

Ancient  
Commentators  
on Aristotle

GENERAL EDITOR: RICHARD SORABJI

PORPHYRY:  
On Aristotle Categories

Translated by  
Steven K. Strange

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Porphyry  
*On Aristotle Categories*

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# Contents

Introduction	1
Plotinus and Porphyry on the <i>Categories</i>	1
Porphyry's Platonising interpretation of the <i>Categories</i>	3
Textual Emendations	13
Felicianus' headings for Porphyry <i>On Aristotle Categories</i>	19
Translation	27
Concerning Synonyms	49
Concerning Substance	76
Concerning Quantity	94
Concerning Relatives	111
On the Qualified and on Quality	136
Concerning Action and Affection	157
Bibliography	159
Appendix: the commentators	160
English-Greek Glossary	170
Greek-English Index	173
Subject Index	182

# Introduction\*

## Plotinus and Porphyry on the *Categories*

The claim is often made that the most extensive of Plotinus' treatises, *On the Genera of Being* (*Peri tôn genôn tou ontos*, *Enn.* 6.1-3), contains a polemical attack on Aristotle's theory of categories.<sup>1</sup> This claim would seem to be well-grounded, given that in the first part of the work (6.1.1-24),<sup>2</sup> Plotinus proceeds through the list of categories given by Aristotle and systematically raises a series of powerful objections to claims Aristotle makes about them in the text of the *Categories*. At the same time, Plotinus' student Porphyry is rightly given credit for establishing Aristotle's *Categories*, along with the rest of the Aristotelian logical treatises usually referred to as the *Organon*, as the fundamental texts for logical doctrines in the Neoplatonic scholastic tradition, and through this tradition later for medieval philosophy, by means of his *Isagoge*<sup>3</sup> or introduction to the *Categories* and his commentaries on that work. Taken together, these two propositions tend to give the impression that there was deep and

\* A different version of this introduction appeared as 'Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Categories*', in W. Haase and H. Temporini (eds), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* 2.36.2 (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1987), pp. 955-74.

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* III.2<sup>4</sup> (Leipzig, 1904), p. 578, n. 4, p. 698; É. Bréhier, *Les Ennéades de Plotin* (Paris, 1924-1938), introduction to *Enn.* 6.1-3, pp. 9-10; A.C. Lloyd, 'Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic', *Phronesis* 1 (1955-56), pp. 58-72, 146-60, at p. 58; P. Merlan in A.H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 38. R. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972), p. 45, makes the work part of Plotinus' 'anti-Aristotelian polemic'.

<sup>2</sup> The *Enneads* will be cited by chapter and line number of the *editio minor* of P. Henry and H. Schwyzer (Oxford, 1964-1982).

<sup>3</sup> A. Busse (ed.), *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* [hereafter CAG] IV.1 (Berlin, 1887), translated in this volume.

substantive disagreement between master and pupil about the value of the theory found in the *Categories*. This impression is reinforced by the implication in the introduction to the extant commentaries on the *Categories* of Dexippus<sup>4</sup> (5,1-12) and Simplicius<sup>5</sup> (2,3-8) that Porphyry, in the massive commentary on the *Categories* which he dedicated to Gedalios, probably one of his students, replied in detail to Plotinus' objections against the *Categories*.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, in Porphyry's extant catechism-commentary<sup>7</sup> and throughout Dexippus' and Simplicius' commentaries, both of which seem to be following closely either Porphyry's lost *To Gedalios* or Iamblichus' lost commentary, itself based on *To Gedalios*, we can see Porphyry doing precisely this. Moreover, it is clear from the text of Simplicius that many of the objections Plotinus raises against the *Categories* in *On the Genera of Being* he got from a work or works of Lucius and Nicostratus, who were certainly hostile to Aristotle.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, I am convinced that this simple way of putting the matter is more than a little misleading: it both misrepresents the nature and originality of Porphyry's contribution to the history of logic and metaphysics and distorts our view of the fundamental

<sup>4</sup> A. Busse (ed.), *CAG IV.2* (Berlin, 1888), translated in this series by John Dillon.

<sup>5</sup> C. Kalbfleisch (ed.), *CAG VIII* (Berlin, 1897).

<sup>6</sup> cf. especially Simplicius' words *Plótinós de ho megas epi toutois* [i.e. Lucius and Nicostratus: see below, n. 7] *tas pragmateiôdestatas exetaseis en trisin holois bibliois tois Peri tôn genôn tou ontos epigegrammenois tõi tôn Katégoriôn bibliôi proségage. meta de toutous ho pantôn hêmin tôn kalôn aitios Porphurios exégêsín te entelé tou bibliou kai tôn enstaseîn pasôn luseis ouk aponôs en hepta bibliois epoiêsato tois Gedaleiôîi prosphônêtheisi k.t.l.*

<sup>7</sup> A. Busse (ed.), *CAG IV.1* (Berlin, 1887), translated in this volume.

<sup>8</sup> *Simpl. in Cat.* 1,18-22 refers to them as *skhedon ti pros panta ta eirêmena kata to biblion enstaseis komizein philotimoumenoi, kai oude eulabôs, alla kataphorikhôs mallon kai apêruthriakotôs*. I follow K. Praechter, 'Nikostratos der Platoniker', *Hermes* 57 (1922), 481-517 (= idem, *Kleine Schriften* [Collectanea 7, Hildesheim, 1973], 101-37), in taking Nicostratus at least to have been a Platonist, not a Stoic as affirmed by Zeller, *op. cit.* (n. 1), III.1, pp. 716-17n., even if he is not identical with the otherwise known second-century AD Platonist as Praechter argues. If Lucius was a Stoic, Nicostratus' dependence on him might help to account for the Stoic elements found in his fragments. Certainly Lucius at *Simpl. in Cat.* 64,18-19 seems to be following a line of objection due to the Stoics Athenodorus and Cornutus, based on the assumption that the *Categories* is about different kinds of words; cf. *Simpl. in Cat.* 18,27-19,1, *Porph. in Cat.* 59,9-14, 86,22-4. At *Simpl. in Cat.* 48,1-34, Porphyry is quoted as using a Stoic distinction to refute an objection of Lucius', which may be evidence that Lucius was a Stoic. On the other hand, Nicostratus' assumption that Forms exist (*Simpl. in Cat.* 73,15-28, where however his name is linked with that of Lucius) as well as immaterial mathematical objects (429,13-20) seems conclusive for his having been a Platonist.

Neoplatonic problem of the relationship between Plato and Aristotle. Elsewhere I have tried to sharpen the statement of the historical situation by examining some of the connections between Porphyry's interpretation of the *Categories* and Plotinus' discussion of the problem of the nature of the categories, especially the category of substance, in *On the Genera of Being*. I have suggested that Plotinus' and Porphyry's attitudes toward the *Categories* are much closer to one another than has previously been supposed, and that in particular Porphyry's position on the nature of categories has been deeply influenced by Plotinus' arguments.<sup>9</sup>

I will now look at some of the more important features of Porphyry's interpretation of the *Categories* that enabled him to downplay the evidently anti-Platonic metaphysical elements that the work contains and to turn it into a basic textbook of logic for his revived school-Platonism. Here I will be relying heavily upon an important and seminal paper by A.C. Lloyd.<sup>10</sup>

### Porphyry's Platonising interpretation of the *Categories*

*Prima facie*, it is hard to see how the *Categories* could ever have come to serve as a basic introductory text for a Platonist philosophical school. There are a number of ways in which it seems to be an explicitly anti-Platonist work. This is most clear in chapter 5 of the *Categories*, the chapter on substance or *ousia*. Aristotle takes over the philosophical use of the term *ousia* from Plato and transforms it. The fundamental meaning of *ousia* in both Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics seems to be 'primary or basic kind of being'. In the *Phaedo* (78d) and the *Timaeus* (29c), Plato uses *ousia* to refer to the separate Forms, and Aristotle's adoption of the term as the name of his first category is connected with his denial, in conscious opposition to Plato's middle-period Theory of Forms, that non-substantial items such as qualities and quantities have being in the primary sense, even considered

<sup>9</sup> Steven K. Strange, 'Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Categories*', in W. Haase and H. Temporini (eds), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* 2.36.2 (Berlin and New York, 1987), pp. 955-74.

<sup>10</sup> A.C. Lloyd, *op. cit.* (n. 1).



as universals. This denial does not by itself necessarily constitute unorthodox Platonism, however, since in the *Timaeus* at least Forms seem to be only of natural kinds, i.e. in Aristotelian terms, of substances. What is fundamentally anti-Platonist about *Categories* § 5 is its argument that less universal substance is ontologically prior to more universal substance, and that particular substance is primary. Aristotle claims at *Cat.* 2b6 that unless first or particular substances exist, nothing else can either: so universal substances, corresponding to the Platonic Forms or *ousiai* of man, animal, and so forth of the *Timaeus*, cannot exist apart from their instances, as separate Forms.<sup>11</sup> In the Academic terminology that Aristotle sometimes employs, this means that particular substances are 'prior in nature' or 'prior in being' to universal substances (cf. *Metaph.* 1019a1-4, *Cat.* 14a29-35, 14b11-13, 25-33). Priority in nature corresponds to the notion of ontological dependence. X is prior to Y in this sense if either (a) X can exist without Y but not *vice versa*, or (b) X is the cause of the being of Y. Note that (b) appears to be a somewhat weaker condition than (a): at least Aristotle remarks at *Cat.* 14b11-13 that it does not entail (a). Nevertheless, Aristotle certainly seems to want to deny in the *Categories* not only the separation of the Forms from sensibles, but also the fundamental tenet of the Theory of Forms that the universal F is the cause of the being of particular F's. The being of universals in the *Categories* seems to consist entirely in their being predicated of particulars, in accidental categories as well as in the category of substance. Aristotle's later metaphysical views represent a further development of this

<sup>11</sup> For this interpretation of Aristotle's view of the nature of the alleged 'separation' (*khôrismos*) of the Platonic Forms, see G. Fine, 'Separation', in J. Annas (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), pp. 31-87. I have not been convinced by D. Morrison, 'Separation in Aristotle's Metaphysics', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1986), pp. 125-57, that Fine's interpretation is incorrect, though the issue is certainly far too complex to be discussed fully here. (See also Fine's reply to Morrison and his response in vol. 4 of *Oxford Studies*, pp. 159-65 and 167-73, respectively.) Morrison argues that separation for Aristotle consists instead in the numerical distinctness of two things or sorts of things from one another. On this view, if the Forms are conceived as in the *Categories* as the genera and species of substance, then they cannot be separate from the individual substances that fall under them, since a thing is included within its genus and species. But in that case Aristotle would not need the argument against separation of the Forms that on my view he gives in *Cat.* § 5.

position. The *Metaphysics* indicates that it was Aristotle's mature considered view that less universal being is prior in nature to more universal being, even that universals have no real as opposed to abstract existence at all (cf. the sixth and seventh *aporiai* of *Metaph.* 3 in Ross's numbering<sup>12</sup> with their resolution in the central books), and though this issue seems to have been a matter of controversy within the Academy,<sup>13</sup> it seems clear that Plato himself took the opposite view, that what is more universal is naturally prior.<sup>14</sup>

The *Categories*, then, seems to contain an attack on orthodox Platonism, in that it denies the separation of Forms and the ontological priority of the universal. Moreover, Aristotle uses the theory of categories as the basis of one of his main objections to the Theory of Forms (*Eudemian Ethics* 1.8, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6). So how can Porphyry, who not only considers himself to be an orthodox Platonist but wants to interpret Aristotle as being one as well, manage to deal with these apparently obvious facts about the metaphysics presupposed in the *Categories*? How does he think he can fit the Aristotelian theory of categories into a Platonist metaphysics? It will only be after we have examined Plotinus' reply to Aristotle's argument in the *EE* and *NE* that we will be able to suggest an answer to the more general problem of how Porphyry could have handled Aristotle's main objection to the Theory of Forms based on the theory of categories. For now, let us restrict ourselves to the question of how Porphyry can read the *Categories* itself as not inconsistent with orthodox Platonism.

Porphyry's approach to interpreting the *Categories* is determined by a specific view of the nature and purposes of that work. Notoriously, it was a matter of controversy among the ancient commentators what the *Categories* was about and to what branch of philosophy it belonged. This issue is covered most fully in extant texts in an extended passage of the preface to Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* (9,5-13,26), where the various positions on the question that

<sup>12</sup> W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1923).

<sup>13</sup> cf. S. Pines, 'A new fragment of Xenocrates and its implications', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, n.s.v. 51, pt. 2 (Philadelphia, 1961), especially pp. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup> cf. *Metaph.* 3.3 with Ross's notes.

had been taken by previous commentators are laid out. Simplicius is there discussing the problem of what the *skopos* or subject-matter of the *Categories* is, i.e. that which it is Aristotle's intention to discuss in the work. The fundamental disagreement among the commentators was over whether the *Categories* was a logical work, concerning either simple terms or the simple concepts they represent, or whether it was a work of metaphysics, concerned with the classification of simple entities or concepts by genera.

There is more at stake here than merely what the text of the *Categories* says, but there are certainly textual grounds for the dispute. Unlike most of Aristotle's other treatises, the *Categories* fails to be explicit about the field of philosophical activity into which it falls. This may be, as Michael Frede has suggested,<sup>15</sup> because the work as we have it is fragmentary and missing its original beginning, where this question would have naturally been addressed. The abruptness with which *Cat.* § 1 begins is indeed striking, as is its lack of apparent connection with what follows it. It may also be that the *Categories* is a very early work of Aristotle's, written at a period of his development at which he had not yet become self-conscious about the departments of philosophical inquiry, in particular about the distinction between logic and metaphysics. But more importantly, Aristotle is quite unclear in the *Categories* about whether he is discussing entities or linguistic items. He slides in a loose way back and forth between the material and formal modes of speech, and presents the list of categories of § 4 as a classification of uncombined *legomena* or 'things said', but as signifying either substances, quantities, qualities, and so forth. The things signified here are presumably entities, but one can certainly understand the temptation to see the work as a whole as being concerned with the *legomena*, the terms that are used to talk about entities – particularly if one is already inclined to think, from reading the *Metaphysics* for instance, that Aristotle does not allow any sort of real existence to universal entities.

<sup>15</sup> 'Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift', in P. Moraux and J. Wiesner (eds), *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum* (9th Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 1983), pp. 1-29.

Porphyry, of course, does want to have Aristotle admit the existence of universals, but nevertheless adopts on this point an earlier Peripatetic line of interpretation that sees the *Categories* as principally about terms or linguistic items, which Porphyry calls 'predicates' (*katêgoria*, Porph. *in Cat.* 57,19-58,20; *katêgoroumena*, *Simpl. in Cat.* 10,21-2).<sup>16</sup> According to Porphyry, this accounts for the title *Categories* or 'predications'.<sup>17</sup> Here Porphyry is agreeing with the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias,<sup>18</sup> which Simplicius gives in an important fragment (10,11-19), probably quoting Porphyry's own quotation of it in *To Gedalios*.<sup>19</sup> Alexander's view is a sort of compromise among the various alternative interpretations listed above. According to this view, Aristotle does indeed in his metaphysics divide simple entities and their corresponding concepts into ten genera, but as Porphyry puts it (58,27-9), the *Categories* itself, which is the first of the logical works of Aristotle, is only incidentally concerned with things thus differing in genus: primarily it is about simple significant expressions, *qua* significant (cf. also Porph. *in Cat.* 58,5-6).<sup>20</sup>

On this interpretation, the *Categories* is a work of logic, not a work of metaphysics. This was clearly also the view of the ancient editor of Aristotle's corpus (perhaps Andronicus of Rhodes)<sup>21</sup> who was responsible for the traditional ordering of the treatises, since he made the *Categories* the first of the logical works, and perhaps also gave it its present title. (There were various other titles current in antiquity; cf. e.g. Porph. *in Cat.* 56,18-19.) This placement of the *Categories* in the Aristotelian corpus predates Alexander, who defended it as the correct one (*Simpl. in Cat.* 10,10). The rationale for the traditional ordering of the treatises of the *Organon* is pretty clearly that they are supposed to deal successively with

<sup>16</sup> cf. *Simpl. in Cat.* 11,2-3 for the technical distinction between these two terms.

<sup>17</sup> Porph. *in Cat.* 59,18; cf. also Herminus ap. Porph. *in Cat.* 59,27-9.

<sup>18</sup> Alexander is himself following his teacher Herminus; cf. previous note.

<sup>19</sup> cf. also Porph. *in Cat.* 58,10 with *Simpl. in Cat.* 10,13-15.

<sup>20</sup> For a contemporary defence of a similar 'linguistic' interpretation of the *Categories*, see M. Matthen, 'The *Categories* and Aristotle's Ontology', *Dialogue* (Canadian Philosophical Review) 17 (1978), pp. 228-43.

<sup>21</sup> See P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, Bd. 1 (*Peripatoi*, Bd. 5, Berlin and New York, 1973), p. 149.

increasingly complex subject-matter (cf. e.g. Porph. *in Cat.* 56,25-8, *Simpl. in Cat.* 9,9-13): the *Categories* with simple terms, *de Interpretatione* with simple propositions, the *Prior Analytics* with syllogisms, the *Posterior Analytics* with demonstrations, and the *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi* with dialectical practice. In turn, the *Organon* as a whole is supposed to serve as the 'instrument' by which one investigates the various theoretical and practical 'parts' (*merê*) of philosophy, i.e. physics or natural philosophy, metaphysics or first philosophy, and ethics.

This picture, enshrined as it is in the traditional ordering of the treatises of the Aristotelian corpus, and defended by Porphyry following Alexander of Aphrodisias, suggests that the *Categories* is the right place to begin the study of Aristotle's philosophy, and that is why it is placed first in the traditional order of the corpus.<sup>22</sup> Porphyry, following the Peripatetic Nerminus (59,21-2), believed that Aristotle had deliberately intended the *Categories* as a work for beginners in philosophy.<sup>23</sup> This is a strange view, for as anyone who has begun an introductory course on Aristotle with it can attest, beginning students tend to find the *Categories* extremely rough going. Porphyry must have been aware of this as well, for he is supposed to have written the *Isagoge* as an introduction to the *Categories* for his student Chrysaorius, a Roman senator who found himself befuddled by Aristotle's terminology in the work.<sup>24</sup> It is worth emphasising that the *Isagoge* is an introduction to the *Categories* and to the *Organon* as a whole, not merely to the *Topics*. Porphyry is often and quite unfairly taken to task for having made the species a 'fifth predicable' in the *Isagoge*, i.e. adding it to the list of four predicables discussed in *Topics* 1.5-9, but the species (*eidos*) is one of the basic sorts of predicates in the *Categories*, though it is a predicate of individuals, and lies therefore outside the purview of the *Topics* discussion, which

<sup>22</sup> cf. *Simpl. in Cat.* 5,5-15.

<sup>23</sup> cf. *Dex. in Cat.* 42,5-8, probably following Porphyry; cf. P. Hadot, 'L'Harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories', in *Plotin e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Problemi attuali di scienze e di cultura 198 (Rome, 1974), pp. 31-47.

<sup>24</sup> cf. Ammonius *in Isag.* 22,13-22 (ed. A. Busse, CAG IV.3, Berlin, 1891).

concerns dialectical propositions involving only universals.

We should take a brief look at the famous preface to the *Isagoge* (1,3-16), for it will help illuminate Porphyry's attitude toward the metaphysical problems raised by the *Categories*. Since he is writing an introductory work, Porphyry says there, he will avoid going into the deeper problems (*ta bathutera zêtêmata*, 1,8-9) concerning the existential status of genera and species – as is well known, his brief summary of the various possible views on this that follows (1,9-14) served as the starting point for the medieval controversies over the problem of universals – but will stick instead to expounding the *logikôteron* opinions of the ancient philosophers, especially the Peripatetics (i.e. Aristotle) concerning the kinds of predicates. The word *logikôteron* here may well mean, as it is usually taken, 'more pertaining to the subject of logic';<sup>25</sup> this would fit with Porphyry's official view of the *Categories* as principally a logical work. It is just possible, however, that it means, in accordance with Aristotle's standard usage of *logikôs*, 'more dialectical'.<sup>26</sup> (Boethius translates it, incorrectly, as *probabiliter*, which shows however that he has the latter sense in mind.) Why Porphyry might want to call these opinions 'dialectical' will become apparent in a moment. In any case, Porphyry is suggesting here that the *Categories* can be adequately understood by a beginner without going into the deeper metaphysical problems concerning the ontological status of universals, e.g. whether or not there are separate Platonic Forms.

Porphyry conceives the *Categories* as being a dialectical work in the sense that it begins the study of substances and their properties from the logical analysis of ordinary language that even non-philosophers use to signify everyday things, and hence introduces the study of ontology, as a sort of subtext, from the point of view of those entities that are most knowable with respect to us, not those most knowable in themselves. Now we are in a position to see how Porphyry can deal with the seemingly obvious anti-Platonism of the *Categories*. This issue is addressed directly in an important

<sup>25</sup> cf. Ammonius in *Isag.* 45,3-22, David in *Isag.* (ed. A. Busse, CAG XVIII.2, Berlin, 1904) 120,19-121,2; Plot. 1.3.4,19.

<sup>26</sup> This possibility was suggested to me by Prof. Alexander Nehamas.

passage of our *Categories* commentary (90,12-91,27). The question is put, why does Aristotle in the *Categories* say that particular substance is primary and prior to universal substance, when actually it is the universal that is primary (i.e. according to Platonism)? We recall that it is precisely on this point that the anti-Platonism of the *Categories* is most apparent. In reply to this question, Porphyry correctly remarks that Aristotle does not mean that a single particular substance taken by itself is prior to its universal, but that the whole class-extension of a universal predicate is prior to it. (Aristotle, in the *Categories* at least, does seem to assume that there can be a universal one over above the many.) This latter claim, however, says Porphyry, is true: we cannot conceive a universal predicate as existing apart from its extension (90,29-91,7). Aristotle calls particular substances primary substances in the *Categories*, according to Porphyry, because he is there discussing the classification of significant expressions, and these apply primarily to sensible individuals, and only secondarily to the abstracted universals that are predicated of them. For the primary purpose of language is to communicate about ordinary things and their individual properties (91,8-9).<sup>27</sup> Abstracted universals for Porphyry, unlike the real universals, the Platonic Forms, have a merely conceptual existence, and are indeed posterior to sensible things.<sup>28</sup>

Hence the *Categories* on Porphyry's interpretation does turn out to have certain ontological commitments, but from the Platonist standpoint they can be defused. A student reading the *Categories* through Porphyry's spectacles will find in it mention only of those entities that are signified by terms of ordinary prephilosophical discourse. But since the *Categories* is not primarily concerned with metaphysics, there is nothing restrictive about its ontological commitments: they can be incorporated within a wider, richer ontology. In particular, this ontology can be an orthodox Platonistic one, as

<sup>27</sup> cf. Porph. in *Cat.* 57,20-8.

<sup>28</sup> In his discussion of abstracted or abstractable universals, Porphyry is following Alexander of Aphrodisias' view of the nature of universals: cf. A.C. Lloyd, *Form and Universal in Aristotle* (Arca. Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs, vol. 4, Liverpool, 1981), ch. 4; M. Tweedale, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias' views on universals', *Phronesis* 29 (1984), pp. 279-303.

long as allowance is made in it for the entities that ground the semantics of ordinary language, the fundamental referents of ordinary terms. Thus the Aristotelian abstractable universals that are the referents of general terms can be included in our ontology alongside the Platonic Forms: they are immanent universals, the Forms are transcendent universals and the causes both of sensibles and of immanent universals.<sup>29</sup> Sensible individuals are primary with respect to us, i.e. they denote the sensible objects that we refer to in our ordinary discourse (cf. Porph. *in Cat.* 91,19-27), but posterior in the order of nature to the universals involved in scientific demonstration, which involves an extension of ordinary language; these universals are more knowable in themselves and causes. Here Porphyry can rely for his interpretation of Aristotle on a well-known passage of *Posterior Analytics* 1.2 (71b29-72a5), which certainly seems foreign to the anti-Platonism of the *Categories*, since it states that universals are prior in the order of nature.<sup>30</sup>

This is the sort of apparent inconsistency in Aristotle's texts that a modern commentator would probably try to account for by recourse to a developmental hypothesis. Porphyry, of course, does not do this, but rather exploits the inconsistency for his own purposes, to show that Aristotle in the *Categories* is really a Platonist, though he appears not to be. Porphyry's interpretation will obviously be comforting for a Platonist who is confronted with the *Categories*. But besides comforting the orthodox, it is philosophically significant as well. For whatever sorts of things the Platonic Forms are supposed to be, it is hard to see how they could be the primary referents of

<sup>29</sup> Simpl. *in Cat.* 79,30-80,7 is probably an amplification, not a criticism, of the position of Porphyry stated just before (79,22-30), *pace* J. Pinborg, *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 1972), p. 39, so that the abstractable universal immanent in the subject is what is predicated of a subject in essential predication, and not the Form. A.C. Lloyd, 'Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic' (above n. 1), n. 1, p. 59, correctly locates the Neoplatonist's source for the concept of immanent form in Plato himself, primarily the Receptacle passage of the *Timaeus*.

<sup>30</sup> *Cat.* § 13, 15a4-7 (part of the so-called 'Postpraedicamenta') also seems to contradict the view of *Cat.* § 5 that the universal is posterior in nature, for it says that the genus is prior in nature to its species. *Metaph.* 7.3 fin., 1029b8-12, also makes the point that what is prior with respect to us is posterior in the order of nature, but with no implication that the latter is also more universal, which would be inconsistent with the view argued for elsewhere in *Metaph.* 7, that universals have no real existence.



terms in ordinary discourse. For apart from some talk about, e.g. mathematical entities such as numbers and about psychological states, what we are concerned with in ordinary speech are things we can see, hear, or otherwise directly experience, i.e. sensible objects and their properties, whereas the Forms are supposed to be intelligible objects, grasped only by a special sort of thought, namely scientific understanding. The Forms are supposed to be the causes of sensibles, but that is a matter that need not fall within the purview of a semantic theory of ordinary language, which according to Porphyry is all that is at issue in the *Categories*. Porphyry's interpretation of the *Categories* thus effects a restriction of its subject-matter to the purely 'logical' relations, as opposed to the more general ontological relations, in which sensible objects participate.

## Textual Emendations

The following textual changes from Busse's *CAG* edition have been adopted in the translation, in many cases following Busse's own suggestions in his *apparatus criticus*.

- 55,4            *pros tina for pros tas* (conj. Busse).  
55,16          Omit *ha* before *epiginetai*, with the *editio princeps*.  
56,6            Read *enklêtikês* for *elantikês* with the MS. (cf. note ad loc.).  
56,8-9        Perhaps read *kath' hou sêmainêtai* for *kata tou sêmainomenou* (Busse and the *editio princeps*; *kath' hou sêmainomenou*, MS.) with Simpl. 17,5-7.  
57,1            <en> *oudemiâi* (conj. Busse).  
58,9            *hekastê gar kata arithmon sêmainei* <hen> *tôn ontôn* (conj. Busse).  
60,7-8        *panta* <ta> *hephexês* (conj. Busse).  
61,18          *pragmata* <ha> *diaphora heurethenta* (conj. Busse).  
63,21          Read *mête* for *mê* (conj. Busse).  
63,32          *zôion* <logikon> *thnêton* (conj. Busse).  
64,8            Read *ho toutôi homônumou horos* for *ho toutou sunônumos horos*.  
66,25          <idion hekaterou logon> *apodôsei* at 66,25 (conj. Busse).  
67,17          *to* <euthun>*on* (conj. Busse).  
68,6-7        Insert *ho te anthrôpos kai ho bous* after *zôion* (conj. Busse).  
72,1            Read *epi* for *epei*, with the *editio princeps*.  
74,2-3        Read *emou kai sôî legontos* vel sim., after Felicianus (cf. note ad loc.).

- 74,2-5 Assign *phere oun ... sumplexas* to the questioner, *poiêson ho legeis* to the respondent, following Felicianus (cf. note ad loc.).
- 78,19 Insert *ou* before *khôrizetai* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 78,22-79,11 Transpose to 80,27 (cf. note ad loc.).
- 80,3 Insert *to kath' hupokeimenou katêgoreisthai* instead of *to kath' hupokeimenou legesthai* after *einai*.
- 80,16 Read *proelthôn* for *proelêphthê*.
- 82,30 Read *tout' <aei>*, *eirêkas* at 82,30 (conj. Busse).
- 83,7.8 Read *allou* for *allai* in both instances (conj. Busse).
- 83,22-3 Omit *ta* before *genê* (conj. Busse).
- 83,32 *ta dê t<oi>auta*.
- 84,1 Read *hoti thateron hupo thateron <mon>on: <hotan de> kai* (after Simplicius 56,25-27; cf. note ad loc.).
- 84,27 Read *ho de <pasas>* (conj. Busse).
- 85,14 Read *eisin* for *estin* (conj. Busse).
- 86,20 Read *tauta ta genê* for *ta auta genê*.
- 86,37 Read *tôn ou<n> legomenôn kata <tôn ontôn phêsi>: legontai de hai lexeis* for † *tôn ou legomenôn. katalegontai de hai lexeis* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 87,16 Read *hekastou* for *hekastos* (conj. Busse).
- 88,3-4 Read *eti mên peri tês taxeôs lege, hina [hekastês] ekdidaxêis* (conj. Busse).
- 89,4 Retain MS. reading *kath' hupokeimenou (kath' hupokeimenôn, Busse)*.
- 89,6 Read *koinou ontos tais prô<tais kai tais deu>terais* (conj. Busse).
- 90,14 Insert *prôtas* before *einai ousias*.
- 90,14 *koinêi* for *koinou* (conj. Busse).
- 90,16 Insert *tês atomou kai to genos mallon ousia tou te eidous kai tês atomou ousias* after *ousia* (conj. Busse).
- 91,14 Read *aitiôntai* for *aitiômai* with Praechter (*Hermes* 57 (1922), p. 505 n. 2).
- 93,10 Read *kath' autôn* with the *editio princeps* (cf. note ad loc.).

- 93,17 Retain MS. reading *en toutôi* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 93,29-30 Assign *oukoun ... idion* to the pupil, *hupograpson* to the master (conj. Busse).
- 94,25 Insert *to kuriôs* before *idion* (conj. Busse).
- 94,27 Read *tôi mê en hupokeimenôi einai* for *to mê en hupokeimenôi einai*.
- 94,36 Read *apo toutôn* for *kata toutôn* (conj. Busse; cf. note ad loc.).
- 96,27 Read *goun* for *oun* (conj. Busse).
- 96,36-97,1 Insert words corresponding to Simpl. 106,6-10 (cf. note ad loc.).
- 97,1-2 Insert *isôs an tis kai to polu tôi oligôi* (vel sim.) before *phaiê*.
- 97,3 Read *hois ouk errhethê ti einai enantion* for *hois ouk errhethê to einai enantion* (conj. Busse).
- 97,3 Read *oude* for *oute* (conj. Busse).
- 97,15-17 Read *oude mên to eidos ho anthrôpos mallon <ousia> ê autos heautou genoito [mallon ousia] ê allou [anthrôpou]* (after Felicianus; cf. note ad loc.).
- 97,23-4 Insert *ousias phês homostoikhous einai. A: homostoikhous phêmi einai tas atomous tais atomais kai tas eidikas tais eidikais kai* vel sim. after *tinas* (conj. Busse).
- 98,21 Insert *hôte* before *mê dekhomenos*.
- 99,16 <*ouk*> *epidektikai*.
- 99,21 Insert *zôion kai* before *anthrôpon*.
- 99,22 <*kai*> *to zôion* (conj. Busse).
- 99,32 Read *to men hupokeimenon tôi khrômati* for *to men en hupokeimenôi tôi khrômati* with Wallies (cf. note ad loc.).
- 100,7 Read *metabolên dunamenês dekhesthai* for *metabolês dunamenês ginesthai* (conj. Busse).
- 100,12 *te esti <ti>* (conj. Busse).
- 102,15 Reading *mêkous ousês aplatous* (conj. Busse).
- 102,27-8 Delete *hê* before *epikeimenê*.
- 104,27 Omit *mê*, with the *editio princeps*.
- 106,1 Insert *en* before *khronôi* (conj. Busse).
- 106,4 Omit comma after *kata sumbêbekos de*.
- 109,1 Read *autou* for *auto* (conj. Busse).

- 109,6 Read *toutôn* for *t'auton*.
- 109,26 Insert *epikheirêma* after *eis to auto* (conj. Busse).
- 112,5-6 Transpose these lines to before *ti oun paris-têsin*; at 111,30 (conj. Busse).
- 112,10 Mark lacuna of one clause after *kata genikên*.
- 112,26 Retain MS. reading *touto hoper estin*.
- 113,11 Place comma after *theton* and read *dê* for *de*.
- 114,8 Insert *A. autos dêlôsei touto* to fill the lacuna (conj. Busse).
- 114,10 Insert *phere* before *hê* to fill the lacuna (conj. Diels).
- 114,14 Insert *dekhetai kai auto enantiôsin* after *enantiôsin* (conj. Busse).
- 114,19-20 Omit *ouk* before *epidekhetai*, with the *editio princeps*.
- 114,21 Omit *ouk* before *epidekhetai*, with the *editio princeps*.
- 114,29 Insert *kai ison* after *gar*, with the *editio princeps*.
- 115,7 Read *epidekhoito <oun> an* (conj. Busse).
- 115,20 Read *to <hôs> pros ta <deutera>*.
- 118,6 Omit *hama* before *suneisagêi* (conj. Busse).
- 119,16 Read *sunairei* for *anêirêtai* (conj. Busse).
- 120,13 Insert *epi* before *tôn allôn* (conj. Busse).
- 120,33 Read *dunatai autou epistê<ton einai>*, (*dunatai autou epistê<mê einai>*, Busse).
- 121,17 Read *meli men estin, geuston [aisthêton] de ouk estin* (conj. Busse).
- 121,23 Omit Busse's supplement *<phês>*.
- 122,23 Read *ktêmata* for *ktêmatôn* (conj. Busse).
- 122,25-6 Read *hê tis kheir* for both occurrences of *hê tinos kheir* (cf. note ad loc.)
- 123,4 Omit *êtoi auta* (conj. Busse).
- 123,34 Read *apodedôken autos* for *apodedôkotos* (conj. Busse).
- 124,10 Insert *doxei: ou gar esti to sôma* to fill the lacuna (cf. note ad loc.).
- 124,13 Read *perilambanei<n> êi to leukon einai* (cf. note ad loc.).

- 125,10 Insert *ei ti men anthrôpos, pantôs touto thnêton, ouk eti de ei ti* to fill the lacuna (conj. Busse).
- 125,15-16 Read *kai <legei> en têi skhesei tinôn tôn pros ti <pros> allêla to einai ekhein ta pros ti* vel sim.
- 126,9 Omit *ti sumbêsetai* (conj. Busse).
- 126,23 Read *ta merê autô<n dêla>dê* rather than *ta merê auta <dêla>dê*, suggested by Busse.
- 126,24-128,1 Assign 126,24 to master; reverse the assignments of speeches in following (cf. note ad loc.).
- 126,29 Insert words corresponding to the content of Simpl. 201,13-16 (cf. note ad loc.).
- 127,12 Retain MS. *poion* rather than reading *leukon* (Felicianus, followed by Busse).
- 128,11-15 Assign to pupil, the foregoing to the master (cf. note ad loc.).
- 129,7 Read *ho bous* for *ho hippos* (conj. Busse).
- 129,8 Insert *ou* before *dienênokhen* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 129,10 Insert *ouk* before *eidopoiôi*, with the *editio princeps*.
- 129,18 Read *pros to analabein* for *pro tou analabein* (conj. Busse).
- 129,20 Insert *ouk estin* before *onoma* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 129,25 Read *auto* for *autou* (conj. Busse).
- 130,8 *esti <ho> mê an katakopeiê* (conj. Diels).
- 130,16 Read *aisthêtikois* for *aisthêtois*, with the *editio princeps*.
- 131,18 Insert *ou ton epitêdeiôs ekhonta* to fill the lacuna (conj. Busse).
- 131,19-20 Read *eiê <eidous: alla ton phusei> pros to orgizesthai p<epoiômenon>* (conj. Busse).
- 131,22 Insert *<hoion hê ep' oligon>* to fill the lacuna (conj. Busse).
- 131,24 Read *tôn poiôtêtôn* for *tôn atomôn*, after Boethius (cf. note ad loc.).
- 133,6 Insert *<poiôtêtos, ho>* to fill the lacuna.
- 133,20 Read *eirêke* for *eirêkas* (conj. Busse).

- 135,23 Read <ouden> *gar legetai* (conj. Busse).
- 136,14 Insert *kai leukotês melaniâi, alla kai to adikon tôi dikaiôi enantion* after *enantion* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 137,5 Insert *ti esti, labontes tôn katêgoriôn* to fill the lacuna (conj. Busse).
- 137,30 Insert *ektous* to fill the lacuna (cf. note ad loc.).
- 139,1 Retain MS. *pragmatôn* rather than Busse's conjecture *skhêmatôn*.
- 140,2 Insert <*to genos tou eidous kai tôn*> to fill the lacuna (conj. Busse).
- 140,11-12 Inserting words suggested by Boethius 260A (cf. note ad loc.).
- 140,12 Omit *pros* before *to genos* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 140,14-15 Insert <*hoper adunaton*> rather than Busse's conjecture <*hoper atopon*> (cf. note ad loc.).
- 141,3 Insert <*eis allên kai allên katêgorian anagomenôs*> after *allo kai allo* (conj. Busse).
- 141,8 Read *hê peri tou poiein kai <hê> tou paskhein* (cf. note ad loc.).
- 141,17-18 Read *to thermainein kai to psukhein* instead of *to poiein kai to kaiein* (conj. Busse).
- 142,11 Insert *khronou kai tou* before *topou* (cf. note ad loc.).

## Felicianus' headings for Porphyry *On Aristotle Categories*

Giovanni Bernardino Feliciano (Latin name: Felicianus), born c. 1490 in Venice, died c. 1554, translated into Latin several works of the Greek commentators, including Porphyry's commentary on the *Categories*. In his translation of this commentary, he has divided the text into many sections and added his own heading to each. A list of these headings is provided here to aid the reader in correlating Porphyry's text to the chapters of Aristotle's *Categories* and to serve as a detailed table of contents for the commentary. The page and line numbers of Porphyry's text are given in parentheses.

### Proemium

1. Why the work is given the title 'Categories', i.e. 'predicates' (55,3)
2. Why the titles 'Before the Topics', 'On the Genera of Being', and 'On the Ten Genera' are inadmissible (56,14)
3. Why the title 'Categories' is a proper one; also, words of first and second imposition and the subject matter of the work (57,13)
4. The subject matter of the work according to the opinion of Herminus (59,15)
5. Why other topics are treated before the doctrine of the categories (59,34)

### Chapter 1

1. The existence of homonyms, synonyms, polyonyms, heteronyms, and paronyms (60,11)
2. Why he mentions homonyms, synonyms and paronyms here (60,34)



3. Why he discusses homonyms first (61,4)
4. Why he discusses homonyms rather than homonymy (61,13)
5. The definition of homonyms (61,28)
6. Why he only mentions names, when many other types of word are homonyms (61,31)
7. What is meant by 'having only the name in common' (62,7)
8. What is meant by having a name in common, and the number of ways something can be said to be 'in common' (62,17)
9. Why he did not merely say that the account of the essence is different, but added that it is the account corresponding to the name (62,34)
10. Why he did not merely say that the account corresponding to the name is different, but added that it is the account of the essence (64,22)
11. The various sorts of homonyms (65,12)
12. How homonymy differs from metaphor (66,29)
13. The definition of synonyms (68,1)
14. The definition of polyonyms (68,28)
15. The definition of heteronyms (69,10)
16. The definition of paronyms (69,14)
17. The conditions that must be fulfilled for there to be paronyms (69,30)

## Chapter 2

1. The subject of the work is simple words; things said with combination and without combination (70,25)
2. The smallest and largest possible divisions of the genera (71,15)
3. Why the smallest division is into four genera (71,27)
4. Instead of the names 'substance', 'accident', 'universal' and 'particular', Aristotle uses their descriptive accounts (72,30)
5. Universal substance (74,25)
6. Particular accident (75,30)
7. Universal accident (76,9)<sup>1</sup>
8. Particular substance (76,25)

<sup>1</sup> This entry and the former are reversed in the printed version.

9. What 'being in a subject' means, and the number of ways a thing can be said to be 'in' something else (77,13)
10. Why what is in a place is not in a subject (79,12)
11. Why an odour is never apart from a subject (79,23)
- 12.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle's division of universal and particular substance and accident is chiasmic (78,22)
13. What 'being said of a subject' means (79,35)

### Chapters 3 & 4

1. How species can be said of man but not of Socrates (80,28)
2. Differentiae (81,23)
3. A differentia is not always said of several things differing in species (82,29)
4. A species is not always said of several things differing in number (82,33)
5. What different and subordinate genera are (83,1)
6. Why subordinate genera sometimes have the same differentiae and sometimes different ones (84,10)
7. In which cases all the differentiae of a higher genus are predicated of a lower one, and in which this is not so (84,26)
8. The greatest possible division of the genera is actually an enumeration (86,5)
9. What 'with combination' and 'without combination' mean (87,1)
10. Why there can be no definition of any of the ten genera (87,16)
11. A proposition is produced by combining predicates (87,28)

### Chapter 5

1. Substance, and why it is discussed first (88,1)
2. What sort of substance is treated of in the *Categories* (88,13)
3. The division of substance into primary and secondary substances (88,23)
4. The characterisation of primary substance (88,32)
5. Why individual substance is said to be substance most

<sup>2</sup> This passage is out of place in the MS as well as in Felicianus (placed after § 9).

- strictly, primarily and most of all (89,10)
6. What secondary substances are (89,33)
  7. Why genera and species rather than individual substances are not said to be primary substances (90,12)
  8. Which species and genera are secondary substances (91,28)
  9. Why the genera and species of substances are called secondary substances (92,3)
  10. How the species is more a substance than the genus (92,36)
  11. No species or genus is more a substance than any other one, and no primary substance than any other one (93,18)
  12. The proprium of substance, and what 'proprium' means (93,25)
  13. Not being in a subject is not the proprium of substances alone (94,13)
  14. Having everything called after them synonymously is not a proprium of every substance (94,35)
  15. The differentia is an essential quality (95,10)
  16. Not signifying a certain 'this' does not apply to every substance (96,3)
  17. In what way 'man' and 'animal' signify qualities<sup>3</sup> (96,14)
  18. Not admitting contrariety does not apply to substance alone, but also to quantity (96,29)
  19. Not admitting of a more and less is not a proprium of substance alone (97,6)
  20. The proprium of substance is to be receptive of contraries while remaining one and the same in number (98,3)
  21. To be receptive of contraries is the proprium of substances alone (98,26)
  22. How it is the proprium of all substances to be receptive of contraries (98,34)

## Chapter 6

1. Quantity, and why it is the first category after substance (100,9)
2. The division of quantity, and that there can be several divisions of the same thing (100,29)
3. Discrete quantity (101,15)

<sup>3</sup> He should rather speak here of 'things qualified'.

4. Speech is a discrete quantity (101,23)
5. What continuous quantity is (102,10)
6. Surface (102,21)
7. Body (102,33)
8. How place is a continuous quantity (103,18)
9. How time is a quantity (103,29)
10. Which quantities have position and which do not (104,4)
11. What accidental quantities are (105,11)
12. That change is an accidental quantity (105,36)
13. Nothing is contrary to quantity (106,7)
14. Whether there is any sort of contrariety in place (107,1)
15. 'Great' and 'small' are neither definite quantities nor contraries (107,31)
16. 'Great' and 'small' and 'many' and 'few' are not quantities but relatives (108,30)
17. Not admitting of a more and less is not a proprium of quantity alone (110,18)
18. The proprium of quantity is being called 'equal' or 'unequal' (110,28)

## Chapter 7

1. Relatives, and why they are the first category after quantity (111,5)
2. What relatives are (111,16)
3. Not all relatives are said relative to the same grammatical case, and indeed some are not said relative to any case at all (111,30)
4. The differentia of relatives that are said relative to the same grammatical case (113,3)
5. Why 'to lie down', 'to sit', and 'to stand' are not relatives (113,17)
6. Which relatives admit of contrariety and which do not (113,29)
7. Not all relatives<sup>4</sup> admit of a more and less (114,25)
8. The proprium of relatives is to be said in relation to a correlative (115,17)
9. A relative must be stated properly in order to be convertible (116,1)

<sup>4</sup> Read *non omnia quae sunt <ad> aliquid* in Felicianus here.

10. How to invent names for correlatives if they are lacking so that the relative will be stated properly (116,9)
11. What needs to be observed in making a proper attribution to a correlative (117,1)
12. Relatives are simultaneous by nature (117,32)
13. Things prior and posterior by nature (118,17)
14. Knowledge and the knowable and perception and the perceptible are simultaneous in nature (119,4)
15. The absurdity that follows from the definition of relatives that was given (121,20)
16. That it cannot be shown from this definition that no substance is a relative (122,11)
17. Another truer definition of relatives (123,24)
18. Whoever knows definitely that something is a relative also knows its correlative (125,29)

## Chapter 8

1. Qualified things and qualities, and why the category is given this title (127,1)
2. The description of quality (127,31)
3. Why qualities are not homonyms, even though they are said in many ways (128,16)
4. The species of quality, and that state and disposition form a single species (128,34)
5. The second species of quality, natural capacity or incapacity (129,17)
6. The third species of quality, passive qualities and affections (130,10)
7. Affective qualities and affections of the soul (131,7)
8. How the third species of quality differs from the first two (131,23)
9. The fifth species of quality, shape and form, and how shape is a quality in one way and a quantity in another (132,20)
10. That form is a species of quality (133,12)
11. Why rare and dense and rough and smooth are not qualities (133,30)
12. Cases in which the name 'qualified' is used instead of 'quality', and cases where 'quality' is used instead of 'qualified' (134,30)

13. There is contrariety in quality, but not in all cases nor here alone (135,26)
14. How to look for the genus of a privation (137,5)
15. Which qualities admit of more and less (137,15)
16. What rules must be followed in investigating receptivity of more and less (138,33)
17. The proprium of quality is to be called 'similar' and 'dissimilar' (139,17)
18. In what way a state can be both a quality and a relative (139,22)

## **Chapter 9**

1. Action and passion (141,5)
2. Position (141,27)
3. When, where, and having (142,6)

Porphyry  
*On Aristotle Categories*  
Translation

# Porphyry

## Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* in question-answer form

Q. Why, given that in ordinary usage (*sunêtheia*) the term *katêgoria* denotes the speech of the prosecution against someone<sup>1</sup> at a trial, which is opposed by the defendant's speech (*apologia*), and that Aristotle's intention was not to instruct us about how to argue accusations against opponents in lawcourts, but about something else, for which this word is not used in ordinary Greek, did he choose to violate accepted usage by giving his book the title *Categories*?<sup>2</sup> 55,3  
5

A. Because ordinary language (*sunêtheia*) is for communicating about everyday things, and employs the expressions that are commonly used to indicate such things, but philosophers are interpreters of things that are unknown to most people and need new words to communicate the things they have discovered. Hence either they have invented new and unfamiliar expressions or they have used established ones in extended senses<sup>3</sup> in order to indicate the things they have discovered. 10

<sup>1</sup> Reading *pros tina for pros tas*, as Busse suggests.

<sup>2</sup> The material concerning the title of the *Categories* contained in the first two responses (55,3-56,14) is most closely paralleled by Dexippus 5,30-6,26, who cites Alexander and Porphyry as his sources. Dexippus too is concerned to defend Aristotle against the accusation of barbarism or non-standard Greek usage (*xenizein*) in the choice of the work's title. He says he is giving the 'deeper' of the responses of Alexander and Porphyry to this accusation, indicating that Porphyry discussed some alternative replies in his larger commentary. Simplicius 16,31-17,7 and 17,28-18,3 has similar material: indeed Simpl. 17,3-7 quotes Porph. 56,8-9 (= Porph. 58,16-18; cf. the notes to those passages below). Simpl. 17,8-28 contains a criticism of Porphyry's view and an alternative interpretation of the title, probably due to Iamblichus, as the reference to pseudo-Archytas at Simpl. 17,26 ff. indicates.

<sup>3</sup> *katekhrêsanto*: i.e. they employ catachresis or 'improper' usage. Not *grammati-*



15 Q. Show us by example what you mean.

A. Aristotle noticed that whenever something that comes to be by the agency either of nature or of art reaches its proper goal (*telos*), certain forms supervene upon it.<sup>4</sup> For instance, when the seed of an animal has been implanted and is set in motion by nature and becomes fully developed (*apotelesthen*), a horse, say, is produced (*apoteleitai*), that is, when it has become ensouled (*empasukhon*) and displays the characteristics of an ensouled being. Hence he called the soul an 'entelechy' (*entelekheia*),<sup>5</sup> from the fact that the seed, having reached its proper goal (*telos*), produces (*apoteleitai*) an ensouled animal. He also said that the form imposed upon the bronze by an artisan, when by his agency it becomes a statue, is an entelechy. He invented the word 'entelechy' to apply to such cases; it did not exist in ordinary language.<sup>6</sup> But the word 'headed' (*kephalôton*), which is used of something else in ordinary language,<sup>7</sup> he transferred to that which has a head, saying that a head is more properly the head of a headed thing than the head of an animal (7a16-17). Thus 'headed' would be a sign signifying that which has a head. 'Head' belongs to 'headed thing' because not all animals have a head, for example, sea-urchins, sea-anemones, and similar creatures. Hence he himself says that it is sometimes even necessary to invent words.<sup>8</sup> So even though *katêgoria* is applied in ordinary usage to the speech of the prosecution<sup>9</sup> which presents evidence against a defendant, he adopted the word, and chose to call those utterances in which significant expressions are

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ally improper, however: Porphyry obviously does not intend to imply that such a usage – he gives as an example Aristotle's use of 'headed' (*kephalôton*) at *Cat.* 7a16 (below, 1,25 ff.), as well as the title *Categories* – would count as poor Greek. Cf. also *Dex.* 6,18 ff., *Simpl.* 17,32-18,3.

<sup>4</sup> Lines 55,16-56,5 are one long and somewhat anacolouthic sentence in Porphyry's text, which I have broken up in the translation. Following the *editio princeps*, I omit *ha* at 55,16, which has no construction.

<sup>5</sup> *De Anima* 412a27, b5.

<sup>6</sup> The play in this passage on words derived from *telos*, which has the senses both of 'completion' and 'perfection' and that of 'goal', is impossible to reproduce in translation. *entelekheia*, 'actuality', is Porphyry's example of a philosopher's made-up word (cf. 55,12 above). Many modern scholars would agree that this word was a coinage of Aristotle's (see for example Ross's note to *Metaphysics* 1047a30), though not with Porphyry's explanation of it.

<sup>7</sup> Of certain plants, e.g. the leek (*prason*).

<sup>8</sup> *Cat.* 7a5: see the commentary on that passage (below, 116,14-29).

<sup>9</sup> Reading *enklêtikês* ('speech of the prosecution') for *elentikês* ('speech of refutation')

applied to things 'predications' (*katégoriai*). Hence whenever a simple significant expression is employed and said of what it signifies, this is called a predication.<sup>10</sup> For example, this stone I am pointing at, which we can touch and see, is a thing, and when we say about it, 'This is a stone', the expression 'stone' is a predicate (*katégorêma*), for it signifies that sort of thing, and is uttered about the thing we are pointing at, the stone.<sup>10a</sup> So too in other cases. 10

Q. Was *Categories* the only title that he gave the book, or did he also call it, as do others, *The Ten Categories*?<sup>11</sup> 15

A. Certainly not.

Q. Why did you say that?

A. Because others have given it the title *Introduction to the Topics*, others, *On the Genera of Being*, and others, *On the Ten Genera*.<sup>12</sup>

Q. Were they correct in giving it these titles? 20

A. They were not.

Q. Explain for us the absurdity of each of these titles.

A. It would be absurd to call the book *Introduction to the Topics*, for why call it *Introduction to the Topics* rather than *Introduction to the Analytics* or *Introduction to On Interpretation*? It is not for the sake of the studying the *Topics* that one 25

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at 56,6 with the first hand in the manuscript. The word *enklêtikhê* is apparently not found elsewhere (it is not listed in LSJ), but fits the context better: compare the term *enklêmati* at the opening of the commentary (55,3-4).

<sup>10</sup> Simplicius gives this sentence (56,8-9) as a literal quotation from Porphyry at *in Cat.* 17,5-7 (immediately following a quotation of 58,16-18: cf. note to that passage below), but with a slight variation from the text preferred by Busse; the manuscript text is corrupt, and Simplicius' quotation may well preserve the original reading. Simplicius' mode of citation (*ho men Porphurios haploikôteron exêgoumenos*) shows that he is quoting from our commentary rather than from the lost, longer commentary dedicated *To Gedalius*, so that we have evidence here of Simplicius' direct knowledge of our question-and-answer commentary.

<sup>10a</sup> Ebbesen p. 379, n. 25, marks a lacuna in 56,11 and reads *hê lithos lexis <katégoria esti, to de lithos> katégorêma*, 'the expression "stone" is a predicate, while the stone itself is something predicated'. See Simplicius 11,2-3 and 17,5-7 for *katégorêma* = 'thing predicated'.

<sup>11</sup> For this title, cf. Alexander in *Top.* 65,15.

<sup>12</sup> The pupil's response here does not seem terribly apt, but the point is probably that the title *The Ten Categories* is no more authentic than others that were in circulation. For the various titles given to the *Categories* in antiquity, cf. *Simpl.* 15,26-16,30. The title *Introduction to the Topics* is a very old one, for it was mentioned by Andronicus of Rhodes, the earliest known commentator on the *Categories* in the first half of the first century BC (*Simpl.* 379,9-11). It was defended as the correct title of the work as late as the second century AD by Adrastus of Aphrodisias (*Schol. in Cat.* 32b36-8 Brandis, cf. *Simpl.* 15,26-16,4; Moraux I p. 100 n. 13).

first has to learn about predications, but also for the sake of learning about the *Analytiks* and about categorical propositions, and indeed just about any other subject.<sup>13</sup> This work is the most elementary one, and serves as an introduction to all the parts of philosophy. It would be best to consider it as an  
 30 introduction to the the physical part of philosophy, rather than to the *Topics*.<sup>14</sup> For substance, qualification,<sup>15</sup> and so forth are the product of nature (*phusis*). But it definitely ought not to be given the titles *On the Genera of Being* or *On the Ten Genera*.

Q. Why?

A. Because beings and their genera and species, and  
 35 differentiae are things (*pragmata*), not words (*phônai*).<sup>16</sup> After listing the ten items, i.e. substance, qualification, quantity, and so forth, Aristotle says, 'None of the above is  
 57,1 said just by itself in<sup>17</sup> any affirmation, but it is by the combination of these with one another that an affirmation is produced' (2a4-7). But if the combination of these is what produces an affirmation, and an affirmation is something that has its existence as significant speech and as a declarative  
 5 sentence, then the treatise cannot be about the genera of

<sup>13</sup> The pedagogical rationale for the traditional order of the works of the *Organon*, which is taken for granted here, is that they concern subject matters of increasing complexity, the understanding of each of which presupposes the knowledge of its predecessor: the subject matter of the *Categories* is terms, that of *On Interpretation* propositions, that of the *Analytiks* demonstration, and that of the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations* dialectical arguments and fallacies respectively. Cf. Frede, p. 18.

<sup>14</sup> cf. Boethius 162C.

<sup>15</sup> *poion*. I follow Ackrill's practice of translating this word, which Aristotle uses as the name of the category of quality, as either 'qualification' or 'qualified' according to context. In fact, however, it is the Greek interrogative for 'of what sort?', just as *poson*, the name of the category of quantity, is Greek for 'how much?' On the meaning of *poion*, see 127,11-12 below with note.

<sup>16</sup> *phônai* are literally 'spoken sounds', as Ackrill correctly translates at *De Int.* 16a5: for this sense, cf. below, 57,3.29. *phônê* in the sense of 'spoken sound' was the first topic in Stoic dialectic (DL 7.55). (At 60,20 below *phônê* just seems to mean 'sound'.) The context here, however, is the debate about the *skopos* or subject matter of the *Categories*, i.e. the denotation of the expression *ta legomena* at *Cat.* § 4, 1b25, the items that are classified into the ten so-called 'categories': are these (spoken) words (*phônai*), concepts (*noêmata*), or things (*pragmata*)? (Cf. *Simpl.* 9,4-13,26 and *Dex.* 1.3, 6,27-10,37.) Hence I have translated *phônê* here and in similar contexts by 'word'. Compare also Porphyry's use of the phrase *hai pente phônai*, 'the five *phônai*', for the terms designating the five predicables at *Isagoge* 13,9. For a general discussion of *phônê* and associated terms, cf. W. Ax, *Laut, Stimme und Sprache (Hypomnemata, Heft 84 [Göttingen 1986])*.

<sup>17</sup> Reading <en> *oudemiâti* at 57,1, as Busse suggests.

being nor about things *qua* things at all, but instead is about the words that are used to signify things. For no combination of things gives rise to an affirmation; rather it is the combination of significant words indicating things that produces an affirmation, and Aristotle says explicitly, 'Of items said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity ...', and so forth (1b25-6). If he were giving an account of things, he would not have said 'each signifies either substance ...'. For things do not signify; rather they are what is signified. 10

Q. You have adequately established that the work is not entitled *Introduction to the Topics* or *On the Genera of Being* or *On the Ten Genera of Being*. Now show that it ought to be given the title *On the Categories* [*sic*]. 15

A. This cannot be done without first indicating what the purpose (*prothesis*)<sup>18</sup> of the work is. When this has been shown, we will also have shown that the title *Categories* is the proper one.

Q. Show us, then, what the proper subject of the work is.

A. I claim that once man himself<sup>19</sup> had come to be able to indicate and to signify the things around him, he also came to name and to indicate each thing by means of words. Thus his first use (*khresis*) of linguistic expressions came to be to communicate each thing by means of certain words and expressions. In accordance with this relation between words and things, this thing here is called a 'chair', that a 'man', this a 'dog', that 'the sun', and again, this colour is called 'white', that 'black', and this is called 'number', that 'size', this 'two cubits', and that 'three cubits'. In this way words and expressions have been assigned to each thing which serve to signify and reveal that thing by employing particular sounds of the voice (*phonê*). When certain expressions had been laid down as the primary tokens for things, man began to reflect upon the expressions that had been posited from another point of view,<sup>20</sup> and saw that some were of such a kind as to be 20 25 30

<sup>18</sup> This is what Simplicius calls the *skopos*, i.e. the intended primary subject matter of the work: Porphyry uses the term *skopos* in this way at 60,1 below. Dexippus also uses both terms.

<sup>19</sup> On this passage and its connection with Boethius 157A, cf. Ebbesen, p. 382.

<sup>20</sup> *kata deuteran epibolên*: for *epibolê* in this sense, cf. Simpl. 123,24, 191,22.

attached to certain articles (*arthra*): these he called ‘nouns’ (*onomata*). Others, such as ‘walk’ and ‘walks’,<sup>21</sup> he called ‘verbs’ (*rhêmata*), indicating the qualitative differences between the two types of words by calling the one ‘nouns’ and the other ‘verbs’. Thus calling this sort of thing ‘gold’ and that material that shines so brightly ‘the sun’ belongs to the primary imposition (*prôte thesis*)<sup>22</sup> of words, while saying that the expression ‘gold’ is a noun belongs to their secondary imposition (*deutera thesis*), which signifies the qualitatively different types of expressions.<sup>23</sup> The subject of this book is the primary imposition of expressions, which is used for communicating about things. For it concerns simple significant words insofar as they signify things – not however as they differ from one another in number, but as differing in genus. For things and expressions are both practically infinite in number. But his intention is not to list expressions one by one – for each one signifies one particular being<sup>24</sup> – but since things that are many in number are one in species or in genus, the infinity of beings and of the expressions that signify them is found to be included under a list of ten genera.<sup>25</sup> Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae, the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so classified. Thus predications (*katégoriai*) are said to be ten in genus, just as beings themselves are ten in genus. So since the subject of the book is

<sup>21</sup> Porphyry actually gives three examples: the first, second, and third-person forms of the present tense of the Greek verb ‘to walk’ (*peripatein*).

<sup>22</sup> The *protá positio* of Boethius 159B: cf. next note.

<sup>23</sup> The important distinction between primary and secondary imposition of names (*prôte thesis* and *deutera thesis*), i.e. between words used to designate objects and words used to talk about the use of words themselves, makes its first explicit appearance here (though something like it is present in Ptolemy, *On the Criterion* § 4). This somewhat resembles the distinction that philosophers today would draw between object language and metalanguage. The same distinction is found in Dexippus (who usually prefers to speak of *prôte* and *deutera khreia* or *sêmasia* rather than *prôte* and *deutera thesis*, but see 57,22 above for *khreia*, ‘use’, in this sense). Compare also Boethius 159BC, in a passage that does not directly parallel the text of our commentary. The fullest discussion of the theory of imposition is given by Sten Ebbesen, ‘Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic: A Reconstruction’, in R. Sorabji, ed., *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, London & Ithaca NY, 1990, p. 147ff. It may originally have been connected with the controversy over whether words apply to their nominata by convention (*thesei*) or by nature (*phusei*), but this is irrelevant to Porphyry’s purposes here.

<sup>24</sup> Reading *hekastê gar kata arithmon sêmainei* <hen> *tôn ontôn* at 58,9, as Busse suggests.

<sup>25</sup> If this is the sense of *perilambanomenê eis to graphesthai* at 58,13-14.

significant expressions differing in genus, insofar as they signify, and people used to call speaking of things according to a certain signification, and in general the utterance of a significant expression about something, as 'predication' (*katêgorein*),<sup>26</sup> it was quite reasonable for him to give the title *Categories*<sup>27</sup> to this elementary discussion of simple expressions, which considers them according to genus insofar as they primarily signify things.<sup>28</sup> 20

Q. But if the treatise is about significant expressions, how is it that the whole of his subsequent discussion was about things?<sup>29</sup>

A. Because words are like messengers that report to us about things, and they get their generic differentiae from the things about which they report.<sup>30</sup> Hence it is necessary to begin the consideration of them from what makes their use necessary, so that they may receive their difference in genus from the generic differentiae of the things about which they report. So our inquiry is incidentally concerned with the generic differentiae of beings, while primarily it is about significant expressions, as I said. 25

Q. But if he here divides significant words into ten genera, why is it that in *On Interpretation* he divides them into two, namely nouns and verbs? 30

A. Because here he is discussing the primary imposition of expressions upon things, while in *On Interpretation* he is discussing their secondary imposition, which is no longer

<sup>26</sup> These lines (58,16-18) are quoted by Simplicius at 17,3-5 (cf. note to 56,8-9 above). For the expression 'according to a certain signification' (*kata ti sêmainomenon*) at 58,17, cf. also below, 62,29; 65,2; 101,27; 127,29 and 140,29-30. These passages suggest that the term 'signification' in these contexts here does not mean the object that is signified by a word, but rather something like the respect or way in which it is signified.

<sup>27</sup> That is, 'predications'.

<sup>28</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 10,20-3: 'Porphyry says both in *Ad Gedalium* and in his question-and-answer commentary that the subject (*skopos*) of the book is things predicated (*katêgoroumena*). These are simple words which signify things, *qua* significant, not *qua* merely being words.' Porphyry's claim is that the *Categories* is about the ten most general types of predications or predicates. It is not a problem for his view that the *Categories* also concerns individuals, for he is prepared to accept individuals as predicables (*Isag.* 7,18-19), since he treats individuals as bundles of properties: cf. *Isag.* 7,18-19 and note to 129,8-10 below.

<sup>29</sup> This and the next question are incorporated practically verbatim by Boethius (162D), who paraphrases the pupil's response to the first question, but not the second: cf. Shiel, 'Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle', p. 219.

<sup>30</sup> cf. *Dex.* 11,12-14.

35 concerned with expressions that signify things *qua* signifying  
 them, but rather with expressions that signify types of words,  
*qua* being of such types. For being a noun or a verb is a type of  
 59,1 word, and whether an expression has its proper use or is  
 metaphorical or is in some other way figuratively used also  
 belongs to the second sort of inquiry about words, not to the  
 first.<sup>31</sup>

Q. Has everyone who has written about the *Categories* been aware of this distinction?

5 A. Certainly not. Otherwise there would not have been those who took the investigation to be primarily about the genera of being,<sup>32</sup> nor those who attacked the work and rejected the division of categories as being insufficiently comprehensive and as failing to include certain items, or again as containing extraneous ones.

Q. Who were the latter?

10 A. The followers of Athenodorus and Cornutus,<sup>33</sup> who took the objects of the investigation to be expressions *qua* expressions, that is, expressions as used properly and figuratively and so forth, for these are differentiae of expressions *qua* expressions. Fixing upon these, they raised the question of what category they belonged to, and finding none, they complained that the division was incomplete, since it fails to include every sort of significant expression.

15 Q. Have all the commentators been mistaken about the subject matter of the *Categories*?

A. Certainly not. Boethus,<sup>34</sup> in his commentary on the *Categories*, said what we have said, and so did Herminus,<sup>35</sup> though briefly.

<sup>31</sup> Dexippus 1.4 goes into much greater detail than does Porphyry concerning what sorts of classifications of words are not relevant to the subject-matter of the *Categories*, but his point is the same as that here: that the *Categories* only concerns words considered with regard to their primary imposition upon things.

<sup>32</sup> For example Plotinus: cf. *Simpl.* 16,16-19.

<sup>33</sup> Athenodorus Calvus and L. Annaeus Cornutus, Stoic philosophers of the first centuries BC and AD respectively, both of whom wrote polemics against the *Categories*, which are referred to by their titles at 86,22-4 below. Cf. B.L. Hijmans, 'Athenodorus on the *Categories* and a Pun on Athenodorus', in *Kephalaion* (Festschrift De Strycker [Assen, 1975]), pp. 105-14, and Dexippus 1.4, with Dillon's note to its title.

<sup>34</sup> cf. Moraux I, pp. 148-50. Boethus was a pupil of Andronicus of Rhodes (Moraux I, p. 143).

<sup>35</sup> cf. Moraux II, pp. 365-6. Herminus was one of the teachers of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Moraux II, pp. 361-3).

Q. Tell us what Herminus says, since you say he spoke 20  
briefly.

A. Herminus says that the subject of the work is not the primary and highest genera in nature, for instruction in these is not suitable for young persons, nor the issue of what the primary and fundamental differentiae of things said are, since in that case the discussion would seem to be about the parts of speech. Rather it is about the sort of predication that will properly belong to what is said in each of the genera of being. Hence it also became necessary to touch in some way 25  
upon the genera to which the predications in questions correspond, for it is impossible to recognise the kind of signification that is proper to each genus without some preconception (*prolēpsis*) of it.<sup>36</sup> This also accounts for the title *Category* [*sic*], which indicates the proper mode of signification connected with each genus. The discussion will reveal as it proceeds that these genera are ten in number, so 30  
that the number of predications is also ten. But it would not be unreasonable for one to give the work the title *On the Ten Genera*, provided this title is taken to refer to the correspondence between the predications and the genera, and one does not think that the book is primarily concerned with the ten genera.

Q. But if the account is about the ten kinds of predication, why does he not begin with these, instead of with homonyms 35  
and synonyms and paronyms? That is like promising one thing and delivering another.<sup>37</sup>

A. But what he says at the beginning is not superfluous, nor 60,1  
does he lose sight of the subject of the work, but he first sets out material that will be necessary for his discussion of predications (*katēgoriai*), so that he will not have to interrupt his account with digressions and destroy its continuity. Just as geometers begin by setting out definitions and axioms and 5  
postulates and divisions, which it is useful to have learned

<sup>36</sup> Porphyry's general strategy for interpreting the *Categories* is to treat it as a logical work aimed at beginners (cf. my remarks in the Introduction). But Herminus' remark here justifies finding in it occasional excursions into the realm of metaphysics: they are necessary to the discussion, in that logical and metaphysical issues cannot be wholly divorced from one another.

<sup>37</sup> This criticism is attributed by Simplicius (21,2 ff.) to the second-century AD Platonist Nicostratus (on whom see Praechter, and Moraux II pp. 528-31). The same criticism is dealt with in Dexippus 1.5.



beforehand in order to grasp the theorems clearly, so Aristotle first takes up the matter of homonyms, synonyms, paronyms, and all the rest,<sup>38</sup> as being most useful for the discussion of predications. After his discussion of predications, he turns to certain other topics, the usefulness of which must be indicated  
 10 when we reach that place.<sup>39</sup>

Q. You have explained the usefulness of the preliminary discussion for the doctrine of the types of predication (*katégoriai*). Now tell us what he means by 'homonyms' and 'synonyms' and whatever else belongs to this sort of classification. What is meant by each of these, and whence and how do they come about?

15 A. I claim that everything possesses both a name and either a definition (*horismos*) or a description (*hupographê*).<sup>40</sup> For example, this thing has the name 'man', and is indicated by that name, but there also exists a definition of it, for we say that man is a mortal rational animal capable of receiving intelligence and knowledge. Each thing is indicated not only  
 20 by its name but also by the account that defines and conveys its essence, as for example when we say that sound is the proper sensible of hearing. Since everything has both a name and a defining account, there are four sorts of relations that

<sup>38</sup> Reading *panta <ta> hephexês* at 60,7-8, as Busse suggests.

<sup>39</sup> A reference to the contents of *Cat.* §§ 10-15, the so-called *Postpredicamenta*: cf. Dexippus 1.7. This clearly indicates that the scope of the commentary must have originally included the *Postpredicamenta*. (Evangelioi pp. 35-6 is misleading on this point.) Indeed, this probably looks forward to the lost later passage that was the source of the introduction to Boethius' fourth book (263B – 264B), where Porphyry is quoted in defence of the relevance of the *Postpredicamenta* to the rest of the *Categories*, against the objections of Andronicus, who thought it did not originally form part of the same work as the *Categories* (cf. also *Simpl.* 379,8-20). (Porphyry seems to disagree with Andronicus on this point, *pace* Chadwick, pp. 143 and 151.) The controversy over the unity of the *Categories* has continued in modern times: cf. most recently Frede.

<sup>40</sup> The Neoplatonic version of this distinction is well illustrated by Boethius 166A: a definition (*diffinitio*) reveals the essence of something according to its genus and differentia, whereas a description (*descriptio*) merely indicates it by means of a common characteristic (*propria quadam proprietate*). The term *hupographê* is Stoic (e.g. DL 7,60 and Galen *Def. Med.* § 1 [SVF 2.227], *De Diff. Puls.* 4,2 [SVF 2.229]), but it could have been suggested by some passages of Aristotle (e.g. *Sophistical Refutations* 181a2, *De Anima* 413a10), and the Neoplatonic usage is connected with the notion of the 'account of what a name signifies' (*logos tou ti sêmainei to onoma*) of *Posterior Analytics* 93b30-1. Elsewhere in Aristotle *hupographê* has its ordinary sense of a sketch or diagram, e.g. *De Int.* 22a23. Ps-Aristotle *On Plants* 819b16 seems to show the later technical usage. (Evangelioi p. 44 n. 35 strangely takes *On Plants* to be a genuine work of Aristotle.)

obtain between defining accounts and names. Things either share both the same name and the same defining account, or the name but not the defining account, or the account but not the name, or neither the account nor the name.<sup>41</sup> When things share the same name but have entirely different accounts, they are called homonyms. When they share both an account and a name, they are referred to as synonyms, since together with (*sun-*) the name they also have the same account. When things share the same account but not the same name, they are called polyonyms, and when they have in common neither a name nor an account, they are called heteronyms. There is a fifth sort of case: when certain things come to be from other things, participating in a way in both the name and the account of the things from whence they come, differing however in grammatical form. These are called paronyms.<sup>42</sup>

Q. Does Aristotle mention all of these?

A. He does not.

Q. Which ones does he mention?

A. Homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms. He does not mention either polyonyms or heteronyms.

Q. Why?

A. Because he does not need them for his subsequent discussion; those that he does need, he mentions.

Q. With which does he begin?

A. With homonyms.

Q. Why does he begin with homonyms, not with synonyms, if synonyms are things that share both the same name and the same account, and something sharing both its account and its name would be a clearer case than something that has only

<sup>41</sup> Strictly speaking, a thing only has a definition *qua* having a certain name, e.g. it is *qua* man that this thing is a mortal rational animal capable of receiving intelligence and knowledge: see below, 63,6-64,20.

<sup>42</sup> According to Simplicius, who presumably depends for his information on Porphyry's larger commentary, the division of homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, polyonyms, and paronyms was reported by Boethius to have been due to Speusippus (Simpl. 38,19-24 = Speusippus fr. 34a Lang). Porphyry's text appears to imply, probably correctly, that Aristotle adopted Speusippus' division for his own purposes in the *Categories*.

It is at this point that Boethius' commentary begins closely following Porphyry's text (163D). The passage 60,18-33 is also the source of part of an anonymous Latin fragment published by P. Hadot ('Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 34 (1959), pp. 11-27). This may well be a fragment of a lost second version of Boethius' commentary, as Hadot claims.

its name in common with something else?

10 A. I claim that Aristotle discusses homonyms first because he holds that being is a homonym and because predications (*katégoriai*) are homonymously said to be predications of that of which they are predicated.<sup>43</sup>

15 Q. Why does he not discuss homonymy before discussing homonyms, given that 'homonymy' is a word, whereas homonyms are things, and you claim that he is primarily concerned in this treatise with words, not with things?<sup>44</sup>

A. Because what produces homonymy in words is not the character of the expression itself, but rather things are found to be different and in no way have anything in common yet  
20 acquire one and the same expression as their name.<sup>45</sup> Until it is recognised that a word applies to a number of things that do not share the same account, there cannot be homonymy.

Q. How does this contribute to his beginning with things rather than with words?

25 A. In that one cannot recognise that there is homonymy of things without first recognising the things as homonyms. So he must first instruct us about what things are homonyms, in order for us to understand 'homonymy' and related expressions.

Q. How then does Aristotle define homonyms?

30 A. 'Those things are said to be homonyms that have only their name in common, and have a different account of the essence corresponding to the name' (1a1-2).

35 Q. But if there exists homonymy not only in the case of names but also verbs and conjunctions – for example in the case of *andrapodisthai*, which means both *enslaving* someone else and *being enslaved* by someone else – why does Aristotle say 'things which have the name only in common', as if

<sup>43</sup> cf. Boethius 166C. Dexippus 1.8 gives only the second of Porphyry's responses to this objection. Simplicius 23,25-24,5 attributes the same answer to Iamblichus, whom both he and Dexippus are probably following.

<sup>44</sup> cf. Boethius 166C and Dexippus 1.9, who gives a fuller version of this reply. Simplicius' version of the aporia (24,6-9) is slightly different: why does Aristotle not discuss homonymy first, he asks, since the notion of homonymy is logically prior to the notion of homonyms? But his reply is the same as Porphyry's: that we are only able to recognise homonymy by noticing that things are homonyms, i.e. that homonyms are conceptually prior to homonymy.

<sup>45</sup> Reading *pragmata* <ha> *diaphora heurethenta* at 61,18, as Busse suggests.

homonymy existed only in the case of names?

A. Because 'name' (*onoma*) applies not only to words possessing a specifically name-like character, that is, those to which articles are adjoined,<sup>46</sup> but to all the parts of speech, because in the case of these, when we ask whether they are homonyms, they are also attached to articles and behave like indeclinable nouns. For we can say '*to andrapodizesthai* is a homonym'<sup>47</sup> and so on. So the word 'name' here (1a1) applies to all the parts of speech. 62,1 5

Q. You have explained what he means by 'name'. But how are we to understand the word 'only'? Is it used to indicate uniqueness, as when we say, 'There is only the universe' instead of 'There is but one universe', or to indicate a contrast, as when we say, 'He only has a shirt', where we implicitly understand that he does not also have a cloak, or something like that?<sup>48</sup> 10

A. I reply that he is using 'only' in the contrastive sense.

Q. With what does he intend it to mark a contrast?

A. With the definition, I claim. Since, as we said, each thing has both a name and a definition, he therefore intends 'only' to mark the contrast with the definition. For homonyms have only their name in common, and not their definitional account. 15

Q. How is 'in common' to be understood? First of all, in how many different ways is the term 'common' (*koinon*) used?<sup>49</sup>

A. I claim that it is used in a number of different ways. Something that is divisible into parts, like bread or wine, is said to be 'in common' if it is a single thing that comes to belong to those who divide it up; property is also 'in common' in virtue of being one of the things that are capable of being divided up. Something that is not divisible into parts is said to be 'in common' if it is used by several persons, such as a horse or a slave that several siblings hold in common. Something is also said to be 'in common' if while it is being used it belongs to 20 25

<sup>46</sup> *onoma*, 'name', is also the technical term meaning 'noun'. For nouns defined as those words which are joined to articles, cf. 57,32 above.

<sup>47</sup> Porphyry's example, *tōi andrapodizesthai homōnumōi onti*, literally, 'for/to andrapodizesthai, which is a homonym', illustrates the declension of the infinitive 'to enslave/be enslaved' in the dative case. For the example, cf. Boethius 164B.

<sup>48</sup> Dexippus 1.10 presents a similar aporia; cf. also Simpl. 26,3-10.

<sup>49</sup> cf. Dexippus 1.12 and Simpl. 26,11-20; Boethius 164CD.

someone but after use it is returned to the common store, such as a bathhouse or a theatre. Something is said to be 'in common' in yet another way if it is something that many can use at once without its being divided. Thus everyone present in the theatre has common access to the herald's voice, without its being divided up into smaller parts for the use of each of the members of the audience.

30 Q. Which signification of 'in common' does he intend?

A. The last, according to which many have use of the same whole simultaneously while it remains undivided. For the name 'Ajax' is used in common both of the son of Oeleus and of the son of Telamon, but it remains as a whole and is not divided between them.<sup>50</sup>

35 Q. You have explained what it means to say that homonyms  
63,1 have only the name in common. Now explain what he adds next, that 'the account corresponding to the name is different' (1a1-2). First of all, why was it not enough for him to say that the account is different, without specifying that it is the account corresponding to the name?<sup>51</sup>

A. I reply that the definition would not otherwise be sound, that is, if it was not given according to the name and corresponding to it.<sup>52</sup>

5 Q. State this point more clearly.

A. We have already said that everything is signified either by means of names or by a definitional account. But the definitional account must correspond to the name and give an explanation of the thing only insofar as that name is used of it. For instance, this substance – let us suppose that the subject is a man – is called 'man'. This denotes all of it at once, but it also has as a name<sup>53</sup> 'animal', which denotes it in a more  
10 compendious fashion. It can be defined by giving an account equivalent in significance to its name, i.e. 'mortal rational animal'. But man is also an animate sensitive substance. Insofar as it is called 'man', it has corresponding to this name

<sup>50</sup> cf. Dexippus 19,32-20,4 and Simpl. 27,12-15. The two Ajaxes are characters in the *Iliad*.

<sup>51</sup> For this aporia, cf. Dexippus 1.15.

<sup>52</sup> cf. Boethius 165A. 'Correspond to' translates *suzugos einai*, 'be equal in extension with': cf. Simpl. 28,13-20; 34,3-4, and below 63,20-2.

<sup>53</sup> Text and translation here are uncertain. For the sense of the passage, cf. Boethius 165CD and Simpl. 22,18 ff.

the account of man, 'mortal rational animal', but insofar as it is an animal, it has the account 'animate sensitive substance'. Suppose that one were to say that the substance in question is a man, and thus indicate it by a name, but then wanted to give its account by saying that it was an animate sensitive substance. One would then have said something true, but one would not have given the account corresponding to the name 'man'. Such a definition would be superfluous and artificial. 15

Q. Why do you say it is superfluous and artificial?

A. Because definitions ought to be convertible with names. To be convertible with a term is to be commensurate with it, that is, to have neither<sup>54</sup> a greater nor a lesser extension than it does. For example, if something is a man, it is also a mortal rational animal. 20

Q. That is true; now convert this proposition and see if the result is also true.

A. If something is a mortal rational animal, it is a man. 25

Q. That is also true.

A. Again, if something is a man, it is an animate sensitive substance.

Q. That is true; now convert it.

A. If something is an animate sensitive substance, it is a man.

Q. That is false. For an ox is an animate sensitive substance, but it is not a man. What is the reason for this? 30

A. That 'mortal <rational><sup>55</sup> animal' was given according to the name 'man'. Hence it does not matter whether one says about this substance, supposing it is a man,<sup>56</sup> 'This is a mortal rational animal' or 'This is a man'. The definitional account 'mortal rational animal' is equivalent to the name 'man'. But, having said that it is a man, if one goes on to give as its definitional account 'animate sensitive substance', one will not be giving the definition of man according to the stated name 'man'. So any definition that is to be soundly given should be given according to and corresponding to the name. That this must be considered as applying to all definitions will be clear if we consider the definition of something 5 64,1

<sup>54</sup> Reading *mête* for *mé* at 63,21, as Busse suggests (cf. his *Corr. et Add.*, p. 182).

<sup>55</sup> Reading *zôion* <*logikon*> *thnêton* at 63,32, as Busse suggests.

<sup>56</sup> Despite Busse, who follows Felicianus, I see no need to posit a lacuna in 64,1.

homonymous<sup>57</sup> with the thing: this also must always be given according to the name, if it is to convey the defining account. For example, the son of Oeleus and the son of Telamon are each called 'Ajax'. When we wish to indicate which is the son of Oeleus, we call him Ajax and say, 'This is Ajax the son of Oeleus of Locrus'. When we want to indicate which is the son of Telamon, we say, 'This is Ajax the son of Telamon of Salaminia'. Clearly the name 'Ajax' is used in common of them – for each is called Ajax – but in giving a description (*hupographê*), which is similar to a definition,<sup>58</sup> of them, clearly one will give a different definitional or descriptive account for Ajax the Locran than one does for Ajax the Salaminian. Nevertheless, if one called them both men, one would not give different definitions according to the name 'man': insofar as one calls them both 'man', one would give them both the corresponding definition. For you would give the definition of both, insofar as they are men and are called by that name, 'mortal rational animal'.

Q. You have correctly shown not only that the phrase 'corresponding to the name' necessarily belongs in the definition of homonyms, but also that the definition of a thing cannot be soundly given unless the definitional account is stated according to the name. But why does he add that the account is 'of the essence'?<sup>59</sup> You ought to show why it did not suffice for him to say merely that the account corresponding to the name is different.<sup>60</sup>

A. This is because *logos* ['account'] is used in several ways. It applies to counting, to external and internal speech (*logos prophorikos*, *logos endiathetos*) and to the seed-formula (*logos spermatikos*). Hence *logos* signifies a number of different things, since the name *logos* is used to refer to many different

<sup>57</sup> Reading *ho toutôi homônnumou horos* instead of *ho toutou sunônnumos horos* at 64,8. The two Ajaxes, considered as both bearing the name 'Ajax', are homonyms (cf. 62,31-3), but considered as men, they are synonyms (cf. Simpl. 29,2-12 and Dex. 20,24-7).

<sup>58</sup> cf. note to 60,15 above.

<sup>59</sup> According to Simplicius (29,28-30,5), Porphyry in his larger commentary reported that Andronicus and Boethus had omitted the words *tês ousias*, 'of the essence', at *Cat.* 1a2, because they did not find them in all manuscripts of the *Categories*, but that Porphyry himself followed Herminus and most of the Peripatetics in retaining the words. Porphyry alludes to this textual problem in our commentary at 68,15-16 below (cf. note ad loc).

<sup>60</sup> cf. Simpl. 29,13-30,15.

things.<sup>61</sup> Yet another signification of *logos* is the definition, that is, the definitional account. This general term for this is 'the account of the essence': the supplement 'of the essence' serves to distinguish it from the other meanings of *logos*. For example, since there are bronze and silver drachmas as well as gold ones, someone who merely says 'Give me a drachma' says something that is unclear, but someone who says 'Give me a gold drachma' distinguishes the kind that he wants from the others. Similarly, since *logos* has several uses, if one says 'the *logos* of the essence', the addition 'of the essence' indicates that what is meant is the definitional account. So the definitional account that corresponds to the name and the account that reveals the essence, that is, the definition, must be different for each of the members of a class of homonymous things. 5 10

Q. Now that you have given the definition of homonyms, you should also provide an example of them. But is there only one type of homonym, which can be sufficiently understood by grasping a single example, or are there several?<sup>62</sup> 15

A. There are several.

Q. What are they?

A. Taken generally, they are of two types: chance homonyms and homonyms from thought. We obtain the full classification by dividing homonyms from thought into three subtypes: those from similarity, those from analogy, and those that derive from and are relative to a single source.<sup>63</sup> 20

Q. What are chance homonyms?

A. Different things that have the same designation purely by chance and unintentionally: for example Alexander the son of Priam and Alexander the son of King Philip of Macedon. These are called chance homonyms: the others all depend on thought, as for example homonyms from similarity. Suppose I were to use the name 'man' both of a mortal rational animal and of a picture of a man – suppose I were to see it and say, 25

<sup>61</sup> For the several senses of *logos*, see also Porphyry's *Commentary on the Harmonics of Ptolemy* 12,6 ff. Düring. For the distinction between external and internal speech, cf. also 101,26-8 below.

<sup>62</sup> With this passage on the different kinds of homonymy (65,12-67,32), cf. Simplicius 31,22-33,21 and Boethius 166BC.

<sup>63</sup> *aph' henos kai pros hen*, sometimes referred to as 'focal equivocity' or 'connected homonymy'.



'That is a man'. Clearly it is not just a matter of chance that I  
 call the thing in the picture a man: it is because it is an image  
 of a living man. So it is due to thought that I call both the  
 30 living man and the statue or picture 'man'. Again, when I call  
 the monad the source (*arkhê*) of number, the point the source  
 of the line, a spring the source of a river, and the heart the  
 source of the animal, the name 'source' is applied to a class of  
 35 homonyms, to which I apply this common name because of the  
 thought that they are analogous. For as the monad is to the  
 numbers, so the point is to lines, the spring to the river, and  
 the heart to animals. This sort of relationship of reference  
 66,1 (?)<sup>64</sup> is what the geometers call 'analogy'. Hence the name  
 'source' (*arkhê*) is included under homonyms from analogy. A  
 third sort of homonyms from thought occurs when different  
 things get their common designation from some one thing. For  
 5 example, the art of medicine is a single thing, yet we call a  
 book a 'medical' book, a drug a 'medical' drug, and a scalpel a  
 'medical' instrument: they get these designations from the  
 name of the art. The book is a medical book because it covers  
 medical topics, the scalpel is a medical instrument because it  
 is a tool used for making incisions in medical practice, and the  
 drug is a medical drug because it is used by doctors in treating  
 patients. So while these all have a common name, the account  
 10 that corresponds to the name is different for each of the  
 similarly designated things. They all derive the appellation  
 'medical' from the single art of medicine, and they have all  
 been given their names by those who refer to them in this way  
 not by chance, but from thought. There is a fourth sort of  
 homonyms from thought, when different things that all seek  
 the same goal receive a common designation from that goal.  
 For instance, health is the goal of a person who is getting well,  
 15 and food, walking, and a reading can all be called 'healthy'  
 derivatively from this. Some connect this type of homonym  
 with homonyms from a single source, referring to the whole  
 class as homonyms deriving from and relative to a single  
 source. Others do not count these as homonyms at all, but not  
 as synonyms either. Instead, they put them between

<sup>64</sup> The text and translation are uncertain at 65,36 (*deixeôs* MS, *apodeixeôs* the  
*editio princeps*). For *deixis*, 'demonstrative reference, ostension', cf. Dex. 16,10, but the  
 word is in all likelihood corrupt.

homonyms and synonyms, because different things are all called 'medical' by participation in the same account, and similarly the things that are called 'healthy' are all so called because they preserve the same health. 20

Q. With which type of homonyms is Aristotle concerned here?

A. With homonyms from similarity, for he says: 'both a man and a picture of a man are animals ... for if one says what being an animal is for each of them, one will give <a distinct account for each>.'<sup>65</sup> For in giving the account that corresponds to the name, one will give a different account for each of them: one will say that the man is an animal because he is an animate sensitive substance, and that the picture of a man is an animal because it is an image of an animate sensitive substance. 25

Q. You said that one type of homonyms was homonyms from analogy. Are there also homonyms from metaphor, and should they be classified under homonyms from analogy, or are these two distinct types? Should we class homonyms from metaphor with homonyms from analogy, or not?<sup>66</sup> 30

A. Many commentators, among them Atticus,<sup>67</sup> have erred in counting metaphor and analogy together as a single kind of homonymy, and have confused metaphor with analogy. 67,1

Q. Tell us clearly what you mean by this.

A. I claim that metaphor occurs whenever a thing has a name of its own, but someone also uses of it another name, which he transfers to the thing (*metapherôn*) and uses of it as if it were its name. Here we would not have homonymy: homonymy occurs when the thing in question has no other name except the one in question. For example, the lower parts of a mountain are called its 'slopes' (*hupôreia*): 5

'But men dwelt on the slopes of Mt. Ida, rich in springs.'<sup>68</sup>

But although 'slopes' is the name for the lower parts of a mountain, poets often call them its 'feet' (*podes*): 10

<sup>65</sup> Supplying <*idion hekaterou logon*> *apodôsei* at 66,25, with Busse, from *Cat.* 1a2-6.

<sup>66</sup> cf. Boethius 166D.

<sup>67</sup> Atticus fr. 42b *Des Places*; cf. also *Simpl.* 32,19 ff. (= Atticus fr. 42a).

<sup>68</sup> *Iliad* 20,218.

'All the feet of Mt. Ida, rich in springs, were set trembling.'<sup>69</sup>

And the parts of a bed that support the whole of its upper surface are also called its 'feet', and there are 'feet' of tables and ships as well:

15 'For I had wielded the ship's foot [i.e. rudder] throughout ...'<sup>70</sup>

In the case of the 'feet' of a ship or of Mt. Ida, one would not say that the word is being used homonymously. For what a ship has as the thing that holds it on course<sup>71</sup> is properly called its 'rudder'. Nor would I say that the lower parts of a mountain are homonymously called its feet. For they have a name, viz. 'slopes'. But in the case of the 'feet' of tables and  
 20 beds, I would say that this is no longer a case of metaphor, but rather of homonymy. For what supports the whole of a bed or a table does have this name by analogy with the feet of animals. Hence homonyms ought to be said to be those things that have 'the name only in common'. In the case of beds and tables, 'feet' is the name of the parts in question, whereas in the case of a mountain or a ship, the names of the corresponding parts are 'slopes' and 'rudder' respectively, and  
 25 the appellation 'feet' is transferred to them in a different way: they are called 'feet' by analogy, and not homonymously. Nor could one say that they are homonyms from similarity, for what likeness do the slopes of a mountain have to the feet of an animal? Rather the slopes of a mountain are called 'feet' by metaphor, not homonymously. However, there is one way in which this case might be made to fit the definition of  
 30 homonyms, in that the slopes of a mountain and a man's feet are both called 'feet', so that they have the name 'feet' in common, while the account differs. In this case we take 'name' to apply to the metaphor as well.<sup>72</sup> This point deserves further investigation.

68,1 Q. You have explained sufficiently how Aristotle defines

<sup>69</sup> *Iliad* 20,59.

<sup>70</sup> *Odyssey* 10,32.

<sup>71</sup> Reading to <euthun>on at 67,17, as Busse suggests.

<sup>72</sup> i.e. we are now taking 'feet' actually to be a *name* for the slopes of a mountain.

homonyms and what types of homonyms there are. Proceed now to synonyms, and give Aristotle's definition of them.

[Concerning Synonyms]

A. 'Those things are called synonyms that have the name in common and the same account of the essence corresponding to the name, as for example <both man and ox> are animal.<sup>73</sup> For both man and ox are called by the common name 'animal', and the account is also the same. For if one is to give the account for each of them, what it is for each to be an animal, one will give the same account.'

Q. Explain this definition.

A. He is saying that synonyms are things that have their name in common, but not merely their name, as in the case of homonyms. It is clear that 'name' here must be taken in its general sense, as applying to all the parts of speech, and 'in common' must also be understood in the way previously explained.<sup>74</sup> Whether he says 'the same account of the essence corresponding to the name', or merely 'the same account',<sup>75</sup> we are to understand that the account is to be given as corresponding to the name, and that it is the account of the essence that is meant, that is, the definitional account. Whenever things share a common name, and the definitional account corresponding to that name is the same, they are synonymously called by that name. His example makes this clear. For let the subjects in question be a man, an ox, and a dog, and let them be called by the common name 'animal'. If for this commonality of name we give the definition that corresponds to the name – the definition corresponding to the designation 'animal' is 'animate sensitive substance', for man too is called an 'animal', and is an animate sensitive substance – it is clear that the definition will be common to all of them. For each of them can be truly called an animate sensitive substance.

<sup>73</sup> Supplying *zôion* <*ho te anthrôpos kai ho bous*> at 68,6-7 as Busse suggests, following *Cat.* 1a8.

<sup>74</sup> At 62,17-33.

<sup>75</sup> An allusion to the ancient textual variant at *Cat.* 1a2.7 (see Minio-Paluello's apparatus ad loc. and the note to 64,26 above with Speusippus fr. 32b Lang). Porphyry correctly says that the variant makes no difference to the sense of the

Q. You have defined these in Aristotelian fashion, since when he mentions them he gives such definitions of them himself. But what about things that have the same account, but not the same name, that is, the so-called polyonyms?<sup>76</sup> How are they to be defined?

69,1 A. I reply that polyonyms are things that have several different names, but one and the same account, such as 'sword', 'sabre' and 'blade',<sup>77</sup> and in the case of clothing, 'coat' (*lôpion*) and 'cloak' (*himation*).<sup>78</sup> In the former case, the thing in question is one, as is the definition that corresponds to the name, for it is a double-edged blade fashioned for the purpose of killing animals, but the names 'sword', 'sabre' and 'blade' are different. Polyonyms seem to be opposite of homonyms: we might call them 'homoiologues' (*homoiologa kai homoiorista*), since they have their account in common but there are different names corresponding to the account. They are like the Romans, each of whom usually has several names.

10 Q. Define heteronyms<sup>79</sup> as well.

A. Heteronyms are things that share neither a name nor an account, for example fire and gold, or Socrates and courage. Those things are heteronyms for which both the name and the account are different.

15 Q. There remain paronyms, which Aristotle does mention. Tell us about them also.

A. 'Those things are called paronyms which get the name that designates them from something else, but with a difference of ending. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, and the brave get theirs from bravery' (1a12-15).

Q. Clarify this definition for us.

20 A. He is saying that paronyms are those things that get their designation from a name by a change in its grammatical form. For example, 'bravery' is predicated of a certain virtue,

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passage.

<sup>76</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 19,1-8; 22,30-23,35; 36,8-31; 38,11-16; and *Speusippus* fr. 32 Lang.

<sup>77</sup> Porphyry's examples are *aor*, *xiphos*, and *phasganon*, all Homeric equivalents for 'sword' (cf. *Odyssey* 11,48; 10,294). I have substituted English words that come fairly close to fitting the definition of 'sword' that Porphyry gives at 69,4-5.

<sup>78</sup> The standard example in Aristotle of a case of two names but one and the same account, though he does not refer to them as *poluonoma*: cf. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* 440b76-8.

<sup>79</sup> See the passages cited in the note to 68,31 above.

and a person is called 'brave' from the designation 'bravery', with a change of ending. The person bears a derived form of the same name, viz. 'bravery', only differing in its ending. He called this change in grammatical form 'declension',<sup>80</sup> but we should not take him to be referring to what we call the declension of a noun.<sup>81</sup> When he says that 'brave' differs from 'bravery' in declension, he means that it is a different form of the same name. That is why he says that paronyms 'get the name that designates them from something else': only the ending is different (1a12-13). 25

Q. What is required for something to be a paronym? 30

A. Three things.

Q. What are they?

A. First, there must be something in which the thing in question must participate; second, there must be a name in which it must participate; and third, the name when applied to the thing must differ somewhat in its grammatical form. If any one of these three conditions is not met, the things in question cannot be paronyms. 'Brave' is a paronym: there exists bravery, the thing in which brave things participate, and they also participate in its name, for they are called 'brave' after 'bravery'. And they participate in this name with a change in form of the ending: *andreia* ['bravery'] ends in the syllable *-a*, while *andreios* ['brave'] ends in *-os*. 70,1 5

Q. Show that if one of these conditions does not obtain there is no paronymy.

A. I will. There is on the one hand a woman who participates in the art of music, who would be called *mousikê*, while on the other there is the thing in which she participates, and there is also the name after which she is so called, *mousikê*.<sup>82</sup> But since there is no change in grammatical form, but both the state of the soul and the woman are called *mousikê*, she is not called *mousikê* paronymously, but rather homonymously. But a [male] musician (*mousikos*) is 10

<sup>80</sup> *ptôsis*, *Cat.* 1a13.

<sup>81</sup> The restricted use of *ptôsis*, 'declension', to mean the grammatical case of nouns (Latin *casus*) was well established in Porphyry's day, but as he points out, was unknown to Aristotle.

<sup>82</sup> The feminine form of the adjective 'musical' and the name of the art of music ('the name after which she is so called') are the same, viz. *mousikê*; cf. 113,24-5. Boethius 168BC gives the same example.

paronymously so called after the art of *mousikê*, since in this case all three conditions are met: participation in the thing, participation in the name, and change of grammatical form.

15 Again, a person is called 'admirable' (*spoudaios*) because he participates in virtue. Here virtue is the thing in which the person participates, but since he does not participate in the name, for 'admirable' and 'virtue' are different names, they are not paronyms. Hence the admirable person, though participating in virtue, is not paronymously called 'admirable'.

20 Q. Why isn't the admirable person called 'admirable' after 'admiration' (*spoudê*), and not from having virtue?

A. Because if a person were called 'admirable' merely from being admired, someone who was admired for any reason could be called 'admirable'. But it is not just anyone who is admired that is called 'admirable', but rather someone who participates in virtue. So the admirable person gets that qualification from virtue, but is not paronymously so called.

25 Q. Now that you have sufficiently discussed the question of the relation of words to things and that of the relation of the definitions of individual words to things, what do you say that Aristotle takes up next?

A. I claim that since the purpose of the treatise is to discuss the simple words that signify things, insofar as they signify them – these are primarily distinguished from one another by genus, according to the genera of things: they are not considered according to the number of particulars and individuals<sup>83</sup> – since this is the intent of the treatise, it is necessary that he instruct us about the kinds of simple expressions and that he show us what these are.

Q. What then does he say?

71,1 A. 'Of things said, some are said with combination, while others are said without combination' (1a16-17).

Q. What is it to be 'said with combination', and in how many ways is this expression used?

A. In two ways. Some things are said with combination by being joined by a coordinating conjunction, for example 'Socrates *and* Plato'. Other things are said with combination

<sup>83</sup> cf. above, 57,20-58,20.

when there are two things joined together in an expression because one is an accident of the other, for example, 'Socrates walks'. Since walking is accidental to Socrates, we combine 'walking' with 'Socrates' without using any sort of verbal conjunction and say, 'Socrates walks'. We speak without combination when we say first 'Socrates' and then 'Plato', or again 'runs' and then 'wins'.<sup>84</sup> His present purpose is to discuss things and expressions that are said without combination and how many genera there are of these. For expressions will be classified in the same way as the things that are primarily designated by them. 10

Q. You have indicated that the subject of the book is simple significant expressions insofar as they are assigned to genera. Show now how you would divide them into the smallest possible number of classes, and also what is the largest possible division of them, that is, the one having the greatest number of classes.<sup>85</sup> 15

A. The smallest number of classes into which I could divide beings and the words that signify them is four: beings are either universal substance or particular substance or universal accidents or particular accidents. There is no possible division smaller than this one. The largest possible division is into ten genera: beings are either substance or quantities or qualifications or relatives or actions or affections or when or where or having or position. Thus the simple expressions that signify beings also have the same number of generic differences. There can be no larger division than this. 20

Q. Why is the smallest division into four classes? 25

A. Because the first and highest division is into two, namely substance and accident, but substances and accidents cannot be expressed without expressing them as either universal or particulars. For substances will either be expressed as universals, such as animal, dog, or man, or as particulars, such as Socrates or Bucephalus, and accidents will likewise be expressed as either universals or particulars, for knowledge is a universal accident, while Aristarchus' knowledge is a particular accident.<sup>86</sup> Since, then, substances cannot be said 30

<sup>84</sup> cf. *Cat.* 1a18-19.

<sup>85</sup> cf. Dexippus 31,16-17; Boethius 169C.

<sup>86</sup> For this, the traditional interpretation of individual accidents (i.e. those items



35 merely as such, but only as either universal or as particular  
and individual, nor accidents merely as such, but only as either  
universal or particular, we obtain a fourfold division, even  
though the primary division was into substances and acci-  
dents. This fourfold division is: universal substance, universal  
accident, particular substance, and particular accident.

72,1 Q. In the case of these,<sup>87</sup> which of them are not capable of  
joining with one another and which of them are?

A. I reply that a substance cannot come to be an accident nor  
an accident a substance. For an accident can be an accident of a  
5 substance, but a substance cannot be an accident nor can an  
accident be a substance. Nor can a universal be a particular,  
nor a particular a universal. But a universal can be predicated  
of a particular, as man is of Socrates, who is a particular  
substance. So there are four possible combinations: a universal  
10 can combine with a substance or an accident, yielding two sorts  
of combination, and a particular can combine with a substance  
or an accident, yielding two more. But a substance *qua*  
substance cannot come to be an accident nor an accident *qua*  
accident a substance, nor can a universal *qua* universal come to  
15 be a particular nor a particular *qua* particular a universal.<sup>88</sup>

Q. Why did you add '*qua* substance' and so forth?

A. Because accidents can come to be *in* substance and exist *in*  
substance, but insofar as they are accidents and are conceived  
as such, they cannot *be* substance. For example, white can be  
20 an accident of body, for we say that a body is white, but the  
white *qua* white is not the same as body. Body is a substance,  
white is an accident. A body participates in whiteness, in that  
whiteness is an accident of it, but it is not the same as  
whiteness. For nothing participates in the body; it is just what  
it is.<sup>89</sup> So too a universal *qua* universal cannot be a part of an  
25 individual, but an individual thing can participate in a

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that are in a subject but are not said of anything as a subject, according to the division of *Categories* § 2, 1a20 ff.) as being individuated by their subjects, cf. also below, 75,38-76,3; so also Boethius 170C *init.* Aristarchus' knowledge of grammar (76,1) is individual, according to this interpretation, precisely in virtue of being the knowledge that Aristarchus has. For the controversy concerning whether this traditional interpretation of individual accidents is correct, see most recently M. Frede, 'Individuals in Aristotle', in his *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Minneapolis, 1987.

<sup>87</sup> Reading *epi* for *epei* at 72,1 with the *editio princeps*.

<sup>88</sup> cf. Boethius 170CD.

<sup>89</sup> i.e., unlike whiteness, it is not also a property of something else.

universal, so that it can be in that universal, as its species or genus, as Socrates is in man as his species and in animal as his genus. And a part is in the whole, as the hand is in the whole body.<sup>90</sup> Hence we must add that *qua* being what it is, each of these is not any of the others.

Q. But why did you give this as a division of beings into universal substances, universal accidents, particular substances, and particular accidents, while Aristotle did not use these terms, but others? 30

A. Because he used instead the accounts that serve to explain these terms, that is, their descriptive accounts. This division is a division into the widest genera, into genera that have no other genera prior to them. For there can be no higher genus above substance or accident.<sup>91</sup> 35 73,1

Q. Show then how he states these descriptive accounts.

A. He first takes the two characteristics, being in a subject and being said of a subject, and constructs their negations, i.e. not being in a subject and not being said of a subject, and then applies these four accounts to the simple and uncombined concepts of the division. 5

Q. What do you mean by 'the simple and uncombined concepts of the division'?

A. I mean that the simple uncombined concepts will fall under a division such as the following: 'Among beings, some are substances, some are accidents, some are universals, and some are particulars.' These terms are simple and uncombined: 'substance', 'accident', 'universal', and 'particular' are all simple expressions. But you would say that they were being combined if I said something like this: 'Among beings, some are universal substances – here "universal" is combined with "substances" – some are particular substances – here "particular" is combined with "substance" – some are universal accidents – here "universal" is combined with "accident" – and some are particular accidents – here "particular" is combined with "accident".' If now it is shown 10 15

<sup>90</sup> This is connected with Aristotle's statement (*Cat.* 1a24-5) that accidents are in their subjects in a different way than parts are in wholes.

<sup>91</sup> cf. Boethius 170D with 166A. Hence the accounts of these genera cannot be true definitions, which must be composed of (higher) genera and differentiae (cf. 87,17-18), but instead are mere 'descriptive accounts' (*hupographikoi logoi*), i.e. descriptions: cf. note to 64,15 above.

what accounts he produces to explain each of the simple expressions, and we combine them, the passage will become clear.

Q. Show how their explanatory accounts are to be composed.

A. He gives as the descriptive or, so to speak, conceptual account of accident *qua* accident 'not being in a subject.' Thus just as it makes no difference whether one says 'man' or 'mortal rational animal', so it makes no difference whether one says 'accident' or 'being in a subject'. If something is an accident, it is in a subject, and if something is in a subject, it is an accident. I shall show later what he means by 'being in a subject'. But if an accident is something that is in a subject, substance, since it is something different from accident, will not be in a subject. Hence if something is a substance, it is not in a subject. Again, if something is universal, it is said of a subject, and if something is particular, it is not said of a subject. As a result there are four accounts that are explanatory of these simple names: 'not being in a subject' of 'substance', 'being in a subject' of 'accident', 'said of a subject' of 'universal', and 'not said of a subject' of 'particular'. But since he did not produce a division of these as merely said by themselves, he combined them with one another, so that the division is into universal substances, universal accidents, particular substances, and particular accidents, we must state the explanatory accounts as composite, in place of the combined simple names.

Q.<sup>92</sup> Now when I give you the combinations of the names, you give the accounts that go with them.

A. Go ahead.

Q. Let me first ask how universal substance could be signified by using the accounts that you gave.

A. Since 'being said of a subject' describes universals, and 'not being in a subject' describes substance, universal substance can be said to be what is said of a subject but not in a subject.

<sup>92</sup> Something is clearly wrong with the text here (74,2-5). I follow Felicianus against Busse in the distribution of speakers here (cf. below, 74,25-6), and in reading *emou kai sôî legontos* vel sim. at 74,2-3 (instead of *emou kai sou legontos*: *age vero dum tibi ego compositionem quandam nominum propono, tu orationes convenientes nominibus subinde connecte*, Felicianus).

Q. How could you signify universal accident by using these combined accounts? 10

A. I would take 'being said of a subject' as the explanatory account of 'universal', and 'being in a subject' as the explanatory account of 'accident'. The combined account signifying universal accident would then be 'what is both said of a subject and in a subject'. 15

Q. Next compose the account signifying 'particular substance'.

A. 'What is neither said of a subject nor in a subject.' For since it is not universal but particular, it would not be said of a subject, and since it is a substance and not an accident, it would not be in a subject. 20

Q. Next express 'particular accident' using these accounts.

A. I would say, 'not said of a subject, but in a subject'. For since it is a particular, it would not be said of a subject, but since it is an accident, it is in a subject.

Q. Just now, I gave the conventional names for these items, and you supplied the accounts that Aristotle produces for them. Now see if when I ask you in turn what Aristotle's accounts mean, you can tell me the conventional names that correspond to them. 25

A. Go ahead and ask. Indeed, Aristotle himself omits the conventional names and gives the explanatory accounts instead.<sup>93</sup> 30

Q. Tell me, what does he mean when he says, 'Of things there are, some are said of a subject, but are not in any subject' (1a20-1)?

A. He means that among the things there are some are universal substances. 35

Q. How did you arrive at that answer?

A. The account that describes universals says that they are said of a subject, and the account that describes substance says that it is not in a subject.

Q. Give an example. 75,1

A. Man.

Q. Why were you able to give the single simple expression 'man' in place of a complex account?

<sup>93</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 45,19-20.

5 A. Because man is spoken of in two ways, both as a substance and as a universal, i.e. something that is not any of the particulars.

Q. Why is it conceived as a substance?

A. Because man is not in a subject, hence is not an accident.

Q. Why is it also conceived as universal?

10 A. Because it is said of a particular man as of a subject, and is not something particular or individual, but is said of many things that differ in number.<sup>94</sup> Aristotle correctly says that ‘man is said of particular man as of a subject, but is not in anything as a subject’ (1a21-2). For since man is a universal, it is said of the particular man as of a subject, for both  
15 Socrates and Plato are called men. But ‘man’ is not said of Socrates because it is an accident of him, as ‘musical’ and ‘white’ are, but rather because man is the species (*eidos*) of Socrates, and so too if you were to say ‘animal’ of Socrates, you would not say it of him as an accident, but as his genus. The species and genera of substances are themselves substances,  
20 and those of accidents are accidents. But substances are not in a subject, so the species and genera of substances are not in a subject either. They are said of individual substances as subjects, but they are not in any subject.

Q. Why did you say that universals are *said of* a subject, but  
25 that accidents are in a subject? What do you mean by speaking of the former as ‘said of’, but of accidents as ‘being’? The reason for this is deep and beyond your level of comprehension. It is beyond the level of comprehension of a beginning student to know that while accidents exist just as substances do, to call something a universal is not to ascribe any real property to it, but refers to how it is conceived.<sup>95</sup> So let us leave these issues to one side. But tell me what he  
30 means when he says, ‘some things are in a subject, but are not said of any subject’ (1a23-4).

<sup>94</sup> *De Int.* 17a39-40 defines a universal as ‘what is by nature such as to be predicated of several things’.

<sup>95</sup> Here, as at *Isagoge* 1,9-14, Porphyry explicitly refuses to discuss the ‘deep’ (*bathus*, cf. *Isag.* 1,13-14) issues about the ontological status of universals, since he is writing an introductory work: see the Introduction. At 90,12-91,12 below, however, he does go into some of the metaphysical issues connected with the problem. On the introductory character of the *Categories*, cf. 56,28-9; 134,28-9, and 141,11.

Felicianus and Evangelidou (p. 12 n. 48) both think an extra question and response is required here (75,35), but this seems unnecessary: the master dismisses the issue he has raised without waiting for a response.

A. I reply that he means those accidents that are particular. For 'being in a subject' is the explanatory account of accidents, while 'not being said of any subject' is the explanatory account of particulars.

Q. Give an example of this as well.

35

A. I will, and not just one example, but since some accidents belong to the soul and others to the body, I will give examples of both kinds. For accidents of soul, let us mention the case of grammatical knowledge. A particular case of grammatical knowledge would be, for example, the grammatical knowledge that Aristarchus possesses. Aristarchus' grammatical knowledge is particular; it is an accident of his soul, and hence is in his soul as a subject. But it is not said of any subject. For it is particular, and a particular, since it is individual, cannot be said of a subject. This is an example of a psychological accident, while a particular white would be an example of a bodily accident. For it is in the body as a subject: white is a colour, and every colour is in body. But it is not said of any subject, for it is not a universal but a particular white.<sup>96</sup>

76,1

5

Q. When Aristotle adds, 'some things are both said of a subject and in a subject' (1a29-b1), what does he signify by this combined account?

10

A. I reply that he means 'some things are universal accidents'. For by saying that they are said of a subject, he shows that he means universals, for 'said of a subject' is the explanatory account of universals. And by saying that they are in a subject, he shows that he means accidents, for these are what are in a subject. So he is saying that there are universal accidents.

15

Q. Give an example.

A. For instance, knowledge. For knowledge, which is an accident of the soul, has soul as its subject, for the soul underlies knowledge. Being universal, it is predicated of more specific forms of knowledge, for example grammatical knowledge, for knowledge is the genus of grammar. Grammar is an accident, and so is knowledge. For the species and genera of accidents are themselves accidents.

20

Q. What does he say about the remaining item of the division?

25

<sup>96</sup> cf. Boethius 172A. 'Every colour is in body' is taken from *Cat.* 1a28.

A. What do you mean?

Q. 'Some things are neither in a subject nor said of a subject' (1b3-4).

30 A. I reply that this statement means, 'some things are individual substances'. For by saying that they are not in a subject, he means that they are substances, and by saying that they are not said of a subject, he means that they are individuals.

Q. Give an example.

35 A. For example, a particular horse, such as the horse Bucephalus, said to have belonged to Alexander, and a particular man, for example Socrates. No such thing is in a subject, for it is a substance, not an accident, nor is it said of a subject, for it is not said universally, but as a particular. He  
77,1 mentioned these because he wanted to instruct us about the simple, uncombined descriptive accounts he gave of them, as we suggested earlier when we said that 'not being said of a subject' signifies an individual, i.e. a being that is not a universal and is one in number, just as 'being said of a subject'  
5 signifies a universal, and just as 'being in a subject' is the account describing an accident, and 'not being in a subject' the account describing a substance. But since substance is combined with accident, he says that insofar as something is particular, it is not said of a subject, whether it be a substance or an accident (1b6-9).<sup>97</sup> If, however, a particular is an  
10 accident, it will then be capable of inhering in a subject, so that if a particular is a substance, it can neither be in a subject nor said of a subject, but if it is a particular accident, it cannot be said of a subject, but can be in a subject.

Q. But what does Aristotle mean by 'being in a subject', and how does he explain this?

15 A. As follows: 'By "in a subject", I mean that which does not belong to something as a part but is incapable of existing separately from what it is in' (1a24-5).

Q. What does he mean by this?

A. I reply that by 'in a subject' he means what exists in something. But since 'in something' is a homonymous

<sup>97</sup> i.e. a particular accident can be said of something else, but not said of it as of a subject, as Porphyry goes on to say. The MS text of 77,6 can thus be vindicated against Felicianus (cf. Busse's apparatus).

expression that has several uses, something must be added in order to determine that he intends the sense in which an accident is in a subject. 'Being in something' is used in several ways: it can mean being in a place, as Socrates is in the house, in the Lyceum, in the bath, or in the theatre. It is possible to be in something as in a container, as water is in a cup or wine in a jar, or as a part in the whole, as a hand is in the whole human body. It is also possible to be in something as the whole is in all of its parts. It is possible to be in something as the species is in the genus, as man is in animal, for the genus comprehends the species, or as the genus is in the species, for the species participate in the genus: animal is predicated of man as of something that participates in it. It is possible to be in something as in a goal (*telos*): for all the objects of human concern are included in happiness, which is the goal of man.<sup>98</sup> Another sense of being in something is being in that which has control (*to kratoun*), as we say that matters reside in the king. Yet another sense of being in something is the way that the form is in the matter, as the shape of the statue is in the bronze, the shape of the knife is in the iron, knowledge is in the soul, and colour is in the body. 20 25 30 35

Q. How many significations of 'being in something' do you count?

A. Nine.<sup>99</sup>

Q. What are they? 78,1

A. Being in a place, being in a container, the part being in the whole, the whole being in the parts, the species being in the genus, the genus being in the species, being in a goal, being in what has control, and the form being in the matter. 5

Q. To which of these nine senses does being in something as a subject belong?

A. To the sense in which the form is in the matter.<sup>100</sup>

Q. Why?

A. Because it is only forms that are inseparable from their matter.

<sup>98</sup> cf. Simpl. 46,12.

<sup>99</sup> Simplicius 46,5-14, presumably following Iamblichus, lists eleven different senses of 'in something'. Boethius 172BC follows Porphyry in giving nine: cf. Chadwick, p. 145.

<sup>100</sup> So also Boethius 173BC. But the material in Boethius corresponding to the next response (172C-173A) shows some interesting departures from Porphyry. It appears



10 Q. Does Aristotle mention all nine of these significations?

A. No, he does not.

Q. Which ones does he mention?

A. Only two: being in something as the part is in the whole, and being in a container. For he says 'what is in something not as a part ...'. What is in a subject is not in something as a part is in the whole. Nor is it in it as a container. For what is in a container can, while continuing to exist, come to be separate from what it is in, but an accident, something that is in a subject, he says cannot exist separately from what it is in. This does not mean that whiteness can<not> become separate from body or the shape from bronze,<sup>101</sup> but they cannot continue to exist after being separated, whereas the wine continues to exist when it is separated from the jar. If accidents are separated from subjects, they can no longer exist, nor do they ever become separate, but merely pass out of existence.

79,12 Q.<sup>102</sup> But if accidents, which are not in their subjects as parts, cannot exist separately from what they are in, how is it that Socrates, who is in a place, but not as a part of that place, and cannot exist apart from some place, is not an accident?<sup>103</sup>

15 A. Because an accident of a particular body cannot depart from that body and come to exist in other bodies, whereas Socrates, while incapable of existing apart from place, can be separated from the particular place that he is in.

Q. What is the difference between these cases?

20 A. That Socrates is always in a place, but he departs from the place he was previously in and comes to be in different places, while an accident can in no way depart from what it is in.

Q. But how is it not absurd to claim that accidents cannot

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that Boethius may be using two different sources at this point.

<sup>101</sup> Inserting <ou> before *khōrizetai* at 78,19: this is necessary to make this passage consistent with 79,25 ff.

<sup>102</sup> As Busse saw, 78,22-79,11 is out of place in the manuscript. I transfer this passage to the end of the discussion of *Cat.* §2, i.e. after 80,27, not after 81,22 as suggested by Busse; this appears to be supported by Boethius 173A and 175B. Bidez (p. 196) noted that Boethius' text confirmed that the passage was out of place, but did not see that it does not support the transposition that Busse proposed. The misplaced passage probably represents the length of a manuscript page at some stage in the transmission of the text.

<sup>103</sup> Dexippus 1.21 raises a similar aporia, that Aristotle's characterisation of being in a subject fits not only something being in a place but also its being in time.

exist separately from their subjects, when the smell and sweetness of an apple are clearly capable of being separated from it?<sup>104</sup>

A. But Aristotle does not say that accidents cannot be separated from their subjects.<sup>105</sup> 25

Q. What does he say, then?

A. He says that they cannot *exist* separately from what they are in. It is one thing to be separated (*khôrizesthai*) from something, and another to exist separately (*khôris einai*) from something. He does not say that they cannot exist separately from what they *were* in, but that they cannot exist separately from what they *are* in. The smell can be separated from what it is in, but it cannot exist separately and on its own: either it ceases to exist or it is transferred to another subject. What he has indicated is that it is inconceivable that accidents could exist separately apart from any subject, not that they are incapable of being separated from their subjects.<sup>106</sup> 30

Q. He has instructed us what it means to be in a subject by means of the definition he gave. It remains for him to tell us what it means to be said of a subject. Where does he instruct us about this? 35

A. In what follows, where he says, 'Whenever something is predicated of something else as of a subject ...' (1b10-11). 80,1

Q. What does he say, and what is it <for something to be predicated of a subject>?<sup>107</sup>

A. He says that something is predicated of something as of a subject when it is stated as belonging to the essence. For example, 'walking' is predicated of Socrates. But if we were to give the essence of Socrates, we would not say that he is walking, because 'walking' is not predicated of Socrates as of a subject. 'Man' is also predicated of Socrates, for you could say, 'Socrates is a man'. But if you were asked, 'What is Socrates?', you would say that he is a man, so that 'man' is predicated of Socrates as of a subject. Again, 'grammar' would be said to be 10

<sup>104</sup> The reference is to the phenomena of lingering tastes and smells: cf. Dex. 1.24 and Simpl. 49,10-30; and J. Ellis, 'The Trouble with Fragrance', *Phronesis* 35 (1990), 290-302.

<sup>105</sup> This appears to support my suggested emendation at 78,19 above.

<sup>106</sup> cf. Boethius 173B. The example of a smell as an accident that can change subjects is also found in Plotinus, *Ennead* 4.4.29, 27.

<sup>107</sup> I insert <to *kath' hupokeimenou katêgoreisthai*> rather than Busse's <to *kath' hupokeimenou legesthai*> at 80,3.

a name. But if you were inquiring what grammar is, you would not say that it was a name. For it is not the essence of grammar to be a name: if it were, everyone who participated  
 15 in the name would really be a grammarian.<sup>108</sup> Rather grammar is a sort of knowledge, so that 'knowledge' is said of grammar as of a subject, but 'name' is not. He himself says later on<sup>109</sup> that in the case of things that are predicated of a subject both their names and their accounts must apply to their subject, but that in the case of things that are in a subject, the account never applies to their subject, and only  
 20 sometimes does the name do so.<sup>110</sup> So what is predicated of a subject must be more universal than the subject, and its name and account must both apply to the subject, that is, they must be capable of being synonymously predicated of the subject. The species and genera of any subject satisfy these conditions, whether the subject is a substance or an accident. He makes it  
 25 clear that what is predicated of a subject is more universal than its subject when he says that individuals are not predicated of a subject. What is said of a subject must not be an individual, if it is to be something predicated in the essence of the subject. So it must also be more universal than the subject.

78,22 Q.<sup>111</sup> Now that you have made this division and the items in it clear, tell me about the following point as well. It is possible to set out this division in a number of ways. For instance, using the names of the items, I might state it like this: some  
 25 things are universal accidents, some are universal substances – or *vice versa*, that some are universal substances, some are universal accidents – and some are particular accidents, some are particular substances – or *vice versa*, that some are particular substances, some are particular accidents. So there are a number of ways that one can state that some beings are universal substances, some particular substances, some  
 30 universal accidents, and some particular accidents. One might also say that among beings, some are universal substances, some are particular accidents – or *vice versa*, that

<sup>108</sup> i.e. everyone who was called a grammarian would really be one.

<sup>109</sup> I read *proelthôn* for the corrupt *proelêphthê* of the MS at 80,16: cf. 114,7-8.

<sup>110</sup> cf. 2a19-34.

<sup>111</sup> I insert 78,22-79,11 after 80,27: see note to 78,21 above.

some are particular accidents, some are universal substances; and that some are universal accidents, some particular substances – or *vice versa*, that some are particular substances, and some are universal accidents. Since this division can be stated in a number of ways, tell me, in what order does Aristotle state it?

A. In chiasmic order.<sup>112</sup>

Q. What is the chiasmus?

A. I claim that he first distinguishes substance from accident, then universal from particular. 79,1

Q. State more clearly what you mean.

A. To divide in the way that he does, saying that among beings, some are either universal substances or particular accidents, and some either universal accidents or particular substances, is to use a chiasmic ordering: he does not list in their order of precedence either universals or particulars, or substances or accidents. 5

Q. From what is it clear that this is how he is dividing?

A. Because this is the order in which he sets out the combined explanatory accounts belonging to their names. 10

Q. What, then, follows from this?

A. Aristotle himself states the consequence: ‘Whenever something is predicated of another thing as of a subject, everything said of the predicate will also be said of the subject’ (1b10-12). 80,28 30

Q. But how can this be true? For ‘man’ is said of Socrates as of a subject, but not only ‘animal’ but ‘species’ as well is predicated of man, for man is a species. But it is not the case that both these are predicated of Socrates: ‘animal’ will be predicated of him, but not ‘species’, for Socrates is not a species.<sup>113</sup> 81,1

<sup>112</sup> Literally, ‘in a criss-cross’: one can imagine, as Chadwick suggests (p. 147), that Porphyry has in mind the traditional diagram illustrating Aristotle’s division in *Categories* § 2, the so-called ‘ontological square’, with universal substances in the upper left-hand corner, particular accidents in the lower right-hand corner, universal accidents in the upper right-hand corner, and particular substances in the lower left-hand corner (cf. *Simpl.* 50,16-20). Such a diagram is found in the Migne edition of Boethius at this point (175CD), and Dr. Monika Asztalos has kindly confirmed for me that it occurs also in most of the major manuscripts of Boethius’ commentary.

<sup>113</sup> cf. *Dex.* 1.27 and *Simpl.* 52,9-53,4 for this aporia and its solution, as well as Boethius 176CD, who is not following our commentary at this point. I do not think it is necessary to change the distribution of speakers in this passage, as suggested by Busse in his apparatus.

5 A. But note that this difficulty arises from an improper understanding of the phrase 'everything said of the predicate', which he does not use in an unrestricted sense. By saying 'whenever something is predicated of something else as of a subject', he informs us that he means what is predicated synonymously and in the essence of the predicate term, when he says that everything said of the predicate will also be said  
10 of the subject. For example, 'animal' is predicated of man as of a subject. For both the name and the account of animal apply to man: man is both an animal and an animate sensitive substance. The name 'species' also applies to man, for man would be said to be a species. But you would not reply to someone who asked for the essence of man by saying that 'species' belongs to its essence: you would say instead that  
15 man is an animal. To say that man is a species is to distinguish it as something predicated in common (*kata koinotêta*), something that is not one of the individuals. To say that 'man' is something predicated in common indicates an accident of it, rather than its essence – not an accident in the strict sense, but something like a differentia of it. Man differs from Socrates in that the former is predicated in common, while Socrates is not predicated in common, but individually.  
20 *Qua* predicated in common, man is said to be a species, and with respect to its genus, an animal. It is an accident of these that they include a multiplicity of things. Substance, however, is predicated in the essence of man.

Q. What does Aristotle instruct us about next?

A. About differentiae.

25 Q. What does he say?

A. 'The differentiae of things that differ in genus<sup>114</sup> and do not fall under one another are themselves also different in species. For example, animal and knowledge: the differentiae of animal are things like footed and two-footed and winged, but none of these is a differentia of knowledge. For one sort of knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed.  
30 But there is nothing to prevent genera that fall under one another from having the same differentiae. For the higher

<sup>114</sup> Porphyry reads *heterogenôn* at *Cat.* 1b16, where *heterôn genôn* ('of different genera' instead of 'of things that differ in genus') is the reading known to Dexippus (29,29) and Simplicius (54,22, etc.). Minio-Paluello in his OCT accepts *heterogenôn*.

genera are predicated of the lower ones, so that all the differentiae of the genus that is predicated will be differentiae of the subject as well' (1b16-23).

Q. Do you see that there are several things being said in the passage you quoted?

A. I do. It is said that some genera are different from one another, while others fall under one another. It is also said that some differ from one another in species. Their differentiae are also mentioned: some of these differ in species, while others are the same in species. 82,1

Q. Explain what he means to instruct us about in this passage in mentioning all these things.

A. I claim that 'species', 'genus', and 'differentia' are each used in several ways. Here 'genus' means what is predicated in the essence of several things that differ in species. For example, animal is the genus of 'winged' and 'terrestrial' and 'aquatic', which differ in species, and it is predicated in the essence of them, when it is asked what they are. For when we give the essence of any of them, we say it is an animal. 'Species' means what is predicated in the essence of several things differing in number. For 'man', which is a species, is predicated of the many individual men that differ only in number, and it is predicated in the essence of each of them, when it is asked what they are. For if we inquire what Socrates is, the proper answer is that he is a man. Since in most cases the many different species that are the same as one another in genus are distinguished from one another by differentiae, as for instance man, ox, and dog are the same in genus – for they are all animals – are distinguished from one another by their differentiae, the differentia indicates how each of the species is qualified, for the differentiae of these things describe man as a mortal rational animal and dog as an irrational animal that barks. So a differentia is something that is predicated as an essential qualification of several different things.<sup>115</sup> For example, 'winged' is a differentia that is predicated of many things, for it is said of the swan, the crow, and the eagle. 5 10 15 20

<sup>115</sup> cf. *Isagoge* 11,7-8, *Simpl.* 55,1-2, and Boethius 177BC. For the expression 'predicated as an essential qualification' (*en tōi poion ti katēgoroumenon*), cf. 95,17-20.

Q. Each of these is an animal. Does it indicate a qualification of 'animal' to say that each of them is winged? For the differentia indicates a quality of a genus or a species.<sup>116</sup>

25 A. No, there are ten ultimate <categories><sup>117</sup> of things, and the genera, species, and differentiae in each of them are different. Whatever category contains the genus also contains the species of that genus and the proper differentiae of the genus and its species.<sup>118</sup>

30 Q. You earlier defined the differentia as something that is predicated of several things.<sup>119</sup> Did you intend this claim to hold <in general>?<sup>120</sup>

A. No, only for the most part.<sup>121</sup> Sometimes there are the same number of differentiae as there are species, for example lightness and heaviness, the former belonging only to fire, the latter only to air.

Q. You also gave the species as predicated of several enumerable things. Does this hold in general?

35 A. No, only for the most part. The bird species phoenix is not said to belong to several things differing in number if indeed only one phoenix ever comes to be. If it is said of several things, they differ by succession (*diadokhê*), not in number.<sup>122</sup>

83,1 Q. You have explained what is meant here by 'genus', 'species', and 'differentia'. Now show which genera are different from one another and which are subordinate to one another.

5 A. Genera that are different from one another are those belonging to the ten<sup>123</sup> categories, for the genera of substance are different from the genera of quality and quantities and those in the other categories. Similarly, the species that fall under each genus are different from those falling under a

<sup>116</sup> cf. *Topics* 128a26.

<sup>117</sup> Understanding *tôn anôtatô* <*katêgoriôn*> at 82,25, as Busse suggests, though there is no need actually to alter the text.

<sup>118</sup> Hence the differentiae of substances, e.g. 'winged' of animal, cannot be qualities.

<sup>119</sup> Above, 82,19-21.

<sup>120</sup> Reading *tout'* <*aei*>, *eirêkas* at 82,30, as Busse suggests.

<sup>121</sup> cf. Boethius 177C. Note the pupil has in fact already qualified this claim, at 82,15 above.

<sup>122</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 55,29-56,1.

<sup>123</sup> *Simplicius* 56,16-17 has the same view.

different genus, defined in the above way, and their differentiae are similarly different. For since animal is a different<sup>124</sup> genus from knowledge – for animal belongs to the category of substance, while knowledge belongs to quality – the species of animal are different from the species of knowledge, and the differentiae of animal are different from the differentiae of knowledge. For one animal differs from another in virtue of one being two-footed and the other being four-footed, while one kind of knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed. These, then, are the genera and species and differentiae that are different from one another. Genera are subordinate to one another if one falls under the other in the same genus of predication, as winged animal, that is, bird, falls under animal, which belongs to the category of substance. 10

Q. State this point more clearly.

A. I claim that among the things that are said universally, some are genera, some are species, and some are differentiae. Among species and genera, some are merely species, that is, those that are divided into particulars, and others are merely genera, those for which no higher genus can be found. Others are intermediate between these two classes: they are species with respect to the genera lying above them, while they are genera with respect to those below them. These could reasonably be called 'subordinate genera'.<sup>125</sup> 20

Q. Make these points more clear through some examples.

A. Substance, for instance, is the single highest genus of substances, for no other genus can be found that is prior to substance. Man is a mere species, for after it come the individuals, the particular men. The genera that come after substance but before the mere species man, those that are found between substance and man, are species of the genera prior to them but are genera of what comes after them. For example, animal is a species of substance, but it is the genus of rational animal, while rational animal is the genus of man,<sup>126</sup> but is a species of animal. Such things,<sup>127</sup> which lie 30

<sup>124</sup> Reading *allou* for *allai* at 83,7 and 83,8, as Busse suggests.

<sup>125</sup> Reading *hupallêla* [*ta*] *genê* at 83,22-3, as Busse suggests. With this passage, cf. Boethius 177D-178A and *Isagoge* 5,6.23 and 7,15.

<sup>126</sup> Both gods and men fall under the genus 'rational animal', cf. *Isagoge* 10,13.

<sup>127</sup> I read *ta dê t<oi>auta* at 83,32.



between the most generic and the most specific genera, and are at the same time both genera and species in relation to different things, are called subordinate genera.

35 Q. Are they then subordinate to one another because each of them falls under the other?<sup>128</sup>

84,1 A. Certainly not. For it is impossible that if mortal rational animal, i.e. man, falls under animal, that animal also falls under man. It is not for this reason that they are said to be subordinate to one another, since if this were so, the same thing would be both species and genus of one and the same thing, rather it is because <only> one of them falls under the other; <when> both of two items are genera<sup>129</sup> but neither falls under the other, they would not be said to be subordinate to one another. For example, animal and knowledge are both genera, but knowledge does not fall under animal, nor animal under knowledge. So for things that belong to different genera – those genera are different that are completely distinct from  
5 one another, for example the ten genera of the ten types of predication, which have ten different predications to indicate them and of which there are ten highest genera that do not fall under any other genus<sup>130</sup> – their differentiae are also different,<sup>131</sup> while genera that are subordinate to one another can share the same differentiae. For not all of them share the same differentiae: some of them have the same ones, others do not.

10 Q. Show how the differentiae of some are the same, while those of others are different.<sup>132</sup>

15 A. Animal and bird are subordinate to one another – for bird falls under animal – but the differentiae of animal are ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’, whereas bird cannot have these same differentiae. Some differentiae of animal, however, can belong to bird as well. For some animals are herbivores, others are granivores, and others carnivores, and these same differentiae also belong to birds.

<sup>128</sup> This would be the most obvious sense for the term that Aristotle uses at *Cat.* 1b21, *hupallélla*, lit. ‘under each other’.

<sup>129</sup> As Busse saw, the text is corrupt at 84,1. I propose reading *hoti thateron hupo thateron <mon>on: <hotan de> kai*, comparing *Simpl.* 56,25-7.

<sup>130</sup> i.e. the ten *katégoriai*, ‘categories’: cf. above, 83,4-16 and *Dex.* 28,20-2.

<sup>131</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 58,7-9.

<sup>132</sup> cf. *Dex.* 1.29 and Boethius 178BD.

Q. Why does this occur?

A. Because animal includes bird among its species, but does not include knowledge, nor is knowledge one of its species. A genus that is included in another genus can have the same differentiae as that genus, but genera cannot ever have the same differentiae if one is not included in the other.

20

Q. How has Aristotle made this clear?

A. By saying that 'there is nothing to prevent genera subordinate to one another from having the same differentiae' (1b20-1). He adds the reason for this: 'For the higher genera are predicated of those that fall under them, so that all differentiae of the predicated genus will be differentiae of the subject as well' (1b22-4).

25

Q. But you have shown that *some* differentiae of animal are the same as those of bird, whereas he says that they <all><sup>133</sup> are, since he said 'all the differentiae of the predicated genus will be differentiae of the subject as well'. However, just previously he had said that there is nothing to prevent the differentiae in the case of genera subordinate to one another from belonging to the subordinate genera, as if not all of them could belong to the subordinate genera, whereas now he says merely 'all the differentiae of the predicated genus will belong to the subject as well'.<sup>134</sup>

30

A. I believe it is for this reason many have thought this passage was corrupt, and have emended it to say instead of 'all the differentiae of the predicated genus will belong to the subject as well', the converse of this, 'all the differentiae of the subject will belong to the predicated genus as well'.<sup>135</sup> But I claim that the solution of the problem is to be found in the very fact that he says both that some differentiae belong to the subject and that all of them do.<sup>136</sup> For if not all the differentiae of the predicated genus are found to belong also to the subject genus, but only some of them, and yet they all are said to belong both to the predicated genus and to the subject, we must look more closely at differentiae to see if there are

85,1

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<sup>133</sup> Reading *ho de <pasas>* at 84,27, as Busse suggests, comparing 85,4 below.

<sup>134</sup> Dexippus 1.28 deals with this problem and presents the same solution to it that Porphyry does. Cf. also *Simpl.* 58,23-60,10.

<sup>135</sup> *Simpl.* 58,27-9 reports that this proposed emendation of *Cat.* 1b23-4 was due to Boethus.

<sup>136</sup> I retain the MS text at 85,4.

species of them, and if so, which species of differentiae can all be predicated of the subject.<sup>137</sup>

10 Q. Show clearly what you mean.

A. I claim that some differentiae are called specific (*eidopoioi*) differentiae, those by which the subject species is constituted and, as it were, made to be qualified, while others are divisive (*diaretikai*) differentiae, those by which the genus is divided into the species that fall under it. For example, 'animate' and 'sensitive' are<sup>138</sup> differentiae that  
 15 when added to substance constitute a species of it and so to speak make it qualified, so that it becomes animal. The species 'animal' is constituted by and made to be qualified by the differentia 'animate' and the differentia 'sensitive', which inform substance in such a way that it becomes animal. This is why we say that animal is animate sensitive substance. These differentiae are generative and productive of animal,  
 20 and lie above it, so that they are predicated of it. For one would say 'animal is animate' as well as 'animal is sensitive'. But there are other differentiae which do not serve to constitute the species 'animal', but rather to divide it into further species, and these all fall under it and lie beneath it. Hence one cannot predicate any of them of animal: for instance 'rational', 'irrational', 'mortal', 'immortal', 'winged',  
 25 'living-on-land', 'living-in-water', 'two-footed', 'four-footed', 'creeping', 'feathered', and 'featherless'. For there are many differentiae that fall under animal and divide it, and constitute the species of animals that fall under it. It is itself however not constituted as a species by the differentiae that divide it, but rather by the former kind.<sup>139</sup>

30 Q. If not all of the differentiae of the predicated genera can apply to their subjects, but only some, what is the class of differentiae that can all be said of their subjects?

A. I claim that not all of the differentiae of animal can be predicated of a subject like 'man', but that all of its specific (*eidopoioi*) differentiae can. The specific differentiae of animal  
 35 are those differentiae that lie above it, i.e. 'animate' and 'sensitive'. These can be predicated of man, for man is both

<sup>137</sup> cf. Boethius 178D-179A.

<sup>138</sup> Reading *eisin* for *estin* at 85,14, as Busse suggests.

<sup>139</sup> cf. Boethius 179AC.

animate and sensitive. So it was correct to say that everything that is predicated of the higher genera will also be predicated of the the lower ones. For the divisive differentiae cannot be predicated of animal, but the specific differentiae can. So everything that can be predicated of the predicate genus, e.g. the higher specific differentiae, will also be predicated of the subject, and what cannot be predicated of the predicate will not be predicated of the subject. There are however some divisive differentiae below animal that are able also to be made divisive differentiae of the subject, as we have shown.<sup>140</sup> 86,1

Q. After having instructed us about these things, to what division does he then pass? 5

A. He proceeds to produce the larger division, i.e. the one into ten classes.<sup>141</sup>

Q. But is this a division?

A. It is not.

Q. Why?

A. A division cuts a genus into species, but here he will not be dividing a single genus into ten species, but rather will be setting out ten genera. So what he will produce is an enumeration (*katarithmêsis*) of the primary genera and of the ten types of predication corresponding to the primary genera.<sup>142</sup> 10

Q. What does he say, then?

A. 'Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or relative or where or when or position or having or doing or being affected' (1b25-7). And he gives illustrative examples for each of these: 'Substance, for instance, to speak in outline, is man or horse' (1b27-8); and he gives an appropriate example to illustrate each of the others as well. 15

Q. Does everyone agree with his enumeration of these as the genera<sup>143</sup> of those expressions that primarily and principally signify things? 20

<sup>140</sup> The reference is to 84,13-15. The text of 86,3-4 is uncertain, but for the sense cf. Dexippus 28,3-5 and Boethius 179B. I translate Busse's text at 86,4.

<sup>141</sup> cf. 71,15-26 and Boethius 180B.

<sup>142</sup> There exists no genus over and above the ten 'categories': cf. Dex. 39,6-15 and Simpl. 61,19-62,23. For the distinction between a division and an enumeration, cf. also Plotinus 6.3.13,11-12.

<sup>143</sup> I read *tauta ta genê* for *ta auta genê* at 86,20.

A. No, Athenodorus the Stoic attacks it in his work *Against the Categories of Aristotle*, as does Cornutus in his *Arts of Rhetoric* and his *Reply to Athenodorus*, and many others do so as well.<sup>144</sup>

25 Q. Are their objections correct?

A. Certainly not.

Q. From what is this clear?

A. Because he has replied to and refuted them on just about every point, and shown how they are mistaken.

30 Q. What sort of objections do they present?

A. There are three sorts of objections: some object that his list contains too many items, some that it contains too few, and others that he has included some genera instead of others.<sup>145</sup>

Q. Why does he say, 'Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity ...' and so on?

35 A. Because his concern here is not with beings and how many genera of them there are, but rather with the question of how many genera there are of expressions that primarily signify beings. Hence <he speaks> of 'things said (*legomena*) <about beings>', for expressions are things that are said.<sup>146</sup>

87,1 Q. What are their differentiae?

A. Some are said with combination, some without combination.

Q. Which are said with combination?

5 A. Those that are composed of two or more complete predications,<sup>147</sup> for example, 'A man runs' or 'A man is

<sup>144</sup> Dexippus also answers the critics who claimed that Aristotle's division into categories is excessive, as well as those who think that it is defective and those who think Aristotle has included the wrong items in it (cf. below, 86,31-2) in *in Cat.* 1.36-8; cf. also *Simpl.* 62,24-66,31. For the objections of Athenodorus and Cornutus that Aristotle's list of categories is deficient because it does not include every sort of significant linguistic item, cf. above, 59,10-14, *Simpl.* 18,28 and 62,28, and *Dex.* 32,17-34,2 (where they are not mentioned by name). The same group of commentators are also alluded to by Plotinus at 6.1.1,11-12.

<sup>145</sup> Busse suggests that may be a lacuna here in which these views were refuted. Certainly the discussion of this point breaks off rather abruptly, but I take it that 86,27-9 is supposed to indicate that detailed refutation is unnecessary.

<sup>146</sup> The text of the last sentence is corrupt and the sense quite uncertain. I assume a lacuna after *kata* in 86,37, and read, *exempli gratia* only, *tôn ou<n> legomenôn kata <tôn ontôn phêsi>: legontai de hai lexeis*, comparing Boethius 180C.

<sup>147</sup> A complete predication (*teleios katêgoria*) means a proposition having both a

walking in the Lyceum’.

Q. Which are said without combination?

A. Those that are not of this type, for example all homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms.

Q. What about expressions like ‘stonebuilder’, ‘cowherd’, and ‘false-believer’?<sup>148</sup> Are they said with combination or without combination?

10

A. Without.

Q. Why?

A. None of them is composed of complete predications.<sup>149</sup>

Q. How many genera are there of expressions said without combination?

A. The ten already mentioned.

15

Q. What is the definition of each<sup>150</sup> of them?

A. It is impossible to give definitions for any of them, for every definition contains a genus, and there is no genus of these: they are the highest genera.<sup>151</sup>

Q. What can one give in this case?

A. Only examples and propria, which is what Aristotle himself does. Here he gives examples; later, during the investigation of each category, he shows what the propria of each of them are.

20

Q. How does he go about giving the examples?

A. He says that substance is, for example, man; qualification, for example, white; quantity, for example, three

25

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clear subject and predicate: cf. *Simpl.* 42,9-43,31. For the contrasting notion of incomplete predicate (*elleipês katêgoria*), see below, 87,31 with note.

<sup>148</sup> Porphyry’s actual examples, *lithologeî*, *boukoleî*, *pseudodoxeî*, literally, ‘<He/she/it> is a stonebuilder’, ‘<He/she/it> is a cowherd’, ‘<He/she/it> believes falsely’, are each single finite compound verbs; each can stand as a complete sentence without a further specified grammatical subject. I have substituted the corresponding compound nouns in my translation, which unfortunately may obscure the point of the master’s question, which appears to turn on the fact that these are single words that can nevertheless have a truth value just by themselves. Porphyry claims that they nevertheless do not count as expressions ‘said with combination’, because they need to have their subject specified in order for the proposition they express to be fully understood: see note to 87,36-40 below.

<sup>149</sup> cf. Boethius 181BC.

<sup>150</sup> Reading *hekastou* for *hekastos* at 87,16, as Busse suggests.

<sup>151</sup> cf. Boethius 181BC.

(*trias*);<sup>152</sup> relative, for example, father;<sup>153</sup> where, in the Lyceum; when, last year; action, for example, beating; being affected, for example, being beaten;<sup>154</sup> having, for example, wearing shoes; and position, for example, sitting.

Q. What is it that is produced by the combination of these?

A. A proposition (*protasis*).

30 Q. Why is this?

A. Because no predicate<sup>155</sup> by itself is a proposition; a proposition results from a certain sort of combination of such predicates.

Q. Why is this so?

35 A. Every proposition is either true or false, but no predicate by itself is either true or false, since it is incomplete.

Q. What? Would you not say that *zô* ('[I am] alive'), *peripatô* ('[I am] walking'), and *huei* ('[it is] raining') are true or false, even though they are things said without combination?<sup>156</sup>

A. Yes I would, but each of these is implicitly (*dunamei*) said with combination, even if this is not expressed in words.

40 For *zô* is equivalent to 'I am alive', and *huei* is equivalent to 'It is raining' (*Zeus huei*).<sup>157</sup>

88,1

[Concerning Substance]

Q. You have presented examples illustrating what sorts of things belong to each of the categories.<sup>158</sup> Now also tell us about the order of the categories, and explain<sup>159</sup> why he gives

<sup>152</sup> Aristotle's examples of quantities in the text are actually 'two cubits' and 'three cubits' (1b28-9). It is possible that the textual variants in the quotation from *Categories* § 4 in this speech represent a genuine alternative ancient recension of that chapter; alternately, they could merely be misquotations due to Porphyry's faulty memory.

<sup>153</sup> Aristotle actually gives 'double', 'half', and 'greater' as examples of relatives (2a1).

<sup>154</sup> Aristotle gives 'cutting' and 'burning' and their correlatives 'being cut' and 'being burnt' as examples for these two categories, respectively (2a4).

<sup>155</sup> By 'predicate' (*katêgoria*) here, Porphyry clearly means 'incomplete predicate': the term 'incomplete' is actually used at 87,35 below; cf. note to 88,4 above.

<sup>156</sup> Each of these propositions is expressed by a single finite verb form in Greek, but they differ from the examples in 87,9-14 above in that they have a clear meaning without their subject terms being further specified.

<sup>157</sup> A common Greek idiom, meaning literally 'Zeus is raining'.

<sup>158</sup> It seems to me that Busse's doubts about the soundness of the text here (88,2) are unnecessary.

<sup>159</sup> Reading *eti mên peri tês taxêôs lege, hina* [*hekastês*] *ekdidaxêis* at 88,3-4, as Busse suggests.

the account of substance first, before the others.

A. That is because all the other things are in substance and depend upon it for their being. This both shows substance to be prior in nature and reveals the account of substance as prior to that of the others.<sup>160</sup> 5

Q. What, then, is substance?

A. It is not possible to give a definition of it, as we stated,<sup>161</sup> and we have already presented examples of it. He gives as its concept 'not being in a subject', for substance underlies all the other genera, and the others cannot have being without it. He will investigate its proprium as well. 10

Q. In how many ways does he use the term 'substance' in other works?

A. In three ways: he says that matter, form, and the compound<sup>162</sup> are substance. 15

Q. What type of substance is he instructing us about presently?

A. Substance as compound.<sup>163</sup>

Q. Does he also mention the other two types?

A. Yes.

Q. In what way? 20

A. In saying that the parts of substances are also substances.<sup>164</sup> The parts of the compound are the matter and the form.

Q. Which differentiae of substance does he mention here?

A. That some are primary, others secondary.

Q. Which are primary? 25

A. The individuals, i.e. Socrates and Plato.

Q. Which are secondary?

A. The genera and the species of individual substances, as for example man is the species of particular men, and animal is their genus.

<sup>160</sup> That is, the items in the other categories all depend on substance for their existence, in the sense that if substances were eliminated, all the others would be eliminated along with them, but not *vice versa*: see. *Cat.* 2b5-6 and 89,16-17 and 90,12-13 below. Cf. also Boethius 182A.

<sup>161</sup> See 87,17-18 above.

<sup>162</sup> to *sunamphoteron*, the compound of matter and form. The reference is to the doctrine of substance of the central books of the *Metaphysics*: cf. e.g. *Metaph.* 8.1, 1042a26-31.

<sup>163</sup> i.e. individual substance, with which the compound substance of the *Metaphysics* is here identified: cf. the *Metaphysics* passage cited in the previous note and Boethius 184AB, which probably depends on Iamblichus (cf. Shiel, p. 224 n. 14).

<sup>164</sup> *Cat.* 3a29-32.



- 30 Q. Which of these are strictly, most of all, and primarily substances?  
 A. The individuals.  
 Q. How does Aristotle refer to them?  
 A. As those that are neither said of a subject nor in a subject (2a12-13).
- 35 Q. What does he mean to convey by using these words?  
 89,1 A. By 'not being in a subject' he conveys, as we have already said,<sup>165</sup> that substance is not an accident. This is something that is common to all substances, whether primary or secondary. Not being said of a subject distinguishes primary substances from secondary substances. For secondary substances, that is, the species and the genera, are said of the  
 5 primary substances as of a subject,<sup>166</sup> but primary substances, as themselves the subjects for everything, are not said of a subject. So while it is common to both primary <and secondary><sup>167</sup> substances not to be in a subject, they are distinguished from one another in virtue of secondary substances not being in a subject but being said of a subject, while primary substances are similarly not in a subject, but are not said of a subject either.
- 10 Q. Why does he say that primary substances are said to be substances most strictly, primarily, and most of all,<sup>168</sup> and what are the secondary substances that he distinguishes from them?  
 A. The primary substances are the individuals, and it is for this reason that they are called primary substances. All other substances are secondary substances. Individual substance is said to be substance most strictly and primarily because all  
 15 other items are either said of these as subjects – I mean their species and genera – or are in them as subjects – I mean the other nine sorts of accidents. So if primary substances did not exist, none of the others would exist either. For example, animal is predicated of man, hence also of a particular man. For if animal were not predicated of any of the particular men,  
 20 it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, if colour or any

<sup>165</sup> See above, 77,17-78,21.

<sup>166</sup> I retain the MS reading *kath' hupokeimenou* at 89,4.

<sup>167</sup> Reading *koinou ontos tais prô<tais kai tais deu>terais* for *koinou ontos tais †proterais* at 89,6, as Busse suggests.

<sup>168</sup> cf. *Cat.* 2a11-12.

other accident is in body or in substance, it will also be in a particular body or a particular substance. For if it were in none of the particular bodies or substances, it would not be in body or in substance at all. Therefore since all other items are either said of the primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects, and since if the primary substances do not exist it is impossible for any of the others to exist, it is reasonable that these substances should be most strictly and primarily substances. 25

Q. But why are they 'most of all' (*malista*) substances?

A. Because of the ten categories, substance is the one that serves as subject, and of the things that are subjects, what is most of all a subject will also be most of all substance; but individual substance is more of a subject, so that it will be most of all substance. For it underlies all of its own species and genera, which are predicated of it as a subject, while accidents are in it as a subject. Therefore individual substance will be most strictly and most of all and primarily substance. 30

Q. Which substances does Aristotle call secondary substances?

A. The species and genera.

Q. All the species and genera, without exception? 35

A. Certainly not. 90,1

Q. Which species and genera, then?

A. He says that they are 'the species in which the things that are primarily called substances belong,<sup>169</sup> as well as the genera of those species' (2a14-15). For the individuals are in a certain way in the species, since things that are said of a smaller extension are said to be contained in things that are said of a larger extension. So the species that contain individual substances and the genera of these species, which contain them, will be secondary substances, for example man and animal. For the particular man is in man as its species, and animal is the genus of man. So these are said to be secondary substances, that is, man and animal and things like that. 5 10

Q. If indeed, as you claim, it is because the primary

<sup>169</sup> Ackrill translates this passage as 'The species in which the things primarily called substances are', but *huparkousin* is literally 'belong in', and Porphyry's explanation focuses on this.

substances eliminate the other things<sup>170</sup> but are not themselves eliminated along with the others that they are primary and most of all and in the strictest sense substances,<sup>171</sup> and it is because of this that individual substances are said to be <primary><sup>172</sup> substances, but when we eliminate in thought (*epinoia*) the man that is predicated in common,<sup>173</sup> Socrates, who is an individual and a primary substance, is also eliminated, how can it be that the species is not more a substance <than the individual, and the genus more a substance than either the species or the individual substance>,<sup>174</sup> since when animal is similarly eliminated in account (*tôî logôî*), both man and Socrates no longer exist? Why is man not prior to Socrates, if when man is eliminated it eliminates Socrates as well, but it is not eliminated when Socrates is? For man exists when Socrates does not, but Socrates does not exist when man does not. Similarly in the case of animal: it is possible for Socrates to exist when animal does, but when animal is wholly eliminated, Socrates cannot exist either. What can be concluded from this? For if those things are primary which eliminate other things along with themselves, but are not themselves eliminated when the others are, and animal and man eliminate Socrates along with themselves, but are not themselves eliminated along with Socrates, then Socrates would not be primary substance, but rather the genera and species would be. How would you respond to this difficulty?<sup>175</sup>

A. I claim that the conclusion you have drawn does not follow.

Q. But why?

A. Because you are speaking about Socrates alone, who can be eliminated while man and animal both remain, but you

<sup>170</sup> We should perhaps read *to <sun>anairein* instead of *to anairein* at 90,12, as Busse suggests: 'the primary substances eliminate the other things *along with themselves*.'

<sup>171</sup> The reference is to 89,10-25 above, though it has not actually been stated there that the latter condition is fulfilled.

<sup>172</sup> I read <*prôtas*> *einai ousias* at 90,14: the supplement seems necessary to the sense.

<sup>173</sup> Reading *koinêi* for *koinou* at 90,14, as Busse suggests.

<sup>174</sup> Supplying, *exempli gratia*, <*tês atomou kai to genos mallon ousia tou te eidous kai tês atomou ousias*>, as Busse suggests, to fill the lacuna at 90,16.

<sup>175</sup> For this aporia, cf. Boethius 183CD.

ought not to speak merely about a single man: you must recognise that individual substance does not mean just one of the particulars, but rather all of the particular men, from whom we conceive the man that is predicated in common, and all the particular animals, through which we think the animal that is predicated in common. These are the cause of the being of the common predicates (*koinêi katêgoroumena*). For it is not possible to think of ox or man or horse or animal in general apart from the particulars. But if it is from the perception of particulars that we come to conceive of the common predicate, which we no longer think of as a 'this', but as a 'such', then if the particular animals are eliminated, what is predicated in common of them will no longer exist either.<sup>176</sup> Also, expressions that signify beings are applied initially to individuals, and it is from them that our thought proceeds to the common items (*ta koina*). Since, however, the subject of this work is significant expressions, and expressions are primarily applied to sensibles – for they are what we first encounter in perception – Aristotle stated, appropriately to his subject matter, that these were the primary substances. As sensibles are the primary objects of signification, he posited individual substances as primary relative to significant expressions.<sup>177</sup>

Q. What other objection would reasonably follow upon this one?<sup>178</sup>

A. I reply that some object<sup>179</sup> that on his own showing it is the intelligibles that are said most strictly and above all and primarily to be substances in the primary sense, i.e. the intelligible god and intellect and the Ideas, if there are Ideas, but he ignores these, and claims that the individuals in sensibles are primary substances.<sup>180</sup>

<sup>176</sup> Porphyry assumes that the secondary substances of *Cat.* § 5 are not Platonic Forms (cf. below, 91,14-27), but abstractable universals present in things: cf. Strange, pp. 961-3. He is apparently relying on Alexander of Aphrodisias' account of the latter, for which see M. Tweedale, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias' Views on Universals', *Phronesis* 29 (1984), pp. 279-303. Iamblichus refused to follow Porphyry on this point, as can be seen from *Dex.* 2.12 and *Simpl.* 82,1-83,29.

<sup>177</sup> 91,5-12 represents a second reply to the difficulty, not a metaphysical one like the first, but one based on 'logical' considerations, i.e. the theory of first and second imposition of names (cf. note to 57,20-58,5 above).

<sup>178</sup> This translation assumes that *aitia* and *engklêma* in 91,13 both mean 'objection' (lit. 'accusation'). This is supported by 91,18 below.

<sup>179</sup> Reading *aitiôntai* for *aitiômai* at 91,14 with Praechter, p. 505 n. 2.

<sup>180</sup> cf. Lucius and Nicostratus ap. *Simpl.* 73,15-28 with Plotinus, *Ennead*

Q. How will you solve this difficulty for him?

20 A. I shall say that since the subject of the work is significant expressions, and expressions are applied primarily to sensibles – for men first of all assign names to what they know and perceive, and only secondarily to those things that are primary by nature but secondary with respect to perception – it is reasonable for him to have called the things that that are primarily signified by expressions, that is, sensibles and individuals, primary substances. Thus with respect to  
25 significant expressions sensible individuals are primary substances, but as regards nature, intelligible substances are primary. But his intention is to distinguish the genera of being according to the expressions that signify them, and these primarily signify individual sensible substances.<sup>181</sup>

Q. But given that ‘species’ and ‘genus’ are used homonymously, which species and which genera is he speaking about?

30 A. Those he calls secondary substances.

Q. How did he indicate this?

A. I reply that he did so when he says, in effect, ‘Do not think that I am speaking of the genera of any other species, that is, the species of any other individuals, such as individual accidents: I speak of those species in which the things that are primarily called substances belong, as well as the genera of  
35 those species.’ He himself explains what he means when he says ‘the particular man belongs in man as a species, and animal is the genus of this species’ (2a16-17).  
92,1

Q. You have sufficiently indicated why it is the individuals that are the primary substances. Now you should instruct us  
5 about why the genera and species of individual substances are secondary substances.

A. I claim that it is reasonable to call the genera and species of primary substances secondary substances, for they are the only predicates that reveal primary substance. For if someone states what Socrates is, he will do so properly if he gives his  
10 species and genus, and he will be more informative if he says ‘man’ or ‘animal’ than if he gives any of the other nine categories. For whichever of these he gives, he will not strictly

6.1.1,19-30, Dexippus 44,32-45,11, and Boethius 183D (Chadwick p. 148).

<sup>181</sup> cf. Boethius 184A.

have answered the question, for example if he says 'white' or 'three cubits tall' or 'moist' or 'running' or any thing like that. For such predications are accidental and do not belong to the nature of the subject, nor do they reveal what it is, but predications of the species and genus are proper to its nature. 15  
Therefore it is reasonable that of the other items besides primary substances, only the species and genera of substances are secondary substances.

Q. Give yet another reason why the species and genera of primary substances are said to be secondary substances.

A. I claim this is because the species and genera possess the greatest degree of similarity to primary substances. For those are said to be substances in the strictest sense because they are subjects for all the other items, but the species and genera stand in the same sort of relation to all the other items. For the remaining items, i.e. the accidents, are predicated of them. For just as it is possible to say, speaking paronymously, that a particular man is educated in grammar and is three cubits tall and has other accidents, so one can also say that a man and an animal are educated in grammar and three cubits tall. For this reason<sup>182</sup> secondary substances are predicated synonymously of primary substances, since in general everything that is predicated of something as a subject is synonymously predicated of that subject. For since man is predicated of particular man as a subject, man in this case will be predicated synonymously, since Socrates is both a man and a mortal rational animal. The other items, the accidents, do not correspond in account to substances, though in some of them will be predicated of substances in name, as white is predicated of body – for one can say that a body is white – but not in other cases, for 'whiteness' cannot be said of body. However, the account of white can never be said of a body, for a body is not a colour that pierces the eyes.<sup>183</sup> 25  
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Q. Since you claim that the secondary substances are the species and genera, do both of these have an equal status in relation to primary substances?

<sup>182</sup> Porphyry is thinking of *Cat.* 2a19-34.

<sup>183</sup> For this definition of white in Aristotle, see the passages listed in Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicum* 182a29-30.

A. No, the species is more a substance than the genus.<sup>184</sup>

93,1 Q. Why?

A. The species is nearer to individual substance than is the genus. For if someone says what primary substance is, it will be nearer the mark for him to give the species than the genus, to say for example that the item in question is a man rather  
5 than that it is an animal. But a thing nearer to something that is more a substance will itself be more a substance. One of them, that is, 'man', is closer and more proper to the particular man, while 'animal' is more general.

Q. Give another reason that you might use to show that the species is more a substance than the genus.

10 A. Primary substances are said to be substances most of all because they are the subjects for everything else, and everything else is said of them,<sup>185</sup> either predicated of them as a subject or being in them as a subject. But the case of the species is similar. For primary substances bear the same sort of relation to their species and genus that the species bears to the genus, and the primary substances bear the same relation  
15 to the accidents that the species does. For the species is a subject for the genus, which is predicated of it as a subject, for that is how the genera are predicated of the species. Similarly, the species is a subject for the accidents, and they are in it<sup>186</sup> as a subject. So the species is more a substance for these reasons as well. But none of the species and genera that do not fall under one another is more a substance than any other,  
20 even though one may be of more value than another. For it is no more proper to say of the particular man that he is a man than to say of the particular horse that it is a horse.<sup>187</sup> Similarly in the case of primary substances: for even though Socrates is more valuable than the horse Bucephalos, he would not for that reason be said to be more a substance than Bucephalos.

25 Q. So far you have discussed primary and secondary substances, but you also should say what the proprium of

<sup>184</sup> cf. *Cat.* 2b7 ff.

<sup>185</sup> I read *kath' autôn* at 93,10 with the *editio princeps*, understanding *legesthai*.

<sup>186</sup> I read *en toutôi* at 93,17 with the MS. Busse's attempt to regularise the grammar by reading *en toutois* would spoil the sense.

<sup>187</sup> With 93,23-7, cf. *Cat.* 2b22-7: Porphyry generalises the point that Aristotle makes there.

substance is. You promised to tell us this when you said that it was impossible to give definitions of substance, but that one could give examples of it and give its proprium.<sup>188</sup> You have given examples, but you ought to state its proprium as well.

A.<sup>189</sup> Should I first describe what a proprium is?

Q. Do so.

A. I claim, then, that there are three senses of 'proprium', and that of these three, one is the strictest sense of the term.

Q. Say what the three types are.

A. A proprium is either what is a property of all the members of a kind, but not of them alone, or of only the members of a kind, but not of all of them, or what belongs to all and only the members of a kind, and this is the strictest sense of the term.<sup>190</sup>

Q. Give examples of these.

A. For instance, to be two-footed is a proprium of man. This is a property of all men, but not of men alone, since there are other animals that are two-footed as well. Again, one could say that it is a proprium of men to be rhetoricians or goldsmiths. These are properties only of men, but not of all men. But note that these are not propria in the strict sense, which are properties of all and only members of a kind: for example being capable of laughter, which is a property of all men and only of men. Since, then, we are seeking the proprium of substance, if something is a property of all substances but not only of substances, or only of substances but not of all of them, it might seem to be a proprium, but it would not really be one. Only what was a property only of substances and of all of them would be a proprium of substance. For example, not being in a subject is common both to primary substances and to secondary substances, but it is not a property of substances alone, but is also a property of the differentiae of substances, for they are not in a subject.

Q. But how can he say that not being in a subject is a common property of substances, when the parts of substances, which are substances,<sup>191</sup> are in a subject, namely in the

<sup>188</sup> Above, 88,9-12.

<sup>189</sup> I follow Busse's suggestion for the distribution of speakers at 93,29-30.

<sup>190</sup> cf. Boethius 190A.

<sup>191</sup> cf. above, 88,21-2.

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94,1

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whole? For surely the parts are in the whole?

20 A. But being in a subject was defined as being in something but not belonging to it as a part. The parts of substances, such as a hand or an eye, are in the whole as parts. Accidents are therefore in a subject according to this definition, but the parts of substances are not in a subject. They are in substances as wholes, but as substances and not as accidents. So not to be in a subject is common both to substances and to differentiae, but  
25 this is not a proprium, that is, a proprium <in the strict sense>,<sup>192</sup> which is something that is a property of all substances and only of substances. Not being in a subject is also a property of the differentiae, so that being a proprium in the strict sense would not belong to not being in a subject.<sup>193</sup>

30 Q. But how is it that a differentia is not in a subject, even though it is predicated of a subject?

A. Because two-footed and footed, which are differentiae, are not in man as accidents. If they were in man as accidents, it would not be the case that both their name and their definition were predicated of man. But as it is, one can say that man is  
35 footed, and can also state the account of 'terrestrial' (*pezon*) of man, that is, 'what proceeds over the earth by means of legs'. Therefore it is common both to substances and to differentiae that all predications made from them<sup>194</sup> are synonymous. This however is not a property of all substances, but only of secondary substances. For individual substance, since it is not  
95,1 predicated of a subject, is not predicated of anything synonymously, for there is no other subject for it. But being predicated of a subject is being predicated synonymously. Therefore species and genera, which are said of individual  
5 substances as subjects, are predicated of them synonymously. So too in the case of differentiae: every differentia is said of that of which it is the differentia as of a subject, since there are no differentiae of individual substances. For a differentia is that in virtue of which a particular species differs from other species, or that which is predicated as an essential qualification<sup>195</sup> of a number of items differing in species. Thus differen-

<sup>192</sup> Reading *hôs <to kuriôs> idion* at 94,25, as Busse suggests.

<sup>193</sup> I read *tôi mê en hupokeimenôi einai* for *to mê en hupokeimenôi einai* at 94,27.

<sup>194</sup> Reading *apo toutôn* for *kata toutôn* at 94,36, as Busse suggests, cf. *Cat.* 3a34.

<sup>195</sup> *en tõi hopoion ti esti katégoroumenon*: this is explained in lines 17-20 below.

tiae belong to species and genera, not to individuals.

Q. If, then, a differentia is not a substance – for you claimed that it was not a substance, even though it is like substance in not being in a subject – nor is it an accident – for it is not in a subject – but there is nothing intermediate between substance and accident – for every being is either in a subject or not in a subject, for they are all either substances or accidents, accidents those items that are in the nine categories,<sup>196</sup> substances those that exist in the way that substances do – if, then, a differentia is neither a substance nor an accident, what could it be?<sup>197</sup>

A. Aristotle says that it is not a mere quality – for then it would be an accident – nor a mere substance – for then it would be reckoned among the secondary substances – but that it is an ‘essential<sup>198</sup> quality’ (*poiôtês ousiôdês*). Therefore it is not predicated in the essence of what it is predicated of, but as an essential qualification.

Q. Show how the differentia is an essential quality.

A. Essential qualities are those that are complements of substances. Complements (*sumplêrôtika*) are properties the loss of which destroys their subjects. Properties that can be gained and lost without the subject being destroyed would not be essential. For example, heat is a property of hot water as well as of fire. But it is not an essential property of water, for when the heat is removed the water is not destroyed by becoming cold. But it is an essential property of fire, for fire is destroyed if its heat is taken away. And differentiae are indeed like this: they are essential qualities. For if ‘rational’ is taken away from man, man is destroyed, and if ‘terrestrial’ is taken away from him, he is destroyed, and if ‘mortal’ is taken away from him, he is destroyed, i.e. if he changes into something immortal. Hence the differentia is included under the definition of substance, since it is a complement of substance, and the complements of substances are substances.<sup>199</sup> Also, accidents do not reveal the nature of a substance,

<sup>196</sup> i.e. the nine secondary categories.

<sup>197</sup> This is the notorious problem of the categorial status of the differentia: cf. Dex. 2.21, Boethius 192A ff., and Simplicius’ discussion of the differentia, 97,24-102,10.

<sup>198</sup> *ousiôdês* could also be translated as ‘substantial’ here, and the context shows that Porphyry does have in mind its connection with substance (*ousia*).

<sup>199</sup> Since they are essential parts of substances: cf. *Cat.* 3a29-32.

35 but the differentia does. For man is an animal, and the  
 96,1 differentiae reveal what sort of animal he is, so that they will  
 be essential qualities. So not being in a subject is a property of  
 all substances, but not of substances alone, but also of  
 differentiae. Hence it is not a proprium of substance in the  
 strict sense of 'proprium'.

Q. Show us another apparent proprium of substance that is  
 not really one.

5 A. I claim that signifying a certain 'this' is such a  
 property.<sup>200</sup> For when I say 'Socrates', I signify a certain 'this'.

Q. Can 'this' be predicated of every substance?

10 A. Certainly not. For one cannot say 'this' of secondary  
 substances; but rather 'such'. For 'man' and 'animal' fail to  
 indicate any thing that is definite and one.<sup>201</sup> For in saying  
 'man', why would I be indicating Socrates rather than Plato?  
 Similarly, if I say 'animal', this word will not be understood as  
 indicating man any more than horse or ox or dog or any other  
 animal. So 'this' does not apply to secondary substances, but  
 rather 'such' does.

15 Q. What, then, does it mean when he says that 'man' and  
 'animal' do not merely signify a certain qualification, as does  
 'white', but mark off a certain qualification of substance, for  
 they signify a substance qualified in a certain way?<sup>202</sup> For  
 white and black and other qualities also mark off a  
 qualification of substance. For they cannot exist without  
 substance, but they exist in it.

20 A. He means that 'man' does not merely indicate a quality,  
 but indicates at least two things, for it reveals an essential  
 quality as well as a commonality of the underlying  
 substances. But 'white' does not indicate an essential quality,  
 nor a commonality of man or ox or stone or of any other  
 substance ...<sup>203</sup>

A. ... moreover, things that are predicated from them<sup>204</sup> are  
 predicated synonymously. But this does not belong to all

<sup>200</sup> cf. *Cat.* 3b10 ff and *Dex.* 2.23.

<sup>201</sup> cf. Boethius 194D.

<sup>202</sup> cf. *Cat.* 3b18-21.

<sup>203</sup> Busse marks a lacuna after 96,22; when the text resumes, the pupil is summarising why various candidates for propria of substance must be rejected, so that at least one question from the master seems to have fallen out. Boethius 195C may reflect the contents of the beginning of the lacuna.

<sup>204</sup> i.e. from secondary substances.

substances, for individuals are not predicated of anything. But a proprium is what belongs to all and only the things in question, and this does not belong to all of them. Hence it is not a proprium of substance. He also says that substance seems to indicate a certain 'this'.<sup>205</sup> But this does not belong to all of them either. For<sup>206</sup> genera and species signify not a certain 'this' but a 'such'. So this is not a proprium of substance either. 25

Q. What other candidate does he add besides these?

A. That there is nothing contrary to substance.<sup>207</sup> Induction reveals this to be so: for there is no contrary to Socrates, nor to a stone nor an ox nor any other substance. 30

Q. Then is this a property of substance alone, so as to be a proprium of it?

A. Certainly not, for there is no contrary to a definite quantity either.<sup>208</sup> For what could be contrary to 'two'? Perhaps someone might say that 'three' was. But why <three rather than any other definite number? But one thing has only one contrary, so that neither 'three' nor any other definite number is the contrary of 'two'. But if such quantities also cannot have contraries, then this is not a proprium of substance, since it does not belong to substance alone.><sup>209</sup> <But perhaps someone> would say that <'much' and 'little'> were <also> contraries, or 'large' and 'small'.<sup>210</sup> But these do not belong to the class of definite quantities, which it was claimed have nothing contrary to them, and perhaps they do not even<sup>211</sup> belong to the genus of quantity at all, but rather to that of relative, as he will show in the chapter on quantity.<sup>212</sup> So not having a contrary is not a proprium of substance either. 35 97,1 5

Q. What other proprium of substance does he investigate?

<sup>205</sup> *Cat.* 3b10: cf. above, 96,4.

<sup>206</sup> Reading *goun* for *oun* at 96,27, as Busse suggests.

<sup>207</sup> *Cat.* 3b24-5.

<sup>208</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b11-14 and 107,31-3 below.

<sup>209</sup> Two lines are missing in the manuscript after 96,36. The supplement is a translation of *Simpl.* 106,6-10, which must approximate the sense of the missing words, as Busse saw. Cf. also Boethius 196AB (see Bidez, p.196).

<sup>210</sup> I read, *exempli gratia*, <*isôs an tis kai to polu tôi oligôi*> *phaiê enantion einai ê tôi mega tôi mikrôi* at 97,1-2.

<sup>211</sup> Reading *hois ouk errhethê ti einai enantion* for *hois ouk errhethê to einai enantion* and *oude* for *oute* at 97,3, as Busse suggests.

<sup>212</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b14-15 and 108,5-110,13 below.

A. Not admitting of a more and a less. This is not however to be understood in an unrestricted sense, but with a distinction (*diastolé*), for an individual substance, considered in relation to itself or to any other similar individual substance, cannot be more or less of a substance, nor can a specific or generic substance compared with itself or any other substance of the same rank be more or less of a substance.

Q. Discuss some examples.

A. Socrates, who is an individual substance, is no more Socrates today than he will be tomorrow, nor tomorrow than he is today or he was ten days ago. Nor is Socrates any more or less of a substance than is Plato. Nor can the species man become more a substance than itself or any other species.<sup>213</sup> Thus just insofar as it is a substance, it does not seem to be any more a substance than itself or any other substance. But a white thing can become more white than itself or some other white thing. However, one substance is said to be more a substance than another when they are not of the same rank, if one is an individual and the other a genus or a species. For individual substance is said to be more a substance than specific and generic substance.

Q. Which <substances do you mean are 'of the same rank'?

A. I mean that individual substances are of the same rank as other individual substances, specific substances of the same rank as other specific substances, and<sup>214</sup> generic substances of the same rank as generic substances.

Q. Then is this a property only of substances?

A. No, 'double' does not admit of a more and a less, nor does 'father'. For why would Odysseus be more the father of Telemachus today than when he was in Ithaca, or when he returned from Troy? Therefore not admitting of a more and a less when a thing is considered in itself and as compared with others of the same rank is not a proprium of substance alone.

Q. What, then, should we say is most of all the proprium of substance?

<sup>213</sup> I read *oude mèn to eidos ho anthrôpos mallon <ousia> ê autos heautou genoito [mallon ousia] ê allou [anthrôpou]* at 97,15-17 For the second emendation, I follow Felicianus' *sed neque homo in specie vel ipse seipso, vel altera specie, puta bove, vel equo magis substantia est.*

<sup>214</sup> There is a lacuna of about 90 letters at 97,23-4; I translate Busse's suggested supplement.

A. To be receptive of contraries while being numerically one and the same.<sup>215</sup> For example, Socrates is numerically one but is receptive of health and sickness, and the same soul is receptive of wisdom and folly. 5

Q. But is it not the case that numerically the same sentence is receptive of contraries, since at one time it is true, and other times becomes false? For example, is not 'It is day' sometimes true and sometimes false? But a sentence is not a substance, is it?<sup>216</sup>

A. It is not. 10

Q. To what category does it belong?

A. To the category of quantity.

Q. Then being receptive of contraries is not a proprium of substance. Why then did you say that this was the proprium of substance?

A. Because substance is receptive of contraries while itself undergoing affection, whereas the sentence is not in any way affected. 15

Q. How is this so?

A. Socrates is at one time healthy and at another sick, himself undergoing the change, but a sentence such as 'It is day' does not itself change when it becomes at one time true and at another false, rather the thing it is said about brings about the change in it. <So><sup>217</sup> it is found to be true at one time and false at another without itself receiving any change.<sup>218</sup> 20

Q. You have solved the difficulty. Since a proprium is a property that belongs to all and only the members of a class, show that this is a property of all and only substances.

A. I can show that it belongs only to substances, and perhaps I will be able to show that it belongs to all of them as well. 25

Q. Show then that it belongs only to substances.

A. Any other item that one considers will not be found to be receptive of contraries while remaining numerically one and

<sup>215</sup> cf. *Cat.* 4a10-11.

<sup>216</sup> For this aporia, cf. *Cat.* 4a22 ff. (where the examples are beliefs, *doxai*, as well as sentences, *logoi*) and *Dex.* 2.41.

<sup>217</sup> I read <*hôte*> *mê dekhomenos* at 98,21.

<sup>218</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 114,5-20. Boethius substitutes Cicero for Socrates as his example here (199BC).

30 the same; this only holds in the case of substances. We do say that an action is at one time fine and at other times base, but not as numerically the same action: either the circumstances (*kairoi*) differ, or the action is done differently in the two cases.<sup>219</sup> But a substance does not become different while becoming good and base, but remains as one and the same substance. So too in other cases.

35 Q. You have shown that this holds in the case of individual substance. If it holds for all substances, it will then be the proprium of substance.

99,1 A. First of all, I will not be able to show this for the case of eternal substances.<sup>220</sup> For the eternally moving heaven, which is a substance, can never come to rest, and rest is the contrary of motion. But let us suppose that the discussion does not concern eternal substances. For they are simple in nature (*monoeidê*), and for the most part not receptive of contraries.<sup>221</sup> However, fire also, which is one of the  
 5 perishable things, is receptive of heat but not of cold, and snow is receptive of cold but not of heat, and water is receptive of moisture but not of dryness. Aristotle would say in response to these examples that what he said was that substance was receptive of contraries, not that it was able to possess  
 10 contraries in its essence: fire is not receptive of heat, but rather heat belongs to its essence, and it is not possible for it to be receptive of what already belongs to it, but only of things that are external to it. Thus water, by virtue of not having  
 15 heat in its essence, is receptive of heat and cold, but it is not receptive of moisture, since moisture belongs to its essence. But moisture does not belong to the essence of earth, hence earth is receptive of dryness as well. The heavenly bodies too are not receptive of the contrariety that is opposed to their essential quality, hence these are not mere qualifications of them, but essential qualifications. Substances are <not><sup>222</sup> receptive of qualities that derive from essential complements. Particular substances, i.e. those which are numerically one,

<sup>219</sup> For a related aporia based on this, cf. Dex. 2.35.

<sup>220</sup> cf. Dex. 2.37 and Simpl. 114,21-115,10.

<sup>221</sup> This is another example of Porphyry's general view that the *Categories* is about ordinary sensible substances

<sup>222</sup> I read <ouk> *epidektikai* at 99,16, which is clearly required by the sense; cf. Simpl. 114,37-115,5 and Boethius 200C.

are receptive of those contrarieties that are external to them, and these are none other than the other nine categories. And since individual substance, which is numerically one, has this property, so do secondary substances. For if Socrates is virtuous and foolish, so also will man be virtuous and foolish, and animal as well, since Socrates is <both an animal><sup>223</sup> and a man. So as substance, man <and><sup>224</sup> animal are receptive of contraries, since man is a substance and animal is a substance. But as universals, they are not receptive of them; rather the items that fall under them are. Just as colour is neither white nor black, but white and black fall under it, so man *qua* common item and animal *qua* common item predicated of a number of things are not themselves wise or foolish or sick or healthy, but the wise and the foolish man and the sick and the healthy man fall under them. Insofar as they are substances, man and animal are receptive in turn of contraries, for man, insofar as it is a substance, is conceived as receptive of contrary qualities, and so is animal. For they are subjects for both of them while remaining the same thing. But colour *qua* colour when it becomes black is not conceived as being the same thing as when it is white, but the body that is subject<sup>225</sup> for the white receives in turn the white and the black, while the colour, which does not remain, is not receptive of the white and the black, but passes away at the same time that the white does, and returns at the same time that the black enters the subject. It is not the case that the colour remains while the white passes away and the black enters into it. So one must consider man and animal *qua* substance to see whether they remain while receiving contraries. Hence it is a common property of every substance *qua* being a substance to receive contraries in turn. This would thus be a proprium of substance alone, which alone can undergo<sup>226</sup> a change, and does not include in its essence the unchangeability of its qualities.

<sup>223</sup> I read *kai* <*zôion kai*> *anthrôpon* at 99,21.

<sup>224</sup> Reading <*kai*> *to zôion* at 99,22, as Busse suggests.

<sup>225</sup> Reading *to men hupokeimenon tôi khrômati* for *to men en hupokeimenôi tôi khrômati* at 99,32 with Wallies (cf. Busse's *Addenda* to his edition of Dexippus, p. 106).

<sup>226</sup> Reading *metabolên dunamenês dekhesthai* for *metabolês dunamenês ginesthai* at 100,7, as Busse suggests.



Q. You have responded adequately to my questions concerning substance. But why is the following category that of quantity and not that of qualification?<sup>227</sup>

10

[Concerning Quantity]

A. Because <something><sup>228</sup> that is, is at the same time either one or many, and one and many belong to quantity, while it is not in general the case that what is is at the same time qualified or relative to something.<sup>229</sup> And quantities are countable:<sup>230</sup> a body, to be a body, has to be be  
15 three-dimensional, whereas to be a qualified body it has to be white or black.<sup>231</sup> Being a body precedes being a qualified body.

Q. Can you state yet another reason why quantity comes after substance, and not some other category?

A. I can.

20

Q. What is it?

A. That most of the characteristics that pertain to substance pertain more to quantity than to the other genera,

<sup>227</sup> The controversy over the relative order of the categories of quantity and quality goes back at least to the first century BC, to the the time of Andronicus and Eudorus of Alexandria, the earliest known commentators on the *Categories*: cf. Moraux I, pp. 107-8 and II, pp. 522-3. The controversy arises from an inconsistency in Aristotle's texts. Quantity is placed before quality in the lists of categories given in *Categories* § 4 and *Topics* A9, but *Metaphysics* 1069a20 clearly states that quality is prior to quantity, while *Metaphysics* 1028a12-19 seems to waver on the point (cf. Szlezák pp. 108-9). Simpl. 120,27-121,12, probably following Porphyry's larger commentary, gives the same arguments for the priority of quantity that are given here; in 121,13 ff., where he discusses the view of pseudo-Archytas, who follows Eudorus in placing quality second (cf. Simpl. 206,10-14; Szlezák 109), Simplicius' source is Iamblichus. Dexippus 3.1 attributes to Plotinus the Eudoran view (cf. esp. Dex. 64,15-65,7). This view however is found nowhere in the *Enneads*, and it was presumably reported by Porphyry as Plotinus' oral doctrine in *To Gedalius*. In his discussion of the Aristotelian categories in *Ennead* 6.1 Plotinus treats quantity first, following the order that is found in the *Categories*. Dexippus' response to Plotinus on this point (65,28-66,13) may derive from Porphyry, since it uses arguments similar to those here. It is that quantity is more akin than is quality to the nature of body or sensible substance, which is what is under discussion in the *Categories* (cf. above, 91,7-27), even though it may be conceded that quality is more akin to *intelligible* substance. The intervening passage in Dexippus (65,8-28), which discusses pseudo-Archytas and gives a more 'intellectual' (*noerós*) reply to the Eudoran thesis, is presumably based on Iamblichus.

<sup>228</sup> I read *te esti <ti>* at 100,12, as Busse suggests.

<sup>229</sup> For this argument, cf. Simpl. 120,29-30.

<sup>230</sup> Busse may well be right in suspecting *ta posa arithmêta esti* to be a gloss, since it disturbs the grammar of the sentence.

<sup>231</sup> cf. Dex. 66,5-7.

for instance not admitting contrariety or the more and the less, for these belong both to substance and to quantity.<sup>232</sup> In addition, if you remove qualification and the items indicated by the other categories from substance, but leave quantity present in it, there can still be substance, but if you completely remove quantity from substance, then there can no longer be anything either continuous or having discrete number. In general, quantity is nearer to substance than are the other sorts of accidents. 25

Q. How many differentiae of quantity are there?

A. Two. 30

Q. What are they?

A. The continuous and the discrete.

Q. When after this division he says, 'and one sort is composed of parts that have position relative to one another, while another is not composed of parts that have position' (4b21-2), what sort of division is he making? 101,1

A. I claim he is making a fresh division of the same thing: he divides the same genus, quantity, in two different ways. For nothing prevents there being several different divisions of the same genus from different points of view.<sup>233</sup> 5

Q. Show how this happens in the case of another category.

A. I will. Animal is divided into mortal and immortal, it is divided again from the outset into rational and irrational, and again it is divided into footed and footless, and it is divided as a whole yet again into winged, terrestrial and aquatic. In the same way, quantity is divided as a whole into continuous and discrete, and again, from another standpoint, into what is composed of parts that have position relative to one another and what is composed of parts that do not have position.<sup>234</sup> 10

Q. Tell us the divisions into which he divides quantity.

A. He says: 'One sort of quantity is discrete, the other continuous' (4b20).

Q. What is discrete quantity? 15

A. That into which nothing can be inserted so as to join together quantities of the same kind. I can also state it in the

<sup>232</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 120,30-3, *Boethius* 202C, and *Dex.* 66,2-4. *Boethius* omits the next argument, but it is given by *Simplicius* (121,1-3).

<sup>233</sup> This point is repeated below at 104,4-10.

<sup>234</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 136,7-11 and *Boethius* 202D-203A.

following way: a quantity is discrete if there is no common boundary at which its parts are joined.<sup>235</sup> In the case of the number five, the unpaired monad does not join together the two that flank it, nor do they join the two flanking them, for if they were joined, we would be able to say what it was that joined them. Hence number belongs to the class of discrete quantities.<sup>236</sup>

Q. Does only number belong to the class of discrete quantities?

A. Certainly not, for speech (*logos*) also belongs to discrete quantity.

25 Q. What kind of speech?

A. Not the speech which occurs in thought (*dianoia*), and which goes on within us even when we are silent,<sup>237</sup> for that is either an activity or an affection of the faculty of thought.<sup>238</sup> Nor is what is signified by speech insofar as it is significant a quantity, but the sort of speech that we utter is.<sup>239</sup>

Q. How is this so, and in what manner?

30 A. All speech is composed of nouns and verbs and the other so-called parts of speech. All these are composed of syllables. Syllables are either long or short: long syllables have a ratio to short syllables of two to one. Two and one are numbers, and number is discrete quantity, so syllables are discrete quantity as well. But speech is composed of syllables, and a compound  
35 thing is of the same kind as the things that constitute it. So speech is a quantity, and a discrete quantity.

102,1 Q. Why?

A. If a discrete quantity is one where there is no common boundary of its constituent parts and where there is nothing common to the parts which joins them together, and it is not  
5 possible to find anything which joins syllables to one another,

<sup>235</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5a1-2, Boethius 203A.

<sup>236</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 123,33-124,5 and Boethius 203B. Porphyry thinks of the number five as five units arranged in a series.

<sup>237</sup> For *dianoia* as involving the silent discourse of the soul with itself, cf. Plato, *Theaetetus* 189e-190a and *Sophist* 263e. The distinction here is the same as that between external and internal speech (*logos prophorikos*, *logos endiathetos*) at 64,29 above.

<sup>238</sup> In his longer commentary, Porphyry claimed that internal speech, as being either an activity or affection of thought, was a qualification of it: cf. *Simpl.* 124,20-2.

<sup>239</sup> The material in this and the following two responses is closely paralleled by *Simpl.* 124,8-20.

then syllables and speech will be a sort of discrete quantity. For example, 'Socrates' is a noun: we cannot say what joins the syllable 'so-' with the syllable '-cra-' or the syllable '-cra-' with the syllable '-tes'. For it is not what is signified that does so, since the word *blituri*<sup>240</sup> merely has three syllables adjacent to one another, not connected by any boundary, for it does not signify anything. So speech is a discrete quantity.

Q. You have shown what discrete quantity is: now show us what continuous quantity is. 10

A. I claim it is the sort of quantity that has the characteristics opposed to those of discrete quantity. In the case of discrete quantity, there was nothing else that intervened to join its parts together, but continuous quantity does have a common boundary joining its parts to one another. For example, in the case of a line, which is an interval without breadth,<sup>241</sup> its parts appear as continuous with one another, so that when one part is moved, the other parts move along with it. In the case of discrete quantity the parts do not behave in this fashion. If one had a measure full of grains of wheat, it would not be the case that if one of the grains was moved that the other grains would move along with it, but if a part of a single grain were moved, the whole grain would move, in virtue of its parts being continuous with one another.<sup>242</sup> Hence a line belongs to the class of continuous quantities. 15 20

Q. Can you give another example of a continuous quantity?

A. I can.

Q. What?

A. Surface.<sup>243</sup>

Q. How is it that surface is continuous? 25

A. Because a surface is divided by a line, and insofar as it is so divided, when the line is present in the division, the line considered in this way, as if projected upon the surface,<sup>244</sup> becomes a common boundary at which the parts of the surface

<sup>240</sup> A standard example of a meaningless word: cf. e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7,57 (= *SVF* 2,149), *Dex.* 11,7, *Simpl.* 12,41; 41,13, etc.

<sup>241</sup> Reading *mékous ousés aplatous* at 102,15, as Busse suggests (cf. his *Corrigenda et Addenda*, p. 182).

<sup>242</sup> cf. Boethius 205A.

<sup>243</sup> For line and surface as cases of continuous quantity, cf. *Cat.* 5a1-4.

<sup>244</sup> I read *hôsper [hê] epikeimenê anôthen* at 102,27-8.

30 are joined to one another. If you were to imagine this line as itself coming to be in actuality between the parts of the surface, it would divide the whole. But if it does not divide the whole, it will be conceived as the limit of one part of the surface and as the origin of the other part, and it will be the shared boundary of the two parts, and will in virtue of itself connect these parts with one another.<sup>245</sup>

Q. Is there another example of continuous quantity, besides line and surface?

35 A. Yes.

Q. What is it?

103,1 A. Body, for body too is a quantity and is continuous. It is a quantity, since it is three-dimensional, and it is continuous, since its parts are connected at a common boundary, namely the quasi-surface (*hoion epiphaneia*) that is conceived as lying between them.

Q. Why did you say 'quasi-surface'?

A. Because a surface is the limit of a body, not a part of it.

5 Q. But why is a part different from a limit?

10 A. Because a whole is composed of its parts, but it cannot be composed of limits. For a line can never be composed of points:<sup>246</sup> it has a point as its limit, but this point is not a part of it, but rather a limit. Nor can a surface be composed of lines: rather the parts of a surface are surfaces, and it has lines as its limits. Nor are the parts of a body surfaces, instead the parts of a body are bodies, and it has surfaces as its limits. So the surface that is conceived as lying between parts of the body is not a surface in the strict sense, but is only imaginary. For if it were to come to be actual, it would divide the body, and would be a limit of the resulting bodies. Insofar as this

<sup>245</sup> The text of this response (102,26-32) is somewhat uncertain (see Busse's apparatus), and the precise meaning is correspondingly obscure, but the general sense, as Busse saw, is apparent from *Simpl.* 125,3-12. The problem is that it will not do merely to say that a surface is continuous in virtue of its parts being joined by actual lines, since in that case the surface will be actually *divided*, and hence will not be continuous. (The parts will be in contact [*ekhomenon*], but not continuous, [*sunekhes*], cf. *Physics* 227a10-13.) Hence we must rather say that a surface is continuous if it is not divided, but that its potential parts (which, if it were divided, would be its actual parts) can be conceived as joined by potential or imaginary lines, which if they were actual would actually divide it into those parts. The corresponding point about the boundaries of the parts of solids is made explicitly just below, at 103,1-17.

<sup>246</sup> cf. *Phys.* 231a24-5.

body is capable of being divided by a surface, if you imagine that surface as the limit of one part of the body and the beginning of the other part, the surface will form a common boundary of the parts of the body – in a way not really existing, but only being conceived. 15

Q. Are these the only continuous quantities?<sup>247</sup>

A. No: besides them, there are also place and time.

Q. How is place a quantity, and a continuous quantity? 20

A. Because place is conceived as lying around body, and it must accompany a body, if the body is to be body. Body *qua* body is three-dimensional, and place, *qua* being the place of body, will also be three-dimensional.

Q. How is place continuous?

A. Just as the parts of a body that is contained in a given place are joined at a common boundary, for the same reason the parts of the place which the parts of the body occupy will be joined at a common boundary, indeed at the same boundary at which the parts of the body are joined.<sup>248</sup> 25

Q. How is time a quantity?

A. It is a quantity because it is conceived as having extension, and because it is measured by a number of a certain amount, for example a number of hours, days, nights, months, or years. It is a continuous quantity, for the past and the future are joined together by the now (*to nun*), which is the starting point of the future and the end point of the past.<sup>249</sup> 30

Q. How does Aristotle present these points?

A. He mentions in turn line, surface, and body, and then says that besides these, place and time are also quantities.<sup>250</sup> 35

Q. Why does he present them in this way?

A. Because line and surface are in a way united with body, 104,1

<sup>247</sup> The passage on place and time as continuous quantities (103,18-104,3) corresponds rather closely to the content of *Simpl.* 125,17-126,5, but *Simplicius* has somewhat more material and presents the points in a different order. *Simplicius* here is probably following *To Gedalius*, and this may provide some evidence that our commentary is a later, abbreviated version of the larger one.

<sup>248</sup> cf. *Boethius* 205D and *Simpl.* 125,22-5.

<sup>249</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 125,32-5 and *Boethius* 205D. For the 'now' (*to nun*) as joining past with future time, cf. *Phys.* 222a10-11.

<sup>250</sup> The reference is to *Cat.* 5a6-7. *Busse* thinks that *Porphyry* is here incorrectly quoting the text of the *Categories*, but it does not seem necessary to assume this, and I have translated accordingly.

for the primary boundary of a surface is a line, of a line a point, and of a body a surface. But place is not united with body, but is rather an external concomitant of it. Similarly, time has no connection with body.

Q. What other division of quantity does he make?

5 A. As we said,<sup>251</sup> he also stated that 'one sort is composed of parts that have position relative to one another, while another is not composed of parts that have position' (4b21-2).

Q. What does he mean?

A. I claim that when he states that there is one kind of quantity composed of parts that have position relative to one another, and another composed of parts that do not have  
10 position relative to one another, he is again dividing the whole of quantity.

Q. Tell us what it is not to have relative position, and what it is to have it.

A. Three things must be conceived in the case of things whose parts have relative position: the place where the parts are located, the parts themselves, which do not disappear, and the continuity of the parts with one another.<sup>252</sup> When some of  
15 these conditions hold but others do not, the thing in question can possess an order, but it cannot have the sort of position that quantities have. Consider ten jars placed on the ground:<sup>253</sup> it is possible to point to one as being first and another second, and one as here and another there, and the parts of the collection do not disappear but are preserved, but  
20 the parts are not continuous with one another, so that the jars possess an order, but do not have position.<sup>254</sup> Again, in the

<sup>251</sup> See 100,33-101,2 above.

<sup>252</sup> cf. Boethius 207C and Simpl. 136,12-15. What is meant by 'the parts do not disappear' is that the parts of the given quantity are capable of existing together simultaneously. This excludes time (*Cat.* 5a26-8) and speech (*Cat.* 5a32-6), where one part passes away before the succeeding part comes into existence.

<sup>253</sup> What follows suggests that we are to think of the collection of jars as arranged in a row or series.

<sup>254</sup> It is doubtful whether Porphyry is faithful to Aristotle's view of relative position in the *Categories* (5a15-37) when he insists that only continuous quantities can exhibit relative position of their parts (cf. lines 23-4 below). Aristotle's examples of quantities of this sort (lines, planes, and solids) are indeed all continuous magnitudes, but nothing Aristotle says prevents him from agreeing against Porphyry with the intuition that the elements of a discrete quantity, such as the collection of jars, can be considered as having position relative to one another. (Note that we are to think of the collection of jars as a *number* of jars, that is, as a discrete quantity.) Indeed, the first two of the three necessary conditions that Porphyry states (being

case of water flowing from a klepsydra, the parts are continuous with one another, but the previous parts cannot be pointed to, nor do they remain, but as soon as they flow out of the hole they disappear. They possess order but not position.<sup>255</sup> This is so in the case of time as well. Its parts possess an order, but they do not have position, for none of the parts of time remains. So there is no position in the case of discrete quantities, but they can have an order, such as the order that exists in the case of numbers, according to which we say that being two comes first before being three.<sup>256</sup> In the case of the parts of speech there is not even an order: for why should the syllable 'ba-' come before the syllable 'be-' rather than before the syllable 'pse-'? But perhaps there will be some sort of order: if<sup>257</sup> you utter a word, you will give an order to its syllables, as people who arrange the discrete amphorae, so as to place some of them in the first rank and some in the second, like an array of soldiers in battle.<sup>258</sup> In the case of the parts of a line or a surface or a body, there is relative position of the parts, due to the fact that each of them is in a certain place and that they remain, and due to the parts being continuous with one another, while in the case of time, there is order but not position, in virtue of the fact that the parts of time do not remain. In the case of a flowing river that mixes with the sea, the surface that is about to be mixed with and is nearing the sea does not have position, because it does not stand still, but is in motion. Hence motion too is something continuous, but it does not exhibit position, in that the time that supervenes upon it is continuous but does not

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spatially located and having coexistent parts) seem by themselves sufficient to characterise the notion of relative position that Aristotle has in mind. Note too that all the examples that Aristotle gives of quantities whose parts do not have relative position (time, number and speech) fail to satisfy *both* these conditions.

<sup>255</sup> This example, along with the example of a river flowing into the sea (below, 104,34-105,3), but not the example of the row of jars, is given by Boethius (208A).

<sup>256</sup> Something may well be wrong with the MS text here (104,25; see Busse's apparatus for a proposed emendation), but it seems just possible to understand it as I have translated.

<sup>257</sup> Omitting *mé* at 104,27 with the *editio princeps*.

<sup>258</sup> The text of this sentence is perhaps somewhat corrupt, and the translation is correspondingly uncertain. For the recognition of the order that is imposed upon speech when it is uttered, cf. *Simpl.* 139,3-10 and Boethius 208CD. The point of the example is that this order does not belong to spoken syllables as such, just as the jars themselves possess no inherent order, but can only have the order that is imposed upon them when they are arranged.



have position, and motion is not a quantity, but something that participates in quantity, as will be shown later.<sup>259</sup> So according to the first division there are five sorts of continuous quantity: line, surface, body, time and place; and there are two sorts of discrete quantity: number and speech. According to the second division, there are four kinds of quantity the parts of which have position: line, surface, body, and place; and three kinds that do not exhibit position: number, speech, and time. Of these, two exhibit order, number and time, and speech in one way has an order, but in another it does not.<sup>260</sup>

Q. Are these the only species of quantity?

A. They are the species of quantity in the primary sense (*proégoumenôs*), but accidentally there are other species.<sup>261</sup>

Q. What is meant by 'in the primary sense' and 'accidentally'?

A. Something is of a given kind in the primary sense if it is that sort of thing in virtue of itself, while it belongs to a kind accidentally if it is that sort of thing in virtue of something else. For example, all the things that I mentioned are quantities in the primary sense, while white, for example, is said to be large accidentally, not insofar as it is white, but because the surface in which it inheres is large.<sup>262</sup> And a man is said to be tall, not insofar as he is a man, but insofar as his height is large.

Q. Will this also be a differentia of quantity?

A. Yes.

Q. How could it be stated?

A. As follows: one sort of quantity is quantity in the primary sense, another is quantity accidentally.

Q. What is quantity in the primary sense?

A. That which is quantity in virtue of itself and not in virtue of something else, as for example number, time, and so on.

Q. What is quantity accidentally?

A. What is said to be a quantity in virtue of something else,

<sup>259</sup> The reference is to *Cat.* 5a38-b10, especially the reference to motion having quantity at 5b3. Cf. below, 105,36-106,6. Aristotle's text claims that motion has quantity accidentally, not *per se*: Porphyry here identifies this with its having quantity by participation; cf. below, 105,14 ff.

<sup>260</sup> With 105,5-10, cf. Boethius 208CD. *Simpl.* 139,18-24, which corresponds in content to this passage, seems to depend on Iamblichus rather than Porphyry.

<sup>261</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5a38-9 and Boethius 209B *init.*

<sup>262</sup> For this example, cf. *Cat.* 5b1-2 and 6-8 and Boethius 209B.

as white is said to be large in virtue of its surface and a man is said to be tall insofar as his size is large. Again, we might say that a fever is great if it lasts for a long time – since if someone were to use ‘great’ not of a protracted fever but of a intense one, he would not be using this expression in the strict sense: he would be speaking about a qualification rather than about a quantity. For ‘intense’ is a characteristic of quality. And if we were to say that such-and-such a person has done a great deal of running, we would be reckoning his motion (*kinêsis*) by the large amount of time that it had taken, and it would be derivatively from this time that we would say that he had done a great deal of running. 30 35

Q. But isn’t change (*kinêsis*)<sup>263</sup> a quantity?

A. No, for it was not classified as a quantity.

Q. How then is it that we speak of much change or of a great change, as Thucydides says: ‘For that was a great change’?<sup>264</sup> 106,1

A. He says that change is not a quantity in virtue of itself, but in virtue of the fact that it takes place in time.<sup>265</sup> ‘Much’ and ‘little’ and ‘long’ and ‘short’ and ‘large’ and ‘small’ belong to time: in virtue of the time in which these inhere, which is a quantity, they are said to belong accidentally to the change as well.<sup>266</sup> Thus if someone were determining the ‘much’ or the ‘little’ belonging to a change or to an action, he would give its quantity in terms of the amount of time it took, as taking a year, a month, or some other amount of time.<sup>267</sup> 5

Q. You have told us what things are quantities in the strict sense and what things are quantities accidentally, and which quantities have parts that have position and which have parts without position, and which are continuous and which are discrete. Now you should determine what the proprium of quantity is. 10

<sup>263</sup> I here switch from translating *kinêsis* by ‘motion’ to translating it by ‘change’, in order to accommodate the example from Thucydides below (105,38-9).

<sup>264</sup> Porphyry is clearly quoting the famous prologue of Thucydides’ history (1.1,2) from memory, since he substitutes *megalê* for *megistê* in *kinêsis gar hautê dé megistê*. The reference is to the Peloponnesian War as the ‘greatest disturbance’ (*kinêsis*) that the Greek world had yet seen.

<sup>265</sup> Reading *tôi huparkhein autên <en> khronôi* at 106,1, as Busse suggests. This reading is supported by 106,30 below.

<sup>266</sup> I omit the comma that Busse places after *kata sumbebêkos de* in 106,4.

<sup>267</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b2-7.

A. I claim it is that quantity has nothing contrary to it.<sup>268</sup>

Q. Since a proprium ought to be what belongs to all and only the members of a given class, show us whether there is anything contrary to the things that are classed as quantities in the strict sense.<sup>269</sup>

A. There is nothing that is contrary to a line as such.

15 Q. How then is it that one kind of line is straight and another curved?

A. 'Straight' and 'curved' are not properties of line as such or insofar as it is quantity, but are accidents of it, insofar as it is a line that is qualified in a certain way. Nor is one line contrary to another line, but rather curvature is contrary to straightness. Nor is there anything that is contrary to surface as such.

20 Q. How then is it that one surface is said to be black and another white?

A. Insofar as surfaces are black or white, they will certainly be contrary to one another, since black and white are contrary, and the same will hold in the case of rough and smooth, but insofar as a surface is a surface it will not have any contrariety to another surface. Similarly, a body insofar as it is body will not have any contrary.

25 Q. Isn't what is incorporeal contrary to body?

A. No, for contraries would fall under the same genus, and there is no common genus over body and the incorporeal.<sup>270</sup> Moreover, contraries are predicated as affirmatives, for example 'sweet' and 'bitter', whereas 'incorporeal' is predicated as a privation.<sup>271</sup> Nor is there anything that is contrary

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<sup>268</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b11. The pupil's claim that this is an *idion* or proprium of quantity is not correct, as the master goes on to remind him in good Socratic fashion in the next few pages. He is forced to admit at 110,14-17 that it does not satisfy the conditions for being a proprium, since it applies also to substance and to some kinds of qualities, and he seems already to have forgotten what was said at 96,33-97,5 above. This is perhaps the only instance of real dramatisation in the dialogue. Simplicius seems correct in stating that Aristotle presents not having contraries not as a proprium of quantities, but as a common characteristic (*koinêi huparkhon*) of them (141,14-15).

<sup>269</sup> With 106,11-39, cf. Boethius 211B-212A and *Simpl.* 141,20-142,24. It appears from 141,28, however, that Simplicius is here following Iamblichus.

<sup>270</sup> The view that there can be no common genus over corporeal and incorporeal substance is insisted upon by Plotinus: cf. *Ennead* 6.1.2,1-8 and 6.2.1,16-28. With the parallel passage *Simpl.* 141,28-31, cf. *Simpl.* 76,13-78,3.

<sup>271</sup> i.e. to state that two tastes are contrary to one another by using affirmative statements, e.g. 'This is sweet' and 'This is bitter', is to oppose two positive properties of things, but to say something is an incorporeal is just to deny that it is a body, not to

to time as such. For if night and day are contrary to one another, it is not due to their being in time that the contrariety belongs to them, rather it exists insofar as day is illuminated air and night is darkened air, and air as such is not a quantity. Nor is there anything contrary to speech (*logos*) insofar as it is speech.

Q. How then is one speech said to be true and another false?

A. It is not insofar as speech is significant that it is taken to belong to the genus of quantity, but insofar as when it is uttered it is considered to be measured by long and short syllables. In this respect, it is not true or false, nor does it possess any sort of contrariety. Nor is there any contrary in the case of number. For what could be contrary to two as such, or to five, or in general to any number? 35

Q. What about place? Don't we conceive of contrariety in the case of place, though it is a species of quantity? 107,1

A. Perhaps a contrariety does exist in this case, if indeed 'above' and 'below' are parts or species of place, and if these are contrary to one another.<sup>272</sup>

Q. Why did you say 'perhaps'?

A. Because some people do not wish to consider 'above' and 'below' to be places, but rather to be relations (*skheseis*) of place.<sup>273</sup> For what is over our heads is 'above', and what is beneath our feet 'below', but since the universe is a sphere, there is no 'above' in itself and no 'below' in itself.<sup>274</sup> If however we understand 'above' and 'below' not in connection with any dimension other than that of the whole universe, so that 'below' would be what lies in the direction of the midpoint 10

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predicate any positive attribute of it.

<sup>272</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6a11-12.

<sup>273</sup> This is the view taken by Simplicius (148,8-14), who claims that Aristotle does not mean to endorse the view he mentions at *Cat.* 6a11-12 that 'above' and 'below' are contrary places. In fact, Aristotle does qualify the statement of the view with 'it seems that ...' (*dokei*), perhaps indicating that he is merely reporting a view of some other thinkers. (It is Aristotle's qualification that accounts for the pupil's 'perhaps' at 170,3.) Presumably Simplicius' interpretation was also that of Iamblichus. Porphyry leaves the question open whether one should accept this interpretation or the related one of Herminius (below, 107,25-30), who also rejects the existence of any sort of contrariety in quantity, or whether he thinks Aristotle does accept the view of *Cat.* 6a12-15, so that not being receptive of contraries would not belong to all quantities. Cf. also 110,11-13 below.

<sup>274</sup> An allusion to *Timaeus* 62c-63a: cf. esp. 62d4-6 and 63a4-6. Porphyry is probably correct in suggesting that the view stated at *Cat.* 6a12-15 is a response to Plato's view in the *Timaeus*.

of the spherical universe, and 'above' what lies away from the midpoint toward the outer limits of the universe, then 'above' and 'below' will be contrary to one another, since the distance from the middle of the universe to its outer surface is the greatest possible, as holds of the limits of circles and of spheres. In this way, what is above will only be above, and what is below will only be below, while in the case of the other dimensions to which 'above' and 'below' are applied, the same thing will appear to be both above and below when it is considered in relation to different things.<sup>275</sup> Hence 'above' and 'below', which exist in themselves as differentiae of place, and are quantities, will admit of contrariety, so that there will be contrariety of quantity, but only in the case of place. Those who defined contraries as things farthest removed from each other seem to be indicating that there exists contrariety of place, for they appear to have taken their definition from the contrariety of 'above' and 'below' as places.<sup>276</sup> For the primary instance of distance is distance in place. So contrariety in quantity will exist only in the case of place.

25 Q. How did Herminus respond to this difficulty?<sup>277</sup>

A. He says that 'above' and 'below' do not signify place, but rather 'where' (*pou*), just as 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow' do not signify time, but rather 'when' (*pote*).<sup>278</sup> 'When' exists in virtue of time, as 'where' exists in virtue of place: nevertheless to be something that belongs to a quantity and to be a quantity are different things. In this way, Herminus<sup>279</sup> too eliminates contrariety from quantity.

<sup>275</sup> According to the proposed definition, the outer sphere of the universe will always lie above any given location and the centre of the earth will always lie below it. But any other place that is not either the centre or lying on the circumference will lie 'above' some places, i.e. closer to the outer limits than they are, and 'below' others, i.e. closer to the centre, so that it will have both the attributes of 'being above' and 'being below', in relation to different things.

<sup>276</sup> This suggestion is made by Aristotle at *Cat.* 6a15-18, who identifies these thinkers with the proponents of the definition of 'above' and 'below' as away from and towards the midpoint of the universe respectively.

<sup>277</sup> cf. Boethius 212B; Moraux II, pp. 371-2. For Herminus, cf. note to 59,17 above.

<sup>278</sup> So that 'above' and 'below' will belong to the category of 'where', not to that of quantity.

<sup>279</sup> Simplicius (143,1) mentions this solution as due to Andronicus (cf. Moraux I, p. 114); presumably this information came from Porphyry's larger commentary. Busse may well be correct in proposing that we should restore Andronicus' name here (107,29). This would allow *alla kai* at the beginning of this sentence to have its usual adversative force: 'Andronicus too eliminates contrariety from quantity in this way.'

Q. Does contrariety then not exist in any of the other sorts of quantity?

A. Not in any sort of definite quantity,<sup>280</sup> but it does seem to exist in the case of some indefinite quantities.

Q. What are indefinite quantities?

A. Those that are indicated by expressions like 'much' or 'little' or 'large' or 'small'.<sup>281</sup> For what is much or little or large or small is a certain quantity. 35

Q. Are these quantities in the strict sense? 108,1

A. It would not seem so.

Q. Why?

A. Because they do not signify quantity, but would rather be relatives.<sup>282</sup>

Q. What then? Are they contraries? 5

A. No: they are opposed to one another, but they are opposed to one another not as contraries, but as relatives, so that even if they do belong to the category of relatives, they are not contraries (*enantia*), but rather opposites (*antikeimena*).<sup>283</sup>

Q. What do you mean by this?

A. Among opposites, some are opposed to one another as affirmation and negation, others as privation and state, others as relatives, and others as contraries.<sup>284</sup> So that relatives are opposed to one another, but are not contraries. 10

Q. But are 'large' and 'small' and 'much' and 'little' relatives?

A. They are not merely relatives, but taken absolutely each of them also signifies an indefinite quantity. For 'large' and 'small' are each used in two ways, as are 'much' and 'little': they have both an absolute and a relative sense.<sup>285</sup> 15

Q. What sort of quantities do they signify when they are used absolutely?

A. Indefinite quantities.

<sup>280</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b11-14 and 96,30 above.

<sup>281</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b14-15. The notion that attributes of this sort are to be considered as indefinite quantities, and not merely as relatives, as Aristotle assumes, derives from Andronicus (*Simpl.* 141,7-14). Porphyry (along with Iamblichus, cf. *Simpl.* 144,7) seems inclined to follow Plotinus (*Enn.* 6.1.4,47-50; 6.3.11,11-14) in agreeing with Andronicus' correction of Aristotle on this point.

<sup>282</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b15-16. With the following discussion (108,5-110,13), cf. *Simpl.* 143,9-145,9 (who however is following Iamblichus rather than Porphyry) and Boethius 213A-215B.

<sup>283</sup> cf. *Cat.* 5b30-1.

<sup>284</sup> cf. *Cat.* 11b17-19.

<sup>285</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 144,31-2.

20 Q. Why indefinite quantities?

A. Because it is not possible to conceive what the quantity is by which a large thing is large or a small thing is small. Whenever our thought says that a thing is large, it is immediately directed towards a particular small thing, so that it can conceive the quantity by which the large thing in question is large.

Q. Why then did you say that these items are not merely relatives, but are also quantity in an absolute sense?<sup>286</sup>

25 A. Because in the first instance they are more of the nature of quantity. 'Large' and 'small' and 'more' and 'less' are used in this way, whereas 'large' and 'small' and 'much' and 'little' show this sort of use, i.e. one that is absolute and not relative to each other, even though they also manifest the relative use. It was for this reason that we said that they each had two significations, one absolute and one relative.

30 Q. Does Aristotle mention both significations?

A. He does not.

Q. Which one does he mention?

A. The relative use, which is the only one that he recognises, and he tries to establish this point by means of a number of examples.<sup>287</sup>

35 Q. What is the primary argument he employs in this demonstration?

A. An argument from induction. For nothing is said to be either large or small just by itself, but things are said to be so in relation to something else, as induction shows. For example, a mountain is said to be small, even though considered absolutely it is not small, so that it is clear that it is called small with reference to something of the same kind that is larger than it.<sup>288</sup> Again, a millet seed, which is smaller than just about anything, can nevertheless be called large in comparison to another millet seed.

109,1

5 Q. How does this help to show that 'large' and 'small' are used as relatives?

A. In that if each of these two<sup>289</sup> were used absolutely and

<sup>286</sup> i.e. given that they can only be grasped in relation to some other quantity, as the pupil has just claimed.

<sup>287</sup> With 108,35-109,26, cf. *Cat.* 5b18-30.

<sup>288</sup> Reading *autou* for *auto* at 109,1, as Busse suggests.

<sup>289</sup> I read *toutôn* for *t'auton* at 109,6.

not with reference to something else of the same kind as their subjects, then a mountain could not be called small or a millet seed large.

Q. Can you state this argument in a concise and syllogistic form? 10

A. I can, as follows: Quantity – for example two cubits, three cubits, surface, and so forth – is not said relative to anything else, but ‘large’ and ‘small’ are said relative to something else, therefore ‘large’ and ‘small’ are not quantities. Or again as follows: Quantity is predicated absolutely, as induction shows, while ‘large’ and ‘small’ are not predicated absolutely; therefore ‘large’ and ‘small’ are not quantities.

Q. You have shown us that ‘large’ and ‘small’ are not quantities but relatives. Now show that ‘many’ and ‘few’ are also not quantities but relatives. 15

A. If a group of three thousand people happened to be in Athens, we would say that they were few, but if there were a group of three hundred people in a village, we would say that they were many, even though the group in Athens was many times larger. And a group of fifty in a house is many, but a group of even many times this size in the city is said to be few.<sup>290</sup> So ‘many’ and ‘few’ are said with reference to something else. Here is another argument: ‘Two cubits’ and ‘three cubits’ and two and five each signify a quantity, but ‘much’ and ‘little’ do not indicate quantity. For when one says ‘much’ or ‘little’, no number is signified, and similarly if we say ‘large’ or ‘small’, no definite quantity is indicated. Therefore these are not quantities. 20 25

Q. Can you produce another <argument> for the same conclusion?<sup>291</sup>

A. I can.

Q. What is it?

A. Bitter, which is opposite to sweet, is both said and conceived as existing in itself. For even if bitter did not exist, sweet could be conceived in itself, and if sweet did not exist, 30

<sup>290</sup> Boethius 214A gives much smaller figures (one hundred people in a village is a large group), and Bidez pp. 194-5 takes this as evidence of the depopulation of Italy in the sixth century.

<sup>291</sup> Reading *eis to auto <epikheirēma>* to fill the lacuna at 109,26, as Busse suggests. ‘The same conclusion’ is that ‘large’ and ‘small’, ‘many’ and ‘few’, etc., are not contraries; cf. 110,6 below.



bitter could be conceived in itself. Similarly, white and black and cold and hot are all things that admit of contrariety, but they can certainly be conceived as existing in themselves, prior to being conceived as contraries. But it is impossible to speak of 'large' and 'small' and 'much' and 'little' as first existing in themselves; it is necessary to conceive along with each of them the thing to which they have reference. For it is impossible to speak of or to conceive of something as being large without referring it to something else, in respect of which one will say that it is large. Similarly for the other three items: for one will not be able to say that he conceives of anything definite when he hears the terms 'large' or 'small' or 'much' or 'little'. If, then, things that admit of contrariety are said to exist in themselves in the primary sense, but the aforementioned four cannot be said to exist in themselves in the primary sense, then they cannot admit contrariety.

Q. What other argument can you give?

A. This: if 'large' and 'small' are taken to be contraries, since if one compares a thing with something larger than it is, the thing will appear to be small, while in comparison to something smaller than it is it will appear to be large, and this will occur at the same time, the thing will turn out to be contrary to itself. Therefore 'large' and 'small' cannot be contraries. The same argument applies to 'much' and 'little'. But if there is no contrariety in these, nor, as some think, in the case of place either, then there will not be any contrariety in quantity.

Q. Will this therefore be a proprium of quantity?

A. No,<sup>292</sup> for it was shown previously<sup>293</sup> that there is no contrariety in substance, and it will be shown<sup>294</sup> that there is no contrariety present in some kinds of qualification either.

Q. Tell us what other characteristic of quantity there is.

A. I claim it is that quantity does not admit of a more and less.<sup>295</sup> This will be clear if we examine particular cases of quantity: for a line insofar as it is a line is not more of a line than another, nor is a surface more or less of a surface than

<sup>292</sup> cf. note to 106,11 above.

<sup>293</sup> Above, 96,29-32, ad *Cat.* 3b24-32.

<sup>294</sup> Below, 135,26-137,14, ad *Cat.* 10b12-25.

<sup>295</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6a19-20; Boethius 215C-216A.

another, nor a body *qua* body, nor a place *qua* place, nor a number *qua* number, nor a time *qua* time. It is clear from these examples that quantity does not admit of a more and a less.

Q. Will this then be a proprium of quantity?

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A. No, for it does not belong only to quantities, even if it does belong to all of them. For it was also shown previously<sup>296</sup> that no substance is more a substance than any other.

Q. What then will the proprium of quantity be?

A. To be called equal and unequal.<sup>297</sup> For a line will either be equal or unequal to another line, and a body will be either equal or unequal to another body, and a surface will be either equal or unequal to another surface.

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Q. When someone applies this expression to white, and says 'this white is equal to that one', what does he mean?

A. He is not using 'equal' in the strict sense, but improperly, in place of 'similar'.<sup>298</sup>

Q. How is it that a man is said to be equal to a man, or a tower to a tower, if these are not quantities?

A. It is said accidentally.

Q. Why is it said accidentally?

111,1

A. It is used not because the thing in question is a substance, but because it has a size. For the primary sorts of quantities that pertain to the substance of our realm<sup>299</sup> are the so-called dimensions (*diastaseis*), which are length, width, and breadth.

Q. What category comes third in the series, after quantity?

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### [Concerning Relatives]

A. The category of relatives.

Q. Why not qualification instead?<sup>300</sup>

A. Because when length, breadth and depth have come into

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<sup>296</sup> Above, 97,6-24, ad *Cat.* 3b33-4a9.

<sup>297</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6a26-7.

<sup>298</sup> Aristotle appears to deny that 'equal' (*ison*) can be used of a quality and in particular of white (*Cat.* 6a30-4), but Porphyry admits that it can be so used in an improper or extended sense. Cf. Boethius 216C and *Simpl.* 151,23-6.

<sup>299</sup> i.e. sensible substances.

<sup>300</sup> As Simplicius notes (157,2-4), Aristotle himself places qualification before relatives in the list of categories in *Cat.* § 4, as he does also in the list at *Topics* 1.9, 103b21-3. Lucius however had raised difficulties about this (*Simpl.* 156,17 ff.).

existence, the larger and the smaller then supervene upon them, and these are relatives.

Q. Why does he introduce relative predicates<sup>301</sup> immediately after quantity?

A. Both for the reason just given, and also because he has mentioned relatives in his discussion of quantity.<sup>302</sup> So that it might more easily be seen what is meant by 'large' and 'small' and 'many' and 'few', he had to explain immediately what  
15 relatives are.<sup>303</sup>

Q. What are relatives, then?

A. As in the case of the other categories, it is not possible to give a definition of them in terms of a highest genus,<sup>304</sup> but it is possible to produce a statement of their concept,<sup>305</sup> and this is what Aristotle does. He says: 'relatives are those things that, as being just what they are, are said to be "of" other  
20 things, or to be in some other way relative to something else' (6a36-7).

Q. What does he wish to convey by using this formula?

A. First, that relatives apply to a plurality of things, as if he had said, 'Some *things* are relatives, not one thing'. If something single were to belong to the relatives, it would not be correct to call it a relative. Just as you would not speak of a  
25 *thing* as 'relative to one another', but instead would say that *things* are relative to one other, so also you would not speak of a *thing* as being a relative, but of *things* as relatives. It is for this reason that he speaks about substance and quantity in the singular, but about relatives in the plural: he says 'those *things* are called relative ...'.<sup>306</sup> Further, the description he

<sup>301</sup> The MS reading *tas tôn pros ti* at 111,11 can be kept if we understand *katégorias*.

<sup>302</sup> At *Cat.* 5b16-28 and 6a8-11, where the examples of relatives are 'large' and 'small' and 'many' and 'few'.

<sup>303</sup> This passage is followed fairly closely by Boethius 216D-217A, *pace* Shiel, 'Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle', p. 221. Simpl. 157,23-158,27, based on Iamblichus, gives a slightly more elaborate version of Porphyry's rationale for the order of Aristotle's exposition at this point.

<sup>304</sup> I have translated Busse's text. But perhaps we should read *autôn* <*ontôn*> *genikôtatôn* at 111,17, and translate 'it is not possible to give a definition of them, since they are highest genera': cf. 72,35-73,1 and 87,17-18.

<sup>305</sup> i.e. a description rather than a definition, cf. note to 60,15 above and Simpl. 159,10-12. Aristotle however does not hesitate to refer to the formula that he gives at *Cat.* 8a29-33 as a definition (*horismos*).

<sup>306</sup> *Cat.* 6a36. The point is that relative terms come in correlative pairs, such as 'father' and 'son' and 'half' and 'double': cf. also Simpl. 159,23-31. Simplicius

gives of them here is said to be a Platonic one,<sup>307</sup> and he corrects it later on.<sup>308</sup>

Q. What does he add after this?<sup>309</sup>

112,5

A. 'Or to be in some other way relative to something else.'<sup>310</sup>

Q. What is he trying to convey, and what is meant by the supplement '... or to be in some other way relative to something else'?

A. I claim that in saying that those things are called relatives that, as being just what they are, are said to be 'of other things, he conveys that relatives are not absolute (*apoluta*), but exist in a relation (*skhesis*)<sup>311</sup> of one thing to another, and that some things are said to be 'of other things where both terms are construed with the same grammatical case (*ptôsis*), while other relatives are construed with different grammatical cases, and others are not construed with a grammatical case at all.<sup>312</sup>

112,1

Q. Make clear what you mean with some examples.

112,7

A. Relatives that are construed with the same grammatical case are those like 'father', i.e. 'father of a child', and 'child', i.e. 'child of a father'. The term from which the relation proceeds is given in the nominative case, and the term to which it is related is given in the genitive case.<sup>313</sup> <Also in the case of 'master' and

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attributes this observation to 'the school of Achaicus and Sotion', Peripatetic philosophers of the first or second centuries AD (cf. Moraux II p. 211). Cf. also Boethius 217AB.

<sup>307</sup> This observation is attributed to Boethus by Simplicius (159,12-15); cf. also Boethius 217C. Simplicius refers for Plato's characterisations of relatives to *Sophist* 255d (cf. Busse's note to the present passage), which is in all likelihood the passage that Aristotle has in mind, and to *Republic* 438a7-b1; cf. also *Parmenides* 133d and the report of Hermodorus concerning Plato's oral doctrine at *Simpl. in Phys.* 247.30 ff.

<sup>308</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8a28-b24.

<sup>309</sup> According to Simplicius 163,6-9, Boethus claimed that the words *ê opôsoun allôs pros heteron* at *Cat.* 6a37 were Aristotle's own supplement to the Platonic definition of relatives.

<sup>310</sup> I follow Busse's suggestion in transposing this exchange (112,5-6) to before 111,30, where it fits in more smoothly. However, Boethius 217C supports the order of the speeches that is found in the manuscript. The corruption, if there is one, seems to have crept into the text before his time. See also note to 112,4 below.

<sup>311</sup> A *skhesis* in this sense is a two-term relation: cf. lines 9-10 below, where the relatives of *skheseis* are designated by the terms *aph' hou*, 'the term from which the relation proceeds' (i.e. the subject of the corresponding relative attribute), and *pros hon*, 'the term to which it is related'. These are also called 'primary' and 'secondary terms' (*ta prôta, ta deutera*) at 115,21 below.

<sup>312</sup> Lines 112,18 below and *Simpl.* 162,34-5 make it clear that the latter point is supposed to be indicated by the supplement to the definition ('... or to be in some other way relative to something else'). This appears to support Busse's transposition of 112,5-6 before 111,30: cf. note to those lines above.

<sup>313</sup> The Greek genitive case is represented in the translation by 'of'.

‘slave’, ‘master’ is given in the nominative case and ‘of a slave’ in the genitive,<sup>314</sup> and conversely, ‘slave’ is given in the nominative case and ‘of a master’ in the genitive. These relatives match each other in the grammatical case they take. But perception is perception *of* the perceptible, where the item from which the relation proceeds is given in the nominative case and the term it is related to in the genitive, while the perceptible is perceptible *by* perception, where ‘the perceptible’ is given in the nominative case, but ‘by perception’ is given in the dative case,<sup>315</sup> not in the genitive. So here the grammatical cases taken by the relatives are different. ‘Large’ is used relative to what is small, but one would not say that it is large *of* the small, nor that the small is small *of* the large, but if one does conceive them in this way, they are not expressed by using this grammatical case.<sup>316</sup> So these relatives stand in relation to something else ‘in some other way’, but this is not expressed in a way analogous to the other sorts of relatives, or by using a grammatical case. But all of these are things that, as being just what they are, are not said to exist by themselves, but rather to be ‘of other things.

Q. What examples does Aristotle provide?

A. The larger is larger than what is smaller; also the smaller is smaller than what is larger, and double is double the half, and half is half of the double. He also adds state, condition, perception and knowledge.<sup>317</sup> All the examples mentioned, as being the very things they are,<sup>318</sup> are said to be ‘of other things, but they do not all match each other in the grammatical case that they take. For knowledge is knowledge of what is knowable and perception is perception of what is perceptible, but what is knowable is not knowable *of* knowledge, nor is the perceptible perceptible *of* knowledge, rather the knowable is knowable *by* knowledge, and the perceptible is perceptible *by* perception.<sup>319</sup> Similarly, a state is the state of a thing capable of having a state (*hekton*), and

<sup>314</sup> Something corresponding to the words given in brackets has dropped out at 112,10, probably by haplography: cf. Boethius 217CD.

<sup>315</sup> The Greek dative case is represented in the translation by ‘by’.

<sup>316</sup> viz. the genitive.

<sup>317</sup> For Aristotle’s examples of relatives, cf. *Cat.* 6a37-6b3.

<sup>318</sup> I retain the manuscript reading *touto hoper estin* at 112,26.

<sup>319</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b33-6 and 112,12-15 above. Again the distinction is between the genitive and dative cases expressing the secondary term of the relation.

this has this property in virtue of states, and a position is a position of a thing capable of having a position (*theton*), and this has this property in virtue of position.<sup>320</sup> So these are, as being just what they are, said to be 'of' other things.

Q. What examples does he provide of things that are said to be related to something else 'in some other way'?<sup>321</sup>

A. He has himself made this clear, for after adding the phrase 'in some other way relative to something else', he continues with 'a mountain is said to be large' (6b7-8). For a mountain is said to be large relative to a small mountain. But this is not expressed by a grammatical case, for the large mountain is not said to be large *of* the small mountain, nor is the small thing said to be small *of* the large thing, but rather the larger one is said to be larger *than*<sup>322</sup> the smaller and the smaller to be smaller *than* the larger. 35 113,1

Q. What is the differentia of those relatives that take the same grammatical case?

A. Some of them employ the same word, others a different one.<sup>323</sup>

Q. Which employ the same word? 5

A. Those like 'similar' and 'equal', 'dissimilar' and 'unequal'. For when one thing is similar to another, the latter thing is also similar to the former. The same holds for 'dissimilar', and so also for the others.

Q. Which relatives employ the same grammatical case, but not the same word?

A. Those like 'father', i.e. father of a child, and 'child', i.e. child of a father ...<sup>324</sup>

<sup>320</sup> For *hekta*, 'things capable of having state (*hexis*)', cf. Simpl. 164,4-12; 209,14-29; 211,2-4; 212,7-11 (SVF 2.390); 214,24-30 (SVF 2.391); 217,8-25; 369,19-24; Dex. 50,31-3 (SVF 2.461); Seneca *Ep. Mor.* 117,11 ff., and perhaps 137,30 below. (I owe the Seneca reference to Paul Sanford.) For *theta*, 'things capable of having a position (*thesis*)', cf. Simpl. 165,2-4 and 113,10-11 below. The former term, and probably the latter as well, were technical terms of Hellenistic metaphysics, common to both the Academics and the Stoics. I have kept the translation 'state' for *hexis*, which is traditional and appropriate for the Aristotelian usage of the term. But as Porphyry was no doubt aware, the Stoics used the term *hexis* in a somewhat different way. A. A. Long and D. Sedley, in their recent *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, translate the Stoic use of *hexis* as 'tenor'.

<sup>321</sup> cf. above, 112,18-19.

<sup>322</sup> The object of a comparison is expressed in Greek in the genitive case.

<sup>323</sup> cf. Boethius 219BC. The distinction here closely resembles our distinction between symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations.

<sup>324</sup> Busse is surely correct in positing a lacuna after 113,9, though very little may

10 A. ... Position and the species of position also belong to the relatives: what is capable of having a position (*theton*)<sup>325</sup> has this property in virtue of position (*thesis*), if position belongs to the class of relatives, for a position would be a position of something capable of having position.<sup>326</sup>

Q. What are the species of position?

15 A. Lying down, standing up, and sitting.<sup>327</sup> For lying down is the lying down belonging to someone who is lying down, and a person who is lying down is lying down in virtue of the position of lying down, and standing up is the standing up belonging to someone who is standing up, and a person who is standing up is standing up in virtue of the position of standing up, and sitting is the sitting belonging to someone who is sitting, and the person who is sitting is sitting in virtue of the position of sitting.

Q. Then given that lying down and standing up and sitting belong to the relatives, do 'to be lying down', 'to be standing up', and 'to be sitting' also belong to the relatives?

A. No, they do not.

20 Q. Why?

A. Because while position and the species of position were relative to something, these are not positions or species of position, but are paronyms from the aforementioned positions.<sup>328</sup> No paronym is the same as that from which it is a paronym, for a grammarian is not the same as the grammatical art, and when a woman is called a grammarian from the grammatical art, she is not paronymously so called.<sup>329</sup>

Q. What would you say about 'being seated' and its relation to a person who is seated?

A. I claim that it is an accident of that person, but its being

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have been lost (cf. Boethius 219CD). When the text resumes, the pupil is speaking: at least one intervening question by the master seems to be missing.

<sup>325</sup> cf. note to 112,31 above.

<sup>326</sup> Something seems to be wrong with the text at 113,10-11: I read *kai to theton thesei theton, ei dê [for de] hê thesis tôn pros ti*. Cf. Simpl. 165,2-4, a close parallel to this passage.

<sup>327</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b11-12. The examples show that 'posture' would perhaps more accurately render what Aristotle has in mind in using the term *thesis*.

<sup>328</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b12-14.

<sup>329</sup> The feminine form of the noun 'grammarian' is the same as the name of the art of grammar (*grammatikê*), just as the feminine form of 'musical' and the name of the art of music are the same: cf. note to 70,8-14 above. Cf. also Boethius 220B.

an accident does not entail that it belongs to the category of relatives.

Q. When you were examining the propria of substance and quantity, you first inquired whether having a contrary or not having a contrary was a proprium of them, and when you had investigated that question, you then showed that not possessing a contrary was not in fact a proprium of them. In the same way, examine whether having a contrary or not having a contrary is a proprium of relatives. 30

A. I claim that there is contrariety in relatives. 114,1

Q. Show that this is so.

A. For example, virtue is contrary to vice,<sup>330</sup> and virtue, as well as vice, is a state, but it has been said that every state, insofar as it is the state of something, belongs to the relatives. But since virtue and vice are states, they will belong to the relatives, for virtue is the state of something, and so is vice. 5

Q. But why does he say later on that virtue and vice are qualities?<sup>331</sup>

<A. He himself makes this clear,><sup>332</sup> when he says later that states are qualities. For nothing prevents the same thing considered in different ways from falling under several categories.<sup>333</sup> Quality, <for instance>,<sup>334</sup> insofar as it makes the things that in some way participate in it to be qualified, will belong to the category of qualification, but insofar as it is the quality of something, it will belong to the relatives. It is impossible to conceive of any relative by itself, without some other category, so that if it is considered as belonging to a category that admits contrariety, <it too will admit contrariety>,<sup>335</sup> while if it is considered as belonging to a category that does not admit contrariety, it too will not admit contrariety, for example quality, which admits contrariety: virtue as a quality is contrary to vice, and the contrariety of virtue and vice will therefore belong to the relatives. But 10 15

<sup>330</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b15-16.

<sup>331</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8b29.

<sup>332</sup> Translating Busse's proposed supplement to fill the lacuna at 114,8.

<sup>333</sup> cf. *Cat.* 11a37-8 with Boethius 220D-221A, and below, 140,27-30.

<sup>334</sup> Reading *hōsper* <*phere*> *hē* to fill the lacuna at 114,10, as Busse, following Diels, suggests.

<sup>335</sup> Translating Busse's supplement to fill the lacuna that he indicates at 114,14. The existence of this lacuna and his proposed supplement are supported by Boethius 221B and *Simpl.* 176,6-9.



substance, insofar as it is substance, does not admit contrariety. Socrates, and substance in general, is subject for  
 20 'father' or 'child' and 'master' or 'slave'. So such relatives do not admit contrariety. Nor does 'double', which has quantity for its subject, admit contrariety, for what is contrary to two relative to one, or to four relative to two? Nor does 'half'. Hence it is not a proprium of relatives to admit contrariety.<sup>336</sup>

Q. Why?

A. Because it neither belongs to all relatives, nor only to them.

25 Q. What then? Do the items in the category of relatives admit of more and less?

A. Some do, but not all.<sup>337</sup>

Q. How is it that they admit of more and less?

A. We say that this thing is more similar to that one <or  
 30 more equal to it>,<sup>338</sup> and 'similar' and 'equal' are said to belong to the relatives.<sup>339</sup>

Q. If quantity does not admit of more and less, but 'equal' and 'unequal' do admit of more and less, how is it that equal and unequal are the proprium of quantity?<sup>340</sup>

115,1 A. Because quantity *qua* quantity does not admit of more and less, but the accidents of quantity can admit of more and less, just as substance too does not admit contrariety, but it is an accident of substance to admit alternating contraries. Also, in this case quantity is one thing and the proprium of quantity  
 5 is another, for the proprium is a quality and a essential affection (*pathos ousiôdes*) of quantity. But qualities and affections admit of more and less. <So><sup>341</sup> 'equal' and 'unequal' can admit of more and less, even though quantity does not.

10 Q. But if 'equal' and 'unequal' are affections of quantity, how can 'equal' belong to relatives?

A. Because what is equal is said to be equal to something that is equal to it, and what is unequal is said to be unequal to

<sup>336</sup> I omit *ouk* before *epidekhetai* at 114,19-20 and at 114,21. With 114,7-22, cf. *Cat.* 6b17-19; *Simpl.* 176,3-18 and Boethius 221BD.

<sup>337</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b24-5.

<sup>338</sup> Reading *gar* <*kai ison*> at 114,29, with the *editio princeps*. Presumably 'more equal' here means 'more nearly equal'.

<sup>339</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b20-2.

<sup>340</sup> With 114,31-115,8, cf. *Simpl.* 177,5-10.

<sup>341</sup> Reading *epidekhoito* <*oun*> *an* at 115,7, as Busse suggests.

something that is unequal to it, for 'equal' and 'unequal', being just what they are, are said to be 'of something else'.<sup>342</sup>

Q. Then do all the items that fall under relatives admit of more and less?

A. No, they do not, for what is double would not be said to be more double than something, nor would what is half be said to be more or less half than something.<sup>343</sup> 15

Q. What, then, is the proprium of relatives insofar as they are relatives?

A. To be said in relation to correlatives (*antistrephonta*).<sup>344</sup>

Q. What is it for them to be said in relation to correlatives?

A. That as the primary terms are said relative to the secondary ones, so the secondary terms are said in the same way relative to the primary ones.<sup>345</sup> For example, let 'father' be the primary term of the relation, and 'child' the secondary term, and let the father be father of the child. If now we reverse the terms and let 'child' be the primary term, the child will also be child of the father. 20

Q. Are all relatives like this?

A. All of them are according to their conception, but not all of them in how they are expressed.<sup>346</sup> Some relatives when converted take the same grammatical case that primary terms do, as for example a father is father of a child and a child is child of a father, where both relations are expressed by the genitive case. Other relatives do not take the same grammatical case when converted, as has already been shown.<sup>347</sup> For perception is of the perceptible, which is expressed by the genitive case, while the perceptible is perceptible by perception, where the correlative takes the dative case. Other relatives cannot be expressed relative to their correlatives. For we do not say that 'large' is large *of* the small, nor that the small is small *of* the large. This was stated earlier.<sup>348</sup> 30

<sup>342</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b22-3 and Boethius 222AB.

<sup>343</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b25-7 and Boethius 222BC.

<sup>344</sup> *Cat.* 6b28.

<sup>345</sup> For the primary and second terms of a relation, see the note to 112,2 above. The beginning of the pupil's reply here is corrupt. I translate Busse's proposed emendation. However, the sense of the passage is clear (cf. also Boethius 222D).

<sup>346</sup> With the pupil's response here, cf. Boethius 223A.

<sup>347</sup> cf. above, 112,12-15.

<sup>348</sup> Above, 112,15-20.

- 116,1 Q. Can this be expressed<sup>349</sup> in just any random way?  
 A. Certainly not.  
 Q. What does one need to be careful of?  
 A. That the relative term is stated properly in relation to its correlative.
- 5 Q. What does this mean?  
 A. For example, if we were to say that a wing is a wing of a bird, what we said would be valid, but it would not have been stated properly, so that it would not be convertible. For we do not say that a bird is relative to its wing. The reason is not the conversion, but that it was not stated properly in the first
- 10 place. For a wing is not said to be a wing insofar as it belongs to a bird, but insofar as it belongs to something winged. Hence if you say that the wing is a wing of a winged thing, the statement will be convertible, for a winged thing is winged in virtue of having a wing. For there are many other winged creatures that are not birds, for example bees, wasps, locusts, cicadas, and a myriad of others.
- 15 Q. Can we find names in ordinary language for the correlative of every relative term?  
 A. Not for all of them.  
 Q. What then?  
 A. He says that in cases where this is not possible, we should ourselves discover the correlatives and invent names for them.<sup>350</sup>
- 20 Q. How shall we go about inventing them?  
 A. By coining names derived from the primary terms of the relation to denote the secondary terms. For example, 'head' is said relative to something, but if we say that it is the head of an animal, we will be mistaken, for there are many animals that do not have heads, such as oysters, crabs and similar animals. Thus if we say that a head is the head of an animal,
- 25 the conversion of this statement will not be correct, i.e. to say that an animal is an animal by virtue of having a head, since there are many headless animals.  
 Q. What should we do, then?  
 A. We should produce a name that is paronymous from

<sup>349</sup> Taking *touto* 116,1 to refer to how correlatives are expressed in language; the master is thinking of *Cat.* 7a23-5.

<sup>350</sup> cf. *Cat.* 7a5-7.

'head', i.e. 'headed'.<sup>351</sup> In this way the statement of the relation will be convertible, for a head is the head of a headed thing, and a thing is headed in virtue of having a head. Similarly for 'rudder'. To say that a rudder is the rudder of a boat will not fit all cases, because there are many boats that are not steered by means of a rudder, such as small ones that are only propelled by rowers. So the statement of the relation will not be convertible, for it is not correct to say that a boat is a boat by virtue of having a rudder. But if we produce a name that is paronymous from 'rudder', for example 'ruddered', it will be correct both to say that a rudder is the rudder of a ruddered thing and, when we convert this statement, that a ruddered thing is such in virtue of having a rudder.<sup>352</sup>

A. So we should not say merely that all relatives are said in relation to correlatives. What do we need to add to this?

Q. That they are so if they have been stated properly.<sup>353</sup>

A. What other evidence of this does he present?

A. That if the relative is not stated properly in relation to its correlative, the statement will not be convertible, not even in the case of those relatives that we concede are said in relation to correlatives having established names, like 'master' and 'slave'. For a slave belongs to a master, but if one does not take 'slave' as said in relation to 'master', but in relation to something else, e.g. to 'biped' or something like that, the statement of the relation will not be convertible. For let 'slave' mean 'slave of a person': it will not be the case that 'person' will be said to be 'person of a slave'.<sup>354</sup>

Q. What other evidence can you provide besides this?

A. That if that to which something is said to be relative is stated properly, then when all the other things that are accidental to it are stripped away, and only that is left to which it has been stated to be relative, it will always be said relative to that. For example, a slave is said relative to a master. If now you strip away 'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', 'mortal', and 'human', but 'being a master' remains, 'slave' in every case will be said in relation to 'master'. Conversely, if

<sup>351</sup> cf. above, 55,25-56,5.

<sup>352</sup> cf. *Cat.* 7a8-15.

<sup>353</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b35-8.

<sup>354</sup> cf. *Cat.* 7a22-31; Boethius 226D.

you keep everything but strip away 'master', you will also eliminate being a slave, even if the thing in question is a man, a biped, and a mortal rational animal. For if 'master' does not exist, 'slave' will not properly be said in relation to any of the items that remain. Similarly, if in the case of 'bird' you strip away its being winged, then 'wing' will no longer belong to the  
 20 relatives, since 'winged' will no longer be anything that exists.<sup>355</sup>

Q. What conclusion do you draw from this?

A. That what a relative is relative to must be stated properly: if there is an established name for it, this should be used, if not, one must coin a name for it. If relatives are stated  
 25 in this way, it will be clear that all relatives are said in relation to correlatives.<sup>356</sup>

Q. Why does this follow?

A. Because correlatives must be of equal extension with one another, and must apply neither to more nor to less than their correlatives do. When one extends farther than the other, as 'winged' has a greater extension than 'bird', or when one is of lesser extension than the other, as 'rudder' is of lesser extension than 'boat', it is impossible for them to be convertible, unless you ensure that they are of equal  
 30 extension, or you find or invent a name of equal extension for the correlative term.<sup>357</sup>

Q. Now that you have shown that it is a characteristic of relatives to be said in relation to correlatives, provided that one states properly what it is that the relative is related to, what other proprium of relatives might there be?

35 A. That they are said to be by nature simultaneous.<sup>358</sup>

Q. Show us that this is so.

118,1 A. He will instruct us specifically about things that are

<sup>355</sup> With this exchange, cf. *Cat.* 7a31-b10; *Simpl.* 185,29-186,14 and Boethius 227AC.

<sup>356</sup> cf. *Cat.* 7b10-14.

<sup>357</sup> cf. Boethius 227D-228B.

<sup>358</sup> Aristotle says 'relatives seem (*dokei*) to be simultaneous by nature' (*Cat.* 7b15): Porphyry's word *legesthai*, 'are said to be', here represents Aristotle's *dokei*, 'seem', which can also mean 'are taken to be'. Simplicius (189,29-31) attributes the claim that it is a proprium of relatives to be simultaneous by nature to Plato. He is following Iamblichus, as his reference to pseudo-Archytas shows. Their source for Plato's view here is more likely to be *Sophist* 255d than *Republic* 438a ff., which is cited by Kalbfleisch ad loc. and by Szlezák p. 135: cf. also note to 111,28 above.

simultaneous later on in the work and will tell us in how many ways this expression is used.<sup>359</sup> One sort of simultaneous things is those that are called simultaneous by nature, and it is this type that he is claiming applies to the relatives.

Q. What are these things that you call 'simultaneous'?

A. Things that introduce each other and eliminate each other. For whenever things introduce or eliminate each other,<sup>360</sup> they are simultaneous. 5

Q. State this point more clearly.

A. For instance, a father is a father when taken together with his child, for it is together with his child that he possesses the being of a father, and a person comes to be a father when he comes to have a child. So 'father' introduces 'child' along with itself, and 'child' introduces 'father' along with itself. Conversely, without a child there cannot be a father, nor can there be a father without a child. Therefore, since 'father' and 'child' introduce each other, and when one is eliminated the other is as well, these will be simultaneous by nature. And it appears that all relatives behave in this way: all things that, as being what they are, are said relative to other things both introduce each other and eliminate each other. But things like this are simultaneous by nature. 10 15

Q. Since it is necessary that we understand what things are prior and what things are posterior, from which are derived but which are distinct from<sup>361</sup> the things that are simultaneous, tell us what things are prior and what things are posterior.

A. Aristotle will also speak about these later in the work,<sup>362</sup> let us discuss them now also, since he is going to use them in his discussion of relatives. 20

Q. Tell us, then, which of them are prior and which are posterior.

A. There are many differentiae of things that are prior and

<sup>359</sup> The reference is to the discussion of simultaneous items in *Categories* § 13: for things 'simultaneous by nature' (*hama têi phusei*) cf. 14b27 ff.

<sup>360</sup> Omitting *hama* before *suneisagêi* at 118,1, as Busse suggests.

<sup>361</sup> If this is the sense of *aph' hôn exô* at 118,18.

<sup>362</sup> In *Categories* § 12. The type of priority that the pupil goes on to define in his next speech is that called 'what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence' at *Cat.* 14a19-30, where the example of priority of the number one (the monad) to the number two (the dyad) also occurs.

of things that are posterior, for these terms are also used in a  
 25 number of ways. But the type that we are considering now is  
 the following. We say that what is prior is what eliminates  
 something along with itself without itself being eliminated by  
 that thing, as for example the monad is prior to the dyad. For  
 when the monad is eliminated it eliminates the dyad, but  
 when the dyad is eliminated it does not eliminate the monad.  
 Since, then, the monad eliminates the dyad along with itself  
 but is not itself eliminated by it, the monad will be prior to the  
 30 dyad. Thus what eliminates something else but is not itself  
 eliminated by it is prior in elimination. But if when something  
 exists something else necessarily exists, but conversely when  
 the latter thing exists it is not necessary that the former one  
 does, the item such that when it exists the other one  
 necessarily does so as well is posterior in being.<sup>363</sup> For when  
 the dyad exists it is necessary that the monad does as well,  
 but when the monad exists it is not necessary that the dyad  
 does, so the dyad is posterior to the monad. So if there are two  
 things such that when the first exists it is not necessary that  
 35 the second one does, but if the second exists it is necessary  
 that the first one does<sup>364</sup> – as is the case with substance and  
 accident, for if an accident exists, it is necessary that a  
 substance exists, but if a substance exists, it is not necessary  
 119,1 that the accident does.<sup>365</sup> Therefore substance is prior to  
 accident. Hence elimination stands in a converse relation to  
 existence: what eliminates something along with itself but is  
 not itself eliminated by it is prior, but what introduces  
 something else and is not itself introduced by it is necessarily  
 posterior.<sup>366</sup>

<sup>363</sup> The text of this rather tortuous sentence is not quite certain (see Busse's apparatus), but the general sense seems clear enough.

<sup>364</sup> On the anacolouthon here, cf. note to 119,3 below.

<sup>365</sup> i.e. (presumably) if for example the white that is in Socrates exists, then necessarily Socrates or some other individual substance exists in which it inheres, but the existence of Socrates does not entail that his whiteness exists.

<sup>366</sup> Thus if X is prior to Y in elimination, Y will be posterior to X in being. The converse of this presumably also holds, so that we are justified in speaking simply of priority and posteriority. This claim is not explicitly argued for in the text as we have it. However, the anacolouthon in 118,34-7 may indicate the presence of a lacuna where this argument was filled in. With the student's reply here, cf. *Simpl.* 191,22-34. As Shiel notes ('Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle', p. 221), Boethius is not following Porphyry here. In fact, he seems to be following Iamblichus' commentary or a source dependent on it for the whole of his commentary on *Cat.* 7b15-8a12, from 228B on, and he does not seem to begin following our commentary again until 234B,

Q. Are all relatives simultaneous by nature?

A. They all are so in reality, but some people think that not all of them are, and Aristotle's argument proceeds dialectically<sup>367</sup> from this assumption. 5

Q. State more clearly what you mean.

A. Aristotle, having posited that knowledge is a relative – for knowledge is knowledge of what is knowable, and what is knowable is knowable by knowledge – and that perception also belongs to the relatives – for perception is perception of what is perceptible, and what is perceptible is perceptible by perception – so, having assumed that knowledge and perception belong to the relatives, he says that knowledge is not in all cases simultaneous with what is knowable, nor is perception in all cases simultaneous with what is perceptible. For if things are simultaneous if they together introduce and eliminate each other, and the perceptible object does not introduce perception along with itself, nor does the knowable object introduce knowledge along with itself, nor when knowledge or perception are eliminated do they eliminate<sup>368</sup> the knowable or the perceptible object along with themselves, then perception cannot be simultaneous with the perceptible object nor knowledge with the knowable object. 10 15

Q. But if they are not simultaneous, what does hold of them?

A. That one of each pair is prior and the other is posterior. 20

Q. Show why they are not simultaneous.

A. Perhaps it will be clear enough which are prior and which are posterior, whence it follows necessarily that they cannot be simultaneous. If knowledge and perception are eliminated, the perceptible and knowable objects nevertheless remain, whereas when the perceptible and knowable objects are eliminated, neither perception or knowledge remains. For this reason, perception and the perceptible object are not simultaneous, nor are knowledge and the knowable object simultaneous, but the perceptible object is prior to perception and the knowable object is prior to knowledge. 25

on *Cat.* 8a13 ff. (cf. note to 124,25). The quotation of Porphyry at 233BD probably comes from Iamblichus (cf. Bidez p. 193 n. 1 and Chadwick pp. 144-5).

<sup>367</sup> *kata to endoxon*, literally, 'according to generally accepted premisses'. Cf. *Simpl.* 190,31-3.

<sup>368</sup> Reading *sunairei* at 119,16 for the corrupt *anêirêtai*, as Busse suggests.



30 Q. Show how the knowable object is able to exist without knowledge existing and how the perceptible object can exist without perception existing, and conversely, that when knowable and perceptible objects exist it is not always the case that knowledge and perception exist.

A. I claim that when we were newborn infants we had no sort of knowledge about anything. But it is impossible for the objects of knowledge not always to exist, for we could not have  
 35 acquired knowledge through learning and education if they did not.<sup>369</sup> But on the other hand, if one were to destroy the animals, as the members of the Stoic school claim happens in the universal conflagration (*ekpurôsis*), there would no longer be perception, since no animal would exist, yet there would be  
 120,1 a perceptible object, for fire would exist. And it is agreed that the various branches of learning only reached the Greeks after a long time, for example geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy. Nevertheless, they were objects of knowledge, even if the Greeks did not know them.<sup>370</sup>

5 Q. And if geometry were to be destroyed because no one was willing to work hard at it, would geometrical objects then not exist?

A. Certainly not. So also in the case of music: musicians in ancient times used to hear the interval of a quarter-tone, but later on, when the enharmonic scale which contained the quarter-tone interval had fallen into disuse, that sort of  
 10 interval was perceived no longer. But it is clear that this interval does exist in the nature of things as a perceptible object, even if the perception of it has disappeared. Aristotle mentions the squaring of the circle as an example of something that is knowable but the knowledge of which does not exist.<sup>371</sup> This was a problem that was investigated by the ancients: namely, whether the area enclosed by a circle could also be enclosed by a square, as can be done <in the case

<sup>369</sup> Presumably Porphyry means to base this claim on the Platonic theory of Recollection. Cf. below, 120,33-121,1 on the divine source of human knowledge.

<sup>370</sup> The arguments from the cognitive state of the infant and from the pre-existence of objects of knowledge are also found at *Simpl.* 191,3-7 (following Iamblichus) and Boethius 230C, but Shiel, 'Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle' p. 224n. is probably right to see Boethius here as dependent on Iamblichus, not Porphyry: cf. the note to 119,2 above.

<sup>371</sup> cf. *Cat.* 7b31-3.

of  $\triangleright$ <sup>372</sup> the other geometrical figures. It seems that there does exist some demonstration that it is possible to enclose the area of a square in a circle, as holds for the other figures,<sup>373</sup> but it has not been discovered how this is so, or if, as some claim, it has, it had not yet been discovered in Aristotle's time.<sup>374</sup> So even though enclosing the area of a square in a circle is an object of knowledge, this knowledge is yet to be discovered. Moreover, it is possible to know about and to be able to predict eclipses of the sun and moon, and this has been discovered, but it was not discovered before Thales, even though it was an object of knowledge. But when the knowable object is eliminated, the knowledge of it is also eliminated, while when the knowledge is eliminated, this does not eliminate the object of knowledge. Hence the object of knowledge is prior and the knowledge of it is posterior, and these are relatives that are not simultaneous with one another. Therefore, it is not a property of all relatives to be simultaneous by nature, so that this cannot be a proprium of relatives.<sup>375</sup>

Q. But is this so in reality?<sup>376</sup>

A. No, it is not. For the object of perception insofar as it is perceptible does not remain or exist if there is no perception of it, nor does the object of knowledge insofar as it is knowable remain or exist when there is no knowledge of it. If the knowable object does exist when there is no knowledge of it, it will exist potentially, and will not be an actual knowable object. But if it is potentially knowable, because it is possible

<sup>372</sup> Reading <epi> *tôn allôn* at 120,13, as Busse suggests.

<sup>373</sup> Reading <ta> *alla skhêmata* at 120,16, as Busse suggests.

<sup>374</sup> cf. Boethius 231B with Chadwick p. 149. Porphyry thus does not agree with Iamblichus' claim (Simpl. 192,16 ff.) that the squaring of the circle had already been discovered by the Pythagoreans, although Aristotle was unaware of this, nor is he as confident as Iamblichus that the methods for squaring the circle proposed by Archimedes and other later mathematicians amounted to demonstrations.

<sup>375</sup> Simplicius 191,34-193,16 has similar material to that in this and the preceding response, but is following Iamblichus. Note that Iamblichus uses the example of the Stoic *ekpurōsis* or universal conflagration to argue not only, as does Porphyry, that the perceptible object is prior to the perception of it, but also that the object of knowledge is prior to the knowledge of it (Simpl. 192,31-193,2).

<sup>376</sup> Aristotle's arguments in *Cat.* 7b15 ff. are dialectical (cf. 119,5-6 above with note), and he is therefore not committed to the conclusion that correlatives are not always simultaneous by nature: cf. Simpl. 193,33-194,11. Simplicius refers to the *Metaphysics* as giving a more accurate account of this matter (the reference is to *Metaphysics* 4.5, 1010b30 ff.; cf. also *De Anima* 425b25-426a25). Hence Porphyry here is defending what he takes to be Aristotle's real view of the matter.

for there to come to be knowledge of it, then the knowledge of it will also exist potentially, because it is possible for its object of knowledge to come to exist.<sup>377</sup> And perhaps human beings do not possess knowledge of a certain knowable object, but the knowledge of all objects of knowledge nevertheless exists in the nature of things and belongs to the eternal intelligence that knows all beings, and the knowledge of the many things is constantly coming down to human beings.<sup>378</sup> Thus if the object of perception exists, there is also the universal perception of it, and if the object of knowledge exists, there is also the universal knowledge of it, and hence relatives are simultaneous.

5 Q. But since Aristotle says, 'In most cases it is of previously existing things that we acquire knowledge, for in few cases if any could one find the knowledge coming into existence simultaneously with the object of the knowledge' (7b25-7), in what cases does the knowledge come into existence simultaneously with its object?

A. I claim that it does so in the case of fictional objects.<sup>379</sup> For if I make up the notion of a chimera, the knowledge of the chimera comes into existence at the same time as the imaginary image (*phantasma*) of it. And whoever first taught people the letters of the alphabet introduced the knowledge of the letters at the same time that he introduced the letters, and whoever discovered the art of painting introduced pictures simultaneously with the art of painting.

Q. Why then does he add, 'in few cases, if any'?

15 A. Because it is possible that these too existed in the nature of things, even if knowledge of them was only acquired later on.

Q. How can you claim that the object of perception does not exist when there is no perception of it?

A. Because, for example, if perception does not exist, honey exists, but it is not capable of being tasted,<sup>380</sup> and white exists, but it is not visible, since there is no sense of sight.<sup>381</sup>

20 Q. What problems does Aristotle raise next after these?

<sup>377</sup> I read *dunatai autou epistê<ton einai>* at 120,33, rather than *dunatai autou epistê<mê einai>*, proposed by Busse.

<sup>378</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 194,21-4, which gives the same claim in Iamblichean terminology.

<sup>379</sup> *anaplastata*: for this example, cf. *Simpl.* 191,14-15 and Boethius 229CD.

<sup>380</sup> Deleting *aisthêton* in 121,17 as a gloss on the preceding *geuston*, as Busse suggests.

<sup>381</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 194,25-7.

A. Whether it is the case that if relatives are defined according to the quasi-definition (*hoion horismos*) of them that he gave, some substances will also be relatives.<sup>382</sup>

Q. Why did you use the term 'quasi-definition', and to what are you referring?<sup>383</sup>

A. I spoke of a quasi-definition and not of a definition, because it is not possible to give definitions of highest genera,<sup>384</sup> and the things falling under the categories<sup>385</sup> constitute the highest genera. The quasi-definition of relatives he gave previously was that relatives were things that, being what they are, are said to be 'of' other things.<sup>386</sup> But according to this description some substances will turn out to be relatives. 25

Q. Why is this absurd?

A. Because a relative is an accident, but a substance is in no way an accident. So if some relatives turn out to be substances in virtue of their very being, then substance insofar as it is substance will be an accident. 30

Q. How can you demonstrate this?

A. If a relative is the sort of thing that is said relative to something else, and the hand of a human being is said relative to something else, then the hand will turn out to belong to the relatives. Similarly for a foot, an eye, and the other parts of which each of us is composed. 122,1

Q. And why is this absurd?

A. Because if the parts of substances are not substances, the whole will not be a substance either. For what is not composed of substances is not a substance either. Nothing could be more absurd than this. So either the previous definition must be further elaborated, or, if we let it stand as being sound, it will be difficult for us to show that no substance is a relative.<sup>387</sup> 5

Q. How then will you demonstrate that according to the description of relatives, there is a substance that belongs to the relatives? 10

<sup>382</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8a13 ff., esp. 8a28-33 ff.

<sup>383</sup> I retain the MS text at 121,23.

<sup>384</sup> cf. note to 111,17-18 above.

<sup>385</sup> Porphyry speaks of 'the things falling under the categories', not the categories themselves, since *katêgoria* refers to the *predicate* which is the most general term of the category and which gives it its name: cf. 58,15-20 with note.

<sup>386</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6a36-7 and above, 111,19-20.

<sup>387</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8a28-31.

A. By dividing substances as follows. I claim that one must say either that individual substance or its parts belong to the relatives, or that the substance that is common to them does, that is, the genera and species of substances, or the parts of the genera and species belong to the relatives, or that none of them do. Now it is not difficult to show for the case of primary substances, that is, individual substances, that one cannot say that any of them belong to the relatives. For Socrates is not said to be the Socrates that belongs to anything. For if someone raises the quibble that Socrates belongs to God,<sup>388</sup> he will also have to claim the converse of this, i.e. that God belongs to Socrates, which is absurd, for God will then belong to a stone or any other substance whatever, and will not be possessed only by rational animals.<sup>389</sup> Moreover, particular items in the cosmos will be the possessions of God, but we are not asking if substances as possessions<sup>390</sup> are the possessions of certain things, but whether substances as substances are substances that belong to certain things, and this cannot be demonstrated in the case of individual substances. Nor indeed can the parts of individual substances belong to the relatives. For a particular hand cannot be the hand of someone: if so, one could say that a particular hand was the particular hand of someone, but instead we simply say it is someone's hand. Also, a head is said to be someone's head, and not the particular head of someone.<sup>391</sup>

Q. You have thus shown that individual substances and their parts cannot be said to be relatives. Now show that this is also a property of secondary substances and their parts.

A. I can show that this is so in the case of secondary substances. For example 'man', i.e. the man that we predicate in common, is not said to be the man of something, nor is 'ox' said to be the ox of something, nor 'stick' the stick of something. If anything, they are said to be the possession of something, but it is clear that for each of these being a man or

<sup>388</sup> This objection and the discussion of it that follows are based on statements in Plato that human beings (*Phaedo* 62b, *Laws* 906b) and all mortal animals (*Laws* 902b) are possessions (*ktēmata*) of God or of the gods.

<sup>389</sup> Presumably God is here identified with intellect (*nous*).

<sup>390</sup> Reading *ei eisin ousiai ktēmata tinōn* at 122,23, as Busse suggests.

<sup>391</sup> Reading *hē tis kheir* for both occurrences of *hē tinos kheir* in 122,25-6: cf. *Cat.* 8a18-20 and Boethius 234C.

an ox or a stick is something different from being a possession.

Q. You have shown that none of these<sup>392</sup> belongs to the relatives. Now show for the parts of secondary substances whether it is a property of any of them to belong to the relatives, insofar as they are parts of secondary substances. 5

A. But it is not possible for me to do this.

Q. Why?

A. Because 'head', insofar as it is a head, is the head of something, just as 'rudder' is the rudder of something.<sup>393</sup> 'Head' as predicated in common is the head of something that is in common (*koinôs*), namely of what has a head,<sup>394</sup> and 'hand' is the hand of what is furnished with hands. If relatives are those things that, as being what they are, are said to be 'of other things, all the parts of secondary substances, since they are said to be of other things, will belong to the relatives. For 'head' is said to belong to what is headed, and 'hand' and 'eye' and 'nose' and 'foot', i.e. those that are predicated in common, are said to be of other things and, as being what they are, are said to be parts of the whole. So according to the proposed definition of relatives, the parts of secondary substances will be relatives. 10 15

Q. But are there genera and species of the parts of substances?

A. Yes.

Q. How is this so? 20

A. A particular hand must have its species and genus: 'hand' as its species, and 'limb' (*melos*) as its genus. These too are secondary substances, i.e. 'hand' and 'foot'. But 'hand' is the hand of something and 'foot' the foot of something, hence these belong to the relatives.

Q. Since it would be absurd to admit that any substances belong to the relatives, what did Aristotle do? 25

A. He withdrew the previous description of relatives and proposed another.

Q. What is it?

A. He says, 'Relatives are those things for which being is the 30

<sup>392</sup> Omitting *êtoi auta* at 123,4, as Busse suggests.

<sup>393</sup> For these examples, cf. above 56,1 and 116,22 ff.

<sup>394</sup> i.e. head considered as a universal is said relative to the universal 'headed thing'.

same as being somehow related to something' (8a31-2).

Q. But this description is unclear, and in fact defines the term in terms of itself.<sup>395</sup>

35 A. Why?

Q. Because when he was asking what relatives are he proposed<sup>396</sup> that they were those things for which being is the same as being somehow related to something. But this statement is unclear, and to ask what relatives are and then say that they are relatives is to define 'relative' in terms of itself.

124,1 A. Although you have raised this objection against his description, you will come to see that it has in fact been correctly and completely stated.

Q. Then explain what he means by this statement.

5 A. Many things exist in one way but have their description in another. Hence one needs to draw a distinction in order to show what sort of description they should have. For instance, 'white' can be applied to the colour of whiteness, for we call this colour 'white', but it can also be applied to a body that participates in whiteness, for we can say that a body is white. So if someone were to say that white is a colour that pierces the eyes,<sup>397</sup> and someone else understood this as applying not to whiteness, but to body: the statement would <seem> 10 absurd, <for body is not><sup>398</sup> a colour that pierces the eye. But the statement can be further elaborated: white insofar as it is white is the colour that pierces the eyes, not what being white is an accident of, that is, the body, so that one includes the qualification 'qua being white' in the very definition of 'white',<sup>399</sup> and so there can be no mistake, nor is what is to be defined being used to explain what is to be defined. So also in the case at hand: he did not say merely that relatives are the same as being related in some way to something, but he added

<sup>395</sup> The master here raises an objection for the student to refute. According to Simplicius (201,34-202,3), this objection was raised by Boethus and Ariston (perhaps Ariston of Alexandria, the pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon: cf. Moraux I pp. 181-2).

<sup>396</sup> Reading *apodedôken autos* for *apodedôkotos* at 123,34, as Busse suggests.

<sup>397</sup> For this definition of white colour, cf. note to 92,35 above.

<sup>398</sup> As Bidez remarks (p. 196 n.), Simpl. 202,13-16 appears to show that the lacuna at 124,10 is more extensive than the manuscript indicates and Busse assumes. I read *atopon ti <doxei: ou gar esti to sôma> khrôma diakritikon opseôs*, following Simplicius.

<sup>399</sup> I read *perilambanei <n> êi [= qua]* to leukon einai at 124,13, comparing Simpl. 202,16-18.

that they were the things for which their being was the same 15  
 as being somehow related to something. For the being of  
 relatives is their standing in a relation to something else,  
 where the thing that they are said in relation to is itself also  
 the same as its relation to what it is said in relation to. For  
 'double' – let us suppose it is the ratio of four to two – does not  
 belong to the relatives in virtue of the four or in virtue of the  
 two, but insofar as the four stands to the two in the ratio of  
 double and the two to the four in the relation of half. So 20  
 relatives consist in the relation (*skhesis*) of subjects to one  
 another, and do not exist in virtue of the subjects of this  
 relation, the being of which is not the same as their being  
 related to one another. But the relation that obtains between  
 relatives is just their standing in some way in relation to one  
 another, so that relatives are indeed those things for which  
 their being is their being in some way related to one 25  
 another.<sup>400</sup>

Q. State clearly what you mean.

A. I claim he means that relatives are brought into  
 existence by certain subjects, but that it is not in virtue of  
 their subjects being subjects that there are relatives, but  
 insofar as the subjects, in virtue of standing in a certain  
 relation to one another, appear to acquire a further  
 property.<sup>401</sup> For four acquires a relation to two when it is said 30  
 to be double and the two is said to be half. For four is said not  
 only to be four, but also to be double, and it acquires this  
 designation insofar as the account of double is considered to  
 apply to it. And two is a relative insofar as it is said to be  
 half,<sup>402</sup> i.e. insofar as it participates in the account of the  
 double and half. This account, then, can be seen to apply to  
 two things which stand in a certain relation to one another. 5

Q. But why does not the earlier account of relatives say  
 precisely this same thing?<sup>403</sup>

A. It states a concomitant (*parakolouthêma*), i.e. something

<sup>400</sup> cf. Boethius 235D.

<sup>401</sup> This line of thought is developed by Plotinus in *Ennead* 6.1.7.

<sup>402</sup> I retain the MS text at 125,3.

<sup>403</sup> Simplicius (199,31-5) quotes Syrianus as reporting that Porphyry said that the second account was equivalent to the first. Presumably this is based on Porphyry's larger commentary, but it is not inconsistent with what is claimed here, i.e. that the second account is a clarification of the first.



that is a consequence of being a relative, but it does not state what relatives are. For if something is a relative, it is certainly the case that it is said relative to something else<sup>404</sup> and that it is said to be 'of' that thing, but it is not always the case that if something is said to be 'of' something else, that that thing is a relative. Being 'of' something else has a greater extension than being a relative. For example, <if something is a man, it will always be mortal, but it is not the case that if something is ><sup>405</sup> mortal, that it is a man, and similarly for 'rational'. Hence if something belongs to the relatives, it will always be 'of' something else, but it is not the case that if something is 'of' something else that it is always a relative. For this reason, many things that are not relatives were included by the previous account among the relatives, which assumed that being 'of' something else belonged only to things that are relatives. But the second account of relatives is not based upon their being 'of' something else, but states that the being of relatives consists in relatives standing in a certain relation to one another.<sup>406</sup> The relation is like an intermediate term (*meson*) between the subjects of the relation, in virtue of which the relative terms come to exist: they acquire a property over and above those of their subjects precisely in that consideration of them reveals a certain sort of connection between them, in virtue of which they are called by the names of the relative terms. In order that it should not seem that what is to be described is being used in its own description, some have thought the description should be stated as follows: 'those things for which being is the same as being somehow related to anything', or, as Andronicus proposed, 'relatives are those things for which being is the same as being somehow related to something else'.<sup>407</sup>

Q. What is this account intended to convey?

25 A. That relatives are present in their subjects neither as essential complements of them nor as any sort of accident that

<sup>404</sup> I retain the MS text at 125,8.

<sup>405</sup> Inserting <ei ti men anthrōpos, pantōs touto thnēton, ouk eti de ei ti> to fill the lacuna at 125,10, as Busse suggests. This is supported by Boethius 236C.

<sup>406</sup> The text of this clause (125,15-16) is corrupt. I read, *exempli gratia* only, kai <legei> en tēi skhesei tinōn tōn pros ti <pros> allēla to einai ekhein ta pros ti.

<sup>407</sup> cf. Simpl. 201,34-202,5 and 203,2 ff.: he attributes the former to Achaicus (above, note to 112,4) and the latter to Ariston as well as to Andronicus (cf. note to 123,31-2 above).

comes to be in its subject, as for example an affection or an activity, but that they are external to their subjects. It is for this reason that they can come to be and pass away without their subjects being affected.

Q. What did Aristotle say concerning this description of relatives? 30

A. That if someone knows a relative definitely, he will also know definitely what it is said in relation to.<sup>408</sup>

Q. Why, and in what way?

A. If one knows that four belongs to the relatives, and being 126,1  
for relatives is the same as their being somehow related to something, he will also know that to which the thing in question stands in relation, i.e. that four stands to two in the ratio of being double. If he does not know at all what it stands in relation to, he will not know that it stands in relation to anything. For it is impossible to know that four is a double without knowing that it is twice two.<sup>409</sup> And if one knows 5  
definitely that Sophroniscus is a father, he will also know who he is father of, namely Socrates, and he will also know that Socrates is the son of Sophroniscus.

Q. Given that this has been shown to hold of the relatives, what follows from what you have said?<sup>410</sup>

A. That someone can know definitely what the parts of 10  
substances are and not necessarily know definitely what they are said in relation to. Suppose one pointed to a particular hand: one could be certain that it is someone's hand, but one might not know whose hand it is, i.e. Dion's or Theon's or some other particular person's, even though one saw it and pointed to it as *this* hand. But if indefinite relatives are said 15  
in relation to indefinite relatives and definite relatives in relation to definite relatives, and the parts of substances when they are definitely known cannot be referred in a determinate way to what they are said in relation to, then they cannot be relatives. 'Head' and 'hand' and other things like these, which are substances, can be definitely known as what they are, without it necessarily being known what they are said in relation to. For it is not possible to know definitely

<sup>408</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8a36-7.

<sup>409</sup> cf. Boethius 237D.

<sup>410</sup> Omitting *ti sumbésetai* at 126,9, as Busse suggests.

20 to whom a head or a hand belongs. Therefore such things cannot belong to the relatives. But these are the only things about which controversy arises as to whether substances can also be relatives. But if they do not belong to the relatives, clearly no other substances nor parts of substances<sup>411</sup> belong to the relatives, insofar as they are substances.

Q. <Does Aristotle state that the definition of relatives excludes that any><sup>412</sup> substance is a relative?

25 A. Aristotle does not think that he should take a firm stand on this before having examined it many times.<sup>413</sup> It is however not without profit to examine the difficulties that arise about each case. For it is possible for someone to claim in the case of each of the parts of the body that he can know definitely to whom it belongs. For when one sees what hand it is, he can also know definitely that it belongs to this person.<sup>414</sup> And someone who sees a hand of a person who is veiled knows  
30 that it is a hand, <but does not know definitely that it is this particular hand>,<sup>415</sup> for knowing that it is this particular hand would be to know that it is this hand of this person. Because of difficulties such as these, he added that one ought not to state firmly that no substance is a relative.

127,1

[On the Qualified and on Quality]

Q. Which category would come next after the category of relatives?

A. The category of qualification (*poion*), because there was a dispute about whether the category of qualification ought to  
5 be placed after substance and quantity, but since many questions about relatives arose in the category of quantity, it became necessary to instruct us about them next after

<sup>411</sup> I read *ta merê autô<n déla>dê* at 126,23.

<sup>412</sup> The first part of the next line is too mutilated to translate, but it is a question by the master and should have approximately the sense given in the brackets. The assignment of speeches should be reversed in Busse's text from 126,25 to 128,1: cf. the *Addenda et Corrigenda* to his edition (overlooked by Evangeliou, p. 12 n. 48).

<sup>413</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8b21-4.

<sup>414</sup> He can, for example, *point* to the person to whom it belongs, even if he cannot name him.

<sup>415</sup> Positing a lacuna before *ton gar* at 126,29, with Busse. Busse's proposed supplement, however, will not do. Simpl. 201,13-16 shows that the missing phrase gives the reply for the case of the hand of a veiled person (on which cf. Simpl. 200,7-9).

quantity. So next after the category of relatives there follows the investigation of the qualified. And indeed, after magnitude, which is a quantity, and after the greater, which belongs to the relatives, there arise the affections, such as hot, cold, dry, and wet, which are qualifications.<sup>416</sup>

Q. How does qualification differ from quality (*poiotês*)?

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A. In that 'qualification' is used in two ways: both of the quality itself and of what has the quality.<sup>417</sup> For the ancient philosophers often speak of the quality of whiteness as 'qualified',<sup>418</sup> while they also say that white is 'qualified'. 'Quality', however, is not used in two ways, but only one, for hotness and whiteness are said to be qualities, but white is not said to be a quality.<sup>419</sup> And in general what participates in quality cannot be said to be a quality, but only something qualified, while a quality can also be said to be qualified.

15

Q. State more clearly what you mean.

A. On the one hand, there exists whiteness, and on the other, there is what possesses whiteness. Both whiteness and what possesses whiteness can be said to be qualified, while what possesses whiteness can be said to be qualified, but not to be a quality.

20

Q. Why then did he give this chapter the title 'Concerning What is Qualified and Quality'?

A. Some claim that this title is not due to him, and that he did not give titles to the chapters on any of the other categories either, but that he gave the technical account of

25

<sup>416</sup> The pupil's response here is closely paralleled by Boethius 239A. As in the case of the category of relatives (111,7-15 above), first a pedagogical and then a metaphysical reason are given for the order of Aristotle's exposition of the categories. The metaphysical reason given here is ascribed to 'some people' by Simplicius (207,21-6); presumably this includes Porphyry.

<sup>417</sup> On these two uses of *poion*, cf. Ackrill pp. 103-4 on *Cat.* 8b25. The Stoics had apparently used the term exclusively in the latter sense, that of a thing qualified in a certain way. I follow to a certain extent Ackrill's practice of translating the term as 'qualification' or 'qualified' according to context, but prefer 'qualification' in passages where both terms occur.

<sup>418</sup> I retain the manuscript reading *poion* at 127,12. Busse adopts Felicianus' conjecture of *leukon* for *poion* ('the ancient philosophers often speak of both white and whiteness as qualities, and again of white as qualified'), but this does not seem necessary, since the reading of the manuscript makes perfectly good, and indeed better, sense. Cf. Boethius 239B.

<sup>419</sup> Given that *to leukon* can mean either the colour white or a thing having that colour, this last claim is not true: cf. e.g. Plotinus *Ennead* 6.1.3,14. But what Porphyry says next shows that he has in mind the use of *to leukon* to refer to a white thing.

each of the categories without a title. Others say that this title is meant to indicate how these terms are used.<sup>420</sup> For since qualities are also called 'qualified', he used the title to signify that it makes no difference whether the category is called 'quality' or 'qualified'. For if 'qualified' taken strictly indicates not only quality but also what possesses quality, it was necessary to know that these are indicated, according to a certain signification, both by the name 'quality' and by 'qualified'.

Q. How does Aristotle describe quality?

A. 'Quality is that in virtue of which we say that things are qualified.'<sup>421</sup>

128,1 Q. But how is it not absurd, if he wishes to describe ...<sup>422</sup>

5 ... but <since> what is qualified is what possesses quality, it is clear that he will direct someone who wishes to know what it is to be qualified to what is qualified. And in this way, quality will turn out to be what is possessed by what is qualified, and what is qualified to be what possesses quality.

10 But it is unclear what quality is, and this is like replying to someone who asks what quality is, that it is quality. For if quality is explained by reference to what is qualified, and what is qualified is explained by reference to quality, then quality will be being explained by reference to quality.

A.<sup>423</sup> If he were indeed giving a definition, there would be this mistake, but since there are no definitions of highest genera, we ought not to raise this objection. For he is explaining the less familiar by the more familiar: what is qualified is more familiar than is quality. For what is white is more familiar than whiteness, and the grammarian is more

<sup>420</sup> This passage shows that ancient manuscripts of the *Categories* were provided with chapter titles. For the two views mentioned here, cf. Simpl. 207,35-208,7. According to Simplicius, the first view was held by 'the school of Achaicus and Alexander'. On Achaicus, cf. note to 112,4 above.

<sup>421</sup> The reading *legometha* for *legontai* at *Cat.* 8b25 ('in virtue of which we say' instead of 'in virtue of which it is said') is found in other ancient commentators besides Porphyry (cf. Minio-Paluello's apparatus ad loc.), as well as in Boethius, and hence represents an ancient tradition.

<sup>422</sup> The next four and a half lines (128,1-5) are too mutilated to translate, but it is clear that they introduced the objection that Aristotle's description of quality is circular: cf. Boethius 240AB. (The parallel is noted by Bidez p. 196.) Cf. also Simpl. 211,7-10.

<sup>423</sup> Assigning only 128,11-15 to the pupil, and what precedes to the master, as suggested by Busse (cf. the *Addenda et Corrigenda* to his edition, p. 182). A similar reply to the objection is given by Simplicius (211,10-16).

familiar than the art of grammar.

Q. But, given that he calls things that are homonymously predicated 'things that are said in a number of ways' (*ta pleonaxôs legomena*), why does Aristotle say that quality is a thing that is said in a number of ways?<sup>424</sup>

A. I claim that it cannot be the case that quality is a homonym, for homonyms never belong to the same genus, so that there would not be a single genus of quality. But 'being said in many ways' is used to mean not only 'being said homonymously' but also 'being said according to a difference'.<sup>425</sup> In this passage, it does not mean 'said homonymously' but 'said according to a difference'. If he were using the expression 'said in a number of ways' in place of 'said homonymously', he would be giving a division of the different significations of a word, but since 'in a number of ways' is in many cases<sup>426</sup> used in place of 'according to a difference', he is here giving a division of a genus into species. 20 25

Q. Why do you say that he is giving a division of a genus into species, rather than a division of the different significations of a word?

A. Because he proceeds by saying 'let states and conditions be called one species of quality' (8b26-7), rather than speaking of one *signification* of 'quality'. For homonyms are divided into different significations, while things that are genera and not homonyms are divided into species. He is talking about different species, and not about different significations. So he does not mean by 'said many ways' being said homonymously, but being said according to a difference. 30

Q. How many species of quality are there?

A. Four. 129,1

Q. What are they?

A. The first is states and conditions.<sup>427</sup>

Q. But do these, i.e. state and condition, differ from one

<sup>424</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8b25-6; *Simpl.* 270.15 and Boethius 241A (Chadwick p. 149). Cf. also Plotinus *Ennead* 6.1.10.

<sup>425</sup> to *diaphorôs legesthai*: perhaps, 'said according to a differentia', as the phrase is supposed to refer to the way a genus is predicated of its species; cf. 128,24-5 below. Simplicius speaks of *diaphorôs legomena* (220,13).

<sup>426</sup> We should perhaps read *pollakis*, 'is often used', rather than *pollakhôs*, 'is in many cases used', in 128,24. (Or perhaps *pollakhôs* is a gloss.)

<sup>427</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8b26-7.

another as species, or do they differ in number?<sup>428</sup>

- 5 A. They are not differentiated from one another as species, as are 'man' and 'ox'. For they do not differ from one another by specific differentiae in the way 'ox'<sup>429</sup> does from 'man'. <Nor><sup>430</sup> are they differentiated from one another in number, as Socrates differs from Plato: for Socrates does not  
10 differ from Plato in virtue of specific differentiae, but in virtue of a particular combination of qualities, in virtue of which, and <not> by specific differentiae, Plato is differentiated from Socrates.<sup>431</sup> Thus just as the more long-lasting white does not differ in species from the white that only lasts for a day<sup>432</sup> – for they do not differ insofar as they are white – but differs from it in virtue of time, even though both of them have  
15 the same account, for both are colours that pierce the eyes, and even if one honey is sweeter than another, it is no less honey for that – then, if a state is indeed longer lasting than a condition, it would seem that it differs from it in virtue of being longer-lasting, and not in virtue of being a quality ...<sup>433</sup>  
... the knowledge of how to box. For one who is capable of becoming a boxer<sup>434</sup> does not yet possess the knowledge, but

<sup>428</sup> cf. Boethius 241CD.

<sup>429</sup> Reading *ho bou* for *ho hippos* at 129,7, as Busse suggests.

<sup>430</sup> Reading <ou> *dienénokhen* at 129,8: see next note.

<sup>431</sup> As Busse remarks in his apparatus, the text of 129,8-10 is very uncertain. The parallel passages in Boethius (241CD) and Simplicius (229,12-20) both make the point that state and condition are differentiated not by specific difference, i.e. by a difference in the account of their essences, nor in the way that two persons, e.g. Socrates and Plato, differ, but as the same person or animal differs from itself at different stages of life: this is what our commentary calls difference 'in virtue of time' (cf. also *Simpl.* 219,18). Simplicius, but not Boethius, rightly distinguishes this type of difference from difference in number, hence my emendation of 129,8: here again, Boethius' text of Porphyry may already have exhibited the same corruption that ours does. I also follow the *editio princeps* in reading <ouk> *eidopoïdi* in 129,10. For Porphyry's conception of an individual as distinguished from other individuals in the same species as a particular bundle of qualities, cf. *Isagoge* 7,21-7 with Boethius' commentary (*in Isag. ed. sec.* 235,5-236,6) and Boethius *in De Int. ed. sec.* 136,17-137,26 (462D-463B Migne).

<sup>432</sup> An allusion to *Nicomachean Ethics* 1096b4-5; cf. also *Eudemian Ethics* 1218a13-14.

<sup>433</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8b27-9a10. As Busse notes, the lacuna here (129,17) is probably considerably longer than the 55 letters indicated in the manuscript. (Cf. also Bidez pp. 196-7.) The missing passage contained the concluding part of the discussion of states and conditions, perhaps corresponding to the content of Boethius 242A-245A. When the text resumes, the discussion has turned to the second species of quality, natural capacities and incapacities (*Cat.* 9a14 ff.), and the pupil is speaking.

<sup>434</sup> *ho puktikos* (*Cat.* 9a19), literally, 'the person capable of boxing', means the sort of person we might call a 'natural boxer'. The natural aptitude for boxing is distinguished from being a boxer, i.e. actually having the knowledge of boxing, at

possesses the aptitude for acquiring<sup>435</sup> the knowledge of 20  
 boxing. I claim, however, that this natural capacity does not  
 have a name, and in general that there is no name for this  
 species of quality.<sup>436</sup> If we <cannot><sup>437</sup> give it a name, let us  
 provide an account of this sort of quality. The person capable  
 of boxing is so called after his aptitude for boxing, and the  
 unhealthy and sickly person is so called after his tendency to  
 be ill; similarly, the healthy person is so called after a  
 tendency to be healthy. Aristotle calls this species of quality 25  
 ‘that in virtue of capacity and incapacity’.<sup>438</sup>

Q. How can it be something that is in itself receptive of  
 contraries?<sup>439</sup> For capacity is contrary to incapacity.

A. There is nothing absurd about this, for to the degree that  
 a capacity for something obtains, to the same degree we will  
 find an incapacity accompanying it. For if someone should 30  
 have the capacity to be healthy, he will also possess the  
 incapacity to become sick easily, and whenever the capacity to  
 become a boxer belongs to someone, he will also have present  
 to him the incapacity not to be one.

Q. How does Aristotle state this point? 130,1

A. By saying, ‘they are called healthy because they have a  
 natural capacity not to be affected easily by what happens to  
 them’ (9a21-3) – just as if he had said ‘... in virtue of having  
 the incapacity to be easily affected by diseases’.

Q. Why did Aristotle place ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ in the 5  
 aforementioned species of quality?

A. Because what is hard is what has the capacity not to be  
 cut easily – for there is no body in the realm of generation and  
 destruction <that><sup>440</sup> cannot be cut up – and what is soft is  
 what has the capacity to be cut up easily.

Q. What is the third species of quality? 10

135,3-15.

<sup>435</sup> Reading, as Busse suggests, *pros to analabein* for *pro tou analabein* at 129,18.

<sup>436</sup> cf. *Cat.* 10b1-3 and the note to 135,5-7 below.

<sup>437</sup> The corrupt phrase † *eite onoma autêi thesthai* at 129,20 must conceal a negation, for it is clear that we are to designate this sort of capacity by using an account and *not* by a name (cf. *Simpl.* 243,10-11). I read, *exempli gratia* only, *ei de <ouk estin> onoma autêi thesthai*.

<sup>438</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8b15-16. I read *auto* for *autou* at 129,25, as Busse suggests.

<sup>439</sup> To be in itself receptive of contraries was earlier held to be the *proprium* of substances.

<sup>440</sup> Reading *esti <ho> mê an katakopeiê* at 130,8, Diels’s conjecture reported by Busse.



A. Affective qualities and affections.<sup>441</sup>

Q. What does he mean by affective qualities and affections?

A. He means that this species of quality indicates an affection, not however in the same respect or in just one way.

15 Q. Show clearly what you mean.

A. There are certain qualities which produce affections of the senses in those animals that are capable of perception,<sup>442</sup> and it is reasonable to call these 'affective qualities', while again there are others that arise from an affection of the things that possess them.<sup>443</sup> For example, sweetness, bitterness, and sourness: it is clear that these are qualities, for things that admit them are said to be qualified in virtue of them. Honey is said to be sweet from its sweetness, wine is said to be sour from its sourness, and wormwood is said to be bitter from its bitterness. These are called affective qualities in virtue of the fact that they produce affections of the senses, as are hotness and coldness, not in virtue of being affected themselves, or in  
20 possess them.<sup>443</sup> For example, sweetness, bitterness, and sourness: it is clear that these are qualities, for things that admit them are said to be qualified in virtue of them. Honey is said to be sweet from its sweetness, wine is said to be sour from its sourness, and wormwood is said to be bitter from its bitterness. These are called affective qualities in virtue of the fact that they produce affections of the senses, as are hotness and coldness, not in virtue of being affected themselves, or in  
25 virtue of what is qualified by them being affected, but in virtue of the fact that they produce an affection in something else.

Q. You have shown what this species of quality is; now show how else the phrase 'affective qualities' is used.

A. I claim that paleness and blackness and other colourings<sup>444</sup> are called affective qualities in virtue of the things possessing them undergoing some affection, for one becomes pale when frightened or turns red when ashamed because one's body is affected. Just as turning red from shame or turning pale from fright happens because of an affection, so too, he claims, it can happen that the body acquires this sort of colouring from a natural affection.<sup>445</sup> However, in the case of fear and shame, certain mental appearances precede the change in colouring, while in the case of natural affections, a certain constitution does.<sup>446</sup> That these too are qualities is  
30  
131,1

<sup>441</sup> cf. *Cat.* 9a28-9.

<sup>442</sup> Reading *aisthêtikois* for *aisthêtois* at 130,16, with the *editio princeps*.

<sup>443</sup> Something seems to be wrong with the text here (130,18-20), since sweetness, bitterness, and sourness are examples of the *first* sort of affective qualities: cf. lines 22-5 and *Cat.* 9a35-b2.

<sup>444</sup> *khroiai*, i.e. colourings of the skin.

<sup>445</sup> The distinction here is that between affective qualities connected with affections of the soul and those connected with affections of the body: cf. *Cat.* 9b19-10a10.

<sup>446</sup> Porphyry's use of *krasis*, bodily mixture or constitution, here corresponds to

clear from the fact that something comes to be white from whiteness and to be black from blackness.

Q. Are all these without restriction said to be qualities?

A. No, they are not.

Q. What distinguishing mark can we attribute to them? 5

A. Being permanent and hard to change and long-lasting. For someone who is blackened for a short time by the sun would not be black in the same way as someone who is born black, nor would someone who had turned red from shame be red in the same way as someone who was born like that and for that reason was called 'ruddy'. Since, then, people do not come to be qualified in virtue of such colourings, they will not be qualities attaching to those who underwent those affections, but affections of them.<sup>447</sup> 10

Q. Now that you have listed for us the affective qualities and affections that pertain to the body, show us the corresponding ones that pertain to the soul.<sup>448</sup>

A. I claim that the qualities that arise from affections are those that are permanent and hard to alter, for example greed and mental disturbance and irascibility. For a person who becomes irritated once or a person who is irritated at the appropriate things would not be irascible, but rather one who is insufferable and has become affected in this way either through disease or perversion. 'Irascible' must be understood <not as meaning someone who is apt><sup>449</sup> to become irritated, for that would belong to the second <species of quality, but rather as meaning a person who is qualified by his nature in such a way> as to become irritated,<sup>450</sup> and for whom this is a kind of morbid state. Love and sexual passion are also qualities of this sort. States that are not permanent will be affections, not qualities, <for example> irritation and desire <that last for a short time.><sup>451</sup> 15 20

Q. In what respect do these qualities differ from the first 25

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Aristotle's phrase *kata phusikên sustasin*, 'in virtue of natural composition', at *Cat.* 9b17-18.

<sup>447</sup> cf. *Cat.* 9b32-3.

<sup>448</sup> For these, cf. *Cat.* 9b33-10a10.

<sup>449</sup> Translating Busse's proposed supplement to fill the lacuna at 131,18.

<sup>450</sup> Translating Busse's proposed supplement to fill the lacunae at 131,19-20.

<sup>451</sup> Translating Busse's proposed supplement to fill the lacuna at 131,22.

species of qualities?<sup>452</sup>

A. In that the former kind are brought to realisation through instruction and from outside, for kinds of knowledge and the virtues are increased by instruction. But the latter kind are realised not through instruction, but have their realisation by nature. For blackness and whiteness and sweetness occur by nature, and drunkenness and greed do not come about through instruction, but come about through vicious habits.

30 Q. But if they come about through vicious habits, how do they differ from the second species?

A. Because those were observed to reside in a capacity and in mere aptitudes, while the ones belonging to the third species have their existence in virtue of having been fully realised. For whiteness and drunkenness are permanent qualities that are already complete and fully realised.

132,1 Q. But why, when he has listed heatings and coolings and disease and health under the first species, as conditions,<sup>453</sup> does he here classify hot and cold as belonging to another species different from that one?<sup>454</sup>

A. Because there he was speaking of 'hot' and 'cold' as conditions that obtain in virtue of something being disposed  
5 in a certain way, though not permanently, whereas he is classifying them here<sup>455</sup> in virtue of their producing an effect upon something else. But the same thing considered in different respects can belong to different species, as a father is a substance insofar as he is Socrates, but belongs to the relatives insofar as he is a father.<sup>456</sup> In the same way, heat will be a condition insofar as it makes its subject to be  
10 disposed in a certain way, but if the condition becomes permanent and hard to remove, it will become a state, while if

<sup>452</sup> I read *tôn poiôtêtôn* for *tôn atomôn* at 131,24: cf. Boethius 249D (*quaeri potest quomodo hae quoque passibiles qualitates distent a prima illa specie qualitatis ...*, cited by Bidez p. 197).

<sup>453</sup> cf. *Cat.* 8b35-7.

<sup>454</sup> cf. *Cat.* 9a30-1.

<sup>455</sup> I assume that the MS text at 132,6 can be retained if we understand *katalegēi* from the master's question.

<sup>456</sup> Simplicius (256,23-4) puts this point slightly differently, but *pace* Busse, who marks the passage as corrupt, I see no reason to alter the text to bring it in line with Simplicius' formulation. For the claim that the same thing can be classified differently when it is considered under different aspects, cf. 114,8-9 with note.

it causes heating in the perception of persons near it, it will be an affective quality.

Q. Will this momentary heating, which is an affection, be the same as the condition?<sup>457</sup>

A. The heating that belongs to the body and brings about that the other is heated will be a condition, but the momentary and temporary heating that belongs to the person heated, since it is unable to heat any other body, will be an affection. Hence the condition is an extended form of the affection, which will also be an affective quality, and the state will be an extended form of the condition, which will all the more so be an affective quality. 15

Q. What is the fourth species of quality? 20

A. The shape and external form of each thing.<sup>458</sup>

Q. What is shape, and how is it defined by geometers?

A. Shape is what is bounded by a line or lines.

Q. Suppose an area is bounded by a line or by three or four lines: will it then be a quality, if it is bounded by these lines? 25

A. No, it will not, for what exists as a multiplicity is a quantity, not a quality.

Q. Why then does he put shape in the category of quality?

A. This is not merely because a collection of three lines produces a shape, rather it is due to their being placed in relation to one another in a certain way and as forming certain angles with one another. For whenever lines are so connected with one another as to form three angles, so as to mark off a particular area and surround it in a such a way as to form a complete boundary of it, the shape that is produced is a triangle. It is a quality not insofar as it possesses three angles, but insofar as a certain sort of form appears upon the three lines and the three angles: this quality certainly does not exist in virtue of colour, but in virtue of a certain sort of shaping<sup>459</sup> of the surface. Similarly, when a given surface has become circular, a circle appears, and this circle is a quality. And triangular shape, quadrilateral, and all the other 5

<sup>457</sup> That is, when I perceive the heat given off by a body that has the capacity to produce this perception in me, i.e. possesses the affective quality, is my feeling its heat the same thing as my receiving the *condition* of being heated?

<sup>458</sup> cf. *Cat.* 10a11-12.

<sup>459</sup> *poion skhēmatismon*: recall that the term *poion* (which I have elsewhere translated as 'qualified') is originally the interrogative 'of what sort?'

geometrical figures are brought under a single species <of quality, which><sup>460</sup> Aristotle enumerates last. A line will be a quantity insofar as it is a length without breadth, but a straight line, insofar as it is straight, will be a quality. And a surface insofar as it is a surface will be a quantity, for a surface is defined by its length and breadth, which belong to quantity. But a plane surface, insofar as it is a plane, will belong to quality.

Q. You have said what shape is and why it is considered to be a quality; now show how form is a quality.

15 A. 'Form' (*morphê*) is used in two ways by Aristotle: in one signification, he uses it to mean substantial forms, in another to mean what appears upon the substantial forms and the way that their surfaces are formed. It is in virtue of the latter that we say the forms are beautiful and well-shaped, with no reference to substantial forms. Thus it is in the sense of these forms that form is a quality in the same way that shape is.

20 Q. What other kinds of quality did he say<sup>461</sup> there are?

A. He added straightness and curvature, and whatever is similar to these.<sup>462</sup>

Q. What are the other things that are similar to these?

25 A. For example, some things are spiral-shaped or cone-shaped or lens-shaped or have other such shapes.<sup>463</sup>

Q. From what can one conclude that these are qualities?

A. Because the account of qualities is that given previously, i.e. that what are called paronymously after quality are qualified things. If what are named after these items are qualified things, then what they are named after will be qualities.

30 Q. But if the fact that what are named paronymously after certain items are qualified things is enough to show that what they are named after are qualities, but 'rare' is named after rarity, 'dense' after density, 'smooth' after smoothness, and 'rough' after roughness, why won't we also say that rarity, density, smoothness, and roughness are qualities?<sup>464</sup>

<sup>460</sup> I insert <*poiôtêtos, ho*> to fill the lacuna in 133,6.

<sup>461</sup> Reading *eirêke* for *eirêkas* at 133,20, as Busse suggests.

<sup>462</sup> *Cat.* 10a12-13.

<sup>463</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 262,27.

<sup>464</sup> For Aristotle's denial that these are qualities, cf. *Cat.* 10a16-24. The following discussion (134,1-19) merely restates Aristotle's argument.

A. Because these differentiae of subjects, even if they do bring it about that their subjects are disposed in a certain way, still do not confer this appellation upon them in virtue of their being qualified in a certain way, but rather in virtue of their being considered as having a certain relative position of their parts. For things are said to be dense in virtue of their parts being close to one another, so that no body of a different kind can be inserted into them, as is the case with gold and iron and bodies like that, while things are said to be rare in virtue of their parts being arranged in such a way that a body of a different kind can be inserted into them, like sponges, pumice-stones, and wool. And a thing is smooth when its parts are placed evenly next to one another, so that none of them extends further than any other, while it is rough when its parts are arranged relative to one another in such a way that some extend farther than others do or have others extending farther than they do, as is the case with the parts of a saw blade.

Q. What do you conclude from these definitions?

A. What else than that rarity, density, smoothness, and roughness are species of relative position (*thesis*)?

Q. How does this make for their not being qualities?

A. Because relative position was shown previously to belong to the category of relative, and rarity, density, smoothness, and roughness are kinds of relative position. They will belong to the category of relative and not to that of qualified things.

Q. So are there only these four species of quality? 20

A. Perhaps.

Q. Why do you say perhaps?

A. Because Aristotle too says, 'Perhaps another manner of quality might come to light' (10a25).

Q. Where does he investigate this question? 25

A. In the *Metaphysics*.<sup>465</sup>

Q. Why does he omit to engage here in a detailed inquiry?

A. Because he wrote the *Categories* as an elementary work for beginning students, while the *Metaphysics* was written for advanced students.<sup>466</sup>

<sup>465</sup> *Metaphysics* 5.14.

<sup>466</sup> For the *Categories* as an introductory work, see note to 75,26-9 above. Cf. also Boethius 252BC.

30 Q. But why does he say: 'These, then, that we have mentioned are qualities, while the things that are called paronymously after them or in some way derive from them are qualified things' (10a27-9)?<sup>467</sup> Why did he not merely say that the things called paronymously after them are qualified things, instead of adding '... or in some way derive from them'?

135,1 A. Because ordinary usage is irregular.<sup>468</sup>

Q. Why, and in what way?

A. In some cases, both the quality and what it qualifies have names: for example, both the quality of 'grammatical knowledge and what is qualified by it, i.e. 'grammarian', have names. But other cases, where only one of them has a name, i.e. either the qualified thing but not the quality, or the quality but not what it qualifies, were said to belong to the second species of quality.<sup>469</sup> For there are no names for natural abilities, and a person is said to be capable of boxing or running or to be healthy, not from the quality he already has, but from the quality that he is going to acquire. For 5 boxers are so called after the art of boxing and wrestlers after the art of wrestling, but persons capable of boxing or of wrestling are not named paronymously after their capacities, but rather after their ability to acquire those arts, so that they get this designation from their expectations: since they have the expectation of acquiring the art and being boxers or 10 wrestlers, we refer to them as persons capable of boxing or wrestling. We thus speak about these persons as being somehow qualified, though the quality that they possess has no name. But in some cases the quality has a name yet we do 15 not speak of the persons as named paronymously after it: for

<sup>467</sup> Porphyry's quotation here differs slightly from the standard text of *Categories* 10a27-9: he omits *allôs* in a28, along with some other ancient authorities (cf. Minio-Paluello's apparatus ad loc.).

<sup>468</sup> That ordinary language was irregular (*anômalos*), that is, not governed by general rules, was maintained by Chrysippus, who was followed by many, but not all, later grammatical theorists: cf. *SVF* 2.151 and the title of Chrysippus' work *On the Anomaly of Expressions* (DL 7.192). For the question of the ancient controversy on this point, cf. D. Blank, *Ancient Philosophy and Grammar* (Chico, California, 1982), pp. 1-5. Porphyry here interprets Aristotle so as to have him agree with the Chrysippean position. Simplicius (264,20-2), presumably following Iamblichus, claims that the irregularity of usage explains only some of the cases where things qualified are not paronyms of qualities.

<sup>469</sup> The reference is to the fragmentary discussion at 129,17-21 above.

virtue is the best state of a person, but we do not speak of a person qualified by it as named paronymously after virtue. For 'virtuous' and 'envirtued' are not used in ordinary speech.<sup>470</sup> Nor is a person who is qualified by the art of grammar said to be 'engrammared'.<sup>471</sup> Rather, a person is called 'worthy' (*spoudaios*) or 'good' (*agathos*) after virtue.<sup>472</sup> Still, there are some things of this type that do have names, e.g. a just person (*dikaios*) is named after justice (*dikaiosunê*). For there is <nothing> that is called 'just' after the just (*dikê*),<sup>473</sup> nor 'tempered' (*sôphrosunos*) after temperance (*sôphrosunê*), while a person may be called 'joyful' (*euphrosunos*) after joy (*euphrosunê*). And one can find many other cases of irregularity in ordinary usage.

Q. Since he has inquired in the case of the other categories about the features they have in common with other categories and about their propria, does he do the same here?

A. He does.

Q. In what way?

A. He says 'there is contrariety also in regard to qualification' (10b13).

Q. Why does he say 'there is contrariety *also* ...', rather than simply saying that there is contrariety, without adding the conjunction 'also'?<sup>474</sup>

A. Because he has shown that there are other characteris-

<sup>470</sup> cf. *Cat.* 10b5-9: the person who has virtue (*aretê*) is not called after *aretê*, but is instead called *spoudaios*, a word not grammatically connected with *aretê*. In contrast, the words *aretaios* (translated 'virtuous') and *enaretos* (translated 'envirtued': an obsolete English word meaning 'endowed with virtue'), both of which are derived paronymously from *aretê* in the same way as the English word 'virtuous' is derived from 'virtue', do not occur in ordinary Greek. *aretaios* is not listed in LSJ, and *enaretos*, 'endowed with virtue', is a jargon term of Hellenistic philosophy, apparently of Stoic coinage (*SVF* 3.72), hence does not belong to *sunêtheia* or ordinary speech: cf. 55,8-14 above.

<sup>471</sup> *engrammatos*, here translated 'engrammared', also has a perfectly good ordinary sense, namely 'written', as in *phônê engrammatos*, 'written speech', at pseudo-Plato, *Definitions* 414d.

<sup>472</sup> Porphyry's mode of expression here is foreign to Aristotle's usage in the *Categories*, in which 'call after' means precisely 'name paronymously after'. However, Porphyry is out to establish that the phrase *ê hopôsoun ap' autôn* ('or in some other way derive from them') in Aristotle's characterisation of quality at *Cat.* 10a28-9 refers precisely to those *poia* or qualified things whose names are *not* paronymously derived from the names of qualities.

<sup>473</sup> With some hesitation, I read <ouden> *gar legetai* at 135,23 with Busse.

<sup>474</sup> Ackrill omits this word in his translation of *Cat.* 10b13.



tics that also belong to quality:<sup>475</sup> he is saying that we ought to be aware that in addition to these others, contrariety belongs to quality as well.

Q. Does it belong to all qualities and only to them?

5 A. No, it does not. That contrariety does not belong only to qualities is clear from the fact that it is present also in the case of relatives, and it does not belong to all qualities, because there is no contrary to the quality of shape, nor is there a contrary to pale or ruddy or grey or any other of the intermediate colours. However, black is opposite to white, <for they are the extremes>,<sup>476</sup> but there are no contraries to the intermediate ones, as I said.<sup>477</sup>

Q. Why is there no contrary to the quality of shape?

10 A. Because there is no contrary to triangle nor to rectangular shape nor to anything like that.

Q. Is there any contrariety to qualified things, in virtue of the qualities that they admit?

A. For example, justice is contrary to injustice <and whiteness to blackness, and the just thing is contrary to the unjust thing><sup>478</sup> and white is contrary to black.

15 Q. If one of two contraries is a qualification, is the other one also a qualification?<sup>479</sup>

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

20 A. Because if justice is contrary to injustice and justice is a

<sup>475</sup> If the text here (136,1-2) is sound, this presumably means the characteristics of having whatever is derived from them be qualified (8b25, 10a27-9), and of being a genus having as its species the four discussed previously. It is possible, however, that we should read *deixei*, 'he will show' instead of *edeixe*, 'he has shown', at 136,1 (cf. *Simpl.* 277,17-19). The other characteristics would then be the other candidates for *propria* of quality that Aristotle discusses later in *Cat.* § 8. In any case, Porphyry's interpretation is probably unnecessary: Aristotle is merely thinking of the previous discussions of contrariety in the category of quantity at *Cat.* 5b11-6a18 and in the category of relative at *Cat.* 6b15-27.

<sup>476</sup> As Bidez p. 197 notes, Busse's supplement here (136,8) is supported by Boethius 255B.

<sup>477</sup> cf. *Cat.* 10b15-17. Aristotle conceives of colours as arranged along a single range of opposition, black and white being the extremes and all other colours being mixtures of these: cf. e.g. *Top.* 123b26, *Phys.* 188b24.

<sup>478</sup> Comparison with *Cat.* 10b12-18 suggests, as Busse notes, that something has dropped out after *enantion* in 136,14. I translate the possible supplement *kai leukotês melaniâi, alla kai to adikôn tõi dikaiôi enantion*: the omission would then be by haplography.

<sup>479</sup> *poion* is being used here in its wider sense, as at *Cat.* 10b19-21: cf. 127,10-27 above with note.

quality, then injustice will certainly be a quality as well.

Q. Why then does he say 'if justice is contrary to injustice' (10b19-20), and not 'since justice is contrary to injustice'?

A. Because there were some people who refused to grant that injustice was contrary to justice, but held that the opposite state had no name, and that injustice was not a state but a privation (*sterêsis*). For they held that states had to be spoken of in positive terms, and privations in negative terms.<sup>480</sup> 25

Q. Is their classification a good one?

A. No, it is not, for we often also speak of states in negative terms, when we say that intemperance is the state that is opposite to temperance, that imprudence is the state that is opposite to prudence, that niggardliness is the state that is opposite to generosity, that the state of impiety is opposite to piety, and that the state of unholiness is opposite to holiness. We also speak of privations in positive terms: for example we speak of blindness and deafness and paleness<sup>481</sup> in positive terms, although they are privations. 30 137,1

Q. If we were investigating to what genus <a thing belonged, and we were to consider> each <of the categories><sup>482</sup> that contain contrariety, how could we then track down the item we are looking for and discover the genus to which it belongs? 5

A. We will take the item that is opposed to the one we are looking for, which is more familiar to us than it is, and if we are able to find the category in which this item is included, we will also know that the opposite of it should be placed in the same category. For example, if one is investigating to what category injustice belongs, one should consider 'justice'. Justice is a quality, so injustice is a quality too. Similarly, if one is investigating the category to which blindness belongs, one should find out to what category sight belongs, and if it is 10

<sup>480</sup> cf. Simpl. 278,20-33, who also neglects to tell us who it was that held this view. *kataphatikôs* and *arnêtikôs*, translated as 'in positive terms' and 'in negative terms' respectively, mean literally 'formed without [resp. with] a sign of negation'.

<sup>481</sup> Porphyry adds here the example of *nôdotês*, 'toothlessness', which is a negative term in English, and hence is omitted from the translation. Etymologically, this Greek word seems to have been formed with a negative particle (cf. LSJ s.v. *nôdos*), but Porphyry overlooks this.

<sup>482</sup> Translating Busse's proposed supplement to fill the lacuna at 137,5: cf. Simpl. 278,11-13, which however unfortunately also has a lacuna at the corresponding point.

the category of quality, blindness will be said to belong to this category as well.

15 Q. Since he has inquired concerning the foregoing categories whether they admit of more and less, shall we say in the case of quality that it admits of a more and less?

A. It does admit of it, but not it alone, for relatives admit of  
 20 it too, nor does every quality admit of it, for triangularity cannot become more or less, nor can a circle become more or less a circle, nor does perfect virtue or perfect art admit of a more and less. But many other qualities admit of a more and less, for we say that one white is more or less white than another.

Q. State more clearly and distinctly whether qualities and the qualified things that derive from them admit of more and less.

25 A. But how can one say anything clear about these matters, when there have been so many different schools of thought about them?<sup>483</sup> For some have claimed that all states of matter and qualified entities become more and less intense,<sup>484</sup> since matter itself admits of a more and less. Some Platonists have taken this view. Others have held that some states and  
 30 the <entities capable of having the state><sup>485</sup> that are qualified by them do not admit of a more and less, as is the case with the virtues and persons who are qualified by them,<sup>486</sup> while other states and qualified entities do admit of intensification and relaxation, as is the case with all  
 138,1 intermediate arts and intermediate qualities, and the persons  
 5 who are qualified by them. The Stoics held this view. But there is a third view, which is the one Aristotle refers to, that holds that states cannot be more intense or more relaxed, but

<sup>483</sup> For the four views about this issue which are discussed in 137,25-138,32, cf. Simpl. 284,12-285,8 and Boethius 257B (noted by Bidez, pp. 197).

<sup>484</sup> This passage (= SVF 3.525) and two passages in Simplicius (237,29-31 and 284,32-4, both = SVF 2.393) are our principal sources for the important Stoic notion of qualitative degrees, of intensification and relaxation of quality (*epitasis* and *anesis*); cf. also Diogenes Laertius 7.101.

<sup>485</sup> I venture to insert *ektous* to fill the lacuna at 137,30: cf. 112,30.

<sup>486</sup> The Stoic technical term for this sort of state was *diathesis*, according to Simplicius (237,29-31). Hence whereas Aristotle had held that *hexeis*, 'states', and *diatheseis*, 'dispositions' were to be distinguished by being permanent or not, the Stoics used the same terms to distinguish qualitative states that did admit of a more and less vs. those that did not. On the Stoic use of the term *hexis*, cf. note to 112,30 above.

that the persons that are qualified by them do admit of a more and less: not all of them, however.

Q. How do you say that Aristotle refers to this school of thought?

A. I claim that he does so when he says: 'Some people dispute about this, for they utterly refuse to grant that one justice is called more or less justice than another, or that one health is more or less health than another, though they say than one person has health less than another or is more just or more healthy (10b32-11a1); ... they say that triangle and rectangle do not admit of a more, nor do any of the other shapes. For things that admit the account of "triangle" or the account of "circle" are all equally triangles and circles, while none of the things that do not admit of these accounts are any more triangles or circles than another, for a square is not more a circle than is an oblong, for neither of them admits the account of a circle' (11a5-12).<sup>487</sup>

Q. Can you also tell us about a fourth view concerning increase and decrease of intensity in qualified things and in qualities?

A. Yes.

Q. What?

A. There was a view that held that immaterial and separate qualities<sup>488</sup> do not admit of a more and less, but that all material qualities and the things that are qualified by them do.

Q. And do you think that what these people held is correct?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Why?

A. Because the immaterial qualities that exist separately are not qualities but substances, and it is for this reason that they do not admit of an increase in intensity, since neither do other substances.

Q. What general theorem did Aristotle give us to enable us to discover which things<sup>489</sup> do not admit of more and less and which do?

<sup>487</sup> There are a number of minor deviations from our text of the *Categories* in this quotation, which also omits a sentence of five lines. Only one of these deviations is noted in Minio-Paluello's apparatus. But Porphyry may be quoting inaccurately from memory.

<sup>488</sup> i.e. the Platonic Forms corresponding to qualities.

<sup>489</sup> I retain the manuscript reading *pragmatôn* at 139,1, rather than Busse's

5 A. He shows that things that do not admit the relevant account cannot be said to be more and less. For example, a triangle does not admit the account of square, nor does a square admit the account of circle, and therefore a more and a less are not found in these things. But a white cloak, snow, and many white things admit the account of white, so a more and a less is found in them.

10 Q. So do all things that admit the same account admit of a more and less?<sup>490</sup>

15 A. No, they do not, for all particular men admit the account of man, but a man is no more or less a man than another man. But it is impossible for things that do not admit the same account to admit of a more and less, for judgments of more and less are made with reference to things that have the same account, not with reference to things that fall outside the account of the thing.

Q. But if this is not the proprium of quality either, what will its proprium be?

20 A. Similarity and dissimilarity, for it is only in respect of qualities that something is said to be similar to something else, and being similar or dissimilar is predicated only of qualities, so that to be said to be similar and dissimilar will be a proprium of quality.<sup>491</sup>

25 Q. One might raise the following difficulty: why it is that in going through the species of relatives he classified states as belonging to them, whereas in the discussion of quality he explicitly said that states and dispositions constituted one of the species of quality. So 'state' will belong to two categories, both to the category of relatives and to that of quality, and

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conjecture *skhēmatōn*, which would restrict the scope of Aristotle's point at *Cat.* 11a12-14 to the case of shape that he has just been discussing, instead of making it be about qualified things in general. But Porphyry calls it a 'general theorem' (*katholou theôrēma*, 138,33) clearly with reference to Aristotle's word *haplōs* ('without qualification') at 11a12: cf. also 94,1 above, *Simpl.* 285,13-15, Boethius 258D, and 139,6-8 below.

<sup>490</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 285,21-7.

<sup>491</sup> cf. *Cat.* 11a15-19. By Porphyry's own standards, in order to establish that being similar or dissimilar is a genuine proprium of quality in the strict sense (cf. 94,1 ff.), it also needs to be shown that it belongs to every quality (cf. 136,3). But Porphyry is presumably assuming that similarity is just sameness of quality: cf. Boethius 259A11-12, *Nam si eadem qualitas sit in duobus, illa in quibus est similia sunt* ('For if the same quality is in two things, the things it is in are similar'); *Simpl.* 290,30-1 and Plotinus *Enn.* 6.1.6,17-19.

hence it will come about that a single thing, i.e. 'state', will take on differentiae that differ in species. For the differentiae of things that differ in genus and do not fall under one another are different in species.<sup>492</sup> So we must find an explanation that will resolve this difficulty.

A. But Aristotle too was aware that this would disturb many people, and he provided two ways of resolving the difficulty.<sup>493</sup>

Q. What does he say they are?<sup>494</sup>

140,1

A. First, that <a genus> differs greatly <both from a species and from><sup>495</sup> particular things. For knowledge is a genus, grammatical knowledge is a species, and, finally, Aristarchus' grammatical knowledge is an individual. It has been said that the knowledge and state that lies over all the specific and particular kinds of knowledge belongs to the relatives,<sup>496</sup> but the specific kinds of knowledge, and especially individual instances and particular cases of knowledge, are qualities. For an individual instance of grammatical knowledge, e.g. that of Aristarchus, an individual instance of musical knowledge, e.g. that of Aristoxenus, and an individual instance of medical knowledge, e.g. that of Hippocrates, will be qualities, and will certainly not belong to the relatives. <For the persons> qualified by them are called after them, and qualities were those things in virtue of which the persons qualified are paronymously named or are called in some way after them. But if someone were to claim that they belonged to the relatives, <he would not mean that the particular cases of knowledge><sup>497</sup> are relatives, but rather that the genus is,<sup>498</sup> for grammar could be said to be the *knowledge* belonging to someone, but grammar could not be said to be the *grammar* belonging to Aristarchus, for if one were to speak in this way, and performed the conversion, then one would also say that

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<sup>492</sup> cf. *Cat.* 1b15-16 and 81,23-82,28 above.

<sup>493</sup> cf. *Cat.* 11a20-38 and *Simpl.* 291,24-8.

<sup>494</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 291,28-292,19 and Boethius 260AC.

<sup>495</sup> Translating Busse's proposed supplement to fill the lacuna at 140,2.

<sup>496</sup> cf. *Cat.* 6b3-5.

<sup>497</sup> My proposal for the contents of the lacuna at 140,11-12 and reconstruction of what follows are suggested by the parallel passage at Boethius 260A.

<sup>498</sup> Omitting *pros* at 140,12.

Aristarchus belonged to the grammar of Aristarchus, <which is impossible>.<sup>499</sup> I claim, therefore, that the genus, that is, knowledge, belongs to the relatives, for knowledge is the knowledge of the knowable object, and what is knowable is knowable by knowledge. But the particular instance, that is, Aristarchus' grammatical knowledge, does not any longer belong to the relatives, but rather to quality, since  
 20 Aristarchus and all the other persons who possess each of the other types of knowledge are not named paronymously after the genus of knowledge, but from the particular instances of knowledge: Aristarchus after his knowledge of grammar, Aristoxenus after his knowledge of music, and the rest similarly each after their own knowledge, which are particular instances of knowledge.

Q. You have given us one of the ways of resolving the  
 25 difficulty, but you said that there were two, so tell us what the second one is.

A. I claim that if one does not wish to accept this solution, one should adopt the other one, namely that nothing prevents the same thing from falling into two categories.<sup>500</sup> This is in no way absurd: it would be absurd if the same thing in one and the same respect<sup>501</sup> were to be put into two different  
 30 genera of predication<sup>502</sup> that were not subordinate to one another, but there is no absurdity if it is considered in respect of different significations. Socrates, for instance, can be shown to be subject to a number of affections: insofar as he is a man, he is a substance; insofar as he is three cubits tall, let us  
 141,1 suppose, he is a quantity; insofar as he is a father or a son, he belongs to the relatives; insofar as he is temperate, he is qualified; and in this way he is brought under the different categories in virtue of various differentiae. If, then, Socrates, who is a single thing, is found <to fall under different categories><sup>503</sup> when he is considered in different respects,

<sup>499</sup> Insert <hoper adunaton> at 140,14-15, comparing Boethius 260A: *Dicitur ergo et Aristarchus grammaticae Aristarchus, quod fieri non posset.*

<sup>500</sup> cf. *Cat.* 11a37-8; *Simpl.* 292,19-24 and Boethius 261BC.

<sup>501</sup> The MS text can perhaps be kept at 140,28, despite Busse's mark of corruption: cf. 114,8-9 and 132,5-8, where the example is Socrates, as here; see also Boethius 261B8 ff.

<sup>502</sup> *genê katêgoriôn*: Aristotle uses this expression of the categories in *Topics* A9, 103b20.

<sup>503</sup> Translating Busse's proposed insertion <*eis allên kai allên katêgorian*

what is absurd about a state being in one respect a relative, and in another a quality?

[Concerning Action and Affection]

5

Q. Now we have gone through four categories, which seemed to involve us in a great deal of difficulty. What categories remain?

A. The category concerned with action, <the> category of affection,<sup>504</sup> the category of being in a position, the category of when, the category of where, and the category of having.

Q. What then? Don't these six categories require some discussion? 10

A. Indeed they require a good deal of discussion, but for beginning students it suffices to know what he did <at the beginning>, so that they can refer each of the simple predicates to these categories.<sup>505</sup> For he has adequately discussed action and affection in *On Generation and Corruption*; 'when', which signifies time, and 'where', in the *Physics*, where he has treated of place and time; and all of them in the *Metaphysics*.<sup>506</sup> For now, since it is clear that heating and cooling<sup>507</sup> are kinds of activity, and being heated and cooled are kinds of affection, he says that both action and affection admit of being contrary. For it is obvious that heating is contrary to cooling, being heated to being cooled, and feeling pleasure to feeling pain.<sup>508</sup> 15

Q. Is contrariety the only concomitant of these? 20

A. Not it alone, but also admitting a more and less. For we

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*anagomenós*> after *allo kai allo* at 141,3: cf. Boethius 261C *init.*, which appears to lend support to some such supplement.

<sup>504</sup> The MS reading *hē peri tou poiein kai tou paskhein* at 141,8 would mean 'the category concerned with action and affection', but action and affection must count as two different categories in order to yield a list of six (cf. 141,10). I therefore read *hē peri tou poiein kai <hē> tou paskhein*. Some critics had already argued before the time of Boethius that action and affection belonged to a single category, that of change (*kinēsis*), cf. *Simpl.* 63,6-9, and 302,5-16. They were followed by Plotinus (*Enn.* 6.1.11 and 6.3.28) and perhaps earlier by Galen (*Institutio Logica* 13,9). Clearly, however, Porphyry adheres to Aristotle's list of ten categories.

<sup>505</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 295,6-10 and note to 75,26-9 above. 'What he did at the beginning' refers to the list of categories given in *Cat.* § 4.

<sup>506</sup> cf. *Simpl.* 295.10-16 and Boethius 261D-262B.

<sup>507</sup> Reading to *thermainein kai to psukhein* for *to poiein kai to kaiein* at 141,17-18, as Busse suggests: cf. *Cat.* 11b2-3 and Boethius 262A.

<sup>508</sup> cf. *Cat.* 11b1-4.



25 say that there is more and less heating, and similarly that there is more and less of being heated, and of causing pain and feeling pain, so that there can be less action or more action, and similarly for being affected.<sup>509</sup>

Q. This is what Aristotle says about acting and being affected. What can you say about 'being in a position' (*to keisthai*)?

30 A. That position (*thesis*) has already been shown to belong to the relatives, but being in a position does not belong to the relatives, but is a paronym. For it belongs to another category, i.e. the category of being in a position.

Q. Say more clearly what you mean.

142,1 A. Position, since it is the position of something, will belong to the relatives. Therefore lying down, standing, and sitting, which are positions, will themselves also be relatives. But things named paronymously after these will not belong to the relatives: I mean 'to lie down', 'to stand up', and 'to sit'. These are not relatives, hence are not positions, but rather are things named paronymously after positions. As such, they  
5 belong to a different genus, that of 'being in a position'.

Q. Three categories still remain, the category of when, the category of where, and the category of having. It is clear that Aristotle has said nothing about them, but what can you say about them?

10 A. What else than that just as a relative is not one of the things that is considered to exist primarily, but is something that supervenes on these, as if it were an offshoot of it,<sup>510</sup> so too 'when' and 'where' are parasitic upon quantity <and time and> place as subjects.<sup>511</sup> For if place and time, which are quantities, do not exist, 'where' and 'when' cannot exist either. However, time is not identical with 'when', nor place with 'where', nor 'where' with place, <but> when place already exists, then ...<sup>512</sup>

<sup>509</sup> cf. *Cat.* 11b4-8.

<sup>510</sup> *paraphuadi eoikos*: cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1096a20-2.

<sup>511</sup> I read *epi hupokeimenôn tou posou kai tou <khronou kai tou> topou* at 142,11: cf. *Simpl.* 297,27-8.

<sup>512</sup> The text breaks off here. Cf. however *Simpl.* 297,28 ff. and Boethius 262D-263A, which give some idea of the content of the immediate continuation of this passage.

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# Appendix

## The Commentators\*

The 15,000 pages of the Ancient Greek Commentaries on Aristotle are the largest corpus of Ancient Greek philosophy that has not been translated into English or other modern European languages. The standard edition (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, or *CAG*) was produced by Hermann Diels as general editor under the auspices of the Prussian Academy in Berlin. Arrangements have now been made to translate at least a large proportion of this corpus, along with some other Greek and Latin commentaries not included in the Berlin edition, and some closely related non-commentary works by the commentators.

The works are not just commentaries on Aristotle, although they are invaluable in that capacity too. One of the ways of doing philosophy between A.D. 200 and 600, when the most important items were produced, was by writing commentaries. The works therefore represent the thought of the Peripatetic and Neoplatonist schools, as well as expounding Aristotle. Furthermore, they embed fragments from all periods of Ancient Greek philosophical thought: this is how many of the Presocratic fragments were assembled, for example. Thus they provide a panorama of every period of Ancient Greek philosophy.

The philosophy of the period from A.D. 200 to 600 has not yet been intensively explored by philosophers in English-speaking countries, yet it is full of interest for physics, metaphysics, logic, psychology, ethics and religion. The contrast with the study of the Presocratics is striking. Initially the incomplete Presocratic fragments might well have seemed less promising, but their interest is now widely known, thanks to the philological and philosophical effort that has been concentrated upon them. The incomparably vaster corpus which preserved so many of those fragments offers at least as much interest, but is still relatively little known.

The commentaries represent a missing link in the history of philosophy: the Latin-speaking Middle Ages obtained their knowledge of Aristotle at least partly through the medium of the commentaries. Without an appreciation of this, mediaeval interpretations of Aristotle will not be understood. Again, the ancient commentaries are the unsuspected source of ideas which have been thought, wrongly, to originate in the later mediaeval

\* Reprinted from the Editor's General Introduction to the series in Christian Wildberg, *Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World*, London and Ithaca N.Y., 1987.

period. It has been supposed, for example, that Bonaventure in the thirteenth century invented the ingenious arguments based on the concept of infinity which attempt to prove the Christian view that the universe had a beginning. In fact, Bonaventure is merely repeating arguments devised by the commentator Philoponus 700 years earlier and preserved in the meantime by the Arabs. Bonaventure even uses Philoponus' original examples. Again, the introduction of impetus theory into dynamics, which has been called a scientific revolution, has been held to be an independent invention of the Latin West, even if it was earlier discovered by the Arabs or their predecessors. But recent work has traced a plausible route by which it could have passed from Philoponus, via the Arabs, to the West.

The new availability of the commentaries in the sixteenth century, thanks to printing and to fresh Latin translations, helped to fuel the Renaissance break from Aristotelian science. For the commentators record not only Aristotle's theories, but also rival ones, while Philoponus as a Christian devises rival theories of his own and accordingly is mentioned in Galileo's early works more frequently than Plato.<sup>1</sup>

It is not only for their philosophy that the works are of interest. Historians will find information about the history of schools, their methods of teaching and writing and the practices of an oral tradition.<sup>2</sup> Linguists will find the indexes and translations an aid for studying the development of word meanings, almost wholly uncharted in Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon*, and for checking shifts in grammatical usage.

Given the wide range of interests to which the volumes will appeal, the aim is to produce readable translations, and to avoid so far as possible presupposing any knowledge of Greek. Footnotes will explain points of meaning, give cross-references to other works, and suggest alternative interpretations of the text where the translator does not have a clear preference. The introduction to each volume will include an explanation why the work was chosen for translation: none will be chosen simply because it is there. Two of the Greek texts are currently being re-edited –

<sup>1</sup> See Fritz Zimmermann, 'Philoponus' impetus theory in the Arabic tradition'; Charles Schmitt, 'Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* in the sixteenth century', and Richard Sorabji, 'John Philoponus', in Richard Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987).

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Karl Praechter, 'Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 18 (1909), 516-38 (translated into English in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence* (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990)); M. Plezia, *de Commentariis Isagogicis* (Cracow 1947); M. Richard, 'Apo Phônês', *Byzantion* 20 (1950), 191-222; É. Evrard, *L'École d'Olympiodore et la composition du commentaire à la physique de Jean Philopon*, Diss. (Liège 1957); L.G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam 1962) (new revised edition, translated into French, Collection Budé; part of the revised introduction, in English, is included in *Aristotle Transformed*); A.-J. Festugière, 'Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus', *Museum Helveticum* 20 (1963), 77-100, repr. in his *Études* (1971), 551-74; P. Hadot, 'Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'antiquité', *Museum Helveticum* 36 (1979), 201-23; I. Hadot, 'La division néoplatonicienne des écrits d'Aristote', in J. Wiesner (ed.), *Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung* (Paul Moraux gewidmet), vol. 2 (Berlin 1986); I. Hadot, 'Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens', in M. Tardieu (ed.), *Les règles de l'interprétation* (Paris 1987), 99-119. These topics are treated, and a bibliography supplied, in *Aristotle Transformed*.

those of Simplicius in *Physica* and in *de Caelo* – and new readings will be exploited by translators as they become available. Each volume will also contain a list of proposed emendations to the standard text. Indexes will be of more uniform extent as between volumes than is the case with the Berlin edition, and there will be three of them: an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and a subject index.

The commentaries fall into three main groups. The first group is by authors in the Aristotelian tradition up to the fourth century A.D. This includes the earliest extant commentary, that by Aspasius in the first half of the second century A.D. on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The anonymous commentary on Books 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in CAG vol. 20, is derived from Adrastus, a generation later.<sup>3</sup> The commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias (appointed to his chair between A.D. 198 and 209) represent the fullest flowering of the Aristotelian tradition. To his successors Alexander was The Commentator *par excellence*. To give but one example (not from a commentary) of his skill at defending and elaborating Aristotle's views, one might refer to his defence of Aristotle's claim that space is finite against the objection that an edge of space is conceptually problematic.<sup>4</sup> Themistius (fl. late 340s to 384 or 385) saw himself as the inventor of paraphrase, wrongly thinking that the job of commentary was completed.<sup>5</sup> In fact, the Neoplatonists were to introduce new dimensions into commentary. Themistius' own relation to the Neoplatonist as opposed to the Aristotelian tradition is a matter of controversy,<sup>6</sup> but it would be agreed that his commentaries show far less bias than the full-blown Neoplatonist ones. They are also far more informative than the designation 'paraphrase' might suggest, and it has been estimated that Philoponus' *Physics* commentary draws silently on Themistius six hundred times.<sup>7</sup> The pseudo-Alexandrian commentary on *Metaphysics* 6–14, of unknown authorship, has been placed by some in the same group of commentaries as being earlier than the fifth century.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Anthony Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford 1978), 37, n.3; Paul Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 2 (Berlin 1984), 323-30.

<sup>4</sup> Alexander, *Quaestiones* 3.12, discussed in my *Matter, Space and Motion* (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1988). For Alexander see R.W. Sharples, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation', in W. Haase (ed.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, part 2 *Principat*, vol. 36.2, *Philosophie und Wissenschaften* (1987).

<sup>5</sup> Themistius in *An. Post.* 1,2-12. See H.J. Blumenthal, 'Photius on Themistius (Cod.74): did Themistius write commentaries on Aristotle?', *Hermes* 107 (1979), 168-82.

<sup>6</sup> For different views, see H.J. Blumenthal, 'Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle?', in Glen W. Bowersock, Walter Burkert, Michael C.J. Putnam, *Arktouros*, Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M.W. Knox (Berlin and N.Y., 1979), 391-400; E.P. Mahoney, 'Themistius and the agent intellect in James of Viterbo and other thirteenth-century philosophers: (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate)', *Augustiniana* 23 (1973), 422-67, at 428-31; id., 'Neoplatonism, the Greek commentators and Renaissance Aristotelianism', in D.J. O'Meara (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought* (Albany N.Y. 1982), 169-77 and 264-82, esp. n. 1, 264-6; Robert Todd, introduction to translation of Themistius in *DA* 3.4-8, in *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect*, trans. Frederick M. Schroeder and Robert B. Todd (Toronto 1990).

<sup>7</sup> H. Vitelli, CAG 17, p. 992, s.v. Themistius.

<sup>8</sup> The similarities to Syrianus (died c.437) have suggested to some that it predates Syrianus (most recently Leonardo Tarán, review of Paul Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus*,

By far the largest group of extant commentaries is that of the Neoplatonists up to the sixth century A.D. Nearly all the major Neoplatonists, apart from Plotinus (the founder of Neoplatonism), wrote commentaries on Aristotle, although those of Iamblichus (c. 250 – c. 325) survive only in fragments, and those of three Athenians, Plutarchus (died 432), his pupil Proclus (410 – 485) and the Athenian Damascius (c. 462 – after 538), are lost.<sup>9</sup> As a result of these losses, most of the extant Neoplatonist commentaries come from the late fifth and the sixth centuries and a good proportion from Alexandria. There are commentaries by Plotinus' disciple and editor Porphyry (232 – 309), by Iamblichus' pupil Dexippus (c. 330), by Proclus' teacher Syrianus (died c. 437), by Proclus' pupil Ammonius (435/445 – 517/526), by Ammonius' three pupils Philoponus (c. 490 to 570s), Simplicius (wrote after 532, probably after 538) and Asclepius (sixth century), by Ammonius' next but one successor Olympiodorus (495/505 – after 565), by Elias (*fl.* 541?), by David (second half of the sixth century, or beginning of the seventh) and by Stephanus (took the chair in Constantinople c. 610). Further, a commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* has been ascribed to Heliodorus of Prusa, an unknown pre-fourteenth-century figure, and there is a commentary by Simplicius' colleague Priscian of Lydia on Aristotle's successor Theophrastus. Of these commentators some of the last were Christians (Philoponus, Elias, David and Stephanus), but they were Christians writing in the Neoplatonist tradition, as was also Boethius who produced a number of commentaries in Latin before his death in 525 or 526.

The third group comes from a much later period in Byzantium. The Berlin edition includes only three out of more than a dozen commentators described in Hunger's *Byzantinisches Handbuch*.<sup>10</sup> The two most important are Eustratius (1050/1060 – c. 1120), and Michael of Ephesus. It has been suggested that these two belong to a circle organised by the princess Anna Comnena in the twelfth century, and accordingly the completion of Michael's commentaries has been redated from 1040 to 1138.<sup>11</sup> His commentaries include areas where gaps had been left. Not all of these gap-fillers are extant, but we have commentaries on the neglected biological works, on the *Sophistici Elenchi*, and a small fragment of one on the *Politics*. The lost *Rhetoric* commentary had a few antecedents, but the *Rhetoric* too had been comparatively neglected. Another product of this

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vol. 1, in *Gnomon* 46 (1981), 721-50 at 750), to others that it draws on him (most recently P. Thillet, in the Budé edition of Alexander *de Fato*, p. lvii). Praechter ascribed it to Michael of Ephesus (eleventh or twelfth century), in his review of CAG 22.2, in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeiger* 168 (1906), 861-907.

<sup>9</sup> The Iamblichus fragments are collected in Greek by Bent Dalsgaard Larsen, *Jamblique de Chalcis, Exégète et Philosophe* (Aarhus 1972), vol.2. Most are taken from Simplicius, and will accordingly be translated in due course. The evidence on Damascius' commentaries is given in L.G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, vol.2., Damascius (Amsterdam 1977), 11-12; on Proclus' in L.G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam 1962), xii, n.22; on Plutarchus' in H.M. Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries', *Phronesis* 21 (1976), 75.

<sup>10</sup> Herbert Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, vol.1 (= *Byzantinisches Handbuch*, part 5, vol.1) (Munich 1978), 25-41. See also B.N. Tatakis, *La Philosophie Byzantine* (Paris 1949).

<sup>11</sup> R. Browning, 'An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* n.s. 8 (1962), 1-12, esp. 6-7.

period may have been the composite commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (CAG 20) by various hands, including Eustratius and Michael, along with some earlier commentators, and an improvisation for Book 7. Whereas Michael follows Alexander and the conventional Aristotelian tradition, Eustratius' commentary introduces Platonist, Christian and anti-Islamic elements.<sup>12</sup>

The composite commentary was to be translated into Latin in the next century by Robert Grosseteste in England. But Latin translations of various logical commentaries were made from the Greek still earlier by James of Venice (fl. c. 1130), a contemporary of Michael of Ephesus, who may have known him in Constantinople. And later in that century other commentaries and works by commentators were being translated from Arabic versions by Gerard of Cremona (died 1187).<sup>13</sup> So the twelfth century resumed the transmission which had been interrupted at Boethius' death in the sixth century.

The Neoplatonist commentaries of the main group were initiated by Porphyry. His master Plotinus had discussed Aristotle, but in a very independent way, devoting three whole treatises (*Enneads* 6.1–3) to attacking Aristotle's classification of the things in the universe into categories. These categories took no account of Plato's world of Ideas, were inferior to Plato's classifications in the *Sophist* and could anyhow be collapsed, some of them into others. Porphyry replied that Aristotle's categories could apply perfectly well to the world of intelligibles and he took them as in general defensible.<sup>14</sup> He wrote two commentaries on the *Categories*, one lost, and an introduction to it, the *Isagôgê*, as well as commentaries, now lost, on a number of other Aristotelian works. This proved decisive in making Aristotle a necessary subject for Neoplatonist lectures and commentary. Proclus, who was an exceptionally quick student, is said to have taken two years over his Aristotle studies, which were called

<sup>12</sup> R. Browning, op. cit. H.D.P. Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Grosseteste, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* VI 1 (Leiden 1973), ch.1, 'The compilation of Greek commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*'. Sten Ebbesen, 'Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in *Sophisticos Elenchos*', *Cahiers de l'Institut Moyen Age Grecque et Latin* 34 (1979), 'Boethius, Jacobus Veneticus, Michael Ephesius and "Alexander"', pp. v-xiii; id., *Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi*, 3 parts, *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, vol. 7 (Leiden 1981); A. Preus, *Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus on the Movement and Progression of Animals* (Hildesheim 1981), introduction.

<sup>13</sup> For Grosseteste, see Mercken as in n. 12. For James of Venice, see Ebbesen as in n. 12, and L. Minio-Paluello, 'Jacobus Veneticus Grecus', *Traditio* 8 (1952), 265-304; id., 'Giacomo Veneto e l'Aristotelismo Latino', in Pertusi (ed.), *Venezia e l'Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Florence 1966), 53-74, both reprinted in his *Opuscula* (1972). For Gerard of Cremona, see M. Steinschneider, *Die europäischen Übersetzungen aus dem arabischen bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts* (repr. Graz 1956); E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London 1955), 235-6 and more generally 181-246. For the translators in general, see Bernard G. Dod, 'Aristoteles Latinus', in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds). *The Cambridge History of Latin Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge 1982).

<sup>14</sup> See P. Hadot, 'L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories', in *Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente* (Rome 1974), 31-47; A.C. Lloyd, 'Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic', *Phronesis* 1 (1955-6), 58-79 and 146-60.

the Lesser Mysteries, and which preceded the Greater Mysteries of Plato.<sup>15</sup> By the time of Ammonius, the commentaries reflect a teaching curriculum which begins with Porphyry's *Isagôgê* and Aristotle's *Categories*, and is explicitly said to have as its final goal a (mystical) ascent to the supreme Neoplatonist deity, the One.<sup>16</sup> The curriculum would have progressed from Aristotle to Plato, and would have culminated in Plato's *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*. The latter was read as being about the One, and both works were established in this place in the curriculum at least by the time of Iamblichus, if not earlier.<sup>17</sup>

Before Porphyry, it had been undecided how far a Platonist should accept Aristotle's scheme of categories. But now the proposition began to gain force that there was a harmony between Plato and Aristotle on most things.<sup>18</sup> Not for the only time in the history of philosophy, a perfectly crazy proposition proved philosophically fruitful. The views of Plato and of Aristotle had both to be transmuted into a new Neoplatonist philosophy in order to exhibit the supposed harmony. Iamblichus denied that Aristotle contradicted Plato on the theory of Ideas.<sup>19</sup> This was too much for Syrianus and his pupil Proclus. While accepting harmony in many areas,<sup>20</sup> they could see that there was disagreement on this issue and also on the issue of whether God was causally responsible for the existence of the ordered physical cosmos, which Aristotle denied. But even on these issues, Proclus' pupil Ammonius was to claim harmony, and, though the debate was not clear cut,<sup>21</sup> his claim was on the whole to prevail. Aristotle, he maintained, accepted Plato's Ideas,<sup>22</sup> at least in the form of principles (*logoi*) in the divine intellect, and these principles were in turn causally responsible for the beginningless existence of the physical universe. Ammonius wrote a whole book to show that

<sup>15</sup> Marinus, *Life of Proclus* ch.13, 157,41 (Boissonnade).

<sup>16</sup> The introductions to the *Isagôgê* by Ammonius, Elias and David, and to the *Categories* by Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias are discussed by L.G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena* and I. Hadot, 'Les Introductions', see n. 2. above.

<sup>17</sup> Proclus in *Alcibiadem 1* p.11 (Creuzer); Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena*, ch. 26, 12f. For the Neoplatonist curriculum see Westerink, Festugière, P. Hadot and I. Hadot in n. 2.

<sup>18</sup> See e.g. P. Hadot (1974), as in n. 14 above; H.J. Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries', *Phronesis* 21 (1976), 64-87; H.A. Davidson, 'The principle that a finite body can contain only finite power', in S. Stein and R. Loewe (eds), *Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History presented to A. Altmann* (Alabama 1979), 75-92; Carlos Steel, 'Proclus et Aristote', Proceedings of the Congrès Proclus held in Paris 1985, J. Pépin and H.D. Saffrey (eds), *Proclus, lecteur et interprète des anciens* (Paris 1987), 213-25; Koenraad Verrycken, *God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus*, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985).

<sup>19</sup> Iamblichus ap. Elian in *Cat.* 123,1-3.

<sup>20</sup> Syrianus in *Metaph.* 80,4-7; Proclus in *Tim.* 1.6,21-7,16.

<sup>21</sup> Asclepius sometimes accepts Syrianus' interpretation (in *Metaph.* 433,9-436,6); which is, however, qualified, since Syrianus thinks Aristotle is really committed willy-nilly to much of Plato's view (in *Metaph.* 117,25-118,11; ap. Asclepius in *Metaph.* 433,16; 450,22); Philoponus repents of his early claim that Plato is not the target of Aristotle's attack, and accepts that Plato is rightly attacked for treating ideas as independent entities outside the divine Intellect (in *DA* 37,18-31; in *Phys.* 225,4-226,11; *contra Procl.* 26,24-32,13; in *An. Post.* 242,14-243,25).

<sup>22</sup> Asclepius in *Metaph* from the voice of (i.e. from the lectures of) Ammonius 69,17-21; 71,28; cf. Zacharias Ammonius, *Patrologia Graeca* vol. 85, col. 952 (Colonna).



Aristotle's God was thus an efficient cause, and though the book is lost, some of its principal arguments are preserved by Simplicius.<sup>23</sup> This tradition helped to make it possible for Aquinas to claim Aristotle's God as a Creator, albeit not in the sense of giving the universe a beginning, but in the sense of being causally responsible for its beginningless existence.<sup>24</sup> Thus what started as a desire to harmonise Aristotle with Plato finished by making Aristotle safe for Christianity. In Simplicius, who goes further than anyone,<sup>25</sup> it is a formally stated duty of the commentator to display the harmony of Plato and Aristotle in most things.<sup>26</sup> Philoponus, who with his independent mind had thought better of his earlier belief in harmony, is castigated by Simplicius for neglecting this duty.<sup>27</sup>

The idea of harmony was extended beyond Plato and Aristotle to Plato and the Presocratics. Plato's pupils Speusippus and Xenocrates saw Plato as being in the Pythagorean tradition.<sup>28</sup> From the third to first centuries B.C., pseudo-Pythagorean writings present Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines as if they were the ideas of Pythagoras and his pupils,<sup>29</sup> and these forgeries were later taken by the Neoplatonists as genuine. Plotinus saw the Presocratics as precursors of his own views,<sup>30</sup> but Iamblichus went far beyond him by writing ten volumes on Pythagorean philosophy.<sup>31</sup> Thereafter Proclus sought to unify the whole of Greek philosophy by presenting it as a continuous clarification of divine revelation,<sup>32</sup> and Simplicius argued for the same general unity in order to rebut Christian charges of contradictions in pagan philosophy.<sup>33</sup>

Later Neoplatonist commentaries tend to reflect their origin in a teaching curriculum:<sup>34</sup> from the time of Philoponus, the discussion is often divided up into lectures, which are subdivided into studies of doctrine and of text. A general account of Aristotle's philosophy is prefixed to the *Categories* commentaries and divided, according to a formula of Proclus,<sup>35</sup> into ten questions. It is here that commentators explain the eventual purpose of studying Aristotle (ascent to the One) and state (if they do) the requirement of displaying the harmony of Plato and Aristotle. After the ten-point introduction to Aristotle, the *Categories* is given a six-point introduction, whose antecedents go back earlier than Neoplatonism, and which requires

<sup>23</sup> Simplicius in *Phys.* 1361,11-1363,12. See H.A. Davidson; Carlos Steel; Koenraad Verrycken in n.18 above.

<sup>24</sup> See Richard Sorabji, *Matter, Space and Motion* (London and Ithaca N.Y. 1988), ch. 15.

<sup>25</sup> See e.g. H.J. Blumenthal in n. 18 above.

<sup>26</sup> Simplicius in *Cat.* 7,23-32.

<sup>27</sup> Simplicius in *Cael.* 84,11-14; 159,2-9. On Philoponus' *volte face* see n. 21 above.

<sup>28</sup> See e.g. Walter Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft* (Nürnberg 1962), translated as *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge Mass. 1972), 83-96.

<sup>29</sup> See Holger Thesleff, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic Period* (Åbo 1961); Thomas Alexander Szlezák, *Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien*, *Peripatoi* vol. 4 (Berlin and New York 1972).

<sup>30</sup> Plotinus e.g. 4.8.1; 5.1.8 (10-27); 5.1.9.

<sup>31</sup> See Dominic O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in late Antiquity* (Oxford 1989).

<sup>32</sup> See Christian Guérard, 'Parménide d'Elée selon les Néoplatoniciens', forthcoming.

<sup>33</sup> Simplicius in *Phys.* 28,32-29,5; 640,12-18. Such thinkers as Epicurus and the Sceptics, however, were not subject to harmonisation.

<sup>34</sup> See the literature in n. 2 above. <sup>35</sup> ap. Elian in *Cat.* 107,24-6.

the commentator to find a unitary theme or scope (*skopos*) for the treatise. The arrangements for late commentaries on Plato are similar. Since the Plato commentaries form part of a single curriculum they should be studied alongside those on Aristotle. Here the situation is easier, not only because the extant corpus is very much smaller, but also because it has been comparatively well served by French and English translators.<sup>36</sup>

Given the theological motive of the curriculum and the pressure to harmonise Plato with Aristotle, it can be seen how these commentaries are a major source for Neoplatonist ideas. This in turn means that it is not safe to extract from them the fragments of the Presocratics, or of other authors, without making allowance for the Neoplatonist background against which the fragments were originally selected for discussion. For different reasons, analogous warnings apply to fragments preserved by the pre-Neoplatonist commentator Alexander.<sup>37</sup> It will be another advantage of the present translations that they will make it easier to check the distorting effect of a commentator's background.

Although the Neoplatonist commentators conflate the views of Aristotle with those of Neoplatonism, Philoponus alludes to a certain convention when he quotes Plutarchus expressing disapproval of Alexander for expounding his own philosophical doctrines in a commentary on Aristotle.<sup>38</sup> But this does not stop Philoponus from later inserting into his own commentaries on the *Physics* and *Meteorology* his arguments in favour of the Christian view of Creation. Of course, the commentators also wrote independent works of their own, in which their views are expressed independently of the exegesis of Aristotle. Some of these independent works will be included in the present series of translations.

The distorting Neoplatonist context does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The introductions to Aristotle's philosophy insist that commentators must have a minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus, and this they certainly have. Commentators are also enjoined neither to accept nor reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one's attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences and ideas in Aristotle, which one could easily have passed over, however often one read him. The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would be likely to on his own.

The relations of Neoplatonist commentators to the Christians were subtle. Porphyry wrote a treatise explicitly against the Christians in 15 books, but an order to burn it was issued in 448, and later Neoplatonists

<sup>36</sup> English: Calcidius in *Tim.* (parts by van Winden; den Boeft); Iamblichus fragments (Dillon); Proclus in *Tim.* (Thomas Taylor); Proclus in *Parm.* (Dillon); Proclus in *Parm.*, end of 7th book, from the Latin (Klibansky, Labowsky, Anscombe); Proclus in *Alcib. 1* (O'Neill); Olympiodorus and Damascius in *Phaedonem* (Westerink); Damascius in *Philebum* (Westerink); *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Westerink). See also extracts in Thomas Taylor, *The Works of Plato*, 5 vols. (1804). French: Proclus in *Tim.* and in *Rempublicam* (Festugière); in *Parm.* (Chaignet); Anon. in *Parm.* (P. Hadot); Damascius in *Parm.* (Chaignet).

<sup>37</sup> For Alexander's treatment of the Stoics, see Robert B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics* (Leiden 1976), 24-9.

<sup>38</sup> Philoponus in *DA* 21,20-3.

were more circumspect. Among the last commentators in the main group, we have noted several Christians. Of these the most important were Boethius and Philoponus. It was Boethius' programme to transmit Greek learning to Latin-speakers. By the time of his premature death by execution, he had provided Latin translations of Aristotle's logical works, together with commentaries in Latin but in the Neoplatonist style on Porphyry's *Isagôgê* and on Aristotle's *Categories* and *de Interpretatione*, and interpretations of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi*. The interruption of his work meant that knowledge of Aristotle among Latin-speakers was confined for many centuries to the logical works. Philoponus is important both for his proofs of the Creation and for his progressive replacement of Aristotelian science with rival theories, which were taken up at first by the Arabs and came fully into their own in the West only in the sixteenth century.

Recent work has rejected the idea that in Alexandria the Neoplatonists compromised with Christian monotheism by collapsing the distinction between their two highest deities, the One and the Intellect. Simplicius (who left Alexandria for Athens) and the Alexandrians Ammonius and Asclepius appear to have acknowledged their beliefs quite openly, as later did the Alexandrian Olympiodorus, despite the presence of Christian students in their classes.<sup>39</sup>

The teaching of Simplicius in Athens and that of the whole pagan Neoplatonist school there was stopped by the Christian Emperor Justinian in 529. This was the very year in which the Christian Philoponus in Alexandria issued his proofs of Creation against the earlier Athenian Neoplatonist Proclus. Archaeological evidence has been offered that, after their temporary stay in Ctesiphon (in present-day Iraq), the Athenian Neoplatonists did not return to their house in Athens, and further evidence has been offered that Simplicius went to Harrân (Carrhae), in present-day Turkey near the Iraq border.<sup>40</sup> Wherever he went, his commentaries are a treasure house of information about the preceding thousand years of Greek philosophy, information which he painstakingly recorded after the closure in Athens, and which would otherwise have been lost. He had every reason to feel bitter about Christianity, and in fact he sees it and Philoponus, its representative, as irreverent. They deny the divinity of the heavens and prefer the physical relics of dead martyrs.<sup>41</sup> His own commentaries by

<sup>39</sup> For Simplicius, see I. Hadot, *Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiérocès et Simplicius* (Paris 1978); for Ammonius and Asclepius, Koenraad Verrycken, *God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Iohannes Philoponus*, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985); for Olympiodorus, L.G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam 1962).

<sup>40</sup> Alison Frantz, 'Pagan philosophers in Christian Athens', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 119 (1975), 29-38; M. Tardieu, 'Témoins orientaux du Premier Alcibiade à Harrân et à Nag 'Hammâd', *Journal Asiatique* 274 (1986); id., 'Les calendriers en usage à Harrân d'après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la *Physique* d'Aristote', in I. Hadot (ed.), *Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie* (Berlin 1987), 40-57; id., *Coutumes nautiques mésopotamiennes chez Simplicius*, in preparation. The opposing view that Simplicius returned to Athens is most fully argued by Alan Cameron, 'The last days of the Academy at Athens', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 195, n.s. 15 (1969), 7-29.

<sup>41</sup> Simplicius in *Cael.* 26,4-7; 70,16-18; 90,1-18; 370,29-371,4. See on his whole attitude Philippe Hoffmann, 'Simplicius' polemics', in Richard Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987).

contrast culminate in devout prayers.

Two collections of articles by various hands have been published, to make the work of the commentators better known. The first is devoted to Philoponus;<sup>42</sup> the second is about the commentators in general, and goes into greater detail on some of the issues briefly mentioned here.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Richard Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987).

<sup>43</sup> Richard Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence* (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990). The lists of texts and previous translations of the commentaries included in Wildberg, *Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World* (pp.12ff.) are not included here. The list of translations should be augmented by: F.L.S. Bridgman, Heliodorus (?) in *Ethica Nicomachea*, London 1807.

I am grateful for comments to Henry Blumenthal, Victor Caston, I. Hadot, Paul Mercken, Alain Segonds, Robert Sharples, Robert Todd, L.G. Westerink and Christian Wildberg.

# English-Greek Glossary

absolutely, in an absolute sense:

*haplôs, apolutos, kath' heauto*

accident, *sumbebêkos*

action: *poiein, praxis*

activity: *energeia*

affection: *paskhein, pathos*

affective: *pathêtikos*

affirmation: *kataphasis*

analogy: *analogia*

animate: *empsychos*

appellation: *prosêgoria*

aptitude: *epitêdeiotês*

aquatic: *enudros*

beings: *ta onta*

belong: *huparkhein*

body: *sôma*

brave: *andreios*

bravery: *andreia*

capacity: *dunamis*

carnivore: *kreêphagos*

category: *katêgoria*

chance: *tukhê*

change: *kinêsis, metabolê*

colour: *khroma*

colouring: *khroia*

combination: *sumplokê*

common: *koinos*

commonality: *koinotês*

complement: *sumplêrôtikos*

concept: *ennoia, epinoia*

conceptual: *ennoêmatikos*

concomitant: *parakolouthêma*

condition: *diathesis*

continuous: *sunekhês*

contrariety: *enantiotês, enantiôsis*

contrary: *enantios*

corporeal: *sômatikos*

correlatives: *antistrephonta*

definition: *logos, horos, horismos*

description: *hupographê*

differentia: *diaphora*

discrete: *diôrismenos*

distance: *to diestêkos* (see *diistanai* in the Greek-English Index)

division: *diairesis*

divisive: *diaretikos*

dyad: *duas*

eliminate: *sunanairein*

enumeration: *katarithmêsis*

equal, *isos*; (equal in extension), *episês*

essence: *ousia, ti esti*

example: *paradeigma*

exist: *huphistanai*

existence: *hupostasis, huparxis*

explanatory: *exêgêtikos, parastatikos*

expression: *lexis*

familiar: *gnôrimos*

fictional object: *anaplasma*

form: *eidos*

generic: *genikos*

generosity: *eleutheriôtês*

genus: *genos*

granivore: *spermophagos*

having: *ekhein*

heaven: *ouranos*

herbivore: *poêphagos*

heteronymous: *heterônumos*

holiness: *hosiotês*

homonymous: *homônumos*

homonymy: *homônumia*

image, *homoiôma*

impiety: *asebeia*

imposition of words: *thesis*

imprudence: *aphrosunê*

incapacity: *adunamia*

incorporeal: *asômatos*

indefinite: *aoristos*

individual: *atomos*

induction: *epagôgê*

infinite: *apeiros*

injustice: *adikia*

intelligence: *nous*

intelligible: *noêtos*

intemperance: *akolasia*

irregular: *anômalos*

just: *dikaïos*

justice: *dikaïosunê*

knowable: *epistêtos*

knowledge: *epistêmê*

limit: *peras*

line: *grammê*

monad: *monas*

motion: *kinêsis*

negation: *apophasis*

niggardliness: *aneleutheriôtês*

non-rational: *alogos*

noun: *onoma*

opposite: *antikeimenon*

order: *taxis*

paronymous: *parônumos*

participate: *metekhein*

participation: *metokhê*

particular: *kath' hekaston, merikos*

perceptible, *aisthêtos*

perception: *aisthêsis*

picture: *eikôn*

piety: *eusebeia*

place: *topos*

polyonymous: *poluônomos*

position (the category): *keisthai*;

(relative position), *thesis*

posterior (opp. prior): *husteros*

predicate (as noun): *katêgoroumenon*,

*katêgorêma*

predicate (as verb): *katêgorein*

predication: *katêgoria*

principle: *arkhê*

prior (opp. posterior): *proteros*

privation: *sterêsis*

proposition: *protasis*

proprium: *idion*

prudence: *phronêsis*

psychological: *psukhikos*

qualification: *poion*

quality: *poiotês*

quantity: *poson*

realise: *teleioun*

relation: *skhesis*

relative: *pros ti*

sensible: *aisthêtos*

sensitive: *aisthêtikos*

sentence: *logos*

shape: *morphê, skhêma*

significant: *sêmantikos*

signification: *sêmainomenon*

signify: *sêmainein*

similar: *homoios*

similarity: *homoiotês, homoiôsis*

simultaneous: *hama*

soul: *psukhê*

source: *arkhê*; (from a single), *aph'*

*henos*; (relative to a single), *pros*

*hen*

species: *eidos*

specific: *eidikos, eidopoiος*

subject: *hupokeimenon*

subject matter: *skopos, prothesis*

subordinate: *hupallêlos*

substance: *ousia*

supervene: *epigignesthai*

surface: *epiphaneia*

synonym: *sunônumos*

temperance: *sôphrosunê*

terrestrial, *pezos*

thing: *pragma*

thought: *dianoia*

time: *khronos*

title: *epigraphê, epigrammê, epi-*

*graphein*

treatise: *pragmateia*

unequal: *anisos*

unholiness: *anosiotês*

universal: *katholou, katholikos*

universe: *kosmos, to pan*

value: *axia*

verb: *rhêma*

virtue: *aretê*

virtuous: *spoudaios, aretaios*

when: *pote*

where: *pou*

white: *leukos*

whiteness: *leukotês*

winged, *ptênos, pterôtos*

word: *onoma, phônê*

# Greek-English Index

References are to the page and line numbers of Busse's *CAG* edition, given in the margins of the translation.

- adikia*, injustice (example of quality), 136,20.24ff.; 137,10ff.  
*adunamia*, incapacity (opp. *dunamis*), 129,24ff.  
*Aias*, Ajax (as example), 62,31; 64,9.12.14ff.  
*aïdios*, eternal, everlasting, 98,36ff.; 120,35  
*aisthêsis*, perception, 91,9.21; 112,12ff.; 119,10ff; 120,2; 130,17.23  
*aisthêtikos*, capable of perceiving, sensitive (differentia of animal), 63,12.29; 68,24; 85,14.18  
*aisthêtos*, sensible, perceptible, 60,20; 91,8.17ff.; 112,13.28.29; 119,11ff.; 130,16  
*aitêma*, postulate (in geometry), 60,5  
*akhôristos*, inseparable, 78,9  
*akolasia*, intemperance, 136,30  
*alêtheia*, reality, truth (opp. *to endoxon*, what is generally accepted), 119,5; 120,26  
*Alexandros*, Alexander (as example), 65,23  
*alogos*, non-rational (differentia of animal), 84,12  
*ametabatos*, unchangeable (of qualities), 100,8  
*analogia*, analogy, 65,20.34; 66,29  
*analogos*, analogous, 131,13  
*analutikos*, analytic (*Ta Analutika*, the *Analytiks*, work of Aristotle), 56,24.26  
*anaplasma*, fictional object, 121,8  
*andrapodisthai*, to enslave (as example), 61,33.34; 62,5  
*andreia*, bravery (as example), 69,21ff.  
*andreios*, brave (as example), 69,22ff.  
*Andronikos*, Andronicus of Rhodes (Peripatetic commentator), 107,29? (cf. n. ad loc.); 125,21  
*aneleutheriôtês*, niggardliness (example of quality), 137,1  
*anesis*, relaxation (of condition, opp. *epitasis*), 137,7; 138,2.21  
*anisos*, unequal, 110,29.30; 113,6  
*anômalia*, irregularity, 135,25  
*anômalos*, irregular, 135,1  
*anomoios*, dissimilar, 113,6; 139,18  
*anonomastos*, without a name, 129,19  
*anônumos*, without a name, 129,20; 135,16; 136,25  
*anosiotês*, unholiness (example of quality), 137,2  
*anthrôpos*, man, human (as example), 60,18; 63,9.22; 65,27.30; 82,18; 90,14; 139,11  
*antidiastollê*, contrast (*kata anti-diaistolên*, contrastive sense), 62,9ff.  
*antikeisthai*, to lie opposite, be opposed, 55,4; 99,14; 108,10 (*to antikeimenon*, opposite), 108,10; 137,8  
*antistrephêin*, to be convertible with, 63,21.23; 74,27; 117,27; 140,14; (*ta antistrephonta*, correlatives) 115,18ff.  
*aoristos*, indefinite (opp. *ôrismenon*), 107,32ff.; 126,14  
*apeiros*, infinite, 58,7  
*aph'henos*, from a single source, 65,21  
*aphrôn*, imprudent, foolish, 99,26  
*aphrosunê*, imprudence (example of



- quality), 98,6; 137,1  
*apologia*, defendant's speech (opp. *katégoria*, accusation), 55,4  
*apolutos*, absolute, 108,29; 112,1  
*apophantikos*, declarative (sentence), 57,4  
*apophasis*, negation (opp. *kataphasis*), 73,5; 108,10  
*aretaios*, virtuous, 135,19  
*Aristarkhos*, Aristarchus (grammarians, as example), 71,33; 76,1; 140,4ff.  
*Aristotelês*, Aristotle, 55,16; 60,10.28; 68,28; 72,32; 74,26.27.29; 75,12; 76,14; 79,25; 80,29; 84,21; 86,23; 88,32; 89,33; 91,10; 108,30; 112,22; 117,20; 119,6.8; 120,10; 121,4.20; 123,25; 125,29; 126,25; 127,31; 128,17; 129,24; 130,1.5; 133,14; 134,23; 138,4.7.30; 139,29; 141,27  
*Aristoxenos*, Aristoxenus (musical theorist, as example), 140,8.21  
*arithmêtikê*, arithmetic, 120,1  
*arithmos*, number, 65,31.36; 70,30; 101,21; 105,6ff.; (*arithmôi diapherein, kata arithmon diapherein*, to differ in number), 58,6.9; 70,30; 98,4; 129,4  
*arkhaïos*, ancient (*hoi arkhaïoi*, the ancient philosophers), 127,13  
*arkhê*, source, principle, 59,35; 65,31ff.; 77,2; 102,31; 103,15.33  
*arthron*, article (part of speech), 59,32; 62,23  
*asebeia*, impiety, 137,2  
*asômatos*, incorporeal, 106,25ff.  
*astronomia*, astronomy, 120,1  
*athanatos*, immortal (differentia of animal), 108,7  
*Athênai*, Athens (example), 109,17.19  
*Athênodoros*, Athenodorus (Stoic critic of *Categories*), 59,10; 86,22  
*atomos*, individual (*atomon*, an individual), 70,30.31; 72,25; 76,30; 80,25; 88,26; 91,6; 122,14.16; 140,4.7ff.  
*Attikos*, Atticus (Platonist philosopher), 66,34  
*axia*, value, 93,20.23  
*axiôma*, axiom, 60,4  
*blituri* (nonsense word), 102,8  
*Boêthos*, Boethus (Peripatetic commentator), 59,17  
*Boukephalos* (Alexander the Great's horse, as example), 71,31; 76,35; 93,23.24  
*diadokhê*, succession, 82,37  
*diairesis*, division, 59,13; 60,5; 86,10; 71,16ff.; 86,6; 128,23.27  
*diaretikos*, divisive (*diaretikê diaphora*, divisive differentia), 85,12ff.  
*dianoia*, thought, 65,18ff.; 91,3.6; 101,26; 108,22  
*diaphora*, differentia, 56,34; 58,12.25; 59,22; 81,24ff.; 82,2.18.24.31; 83,10; 84,4.7; 85,18.34.37; 86,2; 94,29; 95,6.11.19ff.; 139,26  
*diastasis*, extension, dimension, 107,10; 111,3  
*diastatos*, extended (*trikhêi diastaton*, three-dimensional), 100,14; 103,1.23; cf. 111,3.10  
*diathesis*, condition, 112,25; 132,17; (opp. *hexis*), 129,3.15  
*diesiaios*, quarter-tone (*diesiaion diastêma*, quarter-tone interval), 120,6.8  
*diïstanai*, to be at a distance, 84,5; 134,7; (*to diestêkos*, distance), 107,21ff.  
*dikaïos*, just, 135,22  
*dikaïosunê*, justice (example of quality), 135,22; 136,20; 137,11  
*Diôn*, Dion (as example), 126,13  
*diorizein*, to mark off (*diôrismenos*, discrete, opp. *sunekhês*, continuous), 100,32ff.; 101,14ff.; 105,7  
*dipous*, biped (*to dipoun*, differentia of man), 83,12; 85,25; 93,5; 94,31; 117,6.13.16  
*dromikos*, capable of running, 135,8  
*duas*, dyad, 118,27ff.  
*dunamis*, power, faculty, capacity, 129,19.24.28; 130,2; (*dunamei, en dunamei*, potential, potentially, opp. *energeïai*, actual) 87,38; 120,30ff.; 131,32  
*dusanalutos*, difficult to remove, 132,9

- duskinêtos*, difficult to change, 131,6
- dusmetablêtos*, difficult to change, permanent, 131,15
- eidikos*, specific, of the nature of a species, 83,32
- eidopoiôs*, species-making, specific (*eidopoiôs diaphora*, specific differentia), 85,11ff.; 129,7
- eidôs*, form, species, 55,16.22; 72,26; 77,27.29.34; 78,6.9; 82,1.35; 83,13.19.28.33; 88,23; 128,26; 129,3
- ekhein*, to have (having, as category), 71,24; 86,17; 87,27; 141,9; 142,17
- ekleipsis*, eclipse, 120,19
- ekpurôsis*, universal conflagration (Stoic doctrine), 119,36
- eleutheriôtês*, generosity (example of quality), 137,1
- ellipês*, incomplete, 59,13; (*ellipês katêgoria*, incomplete predication), 87,35
- empsychos*, animate (differentia of animal), 55,20; 63,12ff.; 85,13.18.35
- enantios*, contrary, 96,30ff.; 98,5ff.; 98,30ff.; 99,7; 106,11.21.26.27.30; 107,20; 108,10; 113,32ff.; 136,25; 141,19
- enantiôsis*, contrariety, 106,23.28; 107,8ff.; 110,12ff.; 114,13ff.
- enantiotês*, contrariety, 99,14.17; 100,22; 106,30; 107,19ff.; 110,5; 135,30ff.; 141,22
- enaretos*, envirtued, 135,20
- enarmonios*, enharmonic (*enarmonios melôidia*, enharmonic scale), 120,7
- endoxos*, generally accepted, 119,6
- energeia*, activity, 103,37; 141,17; (opp. *pathos*, affection) 101,27; 125,27; 141,18; (*energeiâi*, in act, actual, opp. *dunamei*, potential), 102,29; 120,30
- engrammatos*, engrammared, written, 135,20
- ennoêmatikos*, conceptual (*ennoêmatikos logos*, conceptual account), 73,22
- ennoia*, concept, 88,10
- entelekheia*, entelechy, 55,20.22
- enudros*, aquatic (example of differentia of animal), 82,7; 85,24; 101,9
- enulos*, enmattered, material, 138,25
- epagôgê*, induction, 96,30; 108,36; 109,13
- epibolê*, approach, point of view, 57,30; 101,4.11
- epigignesthai*, supervene, 55,16; 105,3; 142,10; (opp. *prouparkhein*, exist previously), 111,9
- epigramma*, title, 57,12; 127,23.24
- epigraphê*, title, 56,22ff.; 59,28.32
- epigraphain*, to give a title, 55,7; 56,14ff.; 127,22
- epinoia*, concept, 73,7ff.; 75,28; 90,15ff.; 103,13; 111,18; 112,17; 115,25
- epiphaneia*, surface, 102,24ff.; 103,8.10; 133,3
- episês*, equal in extension (of terms), 117,30
- epistêmê*, knowledge, 60,18; 71,32; 76,19; 112,27ff.; 119,8ff.; 120,26.34; 121,1; 129,19; 135,10; 140,3.6.20
- epistêtos*, knowable, 112,28.29; 119,9ff.; 120,29.34; 140,17
- epitasis*, intensity (of condition, opp. *anesis*), 132,17; 137,27; 138,2.21
- epitêdeiotês*, aptitude, 129,19ff.; 131,32; 135,7.10
- ethos*, character, 131,29.30
- euphrosunê*, joy (example of quality), 135,24
- eusebeia*, piety, 137,2
- exêgêtikos*, explanatory (*exêgêtikos logos*, explanatory account), 63,8; 72,34; 73,20; 79,10
- gelastikos*, capable of laughter (proprium of man), 94,9
- genesis*, coming to be, 130,8; (*Ta peri Geneseôs kai Phôra*, *On Generation and Corruption*, work of Aristotle), 141,14
- genikos*, generic, 58,13ff.; 71,26; 72,35; 83,32; 87,18; 97,24
- genos*, genus, 58,10.13.16.27; 59,24; 64,12.14; 70,30; 72,26; 77,27.29; 83,4.14.22.25.32; 84,4ff.; 86,12;

- 140,15,28; (*Peri tôn Deká Genôn, On the Ten Genera*, alternative title of *Categories*) 56,18; (*Peri tôn Deká Genôn tou Ontos, On the Ten Genera of Being*, alternative title of *Categories*), 57,14
- geômetrês*, geometer, 60,4; 66,1; 132,22
- geômetria*, geometry, 120,1.4
- geômetrikos*, geometrical (*ta geômetrika*, geometrical objects), 120,5; 133,5
- gnôrimos*, familiar, 59,27; 74,25ff.; 92,9; 128,13ff.
- gnôrisma*, distinguishing mark, 131,5
- grammatikos*, grammarian (as example), 92,23.24; 113,24.25; 128,15; 135,4; (*grammatikê*, grammar, grammatical knowledge, as example), 75,38; 76,22; 80,11ff.; 113,24; 128,15; 135,4; 140,3.7
- grammê*, line, 65,36; 103,7; 106,15; 132,33ff.; 133,7; (defined) 102,15
- hairesis*, school of thought, 137,26.29; 138,7
- hama*, simultaneous (*hama têi phusei*, simultaneously by nature), 117,35ff.; 118,5ff.
- haplôs*, simply, unqualifiedly, absolutely, in an absolute sense, 97,8; 108,17.24; 116,1
- hekastos*, each (*kath' hekaston*, particular, syn. *merikos*), 70,31; 89,21ff.; 90,32; 140,15ff.
- hektos*, capable of having a state, 112,30ff.; 137,30? (cf. note)
- Hellênes*, the Greeks, 119,37
- hermêneia*, interpretation (*Peri Hermêneias, On Interpretation*, work of Aristotle), 56,24
- Herminos*, Herminus (Peripatetic commentator), 59,17ff.; 107,25ff.
- heterônumos*, heteronymous (*heterônuma*, heteronyms), 60,31.36; 69,10ff.
- hexis*, state, 70,10; 75,27ff.; 132,10; 135,18; 136,29; 137,26; 139,24ff.; 141,4; (opp. *sterêsis*), 108,11; (opp. *diathesis*), 129,3.15; (conn. with *hektion*), 112,30
- Hippokratês*, Hippocrates (doctor, as example), 140,8
- homoiologos*, having a similar definition, 69,7
- homoïôma*, image, 65,29; 66,27
- homoioristos*, having a similar definition, 69,7
- homoios*, similar, 59,36; 110,32; 113,6; 114,29; 128,8; 133,22; 135,27; 139,18ff.; (*homoïôs*, similarly), 65,1; 125,11; 140,22; 141,24.26
- homoiôsis*, similarity, 65,25; 67,26
- homoiotês*, similarity, 65,19ff.; 66,23ff.; 67,27; 92,19
- homônumia*, homonymy, 61,13ff.; 65,26; 67,6ff.
- homônumos*, homonymous, 64,8; (*homônuma*, homonyms), 59,35; 60,7.25; 61,6.29ff.; 65,15ff.; 66,23ff.; (*homônumôs*, homonymously) 61,11; 70,12; 128,16.19
- horasis*, seeing, sight, 121,18; (opp. *tuphlôtês*), 137,13
- horismos*, definition, 60,15; 62,15; 121,23ff.
- horistikos*, definitional (*horistikos logos*, definitional account), 60,19ff.; 63,7ff.; 64,16ff.; 65,10
- horizein*, define, 61,28; 68,1.28; 126,12; (*hôrismenon*, definite), 107,32ff.; 126,15; (*hôrismenôs*, in a definite way), 125,31; 126,5ff.; (*horistos*, definite), 110,2
- horos*, definition, boundary, 60,4; 63,3.20; 64,6; 67,29; 68,3.11.23.26; 69,3; 70,26; 87,17 (cf. 121,21ff.); 101,18; 102,2ff.; 103,15
- hosiotês*, holiness, 137,2
- hugiês*, sound, correct, 63,3; (*hugiôs*, correctly), 64,6ff.; 116,6.24; 122,9
- hulê*, matter, 77,34; 88,14; 137,26ff.
- hupallêlos*, subordinate (*hupallêla genê*, subordinate genera), 81,30.35; 83,2.14.22.32; 83,35.38; 84,8.22.30; 140,29
- huparkhein*, belong, 82,26; 128,12
- huparxis*, existence, 75,28; 119,1
- huphistanai*, to exist, 60,14; 72,17; 121,9; 124,4.27; 125,17; 131,33; 133,2; 138,30

- hupographê*, description, 60,15; 64,15; 121,27; 123,26ff.; 124,5
- hupographēin*, describe, characterise, 93,29; 124,4; 127,31ff.
- hupographikos*, descriptive (*hupographikos logos*, descriptional account), 64,16; 72,35; 73,3
- hupokeisthai*, to underlie (*hupokeimenon*, subject), 63,15; 68,21; 73,4.23.28.30ff.; 75,24ff.; 77,15ff.; 78,7; 80,1ff.; 80,17; 84,24ff.; 93,14ff.; 114,18ff.; 124,22.28
- hupostasis*, existence, reality, 57,4; 132,27
- husteros*, posterior (opp. *proteros*, prior), 118,17ff.
- iatrikê*, the art of medicine (as example), 66,4ff.
- Idê*, Mt. Ida (example, in Homeric verse quoted), 67,9.12
- idea*, Platonic Idea, 91,16
- idion*, proprium, 77,20; 87,20.22; 94,27; 96,2; 115,5; 135,27; (definition), 93,31ff.
- idiotês*, proper characteristic (opp. *koinotês*), 129,9
- isos*, equal, 110,29; 114,32ff.; 117,27.30; 134,9
- Ithakê*, Ithaca (island, as example), 97,28
- katakhrêsthai*, to use a word in an extended sense, 55,13; 56,1; 67,5, 110,32
- kataphasis*, affirmation (opp. *apophasis*), 57,1.3.8; 108,10; (opp. *sterêsis*), 106,27
- katarithmêsis*, enumeration (opp. *diairesis*), 86,11ff.
- katêgorêma*, predicate (thing predicated?, cf. note ad loc.), 56,11
- katêgoria*, accusation, 55,3.4; 56,6; (*katêgorein*, accuse), 55,5; predication, predicate, 56,7; 58,9; 59,24.30; 61,11; 87,4.13.17ff.; 121,24; (*Katêgoriai*, *Categories*, title of work), 55,7; 56,14; 57,18; 58,18; (*Deka Katêgoriai*, *The Ten Categories*, alternative title of work), 56,15; (*Peri tôn Katêgoriôn*, *On the Categories*, alternative title of work), 57,15; (*katêgorein*, predicate), 55,17; 81,1; 92,31; 96,23; (*katêgoroumenon*, predicate), 59,26; 80,30; 81,4ff.; 84,24ff.
- katêgorikos*, categorical (proposition), 56,26
- katholikos*, universal, 76,20; 80,20.24.27; (*katholikôs*, universally), 71,30
- katholou*, universal, 71,21ff.; 72,24; 83,18; 99,23; 121,2; 138,33
- keisthai*, to lie, be established, 55,13; 67,6; 117,4ff.; 119,11; (position, as category), 71,25; 86,16; 87,27; 141,8.30
- kengkhros*, millet seed (example of small thing, opp. *oros*, mountain), 109,2.8
- kephalê*, head (example of part of a substance), 55,25; 56,1ff.; 116,22.24; 122,9ff.; 122,27; 126,17
- kephalôtos*, headed, having a head (example of relative), 55,25; 56,1ff.; 116,27; 123,12ff.
- kheir*, hand (example of part of substance), 94,21; (example of relative), 122,2.25; 123,11.20; 126,12
- khiastos*, criss-cross (*hê khiastê*, sc. *taxis*, criss-cross arrangement), 78,36ff.
- khimaira*, chimera (example of fictional object), 121,8
- khêsis*, use (of words), 55,9; 57,22; 62,22.26.31; 127,25
- khroia*, colouring, 130,28ff.; 131,10; 136,7
- khroma*, colour, 57,26; 77,36; 92,35; 99,24.32ff.; 124,10.11; 129,13
- khronos*, time, 103,19ff.; 104,23; 108,29ff.; 141,16; 142,12
- kinêsis*, motion, change, 99,2; 105,2.44.36.38
- koinos*, common, in common, 62,17ff.; 64,14; 65,34; 90,14.32ff.; 91,3; 93,6; 99,25; 102,3; 122,34; 135,26; (*to koinon*, common item), 91,7
- koinotês*, commonality, 68,22; 81,16.20; 96,20
- kôphotês*, deafness (example of quality), 137,3

- Kornoutos**, Cornutus (Stoic critic of *Categories*), 59,10
- kosmos**, universe, 62,9
- krasis**, mixture, consitution (*phusikê krasis*, natural constitution), 131,1
- kreêphagos**, carnivore (differentia of bird), 84,15
- kurios**, proper, 59,11; 81,8; 88,30; 89,13.25; 92,11; 93,32ff.; 94,27; 96,2; (*kuria lexis*, proper use of expression, opp. *metaphorikê, tropikê*), 58,37
- leukos**, white (example of qualification), 72,19ff.; 76,5; 109,32; 124,9; 127,2; 129,12; (definition of) 92,25; 124,9; 129,13; (dist. *leukotês*), 124,6ff.; 127,12ff.; 128,14; 131,2
- leukotês**, whiteness (example of quality), 72,23; 78,19; 92,33; (dist. to *leukon*), 124,6ff.; 127,12ff.; 128,14; 131,2
- lexis**, expression, 55,9.12; 56,7.8.11; 57,22.30ff. 58,8.11.19.34.35; 61,17.19.27; 70,32ff.; 71,13.15; 86,21.36; 91,5.7
- logikos**, rational (differentia of man), 60,18; 63,12.22; 65,27; 82,18; 95,29; 117,17
- logos**, speech, reason, sentence, account, argument, 56,6; 57,4.10; 58,22.33; 59,23; 60,22ff.; 61,12; 63,3.7; 68,18; 72,34; 75,26; 90,27.29; 92,30; 94,33; 98,7.12; 101,24.31; 104,25ff.; 105,9; 139,3.14ff.; (ratio, proportion), 91,13; 124,20; 125,2.4 (cf. 112,19); (*logos endiathetos* vs. *prophorikos*, internal vs. external speech), 64,28 (cf. 101,26.28; 106.35); (*logos spermatikos*, seed-formula), 64,28
- Lukeion**, the Lyceum (as example), 77,23; 87,25
- mathêma**, object of learning, 66,6; (*ta mathêmata*, branches of learning), 119,37
- melania**, blackness (example of quality), 130,28; 131,2.28
- melas**, black (example of qualification), 109,32ff.; 131,27
- merikos**, particular (syn. *kath' hekaston*), 71,33; 72,8; 73,14; 74,16.21.34ff.; 75,10.11; 76,1.21; 140,5
- meson**, intermediate term, 60,3; 66,18; 107,11ff; 125,16; 136,8; 138,3
- metabolê**, change, 98,21
- metapherein**, to transfer (a word, as in metaphorical usage), 67,5.24
- metaphora**, metaphor, 66,30ff.
- metaphorikos**, metaphorical (*metaphorikê lexis*, metaphorical expression, opp. *kurios*), 58,37
- metaskhêmatismos**, change in grammatical form, 60,34; 69,24ff.; 70,4
- metaskhêmatizein**, to change grammatical form, 69,22ff.
- metekhein**, participate, 60,32; 69,33ff.; 72,21.23; 77,30; 105,4
- metokhê**, participation, 66,19; 70,13
- monas**, monad, 65,31.35; 101,19; 118,27
- monoptôtos**, indeclinable (*ta monoptôta*, indeclinable nouns), 62,4
- morphê**, shape, 77,34; 133,1.13ff.; (definition of), 132,21
- mousikos**, musical (as example), 70,11ff.; 75,16; 120,6; (*mousikê*, sc. *tekhne*, the art of music, as example), 70,8ff.; 120,6; 140,8.22
- nôdotês**, toothlessness (example of quality), 137,3
- noein**, think, 90,34; 92,2
- noêtos**, intelligible, 91,15.25
- nous**, intelligence, 60,18; 91,15; 120,35
- Odusseus**, Odysseus (Homeric character, as example), 97,27
- ôkhros**, pale (example of qualification), 130,29; 136,6
- ôkhrotês**, paleness (example of quality), 137,3
- onoma**, word, name, noun, 55,11; 57,28.33; 58,31; 60,15ff.; 61,32; 62,1ff.; 63,3ff.; 68,14.23; 101,30
- onomastikos**, name-like, 62,1
- onomatopoiein**, to coin words, 56,5; 116,21; 117,23

- ophthalmos*, eye (example of part of a substance), 94,21; 123,15
- oros*, mountain, 67,11; (example of large thing, opp. *kengkhos*, millet seed), 108,38; 109,7
- ouranios*, heavenly (*ta ourania*, the heavenly bodies), 99,14
- ouranos*, heaven, 99,1
- ousia*, substance, essence, 56,30; 60,19ff.; 63,12ff.; 66,26; 68,24ff.; 71,20; 72,8; 73,28; 81,11; 83,25; 86,34; 88,4ff.; 89,7.10.33ff.; 91,10.15.17.28ff.; 92,15ff.; 93,2ff.; 94,13ff.; 96,4.30; 97,7; 98,4ff.; 100,6; 121,28ff.; 122,6.14.16ff.; 123,4; 125,25; 126,10ff.
- ousiôdês*, substantial, essential, 95,19ff.; 99,14ff.; 115,5; 133,15.17
- palaistês*, wrestler, 135,11,14
- palaistikos*, capable of wrestling, 135,12.15; (*palaistikê*, the art of wrestling), 135,10
- paradeigma*, example, 55,15; 65,13; 68,20; 86,17.19; 87,20; 88,9; 112,22
- parakolouthein*, be a concomitant of, 129,29; 141,22
- parakolouthêma*, concomitant, 127,7
- paraphuas*, offshoot, 142,10
- parastatikos*, explanatory, 55,9; 58,4; 60,30; 81,17; 84,6; (*parastatikos logos*, explanatory account), 73,21ff.
- parônumos*, paronymous (*parônuma*, paronyms), 59,36; 60,7.34.37; 69,16.30; 113,23; 133,30; 135,17; 141,30; (*parônumôs*, paronymously), 70,12ff.; 92,24; 135,19; 142,3
- pas*, whole (*to pan*, the universe), 107,10ff.
- paskhein*, to be affected (affection, as category), 71,24; 141,5.8.13.23
- pathêtikos*, affective, 130,11; 131,6ff.; 132,1.17
- pathos*, affection, 127,29; 130,11.16.25; 131,6ff.; 132,6.17; (opp. *energeia*, activity), 101,27; 125,26, 141,17; (*pathos ousiôdes*, essential affection), 115,5; (*pathos phusikon*, natural affection, emotion), 130,32; 131,1
- pêdalion*, rudder, 67,18; 116,29.34ff.; 117,29; 123,10
- pêdaliôtos*, ruddered (example of relative), 116,33ff.
- peras*, limit, 102,31; 103,5ff.; 107,12
- pezos*, terrestrial (example of differentia of animal), 82,7; 94,31.35; 101,9
- phakoeidês*, lens-shaped, 133,24
- phantasia*, mental appearance, imagination, 130,33
- phantasma*, imaginary image, 121,9
- philosophos*, philosopher, 55,10
- phoenix*, phoenix (mythical bird), 82,35
- phônê*, word, vocal sound, 56,35; 57,3ff.; 58,5.13.21.36; 59,13; 60,20; 62,27.31; 70,28; 71,19ff.; 128,23.26
- phronêsis*, prudence, 98,6; 130,3
- phronimos*, prudent, wise, 99,26.27
- phusikos*, natural, physical, 56,30; 129,19; 130,2.32; 131,1; 135,7; (*Hê Phusikê Akroasis*, *Physics*, work of Aristotle), 141,16; (*Ta Meta ta Phusika*, *Metaphysics*, work of Aristotle), 134,26.29; 141,17
- phusis*, nature, 55,17.18; 56,30; 59,20; 88,6; 91,21.24; 92,13; 117,35; 120,34; 131,27.30
- Platôn*, Plato (as example) 71,5.11; 75,15; 88,26; 97,17; 129,8.9.10
- Platonikos*, Platonic (passage), 111,28; (Platonist philosopher), 137,29
- poêphagos*, herbivore (differentia of bird), 84,14
- poiein*, to do (action, as category), 71,24; 86,17; 87,26; 141,8.13.19.23
- poiêtês*, poet, 67,10
- poios*, qualified (*poion*, qualification, as category), 56,36; 86,16; 87,24; 127,3; (*poion ti*, of what sort, opp. *ti esti*, what it is, essence) 82,17.20; 95,8.20
- poiôtês*, quality, 56,36; 82,24; 95,19ff.; 124,23; 127,10.32; 128,34; 129,3.20; 130,11; 132,1.21; 133,21; 135,3.30; 137,18.26; 138,3.20.25ff.; 139,18; 140,6
- poluônomos*, polyonymous (*poluônoma*, polyonyms) 60,30; 68,30ff.; 69,6

- posos*, how much (*poson*, quantity, as category), 56,36; 71,24; 86,16.34; 87,25; 100,11.27.32ff.; 101,14; 105,12ff.; 106,11; 107,32; 110,19.29
- pote*, when (as category), 75,24; 141,8.14; 142,7
- pou*, where (as category), 75,24; 86,16; 87,25; 141,9.15; 142,6.9
- pragma*, thing, object (opp. *onoma*), 55,8.10; 56,9.12; 57,5.11.20; 58,7; 61,15; 77,33; 124,4
- pragmateia*, treatise, inquiry, 57,5.19; 58,21; 59,1.2; 61,15
- praxis*, action (type of change), 98,29; 105,5
- prolēpsis*, preconception, 59,27
- pros hen*, relative to a single source, 65,21
- pros ti*, relative (as category), 71,24; 86,16; 87,25; 97,4; 108,11; 111,8.19.32; 112,22; 113,29ff.; 123,29ff.; 124,16; 125,15.21; 142,9
- prosēgoria*, appellation, 65,23; 66,3.13; 67,25; 68,24; 69,17.21ff.; 125,2; 134,2
- protasis*, proposition, premiss, 56,26; 87,29.32ff.
- proteros*: prior (opp. *husteros*, posterior), 118,18ff.
- prothesis*, purpose, subject (of the work), 57,16.19; 58,4; 59,15; 70,28; 71,15; 91,8
- psukhē*, soul, 55,20; 75,36ff.; 77,35; 131,13ff.
- psukhikos*, psychological, 76,5
- ptēnos*, winged (example of differentia of animal), 82,8.19; 83,15; 85,24; 101,9
- pterōtos*, winged (example of differentia of animal), 85,25; 116,11; 117,19
- ptōsis*, (grammatical) case, case-ending (of word), 69,24ff.; 112,3.15; 115,26ff.; (*orthē, eutheia* *ptōsis*, nominative case), 112,9.12; (*genikhē ptōsis*, genitive case), 112,11ff.; 115,8; (*dotikhē ptōsis*, dative case), 112,14; 115,30
- puktēs*, boxer, 135,8ff.
- puktikos*, capable of boxing (example of quality), 129,28,31; 135,8; (*puk-*
- tikhē*, the art of boxing), 128,31; 135,8
- rhēma*, verb, 57,33; 58,31; 61,32; 101,32
- Rhōmaios*, Roman, 69,9
- sēmainein*, signify, 56,9; 57,11; 58,3; 127,26ff.; (*to sēmainomenon*, signification), 58,17; 62,29; 64,30; 65,2ff.; 108,30; 127,29; 140,28.30
- sēmantikos*, significant, 56,7.8; 57,3.21.28; 58,5.18.34; 74,16; 86,21; 106,35
- skhēma*, shape, 77,35; 78,19; 120,13.15; 132,21ff.; 136,9; 138,33
- skhēmatismos*, shaping, 133,3
- skhesis*, relation, 57,24; 60,22; 70,25ff.; 108,27; 112,2ff.; 124,17.23ff.; 125,15
- skopos*, subject-matter (of work), 60,1
- Sōkratēs*, Socrates (as example), 71,5.8.10.31; 72,8.26; 75,15-18; 79,13.27.20; 80,5.7.9.10.32; 88,26; 90,21.23.26.30; 92,8.30; 93,23; 96,5.31; 97,15.16; 98,6.18; 99,20.21; 114,18; 122,18.19; 126,6; 129,8.9.10; 140,30; 141,3
- sōma*, body, 75,37ff.; 102,37ff.; 103,11; 106,25ff.; 130,8; 131,12.13
- sōmatikos*, corporeal, 76,5
- Sōphroniskos*, Sophroniscus (father of Socrates, as example), 126,5.7
- sōphrosunē*, temperance (example of quality), 135,23; 136,30
- spermophagos*, granivore (differentia of bird), 84,14
- spoudaios*, admirable (as example) 70,14ff.; 99,19.20; 135,21
- spoudē*, admiration (lit. 'eagerness'), 70,14ff.
- stasis*, rest (opp. *kinēsis*), 99,1; 112,14; 141,33
- sterēsis*, privation, 106,28; 136,25ff.; 137,2; (opp. *hexis*), 108,11
- Stoa*, the Stoa (Stoicism), 119,35; 138,3; (*Stoikos*, Stoic philosopher), 86,22
- stoikheiōdēs*, elementary, 56,28; 59,22
- stoikheiōsis*, elementary discussion, 58,19; 134,28

- sullabê*, syllable, 101,31ff.; 104,26  
*sumbaneîn*, to happen to, be an accident of, 71,7; 72,19; 117,21ff.; (follow from), 80,28; 110,9; 117,25  
*sumbebêkos*, accident, 71,20; 73,23.25.33; 75,36; 76,5; 81,17; 105,12ff.  
*sumbolikhôs*, as a token, 57,29  
*sumplêrôtikos*, complementary, 95,22; (*sumplêrôtikon*, a complement), 95,22; 99,16; 125,25  
*sumplokê*, combination (cf. *Cat.* 1a16-18, 2a8), 57,3.6.9; 71,1.3ff.; 72,9; 87,4.14.32.38  
*sunamphoterôs*, composite (*to sunamphoteron*, the composite of form and matter), 88,14ff.  
*sundesmos*, conjunction (part of speech), 61,32; 71,9; 135,32; (*sumplêktikos undesmos*, coordinating conjunction), 71,5  
*sunekhês*, continuous, 60,4; 105,5; (opp. *diôrismenôs*, discrete), 100,26.32ff.; 102,12ff.  
*sunêtheia*, ordinary usage, ordinary language, 55,3.8; 56,6; 116,14; 135,1.25  
*sunônumos*, synonymous (*sunônuma*, synonyms), 59,35; 60,7.27.37; (*sunônumôs*, synonymously), 80,22; 81,7; 92,26ff.  
*suzugos*, correspond with (*suzugos einai*, to correspond with, equal in extension), 63,4.7.13.17.18; 68,23  
  
*taxis*, order, 104,14ff.; 105,9; 111,5  
*tekhnhê*, art, craft, 55,17; 137,20; 138,2  
*teleios*, complete, perfect, realised, 131,25.31; 134,29; 137,20; (*teleios katêgoria*, complete predication), 87,4.13; (*to teleion*, realisation), 131,27  
*teleioun*, to realise, 131,25.35  
*Telêmakhos*, Telemachus (son of Odysseus, Homeric character, as example), 62,32; 64,10.13  
*telos*, goal, end, 55,17.20; 66,12ff.; 77,31; 69,22ff.; 133,7  
*tetragônismos*, squaring (*tetragônismos kuklou*, the squaring of the circle), 120,9ff.  
*Thalês*, Thales (Greek philosopher), 120,20  
*Theôn*, Theon (as example), 126,13  
*theôrêma*, theorem, 60,6; 138,33  
*theos*, God, 122,19ff.  
*thesis*, imposition (of words), 58,1.3.32.34; (relative position), 101,2; 104,5.14; 112,31; 113,10.12ff.; 141,29.33  
*thetos*, capable of having a position, 112,31; 113,10  
*thnêtos*, mortal (differentia of man), 60,18; 63,12.22; 65,27; 82,18; 85,24ff.; 108,7; 117,17  
*Thoukudidês*, Thucydides (historian, quoted), 105,38  
*Topika*, *Topics* (work of Aristotle): *Ta pro tôn Topikôn*, *Introduction to the Topics* (alternative title of *Categories*), 56,18  
*topos*, place, 77,22; 103,19ff.; 107,1.7.23; 141,16; 142,12  
*Troia*, Troy (as example), 97,28  
*tropikos*, figurative (*tropikhê lexis*, figurative expression), 59,1.11  
*tukhê*, chance, 65,18.24  
*tuphlôtês*, blindness (example of quality), 137,3.13  
  
*xenizein*, to violate accepted Greek usage, 55,7  
  
*Zeus*, Zeus (as example), 87,40  
*zôgraphia*, art of painting, 121,11  
*zôion*, animal (as example), 60,18ff.; 63,11ff.; 66,26; 68,34ff.; 84,14; 85,18; 117,17; 130,16



# Subject Index

References are to the page and line numbers of Busse's *CAG* edition, given in the margins of the translation.

- accident, *sumbebēkos*  
particular accident, 71,22.32.34ff.;  
72,1-15; 72,30ff.; 73,14-74,4;  
74,21ff.; 75,30-76,8; 78,22-79,11  
universal accident, 71,22.32.35ff.;  
72,1-15; 72,30ff.; 73,14-74,4;  
74,10ff.; 76,9-23; 78,22-79,11  
action, *poiein* (as category), 71,24;  
87,26; 141,8.13.17-27  
affection, *paskhein* (as category),  
71,24; 87,26; 141,8.13.17-27  
*Analytics*, work of Aristotle, 56,24  
Andronicus of Rhodes (Peripatetic  
commentator), views of, 107,29?  
(cf. n. ad loc.); 125,21  
animal, *zōion*, definition of, 66,26;  
68,24ff.; 85,18  
Athenodorus (Stoic critic of *Catego-*  
*ries*), views of, 59,10; 86,22  
*Against the Categories of Aristotle*,  
86,23  
Atticus (Platonist philosopher), error  
of concerning metaphor, 66,34  
being-in, *en*, senses of (see also  
inherence), 77,19-78,21  
Boethius (Peripatetic commentator),  
opinion on subject-matter of  
*Categories*, 59,17  
body, *sōma*, as continuous quantity,  
102,27-103,17; 104,1-3.31;  
106,24  
*Categories*, see title of work  
categories, *katēgoriai*, 56,35; 71,23ff;  
82,25ff.; 84,5; 86,7.13.21;  
87,24ff.; 88,2; 139,25; 140,28  
order of, 88,3ff.; 100,10ff.; 111,8ff.;  
127,2-9  
change, *kinēsis*, as accidental quan-  
tity, 105,5-6; 105,36-106,6  
chiasmus, 78,35-79,11  
combination, *sumplokē*, 71,1-14;  
87,1-15  
common, *koinon*, senses of, 62,19-33  
condition, *diathēsis*, see also quali-  
fication  
Platonist view of, 137,26-9  
Stoic view of, 137,29-138,4  
contrariety, see individual categories  
genus of contraries, 137,5ff.  
correlatives, *antistrephonta*, see  
relative  
Cornutus (Stoic critic of *Categories*),  
views of, 59,10  
*Arts of Rhetoric*, 86,23  
definition, *logos*, *horos*, *horismos*, see  
dog, man  
conditions on, 63,20ff.; 87,16-23  
description, *hupographē*, 60,15;  
64,15; 121,27; 123,26ff.; 124,5;  
cf. 111,18, 121,23ff.  
differentia, *diaphora*, 56,34; 81,23-  
82,32; 84,10-86,4  
an essential quality (*ousiōdēs*  
*poion*), 95,17ff.  
specific vs. divisive differentiae,  
84,26-86,4  
of category of substance, 88,22ff.  
of quantity, 100,29ff.  
direction, above and below, 107,1-30  
dog, definition of, 82,20  
enumeration, *katarithmēsis* (opp.  
division, *diairesis*), 86,1-19

- flavour, inseparability of, 79,23ff.
- genus, *genos*, 56,34; 82,5-7; 83,1-86,4; 89,35-93,24  
 subordinate genera, *hupallêla genê*, 81,30ff.; 83,2-32; 83,35ff.; 84,8-30; 140,29
- having, *ekhein* (as category), 71,24; 87,27; 141,9; 142,6ff.
- heaven, *ouranos*, heavenly bodies, *ta ourania*, 99,1ff.
- Herminus (Peripatetic commentator)  
 opinion on subject-matter of Categories, 59,17ff.  
 opinion on relations of place, 107,25ff.
- heteronyms, *heterônuma*, 60,31.36; 69,10-13
- Homer (*Iliad* quoted), 67,9.12; (*Odyssey* quoted), 67,15
- homonyms, *homônuma*, 59,35-67,32  
 types of, 65,12ff.
- imposition of words, *thesis*, primary vs. secondary, 58.1-3
- inherence of accident in subject (see also being-in) 72,17; 75,24ff.; 77,13-78,22; 79,12-34; 88,5
- Introduction to the Topics*, alternative title of *Categories*, 56,18.23
- intelligence, *nous*, 60,18; 91,15; 120,35
- knowledge, *epistêmê*, relative to knowable objects, 112,29; 119,9-121,4  
 eternity of knowable objects, 119,33ff.
- line, *grammê*, as continuous quantity, 102,14-20; 104,31; 106,15-19; 110,21
- logos*, speech, account, definition, sentence  
 admits truth and falsity while remaining the same, 98,7-22  
 as discrete quantity, 101,24-102,9; 105,8-10; 106,33-9  
 external vs. internal speech (*prophorikos* vs. *endiathetos logos*), 64,30; cf. 101,26.28; 106,35  
 senses of, 64,28ff.
- man, definition of, 60,17-18; 63,10.22; 65,27; 82,18; 117,14-17
- metaphor, *metaphora*, 66,30-67,32  
*Metaphysics*, work of Aristotle, 134,26.29; 141,17
- motion, see change
- number, *arithmos*, as discrete quantity, 101,19-23; 105,8-10.25
- odour, inseparability of, 79,23ff.
- On Generation and Corruption*, work of Aristotle, 141,14
- On Interpretation*, work of Aristotle, 56,24
- On the Genera of Being*, alternative title of *Categories*, 56,18.31
- On the Ten Genera*, alternative title of *Categories*, 56,19.31
- ordinary language, ordinary usage, *sunêtheia*, 55.3.8; 56,6; 116,14; 135,1.25
- paronyms, *parônuma*, 59,36; 60,31-7; 69,14-70,24
- parts of philosophy, 56,28-32
- perception, *aisthêsis*, relative to perceptible objects, 112,13ff.; 119,9-121,4
- phoenix (example of species with only one member), 82,32-7
- Physics*, work of Aristotle, 141,15
- place, *topos*, 77,23; 79,12-22; 141,16  
 as continuous quantity, 103,19-28.36; 107,1-30  
 distinguished from 'where', 142,12
- polyonyms, *poluônuma*, 60,30.37; 68,30-69,7
- position, *keisthai* (as category), 71,25; 87,27; 141,8.27ff.
- position, relative position, *thesis*, 101,2; 104,5-105,10; 112,31; 141,29.33  
 as relative, 113,10.12ff.; 134,15-19
- predication, *katêgoria*, 56,8-13  
 complete (*teleios*) vs. incomplete (*ellipês*), 87,5.13.31
- prior vs. posterior, 118,17-119,3
- proposition, *protasis*, 87,28ff.
- proprium, *idion*, see individual

- categories
  - definition of, 93,31ff.
  - senses of proprium, 93,29-94,17
- qualification, *poion* (as category), 56,31; 71,24; 87,24; 110,16; 111,9; 127,1-141,4 passim
  - admits contrariety, 135,26-137,14
  - admits more and less, 137,15-139,16
  - affective qualities, as species, 130,10-132,19
  - capacity and incapacity, as species, 129,17-130,9
  - description of, 127,31-128,15
  - distinguished from quality, 127,10-21; 134,30ff.
  - does not include rough, smooth, dense, rare, 133,30-134,19
  - essential qualification (*ousiôdes poion*), 82,22; 95,19ff.; 99,14ff.; 100,11; 115,5
  - not homonymous, 128,16-33
  - paronyms of, 133,20ff.
  - possible fifth species, 134,20ff.
  - proprium of, 135,26-139,21
  - shape, as species, 132,20-133,39
  - similarity and dissimilarity of, 139,17-21
  - state and disposition, as species, 128,34-129,16
  - title of chapter, 127,22ff.
- quality, *poiotês* (as category), see qualification
  - distinguished from qualification, 127,10-21; 134,30ff.
  - immaterial quality, as substance, 128,20-32
- quantity, *poson* (as category), 56,36; 71,24; 87,25; 97,4; 100,10-111,4
  - passim
  - accidental quantity, 105,11-106,6; 108,4
  - continuous quantity, 102,10-104,3
  - differentiae of quantity, 100,29-101,14; 105,19ff.
  - discrete quantity, 101,15-102,9
  - does not admit more and less, 110,19-111,4
  - indefinite quantity, 107,32-109,14
  - proprium of quantity, 105,5-111,4; (to be called equal and unequal), 110,30-111,4
  - receptive of contraries, 106,11-110,17
- relative, *pros ti* (as category), 71,24; 87,25; 108,12-17; 111,5-126,32
  - passim; 134,15-19; 136,7; 139,22-141,4
  - admit contrariety, 113,30-114,24
  - admit of more and less, 114,25-115,16
  - concept of, 111,16ff.
  - grammatical variation in relatives, 111,30-112,23; 113,3ff.
  - primary vs. secondary correlative terms, 115,20ff.
  - proprium of relatives, 113,9-115,33
  - quasi-definition of relatives (Platonic), 111,18-29; 121,20-122,10; (corrected by Aristotle), 123,22-125,28
  - said with reference to correlatives, 111,16ff.; 115,17-33; (need to state correlative properly), 116,1-117,31; (knowledge of correlatives), 125,29-126,32
  - simultaneous by nature, 117,32-119,3
- seed-formula, *spermatikos logos*, 64,28
- simultaneous, *hama*, 117,35-120,19
- species, *eidos*, 56,34; 80,32-81,23; 82,5-15; 82,33-7; 89,35-93,24
- speech, see *logos*
- squaring of the circle, 120,9ff.
- state, *hexis*, see also qualification
  - as belonging to both qualification and relative, 139,22-141,4
- Stoics, 86,22; 119,35; 138,3
- students, beginning vs. advanced, 75,26; 134,33
- substance, *ousia* (as category), 56,30,35; 71,23; 87,24; 88,2-100,8 passim; 100,21; 110,15,27; 121,23-123,23; 126,17-33; 128,20-32
  - concept of, 88,10
  - does not admit more and less, 97,6ff.
  - does not have contrary, 96,29ff.
  - particular substance, 71,21,31,35ff.; 72,1-15; 72,30ff.; 73,14-74,4;

- 74,16ff.; 76,25-77,12; 78,22-79,11; 99,17-23
- primary vs. secondary substance, 88,23-92,35; 96,6ff.
- priority of substance to other categories, 88,5ff.
- proprium of, 93,25-100,8
- receptive of contraries while remaining the same thing, 98,5-100,7
- senses of substance, 88,13-22
- synonymous predication of substances, 96,23ff.
- universal substance, 71,21.31.35ff.; 72,1-15; 72,30ff.; 73,14-74,4; 74,5ff.; 74,25-75,29; 78,22-79,11; 99,23ff.
- subject, *hupokeimenon*
- said of a subject, 79,35-81,23
- subject matter of the *Categories*, *skopos*, *prothesis*, 57,20-59,34
- twofold classification of simple words, 71,15ff.
- surface, *epiphaneia*, as continuous quantity, 102,24-36; 104,31; 106,20-4; 110,21
- synonyms, *sunônuma*, 59,35; 60,27.37; 61,6; 68,1-27
- Ten Categories, the*, alternative title of *Categories*, 56,15
- text of *Categories*, 85,1ff.
- time, *khronos*, 108, 29, 141,16
- as continuous quantity, 103,19-33.36; 104,34-105,10.25; 106,29; 107,28
- distinguished from 'when', 142,12
- things, *pragmata*, vs. words (*phônai*), 56,34-57,12; 57,24
- title of work, *epigraphê*, 55,3-57,18
- derivation of title, 55,3-56,13
- other titles given to the work in antiquity, 56,14-57,12
- when, *pote* (as category), 71,24; 87,26; 107,27; 141,9.14.16; 142,7ff.
- where, *pou* (as category), 71,24; 87,25; 107,26; 141,9.14.16; 142,7ff.
- word, *phônê* (opp. *pragma*, thing), 56,34-57,12; 57,24