1. Soul, then, is an eternal intellectual essence, having for purpose 1
<#fn_263> the reason of itself; and when it thinks with 2 <#fn_264>
[it,] 3 <#fn_265> it doth attract [unto itself] the Harmony’s
intention. 4 <#fn_266>

But when it leaves behind the body Nature makes, 5 <#fn_267> it bideth
in and by itself,—the maker of itself in the noëtic 6 <#fn_268> world.

It ruleth its own reason, bearing in its own thought 7 <#fn_269> a
motion (called by the name of life)

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like unto [that of] that which cometh into life. 1 <#fn_270>

2. For that the thing peculiar to the Soul [is this],—to furnish other
things with what is like its own peculiarity.

There are, accordingly, two lives, two motions:—one, that according to
the essence of the Soul; the other, that according to the nature of the
body.

The former [is] more general, [the latter is more partial]; the [life]
that is according unto essence has no authority but its own self, the
other [is] under necessity.

For every thing that’s moved, is under the necessity of that which
moveth [it].

The motion that doth move, however, is in close union with the love of
the noëtic essence.

For Soul must be incorporal,—essence that hath no share in any body
Nature makes.

For were it corporal, it would have neither reason nor intelligence. 2
<#fn_271>

For every body is without intelligence; but when it doth receive of
essence, it doth obtain the power of being a breathing animal.

3. The spirit 3 <#fn_272> [hath the power to contemplate] the body; the
reason of the essence hath the power to contemplate the Beautiful.

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The sensible—the spirit—is that which can discern appearances. It is
distributed into the various sense-organs 1 <#fn_273>; a part of it
becometh spirit by means of which we see, 2 <#fn_274> [a part] by means
of which we hear, [a part] by means of which we smell, [a part] by means
of which we taste, [a part] by means of which we touch.

This spirit, when it is led upwards by the understanding, discerns that
which is sensible 3 <#fn_275>; but if ’tis not, it only maketh pictures
for itself.

For it is of the body, and that, too, receptible of all [impressions].

4. The reason of the essence, on the other hand, is that which is
possessed of judgment. 4 <#fn_276>

The knowledge of things worthy [to be known] is co-existent with the
reason; [that which is coexistent] with the spirit [is] opinion.

The latter has its operation from the surrounding world; the former,
from itself.