2).

Where is definition treated? In the “General Doctrine of Method.”² Definition serves the “conveying of the logical completeness” of the concept.³

Concept: repraesentatio per notas communes⁴—§98.⁵

Material and form: mere intuition—intuition and *concept*.⁶ Determinateness of the intuition—*what is general* in this: on the basis of the *where-to*, this in *dealing*. Determinateness: “what.”

The what: a) wherein I see, lay claim to, the “what”; b) what “what” means; c) its origin. The proper and obligatory answer to the question, “What is that?” is the definition.

What is striking and revealing of history: 1. definition—methodological—*means of logical completeness*: a) means, b) “logical.” 2. Basic rule of definition *not for real definition*.

Ad 2.⁷ Where do we encounter the concept? In the *perspicuous* grasping of the knowing and of what is known. *Affair of perspicuity*? Why is it satisfied precisely by definition determined in this way? Why *genus* and *species* in particular? What are *predicables*, *kategoremata* supposed to do?

We will see more clearly if we go back to the *historical origin*: ὀρισμός a λόγος οὐσίας:

1. Addressing beings in their being-there;
2. Beings in themselves;
3. ὀρισμός, since beings themselves are characterized in the πέρας.

Consequently, ad 3:⁸ *enrooting*:

1. in the *addressing*, expressing, self-expressing;
2. *Dealing in beings*, *being* with beings in the character of the *there—being-there*. Aristotle [has] no word for “concept.”⁹

Λόγος = “concept,” how something stands in discourse, is exhibited, discussed, becomes evident as this or that and therefore “there,” available, *discovered*.

Consequently, it requires a familiarity with this milieu wherein the concept is rooted. Dual preparation:

1. as to *dealing with beings*, being-in-[the]-world: ζῶη πρακτική, ψυχὴ, ἀλήθεια—being and being-true, being-there;¹⁰

2. VorlesungenKants.

3. A. a. O., S. 444.

4. A. a. O., I. Allgemeine Elementarlehre, § 1.

5. A. a. O., II. Allgemeine Methodenlehre, § 98.

6. Cf. a. a. O., Einleitung, S. 350 sqq.

7. Editor’s note: Refers to the enumeration on the previous page.

8. Editor’s note: Refers to the enumeration on the previous page.

9. Inserted by the editor.

10. Inserted by the editor.

2. *speaking*, addressing, discussing, self-expressing: λόγος, κατηγορία;
3. context: *fourfoldness of the ὄν*
—leading back to *being-there!*

This preparation on the path of a presentative orientation. Topic: being as being-there, “there,” being the origin of being—neither logic nor ontology, *hermeneutics*? Pursuing in the concrete: what beings in their being mean; how expressed in which conceptuality.

Ποίησις, κίνησις, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια: being-produced.
Εἶδος, οὐσία: being-there. Cf. p. 337ff.

On §4

Some Aristotelian basic concepts *in their conceptuality*: Why not simply “basic concepts”? Why the addition, “in their conceptuality”?

Concept: *notio*, *intentio*, *conceptus*, *species*. Taken roughly, the concept says what a matter is, what one understands by it, which meaning one has of something. E.g., the concept κίνησις, “movement,” μεταβολή, “change”: if we are hearing-out in the text, we shall thereby experience which apprehension Aristotle has of movement, what movement is in his sense. However, we do not want to interrogate Aristotle about which apprehension he has of certain objects in order to distinguish it from later or modern apprehensions and obtain a knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy.

Conceptuality:

We want to understand such concepts *in their conceptuality*, i.e.

1. We are examining what the matter indicated in the concept is *originally experienced* as. And what did Aristotle have in view in terms of the thing moved, if he is seeking to apprehend the phenomenon of movement in it? Which sense of being is meant with the experience of a being-that-is-moved? Which being provides its look?

2. We are asking: what does Aristotle perceive in the phenomenon of movement thus presented? In relation to what *is he addressing it*? Is he seeking to clarify it on the basis of fixed concepts already at hand—transition from not-being to being—or does he take from the phenomenon presented to him, the originally understood matter itself, that which he understands by it. Does he set it free for the address?

3. [Which address is posited in the determination of the thing secured in this way, i.e., for what sort of address is the understanding sufficient? Is the address of the matter in its intelligibility, corresponding to the dealing with it, appropriate or is it held out as something foreign, fantastical, to it? (Mathematical definition of ethical concepts)]¹¹

11. Editor’s note: Deleted in the handwritten notes.

3. For which type of intelligibility and determinateness is the unwrapping of the phenomenon sufficient? Does the intelligibility striven for emerge from the concrete character of the matter and the legitimate dealing with it (use!), and is it measured by it? Or is it guided by a fantastical idea of intelligibility, determinateness? In which interpretedness is the thing that is seen and addressed discussed? (Mathematical definition of ethical concepts, natural-scientific definition of historical concepts, philosophical definition of theological concepts.)

These three aspects are not exhaustive, but they do *indicate* what is meant by conceptuality:

1. concretely giving basic experience,
2. the occurring *guiding claim* (toward-what),
3. character of the *prevailing intelligibility*, tendency and determinateness.

Basic concepts in their conceptuality—that means, then, conducting inquiry with the concepts at the moment according to these aspects. Whether the matters intended are properly understood only in this particular and genuine way is something that can be shown only by carrying it out. Conceptuality is emphasized explicitly because it is what should matter to you. Not so that you take notice of it and, alongside the conceptual content, also know some information about its conceptuality, but rather that you so to speak *feel* how, in what was indicated roughly as conceptuality according to some of its aspects, nothing else is stirred up but the *fulfillment of scientific research in its substance*. That means, however, that you yourselves have to execute the decisive work: *becoming attentive*, for your part and in the place where you have located yourselves in a scientific discipline by a free decision, to what occurs with the conceptuality at the moment. A precondition for being-able-to-become-attentive is that one *stands within the matter*. Therefore, not in such a way that you speculate about concepts now for a semester and say to yourselves, “Yes, first of all I have to know what philology is, then I can start.” That guy will never reach the starting-point, because he will never come to know what philology is. By no means is it to take over Aristotelian concepts and apply them—it’s not repeating his *talk*, but *doing* what he does! I myself have nothing to do with it but to take care that Aristotle be given the opportunity to put before you his matter.

Aristotelian basic concepts in their conceptuality: κίνησις, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, ἀλήθεια, λόγος, and so on—we are thus to question them according to the aspects discussed. That requires a dual precaution:

1. that we understand wherein these aspects of conceptuality belong, *where conceptuality is indigenous*, what and how it is then as such;
2. we are to understand Aristotelian concepts in their, i.e., Aristotelian, Greek, conceptuality—therefore, to have the *Greek* indigenous character of conceptuality come into view.

On §5

For the purpose of going back into Greek conceptuality and its indigenoussness we start from something that is most familiar, from which the concept as such becomes explicit, now and for a long time: *definition*. In definition, the concept is genuinely concept. There we question back: How did it stand with definition for Aristotle? What did it mean for him? What are we to infer from this for the pre-understanding of conceptuality? Secondary object: to demonstrate the change that so harmless a thing as definition went through, change as *decline from a basic possibility and mode of genuinely speaking with the world to a rule of thought-technique*.

The two questions that are to be answered for us through Aristotle: Where is conceptuality indigenous and how is Greek conceptuality to be determined?

Ὅρισμός as λόγος: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὗ ὁ λόγος ὀρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἐκάστου.¹²—τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία, τοῦτου δὲ λόγος ὁ ὀρισμός.¹³ ὁ ὀρισμός οὐσίας τις γνωρισμός.¹⁴

Ὅρισμός as λόγος οὐσίας: *circumscribing* beings in their being, exhibiting in themselves their *limitation*, i.e., completedness. Completely there = being produced (here) out of . . . (for οὐσία—λόγος, cf. this lecture course p. 208 ff: interpretation of *De partibus animalium* A 1).

Ὅρισμός as λόγος οὐσίας:

I. what λόγος,

II. what οὐσία,

III. when this λόγος ὀρισμός,

IV. how does indigenous character look? i.e., where-to to what extent?

Phenomenon of equiprimordiality (only negative!). Cf. later.

On §6

I. Λόγος, λέγειν:

A. a) Speaking about something in the sense of ἀποφαίνεσθαι (δηλοῦν), having to do with (being-in) in such a way that what is spoken about shows itself in speaking (cf. c): showing something for itself in the there, clarifying itself with it, itself as being-in!).

b) Speaking (about something) *to others* (or, to myself, to one), so that what is spoken about in speaking about . . . shows itself *to* those to whom it is spoken.

c) Speaking about . . . to . . . also *self-expressing*, expressing oneself (speaking *of* myself, oneself, of being-in) (on this cf. *publicness*: the being-lived

12. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 21 sqq.

13. Met. H 1, 1042 17.

14. An. post. B 3, 90 b 16.

of language as the basic how, being through it, cf. *ψεῦδος*, WS 23/4).¹⁵

B. At the same as what is spoken in this way, this intelligibility become public, available, able to be appropriated, able to be obscured: τὰ δὲ κείμενα [ὀνόματα] κοινὰ πᾶσιν,¹⁶ “the fixed words [available, once spoken forth] belong to all”—in the belongingness of “one”—intelligibility.

This λόγος the basic characteristic of human beings, specifically with respect to the *mode of their being*. Human being: ζῶον, “living thing” (ζῶον unspecified, before the concretion of modern biology, before humanistic [or]¹⁷ natural-scientific psychology. Ζωή, “living”: mode of being as being-in, being-in in the sense of exhibitiv-interpretive speaking.

Ἔχον, ἔχειν in the sense of: τὸ ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὀρμήν,¹⁸ conducting oneself, comporting oneself in the sense of “managing,” “completing,” emerging therein “from out of the *ownmost drive*.” The being-there, qua human being, is speaking from out of itself in the special, full sense!

On §7a

II. Ὁρισμός as λόγος οὐσίας:

The ὀρισμός is λόγος οὐσίας, the “addressing exhibition of beings in the how of their being.” *Beings* are addressed in themselves with respect to their *being*. With the translation of οὐσία in “beings in the how of their genuine being,” an entirely determinate—even still, a determinately multiple—meaning is assigned to the word. If the multiplicity of meanings of the word οὐσία is to be able to obtain a grounded orientation, then the λόγος οὐσίας would also have to receive a proper clarification. Furthermore, the word is *the title for Aristotelian fundamental research*—or, more precisely, for *Greek fundamental research as such*—the *basic concept per se*, the *term*. The question as to the τί τὸ ὄν is the question, τίς ἡ οὐσία. In this way the question of being is first brought about.¹⁹ That precisely a *fundamental word* like οὐσία and others like it are afflicted with an *ambiguity* should not diminish its appropriateness as the title of the investigation. On the contrary. *Everything depends on the multiplicity of meaning as such being understood.*

Ambiguity of words, basic words, can be a sort of *entanglement*: that the ambiguity be used indiscriminately for various matters, without knowledge of the matter and familiarity with the application of meaning. It can therefore prevail, and precisely in this case, where it need not prevail, where the ambiguity

15. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, GA 17: 31ff.

16. Met. Z 15, 1040 a 11.

17. Insertion by the editor.

18. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 8 sq.

19. Met. Z 1, 1028 b 22 sq.

is already governed by a rule on the basis of the matters, but, by a deficiency of familiarity with the matter, the rule-governance is lost.

The ambiguity can generate a prevailing *incapacity to appropriate the matter* and interpret it, a specific *insensitivity to difference*.

However, the ambiguity can also be a multiplicity of meaning in such a way that it emerges precisely from out of *dealing with the matters*, which dealing *thereby comes to prevail over the ambiguity* (?). The degrees of meaning arise from the *proper understanding of matters*. Insofar as degrees of meaning are, *always in their origin*, determined and *held fast* on the basis of matters experienced and interpreted thus, the ambiguity is a *concretely oriented* one and, as such that is fixed, it is a *multifariousness*. And precisely if it is held fast as this, and not dressed up as systematic tendencies foreign to the matter or leveled into an artificial uniformity of meaning, then, as a multifariousness of meaning, it has the proper suitability to convey an *understanding of the concreteness of matters*. The multifariousness of meaning is then precisely the *adequate expression* of the matters. The more originary that the understanding of the ground of multifariousness and its necessity is, the more the adequation increases.

Aristotle had an *explicitly positive consciousness* of the multifariousness of meaning, and particularly in the field of basic concepts. *Metaphysics* Δ treats of them as *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα* (cf. the traditional title of the book), not in order to remove them, but rather to let them stand and let them be seen as such. Perhaps conceptuality becomes evident precisely thereby. The *instinct for concreteness* thereby keeps hold of him. Nothing is said about the origin and necessity of multifariousness: to uncover only on the basis of the understanding of the *λεγόμενα* as such, i.e., as *λόγος*—that, consequently, the determinate multiplicity is grounded precisely in what “speaking” is! And for that just now in the preparation.

Presumably, then, the multifariousness of *οὐσία* is not a sort of confusion and unfamiliarity with the matter. If not, however, we alone are obliged to obtain the proper *basis of orientation*. Insofar as, here, it is an issue of the basic concept per se, not only is the possibility of a better understanding of *ὀρισμός* as the *λόγος* related to *οὐσία* obtained thereby, but also the *ground for other basic concepts* is prefigured. The multifariousness of meaning of *οὐσία* is therefore not treated here for its own sake, but rather always only in the direction of the proper appropriation of the matter, i.e., the understanding of what is addressed in *ὀρισμός* as *λόγος*.

Οὐσία was translated: “beings in the how of their (genuine) being.” *Being* of beings, or *being-ness* of beings, expresses that *something is being said* about being itself, that it has “aspects,” and the like.

Οὐσία as the basic word for research is a term. A word is a term insofar as it functions as an expression whose meaning and usage arise out of scientific research, within such research and for it.

A word can be *expressly and directly stamped* as a term at one with the discovery and apprehension of a matter to be understood thus and so.

However, it is also the case that an already customary word can be given a determinate meaning *in addition* from out of investigative research into a matter, in such a way that the additional meaning stands in some relation of lineage to the already customary meaning, that therefore an aspect of meaning which is *co-understood inexplicitly* in the customary meaning acquires a *thematic role* in the terminological meaning, which is in question in a determinate way in the express use of the word as a term.

On §7b

The customary meaning: the meaning of customary word-usage in language before, and outside of, science. The customary, natural speaking, in accordance with what was earlier, the mode of the customary, natural being of a living thing, of human beings in their world.

The customary meaning as guide. Caution! It can disappear. Only if there is a comprehensive test of this indicating. Otherwise it's a bit dilettantish! Apparent reasonableness. Here, in particular, the fate and historicity of every language must be taken account of.

Speaking about . . . self-expressing:

Naturally: i.e., a mode that rules preponderantly, *initially and for the most part*, not in an independently formed inquiry, and where such a thing is there, it is the natural one that is there from the outset and leads.

Customarily: everyone speaks this way with others and one understands it without further ado. The “without further ado” and the “one.” The mode of operating in an *average intelligibility* and in a way that is available to all. In the customary the word exhausts itself: ground down, without tone.

The word οὐσία as a term stems from such customary word-usage.²⁰ Even more, in Aristotle (and afterward) the terminological meaning and the customary one stand close beside one another. These are the facts! But not the reverse direction of inference/derivation! Only a *directive* toward the sense of being that was co-experienced by the Greeks and constantly.

The customary meaning: property, possessions and goods, household, estate (cf. the rich use of the word in *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bonitz, Index [Fragment 401]²¹ 1545 a 8 sqq.).²² *Determinate beings* are here addressed as

20. Cf. Rhet. B 13, 1389b 28f: ἐν γὰρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ οὐσία.

21. Insertion by the editor.

22. Editor's note: In the handwritten notes it says, “544a 6–25” after “Index.” Since this passage, in *De animalium historia*, has nothing to do with οὐσία, it appears to be an oversight on Heidegger's part.

being in the genuine sense, genuine beings: encountered in the aforesaid, and this a *being in which along with itself its being is co-experienced*. Correspondingly, the being-character in beings is emphasized. What is meant by this is not only what is at hand in general, but at hand in such a way that it is *available*, and as available it is *present, usable*, the *there* is in its usability, and that as *there-character*: πράγματα, χρήματα, “that with which one has do everyday,” “what stands in use.”²³ The being of this being means: a being *There*. Therefore, οὐσία initially is not some sort of indifferently expressed thing, but originally there is already an interpretation of being-experience as being-*there*.

In the course of customary meaning, the weight rests on beings, but in the how of this genuine there, the terminological meaning (in Aristotle) grasps this how of beings, being, as there, in such a way that the beings of this being are thereby co-intended, occasionally are alone intended. (What “grasping” means?) Thus, with the term, one does not have being in some supra-historical-semantic [?] meaning, but determinate interpretation.

Consequently: 1. orientation in the multifariousness of meaning (τίς ἢ οὐσία), 2. directive for the understanding of being as being-*there*. Customarily: there in dealing and for dealing—the specific there-experience.

On §7c

Thus, a basic orientation in the multifariousness of the meaning of οὐσία is obtained. So at this point only the *terminological meaning* is to be put forward in its multifariousness.

1. οὐσία means the being (of beings), being-ness, being-*there*.
2. οὐσία means beings, beings that are there.

Within these two possibilities there are in each case further distinct meanings. With respect to 1. it means various characters of being, characters that constitute the there as such, each designated at the moment as οὐσία. With respect to 2.: various beings, a manifold, which satisfy the characters of being, and thus are addressed as beings.

Should there be a kind of research that has the being of beings as its topic, οὐσία, we would expect that it would treat of beings, and various beings, in a certain way. For, presumably, it is only in beings themselves that their being can be revealed. Accordingly, there is nothing arbitrary in the fact that the two main degrees of meaning of οὐσία appear in such research. In the end, every genuine concept of being necessarily has these dual degrees of meaning.

It would be in keeping with the order of encounter and access to discuss, first of all, the second meaning of οὐσία.

Ad 2. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν,²⁴ the

23. Cf. Eth. Nic. Δ 1, 1120b 34 sqq.

24. Met. Z 2, 1028 b 8 sq.

ὁμολογούμεναι οὐσία (!).²⁵ “It looks as though being shows itself in the most obvious of beings, which we call the σώματα”: ζῶα, φυτά, τὰ φυσικά σώματα, οὐρανός, ἄστρα, σελήνη, ἥλιος—“the bodies.” What this means for the Greeks is not primarily having-the-matter-of-stuff, materiality, but rather a specifically *obtrusive there-character*. Hence, later: τὸ σὸν σῶμα = σύ, “you” there, with which I now have to do; σῶμα: the “slave,” the “captive,” what stands directly at my disposal, is present. The aforementioned beings are the sort about which everyone speaks in agreement with others, one says of them, without qualification, that they “are,” i.e., that they satisfy the sense of being that guides the addressing of beings as being. “One without qualification” a definite intelligibility of what one means by being. But that is a being that *initially and for the most part is there* in and out of the world, what *is encountered in everydayness*, wherein the everyday operates and maintains itself. Οὐσία plural! A research that examines the being of beings will, accordingly, insofar as it rests on it, be grounded and not discourse phantastically, maintaining itself initially in such beings: ὁμολογοῦνται δ’ οὐσία εἶναι τῶν αισθητῶν τινέξ, ὥστ’ ἐν ταύταις ζητητέον πρῶτον.²⁶ Perception along the way, the sense contains manifold concepts [?].²⁷

[Ad 1.]²⁸ How such research looks will be pursued later in a concrete way, according to its individual steps. For now, we are asking the more systematic question, what comes to light in it as to the being-characters—i.e., according to the multifariousness of the meaning of οὐσία in the first direction of meaning: being-ness. More precisely, we are asking: are the being-characters *there-characters*, and specifically such that in some way stem from the sense of the there that we have come across in the customary meaning of οὐσία?

The customary orientation as to the being-characters is one that we take on the basis of *Metaphysics* Δ 8. At the beginning of this chapter, the beings mentioned above are listed for the purposes of designation, and in such a way that, at the same time, a being-character is gleaned from them. They are ὑποκείμενα,²⁹ what already is lying there before all else. Their being means *being-at-hand*, and at-hand, always already something met with and addressed, insofar as they are to be discussed more in depth.

1. Thus, there results the there-character of presence-at-hand, present-ness. In this case, not in the emphatic sense of what is most immediately and urgently at hand, in the sense of the household, but rather presence-at-hand of that toward which the estate stands, ground and soil, land, animals, plants,

25. Met. H 1, 1042 a 6 sqq.: οὐσία [. . .] ὁμολογούμεναι

26. Met. Z 3, 1029 a 33 sq.

27. Editor’s note: The reading of the last nine words, written in shorthand on the manuscript, is uncertain.

28. Insertion by the editor.

29. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 13 sq.: οὐ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων ἄλλα.

mountains, earth, sky. All that has the character of the most obvious being, this presence-at-hand (in everydayness).

2. In another respect, what is addressed as being-character is that which is “also there,” “also-at-hand,” in beings of the aforementioned mode of being, in such a way that this presence-at-hand is to “blame,” that constitutes τὸ εἶναι, “the being” of the beings in question.³⁰ Οὐσία in this sense is ἡ ψυχὴ.³¹ “Soul” is what constitutes the specific presence-at-hand of beings qua living things, the being-ness of being-in-a-world. Again, a there-character of an entirely peculiar sort (cf. later, the interpretation of ζωή).³²

3. Further, οὐσία names what is “also at hand” in a being that is there as a constitutive part or aspect, to such an extent that the removing of the same, the not-there of the same, takes the being in question so to speak out of its there, i.e., out of its being: e.g., a body with its surfaces removed is no longer there as body; lines are not surfaces.³³ These aspects are ὀρίζοντα,³⁴ “circumscribing,” “they constitute the limits” and “designate” the being as, mark it as, “that there.”³⁵ Some even suppose (Platonists) that this function of the there-character has “number” (limit) for everything and “in general.”³⁶

4. Moreover, what functions as οὐσία is the τί ἦν εἶναι οὗ ὁ λόγος ὀρισμός, [. . .] οὐσία [. . .] ἐκάστων,³⁷ the “what something is in its what-it-already-was,” the being-character of beings that determines it in its descent, coming from . . . into the there. The being whose being constitutes the τί ἦν εἶναι is designated as ἕκαστον, “the particular,” the τί ἦν εἶναι constitutes the particularity of beings.

5. Aristotle collects the aforementioned being-characters into two modes of being-ness, which are determined as 1. “last presence-at-hand,”³⁸ 2. as being “what” there, specifically in the sense of the being-there “for itself” in its own place.³⁹ The there-character of such being is designated as εἶδος, “look,” “appearing-thus-and-so.”⁴⁰

The five being-characters that have been gleaned: ὑποκείμενον, αἴτιον ἐνυπάρχον, μόριον ἐνυπάρχον ὀρίζον, τί ἦν εἶναι (τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον), εἶδος, signify, more or less transparently, a there of beings. In order to understand them as there-characters and thereby grasp the meaning of οὐσία in its motivated

30. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 15: αἴτιον (τοῦ εἶναι) ἐνυπάρχον.

31. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 16.

32. See p. 45 ff., 353 sq.

33. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 17 sqq.: μόρια ἐνυπάρχοντα [. . .] ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον, ὅν ἐπιπέδον οἶμα [. . .] καὶ ἐπίπεδον γραμμῆς.

34. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 17.

35. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 18: τότε τι ομαίνοντα.

36. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 20: καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς δοκεῖ τιος τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

37. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 22 sq.

38. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 24: ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατον.

39. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 25: ὃ ἂν τότε τι ὄν καὶ χωριστὸν ἦ.

40. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 26.

multifariousness, an understanding of the there that pushes further will be necessary. The clarification of this basic phenomenon of the there can succeed for its part only if we seek it out in its there.

The guide was the customary meaning of οὐσία: the being that is there in the distinctive sense and the being not in an unspecified presence-at-hand, but the there of the pressing immediacy of everydayness, the everydayness of living, the there in which and on the basis of which living is “eked out.” Thus, the clarification of the there is guided back to an explication of living as being-in (remark on “subjective”!). Although the presentative investigation is thereby grasped in advance, in fact a pre-figuring of the basic character of the sense of the there, and consequently of being, would already be given, specifically on the basis of the characters enumerated.

On §8

On *Metaphysics* Z-Θ—General:

“There results from the λόγοι themselves [investigation⁴¹ or λόγος as phenomenon] that something else/different is οὐσία—ἄλλαι οὐσίαι [more than one!—τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and ὑποκείμενον.”⁴²

The fundamental methodological (only methodological) priority of οὐσία αισθητή.⁴³ Σύνολον: ὑστέρα with respect to the ordering of categorical originariness, δηλή⁴⁴ “clear,” “transparent,” i.e., in the particulars there is nothing further to be constituted ontologically (Greek). The methodological principles themselves (cf. Jaeger on research maxims).⁴⁵

Interpretation of the “one”: what is encountered by such a one, what one deals with. “What is familiar initially and for the most part in an average way is often imprecise, unarticulated, not salient, without noticeability and has little or nothing of genuine being-there.”⁴⁶ The there-ness, presence, effaced, disappeared. The in general, for the most part, initially, not generally there. The particular: what is the same in particularity, τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα in the characters of particularity, in the character of the “distant,” the “remote.” Toward-what does it first come forth explicitly—in what process?—and seeing? Constitute the being of beings. For, entirely distinct the universal and the specific. Τόδε τι: the what, being-produced in its there.

But *lifting/raising* from there in such a way that precisely this there can

41. Cf. Met. Z 3–4.

42. Met. H 1, 1042 a 12 sq.: ἄλλας δὲ δὴ συμβαίνεις ἐκ τῶν λόγων οὐσίας εἶναι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

43. Cf. Met. Z 3, 1029 a 33 sq.

44. Met. Z 3, 1029 b 31 sq.

45. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*. Berlin 1912, S. Amn.

46. Cf. Met. Z 3, 1029 b 8 sqq.: τὰ δ’ ἐκδοτοὶς γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος.

be made intelligible precisely for us on the basis of a genuine hermeneutical-ontological science. Precisely on account of this, from what is thus familiar, from this being-that-is-there, what shows itself thus as being-there, emerging, following there-ness in this itself.

Thus, the interpretation of beings is called back to being within the circle of the immediate, explicitly, and precisely thereby the look-out radically for being, during *Plato*, with a side-glance at the being-that-is-there, is caught in a phantastical λόγος, and thus, consequently, misses the way in a Greek manner.

Cf. *Physics* A 1. Clear already about the principle: τὰ συγκεχυμένα,⁴⁷ τὰ καθόλου,⁴⁸ what is “as a whole,” πατέρες.⁴⁹ The immediate, what is known, is the *average* and in this way *general*. In it everything is seen, addressed, interpreted on its basis. This introduction of the *Physics*, i.e., the ontological work of Aristotle is programmatic (a better word and more precise!). Precisely what has been said counts as to τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.⁵⁰ Cf. *Topics* Z 4.⁵¹

Basic concepts in their conceptuality, e.g., οὐσία. What is meant, fundamentally, by the return to the customary meaning, to the expressing and addressing of beings as being in the customariness of everyday being-there? The everydayness of the being of life, of human beings, human life as a mode of being. In this connection, speaking in a special sense basic phenomenon. Thus, conceptuality: interpretedness and possibility of this being, of being in the sense of the there, of the there grasped in the moment, discoveredness.

The Aristotelian explication of this being presented in such a way that the understanding of λέγειν and λόγος are thereby determined and made more concrete. Thus, attention is to be given to how the aforementioned being-characters—ψυχή, πέρασ, ἀρχή, τέλος—took part in the being-characteristic of beings (qua living).

On §9

The being of human beings:

Ζωή, there-character of its being—ζῶον πολιτικόν⁵²—ζωή πρακτική (μετὰ λόγου),⁵³ possibility, πέρασ, ἀγαθά, ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθον.⁵⁴

ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια:⁵⁵ ψυχή: κρίνειν, κινεῖν⁵⁶ (ὄρεξις, ποίησις), ἀκούειν,

47. Phys. A 1, 184 a 21 sq.

48. Phys. A 1, 184 a 23 sq.: ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.

49. Phys. A 1, 184 b 13.

50. Phys. A 1, 184 a 15 sq.

51. Top. Z 4, 141 a 26 sq.

52. Pol. A 2, 1253 a 2 sq.

53. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 3: [ζωή] πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.

54. Eth. Nic. A 1, 1094 b 7.

55. Eth. Nic. A 6, 1098 a 7.

56. De an. Γ 2, 427 a 17 sq.

ἐρμηνεύειν (in [the]⁵⁷ world, οὐρανός, day and night)—ἀληθεύειν: modes of the being-there in the particular discoveredness, θεωρεῖν, a possibility, διαγωγή. Cura: anxiety of ἀπουσία, μή ποτε στῆ!⁵⁸ Uncanniness and discoveredness. Anxiety of the disappearing of the genuine there. There: being-present, not-led-into-oblivion,⁵⁹ related to εὐδαιμονία, how of the there.

Above all, λόγος—κατηγορία

Ζωή πρακτική—two investigations, paying attention to:

1. Ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια (μετὰ λόγου): τέλος, ἀγαθόν, τέλειον, πέρας, εὐδαιμονία, ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν: determining the being of human things, the good not in fantasy!

2. Ψυχῆ: λόγον ἔχον—ἄλογον etc. (dual showing!), κρίνειν, κινεῖν, ἀκούειν, ἐρμηνεύειν (guiding back to the whole of phenomena, concrete being: οὐρανός, day and night) ἀληθεύειν, διαγωγή, εὐδαιμονία!

Πρακτική: not “practical” rather than “theoretical,” but rather concern: ἀγαθόν, there—how of being-there. Decisively speaking with . . . Αἴσθησις and thus νοεῖν already decisive for ζῶα.

Transition from *Politics* (therein a basic determination πολιτικόν) to *Ethica Nicomachea* A 6: λόγον ἔχον, πολιτικόν—αἴσθησιν ἀγαθοῦ ἔχον. Averageness and everydayness is the “one,” with-one-another.

Ἀγαθόν: Where evident? Ἔργον, τέχνη, προαίρεσις . beginning [?] constituting the end.

Ἔργον ἀνθρώπου. Ground, address, fore-having, basic experience for this interpretation. Discoveredness of ἔργον: ἀρετή, τέλος etc., ἄριστον. Holding πολιτικόν fast always!

On §23

The Indigenous Character of Conceptuality

In the preceding, the *being-there of the human being* was explicated as *being-in-the-world*, in such a way that λόγος came forth as *the basic character of this being*, determined as being-in: the how of the there of discoveredness.

What purpose guided the consideration of being-there? What is the question after? It is after the *indigenous character of conceptuality*. And why? For the purpose of understanding conceptuality. And why this? Because in this way a concept is *genuinely understood*. “In this way,” i.e., with that which constitutes conceptuality, holding the *clue* for understanding concepts as such. Was this at stake in reaching conceptuality? It should have been sought where it has its being, where it is at home, which it outgrows and where it can only

57. Editor’s insertion.

58. Met. Θ 8, 1050 b 23.

59. Eth. Nic. A 11, 1100 b 17: μή γίνεσθαι περι αὐτὰς λήθην.

be; it should be what it can. With the setting off of the indigenous character of conceptuality, specifically in the case of the Greeks, the concern of an interpretation of basic concepts is given its orientation.

Conceptuality is characterized by three aspects: 1. concretely giving basic experience, 2. guiding claim, 3. prevailing intelligibility. Therefore, the question concerning the indigenous character of conceptuality is the question: *Where* and *how* do the characters mentioned have their *being*, such that they are *possible* in this being, from which they arise in such a way that they also *are there at home* as beings that are there, that they *belong* there; i.e., they themselves constitute a possibility of this being. The purpose of answering the question concerning the indigenous character of conceptuality must be to exhibit a being *of this aforementioned type*.

Being-there was explicated. This explication was such that the basic concepts it treated (in Greek science) were understood: λόγος, ζωή, ψυχή, τέλος, αγαθόν, πάθος, ἡδονή, δόξα, etc. Compare the interpretation as *retrieved*: primarily of *what is there—genuine interpretation*.

1. Is the being characterized in this way in its being the *possibility*, the ground of conceptuality?

2. *How* is being-there this possibility? (The answer in two steps: a), b).)

Ad 1. Demonstration that conceptuality is, in accordance with the three aspects, in being-there as *possibility*. “Possibility,” moreover, in the sense of the being-character of beings in which they are possible; not in the sense of an empty possibility that could, so to speak, be held before being-there. Rather, *it must itself be conceptuality in a certain mode*. Still, it is not necessary that it already have come forward in being-there.

a) *Concretely giving basic experience*, therein lies: a being that can show itself, and a being as disclosing approach to it. Being-there is being-in-the-world: world *there*, discovered in its looking-thus-and-so. Being-in itself in a certain possible mode there: *disposition*. Being-in as dealings, concern—the possibility of *abiding*, abiding alongside . . . , looking-out, having of . . . , abstaining from accomplishing and setting things in place. How, as possibility, becomes properly evident only as in 2. above.

b) The *guiding claim*: *in terms of which* beings are *addressed*. Ultimately, *in terms of their being*. A determinate sense of being implicitly guides: οὐσία in its customary meaning. There: *presence* and *being-produced*. All assertions about beings that say something of them, insofar as and how they “are,” have in the “being” that is said one basic meaning rather than another: *ready*.

c) *The prevailing intelligibility*: being-with-one-another pervaded by ἔνδοξα, in terms of which everything is interpreted, and out of which, along with other aspects, determinate claims to intelligibility (the idea of evidence and of validity, “rigor”), can be formed: familiarity in which understanding and cognition occurs, manner and mode of cultivation, claim to being-familiar.

Ad 2. The *how* of the being of the possibility is defined by the being-character of being-there itself. Here is what is distinctive: this being is determined

in its being precisely as *being-possible*. This pertains to *every* being with the being-character of *living* (see ὄργανον—δύναμις), and each one differently according to the type of *genuineness* of living. In the case of human being-there: ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου, being is determined by πρᾶξις, i.e., ontologically by προαίρεσις, ἔξις προαιρετικῆ, ἀρετῆ; the *ability* to have being-possibilities at one's disposal. (In the case of the θρεπτικόν: being-nourishing, rules regarding nourishment and feeding). Conceptuality is a legitimate possibility of living (existence—scientific research!), this being-possible as being-possible, *having-the-possibility-for* . . . , as such is, according to its being-sense, related to an *also-other*, a *contrary-to-it*. Being-possible as *for* is only from out of the *against* and the *against-which* is always, at the same time, the *out-of-which of being-possible for* . . . , such that the latter is at the disposal of the former. Being-there is, as being-possible, such a thing in this double-sense. The against-which is not another, but is precisely itself, specifically, such that being-possible, as that out of which ἔξις is (ἔξις as πῶς ἔχομεν πρός) constitutes the average and everyday being of being-there.

Conceptuality, in accordance with the three aspects, is a determinate being-possible of being-there in the two-fold sense.

On §24

α) The Out-of-Which, From-Which as the Against-Which It Can Be Cultivated

With the determination of this out-of-which, we attain what is characteristic of the mode-of-being-there—of the average—of what was shown in 1. above. At the same time, the occasion to get a more acute ontological understanding of the three aspects of conceptuality out of the being-character of being-there, and to shift it back toward a basic phenomenon of being-there (fore-character), and thereby to make evident (interpretedness) the uniformity of the three aspects.

Being-there is, as being-in, determined by λόγος, which means, however, that everydayness is pervaded and protected [?] by talk, the spoken: word-thinking and second-hand telling, repeating, book-learning, “the newspaper.” In relation to the three aspects of conceptuality, this means the following.

1) Beings in their there, the world of dealings and of consideration, in each case already determined thus and so, are encountered in it and in the look, in the same being-in. *The apprehension of living itself is already there*. Approaching the world, one grows into a tradition of speaking, seeing, and interpreting—from a world thus encountered, apprehended, interpreted. Being-in-the-world is in each case a *having-the-being(world and living)-thus-and-so*. This already-thus-having, regarding world and living as already had in such a way, is terminologically *fore-having*.

2) The guiding claim: In the same way, a determinate customary sense of being (being—non-being: mode of appropriation of the fore-having, cultiva-

tion with itself) in terms of which the beings had in the fore-having are viewed and questioned. Being-there already maintains itself, in each case, in this looking-out, already operates in this “sight”: look, being-produced—implicitly (dealings, concerned—looking that deals with). The fore-having is already set within a definite *fore-sight*.

3) The prevailing intelligibility. The fore-having that is already there is, as set in the fore-sight that pertains to it, explicated in accordance with a prevailing type to foreground the being-determinations of beings in this way, the concrete as-what determinations. Fore-having and fore-sight are controlled by a determinate call to interpretation, a determinate extent of evidence, a determinate type of showing and of proof (rigor): *fore-grasp*.

Fore-having, fore-sight, fore-grasp constitute the *interpretedness of being-there*, which pervades the particular being-there, being-with-one-another, and which directs interpretations in an average way. Conceptuality is initially there as this interpretedness. The *fore* = already there from the outset, i.e., in relation to being-there: in accordance with its being, governed by . . . *being-in* means to be determined by this *fore-character* of having, sight, and grasp. Being-there: to be in interpretedness that already prevails.

The *being of this prevalence* lies in λόγος, and being-there for itself in its initial and familiar character is presented in λόγος. Thereby, a phenomenon that is already given should become more perspicuously evident afterwards. That which is spoken: sentences, words, expressed and communicated, in circulation, repeated. In opinion, again to discuss that which is discussed without recourse to what is said, to what is spoken further, λόγος can *conceal* and *dissimulate*, precisely, beings. That means: speaking, as operating communicating in interpretedness is implicit and unintentional dissimulating, as *communicating* dissimulating asserting about . . . , i.e., *mis-leading*. Therein lies the possibility of *deception*, of deceiving and being-deceived, and further of the *false*. Being-there, as determined in this way by λόγος and in the fore-character of its interpretedness, is itself the possibility, in accordance with its being, of error and of the erroneous, and furthermore of the false and of lies (see WS 23/24: being-erroneous).⁶⁰ The same connection of λόγος-εἶδος is the ground of the expression “false gold”—“false” of a being in the world. False: therein the look: to look like . . . and yet to be, look as *seeming*.

Prevalence of λόγος: see *Parmenides*. Curiosity: to be let loose in this prevalence, its support. Prevalence of λόγος in relation to the tradition of words, word-meanings. Κληρονομία ὀνόματος, said of ἡδονή—basic concept of the interpretation of being-there: that which it means, originally bears in itself, “heritage,” to seize hold of, specifically σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ εἰλήφασιν.⁶¹ What is initial and most familiar in everydayness seizes hold of the interpretation

60. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, GA 17: 31ff.

61. Eth. Nic. H 14, 1153 b 33 sq.: εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος αἰ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί.

and gives it a pre-figuring. Here, word, language as possession, inheritance—possibility of abuse, decline.

To take up into “saving” that which is given in advance, the possibility of genuinely cultivating.

This fore as *already there* (time): the cultivatable possibility in an against-it.

The fore as *not yet*, the *at-the-outset*.

The having-”rank-in-advance,” taking-rank-in-advance—ἔξις.

Ἀρχή—λόγος, διάνοια—σοφία, ἐπιστήμη.

To leap across from back there, but in the same possibilities and in being-there itself. To take up tradition, to question from the proper fore-path.

β) The Genuinely Positive How. The Positive How:
The Possibility For . . .

Being-there: being-in in interpretedness, λόγος -prevalence, δόξα. On the basis of this “seeming,” as prevailing in advance, the *positive possibility* in relation to this befalling. Not simply out of it—non-sense. Interpretedness in itself, ὑπολήψεις, in terms of raw translucency, genuinely intended. The seizing of the fore-having, fore-sight, fore-grasp, to grasp in interpretedness, cultivating conceptuality.

Πράξις: acting, treating, conferring, debating. Λόγος independent ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Λόγος now μετὰ λόγου for?—Αἴσθησις, νοεῖν, perceiving, looking-out, and delivering what is seen, something as something, in its look, as what, the guiding as-what.

That means: 1. to cultivate fore-having: the being itself, that as that, and it is to be determined, already there, to seize only—appropriation, primary. 2. The cultivation of the guiding as-what, ἀρχή, secure what is foremost. 3. Type of demonstration and of explication: λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἶδος “look,” “being-there in its being-from-out-of . . .,” γένος, presence and producedness, descent from . . .

[?] of the subject-area, leading as-what, from which to determine the beings of the area, in the sense of the prevailing sense of being and the claim of the demonstrating.

1. The independent λόγος in supposing.

2. Supposing itself, ἀληθεύειν, as διά.

3. Interpretation of the possibility of διά, its averageness.

4. The possibility of λόγος καθ’ αὐτό, and therein (in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-grasp) of legitimate διανοεῖσθαι in itself, but such that the original as-what that it itself is is exhibited.

Λόγος in νοεῖν, basic mode of discoveredness, supposing perceiving. Νοῦς and καλούμενος νοῦς,⁶² familiar to everydayness. Νοῦς as διάνοια: διά, sup-

62. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 22.

posing split in two, the being that is there in relation to something as something. This mode of perceiving that is guided in this way has, in a certain way, what is supposed also as *one*.

Discoveredness

So far, λόγος: ἀποφαίνεσθαι—ἀποφαίνεσθαι from something that is maintained as closed and disclosed in taking hold. The mode of possibility: being-in as having-there; accessing and maintaining in λόγος itself, but in experience still more: perceiving.

As always an expressing: not simply fulfillment as type of movement, but appropriation, type of having and type of communication. See ψευδος.

In perceiving: not theoretical, αἴσθησις. Perceiving as perceiving: νοῦς; as determination of being-in—ἡδονή: διάνοια.

Acting, treating, conferring, debating. See “Conclusion.”

Λόγος: uncovering, interpreting—λόγος as basic phenomenon, its basic structure as interpretation.

Λόγος initially and for the most part: τὶ κατὰ τινος—that is the being of assertion, communication.

Why? Αποφαίνεσθαι, νοεῖν as διανοεῖσθαι—therefore, *linked with* seeing, perceiving. What does ἀληθεύειν mean in νοῦς?⁶³ Something as something: grip, εἶδος, genus, producedness: sight (already co-given in being-there).

Why? Ἡδονή, to be glad—to be distressed, δῖωξις—φυγή = ζῆν. Being-disposed = being-there = being-in and the having of being-in = i.e. finding—“oneself”—as a being in the world, to accompany in this being, distress, care.

Our being, in relation to its discoveredness, is initially and for the most part διάνοια. Φύσει οὐσα ζωή, being-in, living, possessions.

Interpretedness (fore-having, fore-sight, fore-grasp) and ἔξις of the ἀληθεύειν—ἐπιστήμη, σοφία.

Νοεῖν as διανοεῖσθαι—ἡδονή—λέγειν τι κατὰ τινος—καὶ ἀληθές και ψευδος—δόξα, averageness.

Ἀληθεύειν, ἀληθές: ἀδιαίρετα θιγγάνειν. Λόγος καθ’ αὐτό: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, γένος, “being-from,” εἶδος, “look,”—there in the present. Z 4: distinctive λόγος.⁶⁴

Ἔξις of research: as what in beings themselves, basic respects. Out from where and wherein beings are evident. ἀρχαί.

Νοῦς—general characteristic: νοεῖν, ἐπιστήμη, δυνατόν, νοῦς ποιητικός—παθητικός, ὕλη, μορφή, κίνησις, ζωή.

Ἀρχή-research, the most original: ὄν ἢ ὄν.

Τί τὸ ὄν? “What are beings” as beings, i.e., what is the being of beings?

63. Cf. Eth. Nic. Z 6, 1140 b 31 sqq.

64. Met. Z 4, 1030 a 6 sq.

νοῦς—διάνοια—ἡδονή

πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.⁶⁵

Νοῦς: ὃ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ βελτίστη ἕξις)⁶⁶—the being-possibility of being-in-the-world in the mode of *being-familiar*, *becoming-familiar* with . . . [as well as]⁶⁷ that of *looking-around*, being-oriented *with* . . . in the wider sense, being-oriented *for* . . . , orientation as “can,” πρὸς ἄλληλα, being-in. Orienting-oneself-thus.

Νοῦς—νοεῖν: ἀπαθές, δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἶδους,⁶⁸ to be able to perceive the look, *to be it in accordance with the possibility* (basic ontological determination of δύναμις!). μηδεμία φύσις ἀλλ’ ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν⁶⁹: the possibility of the there of beings, of their being-there, because the being and being-possible of discoveredness. ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστίν⁷⁰: the being-in-the-world and the being-alongside-itself of being-there “is the being,” its possibility in view of the appropriation of the there, the discoveredness. δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη⁷¹: the being is always there in its “look.”

ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος in the everyday self-interpretation of being-there, the ‘initially and for the most part,’ that which is familiar to τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς [. . .] οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργεῖα τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν:⁷² νοῦς is not the *presence* of beings, the possibility becomes genuine through fulfillment and through σφόδρα νοητόν⁷³, i.e., the being of beings (always originally determined in the ἀρχαί) itself yields precisely the being in its wider non-original determinations in the proper mode.

ὁ κατ’ ἐνεργεῖαν [τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς] [. . .] καὶ τότε δυνάμει πῶς,⁷⁴ also, then, never with everyone (i.e., it is not mixed, solely δεκτικόν, μηθεὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ἀπαθές⁷⁵), but rather also then and always possibility, being of being-in. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν:⁷⁶ in itself remained possibility and thus νοητός,⁷⁷ itself something accessible for itself, the access to itself from out of its being-character (not “reflection” and “I”).

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν. [. . .] ἐκεῖνῳ δὲ [τὸ οὐτῶς [[θεωρητικῶς]] ἐπιστητόν] τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρψει.⁷⁸ The being of νοῦς as

65. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 13.

66. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 10 sqq.

67. Editor’s insertion.

68. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 15 sq.

69. De an. Γ 8, 29 a 21 sq.

70. De an. Γ 8, 431 b 21.

71. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 29.

72. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 22 sqq.

73. De an. Γ 4, 429 b 3 sq.

74. De an. Γ 4, 429 b 6 sq.

75. De an. Γ 4, 429 b 23 sq.

76. De an. Γ 4, 429 b 9.

77. De an. Γ 4, 429 b 26.

78. De an. Γ 4, 430 a 4 sqq.

how of the being of being-there itself in fore-having of ὄλη—ποίησις.

ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος [ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νοῦς] is τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι.⁷⁹ And how is it? As *perceiving supposing of the present*, appropriation of the present—γίνεσθαι—, in the sense of the aforementioned being ἐπιστήμη.

ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἶον τὸ φῶς.⁸⁰ being: being-there, present, present as produced, product of the present.

τιμωτέρον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ἀσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης.⁸¹

Supposing and αἴσθησις—φάναι.

σύνθεσις τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὡσπερ ἐν ὄντων.⁸² being-completed, ἐν, there; always already the one with the other, i.e., something in its look, in this regard, τὶ κατὰ τινας—here καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές.⁸³

Where τὸ ψεῦδος is not, i.e., not σύνθεσις, there νόησις in terms of ἀδιαίρετα.⁸⁴ supposing of that which is precisely not uncoverable in the ‘as that.’ Here, there is for uncovering no possibility of dissimulating, of mis-leading. Guiding simply toward itself: τὶ καθ’ αὐτό—not in any respect and not among others.

Ἀληθεύειν is σύνθεσις not originally as the genuine possibility, but derivatively: the averageness of ἀληθεύειν as determined by being-there—διάνοια. This διά operates, maintains itself in a determinate mode in genuine ἀληθεύειν, which initially in λόγος—externally—, but already ἀποφαίνεσθαι, δηλοῦν, shows the basic function. Judgments true and false—from there discussion of the concept of truth. On the contrary!

Αἴσθησις and νοεῖν: τῷ φάναι μόνον ὅμοιον.⁸⁵ “Naming”: to name simply with names, to call something to itself and have it there. But when ἡδύ and λυπηρόν are encountered, then it is κατα- and ἀποφάναι.⁸⁶ World there in the συμφέρον, “conduciveness,” as thus and so. Being-in determined by ἡδονή, disposition in being with the ‘as thus and so’. Disposition is δῖωξις and φυγή, “to go” toward something *as that*, “to retreat” before it *as it*. Primary accomplishment of interpretation! Something as something and so ψεῦδος is given, dissimulating. Σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις: out . . . toward, away from . . .—not alongside itself.

To the extent that prevalence, in an average way, is a task, though a possible one, so νοεῖν and ἀληθεύειν having there, is simply calling to itself. This task: in relation to the guiding as-what, this itself no longer in another. Here

79. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 15.

80. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 15.

81. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 18 sq.

82. De an. Γ 6, 430 a 27 sq.

83. De an. Γ 6, 430 a 27.

84. De an. Γ 6, 430 a 26 sq.: Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαίρετων νόησις ἐν τούτοις, περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος.

85. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 8: τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν.

86. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 9: ὅταν δὲ ἡδύ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἶον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα.

only, to the extent that perceiving gets a grip or does not.

Concept: something *as* something—as-character. Beings as what? In their being (ἀρχή, that which is decisive—‘as what’—*Physics* A 1, *Metaphysics* Z 3).

To experience, to have there, to look into, to interpret, something as something. Λόγος: τί κατὰ τινοσ—λόγος καθ’ αὐτό.

Λόγος in νοῦς. Νοῦς as how of being-in determined by ἡδονή. Ἡδονή and being-in as having-there. Φόβος: the ancients—to drive fear away. To clarify, to understand beings as being!

Δίωξις—φυγή, ὄρεξις, νοεῖν, διανοεῖσθαι, προαίρεσις.

On §25

In such being-in, speaking about . . . , the possibility of further tasks. See beginning of lecture—to take up: to what extent the indigenous character of conceptuality? Cultivation of the fore-having, fore-sight, fore-grasp.

The fore: being-in and care, disposition. See *Nicomachean Ethics* A 12: the way that the human being is, so he speaks, how extensively it always brings the being-an-issue of beings for being-there, such that the human being is resolved.

Everydayness leaps over and so back into itself, not philosophically out from itself.

Concept-cultivation as ἔξις—existence, research, scientific knowledge.

Aristotle—tradition, Plato.

Fore-having—cultivation.

The proximity of the world as the always—genuine being! Basic experience, but such that it shows itself in itself in the proper way. As such a basic fact posited in fore-having and originally worked out κίνησις.

On §26a

[*Physics*]⁸⁷ Γ 1: Disposition

200 b 12–25: Basic topic of μέθοδος περὶ φύσεως: κίνησις and what is co-given in it (ἔπεται, τὰ ἐφεξῆς).⁸⁸

b 25–32: Advanced giving of the basic modes of being: ὃν δυνάμει and ἐντελεχείᾳ,⁸⁹ ὃν of the categories,⁹⁰ with it πρὸς τι,⁹¹ the “in relation to . . .”

b 32–201 a 3: Κίνησις not παρὰ τὰ πράγματα,⁹² how of the being of beings

87. Editor’s note.

88. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 16: περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς.

89. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 26 sq.

90. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 28.

91. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 28 sq.

92. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 32 sq.

that are there determined in the form of being of the categories.

a 3–9: Certain categories (that were just cited) allow a διχῶς:⁹³ the being that is there, it as thus and so; possibility of the “from . . . toward . . .” of those beings. Look corresponding to movement.

a 9–15: Definition of κίνησις—λόγος κινήσεως.

a 15–19: Concrete illustration and elucidation of movements.

a 19–27: The being-determined of those beings by δύναμις—ἐνέργεια and the possibility of contexts of movement in beings. That which moves itself is moveable—whether that is the case, questionable.

a 27–b 15: Refined definition of movement and its explication.

On §26b

In everydayness, and precisely in it, basic experience of the always-there, breaking out of the sense of being as of genuine being. Genuine, insofar as being-there itself is such that being matters to it: σωτηρία, not to vanish out of being-there. This sense of being, more or less, explicitly leads all speaking with . . . about . . . , which beings, always different in their being, make explicit and maintain in explicitness. But in this way speaking conceals prevalence and guidance, displaces being-in, speaking about . . . : ἀληθές—ψευδός, the means is δόξα, i.e., λόγος is there by way of ψευδός, communicating is misleading. And precisely this overpowering there becomes concealed through λόγος (Parmenides)—at least free for encountering.

Ἦδονή—φόβος of the ancients: “fear” and the ability-to-disappear, change, run its course, possibly stop; fears the completed of having-disappeared, the completed of the there, hoped for present, held fast. The being-belief and, at the same time, in itself a being-interpretation and being-interpretedness. The trusted as the familiar: to bring into the familiar, to protect, to care for, in the familiar, to drive fear out, διαγωγή. Everydayness, tradition, ἔνδοξα.

On §26d

Ἐντελέχεια

See H. Diels, *Etymologica*. [In:]⁹⁴ “Journal of Comparative Language Research,” Volume 47 (1916), pp. 200–203.

See, for the clarification of meaning: *Metaphysics* Θ 3, 1047, a 30.

Ἐντελέχεια: Maintaining-itself-in-being-completed, completed-lying-before, present (simple availability for . . .).

Etymology: Ἐντελέχεια presupposes the only belatedly demonstrable

93. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 3.

94. Editor’s note.

έντελεχῆς (see νουνέχεια, νουνεχής, “intelligent,” “circumspect,” “cautious,” νοῦν ἔχειν), έντελές and ἔχειν: beings in completion, to have this being, to constitute it. To give up the root ending—ες. Ἐντελόμισθοι, Demosthenes, contra Polycl. 50, 18: καὶ ἐτέρους ναύτας έντελομίσθους προσέλαβον. οἱ έντελεῖ τὸν μισθὸν λαμβάνουσιν.⁹⁵ Diels, [*Etymologica*, p.]⁹⁶ 203: “Property of completedness”—does not reflect the basic ontological sense: maintaining-itself-in-being-completed, to be the being-completed, to genuinely be-there! Τέλος: “end,” not the final addition, but how of the there of a being that is from production. Genuinely there: what is *only* so, i.e., what was never produced, never had the possibility to not be, but always already there. What is always already thus completed, completed because never made, has no possibility, also does not have the “can” of disappearing.

To see the *range* of these determinations of movement. Λόγος κινήσεως: look of movement itself as movement, a mode of the being-there of a being, co-said in φύσις. Movements as *altering themselves*, the there of something *self-altering*. And *altering* in the widest sense, not simply as altering of place, altering of site, locomotion. $s = c \cdot t$: it does not arrive at something like the clarification of movement, but rather approaches the arrangement in the basic relation of clarification of extents; in *c* the movement of place is already presupposed *s/t*. It is much more important to clarify the being-altering, altering as how of the being of beings. Later, not movement itself as how of the being-there of a being, but system of relations of the measurement of movement. Aristotle defined *speed* in the determination of the faster and slower.

That means: to uncover the types of being-*characters* that, insofar as they determine beings in their being, characterize it such that it must be regarded as found in movement—ἐμφαινόμενα in λόγος κινήσεως. In the same way that κίνησις τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως ἐμπεριέχεται.⁹⁷

1. With movement itself co-given, a series of determinations of beings that must also be investigated, in order to be able to address the full there of every moved thing in its being. They are πάντων κοινά,⁹⁸ “common to every being [of the aforementioned determination].” ὕστερα [. . .] ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρία,⁹⁹ “later, the research into the particularities of a determinate region of being.” Production in advance, what accrues to something as such—ἀρχαί. But this is not to say that this would, therefore, already also be the most familiar, on the contrary (cf. δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν).¹⁰⁰

2. ἔστι δὴ τι,¹⁰¹ “it is, therefore, something manifestly there”: 1. as “pure

95. H. Diels, *Etymologica*, S. 203.

96. Editor’s note.

97. Themistii in Aristotelis Physica paraphrases 202, 7 sq.

98. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 22.

99. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 24 sq.

100. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 13 sq.

101. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 26: ἔστι δὴ τι τὸ μὲν έντελεχεῖα μόνον.

presence,” “comporting-itself-in-pure-being-completed”; 2. there—in the tree, wood, tree-trunk, as a ship’s keel—συμφέρον, “serviceable,” “applicable,” “useable”; therefore: encountered in dealings that are serviceable for . . . , is there in such a way; encountered by a ship-builder in a way that looks at the forest, and the tree-trunk is there in this “can.” We see that which also and from the outset lies in the forest or stands there as tree. There: being-referred to . . . Looking-around, τέχνη—the world in its being-around and being-so. Πρακτόν and λεγόμενον: beings that are simply there, and in their there and as this. In being-there, “can”: is able to be addressed in accordance with various modes of being-there.

Circumscribing of the intelligibility of the categories! Fore-having in the how of the basic ontological concepts, viewpoints, that guide the addressing of the κινούμενον in terms of its being-there-thus (κίνησις) as such, thereness as such.

The being that is there thus, that which is addressed by the categories, and which points to a διχῶς in the how of being that is thereby uncovered: ἐντελέχεια and the there of δύναμις, according to their being, stand in the conditions for understanding of *alterability*, are alterable, as alterable being-there—there—characters of the alterable, of change!

Categories: πρὸς τι, “in relation to . . .” Producing from, bringing something into line, to wrap something up is in itself an out-toward-another.

Basic determination of κίνησις: no παρά,¹⁰² no καθ’ αὐτό, no χωριστόν, not a being in itself, independent, but in that which is moving and beings that are in movement. Movement, as ‘in movement,’ is a how-there of beings, and therefore a *how* in accordance with being-possibilities as they are expressed in the categories. These have no κοινόν, there is no being, the genus would be, what would be what it is, without ever being such in a definite how, i.e., to be there; not anything like movement in itself.

Ἐνεργεῖα καὶ δυνάμει: Which beings? Ἐνεργεῖα καὶ δυνάμει: maintaining-in-a-being-completed, there, present. Δυνάμει—meaningfulness. This being that is so, distinguished by ἐνέργεια: this there, constituting its there purely from out of itself—chair, house, this slave, Socrates, tree, tree-trunk. World: sky—surrounding world, closest position (situation). The to-character of the positive there: within and precisely in the there, i.e., especially, “to,” “for” (being referring to), set forth in the discoveredness of πρᾶξις, and λεγόμενον from out of ἡδονή, συμφέρον, ἀγαθόν. Of course, primarily closer ἀκίνησις.

These beings “in the categories.” Corollarium, not παρά. Beings in the how of the categories, διχῶς.

Τὸ δυνάμει (*Metaphysics* Θ 7)

When is a particular being δυνάμει? Not always, now and again, now and

102. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 32.

again not, “not at just any time at all,”¹⁰³ only now and then. Being-possible, as “can,” is a being’s *distinctive being-there-thus*, i.e., a *how* of its there insofar as it already is—already, i.e., *ἐνεργεία*. “Is the earth the being-‘able’ of being-human? Previously, if γῆ, then already σπέρμα, but perhaps not only then.”¹⁰⁴ It must change itself into another “can.” “Γῆ not yet ἀνδριάς, it must first change into being-bronze.”¹⁰⁵

How is that from which something changes into . . . , that out of which it becomes other as this and that, which *constitutes with being* that about which we say: εἶναι—ὁ λέγομεν εἶναι,¹⁰⁶ what we address in each case as being-there? It is not the out-of-which of its constituting, the from-where of changes. The statue is not bronze, it is not in being-there from being-bronze; the chest is not in being-there from out of wood, is not τόδε τι. Wood in itself is not at all there in the chest, but the *chest* is there, πρακτόν, and the chest is “wooden”¹⁰⁷ in its being-there. It is not that other as τόδε τι, the wood, but is “that-like,”¹⁰⁸ not other, but “other-like”; in the look, appearing of the chest, not the wood, but the being-wooden. The from-out-of-which of the being-here of a being that is there, the from-out-of-which of its constitution, is not itself there, *ἐνεργεία*, but rather the present is determined for us from the primary look: chest.

κινούμενον, ὡς τὸ ἐκείνινον.¹⁰⁹ movement is not a being, but a *how* of being-there, such that the *how* of this there is something already present: look. Ἐκείνινον—ἐκείνο: the distant, not the nearest there (always the ‘this and there,’ look), with and in this “that,” in the way that this “that-like” is. In the case of that which is moved: to find in movement; the initial, genuine presence: it, what moves itself, “it is mobile.” *The* movement is not, is never there! Also, no δυνάμει! Cf. E 2: οὐ γὰρ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τι ἢ μεταβολή.¹¹⁰ Perhaps the wood, tree-trunk? That which is moved does not also consist of movement! What, then, is movement? Not a being, but a *how of being*, and therefore to be determined from there!

Preparation of the determination of the definition of movement. There it shows itself as *how* of the there, being-present of the world. And if so, then precisely it as *how* fundamentally *with*, in order to properly understand the there of the world in its being.

1. Presence: ἐντελεχείᾳ, δυνάμει—ἐνεργείᾳ. 2. Mode of encounter: to show itself as world, λόγος, of all dealings μετὰ λόγον. 3. Not παρά. 4. διχῶς.

From 4, to apprehend the explication of being as possible being-present,

103. Met Θ 7, 1048 b 37: οὐ γὰρ ὅποτεοῦν.

104. Met Θ 7, 1048 b 37 sqq.

105. Met Θ 7, 1049 a 17 sq.: ἡ γῆ οὐπω ἀνδριάς δυνάμει· μεταβαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός.

106. Met Θ 7, 1049 a 18.

107. Met Θ 7, 1049 a 19: ζῦλινον.

108. Met Θ 7, 1049 a 20: ἐκείνινον.

109. Met Θ 7, 1049 a 33.

110. Phys. E 2, 225 b 20 sq.

and to understand movement as *unified* on this ground.

Κινησία: cf. Fragment 586: κινήσις δύο λέγει Ἀριστοτέλης γεγονέναι.¹¹¹

By the way: the ονομάζεσθαι τὴν μεταβολήν.

Addressing and Designating μεταβολή

μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰς ὃ ἢ ἐξ οὗ κινεῖται, ονομάζεται ἡ μεταβολή.¹¹² I.e., seen in terms of what? In terms of the within-which, “in which” what is moved alters itself.¹¹³ οὔτε γὰρ κινεῖ οὔτε κινεῖται τὸ εἶδος ἢ ὁ τόπος ἢ τὸ τοσόνδε, ἀλλ’ ἔστι κινουὺν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται.¹¹⁴ ἢ κίνησις οὐκ ἐν τῷ εἶδει.¹¹⁵

Movement is a *how* of being, not the *being* of presence. Presence does not move, but κίνησις is a how of presence, i.e., κίνησις is an *ontological* determination. Being-moved is a mode of the being-present of determinate beings.

Ἀγορεύειν: on the market, where being-with-one-another is played out each day, to talk in public, such that everyone can hear it, perceptible to everyone. Basic mode of something self-evident. Κατηγορία, κατηγορεῖν a λόγος, exhibiting, and in a distinctive way: “to say something to someone’s face,” that he is this and that, “to accuse.” Κατηγορίαὶ τῶν ὄντων: modes of saying-something to a being’s face. What? That it is this and so, i.e., to uncover beings in the how of articulated being-in-itself.

Λόγος, λεγόμενον: the how of beings, how they are in themselves, how they can be. Beings: the present beings that are there. Οὐσία: “possessions,” “household,” that which I manipulate, and in manipulation produce again, bring to use. Modes of the being-there in itself of that which is present in the surrounding world. Ζωὴ πρακτική: what is uncovered in being-in as ζωὴ πρακτική—συμφέροντα, ἀγαθά.

Only because the categories, modes of being-there of the beings of the surrounding world, are at hand in the world as world, and because ἀγαθόν is πέρας of πράξις, πρακτὸν κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν,¹¹⁶ the modes of being-there are modes of *being-conducive*, which is determined as constitutive of being-completed.

Because of that an ἀγαθὸν καθόλου makes no sense; it takes away the very being-determination that is constitutive of beings (ἀγαθόν): always is. Ἀγαθόν is not just something unlike “value,” but rather no a priori, ideal being at all; it is what it is, always as this—the καιρός.

Categories as guides:¹¹⁷ not schematically, but they appropriate beforehand the particular concrete content of the how of being-there in question! Not to

111. Fr. 586, 1573 b 28 sq.: ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ταῖς διδασκαλίαις δύο φησὶ γεγονέναι [κινήσιος].

112. Phys. E 1, 224 b 7 sq.

113. Cf. Phys. E 1, 225 a 1 sq.: πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστὶν ἐκ τινος εἰς τι (δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα: μετ’ ἄλλο γὰρ τι καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον δηλοῖ, τὸ δ’ ὕστερον).

114. Phys. E 1, 224 b 5 sqq.

115. Phys. E 1, 224 b 25.

116. Eth. Nic. Γ 1, 1110 a 13 sq.

117. Cf. De an. A 1, 402 a 11 sqq.

place under a form arbitrarily and formalistically, but just the first indication that makes all investigation at all necessary.

Basic mode of being-in-the-world: of all dealings μετὰ λόγου, i.e., implicitly guided by κατηγορία, and this διχῶς (the average), implicitly, concealed, on detours, initially in the world—σχῆμα.

Διαρέσεις simply for λέγειν τι κατὰ τινας. As what? As the ἐντελεχεία ὄν λόγος—κατηγορία, ψυχὴ—ἐντελεχεία, modes of being-there, being-present, the present that is, having the world.

Κατηγορεῖν: Customary Meaning

Rhetoric A 3, 1359 a 18.¹¹⁸ Cf. the context, and what demands the intelligibility and the fulfillability of κατηγορεῖν. Especially, 1358 b 11.¹¹⁹ In terms of what can I reveal the being that is there? In terms of its being. “To raise an objection,” “to put it on its account,” “to convict it.” In which attitude of speaking? In being-in, concrete ζωὴ πρακτική. Cf. *Rhetoric* A, Chapter 10.

On §26e

Nicomachean Ethics A 4:

1. There is no good in general.
 2. Even the simply good in itself (not πρὸς ἄλλο) is not good in general.
 3. And if there were such a thing, it would not settle anything. Useless!
- Earlier: πέρας—πρακτόν, with which a concern always comes to an end.

Origin of the categories in accordance with that which was constituted, not without purpose, in relation to the present question concerning λόγος, already evident earlier. Λόγος: to speak with another about the world, to bring it into being uncovered. This speaking is not what implicitly stands out in the initially as such, but there are already basic modes of the interpretation of beings in their being-there. What is uncovered therein is always a how of the there of beings that are there. Number: principle and system? Not accidental that Aristotle wavered 10,8,4,2.

Naming (referred to λόγος) and what is thereby meant are the guides of speaking-about, for being-in-the-world in closest customary dealings. The world there exhibited primarily in λόγος, in its presence. Modes in which the being that is there shows itself, with regard to which all discourse operates.

Accordingly, neither beings nor assertions nor concepts are articulated and “arranged” by it, but rather being in the sense of the possibilities of being-present.

1. τὰ πρῶτα τῶν γενῶν:¹²⁰ ‘as what,’ derived from . . . Κατηγορία is what

118. *Rhet.* A 3, 1359 a 16 sqq.: ἅπαντες [. . .] κατηγοροῦντες [. . .] οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύονα πειρῶνται.

119. *Rhet.* A 3, 1358 b 10 sq.: δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία τὸ δ’ ἀπολογία.

120. *Met.* B 3, 998 b 15.

it is in λόγος, always this. When interrogated regarding its being, that which is determined as this or that has a descent from categories; it stems from there. What it is leads back to this stem.

2. τὰ ἔσχατα κατηγορούμενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων:¹²¹ where beings in their there no longer yield any possible ‘as what,’ the ultimate ‘as what’ of encountering the world. There: to be ever here and now in the present, not generally and nowhere!

3. τὰ γένη.¹²²

4. αἱ διαιρέσεις:¹²³ simply; shattering of beings simply in their possible there, and with that the possible ‘as what,’ the primary, the from where. Every species with concrete content is what it is (color), quale.

5. πτώσεις,¹²⁴ casus, inflections of λέγειν (of the being-there of beings).

Κατηγορία—κατηγορήματα: having a look, how of being.

Σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας: ἡ κατηγορίας, the addressing of beings simply in their being.

Γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν: always its own stem, to not stem from another. “Being,” ὄν, not itself γένος (ὕλη, ὑποκείμενον).¹²⁵

On §26f

Διχῶς: Turning-oneself in relation to . . . , the toward-which doubled, ἀφ’ ἑκατέρων τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον.¹²⁶ Οὐσία: γένεσις—φθορά. A being that is there, something present, something lying before must be δυνάμει in itself; δυνάμει, i.e., in relation to the how of its being-there, a ‘from . . . to . . .’ must be grounded in the how of its being. For this δυνάμει ὄν should certainly be ἐνεργεία, should be put to work, and ἐνέργεια the how of the there of a being.

To unfold the explication from there. Κίνησις is the there of the ‘from . . . to . . .’ as such. A being must be able to be in a certain way from itself. And that it can do so—the ownmost possibility of a being itself—, categorically exhibited, i.e., κίνησις all the more, not παρά.

The categorical ‘to . . .’: The being that is there in the how of its being is *possible being-‘from . . . to . . .’* Therefore, εἶδος, appearing as presence, presence in the look, is *possible absence*—mode of being-present and precisely as follows: of something about which I say: “But it lacks something.” The *lack* = “to be missing.” To be concerned and “to be missing”—to be wanting: “I

121. Met. B 3, 998 b 16. Cf. Met. a 2, 994 b 21 sq., B 3, 999 a 15 sq.

122. Met. B 3, 998 b 28.

123. An. post. B 13, 96 b 25.

124. Met. N 2, 1089 a 26.

125. Editor’s note: On the topic of the “Categories,” see also the “Supplements” in the appendix.

126. Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor priores commentarii. Consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae ed. H. Diels. Berlin 1882. 92v 41.

miss him very much.” Not “to be missing,” but rather to have there present: *to have it at one’s disposal*.

The remaining διχῶς: ἀναλογήσει τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ στερήσει.¹²⁷ Κρεῖττον—χεῖρον: more or less. Constitutive averageness. Averageness and rest. The κατηγορίαί genuinely, but as such not explicitly; not explicitly but there in the initial of the average, more or less. Present and absent.

Surrounding world of concern: With κίνησις, with the uncovering of the categorical articulation of being-there, the world first becomes evident, although it is not the closest surrounding world as there of dealings that is the explicit and genuine topic.

Διχῶς: ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μεταβολὴ ἀφείσθω· ἐν ἅπασί τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ πάντων.¹²⁸

The genuine μεταβολή: ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ τοῖς μεταξὺ καὶ ἐν ἀντιφάσει¹²⁹—μεταβολή.

λέγω δὲ ὑποκειμενον τὸ καταφάσει δηλούμενον,¹³⁰ something as something, what is evident ‘as this and that.’

Why “logically” phenomenological! That means the addressing-from-the-outset from which something is exhibited—from which it is evident as in itself, and therefore is itself evident.

Being as being-there of the world. Being-there: 1. *there as present*. 2. *there from out of here*—completed: there, present, *true!*

Beings, they are *thus* and therefore something *is not yet*, but it *can be*. *To be useable for . . .*: The being that is there in this way, being useable, i.e., being able to be this and that, is this in itself, a ‘from . . . to . . .’ Beings in the how of the categories διχῶς. It is an ability-to-be: this and therefore that, from . . . to . . ., halfway there in the ‘more or less,’ it can also be otherwise. Wood, this wood, lies before us in usability, lies before us for the there as from-which-something-is-constituted in the chest. Lying-before, being-at-hand—rest. This being that is there, insofar as it is present as such with regard to its being-useable, is in *movement* or *rest*. Rest only a *limiting case of movement*.

There the surrounding world: 1. averageness—διχῶς, 2. rest.

On §26g

Κίνησις: ἐντελέχεια, “presence,” τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, “of a determinate being-there to . . ., insofar as it is this,” ἢ τοιοῦτον.¹³¹

Κίνησις: presence of the ability-to-be-a-chest of this wood as such (related

127. A.a.O. 92v 44 sq.: πανταχοῦ δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον τῶν ἀντικειμένων οὐδὸς τὸ εἶδους ἔχον λόγον εἶδει καὶ αὐτὸ ἀναλογήσει, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ στερητικὸν στερήσει.

128. Phys. E 1, 224 b 26 sqq.

129. Phys. E 1, 224 b 29.

130. Phys. E 1, 225 a 6 sq.

131. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 10 sq.: ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἢ τοιοῦτον.

to the ability-to-be-a-chest). The ability-to-be as of the character of being-there, not thought, planned, supposed, but encountered in the surrounding world. As being, becoming-made is in the workshop. Being-moved: a being in movement. It is not a chest that is there, not wood, not a room for storing wood, but rather *something in work*, the carpenter has it precisely *in hand!*

Κίνησις as how of the there. This κίνησις ἐνέργεια: the how of being-there as *being-in-work*. Movement, ἐνέργεια, does not negate the possibility, but contains it, constitutes its there—the *effective possibility*.

Moreover: to make intelligible only on the basis of the being-a-being of presence and its modes—meaningfulness, usability, etc. These determinations must be seen. Phenomenon of the there, presence (presence is concentrated as being of the there): before me, at the place where I am, present, now. Presence and there: *situated temporality*. To be in the world, to be time, to be *the present*.

Therefore, *rest* and not meaningfulness? *Constitutive for the phenomenon of the real of the world*. Being-wood is not the same as being-there in this determinate usability. There in this way, it only is a being as in the work, in movement. Κινούμενα, though, are beings as encountered in the world, with which it has to do. In work, one has the surrounding world (also that which is of interest, and the like). We are concerned with the surrounding world in hand. *Even what is at rest is there in this mode*. What I have in hand can rest, and only what is being-in-hand can rest. Not every not-being-moved is rest, ἡρεμία only a determinate ἀκίνησία: it rests in the workshop during the mid-day break. But the world is very often and for the most part there, and that means κινούμενον too. The surrounding world, the there character of rest, [belongs]¹³² to being-there. Rest *prior* to presence, to the extent that we forget, it does not occur to us that it is ἀκίνησία in a determinate way: to while, now, beforehand, afterwards. Rest as there-mode of beings in movement as that which is of concern and is of the world, and only with that is meaningfulness fully determined.

Customary: a being—“real thing”; it is independently of being-grasped and being-thought. [One]¹³³ acts on ‘reality’ without ever having seriously asked about it, and without showing which sense of being [it possesses],¹³⁴ whether it is at all unified, handed down, experienced in a peculiar way. “Thing” in this context: what is not at all there in the way it is supposed that it is there.

On the other hand, there is not time to even understand Aristotelian research, let alone to take it seriously. And that for the same reason: an indeterminate concept of actuality, invocation of the healthy human understanding. Actual—possible; the possible is the non-actual. Equipped with this, one can deal with Aristotle’s definition of movement. Therefore: Aristotle says, movement

132. Editor’s note.

133. Editor’s note.

134. Editor’s note.

is actuality, but the actuality of δυνάμει, of possibility, i.e., of non-actuality—actuality of inactuality: a contradiction—and he even lets it stand—antinomy, dialectic! That sounds very ingenious, but there is nothing to it except thoughtlessness, or perhaps something else: irresponsibility to history.

Κίνησις not παρά, but “in” the aforementioned how of the there. “In”: cf. ἐκείνινον. Movement is there like wood in a chest, but it cannot itself be like wood to earth and water, it is itself a there-character, mode of being-at-hand. As how of the there, arrested “that,” even said ontologically that these are themselves διχῶς: κίνησις—δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ.¹³⁵ Insofar as a being is there in the how of being-moved, it has the character of the categories, more precisely the four categories mentioned above, and these διχῶς.

A being that is there as δυνάμει, present, in presence, there now in this being-thus—we then say: “It is built,”¹³⁶ it is there through alteration. Here, on the basis of the type of explication already evident, the way that movement is understood as a determinate being-present. And this altering itself, becoming-altered in altering is οἰκοδόμησις.¹³⁷ Altering something, ποιοῦν—to be itself in alteration, πάσχον. To understand on the basis of explication? Being-present: ever altering itself, itself but also another, occurring but with me—to be related from itself. Something warm alters something cold, it is there altering in the mode of changing itself, becoming cold.

Not just any ἐντελέχεια, absence even of the non-moved, but rather τότε—ὅταν, αὐτή, “neither before nor after,”¹³⁸ but then, *in the now*. ὅτε μὲν ἐνεργεῖν ὅτε δὲ μή:¹³⁹ “to be in work,” being-present now of δυνάμει. This being-now-present of δυνάμει is a limiting case: being-now-present of δυνάμει as rest (rest and now, presence and time). Rest is primarily grounded therein since resting is a how of the there of a being in work, a being taken into work. Already having-been-completed rests there, can rest. Rest is constitutive of this there, i.e., meaningfulness.

Ἐνέργεια, “being-in-work,” being-there in becoming-produced. The hermeneutic fact of the matter: I and you, we are not concerned with it, and yet it is there, it happens, is concerned with itself, is there arising, and the like—to come from itself into presence and, e.g., to rest therein—reality. Φύσις characterizes a being that is: *to be in itself the worker of itself*.

Οἰκία: for the “house,” being-there as *being-completed*—οἰκοδόμησις, which ἐνέργεια. Ἐνέργεια, particularly being-there as *being-uncompleted*, a how of the there of ἐντελέχεια.

How of the there of something: how does “being-in-work” come to this

135. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 20.

136. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 17: οἰκοδομεῖται.

137. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 18.

138. Phys. Γ 1, 201 b 5 sqq.: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αὐτή, καὶ ὅτι συμβαίνει τότε κινεῖσθαι ὅταν ἡ ἐντελέχεια ἢ αὐτή, καὶ οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον, δῆλον.

139. Phys. Γ 1, 201 b 8.

ontological-hermeneutical pre-eminence? Because being = *being-produced*. There = being-present, being-completed, being-here in the now, in a presence; in being-present, being-there-having, abiding with . . .

Abiding, being-in precisely the there of living. A stone does not abide, it happens. But an animal: “It abides” in its heart! Θιγεῖν and ἀφή: primary and primitive being-in. “Dwelling”! Οὐσία, “household”! “In” = “abiding with . . .,” cf. Grimm!¹⁴⁰ Primary hermeneutical category, not at all spatial as to be contained, contained in . . . With-which of abiding!

Until now, not hermeneutically seen: being-in, abiding, presence, being-present, disposition (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* K 3), waiting for something, not-there, to flee in the face of . . . , to go toward . . . , care. Fulfillment of waiting: concern. To take back over-lighting! Κίνησις, ὄν from ποιήσις, dealings, and that means *primarily* the world—not until later did it become a category of nature. Here, initially the indifference of that which is initial.

Παρουσία, οὐσία (cf. φῶς)—basic explication: ἐντελέχεια, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια. With this, Greek ontology first comes into its own. But that means: how, which being-there, always what, which are we? Everything shifts in the direction of this question. Being-there in general experienced as ontological task. One means, one has [to do]¹⁴¹ with consciousness and person and living. Here, everything breaks down. Cf. *Jaspers*.

Κίνησις a how of the there, the σώζει τὴν δύναμιν,¹⁴² the δυνάμει ὄν, it contains it in the there—to maintain it in being-uncompleted, to allow being-there. The δυνατόν is ἀτελής,¹⁴³ and therefore its how of the there is, as this ἀτελής, such that this how of the there “saves,” and that is κίνησις. Completed: *is already* completed. Ἐνέργεια: the there, the not-yet-completed. Οἰκία: the completed, but not the completed, what is with its end, δυνάμει. Τελειότητα related to the how of the there, whose genuineness for δυνάμει is precisely ἐνέργεια. Duration of movement: If this how of the there stops, then the house is there completed—no more movement, no longer in movement.

On §27a

[*Physics* Γ]¹⁴⁴ Chapter 2

Confirmation:

I. [201 b 16–18] :¹⁴⁵ Topic: seen together 1. “out of that which the earlier

140. Cf. Artikel “in.” In: *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm*. Verten Bandes zweite Abtheilung. Leipzig 1877, Sp. 2081 ff.

141. Editor’s note.

142. Themistii in Aristotelis Physica paraphrases 205, 22 sq.: κίνησιν λέγω καὶ τελειότητα τῆς δυνάμεως. πᾶσα γὰρ τελειότης σώζει ὃ τελειοί. 213, 1 sq.: ἄλλη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἢ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐν τῷ πράγματι σώζουσα αὐτοῦ τὸ δυνάμει.

143. Phys. Γ 1, 201 b 32.

144. Editor’s note.

145. Editor’s note.

interpreters agreed upon in the discussion,”¹⁴⁶ until then, that 2. “not easy to explain otherwise.”¹⁴⁷

II. 201 b 18–24: Place in which γένος? What kind of ontological name? Being-characters: “being-otherwise,” “being-unlike,” “not-being.”¹⁴⁸

III. 201 b 24–27: αἴτιον in the phenomenon of κίνησις itself for this ontological descendedness: ἀόριστον,¹⁴⁹ therefore to the suitable ἀρχαί (ἑτέρα συστοιχία).¹⁵⁰

IV. 201 b 27–202 a 3: The αἴτιον for the ἀόριστιον εἶναι,¹⁵¹ and then the account that bears everything, and the genuine determination of κίνησις.

V. 202 a 3–12: “Even that which is moving is in movement,” but only such that what is itself “moveable,”¹⁵² what is [to]¹⁵³ move. Moveable: what is occasionally not in movement and whose ἀκίνησις is “rest,”¹⁵⁴ i.e., the being-not-in-movement is something determinate, is not generally standing outside [of]¹⁵⁵ the ability-to-be-moved.

On §27b

What was explicated through the earlier categorical determinations: a being that, when seen in this way, need not *necessarily* be understood as moved. It *can* be something moved, about which I make the above assertions. But these are not, as such, assertions about a being in movement. With that indicated, which has to meet the demand of the definition of movement, i.e., what it should do; is to bring forth the kind of being-characters that make the there of a being, *as found to be in movement*, apparent.

Consequences: If these being-characters do not pertain to movement, then the ontology that is aware of the aforementioned basic characters of being as the genuine and only ones, is not just externally pertinent to movement, but insofar as movement is expressed, it *shifts* at the same time. It only looks this way when movement is conceived categorically, and the tradition of this type of ontology cuts off access to movement in this way, while it also makes a formal systematic possible.

Ἐτερότης, ἀνισότης, μὴ ὄν:

Many are differentiated from others (determined by “being-otherwise”), but as a result, i.e., as this, are not encountered in movement. A person is de-

146. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 16 sq.: ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι περὶ αὐτῆς λέγουσι.

147. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 17 sq.: μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διορίσαι ἄλλως αὐτήν.

148. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 20: ἑτερότητα καὶ ἀνισότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν.

149. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 24.

150. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 25: τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας συστοιχίας αἱ ἀρχαί.

151. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 28.

152. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 3 sq.: κινεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸ κινουῦν [. . .], τὸ δυνάμει ὄν κινήτόν.

153. Editor’s note.

154. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 5: τοῦτω ἢ ἀκίνησις ἡρεμία.

155. Editor’s note.

terminated by ἐτερότης in relation to oxen, but *to this extent* is not moved. 10 is “not equal” to 5, ἄνισα, but is not *therefore* in movement.

Certainly, a representative of opinion could say, ἐτερότης is not meant in that way, but instead “being-otherwise” is to be understood as determination of *beings themselves* that are in movement; not in relation to others, “being-otherwise” is *in itself*. But what is characterized by a manifoldness of aspects, or even is both δυνάμει and ἐνεργεία, is not in movement. Wood can be a chest and is there as wood—determined in itself by ἐτερότης—and nevertheless not be determined as moved.

But perhaps ἐτερότης is understood as ἐτεροίωσις, “becoming-otherwise.” But then, surely, movement is defined by movement. (ἐτεροίωσις is ἀλλοίωσις, ἕτερον—ἄλλο).

As long as κίνησις is not understood on the basis of presence as a mode thereof, it cannot be apprehended ontologically.

Already that which is characteristic of μὴ ὄν is approaching, insofar as it is taken as simply-and-generally-not-being-there, but as something that is not yet determined, in terms of which possibility is constituted. And yet not sufficiently, since a determination κατὰ συμβεβηκός is not what that which is moved always is in itself, the how of *its* there, being-present, but instead on the basis of the relation to another. Every being is something, and it is not many others. All that is in movement must be in movement by way of this not-being.

On §27c

What is determined in its being through being-otherwise, inequality, not-being is determined as a being in movement. It must not, therefore, be named a moved being. On the other hand, to explicate movement in this way determines it as how of a being, which is seen in this determination, and is seen as a moved being.

Why these ἀρχαί? Where is the motive for this categorial apprehension, and particularly of the static? Movement as immovability? What is meant phenomenally by συνεχές?¹⁵⁶ That which is static seems to pertain to that determination of this phenomenon. None of these [ἀρχαί]¹⁵⁷ determine a being in the sense that the categories do (instead, they are only formal-ontological determinations), and κίνησις is not a determinate being with concrete content (fundamental objection to Plato). Therefore, one can address being-moved as moved: participating in *the* movement, one can want to determine this on the basis of κοινωμία, and yet miss everything! By contrast, in Aristotle, the categories are the guiding clue of the analysis of the being of beings that are moved, i.e.,

156. Cf. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 16 sq.: δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν.

157. Editor's note.

concrete experience of being-there as such. The explication of movements not in antithesis [?], but a matter of originally proper “seeing.”¹⁵⁸ εἶδος οἴσεται.¹⁵⁹ A “look,” an “appearing,” always in accordance with the categories, lead—quite clearly to the fore-having of movement.

οἴσεται εἶδος τὸ κινουῦν:¹⁶⁰ a “look,” “self-guiding,” an “appearing”—*therein, in there*: appearing-thus-and-so.

Chapter 3: κίνησις and κινεῖσθαι, κίνησις: ποιήσις—πάθησις,¹⁶¹ how διάστασις and δίστασθαι.¹⁶² τὸ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι¹⁶³ for κίνησις.

To come to the there and to disappear from it as how of being-there itself (presence, producedness): γένεσις—φθορά, from the not-there into the there; αὔξησις—φθίσις, to arise, more there—less, to diminish; ἀλλοίωσις, to become otherwise in being-constituted, not to increase or to diminish,¹⁶⁴ not away; φορά, from one place to another.¹⁶⁵

Movement ἀόριστον: ὅταν γὰρ ὀρισηῖ, παύεται (Themistios 211, 12).¹⁶⁶ “Being-there”: in its place, to be firmly completed within limits. I set limits, and then movement comes to a stand; I plainly do not have it. To be able to apprehend it in its not-being-firmly-in—place, but as change of place, alteration, it must be characterized in the categories of indeterminacy.

Θεῖναι ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει¹⁶⁷—εἰς ταῦτα: ἐτερότης, ἀνισότης, μὴ ὄν. Descent, not to otherwise determine this how of being-there.

What is determined in its being-there by the propounded characteristics needs no beings to be that are moved. Are the above characteristics sufficient to determine a being in its there as a being in movement? If not, then is an ontology that is entirely dependent upon encountering beings externally, to be sure—what is here only meant as—λογία—as self-expressing conceals it, misplaced. With this veiling of λόγος, the analysis of being-there is hindered, movement turns into what—tradition!! And in its effort to be radical, half-measures. If a being is thus determined in its there, as Aristotle determines κίνησις, then it is in movement.

In what is this τιθέναι¹⁶⁸ grounded? Κίνησις an ἀόριστον.¹⁶⁹ Why? Because

158. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 2: ἰδεῖν.

159. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 9: εἶδος δὲ αἰεὶ οἴσεται τὸ κινουῦν.

160. Ibid.

161. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 22 sq.

162. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 17 sq.

163. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 21 sq.

164. Editor’s note.

165. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 12 sqq.

166. Themistii in Aristotelis Physica paraphrases 211, 12.

167. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 18 sq.: οὔτε γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει θεῖναι δύναται ἄν τις.

168. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 24.

169. Ibid.

not ἀπλῶς θεῖναι εἰς δύναμιν and not εἰς ἐνέργειαν.¹⁷⁰ Not ἀπλῶς, but σύνθεσις of the being-character. How is ἐν as there, the being-present of that which changes? Therefore,

1. generally, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια (from being-being-there as constitutive for the being-there of beings in motion);

2. not simply, in itself: beings, what is moved in another, is something like that, but how? Transition—the ‘from . . . to . . .’

Κίνησις: ἐνέργεια but τοιαύτη,¹⁷¹ i.e., δυνάμει ὄντος, and as such ἀτελής,¹⁷² ἐνδεχομένη δὲ εἶναι, “but something that is extant,” even if “difficult to see.”¹⁷³

Rest: a how of being-there, there of the type of thing that can be in movement. Ἀκίνησία (cf. οὐσία!) furthermore: “unmovedness.” a) being-not-now-in-movement, b) unencounterable from being-in-movement.

The ἐνεργεῖν πρὸς τὸ δυνάμει ὄν, ἢ τοιοῦτον, αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖν ἐστίν.¹⁷⁴ “Moving is bringing-this-being-possible-in-this-way-into-the-there.” That which is moving through θίξις—simple, direct, having, taking an influence—i.e., something occurs with itself (cf. Prantl, notes).¹⁷⁵ Bringing-something-about; becoming-brought-about and bringing, cf. ποίησις, πάθησις. Being-in-movement a how of the there.

Κίνησις a How of the There

Presence, that is a determinate one. As presence, and as this determinate one, it makes time, the now, explicitly: there now.

Κινησία and ἀκίνησία.

With κίνησις, precisely the how-possibilities of being in movement. Cf. meaningfulness—rest.

Rest makes the impression of presence beforehand, to such an extent that we thereby forget that it is ἀκίνησία, that it is ungenue movement, i.e., πρότερον—ὑστερον concealed as now, specifically as duration, i.e., πρότερον—ὑστερον there, but set in the now. Implicitly, I need, unconcealed to me, to leap into the now, but concealedly.

Aristotle inquires into the *to what extent*. How did it happen? You have seen the moved in a certain mode. *What* in itself requires this becoming-addressed

170. Phys. Γ 2, 201 b 28 sq.: οὔτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων οὔτε εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔστι θεῖναι αὐτήν.

171. Phys. Δ 2, 202 a 1 sq.: ἐνέργειαν μὲν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ’ ἐνέργειαν οἴαν εἶπομεν.

172. Phys. Δ 2, 201 b 32.

173. Phys. Δ 2, 202 a 2 sq.: χαλεπήν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ’ εἶναι.

174. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 5 sq.: τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο [τὸ δυνάμει ὄν] ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ τοιοῦτον, αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖν ἐστίν.

175. Phys. Δ 2, 202 a 8 sq.: συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο θίξει τοῦ κινητικοῦ, ὥσθ’ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει. Editor’s note: These words were bracketed by Von Prantl.

in how it shows itself? This inquiring-back, *positive* criticism, makes an insufficiency newly evident.

Χαλεπήν ιδεῖν, “but something *that can be!*”¹⁷⁶ What is primary is what shows itself: the moved is there. How do I catch sight of it? Not in the foregoing way. Therefore: to see the there, the presence of that which is not yet produced. Only possible if *presence* is seen, i.e., if the ontological problematic is made explicit with regard to its genuine ground: *presence* (abiding—presence). Being-there itself seen as *being-in* and viewed according to basic possibilities.

On §28a

[Physics]¹⁷⁷ Γ 3—Disposition

202 a 13–21: Presence of the moveable and of the moving. Ἐν τίνι ἢ κίνησις; — μία ἀμφοῖν.¹⁷⁸ Return to πρὸς τι.

202 a 21–202 b 5: But right then, from the πρὸς τι (ποίησις—πάθησις)¹⁷⁹ ἐνέργεια ἕτεραι,¹⁸⁰ two movements. Therefore, *two* to genuinely address and express, but *one* is meant—ἀπορία λογική.¹⁸¹ ἐν τίνι¹⁸² both of them?

a 22–28: Threefold possibility:

1. ποίησις—πάθησις both ἐν κινουμένῳ,
2. ποίησις in ποιοῦν, πάθησις ἐν κινουμένῳ,
3. ποίησις in the κινούμενον, πάθησις in the κινουῦν.

a 28–31: Ad 3.

a 31–b 5: Ad 1.

Ad 2: what follows, only understood properly.

202 b 5–22: Resolution of the difficulty. Doubling of the taking of a viewpoint with the self-sameness of the fact of the matter.

202 b 22–29: Conclusion and new formulation of the definition of movement on the basis of [Chapter]¹⁸³ 3.

On §28b

In preparation for the definition of movement, Aristotle had referred 1. to being-there-present and being-able-to-be-there, 2. to the modes of encountering the world as present and able to be. 3. This reveals beings as such, which in

176. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 2 sq.: χαλεπήν μὲν ιδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ' εἶναι.

177. Editor's note.

178. Phys. Δ 3, 202 a 18: μία ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια.

179. Phys. Δ 3, 202 a 23 sq.

180. Phys. Δ 3, 202 a 25.

181. Phys. Δ 3, 202 a 21 sq.: ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν λογικὴν.

182. Phys. Δ 3, 202 a 25.

183. Editor's note.

themselves are always in a ‘from . . . to . . .,’ appearing and so not-looking—thus, being-absent of something, the character of the average.

Until now, an equally preparatory, broader determination of beings that is connected to the naming of the categories has not been discussed, the *πρός τι*.¹⁸⁴ The *πρός τι* is itself a category that reveals the world that is there in the encounter-character of the ‘in relation to,’ i.e., of the [from]¹⁸⁵ one to another. To the four categories οὐσία, ποιόν, ποσόν, τόπος correspond the four εἶδη of κίνησις: γένεσις—φθορά, ἀλλοίωσις, ἀΐξις—φθίσις, φορά.¹⁸⁶ There are no other kinds of movement. The explicit lead of the *πρός τι* in the ontological preparation of the definition of movement must, accordingly, have another sense: not a pre-figuring of the type of encounter of the world in relation to a determinate mode of movement, but in relation to every being that is in movement. The lead of this category should reveal the basic fact of the matter: beings of the world encountered as manifoldness of beings as beings that are “in relations to each other,” *πρός ἄλληλα*. Insofar as beings are ever in *διχῶς*, they are also in themselves in relation to each other in the ‘more than that and less.’ The degrees are there as how in the being-in-relations of beings. Cf. *Categories* 7. Ὑπεροχή [and]¹⁸⁷ ἔλλειψις are possible determinations of the *πρός τι*,¹⁸⁸ which lies at their ground. Along with *ὑπεροχή* and *ἔλλειψις*, Aristotle names *ποίησις* and *πάθησις*,¹⁸⁹ “having to do with . . .,” “having something matter to . . .,” (“Reciprocation”), as such basic concepts.

This relation is found in the world, more precisely: beings as always this here and now are encountered in it, beings as beings at hand, beings that occur and are encountered in this way, but in a specific type of being of presence-at-hand-in-the-world—the initial, indifference.

Earlier, we referred to the fact that human beings are at hand and encountered in the world, we ourselves are at hand, human beings that manipulate, busy themselves with . . . , living things, animals. This busying-oneself-with . . . , being in such relations, is equally familiar to us whether as occurrences in the world or as the mode of our being-there that is not merely being-at-hand, but instead in the basic mode of being-in-the-world.

The *πρός ἄλληλα* (cf. *De Partibus Animalium* and *De Anima*) still possesses this distinctive possibility of the *πρός τι*: in the sense of the *ἀντικείμενον*,¹⁹⁰ so that this genuine *ἀντί* is: the to-which of being-related in person, i.e., to show oneself, showing in the mode of being-uncovered, there in discovered-

184. Cf. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 28—32.

185. Editor’s note.

186. *Phys.* Γ 1, 201 a 12 sqq.

187. Editor’s note.

188. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 28 sq.: τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τι τὸ μὲν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν λέγεται καὶ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν.

189. *Phys.* Γ 1, 200 b 29 sq.: τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικόν.

190. *Cat.* 10, 11 b 32 sq.: Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι, αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἔστιν ἐτέρων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται.

ness, i.e., there for . . . and to perceive it as one, *πάσχειν*, affected by beings as world; *πάσχειν* as *δέχεσθαι*, “to perceive” and that primarily as *πάθος*, “becoming-affected,” “disposition,” being related to the world as *in it*, being in dealings with it.

Being-there as living, a being as being toward the world. Human being-there determined by *νοῦς*; discoveredness is in this *being-supposing*. This supposing as basic mode of human being-in-the-world is ultimately also a perceiving-it, having-it-there-thus-and-so, i.e., of the world, not only determinate beings in determinate kinds of encounters, but *becoming-affected* by all possible beings of the world (cf. ἡδονή—καταφάναι, ἀποφάναι—διά). This νοεῖν has the being-character of becoming-affected by what is discovered, what, for its part, is only possible in such a way that this becoming-affected by what is discovered is grounded in a *generally-being-discovered* and a *being-discovered*, i.e., in a discovering, a giving-sight-of *as such*. νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς is παθητικός¹⁹¹ (which was said later, Aristotle did not have this term), and it is that as νοῦς of beings on the basis of the ποιητικός, which makes perceivability in general, discoveredness, possible, i.e., that which lets the discovered be seen, makes seeing—νοῦς ποιητικός.¹⁹²

As modes of the explication of beings, ποίησις and πάθησις point in this way into the being of being-there as such, which means, however, that they prevail as *the* guiding clue of the interpretation of beings that clarifies what was always already claimed in our pedagogical propositions: being means being-produced—sense of being as ποίησις and, at the same time, interpreted on the basis of being-present. Why is νοῦς simply being? Because *the* ποίησις makes presence at all possible, ποίησις in a distinctive sense such that νοῦς ἀμιγῆς¹⁹³ as uncovering, sight giving. What is in this way is “a being as such” (cf. ὄν ἢ ὄν)!

Aristotle concludes the characterization of the πρὸς τι, reference to the type of relation, with: καὶ ὅλως, “and on the whole, what can move and the moveable.”¹⁹⁴ With that it becomes evident that the being in movement is, as a being, there in being-there-with with others, the there-with determined by the *relation* of one to the other, of the other to the one.

On §28c

And κίνησις explicated already as determinate mode of the being-present of δυνάμει ὄν as such. Κίνησις the type of presence of beings that are in the aforementioned being-there-with of one to another. But insofar as this being-

191. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 24 sq.

192. Cf. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 10 sqq.

193. De an. Γ 5, 430 a 18.

194. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 30 sq.: καὶ ὅλως κινητικόν τε καὶ κινητόν.

character extends to beings in their universality, κίνησις becomes a distinctive mode of the being-there of beings.

Said in terms of the task of the interpretation of Greek ontology, that means: The *showing of the sense of being*, which prevails in Greek ontology and its genuine culmination in Aristotle, prevails because it is already experienced in the implicit experience of the being-there of the world and of living—the showing *focuses on the interpretation of movement!* But insofar as κίνησις is posited in the names of ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια, these are the primary being-categories of Greek ontology!

The being in movement was determined as presence of beings in their ability-to-be. Therefore, κίνησις constitutes the there of beings in movement, of what is moved. But something moved is (cf. πρὸς τι) being in relation to what is moving, in the being-there-with of a κινουῦν, or a κινητικόν. How is the there of this being that is with beings in movement to be determined as moved beings that are there with? Is this there also determined by presence in the sense of the present of δυνάμει ὄν, ἢ τοιοῦτον, and therefore ἐνέργεια? Is this present another such that the κινουῦν and the κινούμενον would be determined by various ἐνέργεια? Or is this one and the same, and, only when apprehended in this way, the properly understood there of beings in movement, the self-moving (φύσει ὄντα, moving itself from itself)? Aristotle poses this question in Chapter 3. The explication of movement first comes to an end when this question is answered.

Κίνησις ἐν *in* that which is mobile: being-present in the there—in bringing the there, moving. That which is moving and that which is moved are *in the same there*.

Ἐνεργεῖν: to take into work, to being into the underway, the underway of the there, the determinate presence of the δυνάμει as such. What can bring is that which has the ability to bring into the underway of a κινητόν. To bring into the underway, to set out—to *be in the same there*. The same there: like διάστημα. Being-moved is being in the being-there-with of what is moving. There-with = ἐνέργεια. Κινουῦν—κινούμενον: its being-there is the same being-present.

The same—but λόγος and taking a point of view are different. Ἀπορία λογική¹⁹⁵ pertains to addressing as . . . : Apprehensible ἐνέργεια ἀποτεταγμένη,¹⁹⁶ “cut out for itself,” instead primarily being-in-relation-to-another. The how of the being-there of beings (the being is something moved, that is moved), first of moving and then of becoming-moved—ever the same: beings in movement. Ἐνέργεια of the κινουῦν, not of any other.

Sameness clarifies a how of the there: not “powers” and the like, “effect,” “energy,” i.e., no mystical question of influxus and the like, but in the field of

195. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 21 sq.: ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν λογικήν.

196. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 8.

the there, the being-present of beings is inquired into, of beings that are there with others, and that are δυνατόν in themselves. Κινητόν is in “what is mobile,” ἐνέργεια. Movement is the there of the δυνάμει. But it *becomes* by way of what is moving. Does the present *become*? Being-present? The moving of what is moving and the becoming-moved of what is moved is the same there, i.e., movement is not a being, but the how of the being of the world: many things in movement, moving, rest alongside not-moving.

The Threefold Definition of Movement

The being-there of the one teaching, always concretely before one and to one, is the learning of the other. διδάξις μὲν ἐπιστήμης δόσις, μάθησις δὲ ἐπιστήμης λήψις [. . .] ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ θεώρημα.¹⁹⁷

Two definitions of movement:

1. ἐντελέχεια τοῦ δυνάμει, ἧ̃ τοιοῦτον,¹⁹⁸ the being-present of a being in determinate relation to another, specifically such that the first is as something able-to-be “through” the second.

2. ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ἧ̃ κινητόν,¹⁹⁹ in the being-there-with of what is moving, there with the moving of the moveable; being-present—the fullness of the δυνάμει—is in itself being-there of what is moving.

ἐντελέχεια [. . .] ἡ̃ τοῦ δυνάμει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ, ἧ̃ τοιοῦτον.²⁰⁰ To first lead this, after which it is said: these are two different movements that constitute a third (therefore, movement already presupposed!), but rather terminations of one and the same.

Conceptuality and Movement—Ontology

Fore-having: τί τὸ ὄν; φύσει ὄντα, κινούμενα—holding fast of the ground.

Fore-sight: the being of this being: being-there as world, presence, there, sense of being as such, in which to understand κίνησις as how of being-there—γένος, descent, out-from-where (cf. the below).

Fore-grasp: beings in their being: accordingly, the kind of being-characters that show with themselves beings as what are moved. Ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια, δύναμις the primary world-categories, from them primarily the reality and presence of world: things at rest, disappearing, etc. But also concern, going around, being-present, to make abiding evident. Discoveredness—νοῦς.

The method for cultivating concepts out of contrasts is clear. Tendency toward ground (cf. αἴτιον) and fitness, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, such that what is exhibited is nothing other than εἶδος. This is how it looks. To that end, A and B. Guarantee. Asked in that way, what is it after? Ultimately, that represents new tasks.

197. Themistii in Aristotelis Physica paraphrases 218, 21 sqq.

198. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 10 sq.: ἡ̃ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἧ̃ τοιοῦτον.

199. Phys. Γ 2, 202 a 7 sq. Cf. 201 a 27 sqq.: ἡ̃ δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια [. . .] ἡ̃ κινητόν.

200. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 25 sqq.

Analysis of movement itself is nothing different than the discovery of being as being-present. For this γένος is not itself *para* but is created precisely in and with movement. When questioned about its being, this being (κινούμενον) makes these characters explicit.

The cultivation of concepts, properly understood, always does its work in the ἀρχή, the τί ἦν. Concepts are not the what but the whence, from-where of going out. That is productive cultivation of concepts, in which imitation is possible. Λόγος: regard to . . . , for-which earlier καθό “being-in,” whose primary interpretedness—this καθό or καταλλήλως.

Supplement 1

Categories

Categories stand within the horizon of ἀρχαί. What, in general, do ἀρχαί mean? “From out of what” of beings (as such), i.e., how of *being*. What function do the categories have as ἀρχαί? What can and must be the ἀρχή/ἀρχαί of beings? Αρχή of *there-ness*: beings qua οὐσία, i.e., in relation to *thereness*—ἢ ὄν refers to a determinate sense of being!

Either 1. τὰ πρῶτα τῶν γενῶν, or 2. τὰ ἔσχατα κατηγορούμενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων (κατὰ μή).

Ad 1. Are γένη in general able to be ἀρχαί? Πρῶτα γένη, τὰ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν are τὸ ὄν and τὸ ἔν. Being as such cannot be a genus, to the extent of predicates of genres. Can it not be ἀρχή? Does it follow from this that ἀρχαί are not γένη? Insofar as even “being” the μάλιστα κατὰ πάντων? But *how*?

Categories and Discoveredness

Speaking about . . . : self-expressive addressing of . . . as being-in or being-*there* of the world.

Cf. the controversies: 1. determinations of beings; 2. those of λόγος: a) language, grammar, b) sentence, judgment, predication—and variations. (Being of categories, cf. especially Nic. Eth. A!)

Both apprehended unclearly: not of beings, but rather of being—how of the there (and of the determinate environing world—ζωή πρακτική, Nic. Eth. A 4); not of speaking, as “subjective” or the like, but rather of *interpretive-being* toward . . . : the fore-sightings, fore-havings of dealing, i.e., characters of the how of being-in in [the] world, of the *being-positioned-in-relation-to* these—not aspects, but *discoverednesses*.

Seeing directly out on λόγον ἔχον! Pointed explicitness of the worn out λόγος in the κατηγορεῖν. Aristotle’s terminological construction!

Supplement 2

Categories of Aristotle (On the Categories)

Τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα—ἕκαστον σημαίνει.²⁰¹

201. Cat. 4, 1 b 25 sq.: Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον [. . .] σημαίνει.

Thus, 1. λεγόμενα: what is being said, with whom/what, exhibited in which way, therefore exhibiting—exhibited.

2. κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν: in no way exhibiting in the how of the one among others (μὴ καταλλήλως), not ἕτερον καθ’ ἑτέρου (Chapter 3). Modes of letting-see-plainly, ability-to-give-beings-plainly, possibilities of giving, namely in the how of its being-there; modes of discoveredness (ones that are determinately Greek!) in such dealing, how of the being-there of beings, how of beings! Not only ἄνευ (cf. Chapter 2 [and] Chapter 4, the same examples), in general turning out of this customary λόγος! ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει—αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό.²⁰² Here, already, the most genuine and sharpest opposition to all Platonic “ontology” and “logic.” They give not the *being* itself, but are rather articulation-possibilities of the there. It is not the being that is divided/arranged, not propositions, nor words or concepts, but rather being, the *possibilities of the there*, i.e., discoveredness, i.e., of being-in, dealing (determined in a Greek way, and already interpreted and pinned down). They are never ἀληθές they do not uncover, it does not include the tendency to uncover, address, a *being*.

Only through συμπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλλα τούτων.²⁰³ The categories as such? No, but that something (standing in *this* respect) with respect to . . . is exhibited, only in the “something (respect) with regard to. . . .”

Supplement 3

Categories

Θ 1, at the beginning: οὕτω λεγόμενα, i.e., πρὸς οὐσίαν.²⁰⁴ Λεγόμενα = οὕτω κατηγορούμενα.²⁰⁵ Λόγος: ἀποφαίνεσθαι, but this *being-in*, therefore ἀποφαινόμενα, how of (determinately) genuine there-ness.

1. Λεγόμενα: interpretednesses,

2. and specifically formulated with respect to the being in the how of οὐσία. As to the clarification of such things, of *thereness*, everything to interpret further!

Καθ’ αὐτὸ λεγόμενον ὄν (cf. Met. Δ 7):²⁰⁶ is articulated in them according to its possibilities.

Οὐσία is πρῶτως (whence? Originariness and steps?) καθ’ αὐτὸ λεγόμενον. Cf. Η the συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν λόγων:²⁰⁷ the genuine structures of οὐσία ὑποκειμένον and τί ἦν εἶναι.²⁰⁸ It means χωριστόν and τότε τι, (there) “in it-

202. Cat. 4, 2 a 5 sq.

203. Cat. 4, 2 a 6 sq.: τῆ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα τούτων συμπλοκῆ κατάφασις γίγνεται.

204. Met Θ 1, 1045 b 27 sqq.

205. Met. Z 1, 1028 a 13.

206. Met. Δ 7, 1017 a 7 sq.: τὸ ὄν λέγεται [. . .] καθ’ αὐτό.

207. Met. Η 1, 1042 a 12.

208. Met. Η 1, 1042 a 13.

self,” “that there.” The genuine criteria of thereness: being encountered and appearing thus.

How the connection with ὄν ὡς ἀληθές: a special how of the discoveredness of determinate λέγειν, λόγος. More precisely, Nic Eth Z! What is precisely Greek, that this how of being itself becomes explicit in special (circumstances?). From out of it alone, in particular, access to the there.

Cf. Z 3 (Comment [on] p. 66.): οἷς ὤρισται τὸ ὄν.²⁰⁹ Here, in particular, perspicuous how they “emerge” from λόγος, are in it as the how of discoveredness, but precisely that in the full sense. “Υλη goes over them and away!”²¹⁰

Cf. Z 4 (Comment [on] p. 65f.): that there-characters, possibilities of being-in, carry the names (cf. Bogen, “Kategorien”: πτώσεις, διαιρέσεις)²¹¹ of awarding to, attributing to as found already in itself, the character of found already (finding in advance) constituting in the moment, there-character, i.e., forming sight!

Supplement 4

Categories

Λόγος decisive field of genuine problematic of being. *Plato* and those earlier than him did not see λέγειν τι κατά τινοσ by contrast with καθ’ αὐτὸ λέγειν, and the latter itself they did not see in its fundamental structure.

However, this comes to expression in the categories. Consequently, the fact that the categories lead ontological investigation already early on and in a fundamental way means that a new and genuine understanding of the problematic of being is obtained, obtained from: 1. being produced (therein 2. is precisely not apprehendable!), 2. εἶδος as “appearing.” Cf. the narrow context for understanding the ontology of becoming, i.e., physics.

Already the name of the categories emphasizes the explicit importance of Λόγος-fixation, and lays stress on awarding to, attributing to, καθ’ αὐτά, thus at one with the primary articulation of the context of the categories—οὐσία as πρῶτον. This means that everything is further determined hermeneutically by the experience of being-there implicit in οὐσία. For Aristotle, derivation and number and the like are entirely secondary aspects, and are sought from and carried over from entirely foreign tendencies of a systematic, and thus are not discoverable! It is a matter of the concrete possibility of research, not of a “doctrine of categories,” which is always physicalist. Aristotle does not treat

209. Met. Z 3, 1029 a 21.

210. Cf. Met. Z 3, 1029 a 20 sq.

211. See p. 374 sqq.

the categories as systematic, but rather he interprets them (οὐσία) in the sense of ontological research.

Supplement 5

Κατηγορικόν

τὸ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἅπαν καθόλου καὶ κατηγορικόν.²¹²

Supplement 6

Κατηγορία

Met. Λ1 at the beginning: the bracketing of οὐσία as being-ness of beings and πρὸς ἓν clear for the categories—the twofold πρῶτον.²¹³

1069 b; 1070 a 31, 35; 1070 b.

Met. N 1.

Supplement 7

The πρὸς ἓν of the categories

Cf. Met. Λ 4: οὐσία not στοιχεῖον—not [στοιχεῖον] for the others—and the categories no κοινόν.²¹⁴ What does the ontological mean?

Supplement 8

Categories

Τόδε τι: the “being-*that*-there,” “being-*that*-*there*,” “Being-encountered-in-itself.”

Present and now.

Οὐσία: “availability,” the “having,” “immediate there,” the “immediate” within the circle of what is discovered, what is present immediately and present now.

Immediate-opposite-ness: disposition, stay, u. a.

212. An. post. B 3, 90 b 4.

213. Met. Λ 1, 1069 a 18 sqq.

214. Met. Λ 4, 1070 b 2 sq.

Editors' Afterword

The volume before you—volume 18 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*—contains the previously unpublished text of the lecture course that Heidegger gave at the Philipps-Universität Marburg in the summer semester of 1924. In the course schedule, Heidegger had advertised a lecture course on Augustine, but then decided to substitute for this a lecture course on Aristotle, in order to work toward publishing a book on Aristotle that had been planned since 1922.

The title of the lecture course reads, "Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy," in accord with the evidence from the handwritten manuscript, as well as from a part of the transcripts of the lecture course written up by some of those who heard it. The title, "Aristotle: Rhetoric," advertised in the publication prospectus since November 1991, was a provisional title in the course of planning the *Gesamtausgabe*, taken from the "List of Heidegger's Lecture Courses and Practicums," drawn up for William J. Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, The Hague: 1963 (p. 665). The title of the handwritten manuscript appears as rather more appropriate as the content of the lecture course. For, indeed, there is accomplished in the center of the lecture course the interpretation of the being-there of human beings with respect to the basic possibility of speaking-with-one-another, following the guide of Aristotelian rhetoric, but also a series of further texts of Aristotle are taken as the basis for this interpretation. Furthermore, in its full conception, the lecture course is oriented toward Aristotelian basic concepts as such, and therefore not toward a specific area of content or even tied to a determinate text.

In the handwritten manuscript, the following notice follows the title of the lecture course: "S.S. '24, Beg. May 1 (Mon, Tue, Thur, Fri, 7–8 a.m.)." Accordingly, Heidegger conducted the course from May 1, Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, from 7:00 to 8:00 in the morning (not, as advertised in the course schedule, from 3:00 to 4:00 in the afternoon), and indeed up until July 31, as we gather from the information on dates in some of the transcripts of the lecture course by students. Aside from the break for Whitsuntide (June 9 to 16), there was an interruption only from May 5 to 8, while Heidegger stayed in Messkirch for the burial of his father, who died from a stroke. On page 7 of the handwritten manuscript, we find the fittingly gloomy note in the margin: "† F May 2, '24." In all, the lecture course comprised forty-three hours of lecture.

With respect to editorial principles, the lecture course before you presents a special case, insofar as no complete manuscript of Heidegger's or the transcript of the lecture course has been preserved. Rather, there is only the beginning and concluding parts, which together make up something like a third of the whole. Perhaps the manuscript was taken apart in the context of working on

the Aristotle book referred to, and then partially lost. Heidegger himself could not clarify the whereabouts of the missing parts of the manuscript during the preparatory work for the editing of the *Gesamtausgabe*. In his instructions at the time, a typewritten transcript of the complete notes taken of the lecture by Fritz Schalk was prepared by Christina Klostermann, which Heidegger himself saw, but did not thoroughly check or correct. Since, therefore, on the one hand all attempts on the part of the trustees of the estate to find the missing part of the manuscript have remained unsuccessful, and on the other hand there are now two additional complete notes of the lecture course besides those of Fritz Schalk, the decision was made to edit the lecture course on the basis of the notes taken of the lectures and the preserved parts of the manuscript.

The handwritten document comprises two document portions. The first document portion comprises pages 1–14 and nine supplements. The second document portion comprises pages 59–70.5 and twenty-eight supplements. The page numbering that runs through the second document is so complete that some page numbers include more pages, that are then, by means of subordinate numbering—whether it be by Arabic or Roman numerals, or by Roman lowercase letters—themselves numbered. Also, the main numbering is found overlapping with alternative numberings of sections, either by means of Arabic or Roman numerals. Some pages belonging to the continuous manuscript have no page numbers at all or only one of the alternative numberings for sections, but can be integrated free of doubt on the basis of their content. Thus, apart from the supplements, the second document amounts to twenty-nine consecutive pages in all. Often, in the right margins, we find elaborations whose belonging to the main text is indicated in part by insertion marks. In two places Heidegger had, at the time, written a short sentence in shorthand. A copy of the original from the German Archive of Literature in Marbach, as well as a typewritten transcript of it prepared by Dr. Hartmut Tietjen, was made available to the editor.

The existing notes taken on the lecture course are, in part, extensive typewritten or handwritten transcripts based on shorthand notes; in part, they are less extensive transcripts of the lecture course or notes taken during the lecture.

The former derive from Walter Bröcker, Fritz Schalk, and Gerhard Nebel. Walter Bröcker provided for the lecture course—as he had for other lecture courses and presentations of Heidegger—shorthand notes taken during the lectures, and a handwritten transcript based on these, which he later handed over to Herbert Marcuse, who in turn made a typewritten transcript with two duplicates. But what has been preserved are only these typewritten duplicates, one of which is found in the Herbert Marcuse Archive in the library for the city and university of Frankfurt am Main, and the other of which was in the possession of Otto Friedrich Bollnow and from there ended up as a gift to the Dilthey Research Center at the University of Bochum. A copy of this latter duplicate was used for editing. It comprises 134 pages and a flyleaf with the

title, "Martin Heidegger/ Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy/ Summer Semester 1924, Marburg/ L.," which is repeated in abbreviated form on page 1. In the typed script there is included in handwriting, presumably by Marcuse and Bollnow, some corrections and additions, but above all the numerous Greek citations. Since the latter exemplar in Bochum originally went up to only page 85, Dr. Guy van Kerckhoven, associate of the Dilthey Research Center, added the missing citations on the basis of the parallel exemplar at the Herbert Marcuse Archive.

Apart from a few brief shorthand notes, the notes on the lecture course by Fritz Schalk, composed in Latin script, comprise 361 pages in three notebooks. The originals of the first two notebooks (pages 1–130 and 155–308; the unwritten pages 131–155 represent no lacuna in the text of the lecture course) were able to be used for editing, as they were found in the possession of Klaus Reich†. A copy of the original of the third notebook (pages 309–385), which is found in Marbach, also contains a part of the *Sophistes* lecture course from the winter semester of 1924–1925. Page 1 begins with a formulation of the title: "Marburg S.S. '24 Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Arist. Philosophy." Occasionally we find longer Greek citations and bibliographical information supplied as footnotes, obviously after the fact. Furthermore, there are insertions by another hand in red ink and pencil. With scarcely more to fall back on besides the typewritten transcript prepared by Klostermann, referred to previously in Heidegger's instructions, the editor afterward managed to discover the first two notebooks in the original.

The notes on the lecture course composed in Latin script by Gerhard Nebel were available—as a copy of the original, which is found in Marbach—though, to be sure, only 129 pages in three of what was originally seven or eight notebooks are preserved: Notebook 1 (pages 1–54), Notebook 4 (pages 1–38) and Notebook 5 (pages 1–37). Thus these notes on the lecture course cover only pages 2–55 and 135–207 of the present edition. Occasionally we find additions in another's handwriting.

A comparison of these three extensive sets of notes shows that the sets of notes from Bröcker and Nebel, if one ignores for the moment the missing notebooks, show such strong agreement, and at the same time show so many small deviations from one another that cannot be attributed to errors of transcription, that they can be traced back, with a likelihood bordering on certainty, to independently prepared shorthand notes taken during the lectures. By contrast, the notes on the lecture course by Schalk are to an extent identical with those of Nebel up to page 200—again, if one sets aside the issue of the missing notebooks—and then are to an extent identical with those of Bröcker up to page 360. Since, furthermore, Schalk's notes show only the sort of deviations from Nebel and Bröcker that can be attributed to errors of transcription, they can be treated as a transcript of the notes on the lecture course taken by Nebel and Bröcker. Implicit in this finding is the fact that, for the greater part of the lecture course, there are two quasi-complete transcript traditions that are

independent of one another—Bröcker and Nebel/Schalk, or Bröcker/Schalk and Nebel—from which, in fact, the text delivered by Heidegger can be pretty accurately reconstructed. With respect to the integrity of Schalk's notes on the lecture course, it is to be observed that its variants are not taken into account where we have the passages transcribed from Nebel's notes on the lecture course; however, where Schalk has transcribed from Bröcker, the surviving typewritten transcript from Marcuse that the editor has to rely on for Bröcker's notes on the lecture course can be, in principle, every bit as defective as that of Schalk's handwritten transcript.

The less extensive notes on the lecture course derive from Helene Weiß, Jacob Klein, Hans Jonas, and Karl Löwith. The notes composed by Helene Weiß in Latin script, and partly in German script, comprise eighty-seven unpaginated pages in three notebooks, the first of which has on its cover the inscription: "Sum-Sem. 1924/ Heidegger: On Some basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy." On the first page we find, under the repeated title of the lecture course, the note: "Transcript Bondi." Clearly Helene Weiß had a copy of the lecture notes of her fellow student, Elli Bondi, as she already had for the last week of the lecture course in the winter semester 1923–24 (cf. *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 17, Editor's Afterword, p. 323). A copy of the original was made available to the editor by Professor Ernst Tugendhat, the nephew of Helene Weiß, from his aunt's *Nachlass*.

The notes on the lecture course by Jacob Klein are composed in Latin script and run a full fifty-eight pages, breaking off at page 191 in the present edition. On page 1, the title at the top reads: "Summer 1924/ Marburg/ Heidegger/ Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy." A copy of the original, which is in the possession of Elze Klein, widow of Jacob Klein, was made available to the editor.

The notes on the lecture course written in Latin script by Hans Jonas comprise only twenty-two pages in a single notebook under the title, "Heidegger on προαίρεσις & ἀρετή/ S.S. 1924," in which we also find notes on other course meetings. They cover only pages 143–197 of the present edition. The notes on the lecture course by Karl Löwith, composed partly in Latin script and partly in shorthand, comprised originally forty-seven pages, though pages 2–3 are not preserved. A copy of the Marbach originals of these two last-mentioned lecture notes was made available to the editor.

These four less extensive notes on the lecture course, when compared with those of Bröcker, Nebel, and Schalk, result in the finding that only the lecture notes taken by Jacob Klein and Helene Weiß—and the latter to a greater extent—reach the same level of comprehensiveness as do those that go back to the shorthand notes taken during the lectures. Consequently, only these two sets of lecture notes were consulted in reconstructing Heidegger's delivered text, and not the notes taken by Hans Jonas and Karl Löwith. These latter sets of notes fit the description of more or less complete cursory notes.

The decision to edit the lecture course proceeded from the possibility of allowing the text of the transcripts to substitute for the missing two-thirds or so central parts of the manuscript. For this reason, a step was taken at the outset in the direction of making the text of the transcripts self-standing in a way that was not foreseen by Heidegger for the edition of his lecture courses. So it seemed only logical to ask whether, even for the parts of the lecture course that are attested by the manuscript, it would not be better to have an integration of transcript and handwritten manuscript, in order to not disguise somewhat the incomparably great self-standingness of the text of the transcript vis-à-vis the handwritten manuscript, when they are seen altogether. Anyhow, the procedure for such integration as foreseen by Heidegger for the edition of the lecture courses rests on definite presuppositions: in the first place, on the presupposition that a complete manuscript exists in which the lecture transcripts are provided with sufficient correction; in the second place, on the presupposition that in the case of handwritten manuscript and (extensive) transcripts it is not a matter of various texts, but only of deviating versions of one and the same text: they are so close to one another that they *can* be integrated into a final version. In the case of this lecture course, neither presupposition holds. A comparison of the handwritten manuscript and the extensive transcripts shows that Heidegger clearly, in his delivery, not only undertook expansions and supplementary remarks and gave renderings of passages outlining key words, but also almost always replaced the previously rendered passages with new formulations. In this way, the attempted integration of formulations from the handwritten manuscript would be of value to a limited extent. In view of the fragmentary character of the handwritten basis for the edition, it does matter to at least consider the preserved parts of the manuscript in their full scope. It seemed that this could occur only by way of—and as an exception made for this volume, on account of the special situation of its sources—having both texts, the transcripts and the handwritten manuscripts, edited completely and placed one after the other.

The designation of part 1 and part 2 is thereby meant to express that the handwritten manuscript, even if it is placed in the second position, is by no means to be considered only an appendix. Rather, like the transcripts, it should be considered a complete attestation of the text of the lecture course in a specific sense. Here we call the reader's attention to the fact that some important matters, such as, for example, the analysis of the basic concept of οὐσία or the demonstrated possibility of conceptuality in the being-there of human beings, is found presented in the handwritten manuscript comparably or, what is more, in some cases more extensively than in the transcripts. The sequence of parts 1–2 has merely a didactic significance, insofar as the preceding readings of the continuous and complete text of the transcripts may essentially facilitate one's understanding of what, in the handwritten manuscript, is often only key words and incomplete text.

* * *

What pertains to editorial work on the present sources in individual cases was set forth in like measure for the handwritten manuscript and the transcripts. Spelling and punctuation were corrected. With respect to the great number of idiomatic expressions, which as a rule are either written as separate words or are combined with hyphens, the texts were given a unity of written form by the editor with a view to Heidegger's customs in general, since such a unity is discernible neither in the handwritten manuscript nor in the transcripts. Two central concepts deserve special mention. In the handwritten manuscript one finds the written forms, *Dasein*, *Da-sein*, and *Da'-sein*, which, in the original intention, are clearly meant to reflect the degree to which, in each case, the "there" character of being-there is thematized. In this sense (i.e., in the sense of the thematization of the there-character), the writing of this concept was handled by the editor the same for the text of the handwritten manuscript as for the text of the transcript, so that in every case the highest degree of thematization is not written *Da'-sein*, but rather *Da-sein*. Furthermore, "being-in-the-word," together with the variants appearing in this lecture course, "being-in-a-world," "being-in-its-world," and so on, are consistently written with hyphens, thereby approximating the manner of writing in *Being and Time* in order to make conspicuous the unity of terminological meaning that befits them concretely in this lecture course. With respect to punctuation, what matters is not simply following the rules, but making evident by one's decision as to one among many possible punctuation marks the context of meaning for sentences and parts of sentences in thousands of cases.

* * *

Heidegger's lecture course on the "Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy" must be seen against at least two backgrounds: on the one hand, against the background of what was, by 1924, an already for some years constant, very intense preoccupation with Aristotle and one that was closely attentive to the Greek texts; on the other hand, against the background of the barely begun working out of the fundamental-ontological analytic of *Dasein* of *Being and Time*. What becomes intelligible in the first case is the passionate manner with which Heidegger absorbs himself in Aristotle's text and its language, and allows himself time and again to be swept along by it, one might almost say, so that at times the individual analyses appear to develop an incomparably potent dynamism of their own. In the second case, what also becomes intelligible is the systematic impetus with which Heidegger understands everything to happen in a two-step hermeneutic process: first, setting forth human *Dasein* in the sense of the speaking-with-one-another being-in-the-world as the ground for all conceptuality; and then, on the basis of this ground, interpreting, in

the mode of retrieval, determinate basic concepts as a radical grasping of the interpretedness of *Dasein* as a speaking-with-one-another being-in-the-world. Beyond that, the present lecture course makes evident how Heidegger secured, or at least proved the worth of, his own existential-ontological thinking in the course of his investigation of Aristotelian conceptuality.