Aleksandr Dugin

POLITICA ÆTERNA



BERSERKER

BOOKS

A.G. Dugin

NOOMACHIA

WARS OF THE MIND

POLITICA AETERNA

POLITICAL PLATONISM AND BLACK ENLIGHTENMENT

The main idea of the course on political philosophy is to show the synchronic structures of political Logos in their connection with philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology, and then to outline the diachronic unfolding of these structures in political history. It was precisely the synchronism of the structural description that became the decisive argument in choosing the title — Politica Aeterna or Eternal Politics. The author approaches the consideration of the political first as a timeless structure and only then as processes of historical transformation.

The two poles of the temporary deployment of Politica Aeterna are traditional society and modern society. Thus, Politica Aeterna, static in some of its structures, becomes clear in other structures only in the course of historical processes that actualise what previously remained potential. At the same time, the foundations of politics that dominated traditional society become potential, virtual, and gradually as marginal and "heretical" as the previously materialistic versions — democracy, individualism, economics, etc. This tension in the polar interpretation of the political throughout history is organised in such a way that at first one pole, well aware of itself, describes the opposite pole approximately or even incorrectly, and then the same happens with the opposite pole. The political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle conveys the truth about the vertical Logos of Tradition, but political materialism presents it in a distorted and very approximate way. Modern political philosophy moves towards the realisation of its nihilistic essence gradually, reaching it only when Modernity finally triumphs and the transition to Postmodernity and speculative realism begins. Here, the truth of political nothingness is revealed, but at the same time, the understanding of the Logos of Tradition is completely lost. Thus, in both cases, we are dealing with a partial truth about the structure of the political Logos, which is an inevitable and, probably, constitutive aberration of time for the very nature of history. It is time — political time — that prevents us from correctly assessing the metaphysical foundations of the Political in all its entirety, since we are forced to take a position in time, that is, in a specific phase of political history, which predetermines our view and, at the same time, the object on which it falls and which it seeks to distinguish.

Preface. Politica Aeterna — topology, theory, method

The Political Dimension of Eternity

The book Politica Aeterna is based on edited lectures from a course on political philosophy taught at the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University in 2014. However, some of the topics covered there are developed in much greater detail, and some sections have been rewritten. Thus, the book combines the simplicity of the lecture language with more rigorous philosophical generalisations. At the same time, the main idea of the course has been preserved unchanged. It was to show the *synchronic* structures of the political Logos in their connection with philosophy, metaphysics and ontology, and only then to outline the *diachronic* unfolding of these structures in political history. It was precisely the synchronism of the structural description that became the decisive argument in choosing the title — Politica Aeterna or Eternal Politics, but it can also be understood as the political dimension of eternity or the politics of eternity. Politica Aeterna approaches the Political first as a timeless structure, and only then as processes of historical transformation. The eternal explains time, which adds nothing to the structure of the philosophical City (polis), but may well detract from its completeness. However, this completeness, glimpses of which we encounter in the philosophical systems of the greatest geniuses — Plato, Aristotle and... Democritus, being generally represented in the classical teachings of Antiquity, many of which have direct analogues beyond the Mediterranean civilisation — in India, Iran, China, etc., nevertheless has, in turn, some less contrastingly described and interpreted aspects. This applies above all to the materialistic interpretation of politics, which was generally deeply alien to the very spirit of Greco-Latin culture and, moreover, to traditional civilisation as a whole. Yes, the ancient materialists Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius and the schools and movements close to them had already outlined the main vectors of their interpretation.

the political Logos, but for them to become fully clear, it was probably necessary to have the political philosophy of Modernity, where political materialism and nihilism itself could reveal themselves much more fully than in traditional society, where they were marginal and "heretical" (from a philosophical point of view) phenomena. Thus, Politica Aeterna, static in some of its structures, becomes clear in other structures only in the course of historical processes that actualise what previously remained in potential. At the same time, the foundations of politics that dominated traditional society become potential, virtual, and gradually as marginal and "heretical" as the previously materialistic versions — democracy, individualism, economics, etc.

Politica Aeterna is therefore supplemented by an analysis of political Modernity, which, without adding anything to the eternal structure, nevertheless clarifies some of the borderline territories of political Logos, revealing its darkest, shadiest aspects, associated with the structures of nothingness, matter and the figures of the Great Mother. At the same time, turning to the political Logos of traditional society as the main content of Politica Aeterna, we recall that its relationship with the "past" has a symbolic and conventional meaning that should not obscure the eternal relevance of patriarchal — Platonic and Aristotelian — models of vertical and hierarchical organisation of society. Therefore, what was obvious and clear — real — in traditional society in the Modern Age has become potential, blurred and considered "something that has been overcome," "removed," and therefore irrelevant and, ultimately, "incomprehensible." Conversely, the marginal and peripheral conception of the political in traditional society, which was in turn "incomprehensible,"
"eccentric" and "extravagant" became self-evident in the era of European Modernism. This tension in the polar interpretation of the Political throughout history is organised in such a way that at first one pole, well aware of itself, describes the opposite pole approximately or even incorrectly, and then the same happens with the opposite pole. The political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle conveys the truth about the vertical Logos of Tradition, but political materialism presents it in a distorted and very approximate way. Modern political philosophy moves towards the realisation of its nihilistic essence gradually, reaching it only when Modernity finally triumphs and the transition to Postmodernity and speculative re-

realism. Here, the truth of the political is revealed, but at the same time, the understanding of the Logos of Tradition is completely lost. Thus, in both cases, we are dealing with a partial truth of the structure of the political Logos, which is an inevitable and, probably, constitutive aberration of time for the very nature of history. It is time — political time — that prevents us from correctly assessing the metaphysical foundations of the Political in all its entirety, since we are forced to take a position in time, that is, in a specific phase of political history, which predetermines our view and, at the same time, the object on which it falls and which it seeks to distinguish. In Modernity, and especially in Postmodernity, we are close to political nothingness, to the lower limit of the Political, to the very substance of politics, and therefore we are able to discern its details at the quantum level. But the price for such detail is the loss of the idea of the whole, the complete, the perfect. The discovery of the truth about nothingness comes at the cost of the loss of being.

In traditional society, and especially in its most complete and perfect forms, existence reigns supreme, but at the expense of ignoring non-existence, pushing nothingness beyond the limits of attention, and at the expense of a lack of detail. And although in traditional forms of politics — empire, theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, etc. — the deficit is negligible (the only thing missing here is knowledge of what nothingness is), and in political modernity, on the contrary, knowledge of nothingness is achieved through complete oblivion of being, Nevertheless, for the completeness of the political Logos, it is important to combine the diachronic picture into a synchronic model, where not only completeness and perfection (lost in Modernity and even more so in Postmodernity) are taken into account, but also matter, distortions, decay, poverty, insignificance, and nothingness itself. This is precisely what constitutes the content of Politica Aeterna, complementing the traditional view of the Political with nihilism and the motifs of the "Black Enlightenment," but at the same time reminding the nihilistic period of political history in which we live that what once was is not simply a thing of the past, but is eternal, and therefore may be in the future, beyond Modernity and attempts to overcome it, plunging ever deeper into its own essence (i.e., into Postmodernity). The political vertical of Platonism and Aristotle's normal state (i.e., monarchy) are always and always possible. But there is also always and forever the possibility of political Modernity and Postmodernity, realised today, but fully understood and lived out by Democritus.

Taken together, this constitutes the general topology of Politica Aeterna, as a system of political philosophy that does not

knows political decrees as something irreversible and fatal, and opens up the realm of political thought to absolute verticality. The ancient Greeks or Hindus could have chosen materialism, scepticism, nihilism, and democracy. And sometimes they actually did. But then such choices were reversed, and the decision shifted to the realm of monarchy, aristocracy, or theocracy. The fact that vertical politics prevailed and constitutes the basic definition of traditional society: in it, verticality and sacredness prevail, and the always possible outbreaks of materialism are exceptions. In the modern era, on the contrary, materialism, egalitarianism, democracy, and atomism (individualism) are the most common, and attempts to return to sacred politics are exceptions. Politica Aeterna draws a fundamental conclusion from this observation: political time, with its own logic, is not an irreversible fate. It may seem so, but this is an illusion. Any political system, whether traditional or modern, is based on a Decision. Turning to "political eternity," we can choose any of its areas. Some of them seem more distant and difficult to access, while others, on the contrary, seem close and almost obvious. This is precisely what political history determines. But Politica Aeterna asserts a perpendicular to this history. It must be taken into account and reckoned with, but *the choice always exists.* This is precisely the revolutionary content of Politica Aeterna: it makes the Decision free, restoring the dignity of human (and non-human) thought. When choosing in the context of Politica Aeterna, we are dealing with the present, that is, with what is and what is here and now. Another question is the degree of intensity of this presence. It varies. But this is not fatal: for however shaky the truth may seem, in the end it will prove to be harder than any metal.

Philosophy and politics: the nature of an inseparable connection

From the description of the essence of Politica Aeterna, one can move in different directions. First, one can delve deeper into the thesis of the profound identity of philosophy and politics, or the philosophical and the political. This is almost obvious in theory, but we often forget about it when we immerse ourselves in political analysis, especially in applied political science. Meanwhile, no other field lies so close to philosophy and depends on it as much as politics depends on philosophy. It is philosophy that establishes the Political and all its proportions and structures, which

in turn affect science, society, education, the economy, and everyday life. This totality of the political is recognised by everyone from Plato to Deleuze, but politicians themselves and those who try to think about politics more systematically (political scientists) often overlook this, reducing politics to a set of technologies or solutions to practical issues related to power, its acquisition, retention, and application, and all the purely instrumental practices associated with it. For individuals or entire groups within society, the question of power is indeed central and paramount. But the context in which this power is acquired and exercised is much more important than is usually recognised. Everything fundamental in society depends on the political Logos, and individual rulers, parties, groups, dynasties, etc. can influence it only to a very limited extent. A tyrant, dictator or, conversely, a benevolent humanist in power can do practically nothing to change its structures. At the root of the most serious political transformations are prophets and philosophers, often having no direct connection to a particular authority, but deeply understanding the very nature of the political Logos. It is the Logos that rules, and those who realise this are closer to the element of power than those who occupy central positions in it. Power is a philosophical category and is associated with the depths of the metaphysical Decision. Those who do not know this element of Decision do not rule, but only play a role, representing the true power, which in this case lies elsewhere.

In traditional societies, this circumstance was openly acknowledged: the ruler was a priest, a philosopher, and the central figure of the social and cosmic cult. Power is sacred, and therefore those who wield it must be as close as possible to the sacred realm. In the modern era, democratisation processes were directed towards the desacralisation of power. However, this did not completely abolish the sacred (as that would have abolished power altogether), but rather concealed it. In this sense, the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt spoke of two types of power: Potestas Directa (direct power) and Potestas Indirecta (indirect power). True power is sacred, metaphysical and based on decisions made in the context of the general synchronous structure of Politica Aeterna. In traditional society, Potestas Directa (direct power) was openly sacred and therefore unique. Sometimes only two of its sides were represented by the pair of the king and the priest (as King Arthur and Merlin the wizard in medieval legends) or the Emperor and the Patriarch (as in the Byzantine symphony of powers). Both the king and the priest were Potestas Directa

(direct power). In the modern era, Potestas Directa (direct power) is stripped of its sacred content, hence the principle of separation of powers, transparency, etc. But such power, deprived of its connection with the political Logos, would be unstable and would quickly collapse. This is how "Shadow power" — Potestas Indirecta. This power also maintains links with the sacred, but only covertly, not directly, through parallel hierarchies and closed structures — lodges, clubs, etc. In this case, Potestas Directa (direct power) can indeed remain profane and ignorant in the sphere of political philosophy, since Potestas Indirecta (indirect power) takes care of the political Logos. In this case, the philosophical incompetence of the ruler does not pose a problem: he thinks he rules, when in fact others rule for him. And if Potestas Indirecta (indirect power) pursues everyday technical goals, this means only one thing: it is not real Potestas Indirecta (indirect power), but its simulacrum. Political ontology itself is such that it is inextricably linked to philosophy and depends directly on it.

But in any case, Politica Aeterna draws attention to the fundamental and decisive significance of philosophy in relation to politics, which is sometimes overlooked.

Politica Aeterna and the Fourth Political Theory

Politica Aeterna is fundamental in another context as well: in the search for an alternative to the political philosophy of Modernity and Postmodernity. We refer to the move beyond the political paradigm of the Modern era as the "Fourth Way" or "Fourth Political Theory."[1] This direction aims to overcome the three dominant political philosophies of modernity — liberalism, communism and nationalism — and to construct an alternative political theory beyond the political paradigm that prevails today on a global scale. Interest in this is gradually growing, and accordingly, more and more detailed arguments are needed both in the critique of political modernity, and especially its currently dominant version — liberalism — and in the justification of an alternative political Logos — its content, its structures, its proportions and forms.

The fourth political theory includes, first and foremost, everything that was rejected by modernity: political Platonism

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory. Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

and Aristotelianism. Platonism is included through its most radical and revolutionary version in the form of 20th-century traditionalism, which declared ontological and epistemological war on Modernity. In this capacity, the Fourth Political Theory can be seen as a logical continuation of traditionalism. But the appeal to Politica Aeterna significantly broadens the understanding of political Platonism, placing it in a broader context and clarifying its relationship with other political paradigms — above all with political Aristotelianism.

However, since the Fourth Political Theory addresses not only elites but also peoples as human beings as such, its focus is on the human being, taken, however, in isolation from secondary historical and social superstructures. Therefore, Da-sein, the central concept of Martin Heidegger's philosophy, is proposed as the subject of the Fourth Political Theory. This opens the way to phenomenology as a whole, making the Fourth Political Theory not just a call for sacred restoration, but also a path to the construction of a special existential ontology. This is part of the avant-garde nature of the Fourth Political Theory, which cannot be reduced exclusively to traditionalism. In the context of Politica Aeterna, the zone of phenomenology corresponds precisely to Aristotle's teaching, the appeal to which became the most important moment in the development of phenomenology — in Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger himself. Moreover, Heidegger's reading of Aristotle made it possible to establish a metaphysical kinship between Aristotle's philosophy and phenomenology in contrast to Platonism.

The combination of the political interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, or in modern terms, traditionalism and phenomenology (existentialism), forms the metaphysical basis of the Fourth Political Theory. Its alignment with the context of Politica Aeterna further clarifies its structure and essence.

At the same time, Politica Aeterna allows us to correctly interpret speculative realism and object-oriented ontology as expressions of the terminal stage of all political modernity and the final chord of postmodernity. Speculative realists close the page on rhetorical humanism, under which Modernity concealed its essential nihilism, detectable only by its critics (such as Nietzsche and Heidegger), and acknowledge this as its essence. This is the source of Nick Land's thesis of "Black Procession," accelerationism, and "transcendental nihilism" (R. Brasier). This truth about political materialism, which finds its justification and topological predestination only in Politica Aeterna, is also the most important argument of the Fourth Political Theory.

, is also the most important argument of the Fourth Political Theory. Political Platonism and political Aristotelianism did not know the truth of matter, denying the very possibility of the existence of Logos in it. Modernity created a political reality that was impossible and unacceptable within the structure of the ontological hypotheses of sacred vertical politics. In doing so, it insisted on its own Logos, fully manifested precisely in speculative realism, which pushed the boldest intuitions of postmodernism to their limits. The fourth political theory, thus, in opposition to liberalism, communism and nationalism, metaphysically rejects the entire political Modernity. But the essence of this political Modernity — political materialism and nihilism — in the field of philosophy is precisely the "Black Enlightenment." The Black Enlightenment no longer hides the essence of modernity and openly declares war on man and even on life in favour of the Radical Object. This is precisely what the Fourth Political Theory opposes, not simply rejecting the Logos of matter, but now — and precisely thanks to modernity — knowing its truth. The Fourth Political Theory does not simply reject nihilism, unwilling to know anything about it (like Plato and Aristotle), but overcomes it by first knowing it. And this overcoming, based on prior knowledge, is another distinctive feature of the Fourth Political Theory. It does not simply combine traditionalism with phenomenology (Dasein), but also accepts the challenge of the "Black Enlightenment," offering an answer to the challenge of the Radical Object of speculative realists. This answer is the Radical Subject([1]) but this topic goes beyond the scope of Politica Aeterna, although it remains deeply connected to it.

[1] *Дугин А. Г.* The Radical Subject and Its Double. Moscow: Eurasian Movement. 2009.

PART 1. POLITICAL PLATONISM

Chapter 1. The Essence of Politics. Plato and His Cave

Subject of Study

First of all, let us consider the nature of the discipline known as *political philosophy*. If we turn to the history of philosophy and the history of political systems, we find the following pattern: from the very beginning, philosophy and politics have developed not simply in parallel, but inextricably linked. Among the first Seven Sages, who are considered the founders of the pre-Socratic philosophical tradition, are many who are known for writing political laws and regulations (in particular, Solon). In essence, they were political figures representing their cities and political entities. Therefore, from the very beginning of the history of philosophy, we see *an inseparable link between philosophy and politics.*

Thus, politics as a separate phenomenon, detached from philosophy, represents a completely different approach. The philosophy of politics is a much deeper discipline. It considers both philosophers who were involved in politics and wrote about politics, and politicians who justified their laws and the structure of their political system with philosophical principles. In fact, at the dawn of philosophy and politics, these things were not separated at all.

Thus, the subject of political philosophy is the *original* sphere that united philosophy and politics into a certain there is a common and unified direction.

I mean that there are no such separate phenomena as "philosophy" and "politics" that we artificially combine and use philosophy to study politics. We are not just talking about the political philosophy of a particular direction, period, culture or civilisation. When we talk about *the philosophy of politics,* we are talking, on the one hand, about *the essence* of politics, about what makes politics *politics,* and on the other hand, about the political essence of philosophy, which makes philosophy *philosophy.* But note that there is a difference: philosophy dominates here because *politics without philosophy is impossible.*

Politics is a form of applied philosophy, the application of philosophy to a specific sphere of human life. And philosophy without politics is possible. That is, there is philosophy that does not deal with politics. But there is no politics that is not based on philosophy.

The union of philosophy and politics

The philosophy of politics studies not only the philosophical foundations of politics, but also the political aspects of philosophy itself, because politics is not a private and accidental application of philosophy, but the *most fundamental*, albeit still applied, element of philosophy. As soon as philosophy appears, it necessarily turns first to politics; and all politics flows from philosophy. There is no equilibrium between them, but a deep organic connection. Where this original union *of the philosophical and the political* takes place, there arises the birth of all possible political systems and, at the same time, the crystallisation of philosophical knowledge.

In theory, there is a philosophy that is free from politics and deals with non-political issues. But in reality, even such a free, non-political philosophy is in one way or another connected with politics (since philosophy and politics have common roots). If philosophy considers aesthetic, historical, and cultural issues and yet says nothing about politics, this does not mean that such philosophy is a completely separate — non-political — phenomenon.

All *philosophy has a political dimension*: in some cases explicit (Solon, the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle), in others implicit (when philosophy says nothing about politics, but the very fact of the existence of a philosophical paradigm implicitly contains the possibility of a political dimension). Therefore, there is a very deep connection between philosophy and politics — a connection at the level of their origins. And studying philosophy in isolation from politics significantly impoverishes or weakens the very meaning of philosophy.

On the other hand, the study of politics without philosophy is generally unreliable. A person who does not know philosophy cannot engage in politics. Any philosophical system has a political dimension. But not every philosophical system explicitly develops this model.

Homologies: the history of kingdoms and the history of ideas are not different from each other.

Strictly speaking, the history of philosophy and the history of politics follow *the same pattern*. There is absolute *homology* between them. When philosophy moves in one direction, politics moves with philosophy in the same direction and cannot move in another. If something changes in philosophy, something will inevitably change in politics. But if something changes in politics, it means that something (either before or simultaneously) has changed in philosophy, which predetermined this change.

In fact, there is no autonomy of politics from philosophy. From the point of view of political philosophy, political history is a cross-section of the history of philosophy, depending on this history in an absolute way. No politician is free from philosophy, and no philosopher can be considered in isolation from his implicit political dimension. In other words, the historical picture, history itself as such: the rise of kingdoms, the fall of kingdoms, the construction of a particular civilisation, the demise of civilisation, the conflict between civilisations, states or peoples, dynastic changes, political revolutions, changes in the balance between the urban and rural populations, etc. — all this has a philosophical dimension (not always obvious, not always clearly understood). But the task of those who study the philosophy of politics is to construct the completeness of this total homology. What does *homology* mean *(*from the ancient Greek ομοιος — similar, alike; λόγος — word, law)*?* It means equivalent in meaning; the meanings are common.

The meaning of history — political-philosophical or philosophical-political — is the same. History has two sides: on the one hand, it is the history of kingdoms, states, peoples; on the other hand, it is the history of ideas. *The history of kingdoms and the history of ideas are not different. They are interconnected*. It is the same story.

Therefore, if we observe changes in the sphere of philosophy, for example, the transition from subjective idealism to objective idealism, this is necessarily accompanied by similar political changes. In the transition from subjective idealism to objective idealism, we move from one political model to another. The transition from idealism to materialism entails other changes. Changes in the configuration of religions radically alter the content of political processes in societies where this philosophy is widespread. This homology between the philosophical and the political can be approached from all sides, but it is explained by the unity of a common semantic core.

In the image and likeness

This homology can be likened to the common ancestral root between the figures of the Father and the Son. The philosophical realm—the realm of ideas—is the domain of the Father. It is always above. This gives rise to a certain autonomy of philosophy in relation to politics—that is, the fact that philosophy can contain politics both explicitly and implicitly. Politics, on the other hand, is always and in all cases a projection of the philosophical.

However, the relationship between the Father and the Son, or between the Idea and the Kingdom, cannot be represented in strictly linear terms. The Father, who creates the Son, reproduces in him that which is *common* to both and which is commonly called *the genus*. There is no more nature in the Father than in the Son, despite a certain hierarchy and logical and chronological sequence. In some cases, the Son may embody nature more fully than the Father, and in this case he is more Father than the Father himself.

This can be illustrated in a diagram.



Scheme of the relationship between the Philosophical and the Political

Thus, the homology between the philosophical and the political must be conceived on the basis of generic unity, rather than as a mechanical application of philosophy to politics. After all, the genus is equally primary in relation to the Father and in relation to the Son, but not chronologically, rather ontologically, metaphysically.

Politics and the Political (Das Politische)

In order to study the philosophy of politics, we start with a certain axiom — the absolute homology between the Political and the Philosophical. Here, of course, one can find a certain difference between politics and the Political. One of the greatest political philosophers, Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), distinguishes between politics and *the Political (*das Politische)([1]) The latter should be understood not as an adjective but as a noun. By "politics," Schmitt means the application of the Political to a specific social and historical situation. In other words, *politics is the concretisation of the Political.*

What, in turn, is the Political? Das Politische is the point where the Son/politics connects with the Father/philosophy. This is the realm of the genus. The political is the sphere of political philosophy, the point of homology where we are no longer talking about politics, but not yet about philosophy. Thus, the sphere of the political is the sphere of the existence of preconceptions. And by studying preconceptions, we study the homology mentioned earlier.

The point is that there is a field where the set of philosophy intersects with the set of politics, and between them there is something common that belongs to both the first and second circles — a certain segment that is the Political, the main subject of political philosophy.

The philosopher-king. Plato as a synonym for all philosophy

It is believed that Plato (c. 427–347 BC) was the creator of the first complete philosophical system in history. He most fully formulated the philosophical agenda that determined the entire ancient history of philosophy, the entire Middle Ages, and, to a large extent, the philosophy of the Renaissance, anticipating the philosophy of the modern era. Today, in the 21st century, there is no thinker who...

[1] *Schmitt, K.* The Concept of the Political. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Publishing House "Nauka" RAS, 2016.

more famous and relevant, but at the same time less comprehended and less understood than Plato.

Plato is philosophy itself. All the most brilliant thinkers of the 14th–20th centuries turned to Plato. We still haven't outgrown his agenda. Every word Plato wrote is still hotly debated today. Some geniuses rise up to tear down Platonism,[1] while others restore it. All Christian dogma is based on Plato, and there is not a single thesis in Christian theology that does not have a Platonic dimension. Islamic theology is also built exclusively on Platonism. That is why Plato is considered a philosopher-king whose kingdom — within the realm of philosophy — no one has yet been able to attack effectively. Thousands of times it has been declared that Plato's empire has fallen, but such statements have been reduced to "marginal hallucinations." It still stands.

Plato is the king of philosophy. We either dispute this (and then raise a slave revolt) or accept it unconditionally. The idea that the history of philosophy has added anything to Plato is completely unfounded. Even those who are considered the embodiment of, for example, modern philosophy—Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Karl Popper (1902–1994), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970)—turned to Platonism. Sometimes even such positivist philosophers as Whitehead (1861–1947) were inspired by Plato.

Plato is everything. When a person reads Plato, they come into contact not with a single philosopher, not with a single author, not with a single school — they come into contact with philosophy as such, because all philosophy is nothing more than a movement between Plato's theses, their development, their comparison or contrast, their rejection and new acceptance. Plato created *all of philosophy at once.* One could say that the study of philosophy is the study of Plato's philosophy. Everything else, in essence, as Whitehead himself said, is "mere notes in the margins of Plato."

Accordingly, we must pay attention to the fact that philosophy is only Plato, and if we do not understand Plato, we do not understand the "programming language" of philosophy. The study of philosophy begins with the study of Plato's works, continues through the study of Plato's works, and ends with the study of Plato's works. There is not a single philosopher who does not know Plato.

[1] Among these geniuses were Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), whose philosophy, in his own words, was "inverted Platonism," and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976).

Thus, if we want to become acquainted with the matrix on which the Political, das Politische, is built, i.e., the sphere of the homology we are talking about, if we want to understand where politics comes from, what its structure is, and how it manifests itself through the Political, we need to study Plato. Consequently, Plato is the basic author for the course "Philosophy of Politics" ([1]).

Politics and the doctrine of ideas

Let us turn our attention to where Plato formulates his doctrine of ideas in the clearest form. Key to understanding Plato in this sense is the dialogue The Republic [2](Politeia, Greek: Πολιτεία*, Latin: Respublica*). Plato's state is not simply a "state" in our understanding of "State" or "power." One could say that Politeia is the Political itself. Politeia is translated as both "state" and "republic," but the Greek word has a deeper meaning. It means *any political entity*. In essence, Politeia is what Carl Schmitt calls das Politische. It is the Political, which is most often embodied in the state; the state itself finds its meaning through the Political. *Politeia is primary in relation to the state.*

The question arises: is it a coincidence that Plato formulates his philosophy in its most systematic form in a work called "Politeia," The Political? The answer is no. Therefore, it is Plato's dialogue "The Republic," the main work of the main philosopher, that serves as our starting point for understanding the philosophy of politics.

Every philosopher has an inner coherence and an inner obligation to the truth. A philosopher is not free from the truth. What he writes, how he calls, how he formulates a phrase, is a fundamental statement in the face of the most monstrous authority, no less terrifying and irreversible than death.

As Heidegger notes, *philosophers think in the face of death*. Those who do not think in the face of death do not think at all. Every word of a philosopher is his *last* word.

Check out the dialogue "Phaedo" [3], which describes Socrates' last days and last words. The words Socrates spoke before drinking the cup of hemlock are

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1 *Plato.* Collected Works: In 4 vols. Moscow: Myśl, 1990–1994.

2 *Plato.* The Republic / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow: Myśl, 1994.

3 *Plato.* Phaedo / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow: Myśl, 1993.

philosophy. What does Socrates say in this dialogue? He says: what have I been doing all my life, my friends? I have spent my whole life philosophising on the brink of death. Will I attain a new state after I drink the poison? I have spent my whole life in it — facing death. This cup of hemlock has accompanied me from the moment I felt my calling to philosophy.

Alcibiades in "The Symposium" [1] tells how Socrates bravely retreated during the war. He took part in military operations in which the Athenian army was defeated and all its participants fled. Those who fled cowardly were the first to be pursued by the enemies. Alcibiades says how well Socrates retreated. He retreated thoughtfully, calmly, and the enemies, seeing his unhurried gait, did not dare to throw a spear at him or strike him with a sword. According to Alcibiades, Socrates retreated *with dignity.* Alcibiades says:

> It was especially worth seeing Socrates, my friends, when our army, turning to flight, was retreating from Delia. I was then in the cavalry, and he was in the heavy infantry. He was leaving with Lachetus when our men had already scattered. And so I met them both and, as soon as I saw them, I urged them not to lose heart and told them that I would not abandon them. It was then that Socrates showed himself to me in an even better light than at Potidaea, for I myself was in less danger because I was on horseback. First of all, he had more self-control than Lachetus. Besides, it seemed to me that there, as here, he walked, in your words, Aristophanes, "looking properly to the left and to the right," that is, calmly looking at his friends and enemies, so that even from a distance it was clear to everyone that this man, if provoked, would be able to defend himself, and therefore both of them completed their retreat safely. For those who behave in this way are usually left alone in war; it is those who flee without looking back who are pursued.

The title "The State" in Plato cannot be accidental. His teaching about ideas, therefore, has a direct bearing on politics. "The Republic" is a basic document of political philosophy or the philosophy of politics. There we are dealing with the transition between philosophy (for Plato, this is the doctrine of ideas) and politics as the organisation of the polis in its pure form. Between philosophy and politics lies "The Republic".

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[1] *Plato.* The Symposium / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2.
[2] *Plato.* The Symposium. pp. 131–132.

It should be noted that in Plato's Republic, the philosopher reigns supreme. The ruling philosopher is a figure of the Political.

Plato did not succeed in establishing the political system described in The Republic during his lifetime, and it is quite possible that it cannot be established at all, but he managed to justify the Political, the "state of philosophers," the ideal state or Kallipolis (Καλλίπολις — from the Greek Kallos, "beautiful" and polis, "city"). If we understand what Plato was leading to (and he was leading to the philosophy of politics, not to politics), if we realise that all his statements are not concepts, but pre-concepts (in other words, the things from which specific political concepts are derived), then we will understand that the ideal state (Kallipolis) and the Political, which Plato described in his "Republic," are the meaning of practically all subsequent history — both the history of thought and the history of actions.

In reality, in his ideal state, he did not simply give some kind of covenant, plan or project that could either be implemented or not — he raised and showed the foundation on which all politics in its concrete manifestations rests.

Plato wanted to bring a whole range of specific forms of politics into a single matrix, and he succeeded in doing so. That is why Plato's "State" is the most realistic thing in the entire history of politics.

We live in Plato's state, we have always lived in Plato's state, and we are moving towards the construction of Plato's state — from Plato's state to Plato's state, but only by sorting through the technical possibilities and historical-political concepts of this "State," which all converge on the preconceptions of Kallipolis[1].

Three functions

Plato says that the structure of the Political is divided into three castes: philosophers (guardians), warriors (assistants) and everyone else (mainly peasants, as well as craftsmen and artists) engaged in the production of material goods. If we look at the history of Indo-European civilisation, as reconstructed by Georges Dumézil (1898–1986), we see that it was precisely these three functions that determined the structure of Indo-European societies for thousands of years: from the ancient Scythians and nomads who lived in Eurasia since time immemorial to Rome, Greece,

[1] In modern sociology, this corresponds to the concept of the "ideal type" (German: Idealtypus) put forward by Max Weber (1864–1920).

Iran, India, and throughout the Mediterranean. Everywhere we encounter these three types: divine kings (or priests), warriors, and peasants[1].

Plato described to us the fundamental matrix of what was and is. The entire Middle Ages and the entire Roman Empire were built strictly according to this principle: at the top were the sacred monarchs (philosopher kings, or a division between king and philosopher, emperor and high priest); then the noblesse/noble warriors (the Russian aristocracy was also part of this second class), who, according to Plato, were the guardians' assistants; at the bottom was the main population — peasants (and artisans). We see exactly these models in Greece, Rome, Iran, India, etc.

There is an opinion that Plato's state was never realised, and that the philosopher himself was a "failure" who invented an unworkable system, and that all his attempts to involve the tyrant Dionysius in this system were fruitless, after which Plato was sold into slavery, later ransomed, and later no longer engaged in politics. This is a banal — and completely false — story about Plato's failures to build an ideal state.

The true story of the fate of Platonopolis is as follows: Plato built that great state which was, is, and will be, because he established an ontological and metaphysical system of preconceptions for political organisation. The three-function model discovered in the 20th century by Georges Dumézil (1898–1986) in the course of sociological research on the structure of Indo-European societies is nothing more than another retelling of Plato's "The Republic." The entire Middle Ages, with its three estates, is *the realisation of* Plato's ideal state (Kallipolis).

We see these estates in most societies. That is why Plato is one of the most successful political philosophers in the world, since the model he established truly dominates in various historical types (with some variations). It should be understood that *Plato was engaged in political philosophy*, not politics:

- his project was created at the level of a preconception,
- the construction of certain matrices within which different names and relationships can be fixed and arranged in different ways.
- he simply outlined the most general structure of what is Political, and all political forms are concretisations, transitions from preconception to concept.

[1] *Dumezile G.* The Supreme Gods of the Indo-Europeans. Moscow: Nauka, 1986; *Dumezile G.* The Tripartite Ideology of the Indo-Europeans. Paris: Latomus, 1958.

There is nothing accidental, nothing banal, and nothing secondary in Plato.

The Cave. Anodos and Katodos

Let us turn to Plato's fundamental image in his dialogue The Republic. It is the image of a cave. The story told by Plato is as follows: deep inside a cave, there are people (believed to be slaves or captives) sitting and looking at a wall on which shadows are moving; the attention of the entire group is completely fixed on the shadows, and the people believe that this is life.

What does the philosopher do at this moment? He realises that something is wrong here and begins to look for another explanation for what is happening. The philosopher turns his head in the other direction, he *turns back.* In doing so, he separates himself from the other people who continue to contemplate the shadows (looking straight ahead). He takes a risky action, going against the flow.

And what does *the philosopher* see *when he turns around*? He sees that on a platform, some people (a procession) are carrying statues. Of course, this is the Dionysian procession. The priests of Dionysus are walking there. Everyone is looking only at their shadows.

Then the philosopher makes a second gesture — he rises from his seat and heads towards the procession. This is followed by a third gesture — the philosopher does not remain with the Bacchantes and the Phaenicians, but searches for the source of light that casts its rays upon them, so that they, in turn, cast away the shadows. Thus, the philosopher reaches the entrance to the cave and beholds the real world for the first time. Socrates says that the philosopher must do this at night because his eyes must first get used to the dim light of the stars, for if he immediately rushes outside, the sight of the sun will blind him. At first, the philosopher must look at the multitude of stars, at the world of ideas, and only then at the sun, which is the source of these ideas. Plato calls the ascent to the exit of the cave "anodos" (Greek: ανοδος — the way up).

Thus, the philosopher makes three gestures: he turns his head, joins the Bacchantes [1]and goes to the entrance of the cave to see the real world, where he first contemplates a multitude of ideas

[1]In "Phaedo," Socrates calls true philosophers Bacchantes, counting himself among them: "Yes, for, as those who are knowledgeable in the mysteries say, 'there are many thyrso-bearers, but few Bacchants,' and 'Bacchants' here, in my opinion, are no one else but true philosophers. I have tried to become one of them — all my life, with all my strength, without missing anything. Whether I tried correctly and achieved anything, I will know for sure, if it pleases God, when I come to Hades." *Plato.* Phaedo. P. 29.

(in the form of stars), and then the main idea — the idea of Good (represented, according to some interpretations, by black [1]— the sun).

A philosopher is someone who has performed these three gestures and, in the end, has left the cave and sees the prototypes of those things whose shadows satisfy ordinary people. In other words, a philosopher twice overcomes man:

1) he moves from shadows to reality,

2) he passes from reality to archetypes.

Thus he accomplishes a fundamental ascent, anodós.

But then comes *katodos* (ancient Greek κάθοδος — the way down). Realising how everything is arranged in the world of ideas, the philosopher *descends*. In this descent, he returns to those who contemplate the shadows and becomes their king. The philosopher becomes a philosopher through anodos/ascension, and a politician through katodos/descent.

Philosophy is ascension, politics is descent. This brings us to the main connection between philosophy and politics, to the structure of the homology we mentioned earlier. This is how pre-concepts are formed. The philosopher comes with knowledge that is inaccessible to everyone else and begins to open the eyes of the prisoners. He says that freedom is better than slavery, that reason is better than stupidity, that will and control are better than blind obedience, that truth is much more interesting and sweeter than delusion, that light is much more meaningful and exciting than this play of shadows in eternal twilight, that breathing the real air of existence is incomparably more pleasant than suffocating in the nightmarish stench of the cave floor.

Then (often) he is killed. He is killed because everything he says is completely at odds with the usual ideas, and the philosopher simply prevents people from watching the spectacle cast by the shadows of the Corybants on the wall. But in some cases (as an exception), he is not killed, and then he convinces the prisoners that even if not all of them are ready for the three philosophical gestures, at least they are capable of facing the truth — of looking back, of looking in another direction. Others can rise up to the Bacchantes and take part in the festival of Dionysus. If anyone wants to follow further, the philosopher takes him by the hand and leads him to the exit of the cave.

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[1]Neoplatonists emphasised the apophatic nature of the Good, identifying it with the super-being One from Plato's dialogue Parmenides. *Plato.* Parmenides/Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2. On the black sun, see *Marlan S.* The Black Sun: The Alchemy and Art of Darkness. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005.

Those who determine the philosophical paradigms of governance rule

Before us lies *the entire political programme*: rise up, descend so as not to leave people behind, and lift up all the rest — those who can still be awakened. Politics must be placed *under* the Political, i.e., under the philosophy of politics. Then the philosopher is the King, and only the philosopher has the right to power. All others are usurpers. Only those who can perform two actions — anodos and katodos — can be adequate philosophers and adequate rulers.

Of course, the question arises: why descend? Socrates replies that it is a sacrifice. A true philosopher must ascend, but if he does not descend, he will show his dependence on the filth he left behind. He will be too squeamish a philosopher. It is truly necessary to descend into the cave, reach its bottom, and clean up all the rubbish that is there, to awaken people from their sleep.

Therefore, *true politics is the politics of philosophical awakening*. Only a political system that guides all its citizens towards awakening and spiritual self-awareness is adequate. If politics does not pursue this goal, it is false politics, the politics of evil, the politics of usurpation.

All power has a philosophical dimension, and it is always philosophers who rule. Those who rule are those who determine the philosophical paradigms of governance, those who engage in political philosophy, not politics. And political philosophy, as we have said, involves two actions: the ascent to philosophical contemplation (anodos) and the sacrificial descent in order to awaken the people (katodos).

Therefore, in this parable, in Plato's cave, where the doctrine of ideas is first introduced, the most complete representation of political philosophy appears for the first time. The metaphor of the cave is the essence of political philosophy. For Plato, philosophy becomes complete when those who have attained the highest descend to the lowest, when those who have seen the truth bring it to those who are deluded and sitting below (but this is only possible by political means). A philosopher truly becomes a philosopher when he becomes a king.

Layers of polity

In The Republic, Plato describes the ideal city. Its fundamental feature is a vertical organisation

, a hierarchy corresponding to the vertical structure of Platonic ontology, that is, of all existence as a whole.

The philosopher-king stands at the top of the social hierarchy of the polity. He is completely immaterial, ascetic, devoted only to the contemplation of the Good, and performs all other functions only under the influence of the idea he contemplates. The Neoplatonist Plotinus (204/205–270) described this as the philosopher being "overflowing" with the rays of the One (Ev), which requires the further outpouring of these contemplated rays onto the rest of society. The philosopher thus performs a salvific function, and power acts as a soteriological instrument that dispenses genadic (from the Greek ἥνας, "genada," "participation in the One") belonging to the transcendent principle.

The main function of the philosopher is *knowledge*, therefore, in the human soul, royal power and aristocracy correspond to the ability to engage in higher forms of thinking — theory (θεωρία — contemplation).

At the opposite end, at the bottom of society, are peasants, cattle breeders, artisans, traders, merchants, artists, painters, metics, and slaves. They are divided vertically (slaves are at the bottom) and horizontally (Plato recognises the division of labour and sees in it the inability of people engaged in specific professions to rule the whole society). This is the main composition of the polity, engaged as necessary in interaction with the realm of materiality and corporeality. The attraction to the material is predetermined by the quality of the soul of the common people: they are dominated by lust, a craving for material pleasure, food, physical comfort, and lower down — by lust, debauchery, baseness, meanness, etc. Here, money becomes the key instrument as the antithesis of philosophical thought. Everything noble, sublime, refined, insightful, and upward-looking gravitates toward philosophy. Everything defective, ignorant, base, coarse, banal, and scattered in a multitude of carnal sensations strives for money. The soul of the lower classes is structured in such a way that it is dominated by a focus on production (poiesis).

Above the main mass of material citizens, focused on production, are the "guardians" (φύλα3) and their assistants. In some cases, the "guardians" are identified with the philosophers themselves, and the assistants of the guardians with warriors. The type of warrior is driven by "fury," θυμός. Warriors are called upon to defend the citizens of the City from external threats. In the structure of Plato's polity, guardians and warriors play a key role. They are seen as bearers of a special nature, in which gold and silver predominate,

while the lower classes are associated with copper and iron. It is the guards who represent the elite of the City and are the primary focus of Plato's attention. This is the "political class," and the quality of its condition and education directly determines the entire polity as a whole.

Possessing "fury" clearly distinguishes warriors from other types. Plato interprets fury as something that *restrains natural animal needs*: first and foremost, the need for production. A fierce person seeks honour and glory, i.e., builds their existential strategy on overcoming and excelling. Here, according to Neoplatonic theories, politics and "political virtues" begin.

Political virtue differs from other virtues (e.g., ethical virtues) in that it strictly regards the body as an instrument of the soul. The soul is fierce, and it is the soul that is most of all the soul, not the body, i.e., a self-propelling and matter-free autonomous entity, the source of movement and the centre of life. It is fierce where it is full, where it is "overflowing" with life, bursting at the seams. Fury freely manifests itself in war, in the defence of the homeland and the people from external threats. And there, warriors realise the fullness of their nature.

The metaphor of the dog

In one place, Plato addresses a very important issue: if ferocity is the main virtue of warriors (assistants to the guards), will they not spread it to each other, leading to chaos and discord within the polity itself?

Here, Plato's attention falls on the dog (incidentally, many have wondered why Socrates repeatedly swears by dogs in his dialogues). It is precisely the dog that Plato calls a philosophical animal, a beast possessing the primary skills of philosophy. What are these skills?

Plato explains it in the second book of The Republic:

> — (...) You know about purebred dogs, that their nature is to be as gentle as possible with those they are accustomed to and know, but with strangers, just the opposite.
>
> — I know, of course.
>
> — So, it is possible, and seeking such qualities in guards is not contrary to nature.
>
> — Apparently not.

— Don't you think that a future guard needs something else: not only must he be fierce, but he must also, by nature, strive for wisdom.

— How so? I don't understand.

— And you will also notice this trait in dogs, which is very surprising in an animal.

— What exactly?

— When a dog sees a stranger, it becomes angry, even though the stranger has done nothing to it, but when it sees a familiar person, it fawns on them, even though they have never done anything good for it. Hasn't that struck you?

— I hadn't really noticed it before, but it's clear that the dog behaves in this way.

— This trait of its nature seems remarkable and even truly philosophical.

— How so?

— Well, a dog determines whether a person it sees is friendly or hostile based on whether it knows them or not. Isn't this a desire to learn, when the determination of whether someone is close or, conversely, a stranger is made on the basis of understanding or, conversely, misunderstanding?

— This cannot be denied.

— And the desire to know and the desire for wisdom are one and the same[1].

The ability to control anger as the main trait of a guard dog is rooted only in wisdom, i.e. in theory, in philosophy. Therefore, a dog capable of abstract concepts such as "friend," "one's own" (even if it has done nothing good for it) and "enemy" ("stranger," even if it has done nothing wrong to it) represents an initial form of abstract philosophising, the identification of the eidos of "one's own" and "the other" as predetermining rigid behavioural patterns (playful games/threatening barking). Thus, the dog becomes a symbol not only of loyalty to its master (like a guard loyal to the polis), but also a symbol of wisdom, since it is capable of activating the higher aspects of its soul — precisely those where wisdom is rooted and where the ability to contemplate ideas is located. From this, we can draw an important conclusion: the symbolism of the dog may be related to the caste of warrior-philosophers or warrior-priests, which refers us to the Ghibelline Emperor, symbolised by a greyhound (veltro), to the Catholic order of the Dominicans (dogs of the Lord).

[1] *Plato.* The Republic. pp. 138–139.

them), as well as to the use of dog heads in the symbolism of the Russian oprichnina under Ivan the Terrible (1530–1584) — a figure in Russian history who was closer than any other to the figure of the philosopher-tsar.

Guards and philosophy

The ability of guardsmen to control their anger gives them access to philosophy. The nobility of their souls is such that the best among them can become philosophers, and in their case, a philosophical education should complement their gymnastic and musical training. Physical strength and sensitivity must be crowned with theoretical knowledge. Therefore, the guards become the environment that binds the entire polity together: from this environment, the most worthy and wise become philosophers and, perhaps, kings, while others maintain the philosophical level from generation to generation through education, upbringing, and a kind of caste hygiene (encouraging selection — heroes and wise men should have as many children as possible, while the weak and inferior should have as few as possible). Another part of the guardians, whose abilities for philosophy are limited, remain in the rank of "assistants." Assistants interact with the general population, monitor order and compliance with norms and laws, and participate in military operations. All guardians are prohibited from owning private property, money, or starting families. Equality and simplicity of morals, contempt for materialism and physicality flourish among them. Their entire human nature is artificially constructed: the body is formed through physical exercise; the soul and sense of beauty are formed through the mastery of the arts and music (in "The Laws" ([1])Plato insists that the inhabitants constantly perform sacred dances in honour of the rulers and gods, sing and dance, and that this should be made a duty for citizens); wisdom i s achieved through contemplation and dialectics, the highest of the sciences. It is very important to emphasise here the direct identification of power with asceticism and material minimalism, and of submission with material well-being, wealth, and the possession of financial resources. Noble modesty rules over voluptuous wealth.

Stratification of polytheia

In The Republic, two forms of vertical division of society can be found: dyadic and triadic. In one case, there is a pro-

[1] *Plato.* Laws / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Myśl, 1994.

hundred men and guards. And from the most gifted of the guard dogs, philosophers-rulers are educated. In the other case, there are commoners, guards (as assistants) and philosophers-aristocrats. Both of these models can be accepted simultaneously, since the triadic structure corresponds exactly to the tripartite structure of the main properties of the soul: desire, anger and reason (which gives us commoners, guards and philosophers), while the dyadic structure draws a line between the noble elite (guards, including philosophers) and the masses (everyone else). At the same time, all castes are conceived as a single organism in which the soul and mind are related to the higher, and the body and organs to the lower.

The education of the guardians is the main task of the polity. To achieve this goal, Plato proposes censoring mythology and poetry, retaining only those stories that describe gods and heroes in a respectable manner.

Chthonogenesis

Plato expresses an important idea regarding the chthongensis of the citizens of the ideal state. Plato mentions the origin of humans from the earth in the dialogue "Politicus":

> *Stranger*. It is clear, Socrates, that in the nature of that time there was no birth of living beings from living beings; the lot of the generation of that time was to be reborn from the earth, as in the past, people were earth-born [1].

Plato suggests instilling in the citizens of the polity the belief that they were created by the earth, not by other people (thus proposing a return to the original time, the "golden age"). To this end, on the one hand, families are abolished so that children do not know their parents and attribute their birth to the state and its land, and on the other hand, a chthonic genealogy is taught from childhood. Plato writes:

> — I will try to convince first the rulers and soldiers, and then the rest of the citizens, that everything in which we have raised and nurtured them appeared to them in a dream as something they had experienced, when in fact they were underground, being moulded and nurtured in its depths — both themselves and their weapons and various

[1] *Plato.* Politician / Plato. Collected works: In 4 volumes. Vol. 4. P. 20.

equipment prepared for them. When they were completely ready, the earth, being their mother, brought them forth. Therefore, they must still care for the country in which they live as for their mother and nurse, and defend it if anyone attacks it, and treat other citizens as brothers, also begotten by the earth(1).

And he continues:

Although all members of the state are brothers (so we will say, continuing this myth), the god who created you mixed gold into those of you who are capable of ruling, and therefore they are the most valuable, and silver into their assistants, and iron and copper into farmers and various craftsmen. You are all related, for the most part you give birth to your own kind, although it does happen that silver offspring are born from gold, and gold from silver; the same is true in other cases. God demands first and foremost of rulers that they be valiant guardians and protect nothing so zealously as their offspring, observing what admixture there is in the souls of their children, and if a child is born with an admixture of copper or iron, they should not show any pity towards him, but should treat him according to his natural abilities, i.e. include him among the craftsmen or farmers; if anyone is born with an admixture of gold or silver, he should be valued and honourably transferred to the guards or assistants. For there is a prophecy that the state will be destroyed when it is guarded by iron or copper guards (2).

Plato clarifies here that if the actual characteristics of a member of a particular caste of the polity do not correspond to the norms, the caste can be changed — if a peasant's child shows an aptitude for war and philosophy, it means that there is gold and silver in his soul; and if an aristocrat is cowardly, mean, lazy, greedy, deceitful, or loves money, then copper or iron prevails in him, and he must be expelled from his caste.

In this way, patriotism is also cultivated: all citizens grew out of the Hellenic soil (as if Plato were continuing the mystical idea of the primacy of the soil of Xenophanes of Callippus), and therefore its defence is their direct natural duty.

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1 *Plato.* The Republic. P. 184.

2 Ibid. pp. 184–185.

It is important to emphasise here that the structure of the citizens of the City, who arise directly from the Earth under the influence of the heavenly Logos without the mediation of humans, corresponds to the phase when the cosmos is governed directly by God. Birth from humans and, accordingly, the institution of the family belong to that historical stage when the cosmos becomes autonomous and begins to (falsely) think of itself as self-created, autogenous. Within the cosmos, individual parts also begin to consider themselves autonomous and autogenous. Therefore, the artificial myth of the origin of humans from the earth, which Plato proposes to introduce as an element of the education of the guardians, is actually closer to the truth than the birth of humans from humans. It is the Logos, acting on matter, that makes humans human.

Chapter 2. Ontology of the ideal state (Kallipolis)

Political: implicit and explicit

Let us consider the classical view of political philosophy as presented by Plato. Three of his dialogues are specifically devoted to the problems of political philosophy: The Republic, The Statesman [1], The Laws [2] (and its supplement, The After-Laws [3]). However, we will not focus on them. Although it is in these dialogues that Plato's conception of political philosophy is most fully developed, this conception is inextricably linked to Plato's philosophy *as such*. Therefore, based on the homology between the Political and the Philosophical, we can consider and seek the political dimension not only in those dialogues devoted to the philosophy of politics, but also in dialogues devoted simply to philosophy. This is a very important element. Plato's philosophy is something whole: in part he speaks about politics, and in part he does not. But even where he does not speak about politics, one can find political change. In any, even the most abstract and abstract philosophical statement of Plato, we can find a kind of equivalent of the political — in that *intermediate set* where homology is constructed between philosophy and politics, i.e., in the sphere of the Political.

This does not mean that all philosophy boils down to politics; it only means that all philosophy has the potential for political interpretation. Philosophy, as we have said, is more than politics. Philosophy contains all politics within itself. Therefore, from the completeness of philosophy, we can extract the completeness of politics. The dialogues of Plato listed at the beginning of this lecture serve as an example of this. They make explicit the basic philosophical principles of politics.

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[1] *Plato.* The Statesman.

[2] *Plato.* Laws.

[3] *Plato.* After the Laws /Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4.

Every philosophical idea of Plato has a political dimension

In his dialogues devoted directly to politics, Plato says: we take philosophy, apply it to politics, and obtain the realm of politics. In other cases, he himself does not carry out this operation of translating the philosophical into the political.

But does this mean that Plato's other dialogues should be considered exclusively in the realm of philosophy? Certainly, they can be considered in the realm of philosophy in isolation from politics (this is a perfectly legitimate operation), but in fact, this is neither exclusive nor necessary; in other words, every philosophical idea of Plato has a political dimension.

In one case, this measurement is explicit, i.e., frank, open, and clear, while in another, it is implicit (this means that Plato himself did not apply a particular philosophical idea in the sphere of politics, but it does not mean that those who follow him cannot do so). Does this mean that the very application of a philosophical idea in a given sphere is called into question? No, it does not. If Plato himself did not draw political conclusions from his philosophical ideas, this does not mean that this should not be done or that it is impossible to do so. Consequently, in order to understand the completeness of Plato's Politics, we can draw on both dialogues explicitly devoted to political philosophy and those in which nothing is said on the subject.

Accordingly, Plato's *entire philosophy* can be viewed as either explicitly or implicitly containing political philosophy.

The ontology of Timaeus and the three states: ideal, phenomenal, material

In this regard, attention should be paid to the following dialogue, which is strictly necessary for understanding the completeness of Plato's thought as a whole. This is the dialogue "Timaeus" [1]. There, Plato talks about the structure of the cosmos, ontology and metaphysics, and says nothing about politics. Nevertheless, based on what has been said earlier, we ourselves can perform the operation that Plato did not perform. That is, we can apply his philosophical, cosmological, ontological, and metaphysical views to the political sphere. He himself does something similar in the dialogue "The Republic."

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[1] *Plato.* Timaeus / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 3.

Timaeus is a long, detailed dialogue, most likely representing a Platonic exposition of Pythagorean cosmology. The following is important for us: what is set out in Timaeus is fully consistent with the entire structure of Plato's thought and, in particular, with the picture we discussed when talking about the cave metaphor — first of all, where it is about shadows, then about objects, and then about the search for the source of light. This ascent (ανοδος) of the philosopher to the source of light and his descent/return (κάθοδος) on the one hand, describes a kind of vertical path of philosophy, and on the other, the vertical structure of politics, because at the centre of the Political, according to Plato, stands *the philosopher-king* who has returned from his metaphysical journey to the origins. If he has not made this journey, his power *is metaphysically illegitimate.*

Legitimacy, validity, normality, and idealism in the structure of power are like a philosopher returning from a transcendental journey. That is what a king is. He returns with memories of contemplating the highest principle. Thus, the vertical ascent and descent that underlie the basic scenario of normative political philosophy are clarified in the topic of the dialogue
"Timaeus."

The metaphor of the Father: The world of paradigms

What does the dialogue "Timaeus" say in its most fundamental dimension? It says that there are three principles, three main types of all that exists. All that exists can be divided into three ontological categories.

The first category, which Plato summarises as the Father, represents *the world of paradigms* (Greek: παράδειγμα — model*).* This corresponds exactly to *the idea* (Greek: ίδέα — prototype, type*).* An idea is almost the same thing as a paradigm. The first world of paradigms is the world of the spirit, the world of the Mind, Νους. It is the world in which the original seeds of things, ideas or eidos, reside.

Accordingly, this world is truly real. It exists in the full sense of the word. It is not a representation or projection of human consciousness. On the contrary, human consciousness is a projection of these ideas.

It is important to note that, according to Plato, the contemplative (νοητο̃ς) comes first, followed by the contemplative (νοερο̃ς). In the beginning, there is an ideal world, which is a zone of models according to which everything else is arranged. This world is active and is the centre of existence.

From Plato's point of view, an idea is not something that is in our heads, not something we invent; an idea is something that really exists. An idea is the contemplative (νοητῦς). It is also παράδειγμα. ίδέα is the visible, παράδειγμα is the model.

These two concepts are very important because their meaning and identification show us how Plato's philosophy (Platonism) and practically all idealistic philosophy is constructed. When we talk about ίδέα, about παράδειγμα, we describe philosophy as such, in its original, unchanging, eternal structure, characteristic of philosophy today.

Contemporary philosophy represents a vicious attack on Plato, that is, an attack of time on eternity, of stupidity on intelligence, of delusion on truth. However, in reality, all that exists is Plato and his enemies (and, of course, the notes in the margins of his works).

Everything is Plato. That is why it is so important to understand *what* Plato is. And if we are talking about political philosophy, we must constantly refer to Plato. Plato was, is, and will be. This is the only thing that people who study political philosophy begin with and, more often than not, end with. Everything else is, at best, good commentary. Reading the dialogues: "The Republic," "The Laws,"
"The Statesman," but also "Timaeus" will give us some idea, albeit a very distant one, of Plato. Without this, it is impossible to study political philosophy. If Plato is not open to us and these works are not read, our knowledge of political philosophy will be notoriously incomplete.

The ideal state is a state that eternally exists

Thus, ídéa is παράδειγμα, the visible is the exemplary. This means that the idea/paradigm/world of the Father is what is. *How* does an idea exist? It exists *eternally*. Therefore, the idea was, is, and will be. The idea is primary in relation to time. The idea contains within itself all its possible embodiments. The world of ideas constitutes the world of paradigms (models). This is the world of the Father.

Please note: when we say "the ideal state," we are not talking about the state we should strive for, nor are we talking about the state we have imagined. *We are talking about the state that exists.* And to the extent that the existing state resembles the ideal state, *to that extent* it is the ideal state.

An ideal state is a state that exists eternally and serves as a model for all historically existing states. All historically existing states are nothing more than temporary and random reflections of this ideal state. Accordingly, we speak of the ideal state not as something that could be, should be, or was conceived by someone, but as a state that truly exists.

The following can be said about the state in which we live: to the extent that it resembles the ideal state, it also exists. Similarly, to the extent that it does not resemble an ideal state, it is non-ontological, non-existent, fictitious, transient, unstable, false and non-existent. That is, it does not really exist, but rather a distorted parody of it, a pseudo-state.

The true and the visible

Greek philosophy, starting with Parmenides (c. 540 – c. 470 BC), distinguishes between the true *(,* Greek for "unhidden," "true") and *the visible* (δό3α, Greek for "opinion," "imaginary"). The world we see is the imaginary world. The real world is hidden *behind* the imaginary world, just as truth (αλήθεια) is hidden behind opinion (δό3α). What we see is imaginary, containing truth within itself, simultaneously hiding and revealing it. But not everything we see, perceive and know is true; much of it is only imaginary, apparent. Thus, the imaginary deceives us, appearing to be, but not being.

The ideal state is a state that fully corresponds to the idea of the state; a state that exists eternally in the structure of the paradigm. That is, we can say that it is a paradigmatic state, or a state of ideas/a state of paradigms. Accordingly, the idea of the ideal state as a Fatherland, founded on the logic described by Plato, exists eternally; it is true, it is. Everything else combines "is" and "is not." Everything that is different from the ideal state is *an imaginary state.*

The metaphor of the Son: icons, symbols

In order to understand the ontology of everything else besides the world of the Father and move on to the second principle of the Timaeus, we turn to *the metaphor of the Son*. This is the second world.



The structure of "Timea"

Who is the Son? The Son is both the Father, since he was created by the Father, and Other than the Father. And since the Son is in the Father, and not the Father in the Son, he is in some ways similar to the Father, and in some ways different from him. The Son is in some way inferior to the Father. He cannot be better than the Father, otherwise, from the point of view of

the idea, he would be the Father himself[1]. The Father-Son relationship in the patriarchal Greek model is a symbolic relationship, a relationship of wholeness and part (inheriting something from the whole). So, the metaphor of the Son is the first thing.

The second is the icon (from the Greek είκον, from the ancient Greek εἰκών, "image," "depiction"). The world of the Son consists of icons or images. Images are not models; images are copies. The second world is the iconic or symbolic world, the world of symbols (σύμβολον).

What do symbols symbolise? They symbolise ideas. Ideas are what exist, but symbols... do they exist or not? *Symbols partly exist and partly do not*. Ideas are identical to themselves. They are themselves, they are what they are. Symbols *point* to these ideas. That is, symbols partly *exist* to the extent that they point to an idea, but partly they do not exist — just as they do not exist in isolation from the ontological act of pointing. If the formula A=A (an idea is an idea) is true for an idea, then a symbol has a much more complex relationship to being; it exists because it is not itself (A≠A); a symbol does not symbolise itself, but someone else, and without the other, it loses its meaning in being. disappears. It exists as long as it points to something other than itself.

But a symbol in itself is not what it points to. It is not an idea or a model. A symbol is not a paradigm, but an icon, a copy. Accordingly, like A=A, it does not exist.

The existence of a symbol is not the same as the existence of an idea. The existence of a symbol is both real and unreal. It is *a combination of existence and non-existence in one*. As an indicator of an idea (which definitely exists), a symbol exists. As a thing in itself, it does not exist. What is a mirror? In reality, a mirror is meaningless *in itself*. It acquires content when it reflects something. But what does a mirror reflect when it reflects nothing? Nothing. That is, there is no existence in this mirror. If we imagine a symbol as a mirror reflecting some kind of existence, we will say that we really see some kind of existence in it, and therefore this mirror exists.

In the work of Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–1898), the image of a mirror lying on the floor of a dark room at night recurs, and the poet asks, in what sense does this mirror exist? This mirror reflects nothing. The meaning of a mirror is to reflect. But if a mirror reflects nothing, does it exist?

From the idea of a mirror left in an empty room at night, the idea of pure possibility arises, which Plato describes in Timaeus as the third genus or order of being.

[1] This is possible, however, if we consider the primordial nature of the concept of gender in relation to both the Father and the Son.

The phenomenon as an icon

But before we move on to explaining the ontology of matter, I would like to draw attention to another second-order name, the world of copies or the iconic world. Plato calls it *phenomenon (from the Greek* φαινόμενον — "appearing," "phenomenon").

It is important to note that a symbol, an icon, a copy is *a manifestation* of an idea. Through the Son, the Father is manifested; through the copy, the paradigm is manifested; through the phenomenon, the idea is manifested. The meaning of a phenomenon lies in its dual existence. On the one hand, it is φαινόμενον, a phenomenon — it is (since something is manifested in the phenomenon), and on the other hand, it does not exist in itself. This is a very important philosophical point. Hence the term "phenomenal" or the branch of philosophy called "phenomenology." A phenomenon is that which is revealed, but revealed not as identical to itself. A phenomenon always has its essence, that is, something that is through this phenomenon.

The world of phenomena, the world that is given to us in direct perception, is the world of the manifestation of ideas — to us. That is, they exist through the world of ideas, and therefore this world is not identical to itself. The world we perceive is an imaginary world, a world of opinions. Nothing here points to itself, nothing here is self-referential. Every object and every phenomenon of nature, from the point of view of Platonism, is a symbol, i.e. a pointer to something else. It is not the truth itself, but its manifestation.

Time, according to Plato, is a copy of eternity.

But there is something in this phenomenon that resembles an idea (which is why the world is fundamentally beautiful), and there is also something that does not resemble an idea (which is why the world is essentially transient and mortal). The law of the second world, *the world of the Son, is* γένεσις (origin) *and* φθόρος (destruction); moreover, it is time.

If eternal ideas exist in the world of models/paradigms, then time exists in the world of copies. What is time, according to Plato? It is *a copy of eternity*. What is simultaneous in eternity is sequential in time.

In eternity, we are unborn, small, adult, old and dead *at the same time* [1]. The idea of us is eternal and unchanging.

[1] In this sense Empedocles (c. 490 – c. 430 BC), who taught about the four elements (roots) of reality, claimed that he was *simultaneously* a child, a bush, a fish, and a bird. By this he wanted to show that his inner self, his subject or his daimon, was essentially unchanged, no matter what elements it took on. It is interesting

, but in the world it is given to us sequentially: we appear from nowhere, come into the world of phenomena and disappear into nowhere.

But according to Plato, this "nowhere" — the world of death and the world that precedes birth — is what *we ourselves* are. Our death is fundamentally ontological. This is our *idea*. We emerge from the idea of ourselves and return to the idea of ourselves. Moreover, this idea of ourselves is, to a greater extent, itself not when we are, but when we are not.

Plato describes this through the concept of the eternity *of the soul* (ψυχή). The soul is the idea of us. We ourselves are phenomena, which is why we live in time. In time, the idea of us turns into a phenomenon, the ideal "us" turns into the phenomenal, we are ourselves through ourselves. *We are copies of ourselves.* Note that here the concept of the dialectic of the world of the Father and the world of the Son, the world of originals and the world of copies, is introduced.

The ideal and phenomenal state

We can apply the second principle to the state: there is an ideal state and a phenomenal state (the state as a phenomenon, the symbolic state, the iconic state, the state of copies).

What is the phenomenal state a copy of? The ideal. If the ideal state exists, what is the ontological status of the phenomenal state?

On the one hand, the phenomenal state exists (since it reflects and represents the ideal state), and on the other hand, it does not exist (since it has a diminished ontology, which is ultimately non-existent). We can say that the ideal state (Kallipolis) is *a state of the soul,* where its citizens are eternal ideas, and the phenomenal state is a genetic state (it arises and then inevitably perishes). Its citizens are people.

The ontological status of the ideal state and the phenomenal state through "Timaeus" helps us understand the metaphor of the cave. The philosopher's upward movement (ανοδος) and downward movement (κάθοδος), his exit from politics through the Political into the Philosophical, and further, the establishment of ideal politics through the Political in his return, are in fact precisely this *dialectic*

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that the human image in Empedocles (the child) corresponds to the element of fire or the sun. *Wright M. R.* Empedocles. The extant fragments. NY; L: Yale University Press, 1981. A similar idea of the eternally unchanging Soul was held by the Neoplatonist Plotinus (204/205–270).

the transition from Father to Son. When the Political emerges, the philosopher (the Son, the phenomenal man) returns to his own soul (the Son returns to the Father) and descends again to himself, but now *as someone else*. It is one thing for the Son *to be* simply *born,* and quite another *for* the Son *to know* the Father. At first, the Son realises that he *is only* the Son, that this phenomenal world, the world of opinion (δό3α), is only a copy, just like himself. Realising what he is a copy of, i.e. comprehending the Father through contemplation of himself, he becomes *a different* Son*;* a Son who emphasises *his similarity* to the Father, not *his difference, his unity* with the Father, not *his opposition.* The Son understands that he is not himself, but a symbol. He is no longer a victim of the delusion that the world we are given is everything. The Son understands that this world is not true. What is true in this imaginary world? That it *symbolises* the true world. Therefore, by the method of cataphysics (from the Greek καταφατικός, 'affirming'), by the method of similarity, we can arrive at *what* is in the phenomenon. What is in the phenomenon is not the phenomenon itself. Pay attention to how the phenomenal state relates to the ideal state: the phenomenal state is a state-phenomenon, a copy, and to the extent that this copy reflects the ideal state (Kallipolis), this state exists. Similarly, to the extent that it does not reflect it, this state does not exist.

The philosophy of politics asserts that *politics cannot be studied using political methods*. The content of politics is not politics itself. The content of politics is philosophy. Politics is the realm of phenomena, while philosophy is the realm of ideas. Every element of politics is nothing more than *a political phenomenon,* a phenomenon. *What* this phenomenon is is a question that needs to be studied.

And one last remark: we need to pay attention to what a "norm" (Latin: norma) is. A norm means almost the same thing as the word "idea" or "ideal." "To be normal" and "to be ideal"
are approximately the same thing. A norm is never a given; a norm is an ontological content or paradigm/model against which we measure the phenomenal. Therefore, Plato's ideal state is *a normal state*. Moreover, any phenomenal state is normal only to the extent that it is ideal or similar to the ideal. What, then, is the state we are dealing with in history? It is by definition an abnormal state, differing only in the scale and variety of its abnormality.

Woman and the bastard Logos

The third genus in Timaeus is "chora" (χῶρα). This term originally means "space" or "place." Plato calls χῶρα
"Mother," "Recipient," or "Nurser" and identifies space and the feminine principle with each other, simultaneously describing it as a sphere where the primary elements (στοιχεῖο) are located.

This third feminine principle, from Plato's point of view, cannot be understood by the mind, because in the pure feminine principle everything is meaningless. Woman is understood through a special Logos — a bastard ("illegitimate") Logos. Everything in a woman that is purely feminine is understood not by the mind, but by the pseudo-mind.

On the contrary, the Father and the Son are understood by the normal Logos. Therefore, Plato does not pay much attention to the bastard Logos. In Greek, "illegitimate," "illegitimate" is λόγος νόθος.

Plato writes about it as follows

> There is another genus, namely space (χῶρα): it is eternal, impervious to destruction, provides a home for everything that is born, but is itself perceived outside of sensation, by means of a kind of unlawful reasoning (λόγος νόθος — literally "bastard logos"), and it is almost impossible to believe in it. We see it as if in dreams and assert that all existence must necessarily be somewhere, in some place, and occupy some space, and that anything that is not on earth or in heaven does not exist. In our sleepy oblivion, we transfer these and related concepts to the nature of true being, which is unrelated to sleep, and when we wake up, we find ourselves unable to distinguish between them and speak the truth, namely that, since an image does not bear the cause of its own birth within itself, but invariably represents the phantom of something else, it must be born within something else, as if attached to its essence, or not be anything at all ([1]).

It should be noted that at this point in Timaeus, Plato's previously crystal-clear speech loses its transparency, and he begins to speak using vague images, losing the metaphysical certainty that is unshakeable when he describes the first and second kinds of being. This can be likened to...

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[1] *Plato.* Timaeus. P. 455.

to the fact that the gaze of the heavenly god reaches the surface of the Earth, the lower boundary of the world of copies, and here, encountering its limits, sees something that cannot be clearly distinguished. On the border of day, the realm of night dreams flickers. Therefore, Plato limits himself to a few indications and postulates "chorus," χῶρα (space) as a flat boundary beyond which there is nothing, which cannot be understood, since there is nothing to understand in it.

The Logos born of the law is the Logos of the Father and the Son. Between them unfolds the entire philosophy of politics in the ideal state (Callipolis). Woman (χῶρα) is only a nurse; she feeds the Son without giving him anything of substance. Woman (χῶρα) merely gives him *a* certain *phenomenal existence.* In essence, woman (χῶρα) brings only *illusion* into the world. She is the mother of pure "doxa," that is, the direct opposite of truth.

When does the phenomenal approach the ideal? When the second (Son) approaches the first (Father), breaking away from the third (Mother, Nurse). What does a woman give to the soul, according to Plato? The body. But the body is a kind of meaningless burden that transforms the eternal into the temporal, the transparent into the semi-transparent, and so on.

The chariot of the soul

Plato asserts the same fundamental triad in the very structure of the human being. In Phaedrus[1] he compares the human soul to a chariot drawn by two horses. This chariot participates in the races of the gods across the heavens. And only when the chariot strays from its path and breaks away from the group of deities does it enter the body, from where it strives to free itself and return to its divine companions and leaders.

In the structure of the soul (chariot — Greek ὄχημα) there is

1) a charioteer (Greek: κούβεφθείς, i.e. λόγος, νους — "mind"),

2) a white horse with a black eye (anger, Greek θύμος)

3) and a black horse with a white eye (lust, Greek ꚙπιθυμία). The chariot of the soul, driven by the charioteer, has three principles: nothingness nothing and two horses.

The charioteer himself is a philosopher, the noblest part of the soul. He who cultivates the mind develops the highest principle within himself. He does not simply live by the power of the soul, but subjugates life to thought, contemplation...

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[1] *Plato.* Phaedo / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2.

contemplation, that is, he strives to give life meaning and purpose. The charioteer represents the most divine side of the soul

The white horse with a black eye is rage (θύμος), the desire to kill, to commit violence, but also to be courageous, to defend one's homeland. Rage is a masculine trait, the soul's desire for expansion. It is the turbulent principle of the soul, associated with pride, vanity, the will to power, the desire to dominate others, to conquer. But at the same time, this desire draws the soul away from the physical world — into more subtle worlds.

The black horse with a white eye is lust (ἐπιθυμία), which binds a person to material things, thereby constituting them, because it is precisely the orientation of expansion towards matter that gives rise to the materiality and corporeality of things. According to Plato, this horse must first be subjugated, the other tamed, and the charioteer nurtured, as this is our "higher self."

Thus, Plato distinguishes three fundamental levels in the structure of man.

The dialectic of Parmenides

To understand Plato's thought as a whole, it is also important to consider the dialogue "Parmenides" [1] . It establishes a hierarchy of dialectical statements reflecting the relationship between the One and the Many. Later, non-Platonists — primarily Plotinus [2] , Iamblichus [3] (245/280–325/330), and especially Proclus[4] (412–485) and Damascius [5] (458/462 – after 538) built on the analysis of this dialogue a detailed and extensive system combining theology, cosmology, ethics and physics [6]. Proclus and Damascius identify nine hypotheses in the dialogue Parmenides. The first five hypotheses are based on the recognition that the One (Ev) exists. For the Platonists, this recognition is fundamental: if the One (Ev) exists, then everything else exists, that is, the Many. However, immediately in the first hypothesis, the very existence of the One (Ev) is significantly clarified: the One (Ev) does not simply exist like everything else, it exists in a radically different way. In a sense, if we take "is" to mean how everything is,

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[1] *Plato.* Parmenides.

[2] *Plotinus.* Enneads: In 7 vols. St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyško Publishing House; University Book, 2010.

[3] *Iamblichus of Chalcis.* Commentaries on Plato's Dialogues. St. Petersburg: Aleteya. 2000; Ibid. On the Egyptian Mysteries. Moscow: Aleteya, 2004.

[4] *Proclus Diadochus.* Commentary on Plato's Parmenides. St. Petersburg: Publishing House Mir, 2006.

[5] *Damascius.* Commentary on Plato's Parmenides. St. Petersburg: Mir. 2008.

[6] *Dugin, A. G.* In Search of the Dark Logos. Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

What is, is the One (Ev), which is qualitatively superior to everything else. This is stated in the first hypothesis: the One (Ev) radically transcends being. And only when recognised as such does being itself begin to exist. Being has a pre-existent (super-existent) cause. In the theological system of Christianity, this was called
the "apophatic interpretation of God." We find similar ideas in Islamic Sufism, Jewish Kabbalah, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

So, the first five hypotheses are as follows:

1) ὃν (the one);

2) ὃν πολλά (the one and the many);

3) ὃν και πολλά (the one and the many);

4) πολλά και ὃν (many and one);

5) πολλά (many).

All five of Parmenides' first hypotheses originate from the One (Ev), therefore all the worlds they describe exist. The second, third, fourth and even fifth hypotheses become valid only because the first was already established.

The remaining four hypotheses, from the sixth to the ninth, discussed in the same dialogue, originate from the non-One. These are purely speculative logical constructions, which for the Platonists have no ontological basis.

The sixth hypothesis asserts *that there is no unity, but there is much*, and therefore, *under certain circumstances, much can be combined into a "unity."* This "one" will be composite, collective, artificial, i.e., it will not possess the primacy of the genuine one (the denial of which gives rise to the second series of hypotheses). Some Neoplatonists say that such an assumption is simply a game of the mind. Others (such as Damascius) say that unity can be conceived in this way from the point of view of the body. In other words, such a unity is the possibility of combining a multitude of atomic (individual) parts into a secondary whole.

The seventh hypothesis states: *There is no unity, but there is multiplicity, which is left to itself*, that is, *it cannot* be combined into a "unity." The eighth hypothesis: *There is no unity, but there is multiplicity for multiplicity*. That is, individual atoms exist through interaction between co-

.

Finally, the ninth hypothesis: *There is no unity, but there is also no multiplicity for the many*.

This dialectic of the One/Many gives rise to another type of hierarchy, quite homologous to the general structure of Platonic ontology, and clarifies some of its most important points.



Metaphysical and ontological hierarchy of the One/Many in Plato's Parmenides

Three types of political ontology in "Timaeus"

Thus, we have arrived at three types of political ontology. Accordingly, there exists:

- the ideal, paradigmatic, Father; it is.
- the phenomenal, iconic, filial; it is and is not; it is as a symbol. Thus, there are two states: the ideal and the phenomenal.
- Χῶρα is the place where the state resides; where the physicality of the state, the primary matter of the state, exists. Χῶρα, to the extent that she is only a woman, only herself, does not exist; however, to the extent that she exists, she participates in the Son; the Mother exists through the Son.

According to Plato, a woman represents nothing except nursing and bearing *another* than herself. And the material structure of statehood acquires being (including political being) only when it begins to act as the primary matter *for the* state *phenomenon*.

Thus, we can imagine three ontologies of political philosophy:

- The State of the Father: eternal, ideal, paradigmatic state, which eternally exists;
- The State of the Son: a phenomenal state — a projection of the first true state into the sphere of phenomena, which is partly there and partly not there; it combines being and non-being, arises and disappears, and can be likened to us ourselves, living beings.
- The material aspect of the state. In its pure form, it does not exist. It is a kind of burden on the state. A non-existent, false state.

We obtain a triangular figure in which three sectors can be identified (see next page).

The economy appears here as non-politics, or the politics "animalistic humanity" (according to Plato); this is the lower aspect.

Many positions and many schools will fit into this triangle, into this Platonic picture of political philosophy. Whatever philosophy of politics, whatever state and whatever political system we take, we must find a place for it in this Platonic picture. Beyond the limits of this scheme, there can be no politics or thought about politics.



Three ontological layers of politics

Plato's ideal state: the philosopher-king

Now we can correlate these three parts of the general ontology of Timaeus, the three types of state (ideal, phenomenal and material) and the three classical castes of Plato's ideal state.

What does the ideal state correspond to? A philosopher-king. Plato also adds: aristocracy. At the head of Plato's ideal state (Callipolis) are representatives of the first caste (philosophers, kings, aristocrats, guards). This is monarchical rule, philosophical rule, and aristocratic rule. For Plato, only philosophers are *the best (*άρίστος). In any state, those who know what the ideal state is should rule. And even if this state is phenomenal, the best should rule.

Who is a monarch? A monarch is someone who has, to a greater extent, found his way to his soul. For him, the entire state is himself, not a collection of others. A monarch experiences everything personally, and accordingly, the political in him reaches its peak of intensity at the moment of power. He represents the point of the most concentrated expression of the paternal principle.

And the fourth concept (along with the three already mentioned: philosopher, king, aristocrat) is guardian (φύλα3). A guardian does not simply guard, he *stays awake when everyone else is asleep.*

Remember how the philosopher began to behave in the cave metaphor? Everyone was satisfied with the state of illusion, but he wanted the truth. Everyone was asleep, but he woke up. Everyone was looking in one direction, but he looked in the other. Night falls, and everyone falls asleep. Everyone except the guardian. He alone walks through the city with his club while everyone else sleeps. Surrounded by owls and gods, who are also awake, the guardian patrols the Greek polis. He separates his destiny from that of others. He lives at night. He guards not only these sleeping people, but to a greater extent he guards the gods (sometimes even from these people themselves). The guard guards the sacred, existence, the ideal state. He is on guard for the Other. For that which truly is.

The phenomenal state — the state of the warrior

The second level is the phenomenal state. In Plato's hierarchy, it corresponds to *the guardians' assistants*. They are also warriors whose virtue is masculinity.

What is most important in the world of phenomena? Plato says that another virtue dominates here — not the contemplation of ideas

directly, not the protection of being, not a view of the paradigm, but *courage*. If a philosopher enters the world of death, reaching its depths, then a warrior or a philosopher's assistant constantly interacts with this death from outside. A warrior causes death to others, i.e., he necessarily kills, and he is ready to sacrifice himself for his state and for the Political itself.

Accordingly, this is the second caste of warriors, which represents the assistants and defenders of philosophers who strive for glory and courage; in addition, they are disciples of philosophers. They have a completely different structure — they are *people of the phenomenal world;* they are born, kill and die, they are not in eternity, but in time. If the first caste is philosophical, the ontological caste of philosopher-kings, then the second caste is phenomenal.

The phenomenal is not the concern of the philosopher. Unlike him, members of the second caste are concerned with phenomena. In this sphere, *rage* (θύμος) reigns supreme. According to Plato, this is a positive passion. Of course, rage prevents philosophising, but it is nevertheless very useful in other cases, as it is the maximum expression of life force.

Thus, we come to an understanding of the phenomenal state, or the state of warriors (the Kshatriya state), in which valour (αρετή) and rage (θύμος) dominate.

Pacifist warriors are a pathology

The dialogue "Politician" talks about how to tame warriors who live by rage. Since a warrior is incapable of pure contemplation, when left to his own devices, he may discover *a tendency towards* ὕβρις (Greek "arrogance," "pride"), and boundless belligerence (under its influence, a person not only kills an enemy but, for example, mocks his corpse). Enough examples can be found in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Under the influence of ὕβρις, the warrior's fury goes beyond its legitimate limits.

Fury is necessary, Plato believes, but a balance must be found. It is *philosophers who pacify warriors*. In order to pacify them, warriors must be eager for battle. Pacifist warriors are undoubtedly pathological. Warriors must be fierce, they must love to kill, like hunting dogs, they must smell blood and be excited by it; however, moderation is necessary here. Thus, the problem of the phenomenal state is rage and *the measure of rage.* In other words, the phenomenal state is created by warriors; they constitute the warrior caste.

Providing for thinkers and warriors

The third principle is associated with χῦρα, the Provider. Just as the nurturer feeds the child, so the peasantry and craftsmen feed the warriors and philosophers. The task of the peasant is to ensure that the warrior is well fed when he rides out to cut off someone's head. Accordingly, the resource-based economic state is subordinate to the warriors.

Mothers and wet nurses (χῦρα) correspond to the third caste — the caste of producers and peasants. They are located in the sphere of space, in χῦρα; they work in the countryside: they plant and harvest crops. Their role is to provide a visible material foundation for the state, to be the place where the state manifests itself.

In the dialogue "The Laws," Plato talks a lot about what ordinary citizens of the state should do. They should dance in circles (introduced by the state as a duty). Plato dwells in detail on how these circles should be arranged, proposing to divide them into three circles according to age categories. Circular movements reproduce the rotation of the heavenly bodies and planets. Therefore, through the cyclical nature of labour and festive dances, the main population of the ideal state also participates in eternity — in the world of ideas.

Philosophers think, warriors fight, and the rest work and dance in circles. This is the ideal model of political philosophy.

Stages of state degradation according to Plato: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny

In the dialogue "The Republic," Plato talks about perverted types of states. So, there is an ideal state (Kallipolis), which we have described, and there are perversions or deviations from this paradigmatic model. Plato names four types of state that should not exist but, unfortunately, do: *timocracy, oligarchy, democracy* and *tyranny.*

1. Timocracy (τιμοκρατία) *or timarchy* (τιμαρχία). Plato associates it with the Spartan model, in which the military principle (rather than the philosophical one) prevails. That is, there is a certain weakening of the philosophical principle and a strengthening of the military one. The centre of gravity shifts from the guards to the assistants of the guards. Under timocracy, there are still philosophers, but they are not as powerful as they should be. Fury, as a trait of warriors and a virtue of the second level, begins to dominate wisdom, a virtue of the first level. This is not yet a complete seizure of power by philosophers, but only a



The three castes of Callipolis

Initial state, first signs. Here, wise men are listened to less, and valour is elevated to an absolute, rather than relative, value. Spartan gerousia, military style, and militarism become dominant values.

Plato does not think badly of timocracy, saying that it is not the worst form of government. Nevertheless, timocracy is a perversion. It is very important to note that as soon as a warrior is distracted from philosophy, that is, ceases to be a spiritual warrior, an assistant to the guardians of being, he becomes attracted to material things. He begins to use his will not only to fight, but also to grab as many trophies as possible. As the realm of phenomena becomes more self-centred, it becomes more material and less and less *what* it is. When the warrior class becomes interested in material aspects, it approaches its degeneration.

2. Oligarchy (όλιγαρχία)[1] . This type of government arises when several degenerate, influential military rulers or corresponding groups who have lost their status, together with wealthy townspeople, form a society of a few rich people, oligarchs. This is a group of major material and political figures who, by fair means or foul, by force or cunning, have gained power and rule the city (state). Plato considered this to be a very bad order. It is a transition to an even lower stage — between the phenomenal state and pure economics. Oligarchy is a decisive step away from the order of the Son to the order of the Mother.

3. Democracy (δημοκρεια)[2] . Plato believed that this political system represented a complete perversion and decline, and essentially meant the transition of the phenomenal state into *a* material *sub-state*. Here, oligarchic power is distributed among a large number of citizens, each of whom thinks selfishly only of their own material well-being.

For Plato, Socrates' death was the death of a philosopher-king at the hands of a maddened democratic mob. This is the essence of Plato's revolution in relation to the society in which he lived. He said that we are in the third, practically the worst form of perversion, and in order to return to a normal state, we must turn away from the democratic mob and take a step towards the ideal model. Thus, Plato, being a representative of the aristocracy, believed that the state should be ruled by the wise, and not by the masses.

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[1] Greek: όλιγαρχία (oligarchia) — "rule by the few", from ancient Greek: όλίγος (oligos) — "few" and other Greek words derived from ἀrché (arche) — "power".

[2] Ancient Greek δημοκρ□τία — "power of the people," from δήμος — "people" and κράτος — "power."

The leader of an aristocratic Athenian family (one might say an oligarchic family) challenges it and says that this form of government must be corrected and that it is necessary to return from the material sub-state χ̄ōr to the ideal model.

4. Tyranny (τυραννία)[1]**.** According to Plato, this is the worst and final form of statehood. It is an inverted parody of the rule of the philosopher-king. The philosopher-king is the best of men who rules, while the tyrant is the worst. Any democracy ends in dictatorship, i.e., tyranny, the seizure of power. It is clear that sooner or later, a dull democratic society will choose (or have imposed upon it) the worst of its representatives. Or, out of fear of disorder and chaos, it will surrender power to a usurper.

Anti-king

This is how Plato describes the four stages of the degradation of the ideal state (Kallipolis). At first, we have a departure from the norm, then an increasing deviation, and finally a complete parody, because the tyrant parodies the philosopher-king. The tyrant is the anti-king, the anti-philosopher. He is the most foolish and vile of men, claiming to rule over others. He is the most cowardly, claiming to lead the army. He is a thief and a corruptor, saying that he can improve life. Tyranny embodies *anti-politics.* Starting with democracy, we enter the realm of the sub-state.

The whole picture we have described will only be clear if we understand what an ideal state (Kallipolis) is. An ideal state always exists; it remains unchanged, which cannot be said about its projections, phenomena. The ideal state (Callipolis) may be slightly distorted in a timocracy, more distorted in an oligarchy, even more distorted in a democracy, and as a parody, as its own opposite, in a tyranny. Accordingly, a tyrant parodies a monarch, a dictator parodies a philosopher, and so on. According to Plato, tyranny brings together all the worst that can be found in other types of statehood. From the point of view of ontology, *a tyrant is someone who is even lower than matter.* Therefore, the existence of tyranny is minimal. There is nothing more ephemeral than tyranny. What claims to be eternal in tyranny usually turns out to be temporary, transitory, and illusory.

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[1] Greek: τυραννίς — arbitrariness.

However, the cycle of degradation does not affect the nature and existence of the ideal state. All distortions are distortions of the original, which remains unchanged in itself. Therefore, according to Plato, after tyranny, the time of the philosopher-king returns. Callipolis, in its ideal immutability, establishes the boundaries of its phenomenological manifestation. When the copy state reaches the limit of dissimilarity with the model state, that is, when tyranny is established, everything returns to Callipolis, restoring the normative proportions. Therefore, the Greeks considered one of the wonders of the "old tyrant"; tyrants usually did not live to old age.

Chapter 3. The State of the Son. Aristotle

Politics according to Aristotle

Plato's philosophy provides the most complete picture of the essence of metaphysical, ontological, cosmological, political, and anthropological issues. As we have already said, Plato represents the completeness of all possible variants and includes all possible types of worldviews. When we spoke about "Timaeus," we pointed out that there are three kinds of beings —

1) paradigmatic,
2) phenomenological, and
3) material

These correspond to three principles:

1) the Father,
2) Son, and
3) Mother (Nursing Mother, Recipient).

Theoretically, we can identify three philosophies in this cosmology of Timaeus:

1) a philosophy that emphasises *paradigms*,
2) a philosophy that *emphasises phenomena*,
3) a philosophy that *emphasises matter*.

These three levels of the cosmos, being, ontology, and metaphysics, correspond to three philosophical traditions. We encounter them both in Ancient Greece and in the modern world. In fact, Plato and everything that is called Platonic philosophy is inextricably linked to the first philosophy — to the supremacy of the world of paradigms. In the first philosophy (in Platonism in the broadest sense), ideas are endowed with being, which are considered to be the only fully and purely *existing things,* while phenomena in this case become *half-existing, half-non-existent,* with virtually no attention paid to the material side of being (hence the idea of matter as privation, deficiency).

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Three Logos. Moscow: Academic Project, 2014. This line of thought is consistently traced throughout all volumes of the Noomakhia project.

Matter is *the physicality* of a phenomenon. Everything we see in the material world *exists* because it has a certain eidos (εἶδος), a type, i.e. the existence of a material object does not in any way flow from matter itself, which is merely a "receptor" of eidos, which has an immaterial (supermaterial, supra-material) nature.

Here a very clear picture emerges: the world of paradigms *is absolute*, the world of matter/corporeality in its pure form *is not absolute in* itself, but the phenomenal world mixed between them *both is and is not*.

Platonic philosophy and, accordingly, Platonic political philosophy are constructed in exactly this way. In this case, there are

1) an ideal state (which is),
2) the phenomenal state (which partly is and partly is not) and
3) the lowest material "state," concerned with purely material issues — caring for the population, striving for comfort, i.e., the economy[1] (such a state *is not*, or at least is not a state, not a polity (πολιτεία), but something else — for example, a "civil society" or a "market").

From Plato's point of view, a political system that pays attention to the third caste of producers and traders (oligarchy and democracy) is *anti-political*, destroying political idealism.

Three philosophies of politics

Theoretically, it is possible to consider other types of philosophy. Plato describes all of them at once, but we can also outline a consideration of phenomenological philosophy (in the 20th century, this philosophy was partially constructed by Husserl (1859–1938) and, to a large extent, Heidegger) and materialist philosophy (materialism appeared as early as Ancient Greece — Democritus

[1] The term "economy" here refers to its modern meaning, whereas in Ancient Greece it was called "chrematistics" χρηματιστική, "enrichment," from χρήματα, "money." It is important to note that etymologically, the word χρᾶιματα, "money," comes from the verb χρᾶιω, "to need something," "to experience need." This corresponds precisely to the Platonic understanding of matter as lack, deficiency, need. "Economy" (from oikos, "house," 'household' and νόμο, 'law', 'organisation of territory') was a more complex concept of the ordering of life and living space, i.e. 'house building' or 'housekeeping', which was by no means reduced to increasing comfort, let alone the pursuit of money and profit.

Crete, Epicurus). Thus, within the Platonic complex (Timaeus), three philosophies of politics can be distinguished:

- Platonic;
- phenomenological;
- materialistic (reduces politics to economics). Examples of contemporary materialism, which has developed in

The political components are well known: liberalism, Marxism and (to some extent) nationalism. The materialists of the ancient world were unable to build a definitive political system. Plato built one (and we can see how complete and comprehensive his political philosophy is). It should be noted that the materialist Democritus was the first to engage in speculation (pure chrematistics) in his city of Abdera, buying up grain reserves and then reselling them when their price rose. Nevertheless, the Greeks never created a materialistic philosophy of politics that would be directly and comprehensively linked to the third genus of being — to Mother and "chora."

The polity of the Father and the polity of the Son

Now we move on to the philosophy that was developed in Greece and which differed significantly from Plato's philosophy. This is the political philosophy of Aristotle (384–322 BC).

Let us begin with the fact that Aristotle was a student of Plato and listened to the entire course of Platonic teaching. Therefore, whether he wanted to or not, he was fundamentally "programmed" by the basic maxims of Platonism.

If you like, Aristotle's consciousness was shaped by Platonism. This thinker is within the Platonic tradition. When people say "Plato and Aristotle," they essentially mean
"Aristotle is the 'Son' of Plato." What Aristotle has that is most essential and reasonable, he took from his "Father."

But Aristotle decided to construct *the philosophy of the Son*, that is, a kind of prototype of what in the 19th and 20th centuries would be called "phenomenology." Earlier, we spoke of three worlds or kinds: the world of ideas, the world of phenomena/appearances, and the world of matter. Plato's philosophy is based on the first kind, while *Aristotle's philosophy is based on the second kind.* This is *phenomenological philosophy of politics*[1].

[1]This can be compared to the sociological theory of the "normal type" (German: Normaltypus) put forward by Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936). In this interpretation, Max Weber's "ideal type" corresponds to Tönnies' "normal type."

Aristotle constructs the philosophy of the Son partly similar to the philosophy of the Father, and partly not. As we have said, the Son has something from the Father and something not from the Father. Or, from Plato's point of view, he has something from being and something from non-being. Aristotle is the same: he has something from Plato and something not from Plato. What he has from Plato determines his similarity to Platonism. But Aristotle also has something else — criticism of Plato.

Aristotle, being a Platonist, sets himself the task of criticising Plato. This is the criticism of the Father by the Son. To the extent that the Son follows the Father, he is *the same* as the Father. To the extent that he opposes the Father, he falls, from the point of view of Platonism, into "sin."

Two male philosophies

Aristotle's philosophy is partly the same as that of the Father, and partly directed against him. To the extent that it is directed against the Father, it does not exist. To the extent that it continues the Father, it exists. Therefore, Aristotle himself is the spiritual "Son" of Plato, and together Platonism and Aristotelianism cover all the possibilities of male philosophy (the philosophy of the first two genera). That is, a man thinks either as the Father (and then he is a Platonist) or as the Son (and then he is an Aristotelian). Where materialism prevails, the third genus (in particular, economics), the masculine principle disappears, is eliminated, and what can be called the philosophy of the Mother or the philosophy of the "chora" begins. There, statehood (as polity, πολιτεία) ends, the idea of the classical Greek Indo-European order disappears, and the domination of two castes (the caste of philosophers and the caste of warriors), which correspond to two philosophies, the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son, is eliminated.

There are two male philosophies: Platonism as a fully male philosophy (Plato did not allow women to listen to his lectures, but some still managed to sneak in by dressing in men's clothes; among them were several female disciples who were so devoted that after his death they created the Oracle of Plato, propagated his teachings and designated their philosophical priestly dignity) and Aristotelianism as a revision of Platonism from the point of view of the Son. Plato

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is analogous to the relationship between Plato's ideal state and Aristotle's actual (normal, phenomenal) state.

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Three Logos.

and Aristotle remain within the same philosophical space: one looks at ideas and positions himself as the Father (the philosophy of Zeus, Apollo), the other looks away from ideas and positions himself as the Son (the philosophy of Dionysus)[1].

Logos apophantikos and the declarative state

So, if Plato develops the theme of the *ideal* state (Callipolis), i.e., one that *exists* from the point of view of the world of ideas, and considers that the *phenomenological* state, i.e., the state that *is,* is nothing more than a relative manifestation of the eternal in the temporal, the absolute in the transitory, then Aristotle justifies another state — the phenomenal (phenomenological) state itself. This is a state that exists here and now and must be understood as a given, as a phenomenon. In the spirit of Aristotle's teaching, it can be called *an apophantic state (*from the Greek ἀπόφανσις, "statement," "affirmation"), parallel to the way Aristotle uses the concept of *apophantic or apophantic statement (λόγος αποφαντικός).*
"affirmation"), parallel to Aristotle's use of the concept of disclosure or declarative utterance (λόγος αποφαντικός). The declarative (apophantic) state is what the state is in isolation from what it should be and what it is in the transcendent world of ideas. Here we see a transition from the political philosophy of the Father (paradigm) to the political philosophy of the Son (phenomena).

Now, if we recall "Timaios," it immediately becomes clear that as soon as we place ourselves in the position of the Son, we say
"The Son is everything. And what is Fatherly in him is the Son, and what is not Fatherly in him is also the Son."

But if Plato says that the part of the Son that is not Father is accidental and illusory, then the Son, who constructs an autonomous philosophy, asserts something else and says:
"The Son is what *is*, and the Father and the Nourisher are not, but are only the boundaries of the Son."

In other words, the Son places himself at the centre and builds politics, the state, philosophy, cosmology, and theology from this *central position*. Therefore, if Plato's philosophy is divine, then Aristotle's philosophy is divinely godless. To the extent that the Son resembles the Father, it is divine. To the extent that there is criticism of the world of ideas, it is godless philosophy.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomachia. Three Logos

But this is only from Plato's point of view. From Aristotle's point of view, this is certainly not the case. On the contrary, Aristotle says that his philosophy is true and correct in both directions. There is neither the material nor the paradigmatic here, but there is the phenomenal. That is, that which is, λόγος αποφαντικός.

It is fundamentally important that for Aristotle, *it is* the phenomenon itself *that exists* (just as for Plato, *it is* the idea *that exists* first and foremost), which is why he attacks Plato's doctrine of ideas. At the same time, Aristotle does not assert things (in their physicality) instead of ideas; he asserts something else — instead of ideas, for him there is eidos (ειδος), form. For Plato, eidos (ειδος) and idea (ίδέα) are almost the same thing. Aristotle asserts that ideas do not exist separately from phenomena, but that phenomena have an eidetic character, since every phenomenon has within itself μορφή (form), which is eidos (ειδος), and ΰλη (matter, wood). If Plato spoke of χo̅rḍa (space), Aristotle spoke of ΰλη. Incidentally, the word "matter" (māteria) is not derived from the word "mother," as many believe, but from a word that referred to shipbuilding timber, from which masts, in particular, were made. We are dealing with a practical calque of the Greek word ΰλη, meaning "tree," "wood" (1).

Aristotle's philosophy denies not only Plato's upper world of ideas, but also the world of Matter

So, according to Aristotle, there are no ideas, but there are eidos (ειδος). Phenomena are always constructed in this way: they have a primary element (eidos, ειδος) and a secondary element (matter, ΰλη); there is content (content, form) and subject (substance), i.e., that *in which* this content manifests itself (the material). Unlike Plato, Aristotle believed that matter does not exist on its own. In Plato, matter, χo̅rα, is called the third genus of being. It is a genus of being that is non-existent, but this genus exists in itself, in its non-being. Aristotle says: matter does not exist, just as ideas do not exist, but there is *a* material and ideal eidetic *horizon of phenomena.*

Aristotle's philosophy denies not only Plato's upper world of ideas, but also the world of Matter. It asserts that there is only and exclusively *the world of the Son*. Who is the Father? This is the Son's hypothesis about his origin. Who is the Mother? This is the material cause.

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[1] Some Latin authors translated Aristotle's term ΰλη not as materia, meaning 'mast wood' or 'ship timber', but as selva, simply 'forest' or "wood."

on the Son, who thinks about his origin. In other words, for Aristotle, everything boils down to the Son, to the intermediate level, to the world of phenomena, where there are two horizons — the ideal and the material. But what is *a horizon (*Greek ὸρί3ων — literally, a limit, a restriction from the root ὸρί3ω, "to divide")? It is the most extreme side of the same thing. And for Aristotle, this implies that beyond the horizon of the Son, on the other side of it, *there is nothing.* The philosophy of the Son is absolutised, which clarifies the fundamental difference between Plato's use of the concept of "idea" (ίδέα) and Aristotle's use of "eidos" (ειδος). Aristotle thinks of eidos (ειδος) as the upper horizon and ΰλη (matter) as the lower horizon. These are the boundaries of the Son *from within* himself. Nothing exists beyond these boundaries. Therefore, Aristotle has no concept of the "transcendent" or "beyond the limits." In this respect, Aristotle's philosophy is certainly not Platonism and is based on complete immanence.

Two philosophies

Thus, two philosophies emerge: Plato's transcendental philosophy and Aristotle's immanentist philosophy. If Plato's theology, later developed by the Neoplatonists — in particular, Proclus[1] (412–485), is associated with a *transcendent* God, a god beyond the limits of the world, Aristotle's god is completely different — he is an *immanent* God ("unmoved mover" — Greek ὸ ού κινούμενον κινεῖ). Plato's God is God the Father, while Aristotle's God is God the Son. In essence, these are two views of the divine.

According to Aristotle, the entire universe revolves around an "immovable mover," and all things strive toward it, but the matter mixed with these things prevents them from merging with God. They remain at a certain distance. The rotation of the heavenly spheres, the daily rhythms, the cycle of the year and the elements show us how this happens. Everything revolves around the point of the "immobile mover," around the pure Son, and only an Aristotelian philosopher can come so close to God that he essentially becomes that god. Aristotle considered himself a god, and his disciple Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) also considered himself a god. They (one from the point of view of philosophy, the other from the point of view of politics) were closest to the "immobile mover." In this sense, Aristotle is divine, but divine *in an immanent sense.*

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[1] *Proclus.* Platonic Theology. St. Petersburg: RHGI, Summer Garden, 2001.

Aristotle as an apologist for slavery

Aristotle constructed a complete, comprehensive, developed, phenomenological, immanentist ontology, philosophy, cosmology, physics, and political science. These things are necessary to know in order to understand the meaning of Aristotle's treatise Politics [1].

Like Plato, Aristotle discusses politics by applying his philosophy to the political sphere. And, like Plato, Aristotle asserts that engaging in politics and engaging in philosophy are two types of activities that are noble and superior. Anyone who does not engage in philosophy and politics, from Aristotle's point of view, is a slave. However, Aristotle treats this slave very well, since a slave must work, master technical professions, and be able to get along well with others. Accordingly, people who are engaged in technical matters (production, management, etc.) are, for Aristotle, inferior people. He even said that people who produce something with their own hands should not be given freedom. People who are connected with material things, with physicality, should be slaves; otherwise, they will try to bring their completely unnecessary economic considerations into politics, which is the business of warriors, and into philosophy, which is the business of wise men. Aristotle was an apologist for slavery.

On the one hand, Aristotle rebelled against Plato, stating that one should not submit to a higher transcendent principle. At the same time, however, he retained many of Plato's ideas, believing that it was necessary to introduce a strict hierarchy within the phenomenal (note: *declarative*) state. At the head of the expressive state (the Son), we again encounter three Platonic types: philosophers, assistants, and producers. Aristotle taught that philosophers (but not Platonists, rather Aristotelians, priests of the "unmoved mover," priests of the immanent deity), alongside them should be warriors (well-armed, strong, courageous, and willing to sacrifice their lives), and below them should be everyone else.

Aristotle set himself a practical task, asking the question: how can philosophers rule over warriors? This was solved with the help of an ethical system that prioritised nobility and refinement. People who think are, of course, more noble and refined than those who fight. In turn, those who fight are more noble and refined than those who

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[1] *Aristotle.* Politics / Aristotle. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Myśl, 1983.

They labour, dealing with physicality, matter and its inherent heaviness and coarseness.

Despite all his differences from Plato, Aristotle retains his three-part structure of vertical social organisation. Thus, in Nicomachean Ethics [1]he speaks of three types of life and the hierarchy that exists between them. These types are as follows:

1) βίος θεωρētικός (*contemplative* life, whose goal is to understand the essence of the human being as such in itself and the truth);
2) βίος πολιτκός (*political* life, whose goal is the acquisition of glory, "time[2] " — τιμή);
3) βίος άπολαυστικός (a life of pleasure, i.e. hedonism). These three forms of life correspond to three abilities of the eternal soul:

human soul:

1) mind (νους),
2) striving, desire, attraction (ŏρε3ις[3]) and
3) feeling (αισθησῖς).

Here we see the same triadic scheme that Plato elaborates in the Phaedrus. Accordingly, the types of life are forms of priority development of one or another part of the soul. And again, like Plato, Aristotle reduces this triad to three human types.

1) the perfect man
2) hero
3) the common man.

According to Aristotle, the person who has the most developed mind and who strives for a contemplative life is the perfect man (τέλειον). Through the study of philosophy, such a person achieves complete self-control and complete *self-sufficiency* (αυτάρκη). Thus, it is thought that makes a person truly free and independent of any external conditions and circumstances. Self-sufficiency stems from the fact that only through

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[1] *Aristotle.* Nicomachean Ethics/ Aristotle. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Myśl, 1983.

(2) The predominance of this type of life in Plato lies at the heart of "Timocracy."

[3]The term ŏρε3ις goes back to the verb όρέγω, "to stretch out," which means horizontal expansion. Its etymology is related to the Indo-European root *h3reǵ-, from which fundamentally important Indo-European terms related specifically to the second caste (the warrior caste) in Sanskrit (the element of fire associated with the middle — warrior — part of the soul — "rajas", from which "raja" — king, ruler), the Iranian tradition — "kharj", also king, ruler, and Latin — rex, king, and rego, "I rule". From the same root (rehtaz) in Germanic languages, concepts meaning "law," "straight direction," and "order" are formed.

Contemplation is understood as the highest goal of existence. And it is precisely in the course of a contemplative life that goodness becomes the inner content of the thinker (hence self-sufficiency).

According to Aristotle, heroes also strive to make virtue internal and inseparable (δυσαφαίρετον) through glory, but they still depend on certain external conditions — not on nature, but on society.

The third category of people live by their feelings and strive for physical and emotional pleasures. They constitute the common people.

The common people are mainly engaged in "household management" (economics, οίκειον) and are completely dependent on the external world, on society and nature.

In a normal society, a philosopher-king, a perfect contemplator, rules. He is the bearer and guardian of the Logos, *and therefore* of the polis. According to Aristotle, man is by nature defined as a "thinking animal" [1](3ωον λόγον ŭχον) and at the same time as a "political animal" [(2)] (3ō̄ον πολιτικόν). Thought and politics constitute the essential aspects of human existence, separating it from other forms of life. Therefore, the most intelligent (philosopher, contemplator) is at the same time the most political, and the contemplative life is not opposed to politics, but is its source and its centre. States are a form of thought. And therefore, the central place in a good state must be given to wise men.

The state is defended and protected by warriors who love glory. If the philosopher is focused on truth (αλήθεια), then the warrior is focused on appearance, that is, on approaching truth, which the Greeks defined as δό3α. The meaning of the term δό3α is multifaceted and goes back to the verb δοκέω, "to indicate," "to seem," "to suppose," "to imagine." In some cases, δό3α is translated into Slavic as "glory," hence όρθοδο3ία,
"Orthodoxy," which means "right opinion." Thus, warriors, driven by a desire for glory, seek the truth on the one hand, and on the other hand, embody what they have been able to comprehend in life, thereby bringing order to it and introducing an orthodox vector. This vector is the existential axis (ŏρε3ις) of heroism.

All other citizens of Aristotle's phenomenal state live a quiet and measured life devoted to pleasure and bodily comforts. They belong to the lower spectrum of existence and have only an indirect relationship to truth and even orthodoxy —

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[1] λόγον δ□ μόνον ανθρωπος ŭχει των 3□ων. *Aristotle.* Nicomachean Ethics; *Ibid.* Politics. P. 379.

[2] ὸ ανθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν 3¼ον. *Aristotle.* Politics. P. 378.

through the ordering of the world of things and feelings. They also participate in politics, but in its most pragmatic and practical matters related to the organisation of the physical world.

Since ordinary citizens develop the lower, sensual side of the soul, they should play a subordinate role in politics.

First a warrior, then a philosopher

With regard to the structure of the soul, Aristotle generally accepts Plato's division into three parts — rational, passionate, and lustful — and, accordingly, the metaphor of the chariot of the soul, consisting of a charioteer (reason), a white horse (passion), and a black horse (lust). Depending on which principle prevails in a person, we get a philosopher-sage, a warrior or a lustful labourer. How can we establish a hierarchy between them? Aristotle believed that the intelligent and strong would inevitably establish dominance over the "materially oriented part of the population." Aristotle asks himself: how are the specific societies of most Greek polis organised — in Lacedaemon (Sparta), Attica, Epirus, Magna Graecia, Ionia, as well as in other countries — for example, in Phoenicia or Thrace? They are organised exactly like this. And it has never been otherwise. The stupid, weak, and materially preoccupied are always under the boot of the clever and bold.

The question is how to make a strong warrior with a sword obey a philosopher without a sword, who thinks about the high, the right, and the true, but whose fury is tamed? That is, how to make a strong horse submit to a groom?

According to Aristotle, the problem of the philosophical and military principles can only be solved if we consider the following situation: when there is *something that is different* and at the same time *the same* (i.e., it simply violates the first law of its own logic). In order for us to be able to subordinate warriors to philosophers, it is necessary that they be *the same people.* The same, but different. To do this, we need to divide the life of a noble person into two parts — young and older, up to 50 and after 50. Up to 50, he is a warrior, after 50 — a philosopher. That is, in the first part of his life, a person fights for the state, and in the second, he lives as a philosopher. Thus, a person (warrior) is not subordinate to another, but to himself (philosopher), but to his older self. According to Aristotle, a noble person is a warrior-philosopher (who is first a warrior and then a philosopher).

Both types — philosopher and warrior — are considered aristocracy by Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle said that in some societies, people are born aristocrats, in others they become aristocrats, and in others they are both born and become aristocrats. The philosopher believed that if a person is born noble, he will remain noble, but if he is born a slave, he will remain a slave.

some societies, while in others they become aristocrats, and in others they are both born and become aristocrats. The philosopher believed that if a person came from a noble family and if his ancestors had fought for Greece, then he was most likely a good person and would have good offspring. According to Aristotle, people born with inferior qualities should be killed, since only those who improve society, not those who worsen it, should live.

Aristotle himself was not a citizen of Athens, that is, a metic (Greek: μέτοικος), and he even had restrictions on owning his own school, the Lyceum (Greek: Λύκειον). He was born in Stagira. He did not protest against this. The man who raised the great emperor nevertheless had certain restrictions on his citizenship by virtue of the law. Therefore, aristocracy does not always coincide with the highest administrative positions in the polis. As with Plato, Aristotle is primarily concerned with aristocracy of the soul.

The paradigm of three types of government

What types of government does Aristotle identify in his Politics? He differs somewhat from Plato in his list of types, but he does agree with him in part. Aristotle says that there are three fundamental types of government, which can be viewed positively or negatively, or as genuine or false. There is the rule of one — the rule of a king. There is the rule of a few — the rule of a certain elite. There is the rule of the majority, i.e. of many. Aristotle sees these three forms in all political systems. In Sparta, he identified all three types and therefore (like Plato) sympathised with this part of Greece and its political system, while being sceptical of Athenian democracy.

The three models outlined above form a kind of matrix, a topology of political systems that has remained unchanged to this day. Accordingly, just as Plato set the global framework for political philosophy, Aristotle's political theory also creates fundamental types of politics. Unlike Plato, these types are not based on the eternal-temporal, ideal-perverted model. Aristotle looks at the situation phenomenologically. In fact, there is either the rule of one, the rule of several, or the rule of many — and in various combinations. One can draw a triangle of Aristotelian politics, with the rule of one at the top, the rule of several in the middle, and the rule of many at the bottom.



General scheme of Aristotle's types of government

This triangle can be used to analyse any political system, both ancient and modern. It is a general law of political science or political philosophy.

A good state

Aristotle goes on to say that there is good government by one, good government by several, and good government by many, and there is bad, perverted government by one, government by several, and government by many. In other words, a duplicate of this scheme is created. Not one triangle, but two triangles.

The correct triangle would be:



Positive types of political systems according to Aristotle

Aristotle considers these three systems of government to be correct:
1) monarchy (μοναρχία),
2) aristocracy (åριστοκρᾱτια) and
3) polity [1] (πολιτεία).

[1]Aristotle uses the term "πολιτεία" in a slightly different sense than Plato. For Plato, it means any politically organised community, regardless of its form of government, while for Aristotle, it refers to a specific type of government in which power is distributed among all free citizens of a city or settlement. Therefore, we use two English transcriptions for the same Greek word πολιτεία:
"politeia" in the case of Plato and his interpretation, and "politia" in the case of Aristotle to denote the positive version of what is generally understood by "democracy" or "organic democracy."

Various combinations and combinations are possible between them, which are also theoretically positive.

Monarchy: the monarch is a noble philosopher, a wise man, a person who is truly guided by the common good. The monarch is the embodiment of political good. His power must be as reasonable, selfless and exalted as possible. This is exactly how Aristotle tried to raise his son Philip of Macedon (382–336 BC), Alexander, who indeed became the greatest of the Greek rulers.

Aristocracy: the embodiment of political dignity, i.e., certain virtues associated with courage, bravery, heroism, and self-sacrifice. Aristocrats are, first and foremost, noble warriors. At the top of their value system are bravery, honour, dignity, and fearlessness in the face of death.

Polity: a community of mentally sound, responsible, benevolent people of good will. The majority are qualified to make laws and govern themselves. Aristotle usually refers to a village where everyone knows each other. Polity is the least good form of government; it is much worse than the rule of warriors, aristocrats, and, even more so, monarchy. But it is not bad either.

At the same time, Aristotle introduces a spatial principle for classifying types of political systems. Monarchy is most suited to large territorial states. Aristocracy is suited to medium-sized states, while polity is most effective on a small scale — in villages, settlements, and small towns, where people know each other and can assess the qualities of those elected more or less responsibly.

If we mix all these levels — monarchy, aristocracy, and polity — we get a positive image of a state that is not ideal, but *good*. Aristotle does not say that such a state exists. He says that it can be and should be. This is the "immovable mover" to which we aspire. It is *the natural place* of politics, towards which all processes are directed. In any state, there must be an intelligent king who cares about the common good, there must be the best warrior-aristocrats who have proven with their lives, courage and skill that they have a right to power, and there must be a responsible, kind, pious people who obey all the rules.

According to Plato, there is no doubt that the ideal state exists. According to Aristotle, such doubts exist because a good state may or may not come into being.

Look at how this political doctrine transformed the consciousness of Alexander the Great. The Macedonians came from the north,

Athens was captured, and Aristotle told his student Alexander that it was necessary to create a unified whole, with a single "immovable mover" at its centre. They should strive to create a state headed by a king who cares for the common good, surrounded by an aristocracy and a responsible population. Alexander thinks — Alexander acts. He listened to his teacher, and a few years later, the vast Greek world, which had never been united by anyone in all of history, plus territories many times larger than it, stretching as far as Northern India, the entire Middle East, and all of Iran, found itself under the rule of a single monarch. That is what a good philosopher is, and that is what a good student is. Alexander realised that he was that "good king," dealt with his rivals, selected the best, formed a guard based on them, and conquered the whole world. Aristotle's ontology of politics takes on the character of action, of an active phenomenon. For something to appear, it must be revealed. The state comes into being when we create it. This is Aristotle's philosophical praxis. stotel.

Note how political philosophy is transformed in the transition from Plato to Aristotle, from a philosophy where contemplation completely dominates action — Aristotle introduces "*contemplative action*." When we take this teaching seriously, we get an empire in which there really is the best king, the best aristocrats and responsible citizens. It is this combination of monarchy, aristocracy and polity that became the possible, achievable ideal of classical Mediterranean civilisation.

It was this idea that later formed the basis of the Roman Empire. It was built according to the "pattern" of Alexander the Great. It is a completely Aristotelian empire, dominated by three principles: Caesar (the sacred emperor), the senate (the aristocracy) and the Roman people (the polity). Aristotle's eidetic goal, the natural place of Aristotelian politics, is possible, achievable, desirable, and the best are moving towards it.

A bad state

Just as there can be a good state, there can also be a bad one. But even a bad state, in all its forms, can be reduced to the original typology of the Political. This gives us a version of the same triangle, but with all forms of government being non-negative.



Negative types of political systems according to Aristotle

According to Aristotle, as well as Plato, the worst form of government is tyranny, the rule of an idiot; Carl Schmitt calls this "sovereign dictatorship" [1](when the dictator acts only in his own name as an individual). The rule of one in a positive case is the best, and the same rule of one in a negative triangle is the worst. Accordingly, if a sole ruler is guided not by the common good but by his own individual interests, he is a representative of the worst political system.

[1] *Schmitt, C.* Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006.

A little better than tyranny, but still a bad form of government, is oligarchy, the rule of a few. Oligarchy is the opposite of aristocracy. A few of the best rule in an aristocratic system, and a few of the worst rule in an oligarchic system.

The next level, the worst form of government, is democracy. Democracy is a parody of polity. While in polity, responsible citizens make responsible decisions, in democracy, irresponsible citizens make irresponsible decisions, moving in sporadic bursts of sleepy consciousness. In other words, democracy is a parodic organisation of the majority, where the mob (ὄχλος) acts under the guise of the majority. At the same time, Aristotle excluded not only slaves but also many labourers from even such a democracy.

The philosopher considered democracy to be the terrible rule of the intellectually inferior masses. At the same time, he says that if tyranny is radically different from monarchy (like top and bottom) and oligarchy is also very different from aristocracy, then polity is less different from democracy. Nevertheless, worse than democracy is oligarchy, and worse than oligarchy is tyranny. On a par with the kingdom of Alexander the Great, one can imagine an anti-Empire ruled by a tyrant, supported by oligarchs and under the cover of an unthinking majority.

Aristotle's analysis, with all his models, is absolutely applicable to any political system of any time.

Chapter 4. Sacred politics and religion

Religion and three types of societies

All types of society can be reduced to three general groups [1]:

1) traditional society (also known as pre-modern society);

2) modern society (modern society);

3) postmodern society (postmodern society). Religion is a distinctive (and main) feature of traditional society.

Therefore, in order to study all aspects of any traditional society, and above all its political structure, it is necessary to thoroughly study the religious premises on which it is based.

Any religion and, more broadly, any traditional teaching [2]places at the head of its value system an otherworldly, spiritual principle, that is, something sacred, divine, sometimes formulated into a strict theological system, sometimes represented in the form of myths, rites and rituals, sometimes existing as completely archaic beliefs (which is characteristic of the simplest types of societies).

This is the most general concept of religion, encompassing all types of traditional societies, including archaic ones. Religion can be institutionalised in the form of a church, a body of dogmas, texts, or laws. It can also have more vague contours, taking the form of mythology, rituals, or a system of beliefs in spirits, gods, heroes, the souls of the dead, etc.

It is characteristic that modern society is built on the denial of the dominant position of religion. Therefore, modernisation includes secularism, i.e. the relegation of religion to the periphery of the socio-political system; the strict separation of religion from power, politics, education, etc. Modern society is also defined by its attitude towards religion, but in this case, the attitude is negative; if religion is allowed, it is only in the form of

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy. Moscow: Eurasian Movement. 2009.

[2]There are many different definitions of religion. The difference between religion and sacred tradition will be discussed later.

marginal authority, and the choice of religion becomes a matter for each individual to decide by law. This is the fundamental difference between traditional society (pre-modern) and modern society (modern). The former is necessarily religious, and religion plays a dominant role (including politically). The latter rejects religion in this role and either relegates it to the periphery or abolishes it altogether.

Postmodern society has a more complex relationship with religion. It does not so much deny it outright as parody it, mock it and give it grotesque features. Postmodernism seeks to carry the line of modernism to its conclusion, but believes that the means of modernism itself cannot achieve this. Therefore, atheism and secularism, which predominate in modernism, are seen by postmodernists as insufficient, and they resort to irony, parody and simulacra to destroy religion.

The sacred: dark and light sides

Traditional society includes all types of societies in which God, the divine, and the spiritual are at the forefront. This type of society can be called *a sacred society*.

The sacred [1]is a very complex category. Usually, the sacred is separated from the concept of "holy," although it is formally very difficult to find an exact equivalent for the concept of "sacred" in Russian. It is both holy and sacred at the same time. At the same time, it includes something "cursed" and "demonic." In any case, the sacred inspires awe and reverence and establishes a distance between people and powers that far exceed human capabilities and understanding.

The concept of "sacred" is an essential sociological category and represents a kind of higher principle that cannot be rationally understood and precedes all types of

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[1]From Latin sacer — "sacred." The sacred is ambivalent and includes not only the "holy" and "pure," but also the "demonic." Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) also points this out: "Commenting on Virgil's words 'auri sacrafames' ('rumour sacred to the ear'), Servius rightly remarks that 'sacer' can mean both 'cursed' and 'holy'. Eustathius points to the same duality of meaning in the Greek αγιος, which can mean both "purity" and "impurity." And we find the same ambivalence of the sacred among the ancient Semites and Egyptians." *Eliade, M.* Essays in Comparative Religion. M.: Ladomir, 1999. P. 30. See also *Durkheim, E.* The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. M.: Publishing House DELO, 2018 and *Eliade, M.* The Sacred and the Profane. M.: Moscow State University Press, 1994.

[2]*Otto, R.* The Idea of the Holy: An Essay on the Meaning of the Rational in a World Filled with Myths, Theologies, and Religious Theories. New York: The Free Press, 1959.

myths, theologies, and religious theories. This concept is experienced in concrete experience—in the experience that C. G. Jung (1875–1961) called *the numinous experience*[1].

> We are talking about a collision between a person and something fundamentally higher than themselves. So high that this collision gives rise to a double feeling: a feeling of delight and a feeling of horror. It is very important that the sacred is not just an experience of goodness; it is an experience that has not yet been divided into awe and horror, into a sense of one's own absolute insignificance and the greatness of what is revealed.

There is a dark side to the sacred, and there is a light side . The dark side is what terrifies a person and therefore removes their personality (in this respect, the sacred often takes the form of death). In other words, the individual ceases to exist when experiencing the sacred.

The other, light side of the sacred is that which fills a person with delight, endless joy, and bliss; here again, the individual is stripped away, but in a positive sense, and the place of the vanished person is taken by the all-consuming joy of contemplating the light.

The sacred is distinguished by the fact that the terrifying and the awe-inspiring remain *inseparable*. This is the common root of the two most powerful forms of experience. Thus, a society that places this instance at the forefront is a sacred society. It may be called "God," "spirit," "Heaven," "supernatural," but in each case we are dealing with something sacred. In some societies, leaders became sacred figures (sacralisation of power), inspiring both fear and love in the people.

The sacred ruler is the central figure of a religious society.

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[1]The concepts of "numinous," "numinous," and "numinosum" (from the Latin numen, meaning "divinity" or "will of the gods") were introduced by the German theologian Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) in his work The Sacred (Das Heilige). According to Otto, the numinous includes four main components: 1) a sense of creaturehood (Kreaturgefuhl), 2) a terrifying mystery (Mysterium tremendum), 3) awe (Fancinans), and 4) a sense of the numinous value of the sacred (Sanctum als numinoser Wert). According to Otto, the basis of all religions is one and the same and is rooted in the experience of the numinous. See *Otto, R.* The Sacred: An Essay on the Irrational in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. Following him, C. G. Jung believed that "the idea of God originated from the experience of the numinous. It was a physical experience, moments of being overwhelmed, intoxicated by it. Rudolf Otto, in his psychology of religion, defined this moment as numinosity, tracing the word back to the Latin numen, meaning hint or sign." *Jarrett James L. (ed.).* Jung's seminar on Nietzsche's Zarathustra (1934–1939). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. P. 1038.

The main element of the political philosophy of a religious society (if we understand religion in a broad sense) is the sacred, and we are dealing either with a *sacred* society (in which case it is religious) or with *a profane society*, i.e. one that does not place the sacred at the forefront, but something else. Traditional society is sacred. Modern society is profane, i.e. non-sacred. Continuing to apply this criterion, we can say that postmodern society is anti-sacred, parodically sacred, or sacred in reverse. The term sacred has been widely used in sociology and politics since Durkheim. Sacred sociology was founded in the late 1930s by Roger Caillois (1913–1978) and Georges Bataille (1897–1962)[1].

Religion according to Guénon

There is a narrower understanding of the term "religion," particularly that used by Protestant theologians [2] and by the French traditionalist René Guénon (1886–1951). Guénon views religion not as the entirety of sacred society, nor as all types of sacred phenomena, but only as a part thereof. According to his terminology, only those sacred institutions that consider the sacred principle to be strictly transcendent can be called "religion" in the full sense of the word. René Guénon insists that the term "religion" should only be used within the group of monotheistic religious traditions formed by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Guénon also points out the difference between purely metaphysical thinking, corresponding to the sacred in the most general sense, and theological, i.e., religious thinking.

According to Guénon, religion differs from other sacred systems in that its highest sacred principle is called a transcendent God. This God is *the Creator* (hence the concept of "creationism"); he creates the world out of nothing, not out of himself (in creationism, there is an ontological gap between God and the world He created). God is always and absolutely, while the world is created out of nothing (the idea of creation ex *nihilo)*. It is precisely the concept of creation, creation out of nothing, that defines what is called religion in the narrow sense. From this view arises strict monotheism, that is, the dogmatic assertion that God is not only one, but also unique, and that between Him and the rest of the world (including humans) lies an insurmountable ontological abyss([4]).

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[1] *Denis O.* College of Sociology. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2004.

[2] *Bartsch H.-W.* (ed.) Kerygma und Mythos. Vol. 1–5. Hamburg: Resih, 1948–1955.

[3] *Guénon, R.* Essays on Tradition and Metaphysics. St. Petersburg: Azbuka-Klassika, 2010.

[4] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

Creation and Manifestation.

Every term in philosophy, politics, and science in general must be explained in a certain way through a negative pair. When we talk about the sacred, we emphasise: the sacred, *not* the profane. When we talk about the ideal, we contrast it with the "normal" and the "material." When talking about sole rule, we contrast it with the rule of several or the rule of many (i.e., not one). The most important aspect of philosophy is the precise selection of a specific and positive meaning that takes the place of the initial thesis, term, or statement in the process of negation ([1]).



Examples of Greimas' semantic square as applied to basic terms in political philosophy

[1] This is systematically studied by hermeneutics and, in particular, by A. Greimas (1917–1992), who developed a special semantic square. See: *Greimas, A.-J.* Structural Semantics. Moscow: Academic Project, 2008.

What semantic pair, what antonymic doublet is there for the concept of 'creation'? Is it the term 'manifestation',
"Manifestation." Herein lies the difference between the *broad* understanding of religion (which includes both theories based on manifestation and theories based on creation) and the *narrow* understanding (which includes only those theories of the origin of the world that are based on the principle of creation).





Semantics of the definition of religion and monotheism

Creation means God's creation from nothing (ex nihilo), not from Himself (ex Deo). And therefore, another pair of terms to the pair "creation — manifestation" is *"creatio ex nihilo — creatio Ex Deo"* ("creation from nothing — creation from God"). Creatio Ex Deo= manifestation. If God creates from Himself, then He manifests Himself in the world. There is no rigid, insurmountable ontological barrier between Him and the world, no strict transcendence.

God the Creator as a Person

God the Creator is a personal God. He is, if you will, an individual who is in a "contractual" relationship with other individuals. This gives rise to the idea of the Covenant as an agreement, a contract, a legal transaction between one individual (transcendent, omnipotent, absolute, eternal, immortal and creative) and other individuals who are his antithesis; that is, people who are mortal, limited, temporary, and ambiguous.

This idea of the individualisation of the sacred is the second feature that defines a narrow understanding of religion. God in religion, in the narrow sense, is always a personal, creative, transcendent God.

Religious and secular societies

Thus, we have divided the concept of religion into a broad understanding and a narrow understanding. It is precisely the second, narrow understanding of religion that is characterised by such a phenomenon as theology.

The term "theology" itself was introduced by monotheism to describe the construction of the philosophy of religion within this basic model: when God is the Creator and when God is a personality. The narrow understanding of religious societies includes three monotheistic religions:

1) Judaism,
2) Christianity, and
3) Islam.

If we take a broader concept of religion, then, of course, all other types of societies are included, except for the profane society — that is, modern Western society or societies modelled on it.

Secular societies began to emerge in Europe in the modern era, starting in the 16th century. All other societies — non-European societies, as well as

European societies before the 16th century — were and remain, in *a broad* sense of the word.

Some societies existing today are also religious. Such are some Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iran, etc. Hindu civilisation is, of course, sacred and religious in the broad sense (but not in the narrow sense!); apart from a few branches of Vishnuism, the main body of Hindu religious beliefs corresponds to manifestationism ([1]). In Hinduism, God is impersonal; He creates the world from Himself (creatio ex Deo).

The Chinese civilisation (perhaps until the Soviet period) is a sacred civilisation, and the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Japan and, to some extent, Indochina were under its decisive influence. Throughout its history, Chinese civilisation has been religious in a broad sense, but not monotheistic or creationist, because the Chinese tradition is even further removed than all other traditions from the idea of an individual deity. While in Hinduism, in some forms of Krishnaism and Vishnuism, there are instances of an individual God perceived as a personality, nothing of the sort can be found in the Chinese tradition. This tradition does not even have a remote concept of a creative transcendent personality. It has the Tao, the will of Heaven, the sacred Emperor. It is a sacred civilisation in the full sense of the word, but in the narrow sense of "religion" it is very poorly grafted onto it.

If we look at the world as a whole, we see that most political systems and most societies — both in ancient times and today — live in sacred societies. This may surprise many, because we are accustomed to thinking that we live in a new era (Russians live in it only halfway), but this is only a small spot of profanity compared to the vast sea of sacredness. However, modern society is extremely intrusive and intolerant, claiming universality and universality, although in reality, even today, despite Westernisation, modernisation and globalisation, it is only a pretentious, aggressive, colonial, imperialist island of profanity in a sea of sacredness. This sea has not dried up.

Romanian intellectual Calin Georgescu, who was the UN Special Representative for the Pacific, said that until the 1950s, the Marshall Islands were an absolute

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Great India. The Civilisation of the Absolute. Moscow: Academic Project, 2017.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. The Yellow Dragon. Civilisations of the Far East. China. Korea. Japan. Indochina. Moscow: Academic Project, 2017.

a paradise where everything was sacred. Then the Americans came, and in just a few decades, the paradise islands turned into a real hell. The Americans set up a naval base there, spread tents with Coca-Cola and Pepsi, and gradually the people began to degenerate.

The natural relations between the tribes began to turn into competition, and life expectancy decreased significantly. Nature was destroyed by underwater nuclear explosions, everything was contaminated with radiation, and a huge, feral, impoverished population, grouped in new pseudo-Western cities, was forced to feed on scraps.

Thus, the stain of profanity reached the sacred Marshall Islands. The history of Western European civilisation can be viewed in much the same light, which first dismantled sacredness on its own territory and then spread throughout the world like a poisonous stain, reaching territories further and further away from Europe.

Therefore, when we want to gain a clearer understanding of what a sacred society is and what a profane society is, and, accordingly, what sacred (religious) politics and profane politics are, we must take into account that, although today our education is based on *the absolutisation of the profane,* the majority of humanity *still* lives in a sacred world. When we talk about sacred political philosophy, we are not talking exclusively about something that once was — today it is almost the entire Islamic world (!), and if we look at other regions, then, apart from Europe and North America, sacred principles clearly prevail there. It is believed that modern humanity has been living in a modern society for several centuries. This is true only for Western Europe and North America. Outside these regions, elements of traditional society remain extremely stable and sometimes even openly dominant.

This is a paradoxical moment: modern humanity is more sacred than profane, although the official (quite totalitarian) ideology of self-understanding of all our cultures and civilisations is precisely profanity.

This topic immediately brings to mind the idea that somewhere there is a pole of "pure profanity"; this is modern Europe and the United States. For 500 years, the West has been living under profane philosophy and profane politics. Over the course of these 500 years, religion has gradually been replaced by

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Theory of a Multipolar World. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

further and further away — from the centre of society to the periphery, transforming from a public (and political) institution into a private one.

The experience of the death of the individual

The collective dimension of religion is decisive for a sacred society, which places emphasis not on the individual but on that which *transcends* the individual. When we experience the sacred, we experience the death of the individual. When we experience the sacred, we experience something greater than ourselves. So much greater, brighter, more global that we dissolve before it and rejoice in this dissolution. Or we are terrified. Or we experience both at the same time.

Therefore, we can say that at the heart of *the sacred philosophy* of politics lies the experience of death, the experience of the "terrible" beginning, which is at the same time the beginning of "good." And if we try to separate the good beginning from the terrible, for example, the delight from the horror, we will simply destroy the sacred, since its property is to have both sides *at the same time*.

The sacred cannot be *only* holy. The sacred is necessarily also monstrous, that is, it frightens, destroys, suppresses, and causes trembling. And if the sacred does not make us tremble, then it is not sacred, but merely a substitute, a simulacrum. The genuine sacred is distinguished by the fact that it precedes the division into the good and the terrifying.

Secularism

Profane civilisation banishes the concept of the sacred and constructs a completely different profane politics. In this case, religion moves from being a central institution of society to a peripheral one, from a universally binding model to a matter of private choice.

Accordingly, religion ceases to be religion, and even if it survives, it survives in these profane societies in a new guise. Is there religion in the modern West? Of course there is. But it is a profane society because religion is neither at the centre of social life, nor does it have a public dimension, nor is it a political institution. It exists, but from a socio-political point of view, it does not exist. It does not exist as the axis and core of the political. And before the beginning of the modern era, it was precisely that — a kind of "measure of things."

This is the idea behind secularism and secularisation: the separation of church and state, the separation of religion and society. In a sacred (religious) society, this is impossible. Politics is subject to religious principles and has its roots in religion. In a profane society, politics is seen as something independent, also stemming from philosophy, but from profane philosophy. Thus, we can say that there is a religious philosophy of politics, characteristic of sacred societies, and a profane philosophy of politics, characteristic of profane societies, i.e. those that have proclaimed the principle of secularism and made religion not political or social, but personal and private.

When religion becomes a private matter for individuals, it ceases to be a religion

When religion becomes a private matter for individuals, it ceases to be religion

The fact is that if religion becomes a private matter for individuals, it *ceases to be religion.* When the Church or another institution moves from the sacred world to the profane world, *the nature of religion changes*. Religion presupposes a comprehensive understanding of the world. The religious world cannot be the product of the "self-development of matter" or the "evolution of monkeys." The world with which the religious worldview deals is either an expression of the deity or a product of God's creation. In both cases, this world unconditionally possesses the principle of holism, of wholeness. The whole precedes the parts; it is not composed of parts, nor is it the result of their "evolution." God, thought, spirit, and subject are primordial.

Holism is opposed to the concept of individualism [1]. Thus, we have two approaches to understanding (any) thing. Aristotle gave us a holistic understanding of things: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. An individualistic understanding implies that the whole is an arbitrary combination of parts (i.e., the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, and if we regroup these parts, we create a different whole). From the point of view of holism, the whole possesses a quality that surpasses the qualities of all its constituent parts, determines them and precedes them. From the point of view of individualism, the whole is completely equal to its parts. The founder of sociology, Émile Durkheim understood society in an Aristotelian way, believing that

[1] *Dumont, L.* Homo Hierarchicus: An Attempt at a Description of the Caste System. St. Petersburg: Eurasia, 2001; Ibid. Essay on Individualism. Dubna: Phoenix, 1997.

[2] *Durkheim, E.* Sociology: Its Subject, Method, and Purpose. Moscow: Canon, 1995.

that society is primary in relation to the individual. This is a holistic approach.

As for the *religious* philosophy of politics, in a broad sense we can consider it as a combination of political Platonism and political Aristotelianism. All types of religious philosophy fit completely into Platonism and Aristotelianism. In fact, Islamic political philosophy, Christian political philosophy, Jewish political philosophy, and the political philosophy of India and China can all be explained in one way or another using Plato's understanding of the world and the state (polis), and — provided that something does not fit into the framework of this political Platonism — the principle of political Aristotelianism can be applied.

Both Plato's political philosophy and Aristotle's political philosophy are *religious*. These types of political philosophy are sacred and correspond to traditional society (one with a highly differentiated structure).

One more general remark should be made. Many archaic societies are generally not as symmetrical and vertical as the pictures painted by Plato and Aristotle. We have already mentioned that both Plato and Aristotle distinguish three castes, three classes:

- priests/philosophers
- warriors
- producers

This scheme corresponds to developed traditional societies, where we see a high degree of social differentiation. In hunter-gatherer societies or in the simplest agrarian collectives, we do not find such a strict triadic model.

PART 2.
MONOTHEISTIC RELIGIONS AND TYPES OF POLITICAL THEOLOGIES

Chapter 1. The Political Philosophy of Judaism

Judaism and politics. Israel as an idea

The political philosophy of Judaism is based on the religious principle of a covenant between a single personal God (the Creator) and the "chosen people" (the Jews). This is called the Old Covenant[1]. The Jews made a pact with God the Creator to serve Him and no other gods.

From the whole collection of sacred symbols, the Jews chose one figure. Here, religion coincides with the people, and belonging to the people is determined by the fact of religion. Anyone who believes in the one God of the Old Testament, anyone who inherits the covenant with him, is a Jew.

Since the Jewish people lived for a long time in opposition to other peoples, they developed a distrustful attitude towards peoples who also claimed to believe in gods and in the sacredness of their political system, but did so differently from the Jews. Thus, a gradual convergence between the ethnic and the religious took place.

It is interesting that, from the point of view of Jewish political philosophy, the optimal political system is a state of paradise (before the Fall). In this "political" system, there are no rulers, no labour, only Adam, faithful to God. This paradise on earth is the starting point of history and a spiritual model. Paradise in Judaism fulfils the same role as the ideal state (Kallipolis) in Plato's philosophy.

It is important to note that the word "paradise" (Hebrew:פרדס , pardes) comes from the ancient Iranian root parādaiĵah-, from which the Avestan pairi-daêza- was derived, meaning "park surrounded by walls" [2]. At the same time, the most ancient meaning of this term was associated precisely with walls (Old Persian daêza), but it was precisely the presence of walls that was the main feature in ancient times.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Va'al. Moscow: Academic Project, 2017.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

sign of the city, πόλις[1] . Paradise (paradise) is a paradigm of the structure of life in the Jewish tradition.

The entire history is conceived as the expulsion of the forefathers from paradise, that is, the departure from the ideal city, wanderings and trials, and the restoration of paradise in the last days. Thus, in a political and philosophical sense, history itself is interpreted by Jews as a path from paradise (which lay at the beginning of history) to the final messianic times, when the Messiah will come[2] that is[3] back to paradise.

At the heart of Judaism is a covenant with the Creator

Accordingly, the various historical stages between the Fall/expulsion of the first parents from paradise and the restoration of the original fullness of the paradise world constitute the cycle of sacred history.

The Jewish people and the Jewish religion are directly linked to this sacred history. A Jew is someone who lives in this history and is part of it. A Jew is a subject of history. All other peoples are demons, manifestations of the powers of "the other side" (Hebrew: "סטרא אחרא " — "sitra achra"). This gives rise to the idea that since the Jewish people are the subject of history, then in fact, from beginning to end, all of history is conceived and measured in terms of the stages of the Jewish people's existence. This gives rise to radical religious ethnocentrism.

Thus, at the heart of Jewish political philosophy lies the covenant between the Jews and the Creator of the world, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In essence, the entire history of Judaism is a problem of loyalty and betrayal towards one's God.

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[1]The fact that such a fundamental term in Judaism as "paradise" is an Iranian borrowing is highly significant. After their return from Babylonian captivity, the Jews incorporated many elements of Iranian religion into their religious, political and cultural traditions. See *Dugin*, *A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Moon Monotheism and the Gestalt of Baal.

[2] Mashiach, or Messiah, comes from the Hebrew word "מָשִׁיחַ," meaning "anointed one." See: *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Semites. Moon Monotheism and the Gestalt of Baal.

[3]This religious-political philosophy of history is associated with the coming of the King-Savior at the end of time, and the term "anointed" refers specifically to the King.
"anointed to the kingdom" also almost certainly has Iranian origins, since the Iranian tradition was originally built on a close connection between the structure of history, the fate of the kingdom, and the expectation of the coming King-Restorer (Saoshyant in the Mazdean tradition). At the same time, all these themes are absent in early Judaism and appear only in the later, post-Babylonian edition. See *Dugin*, *A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.

At different stages, the political organisation of the Jews relates differently to this vertical structure. Having received the Old Testament, the Jews begin to carry it. The most important idea became the organisation of society around the vertical axis of the Covenant: around religious leaders, judges, prophets, around the sacred Ark of the Covenant, where the tablets of the Covenant that Moses received on Mount Sinai are kept. Accordingly, Jewish society, politics and history are built around this *sacred* model, which is why Jews often refer to themselves as a "priestly nation."

Judaism and Platonism

If we now return to Plato's model of the cave and ask who is the legitimate ruler in the Jewish understanding, we will answer that it is the same Platonic philosopher who rises from the cave (anodos) and descends again (katodos). The entire Jewish people as a whole think of themselves as priests among other nations. Other nations are either warriors or craftsmen, while the priestly nation is the nation of the book, the nation of thought, the nation that makes service to the supreme deity its fundamental task (hence the large number of synagogues and people studying the Torah).

This approach shapes the perception of the place of Jews among other peoples. This is the royal-philosophical place that was occupied by the Jews during the period when the Promised Land was destined for the future kingdom, followed by the Egyptian captivity, and then, with Moses, the Jews were able to return to the Promised Land to once again become rulers, restoring their royal dignity.

The Promised Land was given by God to the 12 tribes of Israel, and they returned to their land to become kings of the Canaanite peoples living around them. A Canaanite centre emerged, where the Jews controlled what was then a vast territory of Israel. At first, the organisation of the Jewish people, linked to the division of the territory into 12 tribes, was uncertain: after the messianic leaders Moses, who led the Jews out of Egypt, and Joshua, who reconquered the territory of Israel after the end of the wanderings in the Arabian desert, a period of judges began. All Jewish leaders were priests and sages who determined how to fairly organise the political and social model of ancient Israel based on the Covenant.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal.

However, during the conquest of Canaan, it was military leaders such as Joshua, who achieved a religious goal by military means, who distinguished themselves. The Israelites often fought with neighbouring peoples, but in their eyes, this war was *sacred*. Establishing Jewish rule over the "promised land" was a religious mission, a kind of restoration of the conditions of a lost paradise. From this, it is easy to understand the place of the territory of Palestine in the political philosophy of Judaism (both in ancient times and today).

Property, livestock, slaves, and everything else that the Jews seized from the defeated peoples as a result of war was called by a special term, "cherem" (Hebrew:חרם). This is a very interesting term, which is worth considering in the sociology of religion by Émile Durkheim.

Why is the spoil captured by the Jews from other nations called "cherem"? On the one hand, "cherem" can be offered as a sacrifice to God, and on the other hand, it is something that the Jews themselves, being pure, cannot eat or take for themselves. Herem must either be sacrificed to God or destroyed, because other peoples are "tainted by demons" and polytheism, and what is taken from them is "herem." The term "herem" corresponds exactly to the concept of "sacred." It is both too high (i.e., belonging to God) and too terrifying, capable of causing irreparable harm to people. Here we see the duality of the very principle of the sacred, the meaning of which is that the sacred transcends the human level — both upward, toward God, and downward, toward the "demonic."

We see that in the Jewish religion and the sacred history of the Bible, there is a clear and coherent political philosophy that fits perfectly into the concept of political Platonism, but instead of a philosopher-king, there is a chosen people, the "king of all nations." God says to the Jews: "You shall rule over all nations" [1].And not because they are kings, and not even because they want to be. They will rule over other nations because they have ascended (ανοδος) to God, and God sends them to rule, sends them as a sacrifice (κάθοδος) so that they may save their people and, through them, the whole world. From the point of view of Platonic topics, one can understand both the religious structure of Judaism and its political philosophy. The anodos of the Jews is the Revelation received by Noah, Avraham, Jacob, Moses, and other leaders of the Jews, which became the axis of the Covenant or the Law.

[1] "And thou shalt rule over many nations, and they shall not rule over thee." Deuteronomy 28:12.

It is telling that the Bible refers to the Torah (Hebrew:תּוֹרָה), which literally means "law," as the socio-political and legal code governing the life of society. Once again, we clearly see the profound unity and common roots of religion, philosophy, and politics.

The philosopher Samuel and King Saul

During the reign of Saul, the idea of a Jewish kingdom emerged. It is very interesting how the Bible describes its formation: the Jewish people felt that they could not cope with an organisation based on the authority of the institution of judges that had developed after Joshua, and asked the prophet Samuel to appoint a king over them.

The prophet Samuel is very upset by this request, because God is the king of Israel, and if the people ask for a king to rule over them, as other nations have, it means that they want less and worse for themselves. The prophet Samuel tests the Jewish people, pointing out that if he appoints a king over them, they will have to obey God *indirectly* rather than directly. Samuel promises to anoint Saul as king, while warning the Jews that they will lose the best king (God) — by losing a *sacred* king, they will get a king who is only *partly* sacred.

By decision of the Jewish people, the prophet Samuel nevertheless anoints Saul as king. Thus, a new political system is established — a kingdom that receives blessing and ritual anointing from a priestly authority (the prophet). The king of Israel becomes the "firstborn of Israel." Here we see again the figure of the philosopher-king, but now it is divided: there is
"philosopher" Samuel and "king" Saul. And Saul, king of Israel, is not just a warrior, not just the best and strongest. He becomes a sacred figure who belongs to the first caste, not the second. Below him is the Israeli nobility, and below the nobility (as in any system) are the labourers.

The Babylonian Captivity

During the era of the Kingdoms, the structure of the chosen people's relationship with God changes, but the general model of politics remains the same:

[1] "And the Lord said to Samuel, 'Listen to the voice of the people in all that they say to you, for it is not you they have rejected, but Me, that I should not reign over them.'" 1 Book of Kings. Chapter 8: 7.

We are dealing with classical political philosophy of a sacred nature, but instead of the general figure of the philosopher-king (as in Plato), here patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob), messianic leaders (such as Moses and Joshua), then judges, and then kings (Saul, David, Solomon, etc.).

The Age of Kingdoms is also based on sacred philosophy: the king is a sacred figure. However, the warning of the prophet Samuel gradually begins to come true, and kings in the specific circumstances of their reign begin to deviate from high ideals.

This deviation began with Saul, and even the prophet David had serious transgressions (taking Bathsheba as his wife and effectively murdering her husband, Uriah the Hittite). Under King Solomon, through his numerous wives taken from other nations, foreign motives, cults, and practices penetrated the religion itself.

The kingdom begins to decline in a certain way until its complete destruction, collapse, division into Israel (north) and Judah (south), under the rule of separate dynasties, and finally the invasion of the Babylonians, the capture of Jerusalem, the destruction of the Temple, and the Babylonian captivity. In the future, the Kingdom of Israel no longer reaches its own highest horizon. It is punished by God for deviating from his ideal model, for the Jews' departure from their destiny. Real politics deviated critically from normative political philosophy, from Heavenly Israel, from the idea of Israel, from Israel as an idea, from the eternal paradigm of "pardes."

Israel and Aristotle

The meaning of Israel, when it acts in history, can be reduced to Aristotelian politics. Recall what Aristotle's "unmoved mover" or his immanent God is.

The function of the "immovable engine" in Jewish political philosophy during the era of the Kingdoms is performed by the axis of the world — Jerusalem or the Temple built by the third king, Solomon[1]. Everything related to Jewish history thereafter is a desire to preserve and protect the Temple, and after its destruction, to restore it

[1] But Jerusalem is already the fourth historical manifestation of the "immovable engine." The original, first and eternal is "paradise," the "garden enclosed by camps," the Callipolis of Judaism. Then its role is transferred to the Promised Land, located in the centre of Canaan. And finally, under David, the ancient city of Jebus (named after the Jebusites), also known as Jerusalem, becomes the final historical-mystical form.

The Temple (which was built during the construction of the Second Temple by Zerubbabel) and finally, in our time (considered in Judaism to be the Messianic, "Last" era), to build the Third Temple[1].

If the Platonic model represents an ideal and eternal Israel that is always close to God, then the Aristotelian model represents a phenomenal Israel. Such a phenomenal Israel may in some situations stray from God, but it can (and must) return to Him through its own *efforts*. This is the Aristotelian effort. It is not simply the contemplation of a pure image of political philosophy, but a volitional, active, practical striving connected with the political metaphysics of the Temple. Hence the idea of returning to Jerusalem and rebuilding the Temple. Thus, within the spectrum of political Aristotelianism, Jewish political philosophy is linked to the restoration of the Temple, the defence of Jerusalem and the re-establishment of the state of Israel.

In a political sense, the dispersion that began with the reign of Titus Flavius Vespasian (9–79), from 70 CE, was God's final punishment of the Jews for their unfaithfulness to Him and their departure from His divine commandments. And the Jews were sent into galut (Hebrew:גָּלוּת — "exile") in order to purify themselves. During this period, their politics are directed towards the past and the future; they have no political philosophy in the present. For 2,000 years, the Jews have lived under the influence of other (gentile) political systems, which are a punishment for them. Therefore, the political philosophies, states and societies in which Jews have been present for 2,000 years are, in essence, anti-Jewish and were given to the Jews so that they would feel how bad it is to abandon God. This is a kind of historical propaedeutics.

The peak of suffering was the mass extermination of Jews — the Holocaust (Greek: ὀλοκαύστος — "burnt offering," "sacrifice by fire") or Shoah (Hebrew:שׁוֹאָה "disaster," "catastrophe"). This purifying suffering prepares the next — and final — stage in Jewish history: the return to the Promised Land, the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the construction of the Third Temple on the Temple Mount, and finally, the coming of the King of the Jews, the Messiah. This will be the restoration of the "immovable mover" as the axis of the world and the foundation of the "good kingdom," which in turn will restore the direct connection with the transcendent and will be a return to paradise (the ideal state).

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Semites. The Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal.

Israel as Political Praxis. Zionism. King Messiah

How does Jewish political philosophy dictate that Israel should act in the era of galuta? The main thing is to strive to return to the Promised Land, that is, to restore the past (but in essence, the eternal) in the future. Hence the messianic-political idea of returning to Palestine by any means necessary, rebuilding the state of Israel, recreating it in the same place where it once stood. This is a genuine desire to return to what Aristotle calls the "natural place." And the "natural place" of the Jews, from a religious point of view, is the Temple of Jerusalem. This aspiration formed the basis of the politics of the galuta during that period.

However, how and when the Jews should return to Palestine from the Diaspora was a matter of fierce debate within the Jewish diaspora. At the same time, the Talmud strictly forbade this return from taking place *before the time was right* — that is, before the coming of the Messiah.

The first wave of Zionism, i.e. the return to Zion, where Jerusalem is located, to its "natural place," occurred in Jewish history with the appearance in the 17th century of the "pseudo-Messiah" Sabbatai Zevi[1] (1626–1676). Sabbatai Zevi announced to his followers that the end of time had come, that he himself was the Messiah, and that they should follow him to the Promised Land. This marked the beginning of the first active emigration of Jews to Palestine. From the point of view of Jewish historical philosophy, the end of the world will come with the arrival of the Messiah. Note: for Jews the Messiah is a *king* a good and righteous king who will restore the completeness of Jewish political philosophy in both its Platonic and Aristotelian forms.

In a platonic sense, this eschatological Israel becomes the ideal Israel, and from the point of view of volitional intention, it is embodied in the Messiah King (it is very important that for Jews, the Messiah is not God, but a king, a messenger of God, and this is their fundamental difference from Christians). This king, by his will — in the Aristotelian sense — returns his people to the Promised Land; and here the action of the phenomenal world, subject to time, resonates with the structures of the unchanging eternal world; the immanent pole, which is Jerusalem, is closed

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. The Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal

[2] On the Iranian roots of this idea, see: *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation; *Ibid.* Noomachia. Semites. The Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal.

Temple, and the transcendent principle. This is the end of history, and this is the political project of modern Jewry.

The dispute over time and methods

The process of the Jews implementing their historical political programme, which spans thousands of years, is not taking place in a vacuum. It is unfolding against the backdrop of the collapse of traditional Western civilisations, de-Christianisation and the establishment of the secular political paradigm of the modern era, where religious factors are not taken into account at all. Modernisation also affects Zionism, which in the 19th century takes on the form of nationalism copied from the European bourgeois type (but within the Zionist movement, of course, it is enlivened by religious political philosophy).

Israel, as it exists today and was created in 1947, is a sign of the beginning of the messianic era. Jews are already living in the messianic era. Jews are returning to Israel, the Promised Land, from their galuta only in the messianic era (and not on the eve of it).

Thus, this horizontal phenomenal philosophy of politics is closing in on the vertical philosophy of politics. And this is happening now. This explains the intensity of the confrontation with Muslims in Jerusalem. Muslims are contesting the territory where the Temple stood, and the Temple, as we have already said, is the "immovable engine" of Jewish politics, its historical, political and religious goal.

Most Jews, both those who have returned to Israel and those who remain outside it, accept the general model of Zionism in one form or another, whether in its religious, secular, or mixed form. Only a small number of religious Jews, particularly those from the Neturei Karta movement, reject Zionism as contrary to the traditions of the Talmud and the entire logic of the Jewish religion. For them, the creation of Israel before the coming of the Messiah, based on force, nationalism and political intrigue, is a parody and sacrilege, something similar to the actions of the pseudo-Messiah Sabbatai Zevi. Although the "Neturei Karta" proceed from a strictly identical political philosophy to that of the Zionists, they radically disagree with them on the methods and timing of the return to Palestine. Returning from the Diaspora before the arrival of the Messiah is equivalent in their eyes to "political and religious Satanism," since in this case people attribute to themselves the attributes of God and God's messenger.

The political philosophy of Judaism, embedded in sacred history, in the Old Testament religion, in Judaism as a whole



The structure of the historical process in the context of Judaism

religious and legal concepts is not merely a shadow of some distant past. The texts of the Torah are still read today, prayers are continuously offered, commentaries and the Talmud are diligently studied — and this is one continuous process of Jewish political philosophy, which at the present stage, the final one for the Jews, puts the final seal on the Covenant made by the Jews with their God in ancient times.

The philosophy of politics as applied to religion is extremely relevant. And this is not a thing of the past — it is happening today and allows us to adequately interpret news stories concerning, for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or American-Israeli relations. Thus, the political philosophy of religion is an active factor in contemporary politics, explaining the past and determining the future.

Chapter 2. The Political Philosophy of Christianity

Christianity and Rome. The restraining force (katechon)

Christian political philosophy is made up of several factors. First, there's the special theological model of Christianity. Christianity is a specific religion that partly comes from Judaism and therefore accepts its basic ideas about monotheism and creationism. At the same time, the idea of the incarnation of God, unimaginable for Judaism and contrary to all logic of Jewish religious theology, is at the centre of the Christian religion. Christianity is thus both a continuation of Judaism and, at the same time, its theological overcoming or refutation. In this sense, Christianity finds itself in a complex position in relation to Judaism. The fact that Christian theology is completely unique in the context of other versions of monotheism (Judaism and Islam) also affects *Christian political philosophy.*

In addition to a special theology based on the New Testament and the basic Christian idea of the incarnation of God in man, there is another very important circumstance — the continuity of Christianity in the Roman Empire[1].

The philosophy of the Roman Empire tends to combine all three types of positive models of Aristotelianism. The Roman Empire is more similar to Aristotle's philosophy of politics than to Plato's; and to a large extent, the Roman Empire saw itself as a repetition (in Latium, in Italy) of the state-building feat of Alexander the Great, who was a student of Aristotle. This empire strives to embody the three best aspects of Aristotle's understanding of politics and proposes to establish *a positive monarchy (*hence: the emperor as a sacred figure, in fact a living deity). The empire

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Latin Logos. Sun and Cross. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

The ruler was also called "pontifex" (Latin for "bridge builder") — a bridge between the world of humans and the world of gods, between Earth and Heaven, between life and death. Therefore, the sacred king, the emperor, is at the centre of this sacred monarchy of the Roman Empire.



The Political Structure of the Roman Empire and Aristotle's "Good State"

The next level of power is *the aristocracy*: the Roman Senate, the Roman patricians, the high-ranking noble citizens of Rome, who represent the second layer of Aristotle's model.

And finally, *the* Roman *polity*, that is, the people of Rome, who also act as a political institution in significant cases.

The Roman people support or overthrow the emperor; they side with the aristocratic patrician families or, conversely, enter into conflict with them, and in the Roman Empire they sometimes even organise systems of self-government based on a *qualified* majority (as opposed to democracy).

Thus, in the Roman Empire, we see a combination of all three types of Aristotle's political model:

1) the sacred Emperor (Pontifex), who corresponds to the monarch;
2) aristocracy in the form of the Senate;
3) Roman citizens, Populus Romanus Quiritium — members and foundation of Roman politics.

Note how Aristotle distributed these forms of government among themselves:

1) A large territory tends towards monarchy,
2) the middle part to aristocracy,
3) and the small one to polity.

Accordingly, since the Roman Empire was huge, it was headed by monarchs or emperors. At a more limited level of the Roman Empire, power belonged to the aristocracy, and finally, in small settlements, towns or villages, polity prevailed.

When Christianity became established in the Roman Empire, a very important theoretical identification of the figure of the emperor with the image from the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Thessalonians occurred. This passage defines the essence of Christian political philosophy.

In the prophecy of the Apostle Paul, it is said that the son of perdition, that is, the Antichrist, will not come into the world "until he who restrains now is taken out of the midst" [2]. This mysterious phrase has been interpreted in different ways. The classical Orthodox (and to a large extent

[1] The Apostle Paul, who lived in the era of the first apostles, initially acted as a persecutor of Christ, but was later converted and became the most prominent preacher of Christianity.

[2] "Let no one deceive you in any way, *for that day will not come* until the apostasy comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of destruction, who opposes and exalts himself above every so-called god and every object of worship, so that he sits in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God. Do you not remember that when I was still with you, I told you this? And now you know what he is doing, that the time for him to be revealed has *not yet* come. For the mystery is already at work; *only* he who now restrains it will do so until he is taken out of the way." Second Epistle of Saint Paul to the Thessalonians. Chapter 2:3–7.

The medieval interpretation (both Catholic and Orthodox) identified the image of the "restrainer" with the Emperor[1].

In the Apostle Paul's prophecy about the "last days," it is said that the "son of perdition," that is, the Antichrist, will not come into the world "until he who restrains him is taken out of the way," which in Greek is "katechon" (ὸ katechōv — "he who restrains"). The word "katechon," usually translated into Russian as "holding back," literally means "the one who has under himself" (Greek: kat — "under" and űcho — "to have"), that is, "the one who rules," "the one who possesses."

In the Greek text of the Gospel, the passage from the Epistle of St. Paul — "and now you know *that* it is not permitted for him to be revealed at his time" — includes an important concept that is omitted in the Synodal translation: "And now the holding back, that it may be revealed at his own time" [2]— "that which restrains," in the neuter gender — in Greek τὸ κατέχω. This "restraining" is that which restrains "the restrained." It is precisely this "holding" that St. John Chrysostom (c. 347–407), the undisputed bearer of Christian orthodoxy, identifies as "the Roman state." Let us quote this passage in its entirety because of its fundamental importance for the very foundations of Christian political philosophy:

> It is fair for anyone to ask, first, what is *this restraining force* (τό κατέχον), and then to want to know why Paul speaks so unclearly about it. What is this *"restraining force"* that *appears to him*, that is, "the hindrance"? Some say that it is the grace of the Holy Spirit, while others say that it is the Roman state; I agree more with the latter. Why? Because if the apostle had wanted to speak about the Spirit, he would not have expressed himself unclearly, but would have said clearly that what was now preventing him from appearing was the grace of the Holy Spirit, i.e., extraordinary gifts. Besides, it would have been appropriate for him to come already, if he was to come when the (extraordinary) gifts were depleted, because they had long since been depleted. But since (the apostle) says this about the Roman state, it is understandable why he only hints at it and speaks covertly for the time being. He did not want to incur excessive enmity and useless danger. Indeed, if he had said that the Roman state would soon be destroyed, then immediately he would have been

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Byzantine Logos. Hellenism and Empire. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

[2] In the original Greek: kài vu˜v tò kàtechov oidate eis tò apokaluthèvtai autòv thv tò dautou kaipò.

as a rebel, would wipe them off the face of the earth, and (along with them) all believers, both living and striving for this.

That is why he did not use such an expression; nor did he say that it would soon follow, although (implicitly) he always says so. (...) He says the same thing here: *"hold fast (*ò katechō) *now until the middle of time*." That is, when the Roman state ceases to exist, then he (the Antichrist) will come. And rightly so, because as long as people fear this state, no one will quickly submit (to the Antichrist); but after it is destroyed, lawlessness will reign, and he will seek to seize all power, both human and divine. Just as the kingdoms were destroyed before, namely: the Median by the Babylonians, the Babylonian by the Persians, the Persian by the Macedonians, and the Macedonian by the Romans, so this last one will be destroyed by the Antichrist, and he himself will be defeated by Christ and will no longer reign. All this is conveyed to us with great clarity by Daniel. *"And then,*" he says, "*the lawless one will appear*." What then? Immediately after this comes consolation: (the apostle) adds: "*whom the Lord Jesus shall slay with the spirit of His mouth, and bring into nothing the appearance of His coming: whose coming is to the working of Satan*." Just as fire, when it approaches, even before its arrival, paralyses and destroys small animals that are even far away, so Christ, with a single command and His coming, will kill the Antichrist. It is enough for Him to appear, and all will perish. As soon as He appears (the Lord), He will put an end to deception ([3])...

Christianity emerged on the eve of the anticipated arrival of the Antichrist, and this determined Christian philosophy and history. The Christian religion asserts that Christ will come at the "end of time" to save the world, followed by an era of "apostasy" (apostasy — Greek ἀποστασία) and, finally, the Antichrist will appear. Unlike Judaism, Christ is not the King of Israel, but the King of all existence, and "his kingdom is not of this world." Consequently, the understanding of political history is also different from Judaism: it is not limited to the Jewish people (as the subject of history), but extends to all of humanity. However, it is the Church of Christ that becomes the true subject. It was founded by Christ and the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, the Holy Spirit, after the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ.

[3] *St. John Chrysostom.* Works of Our Holy Father John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople. Vol. 11. Book 1. St. Petersburg: Publication of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, 1905. pp. 597–598.

And since Christ is God for Christians, the Old Testament history ends and a new history begins — the New Testament. This is the history of the Church. In this history, in turn, semantic poles arise — the exemplary time becomes not so much
"Paradise" refers to the time Jesus Christ spent on earth among people, and the opposite pole is the coming of the Antichrist. Therefore, Christianity thinks politically differently, introducing a "transcendent" dimension—the Kingdom of Heaven, which is expressed in the Church.

Christian teaching is eschatology, the doctrine of the "end of the world" (from the Greek Ϧσχατον — "end," "limit"). Christ comes in the last days before the coming of the Antichrist, and the Christian worldview can be called the worldview of people awaiting the end of the world. This end of the world has the following scenario: first comes the Antichrist (Αντίχριστος), which can mean both the one who *is against* Christ and the one who comes *before* Him. Then the Second Coming of Christ takes place and the Antichrist is defeated by the heavenly army.

The First Coming is Christ suffering and crucified. The Second Coming is "Christ in power" ([1]).The second time, Christ comes not as a man, but as God, and puts an end to the reign of the Antichrist. The reign of the Antichrist thus takes place between the First Coming and the Second.

The philosophy of Christian history asserts: Christ came, saved the world, was crucified, and on his blood and flesh the Church was formed as a new subject of history (this New Testament Church moves through history, carrying out its mission of universal salvation), in the further future — the coming of the Antichrist, apostasy, and, finally, the Second Coming, which will end the era of apostasy. It is in this eschatological context that Christian political philosophy is situated. Accordingly, when we say that
"until the one who restrains him is taken out of the way," the son of perdition (the Antichrist) will not appear, the holy apostle Paul indicates that after the worldwide spread of Christianity and its victory, there will be a certain historical period during which the coming of the Antichrist will *not yet* take place. That is, there is the following Christian structure of historical logic.

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[1] The central icon in the traditional Russian iconostasis is also called this. "Christ in Power" is an image that expresses the appearance of Christ the Saviour at the end of time in glory and power. Christ will descend to earth in the name of fulfilling God's Providence, uniting heaven and earth under Christ's head.



The structure of the Christian understanding of history

After the era of Christ, there will be a unique period when the Antichrist will not yet exist — in the Apocalypse, this is described as a time when the dragon, the ancient serpent, will be bound for a thousand years.

> And I saw an angel coming down from heaven, having the key to the bottomless pit and a great chain in his hand.
>
> He seized the dragon, that ancient serpent, who is the devil and Satan, and bound him for a thousand years.
>
> and cast him into the abyss, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, so that he should deceive the nations no more, until the thousand years were finished; after that he must be released for [a] little while.

And further

> When the thousand years are over, Satan will be released from his prison and will go out to deceive the nations in the four corners of the earth, Gog and Magog, and gather them together for battle. Their number is like the sand of the [sea].

The serpent (Satan) is released from his prison at the very moment when "the restrainer is taken out of the midst." Such is the Christian view of history.

Christianity already contains a political component even when it does not yet speak of it does not speak of it

The first community was built in the time of Christ on the basis of communal living; it was not yet a political system, but an organisation of society completely immersed in the fact of the divine incarnation and in the understanding of the "Good News."

But already in the first generation, particularly in the writings of St. Paul the Apostle, there is a certain view of how Christianity will exist until the next period, when it is destined to spread throughout the earth. *The prophecy about the catechon is the key to the entire formula of Christian history and political philosophy.* The restrainer mentioned in the epistle of St. Paul was interpreted by Orthodox teachers, including St. John Chrysostom, as the Roman Emperor.

[1] Revelation of St. John the Theologian. Ch. 20: 1–3.

[2] Revelation of Saint John the Theologian. Chapter 20: 7.

Thus, long before Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, there was already a prophetic understanding of the coming ecclesiasticalisation of the Empire and the religious mission of its ruler, the Emperor. Already in the first apostolic period, which was an era of persecution and oppression (including from the Empire), early Christians believed that after some time Christianity (as a community with no political dimension) would change its catacomb nature and become a creed with *a political dimension.*

Thus, we see that Christianity already contained a political component from the very beginning, even when it did not explicitly state this and appeared to be completely separate from politics. In the concept of "holding back," we are dealing with an image that is rare in the early Christian context and has a political dimension; it is from this point that the entire political philosophy of Christianity is born.

The Roman Empire (Aristotle's political model) is further seen as a providential vessel (the kingdom prepared by God's Providence) for receiving Christianity. Thus, the early Christians, in a remarkable way, believed that the Roman Empire was created for them and that the fact that Christ was born in this very empire was endowed with enormous prophetic significance. Thus, according to the early Christians, this empire was to fulfil a very important religious function connected with the coming of the Antichrist. As long as the Empire exists, as long as there is an Emperor (the one who holds it together), the Antichrist cannot come. Note the fundamental religious significance that the Roman state acquires in Christian political philosophy.

The doctrine of the four kingdoms and the "political Antichrist"

In Christianity, there was a doctrine of the Four Kingdoms. The first kingdom was considered to be Babylon, the second — Persia, the third — Greece (the kingdom of Alexander the Great), and the fourth — the Roman Empire. Each of these kingdoms corresponded to a specific metal: gold to Babylon, silver to Persia, copper or bronze to the Empire of Alexander the Great, and iron to the Roman Empire. This symbolism was based on the story of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, in which he saw a colossus made of four metals standing on clay feet, and on the interpretation of this dream by the prophet Daniel.

It is very important that the Empire in this understanding is not just an ordinary state. It is conceived as *a world kingdom*, a kind of absolute state, a meta-state, a superstate, which included many states and smaller polities (πολιτεία). The emperor was not just a king, but a "king of kings" — a sacred, divine figure.

It is precisely because of its sacred nature that the Empire is able to unite such diverse individual states, peoples, principalities, and other political forms. From a Christian point of view, the only legitimate entity is the Christian Roman Empire. It is the political homeland of Christians. This Empire is the direct heir to the previous three kingdoms, and after it, there can be no legitimate organisation of the political space on a global scale. When Rome falls, the Antichrist will come. This will happen when the Roman Emperor, the "katechon," the "restrainer," is "taken out of the midst." The fall of the Empire will mean the onset of the "last days" and the coming of the Antichrist.

Here, a very interesting point arises—the possibility of giving the Antichrist a political or historical-political dimension. In a sense, one can speak of the "political philosophy of the Antichrist." That which destroys the normative (good) kingdom, that which replaces the only correct and acceptable political form of the Christian state, is *the political Antichrist.* The political Antichrist is, in general terms, everything that is *opposed to the Empire.* The doctrine of the political philosophy of the Antichrist is the doctrine of any political organisation that denies the fundamental soteriological (from the Greek σωτήρ, "savior") eschatological function of the Christian Roman Empire. Thus, a conscious enemy of the Empire, an opponent of the "katechon," appears in the context of Christian political philosophy as the bearer of the political philosophy of the Antichrist.

The political system of the devil

The end of the Roman Empire, the fall of Rome, and the removal of "the thing that now restrains" bring Christians into a world *of illegitimate political systems*. Any non-imperial, non-Christian political system is illegitimate for Christians, and one that is not simply excluded from the Empire but comes after its end or instead of it, contributing to its destruction, is *an active*

the political form of the Antichrist. It follows that Christians must oppose the Antichrist not only on a religious level, but also on a political level. A political system built around a secular non-Christian (anti-Christian) ruler and *any* non-catechumenal (and especially anti-catechumenal) political ideology is *a political system of the devil* or a political system of the Antichrist.

After the pagan Roman Emperor Constantine (288–337) issued the Edict of Milan prohibiting the persecution of Christians, and after some time moved his capital to the newly rebuilt Byzantium and proclaimed Christianity the state religion of the Roman Empire, the prophecy of St. Paul the Apostle from the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians came true, and the katechon (the restrainer) becomes a concrete political and historical reality.

Thus, the Christian Roman Empire was established in practice, whose purpose was to keep the devil, the ancient serpent, in chains for a thousand years and prevent the coming of the Antichrist. Constantinople was given the name New Rome, but now the Orthodox Empire is conceived as a continuation of the same fourth universal kingdom.

Byzantium. Symphony of Powers

At first, the Roman Empire united the East and the West, but gradually they began to separate because the western Roman provinces slipped out of the control of New Rome.

Thus, a difference arises in the political destinies of the two halves of the Christian world. The classic moment we talked about — the doctrine of the Orthodox Empire, of the katechon, of Rome, of the Emperor preventing the coming of the Antichrist — is fully affirmed in the eastern part of the Roman Empire (much later it will be called "Byzantine").

Here, too, a political doctrine of normative "symphony of powers" developed, in which the Orthodox Emperor, a sacred figure endowed with the function of preventing the coming of the Antichrist, stands at the head of the sacred state, and with him is the patriarch (or several patriarchs), the head of the Church. The Emperor bases his rule on a union with the head of the Church. Religious and imperial power, represented by the patriarch and the emperor, act in complete harmony, because the Church is not simply an addition to the Empire, but the force that changes

the very essence of the Empire. Thus, we once again encounter the Platonic figure of the philosopher-king, the sacred ruler, only in this case his figure is divided into two "inseparable and unmerged" (like the two natures in Christ) poles, which constitute the content of the "symphony of powers."

In turn, the Empire is not merely an instrument of the Church, it is something transformed by the rays of Christ's faith; a space where "sacred" ("sacral") politics is established. From a Christian point of view, imperial politics is sacred; in its context, every person who carries out the political instructions of their leader fulfils, in a sense, not just a civic duty, but a *religious* one.

When the Church becomes inseparable from the state, the state itself becomes part of the Church. Therefore, political decisions and political institutions are not simply rational mechanisms — they become moral soteriological instruments. A person who rules well and a person who rules badly are not simply passing a technical exam in their competence, and even less are they realising their personal will to power — they are either sinning or practising virtue. At the same time, the scale of the Emperor's sins and virtues far exceeds that of ordinary citizens — the Emperor is given much, but much is also demanded of him. Therefore, the very rule of the Empire acquires a comic and, moreover, a spiritual dimension. The Christian Emperor acts in the earthly world on behalf of Christ's "heavenly kingdom" and carries out the will of Heaven on earth.

In the eastern part of the Roman Empire, the idea of sacred politics (hieropolity) remained in its original form. In the west, starting from the first centuries of the Byzantine Empire, a gradual departure from this norm began. This happened against the backdrop of the increasing political autonomy of the western lands, their distancing from the capital of the Empire, and the gradual conquest of these territories by pagan peoples. The Western Roman Empire began to tremble and decay under the blows of the barbarians.

The barbarians establish a completely different political system there. Its main difference is that the barbarians do not build an empire, but ordinary states, completely detached from soteriology, eschatology, the catechon mission, and the doctrine of the universal kingdom. In each part of the fragmented Western Roman Empire, their own kings appear, whose polities (πολιτεία) are organised in accordance with the traditions of warlike tribes and tribal unions, primarily Germanic ones. Here, there is no figure of the emperor himself.

These peoples still nominally recognise the Byzantine Emperor as their supreme ruler, but they have already built a completely different political system. It is qualitatively different from the catechon Byzantine system. In the new political system, the unity of the Western Roman Empire is no longer ensured by the emperor (as in the Eastern Roman Empire), but by the Pope of Rome.

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The model of "unholy politics"

A completely new model of "unholy politics" is emerging, the preconditions for which can be seen in the theory of the "two cities" [1]of St. Augustine (354–430). Instead of Aristotle's idea of a phenomenal Empire, St. Augustine offers a theory more reminiscent of Plato. He formulates a doctrine of "two cities," the Heavenly City and the Earthly City, between which there is a war. The Earthly City lies in evil, while the Heavenly City is the city of saints, waging war against the city of the damned.

Here we can see the origins of a completely different political philosophy, distinct from the Byzantine sacred (symphonic and catechon) politics. Here, a holy ideal city and an unholy dark earthly city are affirmed, between which there is not harmony, symphony, that is, "consonance" (as in Byzantium), but opposition. It is precisely this teaching of Blessed Augustine that forms the basis of the political system known to us as Catholic political philosophy.

Initially, the Christian political philosophy we discussed earlier prevailed in the western part of the Roman Empire. but gradually, as the fates of the western and eastern parts of the Roman Empire diverged, it survived only in Byzantium, where it existed until its end, while in the western part a new political philosophy emerged, based *on the opposition between* the Church and the state. In Byzantine political philosophy, their *synthesis* was established, while in Catholic political philosophy, on the contrary, their *separation* was established.

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[1] *Blessed Augustine.* The City of God. Moscow; Minsk: AST; Harvest, 2000.

In such a situation, the Pope, who was the only authority ensuring the ideological and cultural unity of the Western Roman Empire, began to be identified with the representative on earth of the "city of saints," the Heavenly City, while secular kings, princes and other rulers, as well as the polities (πολιτεία) they created on the ruins of the Western Roman Empire, found themselves in the position of the "city of the damned." Thus arose the idea of a spiritual war between Catholicism (the Roman See) and the political systems of the barbarian rulers.

Thus, in the dualism of the "two cities," something emerges that goes beyond the classical Roman tradition—a political phenomenon that is in itself devoid of sacredness, that is, "unholy." And in order to give this phenomenon legitimacy, it must be subordinated to the will of the Pope and the Catholic Church as an institution that ensures the connection with the "Heavenly City." In the Eastern Empire, "sacredness" is inherent in imperial politics as such. In the Western part, this sacredness disappears, and only a non-political institution — the Catholic Church — can restore it, at least in part.

The Papacy. The usurpation of the empire by Charlemagne

Thus, two political philosophies gradually emerged in the once united Christian world (the Christian oikoumene):

1) the main "catechon" philosophy, which continued to exist in Byzantium, in the eastern part of the Roman Empire;
2) a new dualistic philosophy of "two cities," systematically taking root in the gradually disintegrating Western Roman Empire.

If we look at these models from the point of view of the philosophical and political paradigms we discussed earlier, we can say the following: initially, the Aristotelian idea of the Roman Empire prevailed in Christianity, while in the Western Roman Empire, a dualistic form of political Platonism gradually took hold, in which models were contrasted with their copies (the earthly city — the heavenly city).

In history, this phenomenon has been called "Caesaropapism" [1] and "Papocaesarism" [2] . Caesaropapism is an Eastern, Byzantine model in which the emperor is not merely a political secular ruler, but also a spiritual authority who prevents the coming of the Antichrist. Pa-

[1] Caesaropapism also comes from the Latin caesar, meaning "Caesar," and papa, meaning "pope."

[2] Formed from the same words, only in reverse order.

Caesarism is a Catholic model in which, on the contrary, any political figure is seen as strictly secular, non-sacred and even deliberately "sinful" ruler, above whom stands the sinless and sacred Pope of Rome.

Thus, Aristotelianism and Platonism within Christian political philosophy take on somewhat antagonistic expressions. This continues from the 4th to the beginning of the 9th century.

However, since until the 9th century there was only one emperor in the Christian oikoumene (nominally recognised even by the West), it can be said that during this period the entire Roman Empire still nominally existed as a single political and religious entity with a common political philosophy. At a certain point in Byzantium, Irene (c. 752–803) became Empress, and in parallel with this, important changes took place in the West: the powerful king from the Carolingian dynasty, Charlemagne (748–814) united numerous Germanic tribes under his rule and became the almost sole ruler of the previously fragmented lands of the Western Roman Empire.

So, in the East, dynastic power ended up in the hands of a woman (which was unusual for the patriarchal Roman society), while the western, previously fragmented half of the Roman Empire was united under the leadership of a strong and masculine king of the Franks. In this situation, Charlemagne decided to become emperor. According to some sources, he initially wanted to achieve this through a dynastic marriage with the Byzantine Empress Irene. The plan was as follows: if he married Irene, he would become the sole emperor of both the East and the West, and the Roman Empire would be restored in its ecumenical unity. Charlemagne sent matchmakers to Irene, but the empress refused. After her fatal decision, Charlemagne declared that he denied her imperial title and was ready to proclaim himself Emperor. The Pope anointed Charlemagne as king according to the ancient rite of the "Emperors," just as the Patriarchs of Constantinople anointed the Byzantine Emperors. The coronation of Charlemagne took place.

Thus, in the space of the nominally unified Christian Empire, two catechons, two emperors, emerge simultaneously: Charlemagne in the Western Roman Empire and Empress Irene in the Eastern Roman Empire.

Constantinople does not recognise Charlemagne's coronation.

It is important that, in parallel with his claims to imperial status, Charlemagne moves towards recognition of the Filioque (a dogmatic addition

to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, concerning the Third Person of the Trinity — the Holy Spirit — as
"proceeding from the Father and the Son" [1]. By introducing the Filioque and crowning Charlemagne as Emperor, Western Christianity separated itself from Constantinople. Thus, a second
"katechon" appeared in the Christian oikoumene.

Byzantium rejected both, declaring the Filioque a heresy and refusing to recognise the imperial status of the Carolingian kings. From the point of view of Byzantine political philosophy, this was usurpation. Here, the contradictions between the Christian East and the Christian West, which had been building up for some time, reached their peak, gradually leading to the final schism in 1054.

It should be noted that in the case of Charlemagne, the Christian West acted on the basis of the original and common Christian conception of *political philosophy*. The Carolingian ruler understood perfectly well that the only legitimate political form for Christians (and the Franks were among the first to adopt Orthodox Christianity[2]) was the Holy Roman Empire. One could only be the political ruler of all Christians as an emperor, no matter how vast the power of a particular ruler might be. The Franks were able to retain their imperial status later on, which Constantinople — and Orthodox Christianity as a whole — never recognised. Later, Charlemagne's state was named the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

Two political philosophies: Orthodox and Catholic

In 1054, the final schism of the Churches took place, followed by excommunication: Catholics called Orthodox Christians "Eastern schismatics" (heretics), while Orthodox Christians declared Catholics to be representatives of the "Latin heresy" or
"papist heresy."

From this moment on, two political forms emerged — two political philosophies that prevailed in two parts of what was once a united Christian world. On the one hand, there was Orthodoxy

[1] In the Orthodox version, the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father. The addition of the phrase "and from the Son" (Latin: Filioque) to the Creed gave Orthodox theologians the impression that the West had adopted a model of subordination, i.e., hierarchical subordination of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, which was rejected as heresy.

[2] Many other Germanic tribes — primarily the Goths — were inclined towards Arianism, a heresy that had already been rejected at the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea.

the glorious philosophy of politics, and Catholicism. These two models continued to dominate for many centuries and have retained some of their influence in Western and Eastern Christianity to this day. It can be said that political Platonism in its dualistic, rigidly antagonistic version, contrasting the Heavenly City (the Church) with the Earthly City (the state and its ruler), came to dominate in Western Europe. This was finally consolidated with the victory of the Guelphs (the papal version) over the Ghibellines, supporters of imperial power (the heirs of Charlemagne and, above all, the Hohenstaufen dynasty) in the Western manner. Thus, the West became the territory of papal supremacy. In the East, the Caesaropapist, catechistic imperial principle, which was original to Christianity, remained unchanged and continued to prevail until the end of the Byzantine Empire. From there, it spread to other Orthodox peoples — the Bulgarians, Serbs and, finally, the Russians, who at various stages proclaimed themselves the successors of the Byzantine Empire (hence the ideology of Moscow as the Third Rome).

Thus, within the framework of a single Christian religion, two political philosophies were formed: Orthodox and Catholic. The first predetermined the normative structure of the Eastern Church's politics, the second that of the Western Church's politics.

The wandering Rome reaches Moscow

In 1452, the history of Byzantium came to an end. Byzantium fell under the blows of the Ottoman Turks, after which the Ottoman Empire arose in place of the Eastern Roman Empire, where Islam and its corresponding political philosophy became the dominant religion. At various stages of history, a number of Orthodox peoples had already expressed their intention to become the successors of Byzantium. This was the case during the heyday of the First and Second Bulgarian Empires ([1])In the 14th century, the Serbian rulers grew in power, building a strong state that successfully rivaled the weakening Byzantium. Thus, the Serbs also dreamed of becoming the Third Rome. These claims of the Slavic Orthodox rulers, who at certain moments achieved power and prosperity, were based on the concept of the "wandering Rome."

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Eastern Europe. Slavic Logos: Balkan Nav and Sarmatian Style. Moscow: Academic Project, 2018.

The idea was as follows: in the historical and geographical context of the same Fourth World Kingdom (the Iron Roman Empire), the centre of the Empire (i.e. Rome) could shift. It is important to note that the First Rome is not the Catholic Rome of the Popes, but Rome as the capital of the pre-Christian Roman Empire, the seat of the Emperor. With the adoption of Christianity, this Rome moved to the Second Rome, or New Rome, which became Byzantium. Therefore, as Byzantium weakened, the status of "Rome" could shift again — to those Orthodox peoples who proved themselves worthy of it.

This idea of a "wandering Rome" became particularly relevant when Byzantium finally fell to the Ottoman Turks. Accordingly, it seemed natural to imagine that this time Rome
"migrated" to those Orthodox peoples and states that remained independent.

Among all the Orthodox kingdoms at that time, only one managed to preserve its imperial scale, independence and Orthodox faith — the Russian state, Muscovy [1]. It was then that the Russians declared themselves the Third Rome, while the Bulgarians, Serbs and even Romanians, who had previously claimed this status, found themselves under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Moscow, as the Third Rome, took on the mission of the catechon. The doctrine of a normative political system was transferred to Muscovy. Perhaps this is why Aristotle, the most brilliant thinker of the "real Empire," is depicted in some ancient frescoes in Russian churches. Sacred politics moved to the Third Rome, and Russian rulers, beginning with Ivan the Terrible (1530–1584), became not just grand princes, but Vasilevs (Greek: Βασίλειος), emperors. The realisation of the new significance of Muscovy began under Ivan III (1440–1505), when the doctrine of "Moscow is the Third Rome" was finally formulated and during the reign of Ivan IV, the historical ritual of anointing the Russian tsar according to Byzantine canons took place. Since then, Russian tsars became the catechon, the Russian kingdom became "Rome," and the Russian people became part of sacred politics, where — at least according to religious-political philosophy — every action of every person took on a soteriological character. This found expression in the theory
"draught state."

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Russian History. The People and the State in Search of a Subject. Moscow: Academic Project, 2019.

[2] Its authorship belongs to the monk Philotheus (c. 1465–1542) of the Pskov-Pechersk Monastery.

Reflections of the Catechon

The end of the Muscovite period is associated with processes of desacralisation that led to a schism in the church. The official Church and state followed the countries of the West, which had already entered the New Age, into the paradigm of Modernity. The most consistent proponents of the ideology of Moscow as the Third Rome were the Old Believers ([1]) who, however, were defeated and found themselves in the position of a persecuted minority. The Old Believers adhered to the norms of Ancient Rus, which predetermined their complete rejection of religious reforms, which were followed by political innovations.

This was most evident during the reign of Peter the Great (1672–1725), who began to restructure the political and ecclesiastical system along the lines of Western European monarchies, primarily Protestant ones.

Despite the departure from the fundamentals of Orthodox political philosophy embodied in the principle of the symphony of powers (Peter abolished the patriarchate altogether, transferring power over the Church to a secular official, the Oberprokuror of the Synod), distant echoes of strictly Christian politics persisted in later eras. This was particularly noticeable in the 19th century, when Russian tsars and the intellectual elite (especially the Slavophiles) once again focused on the mission of defending Christian truth and rethought the role played in Russian history by the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome. An attempt to give politics a sacred — Christian — dimension was proclaimed by Alexander I (1777–182) in the "Holy Alliance," which was intended to unite Christian peoples in the face of advancing secularism, atheism, and political modernity in general.

Until the Soviet period of Russian history, there was a shadow of sacred politics, the idea of the Empire as a mission, the religious function of the Russian state, and the Russian tsar as the one who holds things together, the one who stops the "son of perdition" from coming.

It can be noted that for an Orthodox Christian, the only legitimate form of political existence is the sacred Christian Empire. Catholics have a slightly different view: for them, in accordance with the political philosophy of Catholicism, the most important thing is submission to the Pope.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Russian History. The People and the State in Search of a Subject.

From the point of view of a fully-fledged Christian politics (both Orthodox and Catholic), the idea of the separation of Church and state is inherently anti-Christian and even anti-Christ. Political Modernity, which attempts to build its political philosophy on the denial of the sacred character of the Empire and of politics as a whole, cannot be anything other than an "anomaly," an unnatural, perverted form of government, a "bad state" in the eyes of a Christian. According to Aristotle, the worst versions of this are democracy and tyranny.

Protestantism and democracy

In Western Christianity, the Reformation began in the 16th century, leading to another form of Christian political philosophy — the phenomenon of Protestantism[1]. Protestantism, which is opposed to Catholicism, is nevertheless an entirely Western phenomenon and inherits all the characteristics that historically divided Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Protestantism stands even further from Orthodoxy than Catholicism, although in the early stages of the Reformation some Protestant leaders sought an alliance with Orthodox rulers, but these attempts did not develop further.

What does Protestant political philosophy oppose to Catholicism? For Catholics, as we have already noted, the highest authority is the Pope as the spiritual head of the Western Christian world. Protestants, on the other hand, reject this authority, abolish the doctrine of the two kingdoms, attack St. Augustine and political Platonism, and, for the first time in history, introduce a completely new model of political system based on *the individual*, which had previously been absent in the Christian world.

Protestantism within the Western Christian Church justifies the doctrine of democracy — that is, the worst and lowest type of government (according to Aristotle). In church democracy, Protestants reject the clergy, celibacy, the power of priests, and the transmission of apostolic blessing, that is, all those sacred components that have survived in the West to this day in Catholicism.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Germanic Logos. The Apophatic Man. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015; *Ibid.* Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

[2] *Dumont, L.* Essay on Individualism. See also: *Sombart, W.* Collected Works: In 3 vols. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2005.

Believers themselves are capable of creating any denomination based on the contractual acceptance of certain interpretations, which completely abolishes the very idea of the Church as created from above — from God to people, from Heaven to Earth.

From the vertical model emerges a kind of horizontal religiosity, where there is a transcendent God and an individual who builds his own individual model of relations with this God, ignoring all mediating instances. In essence, such a view of religion brings to the fore human reason, the human individual who exists on his own — outside the Church (unlike Catholics) and outside the Empire, outside sacred politics (unlike Orthodox Christians) — and takes it upon himself to judge what is right and wrong, that is, to "establish" the Church and, accordingly, create a political regime that meets its needs and interests. This is an act of radical desacralisation of the entire Christian teaching as a whole, including its political dimension.

Protestantism — a revolution against vertical thinking

Protestantism represents an unprecedented step in Christian history, sharply different from Platonism, Aristotelianism, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy. In fact, it is a break with the entire tradition of Christian politics, which, as we have seen, continued the Greco-Roman model. Here there is neither directly sacred politics (Caesaropapism) nor religious Platonic politics (Papocaesarism).

Protestantism represents a religious revolution directed against the authority of the Church. In fact, it rejects the thesis of the Church as a community of the elect, whose pastors have direct apostolic succession.

Aimed primarily against the Pope and Catholicism, Protestantism carries with it a fundamentally new political philosophy. This political philosophy is linked to the self-organisation of individual groups.

Protestantism began its struggle simultaneously with the Empire (Western) and with the Catholic Church. In essence, it is a rejection of both political Platonism and political Aristotelianism. It is a rebellion of matter, of the plebs, a rebellion of the masses against the educated majority, against the clergy, against the priesthood, and also against the nobility and aristocracy.



Christian history and contexts of Christian political philosophy

This is the bourgeois revolution, or Protestant ethics[1]. In fact, this is how *a* completely new *bourgeois political philosophy* emerges, which is a direct product of the Protestant religious Reformation. Capitalism and the bourgeois system grew out of Protestant Europe as a direct consequence. Protestantism as a religious phenomenon carries within it the political idea of anti-sacral, anti-imperial and anti-ecclesiastical democracy, where all decisions are made on the basis of the individual reflection of a single member of society.

Thus, a new subject emerges — not the chosen people (as in Judaism), not the Church, and not the Christian Empire (as in Catholicism and Orthodoxy), but the individual, who henceforth becomes the source and measure of legitimacy in religious and political matters.

Three political philosophies of Christianity and the assumption of a fourth model

So, we have briefly examined three types of political philosophy in Christianity:

1) the political philosophy of Orthodoxy (Caesaropapism, symphony of powers, the katechon, the sacred Empire);
2) the political philosophy of Catholicism (papal supremacy, two cities, the primacy of the Holy See over "sinful" politics);
3) the political philosophy of Protestantism (which rejects superhuman authority and makes the individual, capable of independently determining his relationship with God and other people, the main criterion).

It is worth noting here that, in theory, Christian thought allows for a fourth type of political philosophy, which is in direct opposition to Christianity in general. It can be conditionally called the "political philosophy of the Antichrist." Such a philosophy can be found in a state or other form of political organisation where the truth of Christianity is denied and the separation of Church and politics is normatively justified. In the eyes of a Christian, such a political system represents an anomalous eschatological phenomenon, suggesting that the coming of the "son of perdition," which was prevented by the traditional political model, has been accomplished.

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[1] See: *Weber, M.* The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Moscow: Ist-Viu, 2002.

Chapter 3. Political Philosophy of Islam

Radical Creationism

The Islamic religion is based on the principle of radical creationism, embodied in the idea that there is no intermediary between God and the world (man). This is the essence of Islam. In Islam, the formula "do not associate partners with God" [1]is of central importance. Attributing partners to God, i.e., denying pure monotheism, is called *shirk (*Arabicشرك , "paganism," "polytheism") in Islam, which is considered the most serious crime, not only religious but also *political (* within the Islamic system).

The meaning of strict creationism in Islam *lies in the absence of an intermediate authority* and, accordingly, in the emergence of a relationship of absolute domination between God and humans: God appears as the unconditional, sole Lord of the world and of humans, a Lord who has nothing in common with his slaves. The term *"Islam" (*Arabic:الإسلام) means "submission" (to God), complete humility before the Lord (Arabic:ر ّب) and recognition of one's own insignificance before Him(2). Thus, God and the world (man) are radically different metaphysical entities. God is Everything, and man is nothing. God acts as an absolute scythe of death in relation to the world — God kills the world because the world is insignificant in relation to God (3).Between these two poles — insignificant man and absolute God — there is no mediator. This is the fundamental meaning of the Islamic religion: it is impossible to place anyone or anything *between* absolutely insignificant man and absolutely complete God.
human being and the absolutely complete God.

Here we see a special version of the transcendental relationship between God and man, or more broadly, between the Creator and creation[4]. This relationship is extremely tense and represents an opposition: God is opposed to

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[1] Quran. Sura 17, verse 22.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

[3] *Dzhemal G.* The Revolution of the Prophets. Moscow: Ultra.Culture, 2003.

[4] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

It is presented to humanity and the world as a radical alternative, and all creatures are forced to make a fundamental choice between submission to the Other or solidarity with what is given—with the fact of existence. Thus, the Platonic dualism of the "ideal state" takes on a conflictual character here, and the two poles — the paradigmatic and phenomenological ontology of Timaeus — find themselves in profound opposition. This is the basis for Islam's criticism of what is called "jahiliyya" (Arabic جاهلية) or "polytheism."

Shirk

Polytheism implies "assigning partners to God," affirming certain *intermediate* instances between God and the world (man), and therefore, for Islam, polytheism represents a metaphysically completely false model of philosophy and ontology.

The main thrust of Islamic philosophy is directed against polytheism. Those who recognise the oneness of God are righteous, true, and submissive to the transcendent God (Muslims). Those who oppose the oneness of God, this absolute Person who removes any possibility of autonomous ontology, are bearers of evil, rebelling against God.

What kind of evil, and to what extent is this evil? Islam clearly states: to the extent of the absolute necessity of the physical destruction of polytheists.

The Quran contains a direct call to this effect:

> Kill (the infidels) wherever you find them, drive them out of the places where they drove you out, for their disbelief (fitna) is worse than death at your hands[1].

Elsewhere, this call is literally repeated:

> They want you to become unbelievers like them, so that you may be equal. Therefore, do not take them as helpers or friends until they emigrate in the way of Allah. But if they turn away, seize them and kill them wherever you find them.

A person who does not recognise the oneness of God must be put to death. This is the norm in Islamic tradition. At least, this is how it should be in a normative (Islamic) society.

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[1] Quran. Sura 2, verse 191.

[2] Quran. Sura 4, verse 89.

Political and Religious Anthropology of Islam. People of the Book and Their Status

Islamic theology is based on the idea of genocide on religious grounds: all people who do not recognise the oneness of God (Allah) must be destroyed. The only exception is for those referred to as "people of the Book" (Arabic:اهل الكتاب — "ahl al-Kitab") — Jews and Christians. From the Muslim point of view, Jews and Christians worship the same God as Muslims. This is the one God, a transcendent, creationist God. Jews and Christians are not considered polytheists, and therefore guilty of shirk, i.e. "associating partners with God"; accordingly, the People of the Book have the right to live.

Nevertheless, the Quran contains significant criticism of Jews and Christians, based on the most important principle of the Islamic religion — "*not associating* partners with God." Those who are pure pagans *openly* "associate partners with God." In turn, the "people of the Book" (the Abrahamic traditions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) recognise the uniqueness of the transcendent God.

The Prophet Muhammad (571–632) is considered by Muslims to be the last prophet and the "seal of the prophets" [1](خَاتَمَ النَّبِيِّينَ), completing the cycle of prophets. Why, from a Muslim point of view, is the last revelation of the monotheistic cycle necessary? Muhammad restores the completeness of the original Revelation, so it can be said that Islam in its archetype (as pure paradigmatic monotheism) has always existed: in the original form of the ancient Revelation, then in the form of Judaism, then in the form of Christianity, and then the Revelation was restored to its fullness through the prophet Muhammad([2]).

Jihad: either Islam or paganism

Continuing this line of radical purification of the transcendent God from all intermediaries, insisting that the transcendent God and the immanent world (and man) have nothing in common and nothing in between, the norm of religious genocide of polytheists (which is the leitmotif of Islamic history) is essentially justified. the norm of religious genocide of polytheists (which is the leitmotif of Islamic history). We are talking about a holy war, "jihad" (from the Arabicالجهاد — "effort") against pagans, i.e., those who "associate partners with God." The entire history of Islam has been and continues to be marked by this.

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1 Quran. Sura 33, verse 40.

2 *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

Thus, religious philosophy in Islam is directly expressed in politics, since jihad appears as an expression of a profound metaphysical truth. "Why is it necessary to fight the pagans?" "Because they deny the philosophical religious truth *of the oneness* of God."

From the Muslim perspective, they are theologically mistaken, which means that they must either submit to Muslims and acknowledge their righteousness or be destroyed. This radical approach to religious philosophy has predetermined the political practice of Islam throughout its history.

The uniqueness of God (Allah) is directly linked to the theme of power. Recognising a single God means recognising his authoritative status. To be a "Muslim" (literally, "one who has submitted to Allah") means not only to recognise God as the Creator of the world, but also as the supreme ruler. Thus, the Islamic religion, at its very core, already includes a *political* dimension, since power is primarily a political concept.

Where there is polytheism or any other form of society that refuses to recognise God (Allah) as the bearer of absolute power, a socio-political and cultural environment develops that is radically incompatible with Islam. It is either Islam or paganism (shirk, jahiliyya). If Islam comes into contact with paganism, then someone must die (from the Muslim point of view, but not from the point of view of the pagan, who does not take away the Muslim's right to believe in one God, while reserving the right to believe otherwise).

However, in such a situation, how do Muslims view a figure such as Christ, i.e., the God-man (mediator between the purely transcendent God and the world)? What is their attitude towards the community of Israel, the Jewish people, who also consider themselves mediators? These two points — the Incarnation in Christian theology and the special sacred function of the chosen people in Judaism — are what the Qur'an holds against Christians and Jews, fundamentally distinguishing them from Muslims. They do not recognise any gods other than the one God, and therefore they are recognised as human beings, but from the Muslim point of view, it is precisely these theological postulates that violate the purity of radical transcendentalism, and thus they find themselves *between* heretics/polytheists and pure Islam. Jesus Christ is regarded by Muslims as one of a chain of prophets who preceded Muhammad, and Jews are considered one of the peoples who received revelation on an equal footing with others, but who are not "chosen" and do not differ fundamentally from all others.

Attitude towards Jews and Christians

Islam rejects the dogma of the Holy Trinity and the incarnation of God in Christ, whom Muslims see as merely a man, a prophet, and the belief of Jews that they are the chosen people (there is no such concept as "people" in Islam). Jews and Christians are, from the point of view of Islam, "non-Muslims" and, accordingly, "non-citizens," so in the political system they, as "people of the Book," are subject to additional taxes ("jizya" —جزي), significant restrictions on holding certain positions in the state, and various prohibitions on the practice of religion (for example, in some Islamic countries it is forbidden to have crosses on Christian churches, and in almost all Islamic countries the use of bells is prohibited). In the political system
In Islam, "people of the Book" have the ذمي (dhimmi) meaning
literally "under protection" or "under guardianship." Similar formulas are used in political philosophy to refer to a category of people whose rights are limited but not completely denied.

Note the significance of theology here: the gradation of three types of people in Islam (Muslims, "non-Muslims," pagans) associated with the structure of the religious worldview takes on a purely political expression and predetermines social and political status.

The pure transcendence of God constitutes the Muslim, which in Islamic politics guarantees full political status and citizenship. Recognition of the transcendence of God with some elements of mediation in the person of the Incarnation of Christ (for Christians) or the divine election of the Jewish people (for Jews) — place
"Zimmis" were relegated to a lower status (people under the "protection" of others, i.e., full citizens). Polytheists fell outside the political system altogether, finding themselves in the position of outcasts — they were offered the choice of converting to Islam or being destroyed. In practice, Muslims did not always treat polytheists so harshly, sometimes being forced to compromise and granting them the "right to live" in marginalised areas of society. This was the case with Hindus and Buddhists in India, Zoroastrians in Persia, some archaic tribes in Africa that came under Muslim rule, etc. From the point of view of a complete political philosophy of Islam, however, such "softness" is already a deviation from the strict norm of exclusive monotheism. Thus, the legal and judicial system of Islam reflects
There are three metaphysical attitudes between the world and God.

The global Islamic political empire

Islamic theology predetermines not only the internal politics of Islamic society, but also its foreign policy. This was the driving force behind Islamic expansion when a small religious community of nomadic Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula spread its influence worldwide, creating a huge centralised state — the Caliphate — built on the principles of Islamic religious philosophy.

Why should Muslims rule the world? Because the world is *already* ruled by the one transcendent God (Allah). Muslims' belief in this purely transcendent God, and moreover, their recognition of Him as the only true and legitimate Lord and ruler, gives them the right to global planetary rule; moreover, it makes this a duty.

Christians and Jews are under the protection of Muslim rule until they themselves become Muslims.

Who is financing the construction of this global Islamic political empire? At the expense of pagans (as well as materialists, atheists, and agnostics), who must either be destroyed or converted to Islam. That is why Islamic religious philosophy inherently carries political universalism and justification for political expansion.

Of course, when they find themselves in the context of other, non-Islamic societies built on principles different from Islamic philosophy, Muslims adapt to the existing conditions. But from the point of view of the completeness of the Islamic worldview, this state of affairs is "temporary," a kind of political (and even partly religious) compromise with easily discernible limits.

Islam and Christianity in architecture

Let us consider other aspects of Islamic tradition. For example, architecture. In his book Understanding Islam, Frithjof Schuon [1] (1907–1998), a Swiss traditionalist philosopher who converted to Islam in its mystical form (Sufism), describes the specific features of Islamic architecture. The idea that one should not "give God partners" is embodied in the absence of roofs on Islamic buildings. The idea of flatness, horizontality, which has no common

[1] *Schuon F.* Understanding Islam. Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 1998.

Measures with verticality are expressed in the very structure of the Islamic city. If we look at a traditional Islamic city, we see flat roofs, low buildings, periodically interrupted by tall, slender minarets (towers dedicated exclusively to God). This model of the Islamic polis reflects the essence of both the Islamic religion and Islamic political philosophy.

With God, everything is vertical, with man, everything is horizontal. There is no unity between the temple and the home. In the Christian tradition, on the contrary, the structure of the temple and the structure of the home are always connected with roofs (there is a gradual and slow ascent from the horizontal to the vertical). The triangular roof of an ordinary dwelling (both rural and urban) symbolises the ascent of many things to the One. The phenomenon of the roof itself (primarily its shape, ridge, carved patterns, etc.) represents the deepest metaphysical element of the Christian world. In essence, every house is a small temple, a small church. A church is a large house, and a house is a small church. And both are directed towards the sky.

A completely different picture emerges when we consider the flat roofs of ordinary people's dwellings and the minarets reaching towards the sky. Two different metaphysics, two different architectures, two different societies.

The absence of priests in Islam

In Islamic teaching, all people are fundamentally equal. This equality leads to a sharp rejection by Islamic tradition of the very status of priests/clergy [2]. In Islam, there are no priests, no ordination, and the mullah, whom we sometimes mistakenly perceive as a priest, is nothing more than a learned Muslim who has received special education. This is a striking difference from the Christian priesthood, where the priest is a minister of God Almighty and receives special

[1] A contemporary American philosopher (of Iranian origin) and proponent of "speculative realism" Reza Negarestani gives a similar theological and political interpretation of the hostility of modern radical Salafi Muslims, who preach a return to original Islam and reject all vertical structures and objects in general. In the spirit of Negarestani's own philosophy, he interprets this as a desire for underground realms, inside the earth, towards the centre of maximum poverty and insignificance, as the main property of creation in Islam — the most radical of all versions of monotheism. *Negarestani R.* Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials. Melbourne: Re.Press, 2008.

[2] *Jemal G.* The Revolution of the Prophets.

The laying on of hands by the Holy Spirit, which comes from the apostles, and is actually considered a person endowed with a special status.

For a Muslim, there is no difference between a simple believer, a political leader of Islam, and a mullah. They are all ordinary people. And if someone says that he has more reason to believe that he is closer to God than others, he will find himself in the position of one who "gives God a partner" (i.e., himself), and thus becomes a bearer of shirk and thereby condemns himself to death. There is fundamental equality among Muslims; Islam rejects any kind of caste-based anthropological differentiation. It is important to note that for Muslims, even Muhammad, whom they revere, and other prophets are simply human beings. Muhammad is not God, not an angel, but only a human being, albeit one chosen from among other people to receive revelation about the absolute transcendence of God.

Therefore, the landscape of Islam consists only of flat roofs, only ashes, only decay, only death. The Islamic world is a world of fundamental death. Everything that happens in Islamic society is movement *within the territory of death,* because only God is alive and only God is a person (while all others are not persons, they are not alive, they do not exist, and the most they are capable of is being submissive). Who is a Muslim? He is submissive, bowed down, prostrate. He does not see himself as God or the son of God. He is only a created human being, but unlike other creatures, he has knowledge of the existence of the absolute God, the creator of Heaven and Earth, and humbly accepts His absolute power.

This model represents a departure from the traditional state structure based on a pyramid, as described by Plato and Aristotle. The radicalisation of relations between the Creator and creation gives rise to a different model of politics — the *Islamic* state as a state based on anthropological equality (contrary to Plato's ideal state with the domination of a philosopher-king or Aristotle's phenomenal Empire, where various forms of power or a combination of several types are allowed).

Islam and politics: dispute is war

In Islam, the absence of a distinction between religion and politics can be seen most clearly. Islam does not conceive of itself as a *purely* religious or *purely* political phenomenon. Islam does not accept

[1] *Jemal G.* Daoud vs Jalut (David vs Goliath). Moscow: Social and Political Thought, 2011.

knows no difference between religion and politics. If power belongs to God, then accordingly, those who *properly* worship that God should rule. The struggle for faith in a theological dispute and the struggle of Muslims against non-Muslims in a military sense are strictly *the same thing*.

There is no separate theological dispute and separate war. Dispute is war, war is dispute. *Muslims see the affirmation of their metaphysics in concrete political actions*. Theology and politics are one and the same. In the Quran, we can find ideas about the structure of heaven and hell, the creation of the world and man, sacred history, religious norms, as well as advice on how to organise human society in an orderly manner, how to build relationships within the community (Arabic: Umma,أمة), how to treat livestock, what hygiene rules to follow, etc.

This is where the Quran is totally different from the Bible. The Bible doesn't say anything about how to organise politics and society (Christians got their social and political model from the Roman Empire). The Quran presents a completely different situation — it is filled with political, social, economic, moral, and even everyday guidelines that determine the political system, government, norms of social organisation, and forms of warfare. Here we see the complete unity of religion and politics.

Therefore, for a true Muslim, it is absolutely unacceptable to consider Islam as *merely* a religion. This is the meaning of the concept of "sharia" (Arabic:شريعة f), which originally means
"mode of action," but in Islam it acquired the meaning of the legal basis of society. "Sharia" is the legitimate model of politics, which organically combines theological norms, structures of universally binding religious practice, the foundations of the political system, principles of economics, morality, culture, and everyday behaviour that are considered necessary for compliance. In Sharia, religion and the socio-political system are regulated with equal rigour and clarity. For Muslims, Sharia is the only acceptable and justified form of social organisation, which, in addition to religious worship, necessarily includes everything else.

Caliphate

In its pure form, *Islam does not recognise any society other than an Islamic one*, and the entire history reflected in the Quran, and even more so,

The entire history of Islamic conquests is connected with this. In the beginning, there was a struggle between Muhammad's community and his followers against the Arab pagans. Later this grew into the imposition of Islam on the surrounding peoples. The impulse to strictly combine religion with politics, the unconditional assertion of the necessity for Muslims to rule over all non-Muslims, and the call for the destruction of polytheists all had a tremendous explosive effect in the era of Muhammad, in the late 7th and early 8th centuries. And already during the eighth century, in just a few decades, a gigantic Islamic empire was created. In this empire, everyone either converted to Islam, found themselves in the position of "dhimmi" ("People of the Book"), or were destroyed. We see the construction of the first Arab Caliphate as a complete and brutal affirmation of the foundations of Islamic theology, reflected in the Quran and stemming from the main tenet of the Islamic religion (the absolute transcendence and uniqueness of the Creator).

The first Arab Caliphate, founded during Muhammad's lifetime, was a model of the practical application of Islamic teachings and their embodiment in life. For centuries thereafter, this was considered the norm for Muslims. History, of course, placed Muslims in new historical circumstances. They were not always able to behave as strictly and consistently (aggressively) everywhere. They did not always succeed in following the original line flawlessly in everything. But where such an opportunity arose, it was precisely this approach that prevailed: the combination of religion and politics, the direct implementation of the metaphysics of creationism, embodied in the political power of Muslims, without any intermediate instances.

Thus, Islamic history in its internal — paradigmatic — dimension represents an *eternal* struggle against "jahiliyya" ("polytheism," "shirk"), the *eternal* conquest of Medina and Mecca by Muhammad's followers, which symbolically means the struggle against pagans, against all non-Muslims, and the establishment of Islamic rule over all historically accessible territory. This is a model, a kind of "ideal type" of society (according to M. Weber), which, under favourable historical circumstances, also becomes "normal" (according to F. Tönnies). The conception of the Islamic religion, embodied in the Islamic political system and historically fixed in the Arab Caliphate, is for Muslims a kind of *absolute horizon of the Political.*

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

The House of Islam and the House of War

Contemporary Islamic theorists (mainly theorists of pure Islam[1]) have proposed *the theory* of *the "three houses*." Where the rules we have discussed are observed, that is, where Sharia law is established, there is *the "house of Islam*" (Arabic: "dar al-Islam,"
دار الإسلام). The territory where there is no "dar al-Islam" is called
"dar al-kufr [2]" (دار كفر), *"*house of *falsehood"* or "house of *Satan"* (دار شيطان) — because any non-Islamic society is a "Satanic society." A Muslim who lives in the "house of Islam" must be peaceful, law-abiding and humble. He is on his own territory, and any deviation from Sharia law is both a moral sin and a social crime, which must inevitably result in appropriate punishment.

Meanwhile, a Muslim living in the "house of falsehood" must turn that house into *a "house of war*" ("dar al-harb" — دارالحرب). Thus, if a Muslim lives in an Islamic society, he is a respectable and law-abiding citizen. However, if this same Muslim is transferred to a non-Islamic society, he becomes a centre of terrorist activity and turns the "house of Satan" into a "house of war" — in order to sooner or later destroy the polytheists ("jahiliya") or subjugate the "people of the Book" (because Christians and Jews — in normal circumstances — should also be subordinate to Muslims, i.e. have the status of "dhimmis" under "protection").

Of course, most Muslims today do not believe this and do not adhere to it, but throughout world history there have been Islamic tendencies that have repeatedly returned to original Islam and sought to build the same caliphate, to reproduce the same logic. Today, this is a minority of Muslims, but nevertheless, this principle is at the heart of the Islamic religion itself, at the heart of the religious philosophy and theology of Islam, and at the heart of the political system of Islam. Therefore, there is always the possibility that a certain group of Muslims will decide to return to the original model and transform

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[1]According to Iraqi scholar Majid Khadduri (1909–2007), this theory basically took shape around 732 after the Umayyad Caliphate got beat at the Battle of Poitiers, which stopped the spread of Islam in Europe. See: *Khadduri M.* War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.

[2] The term "kufr" (كفر) means "unbelief," "concealment (of the truth)," etc. Hence "kafir" means "unbeliever" or "non-believer."

the "house of falsehood" (dar al-kufr) becomes the "house of war" (dar al-harb). This gives rise to a corresponding system of actions directed against societies that do not conform to Islamic norms.

In the full sense of the word, such a coherent ideology did not dominate for long. Muslims lived according to this law for several decades — during the era of the first Arab Caliphate[1]. At that time, there were no hereditary rulers of the ummah — the most courageous and gifted were chosen from among Muhammad's companions; there were no nation states or priesthood. It was a society of radical, militant and religious egalitarianism, *jamaat (*Arabic جماعة — a society, collective, community), male brotherhoods, which were essentially engaged in warfare against atheists, polytheists, and Christians (at that time, Jews did not constitute an independent political force). Although this idea was given theoretical form at the next stage — during the Umayyad Caliphate ([2]) — when some deviations from the original model of Muhammad's military-religious community had already occurred.

In general, the theory of the "three houses" has become widespread among theorists and practitioners of Salafism and Wahhabism, radical fundamentalists and other structures. It forms the basis of the political projects of extremist organisations such as Al-Qaeda (القاعد), Hizb ut-Tahrir (حزب التحرير), Islamic State (also known as Daesh — داعش [3] etc.

Shiism and its philosophy

During the reign of the third caliph, Uthman ibn Affan (574–656), *the Fitna* (Arabic:فتنة meaning "turmoil") began, a civil war within Islam. At this point, Islam split into two deeply different tendencies: Sunni and Shia. During this civil war, an alternative pole emerged in the form of the Prophet Muhammad's cousin, Ali (599–661), who was married to his daughter Fatima (605–633). A separate party, *the Shia (*Arabic: شِيعَةٍ — literally "party," "group of followers"). Since politics in Islam is inextricably linked to religion, the struggle for power in the Arab Caliphate was inextricably and organically intertwined with theological issues and the problem of interpreting the Quran and Islamic tradition as a whole.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

[2] *Khadduri M.* War and Peace in the Law of Islam.

[3] These organisations are officially banned in the Russian Federation and most countries as terrorist organisations.

This is how *Shiism* emerged as a distinct branch of Islam. Shiism asserts that all fundamental Islamic tenets accepted by the Muslim ummah (community) at that time are completely valid. Except for one, but fundamental, concerning the legitimate political authority in Islamic society and, at the same time (inseparable from this), the question of the highest authority in interpreting Muhammad's legacy. The Shiites, supporters of Ali, proclaimed that, apart from the figure of the prophet, *nabi (*Arabic:نبي), Muhammad, there is another fundamental figure — the interpreter, *the wali (*Arabic:ولي — "interpreter," "support," "saint"), who possesses the highest divine knowledge of the Quran and the basic religious tenets. This interpreter is Ali, the prophet's cousin. Accordingly, the fundamental principle of equality on which Islamic philosophy is based is violated or, more precisely, significantly modified.

This gives rise to a completely different model of theology, a different religious philosophy, where another instance appears between God and the world. Islam eliminates all instances between God and the world, while Shiism, recognising the adequacy of this elimination in relation to polytheists, and partly to Christians and Jews, re-establishes a certain instance that turns out to be more important than the ordinary person. This is further developed in the theory of "imamate" (Arabic:إمامة), which is an institution of rulers-interpreters and their loyal followers (Shiites), founded by the "first imam" Ali, and then his descendants, the "holy imams" [1].

Thus, Shiism establishes anthropological, ontological, soteriological, gnoseological, and political *inequality*. All people are equal, Shiites assert, except for the "holy imams." All people are the same, except for the house of the Prophet Muhammad through his cousin and his daughter Fatima. The holy imams are intermediaries between God and people, and only they know how to interpret the Quran and Islam correctly. That is, only they possess the keys to true interpretation, and only their interpretation is reliable. In a religious sense, a new authority emerges. When asked how to understand the suras of the Quran and the hadiths, Shiites respond: as the holy imams tell us. Accordingly, it is they who should hold power in a fully-fledged Islamic society. This community was founded by the prophet, the nabi, who is considered the last in Islam. Therefore, he may have successors among the prophets, whose chain ends with Muhammad. They are replaced by a chain of interpreters, the vali, that is, the imamate.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Va'al.

Ali's opponents, the followers of Uthman, rejected the claims of the Shiites in both theology and politics. And military force was on their side. This led to a division between *the Shiites,* supporters of Ali and the imamate, and *the Sunnis,* who relied on the interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah (سنة — sacred Islamic tradition). The Umayyad Caliphate was Sunni, and Ali's supporters found themselves in the role of a persecuted minority ([1]).

The Mahdi and the culture of expectation

Shiism is a deeply elitist ideology that permeates Islam and changes many of its aspects. "Elitist" in this case means that all people are equal, but there are those who are higher than all these equals — the "holy imams." This gives rise to the idea of the political power of the imams — only the Alids (Arabic:العلويين) can rule, and if there are none, representatives of the holy imams must rule, who act as intermediaries not only with God, but with the imams. It is believed that the Last Imam (the Seventh for the Ismailis and the Twelfth for the Twelver Shiites) did not die but went into hiding and will return at the end of time.

This gives rise to a political "culture of waiting." The Shiites await the arrival of the Imam, and until he comes, they remain in the minority and are persecuted. They base their political system on the return of the holy Imam Mahdi. A new fundamental hierarchy emerges, rejected by Sunni Islam, giving rise to the dynastic succession of the Alids and the idea that religious interpretation should be based on the authority of the holy Imams.

Between the status quo, in which Sunnis enjoy political and theological superiority, and the ideal Shiite state, there is opposition. It will be resolved through the arrival of the last Imam and his representatives. However, the expectation of the Mahdi should not be passive: his arrival must be hastened by the struggle for Shiite truth, which is both religious and political. This principle was the basis for the Fatimid Caliphate (909–1171), which temporarily united the countries of the Maghreb and the Middle East under Shiite rule, the Karmathian state, and later Safavid Iran, created in 1501 by the Shiites, and the modern Islamic Republic of Iran.

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1 *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.
2 *Korben, A.* History of Islamic Philosophy. Moscow: Sadra, 2018.
3 *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.

Shiism and Iranian influences

So, two parties emerged in the Islamic world: *Sunni* and *Shia*. One (Sunnis) stands for the original version of Islam, although since the Umayyad era it has undergone certain changes that became even more apparent in the Abbasid Caliphate (with its capital in Baghdad), while the other stands for the Shiite version ([1]).Thus, a certain pole *of alternative metaphysics* emerged in Islam, which was immediately projected into *alternative politics.* Moreover, since we have seen that theology and politics are not separate in Islam, a slight change in theological orientation (as in Shiism) also changes the political structure.

These principles are valid for understanding the history of Islamic states in the period of traditional societies (pre-modern), but they also have a significant influence on the current political situation in Islamic societies. Thus, modern Iran is a Shiite state in the full sense of the word, and the current leadership of Syria is also Shiite (Alawites are one of the branches of Shiism).

There are two other fundamental elements that changed Islamic metaphysics and politics. The second element, alongside Shiism, was a movement known as *spiritual Islam* or *intellectual Islam.* This movement began to develop during the Abbasid Caliphate and was dominated almost exclusively by Iranians ([2]).

Arab Muslims, who were the first to adopt this ideology (extremely Sunni), took over the Persian Empire of the Sassanids, killed a bunch of Zoroastrians, and made everyone else convert to Islam. Thus, huge masses of a completely different Iranian culture, which had nothing in common with the Arabs and represented a different metaphysics based on the principle of the opposition of Light and Darkness[3], found themselves under Islamic influence (having accepted Islam, they immediately began to reinterpret it based on their own deep philosophical models). An Iranian stratum immediately formed around the first Shiites, supporters of Ali. The Iranians enthusiastically supported the Shiite version because they saw in it much more similarity to their own pre-Islamic tradition. Gradually, Shiism became, to a large extent, an almost purely Iranian phenomenon.

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1 *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.
2 *Korben, A.* History of Islamic Philosophy.
3 *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. World War and the Culture of Waiting.

Sufism — the secret "religion of love"

In Sunni Islam, another movement developed in parallel — *Sufism*, which radically reinterpreted the Islamic tradition in the spirit of Platonism and dualistic Iranian light gnosis[1]. This was a completely different Islamic philosophy. In essence, Islamic philosophy itself was created by the Iranians. For example, the two greatest representatives of Islamic philosophy, Al-Farabi (870–950) and Avicenna (980–1037), were Iranians.

Iranian philosophy and Sufism represented a metaphysics based on *the metaphysics of mediation*. We have already established that Islam categorically *rejects* mediation. Sufism and spiritual Islam, on the other hand, *affirm* mediation. For example, it is claimed that before Muhammad there was the eternal Light of Muhammad (Arabic: نور محمدی), which existed between God and people and manifested itself in the historical Muhammad. Accordingly, this Light connected God and the world, and those who are part of this Light are special beings, "friends of God." Once again, an anthropological differentiation arises, dividing people into two types on grounds very close to Platonism. The "friends of God" are those who contemplate His Light, rising above the prejudices of the blind majority, who are satisfied with merely contemplating the play of shadows on the wall of Plato's cave.

Sufism is less politically pronounced than Shiism. Sufis do not have a single doctrine about who should hold power. They have not created their own political doctrine, but they do believe that Sufi sages, or sheikhs, should guide political power. This applies equally to Sunnis and Shiites. The consideration of the inner dimension of existence, which Sufis insist on, is extremely useful for ensuring that power is just, harmonious, and spiritual. Also, Sufis do not have a big problem with the existence of Muslims outside Islamic society. Following their own — inner — tol-

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[1] *Korben, A.* The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism. Moscow: Foundation for the Study of Islamic Culture; Magic Mountain; Design. Information Cartography, 2009

[2] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The Light War and the Culture of Expectation.

[3] Al-Farabi is the author of a series of treatises on the "ideal state," which generally follow Plato's main line of thought. In Islamic philosophy, he was the one who most fully described the model of "Kallipolis." *Al-Farabi. On* the Perfect State. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. At the same time, he proposed building Islamic societies on this basis in specific political and historical circumstances, that is, harmoniously combining Plato's "ideal type" with Aristotle's "normal type." *Al-Farabi.* The Political Writings. Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

the Islamic religion, they can adapt to any society, finding reflections of the one Truth everywhere. Thus, the greatest philosopher of Sufism Ibn Arabi (1165–1240), wrote about a special "religion of love," understanding it as the teaching of the Sufis:

> My heart has become capable of taking any form: it is a pasture for gazelles, a monastery for Christian monks, a temple for idols, the Kaaba for pilgrims walking around it, the tablets of the Torah, and the scroll of the Quran. I follow the religion of love, and whatever path the camels of love choose, that is my religion, my faith.

Mazhabs and states

Already in the Umayyad Caliphate and the Abbasid Caliphate that followed, the idea of dynastic succession of caliphs gradually took root, which was a departure from the original egalitarianism of the umma. Various ideas and attitudes of the peoples who found themselves under Arab rule also began to gradually penetrate Islamic culture, gradually strengthening their influence on the Arab elite. Thus, in the Abbasid Caliphate, the active formation of legal schools, or madhhabs (Arabic:مذهب), began.

The most widespread was the Hanafi madhhab (Arabic:حنفية – Hanafi), which included local ethnic beliefs as one of the sources of law, something that was completely unthinkable in early Islam. Other madhhabs — primarily the Hanbali (Arabic:الحنبلي) — reflected attitudes more appropriate to Arab nomadic societies. The Shiites created their own madhhab, the Ja'fari (Arabic:جعفرى), which included the political and religious ideas of the imamate ([3]).

At the same time, the unified Islamic space became pluralised: various separate states began to emerge, where Islam and Sharia law formally dominated, but local customs — including those relating to the political and social structure — continued to retain their significance to a large extent. The initial extreme metaphysical radicalism of the early Caliphate increasingly gave way to various local lo-

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

[2] *Ibn al-Arabi.* Turjumān al-Ashwāq. Beirut: Dār ?ādir, 1966. English translation in *Nicholson R.* The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq: A Collection of Mystical Odes by Muhyiddīn Ibn al-'Arabī. London: Royal Asiatic Society, Oriental. 1911.

[3] *Dugin A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. The monotheism of the moon and the gestalt of Wa'al.

cal tendencies. In the Abbasid Caliphate, which replaced the Umayyad Caliphate[1], these tendencies became somewhat entrenched. Although the state was conceived as a religious umma, it largely acquired an independent character.

The political landscape

The political history of Muslim societies is closely linked to theology. Theology and politics are inseparable components of a unified Islamic worldview. This fully confirms the basic thesis that politics is only one dimension of philosophy, if we understand philosophy broadly, including religion and its inherent metaphysical picture of the world, i.e., theology. The political philosophy of Islam is shaped by how the Islamic religious worldview emphasises, understands or interprets the relationship between the world (human beings) to God, how radically or non-radically it pursues the idea of the absence of a mediator, or, conversely, how it expresses and describes an intermediate instance between God and the world. The entire political history of Islamic societies is inextricably linked to theological attitudes within Islam. The same principle applies here as the features of Islamic architecture noted by Shuon: the pattern of the political history of Islamic peoples and states is built depending on the structures of the metaphysical interpretation of the most profound and fundamental theological and metaphysical questions. The nature of the relationship with God, the interpretation of sacred texts, and one or another version of the sacred determine how events, wars, conflicts, dynastic collisions, popular uprisings, and social protests unfold. It should be noted that when dealing with Islamic society, we find ourselves in the paradigm of Tradition (Premodern), and therefore the transcendent dimension underlying Islamic religion and dogma must be taken into account as a crucial and effective factor.

In order to understand what is happening in the Islamic world and how we should build relations with Muslims today, it is necessary to operate on the basis of theological principles.

Salafism and Wahhabism

Today, there are several versions of political Islam.

[1]Remnants of the Umayyad state survived, however, in North-West Africa and on the Iberian Peninsula, where they persisted for several more centuries.

- radical Islam, Salafism (and its extreme form, modern Wahhabism),
- political Shiism,
- and a wide range of versions of traditional Islam. Salafi Islam (from the Arabic سلفية, meaning "the followers of the first generation") calls for

It seeks to return to the ideals and norms of the first Arab Caliphate, the era of Muhammad himself and his companions. Here, the political programme consists of a literal repetition of early Islamic history, including an uncompromising attitude towards "infidels," a tightening of the application of Sharia law, a rejection of flexible forms of legal interpretation, and an irreconcilable struggle against internal Islam (Sufism) and Shiism. Salafis differ from representatives of traditional Islam precisely in that they view virtually all periods of Islamic history with suspicion, with the exception of the earliest era. They see a departure from the "ideal" ("norm") already under the Abbasids, not to mention later periods.

In the 18th century, an even more radical version of Salafism emerged in Saudi Arabia, rejecting all madhhabs (although most Salafis still recognise the legitimacy of established Islamic legal forms, except for Shiite ones) — Wahhabism. Its founder was the preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), who called on his followers to reject any interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, taking everything strictly literally and returning to the 6th–7th centuries, right down to clothing, everyday life and the smallest details. Among the Wahhabis, Salafi tendencies towards the "purification of Islam" reached their logical conclusion, and the entire history of traditional Islam was subjected to radical criticism, being recognised as a deviation and hidden "idolatry" (i.e. shirk). The alliance of Wahhabi reformers with the political leaders of the Saud dynasty, the traditional rulers of the Arabian city of Ed-Diriyah, laid the foundation for the future state of Saudi Arabia, which emerged with British support on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

Saudi Arabia and a number of Arab states close to it remain to this day a stronghold of radical Salafism and its corresponding political philosophy. Ideologically close to this movement is the Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged in Egypt. In its extreme forms, this version of Islam is used to justify terrorism and various forms of political and religious extremism, which stems from the literal application of

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

the principle of the "three houses." The Islamic State is one of the most striking examples of such a political-religious model.

Contemporary Shiism

Modern Shiism prevails in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where, after the overthrow of the Shah's regime, a special form of Shiite rule was established, called the "state of the enlightened" [1] (Arabic:ولاية الفقيه — "wilayat al-faqih"). It assumes that while the Last Imam is still in hiding, Shiite scholars, who form a hierarchy based on the depth of their religious experience and breadth of Islamic knowledge, should rule on his behalf. The highest rulers are the Ayatollahs (آية الله , the highest rank among interpreters of religion and law), among whom the Alids, descendants of various branches of the family of Ali, are particularly distinguished. Together, the Alids constitute the "ahl al-Bayt" (أهل البيت), meaning "people of the House," referring to the descendants of Muhammad and Ali.

The "wilayat al-faqih" system is oriented towards the coming of the "end times," when the Last Imam must return to the world and engage in the final battle with the armies of Darkness (which the Shiites consider to be primarily modern Western civilisation — materialistic, atheistic, colonial and hegemonic). This should be accompanied by the spread of Shiism and a series of political victories.

The model of "wilayat al-faqih" and the theories of the Islamic (Shiite) revolution were developed in the 20th century by Shiite intellectuals, primarily Imam Khomeini (1900–1989), who became the leader of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. However, similar ideas were supported by the Shiites of Iraq (who make up about 70 per cent of the Iraqi population) and the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah. There are also Shiite populations in other countries, such as Syria, Yemen (where Shiite Houthis are currently fighting other political groups), Bahrain, Turkey (Alevis), and some countries in the Middle East, the Maghreb, and Central Asia. Shiism is also somewhat widespread in Africa and the United States (mainly among African Americans). There are Shiites in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The Shiites, who have always been persecuted, have a principle called *takiyya* (Arabic:التقية — "prudence," "caution," "discretion").

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.

(2) The Shiite revolution in Iran took place in January 1978 - February 1979 (1357 according to the Iranian calendar).

"caution"), i.e. the principle of concealing one's own affiliation in difficult circumstances. Thus, Shiites do not always say that they are Shiites. And in cases where they encounter aggressive opponents of Shiism, they may refer to themselves as "Sunnis". Shiism is a tradition that is, in a sense, parallel to Islam. Shiism has almost always lost historical battles, and all the first imams were killed[1]. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine the exact number of Shiites in the world.

Shiism is a tradition of suffering and pain, a tradition of waiting. But this waiting must be *active* and energetic. At present, Shiite authorities clearly distinguish between the signs of the "last days" and the approaching arrival of the Mahdi, the Last Imam. This has a significant impact on the contemporary political map of the Middle East and, to some extent, Central Asia. The confrontation between modern Iran and Israel is interpreted by both sides in religious and eschatological terms. For Shiites, the state of Israel, which arose on territories previously inhabited by Muslims and is preparing to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the second holiest site in Islam after the Kaaba, in order to begin construction of the Third Temple on that site, embodies the power of pure evil — the principle of Dajjal (Arabic:الدجال), the "Deceiver" — the analogue of the Antichrist in Christian political philosophy, is an eschatological enemy. The support of Israel by the West, and especially the United States, further convinces Shiites of the correctness of this analysis (the West is= Dadjal, or "Great Shaitan," in the words of Khomeini). In response, Israelis identify Iran as the force that is preventing the coming of the Messiah and seeking to prevent the fulfilment of the prophecies about the restoration of the Third Temple.

Traditional Islam

It remains to briefly consider traditional Islam. As a rule, this refers to the Abbasid-Ottoman versions of Islam adapted to local conditions. That is, "traditional Islam" refers to Sunni Islam, but not fundamentalist, Salafi, or Wahhabi Islam. At the theological level, this form of Islam tends to soften the relationship between the world and God. Theological and

[1] It is reported that Abu Hasan Rida said: "All eleven imams after the Prophet (s) were killed. Some died by the sword, like the Commander of the Faithful and Husayn (a), and others were poisoned." *Al-Ka'im Mahdi Muntazir*. Jesus in the Qur'an and Hadith. St. Petersburg: Petersburg Oriental Studies, 2012. P. 63.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. World War and the Culture of Expectation.

The metaphysical meaning of traditional Islam lies in softening the opposition between the immanent existence given to us and the transcendent Beginning (Allah). As soon as this opposition is softened, we are dealing with traditional Islam.

And where this traditional Islam reaches its highest intellectual level of understanding, we encounter Sufi *tariqas* (Arabic: — road, path), orders, and representatives *of tasawwuf* (Arabic طريقه).

Sufism, continuing the line of Ibn Arabi, reinterprets the exclusive oneness of God into an inclusive unity, which allows Muslims to find a place outside the Sharia context, and in Islamic societies to be sufficiently open to various religious forms — primarily monotheistic, but not exclusively so (as Asian Sufism demonstrates in relation to the polytheistic traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism). Politically, this is reflected in the fact that traditional Islam even formally rejects Salafism, recognises the legitimacy of various periods of Islamic and world history, and seeks to find the key to their dialectical interpretation. Therefore, for traditional Islam, the interpretation of the Quran is always relevant and should not be closed at any stage or rejected altogether (as in Wahhabism).

At the same time, supporters of traditional Islam, which includes the vast majority of Muslims in all countries, do not have a single political ideology. Such Islam naturally gravitates towards maintaining Sharia norms, insisting on the fulfilment of religious obligations and the norms of Islamic law. Where possible, priority is given to the creation of an Islamic social order based on the principles of the Quran and Sunnah. However, the most stringent precepts of Islam are interpreted allegorically. Thus, among the two versions of "jihad" ([1]) "holy war," priority is given to the "great jihad," which believers must wage against their own vices and weaknesses, while the "lesser jihad," i.e., the actual "war against infidels," is interpreted as opposition to the enemies of the fatherland, that is, in the spirit of generalised patriotism. Therefore, traditional Islam and its most intellectual core (Sufism) contrast with the more clearly expressed models of the Salafis and Shiites (both in theology and politics), but at the same time it does not represent something whole and allows for many versions.

[1] This interpretation goes back to the Arab jurist and theologian of the Abbasid period, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi (1002–1071), whose authority is generally rejected by Salafis.

The Sufi Empire of the late

The political ideas set forth by Ibn Arabi in his major work The Meccan Prophecies [1] bear a striking resemblance to Shiite eschatology. Ibn Arabi describes the regime that the Mahdi and his loyal viziers will establish at the end of time as a model state. The Mahdi here represents an eschatological version of the "perfect man" (al-insān al-kāmil — الكامل الإنسان), who is generally described by Ibn Arabi as a mediator between God and the world and a divine vice-regent. At the beginning of time, the "perfect man" is represented by Adam, and at the end by the Mahdi. The Mahdi, like the Jewish Messiah, is presented as the "ideal ruler." During the reign of the Mahdi, the restrictive aspects of external Islam and a number of legal interpretations will be abolished, as the Mahdi will know spiritual truth directly. The Mahdi's viziers are described as spiritual beings capable of penetrating divine mysteries and, together with the Mahdi, bringing the external material world into conformity with the Divine plan and light archetypes. Ibn Arabi clarifies that none of the Mahdi's assistants will be ethnic Arabs, although they will all speak only Arabic. Some passages by Ibn Arabi suggest that the Mahdi's "vizirs," endowed with superhuman qualities, will not be mere servants, but his mentors, direct conduits of divine will, a kind of incarnate angels, while he himself will be only a sword, that is, an instrument of will. This again takes us back to the rule of the philosopher-guardians of Plato's Kallipolis. Mahdi (al-Mahdi — ٱلْمَهْدِي) literally means "guided" (meaning "guided by God"), but his viziers are called "the guided" (al-hudat — الْهُدَاة). According to Ibn Arabi, there should be nine such "guided" ones.

It is important that the Sufi vision of the End Times Empire includes a forceful component. The Mahdi himself is repeatedly referred to as a "sword," and various fragments of the "Mecca Prophecies" emphasise that he will defeat his enemies by force.

At the same time, one of the most important features of the Mahdi's rule should be the fair distribution of wealth and honours. If injustice reigns in the present world, the Mahdi's empire will overturn the existing proportions and restore the divine order that has been lost over time. This is the social character of political Sufism, which is, however, exclusively

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[1] *Morris J W., Chittick W. (ed.)* Ibn ‘Arabi: The Meccan Revelations. NY: Pir Press, 2002.

In view of the prospect of the "end of the world," Sufis suggest focusing on the inner spiritual path and calmly accepting the injustices and lawlessness that prevail in the world. In this, the Sufi attitude towards society differs significantly from Salafi projects, which insist that compliance with Sharia law is already a sufficient condition for justice and that this must be enforced immediately, without waiting for some special era.

Sufi sheikhs, including the highest among them, who have the status of "pole" (al-qutb — القطب), generally avoid direct involvement in politics, limiting themselves to providing spiritual guidance to those leaders who turn to them for help. However, in the end times, Sufi teachings (and therefore the inner core of traditional Islam) take on pronounced political features, and the scenario of the Mahdi's struggle with his opponents, and even his title "Great Imam" (al-Iman al-Akbar — الإمام الأكبَر) completely coincides with Shiite eschatology. The only difference is that the Sufi scenario of the restoration of the "ideal state" under the leadership of the "perfect man" is not directly linked to the descendants of Ali, and accordingly, the Sufi Mahdi is seen as having no (at least explicit) connection with the "hidden Imam."

Islam of the Medina Constitution

However, there is another version of traditional Islam that differs from Sufism. In this interpretation, the emphasis is not so much on metaphysics as on determining what constitutes the normative structure of society. In this case, the focus is on the position of the Islamic ummah that prevailed during the lifetime of Muhammad himself. At that time, his followers formed a traditional tribal community of Arab nomads, where the laws of military democracy prevailed, but in the case of Muslims, the head of this community was the prophet. Probably, the Jews in the era of Abraham, but also Moses and up to the era of the Judges, were a similar society, which was replaced by the establishment of the kingdom under Samuel and Saul. In the corpus of Islamic hadiths, evidence of how this early community was organised is contained in the so-called Medina Constitution.

Supporters of this interpretation of traditional Islam reject Salafism, which considers the structure of Islamic society that developed after Muhammad under the first caliphs (i.e., the "salafa," or "followers") to be an unconditional dogma. "followers"), when the foundations of the state, as understood by Sunnis, were laid. In the Umayyad,

Abbasid and, ultimately, Ottoman caliphates, many extraneous elements were added to this. The Shiites and Sufis further enriched Islamic culture with various mystical motifs, moving even further away from Muhammad's Arab nomadic community than the first caliphs and Salafis. If traditional Islam is understood in this way, it can serve as a religious justification for the tribal system in combination with Islamic tradition and as a paradigm for the preservation or even artificial revival of tribal communities. For some Islamic peoples who have preserved their tribal institutions (such as the Chechens and their teips), this interpretation of traditional Islam may be relevant. This explains why one of the leading theorists of such traditional Islam is the Chechen public figure Khoja Ahmed Nukhaev.

The same is true for some ethnic groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Malaysia, and probably for the Bedouins who have preserved their nomadic way of life, some Berber tribes and peoples of Africa who have converted to Islam.

Islam in Russia

In modern history, and in particular in Russian society, as in Europe, America and the rest of the world, these theological and, accordingly, political models are still in force and determine a great deal.

Sunni Islam traditionally dominates among Russian Muslims (only Azerbaijanis are Shiites).

In Sunni Russian Islam, in turn, there are two poles, two political philosophies:

1) traditional Islam, oriented mainly towards Sufi tariqas, and
2) radical Islam, Salafi and Wahhabi, imported relatively recently and mainly from Saudi Arabia).

Radical Islam, as we have seen, is guided by a metaphysical vision of a harsh confrontation between man and God. In essence, it is a terrorist ideology that turns any Muslim (if he lives in a non-Islamic society) into a bearer of "dar al-harb," the "house of war." If he is in an Islamic but non-Salafi society (for example, in a Shiite

[1] *Nukhaev, H.-A. T.* Vedeno or Washington? Moscow: Arktogey-Centre, 2001.

or in a traditional Islamic environment), he must once again rise up against "incorrect" (i.e., non-Wahhabi) Islam. Supporters of this radical version unite in jamaats, militarised political-religious structures that often resort to terrorist activities. Representatives of traditional Islam, and above all authoritative Sufi sheikhs, often become the targets of assassinations and terrorist acts. For Salafis, it is important first and foremost to get rid of ideological opponents within the Islamic umma itself.

Representatives of traditional Islam in Russia (including Sufi circles) are not unconditional supporters of the Russian political system. Historically, some Sufi tariqas became the core of resistance among the mountain Islamic peoples of the Russian Empire, as was the case, in particular, in the Shamil uprising (1797–1871). Although these versions of Caucasian Sufism already had some features of Salafi ideology, directed primarily against local Caucasian ethnic customs that were calmly accepted by traditional Islam. Also, traditional Islam, for all its inclusiveness, cannot accept the legitimacy of atheistic, materialistic, and hedonistic attitudes, as well as social models that go directly against the norms of Islamic tradition. This applies to certain aspects of political modernity and, even more so, to postmodernity. Supporters of traditional Islam are generally bearers of traditional values such as religion, ethics, justice, morality, family, etc. It was precisely by turning to traditional Islam for support in the fight against radical (Salafi) Islam that Russia owed its success in the Second Chechen War, when the main ally of Moscow in Chechnya became the sheikh of the Sufi tariqa (virda) Akhmad Kadyrov (1951–2004).

There is irreconcilable enmity between the two designated poles of Islam — traditional and Salafi. Although Muslims belong to both poles, their metaphysics, political views, social attitudes, ideas about a normative society, and attitudes towards other nations and religions are diametrically opposed.

PART 3. THE POLITICAL PARADIGM OF MODERNITY. THE WAR OF CONCEPTS

Chapter 1. The Political Philosophy of Atomism

Generalised paradigm of politics in the pre-modern era

We now move from the political philosophy of traditional society (pre-modern) to the political philosophy of modern societies. In order to understand the political and philosophical essence of this transition, we must again refer to the map of types of the political, based on Plato's dialogue "Timaeus." The meaning of modernity and the entire spectrum of political teachings inherent in it will remain completely incomprehensible if we do not constantly keep in mind the context in which it originated and what the fundamental system of axioms, principles, and basic postulates it negated. Modernity is the negation of Tradition. But as it spread and deepened, what it originally and programmatically denied disappeared behind the horizon or was distorted beyond recognition in the biased and obsessive interpretations of Modernity itself. Therefore, in order to understand how the Political came to be understood and constructed in the New Age, and on what foundation its hermeneutics was based, one must always refer to the very scheme that Modernity itself sought to demolish, refute and abolish.

So, politics in traditional society can generally be reduced to a common pattern described by Plato and Aristotle, which has remained fundamentally unchanged throughout this period (right up to modern times).

All types of political philosophy in traditional society are based on the first two principles. In turn, they can be divided into Platonic political philosophy, where the focus is on the figure of the Father and the model of imitation of the earthly world by the heavenly world, and Aristotelian political philosophy (the political philosophy of the Son), which focuses on the world of phenomena, divided into the upper horizon (eidos, εἰδος) and the lower horizon (matter, ὕλη).



The structure of "Timaeus" and types of political philosophy

Political philosophy in the pre-modern era is characterised by the reduction of all positive ("good") political systems to two fundamental paradigms: the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son. Applying this to the political philosophy of monotheistic religions, we determine in each specific case where the Father paradigm is stronger and where the Son paradigm is stronger, how they combine and how their balance changes in the course of historical transformations, reforms and conflicts([1]).

[1]Only in Protestantism did we encounter for the first time elements of a different political system that goes beyond these two fundamental paradigms of political philosophy.

Let us also recall the division into three socio-political strata (types of milia castes) that we find in the most general models of traditional societies (also in Plato and Aristotle).



The hierarchy of political strata in Plato and Aristotle

These two types dominate political philosophy in the Tradition. In other words, it is either a monarchical or an aristocratic society. A special case is "theocracy," θεοκρατία, in which the emphasis is on the rule of priests, which does not change the general scheme (domination of contemplative life) but gives the highest caste a special characteristic ([1]).

Some elements of democracy are also found in the Salafi interpretation of Islam.

[1] The two founding theorists of traditionalism, René Guénon and Julius Evola (1898–1974), disagreed on the primacy of priests or sacred kings in traditional society. Guénon insisted on the primacy of priests (Indian

The centrality of hierarchy in Tradition

In traditional society, *a vertical hierarchy* is necessary: radically vertical when it comes to the Father, or relatively vertical when it comes to the Son.

The Greek word ìερπαρχία is formed from two roots, ìερ, "sacred," and åρχή, "rule," i.e., "sacred rule." One may ask: why "sacred authority," why does the term ìερός appear in this system of power? The point is that the political system reflects the system of theology (if we are talking about monotheistic religions) or ontology (in the case of pre-monotheistic religions). In other words, the political structure of traditional society is sacred; it is based on the principle of sacredness. This is the most important distinguishing feature of traditional society.

Vertical organisation is inextricably linked to sacredness, since it places at the root of the hierarchy not simply quantitative criteria such as power, wealth, or the ability to subjugate others by any means. Such a vertical structure would not be 'sacred', that is, it would not be a 'hierarchy'. Power has an otherworldly source. It originates in heaven, in the realm of the eternal and divine. And it is precisely this relationship with the Divine (however it may be interpreted) that determines the legitimacy of power.

The third type in "Timaeus"

In Plato's Timaeus and Republic, as well as in Aristotle, there is another, third principle. In Timaeus, it is called "chora" (χῶρα), "Mother," "Nurse," "Recipient." In Parmenides, this corresponds to the ontological concept of "many" (πολλά). In Plato's ideal state (Callipolis), this third principle corresponds to peasants or artisans.

In Aristotle's description of the physics of the world, we encounter the principle "matter (ὕλη — "wood"). In politics, it corresponds to democracy, as the power of representatives of the lowest — third — class. Accordingly, the political philosophy of traditional society is built on the following model: the political philosophies of Father and Son can argue with each other, the Brahmin castes can argue with each other

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the Brahmin caste). See: *Guénon, R.* Spiritual Dominion and Worldly Power. Moscow: Belovodye, 2012. Evola (in the spirit of the Ghibelline ideology) defended the principle of the superiority of sacred kings. *Evola, Y.* Revolt Against the Modern World. Moscow: Prometheus, 2016; *Ibid.* The Mysteries of the Grail. Moscow-Voronezh: TERRA FOLIATA, 2013.

Priests and warriors, just as the aristocracy and the monarchy can argue among themselves — and this is within the bounds of what is permissible.

The third principle in traditional society almost never acquires full power. This principle is material, maternal, peasant-craft. But purely theoretically, just as there is a political philosophy of the Father and the Son, there is also *a* potential *political philosophy of the Mother,* which is unrealizable within the framework of traditional society. This form of government exists only as a hypothesis; from Plato's point of view, it is the ultimate degradation of the ideal state (democracy and tyranny), and from Aristotle's point of view, it is the worst system of government. We are talking about the power of the third principle.

In philosophy, this hypothesis corresponds to the zone of the Mother, matter or space. The sacred politics of traditional society is built on higher levels, but the overall picture of ontological levels and types of political systems reserves a special place for such political philosophy. This place lies beyond the paradigm of Tradition (Premodern) and for many millennia remains a purely potential possibility, coming to life only when normative forms of politics fall into decline and reach a critical point of degeneration.

From Democritus to democracy

However, even in ancient times, we encounter some thinkers who attempted to explain the world not in the traditional Greek manner, where everything originates from the Father or is contained in the living synthesis of the Son, but from the bottom up, starting from matter, bodies, and the direct fact of existence. Plato, in his dialogue Sophist[1] speaks of a "giantomachy in relation to essence," that is, a dispute between those who recognise the world of ideas and consider it to be original and autonomous (like Plato himself), and those who, on the contrary, accept only bodily things as existing. Plato likens this to a battle between gods and giants — the position of the gods corresponds to the bearers of the classical tradition, while the Titans are the first representatives of ancient materialism. The main character of the dialogue "The Stranger" says the following about them to his listener Theaetetus:

> — Some pull everything down from the sky and from the invisible realm onto the earth, as if embracing oak trees and rocks with their arms. Clinging to everything

[1] *Plato.* Sophist / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2.

they claim that only what can be touched and felt exists, and they consider bodies and existence to be one and the same thing, while they pour contempt on all those who say that something immaterial exists, not wanting to hear anything more[1].

To which Theaetetus reasonably remarks:

— You have named terrible people [2].

Here Plato refers to the teachings of the atomists, primarily Democritus (c. 460 – c. 370 BC). Democritus was one of the first to attempt to construct a philosophical model based on the principle of "bottom-up" principle. Early thinkers such as Leucippus, who is considered to be Democritus' teacher, can also be included here. Later, similar ideas were developed by Epicurus (342/341–271/270 BC) and his follower, the Roman philosopher Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 99–55 BC).

Leucippus and Democritus put forward the thesis of "isonomy" (ίσονομία), anticipating later ideas of the Modern Age about the isotropy of space and the existence of everything (the principle of contingency[4]). This thesis, often attributed to Leucippus, reads as follows: "no more than otherwise" (Greek: μηδ₴ν μᾶλλον τοιουτον ή τοιουτον είναι)([5]). It stems from the idea of the infinity of the phenomenal world (which is strictly opposed to both Plato and Aristotle, since the world in their systems is limited and finite, although for different reasons — in Plato, due to its secondary nature compared to the paradigm, and in Aristotle, because of its harmonious structure around a fixed centre([6])). Thus, everything becomes

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[1] *Plato.* Sophist. P. 314.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Many authors in Ancient Greece (e.g., Epicurus) questioned the existence of Leucippus, believing that Democritus himself was the creator of atomism.

[4] Copernicus' astronomy, Galileo's and Newton's physics were based on this principle, and in postmodernism, contingency was elevated to the highest principle in object-oriented ontology. See: *Meillassoux, Quentin.* After Finitude: Essays on the Necessity of Contingency. Ekaterinburg; Moscow: Kabinetny Ucheny, 2016.

[5] *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. L.: Nauka, 1970. P. 207.

[6] The Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43 BC) conveyed Democritus' teaching about isotropic space as follows: "Democritus believes that the bodies he calls atoms, i.e. indivisible, due to their hardness, float in an infinite void, in which there is no highest, lowest, middle, furthest or outermost point, and that they float in such a way that when they collide, they stick together, resulting in all the things that exist and that we see; this movement of atoms must be thought of as having no beginning (

relative, and any order turns out to be just a special case of chaos, and moreover, something random and fleeting. This totally destroys the semantic verticality of the world, which turns out to be a purely material phenomenon, since "infinity" in Greek thought was synonymous with matter.

The principle of "isonomy" established a kind of equality not only between one and another, but also between the existing and the non-existing, equating being with non-being, that is, "something is no more than what it is not" (Greek οὐδ῀ν μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν ἡ τὸ μή ὄν εἶναι).

Democritus, following Leucippus, put forward the idea that *atoms* exist. An atom (ἄτομος) literally means "something indivisible," "something that cannot be cut." Atomists used another term for indivisible particles — ἀδιαίρετα [2]. The corresponding term "amera" (Greek ἀμερή), literally "that which has no parts," was proposed in the 4th century BC by the sophist and dialectician Diodorus Cronus of Megara. Democritus considered "atoms" to be "dense" ("full,"
"perfect" — Greek πλήρης, ναστός). Thus, Democritus completely overturns the Platonic conception of being, placing existence not above, in the realm of ideas and the divine One, but below. However, only Democritus' commentators identified atoms with existence. He himself apparently did not use such a category as being to describe them. Atoms were contrasted with *emptiness* [3] (τὸ κένόν), infinity (ἄπειρία) or "nothingness" (οὐδέν), but precisely as a mirror opposition. Their non-emptiness, non-infinity and non-nothingness do not yet mean that they *exist,* that they represent being. This is only a concept, and it is no coincidence that Democritus avoids ontological definitions in his philosophy. The difference between emptiness and atoms is speculative, purely conceptual, like emptiness and atoms themselves. The "existence" of atoms is only evidenced by human thought, but according to Democritus, this thought is secondary, being a derivative of the momentary random play of atoms. Thinking is an accident of cosmic chaos. Therefore, its conclusions are, on the whole, random. There is no reliability that Plato attributes to the conclusions of thinking.

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but already happening for an infinite amount of time." *Lurie. S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 251.

[1] The Stoic Posidonius (139/135–51/50 BC) reports that the first to formulate the theory of atoms were the Phoenicians, in particular a certain Mohos of Sidon, who lived before the Trojan War. Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was also convinced of this, identifying Mohos with Moses. See: *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Va'al.

[2] This term is attributed to Democritus' disciple Mitrodorus of Chios.

[3] A synonym for "emptiness" is also the important philosophical term "absence" (Greek στέρψη, Latin privatio).

and Aristotle, Democritus is nowhere near. These conclusions are truer than the hallucinations of sensory forms, but still only relatively so. Therefore, the existence of atoms is also relative. They are not so much the ontological foundations of everything as the concept of such foundations. Consequently, it can be said that atoms are not emptiness, but it can hardly be said with certainty that they exist.

Democritus was seriously concerned with epistemology and ontology, that is, reflection on the basis on which he himself asserted the existence of atoms and emptiness and how these assertions relate to sensory experience. It is likely that his emphasis on this distinction led to Democritus sometimes being regarded as a follower of the Eleatics, who, following Parmenides, based their philosophy on the distinction between opinion (δό3α) and truth (ἀλήθεια), where sensory experience affected only opinion, while truth was hidden deep within and accessible only to the intellect. This epistemological position was most fully developed by Plato. But the entire system of Democritus' worldview is opposed to the unity of Plato and Parmenides, proceeding, on the contrary, from multiplicity and emptiness. At the same time, however, Democritus bases his metaphysical judgements on sensory experience, considering it secondary, distorted and unreliable. The Great Void and atoms are postulated by thought, but by a thought that is fundamentally different from the classical Greek interpretation. This is not Logos, not Nous (Νους), not Sophia, which are divine, universal and belong to the transcendent philosophy of the Father. This thought, νοερός, is a product of the mental activity of an individual being. In modern philosophy, this is usually called a "concept" (Latin conceptum, from the verb capere, which literally means "to grasp").
"to grasp"). The instance that grasps the concept is not divine reason, but human reason [1]. But this "quick-witted reason" is different from the information conveyed by the senses. In essence, Democritus was the first in his era to assert a completely original conception of thinking, a special epistemology that surprisingly anticipates the Modern Age, where basic judgements are made on the basis of the same instance — human (primarily individual) reason — bon sense of the French rationalist Descartes (1596–1650) or the common sense of the Scottish realists — T. Reid (1710–1796), A. Ferguson (1723–1816), etc. But it was in the Modern Age that this understanding of thought as a product of rational thinking was most fully proposed by

[1] Democritus said about this: "We know nothing of what is clear in reality, but the opinion of each of us represents the form (*of things*) in a modified form." *Lurie S.Y.* Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 219.

John Locke (1632–1704), who will be discussed further, was a follower of Democritus. Therefore, Democritus' epistemology, as well as his void-atomist ontology, were completely unprecedented in classical Greece. He considered truth to be the result of the activity of the individual mind, i.e. a concept, while existence (or non-existence, nothingness, emptiness, etc.) appeared as the fruit of rational conclusion. At the same time, he considered truth itself to be inaccessible, hence his famous expression "truth is in the abyss" (Greek: ϑν βυθωι γὰρ ϐ ἀλήθεια([1])).

According to Democritus, atoms are like tiny particles of dust that can be seen in the sun's rays but remain invisible when scattered in the air. However, this does not mean that humans are capable of seeing atoms, but is merely a metaphorical indication that something invisible under certain circumstances can become visible under others. The Christian author Bishop Jerome of Stridon (342–419 or 420) in his commentary on the Book of Isaiah (40:12) specifically focused on the following passage:

> Who has measured the waters in the hollow of
> his hand, and marked off the heavens with a
> span,
> and counted the dust of the earth?

In the expressions "earthly dust" and "ashes," he saw a reference to another Hebrew word, daq (דק), which he in turn compared to Democritus' "atoms." From this observation, a number of important parallels can be drawn between grains of sand, the smallest particles of matter, and atomist theory. A similar view was shared by the Islamic Ash'ari school, which also identified the smallest particle of matter, the "atom" (Arabic:ذرة — dhara([2])), with the fundamental basis of existence. For the Ash'arites, every "atom" of matter, as well as every point in space and every moment in time, was created by God. In the materialistic picture of Democritus, Leucippus, and other atomists, these particles of dust were not created by anyone, arose by themselves, and are not subject to any law except chance. Therefore, worlds are created and destroyed by the arbitrary play of atoms that stick together and separate ([3]).

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[1] *Lurie, S.Y.* Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 38.

[2] ذرة — dhara literally means "grain," which refers to a completely different symbolic chain associated with agrarian societies and their beliefs.

[3] This topic has been developed by contemporary philosophers — speculative realists, supporters of objectively oriented ontology, who, at a new stage, seek to justify the existence of matter and sub-material dimensions.

The cosmos is composed of atoms, material particles. It arises from the fact that atoms collide chaotically with each other, clump together and disintegrate, forming *a vortex* (δῖνος).

Democritus clearly did not want to explain which came first, atoms or emptiness, but his description of the emergence of a vortex as a stream of atoms cannot avoid this problem. The birth of a vortex is described as follows:

> A whirlwind of all shapes separated from the universe [1].

These words are attributed to Democritus by the Neoplatonist Simplikios (c. 490–560). Epicurus puts it this way:

> The world is a part of space that has separated from infinity [2].

In the first case, the verb ἀποκρίνω is used in the sense of "to separate," while in the second, Epicurus uses the verb ἀποτέμνω, which has the same root as the word "atom," indicating "cutting" or "dividing." A whirlwind, consisting of indivisible particles, is initially separated from emptiness (infinity), which becomes the beginning of the movement of atoms in emptiness. But here it should be noted that in order to separate from emptiness, it is necessary first to be merged with it, unified, inseparable. And although Democritus and Epicurus strive to give both atoms and emptiness, in the very sense in which they are described, the property of eternity, and thus eternal separateness from each other, the very description of the appearance of a whirlwind of atoms indicates some state preceding this separateness, since the appearance of a whirlwind

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The themes of "sand" and "particle memory" are also of great importance to contemporary philosopher Reza Negarestani, who links sand and dust, as the root of matter, to the distinctive style of Middle Eastern cultures and even directly to Islamic civilisation. See: *Negarestani R.* Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials. Melbourne: Re.Press, 2008. The "memory of atoms" was also a central theme for Russian cosmists N.F. Fedorov and K.E. Tsiolkovsky. According to Fedorov, matter contains the atoms of deceased ancestors, which must be resurrected by scientific methods. *Fedorov N. F.* Collected Works: In 4 vols. Moscow: Progress-Tradition; Evidentis, 1995–2004. Tsiolkovsky believed that every atom of matter was once part of a living organism (according to Tsiolkovsky, life cannot be a random phenomenon of a single planet and is a universal phenomenon, hence his conviction in the existence of life in other worlds, galaxies and planets). Therefore, the atom contains an euphoric quantum of being (the memory that a particle of matter was a component of a living organism inspires it with happiness. *Tsiolkovsky, K. E.* Cosmic Philosophy. Moscow: IDLi; Sfera, 2004. See also: *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Images of Russian Thought. The Sun King, the Reflection of Sophia, and Underground Russia. Moscow: Academic Project, 2019.

[1] *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 274.

[2] *Ibid*. P. 275.

is described as an event whose meaning consists in separation. And it is obvious that the primordial state preceding the appearance of a vortex consisting of atoms must be the non-existence of atoms as such and their fusion with emptiness. This allows us to assume a shadow side of atomistic ontology (more precisely, nihilistic ontology), which Democritus himself probably calls "the abyss in which truth resides."

If we put aside this highly problematic cosmogony (ontogony), the cosmological description of the already existing cosmos, in which vortices swirl, looks as follows. There are voids between atoms, and motion (including the cycle of births and deaths) is explained by the random coupling (ϑπάλλα3ις) and uncoupling of atoms. According to Democritus, the world itself is essentially the Great Void (το κένόν[1]), infinity (åπειρία)[2] or "nothingness" (ούδέν[3]). Atoms move chaotically in this void, creating worlds that arise and are destroyed.

> Atoms rush about in the void in a haphazard manner; colliding with each other spontaneously as a result of their disorderly movement and intertwining due to their diversity of forms, they do not cling to each other and thus create the world and everything in it, or rather, infinite worlds [4].

These worlds consist of forms (είδωλα[5]). Democritus denies the existence of ideas (unlike Plato) and that each thing has its own purpose (unlike Aristotle). Therefore, the only way to explain things is to identify the cause. Existence, having no purpose and no higher eternal meaning, becomes, on the one hand, accidental and, on the other hand, mechanically predetermined by a law of cause and effect, that is, material necessity.

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[1] Lat. inanitas.

[2] Lat. infinitas.

[3] Lat. nihil.

[4] *Lurie. S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 276.

[5]The choice of the term ειδωλον to denote form as opposed to Plato's ίδέα, είδος or Aristotle's μορφή is significant. The Greeks used this word to denote something that appears to be — a ghost, a phantom. The concept of "idol" derives from this. This is not a vision of the essence of a thing, but, on the contrary, its false appearance. In the eidolon, the "idol," the ghost, nothing essential is hidden; it is a shadow, deprived of the body that casts it. Such is the atomistic universe — it is a ghost. In postmodernism, this theme was developed in the direction of "ontology," the "science of ghosts." *Derrida, J.* Specters of Marx. M.: Logos altera, Ecce homo, 2006; *Buse P., Scott, A. (eds).* Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History. London: Macmillan, 1999.

The lying logos

We have seen that Plato, in Timaeus, claimed that matter is grasped by a special "bastard logos." This "bastard logos" is the form of conceptual thinking with which Democritus grasps the existence of emptiness (το κένόν) or "nothingness" (ούδέν). The Neoplatonist Plotinus, reflecting on the nature of the "bastard logos" (λόγος νόθος), comes to the conclusion that Plato's third type of being, the incomprehensible "chora" (χ̄ρα), "is comprehended by thought that does not proceed from the mind, but is empty" ([1]).

The mysterious, empty, bastard, illegitimate Logos is not emptiness itself, since it is still a definite property, but *an emptied thought*. This is the conceptual thinking of the individual, which later became the normative form of consciousness in the Modern era.

According to Plotinus, matter is "fantasy," that is, a purely pseudo-logical category. Plotinus writes:

> (…) some find matter empty (identifying it with emptiness). I say that it is a phantom (fantasy) of mass (weight), φάντασμα ὄγκου, since the soul, which has come (extremely) close to matter, cannot distinguish anything (clearly) (distinguish, ὸρίσαι, define, place within limits, within boundaries), begins to tremble (rage, agitate) in uncertainty, and has no power to grasp something with its gaze (give form, outline, recognise eidos, eidetic features, define) or come to (reveal) a sign (meaning), because that would be the same as distinguishing (and that is precisely what it cannot do)([2]).

This phrase develops the idea that heaviness is more a state of the soul than a property of matter, that heaviness is born of the frenzy, the obsession of the soul, which falls and desperately tries to stop its fall — but not through flight, but through dark and ignoble operations that ultimately lead to the constitution of materiality — as a mark of the deepest degeneration of the mind.

Matter itself does not exist, but there is a "logos" that perceives it. This is the "lying logos."

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[1] ἀλλὰ λογισμ¼ οὐκ ϑκ νου, ἀλλὰ κενως. *Plotinus*. Second Ennead // Plotinus. Enneads: In 7 vols. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyshko Publishing House; University Book, 2010. P. 203.

[2] *Ibid*.

According to Plotinus, the atom is the limit of the descent of the Mind, which cuts and divides any object of thought into two halves.

> The Mind seeks duality, for it divides until it reaches the simple, which can no longer be divided. As long as it can, it will continue to descend into its abyss. The abyss of each is matter; therefore, it is completely dark, for light is the Logos[1]

Accordingly, the cessation of division, i.e., the attainment of the atom, is the moment of complete extinction of the Mind. But if the Mind is extinct, then it does not exist. It can exist after its end only as a phantasm, as an extremely weakened parody of itself, incapable of performing what is the main characteristic of the Mind — *to distinguish*. An undifferentiating mind is a paradox, but it is precisely this epistemological instance that operates with the concept of the atom.

Plotinus' remark is extremely important for Politica Aeterna, as it allows us to better understand the metaphysical foundations of Modernism. Modernity is based on pseudo-logic; it is a generalisation of the "lying logos." And the first to formulate the "lying logos" as the main and only one was Democritus, the most modern of the modern thinkers.

The mortality of the gods, the pull of hell, and democracy

Democritus taught that nothing is eternal, and even the gods are only more durable (more stable) than humans, but sooner or later they perish. It is significant that various sources indicate that Democritus wrote a work entitled "On the Kingdom of Hades," which claimed that the dead can feel something. On this basis, he proposed preserving corpses (in honey) so that they could be resurrected under certain circumstances.[2] All this testifies to Democritus' heightened interest in precisely that underground realm which, in traditional ontologies of classical Greece was placed at the lowest level of existence.

[1] *Plotinus.* Second Ennead. P. 189.

[2] This theme anticipates not only Modernism, but also, in part, the Postmodern paradigm, where, in the context of post-humanist theory and technological development, the question of achieving physical immortality becomes one of the main ones. This aspect of Democritus' teaching can be correlated with the philosophy of the "Russian Cosmists." See *Fedorov, N. F.* Collected Works: In 4 vols. Moscow: Progress-Tradition; Evidentis, 1995–2004.

[3] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Hellenic Logos. Valley of Truth. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

Democritus did not construct an original political philosophy and mainly taught about the structure of the world, but as we have repeatedly noted, any philosophy necessarily has a political dimension. Therefore, if we apply Democritus' principle to society, we obtain the seeds *of a theory of democratic society*. The philosophy of atomism, when projected into the sphere of politics, gives us the basic idea of *democracy.* As confirmation of this, we find a brief fragment from Democritus himself:

> Poverty in a democratic state is preferable to what is called a happy life in a monarchy[1].

When we project the concept of an atom onto a political system, we arrive at the concept of a "social atom." In Greek, atom, ατομος ("indivisible," "that which cannot be cut"). In Latin, there is a direct translation of the term — individuum, "indivisible." From this, it is easy to logically deduce that the aggregate of individuals (political atoms) creates and establishes a political state. Thus, in the most general terms, the philosophy of democracy is born, filling the hypothetical — third — place assigned to it in the complete three-part model of the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of the nature of the Political.

The formula "one from many"

Democritus was an atomist philosopher, and his philosophy, which describes a world built from material atoms (he even considered gods to be material), is a doctrine of democracy. This doctrine can be described by the following formula: from many, "one" can arise. This is the sixth hypothesis from Plato's dialogue "Parmenides." It is significant that the Latin version of this expression, "e pluribus unum" (Latin for "out of many, one"), is the motto on the coat of arms of the United States.

This is the philosophy of the third principle, which is essentially absent in the ancient traditional world, in the world of sacred politics. Plato called for the burning of Democritus' books because, from the point of view of the Greeks, who were oriented towards the Father and the Son, the maternal "philosophy from below" that the masses would determine what is true could inspire only

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[1] *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 361.

For those thinkers who stood on the side of the gods in the "gigantomachy of essences," the phenomenon of democracy or the philosophy of Democritus (atomism) was the ultimate form of degradation.

As long as we are dealing with a religious society, we always remain within the paradigm of the political philosophy of the Father or the Son, and any attempt to construct a political system based on a multitude (individuals, political atoms) is impossible in a traditional society. Although democracy was a phenomenon partially known in Ancient Greece, it was hardly possible to elevate it to an independent political doctrine, to political philosophy. Rather, democracy was conceived as a product of the corruption of more perfect forms of political organisation. But the example of Democritus (as well as Epicurus and Lucretius) shows that the possibility of constructing a philosophical teaching based on the third — material, matriarchal — principle was nevertheless partially realised. It did not develop significantly, since in the culture of Greece, Rome, and then in the European Middle Ages (as well as in the Islamic world and other civilisations) until the Modern era, the traditional model of sacred hierarchy prevailed.

The situation began to change only with the advent of the Modern era. And only then, in the Modern era, did this political philosophy, the philosophy of the third level, gradually come to the fore until it became dominant.

Epicurus: ancient liberalism of the "Garden"

Another Greek materialist philosopher, Epicurus, lived after Democritus, from whom he completely borrowed the idea of atoms and emptiness. While accepting Democritus' cosmology and his atomistic metaphysics, he nevertheless placed much greater trust in sensory perception, which he considered to be the main criterion of truth. Considering the data of the senses to be the basis of real existence, Epicurus developed a sensualist ontology, which, however, rested on a more fundamental basis — the conceptual philosophy of Democritus, to which Epicurus turns whenever it is necessary to make a more profound conclusion than sensory experience allows. Thus, Epicurus explains the existence (and at the same time the mortality) of the soul and even of the gods by the bonding of atoms. Epicurus' gods live in the voids between worlds (Greek: μετακοσμία), which are again a scaling of Democritus' interatomic void.

If Epicurus does not introduce anything fundamentally significant into the ontology of the third kind — Matter, "chora," "multiplicity" —[1] , and his sensualism is in a sense a step backward compared to Democritus' conceptual materialism, he justifies several social and ethical theories which — like everything materialistic and individualistic — will be adopted in the Modern era. Thus, Epicurus considers the human desire for pleasure (Greek ꙉδονή — hence "hedonism") to be the basis of ethics. Here we can easily recognise the third principle of the soul in the metaphor of the chariot in Plato's Phaedo. In Plato, the lowest — the third (a direct analogy with the third gender — Mother-Receiver) — force of the soul is called "desire" or "lust," "wanting" (Greek ꙏπιθυμία), and Epicurus reduces the structure of man to this very quality. Man is governed solely by desires, which constitute the highest goal of his existence. In turn, all desires can be classified, but what desire as such gravitates towards is precisely *pleasure*. Such directness in glorifying the lowest — the least noble — property of the soul was rare in Hellenic culture, but in turn anticipated the ethics of the Modern Age — above all the "utilitarianism" of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832).

Even more insightful — in the same vein as Modern's anticipation — was Epicurus' theory of the origin of society. From his point of view, society and the state arise from the bottom up, as the result of *a "social contract*." Unlike Plato and Aristotle, for whom the whole preceded the parts, Epicurus derives the whole from the parts. He considers the subject of the "social contract" to be the maximisation of pleasure and the minimisation of violence, which is the antithesis of pleasure. People unite in society not because it has some special ontology, mission or goal, but only to protect themselves from causing each other unpleasantness. In general, Epicurus considered a more or less secluded life devoted to the pursuit of pleasures, which included sensory experiences of various kinds — from eating and drinking to conversations with friends — to be optimal. This right to pleasure was something natural for Epicurus, from which he derived the theory of "natural law" (φύσεως δίκαιόν) as the original and normative existence of the individual.

[1] The exception is the assumption of deviation (παρꙗγκλισις) of an atom from a straight line of motion, which was later noted by Karl Marx. The theme of deviation became particularly relevant in postmodern philosophy.

Therefore, the wise man Epicurus advised to "live hidden" (λάθε βιῶσας), at a sufficient distance from society, without getting too involved in its element. He called the school where he lived and taught others his philosophy "The Garden."

Epicurus' attitude towards death is revealing. He considered fear of death unnecessary, as he did not believe that the soul could survive the body and, therefore, that there was no continuity or common measure between life and death (just as between an atom and emptiness). When a person lives, he only comes to life, that is, he exists. And this existence of sensory being is, in a sense, total. It is not limited by anything, since the onset of death does not affect the same being that enjoys life. Death is not experienced, not realised, and does not pose a threat to life, since it does not exist during life, and after death it also does not exist, since there is no subject that could testify to its demise and compare posthumous existence with life. In this, Epicurus disagrees with Democritus, who taught that a corpse has residual sensuality and that the soul disintegrates more slowly than the body. Democritus based his ontology of Hades on this. For Epicurus, who based everything on sensory experience, such a difference between the speed of disintegration into atoms of the body and the soul is meaningless, since it cannot be reliably determined from experience. Once again, this view of death and the absence of the soul corresponds precisely to the most existential culture of the Modern era.

In fact, Epicurus' ideology represents almost complete *liberalism*, anticipating European philosophical thought by a millennium and a half.

Epicurus' teachings were first adopted during the Renaissance, when Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) took a keen interest in his atomism and sensualism.

Ockham's nominalism

The first approximation to the atomism of the Modern Age, in which some features of Democritus' teachings can already be recognised, can be considered the position of the nominalists in the medieval dispute about *universals*. This dispute was in fact a new edition of the "gigantomachy regarding essence," resumed more than a millennium after the era of Plato. The most consistent Platonism, that is, the philosophy of the Father, was the position of "idealism."

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[1] *Gassendi, P.* Works: In 2 vols. Moscow: Myśl, 1966–1968.

The most prominent representative of this school was the Irish mystic John Scotus Eriugena (c. 810–877). Idealists completely shared the position of Plato and the Platonists that ideas precede things and exist independently of things and before them. The idealists interpreted universals, i.e. generalising concepts, precisely as Platonic ideas and insisted on their autonomy and complete ontological superiority. This position was defined as (universalia ante rem). However, this position was rejected by Catholic dogma, although this did not prevent Platonism from surviving in the Catholic Church, albeit mainly in Catholic mysticism.

The idealists-Platonists were opposed by realists who, relying on Aristotle, insisted that "eidos" (but not the idea!) exists and has being only when it exists *through* a thing, within a thing, through a thing (universalia in re). This interpretation was called "realism" (from the Latin res, "thing," since only existing things were endowed with unconditional being). Here, universals were equated precisely with eidos or form, that is, the philosophy of the Son and Aristotelian immanentism (but without materialism) prevailed. This position was held by the majority of scholastics, and it was accepted by Catholicism as an unconditional dogma.

But already in the 11th century, representatives of a third position appeared, who in fact laid the foundation for future materialism and individualism. They argued that a general concept is only a linguistic convention and is not endowed with any existence, representing an "empty sound" (flatus voci). Their position was defined by the formula universalia post rem. The term "nominalism" comes from the Latin nomen, "name," "designation," "designation." This meant that nominalists believed that only concrete things exist, and that their reduction to a generalised form, to a universal, is nothing more than a name attributed from outside for the convenience of classification. The first representative of nominalism was the French scholastic, the founder of nominalism, John Roscelin of Compiègne (c. 1050 - c. 1122). Roscelin's ideas and nominalism in general were condemned because they contradicted realism, which was accepted as a philosophical dogma.

In fact, nominalists propose a model of the universe that corresponds to the third type of Plato's Timaeus — that is, Matter, "chore." Here, a thing is conceived as a primary given, the fundamental

[1] *Erigène Jean Scot.* De la division de la nature. Periphyseon. P.: Presses Universitaires de France; Épiméthée, 1995–2009.

which are materiality and individuality. Only the unique, separate and concrete exist in the full sense of the word, according to nominalists. An attempt to give the same name to different — albeit similar — individual things does not change the existence of each of them or all of them together. They continue to exist both together and separately precisely as individual objects, and the commonality of names is attributed to them by human consciousness, which simplifies its perception of the world through artificial operations that do not affect the individuality — in essence, the atomicity — of each concrete thing. This means that for nominalists there is neither idea nor eidos, that is, neither a model (paradigm) nor a bipolar and indivisible structure in which essence and matter necessarily exist and are both endowed with full and independent existence. By opposing realists, nominalists undermined the very foundation of the worldview on which the medieval model of the world was built, where Aristotle's ontology dominated.

In the spirit of nominalism, a model was constructed by one of the most prominent representatives of late scholasticism, Duns Scotus[1] (1265–1308), who insisted that the most general element of existing things is matter, which constitutes being (an extremely anti-Platonic and anti-Aristotelian idea). At the same time, matter itself in its universality can only be known by God, and everything else that exists is an individual unit. For Duns Scotus, a thing is not a combination of form and matter, as in Aristotle and the realists, but an individuality that is the highest and ultimate reality, ultima realitas entis. Duns Scotus' followers introduced a special term to denote this highest individual reality — haecceitas, "thisness." According to Duns Scotus, the sign of being does not coincide with what a thing is (quidditas, "whatness"), but with the fact of the existence of the named "this" thing. From this follows the recognition of being behind matter (but this truth is open only to God) and behind individuals, and this represents the ultimate truth and the limit of human knowledge. Thus, we see here both materialism (equating being with matter, not with eidos or idea) and individualism, i.e., the refusal to recognise independent existence behind universals.

The nominalist philosophical paradigm was finally formulated by another English thinker, the Franciscan William

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[1] *Blessed John Duns Scotus.* Selected Works: Franciscan Publishing House, Moscow, 2001.

Occam [1](1285–1349). Occam accepts most of Duns Scotus' ideas, but goes even further. According to Occam, God does not create matter (as in Duns Scotus) by his will, which then becomes individual objects through a volitional impulse, but individual things, individuals, directly. According to Occam, individuals exist entirely *outside* the mind, both divine and human. But in God they have their origin as God's will, and in humans, who are in turn pure individuals, the will is limited by certain boundaries. Therefore, in any case, cognition is only cognition by individuals and of individuals. *God knows things through the process of their individual creation.* Man knows things through individual experience of contact with individual things.

The experience of individual things, which alone possess existence, corresponds in consciousness to two types of intentions that form two classes of natural signs. The first intention is *a natural sign* of the mind, a concept (conceptum) corresponding to an individual thing, a kind of "natural sign." The second intention is even more conventional and, in turn, serves to designate "natural signs." These two intentions characterise the logical activity of the knowing mind. Finally, there are also *conventional signs (*flatus voci), which, by agreement, serve to exchange information about natural signs between people. Languages belong to this category. At the same time, according to Ockham, there are no "universals" at all, and everything that serves to designate individual things is nothing more than signs of one kind or another. Thus, Ockham's nominalism prepares the philosophical platform for the science and logic of the modern era. Only individual material physical things are endowed with existence, while their conceptual analogues (first intention and second intention) are placed in the realm of human consciousness and regarded as conventions. Occam's political ideas are highly symptomatic ([2).

He was one of the first European authors to advocate the separation of church and state, formulating his ideal in terms of "enlightened absolutism." Based on his conception of the individual ontology of man and things, he provided a metaphysical justification for absolute private property as a direct legal relationship between two individual entities —

[1] A compendium of Ockham's teachings: a translation of the Tractatus de principiis theologiae. St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, 1998.

[2] *Guilelmi de Ockham.* Opera Politica. 4 vols. Manchester; Oxford: Manchester University Press; Oxford University Press, 1940–1997.

man and thing, which later became the basis of the economic philosophy of liberalism.

Overall, Occam is rightly considered a precursor of *the* later *bourgeois liberal-democratic ideology* based on philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics, which is extremely close to Occam's views. Both the main currents of empirical science and representatives of contemporary analytical philosophy usually trace their origins back to him.

Nominalism prepared the ideological ground for Protestant philosophy and for some trends of the Renaissance. In it, we see two fundamental aspects of the political Logos of the New Age: materialism and individualism, which would later develop fully in a different context — completely outside the paradigm of Tradition. In principle, nominalism contains all the basic prerequisites for a political philosophy that is built strictly from the bottom up, contrary to the vertical models that dominated the Church and the state in the Catholic Middle Ages.

The Modern Era. The Modern Paradigm

Here we come to what is the paradigm of the Modern Age.

The Modern Age is an era that began in the 16th century in Western Europe and lasted until the end of the 20th century, representing a completely unique historical period. During the same period, traditional societies based on the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son still existed in non-Western Europe. Therefore, the Modern Era is a phenomenon that can be localised not only historically but also geographically.

It can be said that the Modern Era is a specific type of philosophy, politics, culture, science, and thinking characteristic of Western European countries from the 16th to the 20th centuries. Initially, under its influence

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[1] It should be noted that in Orthodox culture there has never been anything even remotely resembling nominalism, and the basic topology of thought remains within the context of the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son, never coming even close to equating being with matter or individuality. In Orthodoxy, Aristotle's philosophy has retained its significance to this day, the most important points of which in the context of Orthodox theology are set out by John of Damascus (c. 675 – c. 753). See The Works of St. John of Damascus, Source of Knowledge. Moscow: Indrik, 2002.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

These were partly Italy [1], where certain scientific materialistic teachings developed, as well as England [2]and France [3], which became the two main centres for the spread of Modernism both in Europe and beyond. Modernism then began to expand in "circles," spiraling—mainly through colonial conquests—across the entire world. In fact, the age of Columbus coincides with the beginning of the modern era. In some societies, the modern worldview penetrated as deeply as in Europe itself, where it reached the mineral roots of human culture, making modernity a natural, self-evident mental environment.

While in Europe this movement was directed inward (it could be called "*intensive* Modernism"), in colonial societies or societies that were partially Westernised and Europeanised from outside, these systems of thought were superficially superimposed on deeper archaic and traditional models, and in this case, the extensive spread of the Modern paradigm affected mainly only the superficial aspects of society. This superimposition of two paradigms — the Modern paradigm on the not yet completely obsolete paradigm of Tradition — gave rise to a special sociological phenomenon — *the archaeo-modern (*[4]) In any case, since the 16th century, this paradigm of the New Age has gradually expanded, and today it is dominant in one form or another on a global scale.

What is the meaning of the New Age from a philosophical point of view? Starting with Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and Pierre Gassendi, the first theorists who laid the foundations [for]the scientific picture of the Modern Age this philosophy directly refers to Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. This marks a departure from the vertical worldview of Plato and Aristotle and establishes a new view of the world — from the bottom up, from the perspective of matter, corporeality, and direct earthly existence. This is accompanied by radical attacks on Aristotle, who was considered in the Middle Ages to be the standard and infallible thinker in all matters of science and cosmology. The legacy of the atomists, which existed on the periphery of culture, is extracted

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[1] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Latin Logos. Sun and Cross.

[2] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

[3] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. French Logos. Orpheus and Melusina. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

[4] *Dugin, A. G.* Archeomodern. Moscow: Eurasian Movement, 2011.

[5] *Dugin, A. G.* Evolution of the Paradigmatic Foundations of Science. Moscow: Arktogeya-Centre,
2002

from nothingness and gradually becomes a new scientific and philosophical dogma.

The direct predecessors of the atomists were the medieval nominalists, who had the greatest influence in England. Later, it was England that became the cultural environment where, earlier than other European countries and in a sense more fully and vividly, the main provisions of this new paradigm were developed.

From the perspective of Plato's three levels of existence in the Modern Age, we are dealing with the philosophy of Mother, Metria, and χ̄ρα. The entire scientific picture of the world in the Modern Age — in Galileo, Copernicus, and especially in Descartes and Newton (1642–1727) — is based on the idea of Democritus' atomism. Thus, the philosophy of the New Age is new because it rejects both the principle of the Father and the principle of the Son, and at the same time, the Christian Middle Ages is overthrown. But at the same time, it rediscovers the basic tenets of a philosophical movement that was considered marginal and extravagant in classical Greece.

The new era saw itself as a paradigm alternative to the Middle Ages and set itself the task of overthrowing the verticality that constituted the essence of previous worldviews, which had prevailed in Europe in both the Christian and pre-Christian eras. From then on, scientists who considered only knowledge obtained through rational judgement or physical experience to be valid still acknowledged God, but only as a philosophical convention, an abstract cause necessary to explain the existence of material being. This trend was called "deism," that is, belief in God apart from religion, worship, full-fledged theology, and a complete dogmatic worldview. Such a belief was conceived not as a revelation received from Heaven, but as a rational conclusion reached by a group of separate, atomic individuals on the basis of consistent reasoning.

Protestantism is based on the "religious atom."

The Protestant Reformation was the most important moment in the transition from the paradigm of Tradition to the paradigm of Modernity in Europe.

We have briefly described the model on which the Orthodox and Catholic interpretations of politics are based, mentioning Protestantism as well. Here we should dwell on this in a little more detail, since it is precisely Protestantism that is associated with the phase transition of European civilisation to the Modern Age.

In the 16th century, a new religious movement called *Protestantism* emerged in Europe. It rejected Orthodoxy and Catholicism, asserting a new religious model based on
the "religious atom," not on God, but on man, capable of independently forming his own judgement about God.

The Protestant Reformation, while remaining formally within the Christian context, marked a transition from the political theology of the Father and the Son to *a political theology of the Earth*, at the centre of which was no longer God, but man, [the] individual personality. Protestants unite in congregations, communities where they discuss God based on their own conscience and make decisions about Him. In doing so, they consider themselves entitled to abolish certain aspects of tradition or add something new. Religious dogma loses its meaning. The doctrine of the Church, based on the supernatural presence of Christ and the Holy Spirit, is replaced by a social constructivist interpretation. Thus, at the level of religion, the vertical hierarchy is completely lost, and consequently the entire picture of the sacred world collapses. Protestants rethink Christianity from an individual perspective. This was the main reform of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and his followers, which dealt a powerful blow to the medieval worldview and theocracy.

A new theology, a new philosophy of nature, and, most importantly for us, *a new philosophy of politics* are emerging in the Protestant environment. Almost all the classics of modern political philosophy came, in one way or another, from Protestant circles, since we are dealing with a general phenomenon — *a paradigm shift,* a transition from Aristotelianism and Platonism to a completely new picture of the world. This time, it is horizontal and even chthonic, and at its centre stands not God, as before, but man. Ideas about the world, God, and the relationship between the Creator and creation are constructed not from the top down, but from the bottom up. The political system is now also organised from the bottom up; it is now conceived as a product
"collective agreement" or "social contract." In principle, Democritus understood the essence of politics in a similar way, arguing that laws and states were invented by people and therefore there is nothing sacred about them; they can be restructured or abolished at any time.

Although Protestantism is still a religion, it fundamentally paves the way for the emergence of pure atheism. Here one can

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Germanic Logos. The Apophatic Man.

recall the words of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900): "God is dead. We killed him — you and I!"[1] With regard to political philosophy, this tragic statement means that the essence of the New Age is the dismantling of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of God and the transfer of everything to earth, to materiality, to the economy, to the individual, to material and technical progress, to capitalism. Thus, the political philosophy of the New Age is nothing more than a political cross-section of a new philosophical paradigm.

The revolt of the third estate

In Plato, the philosopher rises from the cave and descends back into it; he separates himself from ordinary people, who see only shadows; then he comprehends the truth and returns with new knowledge. In Aristotle, we saw the "unmoved mover," which is the immanent God around whom all beings revolve, striving to come closer to him. In Platonism, the subject is a transcendent God, and all of Platonism's politics is built around God as an actor. In Aristotelianism, God is no longer thought of as transcendent, but as inherent in the world; this is the idea of an "unmoved mover" who stands at the centre of things, not above them.

At the third level, in the philosophy of the Modern Age, *a new subject* emerges (the bourgeoisie, the third estate), which democratically organises its political system, acts as a socio-political atom and emphasises material things. This transformation is an act of rebellion by the third estate of European society against the two higher castes (priests and warriors). Such an act of rebellion constitutes the profound meaning of modern philosophy.

The political philosophy of the Modern Age presents society and politics as *the creation of human hands*. The state appears as a property of human individuals, and the idea of a social contract (a state based on a social contract) emerges.

Note the metaphysical and philosophical roots of this completely new idea. *The state becomes a product of a social contract only if the subject of politics is the human being, and the object of politics is the human being.*

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[1] *Nietzsche, F.* The Gay Science (la gaya scienza) / Nietzsche, F. Complete Works: In 13 Volumes. Vol. 3: Dawn. Messinian Idyls. The Gay Science. Moscow: Cultural Revolution, 2014. P. 440.

The individual (i.e., the atom) *is the basis of politics*. Self-sufficient atoms unite into a group and launch the state, creating it.

Plato's conception of the state is completely different: the state is not created by anyone, its structure is not created by people, the state as Kallipolis always exists, and in the world of phenomena it is an expression of being, of sacred being, built on the principle of a sacred hierarchy.

Aristotle said that "man is a political animal." What does "political animal" mean? It means that everything non-political in man is animal, and if we remove politics from man, we are left with a beast. Elsewhere, Aristotle says that man is "an animal with the power of thought." Here, man is defined through the state and through thought, rather than thought and the state being defined through man. In the classical version of a vertical society, only a being ("animal") that has awakened to philosophy and politics is truly human. If a person is not involved in politics, according to Aristotle and Plato, if he does not think or philosophise, then he does not exist. Thus, man is a derivative of Logos, of the idea.

The philosophy of the New Age completely overturns this definition. For it, man himself produces both thought and the state. The idea of eternal, shining heavenly truth is transformed into the result of the reasoning of an individual, whose norm becomes the bourgeois, the philistine. Accordingly, the state loses its sacred dimension, turning into a kind of artel, trust or commercial enterprise. The third estate brings with it its own philosophy — the philosophy of the body, feelings, matter, comfort, carnal pleasures, well-being and security. Politics is now built according to the philosophy not of priests, thinkers and heroes, but [1] of merchants.

Man as a producing and trading being

The political philosophy of the Modern Age considers thought and political philosophy to be an artificial construct of the individual. For Platonists and Aristotelians, for people of traditional society, politics is given just as the world is given. For representatives of modern philosophy (as for Democritus), politics is a man-made phenomenon. Politics is as random as the collision of atoms. The state arose artificially,

[1] *Sombart, W.* Merchants and Heroes. Jews and the Economy/Sombart, W. Collected Works: In 3 vols. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2005.

based on contracts and agreements between people, and therefore politics may not exist.

What, then, is man in this philosophy of the New Age? Man here is a producing (homo faber) and trading (homo mercatus) being.

In the classical model, politics is an integral part of the very nature of the philosopher and warrior, but for representatives of the third estate, politics is fundamentally optional. Hence the idea that the philosophy of politics in the modern era regards the political dimension as artificial and contractual, i.e., not inherent in the nature of the world or even in human nature. Politics is understood here as an artificial construct built by humans, but it does not reflect human essence. Politics becomes optional.

What, then, reflects human nature? Food, trade, comfort, security, pleasure, material activity, bodily reproduction. This is the fate of merchants and craftsmen. Politics and the state, unlike economic activity, are completely optional parts of existence in modern philosophy. This gives rise to the idea of civil society as a society of autonomous individuals who, in essence, do not need politics and are content with non-political forms of life.

Thus, economics or political economy gradually comes to the fore. For economic people (homo economicus), who are gradually replacing political people (homo politicus), economics truly becomes destiny.

Godlessness and democracy

Gradually, in modern times, political (i.e., vertically organised, hierarchical) society was replaced by civil society. "Citizens" refers to ordinary city dwellers, townspeople, which means that they do not belong to the higher classes. The term "bourgeois" (French bourgeois), derived from the German Burg, meaning "city," has the same meaning. Civil society is the same as bourgeois society, i.e., a model where the representative of the third estate is the norm.

Civil society is, at its core, a radical, revolutionary, democratic and, in the extreme, "godless" concept. It reflects the act of "killing God" in the sphere of political philosophy. It is a rejection of the recognition of the sacred dimension of politics,

of hierarchy, of the state as an ontological reality. It is the reduction of the political to the economic, commercial, and mercantile.

According to Plato, this is the ultimate degradation of Kallipolis to the level of oligarchy and democracy (ultimately to tyranny). According to Aristotle,
"democracy" is the worst form of government of the many.

However, from the perspective of the modern paradigm, civil society is conceived as the "natural state of man." This gives rise to the idea *that the state is not necessary*. According to classical modern theories, the state can — and sooner or later *must* — be abolished. This is described with some differences in various political ideologies of the modern era. For example, liberals believe that a global market should replace the state. Communists believe that when the communist state has fulfilled its historical function, it will be abolished, and everyone will live in a "single human community"[1] Why do liberalism and communism, as two typical philosophies of modernity, reject the state? Because, from the point of view of the primordial concept of civil society as consisting of atoms, the state is conceived as an artificial construct created by people. Consequently, politics, although possible, does not constitute an essential dimension of human existence. As modernisation and "progress" advance, the state and politics must be completely replaced by the economy (hence the thesis: "the economy as destiny"). If people created the state themselves and it has nothing sacred in itself, then they can also abolish it. Sooner or later, under certain circumstances, they will do so.

Accordingly, politics is something temporary, conditional, intermediate, artificial and completely man-made, non-ontological, non-sacred, non-religious, unnatural and inorganic. Thus, in the transition to the modern paradigm, politics fundamentally changes its status, its very existence. Now it is no longer a universal trait inherent in every human being, but something optional. From now on, it is not man for politics (as a "political animal"), but politics for man.

Moving on to the political philosophy of the Modern Age, we are dealing with a radically new philosophical picture of the world, with different

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[1] Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893–1930) wrote in his poem "To Comrade Nette, the Steamboat, and Man": We live bound by an iron oath. For it, we will be crucified and shot: this is so that in a world without Russia and Latvia, we may live as one human community.

philosophical foundations of thought, science, culture, and social organisation.

This is how the unity between the divine paradigm (the Idea), man, and the world is lost. Now everything is divided into the subjective and the objective (as in Descartes): in such a situation, the state is conceived as something subjective, constructed by people, while nature, and especially matter, is conceived as something objective that must be known and subjugated.

Secularisation: a secular society that kills God

In traditional society, it was impossible to conceive of political philosophy based on material premises. Such a society had to deny God and the sacred in politics, overthrow the hierarchical vertical, and this was at odds with the entire structure of the Traditional (Pre-Modern) worldview.

The term that denies the dominance of religion and the sacred in politics is "*secular*[isation]." A secular society is one that has undergone desacralisation. The very concept of secularity is a fundamental concept of modern philosophy, implying that society is not created by God, on the basis of Revelation or Covenant, or by some higher powers, but exclusively by people — separate, corporeal, atomic individuals.

Secular society is a society that kills God, a society that is godless and anti-Christian. A person who calls himself a supporter of the secular model is a supporter of the Antichrist. This is the meaning of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. Hieromonk Seraphim (Rose) (1934–1982) said that the true enemy of Christ is not the one who is a great denier, but the one who is a small affirmer, who has Christ only on his lips and not in his heart[2] He was referring precisely to Nietzsche. Nietzsche, who wrote about the death of God, does not kill God; he merely states that the modern secular paradigm and philosophy of Modernism, secularism, is the Antichrist. Nietzsche does not call for the Antichrist; he sees the Antichrist in the modern Western secular modernist scientific picture of the world. Nietzsche says that it was not he personally who killed God, but Western European civilisation, which condemned

[1] We have seen that one of the first advocates of secularisation was the great nominalist William of Ockham.

[2] *Seraphim (Rose).* Nihilism: The Source of the Revolution of the Modern Age. Forestville, California: Fr. Seraphim Rose Foundation, 1994.

carried out the rebellion of the Earth against God the Father and God the Son. Nietzsche exposes the negation, the nihilism that lies at the heart of the third version of political philosophy. Nietzsche is a great negator, but, from Seraphim Rose's point of view, those who expose the monstrous essence of the modern world are not as dangerous as those *who do not notice it and* remain indifferent to everything that is happening. The truth about evil is not evil in itself.

Svinopolis of the New Age

All paradigms of modern political philosophy are built within the framework of the fundamental model of political philosophy of the Mother (Titanism, materialism[1]). As Modernity strengthened, the initiative in the battle between gods and giants shifted to the giants.

The modern era radically changed human thinking. In both Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Europe lived by inertia within the framework of the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son (this was the traditional sacred society). The new era decisively rejects these models: there is no Father and no Son, there is only the atomic individual left to himself, bound to his biological existence. Everything else is his constructs, his projections, his creation. This is homo faber, the "man who creates," who has replaced Deus Faber, God the Creator.

If Aristotle had seen the political history of Europe from the 16th to the 20th century, he would probably have said: "Look, these are not people! Their politics are secondary, their thinking is vague. Divine thought and contemplative life are no longer their highest values. It is not wisdom but animal instinct that prevails in their souls." Socrates spoke of something similar in "The Republic," painting a picture of a "city of pigs," a "pigopolis," where people are interested only in food, individual comfort, travelling on holiday, etc. The following picture emerges in the dialogue:

> — If, Socrates, Glaucon replied, the state you are proposing consisted of pigs, what else would you feed them but this?
>
> — But what else is required, Glaucon?
>
> — What is customary: to lie on couches, dine at tables, eat the food and delicacies that people currently enjoy — that, in my opinion, is what is needed in order not to suffer deprivation.

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Three Logos

[2] *Plato.* The Republic. P. 134.

"Lying on couches, dining at tables, eating delicacies and luxuries," "not suffering deprivation" — this is the ethical ideal of pig-like humanity.

The philosophy of the New Age in all its dimensions falls under Socrates' idea of the "city of pigs" or Nietzsche's idea of the "last men" ("Happiness has been found by us," say the last men, and they wink [1]).

Since the 16th century, Western European society and all societies under its influence have been living according to this paradigm for several centuries, so it seems self-evident to us. In essence, our entire education system, our entire society, our entire culture, and our entire politics are built on the foundation that the figure of the citizen and human rights are the main principles, that the individual is the measure of all things, that democracy is the natural, acceptable, and legitimate form of political organisation, that the state is a construct created by individuals and is unquestionably secular, and that the welfare and prosperity of citizens, freedom of trade and freedom of movement are the basic principles of the political system. For us, modern political philosophy is a fundamental code that we are fundamentally incapable of questioning. But this means that other types of political philosophy remain completely inaccessible to us, and we have a very distorted view of them.

Taking "pig-polis" for granted, we can hardly imagine what politics was like in other eras, what it is like for other cultures that have preserved their connection with religion and tradition, and what it could theoretically become again if we choose a different paradigm — that of the Father or the Son.

Regicide — a fundamental gesture of Modernity

In order to gain an understanding of what political philosophy is in its fullest form, of what Politica Aeterna is, one must realise how fundamental the shift was in the transition from the paradigm of Tradition to the paradigm of Modernity. The contemporary worldview — both in relation to nature and society — is entirely based on the Democritean materialist principle. In modern political philosophy, there can be no Platonic philosopher, no king, no aristocrat, no hero. Moreover, within this model, *those who look up*

[1] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra/Nietzsche, F. Collected Works: In 2 vols. Moscow: Myśl, 1996. Vol. 2. P. 12.

Those who seek to go beyond the cave and its spectacle must be sacrificed — torn apart, killed by the rebellious, aggressive masses who *gaze at the shadows* and voraciously destroy anyone who tries to show them something different.

Regicide can be called the fundamental principle of modern political philosophy. The guardians of Plato's state, priests, aristocracy, are also subject to demonisation — the bourgeois uprising presupposes the elimination of the two highest classes — priests and warriors. The new era is the absolutisation of the bourgeois caste, the third estate. The act of regicide was the culmination of the three most symbolically significant revolutions in modern European history —

1) the English Revolution, when Charles I (1600–1649) was executed, which was the culmination of radical Protestantism;
2) the Great French Revolution, during which the Jacobins beheaded Louis XVI (1754–1793), establishing a bourgeois republic;
3) the October Revolution, when the Bolsheviks shot the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II (1868–1918), who held the status of "katechon," and began building the first socialist state in history, based on radical materialism and atheism.

These executions symbolised the destruction of the vertical structure, because at each stage of the revolution, the revolutionaries dealt a crushing blow to the very vertical organisation of society, to the sacred axis and hierarchy, to the foundations of the political philosophy of Tradition. At the same time, the structure of society became — at least nominally — increasingly horizontal, egalitarian, reduced to its lowest common denominator.

The present moment of Modernity

Today, we find ourselves at the end of a full cycle of affirmation of modern political philosophy — at the very bottom of this conceptual field, where individualisation and the movement towards materiality are reaching the stage of transition into the sphere of virtual dispersion and the final elimination of the political principle. In the early 1990s, American political analyst Francis Fukuyama wrote an important text on the "end of history" ([1])He meant *the end of political history,* the complete removal of the Political and the transition exclusively to the

[1] *Fukuyama, F.* The End of History and the Last Man. Moscow: AST Publishing House, 2004.

In his view of the world, global politics was now to be replaced by global economics. And since history is always and above all *political history*, the transition from politics to pure economics would also mean the end of history itself.

Although Fukuyama's prediction proved somewhat hasty, his analysis is generally correct. Political modernity initially consisted of replacing hierarchical (sacred) politics with democratic and secular politics, and as democratisation progressed, politics itself was to be gradually abolished. In effect, Fukuyama declared that "pigopolis" had been built on a planetary scale, and in a sense, given the successes of civil society, liberalism, and the market economy by the end of the 20th century, he was not far from the truth. In any case, there is no doubt that we are currently at the very end of the Modern era. This Modern era began in the 16th century and came to an end at the beginning of the 20th century. We are therefore in a unique situation where we can look back on the entire cycle of the Modern political paradigm. We know how and when it began, we can trace its development and we can roughly imagine how it will end, since the end is obviously near and absolutely inevitable.

Compared to the difference between the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son, between two male political philosophies and ontologies, the transition to the maternal model of the third principle was radically new. The new era was truly *new*. The shifts here were much more fundamental than in the transition from Platonism to Aristotelianism, especially since in the context of traditional society (the pre-modern paradigm), the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son coexisted quite harmoniously and often formed a single structure.

Here, however, with the transition to the political philosophy of the Mother, , a global revolution actually took place, a radical change in all proportions. In all the main philosophical axes, the vectors changed by 180 degrees: in the structure of the world, in the structure of God, in human existence, in the existence of the Political, in ideas about time and space, etc. This was a genuine revolution of the New Age, which can only be understood when fully correlated with other political philosophies characteristic of traditional society.

If we do not understand how revolutionary, avant-garde, and innovative the philosophical assertions of the New Age were,

we will not be able to understand the world we live in and the processes that take place in it. For if we consider *only* the philosophy of the modern era as fundamental, unique and optimal, we will not be able to comprehend what happened in ancient European history, what is happening now in non-Western European societies, or what is increasingly looming over contemporary culture in the form of the Postmodern paradigm, which has already significantly replaced Modernity in many areas.

For a complete understanding of political philosophy, despite the fact that we live in a world of modern political philosophy, we must bear in mind the complete reference structure — the political philosophy of Platonism and the political philosophy of Aristotelianism, even if they do not exist in their pure form in our society. This structure is necessary in order to more accurately understand the very nature of Modernity (which is now in its own transition phase to Postmodernity), to correctly interpret traditional societies remaining in the non-Western world, and to interpret complex variants of the archaeo-modern, i.e., political systems in which modernisation has not penetrated deeply, giving rise to bizarre hybrid forms. This phenomenon is characteristic of some post-colonial countries (Asia, Africa, Latin America), as well as Russia and China, which were forced to carry out defensive modernisation under external pressure from Western civilisation.

Chapter 2. Protestantism and its secularisation: a phase transition in the structure of political theology

Third Christianity

The politics of the New Age are closely linked to the Protestant religion. Protestantism emerged in the 16th century during the reforms of Martin Luther and other reformers such as Jean Calvin (1509–1564) and Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560). The leaders of Protestantism proposed a completely new model of Christianity. This model broke sharply with the paradigm of the Christian worldview that had prevailed in Orthodoxy and Catholicism during the Middle Ages. The Protestant interpretation of Christianity differed both from the Aristotelianism of the scholastics (with elements of Platonism, which was particularly evident in the doctrine of the "two cities") and from the ontology of the Empire that prevailed in the Orthodox world (Byzantinism)([1]) Protestants based their beliefs on a completely new approach to the interpretation of God, the world, the Church, and man. At the heart of their theories was the Christian as an individual who determines his relationship with God based on his own reason.

Thus, a new form of Christianity emerges—the third—beyond the boundaries of Platonic and Aristotelian Christianity: a democratic, "Democritean," atomistic Christianity. This is still a religion, that is, a doctrine that recognises the existence of God and a number of Christian dogmas, including the authority of the Old and New Testaments, Revelation, the Trinity, and the divinity and humanity of Christ. But something is already emerging that fundamentally breaks with the pre-modern era, with the era of traditional society in Europe itself.

Protestantism, as a religion, theology and ethics, prepares the paradigm of modern philosophy in politics, culture,

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Byzantine Logos. Hellenism and Empire.

[2] The immediate predecessors of this "third" Christianity were the nominalists (materialists and individualists), who remained formally within Catholicism but were secretly preparing a completely different worldview.

in economics and other key areas of public life. It was precisely the Protestant worldview, Protestant religion, and Protestant ideology that laid the foundations for the paradigm of the New Age. This is precisely a transitional moment, because religion *still* exists, but the Church (as in Catholicism) no *longer* exists, nor does the Empire (as in Orthodoxy or under the Habsburgs).

The abolition of Holy Tradition

Luther proclaimed that it was necessary to return to the times of early Christianity and "purify" religion of historical accretions. Catholicism (as well as Orthodox Christianity) accepted as sources of indisputable truth and supreme authority the Holy Scriptures (the Bible) and Holy Tradition, i.e., tradition, including interpretations, institutions, customs, foundations, institutions, etc. Luther, Calvin, and other leaders of Protestantism completely rejected Sacred Tradition, i.e., tradition. At the same time, they recognised the authority of Holy Scripture, which, however, they interpreted arbitrarily, relying on rational analysis and personal spiritual experience.

The Catholic Church is built from the top down. There is Christ, there is His incarnation. There is a direct transmission of grace from the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Holy Trinity, descending upon the apostles through an unbroken chain of priesthood. The Holy Spirit *descended from above* upon the apostles at Pentecost. The apostles, thanks to the power of the Holy Spirit, form the Church. The first of the apostles, Simon Peter, becomes the foundation (Greek: Πέτρος — rock) of the Church, the first bishop of Rome, from whom the line of Roman Popes descends. Everything is formed from above, from Christ to his apostles, who, like God, consecrate people, and the Holy Spirit descends upon them at Pentecost. Strictly speaking, the Church is formed according to a vertical principle, by descent. At the same time, it is eternal and participates in history.

This dimension of eternity and this vertical symmetry are also fully inherent in Orthodoxy.

In Protestantism, however, everything changes. Here there is an authoritative book, the text — the Bible. People read it. They comprehend, interpret and comment on the texts, relying on their own reasoning. Some may interpret a passage from the Holy Scriptures in one way, others in another way, and still others in a third way. Here, everyone has the right and freedom to interpret, there is no binding tradition, no higher unquestionable authority. Anyone can, relying entirely on their own reason and their own reflections, interpret any passage of the Holy Scriptures. And when these interpretations satisfy others, they unite in a community, a congregation, a sect.

reflections, interpret any passage of the Holy Scriptures. And when these comments satisfy others, they unite into a community, a congregation, a kind of sect. At the same time, the term "sect" in Protestantism has a neutral-positive character. Formally registered Protestant sects are called "churches" or denominations.

This is not the case in Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity. Interpretation forms the basis of the Holy Tradition of the Church. The interpretation of the Gospel and the Old Testament is transmitted in the Church as an authoritative opinion, confirmed by the Councils and the decisions of the Pope. Orthodox Christians recognise the supreme authority of the Seven Ecumenical Councils and the vast body of patristic literature. Catholics recognise later Councils, but consider the opinion of the Pope to be the ultimate authority in matters of religion. The Pope has the final say in determining what constitutes heresy and how a particular passage of Scripture should be interpreted. In Orthodoxy, this function is performed not by the Patriarch, but by the entire Orthodox tradition as a whole (the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils and the patristic traditions). The two branches of Christianity — Catholicism and Orthodoxy — recognise both Scripture and Tradition. Tradition is passed down in the Church. In this case, personal interpretation of religion and the fundamental issues associated with it must be consistent with this Tradition. Catholics add to this the binding nature of decisions officially announced by the Pope (in the form of a bull).

Protestants object: no, we will interpret religion ourselves. We will interpret it as we see fit. Accordingly, a completely new conception of authority, of the source of authority, arises. The Church or its equivalent is created here *not from the top down, but from the bottom up.* Based on their own interpretations, people make judgements about God, the world, and themselves.

In other words, a completely different concept of authority emerges. The Church still exists, as does the Christian community and the Holy Scriptures, which are endowed with supreme authority. But all interpretation, all constitution of the Church, the community, and society as a whole is built "from the bottom up."

The rejection of Sacred Tradition became the core of the Protestant Reformation, which demanded that only the text of the Bible be followed, calling into question all other aspects of the living Christian tradition, from interpretation to rituals.

of the Bible, questioning all other aspects of living Christian tradition — from interpretation to rituals. Thus, some versions of Protestantism rejected the Eucharist (Communion), liturgy, and icon worship, reducing worship to the communal singing of individual psalms and rather arbitrary sermons. Some

Some sects, such as Calvinism, abolished the institution of the priesthood. Most Protestant sects reject icons. Some Protestant movements, such as the Hussites[1] in Bohemia, reject the cross as a symbol of Christ's suffering. In other words, even the cross ceases to be a symbol of Christianity. In churches, chalices are depicted as a symbol of this movement.

Many have questioned the fundamental foundations of the Christian faith, to the point that the most extreme Protestants — "Unitarianists" or "Socinians"[2] — have rejected the dogma of the Trinity.

Against celibacy

Protestant ideology, based on the individual, his reason and his personal will, destroys the very foundation of the idea of the divine origin of the Church, as understood by both Catholics and Orthodox Christians. By "Church," Catholicism understood the clergy, that is, the body of priests ordained into the priesthood. At the same time, for Catholics, all priests had to remain unmarried (mandatory celibacy) ([3]). According to Roman Catholic teaching, the Catholic clergy — that is, ordained priests who strictly observe celibacy — constitute the citizens of the "City of God," that is, the Church[4]. Ordinary Christians have the right to marry through a special sacrament.

Luther and other reformers struck a blow against priestly celibacy, declaring that the rules of clerical celibacy were a later "innovation" and decreed that from now on priests could be married. Luther himself was originally a monk, and having decided that monks could now marry, he set an example. Thus, monasticism was completely abolished and monasteries were dissolved.

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[1] Hussites — the name of a Czech reformist religious movement, named after Jan Hus. They were called "Chasniki" because they demanded that the chalice be made available to lay people during communion, since in Catholicism only clergy receive communion under both species (the body and blood of Jesus Christ), while lay people are given only prosphora (a wafer). See *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Eastern Europe. Slavic Logos: Balkan Nav and Sarmatian Style. Moscow: Academic Project, 2018.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject.

[3] The Orthodox tradition allows marriage for the white clergy, but the highest episcopal rank requires celibacy, as in Catholicism.

[4] From the perspective of Orthodoxy, the Church includes not only priests and bishops (the clergy), but also all baptised Orthodox Christians, which significantly broadens the concept of the Church and changes its content to some extent.

The authority of the Pope, on which the entire Western European political philosophy had previously been based, was completely rejected. The entire Catholic clergy — cardinals, bishops and priests — suffered the same fate. Some Protestant movements (Lutheranism itself) retained their hierarchy and a number of liturgical practices, while others (Calvinists) rejected both completely.

Against the Empire

Alongside the rejection of the previous doctrine of the Church, the Reformation also rejected the very idea of the Empire. At first, the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire wavered between supporting Rome or the Reformation, partly continuing the imperial traditions of the Ghibellines. Under Charles V of Habsburg (1500–1558), the Protestant north and the Catholic south attempted to divide their powers within a common political system (the Peace of Augsburg). However, some of the Habsburgs, primarily Philip II (1527–1598), a radical supporter of Catholicism, chose Rome, and in the end, the Austrian Habsburgs also leaned towards that choice. This led to the separation of the Protestant countries — Holland, Sweden, Norway and Prussia. Together with England and France (which remained Catholic but was strongly opposed to the Habsburgs), this gave rise to an anti-imperial coalition of European powers.

In place of the Empire—with its echoes of the doctrine of the Cato—comes a completely different political normative idea: the nation-state, created by people (again from the bottom up) for security, protection, and the optimal realisation of private material interests. Such a nation-state has no higher purpose or mission. It rejects both the Byzantine concept of the katechon and the Catholic interpretation of the doctrine of the "two cities." The Empire had a sacred meaning, and papal power brought a transcendent (also sacred) dimension to European politics in the Middle Ages. People obeyed God, the Earth obeyed Heaven, and individual political entities obeyed the highest unity. That is why the Empire was consistently called "Holy." The Protestant state is fundamentally not sacred. It has no mission or higher purpose. It performs technical functions and can always, in theory, be restructured, changed or even abolished. Protestant communities were built on this principle, from which anyone could leave at any time, attracted by a different interpretation.

and converting to a different sect. Bourgeois companies, firms, trusts and trading partnerships were also formed.

Thus, in this Protestant worldview, we arrive at the concept of *the social contract,* which is fundamental to the entire philosophy and politics of the modern era. The Church is no longer a product of the condescension of the Holy Spirit from above. It is a product *of a social contract.* And the state is no longer an empire endowed with a sacred mission, but an artificial creation of individuals for the purpose of solving certain private secular tasks.

Thus, the political philosophy of Protestantism rejected the very structure of the vertical organisation of the world, society, and religion, which was common not only to Western and Eastern Christianity, not only to Byzantinism and the doctrine of the "two cities," but also to the entire European history known to us — from Antiquity to the Renaissance. This is the special significance of Protestantism: it paved the way for a completely new model of looking at the world from the bottom up.

Wealth as a virtue

The phenomenon of Protestantism as the basis of the paradigm of the Modern Age was thoroughly analysed by German sociologist Max Weber, one of the founders of sociology as such, in his work "The Protestant Ethic" [1]. This work by Max is one of the most famous classical works on sociology. In it, Weber shows how the Protestant worldview, Protestant theology, Protestant ideology, and the ethics built on them form the foundations of bourgeois society and the value system of capitalism, which arose precisely from this Protestant approach.

M. Weber demonstrates that Protestantism justified the supreme value of rational practical activity and elevated the merchant, the entrepreneur — that is, the townspeople, the citizens, the bourgeoisie — to the highest ideal. Weber shows that the Catholic worldview as a whole is oriented toward the spiritual world, and wealth is never considered the highest virtue — hence the cult of poverty in some monastic orders, especially among the Franciscans. Protestantism, on the other hand, focused its attention on earthly life, considering material wealth a sign of "electivity." Calvin, in his theory of Predestination, even stated that man is incapable of changing either

[1] *Weber, M.* The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

neither their earthly nor their posthumous fate, and wealth and success should be interpreted as the most visible form of virtue; wealth is good and a sign of being chosen, while poverty is a vice and a curse.

In Protestantism, the concept of posthumous reward disappears. It is believed that a person receives reward not in the future, but in this life. This gives rise to the thesis that God distributes good and evil, rewards the righteous and punishes sinners *in this life*. Not later, not after death, but here and now. Thus, the afterlife, which plays a huge role in Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity, effectively loses its meaning, and the themes of Judgment, punishment, and retribution are transferred to earthly life.

This approach turns everything upside down. In Orthodox Christianity, in full accordance with Christ's Sermon on the Mount[1], it is precisely the poor in spirit, those who mourn, those who suffer, and those who hunger who are considered blessed. That is, the Beatitudes describe people who are deprived, people who suffer, who mourn, who have nothing. And the second part of these symmetrical formulas promises future justice, achieved in the kingdom of heaven — for they shall be comforted, for they shall be filled, for they shall be called sons of God... All the unhappy, the unsuccessful, the destitute, the poor, the suffering, the deprived are the "salt of the earth." This is the ethical norm in Orthodox Christianity. For Orthodox Christians, being poor means, most likely, being good and honest. Being rich means, probably, not being so good. And it is more difficult for the rich to enter the Kingdom of Heaven than for the poor ([2]). The poor are promised an easy path to the Kingdom of Heaven, while the rich have a difficult one. This does not mean that it is closed to them, nor does it mean that every poor person is good. But in general, the poor are better than the rich. Because it is easier for the poor and suffering — they are deprived of much or even everything in this world, in the material, physical universe. And this is not just a test, but a driving force to seek truth and justice beyond its limits — to strive for the kingdom of heaven and Christ. The rich, on the other hand

[1]Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled. Blessed are the merciful, for they will be shown mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil against you because of Me. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, for so they persecuted the prophets who were before you. Gospel of Matthew 5:3–11.

[2]It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. From Matthew 19:24.

bound to earthly existence. For it is said: where your treasure is, there will your heart be also[1]. And, moreover, you cannot serve both God and mammon[2]. The rich have riches in their hearts, which are of little use to them in the next world, and it is difficult for them to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Of course, it is possible if they distribute their wealth to the poor, if they serve their country and the Church. But this is more difficult to do. It is a pity to part with what one has acquired.

In Catholicism, it is not quite the same as in Orthodoxy, but it is close. For example, St. Francis of Assisi (1181 or 1182–1226) composed hymns to poverty, saying that there is nothing more beautiful than the poor brotherhood, and that the second thing he loves after Christ is poverty. He gives everything away. He completely sacrifices himself, absolutely everything. He walks barefoot in winter, wearing only a single robe. His monasteries flourish, and he lives only with beggars and the poor, content with very little. Of course, this is far from the whole of Catholicism, but to a large extent, Franciscan ethics are considered the undisputed pinnacle of piety in Western Christianity. Because everything important and valuable is not here. "My kingdom is not of this world" ([3]).This is how the Orthodox and Catholic religions understand the world and ethics.

But Protestantism understands the world completely differently. On the contrary, from a Protestant point of view, rich means good, which means chosen. The Last Judgment takes place here, and retribution is also meted out here. Therefore, those who are poor *are* also *bad.* And, accordingly, the idea of enrichment takes on a religious meaning. If a person works well, earns a lot, and has accumulated a lot of wealth, then he is almost a saint.

This idea that the rich are holy and the poor are damned is an important feature of Protestant ethics, a specific worldview. Note how ethical guidelines change. Formally, we are dealing with Christianity, but all proportions are reversed, and the entire structure of the worldview is almost directly opposite.

Protestantism creates a completely new scale of values within Christianity. First, the Church is built from the bottom up, not from the top down. And, accordingly, it can be dissolved and re-created. Strictly speaking, there is nothing sacred in the Church. The Church becomes the work of lay people, and people gather around the Holy Scriptures in order to interpret them together, sometimes speaking in tongues (Pentecostals, modern charismatics), that is

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[1] Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 6:21.
[2] Gospel of Luke. Chapter 16: 13.
[3] Gospel of John. Chapter 18: 36.

They shout incomprehensible words, sometimes shake and make incomprehensible gestures, believing that they are vessels for God's will (like the Shaker sect).

Protestantism as the foundation of Modernism

It was from the Reformation movement that the political philosophy of Modernism was born. The modern world is based on Protestant principles:

- religion here is a collective matter, which is determined by consensus as to whether God exists or not, or how He should be interpreted;
- instead of a sacred Church founded by Christ and the Holy Spirit, there is a profane "church," that is, a sect;
- Instead of a God-given and mission-driven Empire, a secular nation-state established on the basis of a social contract;
- instead of focusing on the kingdom of heaven and Christ, complete involvement in the affairs of the material world;
- instead of posthumous reward and the Last Judgement, fatal predestination to poverty or wealth as an expression of earthly justice, measured by material well-being;
- instead of a sacred hierarchy, equality of opportunity;
- instead of priests, monks and warriors — the bourgeoisie;
- instead of verticality, horizontality;
- instead of universality — individualism and the glorification of absolute private property;
- instead of the heavenly — the earthly;
- instead of goodness and compassion — the ethics of profit and material prosperity.

This is precisely what Max Weber emphasises: Protestantism, by shifting attention from the spiritual to the physical and from the heavenly to the earthly, gave supreme importance to wealth.

Protestantism breaks with traditional society and lays the foundations for modernity. But it is still a transition. In Protestantism, there is still an appeal to God; the Church still exists; the authority of Holy Scripture is still recognised; the existence of the state is still justified. From now on, the basis of these elements of religion and politics is the individual, but some objects of interpretation remain from the previous paradigm of the world of Tradition. The axis of interpretation radically changes its direction — instead of a view from above, the view is now directed from below, but some distant connection with the vertical axis still remains.

from the bottom up, but some distant connection with the vertical axis still remains.

If we secularise this Protestant theology, if we remove any mention of God and the Church, if we reject the authority of the Bible altogether, and if we completely relativise the state (which was necessary for Protestants at least as a defence against Catholics), then we arrive at the paradigm of the modern world, Modernity, in its fullest sense. Here, instead of "churches" (i.e., sects), individuals unite in political parties, and parties make up the parliament. Instead of freedom to interpret the Holy Scriptures, it is now possible to interpret anything, and the authority of materialistic science completely supplants the authority of religion. Now the individual is free not only to interpret sacred texts, but also to create his own, which in the context of a purely profane culture are essentially equal in status to private opinion. The state breaks away this time even from the task of defending Protestantism and becomes entirely and completely created by the arbitrarily established Republic, which has strictly selfish interests. Wealth is seen not as a sign of a person's election in a predetermined destiny, but simply as the highest value in isolation from any meaning whatsoever. Capital is now the measure of all things. Hence capitalism, liberalism, the secular world, civil society and, ultimately, globalism.

Weber — as well as L. Dumont (1911–1998), W. Sombart (1863–1941) and others — show that the Protestant Reformation led precisely to this result, but it was achieved only through the overcoming of Protestantism itself. The Reformation paved the way for Modernity. But it was not yet fully Modern, retaining within itself — albeit inverted and distorted — certain echoes of traditional society.

The secularisation of Calvinism gave rise to liberalism.

Protestant theology and Protestant ethics predetermine the foundations of political philosophy in the modern era. It should be noted that several quite different trends can be identified within Protestantism. Each of these trends can be viewed as a matrix on the basis of which one of the three main political ideologies of the Modern era developed in the course of further secularisation.

The most orthodox line emerging from the secularisation of Protestantism was capitalism. It is most fully reflected in the ideology of liberalism.

liberal ideology. It is liberalism that puts the individual, who has become the measure of all things in Protestant anthropology, at the forefront and considers material wealth to be the highest form of personal evaluation. Money in capitalism is an absolute value.

Among Protestant theologians, the Swiss reformer John Calvin is closest to this model. It was he who formulated the basic principles of an individualistic interpretation of religion, politics, society and culture. He was also more consistent than others in insisting on wealth as a sign of being chosen.

Calvinists were the most radical opponents of Catholicism, rejecting hierarchy and the sacraments. In politics, they adhered to extremely democratic views. During the English Revolution of 1640–1660, Calvinists and various movements inspired by them formed the most extreme wing of the Protestant party, insisting on the abolition of the monarchy (or the creation of a special Fifth Monarchy[1]) and the complete restructuring of society on bourgeois-democratic principles.

It is important to note that the founding fathers who arrived by ship in New York when it was still a Dutch colony were Calvinists. The main core of immigrants from England and Europe to North America as a whole were representatives of the most extreme Protestant groups of the Calvinist persuasion. They laid the foundations of North American civilisation.

Calvin was the originator of the Protestant doctrine of predestination, which rejects the Christian thesis of free will (liberum arbitrium). This doctrine radically changed the very concept of the nature of time and the logic of history. Calvin believed that the eternity of God necessarily contains all time. For God, time is synchronous, whereas for humanity it is experienced as a sequence. But in this case, the diachronic unfolding of events cannot change the content of history, because if it were otherwise, God would not be perfect. Consequently, Calvin concludes, free will does not exist; it is merely an optical illusion of a mortal being whose horizon is fatally limited by time. Taking into account predestination, all history was predetermined and had a complete structure.

As this view became more secular and the "God hypothesis" was put aside, Calvinism—in its final modernist, materialistic version—laid the groundwork for the ideology of progress, which is an interpretation of history in which all stages are

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject.

are predetermined. Progress from Calvinism spread to all political ideologies of the Modern era — liberalism, communism and nationalism — becoming one of their most important features in the context of the entire Modern era. But overall, Calvinism had the greatest influence on liberalism. It is quite possible to argue that *liberalism is a product of the secularisation of Calvinism.*

The secularisation of Lutheranism gave rise to bourgeois nationalism

The ideas of Martin Luther, considered the main figure of the Reformation, generally placed the individual at the forefront and had much in common with liberalism. Although Luther relied politically on the support of German princes who sought to use the Reformation to strengthen their political positions in opposition to the Papacy and, to some extent, the Empire, he, like Calvin, was an exponent of the interests of the third estate, ironically referred to in Plato's "The Republic" as "pig-herding." .

However, Lutheranism was not as strict regarding church traditions. It retained the idea of the priesthood (only now priests were allowed to marry) and some church sacraments, such as baptism, communion, and marriage. Lutherans categorically rejected the status of the Pope, sometimes going so far as to identify him with the Antichrist. But while strongly opposing the Vatican, they recognised the legitimacy of national churches subordinate to secular — most often monarchical or princely — authority. Thus, in England, after the restoration of the monarchy, it was the Lutheran model that prevailed in the form of the Anglican Church, whose head is considered to be the English king.

A similar system developed in Scandinavia and Northern Germany, where Lutheranism became the philosophical foundation of nation states in which the vertical structure of monarchical power was combined with the ever-growing political influence of the bourgeoisie. A striking example of such a state was Protestant Prussia, which in the 19th century became the main initiator of the creation of Germany under the Protestant Hohenzollern dynasty. A comprehensive description of the Lutheran Prussian type of political system — a kind of "Prussian socialism or national socialism" — is convincingly presented in the classic work by Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) Prussianism and Socialism ([1]).

[1] *Spengler, O.* Prussianism and Socialism. Moscow: Praksis, 2002.

Lutheranism can be seen as the model that gave rise to modern political nationalism (and, to some extent, National Socialism) during the process of secularisation and modernisation.

The secularisation of Anabaptism gave rise to communism.

Protestantism also had an extreme version, most vividly represented by the Anabaptist movement, one of whose leaders was Thomas Müntzer (c. 1490–1525). The Anabaptists were mainly peasants who shared apocalyptic views. The Anabaptists shared common features with Christian Gnostics, who believed that the world was ruled by an "evil god" whose servants were the representatives of the official Church and the nobility. The supporters of Anabaptism perceived the Reformation as the onset of the end times, when the false church and the associated rule of the nobility would fall and an era of universal equality would dawn. Münzer identified the Catholic Church with the whore of Babylon, categorically rejected Luther, and compared the German princes who followed Luther to the "kings of the Apocalypse." The Anabaptists called on all true awakened Christians to rise up in a rebellion of the poor, backed by Christ, against the rich, who were enemies of the faith. Münzer saw his own mission as the work of John the Baptist, who had come call humanity to spiritual baptism.

Münzer inspired the Thuringian peasants to revolt, but they were defeated in May 1525 at the Battle of Frankenhausen. He himself was captured and executed in Mühlhausen.

Here we see how the rejection of Catholicism during the Reformation gave rise to an ideology that was in many ways opposed to Calvinism, with its "deification" of wealth, and to Lutheranism, with its deep alliance with the princes and the nation state. Marx (1818–1883) himself was clearly aware of the connection between his ideas and those of the Anabaptists, whom he considered the harbingers of communism.

Communism can well be considered the result of the secularisation of Anabaptism.

Three ideologies

Thus, Calvin, Luther, and Münzer can be considered the three figures of the Reformation who anticipated the three main dominant political ideologies of the Modern era: liberalism, nationalism, and communism. The roots of the corresponding versions of Political So-

remain in Protestantism. Consequently, we are entitled to consider Protestantism as the historical paradigm of political philosophy in the modern era. In Protestantism itself, these three versions are not yet completely secular. We are still dealing with Christianity. Even the Gnostic-peasant rebellion of Müntzer, which is very similar to later communism, still unfolds in anticipation of the Second Coming of Christ. Calvin argues that wealth and prosperity are important because they are an expression of being chosen, of holiness, that is, a consequence of predestination. Luther insists that it is necessary to affirm and support the nation state primarily to protect Protestant interests from the Catholic Austrian Empire and the Roman See. These versions of the Reformation still retain a reference to the religious dimension. These are religious movements, and the politics based on them in the 16th–19th centuries still retain something of Christianity and, accordingly, of traditional society (the pre-modern paradigm). But having been subjected to secularisation, completely detached from theology, with the factor of God and Holy Scripture being bracketed out (in what Nietzsche called "the death of God"), they give us three political theories that dominate the modern era (liberalism, communism and nationalism). Geographically, the German North of Europe becomes predominantly Protestant, while the Latin South remains Catholic. At the same time, there is a solid segment of Catholicism among the Germans — Austria, Bavaria, and more broadly, Southern Germany. In addition, the Celtic Irish remained faithful to Catholicism, which sharply distinguished them from the Celtic Scots, who became the most radical

the bearers of Calvinism in the British Isles.

Chapter 3. Founding Fathers of Modern Political Philosophy: T. Hobbes, N. Machiavelli, J. Bodin

Niccolò Machiavelli: the autonomy of politics

Protestantism is a historical but still religious expression of a philosophy that contains the seeds of a specific secular politics that became the norm in the New Age. Now we can examine how this philosophy of modern politics acquired its explicit features, formulated programmes, and created basic founding texts.

The foundations of the already explicit political philosophy of the Modern Age were laid primarily by three authors who are classics of modern political thought. These are the Italian Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), the Frenchman Jean Bodin (1530–1596) and the Englishman Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679).

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) is one of three political thinkers who substantiated the concept of secular politics. There is still heated debate about the interpretation of his ideas. Some consider Machiavelli an extreme "reactionary" and "monarchist," a precursor of fascism, while others, on the contrary, consider him a "progressive republican."

Machiavelli's main idea is that politics is an autonomous world governed by laws specific to this sphere. This was a complete innovation for the 15th century. For people of the modern era, it is quite natural to recognise that different laws apply in politics, morality and religion. But for medieval Christian Europeans, the idea that there is one truth in politics and another in morality, religion and ethics was completely unacceptable and blasphemous. All spheres of knowledge were built on a single set of universal Christian principles. The only area of medieval thought that partly anticipated this division into several truths was the philosophy of the Islamic thinker Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198), whose followers

— especially among Europeans — proposed dividing *theological truth*, based on the authority of Scripture, into the sphere of religion, and *scientific truth* about the natural world, based on the conclusions of reason.

However, Machiavelli goes much further and proposes to consider the political sphere as autonomous. He asserts that politics is an absolutely self-sufficient thing. In his opinion, politics has no goal or higher meaning. Power is the beginning and end in itself. Therefore, the criteria that should be applied to politics should not be taken from the realm of religion, morality, history, and so on. Politics is a completely self-sufficient world with its own laws, rules, criteria, and evaluations. Machiavelli proceeds from the premise that *the state has no other goal than the exercise of power.*

The Prince: the tyrant as a force from below

The personification of the state is *the Sovereign,* the Prince [1], il Principe.

A prince is not a person, nor is he a specific ruler. He is a special authority, a figure who embodies the sum total of politics, taken in isolation from all other levels of existence. This is how the idea of *an autonomous, self-referential sphere of politics* is formed. Politics is elevated to an independent discipline, an independent sphere. The figure of the prince, who embodies the essence of politics, becomes the symbol of this politics.

Politics, in this case, is taken in isolation from any higher meaning. Machiavelli completely and radically rejects the political philosophy of the "two cities," offering something completely new in its place. He completely disregards the "heavenly city" and focuses his attention entirely on the problems of earthly power, its preservation, strengthening and most effective use. Machiavelli now deals only with the "earthly city," which becomes the sole and self-sufficient object of political philosophy.

The sovereign in Machiavelli's view is *an absolute individual* who rises to the heights of earthly power not in the name of some goal (like Plato's philosopher-king) and not to fulfil some mission. He is pushed to the top by the abundance and even excess of earthly forces. It is *power* that becomes the ontological foundation in Machiavelli's view.

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[1] *Machiavelli, N.* The Prince. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, 1982.

of power; power in its most direct and earthly sense. Everyone *wants* to rule, but only the strongest *can*. Therefore, it does not matter how a person becomes a ruler: if he has become one, then this in itself means that he has proved himself strong enough for it. If power is obtained by chance and by someone who is not very strong, then he will quickly lose it, as a powerful rival will surely rise up from the depths of life to replace him.

Machiavelli builds his theory on this: the sovereign has no other goal than to maintain the power he has, strengthen it, and, if possible, increase its scope and extent. In this theory, we see the absolutisation of the "earthly city" and, at the same time, the standardisation of the figure *of the tyrant*. According to Plato, a ruler who cares only about the realisation of his will and uses power solely to achieve his selfish goals is a classic tyrant. Tyrannical traits were certainly inherent in many Italian rulers as early as the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance, examples of this type of government became even more frequent.

Two moralities according to Machiavelli

Developing his analysis of the Prince, Machiavelli comes to an important conclusion: there is not one morality, but two.

- *The morality of the Prince*, which consists in the most effective retention of power, and
- *the morality of the general population*, ordinary citizens, who must strictly follow prescribed ethical obligations and bear full responsibility for violating the rules.

Machiavelli's idea that the sovereign requires a special morality, different from that of the masses, is completely new. This morality must put power itself at the forefront. For the sovereign, there is one good and one virtue: power, and the stronger and longer it lasts, the better. Everything else flows from it. What good, argues Machiavelli, is it if the sovereign is good, merciful, gentle and compassionate, if he is unable to hold on to power, which means he cannot resist external or internal enemies, protect his citizens from turmoil, establish an effective social and administrative system, and defend the state from its enemies? Conversely, what significance can the personal sins — and even crimes — of a ruler have

if he copes with the main thing: ensuring the prosperity and stability of society, which is impossible without strong power. Even the most bloodthirsty tyrant, committing individual atrocities, cannot cause great harm to society as a whole, at least not remotely comparable to uprisings or enemy invasions.

However, if public morality is violated by the masses, society will fall into turmoil, become ungovernable, the power of the ruler will be shaken, and the state will slide into anarchy and collapse. The morality of ordinary people should be religious, ethical, and consistent with the views of the social majority. In this respect, Christian morality is quite suitable. People who follow moral and religious principles set themselves the goal of having a good reputation, saving their souls, maintaining social order, and not breaking the rules — these ideas about morality, from Machiavelli's point of view, are absolutely remarkable, beautiful, and require observance. By everyone except the Prince. The Prince, on the other hand, must be guided first and foremost by *the pure imperative of power,* which for him is the highest and most binding morality, while the prescriptions for the masses may be shared to one degree or another, but only as something additional and voluntary, and even then only if it does not interfere with the exercise of power.

Machiavelli does not speak out directly against religion, the Church, or traditions. He only talks about the art of ruling and builds his philosophy in a way that is as consistent as possible under the given conditions.

The prince is a representative of the ruling authority. However, this is not necessarily an individual personality. The prince may be collective or individual. He may be legal and legitimate, or illegal and legitimate. This is irrelevant. Only one thing is important: those who stand at the head of society must be guided by a fundamentally *different* approach to evaluating their actions and the actions of others than ordinary citizens.

The idea that the people, the majority, and the prince have two different moralities is an innovation of Niccolò Machiavelli. The morality of the prince is that he is not responsible for himself personally and does not pursue his own interests, but for the realisation of large-scale tasks that involve a large number of people.

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[1] *Schmitt, C.* Legality and Legitimacy/Schmitt, C. The State: Law and Politics. Moscow: Publishing House "Territory of the Future", 2013.

For example, one of the prince's tasks is to preserve the territorial integrity of the principality, the state in which he is the ruler. To achieve this, the ruler can do anything: he can lie, threaten, break agreements, dress his troops in enemy uniforms, stage provocations, send poisoners, invade foreign territory, take relatives and close friends of his enemies hostage — in short, violate all norms of morality and ethics. According to Machiavelli, all this is morally justified for the Prince, although it should be categorically prohibited for everyone else. Because if the majority starts acting in the same way, the state will soon collapse.

The opposite is also true: if a prince is a good, pious, devout man who loves his neighbours, observes all moral precepts and meets the highest standards of morality and godliness, but at the same time is unable to effectively resist the armies of a neighbour who is seizing his territory, plundering his lands, rapes and takes the local inhabitants captive, then even though he is a *good* man, he is *a very bad prince.* He may be a saint as a man, but a complete nonentity as a prince. But if, by sacrificing all Christian commandments, through deception, cunning, meanness, force, etc., the prince is able to play out a political situation in which his lands increase several times over, strengthening the power of his principality, then he is a wonderful prince.

The same applies to domestic policy. Here, the main goal is peace, prosperity, security, and food security for citizens, as well as maintaining order. If, to achieve this, the prince eliminates his rivals, incites enmity among his entourage, promotes to power those who are far from the most worthy and deserving, weaves intrigues, uses deception, bribery and repression, as well as any other methods, to achieve his goal, then he is still a good prince. What is the point, argues Machiavelli, if a good and pious ruler avoids such measures and chaos, disorder, turmoil, famine and anarchy reign in the state? He may save his soul, but he will ruin the state entrusted to him.

Thus, two logics are postulated. What is good for the prince and what is bad for the common man. The goal is to provide a territory that is reliably protected, well-fed, satisfied citizens, security, peace, and order. What you personally do in the process, citizen prince, is of no interest to anyone. What you do there, how you justify it, what is in your heart — that is your business, your personal business.

Machiavelli's paradox: the goal of power is power

Machiavelli builds his political philosophy on this basis. There is no justification for this state of affairs, no criticism, no satire, as Machiavelli's commentators sometimes believe. It is simply a cold statement of facts that the political philosopher sees around him and which he undertakes to describe systematically as they are. If society is openly told about this, it will rebel, and chaos and unrest will ensue. But for the political science of the modern era, of which Niccolò Machiavelli can rightly be considered the founder, this is a fundamental truth. Therefore, Machiavelli himself does not address the masses. He writes for the Prince, for the political elite. Among Machiavelli's advice to the Prince is to hide what he does, use secret intrigues, set everyone against each other, and not allow anyone who could pose a problem or competition to the Prince to rise to the elite. Do not inform your opponents of the real state of affairs. Use various political tactics.

Let the people think what they want; all that is required of them is to obey the established rules and submit. This is how a special realm of politics emerges, where completely separate criteria apply.

From Machiavelli's point of view, the Prince has one main task: *to retain his power*. Outwardly, this seems like a completely selfish and immoral task. For a person, it is, but for the Prince, it becomes moral — because in order to retain it, he must meet all the requirements of power.

First, the Prince *must have power*. That is, he must obtain it, no matter how. This is the first condition. If someone manages to obtain power, this is in itself, according to Machiavelli, a fundamental position. Only those who have power are Princes, not those who are born with it or want to obtain it.

Secondly, he must have a state. There must be a people who do not reject him, who obey him and thereby acknowledge him. It is completely irrelevant how they feel about the prince — whether they love or hate him, accept or simply tolerate him, respect or simply fear him. It does not matter at all. If the Prince is in power, that is the only decisive factor. And that means that the citizens are under him. He ceases to be a ruler only if he is overthrown — by competitors, opponents or subjects. But a new Prince takes his place, and the cycle begins anew.

Despite the apparent simplicity of this analysis, it contains some very serious points. After all, in order to gain and maintain power, the Prince must preserve the territorial integrity and, preferably, even expand the territory of his polity. He needs a calm, normal, submissive people who obey discipline, follow rules and regulations, and refrain from rebellions, uprisings and conspiracies.

This leads to Machiavelli's paradox: a successful prince, without setting any positive goals, with no desire to please his people, leave a mark on history, serve the Church, or contribute to the common good, but instead thinking only of himself, his power, following pure selfishness and driven by a lust for powerand the will to power, is capable of frequently carrying out brilliant historical deeds, building states and societies where the people prosper, temples are full, culture flourishes, territories grow, bread ripens, thought and science develop, and people are free and happy. But above all this stands the sinister, selfish, jealous Prince, an aggressive and predatory "political animal" [1]who does not allow any figure or personality capable of competing with him to come close to his territory.

Such princely egoism, since it operates on a completely different scale than that of a private individual, an ordinary citizen, is — but only and exclusively in the case of the Prince — more important than any altruism.

It is important to note that we live in Machiavelli's world because the current conception of power and the political elite fits perfectly into this model of the Prince (at least in those areas of political philosophy where realism prevails).

Although Machiavelli's views influenced the conception of the nature of politics in the Modern Age as a whole, the most consistent supporters of his approach were representatives of the neo-Machiavellian school, which emerged in Italy at the end of the 19th century. This school includes political philosophers such as the Italians Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941) and the German sociologist Robert Michels (1876–1936). Both were greatly influenced by the ideas of French-

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[1] In a sense different from Aristotle.

[2] *Pareto, V.* Compendium of General Sociology. Moscow: Publishing House of the Higher School of Economics, 2008.

[3] *Mosca G.* History of Political Doctrines. Bari: Laterza, 1937.

[4] *Michels R.* Sociology as a Social Science. Berlin: Mauritius, 1926.

economist Léon Walras (1834–1910), who constructed a model of economic equilibrium. The theory of elites developed by these authors effectively extends the concept of the Prince to the structure of society as a whole. From this perspective, all politics boils down to the seizure and preservation of power.

In other words, the elite is a collective definition of the Prince, and all political life is a struggle to take his place.

All representatives of the school of neo-Machiavellianism denied the independent significance of political ideologies, as well as religious views in their influence on politics, justifying the realm of politics as an independent and autonomous sphere governed only by its own laws and rules. This technological and pragmatic approach to politics stemmed from Walras' principle of equilibrium and the rejection of the idea of progress, as well as any other linear and unidirectional change in society.

Various strands of realism in the field of international relations are also based on this principle.

The prince as a tyrant and as the Antichrist

According to Machiavelli, it is pointless to ask why there is a prince or why there is a political state. It is also impossible to determine whether it is "holy" or "cursed," "good" or "evil," whether it leads to the salvation or destruction of the soul — all these questions are irrelevant, completely unimportant for the organisation of politics and for the study of its nature and laws.

If in the Middle Ages the prevailing belief was that politics was a cross-section of philosophy, then with Machiavelli the opposite occurs. *Philosophy becomes an application of politics.* Politics acquires the character of absolute autonomy, which is connected with the very paradigm of the transition from top-down logic to bottom-up logic.

If we turn to the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, it becomes clear that Machiavelli describes the worst form of government — *pure tyranny*. But unlike the classical vertical model of the ideal state or normal state, where the tyrant is a purely negative figure who turns the entire hierarchy upside down and asserts

[1] *Walras L.* Éléments d'économie politique pure; ou, Théorie de la richesse sociale. Lausanne: L. Corbaz, 1874.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology). Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

The worst replaces the best; in the theoretical field of the New Age, such a titanic image becomes the new norm.

The ontology of the state itself is also changing. The state of the Prince belongs to the dimension of the Mother; it is deeply material, as it is governed by materiality and accepts material criteria as fundamental. The Prince establishes a tyrannical ontology of the Political, introducing a new "political theology" (according to C. Schmitt), from which transcendence, mission, ideal, and normativity are completely expelled. The Prince's state, his "principality," is completely detached from the higher dimension. It represents nothing but itself. In this sense, it is the antithesis of the Holy Empire, since there is nothing sacred in it. Machiavelli gives the first completely profane description of the Political.

It is important that he chooses the term "prince" to describe the main character. Not king, not ruler, and certainly not emperor or tsar, but precisely prince, il Principe. In Latin, as in the Russian translation, the devil in the Gospel is called "the prince of this world" — Pinceps hujus mundi. And in this formula, it is especially emphasised that we are talking about "this" world, as opposed to "that" world, that is, the kingdom of heaven, the Empire of Christ. Machiavelli's state belongs entirely to "this world"; it has no higher meaning, no connection with heaven. And that is why Machiavelli's image of the "Prince" with all his paradoxes has so much in common with the typical characteristics attributed to the devil in religious tradition. Satan, who tempted Christ in the desert, also offered him power over the world. Christ rejected this as a temptation of the "prince of this world." Machiavelli accepts this as a fact, presenting this devilish version of The Prince as the norm. And it becomes the norm in the Modern Age.

Thus, there is a complete reversal of the political ontology of Plato and Aristotle, and the worst form of rule — tyranny — not only gains the right to exist, but becomes the basic methodology for analysing politics. In the Christian context, this could not fail to evoke direct associations with the devil — the "prince of this world."

Hobbes and the idea of absolute original sin

The fundamental author who had a decisive influence on modern political philosophy was the Englishman Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was personally acquainted with such figures fundamental to

philosophy and science in the Modern era, such as Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642).

Hobbes is the author of the famous book on the nature of the state, Leviathan [1]. Hobbes' radically materialistic and completely immanent (secular) view of politics was several centuries ahead of political science and became the subject of study and practical application by subsequent generations of Englishmen and Frenchmen, as well as Europeans as a whole. Leviathan is the most fundamental work setting out the basic principles of modern political philosophy. It provides an understanding of human nature, the essence of the state, the significance of ethics, the significance of coercion and violence, and the various states of civilisation as understood in the modern era. It is a fundamental political philosophy that provides answers to all fundamental questions.

Hobbes argues that humanity initially exists in a state of nature. At the same time, Hobbes asserts that human nature is evil and that *humans are evil*. Hobbes introduces the axiom "man is wolf to man" (homo homini lupus est). In the state of nature, Hobbes argues, man strives for only one thing: domination over others, the seizure of prey, and the satisfaction of his basest desires and instincts. That is, in his view, man is an aggressive predator, a wolf who seeks only his own benefit. If left to his own devices, man will immediately begin to commit violence, subjugate those around him, seize things and territories, disregard everyone else, and use whatever comes to hand solely for his own interests. He acts in this way out of absolute selfishness, because his nature is evil.

This is the idea of original sin, absolutised in a political and anthropological sense. Yes, Christianity asserts that man is a product of original sin, but for Calvinist Protestantism, the only way to be saved is to accumulate wealth and become rich. Christianity and Catholicism have completely different ideas about this: although man bears the burden of the fall of his forefathers, who were expelled from paradise, Christ came into the world and saved humanity, and now it is possible to become a fundamentally new person, a Christian person, build their society and, ultimately, a political system based on different Christian values. That is why Catholics insist

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[1] *Hobbes, T.* Leviathan. Moscow: Yurist, 2001.

based on the principle of free will. According to Thomas Aquinas, man is endowed with sufficient grace to resist sin if he has the will to do so (the theory of gratia sufficiens). For Protestants — for Luther and especially for Calvin — this is impossible, since after the Fall, man became too weak, and this cannot be remedied. In Hobbes, this thesis breaks away from Christian theology and is asserted as a completely secular view of human nature. Man is an evil, selfish creature, a kind of social beast, pursuing exclusively private interests and disregarding others. Thus, from Protestant pessimism about human nature, we arrive at modern atheistic and materialistic pessimism, detached from its theological foundations (Hobbes no longer believes in paradise and the Fall).

So, according to Hobbes, man is a predator. But he is not just a predator, he is also an *intelligent* predator. He is a wolf with brains, which he needs to acquire more, defeat more effectively, capture and destroy his neighbour or force him to serve himself. Gradually, this selfish wolf begins to understand that if he acts solely in his own interests, without regard for the interests of others, then in some situation he himself may find himself in the position of a victim, weaker and prey to another, stronger and more powerful predator.

According to Hobbes, while still in its "natural state," an intelligent wolf at some point begins to understand the relativity of the very principle of predation. It then begins to think about creating conditions in which it can dominate others, but others cannot dominate it. Since this cannot be achieved directly, the intelligent predator concludes that certain compromises must be made.

And then the cunning wolf proposes to conclude *a social contract* with other wolves (people), establishing a set of rules both to legalise and to somewhat restrict their evil nature. A social contract is an agreement. Its essence boils down to the acceptance of certain rules that regulate the war of all against all, establishing laws, boundaries and norms. But in the natural state, no one will simply follow these laws, since no one will force the strongest to respect them, as they will not want to limit their appetites of their own free will (according to Hobbes, free will does not exist, only evil will exists).

The solution to this dilemma is to leave the "natural state" and enter into an agreement to create a state. Cunning wolves come

to the conclusion that it is necessary to delegate some of their powers so that this authority — the State — can control compliance with certain rules in the satisfaction of individual desires.

But for this authority — the State — to be effective, it must be feared, inspiring terror even in the strongest and most powerful of human wolves. Hence the idea of Leviathan, mentioned in the Bible. Leviathan is a sea monster. It is mentioned in the Book of Job [1]when Job protests that he was righteous, loved God, was closest to God, and suddenly experienced such misfortune, blows of fate, losing everything, his wealth and loved ones, and finding himself poor and insignificant, he turns to God with reproaches. God answers his reproaches: "Have you seen Leviathan, Job? He is so terrible that the mountains tremble before him. The seas boil. Have you seen the behemoth, Job? When he walks, the earth shakes. So be afraid and do not rebel against God, for God is almighty and can both give and punish according to his own will. God is stronger than all, even Leviathan and Behemoth, the two primordial monsters, stronger than which there are none.

The reference to Leviathan turns out to be the most convincing argument. Job humbles himself: well, of course, if You have frightened me so much, then You are right. This may not be very Christian ethics, but it is quite in keeping with Protestant pessimism. The more powerful frightened the weaker, and the weaker submitted and fell silent. They showed Leviathan to Job, and Job admitted that he was wrong. So, according to Hobbes, it is enough to present Leviathan to intelligent wolves, and they will retreat in terror.

But if in the Bible there is a man (Job) on one side, God on the other, and between them — as an argument — Leviathan, then Hobbes' materialism does not recognise a separate eternal God. Leviathan is "god," only man-made, created by human hands as a result of a social contract.

According to Hobbes, the meaning and nature of the state is *creation*. *"God*." But an evil, punishing, artificial, and man-made god. This "evil god" is the state, which cunning and selfish wolves nevertheless establish over themselves as an authority to which they can no longer disobey because it is stronger than each of them. And Leviathan now represents an instrument of "legitimate violence" (according to M. Weber([2])). Levi-

[1] , Book of Job, Chapters 40:20–41:26.

[2] *Weber, M.* Politics as a Vocation and Profession / Weber, M. Selected Works. Moscow: Progress, 1990.

A fan is a state. Its main task is to scare and punish those who do not follow the rules established by consensus. If they were *only* wolves (i.e., in their natural state), they would not have created a state. But they are *intelligent* wolves, they have the ability to think, and they understand that they can destroy each other. To prevent this from happening, they create a new monster. This monster, Leviathan, is the state of the modern era.

The main idea of Leviathan is that the state is created *from below*, by evil, disgusting, vicious, selfish people. And it is created solely to keep selfish villains in relative check. The state is an evil, monstrous, punishing "god" established by villains to give some order to villainy, which is why the state does not prevent violence, robbery, seizure, subjugation, and deception; it organises all of this by establishing rules that everyone must obey.

Such is the world of Thomas Hobbes, his political philosophy. Evil, in order not to destroy themselves with their own evil, out of cunning and individual selfishness, create a man-made abominable
"god" called Leviathan, who will frighten and oppress them.

Here, the fundamental idea is the notion of the negativity of human nature.

Spencer: atomism and the struggle for survival in a liberal society

Hobbes did not yet have a theory of evolution of species, as Darwin (1809–1882) later did, but it can already be anticipated in general terms by replacing wolves with monkeys. According to Hobbes, humans are intelligent wolves who built Leviathan but retained their wolf-like nature. According to Darwin, humans are monkeys who, in the struggle for survival, developed the ability to think and built society. Both theories were combined in social Darwinism by the greatest theorist of liberal political philosophy, Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).

Spencer draws on Hobbes and, like him, applies the principles of atomistic physics to society. His goal is to construct a system that would unite the physical structure of matter and the development of biological species and the history of humanity under common laws and methods of investigation. Physicists

[1] *Danilevsky, N.* Darwinism. A Critical Study: In 2 vols. St. Petersburg: M. E. Komarov Publishing House, 1885–1889.

[2] *Spencer, G.* Scientific, Political, and Philosophical Experiments in 3 Volumes. Minsk: Sovremenny Literator, 1998.

Spencer's theory is based on the idea that matter, which in its zero state consists of heterogeneous atoms, particles, possesses an internal inherent force (life, striving) that causes these homogeneous particles to stick together, producing heterogeneous agglomerates in a state of motion. Movement — its accumulation in integrated structures and its dispersion — is a property inherent in matter itself. Agglomerates of particles, driven by the motion of matter, begin to adapt to external conditions, and the results of this adaptation constitute a hereditary code that is transmitted from thing to thing, from being to being. Thus, an ordered universe is born, which is both a consequence of evolution and its process. The goal of evolution is to achieve maximum adaptation to the surrounding conditions, but these conditions themselves are in turn a process of evolution. This gives rise to the principle of struggle and "survival of the fittest," which is at the heart of Spencer's philosophy. The universe and its order embody the limit of adaptation of the fittest and are the peak of evolution. The first most successful and "most adapted" agglomerate of particles is *an individual thing,* which turns out to be so stable that it transmits its properties to other things. In the natural world, the pinnacle of individuation is living beings capable of self-reproduction as species series, perfecting their qualities and passing them on to their offspring, thereby strengthening their individual essence. *The universe is nothing more than individuation.* That is why humans are thought of as individuals capable of adapting to their environment better than other species. and thereby build society.

At the same time, according to Spencer, the individual, in complete harmony with Hobbes, is selfish and aggressive in his natural state, pursuing exclusively his own benefit, sometimes in a deadly struggle with other individuals. Intraspecific and interspecific struggle, according to Spencer, made man human, forcing him to master new and new techniques of adaptation, attack and defence, which are passed on by inheritance, thereby perfecting the human series of individuals. In the course of the struggle between humans, the "fittest" rise to the top of society. Spencer considers *social inequality to be a positive factor,* as it reflects "natural selection" and, therefore, the progress of humanity. A strong person is more human than a weak person, Spencer believes, and on this basis he opposes equality — people should be given the freedom to maximally realise their selfish nature in order to gradually produce more and more perfect series of people, but this realisation will be more rational and "evolutionary" if it is based on the principle of natural selection.

to realise their selfish nature in order to gradually produce increasingly perfect series of people, but this realisation will be more reasonable and "evolutionary" if the rights and freedoms of others are respected, not as givens, but as possibilities. Everyone has the right to participate in the struggle, but the winner gets everything, and the loser is left alone with his loss; so that next time he will fight better, think faster, act more perfectly and more effectively, thereby contributing to the process of evolution.

Chaos and struggle of all against all, war of all against all, are characteristics of natural coexistence, stemming from the evil nature of man. According to Spencer, this is an order based on pure force. But it is precisely because of the struggle for survival and natural selection that people understand that the development of rationality is the most important advantage for survival and success. And on the basis of this rationality, they establish politics, agreeing to some restriction of their freedom, but only in order to realise their will in the best possible way.

Spencer views history as consisting of three evolutionary phases:

- an initial chaotic phase,
- then a phase of creation based on the power and violence of states and political structures that rigidly enforce hierarchies and hinder the free process of natural selection,
- and finally, a phase of industrial competition, when the struggle for survival unfolds through market competition, which is the highest form of intra-species struggle, as it completely unleashes the full potential of selfishness inherent in the human individual and reflects the maximum dynamism of self-propelling matter.

Spencer's political philosophy is *an elitist version of liberalism*, in which *equality of opportunity (participation in competition) leads to inequality of results*, while competition itself takes place in the area where the highest technical and scientific achievements of the human species are concentrated, as an arsenal of methods for waging economic wars. Spencer was opposed to widespread public education, believing that the ignorance of the weak and lower classes was an incentive for the strong and superior to multiply and develop knowledge. Spencer denied women equal rights, believing that they were the least perfect product of evolution, accumulating and genetically passing on

that set of adaptive functions that only reinforced their weakness and uncompetitiveness.

Thus, as modern political philosophy developed, Hobbes' basic thesis about Leviathan and its genesis continued in a new form, when the aggressive consciousness of wolf-like people in the conditions of the State was honed to such an extent that it went beyond its boundaries and chose a new strategy corresponding to the more developed form of modernity. But it was Hobbes who laid the foundation for this approach.

The primacy of the social contract and panegoism

Hobbes' ideas about the nature of the state, developed by his followers, form the basis of modern political philosophy. The overwhelming majority of modern theories about the origin of the state, its functions, its nature and its history are based in one way or another on Hobbes's theses. This applies not only to those who follow him or seek to develop his intuitions, but also to those who fundamentally disagree with him.

Hobbes is a philosopher of the modern era, just as Plato and Aristotle were philosophers of the Tradition. And Hobbes understood with extreme clarity the very spirit of the new paradigm, built from the bottom up, from matter to consciousness, from animal to human, from body to mind, from the chaotic struggle of all against all to the rules artificially established in the course of the social contract.

For Hobbes, the state is negative because it is nothing more than a restrictive institution of violence. But it is not evil in relation to people (who are neutral or good in themselves), but it is evil precisely because the people who created it are evil. Sociologist Max Weber defines the state as an "apparatus of legitimate violence"This is a very Hobbesian idea, because the sole task of Leviathan is to repress, suppress, and punish. But this violence is legitimate; it is used to repress those who challenge the state system (Leviathan), to execute criminals, and to destroy those who do not abide by the rules of the social contract.

The vast majority of modern societies are built on Hobbes' paradigm. This is the prevailing model of the modern state.

[1] *Weber, M.* Politics as a Vocation

[2] *Foucault, M.* Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. M.: Ad Marginem, 1999.

Protestant influences (Calvinism) are clearly evident at the origins of this model, but Leviathan's model itself is completely autonomous. This is purely "political theology" (K. Schmitt), in which the state is "God," and the presence or absence of any other level of divinity adds nothing to this complete picture and takes nothing away from it. Hobbes combines atomism and materialism with social and political philosophy and obtains a completely finished and consistent picture. In Plato's Parmenides system of hypotheses, it corresponds to the sixth hypothesis: atoms artificially create a "unity," which Hobbes calls "Leviathan." It is in this type of society that humanity lives in the modern era.

In Hobbes, we already see the fundamental unit of political philosophy that remains relevant to this day. If we remove original sin or distract ourselves from the idea of social Darwinism, we see only one thing: what is the norm of our modern political philosophy: man is a purely selfish actor, *a rational egoist.* As an egoist, he is a predator; as a rational being, he subordinates his immediate predatory egoistic instincts to certain rational strategies in order to achieve the optimal result.

There is a humorous definition: "An egoist is someone who loves himself very much and hates me completely." Every egoist considers others to be "too selfish." Thus, relationships between people become like mirrors reflecting each other; this is how *panegoism* develops — everyone acts in their own interests without thinking about others.[1] And only when it comes to safety and when the situation becomes critical do selfish individuals create a common defence system for their own safety. In such a picture, selfishness lies at the root of predatory behaviour and at the root of its restraint. Egoism makes animals think, but only to better satisfy their appetites and increase their chances of survival in the struggle between species and individuals. This view of humans as purely selfish actors is at the heart of our understanding of the world today, but its roots go back to the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.

[1] The famous "fable of the bees" by Bernard Mandeville, a classic of liberal thought, is based on this principle(1670–1733), which describes how a society consisting of complete egoists comes to universal prosperity, without remotely setting itself such a goal, and, on the contrary, an altruistic society of kind and compassionate people leads to degeneration, decline and degradation, since everyone in it thinks only of others and not of their own well-being, which ends in universal poverty. *Mandeville B.* The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Clarendon Press, 1714.

Later, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) offered a slightly different interpretation of the social contract. Rousseau also asserts that society is based on a "social contract," but he gives it a significantly different interpretation based on the recognition of the "noble savage," that is, on the idea that human nature in its original state is not evil, as Hobbes believed, but rather good. But it is important to note that Hobbes spoke about this much earlier and provided a philosophical analysis of the mechanism of this social contract. What do selfish actors agree on? They agree on how to establish some kind of order above themselves that will reflect this relationship between their own animal nature and their desire to somehow limit the animal nature of others. This is in order to justify their own selfishness and at the same time protect themselves from the selfishness of others. In Rousseau, this simple but convincing logic of Hobbes is disrupted, and although he also considers the state to be evil, he interprets it as something external to man himself. Hobbes, on the other hand, is extremely consistent and seeks to explain everything by purely immanent factors, without introducing anything extraneous into his system. The limitation of egoism is a consequence of egoism, and the violence of the state is a reflection of the violence inherent in the wolf-man.

Politics is a product of the social contract, and the entire political ontology is built on it. This thesis describes the essence of modern political philosophy. In this, we can easily recognise a complete reversal of Platonism. The state has no existence of its own in the realm of ideas. It has no model. It is built from below by separate atomic material subjects driven by private interests and selfish appetites. Everything else follows from this — the meaning and purpose of politics, its structure, its improvement, the creation and reform of political institutions, the place and powers of authority, as well as its nature, the distribution of powers, the relationship between rulers and the general mass of citizens, etc.

The point of a bottom-up policy is to balance selfish impulses in a smart way. This balancing act requires a certain level of intelligence. There's also a certain balance in a wolf pack, but it's not smart. The strongest wolf is the leader. As soon as the leader weakens, he is killed. In humans, rational mechanisms are also involved in the distribution of roles and powers. The strong unite in society

[1] *Rousseau, J.-J.* The Social Contract. Treatises. Moscow: KANON-press; Kuchkovo, 1998.

and strive to conclude social contracts that would guarantee their dominant position and further strengthen their position. However, the lower classes may respond to forms of political revolution, uprisings, and popular unrest that they consider too unfair. The weaker ones may unite and pose a greater threat. Therefore, it is necessary to negotiate with the lower classes and take their opinions into account. This gives rise to a secondary form of social contract — already within the framework of the Leviathan that has been created: the upper classes negotiate with the lower classes — this is already a different form of social contract. It would be easier to simply suppress the lower classes (as, according to contemporary political philosophers, was the case in Antiquity and the Middle Ages), but even the weak possess intelligence and are capable of realising their selfish interests, which suffer from the domination of the stronger. Thus, they can strike back. The development of this idea leads to socialism and communism. But Hobbes serves as the starting point in any case.

The balance of revising various social contracts constitutes the political history of the modern era. But in any case, in the Modern era, no one seriously questions that the political body of Leviathan itself, its evolution and modernisation, is based on the actions of selfish actors who recombine with each other, creating — always from the bottom up — various political models. At the same time, the bottom-up principle becomes increasingly emphasised, erasing even the distant remnants of verticality inherent in the political systems of early modernity.

Leviathan is a "god-machine," a "god-mechanism," a man-made "god." It is *a* true *idol*. Friedrich Nietzsche expresses this very accurately:

> The state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. It lies coldly, and this lie creeps from its mouth: "I, the state, am the people." (...)
>
> The state lies in all languages about good and evil: and what it says, it lies — and what it has, it has stolen.
>
> Everything in it is fake: it bites with stolen teeth, toothless.
> Even its womb is fake.
>
> The mixing of languages in good and evil: I give you this sign as a sign of the state. Truly, this sign means the will to die! Truly, it winks at the preachers of death!
>
> Too many people are being born: the state was invented for the surplus!

Look how it draws them to itself, this multitude!
How it suffocates them, chews them up and chews them over!
"There is nothing on earth greater than me: I am the ordering finger of God," roars the monster [1].

Therefore, Hobbes emphasises that there is nothing sacred or holy in the state. Monstrous — yes, frightening — yes, awe-inspiring — yes. But it is just an ordinary man dressed in a police uniform. It is the shell that frightens. When the wearer of the uniform comes home, changes into his home clothes, sits down next to his wife and children, he is harmless and dangerous. There is nothing frightening about him, nothing of the monster. But dressed in his armour, the guardian of order gives the impression of a storm.

This observation is wittily described in the fairy tale "The Wonderful Wizard of Oz" [2]. The ruler of the Emerald City, "The Great and Terrible," turns out to be a harmless and pathetic fool who inspires fear only by virtue of a "social contract," embodied by the mandatory requirement to wear green glasses so that all objects in the Emerald City appear emerald. This is exactly what Nietzsche means when he says about the state:
"everything in it is fake."

The meaning of the state is only to frighten. But unlike the sacred, it inspires fear, not horror. It does not abolish our self, replacing it with something new, a new spiritual personality, but simply suppresses it, forces it to bend, curl up, and tremble lowly.

Jean Bodin and the concept of "sovereignty"

Jean Bodin was another creator of the political philosophy of the Modern Age. He played a significant role in political thought during the turbulent 16th century, which was a turning point for France and Europe as a whole, when there was fierce opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism. Jean Bodin drew a fundamental political conclusion from the religious conflict between the Huguenots (Protestants) and Catholics, which, on the one hand, took Calvinist theories of opposition to Rome and its supranational authority to their logical conclusion, and on the other, partly in the spirit of the Catholic party (but entirely in the spirit of Lutheranism), advocated the absolutisation of royal power. In this way, he arrived at *the form*

[1] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra. P. 35.
[2] *Baum, F. L.* The Wonderful Wizard of Oz/Baum, F. L. The Magic Land. St. Petersburg: Andreev and Sons, 1991.

models of the nation state, combining monarchism and the interests of the bourgeoisie, without any specific religious component. Thus, Jean Bodin, somewhat anticipating Hobbes, became the main theorist *of political modernity,* asserting as the norm *a* completely *secular state,* detached from any religious (sacred) content

Jean Bodin's main idea is *the concept of sovereignty*. From his point of view, the state is based on the fact that there is no higher legal or religious authority *above it*. The state has no transcendent goals; its tasks are purely technical. It must protect citizens from external enemies and organise economic and social life based on maximum efficiency and rationality. Bodin's state is a purely mechanical construct whose function is limited to optimal material organisation.

According to Boden, the sovereignty of the state is justified precisely by the fact that it has no tasks that go beyond the scope of technical concerns and challenges. If the state does not serve any idea or mission, then there is no authority capable of evaluating its activities based on higher criteria. The state can judge only itself; this is the essence of its sovereignty, the absence of any higher levels.

Like Hobbes in the biblical triad of Job, Leviathan and God, God is removed and his place is taken by a man-made monster, Leviathan. In Bodin's view, the sovereign, the bearer of sovereignty, is the highest authority. And although Boden does not deny God, in the spirit of deism, he denies Him the ability to effectively intervene in the course of human history. History is made only by the sovereign. He may or may not take God into account. But this has no bearing on the structure of the Political itself.

The elimination of the power of the Pope

This idea that the head of state and the state itself are fundamentally absolute structures is radically new to medieval thinking. God becomes politically powerless, unable and unwilling to intervene in the course of human political history. In effect, he is placed outside the brackets. It is obvious that this is just as radical as

[1] *Bodin, J.* Six Books on the State /Anthology of World Political Thought: In 5 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow: Mysl, 1999.

radically contradicts the Catholic idea of the "two cities" and the ontology of the Empire, as well as the ideas of Machiavelli and Hobbes.

Today, the concept of sovereignty is the foundation of international law and a basic constitutional norm. We use it easily. But why was it important to introduce this concept in the 16th century, when Jean Bodin lived and wrote his works? Because at that time, there was still a belief that there was an authority above states that limited their power — primarily the Roman Catholic Church. The Pope appointed cardinals and bishops, who were, in essence, conduits of the supranational system. The cardinal was the most important figure in a European nation-state; he was subordinate not to the king, but to the Pope. This gave rise to dual power. The universal supranational power of Catholicism, the Pope, and the national power of the king. The essence of Bodin's idea is that there cannot be two powers in a nation state, and all power should be transferred to a secular ruler, i.e., a prince or king. The king is sovereign because sovereignty is the fundamental assertion that there is no other higher legal authority above the king. Therefore, according to Bodin, European society should be viewed as a collection of sovereign states, sovereign units, rather than a single legal field of the Catholic Church, united consecrated by the Pope.

For the era in which Bodin lived, this was a completely new conception of the very nature of politics. Before him, the idea of the state had a sacred foundation: the state serves the Church. Hence such concepts as "Christian monarchy," coalitions of "Christian countries," etc. The Christian principle, embodied in the Catholic Church, was the authority that spiritually endowed the national European states with *a* certain spiritual, supernatural, and super-rational *mission.* The guardians of this mission were the representatives of the Pope, who were the bearers of supranational control. According to Carl Schmitt, this type corresponded to the concept of "commissarial dictatorship" ([1])i.e., a form of government in which the entire ruling institution acted in the name of a higher goal. The Pope himself did not rule on his own behalf, but as "Commissioner of Christ." And his legates, cardinals, and all other clergy, obeying the Pope, also participated in this mission through him. The system of power was open. Boden, however, postulates a completely different model—from now on, the king's power is a "sovereign dictatorship."

[1] *Schmitt, K.* Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle.

where the head of the institution of power is the individual as such. And it is precisely this individual — as a person, not as the bearer of a mission — who is served by his subordinates and the entire people. The words attributed to Louis XIV (1643–1715) can serve as a formula for "sovereign dictatorship":
"I am the state!"

The king's musketeers against the cardinal's guards

Let us recall the famous novels of Alexandre Dumas (1802–1870), featuring the king's musketeers and the cardinal's guards. Their confrontation reflected the fundamental dilemma of 17th-century France: the Catholic authority of the Pope or the national sovereignty of the monarch. The cardinal's guards were a French segment of a special supranational army — bearers of a pan-European (and, given the European colonies, global) network of "commissarial dictatorship." They were not guided by the personal interests of the powerful Richelieu (1585–1642), but ensured *the unity of the European world in the name of a supranational mission.* In this case, sovereignty — and openly so — was held only by the Pope and his system of cardinals, who oversaw the nation states as representatives of the "heavenly city" in the "earthly city." As we have seen, in the model of the blessed Augustine, this "city of heaven," from a Catholic point of view, was the city of the righteous (hence celibacy and priests), while the "city of earth" was the city of sinners. The musketeers, who were on the side of Dumas himself and, more broadly, the republican-nationalist-oriented French of the 19th century, who had by that time already lived for several centuries in a world where the ideas of Jean Bodin had completely prevailed.

It is precisely against the "dictatorship of the commissars" of the Pope and his legates that Bodin's main idea is directed. According to Boden, the state has no mission whatsoever and *therefore* no authority should be above the king. Consequently, cardinals should be stripped of all real power and be purely ecclesiastical officials. In essence, this is a change in the conception of the political system of all European politics and all European philosophy. Here, the "heavenly city" disappears from view altogether. Politics becomes the exclusive domain of the "earthly city." But since there is nothing to compare it to, it cannot be called a "city of sinners." Thus, the vertical dimension is completely removed from politics.

Towards the Westphalian world order

Boden's monarchism is completely desacralised. In his understanding, the king is a strictly immanent and technical figure, but being placed at the head of the state, he becomes its concentrated expression. The sovereign king represents the highest authority of the Political.

In practice, this meant that each state had complete and absolute freedom to build its relations with other states solely and exclusively on the basis of its national interests. Previously, the European order was qualitatively different: for example, Rome and the Catholic Church, which had significant legal powers, actively intervened in disputes and conflicts between England and France. Of course, secular rulers did not always follow the instructions of the popes and tried to influence them themselves (due to political intrigues and unrest in the Catholic Church in the late 14th and early 15th centuries, there were several popes), but from the point of view of the European legal system, it was precisely this supranational system that was legitimate. It was based on the (probably apocryphal) "Donation of Constantine," a legendary document or order according to which Constantine the Great (272–337) transferred full power over the Western Roman Empire to Pope Sylvester (?–335). In such a situation, neither France, nor England, nor any other European power was sovereign in the full sense of the word. It was precisely against this that Jean Bodin's ideas were directed. From now on, the rulers of nation states became the highest actors. And there was no higher authority above them. Relations between them were determined solely on the basis of bilateral treaties, alliances and coalitions, negotiations or war. This was most clearly evident in Protestant England, but France, although it never broke decisively with Catholicism, became the second pole of the new political system. Therefore, although political sovereignty is a product of Protestant thought, it found its application in the Catholic world, where the avant-garde of the transition to modernity was France.

The system based on the principle of sovereignty was finally adopted by the European powers in the 17th century following the bloody Thirty Years' War. In it, a coalition of Protestant countries in northern Europe clashed with southern European powers that sided with the Counter-Reformation and remained loyal to Rome and the Habsburgs. The Catholic south...

made a last-ditch attempt to preserve — even restore — the medieval order, which assumed the supremacy of the popes and the status of the Empire. But even during this war, it became clear that a number of Catholic countries (primarily France) were guided not by a common Catholic agenda, but by their own national interests (opposition to Austria, etc.). Since neither side managed to gain a decisive advantage during the Thirty Years' War, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 essentially cemented the victory of the principle of national sovereignty, rejecting any legal basis for religious authorities, whether Catholic or Protestant. In essence, this was an ideological victory for Protestantism, which initially (in Luther and England) advocated the complete autocracy of national kings and princes. From that moment on, the nation state and its sovereign became the highest political authority, and religious issues were relegated to the periphery of politics. This situation was enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia, which remains the main norm of international law to this day. Thus, the ideas of Jean Bodin prevailed.

Inside Leviathan

We can draw an analogy between the main concepts of the three fundamental founding fathers of modern politics:

The Prince (Machiavelli) — Leviathan (Hobbes) — the sovereign (Bodini)

These are very similar and interrelated concepts. Together and separately, they constitute a new (compared to Antiquity and the Middle Ages) structure of the Political. From now on, politics is situated exclusively in the conditions of the "world of this life"; the ontological vertical collapses, and the state is conceived as an exclusively immanent phenomenon. Politics becomes material, materialistic, technical, and exclusively earthly, sharply detached from any heavenly spiritual dimension. In such politics, there is no place for a philosopher-king or even a warrior-aristocrat. Everything in it is subordinated to utilitarian practical tasks. To recognise the legitimacy of Machiavelli's Prince, Hobbes' Leviathan or Bodin's sovereignty is tantamount to agreeing with the pig-polity and the legitimacy of its philosophical foundations.

Today we live in Hobbes' world (Leviathan, social contract, rational egoism), under the rule of the Prince (the source of names

but sovereign, not commissarial, dictatorship), and from the point of view of the structure of international law — in Jean Bodin's system (the Peace of Westphalia). Any supranational organisations — such as the UN, etc. — have only symbolic significance and possess a recommendatory status[1]. Any state may accept or reject the principles of "international law," since the main provision of this law is precisely sovereignty, which means, among other things, the completely justified possibility of disregarding any international norms. If the principle of sovereignty is recognised as the highest foundation, any supranational union is nothing more than a club. Ostracism or condemnation may be psychologically and morally unpleasant and even painful, but there is no authority that can legitimately force a sovereign state to pursue or refrain from pursuing a particular policy. Only force decides everything, and the decisive argument for exerting pressure on a sovereign state is the ability of another state or coalition of states to compel it to act in one way or another by force.

The politics of the third principle

We live in a world of "Leviathan"; we are dealing with actors of rational egoism, that is, with rational wolves; this justifies the very existence of the state, and the legitimacy of violence on the part of the state is justified precisely by this pessimistic anthropology. Sovereignty is the reality that continues to be of absolute importance to us today. Bodin wrote in the 16th century, but even today this is a fundamental factor in the very structure of the political system, regardless of the specific state in which we live. We are still in Jean Bodin's world. This world remains Westphalian, which means that we base our international practice and international law on the principle of sovereignty.

It is with these three European thinkers—Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bodin—that a paradigm shift in political philosophy takes place. We are leaving behind the state of the Father and the state of the Son, political Platonism and political Aristotelianism, and moving towards the domination of the third principle of Timaeus, the realm of the third social type (the common people, the majority, the demos) and the third principle of the soul (carnal bodily desires).

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology). Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

All these lines are synchronised — the rise of the bourgeoisie, capitalism, secularisation, the abolition of the transcendent dimension, the transition from the vertical to the horizontal, the replacement of religion by science, the shift of the main criterion from unity to multiplicity, etc.

This is how not only the subject but also the object changes. Instead of Plato's and Aristotle's universe, Democritus' universe becomes the norm. Atoms of matter have their counterparts in society in the form of individuals, citizens of a democratic system. The masculine contemplative and heroic principle gives way to Mother, Nurturer, and Recipient.

Chapter 4. Individualism as the basis of political philosophy in the modern era

The basis of Protestantism is the social contract

The dominant basis of modern politics is the idea of the individual as the basic instance of the political. That is, the political is conceived as a product of the creation of the individual. As we have seen, the origins of this approach lie in the special theology of Protestantism, which placed the individual rational being at the centre of the interpretation of Holy Scripture.

Protestants view the Church as a human creation resulting from a social contract. The social contract forms the Church for Protestantism. At the heart of this Church is not the clergy (as in Catholicism), nor apostolic grace, nor a group of people united by the sacrament of baptism (as in Orthodox Christianity), but a contract between individuals. Protestants believe that Christians agree among themselves, and the Church is created from this agreement.

This gives Protestantism a deeply *democratic* character as a religion. In some cases, this leads to the rejection of the priesthood altogether — when there is no pastor at all, or he is elected by all members of the community and does not receive any additional ordination. In many forms of Protestantism (especially in Calvinism, its variants and parallel movements), this leads to the rejection of the Eucharist. In addition, in Protestant sects, we see an almost complete rejection of icons — statues and images of saints and even of Christ himself are considered "idolatry."

In fact, the concept of the Church is radically changing. The Protestant Church is a product of a collective agreement, a social contract.

All we need to do is secularise this Protestant ecclesiology, and we get the basic model of the political philosophy of the New

time. In Protestantism, the principle of the individual is still applied to the interpretation of Scripture, which is still considered sacred and unquestionable authority. The next step towards Modernism is the rejection of this, and from now on individuals are free to interpret not only the Bible, but everything in general. The motive of the sufficiency of the rational principle for judging how a particular passage of Scripture should be understood is extended to the limit: from now on, man can make any judgement based on his own reason.

This is how the normative representation of the subject of the New Age as an individual is formed. This conception is characteristic of all three classical ideologies of modernity — liberalism, communism, and fascism. These three political theories describe practically the entire spectrum of basic, mainstream versions of political philosophy in the modern era. These ideologies take different positions in relation to the individual — but nevertheless, in all three, the idea of the basic source of politics is taken not from outside the human being (in God, in the sacred, in nature, etc.), but precisely from within the human being. The individual human being becomes the main subject of politics. This is the specificity of the modern era.

At the root of all three theories lies the secular model of Protestant ideology. To put it somewhat simplistically, one could say that if we take Protestant ideology and remove God, Christ, and the Holy Scriptures, we are left with the political philosophy of the modern era and the idea of the social contract that underlies this politics.

The paradoxes of the atom — the nihilistic underpinnings of modern ontology

There is a direct and immediate connection between atomism in physics and individualism in political philosophy. This reveals the unity of philosophy and politics, which constitutes the nature of both.

In fact, the concept of the individual is not as simple and self-evident as it may seem. The philosophy of the New Age introduces a new element into the structure of the world that was absent in the Middle Ages, in Antiquity, in religious society, in the world of Tradition, and in cultures where the sacred prevailed.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

The theories of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius were excluded from the prevailing systems of cosmology and ontology (predominantly Platonic or Aristotelian), which directly rejected atomism. However, modern physics, beginning with Galileo and Gassendi, brought this marginal theory of atomism back into the spotlight. The idea that there is something indivisible at the lowest level of the world (the atom in nature and the individual in society) was an avant-garde, paradigmatic idea of the modern era, since the concept of matter in the scholastic, Platonic, and Aristotelian sense is fundamentally anti-atomistic. Why? Because matter is seen as a principle of insufficiency (i.e., privation, absence). The movement towards matter is a process of cooling of the Spirit, the fading of the idea of light. But darkness is only the absence of light. Evil is the diminution of good[1] as Plotinus wrote, which was taken up by Christian Platonism. And in this sense, matter as such does not exist.

Matter is merely a horizon, a limit towards which the falling Spirit strives. There is no darkness as such, only *fading light*. Therefore, from a philosophical point of view, in the era of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and classical philosophy, matter is *a process of materialisation*. Matter is only a limit, only a horizon that is unattainable in itself. The spirit fades, and the process of its fading is movement towards matter. Matter itself was thought of as something that does not exist, as something apophatic, having no existence in itself.

Accordingly, matter is not something given, but *a process*. There is no indivisible atom, there is *a process of division*. Only the conditional, purely conceptual horizon of this division can be called
"matter." There is a process of dispersion of the original unity into a multitude, and *the limit of division*, which is unattainable in the full sense, is called "matter."

In this case, atomism cannot exist, because any material atom — as something that is not subject to "tomé" (Greek τομή) — "division" — is the limit of division, and this limit is ontologically unattainable. An atom can exist as the last link in an infinite chain of division, having no existence of its own.

This is how classical philosophy thinks, and on this it builds its theories about political structure, about the sacred Empire, about the mission of the state. Everything proceeds from the One and moves towards multiplicity in the course of ever greater movement, fragmentation,

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[1] Literally: "Evil is not some deficiency of good, but rather a complete deficiency." *Plotinus.* First Ennead. P. 275.

fragmentation, but never fully reaches this multiplicity, since it represents "nothingness."

It is interesting that Democritus himself builds his atomistic terminology on a pair of concepts — δέν and οὐδέν, which are usually interpreted as "atom" and "emptiness." But only οὐδέν is a full Greek word, meaning "nothing," "absence"[1]. The second term, δέν, has no meaning in the language and was artificially created by Democritus to denote the opposite of "nothing," that is, "not nothing." According to Democritus, δέν means "something," "particle," "atom." But the very creation of this artificial concept is highly significant: Democritus begins with "nothing" (οὐδέν) and moves from there to designate its conceptual opposite. However, Democritus does not use an existing Greek word, but deliberately creates a neologism — δέν. This is necessary to emphasise the purely speculative (conceptual) nature of the "atom," which is postulated by the mind but is not an object of sensory perception like ordinary physical objects. And the fact that this concept is postulated in opposition to another — the original — concept ooúδέν, indicates the ontological primacy of negation. We have said that Democritus himself, unlike his interpreters, does not define the atom as "existing." Not to be "non-existent"
"emptiness" and "nothingness" do not necessarily mean "being." The speculative nature of the atom does not give Democritus sufficient grounds to speak about existence with the same certainty as Plato and Aristotle (for whom the mind itself is God and obviously represents the maximum of being). Therefore, in opposition to "nothing" (οὐδέν), the term δέν appears as an indication of a special mode of being, derived only from rational reasoning and not confirmed by sensory experience. It is important that, from a linguistic point of view, unlike the Russian "ni-chto" or the English "no-thing", the second part of the Greek term οὐδέν, i.e. δέν itself, does not carry the meaning of "thing" (English "thing"). Rather, it corresponds to the Greek particle δέ, which is translated into Russian as "well," "how," "how so," etc., while οὐδέν in this case is something like "here it is," "how so," etc.
"here it is", "how is it", etc., and οὐδέν in this case is something like
"No." By discarding "no," we do not obtain something affirmative; rather, we obtain something meaningless in itself and taken separately from other words — "ze." It is telling that in modern Greek, δέν means precisely "no," "not," as a shortened form of οὐδέν, where the negation οὐ has undergone apheresis. Thus, the truncated word has retained the meaning of the more complete earlier version. From here

[1] *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 250, 253.

we can draw the most important conclusion: the atom as δέν is not, in the full sense of the word, an ontological instance, that is, something that exists, relating to being. Δέν is not "something" obtained by reading "nothing" or "no" out of "nothing." Δέν is "not nothing," about whose existence we cannot say anything definite. The negation of negation in ontology and philosophy (unlike in arithmetic) does not necessarily lead to affirmation. And if, according to Democritus, things that are perceived by the senses are phantoms (ειδωλον), then atoms are the sources of phantoms, their genetic matrices.

Democritus understood emptiness and atoms collectively, which in classical ancient cosmology were seen as matter,
"many" (πολλά), since the absence of an eidetic principle (form) did not allow one to speak of any justified existence and could only be a purely conceptual abstraction, arbitrarily posited within "nothingness." Therefore, δέν as the antithesis of ούδέν is not yet "something," although it is postulated "as not nothing." The ontology of the atom is problematic and contrary to the obvious — both to the obviousness of the classical light mind and to the elements of sensory perception. The atom is something that is as non-ostensible and non-evident as an idea or spirit, but it is not located above, in the realm of the mind, but below, in the inaccessible depths of nothingness.

The same applies to individuals in society. Such a figure does not exist, since every person is partly individual and partly collective, and the proportions between these statuses are extremely complex and multidimensional. To obtain an individual, it is necessary to destroy society. Similarly, in order to obtain an atom, one must first destroy the body by dispersing it below the body's boundaries. Nothing is found only at the boundary with nothingness.

Hence *the nihilism of atomism as a whole*. Not only classical vertical ontologies see matter as nothing, but Democritus, who was groping, nevertheless, in the densest medium of non-being (materiality) for something that differs from it, agrees with this in a certain sense.

It is telling that as atomistic physics developed, it became apparent that an indivisible limit could not be reached, and what was previously considered an "atom," "indivisible," turned out to be "divisible," consisting of even smaller particles that could be divided again. Thus, the atom remains unattainable, which, however, does not refute Democritus, but only emphasises the original conceptual nihilism of his theory. Similarly, the individual is unattainable in society, since even if we free man from all ties to collective identity, we will not reach

the minimum of humanity — beyond that begins the transition to the dividuum, the "parliament of organs," the "rhizome," genetic engineering, and cyborg projects, which form the basis of postmodern anthropology (post-humanism and transhumanism).

An idiot is a person without qualities.

If we consider the classical ancient or medieval interpretation of the nature of earthly man, he was necessarily thought of as part of something. He is part of Adam, part of the Church, part of the people, part of the political body. In a sense, man is part of his own soul (and not vice versa). The individual, on the other hand, is a conditional abstract result (non-existent and impossible in reality) of the dismemberment of some whole. Therefore, in the full sense of *the word, the individual* does not and cannot exist from the point of view of traditional political philosophy. There is *individuation,* a movement towards the individual, but the individual itself does not exist — because its content would be strictly zero. If we really find this individual, it will be insignificant, nihilistic. It will be as elusive an abstraction as Democritus' δέν. As we move from the whole to the particular, as the whole is dismembered, we lose content. Therefore, the individual as such is an empty abstraction.

In Ancient Greece, the term was used to denote a figure in which all qualitative forms of collective identity were abolished and which was reduced to the simple fact of the existence of a human being in complete isolation from content.

"Idiot," ἰδιῶτης. The modern Russian word "idiot" (both in the clinical and derogatory sense) is a calque of an ancient Greek political term that describes a private individual who does not belong to any social group. An idiot is a person who has no ancestors in this city, no place in the social system, no connection to a cult or profession. Such people are neither citizens nor slaves; they are nobodies. They are idiots. An idiot is a pure individual, devoid of any specific form of social identity, with the necessity associated with collective existence and its parameters.

In Greece, where everything was of high quality, an "idiot" was considered to be a person who, for example, came to a city where no one knew him and was unable to say anything meaningful or relevant about himself. The person exists, but there is no substance to him. There were no mythological ancestors, no connection to religion (at least, recognisable within the framework of

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

this society). At the same time, he may be rich, strong, handsome, attractive. But when people in the Greek polis tried to define him, they said, "He's just a 'private individual,' an idiot."

In clinical terms, an "idiot" is a person who is unable to form any coherent discourse, does not really know who they are, and is incapable of making the minimal distinctions and actions necessary to communicate with those around them. No matter how an idiot feels or what he thinks of himself, he is completely detached from society, desocialised and incapable of socialisation. Here, the political criterion of the Greek polis is transferred to a clinical case, which is a pathology and a clear anomaly for any culture. An idiot is a private individual without qualities. A unit with eyes, ears and eyebrows, but no content. What to do with an idiot, with a pure individual as such? In many societies, this was a serious problem. Where to put them? On the one hand, they are not human beings, since they do not possess any form of effective socialisation; on the other hand, they exist and resemble human beings. In some societies, idiots were banished or even killed. In others, such as Christian societies, they were allowed to live freely and were even supported. But even in this case, they were not endowed with any qualities other than the most general ones. Thus, the euphemism for "idiot" was the word "cretin," derived from the French le chr tien, meaning "Christian," which implied that a person lacked any qualities, connections, or characteristics, Therefore, out of mercy, in Christian society they were simply called "Christians" or "good Christians."

The idiot as the norm and individuals as objects

The new era, following the logic of atomism, including socio-political atomism, radically changes the attitude towards the individual. From now on, a person deprived of qualities acts as a social atom and, consequently, as a positive phenomenon (rather than the result of the sum of properties). Thus, something unprovable, non-existent (like an atom in physics) or frankly degenerative is taken as the starting point, the fundamental model for understanding the political process. The origins [of] individualism are therefore not as obvious as they might seem at first glance.

It seems that there is nothing more empirically obvious than the individual. Ostensibly pointing to someone next to us or

[1] *Dumont L.* Essay on Individualism.

When we think about ourselves, we automatically consider both aspects of an individual to be ours. In reality, this is not the case. In order to extract the individual from a specific person, including ourselves, it is necessary to subtract from them everything that constitutes their collective identity: language, way of thinking, gender, parents, origin, education, school, nationality, age, social roles and statuses, etc.

If we take the sociological completeness that forms the content of personality (persona [1]), and subtract all collective forms, we get an abstraction. It is this individual — the social δέν — that is considered the main actor in the political philosophy of the New Age. It is he who enters into a social contract with another individual for the subsequent formation of a political body. Similarly, according to Democritus, bodies are formed by invisible and imperceptible atoms. It is important that the state is created not by people, not by personalities, not by collective identities, but precisely by "individuals," that is, philosophical abstractions. These abstractions henceforth become political and legal norms existing in the ontology of law, but which cannot be discovered in reality, except in cases of clinical idiocy. Nevertheless, it is precisely this instance that is considered to conclude the social contract.

Let us recall Hobbes' Leviathan. What characteristics did he attribute to this normative idiot? He is not quite an idiot, that is, a person without qualities. But he is close to it. Hence the stable and extremely important metaphor of a beast. Moreover, a wild one — in Hobbes' case, a wolf. Plato, who also wanted to express a minimum of social and political qualities, used metaphors of pigs — hence the term "pig farmer." Democritus saw the origins of human society in the imitation of animals. People learned

> from spiders to weave and darn, from swallows to build houses, and from singing birds — swans and nightingales — to sing[2].

Thus, according to Hobbes, an idiot is a wolf. It is someone who, based on their purely selfish desires, wants to obtain the maximum possible amount of pleasure, possession, food, comfort,

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[1] The fact that personality, unlike individuality, is a social and even sociological concept is explained in detail by anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872–1950). See*: Mauss, M.* Societies. Exchange. Personality. Works on Social Anthropology. Moscow: Knizhny Dom "Universitet," 2011.

[2] *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 352.

security. Accordingly, this is someone who strives to build a situation from within themselves. At the centre of their system are their desires and appetites, and on the periphery is everything else. Of course, the beast is by no means an idiot, and is driven by a fairly rigid programme that predetermines its very nature. In this sense, it is collective: all wolves or all hares act almost identically in similar situations. This means that they have certain qualities and characteristics. But when applied to humans, the metaphor of the beast is an attempt to find some kind of atomic basis, that is, to strip humans of everything human. The individual is a beast in the sense that it arises as a result of subtracting human content from humans, as the fruit of abstraction, reduction, and liberation from the human eidos. The most material beginning in a human being is much more material than the body. The body has form, structure, qualities. The fact of separateness carries nothing but the act of cutting off, tearing away, dismembering. Therefore, "wolf," "pig," or "bee" in political narratives applied to humans serve to illustrate the special essences of "wolf-man," "pig-man," "bee-man," etc., designed to describe the chimerical and purely speculative nature of the individual. These are not animals as such, but a specific metaphor illustrating the concept of individuality.

It is very important to note that *the individual is not a subject*. More precisely, the very concept of subject (Greek υποκείμενον, Latin subjectum) carries a semantic ambiguity: it literally means "below," "under" (Greek υπο-, Latin sub-). In Greek, there was a similar term, hypostasis, ὑπόστασις (from υπο- "under" and στᾰ́σις, στᾰ́σεως — "standing," "being"). But what is "under" or "inside" a thing or being can be interpreted in two philosophical paradigms. On the one hand, it is a hidden essence (Greek οὐσία, Latin essentia), which in the Platonic and Aristotelian perspective means the spiritual, heavenly principle, eidos, paradigm. In this case, the "subject" is conceived as a rational soul, that is, the highest level of the soul, peculiar only to humans, while animals, plants and stones have their own souls — animal, vegetative and mineral (there were different opinions about the souls of stones in Antiquity). In this case, the prefix υπο- or sub-oz- means "hidden behind the mask of corporeality," "located on the other side of phenomenal reality." The concept of "subject" has come to mean precisely this — the centre of the thinking, volitional soul of a human being. In Christian theology, this meaning became firmly associated with the concept of "hypostasis," which coincided with the Latin persona, meaning personality.

But it was possible to move in a different direction, following the literal meaning of the prefix "upo-" or "sub-," extending the movement from spirit to matter, from Father to Mother-Nurturer, from paradigm to "chore," from the One to the many, and giving it the meaning of that which lies even lower than the boundary of corporeality. In Latin, this interpretation became associated with the concept of sub-stantia, literally "that which is under," which gives us a complete calque from the Greek ὑπόστασις, but with the opposite meaning this time. Substantia is the deepest layers of materiality, located below the body; in a sense, it is not simply matter, but sub-matter, the material roots of matter. Scholastics directly contrasted the pair of terms essential and substantia with each other, referring to two opposite poles of existence — spiritual, divine, heavenly, thinking, and material, created, insignificant, earthly, and non-thinking. Later, this pair came to be defined as subject and object (objectum), where ob-jectum (Greek ἀντικείμενον) meant that which lies opposite, in front of the subject. At the origins of these concepts, one can see an indication of something hidden, which later came to be interpreted as "hidden" as spirit, as the source of things, as the inner dimension of being, and "hidden" as matter, as that which lies beneath the body, as the most external dimension of being. Ultimately, this could mean both limits of ontology and the One (Ev) and πολλά of Plato's Parmenides. Among the pre-Socratics, this terminology was not clearly defined, and therefore Democritus' atom should be understood from the context as the source of substance, that is, the maximum possible objectivity, materiality.

Interestingly, Aristotle discusses the atom in the social dimension, i.e., the individual in similar terms, in Politics, saying that the political dimension, i.e., collective identity, is the natural state of people, from which there are two possible ways out. Aristotle writes:

> Man is by nature a political animal (3¼ον πολιτικόν), and anyone who lives outside the state by virtue of his nature (διὰ φύσιν) and not by chance is either an immoral creature (φαυλός) or a superhuman (κρέσσων); Homer reviles him, saying, "without family, without tribe, without laws, without a home" (ἀφρέτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀβέστιος); such a man, by his very nature, craves only war; he can be compared to an isolated pawn on a chessboard (a3u3 ων Ƭσπερ Ɐν πεττοῖς)(1) .

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1 *Aristotle.* Politics. pp. 378–379.

Going beyond collective identity (political) gives us either a "superhuman," someone who is better, stronger, and more capable (kréissōv) than other people, or an underdeveloped degenerate — φαυλός. It is important that Aristotle compares him to an unpaired figure (Greek a3u3) in a game. What is meant by the individual in modern philosophy is precisely the sub-material section of the human being, the pole of attraction of the soul towards pure nothingness. The ego in man is the most (and not the least) material instance, which represents *an inverted vertical.* This is the "inner idiot," φαυλός, an unpaired meaningless object a3u3, or the political analogue of what Democritus calls "δέν," "not nothing." Indeed, the idiot/individual is not nothing, but at the same time it *is not something.* It is a vector pointing below the lower boundary of the body. And as Democritus said, atoms can only be seen with the mind, since they are pure concepts. But not Platonic ideas or Aristotelian essences, but [concepts,]something artificially assembled, as understood by modern philosophy. An individual is precisely an object, the most objective and distant part from its essence and spirit, from its eidos and its idea ([2]).

Such empty, "idiotic" individuals, "denes," become *normative figures* in the philosophy of the New Age. They are selfish because at the centre of their individual structure is the point of attraction of their ego, with its desires, ambitions, will, etc. But all the properties of the ego are no longer individual; they are shared by many. The ego itself is individual, its most inner dimension.

The bearer of the ego, the individual, is fundamentally unattainable in reality; it is as abstract and conceptual as a speculative atom.

In physics, the atom serves only as a reference point in the process of increasingly subtle division of matter. This division itself constitutes the essence of "progress" as the main content of time in the conditions of the New Age. This progress is a movement into the depths of matter, a striving to find an even smaller particle behind each new achievement. Progress is an intense transition from the unified

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[1] *Guattari, F., Deleuze, G.* What is Philosophy? Moscow: Institute of Experimental Sociology; St. Petersburg: Aleteya, 1998.

[2]In contemporary postmodern philosophy — primarily in speculative realism — this becomes the main goal: to reduce the human subject to an object. But such a reduction does not violate general individualism; on the contrary, it is the bringing of individualism to its ultimate logical limit. For the core of the individual is precisely the pure object or *the radical object.*

to many things. Therefore, knowledge about many things multiplies, and objects become increasingly fragmented. And although the next contender for the title of "atom" (i.e., something "indivisible") once again proves to be subject to division, progress does not stop and does not reconsider its starting point — belief in the atom.

In political philosophy, something similar happens with the individual. The postulation of the individual as an ego entity becomes the driving force of progress, which consists in liberating the individual from what is collective in him, from what can be separated from him. This determines the dynamics of political time in the modern era — social progress. This progress consists in *delving deeper into the social fabric* in order to find what is sought — the individual, who constantly eludes capture at every stage of liberation, repeatedly turning out to be a "dividee" or a bearer of collective identity. Protestantism liberates the individual from the Catholic Church with its dogmas and from the Empire with its mission. But he finds himself once again captive to the religious authority of one sect or another or under the rule of the Prince. Next comes the liberation of the individual from the state and politics. This is the ideal of civil society and the transition to purely economic interactions. The successes of liberalism, which are increasingly approaching the core of the individual, at some point emphasise that gender is also a collective identity, which gives rise to feminism and the call for gender optionality, just as religion, nationality, class, etc. were previously declared optional. The final step is the transition to post-humanism, since humans are also a collective identity. But it is obvious that the desired individual — pure "idiot" — will not be obtained in this case either, since the result of such liberation will be a machine and/or Artificial Intelligence, which in turn is something individual that can be analysed, dissected, and divided. Therefore, individualism in the New Age should be understood as a process, as a movement towards a limit that cannot be reached by analytical methods[1].

Goat-deer and pseudo-science

Given the special nature of atoms and the content of the basic concept of the individual, we can say that the main idea of the New Age is this: what does not exist, exists. Nihil (nothingness) exists. Non-being exists.

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[1] *Genon R.* The Science of Numbers. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2013.

This is an anti-Parmenidean paradox, although in a certain sense it had already been conceptualised in Plato's dialogues. From Plato's point of view, a lie is a non-being that exists, because if a person expresses an opinion, then the expression itself and the opinion presented in it exist. But being false, that is, narrating something that does not exist, it is not the whole truth and not complete being. This is how the ontology of falsehood arises — a kind of "pseudology" (ψευδολογία)(1).

If we take as the basis of being that which, from the point of view of Plato and Aristotle, does not exist (such as the worlds described by the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th hypotheses of Parmenides), then we find ourselves in the context of a special ontology — *pseudo-logical ontology,* which is precisely in the same sense as a false opinion. Plotinus wrote clearly about the "being" of matter:

> Everything that it (matter) presents itself as is a lie; it itself is a lie [2].

Such a pseudo-logical field of existence is pure nihilism. This is the basis of modern philosophy — nihilism manifested in the ontology of falsehood. That which cannot be (an atom or an individual) is taken for what is.

Aristotle, in his treatise "On Interpretation," gives an example of a possible word that denotes a thing whose existence or non-existence is undefined and cannot be determined. He writes:

> Names and verbs are like thoughts without connection or separation, for example, "man" or "white"; when nothing is added, there is neither false nor true, although they denote something: for "goat-deer" denotes something, but it is not yet true or false when the verb "to be" or "not to be" is not added, either in general or with regard to time(3).

For Aristotle, a goat-deer (Greek τραγέλαφος) is a phenomenon that has no ontological status, that is, a pure concept. In the 19th century, the representative of phenomenological philosophy, Alex-

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[1] *Plato.* Sophist.

[2] Διὸ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖπαγγέλληται ψεύδετα. *Plotinus.* Third Ennead/ *Plotinus.* Enneads: In 7 vols. Vol. 3. St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyshko Publishing House; University Book, 2010. P. 301.

[3] *Aristotle.* On Interpretation/Aristotle. Collected Works in 4 Volumes. Vol. 2. Moscow: Myśl, 1978. P. 93.

S. Meinong [1](1853–1920) proposed a special term for such objects: "substantiation." It is impossible to assert that they exist, but it cannot be proven that they do not exist, since at least the formal aspect of the name complies with certain structural rules and laws. Therefore, "goat-deer" or "golden mountains," according to Meinong, substist, they neither are nor are not. Such objects can be called "virtual" or "pseudo-logical."

The ontological status of an individual belongs to this category — it is a pseudo-logical unit, analogous to "goat-deer." The same applies to atoms.

The entire philosophy of the Modern Age is based on implicit nihilism. From the point of view of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the philosophy of the Modern Age is a well-developed, fundamental, scientifically substantiated lie.

[1] *Meinong, A.* On Possibility and Probability: Contributions to the Theory of Objects and the Theory of Knowledge. Leipzig: J. A. Barthe, 1915.

Chapter 5. Liberalism (the first political theory). John Locke and his legacy

The common metaphysical denominator of the three political ideologies of the Modern Age

In modern times, the history of European societies, as well as European colonies on other continents and in other parts of the world, unfolds exclusively in the context of Plato's third type of "Timaeus." The modern era was born out of a combination of the Renaissance and the Reformation, where the tendency towards the immanent and secular principles of the Renaissance was combined with Protestant individualism. Southern Europe, where the Renaissance began, did not accept the Reformation and individualism of northern Europe. The Council of Trent of the Catholic Church harshly rejected Calvinism and Lutheran theology, laying the foundation for the Counter-Reformation. In some areas of the Protestant world, Renaissance secularism was rejected (for example, by Calvin in Switzerland, where a peculiar Protestant theocracy was established). But the common denominator of Modern philosophy, in complete opposition to both Antiquity and the Middle Ages, was precisely the combination of materialism and secularism on the one hand, and individualism (social atomism) on the other. This is the formula of Modernity: materialism+ individualism.

These properties corresponded precisely to the third zone in the structure of Politica Aeterna, located at the base of the hierarchical triangle of the Political vertical. In ontology, it was about matter, multiplicity (πολλά), "chore" (χῶρα), nothingness, the lower limit of ontology, the "realm of quantity" [2], and in Democritus' model, about the great void (οὐδέν) and the atoms that separated from it (δέν). In the metaphysics of gender, it was about the figure of the Mother, the Nurturer, the Recipient, called upon to nurture and envelop the Son with an outer shell, wholly and completely

[1] *Gilson É.* Héloïse et Abélard. P.: J. Vrin, 1938.

[2] *Guénon, R.* The Kingdom of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. Essays on Hinduism. Esotericism in Dante. Moscow: Belovodye, 2003.

the creation of Heaven-Father. In the structure of the soul, this corresponded to the black horse, personifying carnal desire, bodily pleasures, comfort, etc. (θπιθυμία).

In politics, this was reflected in the urban population, which consisted mainly of artisans and merchants, and in a broader sense, all social units that were free and engaged in the production of goods and material objects — with peasants constituting the overwhelming majority in traditional society. However, peasants were placed outside the city-state and, consequently, at some distance from politics. Thus, a situation arose in which, in the social structure of three estates or classes, the peasants were replaced by townspeople, whose status did not correspond to either the warrior caste (aristocracy, nobility), the priestly caste (clergy), or the dynastic rulers (royal family). Therefore, urban artisans and merchants became representatives not only of themselves, but also of the peasants, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of any state until the very last eras. Peasants remained on the periphery of the Modern era, and townspeople — citizens, bourgeois — spoke on their behalf. Therefore, the third component of society, associated with the lower limit of ontology and anthropology, was represented at the origins of Modernity by the normative merchant, whose role grew as we moved from the paradigm of Tradition to the paradigm of Modernity. Thus, gradually, the bourgeoisie, the merchant became synonymous not just with the townspeople, but specifically with the merchant and entrepreneur, who was now the primary bearer of the physical, material, quantitative principle in society, that is, the collective image of the third estate, which originally included the peasantry, gradually completely pushed to the periphery of the Political.

The entire structure of the Political New Age belongs to this third segment on the Politica Aeterna map. Of course, Modernity did not triumph immediately, even in Europe itself, where its confrontation with traditional society, its philosophy, its interpretation of religion, its institutions and its foundations lasted for several centuries. Therefore, even in the Modern Age, we encounter certain remnants of the old — medieval — order or combined forms of it until the beginning of the 20th century. But from the point of view of political philosophy, everything that rightfully belongs to the modern era and represents contemporary political ideology must necessarily share the fundamental axioms of modernity, that is, the primacy and supremacy of the third sector of ontology, an-

tropology and politics. This means that only political ideology is truly modern in the full sense of the word, as it is based on materialism, a scientific worldview, and the recognition of the primacy of democracy and individual identity, with people uniting into various groups and collectives only artificially and secondarily. At the same time, it is precisely material aspirations (ἐπιθυμία) that are considered predominant and central in humans and society, while everything else is seen as a superstructure over the "black horse" from Plato's "Phaedrus." It is precisely this volitional (or lustful, since the word "lust," from the verb "to want," originally meant simply desire, will, aspiration) side of the human structure that is considered "real," primary, while everything else, including consciousness, is seen as important but secondary. Thus, man is equated with an animal, but one that has developed to such an extent that it has acquired rational qualities. Thus, Aristotle's definition of man as a "political animal" received a new — biological, materialistic — interpretation in the Modern era. For Aristotle, the political dimension is a constitutive quality of man, his eidos, manifested through his immediate physical presence. For the political anthropology of the modern era, beginning with Hobbes, politics was conceived as a new battlefield for survival, gradually formed and mastered by animals. For Aristotle, philosophy and politics are the natural state of man. For Hobbes, they are the result of going beyond the natural state, and for Locke, they are the product of the education (upbringing) of a neutral human inert mass ready to perceive any external impulse.

Within the entire segment of political philosophy of the New Era, as we have repeatedly stated, three distinct ideological forms can be identified: liberalism, communism, and nationalism (fascism). All of them fit completely within the framework of the Modern paradigm and therefore share its ideological tenets — primarily materialism and individualism — but while agreeing with this general tenet, they draw different conclusions, place different emphases and priorities, and offer their own interpretations and combinations of various political and philosophical terms and concepts. This unity of the common denominator and the differences in the theoretical and institutional constructs built upon it should always be kept in mind when considering contemporary political ideologies — liberalism, communism

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

and nationalism. Although they are very different and even antagonistic, grouping themselves into various combinations and alliances in the course of political history, and especially at the decisive stage of the 20th century, they share a common paradigmatic metaphysics and belong to the same segment of Politica Aeterna.

Three types of social contract and the universality of Hobbes

Starting with the Protestants, and especially with Calvin, we are dealing with individuals as the primary creators of the Church, society, and the state. Sometimes these three contracts are separated: agreement among people regarding the interpretation of religion creates a sect or denomination (this is a religious contract), agreement regarding the model of relations with each other at the horizontal level creates society (this is a social contract), and agreement regarding the system of subordination to authorities creates the state (this is the political contract). Secularisation leads to the first type of contract receding into the background, while the second and third come to the fore. At the same time, Hobbes does not distinguish between social and political contracts, since, in his view, individuals first and foremost agree with each other precisely on the creation of Leviathan, i.e. on power. Any other contract is secondary.

This is how *a* completely specific *political anthropology* emerges. The individual is endowed with derivative properties (such as egoism), regarded as the basis of the political body, and then the entire political philosophy is built around this figure. This figure forms the basis of the modern paradigm and is common to all types of political ideologies of the modern era. Liberals, socialists, and nationalists all build their doctrines on the centrality of individuals who enter into a contract with each other. In Hobbes, this contract generalises all possible types that will be derived from this principle in the future. First of all, individuals agree on power, that is, this contract is political, and at its centre stands the establishment of the state. Political nationalism follows precisely this line: the elevation of Leviathan to the highest value. And although, according to Hobbes, this is only a necessary measure for people who are wolves, nationalism gives Leviathan an axiological significance, making it a source of inspiration and positive affect. The individual wants to identify with Leviathan, to become one with it. The exaltation of this identification lies at the heart of modern nationalism and patriotism.

Liberalism and socialism pay more attention to the social contract, that is, the agreement between individuals regarding the creation of society. According to Hobbes, this stems from the will to have a state. But later, this aspect began to stand out as an independent dimension. The social contract does not form a vertical power structure, but rather a kind of trust, a company, or a cooperative. Here, too, certain mandatory rules apply, but they are much less strict and do not imply the establishment of a monopoly on violence in any one structure. Liberals and socialists partly contrast the social — horizontal — contract with the political (vertical) contract, believing — unlike nationalists — that the state is not a value but a necessity (or even an evil), and that the less state there is, the better. Therefore, in theory, according to liberal and socialist teachings, individuals can enter into a contract among themselves to dissolve the state and replace it with social, civil structures.

But there is also a difference between liberals and socialists — this time in their interpretation of the nature of the social contract itself. Both liberals and socialists reject social classes, traditional society, hierarchy, the sacredness of politics, the mission of the state, etc.; they are unanimous in their egalitarianism and desire for equality. But they understand equality differently. For liberals, the highest value is the individual, freed from all forms of collective identity — both classical (ancient, medieval, ecclesiastical, class, imperial, etc.) and new, artificial (national, state or even social). Therefore, liberals insist on equality of opportunity and starting conditions. This is the essence of the liberal contract: everyone agrees that no one in society should have special privileges, and that every individual is completely equal to every other. But only at the beginning. Then, individuals, endowed with equal opportunities, begin to realise them, bring them to life, and do so with varying degrees of success in the process of free competition. The optimal form of such competition is the market, since the economy is the most peaceful form of rivalry — unlike wars, robbery, and battles of all against all. Those individuals who have achieved success find themselves at the top of liberal society. Those who have lost are at the bottom. But this does not violate the principle of equality, liberals believe, and the principle of individual freedom is fully respected. In liberalism, individualism is most fully revealed, as it is freed from both Leviathan and the socialist interpretation of equality.

This socialist interpretation insists not only on equality of opportunity, but also on complete equality of individuals in practically all spheres. According to socialists, any competition carries an element of dishonesty, and starting conditions are never equal in reality. Moreover, the property inequality that develops in a liberal society is unjust and violates the freedom of some individuals (the unsuccessful, the weak, the losers) in favour of others (the successful, the strong, the winners). This gives rise to the idea of a different type of social contract, which can be called socialist. Individuals enter into it among themselves with regard to the recognition of the imperative of de facto equality, which can be achieved through the redistribution of wealth or specific tax policies.

But here the state comes into play again. Some authority must supervise that individuals comply with the contract, whatever it may be, liberal or socialist. Therefore, the state (Leviathan) once again becomes necessary as an instrument for coercing individuals to comply with what they themselves have decided. Such a state may be liberal or socialist, but it comes back into play.

Thus, Hobbes and his political philosophy retain their significance in later stages of the development of modern political philosophy, when his own views receive a more differentiated and isolated interpretation.

John Locke: anthropological optimism

Before Hobbes' fundamental ideas, in various interpretations, became the semantic axes of the three main political ideologies of the Modern era, Hobbes' anthropological pessimism, his view of the evil nature of man (man as a wolf), his egoism, and the immutability of this state of affairs. At the same time, as we have said, this pessimism is purely secular and breaks away from the Christian notion of original sin. Man as an individual is ultimately just a beast, which determines everything else — right down to the contract and Leviathan.

The response to Hobbes' challenge came in the 17th century from another fundamental philosopher of the Modern Age, the founder of political liberalism

[1] *Schmitt, K.* Leviathan in the Doctrine of the State by Thomas Hobbes. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2006.

liberalism, John Locke[1]. Like Hobbes, Locke extended his fundamental influence over the entire political philosophy of the Modern era, right up to the 21st century. But while Hobbes encompasses the entire political Modernity — in all three dominant ideologies (liberalism, socialism, nationalism) — Locke extends his influence primarily to liberals, who necessarily follow the basic tenets of his thought. For socialists and nationalists, he is more of an ideological opponent, which at the same time includes recognition of the soundness and integrity of his teachings.

Liberalism could have been derived from Hobbes if we focus on the individual, who already forms the basis of politics in his work. But it is Locke who adds something to Hobbes's teaching that significantly changes the parameters of political ontology. Locke's paradigm responds to the challenge of Hobbes' paradigm at the deepest philosophical level. For Hobbes, the normative individual is evil — homo homini lupus est. This "idiot wolf" has no qualities other than greed, selfishness, and the desire to destroy others, subjugate them, eat them, and take everything they have. This view of man lies at the heart of Leviathan. Taking into account the analysis of the ontology of atomism and accepting the fundamental thesis that the individual is the most objective, material and even sub-material principle, Hobbes' idea seems quite well-founded metaphysically, although it rejects the very possibility of an alternative — primarily non-individualistic, holistic, eidetic, Christian — Platonic and Aristotelian — anthropology. Hobbes is right in saying that man as an individual is indeed a wolf. But he clearly exaggerates when he asserts that no other human beings exist.

But Locke criticises Hobbes and his view of man from a position that is by no means Platonic or Aristotelian. Locke is just as much an individualist, nominalist and modernist as Hobbes. He also does not allow for any human identity other than the individual. But he disagrees with Hobbes's assessment of the individual — not man as a whole, but the individual himself, the social idiot, the political atom. Thus, Locke accepts Hobbes's boundaries and does not seek to go beyond them, but while remaining within them, he radically changes their interpretation. For him, the individual is still the same profane, desacralised individual (as in Hobbes), but now he sees him not in a sinister light, but quite benevolently. This is not a change of anthropological register or subject of study, but a change of perspective.

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[1] *Locke, J.* Works in Three Volumes. Moscow: Myśl, 1985–1988.

rhetoric of its description. What horrified Hobbes, Locke even likes to some extent. Locke domesticates the individual, transforming the wolf into a domestic dog through benevolent, pacifying discourse. And Locke says: indeed, we are dealing only with individuals, but is the individual really so bad? And from here begins the fundamental debate in political philosophy about the natural state.

state of nature.

This is the most important debate for determining all forms of political philosophy in the modern era. Hobbes tells us that the natural state is a war of all against all, and he justifies this with the evil nature of man. Human nature is evil. The "idiot wolf" is aggressive, selfish, and just waiting to attack others and crush the weak. But he is a clever "idiot wolf" and invents the state to somehow balance this aggression of all against all and turn chaotic slaughter into a war of the state against criminals and a war of states against each other. That is, wars are not between everyone against everyone, but between one Leviathan and another or between Leviathan and its internal enemies. This is a wonderful way to organise aggression: first, the state's apparatus suppresses those who violate its laws, and second, wars are waged, interspersed from time to time with alliances and truces. But all this makes sense when we are dealing with anthropological pessimism and agree that "man is evil." Hobbes formulated his ideas on the basis of the English Civil War, which he witnessed first-hand. When he declares that "man is a wolf to man," he knows what he is talking about, because around him there are monstrous clashes between different political parties, the beheading of the king, violence, torture, denunciations, looting, executions, massacres, all in the context of rabid religious extremism, when simply belonging to the Catholic or Protestant faith, or to one sect or another, was sufficient grounds for immediate murder. And being Irish meant being under attack. It was not easy for the Scots, who were torn between Catholicism and radical Puritanism. All this was "natural" to Hobbes. There is no Leviathan, or Leviathan is weak — and this is what you get as a result. Hobbes also formulates his theory by observing what is happening outside the window of his carriage. Someone is dragging someone else to the gallows, someone is burning, raping and robbing someone else. Informers are scribbling anonymous letters. Yesterday's favourite is dangling from a lamppost. It is not difficult to conclude on this basis that man himself is like that.

Then, looking out of the carriage window—but now in a fundamentally different era, during the Glorious Revolution—Locke peered out of the carriage window.

In his youth, already a staunch Puritan, he fought in Cromwell's army and later participated in the overthrow of James II Stuart (1633–1701). But later, a different landscape appeared before his eyes. Everything gradually fell into place. The sun shines on the green meadows of lovely, kind England and Scotland, which is even more dear to Locke. The bourgeoisie wake up in the morning and hurry to the market. Peasants harvest bread. With difficulty, a new social contract between the warring parties is concluded, albeit at the cost of compromises. And then a thought arises: perhaps the natural state of man is not so bad? Look at all the good people around you — they have gathered their goods and are going to the fair. Where do you see wolves here? Where do you see war of all against all? Man is a commercial being, peaceful and benevolent, concludes Locke.

And then, based on this observation, he formulates a completely alternative political ideology: the individual and the social contract exist, but man takes everything not from his nature, but from society. Man is, in fact, an individual, but not evil, just empty. This is analogous to Democritus's concept of inner emptiness, which he distinguished from outer emptiness (between atoms). Therefore, if an individual is raised in a wolf pack, he becomes a wolf, but if he grows up among friendly Scottish bourgeois and receives a decent education and upbringing, he will not fight, trying to resolve all issues peacefully, relying on his own mind.

From wolf to blank slate

Man is not bad, says Locke. It is not that he is good, but he is a blank slate (tabula rasa). Man is what society has made him. This is a very profound observation, anticipating modern sociology. You can write good things on a person, and you can write bad things.

Of course, Locke did not come to these conclusions simply by looking around and observing life in post-revolutionary England. He was first and foremost a philosopher, and in the field of philosophy he followed the classical English tradition of empiricism. Locke himself was a member of the British Royal Society, which included his friends Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and Isaac Newton (1642–1727), and continued the English traditions of empiricism in the natural sciences and nominalism in philosophy — he revered Ockham above all others. The connection with nominalism is fundamental, since the materialism and individualism inherent in nominalism are precisely what defines

the foundations of Protestant theology, the scientific worldview, and the corresponding bourgeois liberal political philosophy. All these elements are fully inherent in Locke and constitute the semantic core of liberalism.

In the spirit of radical empiricism, Locke argued that human consciousness is a "blank slate" (tabula rasa), and its content is formed by the totality of influences from the external world (in particular, from society—hence the primary importance Locke attached to the process of education). At the same time, Locke rejected those aspects of French rationalism (Descartes, 1596–1650) that recognised the existence of innate "ideas." For Locke, "ideas" are neither independent entities (as in Platonism[1]), nor eidos, manifesting themselves in things (as in Aristotle and Thomism), nor even innate concepts (as in Descartes), but always relative and secondary *products of strictly individual thinking*[2]. An "idea" has no independent existence; it is a transient attribute of individual consciousness. Therefore, all "ideas" are ultimately transient, subject to change and dependent on upbringing and experience. By themselves, they mean nothing and can change depending on a particular social situation or experience. At the same time, Locke sees the genesis of "ideas" in concrete individual and material things, whose reflections or imprints they are in consciousness. It was precisely this understanding of ideas that became generally accepted in European philosophy of the Modern Age. In fact, we are not talking about the ideas of Plato and the Platonists, but about concepts artificially constructed by human reason, or about the "eidolons," "ghosts," and "mental idols" of Democritus.

But if an individual is a "blank slate," then a series of "ideas" can be written on it, that is, certain eidolons can be projected onto it, which he will then manipulate and use to construct his chains of statements, his structures — his
"ideas." The individual here turns out to be a kind of machine that must first be pre-programmed and only then allowed to move freely within the context of the established code.

Therefore, Locke concludes, the natural state of the individual mind does not necessarily have to be wolfish. It is nothing.

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[1] He argued with a group of Cambridge Platonists (R. Cadwall, G. More, J. Glenville, R. Carpenter, R. South, D. Sergent, J. Smith, E. Stillingsfleet, M. Hale).

[2] *Locke, J.* An Essay Concerning Human Understanding // Locke, J. Works in Three Volumes. Vol. 1. Moscow: Mysl, 1985.

And if society undertakes education, that is, enters into a social contract to make itself better, more humane, more reasonable, more friendly, more organised, etc., then the result will be individuals who produce good thoughts and perform moral actions. Thus, the transition from Hobbes to Locke changes the normative conception of the content of the individual: from a beast to a blank slate, from evil to neutrality, which can be programmed in any direction. The individual is no longer evil or bad; he is nothing.

The relativisation of Leviathan

Here we come to a crucial point: if people are not so bad in their natural state and if their sustenance is taken from society (and the social contract is conceived horizontally, as trust), then Leviathan is necessary only in certain historical conditions and primarily to combat an evil society, a state of wolves. It is not necessary to fight against the good. Accordingly, individuals enter into a contract for a political Leviathan when society is in a bad, difficult state, when it is necessary to prevent the worst, stop the slaughter and bring order to chaos. But if the state begins to educate the population, to civilise its citizens, then everything can change. Leviathan will lose its relevance. If people are well educated, Locke believes, then Leviathan can be abolished, allowing society to remain in a natural state, which can become good and continue to improve further and further.

Accordingly, based on the change in the attitude towards human nature and the assertion that this nature is neutral, a new political ideology emerges. It consists of the following: the main actor remains the individual, but the individual is subject to re-education. The individual is not bad, and if we educate him well, he will be law-abiding, moral and well-mannered, enlightened and rational. And the next generation will be even better, as positive attitudes will be strengthened, accumulated and developed. For Hobbes, human society is fundamentally static. For Locke, it changes, develops, and evolves. This brings us to the idea of social and historical progress.

From the point of view of liberalism, education and enlightenment are necessary for social progress to be irreversible. While Hobbes, in his combination of "rational egoism," emphasises "egoism," Locke emphasises "rational." This rationality consists in the ability to

learning. Therefore, humanity can be brought to a certain irreversible civilised level of rational egoism.

For Hobbes, there can be no rational egoism. He simply has egoism, and all his rationality consists in delegating authority to Leviathan until this egoism destroys its own bearer. That is, Hobbes delegates human reason to Leviathan, while continuing to pursue his own private interests. According to Locke, on the contrary, human reason is appropriated by the individual himself. But this process has several phases: first, reason is transferred to the state, which, for its part, implements a programme of higher education and upbringing of citizens; then reason returns to man in the process of enlightenment, and the individual becomes an individual. —becomes a rational egoist. Therefore, in a natural state, this cycle will occur, and people will not kill each other — on the contrary, they will build their relationships in the most peaceful and optimal way — by trading.

This is the idea of liberalism. If the natural state of man is not evil, then the concepts of politics, the state, and Leviathan are seen as temporary phenomena. Not every Leviathan is good — only the one that ends civil war. And the task of the state is not to interfere in people's lives, but on the contrary, to give them the opportunity to be themselves, to educate them and gradually reduce their numbers. And after the programme of education, upbringing and enlightenment has been completed, the state must disappear. Then society returns to its natural non-political state, but at a new level — already *enlightened.* This enlightened society is the natural state of educated (cultured) people created by the bourgeois enlightened state. Society transforms from political to economic — after the state disappears, the commercial bourgeois civil nature begins to dominate. Thus, the vertical (political) contract of power is a temporary measure and fits into a broadly understood social (horizontal) contract.

According to Locke, the state is not God-given; its sacredness was eradicated long ago, during Hobbes's time. Even Protestant ideology lacks a political philosophy of revelation; everything is man-made. But now this man-made nature of Hobbes is transformed into the man-made nature of Locke's soft, civil, liberal society, which asserts that the state is necessary as something temporary and must then disappear. The state has no meaning other than to educate rational egoists. It gradually disappears, and civil society emerges.

Sacred private property

Locke's philosophical and political views later became the basis *of liberalism*, and he is considered its founding father. This ideology assumes that society should strive for a "natural state" (as understood by Locke) and that this is the goal of historical progress and social development. The state can only be tolerated as long as it is constitutional, based on the separation of powers (it was Locke who introduced the principle of the separation of powers into three branches — executive, legislative and federal, and later judicial) and fulfils its main function — education. If the state does not meet these requirements, then society has the right to carry out a "democratic revolution." Locke called a normative society a "civil society" and considered its possibility of existing outside the state, but with the mandatory preservation of "sacred private property," which would perform the functions of the main institution of social order.

The main thing, Locke argues, is to secure what he called "natural rights" — first and foremost, the right to private property, as well as freedom of movement, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, etc. *Individualism at the level of the subject requires its correlate at the level of the object, which is precisely what "private property" becomes.* Locke's world is individualised in everything — it contains only individual beings and segments of objects distributed among them, divided into units of private property. But if, according to Hobbes, rationality and the capacity for calculating thinking are hypostasised in Leviathan, and private property acts as a competitive field for selfish desires for pleasure and possession, then for Locke, private property itself is *the* hypostasised *embodiment of rationality,* and by becoming an institution, i.e. a legal category, it is capable of *replacing the state.*

The "sacredness" of private property is also as man-made and artificial as the sacredness of Leviathan. But if Leviathan is an idol parading the vertical, then private property is *an idol of the horizontal.* It preserves the principle of individuality at a short distance, cutting out a separate fragment from the world, which includes both the individual himself and his ontological surroundings, that is, private property.

Adam Smith: trade versus war ( )

The next step in structuring the philosophy of the New Age was taken by Locke's student, the famous economist Adam Smith (1723–1790). Building on the philosophy of Locke, whom he considered his teacher and idol, he constructed an economic theory of capitalism.

Adam Smith's main idea was to show that Locke's philosophical principles are valid in real life and to create an analogue to these principles in the sphere of economics by interpreting Locke's message in terms of political economy.

Smith's first and most important idea is that the main source of wealth is *not land*, as previously believed by [the physiocrats] and classical representatives of economic thought during the transition period of the Modern Age, but *entrepreneurial activity*. Smith argues that wealth is not created by real estate (estates and land), but by production, which is mobile and can be organised in different places. It is in the industrial and entrepreneurial sector that the maximum amount of goods and valuable things are produced, and it is in this area that the means and mechanisms for the fastest economic growth are concentrated. Smith's thesis reflects the reality of a society where the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie is beginning to seriously encroach on the traditional landowners (aristocrats, landlords), which is a consequence of the transition from a class system to a capitalist and liberal-democratic one. In fact, this is an expression of individualism applied to the economy.

This leads to another fundamental principle of modern economic science: *value is created in the process of labour*. For Marx, this would be the starting point for his own system. And again

Adam Smith's second thesis, which is no less important, is the idea that the main requirement for successful economic development is complete freedom for individuals to trade.

Trade and entrepreneurship, in Adam Smith's view, are expressions of the noble nature of man. Adam Smith contrasts trade with war. Trade is peace, the state

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[1] *Smith, A.* An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Moscow: Eksmo, 2007.

[2] *Quesnay, F., Turgot, A. R. J., Dupont de Nemours, P. S.* Physiocrats. Selected Economic Works. Moscow: Eksmo, 2008.

war and violence. Adam Smith, in the spirit of Locke, is convinced that the state embodies a spirit of intimidation and repression, directed outward to fight other states and inward to suppress manifestations dangerous to the existence of Leviathan, thereby creating an atmosphere of militaristic societies. If we move from Hobbes' anthropological pessimism to Locke's anthropological optimism, then for man — in his natural state — it is not to fight, but to trade. Hence the expression
"la douce commerce" — "gentle trade." This is also the realisation of private interests, also selfishness, but in this form it no longer entails human sacrifice, is not based on violence, and does not require its legitimisation.

Smith's third fundamental thesis: trade must be transnational rather than national, because in this way, along with trade, the principles of freedom and civil society are spread on a global scale. This is required by the universalism of the Enlightenment. Liberal societies built on the principles of peaceful trade cannot allow aggressive, selfish regimes to exist outside them, which is why liberalism inherently presupposes universalism and a global scale. Of course, Smith — as befits an ideologue of the third estate, who measures everything in material terms, money and profit — argues for the necessity of free international trade, bypassing state monopoly, increasing efficiency and accelerating the pace of industrial and economic development, i.e. the laws of the market. But underlying this is a fundamental ideological challenge to Leviathan in foreign policy, where its restrictive, authoritarian and belligerent nature is revealed. Smith's free trade ("free exchange" in French — libre echange, hence "liberalism") is conceived as free from the state in both its forms — internal and external. Liberalism insists on minimising taxes within the state and reducing or completely abolishing customs tariffs. In this way, liberalism seeks to minimise the influence of the state in the economy, both within and outside the state, which necessarily leads to the erasure of its borders and, ultimately, of the state itself.

In practice, however, there are two components to the implementation of such a programme: tax cuts and the state's renunciation of its monopoly on foreign trade. The first only slightly weakens the state's role in the economy, while the second undermines and, ultimately, abolishes its sovereignty.

Smith insists on both, opposing mercantilism, which did not object to a free market within the state but insisted on complete state control over foreign trade. Such liberalism was half-hearted, and Adam Smith sought to make it an applied — practical — theory that was as consistent as possible with Locke's progressive views.

For Smith, free trade and the requirement for direct economic partnership between citizens of one state and another are opposed to customs policy precisely because, from the point of view of his teacher Locke, the state should weaken and gradually die out after fulfilling its functions. The imperative of free trade in Adam Smith, which he himself justifies with economic models, must be sought in Locke's philosophical attacks on Leviathan and on the restriction of national civil society by borders. Locke categorically opposed this, believing that civil society should be universal.

Accordingly, this pan-European society should gradually abolish national borders, and in order for them to cease to exist, free trade must be allowed, i.e., free trade between one actor from one nation-state and another, bypassing tariff and customs complications.

This gives rise to the concept *of liberalism in international relations* [1], which Smith argues for economically: if trade is free, then participation in it will be beneficial to all societies. Consequently, any attempts by the state to restrain this process become "evil" and an obstacle to social and economic development (in his liberal understanding).

Thus, we arrive at a very important conclusion: *Adam Smith's capitalism is directed against nation states*. Smith is not opposed to them as a phenomenon; in a sense, they must exist to ensure free trade and bourgeois legal norms, but for him, the fate of free trade is more important than the fate of nation states. Politics as such becomes merely a moment of economics, and not the other way around, as was believed in traditional society and in the early stages of modernity. Overall, this is a clear sign of the area that occupies the lower sector of the synchronous three-part map of the Political, corresponding to its physical, material side. Smith comes to the conclusion that

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology).

For Pigopolis to be authentic and successful, it must be global.

This is the rationale behind the construction of a global, civic, non-political, supranational, cosmopolitan society, which is a return to a natural state in a new form, but now in an "enlightened" — meaningful, universal — form. In Adam Smith, Locke's entire ideological programme is expressed in the language of political economy.

Roadmap for global capitalism

For Adam Smith, capitalism, free enterprise, and therefore civil society (citizen = bourgeois) should develop as independently as possible from nation states, which in turn should gradually disappear. Thus, Adam Smith's theory provides a fundamental basis for the idea of enlightened states. Locke said little about trade, focusing mainly on enlightenment, education, and the advancement of knowledge. Adam Smith, in turn, says that once the state has successfully fulfilled its educational mission, the main occupation of the citizens of this enlightened state should be *trade*, not war.

Smith conceived of trade and entrepreneurship as a double opposition: on the one hand, in relation to the peasantry, which was tied to the land, where the maximum wealth was produced in medieval society, and on the other hand, in relation to the landlords, who lived off land rent. It is Adam Smith who makes the bourgeoisie — private entrepreneurs or merchants, but by no means peasants or landowners — the normative figure in the economic sphere and, later, in political economy.

Accordingly, it is precisely this economic type that becomes synonymous with Locke's "enlightened citizen." As we have already said, if we look closely at the three terms —
"Citizen," "townsman," and "bourgeois" have exactly the same meaning. Bourgeois (bougeois) is a resident of a "burg," i.e., a town (German Burg — town). And "townsman" is a resident of a town. "Citizen" is the same as "townsman". Therefore, the concept of civil society is a concept of bourgeois and urban society, which includes both the dominant social type (the third estate, corresponding to Aristotle's demos, the masses, Plato's multitude) and belonging to an urban environment.

Thus, *the urban entrepreneur-bourgeois* becomes the basic figure of the political philosophy of liberalism. After Adam Smith, not only a political-educational model, as in Locke, but also a concrete political-economic doctrine of capitalism and the normative forms of the capitalist economy took shape. Adam Smith, with his ideas about free trade, the removal of the state from interference in the economy, and allowing entrepreneurs and traders to conclude deals directly with economic actors from other countries, bypassing the state (since, according to Adam Smith, foreign trade is a private matter, not a national one), created a comprehensive strategy for capitalism, which became the main roadmap for Western Europe and later for the entire civilisation for several centuries.

's endless accumulation of wealth

Another important idea that Smith also borrows from Locke is *social progress*. Thus, Smith, who applied the theory of social progress to the political and economic sphere, developed the thesis of the exponential growth of world wealth. From Adam Smith's point of view, the process of private enterprise leads to linear growth in profits and an increase in general prosperity, even though everyone acts in their own private interests, seeking to enrich themselves personally without thinking about others. But if everyone gets richer, then everyone gets richer, concludes Adam Smith. Consequently, the total amount of wealth must grow.

Smith's position that value is created by labour, not land, as was the case with the physiocrats and earlier political economists, provides a technological basis for the theory of progress. If land and the crops it produces have clearly defined boundaries that can only be expanded slightly, and the fixed income derived from the land can only be redistributed, then industry can develop — technical progress contributes to the development of production, and the volume of world wealth grows steadily. If a society that is less developed than another is involved in free trade, they begin to develop together, helping each other, and once again the total wealth of all humanity increases.

This *principle of the growth of universal wealth is a fundamental axiom* of *the capitalist economy*, on which everything else is based: if one state attempts to defend itself against another state with customs quotas or protectionist measures in order to develop its

national economy, free traders and classical liberals always view this negatively, because it hinders the development of the market, hindering the growth of general wealth, i.e. progress.

It is not so important, liberals believe, that one country has a less developed economy or industry than another. If both countries engage in free trade, the overall growth in wealth will affect both. Moreover, according to Locke, the state should be abolished as far as possible, and the accumulated wealth and developed industrial and commercial complexes capable of increasing wealth will remain, and then it will not matter on whose territory a particular enterprise, trading platform, bank or stock exchange is located. From the point of view of free trade (liberalism in international relations), political (national) territories are always somewhat arbitrary. Entrepreneurship and industry develop better where fiscal policy is more favourable, where it is easier to pay taxes, and where natural resources are closer. Production, finance and trade will go there. But this freedom to move in accordance with purely economic interests and profit maximisation is often hampered by political considerations and interests. As a result, nation states hold back the progress of humanity as a whole. This is a fundamental liberal idea that underlies globalism and globalisation.

The idea of absolute growth in global wealth is a dogma of liberalism (albeit as unproven as any dogma). It was opposed by supporters of an economy based on Hobbesian principles, i.e., primarily mercantilists. Contrary to Smith, mercantilists argued that the amount of wealth on earth is limited, so the development of one country's economy always comes at the expense of another. Once again, there is an acute need for Leviathan, and war of all against all looms on the horizon, but not at the level of society, but at the level of states, converging in a brutal struggle for global resources and the redistribution of wealth in their favour.

Both dogmas — liberal and mercantilist — despite all references to economic indicators, benefits, tables and calculations, are in fact expressions of a metaphysical — philosophical — dispute about human nature. Optimistic liberals follow the logic of progress (Locke), which gives us the axiom of economic growth (Smith). Here, confidence prevails: man is good, but even if he is not good enough now, he can always be improved.

improve. Their opponents argue that progress is relative and even questionable, that humanity always remains the same, i.e. egotistical, greedy and aggressive. That is why it needs a guide in the form of Leviathan. At the same time, the world's wealth is not infinite, but strictly limited. Therefore, the struggle of one Leviathan against another in the economic sphere is a zero-sum game. In other words, one state gains wealth while another loses it, according to mercantilists, who conclude that customs barriers, state monopolies on foreign trade and protectionism must be maintained.

But the dispute between liberals (Locke and his followers) and proto-liberals (Hobbes and his followers) unfolds within the paradigm of modern political philosophy. According to Hobbes, human nature is immutable and fundamentally evil. To some extent, this thesis is inherited by representatives of realism in international relations[1] the traditional opponents of liberals.

Liberalism asserts that progress exists even if no one sees it or if it appears partial, sectoral, or even ambiguous and questionable; it still exists because it is an ideological axiom. There is endless growth of the global economy and the gradual demise of the state, with all nation states turning into a single civil trading society.

Here, the ideological axiom of progress, which Adam Smith transformed into the idea of economic growth, reveals an important moment in the formation of the ideology of liberalism. *Politics is finally replaced by economics.* Economics becomes destiny. Economics, as we have seen in the generalised scheme of Politica Aeterna, is the result of the diminution of politics and, ultimately, its elimination. In liberalism, politics strives for a minimum, and economics for a maximum; instead of a political society, a civil society emerges. Civil society is a commercial system, [a] mercantile society[2] where all values are determined by material equivalents and, consequently, everything has a price, that is, everything is for sale. Civil society is a capitalist commercial and entrepreneurial society where politics is replaced by economics.

The principle of "less politics, more economics" and, in the long term, "no politics" means a vector directed towards the end of political history, where instead of countries and peoples there will be only one world market. The process of globalisation

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology).

[2] *Zombart, W.* Merchants and Heroes. Jews and the Economy.

This is the culmination of this liberal strategy, the fundamental vector of which was laid down extremely clearly and convincingly by Adam Smith. And the fact that Smith became the main symbolic figure of liberalism only confirms the very nature of the transition from politics to economics, which is the essence of liberal ideology, as well as the entire Modern era as a whole.

The middle class and endless growth

There is one key concept in liberal ideology: the *middle class*. The middle class is a key element of liberalism, closely linked to Adam Smith's specific *economic anthropology*. From Smith's point of view, all of humanity represents a potential middle class, *potential entrepreneurs.* Every person is a trader and a businessman, an entrepreneur and a banker. The meaning of history and the task of historical progress is to make this *potential* membership of the middle class *a reality.* This is possible through the endless growth of global wealth — if it grows, so does the middle class, that is, those people who gain access to it.

In this case, the task of humanity is to ensure that, against the backdrop of exponential growth in global wealth, *everyone becomes middle class*. The goal of civilisation and its history is for everyone to become traders, bourgeois (citizens, townspeople), entrepreneurs, and to enjoy a minimum level of prosperity that meets the criteria of the middle class. Liberals see this expansion of the middle class as inextricably linked to the abolition of the state, civil society, globalisation and the elimination of borders. It is important to note that the concept of the "middle class" is yet another liberal propaganda concept, like "progress," "endless growth of prosperity," "liberalism," laissez-faire, free trade, "civil society," etc. It is in the context of liberal ideology and its general structure that this concept acquires its meaning, reflecting deeper levels of Locke's anthropological optimism. The growth of the middle class is the material expression of the Enlightenment(1) . material expression of the Enlightenment[1].

[1] It is obvious that illiberal ideologies of the Modern era (in Marxism and fascism) The "middle class" is interpreted differently. For communists, the middle class refers only to the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat will never become the middle class, because along with profits and technological progress, exploitation, inequality and poverty of the working class grow, and the surplus value created by the working class is continuously appropriated by the capitalists. Therefore, its growth is fictitious and is accompanied by structural crises.

It is important to note that, from a liberal perspective, the middle class is essentially the only normative class. Adam Smith gives an example of the development of an economic system: in a town, there is a baker (a petty bourgeois) who bakes bread rolls. Having accumulated enough funds, he hires workers — ruined peasants who have come to the city. For some time, the peasants bake bread, helping the baker, who takes the main profit for himself. Nevertheless, while working for the baker, the former peasant learns from him how to bake, communicate with customers, advertise, sell goods, where to buy grain, etc. Then he takes out a loan from the bank and sets up his own bakery. Over time, he will settle down, become a baker, that is, a petty bourgeois, and hire another ruined peasant who has come to the city to earn a living and is ready for any job. If we follow this logic, at some point all the peasants will move to the city and become townspeople, since the economic dynamics in the city are significantly higher than in the countryside. Thus, all peasants will eventually become townspeople. As agriculture becomes less and less influential in the gross income of the state, the entire economy will move to the city into the sphere of private enterprise, and peasant farming itself will become a reverse projection of capitalism onto the countryside, rather than something independent. Accordingly, landlords will go bankrupt, land rent will lose its significance, and a kind of continuous, unified city will emerge. Adam Smith developed this theory back in the late 18th century, and now this is exactly what is happening: urbanisation, the transition from villages to cities on a global scale. and (albeit relative, but still) growth of the middle class.

Thus, Adam Smith gave liberalism the form that best suited the bourgeoisie, placing at the forefront the values, issues, and priorities that were close to his heart. And the distant future of humanity was outlined by Adam Smith.

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the contradictions of capitalism, which sooner or later will lead to a proletarian revolution directed precisely against this "middle class." In fascist theory, the middle class of one country is qualitatively different from the middle class of another, and from a social point of view, the differences between the rich and the poor, the haves and the have-nots, are secondary to their common national (racial in national socialism) identity. Consequently, the "middle class" is a cosmopolitan chimera that obscures the importance of the nation and undermines sovereignty. These examples show how a simple change in rhetoric and a few rather banal arguments can radically transform the ideological persuasiveness of a particular ideology that insists on its dogmas and axioms through propaganda, pathos and ideological pressure rather than rational, refined argumentation, which always merely gives form to the deeper — and always philosophical and dogmatic — premises of ideology. The same considerations apply fully to the axioms and dogmas of communism or fascism themselves.

It is quite clear: everyone is destined to become bourgeois, and the world will become a single global free market. Thus, humanity will be corrected, re-educated, abandon its aggression and thirst for violence, and individualism, tolerance,
"human rights" and the norms of "political correctness" will prevail everywhere.

The replacement of the "third estate": bourgeois us usurpation

After Adam Smith, in bourgeois economics and, more broadly, in political philosophy, the third estate came to be definitively and firmly identified with the urban bourgeoisie, precisely as Adam Smith had described and conceptualised it. Although this identification later came to be taken for granted, its origins contain a very important sociological and even anthropological shift that sheds light on some fundamental features of the modern paradigm as a whole and of liberal ideology in particular.

The fact is that in the structure of pre-modern European society, the third estate included all those who had the status of free citizens but were neither warriors (hereditary aristocrats) nor part of the clergy (Catholic priesthood). Throughout all periods of traditional society, from ancient times to the end of the Middle Ages, the basis and absolute majority of this third estate, in the broad and original sense, was the peasantry or serfs. In different societies, it had different statuses and was more or less dependent on landowners, but in Europe it was practically never slaves, i.e., the complete property of their masters. Rather, they were considered the lower echelons of the feudal hierarchy and, in times of war, formed the basis of the militia of small feudal lords, from which larger armies were formed. The relationship between the nobility and the serfs was a continuation of the principle of suzerainty/vassalage, but only at the lowest level. In other words, there was a kind of social pact between peasants and landowners, or landlords. Peasants worked the land, fed themselves from it, and provided sustenance for their lords and their servants. It was the peasantry that was the foundation of the economy, and the European village produced the bulk of the wealth at all stages of traditional society. We have seen that Adam Smith also based his theories on a polemic with the physiocrats, who, until the beginning of the 18th century, continued to consider land to be the main and decisive source of national wealth.

va." When Adam Smith refutes this, separating wealth from the land and transferring it to the sphere of the city, labour, production, entrepreneurship, and trade, he effectively changes the content of a fundamental concept — the third estate — *by excluding the peasantry from it.* Of course, something similar happened before Adam Smith, since in the system of the General States, which had developed in the Middle Ages (from the 14th century) and existed until the end of the 18th century, the common people (i.e., the third estate itself) were represented by wealthy townspeople who were more involved in politics. The very definition of politics already implies the city (polis), and the wealthy and influential non-aristocrats and non-priests of the city were more convenient participants in meetings and discussions than peasants, whose horizons were usually limited to fairly local issues. Nevertheless, in the States General, the urban bourgeoisie was considered to be the representatives of the people, where the majority were peasants, not the people themselves. This was
the "demos," "dim" (δήμος), that is, the urban districts and their authorised representatives, while the peasantry, which remained behind the scenes, was still considered to be participating to some extent. In the physiocrats' economic model, the peasantry plays a fundamental role, as it is the most important element in obtaining wealth from the land, which is the basis of land rent.

Here, one can put forward a certain hypothesis regarding how the democratisation of European society might have proceeded if it had not been for the canonisation of the bourgeoisie (townspeople) by Adam Smith, which ultimately equated urban entrepreneurs and merchants with the third estate, from which peasants were simply excluded by default. In this case, the process of decentralisation of power, towards which modern society gravitated, moved along the lines of redistributing land holdings from landlords to peasants. In this case, the sign of the third estate at some point would have been the possession of a plot of land as the property equivalent of civil (more precisely, peasant, rural) status, according to the principle of one plot of land, as the atom of the economic whole, one vote. It is obvious that the very nature of peasant life, associated with the necessary decentralisation, would lead to a federal system of political organisation, rather than to a centralised and unified system, to which cities and their structures gravitated. In this case, the third estate, in its quantitative majority, would have been taken as the basis of society, and we would have had *a peasant democratic federation.* Something similar, albeit in a slightly different context, was proposed

by the greatest representative and theorist of European federalism, Johannes Altusius (1562–1638).

But Smith's theory finally shifted the focus to industry, cities, entrepreneurship, and trade. Thus, in liberalism, democracy narrowed from the expansion of the rights and positions of the third estate as a whole to the interests of the urban bourgeoisie. From then on, the third estate was represented not by a minority, but by a phenomenon that was completely alien to the majority.

At the same time, the rise of industrial production led to the fact that even in the urban environment, the common people, who made up the "middle class," were pushed to the periphery, initially replaced by industrial complexes, and then trade became an area of more intensive capital circulation than production, which led to the third estate being represented mainly by merchants. As the importance of financial institutions — banks and interest-bearing capital — grew, financiers gradually began to predominate, becoming the priority representatives of the bourgeoisie and acting on its behalf, just as it had previously acted on behalf of all the common people, among whom peasants predominated.

Thus, liberalism logically became the ideology not of the majority, but of a special minority that rose to the highest echelons of society as representation was increasingly reduced. And it is important that this could only happen because the usurpation of representation lies at the very heart of liberalism, which has replaced the very meaning of the term "third estate".

The marginalisation of the peasantry and political science mysteries

Ancient mysteries — primarily the Eleusinian Mysteries [2]— were closely linked to the agricultural cycle and represented a scenario of descent into the underworld, the realm of death, Hades, and then a return to life, which testified to the immortality of the spiritual seed of humanity. Agricultural practices had direct access to this metaphysical narrative, as the seasons of sowing, growing plants, and harvesting were a visual representation of the entire symbolic cycle.

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[1] *Althusius J.* Politica. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995.

[2] *Kerenyi, G.* Eleusis: The Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter. Moscow: Refl-book, 2000.

[3] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. The Kingdom of the Earth. The Structure of Russian Identity. Moscow: Academic Project, 2019.

The peasantry corresponded to the third type in the general structure of Politica Aeterna, which logically associated it with the realm of the earth and the underworld. Thus, the mysteries and symbolism of agrarian practices are naturally associated with the realm of the Mother, the "chora" and the border areas of existence, which are closest to the lowest regions of the cosmos — the Underworld, the underground world. Therefore, the mysteries were dominated by images of goddesses or, as in the Eleusinian scenario, even directly by the goddess of the underworld, Persephone, who, after her abduction by the god of death and king of the Underworld, Hades, was sought by her mother, Demeter, goddess of the fields and harvests. Peasantry was the bearer of Demeter's civilisation, and accordingly, the symbolism of grain and ears of corn played a central role in the mysteries.

But unlike the rebellion of the earth against Heaven, which we see in the philosophy of Democritus and which became dominant in the New Age, the mysteries, although they implied a descent into the underworld, inevitably led to an ascent and a new light, contemplated at the moment of their culmination — epopteia (Ἐποπτεία). Thus, the peasantry maintained its connection with the earth through its association with the underground worlds, on the one hand, and on the other, remained part of the sacred hierarchy of the vertical order, complementing the structure of the Politica Aeterna with the metaphysical experience of visiting the lowest levels of the world-building, but with a subsequent return to the face of Heaven. This is also linked to the peasantry's strong commitment to religious traditions, which modernists interpreted as their "backwardness," "ignorance," "backwardness" and stubborn unwillingness to accept "change" and enter the New Age.

Consequently, the peasantry was ill-suited to building a purely material and secular civilisation that was diametrically opposed to the paradigm of Tradition. At the same time, the urban bourgeoisie, which dealt not with land and wood, but with stone and conventional — abstract — space as the dominant element, was not limited by these sacred boundaries.

In this, we can see a profound explanation of what happened to the concept of the "third estate" in liberal ideology. The urban bourgeoisie was the most desacralised part of the third estate, deprived of access to mysteries and even to their symbolic echoes in economic practice itself. The peasants who grew bread, in their own understanding, were not simply participating in something material. They were participants in the mystery of life, bearers of eternity, passing through a sequentially closed circle of stages — from birth to maturity and death, and then to a new birth. If, from the outside, peasant labour was expressed

In material terms, it was a harvest, but for the peasants themselves it was also a sacred religious ritual, whose meaning in Christian culture was clearly manifested in the sacrament of the Eucharist — in the communion of the blood and flesh of Jesus Christ, into which bread and wine were transformed in the sacrament of the liturgy. But the preparation of bread and wine was, in turn, a preparation for the Eucharist, part of a mystery that culminated in worship.

On the other hand, there was nothing sacred left in the activities of the bourgeoisie. Only they, and not the peasants, dealt with pure matter, pure production, pure accumulation, and the pure pursuit of profit. It is the bourgeois, the normative figure of liberalism, who represents the absolute profane, while the peasantry retains close and inseparable ties with the sacred. Moreover, the peasantry, involved in the mystery of grain, had a certain inoculation against the underworld and its influences. Whereas the bourgeoisie, denying in the course of increasingly
"progressive" ideas about hell, the devil, and the Antichrist, had no defence against them. This is one of the most important aspects of the deep philosophy of liberalism.

Kant: the foundations of constructivism and the prototype of artificial intelligence

In the 18th century, another major theorist of liberal ideology, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), made a fundamental contribution to liberalism. However, Kant's political philosophy is much more complex, stemming from his ideas about transcendental (or pure) reason.

The most important thing in Kant's philosophy is that he questions the Cartesian dualism of subject and object, showing that reliable judgement can only be made by the mind about itself, and not about what lies beyond its limits — both external (object) and internal (subject). This became the basis of the doctrine of "transcendental reason," that is, the autonomy of thought and its laws from both the thinker and the thought. Transcendental reason (pure reason), according to Kant, is a complete structure of epistemological correspondences that predetermines the order of thought, including its content. Everything that a person perceives, sees, senses, feels, etc., stems from

[1] *Kant, I.* Collected Works: In 6 vols. Moscow: Nauka, 1963–1966.

[2] *Kant, I.* Critique of Pure Reason // Kant, I. Collected Works: In 6 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow: Nauka, 1964.

transcendental reason and is predetermined by it. Such reason already contains within itself "a priori forms of sensibility," that is, time and space, with time relating to the more internal (subjective) side of reason, and space to the more external side, where naive and unreflective self-perception locates the "external world."

According to Kant, people are bearers of a certain universal form of rationality, and their individual differences in the face of this structure are insignificant.

Therefore, according to Kant, one individual is as rational as another because reason is transcendental. If you like, there is a universal reason, and different individuals are merely its carriers. Some people perceive reason more vividly, hence the difference between people; if all people perceived it equally vividly, they would live in a perfectly happy society, treating others as they would like to be treated. This is Kant's main imperative: "treat others as you would like them to treat you."

This rational model is transmitted through education (in this sense, Kant follows Locke), and when rationality, reason, and consciousness reach a certain level in society, civil society will emerge in place of the state.

At first glance, this approach seems to have little in common with materialism and individualism, and instead of atomism, it asserts a certain primary unity of reason. Indeed, if we draw a straight line from Democritus and Epicurus to the nominalists (Roscelin, Duns Scotus, Ockham) and further to the creators of the scientific picture of the world (Galileo, Newton, Boyle, etc.) and Protestant theology (Luther, Calvin), and finally to the secular philosophy of the modern era (Hobbes, Locke, etc.), Kant will find himself outside this axis. This is true; in the context of the modern era, Kant occupies a special position. He is not so much an atomist and individualist as the founder *of constructivism*, a philosophical approach that asserts that the external world is a mental construct of the mind. In a sense, this anticipates the postmodern paradigm and the themes of artificial intelligence ([1])and virtuality ([2]).

However, Kant played a significant role in the formation of liberal political philosophy. Kant, like Locke, attaches decisive importance to reason.

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[1] We also find a prototype of artificial intelligence in the monadology of Leibniz (1646–1716), who had a great influence on Kant.

[2] *Land N.* Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007. New York; Windsor Quarry (Falmouth): Sequence; Urbanomic, 2011.

The importance of education. According to Kant, a person is a bearer of pure reason, whose self-awareness is realised in the process of education, which is the formation of the content of pure reason into something explicit, its unfolding. Pure reason is not contained outside or inside a person. A person is a person to the extent that they participate in pure reason. But this reason is not an attribute of God; on the contrary, it is the main feature of belonging to the human species. Education is not simply an inscription on a

a "blank slate," but the inscription on it of the main provisions of the works of Kant himself, who came close to comprehending the structure of pure reason (as well as practical reason [1], which resolves the antinomies of pure reason with the help of moral principles — imperatives). Practical reason, according to Kant, consists of filling in those gaps that pure reason, with the unambiguity characteristic of its procedures, is unable to fill with moral propositions that are as universal and universal as the structures of pure reason. Thus, pure reason describes a constructed ontology, while practical reason realises it, covering problematic areas with active oughtness. Thus, pure reason is incapable of formulating a definitive judgement (yes or no) about God, the external world, or the subject itself. Practical reason, on the other hand, acts on the basis of moral necessity as if these three poles of ontology unconditionally existed. Reality, the subject, and even God appear in this case as anthropological constructs.

Kant's political philosophy and its characteristic pacifism [2], cosmopolitanism, and thesis on the necessity of building a civil society [3]are based on a moral imperative. Human nature consists in its rationality. It may be more or less complete, but as it is mastered, everyone comes to a common position, since rationality is universal and indivisible. Consequently, as education and the sphere of education expand, all people will gradually approach this rational element. Realising the constructivist nature of reality and the homology of reason, everyone will prefer to live peacefully, borders will become unnecessary, and the place of the hierarchical state and the vertical power structure will be taken by a friendly community of people endowed with fundamentally the same form of

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[1] *Kant, I.* Critique of Practical Reason // Kant, I. Collected Works: In 6 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Nauka, 1965.

[2] *Kant, I.* Perpetual Peace // Kant, I. Collected Works: In 6 vols. Vol. 6. Moscow: Nauka, 1966.

[3] *Kant, I.* Metaphysics of Morals // Kant, I. Collected Works: In 6 vols. Vol. 4.

my reason — developed and capable of self-reflection. This is "civil society," which is already forming in the context of politics, but will gradually — as the Enlightenment spreads and is assimilated — supplant it, replacing the state.

Since man and the world are products of construction, according to Kant, the consistent understanding of oneself by reason must lead to an increasingly perfect society, since all excesses and negative aspects of life arise only because pure reason does not operate in people to its fullest extent.

The conclusions drawn from Kant's philosophy were entirely consistent with liberalism. Instead of Hobbes' aggressive individualism, we see here a progressive model close to Locke's, although the significance of the individual is almost reduced to nothing, and the place of matter is taken by universal reason.

"Hartland"

There is an interesting concept by the contemporary Dutch political philosopher Kees Van Der Pijl ([1]), who proposes a new way of understanding the scale of Locke's influence and his philosophy through geography. Kees Van Der Pijl reminds us that Locke originally described the emerging capitalism he observed in Scotland during a relatively peaceful period. In fact, Locke conceptualises exactly what he sees (hence our metaphor of the "carriage window"). Locke draws universal conclusions about human nature, the meaning of the state, the importance of trade, the importance of education, and "natural rights" based on a very specific historical and geographical landscape. This area is limited to Scotland (and partly to England and Holland). And if Locke had limited his conclusions to these boundaries, his conceptualisation would have been flawless. It is precisely this historical and geographical framework, linked to the biography of John Locke himself, that describes what Kees van der Peil calls Locke's "heartland" ([2]). But Locke himself gave his views the character of a universal theory. In practice, however

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[1] *Pijl Kees Van Der*. Vordenker der Weltpolitik: Einführung in die internationale Politik aus ideengeschichtlicher Perspektive. Opladen: Leske+ Budrich, 1996; Idem. The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London: Verso, 1984; Idem. Transnational Classes and International Relations. London: Routledge, 1998.

[2] Heartland, literally "heartland," is an English geopolitical term denoting the central, core territory of a strategic or geopolitical structure.

At the first stage, they were generally accepted in Scotland and England. This was a projection of one society onto another, which somewhat simplified the much more complex picture of England itself. But in any case, Locke's ideas took root in the educated and "enlightened" English society. Later in the 18th century, they found expression in the form of the theory of "free trade" in the works of Adam Smith (1723–1790), a student and follower of Locke, who applied his ideas to economics and created the most famous theory of economics, reflecting all the basic principles of liberalism, which have remained largely unchanged to this day.

Locke's influence gradually spread across the European continent — to France, Austria, Prussia (later Germany). This represents an even greater convention, since the social and political traditions of different parts of Europe differ strikingly from one another. The spread of Locke's "Hartland" gradually became the trajectory of the expansion of liberalism, which went far beyond its original territory and specific time period.

The British Empire was the most important instrument in the expansion of Locke's "Hartland." Thus, liberalism reached the British colonies and took root in the United States, the most important of them, which became one of the pillars and later the leader of modern Western civilisation. In the 20th century, the modernisation and westernisation of the entire world further strengthened liberalism, and in the form of globalism, based largely on the same unchanging principles of Locke, it became the leading world ideology, which until the mid-20th century was one of the three main ideologies (along with communism and fascism), after 1945 and until 1991 one of two (alongside communism), and finally remaining the only one after the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet camp.

It is evident that at each stage, the original model was stretched, moving further and further away from Hartland. Thus, the concrete picture of 17th-century Scotland, which was accurately described and brilliantly conceptualised, turned into a global ideology, necessarily abstract, often contradicting historical and geographical realities, and therefore increasingly rigid, intrusive, frozen and totalitarian, but at the same time fragile.

Today, the same set of theses and axioms that constituted the essence of Locke's Hartland , has become, spiralling upwards, the basis of the paradigmatic, gnoseological and axiological matrix that is perceived as something "natural" and "self-evident" by almost *the entire population of planet Earth.* Thus, from the history of Scotland, and then of England in the 17th century, which represents "Hartland",

territory of Scotland, and then England in the 17th century, which represents the "Lockean Heartland" in its original historical and geographical boundaries, this model gradually spread to all of humanity, predetermining the main moments of modern political philosophy, in which, by the end of the 20th century, it was precisely liberalism that achieved a fundamental political and ideological victory. Thus, Locke's liberalism laid the foundation for:

- the global ideology (human rights, civil society),
- politics (liberal democracy),
- economics (capitalism, free trade),
- ethics (individualism, laissez-faire),
- science (materialism, empiricism),
- technology (technical progress).

Thus, starting with Locke, England itself became an increasingly *global* phenomenon, until, through the United States and globalisation, it became something truly *universal*.

From a philosophical point of view, the British Empire — liberal, commercial, "progressive," modernist — was *Locke's empire*.

Today, in the 21st century, we all live in Locke's "Hartland."

We live in an era of liberalism, which is the earliest ideology of the modern age, but it has proved to be the longest-lived. Attempts to criticise and overturn it by Marxism (sometimes successful) and fascism (no less successful) were bright flashes that predetermined the dramatic periods, clashes and wars of modern history. But liberalism has prevailed.

It should be noted that, on the scale of modernity, this is a rather archaic ideology, on the one hand, and very peripheral, on the other. It operates with universal categories, images, figures, processes and relationships of the European province of the 17th century, where they were fresh, new and accurate at the time. However, when applied to other societies, the dogmas of liberalism were a blatant stretch. But with Anglo-Saxon tenacity in the spirit of their colonial expansion, the British, and later the Americans, carried liberal theories with them as their ideological weapon. Although liberals and progressives, their anthropology, sociology and scientific picture reflect the reality of the Modern era in its earliest stages, in other parts of the Western world and beyond, this has been repeatedly challenged, developed, refuted, revised and overcome. But this provincial ghost of the past has proved to be extremely resilient, despite everything.

subjugating the vital forces of societies, peoples, cultures and civilisations to their chimerical existence.

Compared to liberalism, other ideologies of the Modern Age — fascism and communism — appear much more "modern," dialectical, paradoxical, sophisticated, and dramatic. Of course, they also belong to Modernity, their roots also go back to Hobbes (and even earlier to Protestantism), but compared to the gloomy, monotonous, Scottish-style banality and extreme boredom of liberalism, which has been repeating the same thing for centuries, regardless of place, time and the relevance of its discourse, even modernist versions of liberalism look promising and diverse, capable of varied and lively, sometimes terrifying, risky and catastrophic experiments.

"Civil society" as an ideological slogan

We have come to the concept of "civil society" as a specifically liberal model of political philosophy. Civil society is an ideological construct that operates with the concept of individuals as the basic instance of the bearer of the Political, taken in the spirit of Locke's optimistic anthropology and at the same time based on Kant's transcendental rationality.

"Civil society" is as much a slogan of liberalism as "Workers of the world, unite" is for communists or
"The Aryan race is superior to all others" for the Nazis. When we hear the expression "Aryan race," we immediately understand that it refers to political propaganda, racial inequality, and the division of humanity based on skin colour. This is not simply a scientific statement; it is almost certainly a political ideology based on very specific principles. In other words, this expression refers us to National Socialism.

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[1]Of course, the term civil society can also appear in other political theories. This is the case in Hegel's system, but for him it is only a dialectical moment on the path to the establishment of absolute monarchy. According to Hegel, the collective mind of civil society does not stop at recognising itself as the pinnacle of development, but moves further and comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to transfer power to an enlightened monarch and build a hierarchy based on knowledge as an expression of the Absolute Spirit. See *Hegel, G. W. F.* Phenomenology of Spirit. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1992.

When we hear the slogan "Workers of the world, unite!", we understand without the slightest doubt that this is the communists. The very concept of the "proletariat" is an essential element of Marxism.

And when we hear the expression "civil society," we are completely unaware that we are talking about yet another ideology, which, like other ideologies, has its own dogmas, its own foundations, and its own arguments—as convincing or unconvincing as those of Nazism and communism. The fact that we do not regard the thesis of "civil society" as a rigid political slogan, with all its inherent limitations, propaganda aspects and consequences (e.g., criticism of the political, individualism and the prototype of artificial intelligence), shows that we live today under the domination of liberal ideology. If we are unable to identify this as a propaganda slogan of liberal ideology, then we are already inside it. This means that we live in Locke's "Hartland." Accordingly, if the concept of "civil society" does not cause us the same suspicion as the slogans of communists or fascists, then we already agree to be supporters of Locke and Kant. When we understand that political preachers are trying to convince us of their rightness, to recruit us, to put something into our heads, we usually maintain a certain distance with sufficient critical awareness, understanding that this is propaganda with all its inherent limitations and distortions of the truth in favour of achieving specific results and catching new followers in its net. But when we hear the expression "civil society," we take it for granted, and all our critical faculties disappear.

In Soviet times, when the slogan "Workers of the world, unite!" was heard, ordinary people, ordinary citizens, also nodded: "Of course, unite, and quickly!" At the same time, it was often difficult for them to understand who the proletariat were or why they should unite — they did not think about where it all came from or subject it to critical scrutiny. "Probably we should unite, it's international." We have the same attitude today towards concepts such as "civil society" or "human rights." It seems self-evident, although in reality we are being fed a dogmatic, highly politicised ideological slogan that is just as poorly substantiated, biased and manipulative as in the case of the "uniting proletariat" or the "Aryan race."
"Aryan race."

Those who study political science and political philosophy differ from ordinary people in that when they hear phrases such as "civil society," they first pause to think. The concept of civil society is a consequence of an optimistic interpretation of anthropology and the idea of the natural state of society as a movement towards enlightenment and progress. The concept of civil society is directed against Hobbes' Leviathan, against his pessimistic anthropology, but also against politics in general (with its inevitable centrality of the question of power) and against sovereignty. Those who use the term "civil society" most often assume that the state should perform only one function: to serve as a temporary source of mass education. And as soon as the state ceases to perform this function, it must disappear.

Thus, in the context of Locke's Hartland, the term "civil society" represents a specific understanding of the very nature of the state, which has one task: to form this "civil society," to write the ideas of rational egoism on the "blank slate" of individuals, and then to disappear.

Thus, "civil society" is essentially an anti-state idea. To advocate for "civil society" means to oppose the country, the state as a value and a self-sufficient authority. In essence, to be a supporter of
"civil society" is, in a sense, a crime against the state. Because in this case, the state is seen only as an instrument of enlightenment, nothing more. All its other functions are fundamentally subject to abolition, and the state itself is ultimately subject to dismantling and abolition.

The state as liberals imagine it does not interfere in the affairs of citizens, does not tax them, does not wage war, does not resort to violence except in extreme cases — to violence, strictly adheres to established rules, and strives in every way to distribute power among different authorities (at least three — legislative, executive and judicial, completely independent

from one another). The liberal state is weak and must become weaker and weaker until it disappears. The stronger the "civil society," the weaker the state. Ultimately, in the course of human progress, as humanity approaches equal participation in pure reason, "civil society" will abolish the state altogether and eternal peace will reign.

Therefore, anyone who says "I am for civil society" means "I am for the weakening and, ultimately, the elimination of the state."

Civil society is the antithesis of political society. The movement towards civil society includes a project of systemic depoliticisation of the population.

It is important to note that a civil society based on the principle of individualism and supported by bourgeois norms and capitalism presupposes the overcoming of bourgeois nation states, which are also built on the principle of individualism. But this is not simply opposition, it is overcoming. Civil society becomes relevant when the bourgeois liberal state has already done the groundwork of educating the population, i.e., introducing liberal principles, practices, and axioms into society. From the point of view of liberals, it is good that nation states are being created with a national identity at their core and a social contract as their basic constitutional act, but their value is relative, and they themselves are a temporary and transitional phenomenon. In the face of traditional society, supporters of civil society find themselves in the position of defenders and patriots of the state, at least when it comes to the modern state.

Nevertheless, civil society is a "subversion of Leviathan." In Locke's case, criticism of the state and politics is absent or implicit. But Locke goes deeper into anthropology and, by rethinking the quality of the "natural state" of man — from negative and aggressive (as in Hobbes) to neutral and capable of improvement — undermines the metaphysical foundations of Leviathan. If man is not a wolf by nature, then Leviathan is not destiny, and a social contract can be concluded not necessarily about power (a political contract), but also about horizontal interactions and rules — above all, about the rules of trade (a social contract).

From this, an important conclusion can be drawn: liberalism (Locke and his followers) does not simply reject Hobbes, but continues, develops and overcomes him, preserving a fundamental continuity with him, consisting in general materialism and individualism, but at the same time rethinking the nature of man.

Kant stands somewhat apart in this regard, but the universality
The concept of "pure reason" (as well as "practical reason") allows liberals to find another compelling argument for justifying civil society as a kind of post-political condition for the existence of individuals. Kant can, in a sense, be integrated into socialist systems, since the universality of reason leads to the conclusion that a society based on collectivist principles can be created.

collectivist principles. And if we take into account the development (and, in many ways, the overcoming) of Kant that we find in Hegel (1770–1831), then this is exactly what happened — in the case of left-wing Hegelianism, and above all Marxism. But if Hegel himself, in the spirit of his dialectic, believes that civil society, by virtue of the accumulation of historical self-awareness, will ultimately lead to the voluntary affirmation of an enlightened monarch, whose power will be expressed (in a thoroughly messianic eschatological style) the Absolute Spirit, then for Marx the bourgeois form of civil society, based on individualism and private property (the paradigm of liberalism), will pass through a moment of proletarian revolution to socialism, that is, to an egalitarian socialist (ultimately communist) collectivist form of civil society based on complete property equality (and not just equality of opportunity, as in capitalism).

In general, Locke's philosophy of politics in the 17th century gradually led to the emergence of a specific liberal ideology, which has remained dominant in bourgeois democratic societies to this day. Locke's "Hartland" emerged in the 17th century, but stretched out in a spiral through space and time until the 21st century and on a global scale.

Jeremy Bentham: utilitarianism deontology

A major thinker of the liberal movement was the lawyer Jeremy Bentham, who laid the foundations of *utilitarian* philosophy. Jeremy Bentham embodies the main lines of force of liberal ideology, giving them a systematic form.

First of all, he (like all liberals) proceeds from consistent *individualism*, denying any independent ontology of the "social whole" or "social body." According to Bentham, *only individuals* exist, and it is the aggregate of separate individuals, each possessing complete autonomy and self-sufficiency, that constitutes society.

In politics and economics, Bentham proposed focusing exclusively on the individual and his rights, which he considered the main goal; at the same time, he advocated expanding the categories to which civil rights should be extended, including groups previously deprived of them, such as women, the poor, and indigenous peoples.

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[1] *Bentham, J.* Selected Works. St. Petersburg: Russian Book Trade, 1867.

colony population. According to Bentham, *a person* is *a n = n individual*, and he was convinced that every individual is endowed with "sound judgment" to such an extent that they can take full responsibility for all their actions, deeds, and situations.

On this basis, Bentham builds his main theory, called "utilitarianism." Utilitarianism is an ethical system based on a schematically understood radical individualism. Bentham teaches that it is human nature *to seek pleasure and avoid suffering.* These two parameters motivate *all* human activity. At the same time, the subject of pleasure and suffering is a strictly separate individual, always concerned only with his own private feelings, which can be reduced to two opposites.

The combination of the will to enjoy and the desire to avoid pain gives us Jeremy Bentham's main concept: utility. *Useful is that which leads to maximum pleasure and minimum suffering.* The individual seeks only utility, and it is utility that drives individual activity. At the same time, the presence of rationality in humans transforms the pursuit of individual utility into a meaningful and systematic strategy based on *calculation.* This calculation is at the heart of all human actions — historical, political, cultural, religious, etc. The calculation involves assessing the scale of pleasure and pain, determining the minimum and maximum of both in each specific situation. This is rational choice, which extends to all spheres — from the sensual to the spiritual.

On this basis, Bentham builds his doctrine of truth and a special morality [1]. He himself called it "deontology" (from the Greek term δέον, meaning "duty" or "obligation"), i.e., the doctrine of what is right and proper. *Truth is that which brings benefit,* Bentham asserts, since it is precisely benefit that serves as the measure of conformity and connection between the subjective intentions of the individual and objective realities. The maximum amount of pleasure for the maximum number of individuals is the criterion and measure *of the truth* of a socio-political system.

Utilitarian morality is built on this: good is what gives an individual pleasure (hence hedonism as the main feature of Bentham's morality); evil is suffering and the cause of suffering. But since pleasure and pain are inversely proportional to each other, morality becomes something

[1] *Bentham, J.* Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998.

Relative — when determining good and evil, one must always take into account *the* specific *proportions* between them and also the specific individual who experiences this pleasure and pain. Therefore, utility is always *a* recalculated and subjective *calculation* and cannot be elevated to a universal concept applicable to society as a whole. Social utility is based on the desire for maximum pleasure and minimum suffering for the aggregate of individuals, who are always different and live in different conditions.

In the spirit of Locke, Bentham argues that individualistic egoism, which compels a person to seek maximum pleasure and minimum suffering *only for himself*, is overcome not by Leviathan (unlike Hobbes' ideas), but *by* his *reason,* since man can easily understand that consideration for the benefit of his neighbour can only increase his own benefit. Thus, fundamental psychological, ontological, and moral individualism, which constitutes the essence of human nature, is, according to Bentham, the source of society as a field of exchange, always selfish but always rational. In this case, *private property and the market economy,* where everyone acts in their own interests, become the main social institutions, but this selfish motivation spontaneously creates the rules of the market game. This is entirely in line with Adam Smith.

Jeremiah Bentham insists on the equality of all people, since they consist only of the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This is a characteristic of *every* individual. Pleasure and pain can be purely physical, psychological, or spiritual. Thus, according to Bentham, religion is also useful because in certain cases it allows one to obtain pleasure and to dull or calm pain. True religion should provide spiritual *benefit* and minimise suffering. If this is not the case, and this condition is not met, then it is a "false religion."

Bentham's aesthetics are structured in the same way: *what is useful is beautiful*; what is harmful is repulsive.

It is telling that Bentham was the first to come out as a radical defender of usury. In his 1787 work, written in Russia, where he was temporarily residing, "In Defence of Usury," he justified the growth of money and the practice of lending and borrowing as something that maximises wealth and corresponds to the rational nature of individual decisions, allowing people to consciously and responsibly lend money at interest and take out loans. Bentham expressed the same ideas in his letters to Adam Smith, who in his first

In various editions of his main work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, he expressed disapproval of this practice. Jeremiah Bentham, with his radical defence of usury, was, according to G. K. Chesterton (1874–1936), the first author to usher in the "modern world" ([1]).

John Stuart Mill: the negativity of freedom

The greatest theorist of liberalism was the Scottish philosopher, politician and economist John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). His father, James Mill (1773–1836), was an enthusiastic follower of Jeremy Bentham, fully sharing his ideas of utilitarianism, a love for which he passed on to his son, who also became one of Bentham's most convinced and active admirers. Together with David Ricardo (1772–1823), James Mill was the founder of English classical political economy. In addition, he was the author of the three-volume History of British India, in which he argued for the necessity of harsh exploitation of the indigenous peoples of the colonies, justifying this by the absence in Indian culture of even a hint of *utilitarian consciousness, which he considered a universal form of thinking.*

John Stuart Mill formulated the concept of "freedom," which is central to the ideology of liberalism. Mill, like all liberals, starts from the premise that *the individual has absolute existence and a wholly positive content.* Consequently, granting them complete — preferably *absolute* — freedom is a positive act and the goal of the entire ideological programme of liberalism. But when Mill comes to the content of freedom itself, he encounters the following problem: if we define the content of freedom as something universal, we will end up prescribing a certain duty to the individual, that is, telling him how he should use his freedom. Mill calls this the principle of "freedom for" and designates it with a special term — "freedom."
"Freedom for" is freedom. However, "freedom for" turns out to be something that comes *from outside* the individual.

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[1] "The modern world began with Bentham writing the Defence of Usury." "The modern world began with Bentham's text 'In Defence of Usury'," wrote Chesterton in his work on Thomas Aquinas, who, on the contrary, following Aristotle, was an absolute opponent of usury and, consequently, a defender of Tradition. *Chesterton G. K.* Saint Thomas Aquinas. NY: Doubleday Image, 1956

[2] *Mill J.* Elements of Political Economy. London: Baldwin, Craddock and Joy, 1821.

[3] *Mill J.* The History of British India. 3 vols. London: Baldwin, Craddock and Joy, 1818.

[4] *Mill, J.* On Liberty. // Science and Life.— 1993.№ 11. Pp. 10–15;№ 12. Pp. 21–26.

from itself, and therefore there will be no freedom. For liberal ideology, this poses a major problem and contradiction: by prescribing to the individual what he should use his freedom for (e.g., for the good, justice, creativity, progress, art, etc.), we would thereby make him unfree, since these prescriptions would have a source other than the individual himself. From this, J. S. Mill concludes that the goal of liberalism cannot be positive freedom, "freedom for," but only a different kind of freedom, which he defines as "*freedom from*" and calls liberty, a term of Latin origin. Liberty is negative precisely because, for liberal anthropology, only the individual subject is entirely positive. *It is what it is, and it possesses will and mind.*

Bentham's utilitarianism suggests that the will and mind serve the individual to extract the maximum benefit that he calculates based on his specific situation. Thus, a utilitarian subject who strives to achieve maximum pleasure while minimising suffering is always capable of devising a positive strategy for realising his programme. Moreover, the less the individual is constrained *by external factors*, the more effective this realisation will be. Therefore, Mill concludes, liberty consists in the complete rejection of any prescriptions imposed on a person by the state, society, religion, etc. This negative "freedom from" is what should unite all liberals, regardless of how each intends to realise their freedom and what they intend to use it for. In other words, *liberalism is a universal union of individual subjects, united not by positive goals, but by a unity of rejection of all external prescriptions and restrictions.* The solidarity of liberals with each other extends as far as they all experience oppression from external institutions that are external to each of them. If we assume that these institutions are eliminated, then nothing connects individuals to each other, since no integrating platform of "freedom for" not only does not exist, but cannot exist. Thus, at the limit of the realisation of a liberal strategy on a global scale, the "end of society" and the transition to special post-social forms *of trans-individual coexistence* are postulated. This limit means the abolition of states and social institutions in favour of a "natural state" interpreted as a peaceful and reasonable "civil paradise" in the spirit of Locke, rather than a "war of all against all" in the spirit of Hobbes.

The negativity of liberal freedom (liberty) refers us not only to the chaotic state of atoms in Democritus, but also to the dualistic ontology of δέν, the atom, defined in relation to emptiness, but not as something that exists, but as a kind of turn of emptiness itself, "nothing" (ούδέν). This is the peculiarity of negative freedom: it is not simply the complete liberation of the individual, freeing them from external barriers (which corresponds to Democritus' external emptiness), but also the rejection of any ontologisation of the subject, if the individual is conceived as a subject at all, rather than as a special otherness of the object. In this case, Mill may indirectly refer us to the internal emptiness of Democritus' system, which lives inside the bound bodies, in the interatomic spaces. Thus, the completely liberated individual approaches the image of a ghost, an "eidolon."

The Austrian School: Mises , founder

Later, in the field of economics, the ideas of liberalism were developed in the works of two philosophers and economists, Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) and Friedrich von Hayek (1889–1992).

Ludwig von Mises defended the principle of the dominance of the subjective approach in economics (i.e., the priority of individual decision-making over social norms) and rational choice as the basis of economic practice. The philosophical basis of von Mises' worldview, on which he builds his economic theories, is *absolute individualism*, i.e., the conviction that at the heart of any social system, including the state, lies the autonomous and rational individual, who determines the optimal strategies for economic activity and thereby creates diverse socio-political forms, which he is able to change at will, in a pragmatic relationship with the position of other individuals, who also act on the basis of subjective preferences and private interests. From this followed the familiar liberal prescription to minimise state intervention in the economy and allow individual actors to act with minimal restrictions.

Hayek: neoliberalism

This school of economic thought was taken up by von Mises's student and follower, the leading European economist

[1] *Mises, L.* The Individual, the Market, and the Legal State. St. Petersburg: Pnevma, 1999.

He is considered the founder *of* modern *neoliberalism*, i.e., the version that adapts the principles of classical liberalism, which developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, to the historical conditions of the 20th century.

Like Mises, Hayek's economic philosophy is based on the principle of individual freedom. Hayek sees society as a complex system consisting of a collection of individuals, each pursuing their own individual goals. Everyone does this on the basis of rational calculation and is guided by the principle of efficiency and rationalisation of their activities, striving for one thing: to achieve maximum effect at minimum cost. However, the rationality of such behaviour is limited to the sphere of activity closely related to the individual and to those issues and things that directly interest him and affect his existence and the success of his economic activity(1) ·All factors that they encounter are divided into *relevant* and *irrelevant.* The former are directly related to the implementation of the tasks set, while the latter are irrelevant or indirectly related. Even the number of relevant factors (not to mention irrelevant ones, which are discarded)
"thinking person," homo calculans, immediately) factors are so numerous that even among them, people are forced to make careful choices. The results of distinguishing between the important and the secondary in a specific situation are learned through experience: positive results lead to enrichment and success, negative results lead to losses and failures. This is *the rationality of economic behaviour.* When it is realised in a space associated with the individual, the individual strengthens and develops the logistics of successful and unsuccessful behaviour, testing their actions against the reality of the results. But as soon as we move on to generalisations about the economy, society, or the state as a whole, the number of relevant factors increases exponentially, and rationality dissipates, giving way to dogmatism or utopia, i.e., a theory that is obviously not subject to rational verification at the individual level and is presented as an axiom. Lacking knowledge of critically important relevant factors, social and economic ideologies — such as nationalism and Marxism — fill in the gaps with more or less arbitrary extrapolations, subordinating specific individuals to an irrational project whose postulates cannot be verified.

[1] *Mises, L.* Bureaucracy. Planned Chaos. Anti-Capitalist Mentality. Moscow: Delo, Catallaxy, 1993.

critical reflection. Thus, Hayek concludes *that any generalisations in economics are futile*, as they inevitably lead to violence, totalitarianism, tyranny and the imposition of irrational goals and values on society, which only hinder
"natural development" and creating artificial barriers to the strengthening of minimally rational structures of behaviour accessible to everyone. All this leads straight to slavery[1]. According to Hayek, any attempt to organise society on rational foundations inevitably leads to the triumph of madness and the reign of violence.

Instead, von Hayek suggests limiting ourselves to *a small degree of rationality*, which remains at the individual level. In this sphere, even if an individual makes a mistake or acts irrationally, this will primarily affect him alone or those in his immediate vicinity, whereas social experiments and global projects affect huge masses, directing them towards absurd goals. At the micro level in economics, the most successful approaches are building optimal relationships and intuitively searching for the most effective solutions, which will lead to the gradual progress of society as a whole: everyone in their place seeks the shortest path to achieving optimal results, and the whole society thus moves towards prosperity (the old argument of Adam Smith and classical liberalism). To achieve this, it is necessary to minimise the interference of society and the state in the economic life of citizens, creating as equal starting conditions as possible for all.

On the question of social organisation, Hayek is close to G. Spencer and believes that in society the strongest survive, and any attempt to artificially help the weak and disadvantaged will be detrimental to the strong, but will not improve the weak, leading only to stagnation and delay in progress.

Karl Popper: "The Open Society and Its Enemies"

A prominent theorist of neoliberalism was Karl Popper (1902–1994), a follower of von Hayek who focused primarily on the philosophy of science but wrote an important ideological work, The Open Society and Its [Enemies]. In this book, Popper substantiates the main points of liberal philosophy as applied to the conditions of the 20th century. Beginning with a critique of Plato and Aristotle, that is, with the

[1] *Hayek, F.* The Road to Serfdom. Moscow: New Publishing House, 2005.

[2] *Popper, K.* The Open Society and Its Enemies: In 2 vols. Moscow: Phoenix, International Foundation "Cultural Initiative," 1992.

political philosophy of Father and Son in the context of Politica Aeterna, Popper moves on to socialism and nationalism (the second and third political theories[1]), which he describes as "enemies of an open society." Popper's main idea is that both communists and nationalists operate with idealised concepts, norms and projects that they seek to impose on society by force, leading to disasters, wars and the establishment of totalitarian regimes. In this, he relies entirely on Hayek's argument about the scope of relevant factors.

According to Popper, ideologies that are guided by a project and therefore carry implicit and explicit totalitarianism can only be opposed by liberalism, not simply based on an open market (this principle underlies capitalism), but representing *an open system* capable of constant evolution without any single predetermined goal. Liberalism, according to Popper, must replace politics as such, *replacing it with trade,* and relations between people must replicate the principles of the market and the multitude of transactions, insurance operations and futures contracts that make up the market. This coincides exactly with Smith's ideas.

Popper attacks Marx, Lenin (1870–1924), Stalin (1878–1953) and Hitler (1889–1945), seeing them as tyrants and dictators who oppose the very principle of freedom.

Popper attacks any philosophical teachings that speak of an idea or norm as something that ought to be. This affects both the idealisation of the past and the existence of any goals for the future or models for the present.

Popper proclaims the need to protect and create an "open society," which implies not only progress and the development of liberalism, but also an uncompromising struggle against various types of "closed societies," i.e., communism and fascism. Thus, a project designed to completely overcome dichotomies, Manichean antitheses and any exclusivism, which, according to Popper, are the main distinguishing features of communism and fascism (as well as political systems based on Plato and Aristotle, i.e. the philosophical paradigms of traditional society), in turn, becomes an aggressive, intolerant version that establishes a fundamental opposition between supporters of the "open society" and its enemies, which is reflected in the subtitle of Popper's main political work, The Open Society *and Its* Enemies([2]).Thus

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

[2] *Popper, K.* The Open Society and Its Enemies.

Even in theory, liberalism acquires the characteristics of an intolerant ideology that demands punishment and repression against those who do not share its "peaceful" and "tolerant" principles.

George Soros: liberalism is becoming aggressive

Karl Popper's ideas were put into practice by his student George Soros, who initially achieved enormous success on the stock market through speculation with national currencies, and then invested a significant portion of his capital in promoting networks of various non-governmental organisations and foundations that advocated the ideas of globalisation, civil society, human rights, and the dismantling of the sovereignty of nation states ([1]). George Soros embodies the colourful image of a capitalist who has no religion other than the religion of money ("financial alchemy" ([2]), as he himself calls it), recognises no states or nations, and with messianic determination pursues the establishment of a liberal utopia of an open society on a global scale([3]). In doing so, he relies on a network of informants, agents, emissaries, envoys, like-minded people and direct employees recruited with the help of finance and propaganda, as well as special educational institutions that promote the ideology of liberalism with fanaticism no less than that of religious sects and terrorist organisations. In his fight against the "enemies of the open society," Soros actively uses bribery of political leaders, preparation of colour revolutions and coups d'état, and mass unrest. In some countries, the activities of his foundations have been recognised as extremist.

Fogel: The Gradual Nature of Order, Political Religions, and Totalitarian Heresies

One of the profound theorists of political philosophy in the 20th century is the Austrian thinker Eric Fogel [4](1901–

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[1] *Soros, George.* On Globalisation. Moscow: Eksmo, 2004.

[2] *Soros, J.* The Alchemy of Finance. Moscow: Infra-M, 2001.

[3] *Soros, J.* The Open Society. Reforming Global Capitalism. Moscow: Non-commercial Foundation for the Support of Culture, Education and New Information Technologies, 2001.

[4] *Voegelin E.* Ordnung und Geschichte. 10 Bde. München: Dietmar Herz & Peter Opitz, 2001–2005.

1985). In the first half of his life, he was close to Austrian nationalism and even National Socialism. Many aspects of his philosophy also resonate with the Conservative Revolution. Hence his holism and his sympathy for the Middle Ages. But later he emigrated to the United States, largely revised his original views, and became closer to liberalism, albeit a very atypical form of it. At the same time, Fogel became a consistent opponent of totalitarianism: both in relation to communism, which he always criticised, but also in relation to the third political theory, to which he was close in the early stages. In his criticism, he sought to provide profound metaphysical justifications for the ideologies he criticised, which makes his ideas extremely important in the context of Politica Aeterna. It was Fogel, partly under the influence of Carl Schmitt, the leading representative of the Conservative Revolution, who introduced the concept of "political religion" ([1]) arguing that the totalitarian ideologies of the modern era (primarily communism and fascism) represent a revival in a secular context of precisely those religious teachings, including messianism, eschatology and soteriology.

Fogelin justifies liberalism not through individualism (and in this he differs from most neoliberals, such as Hayek and Popper), but as *the most effective form of social organisation*. From Fogelin's point of view, it is not the individual who is at the centre of the political system, but the ability to organise Order. This is where his methodological holism comes in, which is also extremely far from classical liberalism (if not directly opposed to it).

At the heart of Fogelin's political philosophy lies *the idea of Order*. This is the central concept of his political philosophy. Although Order for Fogelin is a product of social contract, and therefore individualism remains primary, he is interested not so much in this as in the very nature of Order as such.

The meaning of the concept of "order" lies in "transcendent authenticity." From Voegelin's point of view, man is dealing with chaos. Man himself is an element of chaos, and so is the world around him. Man is a chaotic subject immersed in a chaotic object. In such a picture, we easily recognise the universe of Democritus and Epicurus,

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[1] *Voegelin E.* Die politischen Religionen. Stockholm: Bermann Fischer, 1939.

[2] *Voegelin E.* Die neue Wissenschaft der Politik. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2004.

the metaphysical foundation of political philosophy prevailing in the Modern era, particularly evident in liberalism.

The collision of a chaotic subject with a chaotic object generates *the pain* of presence. In response to this pain, there arises a desire to see light in the darkness of chaos. The vision of (rational) light, the perception of space illuminated in darkness, like a circle lit by a bonfire, gives rise to the feeling that the pain of chaos is ceasing; it is removed in the moment of exaltation of light contemplation.

This exalted contemplation of light is the primordial experience of Order, when the human subject overcomes chaos within themselves and in the world. Fogelin calls this a "transcendent leap," which lies at the heart of the political system. Accordingly, he views political history precisely as the evolution of forms of the "transcendent leap." In such a picture, one can recognise Kant's pure reason, but Fogelin does not simply state its existence; he seeks to trace its genesis.

At the same time, the thinker asks himself: why is Order so banal? Why is political thinking in different cultures, peoples and historical eras characterised by such a surprising poverty of political recipes? All societies are organised vertically, from top to bottom, with rulers and subordinates always present; millennia pass, and we change parliaments, chambers of communes, democracies, dictators, tyrants, presidents, emperors, kings, princes, oligarchs in different ways, repeating an extremely limited set of patterns. That is, in every type of society there is an astonishing poverty of political forms. This is how Fogelin problematises the "hyperbanality" of politics. Humanity is extremely diverse in its culture, art and language; it has countless possibilities, orientations and value systems. The chaos of life, the chaos of the subject and the object is open and practically infinite, so why, with such wealth and abundance, do we have such a striking contrast in the primitiveness of the political order?

All types of political orders are remarkably similar, and in all societies we always see the same thing: a dominant subject, a subordinate object, and instruments of subordination in the form of intermediaries who shuttle between the top and the bottom, conveying the will of the top to the bottom and the discontent of the bottom to the top, profiting from this differential. According to Fogel, this is the Order, which is primitive in stark contrast to the richness of life. Life is rich and multidimensional, while Order is primitive and dull, as if man suddenly ceases to be human

and becomes a machine that, like a mechanism, reproduces strictly the same thing — contrary to real possibilities. There is creativity, diversity of forms and creative achievements everywhere — everywhere except in the sphere of politics.

Fogelin concludes that this is the fate of the rationalisation of chaos, and since Order is nothing more than the antithesis of chaos, its task is to reduce diversity and reduce all chaotic richness to simplicity through a transcendent effort. Therefore, order is a process of simplifying chaos. Order is banal, primitive and insignificant, because that is its nature. The task of Order is to simplify to the limit the richness of the chaotic subject and the chaotic object. And in this, according to Fogel, lies the meaning of politics: politics is a form of reduction of the complex chaos of life to the transcendent simplicity of some fundamental organisation.

He goes on to say that this can develop in two ways: *gradually* or *abruptly*. To create a stable order, Fogel believes (and this is where his liberalism lies) that action must be taken gradually. Chaos must be brought together, moving step by step. An infinitely complex chaotic system must be ordered through a step-by-step reduction in the number of bifurcation ([1])links. According to Fogelin, the main element in creating a stable (normative) order is precisely the sequence of reducing the degrees of chaos. Any order is a reduction of the degrees of chaos to zero — this is its meaning. Order is a method of transforming wealth into poverty, a large number of possibilities into a small number. In essence, order is the taming (and ultimately the cessation) of life, the transition from life to death.

When constructing order, it is best to move gradually, from complete chaos to partial chaos, to less chaos, to semi-order, to almost order, and so on, at each stage unfolding around the next "transcendental leap" of the system of political institutions, interactions, and structures. This gradual transition from the non-political, the vital, the political to the chaotic constitutes, according to Fogel, the process of political organisation. Liberalism, in his opinion, is the best way to transition from chaos to order because it is the most consistent (here there is

[1]Bifurcation (from Latin bifurcus, meaning "forked") is a qualitative change in the behaviour of a dynamic system when its parameters change by an infinitesimal amount. The bifurcation model is the basis of chaotic systems. There are predictable particle trajectories, and there are unpredictable ones — bifurcation trajectories: for example, a particle reaches a certain point and can fly either to the right or to the left with equal probability. Knowing where it is flying from and where it is flying to, we cannot calculate whether it will reach its destination.

direct democracy of the first level, referendum of the second level, representation of the third level, etc.) Fogelin understands liberal democracy as the most consistent system for transforming chaotic nature. In other words, it is a way of overcoming chaos that seeks to preserve the richness of life as much as possible, i.e., to incorporate chaos into itself to some extent.

Unlike most liberals, Fogelin does not view progress as something strictly linear and progressive. For him, it is a more nuanced process. He cites Greece and the Middle Ages as examples of exemplary forms of democratic order, where political systems developed that allowed order to be organised with great elegance and a high degree of persuasiveness. Therefore, from his point of view, liberal democracy can be found even more readily in the Middle Ages than in modern society — small communities governed themselves, larger ones in a more complex and comprehensive, but still mostly non-linear way. Moreover, the complexity of the system of governance could include double or even triple subordination that did not contradict each other (for example, vassal, communal, ecclesiastical, etc.). The multidimensional system of management levels, which reduces complexity to simplicity, chaos to order, does not necessarily reach its limit in liberalism, notes Fogel, but the very idea of *gradual* transition is important, as it attempts to preserve some of the diversity of chaotic life in politics. In this, Fogelin somewhat converges with Hayek, who emphasised the absence of a project and the adaptability of social structures in a market society.

In general, according to Fogelin, the movement towards transcendence is nothing more than a process of lowering the status of (chaotic) immanence while preserving its immanent property, which finds its ultimate conceptual embodiment in the democratic system.

Such an apologetic view of gradualism, which would ensure the maximum vitality of Order and include certain elements of chaos that would preserve at least part of the richness of the world, led Fogel to sharply criticise totalitarian regimes, in which this transition to Order was abrupt and coercive, and the simplification of chaos was violent, cruel and conflictual. Fogelin quite rightly considered totalitarian regimes to be a phenomenon of political modernity and interpreted them as "political heresies" or, more generally, forms of "political Gnosticism" ([1]).Christian

[1] *Voegelin E.* Das Volk Gottes. Sektenbewegungen und der Geist der Moderne. Munich: Fink, 1994.

Gnostics, recognised as heretics in the earliest stages of Christianity, were distinguished by their radical opposition to the true spiritual world of immanent reality. This gave rise to a deep conflict with their surroundings and fierce opposition to it. According to Fogel, communism and fascism are typical representatives of such Gnosticism, based on blindness, obsession with Order, and a pathological hatred of chaos with all its vital and cultural richness. People who suffer from chaos, who are overly concerned with its dispersion and spontaneity, try to impose this Order violently on everything they touch, sharply and immediately — bypassing all intermediate stages. The lack of order on the periphery of politics gives rise to an excess of simplified, reduced order, imposed without taking into account intermediate models.

In general, these same considerations regarding the nature of totalitarianism and its critique could also be applied to certain forms of liberal democracy itself, especially in its later manifestation, when it remained the sole and completely dominant political ideology after the defeat of fascism and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Russia. The liberal order in its globalist version deals no less harshly with the chaotic diversity of life, cultures and peoples than the second and third political theories. Therefore, Foghlin's views cannot be fully attributed to liberal orthodoxy, and in part they can be seen as a direction of liberalism from which a transition to the Fourth Political Theory is possible[1].

Leo Strauss: the need to lie

Another important political philosopher of the liberal 20th century, Leo Strauss (1899–1973), was partly in tune with Fogelin and Carl Schmitt. Like Fogelin, Leo Strauss emigrated from Europe to the United States after the Nazis came to power.

Leo Strauss developed an original system of political philosophy[2]based on the assertion that there is *a* fundamental *epistemological dualism* between the intellectual elite of society and the masses. The elite is capable of systematic rational thinking and therefore, already in Antiquity, created a sophisticated rationalist scientific culture that was sceptical of myths, religions and rituals. According to L. Strauss, the intellectual

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

[2] *Strauss, L.* Introduction to Political Philosophy. Moscow: Izograf, 2000.

The intellectual elite is capable of perceiving the world from a scientific perspective, critically reflecting on themselves and the surrounding reality, clearly distinguishing between object and subject, and constructing logical systems. But before the advent of the Modern Age, the elite preferred to pass on this knowledge and these skills in a closed environment, educating their own kind, but not spreading their rationalism and, to some extent, scepticism to the wider society, to the masses. It was only with the Enlightenment that rationalism, logic and scientific realism went beyond the narrow confines of the aristocracy and became accessible to the wider population. This was the essence of European democracy: whereas liberalism had previously been the preserve of the highly educated upper classes, it was now being passed on to the whole of society in the context of civil society. But according to L. Strauss, the mentality of the masses is organised in a fundamentally different way. It is incapable of perceiving logical constructs and gravitates towards myth, faith, religion and ritual. According to L. Strauss, the masses live only in a "world of life" based on unverifiable, illogical and unscientific (mythological) ideas. In pre-modern societies, the elites understood this perfectly and therefore clothed their rational and scientific ideas in mythological and religious forms: this was the *only* way to share knowledge with the masses. But the modern era created a paradoxical situation: elite knowledge (in particular, the scientific picture of the world) was transmitted *directly* to the masses, without a mythological shell. But the masses could not cope with this and turned science, logic and democracy into yet another *myth.* For L. Strauss, the phenomenon of Nazi Germany, from which he had to flee, was a striking example of this contradiction. — Two centuries after the Enlightenment, the German people easily fell prey to the most extravagant myths. This means that rationalism and scientific culture failed to penetrate the masses and existed as a myth themselves — only a "democratic" and "liberal" one. Faced with a stronger myth, the Germans immediately became fascinated by it.

From this observation, L. Strauss drew a pessimistic conclusion: scientific knowledge, the attainment of full individual freedom, and a coherent, responsible personality — that is, the basic postulates of liberalism — are possible only as *properties of a minority*. Therefore, the enlightened liberal elite must clothe their ideals in special *mythological forms* and only in this form pass them on to the masses, since the masses, as such, cannot perceive rational theses and immediately distort them. This is how the theory of the "noble lie" emerged, which is necessary for the advancement of the ideals of progress and equality in the world.

Here we see a combination of anthropological pessimism (characteristic of Hobbes and realism) with liberalism, which, in the spirit of Spencer, becomes elitist in Leo Strauss's view, that is, the preserve of elites who are called upon to rule the masses, either because they are incapable of achieving liberal democracy or because they are moving in this direction very slowly and from time to time falling back into simpler mythological and religious belief systems. Here we again approach Fogel's idea of "political religion."

The philosophical truth accessible to liberal elites is that the world is material and that there is no Spirit, no God, no sacredness. Only mechanical laws operate in the world and society, but only the elite know this. In L. Strauss, the elite is described as the bearer of the Modern paradigm, and he extends this hypothesis to the elite of traditional society — including Plato, whom he considers a sceptic, atheist and rationalist forced to hide his true views under the guise of idealistic teachings.

Since the elite knows that there is no transcendence, only the material interests of certain groups, and the masses cannot understand this, the elite rules the masses. If the masses were to discover this "truth," they would go mad or even die of horror — because they need to "believe in something sacred." In traditional society, religions existed for this purpose; in the modern era, the masses believe in ideology and politics. The elites, who understand that nothing "ideal" exists (all elites, according to L. Strauss, are deliberately materialists, atomists, and supporters of the philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus), and that there are only selfish interests within the limits of global piggery and the struggle for them, they tell the masses myths that they are happy to believe — about morality, humanism, equality, democracy, human rights, etc. In fact, Leo Strauss argues that the elite lies, and, moreover, it has always lied everywhere, knowing that everything is material and utilitarian, that only money, pleasure and selfishness rule. But to the masses it said the exact opposite: that there is faith, hope, dignity, justice, progress, etc.

Here we again encounter a combination of anthropological pessimism in the spirit of Hobbes and an unconditional commitment to liberal-individualistic values, concepts and theories. L. Strauss neither justifies nor condemns this state of affairs; he simply states it as fact, since, in his opinion, it cannot be otherwise. He considers the only solution to be a policy of including ever wider circles in the elite,

who will gradually become accustomed to a sceptical and materialistic understanding of the nature of the world and society, and thus accept liberalism in its realistic form — beyond political and religious illusions. Here, Fogel's gradualism takes on a somewhat different — more pragmatic — meaning.

The idea of justifying the lies of the elites in the name of liberalism in practice was borrowed from Leo Strauss by an influential American neoconservative movement, which combined liberalism with a certain degree of realism. In contemporary American political practice, many of Leo Strauss's concepts and theories have been adopted.

F. Fukuyama: the thesis of the "end of history "

After the collapse of the socialist camp and the USSR, a number of Western political scientists, analysts and experts came to believe that this event marked the end of the complex dialectic of the stages of globalisation and that from now on the world would become fully integrated and liberal, since nothing could prevent the development of the liberal-capitalist paradigm that had prevailed on a global scale. Globalists viewed these changes with optimism and believed that the "point of no return" had been passed and that the world had already become global, unified and planetary, with residual conflicts and contradictions gradually smoothing themselves out.

This view was held in the early 1990s by American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who wrote the epoch-making text "The End of History" [2]. Fukuyama drew on the philosophy of history of Hegel, who believed that the embodiment of the Idea in the historical process is oriented towards its culmination in the Absolute Spirit. History, having become meaningful, will prove to be finite: having achieved a certain goal, it will exhaust its content. K. Marx applied Hegel's thesis to his version of the dialectical development of productive forces and production relations, which was supposed to end in a world revolution and the advent of the "communist formation" as the "end of history." Hegelian philosopher A. Kojève[3] (1902–1968) suggested that history could end with the complete planetary triumph of *liberal* capitalism, the market and bourgeois democracy. Francis Fukuyama, analysing the collapse of the USSR, believed that Kozhev's version was coming true before our very eyes

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Civilisations of the New World. Pragmatics of Dreams and the Decomposition of Horizons. Moscow: Academic Project, 2017.

[2] *Fukuyama, F.* The End of History and the Last Man. Moscow: AST, 2004.

[3] *Kozhev, A. V.* Introduction to Reading Hegel. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2013.

interpretations of Hegel, and wrote first a programmatic article and then a book with the corresponding title.

According to Fukuyama, the meaning of "the end of history" boils down to the end of the major political conflicts that tore humanity apart in previous stages and thus constituted the content of the historical process. Once upon a time, in the "barbarian" era, everyone fought everyone else, and the law of the strongest prevailed. In modern times, nation states were declared the subjects of history and the bearers of sovereignty, and this principle formed the basis of the Westphalian system. Nation states fought each other and thus shaped European history and, through their colonial epics, the history of the rest of the world. After the Second World War, rivalry between nations receded into the background in the face of the ideological confrontation between global capitalism and global socialism, and the meaning of history became the confrontation between two political and economic systems. The collapse of the USSR and the victory of the West in the Cold War brought this period to an end, and thus *history* no *longer* has any *content or* meaning. During the ideological confrontation with communism, the bourgeois states became sufficiently close to each other to become the basis of a new socio-political and economic order, and the disappearance of the ideological enemy theoretically allows liberal democracy, the market economy and the ideology of "human rights" to spread throughout the world. In such a situation, nation states will gradually die out, and politics will be completely replaced by economics. Economics has no history, as it has no meaning, no dramatic tension, no substance. The world will become a global market in which logistics and optimisation will prevail, allowing lagging participants in the global economy to gradually catch up with developed, advanced societies.

Later, Fukuyama significantly revised his views and acknowledged that his prediction had been overly optimistic, but his corrections and reservations are much less interesting than his main thesis about the "end of history." The point is not that he was hasty and jumped to conclusions, but that he accurately reproduced the philosophy of contemporary globalism in its most complete, consistent and coherent form. Fukuyama's ideas seemed quite realistic in the 1990s, when a "unipolar moment" (Ch. Krauthammer) had established itself in the world architecture.

[1]*Fukuyama, F.* Ideas Matter. A Conversation with A. Dugin // Profile. 2007. No. 23(531).

The First Political Theory: liberalism

We refer to liberalism as the first political theory of the modern era. It emerged earlier than others, formed on the basis of the Hobbesian paradigm, but with a qualitative reinterpretation of anthropology — from the pessimistic version of Hobbes himself to the neutral and optimistic version (in Locke and later in Kant). Liberalism became the most consistent ideological expression of capitalism and bourgeois society. It was liberal ideology that placed the idea of enlightenment, education, progress and development at the centre of attention.

Politically, liberalism is expressed in liberal democracy, but in certain cases it allows for oligarchy (as the rule of the wealthiest members of bourgeois society) and even enlightened monarchy, which is called upon to create the conditions for subsequent democratic structures through education and reforms from above. It is obvious that in this case, the rejected and despised systems of social organisation — democracy, the selfish bodily pig-polis, the community of "idiots," political atomism — are, in the eyes of the Platonists (the ideal state, Callipolis) and Aristotelians (the normal state), as well as supporters of similar theories developed in a similar topology during the Christian Middle Ages, are taken as a model, extolled and glorified in every way. But in the end, only the rhetoric and subjective assessment change: what in the eyes of the Platonists, Aristotelians (as well as Catholics and Orthodox Christians) looks like ugliness and degeneration, a kind of political-philosophical "heresy" (the political philosophy of Mother, the Receptor, the "chorus"), is regarded by liberals as the highest achievement of freedom (from all forms of collective identity), progress, the advent of happy times and a way out of medieval obscurantism. However, from the point of view of Politica Aeterna, these rhetorical figures are secondary and do not reflect reality in any way. If we abstract from how we evaluate the structures themselves, the basic theses and the main semantic axes of the three political paradigms, we see that it is liberal ideology that bears the greatest resemblance to the philosophical foundations of what Plato describes as the third kind of being, as the realm of pure multiplicity (πολλά), as the figure of the Mother, as Aristotle's "chora" or "matter" (ύλη). In the three-part structure of the world, political Platonism (in all its versions) represents Heaven, the Aristotelian model represents the intermediate world, Earth, and liberalism represents the underground world.



The genesis and formation of liberal ideology (the first political theory)

areas of existence, a progressive descent towards the centre of gravity, towards the material core [1], in the process of gradually liberating materiality — that is, the atom, the core of the individual, the dimension of radical objectivity — from all transcendent and strictly subjective forms.

Liberalism emerged earlier than other political ideologies of the modern era and lasted longer than them. Its victories over illiberal versions of modernity (fascism and communism) led to its triumph on a global scale by the end of the 20th century. If we trace the ideological fate of the 20th century, we see a clash between three ideologies: liberal, communist and fascist. The first two defeated the third in 1945, and in 1991, the first defeated the second. Thus, throughout the Modern Age, liberalism remained the dominant conceptual matrix and can well be considered synonymous with the political philosophy of the Modern Age. Of course, the political philosophy of the New Age is paradigmatically broader than Locke and Kant (just as Hobbes is broader and more fundamental than Locke), but nevertheless, it is precisely the idea of an optimistic anthropology characteristic of liberalism (as well as communism, or more precisely, borrowed from liberals and communists) that is the dominant trend in the political philosophy of this period.

The idea of the individual as a "blank slate" has deep theoretical connections with the very semantic core of the Modern Age. This brings us to the fundamental law of Modern political philosophy: *liberalism is the dominant force here*. From Locke to the modern United States, the Anglo-Saxon world as a whole, the European Union and practically the rest of the world, first during colonisation, then westernisation and modernisation, and finally globalisation, it is the liberal paradigm that has become unquestionably dominant. Thus, liberalism (capitalism, bourgeois society and its philosophy) won the historical battle, first against traditional society, then against illiberal alternatives within the modern world, and since the end of the 20th century has become the main — and, in essence, the only — operating system of ideology, politics and culture on a global scale.

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[1] *Land N*. Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007; *Negarestani R.* Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials.

[2] *Dugin, A. G*. The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

Chapter 6. Communism (the second political theory): the dialectic of the vortex in history

The Second Political Theory

Now we move on to the second political theory, which includes all types of left-wing, i.e. anti-capitalist, ideologies that are critical of the bourgeois system. The most vivid and complete systematic expression of the second political theory is undoubtedly Marxism, which is the most developed and detailed theory and has achieved impressive, albeit sometimes monstrous, practical results in history. But all types of leftist thought, both Marxist and non-Marxist, collectively referred to as socialism or social democracy (as opposed to bourgeois or liberal democracy, i.e., the first political theory), have something fundamentally in common at the level of fundamental philosophical assumptions. The common denominator of the second political theory is *its attitude towards the individual.* Materialism, belief in progress, recognition of the domination of history and time as the only form of existence, a scientific picture of the world, obsession with technical development, as well as conviction in the necessity of the final abolition of states and the creation of a single global cosmopolitan humanity, all this is common to both the first and second political theories. Up to a certain point, they are in solidarity with each other and evaluate both the content and even the moral significance of historical processes — above all, those of the modern era — in the same way. Thus, both liberals and communists are in complete solidarity in their opposition to traditional society, both in its ancient and medieval forms. They unanimously reject vertical organisation, hierarchy, sacred politics, the ideal state of the Father and the normal state of the Son with all their corresponding metaphysical, anthropological, cultural and political forms. Thus, liberals and socialists, to a certain extent, represent a common front of Modernity against Tradition, pol-

agreeing with both the assessment of the "old order" and the moral and historical imperative of transition to democracy, the authorities of the bourgeoisie. But the differences begin further on. For liberals, bourgeois democracy is the logical culmination of political and historical progress. History ends with it. This line was taken to its logical conclusion in the 1990s by the American liberal Francis Fukuyama[1]. Therefore, capitalism and equality of opportunity are considered the highest limit of liberation. Here, individualism reaches its apogee. In Plato's model of Parmenides, it is not simply a question of the triumph of the last four hypotheses, which deny the One out of the nine, but precisely of a deeper and deeper immersion into pure multiplicity, that is, the liberation of the individual atom from all forms of collective identity. This means that from the sixth hypothesis, which allows for an artificial and secondary "One," liberalism calls for a move to the seventh hypothesis, which denies the necessity of this "One," and further from the eighth hypothesis, within which many (i.e., atoms) correlate with other many (with other atoms), to the last, ninth, where many do not correlate with other many, but only with themselves. This is how extreme individualism is achieved, the most complete expression of which has already become, in the 21st century, the philosophy of speculative realism or object-oriented ontology[2].

Marxism, while not rejecting individualism, interprets it in a completely different way. It totally rejects the idea that bourgeois reforms liberate the individual. Marx believes that capital is a mechanical dependence that prevents true individuality from unfolding, and therefore liberal individualism is an anthropological fraud. It is not the individual that prevails in it, but only a particular aspect of human nature, embodied in hidden aggression (a reference to Hobbes). Like Locke, Marx is convinced that people can be re-educated, but such re-education is achieved through a radical change in the form of society, through the destruction of the bourgeois order and the establishment of a political order based on complete and perfect

[1] *Fukuyama, F.* The End of History and the Last Man.

[2] *Bryant L. R., Harman G., Srnicek N.* The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism. Melbourne: Re.Press, 2011.

[3] Louis Dumont rightly notes: "The socialist Marx believed in the individual so strongly that there was no analogue to this belief in Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, or even Locke. It is possible that such socialism, and such a rise in faith in the individual after the French Revolution, became possible only after the period of 1840–1850." *Dimont L.* Essays on Individualism. An Anthropological Perspective on Modern Ideology. P.: Seuil, 1983. P. 131.

absolute equality and the absence of any kind of property superiority on the part of anyone. Only complete equality will allow us to achieve the true nature of the atom and make the individual truly free. The freedom (liberty) that liberals pursue and extol is a pseudo-freedom that preserves, along with inequality, dependence on capital and harsh mechanisms of exploitation. Capitalism is incompatible with the true freedom of all individuals, since a significant part of them, the proletariat, the working class, finds itself in a position of slavery, and therefore their individuality cannot be justified or fully revealed. Thus, socialists fundamentally disagree with liberals on the interpretation of individuality, placing the main emphasis on equality, without which liberation is impossible.

Another fundamental difference between the second political theory and the first is the attitude towards the artificial "unity" of the sixth and seventh hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides. Thus, liberalism moves towards the abolition of this "one" formed by the many (i.e., from the sixth hypothesis to the ninth), while socialism stops at the sixth, but makes the principle of equality of the many a condition for this "one." That is, in the eyes of socialists and communists, the "one" created by the many must be total and not allow division into two classes (which is what they accuse liberals of) or into national territories (which is the fundamental difference between international communism and nationalists, representatives of the third political theory).

Campanella: the rational city

In the full sense of the word, the second political theory only finally took shape in the 19th century with Marx, but it had predecessors, the most distant of whom include the Anabaptists of Müntzer or the creators of such rationalistic utopias as Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639) or Francis Bacon (1561–1626).

The Calabrian monk Tommaso Campanella was influenced by the general ideas of the Renaissance, which combined several diverse trends — from the Platonism of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Pico della Mirandola[3] (1463–1494) to the atomism and materialism of Galileo Galilei (1574–1609) and the scientific revolution.

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[1] *Dumont, L.* Homo Equalis. The Genesis and Rise of Economic Ideology. Moscow: Nota Bene, 2000.

[2] *Ficino M.* La religione christiana. Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, 2005.

[3] *Pico della Mirandola Giovanni.* De hominis dignitate. Heptaplus. De Ente et Uno. Florence: Vallecchi, 1942.

leia. In the second half of his life, Campanella became close to Galileo, whose ideas in physics and astronomy he partly accepted.

Campanella, while imprisoned for political reasons, wrote his most famous work, The City of the Sun [1]. In it, he describes a world state built on the principles of a "new philosophy," which is the philosophy of Tommaso Campanella himself. The ideal society is created on strictly rational foundations. It is headed by the Metaphysician, who is obeyed by a hierarchy of elected authorities structured according to professional criteria. He embodies the Sun itself, acting as its substitute. His three co-rulers embody the three main principles of the universe: Power (Pon), Wisdom (Sin) and Love (Mor). Below them is the Grand Council, and below that are various professional associations and corporations, each headed by a "king". All the inhabitants of the City of the Sun work selflessly, but not to feed themselves, but out of a sense of morality and solidarity. The rulers distribute wealth based on the principles of justice.

All life in the City of the Sun is extremely rational, everyone is engaged in their own work, and everyone studies science and the arts. Instead of historical religions, a "new religion" reigns, in which all three levels of perception — sensory evidence, rationality, and prophetic mysticism — are harmoniously combined. The level of knowledge and competence increases as one rises through the social hierarchy.

"The City of the Sun can be interpreted in different ways, since it does not yet establish complete equality, but the communists considered the very principle of rational organisation of society, universal obligation to work, and the replacement of existing religions with a universal worldview to be a prototype of their own project for world reorganisation.

Francis Bacon: Atlantis scientists

The author of another utopia that communists considered a model for their own worldview was the English philosopher and prominent political figure Francis Bacon, who outlined his views on the optimal structure of a society based on scientific principles in his book New Atlantis [2]. Bacon was one of the first to formulate a comprehensive programme for scientific knowledge of nature.

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[1] *Campanella, T.* The City of the Sun. Moscow; Leningrad: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1947.

[2] *Bacon, F.* New Atlantis // Bacon, F. Works: In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow: Myśl, 1978.

based on induction and experiment, becoming the founder of modern empiricism. Developing medieval nominalism, Bacon argues that true ideas about things can only be obtained through *sensory experience*, from which alone we should derive our knowledge of the surrounding world.

Bacon, in his New Organon, asserts that only *pure experience* gained from experiments on matter, free from projections of "ghosts" (eidolons) onto it, should form the basis of true scientific knowledge and become the main methodological basis of modern science. Behind this attitude, it is easy to see the implication *of the identity of being and matter* and the secondary nature (reflectivity) of reason, which merely reflects the structure of materiality (i.e., full-fledged materialism). We can easily find the premises of this method in Duns Scotus's teaching on the uniqueness of being and in William of Ockham.

On the other hand, Francis Bacon proposes an active part of the scientific programme, consisting in *the subjugation of nature to man*. If earlier, Francis Bacon argues, people understood nature episodically and subjugated it to themselves from time to time, from now on the complete and total subjugation of nature must become *a conscious task of humanity*. There is nothing in nature except materiality, which must *be studied through experience* and *subjugated to man through practice,* proclaims F. Bacon. There is nothing to contemplate in nature except "eidolons," ghosts, and therefore it must be conquered and made to serve the interests of humanity.

Francis Bacon was one of the first in Europe not only to express but also to fundamentally substantiate the theory of progress. For him, progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge, which predetermines the vector structure of the development of science — *from a minimum of knowledge to a maximum of knowledge.* Along this axis, social time is constructed, moving from minus to plus, and thus representing progress, an irreversible movement forward. Humanity, following the path of experience and conquest of nature, continuously strengthens its potential — becoming more and more intelligent and more and more powerful. Hence Francis Bacon's formula: "Scientia potentia est" ("Knowledge is power").

All three main points of Francis Bacon's philosophy — the recognition of the identity of being and matter and the fictitiousness ("ghostliness," "nominality") of eidetic forms, on the one hand, and the strict volitional determination to conquer and subjugate nature as the dominant factor, on the other hand — are

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[1] *Bacon, F.* New Organon. Moscow: Direct Media, 2002.

scientific knowledge — on the other hand, and confidence in the accumulation of scientific knowledge and scientific progress — on the third, constitute the semantic axis of the Modern paradigm.

F. Bacon describes the ideal society built on the principles of a scientific worldview in his work "New Atlantis," which paints a picture of a state headed by pure rationality, the laws of empiricism, and the constant accumulation of scientific data. The scientific utopia described by Francis Bacon became the prototype for the organisation of the British Royal Society.

For communists, as in the case of Campanella's "City of the Sun," we are dealing with a political project to transform society on scientific and rational principles. At the same time, in the case of both utopias, we are talking about the creation of a kind of "unity" from individual particles, which became the main idea of socialism, that is, the connections (Latin socius — "following together," "accompanying," "companion") of all with all, and this became the main idea of socialism.

"unity" from individual particles, which became the main idea of socialism, i.e., the connections (Latin: socius — "following together," "accompanying," "companion") of all with all, and communism (Latin: communis, "common").

Benedict Spinoza: substantialism

The philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) plays an important role in the genealogy of Marxist materialism and atheism. *Spinoza's philosophy represents the first historical attempt to construct a metaphysical system based on the principle of pure immanence*. All European philosophy of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and all Christian dogma were built on *a vertical topography* that affirmed the ontological primacy of God over nature, the world, the elements, and people, that is, *on transcendence.* This transcendence persisted in all versions and all theological and philosophical systems until Spinoza.

Benedict Spinoza was the first to clearly and openly proclaim *the directly opposite metaphysical thesis*: God is not transcendent to the world, but *immanent* in it. *God is Nature*, Spinoza asserts. Deus sive Natura. This in itself was not simply atheism, but a fundamental change in the entire metaphysical picture of the world, from which the transcendent dimension was completely expelled. Before Spinoza, no philosopher, including those considered materialists, rationalists, and "humanists," dared to assert anything like this. Usually, materialists recognised God as the cause of the world or, as in Newton, as a "watchmaker" watching over the planets moving in the ether so that they do not stray from their orbits.

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[1] *Spinoza, B.* Works: In 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1999.

Spinoza's system is entirely derived from the basic principle of pure immanence. Spinoza asserts that there is a single and absolute beginning, which he calls *substance*. It is the cause of itself (causa sui) and proceeds from itself (sui generis), that is, from its own identity. This principle is everything; it is the world, it is God, and it is nature. Creation from nothing is impossible, since there is neither a transcendent God nor nothingness. Spinoza says as much: "nam ex nihilo nihil fit" ("nothing comes from nothing").

Substance is ontologically unified, but within itself it is divided into two derivatives (as in Descartes) into *the thinking principle* (res cogens) and *extension* (res extensa). The unity of substance guarantees *the knowability of the world,* since what is known and what is known are two sides *of the same thing.* God, who is nature, is not a subject, but means *substance* itself. Marxist ontology, like most materialistic systems, is entirely derived from Spinoza's ideas. Later, Marx simply replaced the concept of "substance" with the concept of "matter" and discarded the word "God" altogether in order to obtain the general structure of his strictly immanentist and materialistic ontology.

From the metaphysics of immanentism, Spinoza derives his ethics, which constitute an important dimension of his philosophy. This ethics is based on the juxtaposition of three principles:

- necessity,
- freedom, and
- violence.

Necessity is the internal law of the causal unfolding of substance. It is irrevocable, since it expresses substance itself. Freedom is the following of this necessity. The ethics of freedom consists in *comprehending necessity* through the knowledge of the laws of nature and science, and in following it. Violence, on the other hand, is an obstacle to the unfolding of substantial necessity, which is perceived — understood and experienced — as lack of freedom. Marx borrowed the thesis of freedom as conscious necessity entirely from Spinoza. In a sense, this is a continuation of Calvin's doctrine of predestination, but while Calvin still retains the idea of a transcendent and eternal deity, which is the transcendent subject, in Spinoza, predestination is already completely inscribed in the substance itself as necessity and has no meaning other than corresponding to the logic of the development of this substance.

The theory of desire is based on the principle of necessity — Spinoza calls it conatus and understands it as the desire of an individual

of the individual as a mode of universal substance *to affirm itself*. According to Spinoza, a person *wants something not because they find it good, but finds good what they want*. They always want only one thing — the affirmation of themselves in the structure of causal chains of an all-encompassing substance, but they express this in many ways. Thus, fundamental materialism (in Spinoza's view, substantialism) and fundamental individualism are inextricably linked.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: direct democracy ( )

An important element in the preparation of the socialist worldview and the theory of communism is the doctrine formulated by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau [1](1712–1778). Rousseau proposed a programme of radical reforms. Therefore, he was approached by the most extreme representatives of revolutionary circles, who insisted on establishing a regime *of direct democracy* in France. In his philosophical works, Rousseau describes the figure of the "ideal savage" (bon sauvage), who lives in harmony with nature according to the laws of equality, goodness and justice. the laws of equality, goodness, and justice.

According to Rousseau, the original organisation of society (the "natural state") is a harmonious coexistence of man with the surrounding world and with other people. Rousseau extols the "savage," endowing him with all kinds of virtues. Evil enters society when selfishness, greed, technology, and culture begin to spread. Rousseau sees civilisation and technological progress as negative phenomena that lead to the transformation of the "good savage" into the "evil civilised man." Complex social institutions — the church, monarchy, state, etc. — represent for Rousseau alienating superstructures over the living human element.

Like Hobbes, Rousseau sees the origins of society in a "social contract" that the powerful gradually forget, usurping authority and securing privileges for themselves and their families. Therefore, Rousseau puts forward the idea of "direct democracy," built on the rejection of any vertical hierarchy, indirect representation, and alienating forms of social organisation. This is a return to the roots of society, to the "social contract," but only in a form that those in power can no longer turn into a justification for personal or group power.

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[1] *Rousseau, J.-J.* Treatises. Moscow: Nauka, 1969.

Rousseau's ideal is the "peasant," "simple labourer," while the higher classes — priests (clergy) and warriors (aristocracy) — are endowed with all kinds of vices and accused of violating the original purity and harmony of life that preceded the advent of differentiated civilisation. It is important to note that, unlike the liberal tradition that prevailed in England, Rousseau's model of "direct democracy" is the rural community, not the "demos" of the city.

At the same time, Rousseau thinks of himself as a representative of Modernity, progress, and the Enlightenment. Thus, Rousseau considers Christianity to be a harmful phenomenon incompatible with direct democracy. He is particularly opposed to the idea of original sin, which he considers an instrument of suppression of free will, imposed on society by the political elite during the era of the stratification of civilisation into a minority that usurped power and an oppressed majority deprived of its natural rights.

The Great French Revolution set itself the goal of putting Rousseau's teachings into practice, overthrowing the old "feudal," ecclesiastical-aristocratic, monarchical order and establishing *political democracy* in its most radical form for the first time in Europe, which reached its peak under the Jacobins.

At the same time, Rousseau's political democracy was fundamentally different from liberalism. Here, the normative figure was not the townspeople or merchants, but people living in a state as close to nature as possible. Later, under the influence of this image of the "noble savage," Marx and Engels (1820–1895) developed the idea of "cave communism," which was of fundamental importance for their theory of the transition of economic formations.

Rousseau's ideas anticipate communism in that they offer an optimistic anthropology (man is inherently good, hence the denial of original sin), they offer a detailed critique of hierarchical structures, including the urban bourgeoisie, and insist on direct democracy rather than representative democracy, which the bourgeoisie defends, since for Rousseau, "representation" is the main source of the usurpation of the will of the people.

Political materialism: matter as the e of being

Moving directly to the communist ideology formulated by Marx and Engels, it should be emphasised that it is constructed within the paradigm of the New Age. In all its

In some respects, it belongs to what we have called "*political Modernism*." Let me remind you of the basic philosophical principle of political modernity: it is the idea of constructing politics, ontology, cosmology and, if you like, theology "from the bottom up". That is, it is the idea that the basic ontological reality is the bottom, a certain horizon of the lower world, defined by the concept of
"matter."

This is the meaning of materialism as the basis of Marxist philosophy and communism. Among other political ideologies of the Modern era, communism, the second political theory, insists most strongly on explicit dogmatic materialism. For Marx and Engels, materialism is not some routine given of the general scientific picture of the world, but the fundamental basis of all ideology. Everything in communism is built precisely on materialism and on the conviction, irrefutable for communists themselves, of the materiality of the world. Liberalism is built on materialism and implies it, but — as in the case of Kant, for example — there can be bourgeois-capitalist theories that offer their own, somewhat different forms of ontology and epistemology. In some cases, materialism may remain latent, unmanifested, and this does not violate the coherence of liberal philosophy. For the second political theory, materialism is precisely an ideological and political dogma. No one insists as harshly and unambiguously as communists on the materiality of the world and the primacy of matter. Therefore, it is necessary to reiterate once again the place that matter occupies in the general structure of Politica Aeterna, especially since this concept takes on such an important political dimension in the second political theory.

Earlier, we discussed the political philosophy of the Father, where ideas exist, and copies of the phenomenal world exist only through their connection to the idea (political Platonism). We also discussed the political philosophy of the Son, where being is contained within the phenomenal world (political Aristotelianism). There is also the political philosophy of the Mother. If we take the dialogue "Timaeus," this is the Nourisher ("chora"), which is at the bottom of the complete metaphysical map of the three principles, the genera of being. Consequently, materialism means that being is placed in its original sense neither at the top (as in Plato) nor in the middle (as in Aristotle), but *at the bottom.*

As we have said, from Plato's point of view, and from Aristotle's point of view, matter as such does not exist. From Plato's point of view, it is a certain limit of the cooling of the idea. According to Plotinus, evil is the diminution of the good.

Here, the emphasis is not on evil itself, but on its diminution, on its deficiency, on the insufficient amount of good. If we imagine the complete absence of good, then from the Neoplatonist point of view, there would be *nothing*, including evil. The absence of good is not evil, it is *pure nothingness*. Evil is the diminution of good as a process; it is the process of dissipation, of cooling of good. If the process is complete, then there is neither good nor evil. That is why, from the point of view of Platonism, matter is a conditional limit of the process of diminishing good. Matter as such does not exist — there is only *the pursuit of material things*, materialisation.

From Aristotle's point of view, matter exists, but only *together* with eidos — form (μορφή). It is a constituent part of the process of existence, without which this existence is impossible. But in its pure form, if we remove the eidetic component (eidos) of a phenomenon, we are left with nothing. In its pure form, matter, as in Platonism, is unrepresentable; it does not exist. It *exists* only through phenomena, through necessary participation in phenomena, but not in itself. The third political philosophy — the philosophy of Matter (chora) — represents yet another ontological hypothesis — that matter (that which is below) actually exists and, in the ultimate sense, is the only thing that exists. Accordingly, here matter is endowed with completely new properties.

When we say that we reject Platonism (matter as a diminution of spirit and a process of cooling of the Idea), reject Aristotelianism (where matter necessarily exists in combination with eidos), we arrive at a third model in which matter exists, it is represented by atoms, and these atoms, indivisible particles of matter, exist in themselves.

In the first case, matter does not exist; in the second case, matter exists only in combination with eidos; and in the third case, matter exists on its own. Matter is endowed with new properties and acquires the character of a special, living matter that carries within itself the content of being. Everything is turned upside down: previously, the content of being was contained in Ideas, but in materialism, everything is the opposite — the content of being is contained in matter.

Living matter of communism

Plato's political philosophy viewed the world and the state from "above" — the state as God-given, as a revelation, as a manifestation of an idea (hence the concept of the sacred state, the sacred empire). In Aristotle's political philosophy, everything is built around an immovable mover

— there is no descent, no revelation of ideas, but the continuous existence of an orderly sacred cosmos, an eternal cosmos.

In the third paradigm — the political philosophy of Marx — we get an idea of growth. This aspect is most clearly represented in communism. For Marxists, matter is endowed with an internal life that develops linearly in the direction of consciousness. Therefore, Marxists picked up on Charles Darwin's (1809–1882) idea of the evolution of species, turning it into yet another political dogma. Matter develops from primary minerals to living cells, then to the simplest organisms (amoebas and ciliates), then to animals, and finally to hominids and humans, reaching the level of consciousness. But consciousness itself, despite its apparent autonomy, is material, since it is nothing more than a product of the development of matter.

Consequently, Marxists develop their ideology, matter is endowed with internal capacities for growth, and therefore the entire world, including the capacity for thought, is a derivative of matter. Any phenomenon (phenomenon), therefore, is not independent (as in the philosophy of the Son) and is not a derivative of an idea (as in the philosophy of the Son), but is *a derivative of the movement of matter*. Thus, matter is endowed with new content and elevated to a new category, dynamically containing within itself the possibilities for the development of being and consciousness. In Marxism, matter is alive and contains within itself the prerequisites for the emergence of consciousness, which predetermine the emergence of various species from matter, including human beings and society itself. *From the point of view of such materialism, society is the peak of the development of matter:* matter grows and matures into the state, into the polis.

This is the meaning of the materialist understanding of the essence of politics. Politics, society, the state, and the polis are the peak of the development of matter.

Marxism as a post-

Marxist political philosophy is built within the paradigm that dominates the modern era. At the same time, however, it is strongly opposed to liberal ideology. Marxism rejects liberalism, but not at all from the position of the era preceding the modern era. The Communist Manifesto [1]by Karl Marx

[1]*Marx, K., Engels, F.* Works. Vol. 4. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1955.

The works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels devote considerable space to a very important point — distinguishing themselves from all other forms of anti-capitalist theory, especially those that oppose capitalism from the standpoint of traditional society. Marxism sees itself precisely as post-capitalism, as post-liberalism, and not as pre-liberalism, nor as various versions of anti-bourgeois ideologies that have survived in modern Europe by inertia from the era of medieval political institutions. Therefore, Marx explains in great detail that the enemies of the bourgeoisie can be anyone, but Marxists are only those who criticise liberalism and capitalism from the position of the phase following capitalism, and not from the position preceding it.

During the period when Marx and Engels lived, there were many different opponents of capitalism in Germany — the Prussian aristocracy, the military, conservatives, and even monarchists, who vehemently rejected capitalism, believing that it represented the decay of the traditional medieval European order and carried with it only nihilism, degeneration, and the reduction of all values to base and material ones. There were many more opponents of capitalism at that time than there were Marxists. In order to show that Marxism belongs to the paradigm of modern political philosophy and does not oppose it on the level of another political philosophy (Platonism or Aristotelianism), Marx emphasises in every way that his critique is a critique of capitalism not from the "right" but from the "left"; that Marxism represents an even more modern, even more immanent, even more materialistic, even more atheistic, even more anti-Platonic and anti-Aristotelian political doctrine than capitalism (liberalism). Moreover, Marxism is in solidarity with capitalism itself in relation to such opponents of capitalism "from the right." Capitalism is an undeniable progress compared to the Middle Ages; it is the socio-economic formation that followed feudalism, the advent of which should in no way be opposed or counteracted, as it is absolutely necessary as preparation for the next phase. According to Marx, there is no road from feudalism to socialism; the only way forward is through capitalism, which must therefore be supported and defended. Another thing is that capitalism is the end of the road for liberals, but for Marxists it is only one of its stages, and the end will come after capitalism, when it in turn will be overcome by the proletarian revolution, the construction of a socialist society, and finally, the advent of communism. Therefore, Marxism sees itself as something even more

Contemporary, modernist, more so than Modernism itself, as an ideology of the future, which has moved much further away from the paradigm of Tradition, from Platonism and Aristotelianism, than the first political theory.

The declension of the atom: the individual and the " "

Marxism argues with liberalism for the right to define the essence of the paradigm of political philosophy in the modern era.

Marx is well aware of the genealogy of his teaching, its origins, its metaphysics, its stages. It is highly symbolic that Karl Marx's doctoral dissertation is dedicated to Epicurus and Democritus, and that Marx's favourite philosopher is the substantialist Spinoza. The point is that Marx is well aware of the origins of his political philosophy in what we have called the political philosophy of the Mother. This is ancient atomism, this is Epicureanism, this is Democritus. Marx is extremely clear about the paradigm of political philosophy with which he is dealing, which he inherits and on which he builds his own teaching.

Marx dwells particularly on what Epicurus calls "deviation" (declination), i.e., the ability of an atom to spontaneously deviate from a straight trajectory of motion. In this feature of the atom (or individual, since Marx is well aware of the direct connection between physical atomism and social individualism), Marx sees a connection between freedom and necessity, which he understands dialectically. Necessity does not lie in the atom's strict adherence to a straight line, but, on the contrary, in its ability to deviate from it, i.e., in the existence of a certain arbitrariness. But this arbitrariness leads, in turn, not to chaos and disorder, but to "development," since the deviation of atoms from a straight line gives rise to their cohesion and further dynamics, forming vortices and "images," "eidolons," that is, bodies and worlds. And in the same way, the "arbitrariness" of the play of atoms gives rise to life, and life gives rise to consciousness and society. This is the necessity in which a multitude of arbitrary atomic volitional impulses are linked in a progressive chain of causes and effects. Thus, freedom turns out to be fatality, and fatality is freedom, not directly, but only when the observer is able to grasp this from a certain distance. This is precisely what Marx does later when he constructs his model of interpreting human history

[1] *Marx, K.* The Difference Between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and that of Epicurus // Marx, K., Engels, F. Early Works. Moscow: Politizdat, 1956.

Society. Individuals act freely, and that is precisely why they move through history along the axis of inexorable mechanical fate.

Epicurus is a particularly important figure for Marx. From his point of view, Epicureanism enlivens Democritus' somewhat abstract atomism by adding dialectics to it, and phenomena become not merely "appearances" (eidola), but expressions of a deeper individual principle.

Gradually, these intuitions of the early Marx led him to the creation of his own political philosophy, based on a clear awareness of the unity of thought with the pre-Socratics.

's titanic rebellion

Marx was well aware of his deep connection not only with Democritus and Epicurus as pre-Socratic materialists, but also with the mythological figure of Prometheus. Marx clearly saw himself as a titan and a god-fighter, challenging the heavenly vertical order of things. Thus, in the preface to his dissertation, Marx writes:

> Philosophy, as long as there is still a single drop of blood beating in its heart, which conquers the whole world and is absolutely free, will always declare, together with Epicurus, to its opponents: "It is not the man who rejects the gods of the crowd who is impious, but the man who joins the crowd in its opinion of the gods."
>
> The philosophy behind this makes no secret of it.
>
> Prometheus' confession: "In truth, I hate all gods,
>
> is his own confession, his own statement directed against all the gods of heaven and earth who do not recognise human self-awareness as the highest deity. There should be no deity beside him.
>
> And in response to the timid souls who rejoice that the position of philosophy in society has invisibly deteriorated, it repeats what Prometheus said to Hermes, the servant of the gods:
>
> Know well that I would not exchange my
> sorrows for servitude:
> I would rather be chained to a rock than be a
> faithful servant of Zeus.
>
> Prometheus is the most noble saint and martyr in the philosophical calendar[1].

[1] *Marx, K.* The Difference Between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and the Natural Philosophy of Epicurus. pp. 24–25.

Marx is perfectly aware of the continuity and mythological connection between his philosophy and active god-fighting, the rebellion of the Titans. Hatred of God, of the vertical, of the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son, is the most important element of Marxism as a worldview. And although for Marx himself, pre-Socratic and, even more so, Greek myths seem naive and extremely approximate forms of thinking, long surpassed by the philosophy and science of the New Age, from the point of view of Politica Aeterna, his references and metaphors take on fundamental significance. For the Modern paradigm, everything related to the Tradition paradigm is ridiculous, naive and, moreover, incorrect. For Politica Aeterna, cross-evaluations can also be meaningful: not only how Modern sees Premodern, but also how Premodern sees Modern. Postmodernism also claims such a distance, but is unable to achieve it due to its too deep involvement in Modernism, which continues to affect postmodernism even in the course of its deconstruction strategies. Therefore, Marx's admissions of his sympathies for atoms, emptiness, as well as titanism, godlessness, and even Satanism can be treated with all due attention and trust. Let us assume that for Marx himself, neither titans nor the devil exist, and that he uses these images as metaphors. But for the titans themselves or for Satan, Marx exists regardless of whether he believes in them or not. At least, this is how some of Marx's statements (especially his early ones) can be interpreted if we truly equate the three types of beings from Plato's dialogue "Timaeus" and recognise the legitimacy of political philosophies that prioritise any of them.

However, since Marx did not believe in God, he most likely did not believe in the devil either. Marx believed in man, but he viewed man himself in the spirit of Promethean titanism and even godless Satanism. This gives us a special Satanic-Titanic humanism, which is the metaphysical and anthropological basis of the second political theory.

Matter, titans, Satan, and those who rebelled against God are vivid figures that emphasise in every way how Marxist political philosophy rebels against the political philosophy of the Father (Plato) and the Son (Aristotle).

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[1] However a detailed study of Marx's Satanism was undertaken by Pastor Richard Wurmbrand (1909–2001). See: *Wurmbrand R.* Marx and Satan. Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1986.

Marx is Modern

Marxism as a political philosophy begins with the following moment: there is the first political theory, there is liberalism, there are Hobbes and Locke, there is individualism, there is the middle class. There is trade and economics instead of politics. By Marx's time, this thesis had already been formulated as an ideology. Bourgeois ideology was directed against the medieval Christian worldview, against Catholicism, against the Holy Roman Empire, against the sacred state.

Marx wants to say the following: we agree with this ideology, with the first political theory, with capitalism and liberalism; we have indeed moved away from class society, replaced politics with economics and trade, abolished family hierarchies and moved to a class principle based on equal starting opportunities. In everything that concerns the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal system (that is, against the preceding socio-political formation), we are in solidarity with capitalism and the bourgeoisie. But then the differences begin.

The Marxists support everything related to the bourgeoisie's struggle against what came before it, and compared to the supporters of the Middle Ages, Marxism looks like a "pro-capitalist" doctrine. But when capitalism triumphs, it will not be the end of history, but the beginning of its most important stage. For, according to Marx, once the bourgeoisie has triumphed and liberalism has prevailed over traditional society, contradictions within this political system will become more acute. Instead of the prosperous existence, growth of the middle class and enrichment of all predicted by liberals, class contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will begin to take effect. At the same time, they will take place against the backdrop of growing inter-ethnic contradictions between bourgeois states and cyclical crises of the capitalist system as a whole. Thus, capitalist society will begin to degenerate and decay, increasingly splitting into two poles — and then the time of communism will come. The hour of communism will not come before capitalism, nor during capitalism, but when capitalism has come into being and triumphed, supplanting the previous ideological models — then it will be replaced by the proletarian revolution and Marxism. At the same time, communists will take full advantage of everything that the liberal order has created.

> The proletariat uses its political supremacy to wrest, step by step, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class, and to accelerate as far as possible the concentration of the productive forces in the hands of the state.

> all the instruments of production into the hands of the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class, and to increase the sum [of] productive forces as quickly as possible.

Socialism is thus the logical continuation of capitalism, and the contradiction between them is the same as that between the present and the future. Compared to the past, the present and the future are qualitatively different and even lie on the same side of the time axis. But at the same time, if we contrast the present with the future, a different symmetry emerges. Thus, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels write:

> In bourgeois society, the past dominates the present; in communist society, the present dominates the past.

Thus, communism is a step forward — into the future — compared to the bourgeois system, which, in turn, is a step forward compared to feudalism, although, according to Marx, it cannot completely free itself from the past, but only qualitatively changes, rather than completely overcoming, and even further exacerbates the inequality inherent in traditional society.

Thus, Marxism fits into the political philosophy of the Modern era and has nothing against it as long as we are talking about the opposition of Modern philosophy in its liberal dimension to the medieval model. Here, it fully agrees with Adam Smith that the source of wealth is not land, but mobile production (i.e., industry and entrepreneurship). When it comes to the transition from the rule of landlords, who control surplus product through control over land and land rent, to the growth of industrial production and the shift of the centre of the economy to the cities, Marxists support this process. In the course of the formation of capitalism, a change from *estates* to *classes* takes place, which is fundamental to Marxism. The class hierarchy is determined by the position of the family in society, and the class hierarchy is determined by the relationship to the means of production.

But when capitalism prevailed and bourgeois society was established, Marx continues, that is when the most important thing began: *class struggle*.

Marx thinks of communism as a second political theory that comes *after* liberalism. Marxism is post-liberal

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[1] *Marx, K., Engels, F.* The Communist Manifesto. P. 446.

[2] Ibid. p. 439.

He criticises liberalism not from the standpoint that liberalism is inherently bad, but rather that it is bad *in relation to something else*. From the communist perspective, liberalism is bad in relation to Marxism, but not in relation to the Middle Ages or traditional society as a whole. In relation to traditional society, it is good. This is very important. Two contemporary worldviews — liberalism and Marxism — compete with each other over which of them is more in keeping with the spirit of the Modern, more avant-garde, more contemporary. This is a dispute over which most fully corresponds to the philosophy of the third kind — Mother (earth, matter, multiplicity, "chora"). Both the first and second political theories represent *a titanic rebellion* against the Father and the Son, against the philosophy of Plato and against the philosophy of Aristotle. And within the framework of this rebellion common to both ideologies, it is determined, in competitive opposition and desperate struggle, which of the two tendencies of contemporary political philosophy will prevail, and therefore which of them belongs to the future — in its progressive, socialist form.

in the modern, modernist understanding.

Both of these ideologies are rooted in Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, earlier in nominalism, and even earlier in Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. Accordingly, they share a recognition of the existence of matter, substance, and the lower limit of the cosmos in the generalised scheme of Politica Aeterna. However, it is precisely among communists that the thesis of the identity of being and matter has a directly political character, being an ideological dogma. For Marxists, this is connected with the fact that communism represents the "future" and clearly, openly and explicitly proclaims what is implicit, implied and even somewhat obscured in liberalism.

Thus, in the context of modern political philosophy as a whole, the first political theory (liberalism) and the second political theory (Marxism) are completely in solidarity with each other in relation to those political paradigms that solve the problem of existence in a radically different way (such as political Platonism and political Aristotelianism), recognising the unconditional superiority of the third type of "Timaeus" — the political philosophy of the Mother.

The dialectic of the "world turned "

In his critique of liberalism, as well as in his system as a whole, Marx draws on Hegel's *dialectic*. Hegel's system is based on the proposition that the structure of the world, the structure of thought, and the structure of being are based on dynamic contradiction.

Hegel asserts that genuine consciousness is *unhappy*. Unhappy consciousness does not mean that it needs to be made happy. According to Hegel, happy consciousness is the state of an idiot. Genuine consciousness as such is always unhappy because in unhappy consciousness, contradiction is actively actualised, and this, in turn, forms the basis of thinking and the main distinguishing feature of the world. Consciousness becomes unhappy simply because of the fact that the subject does not coincide with the object, which gives rise to tension and motivates thought activity.

The spirit is conflict, and since, according to Hegel, history is the unfolding of the spirit, history is conflict.

Consciousness has an object before it, but this pair is not exhaustive. By moving onto itself and maintaining its relationship with the object, consciousness generates representation. In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel calls this *"the inverted world"* or *"the world turned inside out" (*die verkehrte Welt). He writes:

> At first glance, this world is the opposite of the first [1]in the sense that the first world is outside of it and is rejected by it as a kind of reality, that one world is a phenomenon and the other is in itself, one is the world as it is for something else, the other, on the contrary, as it is for itself. So (...) what tastes sweet, properly or internally, is sour in things, or what is the north pole in the actual magnet of the phenomenon would be the south pole in internal or essential being; what manifests itself as an anode in electricity would be a cathode in non-manifest electricity. Or: an act that is a crime in appearance should be, strictly speaking, a good act in its "inner" nature (a bad act with good intentions); punishment would be punishment only in appearance, but in itself or in some other world it would be a blessing for the criminal. However, such oppositions between internal and external, appearance and supersensible as two kinds of reality no longer exist here. The repulsive differences are not distributed again between two such substances, which would be their carriers and would give each of them a separate stable existence, thanks to which reason, having left the "internal," would find itself back where it was before(2).

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[1] To the first world, that is, to the object. — *Note by A.D.*

[2] *Hegel*. Phenomenology of Spirit. P. 87.

In addition to the world, humans form an image of the world in their consciousness, and this image does not coincide with either thinking or the world itself. This exacerbates the problem. The human spirit is a kind of sickness, indicating that the ends do not meet for the subject. According to Hegel, this split lies at the heart of spiritual activity. Human thought is a derivative of a deep-seated illness of thinking, which is thrown into the process of immanent existence as a trace of the original subjective Spirit, preceding the emergence of nature (as a moment of alienation of the subjective spirit from itself).

Thus, the subject, the object, and the "world turned inside out" as a special representation give rise to a complex structure of the dialectic of consciousness, its phenomenology, which Hegel examines at different levels.

Marx takes from this the idea of the conflictual nature of history — and in this respect he is a consistent Hegelian. Liberalism is non-dialectical. It is analogous to an atom moving in a straight line. Bourgeois thought sees history as a process based on equilibrium and choosing the most optimal path of development. Hence the appeals to the growth of the middle class, the bourgeois understanding of progress, equality of opportunity, etc. Here, the axis is the market and its main figure, the merchant. Liberals say: remove the state, and business will find the best way to organise the social system. Atoms move in a straight line. An invisible hand seeks the optimal paths of communication and the most effective means of enrichment. Market society is structured as follows: first comes the merchant, and everything else falls into place behind him. And if he is not hindered, he will build an optimal system, a society that will develop harmoniously and in balance.

Marx objects: nothing of the sort. Development is struggle, conflict, dialectics. Therefore, the bourgeoisie is not a product and culmination of the natural evolution of socio-political forces, but only a phase, a moment in this dialectical confrontation. And the next peak of dialectical opposition must be communism. That is, for a liberal, liberalism is the peak of history, for a communist, it is a dialectical moment. So it is ambiguous: it is better than the previous one, but worse than the next one.

Moreover, capitalism is the "upside-down world" that breaks away from the object, giving rise to its inverse representation, but gets stuck at the level of this representation. The bourgeoisie is incapable of breaking through to matter as the being of the object, and since the being of the object is primary and matter itself is alive, it is also incapable of breaking through to the most true

the nature of the subject, which emerged from matter. The "world turned inside out" must be turned upside down again (revolution), but not in order to return to the pre-representational — "naive" — state of the subject and its uncritical perception of the object ("the first world," according to Hegel), but by taking the next step forward, which will bring into resonance with reality a new form of consciousness, enriched by the experience of representation.

This is why Marx says: I am the future, and therefore Marxism understands itself dialectically as the ideology of the future. It is important that this future here is not so much chronological as philosophical in nature: the communist thinks of himself as a representative of the future already in the present, attacking capitalism not from the position of today, but from the position of tomorrow.

's immanent eschatology of the proletariat

Marxism's appeal to the future is a fundamental feature of this worldview. This manifests itself in its eschatology and, accordingly, in its connection with Hegel's thesis of the "end of history" and, even more profoundly, with Thomas Müntzer and other Anabaptists who, within the framework of the Protestant Reformation, arrived at an extreme form of religious proto-communism in anticipation of the Second Coming of Christ. The Anabaptists abolished private property and created communes based on complete equality of property, since in the face of the end times they saw no point in accumulating or possessing wealth. All differences between people were abolished, since the end of the world was at hand, and people had to focus their attention on the soul and spirit, not on the body.

In Marx, we see a secular version of this Anabaptist moment. As an atheist, Marx naturally does not expect the coming of Christ. Existence is material, and there is no transcendent principle. Nevertheless, the future represents a qualitative revolution, a reversal of the world, which in its scale is comparable to the "end of the world" (albeit an inverted one). History is driven by the internal laws of matter, which unfold dialectically. The capitalist world does not abolish exploitation, but raises it to a new level. Thus, for the first time, the working class itself appears, representing a messianic phenomenon. But unlike the Anabaptists, the communists do not await the coming of God. The proletarians, like titans, are called upon to liberate themselves by overthrowing the bourgeoisie, which, nevertheless, contributed — without setting itself such a goal — to the formation of

class dichotomy. Thus, communism turns out to be an immanent form of eschatology, in which matter, having gone through a complete cycle — from an inanimate state through life to society, its history and, finally, to an era of equality and freedom, in which the atoms of matter, having become conscious atoms of society, achieve completeness and perfection. Communism is conceived as the construction of paradise on earth.

But at the same time, the imagery of Marxists, with its aggressive rejection of the religious vertical, which they identify in capitalism, only in its naked state, when the will to material possession takes on an open, explicit character, previously hidden under complex idealistic and theological systems, gravitates more towards categories such as "paradise" or "the end of the world," but rather to the triumph of the titans and giants, ancient powers from the depths of the earth, flesh from the flesh of Mother Matter, who took their revenge on the gods of Olympus and cast them into oblivion. The messianism of the communists is utterly immanent. It is not the coming of a Saviour from Heaven, from the world of the Spirit, but, on the contrary, the realisation by the population of the underground depths, who have no share in the wealth of the world, that they are their own saviours, which opens up the possibility for them to reverse the process of expropriation of the products of their own labour and become masters of the matter of which they are quite consciously and openly the owners.

Here it is entirely appropriate to speak of the titanic and even Luciferian nature of the working class, which carries the light of labour and which is liberated from the windows of bourgeois exploitation. The proletarians are not messengers from heaven or the gods; they embody the advent of the titan, Satan or Prometheus. Thus, we are dealing with a special eschatology, no longer Christian or Protestant (as with the Anabaptists), but secular, materialistic, atheistic, and even godless.

This is the basis of Marxism's fundamental historical strategy. Marx says: we must overthrow the capitalists, but only *we*. And if any proponent of pre-capitalist ideology, outwardly sympathetic to our own anti-capitalism, attempts to approach *us*, we must immediately get rid of them. Not all anti-capitalism is acceptable to Marxists, only post-capitalist, i.e. communist, anti-capitalism of the future, not of the past.

If capitalism does not yet exist in a society, then socialism cannot exist there either. Capitalism must first be established, and only then can communism follow. This is the peculiarity of communist eschatology: the Titans can defeat the gods only after they themselves acquire material characteristics, descend into the material worlds, and then become dependent on them.

eschatology: the Titans can defeat the gods only after the latter themselves acquire material characteristics, descend into the material world, and then become dependent on the Titans and vulnerable to them.

Therefore, communists are forced to defend capitalism where it does not yet exist or where it has not yet reached maturity. Class society is necessary as a preliminary and indispensable condition for the emergence of the proletariat — the messianic class. Without class society, there will be no proletarian revolution. Without a proletarian revolution, there will be no socialism, and without socialism, there will be no communism.

Class division and ontological antagonism

Marxist conflict theory and dialectics, introduced into the understanding of history, radically alter the general structure of the liberal interpretation of political history. Marxism becomes a critical theory that analyses capitalism in a way that capitalism itself cannot. This is precisely why Marx's magnum opus, [Capital,] gained such worldwide fame.

Liberalism operates with only one class—the middle class. The division of society into three classes, accepted in sociology, is a conventional division that does not have the same meaning as the definition of class in Marxism. From the point of view of liberals, the middle class is constantly growing, and in the future, as all societies become more democratic and liberal, all of humanity will become middle class, and the gap between the very rich and the very poor will narrow. The large bourgeoisie will become smaller in comparison with the middle class, and the number of the destitute and poor will decline.

Accordingly, the middle class will sooner or later become *the only class*. This is the utopia of progressive liberalism, which asserts that the general growth of the well-being of each individual will sooner or later transform all of humanity into the middle class.

For liberal political philosophy, this is quite logical, since they operate with a single normative figure — the merchant, who is taken as the common denominator of economic anthropology[2]. It can be said that, from the point of view of liberalism, there is a middle class, a "very middle" class and a "not middle enough" class

[1] *Marx, K.* Capital // Marx, K., Engels, F. Works. Vol. 23–26. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1960–1964.

[2] . Selected Works. Moscow: Territory of the Future, 2013.

class. From this follows the ontology and anthropology of the middle class. To be a member of a market society means to be middle class.

And what do Marxists claim? That the middle class as such does not exist, and that the middle class has no existence. There are two antagonistic classes (and not just one): *the class of exploiters* and *the class of the exploited*. Of course, an individual can move from one class to another: a person can leave the position of the exploited and become an exploiter, or remain exploited, while an entrepreneur, in turn, can go bankrupt and be forced into the position of a hired worker. But this does not affect the foundations of social and economic anthropology. For communists, class is more fundamental than individuals. It reflects the very dialectic of history and the movement of matter. And the laws of this dialectic are based on antagonism: hence the fundamental thesis *of class struggle.*

From Marx's point of view (and in this he follows Hegel), although the quantity of material goods increases, it still represents a fixed quantity at any given moment, for which two classes struggle — the exploited and the exploiters. At the same time, wealth (and here Marx follows Adam Smith) is created by labour, but appropriated by the exploiter. All values that can be created — exclusively labour and material values — are taken away from the working class by the exploiters. Moreover, according to Marx, the more values the working class creates, the more the exploiting class takes away from it. Thus, there is no equal distribution of wealth among all, but rather the opposite — the impoverishment of the working class and the enrichment of the exploiting class. The poor get poorer and the rich get richer. At the same time, Marx combines both factors — the growth of the total amount of wealth and the dynamics of its distribution — which makes his theory quite flexible. What is important is not who owns the critical amount of wealth at a given moment, but how the process of its redistribution is organised in society, where the strategy of appropriating for their own benefit the surplus value arising from increased efficiency and quality of labour and technical progress, which is rather veiled by the capitalists themselves, is revealed.

From the liberal point of view, the development of capitalism is harmonious, and its internal crises are nothing more than corrections to the main path of endless progress in production and linear accumulation of material wealth. From the Marxist point of view, the internal crises that liberalism is undergoing are manifestations of the conflictual, dynamic, paradoxical, dialectical

nature of history and even of matter itself. Therefore, conflicts and crises in liberal society are vitally necessary and fateful. They reflect the essence of history, which consists in struggle. Therefore, two antagonistic classes, building their struggle around the single theme of possession of material wealth, reflect the algorithm of the dialectic of existence itself, where, according to the atomists, a complex game is played between atoms and the Great Void. The most subtle aspect of this dialectic is determining who actually represents atoms (δέν) and who represents emptiness (οὐδέν).

The definition of class and the battle of concepts

For Marx, the main driving force of history is class struggle. It is perfectly clear that both the middle class of capitalism and the two classes of Marxism (the working class and the bourgeoisie) are purely abstract concepts. We are talking about a certain conceptual ensemble which, being accepted as a basic methodology, offers one or another version of the explanation of reality. In this case, we are talking about an analogue of atoms and emptiness as understood by Democritus: their existence is postulated strictly rationally, and in concrete phenomenal experience we have no chance of encountering them, since the sensory world is a distant derivative of these concepts.

This is the essence of political philosophy: it operates with concepts postulated in the realm of thought, which are then projected onto society and ultimately determine its structure and its derivative phenomenology. By accepting the completely unproven thesis of anthropological pessimism, we arrive at Hobbes and "man is wolf to man" as the main characteristic of the "state of nature," and from this follows the essence of the
of the "social contract" that establishes Leviathan. In reality, we know of no "natural state" of man and base our conclusions on observations and inferences that someone could dispute. But the acceptance of Hobbes' model in his explanation of human nature and the nature of the state that follows from it gives rise to the foundation of political organisation of society in the Modern Age. And we have been living inside Leviathan — exactly as Hobbes designed and justified it — for several centuries.

But it is enough to accept a different thesis, for example, Locke's thesis that the "natural state" can be harmonious or

neutral, which was the basis for Adam Smith, free trade, and liberalism in general, we get a special ideology that insists on weakening and gradually getting rid of the state. Once again, this has been put into practice over the centuries, leading to globalisation and the emergence of post-national structures such as the European Union. Anthropological optimism, just as unproven as anthropological pessimism, based on a different form and structure of conceptualisation, produces a completely different discourse, and then a different policy and, ultimately, a different reality. At the same time, the debate between
"realists" and "liberals" is ongoing, usually without convincing either side of anything.

Rousseau's positive interpretation of human nature, even more optimistic than Locke's, paves the way for socialism and Marx himself, which in turn changes the political landscape of reality once again, giving rise to communist regimes.

This is what politics is all about: it starts with concepts that relate to a particular sector of Politica Aeterna, and then it's put into practice, becoming something real. At the same time, historical practice itself doesn't prove anything, despite what some philosophers say. Political reality is always a projection, and with the presence of will, power and certain conditions, various ideological models can be implemented with equal success. This is the ontology of the political and the essence of ideological struggle: it is not a matter of mathematical proof, where the more logical, convincing and consistent wins, but of a clash between fundamental or less fundamental attitudes, whose victory over opposing or alternative ones does not in any way mean their
"truth." It is a battle of concepts, a semantic war directed deep into the concepts themselves, in the course of their defence and implementation, revealing more and more of their profound philosophical foundations. For example, the atoms of Democritus and Epicurus, which were first proposed in ancient times, were only understood and adopted by Gassendi and Galileo, and became the foundation of science, philosophy and politics even later, with Hobbes and Locke. It is precisely to Democritus and Epicurus that the young Marx turns to justify the metaphysical basis of his worldview, which will fully develop later on. He reflects on concepts, analysing their original form and tracing their historical — and even political (in liberalism and capitalism) — expression and development.

The dispute over a single (albeit potential) middle class (as advocated by liberals) or two antagonistic classes (as insisted upon by Marx and Engels) is precisely a struggle between concepts. It is resolved not in scientific debates, but in the very fabric of political history. Liberals postulate linear progress, where the growth of the middle class under capitalism will sooner or later include all of humanity. This is a concept, but it is also a programme, a strategy and an action. Marx, on the other hand, argues that the war between Labour and Capital is not a war for life or death. Consequently, the representatives of Labour, the proletariat, form one army, and Capital, the bourgeoisie, forms another. At the same time, the middle class and the two antagonistic classes are a conceptual calibration of society, the mechanism of which can be described and explained, but cannot be proven. Postulating class warfare, Marx enters into it, claiming to be its chief strategist and marshal of the army of Labour. In general, this was recognised in the 20th century by the overwhelming majority of left-wing workers' movements.

For Marxism, the proletariat itself is born as capitalist relations develop. But the birth of the proletariat is not a historical accident, but the final expression of a historical law, the final form of a much older war between exploiters and exploited. Pre-capitalist societies also had a class character (the paradigm of Tradition), but this became fully apparent in the bourgeois era. According to Marx, classes existed in both Antiquity and the Middle Ages. They had formed even earlier, with the emergence of the first property and social inequality in primitive societies, when the transition from "cave communism" to primary stratification began. But the whole of history was a movement towards the clarification of the main contradiction between Labour and Capital, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The entire history of human society has been a struggle over the form of distribution of wealth, and from the very beginning, inequality has prevailed in this area, which has only intensified in the future. Since Marx is a materialist, he considers the possession of material goods to be the main content of the historical process, the driving force of time. Therefore, for example, Marxism regards medieval class society as *a veiled class society* — that is, there are classes here too, but they are represented not directly, but indirectly — through estates. Hence the Marxist thesis that the task of both the Church as the first estate and the aristocracy as the second military estate is to justify the appropriation of surplus product. Platonism, Aristotelianism, religion — all these are, for Marx, nothing more than

concealing the class nature of the exploiting class and its ideological justification. That is, Marx considers the class estates of pre-bourgeois society and, accordingly, the main forms of philosophy and political philosophy to be "crypto-bourgeoisie." For Marx, the clergy and the nobility are hidden bourgeois. Marx believes that he has exposed them, revealing that they only exploit the masses with the help of various myths and fairy tales.

Hence Marx's radical anti-religiousness and militant — Promethean — atheism, his thesis that religion is the opium of the people. It should be noted that communism is a harsh anti-Christian, anti-church doctrine that sets itself the task of fundamentally eliminating religious discourse itself, since, from Marx's point of view, this discourse is nothing more than a way of distracting attention from the real social process, which consists in the exploitation of the working class by the ruling classes. In this understanding, any religion is a form of concealment of an exploitative society based on inequality. Instead of directly asserting that workers and peasants must obey the tsar or pay tithes to the Church because they are in a position of power, they are told that this is their *religious* duty. Thus, for Marx, the clergy, priests, warriors, and aristocracy, who in traditional society constitute a sacred hierarchy, reflecting in their own eyes the spiritual vertical inherent in society as such, as impressively described in Platonic philosophy, turn out to be
"hidden bourgeoisie," concerned only with the appropriation of the material products of labour. Accordingly, the entire conceptual side of traditional society — the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son — is resolutely rejected in favour of a prioritised interpretation of existence based on materialistic concepts. Once again, we are talking about concept versus concept.

Marx does not believe in concepts that reject his own conceptuality. In polemics and propaganda, he mocks them and tries to show their inconsistency with reality. But reality for him is his own conceptual construction, or more precisely, its projections.

Accordingly, for Marx, if in a fully class-based (bourgeois) society social position is directly related to the means of production, then class society hides this materialistic reality under the mask of religious ideology. Therefore, capitalism, being the embodiment of inequality, simultaneously carries the positive meaning that it

inequality in its most adequate (i.e., material) form.

's genesis of the proletariat

It is necessary to describe in more detail how Marx conceives the class nature of society as a whole and its clarification in the course of the historical process.

According to Marx and Engels, the earliest state of primitive humanity was "cave communism." This was the starting point for humanity, which developed from primates that began to use tools. According to Marx and Engels, the evolution of human-like apes into humans occurred precisely when apes began to use tools, establishing an ontological distance between themselves and the world, embodied in a concrete object. This laid the foundation for subject-object relations.

At the first stage, "cave people" lived in a state of complete equality, and this original collectivism was an expression of human nature itself, but only in its naive, prehistoric form, not yet tempered by dialectics — negation and negation of negation.

The idea of the original tool that transformed apes into humans, and further, of "cave communism," is yet another concept, an abstraction necessary for constructing a theory. Darwin's theories and the observations of zoologists are used to substantiate it, but they prove nothing and merely enrich Marxist discourse with vivid details designed to have a suggestive effect. However, these conceptual images and figures are necessary for the integrity and coherence of the second political theory and its philosophy.

Furthermore, Marx continues, as tools of labour are improved and individual subjectivity is strengthened, social stratification begins, accompanied by a gradual increase in property inequality. Here, Marx and Engels follow Rousseau with his originally "good" savage, who is corrupted by social relations based on political and social inequality. What is the natural state for Hobbes is, for Marx, the beginning and at the same time the consequence of politics, of the introduction of inequality. Once again, we are dealing with a war of concepts, the acceptance of which will lead us to completely different, sometimes antagonistic conclusions about the very nature of politics.

As soon as political communities form and elders emerge, class distinctions begin to arise in societies based on inequality. For centuries and millennia, the material essence of these differences remained potential, implicit, hidden by numerous ideologies that initially legitimised the clan system, then patriarchal families, later the slave-owning system, and finally feudalism. Only under capitalism, Marx believed, were the masks thrown off, and from that moment on, those who owned the means of production began to rule society openly. In other words, capitalism is a form of extreme shamelessness and open exploitation. Before capitalism, the ruling classes established their dominance through idealistic constructs. For Marx, these "ontologies" served only to conceal the basic, fundamental reality: the meaning of political society lies in the exploitation of man by man. This exploitation by the ruling class by class was the true content of political history.

This is undoubtedly a radically materialistic and even vulgar interpretation of man, the world, life and culture. Ideals, beauty, love, heroism, sacrifice, loyalty to God, suffering and martyrdom mean nothing to Marxism. Only material goods and the means of their redistribution matter. This is precisely why Marx does not recognise the Middle Ages or Antiquity as independent civilisational phenomena — for him, all of this is hidden capitalism, veiled by artificial ideologies designed to camouflage the true nature of material inequality and exploitation. According to Marx, there is only one decisive difference: either material goods are distributed among the working people fairly, that is, equally, or they are distributed unfairly, which means that they are appropriated by the ruling exploitative capitalist elite.

Marx's conception of the class essence of society extends to all types of society, both modern and non-modern. But modern bourgeois society speaks openly about this — this is the meaning of the bourgeois revolution according to Marx. Now everything seems to fall into place: if before it was hidden, now the problem has been identified. There are those who exploit, owning the means of production — the bourgeoisie — and there are those who are exploited — the workers and, to a lesser extent, the peasants.

Thus, Marx does not believe in the Middle Ages, Plato, or Aristotle. He believes only in Democritus and Epicurus; he is a materialist from a metaphysical point of view. For him, matter is alive; it

is the meaning of history, and consciousness is the peak of the development of matter. Overall, this is a purely satanic-titanic view of the human spirit, which springs from the earth. Such an interpretation is the most vivid illustration of the pig city, which, incidentally, is what all types of normative societies of political modernity are. Without denying the "swine" nature of man, which Marx, incidentally, tries to describe in a lofty and even romantic way when it comes to the flowering of individual creative potential in communist society, he insists only on equality of distribution and the absence of any hint of a socio-political hierarchy. Thus, in his case, it is equality that must become the fundamental law of the pig city, whereas the liberal version considers freedom to be paramount.

When the bourgeoisie emerges as a class of purely material exploiters, the working people, who are also exploited, change their nature, gradually forming the urban proletariat, a second class that generalises the pole antagonistic to the bourgeoisie. Those who were peasants or artisans in the Middle Ages and in class society form a new phenomenon, purified of additional and secondary (for Marxists) characteristics and reduced to direct materiality.

The concept of the proletarian: the minimal human being.

The urban proletariat has no connections, no qualities — it embodies the element of *pure labour*. It is precisely the unskilled working class, who came from the countryside and completely renounced their qualities (religious, family, traditional), forgot their culture, folklore, all ties to local traditions, a labour force without qualities or traditions, that is the central figure — the subject of communism. A person who has broken away from culture and become a pure machine, producing material values, is the bearer of the very essence of labour.

Once again, we are dealing with *a* pure *concept*. Just like a monkey wielding a stick that turns into a Cartesian subject; the complete equality of peaceful cave dwellers; the theologian who deliberately piles up multi-storey scholastic constructions, cults and rituals solely for the purpose of robbing simple labourers with impunity; and finally, the bourgeois himself, driven solely by material passions and selfishness. At the same time, if Marx could observe the image of the capitalist with his own eyes, all the more so because representatives of liberal ideology thought in much the same way, also

predominantly materialists and atheists, the degree of conventionality increases, and the purely speculative nature of the image becomes increasingly evident as communist thought moves deeper into history, where in the realm of apes and "cave communism" we are dealing with pure arbitrariness — quite analogous to Democritus's constructions describing how atoms separate from the original Great Void and coalesce into whirlwinds.

The proletariat is a pure concept. In reality, the urban worker is a completely different figure. Almost always (even in Adam Smith's example of the baker), we are dealing with someone who was a peasant until very recently. First he was a peasant, then he became an assistant to a baker, but in reality he retains his connection with the organic community, endowed with culture, a special self-awareness, and numerous qualitative properties. His economic activity never exhausts his life world, being only one of its aspects. The proletarian does not even exist etymologically, since the very name proletarius contains the pejorative meaning of those who are capable of producing only children and are incapable of anything else. For Marx, it is important to emphasise the pure materiality of the worker, his connection with the most primitive element of matter, and for this he invents a term in which qualities are reduced to a minimum. The proletarian is the smallest quantum of the human element, reduced to the lowest level of ontology. He is a fallen titan, driven into Tartarus by the Olympian gods and deprived of his share in the world that once belonged to him (cave communism). The deprivation of all his properties presents him as a spring compressed to the limit, but this is exactly what Marx wants.

From Marx's point of view, the proletarian is a quantitative quantum of labour power — a quantum of labour, a labour atom representing the element of labour itself.

It is important that this concept is not neutral and, moreover, is highly controversial. In principle, those who disagree with the second political theory do not simply criticise the Marxist interpretation of this figure, but deny its existence altogether. For liberals, the proletariat does not exist because this condition is unstable and transitional on the path to the middle class. Therefore, the proletariat is not a class, but a subclass or, in other words, the "potential bourgeoisie" (very small — the smallest — bourgeoisie). There is no proletarian from the point of view of political Platonism or Aristotelianism, since there is no atom, no void, and no matter in itself. Consequently, we are dealing here primarily with the peasant, the craftsman, the householder, the member of a clan, the serf, the ser

family, village, member of a religious community or even a sect, but all these are qualitative characteristics. In other words, the fact that the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are attributed with "existence" means only a political movement of conceptual projection, seeking to give practical ontological (phenomenological) status to one or another rational attitude. In principle, we have the same thing in the case of the middle class in liberalism, etc. At the same time, the difference in conceptualisation between liberals and Marxists occurs within the boundaries of a common context determined by the basic attitudes of modern political philosophy, where materialism, atomism, etc. prevail. Therefore, the main dispute at the conceptual level is about which ideology is more modern and, consequently, more materialistic, atheistic, secular and atomistic, in a word, more progressive, understanding progress as the development of matter, technology and the highest form of evolution of life in the form of society.

The political philosophy of traditional society is built on completely different principles, rejecting not just communism or liberalism, but the very political ontology of modernity. Here, we cannot speak of concepts in the same sense as in liberalism and Marxism. For the Platonists, ideas are not concepts, that is, they are not products of human consciousness. And for Aristotle, the eidos is also not a concept, but the essence of a thing, autonomous — but somewhat differently than in Platonism — from the human subject.

This is the fundamental significance of what we call Politica Aeterna and what this course is devoted to. Political philosophy should be interpreted within the coordinate system in which it describes itself, while striving to separate polemical, biased, rhetorical, and evaluative projections of other ideologies onto it. Marx himself recognised that ideology is "false consciousness," that is, a concept that is only an approximation of the truth, but not the truth itself. For him, truth itself is matter and its deepest and most autonomous dimensions. This can only be reached through science. But in order for this science to become such, it must be freed from the influence of bourgeois ideology. This is the gnoseology, ontology, epistemology and political science of the second political theory, and it is in this capacity that it must be interpreted. Here we see a kinship with liberalism, stemming from the common belonging of the first and second political theories to the paradigm of Modernity, and this is already a fundamental difference from the philosophy of traditional political society, but also a feature of Marxism, which differs from liberalism as an ideology.

on the other hand, whereas in relation to traditional society, terms such as class, ideology, etc. cannot strictly speaking be applied, since its very structure does not allow for this.

Value as the basis of the revolutionary narrative

After Marx establishes these two conceptual classes, he launches a massive war against his main conceptual enemy, which he designates as "Capital." In the 19th century, we can indeed see some phenomenological signs of the middle class and its growth. At first glance, it seems that political and economic history itself confirms the correctness of bourgeois philosophers — the first political theory. To prove that this is not the case, and that in fact there is not one inclusive class at work in history, but two antagonistic ones, Marx delves into the study of the secret mechanisms of bourgeois society. Thus, Marx's magnum opus "Capital" is born.

In it, Marx demonstrates how the bourgeoisie exploits the working class, and consequently, which specific procedures reinforce the dominance of capital in the structure of society, and how bourgeois ideology conceals these structures.

Another fundamental concept becomes central to Marx's teaching: the concept *of "value*." Here again, as in the case of classes, it is primarily a question of a struggle between concepts. Liberalism knows neither the concept of the proletariat as Marx understands it nor the Marxist concept of value. The very expression
"value" appears as early as Adam Smith, who distinguishes between the "exchange value" of a thing and its "use value," but it does not play a significant role in his theory.

From the point of view of liberal theory, in a market economy, it is not value that is important, but price. Price is conceived as a fundamental around which the entire market structure is built. The pricing process is linked to the balance between supply and demand. Accordingly, those who *offer* goods produced on the market at a certain price take into account their costs, expenses, development prospects, risks and, depending on existing demand, adjust the price accordingly. In some cases, the price may be unprofitable for the producer, and then they go bankrupt, in particular, they cannot repay their loan, etc. In other cases, they receive

[1] *Marx, K.* Capital.

large profits. The price thus encompasses the entire market, becoming the point where the entire production process converges into a quantitative monetary equivalent, while on the other hand, the entire structure of consumption, including the consumer's financial resources, the scale and intensity of their needs, and a multitude of social and cultural factors, also converges at this point. Price is fundamental because it removes the significance of all the components that led to its determination. At the same time, there is no such thing as a "fair price" and there cannot be: there is only the price at which the producer is willing to sell the product and the consumer is willing to buy it. Everything else disappears behind the brackets, is discarded.

The concept *of the "value"* of goods also disappears here. If an entrepreneur has paid too high a price for the production of certain goods, thereby increasing their cost price, and the competitive market offers a lower price, then in the end the producer suffers losses. He is forced either to sell at a dumping price, to remain with unsold goods, or even to destroy them. In this case, the value of the goods produced but not sold, the amount of labour, resources and technical operations expended on their manufacture are of no significance.

In a real market economy, everything is determined not by value, but solely and exclusively by price, and value can only serve as a secondary indicator, suitable for technical justification of prices before a product enters the market, and even then only in complex market mechanisms, such as on futures exchanges or in high-risk segments of the economy, prices tend to deviate almost completely from value. In principle, this autonomy of prices is the basis for stock market speculation, which more fully reflects the essence of the capitalist economy.

According to liberalism, it is impossible to say exactly *how much something is worth* in itself — it is worth exactly what price it is offered for and what price it is bought for. If people refuse to buy it at a certain price, its price falls. It is impossible to answer the question of how much something is actually worth. Not a penny. In liberal political economy, there is no value; it is a convention. Therefore, it is impossible to say whether something is worth something or not. If something is not bought, then it is not worth anything. Price is the main market fundamental, and this is the meaning of capitalism. This is the economic expression of "freedom." Everyone is free to produce whatever they want, and everyone is free to buy whatever they want. No one has the right to force anyone to produce or consume anything, or to set a specific price for a good or service.

Everything is determined by the market, which is the space of freedom.

This leads to an important conclusion: from the point of view of the bourgeoisie, since there is no value, there is no exploitation. The share of wage labour in the formation of prices is a secondary factor and is only one of many indicators that influence the price but do not determine it. The entrepreneur is forced to pay the workers one way or another, regardless of whether he makes a profit or loses money in the sale of goods. He is also responsible for the loan. The risk of the market game deprives the workers' product and labour itself of any *autonomy of value.*

So, liberals ask, can we really say that one person is exploiting another in this case? No, because no one took anything. If the bourgeoisie did well, they made money, and if not, they lost out. The worker chooses a guaranteed salary and the absence of nervous breakdowns, and for this peace of mind he pays by not sharing in the profits, but also by not bearing the costs in the event of losses. The entrepreneur takes a risk, chooses a restless life, and it is precisely this risk that gives him the chance to gain more. But in the eyes of liberals, this is not guaranteed. One makes a profit, while the other suffers losses. One manages to get rich, while the other does not and goes bankrupt. Similarly, a bank that risks its loans can go bust and go bankrupt.

In this view of the economic process, in this economic narrative, there is no place for value or exploitation. If a worker no longer wants to work for hire, he can take a risk, save up some money or take out a loan and start his own business. If everything goes well, he will become an entrepreneur himself. But then he will be forced to take risks and depend on the vagaries of the market. For a liberal, everything depends on the free choice of the individual: if equal opportunities are provided, people will become either rich or poor, but entirely *dependent on themselves.* There is no exploitation because there is no value. There is no autonomous commodity in itself, no self-significant elements that make it up; there is only price. If a commodity does not sell, then it is worthless, and no one is exploited.

Liberal materialism is the materialism of money, the materialism of the dynamic market forces. And the main thing here is market fundamentals. And since price depends solely and exclusively on the relationship between supply and demand, there is no value as such — separate from price. But for Marx, there is.

The introduction of value as a self-sufficient category, as a concept, radically changes the entire structure of market description. We are dealing with a completely new narrative about capital and capitalism. If value exists, then the economy is based not on price, but on the reality of the goods produced. But if the main concept of the economy is not price (as a market fundamental), but the actual existence of goods, then we are dealing with a completely different view of the essence of the economy. Here, the thing itself is placed at the centre of attention, not its representation in the form of price. This is a kind of *economic materialism.* Marx immediately thinks of the economy outside the market. But in this case, it is a completely different economy and a different society — a society where production and consumption are linked in a radically different way than through the market. Production and consumption converge not on the price of the commodity, but on the commodity itself. This is what gives rise to the centrality of value as the economic (but not market) fundamental of the commodity itself.

Marx proceeds from the assumption that it is labour that creates a thing, i.e. material value, and that value is equal to the labour invested in it. At the same time, the value that can be imagined outside the market does not disappear in the market, but is hidden. Marx is called a "philosopher of suspicion" because he sees dialectical concealment that must be revealed in the absence of something.

If value, rather than price, is the basis of the economy, then we are dealing not with one economy, but with two, superimposed on each other. One is explicit, bourgeois, built around price; the other is implicit, built around value. The first can only be market-based, while the second can be either market-based or non-market-based. At the same time, a non-market economy — that is, a socialist economy — is an economy of value distributed evenly among all members of society. But before dividing, it is necessary to determine the equivalent of what is being divided, and this is value.

But socialism, the liberation of the economy from the market, is a future prospect. It is also possible only in the context of a conceptual narrative about value, but this narrative can be applied to the present. This is the main content of Capital: a description of capitalist society from the standpoint of value, that is, based on the suspicion that the capitalist narrative itself hides something and is false. Specifically, its falsity consists in concealing the concept of value in favour of the concept of price.

If value exists, then the market is built around a specific commodity, a thing that has value. It is created by labour. This means that, from the point of view of justice and equality, value must

be distributed among its creators. There is labour, there is a thing, there is value.

But in the market, things are not so simple. The capitalist pretends that he is the main figure in the economy, responsible for the pros and cons of the market game. He wants to present everything in such a way that labour is of secondary importance, and it is not the commodity itself, the real thing, the economic atom, that is important, but the profit or loss that arises in the course of its placement on the market. For Adam Smith, this was the meaning of the concept of "exchange value" or "market value," but this is not at all what Marx meant by "value." Marx says: whether sold or not, marketable or not, a produced thing exists, labour is invested in it, and therefore it has value. If a produced thing cannot be sold as a commodity, it can be used in some other way — for example, given away for free or taken by the person who produced it. And this non-market existence does not make value disappear. Consequently, capitalists also deal with value, striving to appropriate it, and the market serves as a specially designed element for this purpose.

The appropriation of surplus value by those who own the means of production is the main mechanism of capitalism, which leads to the growth of capital, wealth and, at the same time, inequality.

If value is the result of labour, then no matter how much is spent on the production of a thing, its value will always include the value *of the labour* itself. Thus, labour adds value to a thing. Marx calls this surplus value. In production, *an increase in value* takes place. It is precisely this surplus value that capitalists appropriate for themselves, hiding behind risks and market forces. In this way, they profit from the underestimation of labour, explaining it away as entrepreneurial and commercial risks.

But if this is the case, then the bourgeoisie becomes the exploiters and the workers become the exploited. Marx shows that the capitalist economy, capitalist states, capitalist mass media, capitalist entertainment industry, fashion and technology are nothing more than a process of veiled appropriation by the bourgeois class of the surplus value created in the process of labour by the proletarian class. Therefore, instead of the growth of the middle class, in fact, from Marx's point of view, the workers only become poorer, while the bourgeoisie becomes richer precisely because it appropriates surplus value.

Value justifies the existence of two antagonistic classes and becomes the basis of class struggle and, in the long run, of the transition from capitalism to socialism.

the construction of a socialist society in which there should be no market, no exploitation, and no capitalist class. The value created in the course of labour should be redistributed directly among the workers.

This is how the second political theory justifies its conceptual apparatus.

Ideology as false consciousness

Developing his theory, Marx argues that the proletariat must form what the bourgeoisie has already formed: *ideology*. According to Engels, ideology is "false consciousness" ([1]).This is the same concept as Hegel's *"inverted world"* or *"world turned upside down" (*die verkehrte Welt), which we have already discussed.

Ideology is a certain form of representation of conceptual reality, which is taken as a basic paradigm. Destutt de Tracy[2] who introduced the very concept of "ideology," understood it to mean *bourgeois ideology*, that is, the bourgeois class's understanding of the world, society, history, and itself, and the establishment of this ideology as the foundation of society and social transformation.

For Marx and Engels, capitalism is a form of social order based on a "world turned upside down," on concepts of "false consciousness" instilled by the bourgeoisie in itself and, to an even greater extent, in the exploited classes.

But Marx calls for more than just fighting "false consciousness." He believes that as contradictions in bourgeois society intensify, an ideology alternative to the bourgeois one will gradually emerge. This is communism: the proletariat will begin to read Marx's works, assimilate his conceptual positions, learn to understand and reproduce, and, if necessary, complete and develop the communist narrative.

The first step towards this is for the proletariat to realise that it is the proletariat. After all, we are talking about a concept, and in its Marxist interpretation, that is, as a class. When a worker understands that he is a class, he realises that he must not pursue his individual interests, but act on behalf of and in the interests of the entire class. And this is already a special collectivist form of consciousness, and not one borrowed from

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[1] *Marx, K., Engels, F.* Selected Letters. Moscow: OGIZ, 1947.

[2] Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836) — French philosopher, politician and economist. See: *Destutt de Tracy A.-L.-K.* The Foundations of Ideology. Ideology in the Proper Sense of the Word. Moscow: Academic Project, 2018.

accepted by the bourgeoisie (such as liberalism, which promises everyone that sooner or later they will become middle class), but antagonistic towards it, ready for class struggle, revolution and the final overthrow of the capitalist system itself. When a person begins to realise themselves as a class, they begin to act differently — historically, socially, politically.

To realise oneself as a class and be ready to enter into class struggle, it is necessary to understand that the results of labour are systematically usurped by the exploiting class; that labour creates real wealth — value, not some conventionality dependent on the vagaries of market forces; that in creating value, the working class always creates surplus value, which is appropriated in its entirety by the exploiting class. And this situation will continue forever, because the total wealth of society, created by labour and the accompanying development of the means of production and technical progress, which constitutes the total surplus value, will always go entirely to the capitalists, while the workers will continue to live in poverty and ignorance. It is therefore time for the proletariat to wake up, take up arms and destroy the bourgeoisie.

This is the essence of Marxism. The first step is for the proletariat to understand itself as a class, to form political communist parties, and then, when the capitalist system collapses, a general strike begins, which turns into a revolution, followed by the establishment of a socialist system and the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, it is often overlooked that for Marx himself, communism is also an ideology, that is, a form of "false consciousness." Here we can see an echo of Democritus, who believed that "truth lies in the abyss" (ϑv βυθωι γὰρ ϐ ἀλήθεια), that is, he saw insurmountable limitations to rational cognition of reality itself. But Marx has a slightly different, more optimistic interpretation. If bourgeois ideology is a lie, then proletarian ideology, although not yet the truth, is closer to it. But the truth itself — that is, genuine knowledge of matter — can only be attained through science. However, science is a social phenomenon, and as long as the bourgeoisie rules, it saturates science itself with its ideology, including the dominant concepts. Therefore, bourgeois science is inherently ideological and, to that extent, not entirely scientific. In order to free science from ideology in general, it must first be freed from bourgeois ideology, which is completely false, and subordinated to communist ideology, and then move towards science as such, which will be "proletarian" not only outwardly, under the influence of communist ideology, but also in its essence.

internally, in its essence, that is, it will reach as far as possible — the truth (in Marx's case, the truth about matter, material truth).

But the very recognition of the status of communism as an ideology is quite significant, since with this correction we can more accurately imagine the entire political paradigm of Modernity. It is precisely ideologies, that is, "false consciousness," conceptual structures, that clash in it. This is the meaning of ideological struggle. Nothing is proven or argued in it. In both cases — liberalism and communism — we are talking about ideology, not science (however we understand it). And if we strictly accept Marx's definition of the nature of ideology, then it should be noted that only political phenomena of modern times can be attributed to it. Traditional societies — Platonism, Aristotelianism, and religious societies included — did not know ideology. They did not represent conceptual systems opposed to each other. They were dominated by ontology, metaphysics, theology, and philosophy in the most general sense, which served as the basis for the formulation of ideas about being, man, society, the state, politics, etc.

Therefore, strictly speaking, we can only talk about three political ideologies: liberalism, communism, and nationalism. All of them emerged in the Modern Age and are based on the same conceptual foundation, as three varieties of "false consciousness." We are dealing with "upside-down worlds," however we interpret them. Therefore, in order to understand them, it is important first of all to identify the central axial concept or series of concepts that make up the general narrative. Arguments, examples, objections, criticism, etc. are purely rhetorical. In a battle of concepts, proof is no more relevant than in an interfaith discussion.

Antonio Gramsci: the autonomy of the superstructure

Marxism had an enormous influence on the intellectual landscape of the 20th century, and a significant number of thinkers were attracted to its critical theory. Elements of Marxism were added to a wide variety of philosophical currents and schools, which further strengthened its influence, but at the same time somewhat blurred its ideological coherence and conceptual clarity.

One of the most consistent and orthodox communists of the 20th century was the great Italian philosopher Antonio

Gramsci [1](1891–1937). He was a staunch supporter of Russian Bolshevism and an opponent of Italian fascism from its earliest days.

Antonio Gramsci was the left-wing thinker who reinterpreted the phenomenon of the Russian Revolution and Leninism more profoundly than anyone else. However, he did not stop at justifying this phenomenon within the framework of classical Marxism, but with great intellectual courage proposed to rethink and, in some respects, correct certain aspects of Marx's teachings.

Classical Marxism viewed politics as a "superstructure" (berbau) above the economic "base" (Basis). According to Marx, political revolution (i.e., a qualitative transformation of the superstructure) is possible only when the necessary preconditions have been met at the level of the base (structure). The basis is the economy, the superstructure is politics and everything else.

The linear dependence of the superstructure on the base was the basis for some European Marxists to deny the orthodox nature of the Russian Revolution and deny Bolshevism the right to be considered classical Marxism. In early 20th-century Russia, *there were* clearly insufficient conditions (the main one being the presence of developed industrial capitalism), but the fact of the socialist proletarian revolution *was there*. Lenin himself, followed by the other Bolsheviks, tried to prove that these preconditions existed in the base and that industrial capitalism had developed in Russia by the beginning of the 20th century. But this was an obvious stretch, significantly weakening the ideological position of the Bolsheviks among European Marxists. Gramsci, who lived in the Soviet Union in 1922–1923 and witnessed the social transformations of the USSR at the earliest stage, offered a different explanation for Bolshevism. In his view, in some cases, under certain historical circumstances, the superstructure (i.e., the sphere of politics) can have *relative independence* from the base and, in turn, influence it. Thus, between the structure (basis) and the superstructure (superstructure) there are not linear relations (the former completely predetermines the latter), but more complex and dialectical ones: although the superstructure (politics) is *an expression* of the base (economy), it can actively influence the base, qualitatively transforming it in turn[3]. According to Gramsci, this is precisely what Russian Bolshevism demonstrated —

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1 *Gramsci A.* Le opere. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1997.

2 *Gramsci A.* Prison Notebooks 3 v. Turin: Einaudi, 1975.

3 *Gramsci A.* Il rivoluzionario qualificato. Scritti 1916–1925. Rome: Delotti, 1988.

The Bolsheviks, as a political force (superstructure), seized power in an agrarian country and rapidly adapted the basis to an industrial model. For Gramsci, this was *proof of the relative autonomy of the superstructure*.



The topic of Marxism in Antonio Gramsci's version

But Gramsci does not stop there. Having established the relative autonomy of the superstructure, he expands its content to include, alongside politics, the fields *of culture*, science, and the humanities in general. Gramsci introduces the concept *of* the "intellectual" as a third figure alongside the politician and the worker/capitalist pair. Economic relations between Labour and Capital distribute roles in the base (the structure of society). They also determine the expression of these roles in politics: the bourgeoisie creates its parties, where the common element is dependence on Capital, and the proletariat creates its revolutionary party, the Communist Party, which represents the interests of the people of Labour. But having formed at the superstructure level, parties gain *a certain autonomy* in relation to the base. If the communist party is strong and effective, it is capable not only of fighting the bourgeoisie, but also *of changing the base*. This is the lesson Gramsci draws from Leninism.

But the second component of the superstructure is no less important — the figure of the intellectual[1]. The intellectual is also free and also dependent

[1] *Gramsci A.* Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura. Torino: Einaudi, 1948.

from the base, just like politicians. But only they can, in turn, be directly independent of politics while remaining the voice of class interests. An intellectual may not be a proletarian and may not be a member of the Communist Party or any other Labour party, but at the same time, through his creativity — art, philosophy, journalism, etc. — *he can stand on the side of the proletariat.*

At the same time, an intellectual, even one of proletarian origin, *can side with Capital* without necessarily aligning himself with bourgeois parties. The intellectual's choice lies in a *different* plane. Here Gramsci introduces the concept of "hegemony." He understands it as *the* spiritual *solidarity of the intellectual with the bourgeois worldview in its deepest and most paradigmatic foundations.* Hegemony consists in capturing the consciousness of a person who henceforth begins to serve the cause of the expansion of Capital, the nature of which tends towards maximum expansion across the entire territory of the planet (Lenin called this "imperialism"). This is a conceptual gesture, a choice of concept and groups of concepts.

By siding with Capital, intellectuals who choose to serve hegemony enter into *a "historical pact*" with it. Such intellectuals may be paid by the bourgeoisie and cooperate with bourgeois parties, but they may also choose not to be paid or cooperate. The historical pact is made at a different level: the intellectual either recognises the historical rightness of capitalism, liberal ideology and bourgeois reforms of society, or he does not. And this is deeper than the mechanics of class affiliation or bribery. It is a spiritual choice that manifests the maximum of human freedom — every thinking person (everyone, according to Gramsci, is an intellectual to the extent that they think systematically) can side with hegemony or reject it. If they reject hegemony, they automatically side with *counter-hegemony.* This is also a historical pact, but this time concluded by the intellectual *with Labour.* And again, this pact can be independent of cooperation with the Communist Party. The choice is realised in the broad field of culture, science, philosophy and art. This field represents an *autonomous* segment of the superstructure. And it is no less important, independent, and influential than the realm of politics. If the autonomy of politics has been proven by Leninism, then the theory of the intellectual, hegemony/counter-hegemony, and the historical pact is entirely the creation of Gramsci himself.

The end of history in the second political 's theory

The Marxist worldview is distinguished by a clear and explicit vision of the historical process. The emergence of intelligent life is a consequence of evolution. Then begins political history, which moves from primitive communism through patriarchy, slavery and feudalism to capitalism. According to Marx, this is not a coincidence, but a law. Socio-economic formations replace one another in a strictly defined sequence. Therefore, the path that the West has taken must be followed by all other peoples of the earth. In this, Marx reveals his Eurocentrism and even cultural ethnocentrism (cultural racism) ([1]).These stages had already been passed during Marx's lifetime, and there were several more to go, which Marxists wanted to bring closer and help bring about.

The logic was as follows. Once the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie reaches its peak, i.e. when a bourgeois urban society is fully established (i.e., when the majority of the population migrates from the countryside to the cities and megacities are created), when capitalism becomes the dominant socio-political system and bourgeois ideology becomes global, at that moment the proletariat, which by then will constitute the majority of humanity, will begin to realise itself as the subject of history, the creator of value and world wealth, will acquire class consciousness, will assimilate Marx, will organise political movements, uniting in a world proletarian International, and at some point will carry out the proletarian revolution. Something along these lines happened in Russia in 1917, although Marx himself and European Marxists were convinced that this country, due to the absence of a bourgeoisie and proletariat and its agrarian character, was precisely where this could not happen, at least in the initial stage. Nevertheless, several generations after Marx, this part of Marxism's historical conceptualisation became reality.

Marx himself believed that once the proletarian revolution had been accomplished, the proletariat would have to abolish private property, dispel the chimera of the middle class, and destroy the bourgeoisie. Thus, the whole of society would live according to the laws of equality. The surplus value created by the labour of the workers

[1] *Hobson J.* The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

will be distributed to the whole society. To this end, a socialist proletarian state must first emerge, which, under the leadership of the Communist Party, will be responsible for redistributing the products of labour more or less evenly among all strata of society. At the next stage, under communism, the state — including the socialist state — will wither away, having fulfilled its function; people will become conscious, creative, truly individual (as individual as atoms) and will receive according to their needs, contributing to the common life as much effort and labour as they can or want (the consciousness of the new people of communism will correspond to the highest standards of collectivist altruistic morality).

The construction of communism is the end of history, which goes through a complete cycle from atoms floating in the Great Void and forming vortices, to life, consciousness, and history, which were a dialectical deviation from the original simplicity of matter, and back to a new return to the fullness of materiality, but not in the form of atoms, but in the form of the moral and conscious human being of communism, in which the materiality of the atom, as a thing-in-itself, would be transformed into free creative individuality as a thing-for-itself, having passed through the entire path of alienation — existence-for-another. What lay beyond this was completely unclear to Marx: communist humanity would have to master the universe in order to fly around it in flying machines — like the atoms and vortices of the Greek atomists, spreading communism everywhere as an ideology and a science.

With communism, history ends because, according to Marx, history is a class struggle. And since the bourgeoisie no longer exists and only the proletariat remains, which under socialism has eliminated the last vestiges of bourgeois consciousness, there is no class struggle.

In the USSR and other socialist countries, socialism was built, meaning that this part of Marxist historical dogma was fulfilled. With regard to equality in the Soviet Union as a whole, Marx's criteria were satisfied. All people were more or less equal in material terms, and differences in income were insignificant. On average, by the end of the USSR, most people earned 100 roubles, which was more or less sufficient; high salaries were considered to be 200 roubles and above, and low salaries were 50–70 roubles. There were differences, of course, but compared to today, they were negligible.

But with the transition to communism, which some Soviet leaders, such as Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), believed would take only a few decades, changes in the socio-economic formations began that were completely inexplicable in the spirit of Marxist theory.

processes. Labour productivity in socialist countries did not grow at the expected rate, the world revolution did not happen, and what is more, its preconditions dissipated, the self-awareness of the Soviet people became clouded, and morality became increasingly 'petty bourgeois', that is, selfish and utilitarian.

Thus, the practical implementation of the Marxist version of history failed, and socialist societies collapsed. Among them, only China (as well as Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba) survived, but China only managed to do so by fully embracing a market-liberal economy in the 1980s, while retaining power in the hands of the Communist Party. But Chinese communism has strayed even further from Marxist orthodoxy than the Soviet version.

With the end of the USSR and socialism in Eastern Europe, the entire model of historical time, as understood by communists, collapsed. Marxism simply did not envisage a return from socialism to capitalism, just as it did not allow for the construction of socialism in a single country. The ideological clarity of the second political theory became clouded. From then on, Marxist views on the logic of history ceased to be perceived as something obvious and convincing. The conceptual side of Marxism also suffered significantly, facilitated by both ideological struggle and parallel processes in scientific circles, which, even in the Modern era, did not always strictly adhere to ideological tenets, of which there were at least three until the mid-20th century (liberalism, communism and fascism), and after 1945, two (liberalism and fascism). communism and fascism), and after 1945 there were two (liberalism and fascism). This confrontation allowed for the development of scientific concepts, albeit relatively, on the periphery or on the fault lines between ideologies. In a capitalist society, where Marxist predictions did not come true (although they should have done so), and after the fall of the USSR, the second political theory lost its most important practical support.

Of course, Marxism collapsed, or at least retreated far back, not because its predictions about the communist end of history did not come true. The entire content of Marxism, like any ideology of the Modern era, consists of concepts that cannot be directly correlated with reality (confirmed or refuted), since reality itself is conceived in the Modern era as a concept. Therefore, the second political theory's ideas were ideological not only about the future, but also about the past and even the present (although in the present — that is, in the era of the rapid rise of capitalism in 20th-century Europe — Marx relied not simply on "reality," but on the conceptual basis of liberalism and on

Hegel's sophisticated philosophical system (1770–1831), which cannot be strictly attributed to either Modernism or, even less so, to liberalism. But political theories and contemporary political ideologies have their own historical destiny. And instead of the Marxist end of history, we are witnessing in our time the "end of Marxism," which must be accepted as a fundamental fact of political philosophy, one that can be explained in many different ways, but cannot be denied.

The significance of political thought and its price

A brief overview of Marxism in its conceptual foundations shows the importance of political philosophy for the specific social, political, and economic environment in which the history of various peoples unfolds. In Politica Aeter- na, its structures, its symmetries, its metaphysics and its conceptual systems, at first glance we are dealing with abstract and speculative subjects — both in the case of traditional society and in relation to the Modern. Thus, the differences between the first and second political theories, despite the unity of some common assumptions (materialism, individualism, progressivism, atomism) stemming from their belonging to the same type of philosophy — the philosophy of Matter — the antagonism boils down to the content of some seemingly rather abstract concepts — class, value, basis, atomic dialectic, matter, etc. But the projection of these conceptual systems — ideologies (as forms of "false consciousness") — into reality gives rise to grandiose historical cataclysms — revolutions, bloody civil wars, battles between peoples and states, repressions that affect practically all of humanity. Thus, an insignificant gap in the conceptual apparatus, the interpretation of a particular term, a correct or distorted understanding of a particular socio-political, economic or historical phenomenon or process is paid for with rivers and even seas of human blood, millions of broken lives, an abyss of suffering, and sometimes grandiose achievements and volcanic eruptions of enthusiasm and galvanised happiness.

From these concepts (bourgeois class, proletarian class, value, surplus value, exploitation, ideology as false consciousness) a second political theory emerges, which, once in power, begins to operate in reality. At the same time, Gramsci shows that in some cases it is the mood of the superstructure, i.e. the historical

pact between organic intellectuals, which can far outstrip the state of the base.

In the 20th century in Russia, Marx's worldview played a fundamental role. His conceptual apparatus was adopted by the Bolsheviks, who carried out a revolution, seized power, and built a socialist society, striving to follow the strategy and dogma of Marxism as closely as possible. The communists' rise to power meant the dictatorship of the proletariat and the destruction of the bourgeoisie, along with the rest of the non-proletarian classes — priests, nobles, landowners, etc.

The civil war, mass executions and repression, the destruction of a thousand-year-old culture, and the disappearance of the aristocracy and, to some extent, the peasantry were the direct consequences of the fascination with Marxism. This is how a totalitarian society was built, in which the second political theory came to be perceived as an irrefutable dogma. The "false consciousness" of the abstract proletariat (which, incidentally, did not exist in Russia to any significant extent) became the natural and universally accepted worldview and intellectual environment for almost a century.

It is telling that at the beginning of the 20th century, the Marxist worldview was the preserve of marginal groups (mainly the intelligentsia), the urban proletariat was insignificant, and industrialisation and the formation of the bourgeoisie were in their infancy. Everything was decided by a historical pact with Marxism, concluded by a very small but passionate and fanatical intelligentsia.

Although the USSR itself was a colossal illustration of a socialist society, the influence of Marxism spread far beyond its borders. A similar system was established after World War II in communist China, Vietnam, North Korea, some countries of the Indochinese Peninsula, Latin America and Africa, as well as in Eastern Europe. European social democracy, also based on Marxism, mostly rejected Bolshevism and Maoism, but communist ideology still had a huge impact on it.

In the 1960s, the successes of the socialist camp on the one hand and the critical potential of Marxist philosophy on the other were so obvious and impressive that many European countries also began to move towards socialism. During this period, not being a communist meant being a "scoundrel" among European intellectuals — it was believed that in this case, the intellectual had entered into a historical pact with the bourgeoisie, with the exploiters, with the forces of evil. This fashion was introduced primarily by the French

French "new left" philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) and Albert Camus (1913–1960). Many representatives of the European artistic avant-garde had been communists since the 1930s, such as the leader of the surrealist movement André Breton (1896–1966). The appeal of communism as post-liberalism was reinforced by the fact that it had already triumphed in many countries, and almost half of the world's population opposed the capitalist system. Intellectuals believed that it could also prevail in Europe, where contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were also growing and where, at times, quite revolutionary events took place — such as in May 1968. At that time, the riots of left-wing youth and students were a kind of analogue of the Marxist revolution — not carried through to the end, but significantly influencing the political environment in France. From that moment on, being a communist became not only prestigious in a cultural sense, but the sharp rise in the influence of the left brought the socialist François Mitterrand (1916–1996) to power. Many believed that Europe was developing in a Marxist direction. Some even felt that Marx had been proven right, not only partially and "morally," but literally, including with regard to the replacement of liberalism by communism.

Of course, there was a fundamental difference between Soviet and European Marxists, which persisted because European Marxists traditionally disapproved of Bolshevism, considering it Blanquism and adventurism, and under the influence of the Trotskyists, they felt particular animosity towards Stalin, believing that he had created a totalitarian society in the USSR that was not so much communist as nationalist and bureaucratic in nature. But the fundamental point is that socialism, as the second political theory, represented for a long time a significant trend that belonged entirely to the paradigm of the modern era, just like liberalism (the first political theory), operating with the same concepts but organising them in a fundamentally different way.

Overall, Gramsci's theses on the historical pact, which essentially recognise the paramount importance of conceptualisation and ideology, have been fully confirmed in European history, where the influence of Marxism, which grew particularly strong in the late 1960s, qualitatively changed the cultural, educational, social, political and economic environment.

The political philosophy constructed by Marx played an enormous role in the development of the dramatic 20th century. Only his example can convince us of the decisive significance that thought, concepts, ideology and philosophy play in the history of peoples.

A concept is formed in the mind of a philosopher or several philosophers, it connects with others or opposes them, and then millions, billions of people pay the price for it. That is how important thought is as such — it is what drives history.

Chapter 7. Nationalism classical and revolutionary (third political theory)

The genesis of the third political theory of

Modern nationalism is a political philosophy that represents the third main line of ideological development of this period. All political theories of the modern era, beginning in the 19th century, crystallised in one way or another, reaching their apogee in three fundamental political worldviews:

1) liberalism (the first political theory),

2) communism (the second political theory) and

3) nationalism (the third political theory).

This sequence in the listing of ideologies is related to the order of their historical emergence: first liberalism appeared, then Marxism as a critique of liberalism, and much later, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, as a response to the challenge of liberalism and Marxism, a full-fledged ideology of political nationalism emerged in the form of Italian fascism and German National Socialism (as well as their analogues in other countries). In addition to fascism and National Socialism, the third political theory includes typologically similar political systems created by António Salazar (1889–1970) in Portugal, General Franco (1892–1975) in Spain, and Peronism (from the Spanish justicia, meaning justice) in Argentina. (from the Spanish justicia — justice) in Argentina([1]) ·At the same time

[1] Contemporary Greek political scientist Dimitris Kitsikis believes that since 1945, when fascism suffered a crushing defeat in Europe, such ideologies have moved to the Third World. According to Kitsikis, many Third World regimes, in particular the Arab Baath Party, combined right-wing and socialist, conservative and Marxist elements, without being strictly socialist or capitalist parties. They represent a spectrum of variations of Third Political Theory. According to Kitsikis' classification, the remnants of Ba'athist regimes were Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq (1937–2006), Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya (1942–2011), and Hafez al-Assad's regime in Syria (1930–2000). there are also many similar combinations of national and social ideas in the Palestinian liberation movement.

Both fascism and National Socialism were largely a reaction to European socialism, partly incorporating some of its principles and partly offering an alternative to them. In the case of German National Socialism, for example, the very name contains a reference to socialism (albeit fundamentally different from Marxism), while in the case of Italian fascism, in addition to doctrinal similarities and the early fascists' sympathy for the USSR (which was mutual at first), it should be noted that Benito Mussolini (1883–1945), the founder of the fascist party, was a socialist in his youth. Lenin spoke highly of the early Mussolini and regretted that such a leader had been lost to the European left.

Fascism and National Socialism in the 20th century are not a Marxist version of anti-liberalism. This was already anticipated by Marx, who carefully distinguished between *left-wing anti-capitalism* and i.e., post-capitalism itself, which gradually developed into Marxism and the second political theory, from various forms *of anti-capitalism on the right,* which oppose bourgeois society in defence of either the preservation of elements of traditional society (religion, class, aristocracy, etc.), or do not accept the proletarian and internationalist dogma of the communists, attempting to combine socialism either with national elements or with the peasant class. Later, the most consistent form of combining socialism with the principles of class society, generalising the tendencies of "conservative socialism" criticised by Marx in the Manifesto, was proposed in his works by the Austrian theorist Otto Spann([1]) (1878–1950).

Marx engaged in fierce debate, particularly with Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864), who defended national or state socialism. His ideological opponents were anarchists — especially Joseph Proudhon ([3]) (1809–1865), who advocated a free federation of rural communities and rejected the messianic role of the proletariat, and Mikhail Bakunin[4] (1768–1854), who recognised the Slavic and, more broadly, the South European peoples as the true revolutionary force, in opposition to Germany and the North European nations.

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[1] *Spann, O.* The True State: Lectures on the Demolition and Reconstruction of Society, given in the summer semester of 1920 at the University of Vienna. Vienna: Quelle & Meyer, 1921.

[2] *Lassal F.* Macht und Recht. Offnes Sendschreiben. Zurich: Meyer & Zeller, 1863.

[3] *Proudhon, J.* What is Property? Or An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Power; Poverty as an Economic Principle; Pornocracy, or Women in Their Present State. Moscow: Respublika, 1998.

[4] *Bakunin, M. A.* Collected Works and Letters. 1828–1876 Moscow: Publishing House of the All-Union Society of Political Prisoners and Exiles, 1934–1935.

which Bakunin considered too "rationalistic." Later, elements of 19th-century national socialism and certain strands of anarchism (especially in fascist Italy) were integrated into a third political theory: revolutionary nationalism. It is important to emphasise that this type of nationalism builds its ideology on Marxism and anti-capitalist left-wing theories and concepts, and therefore logically follows the second political theory, which in turn was a critical reaction to bourgeois ideology (the first political theory, liberalism).

Bourgeois nationalism and revolutionary nationalism

However, although the third political theory, which should be understood as a complete ideology of revolutionary nationalism that takes into account the basic tenets of socialism and Marxism and offers alternative concepts, only emerged in the 20th century, nationalism itself appeared practically simultaneously with the Modern era and reflects the main features of Modern political philosophy. If revolutionary nationalism (of the 20th century) is largely anti-capitalist and staunchly anti-liberal, then at the origins of European nationalism we see, on the contrary, bourgeois tendencies. The nation states themselves in Europe developed under the influence of the Protestant Reformation and were a political challenge to Catholicism and the Empire. Such bourgeois nationalism therefore emerged at the very origins of modernity and, in a sense, even preceded liberalism. In the field of economics, mercantilism, which insisted on a state monopoly on foreign trade, developed long before liberalism, and Adam Smith himself formulated his theories in polemics with the mercantilists. Later, this same logic of bourgeois nationalism became firmly associated with protectionist policies and, in the 20th century, became the basis of realism in international relations ([1])— without any connection to the ideology of the Third Way, i.e., revolutionary nationalism.

Of course, there are certain similarities between bourgeois nationalism, which emerged at the dawn of the modern era, and revolutionary (anti-bourgeois) nationalism, which developed into a fully-fledged ideology only in the 20th century, largely as a reaction to the second political theory. First and foremost, both declare the supremacy of

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology).

the value of national sovereignty, the elevation of national identity to the status of the supreme subject of foreign policy, etc., but in general these are different phenomena. The dividing line here runs along the fundamental principles of capitalism. All types of nationalism, both bourgeois and revolutionary, are critical of liberalism (the first political theory), but bourgeois nationalism considers market society and its fundamental principles (free trade, individualism, progress, etc.) to be completely legitimate, while revolutionary nationalism rejects capitalism as a whole. It is easy to recognise the influence of Marxist thought, only read backwards. Marx, starting from liberal political economy and its postulates, insists on the international nature of capital, on which he bases his alternative proletarian internationalism; for him, the international character of capitalism is a dialectical moment necessary as a preparation for the world revolution of the proletariat, which must also be an international class. But revolutionary nationalists (fascists and National Socialists), accepting the thesis of the international nature of capital (insisted upon by liberals and, even more so, by Marxists), but draw the opposite conclusion, asserting that it is precisely because of its international nature that capitalism is incompatible with national sovereignty and will sooner or later destroy it — either directly, through international monopolies and financial structures, or indirectly, through the proletarian revolution. Therefore, the political theory is precisely revolutionary nationalism, based on a deep philosophical and historical analysis of the main provisions of Modernity and their interpretation in the first and second political theories. Bourgeois nationalism is not so much an ideology as a model for building foreign policy and, in particular, economic relations with other countries. In domestic politics, such nationalism does not differ at all from the general principles of capitalism and, consequently, liberalism.

Given this fundamental difference, we can trace the stages of the formation of nationalism as such — from its initial and bourgeois form to its revolutionary form, which had a rather short period of existence in history.

Countries and social classes in the feudal system

Thus, the roots of political nationalism are directly related to the modern era. This is a phenomenon of modern politics

and, therefore, nationalism belongs to the paradigm that we defined in the terminology of Plato's "Timaeus" as
"the political philosophy of Mother." Thus, nationalism as a whole represents one of the directions of materialistic philosophy of the Modern Era.

Political nationalism is directly linked to the concept of *nation*. A nation is a bourgeois phenomenon that emerged at the dawn of the modern era alongside the sovereign state, which in turn represented the antithesis of the Holy Empire. A nation is the population of a state created by means of a social contract. Thus, at the heart of a nation, as at the heart of a state, lies a social contract. The subject from which a nation is formed is the individual citizen. Where there is a nation, there is individual citizenship. It is a collection of individuals, social atoms.

A nation is an artificial creation of a group of individuals who are considered rational and possess a single will. It is a direct product of a social contract that proclaims the formation of a certain unitary structure. The unitary structure of the state means that the entire territory within the borders of the nation consists of a homogeneous legal field where all citizens of this nation-state recognise a single law, a single language, a single regime, and a single culture. These citizens are considered the authority that establishes the nation.

In French, there is an expression — *État-Nation* (État — state, Nation — nation) — which shows the historical and political unity of the state and the nation, their inseparable connection. In English, the corresponding term is "national state." We could translate this as "national state," but when we do so, we diminish the meaning of the word "national," and the main emphasis is placed on "state." However, in the formula État-Nation, there is no adjective; these are two nouns.

The nation emerges together with the bourgeois revolution. Before the bourgeois revolution, there is a Holy Empire, a traditional state, a class society. Class society is regulated not so much by nationally binding norms and rules as by the relations between different classes, groups and various associations within that society. In this situation, incidents such as the following will arise time and again

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[1] For more details, see: *Dugin, A. G.* Ethnosociology. Moscow: Academic Project, 2012.

When a stable system exists in a certain duchy, vassalage (there is a suzerain, there are vassals, there is a feudal hierarchy), but the strict affiliation of this duchy to Normandy, France, England or Germany is sometimes difficult to determine in European history before the Modern Era. They could belong to two states at once or to none of them, because the concept of the state was not yet unified. Social classes were more important than the state, the feudal system was more important than the national system, and the relations between vassals and suzerains were more important than the national affiliation of this territory to one kingdom or another. At the same time, some territories could be directly subordinate to the Catholic Church, in which case bishops acted as political rulers. Sometimes power belonged to an alliance of rural communities. Mixed forms were also common. A fief is not simply the property of a particular feudal lord or his family. It was a more complex entity, sometimes allowing for a fairly wide variety of forms of government. It was within the feudal estates in the Middle Ages that political and economic exchange took place — services, labour, food, goods. This exchange was most often in kind — goods for goods, services for services, etc. The feudal lower classes — peasants and serfs — had to serve as a militia and supply goods to the lower nobility, who in turn led their troops into the armies of their suzerains, to whom they gave part of their produce and goods, and so on up to the king. The church structure was also part of this feudal structure.

When switching from one suzerain to another, a vassal usually took with him those who were below him. But in general, the attachment of this ladder to a single state — and its ruler, the king — was quite loose and was only felt in cases of serious wars and conflicts. Most of the population may not have known at all which state they belonged to. Everyone knew that they were Christians and that their immediate suzerain was a certain baron, count or duke. Only occasionally did news reach the king, and the very idea of the state was vague and very approximate.

The political system in Rus' was roughly the same until the beginning of the Muscovite period, when it became possible to speak of a semblance of national unity and centralisation of power[1]. But even in Muscovy itself, the boyars enjoyed a great deal of freedom, and this is precisely what Ivan the Terrible fought against — his main reforms were directed against the free boyars

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Russian History. The People and the State in Search of a Subject.

(as an analogue of the feudal lords of the European Middle Ages). During the Time of Troubles, we see how autonomous the Russian boyars remained even after Ivan the Terrible.

The nation as a bourgeois concept

A nation is created in strict opposition to this state of affairs, to this class-based feudal system, to this medieval version of political philosophy. A nation is an anti-class state. It is either classes or a nation. Moreover, a nation is based on the principle of the dominance of the bourgeois type as the normative socio-political actor. And the bourgeoisie, as we have seen, is based precisely on equality of starting opportunities, which in practice means the rejection of class privileges.

In a class society, individual identity is embedded in *class identity*. Where, for example, does the widespread Russian surname "Kuznetsov" come from, which is etymologically and semantically identical to the English surname "Smith," the German "Schmidt," etc.? The fact is that in the past, a person's surname (i.e., family name) reflected what they did for a living. A blacksmith's son was a blacksmith, and his grandson was a blacksmith, and so on ad infinitum. Anyone named "Kuznetsov" was a blacksmith. Such a surname was not possible for an aristocrat or a peasant.

Medieval people defined their individual identity through their social function, profession, place in society, and membership in a fixed class group. Accordingly, the surnames "Medvedev" or
"Volkov" are even older, associated with hunters and gatherers, because during initiation practices, hunters switched roles with their prey, and those who hunted had to be prepared to become the prey themselves. However, in some cases, these may have been village nicknames of later origin.

But the surnames "Ivanov" and "Petrov" are very new — they seem to be traditionally Russian surnames, but this is not the case. They appeared from patronymics during the census based on Western European models. The common people were asked, "Whose are you? Ivanov or Petrov?" since these names were popular among the people, and individuals were recorded by their patronymic, which only later became a sign of family. But this is already an element of individualism — the surname "Ivanov" or "Petrov" tells us nothing about who was the founder of this family from the point of view of the feudal model. These are modernist surnames.

. It was more traditional to call a person "Krestyankin," meaning "son of a peasant woman." This is closer to the paradigm of Tradition.

Accordingly, functional surnames are a remnant of class society, while surnames based on the father's name indicate a certain loss of traditional collective identity, a certain individualism and possibly the migration of peasants to the city, registration as a member of the bourgeoisie as a whole without any characteristic professional traits.

National states are based on individual citizenship. That is, a member of a nation is thought of as an individual, the very atom that lies at the foundation of the materialistic worldview and the corresponding scientific picture of the modern world.

The nation is a product of , nationalism.

The dominant figure of nationalism is the bourgeoisie. Therefore, *all classical nationalism is bourgeois*. It is a form of association of people who have broken their ties with class society and found themselves in the position of pure individuals. Most often this happened precisely with townspeople, that is, the inhabitants of Burg, the bourgeoisie. And in order to bring these individuals together into a manageable and orderly social community, they are made to believe that they are *members of a nation.* A nation is an artificial construct, and it appears as a concept. The entire history of a nation is a product of the imagination of bourgeois nationalists.

All the main points of modern philosophy, and especially modern political philosophy, are concepts. The concept is the individual, and it is precisely this that is the most important and fundamental for modernity as a whole. In the first political ideology, it is taken as the main one (perhaps this is related to the stability of liberalism and its political victories over alternative — illiberal — ideologies of Modernity). The proletariat, property, and socio-economic formation are also concepts. They are central to communism. The nation is another concept. It also deals with the individual, as in socialism, but brings together a group of individuals according to a different scenario — not according to class, but according to the state. A nation is the totality of citizens (= townspeople = bourgeoisie) of a given state. Together they form the État-Nation, the Nation-State.

The mechanism behind the emergence of modern nations and the intellectual and historical context of this process are convincingly described

by anthropologist Ernest Gellner (1925–1995) and sociologist Benedict Anderson (1936–2015). Gellner noted the artificiality of the concept of nation, which has nothing to do with the historical existence of a people or medieval class society[1].

These authors draw attention to a very important sequence in the formation of modern nations: in any situation, nationalists come first, and only then does a nation emerge. Gellner, in particular, insists that nationalism is not a consequence of the existence of a nation, but that nations themselves arise as a development of the ideology of nationalism. He writes:

> It is nationalism that creates nations, not the other way around. Of course, nationalism makes use of pre-existing cultures or cultural diversity, although it does so very selectively and often radically transforms them. Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, [and]a completely mythical original purity [restored].

Nationalism invents a nation, i.e. a society that never existed, but uses elements taken from the real historical experience of specific groups (ethnic groups and the history of a people), which are taken out of context, thereby losing their meaning, and are transformed into a universally binding socio-cultural dogma imposed with the full force of the state apparatus. Gellner emphasises that a nation consists of a mechanical set of anonymous and alienated atomic citizens, but tries to pass itself off as a peaceful rural community, cosy and familiar, where everyone knows each other and shares common habits and synchronised reactions. To achieve this, the state apparatus is put to work: education, a codified language (idiom), works of art glorifying the nation's glorious deeds, some of which are real, and others

Part of it is made up.

A nation is a concept artificially created by a group of intellectuals during the transition from the paradigm of Tradition to the paradigm of Modernity. Intellectual nationalists take as their basis some ancient people or the name of some historical, cultural or political community, real or mythological, and declare the population of some modern bourgeois state that emerged during the destruction of the medieval

[1] *Gellner, E.* Nations and Nationalism. Moscow: Progress, 1991.

[2] Ibid. p. 127.

Catholic and imperial order, or part of this state, as the direct heirs of a long-vanished ethnic group or tribe. Nationalists then convince the citizens of the state that they are the direct descendants of those whose name they bear, and this allows them to artificially bind together an atomised, individualistic bourgeois society that is beginning to imagine itself as the heir to a myth. Anderson believes that this identity is strictly imaginary and often created by romantic poets or artists. In reality, it is a product of the disintegration of class unity, which has long since replaced the organic community of an ethnic nature. But nationalism completely ignores this historical, cultural and political rupture, becoming just as artificial an ideology as liberalism and communism, and just as individualistic and materialistic as they are.

Such flights of fancy reached their peak in racial theories, which were a key part of National Socialism. Here, it wasn't just about the idea of a "nation," but something bigger and even more exotic and artificial — but just as modern — the idea of "race." Formally, National Socialism proclaimed the superiority of the "Aryan" race, i.e. the descendants of the Indo-European peoples. However, the pragmatic conditions of politics and the extreme utilitarian ideology of the Nazis excluded not only Indo-European Slavs from the "Aryan" milieu, but also the Celts, while Italians were classified as representatives of the Mediterranean race. The Gypsies, who also speak an Indo-European language and are descended from the entirely "Aryan" India and are no less
"Aryan" Persia, was generally equated with subhumans — on the basis of culture and phenotype. Nazism, from the point of view of the political use of racism, is the most exotic and, at the same time, sinister parody. It is clear that "Aryans" here meant primarily Germans, while those Indo-European peoples with whom the historical Germans or even the Nazis themselves had political friction were arbitrarily deprived of this status. The correlation between racial purity and phenotype had a completely comical effect, since the leaders of Nazism did not differ in their Nordic appearance, and those who most closely corresponded to it were tall, blond, and blue-eyed Scandinavians, distinguished by a very peaceful and docile character (far from Nordic, if we go by the Nietzschean-heroic rhetoric of Nazi ideologues) and often had Finno-Ugric (i.e., completely non-Indo-European) roots.

Gellner and Anderson show that all nationalism is a concept that serves the interests of the bourgeoisie and is based on imaginary structures used purely pragmatically and utilitarianly. And if nationalist myths are invented by romantics, sometimes without any concern for practical application (such as James Macpherson, who published his own poems under the guise of translations of ancient Celtic ballads by the bard Ossian[1] (1736–1796) or the authors of the apocryphal Dutch book The Chronicles of Ur-Linda [2]), in the hands of bourgeois politicians they became the conceptual basis of political ideology.

In fact, nationalism serves to break up the class society, place the bourgeoisie at the centre of society, destroy the sacred world, justify the secular nature of the state, and destroy the ethnic identity of peoples. The nation state offers one language for all citizens, called the idiom. Usually, one of the dialects, most often the capital dialect, is taken as a model. The rest of the dialects and dialects become
"Patuá", i.e. different from the national standard. Thus, the diversity of living speech and local linguistic traditions is levelled out by the mechanical and alienating uniformity of the idiom. As a result, all other dialects and accents are gradually dying out.

Another contemporary sociologist, Benedict Anderson, developing Gellner's approach, emphasised that a nation is a product of people's imagination[3].

Like Gellner, Anderson describes the origin of the nation as a utilitarian construction of collective identity. In order to hold society together and prevent it from falling apart after the elimination of social classes, some new form of collective identity was needed. Benedict Anderson uses an interesting term to describe a nation as an "imagined community" or "imaginary community." The term "community" means a group of people organically connected by life, history, culture, origin, and a set of stable

[1] Poems of Ossian. L.: Nauka, 1983.
[2] *Virt, G. F.* Chronicle of Ura Linda. The Earliest History of Europe. Moscow: Veche, 2007.
[3] *Anderson, E.* Imagined Communities. Moscow: Canon-Press-Ts; Kuchkovo Pole, 2001.

and long-term relationships. It is precisely this organic unity of people who live side by side — like a large family, a single collective entity, where everyone not only knows but understands and feels each other. In a community, everyone is related, in-laws, brothers.

But bourgeois society has nothing to do with such a "community." On the contrary, in the course of the formation of capitalist relations, organic communities disintegrate into individuals. Communities are usually located in a peasant environment, on the land. The natural landscape of the community is destroyed by urbanisation, industrialisation and the bourgeois system. In this situation, bourgeois society is a product of the disintegration of the rural community, its end, its antithesis.

Ferdinand Tönnies devoted his extremely important research in sociology and political philosophy to the dualism of community (Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesellschaft). Tönnies contrasts these two concepts: community (Gemeinschaft) is based on the existence and long-term preservation of living organic ties, while society (Gesellschaft) is the product of their rupture and separation as a disintegration of individual units (which gives us the figure of the "idiot"). Society is a collection of individuals who have lost their organic ties with the community. When communities disintegrate, a society emerges. And this artificial society is bourgeois society, elevated to a political nation. This is why Benedict Anderson uses the term "imagined" community (comminity). A nation is a collection of disparate elements that imagine themselves to be a whole. This is what distinguishes a nation from a society, and nationalism from socialism. Socialism recognises that it is dealing with a society made up of individuals and proposes to consciously, rather than imaginatively, unite them artificially — again, "e pluribus unum", "out of many, one". A nation, on the other hand, wants to make many individuals believe that they have something in common and that this commonality is inherent to them, although in reality it stems from an artificially constructed political ideology and is simply imposed on everyone for strictly utilitarian purposes.

Thus, in Anderson's view, the nation is a bourgeois deception.

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[1] *Tönnies, F.* Community and Society. Basic Concepts of Pure Sociology. Moscow: University Fund, St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2002.

A limited group of "idiots" as the ideal of nationalism

A nation is made up of the same individuals who, as we have seen, were called "idiots" (ἰδιῶτης) in Greece. It is not a union of people with qualities — families, professions, roots — but an artificial agglomeration of quantitative units. A nation consists of "idiots." Every nation is idiotic at its roots, because it is created precisely by separate, unqualified individuals. And in order for this group of individuals, cut off from their class affiliation, social status, ethnic environment, and religious-political history (and a nation is always secular — it arose as a result of the struggle of Protestant states against the Holy Roman Empire) not to fall apart, the nation offers them an artificial collective identity. Not historical, not religious, not ethnic — not real, but — like everything in the philosophy of modern politics — conceptual.

But if a nation consists of "idiots," then nationalism becomes almost identical in its anthropological foundations to liberalism. The difference between them lies only in the scale of agglomeration of individuals they take as normative and desirable. Liberals are advocates of "maximum idiocy" — their goal is to spread atomisation to all of humanity. This is why German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) called the ideology of liberalism "Planet r-Idiotismus," meaning the application of individualistic anthropology on a planetary scale[1] Such "planetary idiocy" is globalism, which opens up enormous prospects for the individual, provided that everywhere and everywhere he finds only himself, his completely identical copy.

Nationalists set more specific limits for "individual separateness": "idiots" are of the same type within one nation, while in another nation they may differ slightly. This is the basis of nationalist rhetoric: one's own idiocy is contrasted with that of others, while universalist liberals insist that idiocy must be universal.

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[1] *Idiocy* corresponds to *planetarism*. This word does not refer to a psychiatric concept describing a state of extreme weakness of the soul and body. From an ontological and historical point of view, it means a state of solitary separateness, ἰδιον, in which modern man finds himself today, living in a mass society. Heidegger M. Überlegungen XII–XV. (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941). Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014. p. 265.

There is no fundamental difference between the liberal project and nationalism. In both cases, the focus is usually on the free market, the separation of powers, elections, parliamentary or presidential forms of government, etc. The only difference is the configuration of the boundaries within which individuals enter into a social contract. Nationalism assumes the borders of a single Leviathan, while liberalism advocates a world state in which all politics will be internal, and internationalism will equalise all individuals. In both cases, we are talking about the conceptual reduction of real people, with their specific historical and cultural identities, to generalised abstract concepts, but only of different dimensions — in one case to a "nation," in the other to "humanity."

This creates one of the dividing lines and, accordingly, semantic axes of the Political in the Modern paradigm: classical nationalism (as opposed to revolutionary nationalism, which will be discussed later) shares with liberalism the acceptance of the norms of market society and all the main points of bourgeois ideology, with the exception of the scale of its application and the limitation of collective identity to national boundaries (contrary to the universalism of liberals). This contrasts both nationalists and liberals with communists, who, in turn, completely reject the legitimacy of a society based on the market.

Nationalism, Hobbes, and anthropological pessimism

So, the nation is a bourgeois construct of modern times, based on individual identity and, accordingly, opposed to the Christian religion in its traditional medieval forms, namely Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity. The Christian tradition does not recognise nations; it divides the world on the basis of religion — Christians/non-Christians, Catholics/Orthodox Christians, orthodox Christians/heretics, etc. Identity is determined first and foremost by religion, and then by class. The Russian word "peasants" combines both of these aspects. National identity, being directed against class identity, carries with it an orientation towards secularism and, ultimately, atheism and anti-Christianity.

The formation of nations in Europe began among Protestant countries that opposed the popes and the Holy Roman Empire, and then spread to some Catholic peoples who, being involved in the process of modernisation, were forced to

adopt this national model and already speak of the formation of Catholic nations in response to the challenge of the Protestant North.

Of the three main theorists of modern political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes is the closest to nationalism. In fact, he is the bearer of the classical view of modern nationalism. Hobbes is the father of modern nationalism; he has it all: the social contract (the artificial creation of a nation based on a political pact) and the idea that a nation is a mechanism created by an idol, a cult figure, a monster that forms a collective through harsh control.

In Hobbes, we find an interesting detail: it is Leviathan, and the fear he instils in citizens, that is responsible for making people the same. According to Hobbes, the state makes people the same. It is therefore from this idea of Hobbes' Leviathan that the fundamental philosophy of nationalism derives. Nationalism is always, to one degree or another, Hobbesian.

If we look at the difference between nationalism and liberalism from Hobbes's perspective, we see that the main distinguishing feature, given the generally secular, atheistic and anti-Christian nature of both political ideologies, is once again to be found in anthropology. Nationalists tend to follow Hobbes in his pessimism. People do not change, remaining "wolves," and their aggressiveness is most naturally expressed in interethnic relations, where the natural state is recreated, with all its chaos, aggressiveness, and selfishness, but only at the level of macro-subjects: from now on, the bearer of aggressive greed is not an individual, but Leviathan itself. Therefore, human nature, projected onto Leviathan, gives rise to realism in international relations, which allows for a kind of inevitability of war between nations. And here nationalism finds its full application. The wolfish essence of Hobbes' individual is scaled up to a nation that behaves towards another nation like a predator, restrained only by force and natural limitations. At the level of Leviathan, the scenario of transition to the Political is not repeated among supporters of realism. The social contract is concluded only in relation to Leviathan — once. And between Leviathan and another Leviathan (or Behemoth, Leviathan's eternal enemy, to continue the series of biblical images), there is no longer a social contract. The individual, thus, accepts

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[1] *Schmitt, K.* Leviathan in Thomas Hobbes's Theory of the State.

the power of a collective monster, but the monster itself remains in a completely "natural" state.

Opponents of nationalists — liberals and socialists — as we have seen, proceed from a different anthropology — either neutral (Locke's "blank slate"), positive (Rousseau's "noble savage"), or accept Kant's model of universal "pure reason." This affects the interpretation of the state as a historically transient entity and predetermines the liberal theory of international relations, which presupposes the conclusion of a social contract between countries in the name of creating a supranational authority — a World Government.

Thus, in the context of modern political philosophy, another axis of opposition becomes clear: nationalism (as anthropological pessimism), continuing the line of Hobbes, opposes liberalism and socialism, which are based on anthropological optimism.

Mercantilism as an economic of nationalism

We have already said that mercantilism is the most accurate expression of classical bourgeois nationalism in the field of economics.

The theory of mercantilism proceeds from the assumption that the state is the main economic actor in international trade. If everything within a state is determined by market laws, then in international relations, the state becomes the main authority. In this case, it is the only monopoly trader, and all internal market participants can only operate outside the state through its mediation. The state is guided in its economic policy by national interests, i.e., regardless of the interests of a particular national producer or consumer, it establishes tariffs and duties that would be beneficial to the development of a particular branch of national industry as a whole. Such a state creates favourable conditions for its own and complicates competition for foreigners.

In a market economy, there are no "friends" or "enemies," and therefore the state does not act according to market rules, but according to other rules, defending not private but public interests. Mercantilism is a projection of Hobbes' logic onto the economy: the state remains a predator, considering everything within it to be its own.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology).

property, and to what lies outside as a potential threat or victim.

Therefore, a mercantilist state is based on protectionism and the management of foreign trade processes in order to create a positive or, at least, zero balance between exports and imports. An individual entrepreneur seeks only his own private gain, but the state is forced to defend itself at any cost, including by limiting the profits of its individual units in order to protect and strengthen itself as a whole.

Within such a state, there is free competition, while outside, the state itself acts as a collective actor, an entrepreneur acting on behalf of the entire nation. Hence, there is freedom in domestic trade and restrictions, tariff policy, and protectionism in international trade.

Thus, nationalist mercantilists argue with liberal internationalists. These are different concepts: for liberals, *there should be less* state everywhere and always, while for nationalists, there should be exactly as much state as is necessary. At the same time, liberals and mercantilists differ in their understanding of the necessity of the state: the former reduce its role to enlightenment, education and the maintenance of a minimum order, while the latter include representation of the nation in the military sphere, but also in the economic sphere, in relation to other nations.

Nationalists, in a sense, equate Bodin's sovereignty with the nation-state as a whole and insist that the nation must also be sovereign. On behalf of this sovereign nation, decisions are made on matters of peace and war, politics, trade and the international economy. In other words, within the state, order is maintained, while outside it, the state acts as a fully-fledged entity, including in economic terms.

German Romanticism changes the concept of the nation's " "

Before we move on to the 20th century, to revolutionary nationalism, that is, to the ideology of fascism and National Socialism, which usually serve as models for the third political theory, we should pay attention to some attempts to reinterpret bourgeois nationalism in a romantic vein, which we find in Germany in the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries. This is the romantic philosophy of Herder (1744–1803), Fichte (1762–1814), Schelling (1775–1854) and Hegel. These profound thinkers attempted to give the concepts of political modernity — such as

as "nation," "civil society," and even "individual" a more complex and dialectical character, sometimes going beyond the semantic boundaries of the Modern era and returning to political Platonism and political Aristotelianism. Thus, the romantic spirit of German philosophy intervenes in the idea of pure, classical bourgeois nationalism of the Modern Age. These philosophers attempt to reinterpret the nation, an artificial and purely political construct, in a metaphysical key, introducing elements of Plato's idea, Aristotle's eidos and essence, and certain aspects of ethnic, cultural or historical identity. Thus, in Herder, we see the concept of "people" (Volk), which he does not strictly separate from "nation" (Nation) as a continuation of the historical development of the community. Community and society are not opposed to each other, and national society is interpreted as a continuation of the community. This is an attempt to transfer the properties of community to society, organicity to artificiality, and thereby relativise the bourgeois character of the nation. While bourgeois ideologues made use of this transfer, the German Romantics clearly believed in it themselves, without exacerbating the paradigmatic break between the Middle Ages and the Modern Era, and even, on the contrary, trying to overcome it dialectically.

This German Romanticism had a significant influence on 20th-century theories of nationalism, which ceased to be so clearly Hobbesian, individualistic, and modernist, and took on a more atypical and extravagant character.

Herder: history as the history of the " " of peoples

Johann Gottfried Herder was a consistent critic of the ideas of the Enlightenment. But his rejection of the modern paradigm did not mean a simple return to the ideals of the Middle Ages, which was quite problematic in 18th-century Europe, where the Enlightenment was rapidly gaining ground. Moreover, Herder wanted to take a step forward, not backward, viewing the time in which he lived as part of a broader historical process.

In the spirit of romanticism, Herder put forward an idea that later influenced all forms of later revolutionary nationalism: from his point of view, the subject of history is not the individual (in the spirit of bourgeois atomism), nor is it the estates, the Empire or the Church, as pure traditionalists believed. Herder put forward the proposition that the subject of history is the people, or more precisely, *peoples* in the plural, each of them

It is an organic whole, a cultural unity. History is not the history of a single humanity, but of many peoples, and therefore it is non-linear and consists of different overlapping cycles. Herder believed that societies and peoples go through the same phases in their history as individuals — infancy, youth, maturity, old age — and then give way to other peoples. Therefore, each nation builds its own semantic cycle in its history, understandable only to itself or to an attentive and thoughtful observer, and corresponding to its internal logic. At the same time, the nation as an organic whole acts as the bearer of a unique culture that develops and takes shape gradually at each stage.

To conceptualise this organic whole that is the people, Herder introduces the concept of the "*national* spirit," Volkgeist, attributing to it consciousness, subjectivity, and the capacity for volitional and consistent self-development. *History, thus, is a multidimensional series of revelations of the "national spirit" in each people.* There is no common measure between them, although certain patterns and parallels between similar phases of cycles can be identified. However, one should always compare similar stages with each other: a period of decline with a period of decline, a period of rise with a period of rise, and so on. In this way, Herder opened up perspectives for an approach that would become the norm in science two hundred years after his death and lay the foundation for a "new anthropology" that continued and developed Herder's intuition.

Herder outlined his main ideas regarding the structure of the historical process in his seminal work Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind [1]. There he provides the first generalised and systematic description of different types of civilisations in the modern era, based on a balanced approach to each of them, without claiming to construct a universal system. The "national spirit" is always unique and unrepeatable. Herder compared it to "the thoughts of God," between which it is absurd to try to establish a hierarchy — each of them is perfect and valuable in its own way. Together, they make up the harmony of history. At the same time, the "national spirit" works equally through geniuses, military leaders, and great historical figures, as well as through ordinary people who can live a full life, organically participating in culture through customs, ethics, language, traditions, and even everyday life.

For Germany, Herder became the founder *of the philosophy of identity*, since his ideas implied that Germans have their own

[1] *Herder, I. G.* Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind. Moscow: Nauka, 1977.

a cultural ideal, its own "national spirit," which should not be evaluated by comparison with other European nations in the linear logic of "progress," but represents *a unique sequence* of *meanings* expressed in history and culture; and the task of the Germans was to give the "national spirit" the fullest and clearest expression possible — in art, spirituality and, among other things, in a special form of statehood, which the Germans of the 18th century were deprived of, being divided into several disparate states, principalities and electorates. In doing so, Herder laid the theoretical foundation for what later became known as the "special path" (Sonderweg) and became the main line of development of German society in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Herder spoke specifically about the people as a special organic category, quite distant from the political aggregate of individuals united in a single state. For Herder, the Germans were a people, but not a nation, since there was no German state and they were scattered across several political entities of varying sizes. However, in the course of the development of the idea of Germany by Fichte and Hegel, and especially after its creation by Bismarck (1815–1898), Herder's national spirit, as the basis of identity, largely merged with the meaning of "nation," which in German culture took on a meaning significantly different from the classical use of this concept in England, France, and most other European countries.

Fichte: "the great I" of the German nation and " " a closed trading state

Fichte[1]is considered the founder of German classical philosophy. He was a student of Kant, but, departing from transcendental reason, he began to construct his own original philosophy, which is one of the pinnacles of German idealism.

Fichte, continuing Kant's epistemology, comes to the affirmation of the higher self, which lies at the basis of everything. If Kant spoke of pure reason, Fichte moves deeper into it and postulates the figure of the one to whom this reason belongs — the "great self." Further, the "great I" alienates itself, constituting an object. And again, Fichte goes further than Kant, not limiting himself to cautious noumenality in the spirit of constructivism with regard to things-in-themselves, but justifying the reality of the world by the reality of the "great I." Further — already within the object —

[1] *Fichte, I. G.* Works in 2 volumes. St. Petersburg: Mifril, 1993.

The "great I" constitutes the "little I," the empirical personality, which is the messenger of the "I" in the "not-I." The task of the "little I" is to restore the entire structure of the "great I" through complete knowledge of the object (through science, which Fichte understood as a mystical search for traces of the "great I" in nature).

Thus, he sharply broke with modern anthropology as a whole, creating a theory consonant with the Neoplatonist Plotinus or the Hindu doctrine of the "great identity" of the atman (the human self) with Brahman (the Absolute[1]. This anthropology partly resonated with Herder's idea of the "national spirit," and Fichte consciously applied his definition of subjectivity (i.e., the "I" as both great and small) to the German people. At the same time, although Germany did not yet exist, he used the concept of "nation" in a sense closer to Herder than to the classical bourgeois usage. However, following the generally accepted definition to some extent, Fichte proposed to construct this nation by giving the people the characteristics of a state, which he interpreted in the spirit of his conception of the philosophical process.

In his "Address to the German Nation" [2]Fichte outlined a plan for the unification of Germany (which at the beginning of the 19th century was divided into several semi-autonomous principalities and states) as a prerequisite for an ontological and epistemological leap forward, as a key stage in the victory over the non-Self, embodied in the natural and historical obstacles to the unification of the Germans. Fichte considered the Germans to be a people endowed with special abilities for science and culture, and therefore believed that the "German nation" was the most important stage in the return of the aggregate of "little selves" to their unified German "great self."

In economic practice, Fichte was an advocate of *a* completely *closed trading state*, justifying typical mercantilism not simply by the selfish interests of Leviathan, but by a critique of the individualistic principle as such (the "little self" that refuses to strive to become the "great self"). He also noted that free trade (the English version of economic liberalism) creates sharp property and social inequality in society, enriching those who participate in international trade and ruining entrepreneurs engaged only in domestic trade. Fichte contrasted this with a model of state socialism, where the priority of economic activity would be

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1 *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Great India. The Civilisation of the Absolute.
2 *Fichte, I. G.* Speeches to the German Nation. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2009.
3 *Fichte, I. G.* The Closed Commercial State. Moscow: KPASSAND, 2010.

not the satisfaction of individual private interests, but a common effort to overcome obstacles on the path to complete freedom of the "great I", that is, the domination of the subject over the object resisting it (including scarcity, deficit, poverty, etc.).

Hegel: philosophical Empire

Another representative of classical German philosophy who had the greatest influence on the entire philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries, both directly and through his interpreters (including Marx's left Hegelianism), was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Hegel believed that he was creating a synthesis of all philosophical thought, and that his system was the most universal of all existing or ever existing systems, combining all the most essential elements of previous systems. He linked this not simply to a coincidence of circumstances or personal genius, but to the deepest logic of world history, which, having passed through various dialectical stages strictly defined by a metaphysical structure, finds its resolution in German culture and the Prussian monarchy as the culmination (end of history), of which Hegel himself was the theorist, witness and creator. Therefore, in his philosophy, the universal, the universal and the absolute are dialectically embodied in the concreteness of 19th-century Germany. According to Hegel, this was precisely what his system and the philosophy of history itself were: all these were aspects of a single historical process, a metaphysical process connected with the stages *of the unfolding of the Spirit.* Hegel identified the time and place of the formation of his philosophical system — 19th-century Germany — with the finale of this historical process, its apogee. With certain corrections and nuances, this was recognised by all his followers.

Hegel's influence on philosophy, science, and political processes in the 19th and 20th centuries, both among Germans and far beyond Germany's borders, was enormous. One of the main political ideologies of the modern era, Marxism, was built on a special interpretation of his ideas. The chief theorist of Italian fascism, Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944)[1],also considered himself an orthodox Hegelian (right-wing, like Hegel himself), applying Hegel's ideas about Germany to Italy. In the context of liberal ideology, theorists of this school, such as Alexander

[1] *Gentile, D.* Selected Philosophical Works: In 7 vols. Krasnodar: KSU-KiI, 2008–2012.

Kozhev[1] and Francis Fukuyama[2] , who identified Hegel's concept of "end of history" with liberalism and its global victory (globalisation).

At the same time, Hegel's system can be seen as a synthesis of the unfolding of the entire German Logos, summarising the process of world history and that segment of it where Western Europe (since the Middle Ages) became the field of its most intense and semantically rich development. and from a certain point onwards, German thought itself, to which Hegel reduces the history of all humanity and whose ultimate expression became German classical philosophy, the pinnacle of which Hegel himself considered to be his system. The transparency and logic of this series of assertions in the very structure of Hegel's dialectic and his philosophy of history (as well as the history of philosophy) was so convincing that many philosophers, intellectuals and historians who felt the fundamental influence of Hegelianism — both directly, through direct acquaintance with Hegel's works, and indirectly, through numerous derivatives of his system, and primarily through left-wing Hegelianists, mainly Marxists. In Russia, Hegel influenced not only Marxists, for whom he became a dogmatic source, but also Slavophiles, monarchists and sophists, that is, practically all the currents of the distinctive Russian philosophical thought that emerged in the 19th century. Hegel also had a decisive influence on European philosophers of various schools, with the possible exception of the neo-Kantians.

Hegel was an ardent supporter of the creation of a united Germany (the Second Reich) and considered his philosophy to be the global metaphysical framework for this project. "*An* educated *people without metaphysics* is like a temple, richly decorated, but without a sanctuary,"[3] wrote Hegel in the Preface to The Science of Logic. Since in the 19th century, and especially during Hegel's lifetime, the question of creating a German state with its centre in Prussia was very acute, Hegel believed that his metaphysical system should become this "sanctuary," this "altar" in the German socio-political temple.

The foundations of Hegel's system are set out in two major works: The Phenomenology of Spirit [4], which carefully examines

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[1] *Kozhev, A. V.* Introduction to Reading Hegel.

[2] . *Fukuyama, F.* The End of History and the Last Man.

[3] *Hegel, G.W.F.* Science of Logic. Vol. 1. Moscow: Myśl, 1970. P. 76. Literally: "*ein gebildetes Volk ohne Metaphysik zu sehen*, — wie einen sonst mannigfaltig ausgeschm ckten Tempel ohne Allerheiligstes" (to see an educated people without metaphysics is like seeing a temple richly decorated but without a sanctuary).

[4] *Hegel, G.W.F.* Phenomenology of Spirit. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1992.

structure of consciousness, and The Science of Logic [1], which provides an explicit and detailed presentation of metaphysics. The Science of Logic begins where The Phenomenology of Spirit ends, and the rest of his works are derived from these two fundamental works for the entire history of philosophy.

As applied to the unfolding of history, Hegel's scheme can be briefly described as follows:

- subjective spirit (in itself) — thesis or first law of logic (identity);
- objective spirit (for another) — antithesis, the second law of logic (negation);
- absolute spirit (for itself) — synthesis, the third law of logic (the Absolute instead of the excluded third).

The first thesis is the subjective spirit (German: der subjektive Geist) or "Spirit in itself" coincides with the theological postulate of the existence of God: the subjective spirit is God-in-itself. This position is extremely important, as it brings Hegel closer to Platonism and Christian philosophy, that is, it establishes continuity with the philosophical paradigm of the Pre-Modern (Tradition) and, consequently, partly takes it beyond the boundaries of the classical models of the Modern era. Of course, the "subjective spirit" allowed for various interpretations, including rationalistic ones (in the spirit of Kant and his pure reason), but it follows from the general context of Hegel's philosophy that he means by it the transcendent principle, i.e., the God of Christian theology, although it has some features in common with Fichte's "great I," i.e., with the mystical understanding of God as a subject internal to the human soul.

In order to open itself up to the Other, this subjective self projects itself into the objective spirit (German: der objektive Geist), in which it becomes nature and even matter. That is, the subject projects itself into the object. This explains the visibility of nature's self-movement — it is an optical illusion that attributes to the object what is in fact a property of subjectivity, only turned into its opposite by the dialectical process of self-alienation. Since Marx does not believe in a subjective spirit (Marx is an atheist), nature and matter are the driving forces of development, which endows them with "magical" and "mystical" properties (the same applies to Spinoza's substantialism, which forced him to call "nature" "God"). Hegel does not have this need, but for this reason his philosophy begins

[1] *Hegel, G.W.F.* The Science of Logic: In 3 vols. Moscow: Myśl, 1970–1972.

begins with the open recognition of the Deity — the "subjective spirit." Thus, the meaningfulness of nature and its knowability are justified in a vertical topic reminiscent of Platonism and Neoplatonism, only described in a diachronic dynamic context (this was also a distinctive feature of Schelling's philosophy of history[1]).

The third moment of dialectics is the unfolding of the subjective spirit of its content through nature (as through its otherness). Gradually, through man and human history, the subjective spirit returns to its essence, but in a new capacity — as something conscious.

But this is already a new essence — it is not a subjective spirit ("spirit-in-itself") or "spirit-for-another," but *"spirit-in-itself*." Thus, the spirit returns to itself through its own alienation, but this return to itself, according to Hegel, has greater significance than the departure. The departure creates the preconditions for the return, and the return, having gone through the entire cycle, returns to itself the subjective spirit, which becomes *the absolute spirit (*German: der absolute Geist). Thus, first we have the subjective spirit, unknown to anyone, hidden, then the objective spirit, which is constituted as something else, that is, as not God Himself, by which we understand creation, and through creation and its crown — human consciousness — the fullness of perfection is achieved — the conscious absolute spirit.

According to Hegel, the absolute spirit unfolds through human history and ascends to the end of history. The meaning of history is the spirit's awareness of itself through matter. At first, the spirit has itself but is not aware of it, then it begins to become aware of itself but does not have itself. Nature itself carries within itself the prerequisites of history, because it is an element of history. Hence the history of religion, the history of societies, and as a result of the unfolding of the spirit through history, it reaches its culmination at the end of history, when it fully realises and possesses itself. The cycle contains within itself the entire dialectical fullness: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. From this it follows that history is finite.

This is the basis for Hegel's political philosophy. The evolution of political systems, models, and regimes is interpreted here as a sequence of dialectical moments in the formation of the absolute spirit. Politics is the crystallisation of synthesis. Political history *is the movement of the spirit* towards becoming absolute. Politics, therefore, is the history of the absolutisation of the spirit. This definition allows us to consider

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* In Search of the Dark Logos.

Hegel's political philosophy as a dynamic version of Politica Aeterna.

Hegel establishes a certain hierarchy between different political forms. On the one hand, one might get the impression that this is about historical progress, because each successive political regime is in some sense better than the previous one. This idea fundamentally contradicts the paradigm of Tradition, which speaks rather of the degradation of political systems that gradually lose their similarity to the eternal original (Platonism), or of the immutability of the norm, from which individual forms of politics can either deviate or approach (Aristotelian politics). In the recognition of "progress," one can see Hegel's connection with the paradigm of Modernity. However, unlike Marx's theory, this political evolution is not a social continuation of the development of matter or nature. These are phases of the manifestation of the spirit that was *originally* inherent in matter and nature. Accordingly, there is no materialism here. We are dealing with a complex scheme that combines the Platonic (in the beginning there was spirit, not matter) and evolutionary models (when we begin to look at history from the antithesis, from nature — and this formally resembles the political philosophy of the Mother). Marx rejected the Platonic part, reinterpreting Hegel in an exclusively materialistic key. But Hegel himself is more complicated.

The culmination of the third phase — the establishment of the spirit as absolute, i.e., conscious, spirit-for-itself — is conceived by Hegel as the end of history and coincides with the fate of Prussia and the creation of a great state of all Germans — Germany — on its basis. During Hegel's lifetime, the Germans did not yet have a unified state. But they already had a great philosophy, the crowning achievement of which Hegel considered to be his own teaching. Thus, thinkers prepared the end of history, which for Hegel coincided with the future enlightened German monarchy. In this way, all of history is a prelude to the formation of Germany in the 19th century. Hegel said that great nations are those that have either a great state or a great philosophy. He said that the Russians have a great state, while the Germans in the 19th century have no state at all. Accordingly, the Germans must have a great philosophy — then they will have a great state.

Hegel created the philosophy of the great German state before Germany even existed. He formulated his teachings in the German world, which consisted of Prussia, Habsburg Austria, and scattered principalities that were anything but a powerful and strong state. Hegel united Germany in his consciousness

, endowed it with an intellectual mission, and, together with Fichte and Schelling, created an idealistic romantic concept of German statehood as an expression of the spirit that had become absolute. According to Hegel, the German state was to become the peak and end of history — an eschatological monarchy, where the monarch himself was to be supported by a philosophical elite, Platonic guardians who developed the teachings of Hegel himself, the founder of the philosophical empire.

Hegel considered himself a prophet of philosophy, humanity, and Germany. He was a mystical monarchist who viewed the logic of history as a diverse movement of various political forms towards the Prussian monarchy.

This is how Hegel interprets the history of religion, philosophy and politics. The spirit passes into nature, from where it is restored through society and culture until it reaches the culmination of self-awareness in the highest political system of *philosophical monarchy,* the prototype of which, for Hegel, was 19th-century Prussia and which should be embodied in a future united Greater Germany. This scenario predetermines the entire structure of German history and shows Hegel's interpretation of world, European and German history. Different peoples and civilisations create different religious and philosophical systems in an attempt to reflect their attraction to the elusive spirit. History is the history of cycles of consciousness unfolding on the path to the Logos.

The emergence of Greek philosophy marks the birth of Logos in its purest form, when the spirit begins to realise itself through the Greek Daseyn, which is most adequate to itself. The Logos of the Greeks is the harmonisation (Stimmung) of the spirit. The most important event in world history takes place in the field of Greco-Roman culture — the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the Logos itself. This is the culmination of the revelation of being through time. The Greek Logos and the Incarnate Word then live on in Christianity, which in turn goes through various stages of self-understanding that stretch over centuries. Through a chain of dialectical oppositions and their resolution, history reaches the Age of Enlightenment, where the Christian Logos is dispersed among the maximum possible number of individual beings, reaching the mineral bottom of nature — comprehended by science, transformed by culture, and understood by citizens enlightened and transformed by the education of societies.

The final gesture of history is the gathering of all enlightened individuals of the world together, in a synthesis of *a* vertical *philosophical Empire*, where the spirit will complete its movement towards itself through self-

alienation, and history will reach its culmination, *transforming itself into philosophy*, but not abstract philosophy, rather concrete philosophy. This concrete philosophy will be the direct embodiment of the absolute spirit, in which the return of the Logos to itself will be fully realised, inclusively gathering within itself everything that was scattered at the beginning of not just the historical, but also the cosmological and even ontogenetic process.

According to Hegel, the centre of history as the history of eternity is Germany, the "promised land" of the absolute spirit, the territory of the "end of history," the field destined to become the philosophical Empire.
"end of history," a field prepared to become a philosophical empire.

It is obvious that Hegel's grandiose picture, justifying the creation of the German state, has little in common with Hobbes' Leviathan. At the same time, Hegel also considers civil society, i.e. the bourgeois order based on individualism, but considers it one of the dialectical moments in the unfolding of the spirit. Civil society and the Enlightenment era itself are important to Hegel as preparation for the establishment of a philosophical empire, which is conceived not as a nation state in the modern paradigm, but as a mystical "end of history," as its most important concluding event. Obviously, such "nationalism" has nothing to do with classical nationalism, which emerged at the dawn of the Enlightenment, and represents a theory that goes far beyond Modernity as such. However, alongside the communist (in Marx, where the "end of history" comes in the form of communism) and liberal (as in Kojève, where the "end of history" coincides with globalisation and the final triumph of liberal democracy), it would also be possible to offer a monarchist or "nationalist" interpretation of Hegel, as we see among German and Russian conservatives and one of the main theorists of Italian fascism, Giovanni Gentile.

We find Hegelianism in all three classical ideologies of modernity; but this does not mean that it can be classified from the point of view of any one of them. Hegel is broader than all political theories of modernity, and therefore he clearly does not fit into any of them. Accordingly, there is something in it that was borrowed by the three political ideologies of modernity, and something that did not make it there — for example, the idea of an original subjective spirit that precedes all movement from below, which is incompatible with the materialism, individualism, and atomism of the modern era. This element of the original Platonic moment, which then passes into a picture that in a certain sense can be combined (with some stretching) with progressive

and evolutionary motives, does not allow Hegel to be classified as a political philosopher of the Modern era.

A particular interpretation of Hegel — neither liberal, Marxist, nor nationalist — allows us to discover components in his work that are alternative to modern political philosophy and to integrate him into the Fourth Political Theory. Thus, with a certain interpretation based on the principles of Politica Aeterna, we can take Hegel out of the Modern era and the specific period in which he lived and thought, and place him in a different, more general and, in a certain sense, trans-contemporary, non-modernist context. Such a reading of Hegel, such a reconstruction of his political philosophy contrary to readings in the context of the three political theories, must begin with a thorough understanding of the first dialectical moment — the transition of the divine eternal principle into a multitude of immanent givenness. How we understand this process in the context of metaphysics determines the interpretation of the ontology of the world, its eschatological conclusion, and its teleology (purpose), and the meaning and content of politics, which ultimately (as we see in Hegel himself) must be determined above all by the relationship of the state with God, eternity, and the absolute and unchanging source.

Gentile: the state as a 's philosophy

Thus, through Hegel, we come close to revolutionary nationalism, which should be considered the third political theory in the full sense of the word, since such nationalism arose after liberalism (the first political theory) and after communism (the second political theory), while retaining some similarities — at least terminological and partly conceptual — with the classical nationalism that emerged at the dawn of the modern era, even before the emergence of distinct liberal theories, but only developed into a coherent ideology much later.

One of the main ideologists of Italian fascism, Giovanni Gentile, was a staunch Hegelian and supporter of objective idealism, strongly opposing positivism and materialism. Gentile, following Hegel, believed that a great people needed a great philosophy, and saw a direct and inseparable link between the construction of Italy as a nation state and the intellectual shaping of Italian identity in philosophy and culture.

Gentile constructed an original philosophy, which he called "actualism." He based it on the concept of "thinking thought" (il pensiero pensante, il pensiero che pensa). Gentile thought of the act as overcoming the subject-object dualism. For Gentile, as for Hegel, the pure act is the moment of cognition by the spirit, that is, the source of thought, of itself. Gentile distinguishes between thinking thought and thought thought; each has its own logic. Thinking thought is a pure act, while thought thought, on the contrary, is frozen and alienated, objectified, a product of thinking. In Gentile's version, Hegel's dialectical triad corresponds to:

- art (direct manifestation of the subject — thesis),
- religion (elevating thought to the status of an object — antithesis),
- philosophy (the subject's understanding of itself as a pure act — synthesis).

According to Gentile, thought is simply subjective and manifests itself in art. At the next level — in religion — thought becomes conceptualised. And only in philosophy does thought become *thinking*, that is, fully active, coinciding with pure act as the highest moment of self-consciousness. This is the basis of Gentile's understanding of history: it is the unfolding of three moments of the spirit, with religion being the second of these in this system, that is, a form of the spirit, partly overcome by philosophy. Being a Catholic and recognising the value of religious education, Gentile believed that the state should be secular. But secularism, in his understanding, was synonymous with the third and highest act of self-awareness by the spirit of itself, that is, the organisation of society on the basis of the domination of the "pure act." From this directly followed Gentile's political philosophy, which he identified with political fascism.

Fascism, in Gentile's interpretation, is the theory and practice of a pure spiritual act, expressed in the elevation of the state to a philosophical principle. This is the "doctrine of fascism," which represents the logical conclusion of Hegel's philosophy. The self-awareness of the spirit is embodied in the state as an instance where the spirit reaches the stage of synthesis, overcoming both the subjective stage (art) and the stage of objectification (which for Gentile is equivalent to religion). This justifies the absolutisation of the state as an immanent version of an idea that has become flesh.

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[1] It is believed that Gentile was the author of the programmatic work "The Doctrine of Fascism," published under Mussolini's name. *Mussolini B.* La dottrina del fascismo. Florence: Vallecchi Editore, 1935.

At the same time, Gentile and fascism as a whole were characterised by a rejection of all forms of internationalism, both bourgeois and Marxist. The argument for this was the dialectic of the reversal of the spirit, where the individualism of civil society would be overcome not by a philosophically enlightened monarchy (as in Hegel himself), but by a national dictatorship. At the same time, the very idea of social justice played an important role in the context of fascist ideology. C o m m u n ism rejected materialism and internationalism, while concern for the working class and peasantry was an essential part of the fascist political programme. In one of his speeches, Mussolini, the leader of Italian fascism, addressed his audience: "Arise, fascist and proletarian Italy!" [1] Moreover, Mussolini himself came from the socialist movement, and fascism — especially in its early stages — was an anti-bourgeois and revolutionary movement in which socialist motives played an important role. Thus, in Italian fascism, we see a certain convergence between two versions of Hegelianism — socialist and nationalist.

In Gentile and in fascism in general, we see a combination of Hegelian dialectics, idealism, and the political philosophy of the Modern, since Gentile does not return to the traditional Catholic philosophy of the "two states" or to the imperial idea of the Ghibellines (which was defended much more consistently by the traditionalist Julius Evola([2)]), but justifies with his philosophy a secular state, albeit described, following Hegel, in the spirit of the unfolding of the Idea, but too reminiscent of the theories of Bodin and Hobbes. Thus, Gentile's fascism is a bizarre combination of pre-modern and modern elements, but at the same time, appeals to Hegel with his extremely sophisticated intellectual theory do not allow Gentile's theory to be classified entirely as belonging to the Modern era. Thus, this version of revolutionary

's political philosophy

The formation of revolutionary nationalism and, in particular, the personal influence of the fascist leader Benito Mussolini

[1]Such formulas were sharply criticised by Julius Evola, a traditionalist who supported an aristocratic and, consequently, anti-communist and anti-modern political system. *Evola, Julius.* Fascism: A Critique from the Right. Moscow: Revanche, 2005.

[2] *Evola, Julius.* The Mysteries of the Grail. Moscow-Voronezh: TERRA FOLIATA, 2013.

The philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), a completely atypical thinker, had a profound influence on this. If the English mathematician and philosopher A. Whitehead (1861–1947) said that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato, then, paraphrasing him, one could say that all philosophy of the 20th century is a footnote to Nietzsche. Nietzsche is multidimensional and multifaceted, and any of his theses are the subject of long and heated debates, which is why his philosophy cannot be interpreted unambiguously. Nietzsche's philosophy is extremely multidimensional, although fragmentary and unsystematic. Representatives of all the major political ideologies of the 20th century — liberalism, communism and nationalism — were influenced by Nietzsche's thought at various times, interpreting it in each case on the basis of completely different contexts.
text.

It is impossible to consider Nietzsche a "nationalist" in the usual sense of the word. He was extremely critical of modernity as such, sharply rejected the state, and was very sceptical of the Germans. In his drafts, he writes:

> Having thus given the Germans their due — for I do love them despite everything — I see no reason to refrain from reproaching them. They were once a "nation of thinkers": but do they think at all today? They no longer have time for it... The German "mind", I fear, is a contradictio in adjecto. They are becoming boring, and probably already are; big politics is consuming all interest in truly great things; "Germany, Germany above all" — this principle comes at an exorbitant price, but it is not a philosophical principle([1]).

But he remains a German thinker precisely because he provides the last historical testimony to the state of the German spirit, and if this spirit is sick, then Nietzsche, without hesitation, makes this illness his own — in order to go through it to the end, as fate and destiny.

Nietzsche captures the essence of the era in which he lives with a precise formula: "European nihilism," as he calls the first book of his project "The Will to Power." In fact, by "nihilism" Nietzsche means European Modernism, which he rejects but at the same time tries to understand its meaning and decipher its message.

For Nietzsche, the highest value is *life and its power*. Accordingly, where life is subjected to some kind of pressure,

[1] *Nietzsche, F.* Complete Works. Vol. 13. Drafts and Sketches 1887–1889. Moscow: Cultural Revolution, 2006. pp. 489–490.

restraint, subjugation, limitation; this is where the roots of nihilism should be sought. In other words, the source of nihilism is Logos itself — at least, Logos *as directed against life*. Nietzsche's main task was to establish a new understanding of thinking, which should not be separate from life, but within it. This is why Nietzsche's teachings are sometimes called the "philosophy of life." The main idea is that life is a synthetic phenomenon that cannot be broken down into immobility and movement, subject and object, consciousness and the external world, i.e., into the classical topics of modern philosophy. For Nietzsche, everything is in motion, both subject and object; they are not fixed, but merged, although simultaneously separated, in an original unity. Returning to unity beyond the pairs of opposites (subject-object, top-bottom, good-evil) and overcoming these pairs is, for Nietzsche, an alternative way of thinking. To think is not to think life from somewhere from outside, but from within life.

Philosophers usually think of life and nature as objects, as if they themselves were dead or not yet born. Nietzsche teaches that new people must think within life, although this is extremely difficult, since life is a flow. A stream does not allow us to single out anything unambiguous and strictly fixed once and for all — today it is one thing, tomorrow another. But according to Nietzsche, we must not stop the stream; on the contrary, we must immerse our consciousness and thinking in it. According to Nietzsche, becoming is what should be taken as the beginning and end of philosophy. But at the same time, the pure element of becoming eludes thought and being, representing pure contingency (in the spirit of Democritus' isonomy). Nietzsche disagrees with this and calls for finding moments of eternity, crystals of being, in the flow of becoming, for imprinting the stamp of being on the flow of becoming.

Hence the idea of the "eternal return," since the flow of life has a certain meaning that can only be revealed in a huge cycle. The huge cycle, the contemplation of the birth of things at the origins of eternity and their baptism in the waters of eternity, is the task of philosophy.

Life is opposed by nihilism. At first as alienated rationalism, and then as the complete degeneration of thought. In his era, Nietzsche identified nihilism as an open phenomenon, as the essence of history that had become explicit. This is precisely why he has a dual attitude towards nihilism: it is not simply a failure or pathology, an accident or a particularity — it is *destiny*, the tragic destiny of the spirit (consciousness, thought), waging an irreconcilable war with life throughout the centuries.

The problem of nihilism as the tragic discovery of the nothingness of modernity and the horizons for overcoming it is *the theme* of all of Nietzsche's work.

. It unfolds in stages, since life and becoming, unlike for Hegel, are not taken as concepts, but retain the fundamental metaphysical significance that Hegel attributes to becoming (movement) due to the dialectical nature of his apophatic philosophy. If *Hegel is a prophet of history, then Nietzsche is a prophet of life.* Nietzsche sets himself the task of putting the stamp of eternity on becoming.

> *To communicate* the nature of being to becoming is the highest *will to power*[1].

He does not simply state the strength and power of nature, as a materialist, naturalist or pantheist in the spirit of Spinoza would do. He wants to extract from life its secret essence, its "signs of being," that is, to look into the ultimate depths of life, precisely where the source of its tragic and inexorable power lies. Becoming is chaos for Nietzsche. But "imprinting the character of existence" on it, "stamping" (aufzuprägen) it on it, should not be done by someone else — not by a spirit, a subject or a mind, but by *the inner power of life itself,* reaching its culmination. Hence the Nietzschean formula from Thus Spoke Zarathustra:

> I tell you: one must have chaos within oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star[2].

Nietzsche noted the failure of humanity, its historical exhaustion, its futility, which became particularly explicit in humanism, when man showed what he was capable of when freed from the "yoke" — it turned out that he was capable only of baseness. From then on, the Superhuman was to take his place. In the "Prelude" to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche says about this: "Man is a transition and a descent (destruction)."

> What is great about a person is that they are a bridge, not a destination: what can be loved in a person is that they are *a transition* and a descent (a fall, a death)[3].

He perishes to make room for *those who come after him*. Since he is not an end, but a means, a path, an arrow of longing, thrown

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[1] *Nietzsche, F.* The Will to Power // Nietzsche, F. Collected Works: In 5 vols. Vol. 4. St. Petersburg: Azbuka, 2011. P. 307.

[2] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Moscow: IF RAN, 2004. P. 13.

[3] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra. P. 11.

to the other side, the moment of becoming, not substance. Man is the destruction of himself *as man* and the transition to what follows him in the logical structure of history — to the Superhuman.

Nietzsche defines the superhuman as "the conqueror of God and nothingness" ("dieser Besieger Gottes und des Nichts") [1]. This is a crucial definition. God is dead, and with him, order and the world have collapsed. Nothing remains but chaos and the last men. Nietzsche speaks of "the last men":

> What is love? What is creation? Aspiration? What is a star? — asks the last man and blinks.
>
> The earth has become small, and the last man jumps about on it, making everything small. His race is as indestructible as the flea; the last man lives longer than all others.
>
> "We have found happiness," say the last men, and they blink. They have left the countries where it was cold to live, for they need
>
> need warmth[2] ..

This is the last thing left to people: to narrow their horizons to the space immediately surrounding their bodies. The "last man" does not know *love* because he does not experience acute division, does not feel fragmented. This means that he shies away from the challenge of difference. It is enough for him to seem whole to himself — and in doing so, he disintegrates further and further, becoming a divident rather than an individual, especially when he believes that his individuality is guaranteed and securely protected. He does not know *creation*, since he does not know the Creator who created him, but he is also incapable of creating himself: his inner emptiness is powerless.

The "last men" are the people of the Modern Age. Nietzsche deeply despises them. But he believes that in order to overcome the nihilism of the Modern Age, we must not take a step backward, but a step forward — toward the Übermensch. Nietzsche lays the foundations for a new anthropology, where becoming is thus placed in human nature, *making man a variable quantity*. As a moment of becoming, man moves along a vertical axis: *from what is always lower to what is always higher*. This determines his dialectic, his openness, his

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[1] *Nietzsche, F.* Works in Two Volumes. Vol. 2. Moscow: Myśl, 1990. P. 471. The full quote reads as follows: This man of the future, who will free us from the old ideal and from what *was supposed to grow out of it* — from the greatest repulsion, from the will to nothingness, from nihilism, this stroke of the midday bell and the great decision that will once again liberate the will, that will restore to the earth its purpose and to man his hope, this anti-Christian and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and of nothingness — *he must come one day...".*

[2] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Moscow: IF RAN, 2004. P. 14.

Bottomlessness. Man creates himself anew each time, drawing new and new essences from his inner abyss in order to overcome them again, to surpass them, to become the point of destruction and transition, Untergang und Übergang, for a new moment. This applies to historical man and to each individual. Moreover, the subject is always both historical and personal, since human life itself is *a time of transition,* an impulse, a leap, that is, will (Wille). The will to power is the axis of dynamic transformational anthropology. The will to power is the desire to subordinate the past to the future, the subhuman to the superhuman, the present (and past) self to the future self. It is the subordination of the frozen moment of an arrow's flight *to* the *entire* flight.

For Nietzsche, the "death of God" is not a catastrophe; *the catastrophe is people's unwillingness to face the abyss head-on,* to accept the challenge of the desert, to recognise chaos as the only power that assails man from all sides and leaves him alone with himself, without the support or order that has collapsed. The only answer to the challenge of nothingness that opened up after the death of God is the Übermensch. Man cannot withstand the encounter with nothingness: the "last man" is simply naive in hoping to escape the acuteness of the problem.

Nietzsche's philosophy is deeply revolutionary. He calls for a re-evaluation of all values. But this re-evaluation can be interpreted in the context of all three political theories. As a rule, Nietzsche is considered one of the philosophers who inspired Italian fascism and German National Socialism.

Indeed, revolutionary nationalists perceived Nietzsche as a critic of bourgeois values and a champion of the heroic individual, with German National Socialists interpreting Nietzsche's image of the "blond beast" as a direct reference to the "Aryan race."
the "Aryan race."

Mussolini, for his part, liked to repeat Nietzsche's idea that one must live dangerously.

Nietzsche extolled the will, courage, and elemental force of "war." He was not afraid to directly reject and ridicule progress, equality, and morality. Some of his statements were openly misogynistic and harshly patriarchal (for example, his famous remark, "Are you going to the women? Don't forget your whip!"([1)]). Nietzsche extolled inequality, believing that only the brave and intelligent, the strong-willed and courageous have the right to exist. Scandalous for Christians and even

[1] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra. P. 64.

secular-humanistic morality were such statements by Nietzsche as "What falls must be pushed further!"[1]

A number of Nietzsche's statements could be interpreted in a chauvinistic manner. For example, he said that some peoples would be better off never having been born. But he used these shocking phrases in a paradoxical sense, calling on everyone to measure life by its own standards. In his view, a people that is alive, that is imbued with the spirit of life, that courageously and boldly embarks on the path of development, is a worthy people.

Incidentally, Nietzsche was very fond of Russians. He believed that the more vicious a people was, the better, as this indicated greater vitality. He considered Russians to be particularly vicious. He even had an aphorism: "Vicious people have no songs. Why, then, do Russians have songs?"([2])He even suggested giving Europe to the Russians so that they could bring their vitality there, and the pampered European culture would develop peacefully under the rule of a Russian monarch, as Greece once did under Rome. The third political theory, and especially some of its versions — primarily the racism of the National Socialists — was inspired by Nietzsche's philosophy of inequality. Thus, Nietzsche spoke of a "slave race" and a "master race," but he did not associate this with biological race. He spoke of those peoples who, full of life and the will to power, move through history, the triumphant historical race of masters.

and those that proved to be permanently conquered.

In his work The Genealogy [of Morals,]Nietzsche introduced the concept of ressentiment (French for "resentment") into philosophical language. The philosopher and sociologist Max Scheler (1874–1928) has a separate book· Resentment in the Structure of Morals·which is entirely devoted to the disclosure of this important concept. "Resentiment" is the psychological state of a slave, but not a social slave, rather a typological one.

"ontological." It is simultaneously envy, irritation, hatred, recognition of one's own inferiority complex, and a desire to take revenge on all those who are above, who feel confident and calm, who are distinguished by that inner greatness and dignity that are fundamentally inaccessible to the bearer of "resentment," that is, "slaves by vocation" rather than by position, are fundamentally inaccessible. There are people who know for certain that they are finished

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[1] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra. P. 205.

[2] *Nietzsche, F.* Twilight of the Idols, or How Philosophers Philosophise with a Hammer // Nietzsche, F. Collected Works: In 5 vols. Vol. 5. St. Petersburg: Azbuka, 2011. P. 154.

[3] *Nietzsche, F.* The Genealogy of Morals // Nietzsche, F. Collected Works: In 5 Volumes. Vol. 5.

[4] Fr. ressentiment — resentment, vindictiveness, vindictiveness.

[5] *Scheler, M.* Resentiment in the Structure of Morals. St. Petersburg: Nauka: University Book, 1999.

worthless creatures — bastards, cowards, scoundrels and scum. But, clearly aware of this, they blame the strong, honest, brave, handsome and manly for it. And the more acute the feeling of their own inferiority, the greater their hatred for everything that is complete.

According to Nietzsche, this is a fundamental characteristic that divides people into two categories: the master race unites those who are free from sentimentality and who therefore freely extrapolate the excess of life from themselves, projecting it onto everything around them, and there is the slave race — people who are completely deprived of this fullness of life, who always lack something and who therefore always hate everyone else. Nietzsche unhesitatingly projected these generalisations onto certain peoples who live in hatred and envy because, for example, they were once conquered by stronger peoples and have since been unable to free themselves from this influence. But instead of gathering their strength and rising up (although Nietzsche said that "rebellion is the virtue of slaves"), they continue to fool around in their imaginary servility, and sometimes bite, squeal and insult their masters when they are not listening. Unable to rule themselves or others, they constantly experience foreign domination as humiliation. These are not separate peoples — they are a race of slaves, a kind of society, types of people who are endowed with such qualities. But Nietzsche illustrates this anthropological observation with various examples from the history of peoples and religions, which was used by nationalism in a context far removed from what Nietzsche had in mind.

Although it is generally accepted that Nietzsche was primarily a herald of the third political theory, there are interpretations of his ideas in the context of liberalism and communism.

Some liberals view Nietzschean philosophy as an apology for the individual. In this context, Nietzsche's calls for a re-evaluation of all values and his teaching on perspectivism are interpreted as the ultimate form of apologetics for subjectivity. His criticism of the state, his hostility towards socialism, and his image of the Übermensch are interpreted by liberals as a model of extreme freedom applied to the market and capitalism. Nietzsche's glorification of inequality becomes, for liberals, a defence of income and property inequality (contrary to socialists and communists).. One version of this liberal interpretation of Nietzsche is offered by Ayn Rand [1] (1905–1982). Rand takes the principle of liberal individualism and free enterprise to its logical conclusion, extolling the rich as a "master race" and the poor as

[1] *Rand, A.* The Fountainhead. New York: The Fountainhead, 1951.

as well as workers as a "slave race." At the same time, Ayn Rand believes that society and the state exist to restrain and oppress the rich, who must declare war on them and fight it to the bitter end. This philosophy is called "objectivism." Many leading figures in the US Federal Reserve System, including Alan Greenspan, are supporters of liberal Nietzscheanism and followers of Ayn Rand's objectivism.

There is also a "leftist" — communist — interpretation of Nietzsche. One of the first communist Nietzscheans was the Russian proletarian writer and friend of Lenin, Maxim Gorky (1868–1936), who applied Nietzsche's idea of the Übermensch to a romanticised image of the proletariat. A more systematic interpretation than Maxim Gorky's was offered in the 1930s by the French communist philosopher Georges Bataille [1](1897–1962). He developed Nietzsche's theme of overcoming good and evil through radical personal and social revolutionary experience. Following Nietzsche, Bataille asserts that the elemental force of life precedes philosophy, rather than following it. Life is primary in relation to philosophy; it is always paradoxical, never strictly right, good or evil — it has no concept of fixed dualities. From this, Bataille takes Nietzsche's invitation to overcome prohibitions as a social programme. The overcoming of all prohibitions, including sexual ones (which is why some of Bataille's works are, in fact, pornographic[2]). The left-wing version of Nietzscheanism was actively developed by French postmodernists such as Michel Foucault (1926–1984), Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), and others.

Thus, we can justify or criticise the "fascist" Hegel and the "fascist" Nietzsche, the "liberal" Hegel and the "liberal" Nietzsche, as well as the "Marxist" Hegel and the "leftist" Nietzsche. But all these adaptations of Hegel and Nietzsche to the political ideologies of Modernity do not exhaust their political philosophy. And what remains behind the scenes cannot be uncovered and understood by the tools of Modern political philosophy.

Pareto: being the elite is the true meaning of politics

Italian fascism was influenced to some extent by the theories of the great sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), who developed

[1] *Bataille, G.* The Sum of Atheology: Philosophy and Mysticism. Moscow: Ladomir, 2016.

[2] *Bataille, G.* Hatred of Poetry: Pornolatrous Prose. Moscow: Ladomir, 1999.

[3] *Pareto, V.* Compendium of General Sociology. Moscow: Publishing House of the Higher School of Economics, 2008.

partly the philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli. Pareto did not recognise the autonomous significance of political ideologies, believing that they were used by people to cover up more prosaic realities — the fierce struggle for power. In this, Pareto is close to Hobbes with his anthropological pessimism, and partly to Nietzsche, who developed the doctrine of the "will to power" as the main expression of life in the political and social sphere(1).

Pareto argues that society must be perceived as an unconditional given; we do not know where it came from or how it is structured, but we can observe that it has certain iron laws. The main law is the existence of a political elite.

Pareto notes that in any politically and socially organised society, there is always a necessity for elites and masses.

The elite is a certain type of people who *are able* and *willing* to rule; this means that they take upon themselves the element of violence, are ready to exercise it over others and do not allow it to be exercised over themselves. The elite are people who enjoy the very nature of power, take pleasure in ruling others and suffer greatly when they are forced to submit themselves. Pareto believes that this is characteristic of only a small part of society.

The majority of society always represents a mass that cannot and, deep down, does not want to rule, commit violence against others, command, order, or control the fate and lives of others. The masses are indecisive, prefer comfort and security to risky adventures, lead orderly lives and are ready to submit to authority without thinking about the basis on which that authority is built.

According to Pareto, this has always been the case and always will be. Neither the elite nor the masses change. All people belong to one category or another. Either you are a member of the elite or you are a member of the masses. The minority elite always wants to rule and never wants to submit. Pareto does not distinguish between whether people become elite or are born elite — he simply notes a state of affairs that is easily observed in various types of societies, whether archaic or modern, traditional or democratic. Unlike liberal theorists such as Spencer, Pareto does not say that this is an innate struggle for power. He simply notes the existence of these types without explaining them.

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1 *Nietzsche, F.* The Will to Power.

Pareto was a staunch materialist and supporter of evolutionary theory. From his point of view, the political system of society is a projection of the human organism. Lower instincts form "remnants," residui, which affect the unconscious and everyday behaviour of people. Pareto includes religion, magic, superstitions, etc. in this sphere. The verticality of the social and political hierarchy reflects the upright posture of humans, and this vertical power structure is a functional analogue of the spine. The rationality of humans as a species is reflected in the rationality of social systems, and the model of equilibrium is a projection of the activity of the brain.

The elite and the masses are sociological types; therefore, they are not simply hostages to their position in society but, on the contrary, their social typology predetermines this position. *The elite strive to rise to the top, while the masses settle at the bottom.* If a member of the masses is placed at the top of society, they will be unable to hold on to power and will fall back to their "natural place." The same is true of representatives of the elite: wherever they are, they will naturally strive to rise to the top. This leads Pareto to identify another group — *the counter-elite,* which includes elite types who, for one reason or another, do not have access to real power. The counter-elite is a reservoir for replenishing the ruling elite, which, having been in power for too long, tends to decay and degenerate. Pareto formulated the law
"elite rotation," according to which

- the first generation of the elite is heroic and active,
- the second is protective,
- and the third, as a rule, loses the characteristics necessary for rule and gives way to new elites, which are created on the basis of the counter-elite, from among its members.

Pareto identifies another type — *the anti-elite*. He includes in this category those who are fundamentally incapable of power, i.e., who under no circumstances can become the elite and perform its functions, but who are nevertheless distinct from the masses because they are endowed with creative activity and, at the same time, rebelliousness and freedom-loving spirit. Pareto includes representatives of the bohemian, creative intelligentsia, sectarians, and criminal circles in the anti-elite. The counter-elite, as long as it is excluded from power, is often mixed with the anti-elite, and they often participate together in opposition to the ruling elites. But if the counter-elite and anti-elite succeed in overthrowing the existing — usually decrepit — elites, their paths diverge: the counter-elite becomes a full-fledged

elite, while the anti-elite returns to the social periphery, being fundamentally incapable of exercising power.

Thus, the entire typology of society is as follows:

- the elite, who are in power
- the masses, who are always at the bottom and are incapable (unable or unwilling) to rule, but are always ready to obey and follow the rules established by those in power.
- the counter-elite, an elitist type that for some reason has been excluded from power but is stubbornly striving to get there
- the anti-elite, chaotic elements and antisocial types who are incapable of either ruling or obeying.

According to Pareto, the rotation of elites, i.e., the replacement of decrepit elites by a counter-elite, can occur in several ways: it can be a peaceful and gradual process (which is characteristic of democracy) or violent and bloody (in the case of revolutions, dynastic and palace coups, etc.). However, the meaning is the same in both cases: democracy is a method of smooth rotation of elites, and not the distribution of power among all members of civil society, as liberal theory falsely claims.

Pareto's political ideas are sharply opposed to both liberalism (the first political theory) and communism (the second political theory), as he denies the significance of ideology or the reality of democracy, believing that both are merely a cover for the rotation of elites and a means for counter-elites to overthrow or gradually replace the old elites. In doing so, Pareto paved the way for a third political theory, which would triumph in Italy in the 1920s. It is telling that Benito Mussolini considered himself a follower of Pareto and offered him a seat in the Senate for the Fascist Party in 1923.

Pareto's theories, while neither socialist nor liberal, nevertheless remain within the framework of political modernity. He himself was a materialist, atheist and agnostic, and his understanding of the nature of power and the state corresponded to the ideas of Bodin and Hobbes, while he openly acknowledged Machiavelli as his direct predecessor.

Unlike Gentile's Hegelianism or Nietzsche's philosophy of life, Pareto's version of political philosophy remains entirely within the context of the political paradigm of the Modern Age, continuing the line of classical nationalism that emerged at the dawn of the Modern Age.

Pareto's ideas were taken up by other representatives of the neo-Machiavellian school. For example, Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941)[1] , built on Pareto's theory of elites to develop a theory of the "ruling class," identifying the ability to manage and organise as the main trait that defines a special social type that always ends up at the top of society and establishes dominance over the "majority." Another student of Pareto, Robert Michels (1876–1936)[2] formulated the same idea, introducing the concept of the "iron law of oligarchy," i.e., a sociological law according to which the management of society is always necessarily concentrated in the hands of a minority — a few dominant figures.

All representatives of the school of neo-Machiavellianism denied the independent significance of political ideologies, as well as religious views in their influence on politics, justifying the realm of politics as an independent and autonomous sphere, governed only by its own laws and rules.

C. Schmitt: friend/enemy and the structure of the pluriversum

The most prominent theorist of the third political theory was German philosopher and jurist Carl Schmitt, a classic of modern political science. Before the National Socialists came to power, Carl Schmitt was a staunch opponent of liberal democracy, but after 1933 he joined the regime established by Hitler. At the same time, he belonged to the Conservative Revolution movement, which was much broader than the ideology of National Socialism, but had a number of intersections with it. Both Carl Schmitt and most conservative revolutionaries rejected racism and advocated not so much for the nation as for the peoples (in Herder's understanding). Schmitt himself was a theorist of a special concept of "people's rights" (German: Volksrechte), which he opposed both to the liberal theory of "human rights" and to the class approach of the communists, but which at the same time differed significantly from statism, racism, and classical nationalism, with which, however, Schmitt has some points in common (this concerns his realism in international relations and his positive interpretation of Hobbes([3])).

The most important concept introduced by Schmitt was *the concept of the Political*[4] , which we have already discussed. The Political (das

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1 *Mosca G.* History of Political Doctrines. Bari: Laterza, 1937.

2 *Michels R.* Sociology as a Social Science. Berlin: Mauritius, 1926.

3 *Schmitt, C.* Leviathan in Thomas Hobbes's Theory of the State.

4 *Schmitt C.* The Concept of the Political. Berlin: Duncker und Humbolt, 1932.

Politische) is distinct from politics as the sphere of concrete steps and actions, and is the ontological and metaphysical foundation of politics. In a sense, the Political as the essence of politics stands *above* politics and belongs to the realm of meta-politics, that is, to the realm of Politica Aeterna. Defining the Political in his programmatic work The Concept of the Political, Schmitt writes:

> The specifically political division on which political actions and motivations are based is the division into *friend* and *enemy* [1].

The amicus/hostis (friend/enemy) pair is constitutive specifically for the Political domain, as it is based not on religious views or innate attitudes, but *on a rational assessment of the situation and a volitional decision.* Friend/enemy are determined by the situation, which distinguishes this pair from other dichotomies — religious (god/devil), moral (good/evil), species (human/animal), gender (male/female), etc. At the same time, the specificity of the figures of the enemy and the friend lies in the fact that they can theoretically change places: the enemy and the friend are defined in specific circumstances, and this definition itself is a constitutive factor of the Political. Who is a friend and who is an enemy is never completely obvious. This is a question *of* sovereign *decision,* on which the entire structure of the Political as such depends. Politics begins only after this pair has been constructed.

According to Schmitt, the distribution of roles between friend and foe requires the existence of an authority that can make such judgements. To do so, it must be constituted in the same way: that is, it must be the bearer of sovereign will, reason and decision-making capacity. The determination of who is an enemy and who is a friend is always mutual — it presupposes a symmetrical gesture on the part of the other. Moreover, this other must be capable, in turn, of determining friend and foe and acting accordingly. In other words, politics presupposes in its foundations the existence of the other as the political Other. Any political entity is only itself in the presence of a coexisting (strictly speaking, coexisting) political entity. And enmity and friendship are mutual and situational, that is, their definition includes the possibility of a change in status under certain circumstances. In the realm of religion, morality, species or gender, such

[1] *Schmitt C.* Der Begriff des Politisches.. p. 26.

action is impossible: good cannot become evil, a person cannot become an animal or vice versa; here, the dichotomy is presented as an immutable fact, independent of will and circumstances. Politics, on the other hand, is built on the principle of being tied to very specific historical and geographical conditions: friend and foe are always situational, concrete, located in a strictly defined space and time, as well as to the political form that acts as *the subject of the Political* at a given moment and in given circumstances.

Hence the fundamental conclusion of all Schmittian political theory: politics *is pluralistic* in nature and presupposes the existence of a pluralistic universe as a fundamental condition of its existence. Therefore, instead of universality, the Political is always represented as something regional, local, as a concrete order and situational form. The only universal rule in politics is the absence of any universality beyond the limits of a specific political unit or structure.

Schmitt attached great importance to the principle of sovereignty in international politics, following Bode in this. For him, sovereignty and the decision (Entscheidung) taken by the sovereign are transcendent in relation to all parts of the state and do not allow for assessments on a friend/enemy scale. The consequence of a decision to choose an enemy or friend in foreign policy is binding on the entire state, since the transition from domestic to foreign policy changes the subject of the decision — it shifts from a sub-state unit to the state itself. In practice, this is sometimes not the case, but in this case, the policy of forms and structures of the functioning of "direct power" (potestas directa) is violated. In any case, for the very existence of the Political, a pluriversum is necessary, in the space of which the other can be defined as a friend or an enemy.

This interpretation of politics as a pluriverse reflected the main idea of the entire Conservative Revolution: German sovereignty as the highest value and the right of Germans to a special path (Sonderweg), to a special identity both in the European context and more broadly, in the global context.

At the same time, for Schmitt, the political was an area of direct manifestation of the spirit: the definition of friend or foe is primarily influenced by values, and only then by interests. Power, like the principle of order itself, is a spiritual category, while the material aspects associated with the state and the process of ordering social processes are always secondary.

In defining sovereignty, Schmitt introduces another important term.

> Sovereign is the one who decides on a state of emergency [1].

A situation becomes extraordinary (Ernstfall) when the normal functioning of the legal process cannot continue and some extraordinary step is required to resolve the problem: either one that is provided for in the legal corpus as a potential possibility, or one that is taken contrary to the law under the influence of circumstances. *Sovereign is not the one who has the right to make decisions in extraordinary circumstances, but the one who makes them.* According to Schmitt, this reveals the very essence of politics.

This interpretation of sovereignty led Schmitt directly to the concept [of] dictatorship, since the adoption of decisions without reference to any precedent or legislative basis is most clearly manifested in a dictator. Schmitt used this to justify Hitler's system of power in Nazi Germany, which the National Socialists took advantage of.

In his seminal work Political Theology [(3),] Carl Schmitt shows the parallels between changes in religious and metaphysical worldviews and transformations in political doctrines. Political systems strictly follow the slightest fluctuations in theological doctrines, which allows us to say that politics is one of the forms of expression of the human spirit as a whole, along with religion, philosophy, culture, etc. Hence the very concept of "political theology." *The way theologians understand the status of God and man, as well as the relationship between them, directly influences which political and legal systems become prioritised and normative.* Just as German sociologist Max Weber showed the mechanisms of the origin of capitalism from Protestant ethics, Carl Schmitt more generally demonstrates the process of the formation of political concepts and systems from theological models.

Thus, in the Middle Ages, scholasticism and a theistic conception of God dominated. Accordingly, the bearer of supreme sovereignty was the state.

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[1] *Schmitt, C.* Political Theology. Moscow: Canon-Press, Kuchkovo Pole, 2000. P. 15.

[2] *Schmitt, C.* Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle.

[3] *Schmitt, C.* Political Theology.

The papal throne becomes the centre of politics, replacing, in the spirit of St. Augustine's teaching, the "Heavenly City" in the earthly world. In the institution of the Popes, the vicars of St. Peter on earth, and through him Christ himself, the principle of transcendent theological establishment is manifested: God the Creator is above all hierarchies of creatures, and therefore supreme power legitimately belongs only to Him; He is the Almighty, and therefore his vicar on earth, the Roman bishop, is above all earthly monarchies. This theistic attitude, according to Schmitt, predetermined the entire structure of politics in the Middle Ages and lay at the basis of the scholastic understanding of sovereignty: only God is sovereign, and to some extent his representative on earth, the Pope. Schmitt himself was a Catholic and therefore generally shared this pre-modern view of the legitimate nature of power as the most reasonable form of "political theology."

The next form of "political theology" emerged alongside Protestantism. Luther introduced the norm of personal experience and rational interpretation of the foundations of religion. This eliminated the mediating model of the relationship between the "Earthly City" and the "Heavenly City," which was embodied in the Catholic understanding of the Pope and in the idea of the Empire. This gave rise to the concept of the modern state and sovereignty. The meaning of sovereignty for Hobbes and Bodin, as well as for Machiavelli, is that there is *no* higher authority above the sovereign.

In the 18th–19th centuries, as K. Schmitt shows, there was a further immanentisation of theology — from the deism of the Enlightenment to the direct atheism and materialism of liberals and socialists, which led to a new conception of the structure of the state as a product of the "social contract."

In the last section of Political Theology, Carl Schmitt examines the counter-revolutionary projects of European conservatives — Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821), Donoso Cortés (1809–1853) and Louis Bonald (1754–1840), who, having identified the structure of the processes prevailing in the "political theology" of the Modern Age, took a counter-Enlightenment position, rejected the norms of Modernity and, first and foremost, its most radical and nihilistic (from the point of view of traditional theology) expression in liberalism, and proposed projects for the restoration of the political system of the New Middle Ages. Schmitt himself clearly sympathised with this counter-revolutionary project and considered possible versions of the legal formalisation of a path in the opposite direction to the logic of Modernity: from Weimar democracy to a German nation state based on the principle of

absolute sovereignty (with the possibility of dictatorship[1]) and, through it, to a new European Empire, parallel to the restoration of the power and authority of the Popes. At the same time, he saw the counter-revolutionary project as feasible precisely because it was a question of human freedom, which always has the possibility of making a choice (Entscheidung) in the sphere of the spirit, i.e. religion and politics, which are the direct expression of the spirit.

When developing the legal basis for the future European Empire, Carl Schmitt introduced, as we have said, the concept of "*the rights of* peoples" [2]. This principle in his theory was opposed to European nationalism of the Modern era, as it denied the individual nature of citizenship and the bourgeois system of domination of the norms of the Third Estate, which lay at the foundation of the national state, and especially its contractual nature, the recognition of which led to liberal democracy, which gradually abolished states in general in favour of a global "civil society". Schmitt regarded German nationalism as a transitional stage towards a completely new (for the modern era) political organisation of Europe, which, in his view, should be based on:

- the principle of imperial centralisation of strategic management,
- unity of spiritual form (Christianity in its traditional version),
- recognition of the subjects of intra-imperial law not as artificial nations or citizens, but as organic units — peoples united by a common historical destiny.

The third point of the new European Empire assumed that the people (Volk) would become subjects of law, have their own representation and the opportunity to organise their internal structures on the basis of their cultural and historical traditions, as well as on the basis of free choice. The only limitation in this case would be the consideration of the strategic interests of the Empire as a whole. This project encapsulates the essence of the Conservative Revolution: the peoples of Europe are given the free choice to build their future on the basis of democratic consensus (Entscheidung), which allows for a combination of both traditional and innovative

[1] Schmitt devoted an entire work to legal problems and types of dictatorship. *Schmitt, C.* Dictatorship. Op. cit.

[2] *Schmitt C.* Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raum- fremde Mächte. Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht. Berlin: Deutscher Rechts Verlag, 1939.

elements, since the Empire does not have the authority to exert prescriptive influence on this decision, which remains entirely within the competence of the people as a full-fledged subject of law. The people, drawing on their history and culture, can choose any combination of the past, present and future, shaping and transforming themselves as necessary into a self-correcting project. This combines conservatism and a spiritual turn to eternity with democracy and even revolution. Thus, we find ourselves in the context of revolutionary nationalism as a third political theory, distanced from political modernity as such and in direct opposition to liberalism and socialism.

On the other hand, according to Schmitt, the principle of "rights of peoples" must be inscribed within specific territorial boundaries that characterise the Empire. To this end, he introduces the concept of "*large* space" (Grossraum) as an approximate geographical zone within which empire-building takes place. "Greater space" is the cultural field within which the historical preconditions for unification processes exist — either on the basis of precedent (the area of existence of ancient empires), on the basis of spiritual and religious proximity, or on the basis of objective strategic and even economic interests. Schmitt himself defines "large space" not as a full-fledged concept (Begriff), but as a pre-concept, Vorbegriff, that is, as a preparatory stage for the development of a full-fledged legal model. Schmitt traces the process of the formation of historical empires and finds everywhere a special stage where the empire-building centre preliminarily outlines the horizons of the oikoumene, familiar, close to it or simply known to it. *The empire, thus, before being built in practice, matures in spirit.* The same idea was defended, as we have seen, by Hegel.

This idea of "natural borders" is confirmed or refuted by numerous military operations, diplomatic treaties, political alliances, i.e., the entire content of politics. But this plan always exists in one form or another, and sooner or later — if the empire-building endeavour is successful — it turns into a concrete historical and political reality, which is subsequently given full legal status. This is what is meant by "the greater space." The way it is interpreted by the empire-building elite actively influences the specifics of political processes until the preconception gives way to a full-fledged concept, and the "great space" gives way to a full-fledged empire with its borders, laws, and legal system based, according to Schmitt, on the principle of "the rights of peoples."

gives way to a full-fledged empire with its borders, laws, and legal system based, according to Schmitt, on the principle of "the rights of peoples."

Revolutionary nationalism: the boundaries of the ideology of the " "

The ideology of the Third Way is not limited to historical fascism and National Socialism — it is a much broader phenomenon. First, there are characteristics inherent in classical nationalism, which did not develop into a fully-fledged ideology but had a significant influence on the third political theory, becoming part of it. We encounter a distinct ideology only in the 20th century, when nationalism takes on a revolutionary character. In part, this ideologisation of nationalism is a response to the pronounced ideologism of Marxism. The conceptual coherence of the second political theory, which, incidentally, with its systemic criticism, contributed greatly to liberalism being perceived precisely as a "bourgeois ideology" and not simply a set of theses and guidelines, forced nationalists to develop symmetrical conceptual complexes firstly, taking into account liberalism and communism and providing their own answers to their basic postulates, secondly, integrating certain aspects of classical nationalism (mercantilism, realism, etc.), and thirdly, adding completely new and atypical elements, where modernism and innovation (Nietzscheanism, futurism, existentialism, etc.) coexisted with a return to pre-modern forms of politics (Hegel's idealism, Schmitt's justification of empire and the function of the "katechon," the traditionalism of Y. Evola, etc.). Partly close to revolutionary nationalism, the Conservative Revolution that took shape in Germany, which was extremely heterogeneous in itself, represented a parallel phenomenon that can be viewed both as one of the versions of the third political theory and as something independent and separate. Therefore, unlike liberalism and Marxism, which are clearly and unambiguously structured, the third political theory gives the impression of being eclectic, contradictory and inconsistent. Therefore, in order to better understand its main semantic nodes, it is necessary to imagine its general conceptual field.

Strictly speaking, revolutionary nationalism, which manifested itself most vividly (and at the same time most monstrously) in Italian fascism, should be recognised as the third political theory.



Third political theory

Mussolini and Hitler's German National Socialism, and to a lesser extent in Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and during the era of General Perón in Argentina. Other ideological currents, worldview circles, socio-political and economic trends and orientations created a fertile environment for the revolutionary nationalism of the 20th century, influencing it, supplying it with individual elements and conceptual content, but without exhausting it, identifying with it or claiming the role of dogmatism. In this respect, the third political theory differs from the first (liberalism) and the second (Marxism): there is no strictly established theoretical dogma that must be accepted by all those who speak on behalf of the corresponding ideologies. The third political theory was not as ideologically totalitarian as liberalism and Marxism, which do not allow any doubts about their fundamental foundations. In revolutionary nationalism, everything depended on a specific leader or dictator. For example, in National Socialist Germany, racism acquired the status not only of an ideological dogma but also of a legal system, while in Fascist Italy, racist ideas were of peripheral importance and became more pronounced only during the existence of the Republic of Salò under direct German occupation. Similarly, Franco, Salazar and Perón offered their own original versions, and in these Third Way regimes, in particular, great importance was attached to Catholicism and traditional conservatism, whereas in National Socialism neo-pagan motifs prevailed, and in fascism secular heroism, stylised as the ethical culture of Ancient Rome.

Nevertheless, all these political forms can be combined into a third political theory, since the diversity of specific versions and interpretations is comparable to the numerous trends in liberalism and left-wing ideology, where there were also many currents, although their ideological boundaries were more strictly defined and delineated. The third political theory was less dogmatic, although the individual political regimes based on it were characterised by a sharply totalitarian style, imposing their attitudes no less (and sometimes even more harshly and directly) than communism and even more so than liberalism (which prefers to impose its ideology through suggestion, soft power, culture and economics rather than direct and brutal political propaganda([1)]).

[1] However, in recent decades, and especially after the fall of the USSR, liberalism has gradually begun to acquire openly totalitarian features, gradually tightening

Italian fascism: futurism and conservatism

The third political theory manifested itself most explicitly in Italian fascism and German National Socialism, which spread their influence and direct political power to almost the entire territory of continental Europe. However, when considering these forms of revolutionary nationalism, one must constantly bear in mind the entire theoretical field of this ideology, which goes far beyond the much narrower boundaries of historical fascism and National Socialism.

Italian fascism appeared earlier than German National Socialism. It was a reaction of Italian socialism to the internationalist and strictly class-based dogma of Marxism. At the roots of fascism lies precisely the leftist idea of the need to fight capitalism, bourgeois exploitation and the power of economic elites. At the same time, supporters of this movement were convinced that the bourgeoisie was an international phenomenon guided by interests that did not take into account the situation of peoples and states. Therefore, the Italian fascists' struggle against capitalism initially combined social and national levels. Somewhat similar ideas were formulated somewhat earlier by the French left-wing philosopher Georges Sorel (1847–1922), whose authority was recognised by fascists, anarchists and some socialist movements. In principle, many of the tenets of early fascism were extremely close to anarchism. Thus, one of the most famous Italian theorists of anarchism, Curzio Malaparte (1898–1957), who took part in Mussolini's march on Rome, joined fascism at an early stage. Fascist ideas, and especially their militant style of struggle, also attracted some communists, including one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party, Niccolò Bombacci (1879–1945).

It is telling that at the forefront of the fascists were representatives of such avant-garde art movements as the Futurists, whose inspiration and leader was Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944), who became Mussolini's closest associate. The leading American avant-garde poet Ezra

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its ideological nature, which coincided to some extent with the norms of "political correctness," which became not only an ethical rule but also the basis for a number of legislative provisions proclaiming liberalism not simply as the dominant ideology but as a dogma and a legislative axiom.

[1] *Malaparte, C.* The Technique of the State Coup. Moscow: Agraf, 1988.

Pound [1](1885–1972), who moved to Italy and spoke on the radio in support of Mussolini until the occupation of Italy by American troops. Ezra Pound, who hated interest-bearing capital, was particularly inspired by the anti-capitalist aspects of fascist ideology and practice, which he nevertheless considered insufficient.

In its early stages, fascism, led by the charismatic leader Mussolini, was a left-wing revolutionary and fiercely anti-bourgeois movement inspired by the ideas of Nietzsche and the desire to implement radical futuristic transformations. At the same time, it clearly had a nationalist component, which continued the earlier trends of the Risorgimento, early Italian nationalism, which combined republican, bourgeois-liberal and monarchist elements. However, fascist nationalism was distinguished precisely by its revolutionary and anti-bourgeois nature, which became the basis of the third political theory.

Mussolini was not an original thinker, but he possessed sufficient intellectual ability and culture to comprehend the political ideas of nascent fascism, as well as the tremendous will to put this heterogeneous complex of ideas into practice.

The ideology of fascism — as the Italian version of the third political theory — was a combination of several trends:

- *the* cold *political technology* of power in the spirit of Machiavelli, systematically developed by Pareto and the neo-Machiavellians;
- *the right-wing Hegelianism* of Gentile, who justified the necessity of a strong, leader-led nation-state by the very structure of the formation of Italian history in its connection with ontology and the destiny of the spirit;
- *a romantic heroic spirit* in the spirit of d'Annunzio (1863–1938), based on Nietzsche's orientation towards the Superhuman and the glorification of war and battle (this also includes Malaparte's anarchist ideas);
- *a* futuristic *cult of technology* (Marinetti);
- a return *to Roman ethics and Latin ideals*, as well as to fundamentally conservative values (Latin traditionalists such as Julius Evola, Guido Di Giorgio (1890–1957), etc.).

[1] *Pound, E.* Cantos. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2018.

All this is a direct continuation of the ideas and trends that took shape during the Risorgimento and thanks to which Italy itself emerged as a single political entity.

At the same time, fascism absorbed a number of ideas from non-dogmatic socialism, developed a theory of corporate social organisation (based on trade unions), and adopted a colonial strategy that had become the norm in European politics since the early modern period. Distinctive features of fascism included

- the commissarial dictatorship [1](C. Schmitt) duce,
- the totalitarian nature of one-party rule,
- the relativisation of legal norms and liberal-democratic institutions in the face of "revolutionary expediency".

If we look for parallels with the history of Ancient Rome, Mussolini's reforms were — in many ways parodic — analogous to the establishment of the Empire by Octavian Augustus (63 BC – 14 AD) after the Republican period. In both cases, dictatorship, conditioned by a specific historical situation, was elevated to a political principle.

In the second stage, after Mussolini came to power, formally holding the post of prime minister but wielding dictatorial powers (hence the title "Duce," Italian for "leader"), the revolutionary fervour of early fascism gave way to a more classical nationalism. Mussolini, who had previously held anti-clerical and anti-monarchist views, compromised with King Victor Emmanuel III (1869–1947) with the Vatican and representatives of big business, although he retained some socialist social institutions — above all trade unions and corporations, which became the social base of the fascist regime.

By 1928, the fascist regime had begun to take on increasingly totalitarian characteristics—all parties except the fascist party were banned. In 1929, Mussolini signed agreements with the Vatican. During this period, until 1943, the policy of fascist Italy was generally quite conservative and shifted significantly from revolutionary nationalism, which remained at the level of style, slogans and symbols, to classical nationalism. Nevertheless, Gentile's right-wing Hegelianism added a special dimension to this. At the same time, traditionalism as an alternative to Gentile

[1] *Schmitt, K.* Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle. Moscow: Nauka, 2005.

ideology during this period was formulated by the philosopher Julius Evola, a supporter of a return to the pre-Christian sacred tradition of Europe [1] and a participant in the Conservative Revolution movement founded in Germany. The influence of Evola's ideas was marginal and insignificant, especially since he criticised fascism for its "plebeianism," "modernism" and "leftism"[2]. Evola gained fame after 1945, when he became a cult figure for most Italians who did not accept the liberal pro-American regime.

When Hitler came to power in Germany and rapidly transformed the country into a rapidly developing and powerful empire, Mussolini tried to pursue an independent foreign policy, but gradually became closer to Hitler, which forced him to side with Germany in World War II, despite his personal reluctance to enter into conflict with the USSR, as he felt some sympathy for the Bolshevik regime. Communists and liberals resisted fascism throughout its reign in Italy, and during World War II, with support from the West and the USSR, they began direct partisan actions. This led to a civil war that divided Italians into two camps: fascists and anti-fascists.

In 1943, American troops landed in southern Italy with the support of the Mafia, with whom Mussolini had been engaged in a fierce struggle, and left-wing forces. A number of Mussolini's closest allies and members of the upper echelons of the bureaucracy overthrew him and placed him under arrest. Mussolini was rescued from prison by a Nazi special unit, and Germany occupied northern Italy, where the Italian Social Republic, or Salò, was established under the leadership of the liberated Mussolini. There, Mussolini, shocked by the betrayal of the fascist hierarchy, returned to early fascism in its left-wing and anti-bourgeois form. However, under pressure from the National Socialists, he was forced to adopt racist policies that were completely alien to him and to Italian fascism as a whole.

After the fall of Hitler's Germany, the Americans and partisans destroyed Salò, Mussolini was hanged, and those who remained loyal to fascism were subjected to repression and purges. Thus, the two parts of Italian society switched places.

It should be noted that there is no racism at the heart of the third political theory in its fascist version. Thus, after Mussolini's death in 1945, Italian Jews made a statement saying that this regime

[1] *Evola, J.* Pagan Imperialism. Moscow: Arktogeya, 1994.

[2] *Evola, Y.* Fascism: A Critique from the Right.

was not involved, and Jews could hold any position in Italian society. Mussolini did not organise mass executions or genocide. However, this did not diminish the totalitarian nature of this ideology, and nationalism and colonialism (in Libya and Ethiopia) were an official part of the fascist worldview.

There was no racism (nor anti-Semitism) in other forms of Third Way ideology — in Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and even less so in Perón's Argentina.

Consequently, racism and anti-Semitism are not distinctive features of the third political theory. Revolutionary or classical nationalism and a harsh totalitarian character, as well as the dictatorial powers of a charismatic leader, are features that are inherent to all types of this ideology to one degree or another. Racism and anti-Semitism are unique to German National Socialism, the most extensive and sinister, but not the first and far from the only example of the third political theory being put into practice.

Scalar fascism Guido de Giorgio

On the periphery of fascist ideology, a special ideological current was forming that cannot be strictly classified as a third political theory on the grounds that it rejected the very paradigm of political modernity and its premises, materialism, atomism, individualism, philosophy Matter, Receptacles,
"choruses." We are talking about the philosophy of traditionalism, the foundations of which were laid by the French philosopher René Guénon, who, however, himself remained at a distance from all modern political theories, seeing in them a direct antithesis to what he considered to be the ideal or normal understanding of politics, possible only outside the modern world in the realm of tradition. In Italy, Guénon's followers were the philosophers Guido de Giorgio and Julius Evola, who, however, chose a different approach to fascism, seeking to transform it from a political theory of modernity into something else, something sacred. In this, they were close to some representatives of the German Conservative Revolution, with whose leading figures Evola maintained close ties. Traditionalism, like some strands of the Conservative Revolution, does not so much belong to the third political theory as anticipate the Fourth Political Theory([1]).

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

In particular, Geno's Italian follower Guido de Giordano saw in Mussolini's fascism, and in particular in his appeal to Ancient Rome and his rejection of liberalism and communism as two versions of Modernism, the possibility of realising the project of restoring Tradition. He understood that the Third Way also contained elements of Modernism, but believed that this ideology had the potential to evolve into something else. This was also the view held for some time by M. Heidegger and J. Evola. Guido de Giorgio developed sketches *of an alternative fascism*, which he himself called "*sacred fascism*." But such
"Sacred fascism," which rejects nationalism, mechanism, materialism, various forms of racism, and colonialism, could no longer be considered a third political theory, representing something that went beyond its scope. In essence, De Giorgio understands "sacred fascism" not as a political doctrine or Mussolini's regime, but as the Roman Tradition itself, which he traces from Antiquity to the present day.

De Giorgio interprets fascism based on the symbol of the lictor's fasces, which consists of 12 rods and a double axe. For him, "fascism" is what this sacred object symbolises, that is, what is metaphysically connected with the fasces.

> The only thing that connects the twelve rods of the fasces is the single bolt of lightning that pierces them, symbolising the power embodied in the double axe: this is the highest emblem of Tradition, as it represents a vertical flow: ascent and [victory].

Therefore, "fascism" is not the spread of political fascism, but the turning of the spiritual gaze to the Latin Logos, to the essence of Rome itself, as *a point of eternity* within the flow of time. De Giorgio writes:

> A return to the Roman Tradition implies the "fascistisation" of Europe and the world, an integral return to the spirit of truth that is Rome in name, symbol and reality. Rome is a sacred, invincible, indomitable summit, standing above all selfishness and human or populist ambitions, in the true light of the Divine plan to which Rome belongs. This is the highest goal of the Roman Tradition, exalted

[1] The lictor's fasces is an ancient symbol of the Etruscans.

[2] *Giorgio Guido de.* La Tradizione romana. Op. cit. P. 317.

of Rome's power in the context of Tradition, which alone is capable of giving the West truth, justice, and greatness.

The restoration we are calling for, taking inspiration and ideals from Dante, is a return to the spirit of Rome, not simply a repetition of the past, which, among other things, is impossible, since nothing transitory can be repeated, but a direct connection to the eternal principles of truth contained in the Holy Scriptures and ancient symbols. This enormous task of fascistisation requires superhuman efforts on the part of people of good will if they want to save the West from catastrophe, not so much from a material and external catastrophe, which in itself does not particularly affect us, but from a profound, internal and spiritual one: the catastrophe of the life of the spirit, the collapse of truth, which is already decaying in this turbulent disintegration of impulses, aspirations, errors, and egoisms such as have never before been seen in the history of the world·

Guido de Giorgio considers Dante to be the most vivid expression of "sacred fascism." He speaks of this in the following terms:

In Dante, East and West balance each other in a single centre, which is essentially the Primordial Tradition, that is, the unified and sovereignly realised universality of Tradition. However, since there were close contacts between East and West in the Middle Ages, and in this great time, as never before in other eras, elements of different traditions complemented each other, passing orally from teacher to student and from student to student, Dante appeared at the end of this era, when the Dominicans and Franciscans, although significantly degenerate and hostile to each other, still represented two paths — the cherubic and the seraphic — of realising the Divine, both anthropocentric but different from each other in nature and method[2] : but it was Dante who managed to unite them, to "fascistise" them without mixing them. And it must be said that when we use the term *"fascistise"*

[1] *Giorgio Guido de*. La Tradizione romana. Op. cit. P. 45.

[2]De Giorgio refers to Canto 11 (lines 37–43) of Dante's Paradise, where Dante speaks of his vision of St. Dominic and St. Francis of Assisi, founders of the two main monastic orders in Europe — the Dominicans and the Franciscans. *"One burned with the fire of a seraph; / In the other, wisdom seemed so bright / That he shone with the radiance of a cherub. I will praise only one, / But honour both, for they speak of one thing, / Because their goal was the same." Dante Alighieri*. The Divine Comedy. Moscow: Pravda, 1982. Dante associates the Franciscans with the figure of Seraphim, and the Dominicans with the figure of Cherubim. Moreover, Dante specifies that both paths — Seraphim's and Cherubim's — lead to the same goal. De Giorgio builds on this a theory that the two

> By "fixing," we do not mean anything similar to syncretism or mixing: "fixing" in the sense of Tradition means giving each path, each element its own direction, centre, axis, without allowing fusion. This is the novelty of the fixity that embodies Tradition.

And further:

> In Dante, "fascism" reaches its climax: East and West, ancient and new Rome, temporary and eternal, earth and sky, world and superworld, man and God, everything is emphasised, combined, united in the highest vertical, which is Rome. This is what Sacred Fascism consists of, the true triumph of justice and truth in man and the world: the fact that there will be disagreements, battles, and downfalls is of no importance, since all this takes place within a traditional society, where everything is supported by a higher equilibrium ensured by the bearers of the keys (Clavigero) and fasces (Fascigero), the Kingdom (Regnum) and the Empire (Imperium), forever united in Rome(2).

Julius Evola: Fascism and Criticism on the right

Another Italian traditionalist who attempted to reinterpret fascism in the spirit of overcoming Modernity was Julius Evola.

Following Genon, Evola discovered Eastern metaphysics and the Philosophia Perennis, and also found a fundamental metaphysical basis for his radical and largely spontaneous rejection of the modern world, which had already manifested itself in his youth in his sympathies for Dadaism and anti-bourgeois nihilism. *According to Guénon, modernity is not the result of progress, but of degradation*, the decline of sacred civilisation. Therefore, a person who is faithful to the spiritual Tradition must logically remain *in rigid and irreconcilable opposition to modernity*. The modern world, the New Age, on the one hand, and Tradition, on the other, are two *mutually exclusive* phenomena: *only war* is possible between them. Evol fully accepts this idea and clearly defines his place in this war — *on the side of Tradition against the modern world*. "The revival of monastic orders represents two parallel paths of spiritual realisation, which must be connected by a 'sacred fascia'."

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monastic orders represent two parallel paths of spiritual realisation, which must be linked by a 'sacred bond'.

1 *Giorgio Guido de.* La Tradizione romana. Op. cit. P. 316–317.

2 Ibid. P. 317.

"Against the Modern World" [1]— this is how Evola refers to his main programmatic book, in which he systematically sets out his worldview. He outlines the process of the degradation of sacred civilisation from the golden age to the iron age, offering an original version of the reconstruction of the historical process and the change of civilisational types, up to the extreme degree of degeneration and decline that he identifies in European civilisation in the modern era.

However, unlike Guénon, Evola does not accept this decline as inevitable and calls on the last bearers of Tradition in the West to rise up in *rebellion.* It is precisely this "active traditionalism" that explains his relative support for fascism and his occasional contacts with Mussolini. Later, Evola critically re-evaluated fascism as a phenomenon ("Fascism, an attempt at a critical analysis from the right" ([3]), considering his hopes for its evolution in a traditionalist direction to have been unfulfilled.

German National Socialism: from left- ism to right- ism

German nationalism belongs to the same type of revolutionary nationalism as Italian fascism. At the same time, the term "fascism" usually refers specifically to "national socialism," without making any distinctions, which creates a distorted view of the entire third political theory, coloured by memories of the horrific practices of Hitler's regime and the excesses of racism, on the basis of which a huge number of people were exterminated on ethnic grounds. There is no doubt that racism and the practices of mass extermination based on it were an integral part of the ideology of Nazi Germany, and therefore historical German National Socialism cannot be separated from racism, which was an organic and, in a sense, central part of this ideology. However, this feature is absent in classical nationalism (with the exception of some theories that justified colonial practices and is often organically combined with liberalism, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world) and is not characteristic of Italian fascism or other versions of revolutionary nationalism. Nationalism and racism are completely different

[1] *Evola, J.* The Revolt Against the Modern World.
[2] *Evola J.* Gli uomini e le rovine. Rome: Edizioni dell'Ascia, 1953.
[3] *Evola, J.* Fascism: A Critique from the Right.

These are abstract concepts. Nationalism is a political ideology associated with an emphasis on the value identity of the population of a nation state. In other words, a nation is an artificial concept denoting all citizens of a particular state, with the consent of the individual nature of citizenship. Nationalism thus represents a more radical and aggressive form of patriotism, or love for one's state, towards other states (and, accordingly, other nations). It is a political concept based on statehood and individual citizenship. This is the case with classical nationalism and, in the most general case, with revolutionary nationalism. The main difference between them lies not in the sharpness of nationalism, but in their attitude towards capitalism, the bourgeoisie, market society and the institutions of bourgeois democracy. Classical nationalism fully recognises capitalism, while revolutionary nationalism either rejects it altogether or seeks to subordinate it strictly — politically and ideologically — to national and state interests.

German National Socialism belongs to revolutionary nationalism, but also includes a racist component.

At the same time, as in the case of Italian fascism, early National Socialism was much more left-wing, which was preserved in the very name "National Socialist German Workers' Party," where the reference to workers had an important ideological significance. Gradually, however, Hitler began to move closer to conservative circles and a broad spectrum of representatives of the Conservative Revolution, while increasingly emphasising the racist component of his ideology. This led to a split with left-wing Nazis such as Otto Strasser (1897–1974) and National Bolsheviks such as Ernst Nitschke (1889–1967), who opposed Hitler. Thus, left-wing National Socialism gradually shifted to the right[1]. At the same time, racism was inherent in this movement at all stages, from early to late. But this did not apply to the Conservative Revolution in any way.

Pragmatically, this difference in German national socialism was linked to the fact that German nationalism itself historically appealed to Germans living in different states — in Prussia, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and in the territories of fairly independent principalities and regions that had previously been part of the Holy Roman Empire.

[1]The transition from left-wing to right-wing fascism in literary form was described by the Japanese writer and playwright Yukio Mishima (1925–1970). *Mishima, Yukio.* My Friend Hitler/ Mishima, Yukio. The Golden Temple. Novels, short stories, plays. St. Petersburg: Severo-Zapad, 1993.

They were incorporated into the Western Roman Empire. Some Germans were Protestants (Lutherans), while others were Catholics. In addition, German culture was strongly influenced by the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment, Romanticism and radical conservatism. The ideas of the founders of classical philosophy (Fichte, Hegel, etc.) formed the basis of the Second Reich[1] Germany, created in the 19th century by Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) around Prussia. But after the end of the First World War, the Second Reich fell, and there was a need for a new nationalism. This is where interest in racism emerged, initially spreading only among Germans living in different states. It could not simply be called "nationalism" because Germans belonged to different nation states, i.e. different nations, and in order to unite them all in a common polity, it was necessary to propose a new concept — just as artificial as the other political concepts of the modern era — the individuum, class, etc. In Italian fascism, this concept was the state and the nation itself, where the focus was also on the artificial community of the inhabitants of the Italian peninsula, who historically belonged to different political entities — Southern Italy (originally part of Magna Graecia, then Byzantium, the Lombard kingdoms, and later Spain), to Central Italy, where Rome and the Vatican played an important role, and Northern Italy, connected to France in the west, Switzerland in the centre, and Austria in the east. Italian identity was an artificial nation. But in order to unite the Germans after the fall of the Second Reich, a more generalising concept was needed, a function which was taken on by "racism".

Racist ideas in Germany's National Socialist movement ( )

Racist ideas found their way into National Socialism from England, France and the mystical sect of theosophists. Racism was completely alien to German culture, and the idea of the superiority of one race over another, less complete, did not gain widespread acceptance in Germany due to its limited colonial experience. As we have seen, the romantic Herder, who influenced German self-awareness, believed that all peoples were thoughts of God, which ruled out any hierarchy between them, let alone racial inequality. One of the first theses on the inequality of human races

[1] The first Reich is considered to be the Frankish Empire of Charlemagne (748-814) and, more narrowly, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (962-1806).

This idea was put forward by French sociologist Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882). The idea that "white" people were better than other races was really popular in the British Empire, which used it to justify its colonial policy. The British were described not only as conquerors, but also as bearers of "progress" and "the highest form of culture." Such views were common among many English liberals, including G. Spencer, J. S. Mill, and others. The general theory of racism was supplemented by anti-Semitism by the British author Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), who had a significant influence on the worldview of Hitler, the leader of the German Nazis.

Another source of racial theories was the extravagant teachings of theosophists[3], who, based on various religious sources from Eastern civilisations, constructed a hypothesis about the succession of four races, with the white race, in their opinion, coming from the far north, where a special Arctic continent once existed — Hyperborea. Some German and Austrian theosophists combined this doctrine with German nationalism, creating "Ariosophy" (4), which formed the basis of the "Aryan theory" and Nordicism. In this theory, "true Aryans" were usually considered to be Germans — sometimes more broadly, the Germanic peoples.

Thus, from the combination of the pragmatic concept of uniting the German ethnic group, European (primarily Anglo-Saxon) colonialism, anti-Semitism (in which an important role was played by hostility towards "world Jewry" as a synonym for capitalism and internationalism, i.e. the rejection of the first and second political theories, among whose prominent representatives were, in fact, many Jews) and occult "Nordicism," a National Socialist version of racism emerged, which played a very important, if not key, role in this ideology.

Later, racist ideas were adapted to the German version of revolutionary nationalism by the official theorist of National Socialism, Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946), whose main work
"The Myth of the Twentieth Century," was considered the main ideological work

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[1] *Gobineau, J. A. de.* An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races. Moscow: Samoteka, 2007.

[2] *Chamberlain, H. S.* Foundations of the Nineteenth Century. In 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Russkiy Mir, 2012.

[3] *Genon, R.* Theosophy: History of a Pseudo-Religion. Belgorod: Totemburg, 2017.

[4] *Goodrick-Clarke, N.* The Occult Roots of Nazism. Secret Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology: The Ariosofists of Austria and Germany, 1890–1935. Moscow: EKSMO, 2004.

[5] *Rosenberg, A.* The Myth of the Twentieth Century: An Appraisal of the Spiritual and Intellectual Struggles of Our Time. Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag, 1930 (works by this author are banned in Russia).

National Socialist Germany, along with Hitler's own book Mein Kampf (My Struggle) [1].

It was racism that was associated with the most monstrous practices and crimes committed by the National Socialists, which is why biological racism discredited itself and, after the fall of Hitler's regime, became the main argument against the third political theory as a whole. Although racism was a feature of German nationalism in particular, and penetrated German society relatively late and from other European cultures, the scale of racial persecution, genocide, and the adoption of racial laws legalising state practices directed against members of "inferior races" overshadowed all other aspects of the ideology of the Third Way, revolutionary nationalism, and to some extent nationalism as a whole.

So after 1945, when the countries of the bourgeois West (the United States, England, and their allies) and the communist East (the USSR) jointly defeated the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and those who joined them), the third political theory was condemned at the Nuremberg Tribunal for crimes against humanity and declared "criminal." Thus, because of racism, which was not even the main feature of the third political theory, this entire ideology was deemed unacceptable. And although after 1991, following the fall of communism in the USSR, representatives of the first political theory attempted — on similar grounds — to outlaw the second political theory (referring to the truly large-scale crimes committed by Lenin and Stalin, in which many millions died), this was not achieved to the same extent as with revolutionary nationalism.

For a complete picture of the third political theory, even in Germany itself, it should be noted that National Socialism was only one of its strands. Thus, Armin Möller (1920–2003) in his book The Conservative Revolution in Germany 1918–1932 ([2])shows that Hitler's National Socialism, if we take its ideological component, was quite insignificant.

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[1] *Hitler, A.* Mein Kampf. Vol. 1–2. Munich: Verlag Franz Eher Nachfahren, 1925–1927 (this author's works are banned in the Russian Federation).

[2] *Meller, A.* The Conservative Revolution in Germany, 1918–1932. Belgorod: Totemburg, 2017.

A. Meller summarises this movement as the "Conservative Revolution."

This ideology of the Conservative Revolution was espoused by such leading figures in philosophical thought as Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, Oswald Spengler, Werner Sombart, Ernst Jünger (1895–1998), Arthur Müller van den Broek (1876–1925), author of the concept of the "Third Reich" ([1]) and many other world-renowned authors. Some of them had indirect ties to National Socialism, some direct, some were opponents, some were fellow travellers, and some were internal emigrants. Ernst Jünger, for example, who was a famous writer by 1933, refused to become a member of the Reichstag for the National Socialist Party. He spoke contemptuously of Hitler and his movement.

Theoretically, representatives of the Conservative Revolution could take the following positions on National Socialism:

- to view National Socialism as *a transitional phase* towards a more perfect model (this was the case with K. Schmitt and M. Heidegger, as well as the early E. Jünger);
- take *a* radically *negative stance* towards it (Thomas Mann in 1955); Ernst Niki, author of the anti-Nazi manifesto Hitler – Germany's Evil Fate ([2]) ·one of the activists of the Red Kapelle, Harro Schulze-Boysen (1909–1942), etc.);
- view it *indifferently* as a parody and simulacrum (late E. Junger, F. Hilscher (1902–1990), E. von Salomon (1902–1972), etc.).

But in all cases, regardless of their specific attitude towards the third political theory, practically all representatives of the Conservative Revolution interpreted the main thing differently — the subject. All three political ideologies of the Modern era were based on the Cartesian understanding of the subject, whose main properties were considered to be will and reason. But this subject, common to all of them, was given concrete expression in each ideology. Liberalism identified the subject with *the individual,* considering him to be the normative "measure of things." Hence the very morality of liberalism, which consists in demanding the liberation of the individual from all forms of collective identity: religious, ethnic, racial, class (since the end of the 20th century

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1 *Müller van den Broek, A.* The Myth of the Eternal Empire and the Third Reich. Moscow: Veche, 2009.

2 *Niekisch E.* Hitler — ein deutsches Verhängnis. Berlin: Widerstands-Verlag, 1932.

and gender, and finally, in postmodern versions — species, i.e. human).

The subject of Marxism is *class* (two antagonistic classes), which serves as the main agent of history, expressing its laws and dynamics of formation.

The subject of nationalism is *the nation state* (political nation), as in Italian fascism, or *race*, as in Hitler's National Socialism.

But for representatives of the Conservative Revolution, this was not the case at all. For all of them, the subject of political philosophy was something for which there was simply no conceptual place in the Modern era:

- culture (O. Spengler);
- the people (Volk), the spirit (A. Müller van den Broek);
- order (K. Schmitt);
- Dasein (M. Heidegger),
- the heroic worker (E. Jünger), etc.

Such a subject included both rationality and will, as well as contemplation and a sense of the sacred (das Heilige), that is, something *irrational*, holistic, mystical and mythical, relating to the depths of religious experience. Therefore, in the Conservative Revolution, we can see a prototype of what we call the "Fourth Political Theory" [1], i.e., a political philosophy that consciously and consistently builds its topic *outside of Modernity, in opposition to Modernity, overcoming Modernity and refuting it.*

At the same time, representatives of the Conservative Revolution practically unanimously rejected racism, and if they supported National Socialism, they saw in it revolutionary nationalism and a third political theory in a generalised form. Thus, the paths of ideology and political parties in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s diverged significantly.

Ernst Jünger: the gestalt of the

Ernst Jünger was one of the key figures of the Conservative Revolution. He was a participant in the First World War and drew profound existential and philosophical lessons from it. E. Junger describes modern warfare as *a return to the elements* and *a* complete *dehumanisation of existence*, seeing in this the most vivid manifestation of the nihilism of which Nietzsche spoke. The wars of the 20th century destroyed all the illusions of the Enlightenment, placing man, deprived of his qualities, pe-

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1 *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

red face of technology that has completely spiralled out of control. In modern warfare, man loses his cultural content, leaving only *pure will*, as a reflection within the subject of an absolutely cold mechanical and technical objectivity.

Jünger summarised his ideas and reflections in philosophical form in his book The Worker [1], which became the most famous programmatic text of the Conservative Revolution. Here, Jünger develops the concepts *of revolutionary nationalism* as the most left-wing version of the Conservative Revolution. For Jünger, Nietzsche's main lesson was the discovery of the totality of the nihilism of the New Age, from which he sees no way out, especially not in a return to the old times and the ancient way of life (unlike most conservatives). In the face of nihilism, as in war, man is left with only his will, which, according to Jünger, must be affirmed in the construction of a technocratic society, a totalitarian state ruled by an iron dictatorship. Jünger affirms the figure of the Worker as a creative ideal of a being who has no cultural or emotional content whatsoever, except for pure will, from which he creates the reality of a new era. Jünger is convinced that humanity is experiencing the collapse of the bourgeois world, embodied primarily in the concept of the individual. According to Junger, the individual was the normative figure of a civilisation based on rationality and will, but subordinated to the criteria of security and moderation in the form of morality, prudence and sentimentality. The individual subjugated and reduced the scope of will and reason, both in the affirmation of the anarchic personality and in mass society. But the meaning of modernity lies in the fact that these boundaries have gradually blurred and collapsed, and will and reason have gone far beyond the limits of the individual (and the masses), crossing the line of safety and embodying themselves in the phenomenon *of the totality of technology*. In total technology, which goes beyond the dimensions of the individual, Ernst Jünger saw the awakening of the elements, asserting themselves in the fury of steel and fire, wild speed and immeasurable *power* that transcends all boundaries and limits. All this is embodied in the elements of modern warfare, where, according to Junger, the individual has no meaning whatsoever, becoming a purely technical, mechanical and impersonal moment. What replaces the individual and his doubles, multiplied and reflected in the masses, Junger calls the term Gestalt. This is an extra-individual form of the existential organisation of power, coupled with

[1] *Junger, E.* The Worker. Domination and Gestalt. Moscow: Nauka, 2002.

with concepts such as type or style. In our time, the Gestalt is expressed primarily in *the figure of the Worker* (Arbeiter) and also in the Worker State (Arbeitstaat). Jünger does not conceive of the worker as a social or class figure; he is anti-bourgeois, but at the same time he is not a proletarian. He is rather a creature completely free from all human boundaries and consciously committed to the element of technology, to grandiose cycles of ascetic self-overcoming, planetary construction, intense existential activity motivated not by results but by the very fact of participation in the life of steel powers. This is what Junger calls "*total mobilisation*." By this he means the essence of the Worker's activity, directed at the surrounding world with the help of technology. The world consists of elements — merciless and blind. The Worker does not shy away from them, but goes to meet them, gathering all the infinity of human will in his fist, responding to challenge with challenge, blow with blow, power with power. In doing so, the individual completely loses himself in the gestalt of the Worker; the elements erase him, leaving behind — as in war — only the torch of an unyielding, impersonal, and inhuman will.

Jünger calls this position "*heroic* realism," when cruel traits of a new type begin to emerge in a person through the degeneration of a lukewarm bourgeois culture. Jünger observed such transformations on the front lines as experienced soldiers and officers, under fire and in the complex situations of total modern warfare, changed their facial features, gestures, and expressions, acquiring the immobile plasticity of a mask, machines or corpses, and those in whom this was most noticeable became the most effective, fearless and heroic soldiers, capable of coping with impossible tasks. According to Junger, they were thereby elevated to the level of the Gestalt, and the spirit of the Worker began to operate in them.

It was on this principle of the Worker that Jünger proposed to base a new anti-bourgeois and anti-proletarian state, at the centre of which should stand the Gestalt as the highest authority, sorting by its own standards the three basic new classes — people of passive will, the new aristocracy (people of active will) and the highest ascetic rulers, the "guardians," who were as close as possible to the Gestalt in its pure form, that is, personal incarnations of the Worker.

But at the same time, it was Ernst Jünger who wrote the book The Worker [1](Dea Arbeiter), which sets out the foundations of National Socialism.

[1]Junger himself was a participant in the First World War. *Junger, E.* The Worker. Herrschaft und Gestalt. Moscow: Nauka, 2002.

static worldview. Later, Ernst Jünger and a number of other participants in the Conservative Revolution were involved in the conspiracy of Claus von Stauffenberg (1907–1944), which resulted in the failed assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944.

Arthur Moller van den Broek: The Third Reich According to Beyond Hitler

The peculiarity of the ideology of the Conservative Revolution can be traced in the example of Arthur Moller van den Broek, the founder and inspirer of a number of elite patriotic organisations, in particular the "June Club," which included many leading thinkers of Germany in the 1920s. Müller van den Broek was a staunch conservative, romantic, and admirer of the work of Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881), whose translations into German he supervised.

Müller van den Broek was strongly influenced by Nietzsche and set himself the task of constructing a model for the future that would be both a new affirmation of the Teutonic spirit and a refined and sophisticated intellectual breakthrough that took into account all the fundamental scientific, cultural and ideological challenges of the Modern era.

Arthur Møller van den Broek took up Spengler's idea of "young nations" and published a manifesto addressed to US President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) with a radical critique of the Versailles agreements entitled "The Right of Young Nations." The idea that "young nations" should build their own social system without looking back at the old European experience took on a clear political dimension for him. In particular, Müller van den Broek considered *liberal ideology* to be the main evil, which, in his view, embodied the purely *negative* result of European history — the absolutisation of capitalism, materialism, individualism, atheism, i.e. nihilism. Therefore, the new German policy, the main points of which were reflected in the collective collection of conservative revolutionaries "New Front," published in 1922 in Berlin, had to be based *on absolute anti-liberalism*, since liberalism embodies everything that is completely and radically opposed to the German spirit. Müller van den Broek reflected this position in his programmatic article "Liberalism Kills Nations."

But the complete formulation of Müller van den Broek's worldview as expressed in his main work, The Third Kingdom or The Third Empire

, where he presented the ideas of the Conservative Revolution in their most systematic form.

The first section of The Third Empire contains an interpretation of what revolution means to the author and, specifically, what the Conservative Revolution is. For Moller van den Broke, unlike the old conservatives, revolution is not a "conspiracy of nihilists" or "total destruction," but rather *the rise of the creative forces* of the people. The people rise up in revolution only when the existing socio-political conditions run counter to their deep-seated interests and historical intuitions. Therefore, in a revolution, it is always necessary to distinguish between destructive and constructive aspects. Moreover, unlike dogmatic materialistic Marxism, the constructive aspect should be identified on the basis of the identity of each particular people. Hence the conclusion: a revolution must be a popular revolution, that is, a "national" revolution. Arthur Møller van den Broek writes:

> We want to link revolutionary ideas with conservative ones, which keep popping up again and again. We want to push this Conservative Revolution until we get the conditions we need to live. We want to win [the] revolution!

Here we clearly see a direct continuation of Nietzsche's views. Revolution is nothing; it overthrows God. Now there is only one thing left to do: defeat nothingness. And this is within the power of the Superhuman. It is in this vein that Müller van den Broek conceives the movement of the Young Conservatives. He sees that Nietzsche's words are addressed to him and to the German intellectuals of the new generation. And he seeks not to fight the revolution, as reactionaries and old conservatives traditionally do, but *to lead* it, to make it *German.*

The second section of The Third Empire is devoted to socialism. Here, Müller van den Broek proves the thesis he put forward in the epigraph: "Every nation has its own socialism." Accordingly, socialism is not taken as something universal and dogmatic, but as a principle *of the united association of society around a great idea*, not for the achievement of base material goals, but for the realisation of the impossible, the ideal, the spiritual horizon. Each nation sees this horizon differently. Consequently, it is necessary to theoretically substantiate and practically organise German socialism, Russian socialism, Islamic socialism, etc.

[1] *Möller van den Broek, A.* The Myth of the Eternal Empire and the Third Reich.

[2] , ibid., p. 132.

Here, Moller van den Broek provides a detailed critique of Marxism, rejecting its explanation of history solely through economics. He writes:

> The economy is a superstructure, while ideas, power and the state are the foundation. History cannot be dependent on the economy, but it creates the economy. Therefore, the economy is dependent on history. The economy is only a consequence; the cause is historicity[1].

This becomes the basis of spiritual, rather than materialistic, socialism, which, rejecting capitalism just as Marxism does, and even to a greater extent, conceives of a new society based on a metaphysical foundation linked to the historical identity and culture of each people. At the end of the section, Moller van den Broek shows that socialism should not be the meaning of building a normative state.

> German socialism is not the primary task of the Third Reich. It must be its foundation[2].

If Müller van den Broek accepts both revolution and socialism in a special, neo-conservative interpretation, he rejects liberalism *radically and completely*. From his point of view, "liberalism is the freedom to have no convictions, but to assert that this approach is the main conviction" [(3)]. This is where its nihilistic potential lies: it detaches people from the political dimension, turning them exclusively towards material things, the economy, everything petty and insignificant, which makes small people even smaller and more insignificant. Möller van den Broek writes:

> Liberalism leads either to stupidity or to crime[4].

"Stupidity" is the reduction of a person to a consumption machine, to a device in which everything human disappears — the soul, life, nobility, ideals, spirit. "Crime" is the presentation of this stupidity as the highest virtue, value, and goal.

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[1] *Möller van den Broek, A.* The Myth of the Eternal Empire and the Third Reich. P. 145.
[2] , ibid., p. 171.
[3] , ibid., p. 172.
[4] , ibid., p. 181.

> Liberalism undermined culture. It destroyed religion. It destroyed the Fatherland. It was the suicide of humanity.

Liberalism is the last word of the West, of Europe, from the moment when Europeans (first and foremost the French and English, *followed by* the Germans) embarked on the path of the Enlightenment. Müller van den Broek views the Age of Enlightenment, when liberalism emerged and gradually became its most monstrous and totalitarian expression, in an entirely negative light. It was an age of degeneration, lies and nihilism. Having studied the German Logos in depth, Möller van den Broek sees that in its basic parameters it is completely incompatible with the Enlightenment, and therefore the problem is posed as follows: *either Germany or the Enlightenment.* Hence his sharp and unambiguous call:

> The struggle against the Enlightenment that we are beginning will be a struggle against liberalism, which will be waged on all fronts.

Herein lies the main difference between liberalism and socialism and revolution: while the latter can be reinterpreted in a German context, liberalism cannot be reinterpreted in this way. Therefore, it must be destroyed in the most ruthless manner possible. This is the most important moment in the entire course of the Conservative Revolution: politically and ideologically, it hierarchises not only its own values, but also the ideas it opposes — and the main enemy of the conservative revolutionary is precisely liberalism and the Enlightenment era that gave rise to it.

In the fourth section of The Third Empire, Møller van den Broek analyses the concept of democracy and, as in the case of socialism and revolution, finds positive aspects in it. "Democracy is the participation of the people in their own destiny." This is how Møller van den Broek defines the essence of democracy, thereby affirming his organic, holistic understanding of it. According to Müller van den Broek, the subject of democracy can only be *the people as a historical whole,* not a collection of individuals (as in liberalism). Therefore, liberal democracy is the antithesis of democracy, a fake (Müller van den Broek calls it a "liberal chameleon"). Liberalism does not allow the people to participate in their own destiny simply because it denies the very existence of the people, breaking them down into individual atoms and then artificially reassembling them, like stuffed animals that have been killed beforehand. Therefore, for a conservative revolutionary it is fundamentally important

[1] *Möller van den Broek, A.* The Myth of the Eternal Empire and the Third Reich. P. 211.
[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Ethnosociology.

defend democracy in its organic sense and at the same time fight against its liberal interpretation.

Müller van den Broek accepts democracy as a positive value: "Democracy is an expression of the self-respect of the people," he writes. Furthermore, "The will to democracy is the will to political self-awareness of the people. And to their national self-assertion." The introduction of the concept of will — *the will* to democracy — transforms democracy into a positive value, the defence and affirmation of which is the goal of the conservative-revolutionary programme.

From the point of view of the structure of politics, Arthur Møller van den Broek's work conveys the essence of the third political theory more accurately and completely than the "official" ideology of the Nazi regime.

Werner Sombart: against the spirit of capitalism

Another thinker close to the Conservative Revolution movement and also strongly influenced by Nietzsche, Werner Sombart[3] focused his attention on sociological and economic issues of German identity.

Distinguishing the bourgeoisie as a separate sociological type ("haggler"), Sombart, in a separate work, "Haggler and Hero" [4], contrasts it with an alternative sociological type — *the "hero*." The hero type, in his view, dominated Europe until the advent of the modern era and was most clearly manifested in German identity. However, these two types do not simply replace each other chronologically, but coexist in a state of *irreconcilable war*. This is the basis of fundamental dualism. Sombart writes:

> The discussion constantly revolved around one alternative: a merchant mired in his own swamp — he could be called whatever you like: commercialism, mammonoism, materialism, sportism, comfortism, etc. — or a hero rising to the heights of idealism. These are the names given to God and the Devil, Ormuzd and Ahriman, by modern man.

Sombart emphasises that this choice affects *modern* man in particular, constituting his main dilemma: capitalism or communism.

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[1] *Möller van den Broek, A.* The Myth of the Eternal Empire and the Third Reich. P. 226.
[2] , ibid., p. 226.
[3] *Sombart, W.* Collected Works: In 3 vols. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2005.
[4] *Sombart, W.* Merchants and Heroes // Sombart, W. Collected Works. Vol. 2.
[5] Ibid. P. 82–83.

(i.e., for the haggling merchants) or against capitalism (which means, one way or another, for the heroes).

According to Zombart, only *war* is possible between a merchant and a hero, since the domination of one type over the other means the social and moral enslavement of the opponent.

He writes about this sharply and decisively:

> The only relationship that now connects us to the fundamental peoples of Europe is the relationship of war, and the only important task for us for some time now has been victory — complete and decisive[1].

Sombart devoted one of his last works, written entirely in the spirit of the Conservative Revolution, to the theorisation of German socialism [2].

Sombart's appeal to the Germans is a call to give the Anglo-Saxons and the spirit of capitalism they embody a final battle.

> We want to have a strong German people and a strong German state; we are preserving and growing within our organic limits. And if we need to expand our territory so that our growing population has the space it needs to develop, we will take as much land as we deem necessary. Our foot will also set foot in those lands that appear important to us for strategic reasons, because of the need to keep our borders inviolable; if this leads to the strengthening of our power on Earth, we will establish our naval bases in Dover, Malta and Suez. And that is all. We are not striving for any kind of "expansion." For we have more important things to do. We need to develop our inner spiritual essence, we need to keep the German soul pure, we need to ensure that our enemy, the mercantile spirit, cannot penetrate our feelings in any way — neither from within nor from without. And this task is very responsible and difficult. For we know what is at stake: Germany, as the last barrier holding back the flood of filth pouring out of commercialism, which has either already overwhelmed or will inevitably overwhelm all other nations in the future, since none of them has been protected from the advancing threat by the shield of a heroic worldview, from which, as we have seen, can offer protection and salvation([3]) .

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1 *Sombart, W.* Merchants and Heroes. P. 97.

2 *Sombart W.* Deutscher Sozialismus. Berlin: Buchholz&Weisswange, 1934.

3 *Sombart, W.* Torgashi i geroi. Pp. 101–102.



The third political theory in historical context

The atypical nature of the third political theory

Although the third political theory acquired a more or less systematic form in the 20th century in such phenomena as fascism and National Socialism, these movements themselves are quite eclectic. They contain various elements of classical nationalism, the clear influence of Hobbes, realism, the glorification of the secular state, economic protectionism and mercantilism, and sometimes extreme xenophobia. These are some of the constants of nationalism, which, however, became part of a full-fledged ideology rather late. These aspects correspond to the paradigm of Modernity and are fully compatible with bourgeois attitudes. However, the influence of the Romantics, German classical philosophy with its profound metaphysics and paradoxical dialectic, as well as the completely revolutionary and unclassifiable ideas of Nietzsche, who called for the overcoming of both Tradition and the nihilism that emerged after its end through a turn to the Superhuman, as well as traditionalism, transformed revolutionary nationalism into something atypical and extravagant that cannot be completely reduced to political Modernism.

The third political theory, which flared up briefly and subjugated almost all of Europe by force or persuasion, disappeared fairly quickly under the onslaught of the other two ideologies of Modernity, which were much more orthodox in terms of their conformity to the philosophy of the Mother, the "chora," the spirit of atomism, individualism and materialism.

PART 4. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF POSTMODERNISM

Chapter 1. Political Philosophy Postmodernism

Paradigms of Tradition and Modernity exhaust (almost) all forms of the Political

Up to this point, we have examined the "model range" of political philosophies and paradigms related to the paradigm of Tradition and the paradigm of Modernity, that is, practically all areas of Politica Aeterna corresponding to the three types of being in Plato's "Timaeus" and many other types of triadic taxonomies applied to ontology, epistemology, cosmology, anthropology, and politics. Thus, we can consider that we have a complete (albeit schematic) picture of the metaphysical and philosophical foundations of political systems in traditional, sacred, religious societies and of the philosophical premises of modern political philosophy. We have also examined the three main ideological versions in which Modernity manifests itself: liberalism (the first political theory), communism (the second political theory) and nationalism (the third political theory), and their semantic structures. Each of the three political theories of Modernity includes many different versions, combinations and combinations: for example, liberalism plus socialism are ideologies that are formally opposed. But in the phenomenon of European social democracy or left-wing liberalism in general, which in particular forms the basis of many centre-left parties, such as the contemporary Democratic Party in the United States, we see precisely this convergence. Similarly, there are intermediate versions between socialism and classical nationalism (e.g., national socialism). There is a significant segment of political ideologies that lie between nationalism and liberalism (national liberalism), and it is this ideology that dominates, for example, in the Republican Party in the United States.

Each of the three theories has nuances, details, and separate currents within the macro-families of modern political ideologies. A detailed study of these nuances constitutes the discipline known as political science. For Politica Aeterna, it is important to show

how they relate to the anthropological and ontological basis of modern political philosophy, to the ideas of political Platonism and Aristotelianism, and what is the underlying matrix of these political families. All three political theories (liberalism, communism, and nationalism) belong to the political philosophy of the Mother; they are based on an atomistic materialist worldview, anthropological individualism, "progress" and "development," and accordingly view the state as something built *from the bottom up* on the basis of a social contract. This fundamentally distinguishes them from models such as Aristotle's sacred empire and Plato's ideal state.

Among the political paradigms of traditional society (Premodern), there is a huge variety of structures and forms that can be traced back to Platonism and Aristotelianism, but even here we can find many versions, nuances, and mixed models. We saw this in part when analysing political systems based on different monotheistic religions. If we take a broader context, including the sacred civilisations of Antiquity and the East, the diversity of sacred political forms increases many times over.

At the same time, everything that pertains to Modern politics is strictly and sharply distinguished from that which pertains to the paradigm of Tradition, and between the politics of Democritus (the political philosophy of the Mother), on the one hand, and the politics of Plato (the political philosophy of the Father) and Aristotle (the political philosophy of the Son), on the other hand, there is a strictly defined metaphysical boundary that sharply separates Modernity from Tradition and constitutes the key to deciphering the complete picture of the Political in the general context of Politica Aeterna. Thus, the common feature of all three political ideologies of Modernity is desacralisation, secularity, atomism, materialism, progressivism, strictly opposed to the sacred, holistic, spiritual politics of traditional societies based on verticality and hierarchy, on the transcendence of a higher power (and therefore the source of authority), which can be expressed either in the idea of the immutability of politics, or in the recognition of cycles, or in the degradation of political systems that gradually lose their connection with the model, but in no way in progress, the very concept of which is incompatible with Tradition.

However, we mentioned that a third paradigm is added to the two basic paradigms of society — Tradition (Premodern) and Modern — namely, Postmodern.

— Postmodernism [1]. This may cause confusion. If all types of politics are exhausted by three macro-families reflecting Plato's three types of being, then there is no ontological basis left for another paradigm. This is true, but in order to understand postmodernism, we must turn to the metaphysical origins of modernism itself, which, from the point of view of dialectical ontology Plato's Parmenides, already in its foundations, belongs to the realm *of pseudology* or non-being, falsely presented as being. This is precisely what should be understood by the "nihilism" of Modernity: by proclaiming the atom as the constitutive basis of reality, modern physics, adopting the conceptual model of Democritus, cannot find anything "indivisible," while in society, liberal fanaticism in the liberation of the individual gradually leads to his liberation from all properties (collective identity — religion, class, then nation, gender, and ultimately humanity itself), transitioning to the individual. In the early stages of Modernity, its pseudo-logical nature is not explicitly stated. On the contrary, it seems that Modernity deals with reality — including human reality (humanism) — while Tradition dealt with "chimeras." But gradually, scepticism about traditional society and its axioms began to spread to Modernity itself and the values it proclaimed — rationalism, materialism, secularism, equality, democracy, etc. which led in late Modernity to an involuntary agreement with traditionalists (long since excluded as a reference group for contemporary society) that Modernity, in the end, has no reliable foundations — neither in thought nor in its analysis of the surrounding world — and represents a cold nihilism cloaked in humanistic rhetoric. Thus, in the course of late Modernism's critical reflection on itself and its premises, a new philosophical zone gradually emerged, elevated to a new — third — paradigm and given the name "Postmodernism."

Postmodernism does not denote a new realm beyond the three types of existence. It merely draws attention to the lower limit of the philosophy of the Mother, to the deepest level of the "chora," the "matter," pointing to what lies even lower, in the realm of the sub-material, where the attention of not only the philosophers of the Tradition but also the bearers of the Modern paradigm in its classical form did not venture. This realm does not correspond to some new — fourth — dimension, another type of existence. From the point of view of Politica

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

Aeterena is still the same realm of the third—material—principle. But this principle itself is a pseudo-logical instance which, when taken as something autonomous and self-sufficient, turns out to be identical to "nothingness," which refers us back to the insightful Democritus and his basic pair , i.e., "nothingness" and its indefinable dialectical invariant — the atom. Modernity is already nihilism, and therefore the logos it constitutes is bastardised; according to Plotinus, it is a "lying logos." Consequently, one can continue the vector of pseudology even deeper into the realm of nothingness, beyond the limit at which Modernity itself stops, for fear of losing its rhetorical persuasiveness. According to Plotinus, matter inspires existential horror. The soul can cope with it only when its terrifying truth, that is, the total coldness of its nihilism, is hidden. When the shell of formed matter disintegrates, the bottom ice of being reveals itself. This is the transition of nihilism from the implicit to the explicit. This transition is called "postmodernism," which should be located within matter and, conditionally, at its lower boundary. This boundary creates a special topology, since, according to Plotinus, the atom is unattainable for the Mind. It is postulated by the "lying logos" as a concept ([1]), and immersion in its comprehension leads to the extinction of the mind. But the complete extinction of the mind is impossible; it can exist as a striving towards this unattainable limit — just as it is impossible to discover a pure atom or a pure individual — that would be the end of consciousness. Consequently, only a progressive approach to this limit, a gravitation towards it, is possible, but never its attainment. The lower limit of matter is insurmountable, but at this very boundary a special pseudo-logical ontology arises, even more "false" than the materialistic ontology of Modernity. Immersion in it breaks the familiar proportions and scale (as in quantum mechanics or astrophysics) and creates bizarre borderline symmetries in which non-being plays with itself.

From the perspective of the Politica Aeterna model, postmodernism is a borderline phenomenon of modernism, but from the perspective of social, cultural, and political cycles, it can be accepted as an independent paradigm. Postmodernism is both something independent, if we give ontological status to the lower limits of matter and the extravagant images it generates, and a paradigmatic addition to Modernism, its logical continuation and pseudo-logical refinement. In Post-

[1] In a sense, any concept is nothing more than a lying logos.

Modern lies become explicit and grotesquely recognised, while nihilism transforms from a hidden "truth" into a synonym for "progress," breaking the rhetoric of early Modernism and tearing off the masks of its own pseudo-logic. At the same time, postmodernism is not a belated reaction to tradition, but a bold, self-revealing step by the deepest and most avant-garde strand within modernism itself. Modernism becomes so strong, powerful and triumphant that it can afford to turn into Postmodernism without fear of a reaction from the backward and burdened masses of the world, weighed down by numerous archaic traits.

The subject and object of materialism: the sole , and its property

Postmodernism is a special socio-philosophical paradigm that represents the limit reached by modernism. Modernism operates with materiality, facts, objects, individuals, and presents epistemological abstractions as basic data. In Aristotelianism and Platonism, this is not being, not a phenomenon, but only a speculative limit of the degradation of the spirit, just as an atom is a certain conventional quantity of the disintegration of wholeness, but not something whole. In Modernism, matter is taken as an "obvious" given, as a certain ontological phenomenon. In modern political philosophy, matter and atomicity are represented as individuals, objects, things, prices, and society. Modernity believes that everything conceptual that it recognises — the market mechanism, wealth, class, nation, nature, society, the state, the world of things and objects — exists, that is, has unconditional being. Consensus on materiality is the common denominator of all three political theories of modernity.

This materialistic worldview brings together two fundamental principles of modern philosophy. René Descartes described these as the "subject" and the "object." The subject is an individual human being, while the object is an individual thing. Traditional political philosophy does not recognise either the subject or the object as introduced by Descartes. This is because there is a deity acting above the subject, and the world is created by God. Accordingly, there is always *a third instance* above the subject and the object — God — and the subject and the object are not the ultimate measure of things.

In modern political philosophy, on the contrary, we are dealing with this fundamental, basic dualism: the subject is the individual, in politics the citizen, and the object in the external world is (part-

*property (*individual in liberalism, collective in socialism, corporate in fascism). This theme is very well described in the work of the anarchist Max Stirner (1806–1856) "The Ego and Its Own" ([1]).What all modern political philosophy deals with is "the ego and its own," "the individual and private property." Marxism attempts to overcome this dualism, which is why the return to the proletarian class leads to the socialisation of property and the replacement of individual consciousness with class consciousness, but this is still an antithesis to the thesis of "the unique and his property." It is no coincidence that Marx and Engels in The German Ideology ([2])mocked Stirner so thoroughly and at such length.

The attitude towards property lies at the heart of modern legal philosophy, which primarily regulates the relationship between the individual and his property, i.e. the subject and object in their political dimension. In capitalist society, this is absolutised, and private property becomes the measure of the individual subject. Marxism opposes both the individual and property, but in practice this boils down to the formula
"the unique and not his property," which underlies the doctrine of class struggle. The struggle against private property constitutes the programme of Marxism, but the unique (the individual, the subject) is conceived here dialectically. Capitalists represent a collective subject or false subject, which is not truly free precisely because of its dead attachment to property, which becomes its fate. In order to liberate oneself, it is necessary to take as a basis a subject that is deprived of property, but at the same time deprived of self-consciousness, since capitalism projects false consciousness onto it, effectively turning it into a docile machine. The proletariat must awaken as an oppressed subject, realise its subjectivity, overthrow the pseudo-subjectivity of the bourgeois class, and distribute property among all members of the working class, move towards the construction of communism, where the individual will finally be freed from the chains of the object, having conquered matter and nature, and this is possible precisely because man is matter and nature, only the pinnacle of its development. Thus, in medieval epistemology, man could understand the world only through the divine mind. For Marxists, however, knowledge of matter is given only to those who are matter themselves, and those who are most material among the material, that is, the proletariat.

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[1] *Stirner, M.* The Ego and Its Own. Kharkiv: Osnova, 1994.

[2] *Marx, K., Engels, F.* German Ideology // Marx, K., Engels, F. Works: In 50 volumes. Vol. 3. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1955.

It fully accepts the subject of Modernity and bourgeois nationalism, merely placing "the unique and his property" in a national context, contrasting them with "the unique with their property" in the form of another nation-state; the individual is merely placed within a national framework. They limit the freedom of action of the unique in relation to his property if it goes beyond national borders.

Postmodernism is not satisfied with the achievements of liberalism

Postmodernism is a desire to go even deeper into the essence of matter than Modernism was able to do. It is a kind *of hyper-materialism.* If liberalism, communism and nationalism are *naive materialism,* then Postmodernism seeks to develop and purify the philosophy of Matter even further. Let us recall Plato's metaphor: Mother Earth, Mother Nurturer. If political modernity brings Heaven down to Earth, gods down to people, the transcendent to the immanent, then postmodernity seeks to penetrate deep into the Earth. This is a leap into the underground world, a desire not just to descend to the surface, but to bury oneself as deeply as possible in materiality.

On the one hand, postmodernism continues the inertia of modernism, because modernism is a movement towards desacralisation, immanentisation, detranscendentalisation and the desire to accept matter as a basic, fundamental ontological argument.

Postmodernists begin to attack Modernism from the point of view of "even more Modern," despite the fact that Modernism has already taken a number of decisive steps against the philosophy of the Father and against the philosophy of the Son. Modernism killed God, abolished the transcendent, reduced Plato to nothing, and ridiculed Aristotle. The book by liberal ideologist Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, is a manifesto devoted mainly to criticising Plato, Aristotle and Hegel. For Popper, Plato is a fascist, Aristotle is a fascist, and Hegel is a fascist. Or a communist, which is equally bad for liberals. It is important to note that this is not simply outrage at the excesses of historical Soviet communism or historical German Nazism (the Gulag and Auschwitz, mass repression, genocide, totalitarianism, etc.). Popper attacks Plato·Aristotle, and Hegel as political philosophers of history belonging to a different species of being. He criticises

[1] "My analysis and criticism will be directed against the totalitarian tendencies of Plato's political philosophy." *Popper, K.* The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume 1. P. 66.

It is the roots that need to be addressed, not the consequences, especially since these are not the right consequences. Another liberal author, Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), convincingly demonstrated that totalitarianism is not a consequence of traditional society, but arose specifically in the modern era.

Accordingly, postmodernism asserts the following: after the dismantling and overthrow of Plato and Aristotle, it is necessary to move forward and *overcome modernity itself*. What previously seemed to be the limit of descent into the worlds of political philosophy of the Mother (liberalism, the subject, materialism, the One and its property) actually, according to postmodernists, carries too much of the "masculine principle," "verticality," "sacredness" and "ontology."

Postmodernists argue: let's continue to atomise what we atomised in Modernism. Let's look at what the individual and property are. Are they really indivisible atoms, individuals? Have we reached real matter? Have we reached the horizon of complete immanence? We have the triumph of reason over other forms. This is a vertical topic that reflects the old ideology. Yes, we have transferred the state to the level of the individual. In modern political philosophy, the polis itself is reduced to atomistic politics; the polis-state is also congruent, homologous to man (as in the paradigm of Tradition), but now in his individual status. Hence the concept of the "state-man" arises — the individual becomes a state unto himself, and the state is abolished. This is the limit of the ideology of human rights, or civil society, globalisation, progress, humanism, and the complete triumph of the market over politics. But still, postmodernists say, the individual human being is still too "vertical," too "sacred."

In the course of the political philosophy of Modernity, civil society replaces political society, the remnants of class and national consciousness are eliminated, liberalism prevails on a global scale, and we are dealing only with the individual, without any collective characteristics. This individual is the polis of the completed Modern era.

Here, postmodernists say: yes, in Modernity we sharply narrowed the scale, we moved from being to the individual, from politics to the human being, from the state to the specific citizen. But how do we conceptualise this citizen? Will we not encounter Platonism and Aristotelianism that have illegally infiltrated our progressive liberal modern worldview? After all, in humans

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[1] *Arendt, H.* The Origins of Totalitarianism. Moscow: TsentrKom, 1996.

Modernity still has some kind of goal (and this is already violence and suspiciously reminiscent of Aristotle with his "telos," "natural place" and "entelechy") and the domination of reason over feelings and desires is recognised (and this is already suspiciously close to Plato and the metaphysics of the divine Mind).

In the first stage, the liberating practice of modern political philosophy called for reducing all political, ontological, and epistemological instances to the individual. And this was indeed achieved — all the foundations of traditional society were destroyed, all vertical structures were dismantled, all forms of transcendence were eliminated, and everything was reduced to the One and its property.

Although postmodernism sets the liberation of the individual from all restrictions as its main task, which is also the main goal of liberalism, and liberalism asserts that it "brings freedom and equality of opportunity to all," postmodernists are critical of classical liberalism. From their point of view, liberalism retains too many masculine patriarchal traits. Despite all the immanence and materialism of liberalism, postmodernists find it "too transcendentalist"; it believes too strongly in the unity of the individual; it pays too much attention to the structure of the vertical subject and is too attentive to private property. Yes, these are atomistic concepts that are accepted as reality in the spirit of modern pseudo-science, but nevertheless — as is always the case with atoms — it is wrong to take a conventional "atom" for the real thing, and it is impossible to stop the chiselling that moves towards the lower limit of matter. The mind must become increasingly weak, evading oppositions and differences; the lying logos must lie more and more subtly; and all reality — both subject and object — must gradually dissipate further and further, revealing one subatomic level after another. The mistake of liberalism, in the eyes of postmodernists, is that it takes as a real individual someone who is a convention, an approximation, merely an intended vector. The individual is a goal, a task, and therefore, in the search for atomic subjectivity, it is necessary to destroy not only large structures such as the forms of the political in traditional society, but also the structures of modernity itself, built on the ruins of transcendence. Therefore, it is necessary to move in two directions: to continue to liberate the individual from all forms of collective identity (in this case, from gender), and to shift attention to sub-individual levels, and sometimes even to extra-individual levels (this is the programme of post-humanism and "deep ecology").

The same applies to objects (in particular, social objects of ownership). Objects are not atoms, but rather "bills of exchange for atoms." They must also be divided into their constituent parts. Money is a fundamental step in this direction. It breaks down any thing, acting as property atoms, which are absolutised in capitalism. But we cannot stop there. Money itself, like the elements of wealth, must increasingly move from reality to digitality and virtuality. And with the abolition of the classical liberal subject, the object must also be dispersed (evaporated).

Postmodernists often refer to Marxism and its dialectics. Capitalism is modern, but it has objective limits. Marx sought to overcome them, and although he was defeated at the level of political history, the dialectical paradoxes of his teaching remain attractive. But in postmodernism, Marxism is no longer a doctrine of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It becomes "cultural Marxism," that is, it continues Marx's strategy of solidarity with the bourgeois order, but only in order to overcome it. Thus "cultural Marxism" welcomes the liberal obsession with liberating the individual from all forms of collective identity, but only in order to go one step further and fall through the individual, descending (sliding) to the subatomic and sub-subjective levels of man and, accordingly, of the world. In a sense, postmodernism replaces Marxism in post-industrial conditions. Marx sought to overcome 19th-century capitalism in its industrial phase. But in the 20th and early 21st centuries, capitalism in its post-industrial phase has surpassed itself (albeit not without the help of Marxism). Thus, the vector of classical Marx was taken up by postmodernists, while his methods and specific prescriptions in history proved to be either dead ends (this is how postmodernists assess the deviation of Soviet regimes, and especially the USSR, following Trotskyist analysis and European social democracy) or incorrect (the proletarian revolution never took place in developed European bourgeois societies), and therefore had to be revised and discarded.

However, postmodernism cannot be equated with 21st-century Marxism, as many aspects of liberalism and neoliberalism have been integrated into it. The starting point here is not class, but rather the bourgeois individual, but — and this is where it differs from liberalism — he is not glorified as the crown of progress, but is in turn overcome through new, post-human concepts — the network, rhizome, cyborg, chimera, artificial intelligence, etc.

The dissipation of the individual and the dissolution of the object : towards the fractal

Postmodern political philosophy recognises that a certain goal of historical progress has been achieved and, accordingly, the Modern programme has been realised. The father has been killed, executed (Nietzsche says, "God is dead. We killed him — you and I!"[1]). The son has been eliminated (Aristotle's worldview was ridiculed and dispelled at the dawn of the modern era by Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, etc.). From now on, we live in the bosom of the great Mother. This creates a feeling of comfort. Living in a giant techno-social womb is cosy and safe. In the West, history is over (and where it is not over, we can always help with
with "humanitarian bombings"). The global tasks of building the political philosophy of Modernity have been completed in practice.

But it is precisely at this point that Western philosophers note: yes, we have liberated the individual from all (or almost all) forms of collective identity, with feminism, gender politics and the promotion of the LGBT community as the final touches; yes, a market society based on private property has been built on a global scale. But don't you think, say the postmodernists, that we have simply transferred the same Platonic-Aristotelian vertical schemes to the individual and to private property? Don't you see in this relationship between "the one and his property" a hidden Platonism once again? Again, hierarchy, again a certain wholeness that is constructed "from top to bottom," from consciousness to the body, again hidden and veiled, but still the domination of the subject over the object. Isn't Modernism itself a kind of repackaged Tradition? Haven't we ended up with what we were fighting against?

Answering these questions in the affirmative, postmodernists say: the individual (if we take the individual as a human being as he is) is the same vertical concept, and private property is also a concept that is vertical, implying an authoritative pair of the owner and the property. And this is not sufficiently material, egalitarian, and atomistic. It is necessary to continue the process of immanentisation, uprooting the remnants of transcendence that have penetrated the immanence of Modernity.

This has led to a new round of atomisation: since the atom is a conceptual construct, we must move forward not only in science, discovering ever smaller particles and ever more extravagant symmetries and quantum laws, but also in politics, demonstrating...

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[1] *Nietzsche, F.* The Gay Science (la gaya scienza). P. 440.

by destroying individuals and their private property. The only thing that is unique to Stirner, his property, as well as the things themselves, turned out to be not the limit of the destruction of holistic ensembles, but only a stage in such destruction. This means that these are not yet true concepts, not genuine atoms and individuals, but an agglomeration of particles that live their own lives. In physics, this idea is vividly represented by the fractal theories of Benoit Mandelbrot (1924–2010). He begins his fractal theory with the observation that there are no straight lines in nature. A straight line is something that exists in our minds, but in nature it is always slightly curved. Or take volume — it is also three-dimensional only in our minds; in nature, it is three-dimensional only to a certain extent. Similarly, a point — as a line of zero length, a circle of zero diameter or an area of zero volume — does not exist. From this, Mandelbrot concludes that a line in nature is two-dimensional, a plane is three-dimensional, and volume is four-dimensional. To describe this ontology, Mandelbrot introduces the concept of fractals — strange particles that actually fall outside the geometry of our consciousness but approach the geometry of nature, seen, as it were, "from the point of view of matter."

The explanation for this can be found in the early stages of the formation of the scientific worldview of the Modern Age. At that time, materialist philosophers mixed together what Aristotle had strictly separated: logic, mathematics and geometry (which reflected the truths of the spirit, the gods and the world mind) on the one hand, and physics and ontology on the other. It would be more correct to study physics with the help of rhetoric, which is not as precise from the point of view of logic, but much closer to nature. This is precisely what Aristotle himself does when he defines a separate thing (one being, ὅν), that is, an ontic unit, not as a logical unit, but as a dual pair of matter (ὕλη) and form (μορφή). That is, a thing is a rhetorical figure; it is conditionally (from a logical point of view) one, but physically it is dual. Modern physics erased this distinction, insisting on the unity of the physical-mathematical approach, and thereby undermined the obvious coherence of its ontology. Mandelbrot, as well as the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics before him, which questioned some of the postulates of modern physics, merely encountered the consequences of this philosophical aberration, but did not dare to overturn the entire monumental edifice of modernist pseudo-science, which had gained a monopoly in the scientific world, by attempting to

[1] *Mandelbrot, B.* Fractal Geometry of Nature. Moscow: Institute of Computer Research, 2002.

somehow correct the situation, gradually exposing the fictitious nature of all modern science. But this palliative only gave rise to increasingly exotic theories, unable to renounce the legacy of Modernism, but no longer satisfied with its epistemological possibilities.

Accordingly, fractal theory and natural physics can serve as a metaphor for the strategy that representatives of Postmodernism have applied to humans, society, and philosophy. Neither atoms in nature nor individuals in society exist as such. They are conceptual. But this does not mean that we should abandon them; it only means that we should not stop at what has been achieved, but move forward — deeper into matter, dividing it further and further — until the unattainable limit is reached. In the course of this movement of dispersion, dizzying symmetries will arise, phantoms of new microcosms, possibilities for virtual and genetic engineering, and thus the acquisition of new degrees of freedom, albeit partly at the expense of those who could have enjoyed this freedom, since in this process they were gradually erased or at least transformed — human beings themselves, turning into social fractals.

, the cancerous tumour of civilisation

Postmodernism changes not so much the meaning and direction of modernism as the rhetoric used to describe it. Modernism presented itself as a triumphant rise, a movement upward toward new goals — essentially, a titanic assault on the heavens. Postmodernists sharply change the tone and present the same vector as dissipation, dispersion, fragmentation, in a sense as decay that loses its pathos but retains the semantics of the basic processes of civilisation.

Thus, the human individual disintegrates, his subjectivity disperses into a multitude of momentary or more stable, but still ephemeral, selves. This is how mental disorders, and above all schizophrenia, where multiplicity is a characteristic symptom, are valorised. The philosophical meaning of schizophrenia in postmodernism becomes a programme.

The object also disintegrates. Physics breaks particles down into smaller and smaller dimensions, revealing completely new laws and rules at the quantum level that radically change our understanding of the structures of matter and reality as a whole. Reality disintegrates.

Property, which was previously fixed as rigidly as the atomic framework of the "single," also begins to dissipate. In the past, people had money in the form of piles of gold coins, then in the form of banknotes (as a promise of gold coins). Gold itself as an equivalent was a step towards abstraction, towards the decomposition of wealth as things. Next comes its dissipation. But this is not the end of the dusting: digital money is introduced — this is already a promise to receive paper money, which in itself is a promise to receive gold.

The structure of payment cards is such that if even a very small percentage of cardholders simultaneously attempt to withdraw their savings in the form of banknotes, the entire system will collapse, since ATMs and bank branches are only supplied with banknotes for a small fraction of the total amount involved in electronic payments. If you ask for gold in exchange for banknotes, you will not be given any, because since the abolition of the Bretton Woods agreements, no currency is officially backed by gold.

This is how the object dissipates. Both the "unique" itself and its property are subject to increasing erosion. Each time, an even lower, even more subatomic level is found, to which the former atom/individual is offered to descend. Thus, the support of the subject and object becomes less and less noticeable, more and more unstable and transparent.

The very unity of the human being and the object forms and then disintegrates again, suspended in virtuality, often without any real guarantee that promises will be kept.

In such a situation, the global economy faces a growing threat of a "bubble" — new
"valuable" securities (which are not really that valuable, since they are just promises to pay someone something at some point in the future). Then options and hedging transactions are introduced for these "securities," followed by options on options ([1]) and so gradually an economy emerges where the volume of financial liabilities exceeds the world's gross domestic product many times over. Financial documents, including debts, debt sales, debt repayments, debt penalties, penalty repayments, loans and credits, exceed the value of all goods on earth by a thousandfold. Therefore, if a microscopic percentage of securities holders want to get rid of them and get the money itself, the system will completely collapse — the dollar will collapse, obligations between states will collapse, the economy will collapse, and production will collapse. That

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The End of Economics. St. Petersburg: Amphora, 2010.

The enormous financial bubble that the global economy is currently operating with has nothing to do with the rather limited, insignificant amount of all the earth's wealth, which has been overvalued, over-mortgaged, spent and completely withdrawn from the future. Humanity has already consumed goods for several decades ahead. There is nothing ahead but serious population growth and a huge "soap bubble." But to sustain this, the global liberal system continues to extol progress and development, conjuring up the mass consciousness with myths of "endless growth."

The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007), who was interested in phenomenology and even postmodern metaphysics, but kept his distance from it, considered cancer to be a metaphor for postmodern civilisation. He wrote:

> Things are like they have cancer: the uncontrolled growth of non-structural elements within them, which gives them their self-confidence, is a kind of tumour.

Cancer consists in the fact that the same cells begin to multiply, losing their correlation with the rest of the organism as a purposeful structure. Such is capitalism, according to Baudrillard: it uncontrollably produces huge quantities of objects that are detached from the structure of society as a whole organism. But while modernity concealed this under the fanfare of the growth of the middle class (this growth itself was a kind of planetary cancer), postmodernists merely note this phenomenon with indifference. In the end, the most optimistic among them argue that decay and death are part of life, and perhaps they carry within themselves a reference to some other life.

Baudrillard points to another feature of cancer: cells reproduce themselves — identically, without change or limitation. Such reproduction is asexual — no two carriers are involved, the same cell strictly reproduces itself. In fact, in postmodernism, the economic processes of the decomposition of goods, objects and the subject itself (the producer or consumer) lead to the proliferation of a huge amount of waste that reproduces itself without restriction. *Dissipation, dissolution and disintegration* of the object occur.

It is important that we encounter the metaphor of cancer and tumours in Plotinus precisely where he speaks about the essence of matter [2]. He emphasises

[1] *Baudrillard, J.* The System of Things. Moscow: Rudomino, 1999. P. 137.

[2] *Plotinus.* Second Ennead

that matter tends to swell, that is, to produce pus-filled blisters, which are a kind of "inflated nothingness."

> In order to take on eidos, matter does not (necessarily) have to *be* heavy (in itself); it *becomes* heavy (mass) and (becoming so) allows something else (other than itself) to be created[1].

Here we are talking about whether matter has the property of "heaviness," "mass," "weight," "thickness," ὄγκος itself or whether it becomes heavy by taking on eidos. The term ὄγκος is fundamental. It also has the meaning "to swell," "to puff up." From this developed the concept of "vanity," ὄγκωμα. Matter is not mass, that is, it cannot be something in itself, nor can it produce anything. But having received something, it begins to swell, becoming a material copy of what it has received. But if the eidos is broken up, then matter will "swell" not from the eidos, but from its fragments, from its quanta. And the more the eidos is denied, which is precisely what Modernism does, the smaller its particles will be. Consequently, the tumour of matter will become increasingly uniform and lose its connection with the whole (the organism). It is surprising that the word "oncology," literally the science of tumours, most often understood as malignant, comes from the same root: it refers to the unstoppable growth of a tumour as a non-functional proliferation of identical cells. According to Plotinus, this means that matter itself, its swelling, its cancerous fragmentation, is a disease, incurable for everything that comes into contact with it. Therefore, matter is death — everything it touches dies. All matter is already mortal. And the weaker the eidos, the more deadly matter is for it, the more malignant it is.

The search for the authentic individual: towards transhumanism ( )

Just as an object disperses into fractals, into diverging chains of tiny tumours that dismember matter, so too does the subject in Postmodernism. The same dispersion, the same dissipation, the same transition to a lower level of organisation and immersion in the bizarre quantum symmetries discovered in the course of this immersion — this time at the human level.

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[1] Ού τοίνυν ὄγκον δεῖ είναι τὸν δε3όμενον τὸ είδος, âλλ´ ὸμου τ¼ γενέσθαι ὄγκον καὶ τήν αλλην ποιότητα δέχεσθαι. *Plotinus.* Second Ennead. P. 225.

The individual turns out to be not a whole, but an agglomeration of its various components, a product of the interplay of elements and organs. The social personality is dismantled.

This is easy to see in the example of the network, which reflects many characteristic features of postmodernism. Everyone can choose their own a "name" (nickname), as well as gender, photo, history, status, and geography. There is no fixed individual; a network subject is a combination, a set of typical properties, not so much something solid as something fluid. This allows one to create not just another self, but several alter egos. At the corporate level, entire armies of clones and bots, algorithms and programmes are created that exist independently on the network, interact with real users, collide with each other, and make up the chaotic life of the network. These are fractals of users, divi-duums, which are so intertwined with individuals that a new form of combined network identity emerges between them. There is no strict distinction on the network between a real personality, an "avatar," a "simulation," a fake personality, or a bot. Everyone can have the same status of network citizenship.

This divisional structure of the network affects people in their everyday lives, which are gradually becoming more and more similar to cyberspace.

The attitude towards human physicality is also changing. Since ancient times, it's been seen as something whole. Postmodernism questions this wholeness. Already in the early stages of modernism, doctors of iatro-mechanics — J. Borelli (1608–1679), J. Balivi (1668–1707), G. Burgave (1668–1738) — proposed viewing the human body as a mechanism consisting of mechanical parts. This is essentially the basis of modern medicine. Technological advances have allowed this approach to be extended to all aspects of the body, coming close to completely decoding the genome and creating a model of the brain. The body has become not a single entity, but a kind of construction kit, with artificial parts or organs in some cases proving to be more reliable than natural ones.

Similarly, on a physical level, the metaphor of man as a machine — developed by philosopher J. Lametri (1709–1751) — gradually evolved, transforming man into an assembled structure that could be substantially renewed or improved. This led to the development of plastic arts.

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[1] *Castells, M.* The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2000.

[2] *Bauman, Z.* Liquid Modernity. St. Petersburg: Piter, 2008.

and the desire to modify the body. The body thus moved to the individual level.

Body construction began with the sick and disabled, but gradually spread to everyone, changing the very concept of what it means to be human. Postmodernism perceives humans as artificial constructs — at the intellectual level, shaped by society, politics and epistemological strategies, and at the physical level, by medical and anatomical techniques.

Gradually, humans are being constructed into objects that can now be assembled.

Gradually, humanity is preparing to accept machines (cyborgs, robots) as equals, granting them full rights. The logic behind such integration is already clear. At first, cyborgs will be invaluable assistants, performing humanitarian feats to save people (children, women and the elderly) from natural disasters and catastrophes. Then they will become indispensable assistants to humans in their daily activities. And finally, it will be discovered that they are capable of thinking and feeling. Some people reject equality with robots (thus giving rise to robot fascism), but they lose out to inclusive humanists. Then mixed marriages take place, and the line between machine and human is blurred. It is important to emphasise the new atomicity of the robot, which consists in its individuality. The human organism, as conceived by the iatro-mechanics of the New Age, is a mechanism. Now this medical metaphor ceases to be a metaphor and becomes reality. People become disassembled, able to store their consciousness on cloud servers and their memories on flash cards. The concept of death becomes an anachronism.

From a philosophical point of view, we are talking about the further decomposition of the subject, in the course of which there is a movement towards the atomic level, which cannot be definitively fixed and which recedes further and further from the scientific thought that attacks it. Thus, in postmodernism, the identification of the atom (individual) with a separate human being, which proved to be conditional and approximate, is overcome. It turned out to be not an atom, but a whole whirlwind of Democritus, that is, a world consisting of atoms and therefore in need of further dismemberment.

The dismemberment of corporeality occurs simultaneously on several levels. Along with research in the field of genetic engineering,

[1] In modern television series such as Humans and Westworld, this theme is explored in depth and depicted in an extremely realistic manner. Of course, this is an extrapolation of the current state of society, culture and technology into the future, but it is a very plausible one.

With the advent of organ printing, 3D printing, the development of neural networks, and the study of brain function, gender reassignment and artificial body transformations, including the implantation of various organic and inorganic elements, play an important role. This provides preparatory experience for transferring consciousness from one bodily form to another. Naturally, the subject's consciousness itself undergoes transformation, separating itself not only from religious, class, national, and professional identities, but also from gender identity, which touches the very foundations of consciousness as such, associated with the gender dichotomy, which in turn reflects the very nature of the Mind, which, according to Plotinus, manifests itself in division. Gender is the embodiment of the metaphysical work of the Mind in relation to the human species. A change of sex is not a complete transformation of a man into a woman or a woman into a man. It is rather a propaedeutic step beyond the boundaries of sex in general, towards a genderless identity that is much closer to the sought-after individual (atomic subject) than in the case of an ordinary human being. Therefore, the contemporary cyberfeminist Donna Haraway, in her "Cyborg Manifesto" ([1]),rightly notes that complete equality between men and women is only possible through the overcoming of gender as such and the total transformation of all people into genderless cyborgs. From her point of view, it does not matter who is a man and who is a woman, or whether this identity is natural or artificial; in any case, the very duality of gender creates a hierarchy, which is the source of gender inequality, and it is gender inequality that modern liberals, democrats and feminists must fight against.

The same logic is applied by environmentalists to animals and other forms of life, which should also be granted equal rights with humans. This line is consistently pursued by representatives of
"speculative realism" and object-oriented ontology, who advocate a new — radical — materialism[2].

Criticising the subject, postmodernists argue that the human subject is actually a carbon copy of Plato's ideal state. It has a philosophical consciousness, warrior feelings and lower-class labourers who are sensations. All this is structured in such a way that we feel reverence for the mind, treat feelings (some of which are noble, some not) selectively, and consider sensations as residual, as an auxiliary area, a means of production.

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[1] *Haraway, D.* A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late 20th Century. Moscow: Ad Marginem Press, 2017.

[2] . Democracy of Objects. Perm: HylePress, 2019.

providing nourishment for the mind and emotions. In this way, all levels of the subject, which (according to postmodernists) are in fact an agglomeration of disparate elements, each of which is an infra-subjective atom, are hierarchically structured within us, repeating the verticality of traditional society at the human level. For postmodernists, even fierce anti-Platonists and enemies of Aristotelianism, liberals, still remain "too Platonic." They rightly destroy all superstructures above the individual, but stop at the separate human being, who, from the postmodern point of view, is not an individual at all.

Therefore, in order for society to be *truly open*, according to postmodernists, it is necessary to go beyond the formula of man = individual. The human individual is something that must be overcome in the direction of a more authentic individual, who can only be post-human, transhuman or posthuman. Man as a species remains too "vertical," "sacred," "hierarchical," that is, too traditional. Thus, postmodernism is in solidarity with modernism, but considers it insufficient.

The political philosophy of Postmodernism: three supporting theories

The vast majority of prominent postmodern philosophers were French, ranging from the precursors of this movement, the surrealists J. Bataille [1](1897–1962) and A. Artaud [2](1896–1948), to J. Lacan [3](1901–1981), M. Foucault [4](1926–1984), R. Barthes [5](1915–1980), J. F. Lyotard [6] (1924–1998), J. Baudrillard, J. Derrida [7] (1930–2004), B. Latour, and the most brilliant and consistent of

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[1] *Bataille, G.* The Accursed Share. Moscow: Ladomir, 2006.

[2] *Artaud, A.* The Theatre and Its Double. The Theatre of Seraphim. Moscow: Martis, 1993.

[3] *Lacan, J.* Seminars. Book 5: The Formations of the Unconscious. Moscow: Gnosis/Logos, 2002.

[4] *Foucault, Michel.* The Will to Truth: Beyond Knowledge, Power, and Sexuality. Works from Different Years. Moscow: Kastal, 1996; *Ibid*. Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. St. Petersburg: University Book, 1997; *Ibid.* Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison. Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1999.

[5] *Barth R.* Selected Works: Semiotics. Poetics. Moscow: Progress; Univers, 1994

[6] *Lyotard, J.-F.* The Postmodern Condition. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Institute of Experimental Sociology, Aleteya, 1998.

[7] *Derrida, J.* Writing and Difference. Moscow: Academic Project, 2007.

the entire constellation of philosopher G. Deleuze (1925–1995) and his co-author F. Guattari (1930–1992). Practically all of these authors were simultaneously engaged in the development of ontology, epistemology, and political philosophy from a postmodern perspective. From their point of view, politics is not just a separate aspect of human life, but its very foundation. Let us consider only the most striking and fundamental aspects of postmodern political philosophy related to the very essence of this phenomenon. As reference points, we will take

- the psychoanalytic structuralist ontology of Jacques Lacan, who developed the ideas of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939),
- Michel Foucault's study of the role of epistemology in the formation of political structures and his concept of "biopolitics," and
- the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, which represents the most complete and perfect — at least by the end of the 20th century — exposition of political postmodernism.

These foundational authors have shaped the general style of postmodern political science, which deliberately avoids systematicity and welcomes paradoxes, contradictions, ambiguities and chaos in presentation, which is intended to emphasise the transformation of the very nature of the subject towards dissolution, deconstruction and dispersion, which constitutes the essence of the entire postmodern paradigm.

Lacan's three orders

Lacan's psychoanalysis, which focused primarily on clinical therapy for mental disorders and commentary on Freud, despite its extravagance and fragmentary presentation, is the most important foundation of postmodern political philosophy. Lacan himself paid little attention to politics proper, but his philosophical foundations are key to understanding postmodernism. Just as Plato's general structure of thought can be applied to the political sphere, and purely philosophical works often contain ideas and taxonomies that are fundamental to understanding politics, so Lacan, without specifically thematising politics, allows us to understand postmodern political philosophy sometimes better than those authors who were primarily concerned with politics or explicitly included it in the general context of their views.

Lacan's ontological-anthropological (psychoanalytical-gnoseological) model can be described as follows.

[1] *Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F.* Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972.

Lacan compared the relationship between the unconscious and consciousness to the figure of Thor, where the ring corresponds to consciousness and the empty space in the centre corresponds to the unconscious.



Lacan's Three Orders

No matter how the point of thought moves across the surface of this torus, it always remains on the same side, although at different moments it appears "objectively" on different and even directly opposite sides.

false. The only reference point remains the emptiness in the middle, but it instils terror in the consciousness and therefore acts as *a* purely *negative reference point*, which, being negative, cannot be a reference point at all.

Lacan distinguishes three orders on which his theory is based:

- the order *of the real* (le Réel),
- the order of *the imaginary* (l'Imaginaire),
- the order of *the symbolic* (le Symbolique).

Lacan borrows the term "real" from Bataille, understanding it to mean that, for a specific individual being, in the most ultimate and purest experience, there is the experience of oneself as oneself. For Bataille, the real is identical with death. At the same time, Lacan equates the "real" with Freud's Es (It), seeing in it the root structure of the unconscious, from which the basic, fundamental desires arise.

Lacan follows Spinoza in recognising three basic affects — desire, pleasure and displeasure — whereby the unconscious itself, according to Lacan, is active, that is, capable not only of storing representations, images and experiences, but also of generating basic impulses. The real is usually tightly hidden from human consciousness, with which it has a private relationship: consciousness is the systematic denial of the real, its false interpretation, its suppression, its escape from it, its war against it. In this, Lacan strictly follows Freud. By calling the bottom of the unconscious "real," Lacan emphasises the epistemological significance of psychoanalysis as a method directed towards what is in the highest and ultimate sense, giving a unique interpretation of ontology. In the real, according to Lacan, Freud's Eros and Thanatos coincide.

It is important to note that what is real in Lacan is simultaneously active, effective, and entirely negative. It has no structure of its own except that which is constituted by two other orders—according to the principle of the dialectic of differentials and privative oppositions. The real in its pure form as pure unconsciousness is *the power of the negative*, which is not a collection of unconscious archetypes, but only a field of active privation, spreading its insufficiency in the form *of desire*, which (as in Spinoza) is primarily the desire for desire (co-natus), the will to will, and therefore does not want (something), but only wants to want, which means that, in the final analysis, *it wants nothing* or, more precisely, *wants nothingness*. Desire becomes the desire for something only at the symbolic stage, where shame and remorse are formed, and where it takes shape and expresses its negativity as the desire for the forbidden, expressed in inhibition and complex, that is, in pathology. Desire itself is the desire for nothing, the insignificance of the will. *The second order is the order of the imaginary*, where the desire for the forbidden is expressed in inhibition and complex, that is, in pathology. Desire itself is the desire for *nothing, the insignificance of the will. The second order is the order of the imaginary, where the desire for the forbidden is expressed in inhibition and complex, that is, in pathology. Desire itself is the desire for nothing, the insignificance of the will. The second order is the order of the imaginary, where the desire for the forbidden is*

desire for the forbidden, expressed in inhibition and complexes, that is, in pathology. Desire itself is the desire for nothing, the insignificance of the will.

The second order is the order of the imaginary. This is the realm of language.

as structures. Language is a rigid system of paradigmatic relationships into which people are forced to place all their actions, desires, and themselves. Language represents the matrix of a person before birth and begins to actively shape a person immediately after birth: an infant hears the speech of adults, and this field accompanies them until death. Lacan likens language to a hammock in which a person rests, rocked by the iterations of his familiar constructions, and is a prisoner, since the strict boundaries of his differentials, marked by signs, rigidly determine all his manifestations, including his very content. Language, according to Lacan, is absolutely social, and society, in turn, he interprets as a rigid binary structure of kinship. Thus, language is the order in which the unconscious is subjected to rigid structuring and systematic total repression. At the same time, at the level of the imaginary, the unconscious does not become conscious — this is the subtlety of Lacan's psychoanalysis: on the contrary, in language, the real disappears altogether, being replaced by the imaginary, and not the imaginary of the individual, but of language itself. The cunning of thinking lies in the fact that it is not a person who thinks in the process of thinking, but thinking itself. Similarly, it is not a person who speaks in language, but language speaks through a person and even *beyond* them. In this, one can easily recognise the desire to dismantle the individual, which constitutes the essence of postmodernism.

The third order is symbolic, in which — as in the field of signs in structural linguistics — a connection is established between two sets (first orders): the imaginary and the real. The symbolic is the zone of weak, problematic connections between the reality of the unconscious (nothingness) and the imaginary (language structures), which most often manifest themselves in mental disorders. Freud himself describes them as phenomena of slips of the tongue or speech dysfunctions that reveal the mechanism of the "work of the subconscious," which, without ceasing for a moment, is carried out in the depths of the psyche parallel to rational activity and most often outwardly unrelated to it. Only when the mind malfunctions does the subconscious speak more directly about what it wants, what it fears, what it suffers from, and what torments it directly.

The symbolic is a field of acquisition through the desire to contain, but not yet fully formed into positive structures on

At the level of language, where the real "I" (the desiring self) is completely eliminated and replaced by an imaginary "I" that is constituted *by what* can be desired and what should be desired, and, accordingly, by *those who* "correctly" desire and desire precisely *what* is required to be desired. The symbolic is therefore the realm of the structured unconscious, represented for the first time in "positive" terms (in contrast to the pure negativity of desire at the level of the real, which is pure horror), but terms that still bear the imprint of the original darkness. The symbolic order is therefore the order of disease and pathology. Here, desire is structured as forbidden, reprehensible, vicious, painful, requiring punishment, condemnation, repentance and suppression. Having no qualities whatsoever, that is, *nothing (*bottomless, super-evil), desire at the level of the real becomes a *bad,* vicious, sinful desire at the level of the symbolic, so that at the level of the imaginary it can be transformed into a carefully censored and acceptable legitimate desire — to eat, to get married, to wait for a flight, or to win a competition. The strongest desire is the emptiest desire, that is, a desire so strong that, due to its sense of total and infinite emptiness, it cannot be channelled into anything concrete. It weakens at the symbolic level, passing through the filtering labyrinths of pathology. Finally, it dissipates completely — along with the complete loss of the subject — in the realm of the imaginary, where the desired and the desiring become completely autonomous, automatic moments of a single, totally alienated structure.

's political ontology

This model of Lacan, originally intended to describe only the structure of the human psyche and consciousness (based on the subconscious), laid the foundations for the entire ontology of postmodernism. Postmodernists, like Democritus, believe that nothingness, non-existence — οὐδέν — is primary. Only it is real, actual and true. This brings us to the realm of pseudology, because if truth is identical with nothingness, then any description of something other than nothingness, i.e., things, phenomena, thoughts, feelings, distinctions, etc., necessarily belongs to the realm of falsehood. Hence the postmodern irony: postmodernists do not seek truth, they seek truths about lies, that is, the boundaries of their epistemology are lies about lies and truths about lies.

Consequently, at the symbolic level, nothing real appears, but only an escape from truth, that is, the unfolding of pseudo-logical structures that constitute hallucinatory areas of falsehood. This is how Lacan understands the symbolic: as falsehood. The essence of this falsehood is that the symbol always points to something else.

logical structures that constitute hallucinatory areas of falsehood. This is precisely how Lacan understands the symbolic: as falsehood. The essence of this falsehood is that the symbol always points to something else, and that something else, being a symbol, points again to something else, and so on in a period. Everything points to everything else in order to avoid pointing to nothingness, which is truth and death. The realm of the symbolic is the realm of the subconscious. Here, according to postmodernists, politics is born. Its origins are not in the superstructure, but in the base, however, the base is not interpreted as Marx did — as the relationship between the productive forces and the relations of production, but as the structure of the symbolic. The origins of politics lie in the algorithm of self-enclosed symbolism, each element of which points to something, but always not to what is, and accordingly, the basis of the Political consists in the flight from truth, which is nothing. Thus, Marx's suspicion is turned around by postmodernists (sometimes called Freudo-Marxists) into the revelation of Freud's subconscious, whose work determines the true content of human mental life. Lacan goes further and reveals nothingness at the core of the subconscious, turning the subconscious itself into a lie, whereas Freud offered something similar to explain the relationship between two other orders — the symbolic and the imaginary (according to Lacan). According to Freud, lies are the essence of consciousness, which hides the "truth" of the subconscious. Lacan goes further and says: lies are everything that is not truth, and truth is nothing.

Here we encounter Democritus' atom again, but in a special interpretation. Recall his extravagant synonym for atom — δέν, formed from οὐδέν, nothing, but containing no explicit reference to "something" or "being." Δέν is the antithesis of οὐδέν, nothingness, but an antithesis that is genuinely existent, that is, ontologically and obviously opposed to nothingness. This is the materialistic monism outlined by Marx, but which found its final form in Freudo-Marxism. The alternative to pure non-being οὐδέν is not non-existence, not being, but precisely falsehood, that is, the symbolic. Nothing is truth, and not something is falsehood. Hence the secondary nature of the term δέν, derived from οὐδέν, but as we have seen, unlike the Russian ни-что or the English no-thing, the aphorism of the negative particle "ni", "no", does not give us "what" or "thing".
"thing." Δέν is something else, and it is not nothingness, nor is it being, nor is it absence, nor is it presence. It is this that Lacan equates with the basis.

In this case, the superstructure is the imaginary. This is the upper floor of the Political. But its meaning is to give the fluid play of the subconscious a semblance of reliability, immutability, stability, that is, what is commonly called "reality."

From this we can deduce the main theme of postmodern politics. Truth is nothingness, non-existence, abyss and death. Philosophy that seeks truth must be prepared for active nihilism, for the complete loss of illusions. True philosophy can only be nihilism. Unlike Nietzsche, there is no need here to overcome nihilism (which is impossible anyway). It is proposed to accept it as the insignificance of everything. This is extreme ontological — and no longer just anthropological — pessimism. Man is capable of committing only one true philosophical act — suicide (this is how Gilles Deleuze ended his life). Everything else belongs to pseudo-philosophy.

Politics is an imaginary construct rooted in the structures of delirium and dreams. Therefore, politics is the limit of lies and violence, the boundary of escape from death. But this is not the antithesis of death; in a sense, it is its mirror image on the other side of the tora. Those who do not know about Lacan's torus remain in the context of lies, whose degree increases as one moves from the depths of the torus to its surface. Politics is not just a lie, it is a frozen lie, dead, rigid. It is the culmination of lies about lies, whereas in the unconscious we have, rather, the truth about lies. From this follows the revolutionary imperative of postmodernism: it is necessary to return the political to its dreamlike, psychoanalytic origins, to plunge it into the unconscious. Marx's critical theory turns into a critique of the order of the imaginary, a critique of frozen hallucinations in favour of a return to the basis, that is, to the order of the symbolic.

But according to Lacan himself, this is impossible to achieve in full. No matter how successful revolutionaries may be in their attempts to liberate the symbolic and appropriate the imaginary, since the imaginary is order and not mere arbitrariness or aberration, it will inevitably be filled with something. Thus, after the victory of the symbolic (the revolution) over the frozen structures of the imaginary, they will be recreated — albeit on different principles. Thor cannot exist without a surface, and no matter how porous and open he may be without a surface limiting his existence, he will dissipate into nothingness. Yes, this will be the truth, but there will be no one and nothing to declare it. Δέν will disappear into οὐδέν, that is, falsehood into truth.

This leads to a certain postmodern conservatism in Lacan. Despite the radical revolutionary nature of his ontology and his nihilism, he tended to support the existing political system (whatever it may be), striving not so much to change it as to interpret it correctly.

Lacan argues as follows. If desire at the symbolic level requires its legitimation in the imaginary (in order to be realised), then

make legal what is forbidden), this desire will immediately cease to be a symbolic desire and a desire for the symbolic (a forbidden desire) and will cease to be a desire at all, precisely because all its vitality and all its "desirability" consists in its painfulness (forbidden nature). As soon as freedom becomes law, it ceases to be freedom and becomes necessity. As soon as desire ceases to be shameful and forbidden, it loses its connection with the negative subject (with the order of the real) and turns into alienation — when the one who has been allowed to want something no longer wants it, but wants either what he has not yet been allowed to want, or does not want anything at all. But then the restructured order of the imaginary begins to weigh on the individual: what you are allowed to do, you *should do.* Ultimately, freedom (in the imaginary mode) becomes *a form of coercion to freedom* — as in liberalism, especially in its latest totalitarian globalist stage. Lacan is not opposed to this, since the order of the imaginary cannot but be totalitarian, and at the same time cannot but be at all. Whatever content the symbolic throws into it, the imaginary always transforms its nature: frozen water is ice, and it is foolish to demand fluidity from it, just as it is difficult to demand fluidity from steam.

However, those who came after him, accepting Lacanian ontology, did not agree with such ironic conservatism and gave the struggle of the base (the symbolic order) against the superstructure (the imaginary order) the status of a moral imperative, liberation and progress. Thus, nihilism acquired ethical content, becoming the goal of social and political progress, the highest philosophical truth and moral goal.

Foucault: freedom , madness!

Another important author of postmodernism, Michel Foucault, like Lacan, operates with structures.

In the spirit of the general left-liberal mood and Freudo-Marxist generalisations, Foucault, very much in the spirit of Lacan, focuses on the relationship between normative forms of consciousness (generically called epistemes) and the processes of the subconscious, which manifest themselves directly only in the form of mental disorders. Foucault formulates these ideas in his book Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason [(1)] where he approaches a theme that is central to his entire oeuvre

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[1] *Foucault, M.* Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. London: Routledge, 1966.

normative rationality, its criteria, parameters, properties, and methods of implementation and protection. In light of this, the qualification and definition of madness, as well as attitudes towards it at different historical stages, demonstrate, according to Foucault, a change in *the* very *paradigm of normality* and, accordingly, in the anthropological and ontological interpretation of what reason is and what a "rational human being" should be. Here we again see an attack on the individual, whose normality in capitalism and communism is based on rationality, which always has specific boundaries and definitions. In fact, the "normal person" is an imaginary figure (Lacan) and therefore represents a frozen moment of the symbolic (i.e., madness).

Madness as a deviation from this norm, its interpretation, forms of treatment and social evaluation testify to fundamental shifts in the fundamental structures of society. Thus, Foucault approaches the description of the structures of European society, which he studies particularly carefully in the phase of transition to modernity. It is here that fundamental transformations of clinical practice, its methods and foundations take place, providing examples that help us better understand the essence of modern culture. Foucault will return to this theme repeatedly, particularly in his important work The Birth of the Clinic.The revelation of the repressive nature of clinical institutions led Foucault to later describe in detail the process of the emergence of penitentiary institutions in the modern era in his book Discipline and Punish ([2]).Physical violence against marginalised elements, which included the mentally ill, criminals, and even those suffering from serious illnesses, was, for Foucault, an illustration of a deeper phenomenon: the repressive practice of reason against the unconscious, which is effectively tabooed and repressed through dominant epistemologies — that is, the scientific, philosophical, and ideological foundations of society. The political is first and foremost an episteme ([3]).strictly and always arbitrarily establishing a norm for the "normal personality," which does not actually exist and is constituted by the political act itself.

Unlike Lacan, Foucault does not accept this conclusion and calls for an epistemological revolution aimed at overthrowing the dictatorship of reason and liberating the symbolic. It is precisely

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[1] *Foucault, M.* The Birth of the Clinic. Moscow: Academic Project, 2010.

[2] *Foucault, M.* Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.

[3] Foucault introduces the concept of "episteme" in his book*: Foucault,* Michel. The Order of Things. SPb: A-cad, 1994

This approach became predominant in Postmodernism, although it was Lacan — more ironic and "conservative" — who laid the most revolutionary aspects of Postmodern ontology, against which Foucault's revolutionary optimism seems somewhat naive.

Foucault's three epistemes

Foucault traces three phases of European history, where one can clearly see the transition from one episteme to another based on a fundamental shift in the semiotic and semantic fields:

- Renaissance (16th century)
- Early Modern (17th–18th centuries)
- Late Modernity (19th–20th centuries).

The Middle Ages and earlier periods were based on other epistemes, which remain largely outside Foucault's field of vision. But this period is sufficient to convincingly demonstrate the main structuralist thesis: the content of a person, their normative status, their identity and their ontology are completely determined by *the dominant paradigm of epistemology*. Consequently, we cannot speak of man as a universal phenomenon or as an individual, but as *a sociological form* determined by the dominant episteme and, therefore, derived from it. History cannot be constructed around the axis of man, taken as something constant at its core and developing in particulars. History is a change of epistemologies and dominant epistemes, inextricably linked to the dispositive of power. Therefore, the only reliable axis of history is *the epistemological axis*, which, in turn, predetermines history itself as *a functional narrative.* In the Modern era (the classical period), a normative conception of the human (individual) subject as the pole of being, the world, life, and society was introduced. But this introduction itself is a feature of a very specific historical era and the episteme that prevailed in it, which did not exist before and may well not exist in the future. Consequently, Foucault concludes that in other epistemological contexts, the subject of Modernity did not exist and will not exist in the future. For the future, this means a call to dismantle the subject and search for new candidates to represent the normative individual.

Applied to the political sphere, Foucault's analysis of knowledge as the main dispositive of power and of the central significance of authoritative discourse in the general practice of domination became a classic thesis of European social and political disciplines from the 1960s onwards.

The 20th century. The dispositif is the arsenal with which power ensures its stability, continuity and permanence. According to Foucault, power is primarily the establishment of a dominant epistemology, and everything else flows from this. Consequently, the organisation of mental space through culture, education, value systems, etc. is the main instrument for establishing, maintaining and, in some cases, revolutionarily overthrowing the model of power. It is not a question of which individual, group or even class dominates society; it is a question of how they justify this particular system, instilling in society the idea of its immutability, legitimacy and lack of alternatives. Following the Marxist Gramsci, Foucault and other postmodernists focus on culture, i.e. the non-political part of the superstructure, which, in their view, is actually a more solid foundation than the economy. Thus, the entire Marxist model, already modified by Gramsci, is finally turned upside down. At the heart of society is not the economy, but the subconscious, from which the roots of episteme grow.

Biopower and biopolitics

The late modernity according to Foucault, in which we live, is based on this rethinking of the classical (for modernity) symmetries of the political. The desire for democratisation, atomisation, further immanentisation and the ever-increasing degree of materialism have revealed the close connection between power and the biological roots of life. This led Foucault to the concept of biopower and biopolitics[1]. Continuing the main line of research he began in his early works, Foucault concludes that, ultimately, control over minds is control over bodies, since, from a materialistic point of view, consciousness is the sublimation of materiality. Control over physicality through healthcare, demographic regulation, and the economics of pain and pleasure is the main dispositive of power. It is this control that determines the configuration of the dominant episteme, which, through the establishment of "norms" — and the most fundamental norm defining what is to be understood by "health" and "illness" — controls not only consciousness but also the physical level of human beings.

From this, Foucault arrives at the concept of the "biopolitics of desire," believing that epistemology is built on suppression, surveillance

[1] *Foucault M.* Dits et écrits. P.: Gallimard, 2001.

and control over the deepest aspects of human biological existence. Biopower is the real power that asserts its verticality through manipulation of the bottom layers of the unconscious, directly bordering the body.

This picture changes the meaning of revolution in late modernity, transferring it to the psychoanalytic and biological level. This line was later developed by another postmodernist, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben.

Gilles Deleuze: the will to nothingness

Postmodern philosophy is most vividly represented in the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and his regular co-author, psychoanalyst Félix Guattari.

Deleuze accepts Nietzsche's thesis of European nihilism, but rejects the Übermensch as the one who, according to Nietzsche, is called upon to overcome nothingness. Nothing needs to be overcome, nothing needs to be desired, Deleuze asserts, basing on this principle the "*will to* nothingness" ([2]). Deleuze's nothingness belongs to the French philosophical tradition of intense modernism, as understood by Lacan (as a synonym for the real).

The peculiarity of Deleuze's interpretation of nothingness lies in the fact that he removes it from the realm of the real (Lacan) and places it in the zone of indirect but intense attention. "Nothingness" is no longer hidden, but appears in the form of a given, in *the form of a phenomenon*.

Following "nothingness," which, according to Deleuze, is the will of postmodern philosophical thought, matter comes into view, which he interprets as *corporeality*. For him — as for all materialists and immanentists (in particular, those continuing the line of Spinoza's substantialism, whom Deleuze considered, along with Democritus, the Epicureans and the Stoics, to be a philosophical beacon) — *matter is identical to being*, understood, however, negatively. There is only matter (which does not exist), and everything else is its *folds* ([4]). Corporeality occupies the place of Lacan's real order here.

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[1] *Agamben, G.* Homo sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Moscow: Evropa, 2011.

([2]) "Man would rather want *nothing* than want nothing." See: *De L'Eau, G.* Nietzsche. St. Petersburg: Axioma, Kolna, 1997. In this formula, it is easy to recognise Lacan's idea of the identity of Eros and Thanatos in the order of the real, rising in the form of the first impulse into the symbolic.

[3] *Deleuze, G.* The Logic of Sense. Moscow: Academic Project, 2010.

[4] *Deleuze, G.* The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque. Moscow: Logos Publishing House, 1997.

The Body Without Organs: The Political Doctrine of Shaltai-Boltai

In his study of corporeality, Deleuze enthusiastically descends into the microcosm, focusing on the weak currents and desires that rise from the depths of corporeality and move towards what he calls the "surface" or "screen." This is the outer side of corporeality, the skin. When Deleuze talks about corporeality, he does not mean an already organised human or any other body. He is not interested in the body, but in corporeality, that is, what lies *beneath* the body. Using Antonin Artaud's visionary metaphor, Deleuze introduces the concept of the "body without organs" as the basic matrix of corporeality, preceding interaction with the constructed "external world," which represents ontic furrows (l'espace strié) and forces the original "body without organs" to acquire organs, that is, to become a body from corporeality. According to Deleuze, the "body without organs" is the free sliding of a ball on an absolutely smooth surface (l'espace lisse) in any direction. This is the formula of corporeality as such, that is, of being as matter. Everything else is superimposed on this instance. Deleuze finds an analogue of Artaud's "body without organs" in the figure of Humpty Dumpty from Lewis Carroll's (1832–1898) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.[1] Humpty Dumpty is represented as an egg, as indicated by the description of his appearance and the very fact that, having fallen from the wall, he broke into many small pieces, like an eggshell, and consequently scattered irretrievably. But the symbolism of the egg in ancient cultures refers to the image of the Great Mother. Thus, once again, postmodern images refer us to the political philosophy of the Mother, the third kind of Plato's "Timaeus."

The "body without organs" (the surface of Shaltai-Boltai) as the main pole of the new conceptuality of postmodernism is the historical culmination in the formation of the lexicon of the philosophy of the Mother. Deleuze, continuing the line of materialist philosophy, reaches its final, deepest level: he *constructs a philosophy from the perspective of matter.*

The "body without organs" (gynecocratic Shaltai-Boltai) is a pure product of the Earth without the participation of Heaven.

The splitting of the object: chaosmos

Deleuze, moving towards extreme materiality, towards nothingness, continues the philosophical dismemberment of the object, coming close to

[1] *Carroll, L.* Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. Moscow: Labyrinth, 2014.

to that level of atomistically understood matter where the cosmos ends and chaos begins. But pure chaos or pure nothingness, which must be strived for and desired, are unattainable. Therefore, Deleuze fixes his attention on the boundary where the cosmos ends and chaos begins. Following the writer James Joyce[1] (1882–1941), calls this "chaosmos." The term "chaosmos" is derived from the Greek words chaos, χάος, and osmos, ὅσμος. Chaos (χάος) refers to the state preceding the formation of matter, while "osmosis" (ὅσμος) denotes the chemical process of "unidirectional diffusion through a semipermeable membrane of solvent molecules towards a higher concentration of the solute." Osmosis gives chaos a direction, always oriented in the opposite direction to the impulse or disturbance, which generates Democritus' whirlwinds, vortices, always tending towards dispersion and rest. Disturbance and rest, agitating the mass of pure corporeality, are juxtaposed by Deleuze with the Eros and Thanatos of psychoanalysis, which allows us to unite philosophy, psychology and physics into a common postmodern model, analogous to the cosmos in earlier philosophical systems. Chaos seeps through its inherent membrane, generating not order and structures, but precisely "vortices" consisting not yet of the existing, but of Democritus' δέν.

According to Deleuze, God (as a hypothesis of transcendence and vertical symmetry) gives meaning to the world. And then reality becomes a world, an order. But the abolition of God (the death of God according to Nietzsche) means the loss of meaning (le sens), its dispersion in a purely immanent topicality of the surface or, more precisely, the replacement of meaning with the moment of eventful meaninglessness, a quantum of non-sense (le non-sens), which gives rise to a completely different post-structure, where the vertical (transcendent) dimension of God falls away (and if it does not disappear immediately, then, detached from the act of signification, it is quickly forgotten as Deus Otiosus).

Thus, instead of the world, spontaneous meaningless whirlpools of chaotic emissions appear.

Accordingly, the external world in postmodern ontology is constituted as turbulent flows of meaningless quanta, spreading in a bizarre and arbitrary rhythm in planes and symmetries, nominally two-dimensional, but at the same time going beyond the parameters of purely geometric laws in the spirit of Mandelbrot's theory of the geometry of nature and fractals.

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[1] *Joyce, J.* Finnegans Wake // Joyce, J. Collected Works: In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow: ZnA. 1994.

The splitting of the subject: rhizome

If chaosmos is a postmodern replacement for the abolished cosmos, then the classical subject is even more unacceptable to postmodernists. "The world has lost its centre, the subject can no longer create dichotomies, but it achieves a higher unity — the unity of ambivalence and overdetermination — in a dimension that is always additional to the dimension of its own object,"(1) according to Deleuze and Guattari. And instead of the subject, they propose another concept — "rhizome," a rootstock.

This concept is borrowed from botany and describes a special type of plant and fungus that spreads horizontally, *parallel to* the surface of the earth, sending out roots and stems in separate nodes of a branched network system. Rhizomes differ from other plants in that, unlike other plants, pulling out the root and stem does not lead to the death of the entire organism, which continues to exist as a whole regardless of the loss of individual elements. By pulling out a plant with its roots, we destroy only one of its forms, but do not damage the whole, the entire rhizome, which spreads invisibly horizontally under the ground further and further.

Deleuze introduces the concept of "rhizome" in his seminal work Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus, written together with F. Guattari:

> (…)— unlike trees and their roots, a rhizome connects any one point to any other point, and each of its features does not necessarily refer to features of the same nature; it introduces into play extremely different modes of signs and even states of non-signs. The rhizome does not allow itself to return to the One or to the many. It is not One that becomes two, nor even one that directly becomes three, four, five, etc. It is not many things derived from One, or to which One is added (n+7). It is not made of units, but of dimensions, or rather of mobile directions. It has no beginning and no end, but always a middle from which it grows and spills over the edge. It constitutes linear sets with n dimensions, without subject or object — sets that can be laid out on a consistency plane and from which a unit (n–1) is always subtracted. Such a set changes its dimensions only by changing its own nature and undergoing metamorphoses. In , the opposite of is structure, defined by

[1] *Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F.* Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus. P. 11.

a set of points and positions, binary relations between these points and one-to-one relations between positions, the rhizome is made only of lines — lines of segmentarity, stratification as measurements, as well as lines of slippage or deterritorialisation as its maximum measurement, according to which and following it, multiplicity undergoes metamorphoses, changing its nature. We will not confuse such lines, or outlines, with tree-like descendants, which are only localisable connections between points and positions. In contrast to the tree, the rhizome is not an object of reproduction: neither external reproduction as a tree-image, nor internal reproduction as a tree-structure. The rhizome is anti-genealogy. It is short-term memory or anti-memory. The rhizome acts through variation, expansion, conquest, seizure, and puncture. In contrast to graphic images, drawings or photographs, in contrast to tracings, the rhizome deals with a map that must be produced, constructed, always dismantled, connected, revisited, modified — in multiple inputs and outputs with their own lines of escape. It is the tracings that need to be transferred to maps, not the other way around. In contrast to centred (even polycentred) systems with hierarchical communication and pre-established connections, the rhizome is an acentric, non-hierarchical and non-signifying system — without a General, without organisational memory or a central automaton, uniquely defined only by the circulation of states. What is open to discussion in the rhizome is its relationship with sexuality, as well as with animals, plants, the world, politics, books, natural and artificial things — a relationship that is completely different from the tree-like relationship: any kind of "becoming."

The plateau is always in the middle — neither at the beginning nor at the end. The rhizome consists of plateaus·

ic topology of consciousness and the machine of desires

The rhizome is the surface of a great corporeality, an instance in which the fundamental topic of consciousness is formed. In the usual case, the human structure is organised vertically: trunk (stem),

[1] *Deleuze, G., Guattari, F.* Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus. Pp. 37–38.

branches and crown are the upper levels of thinking presence, the roots are reverse projections into the unconscious. At the same time, consciousness and the unconscious are constituted simultaneously in one of the moments of corporeality, forming a concrete body with its eidos, "form" (crown) and "matter" (roots).

The rhizome is constantly "between" or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it: "Plato is always in the middle — neither at the beginning nor at the end." The surface on which and in which the rhizome lives is a screen of desires, onto which *the desire machine* projects them. These desires are not articulated or rational. Deleuze and Guattari oppose the reconstruction of desire in Freud's psychoanalysis, which they accuse of "patriarchal" and "phallocentric" interpretations of Eros. Instead, they offer a female view of Eros as desire in its scattered, unfocused and non-finalised form. The scattered paneroticism of the Great Mother, which knows no prohibitions, is contrasted with the patriarchy of classical Freudianism. Thus, delving into the worlds of corporeality leads Deleuze and Guattari to the thesis that the taboo on incest must be lifted, since, in their view, this cultural requirement reflects mechanisms of repression and is the basis of authoritarianism and dictatorship.

authoritarianism and dictatorship.

The liberation of the "black of depth"

In Logic of Sense, speaking of the Cynics and Stoics, Deleuze describes with great sympathy the appeal to the "black depth":

> There is a clear reorientation of all thought and of what is meant by the ability to think: *there is no longer any depth or height.* The mockery directed at Plato by the Cynics and Stoics is countless. And it is always a question of overthrowing Ideas, of showing that the incorporeal does not reside in the heights, but on the surface, and that it is not the supreme cause, but only a superficial effect, not Essence, but an event. And with regard to depth, they argued that it is a digestive illusion that complements the ideal optical illusion. What does such gluttony, the apology of incest and cannibalism, really mean? The latter theme is present in both Chrysippus and Diogenes the Cynic. And although Diogenes Laertius does not explain Chrysippus' views, he gives a very detailed explanation regarding Diogenes: "There is nothing wrong with eating the meat of any animal: even eating human flesh is not a crime, as is evident from the customs of other peoples. In fact

> In fact, everything exists in everything and through everything: bread contains meat, vegetables contain bread, and in general, all bodies seem to penetrate each other in tiny particles through invisible pores. This is how he explains it in his "Feast," if only the tragedy was written by him... This statement, which also applies to incest, asserts that deep down, everything is a mixture. However, there are no rules according to which one mixture can be considered worse than another. Contrary to what Plato believed, there is no external higher measure for such mixtures and combinations of Ideas that would allow us to determine good and bad mixtures. And likewise, contrary to the pre-Socratics, there is no immanent measure capable of fixing the order and sequence of mixing in the depths of Nature: any mixture is no better or worse than the bodies that permeate each other and the coexisting parts. How, then, can the world of mixtures not be a world of black depths where everything is permitted?

The "world of black depth" is a rhizomatic space of negative freedom: at the human level, freedom from reason; at the political level, freedom from power. Deleuze and Guattari interpret dictatorship in politics as a continuation in the social sphere of the repression of rationality (the stem and crown) against corporeality (the roots and rhizome itself). According to Deleuze and Guattari, a truly free society is only possible when female sexuality is completely liberated and legally normalised, contrary to the repressive models of phallocentric hierarchical socio-political systems. Based on this idea, Deleuze and Guattari proposed a special reform of psychoanalysis, calling for the rejection of rigid gender dualism (which, in their opinion, reflects the vertical topography of crown/roots) but rather unarticulated rhizomatic sexuality (which, in parallel with Deleuze and Guattari, was conceptualised by another postmodern philosopher, Michel Foucault[2]).

True liberation, according to Deleuze, that is, the limit of the realisation of the Modern's programme of liberation, boils down to the liberation of the very "black depths" of corporeality, where "everything is a mixture," and, accordingly, any epistemologies based on difference, division and, accordingly, rationality, including prohibitions on cannibalism, incest or paedophilia, are forms of violence,

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[1] *Deleuze, G.* The Logic of Sense. Pp. 176–177.

[2] *Foucault, Michel.* The Will to Truth: Beyond Knowledge, Power and Sexuality. Works from Different Years. Moscow: Kastal, 1996.

oppression and dictatorship against what Deleuze considers synonymous with existence itself — the nihilistic pulsation of the chaosmos.

Schizomass

Deleuze believes that rhizomatic existence is characteristic of people suffering from schizophrenia, i.e., forms of mental disorders that involve a splitting of consciousness and a transfer of consciousness from the subject to external objects or internal poles of consciousness and will that are not controlled by the mind (hence voices, hallucinations, etc.). According to Deleuze, masses, taken as a whole, are closer to the model of schizophrenia than individual personalities structured by patriarchal culture along the crown/roots axis. Therefore Deleuze sides with what he calls "schizomass" [1] suggesting that schizophrenia should not be considered abnormal, but rather normalised by expanding the concept of what is healthy and sick in relation to the human psyche. In patriarchal culture, Deleuze believes, the metaphor of the tree is taken as the norm and therefore everything that deviates from it is considered a pathology and a disease. But if we put rhizome, surface and chaosmos at the forefront, that is, if we take a matriarchal-centric view of things, illness becomes a sign of health, and rationality becomes a special case of madness. The rehabilitation of madness and the exposure of this pejorative concept as the result of patriarchal and repressive will to power [3] are the subject of the works of postmodernist Foucault, who developed, in parallel with Deleuze, similar matriarchal philosophical trends.

Deleuze had a decisive influence on Postmodern philosophy, including its political projects, which consisted in radicalising liberation, but no longer only of the subject, but also of the object, in favour of the triumph of rhizomatic structures.

Micropolis and micropolitics

The political philosophy of postmodernism is built on these foundations. It should be noted that, on the one hand, this is a continuation of modernism, decisive steps in the same direction — towards the philosophy of the Mother, materialism and the search for the atom

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1 *Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F.* Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus.

2 Ibid. p. 21.

3 *Foucault, Michel.* Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. London: Verso, 1969.

and individuality through their progressive liberation from restrictive structures (order, power, hierarchy). On the other hand, postmodernism overcomes certain boundaries inherent in modernism.

First of all, the idea of the atom as something that has already been achieved — in physics and politics (the individual) — is called into question. Refining the content of atomism in science reveals subatomic dimensions that, at the quantum level, demonstrate new laws and principles that differ significantly from classical mechanics. Thus, the atom becomes "indivisible" only conditionally, that is,
a "volume," a conglomerate of other particles, which in turn are not
"Atoms" (i.e., indivisible) are in fact quite divisible. Thus, an object acquires new content, or more precisely, the old content is gradually drained away. Postmodernists say that the atom is an ideal goal, not a given reality. Everything we have, even at the quantum level, is still a combinatorial agglomerate, a structure, and it must in turn be subjected to decomposition, anatomy, dismemberment. These structures must be torn apart, new contenders for the status of "atoms" must be taken not as a whole, but as a combinatorial ensemble. French philosopher Marcel Conche([1]) says that the world is no longer a world, but an extravagant ensemble, offering its own ontology of chance, rejecting any kind of wholeness.

The same thing happens with the atom of society (politics) — the individual. A person is no longer an individual, but an agglomeration of separate combinatorial elements, whose freedom lies in the fact that they can be assembled in different ways, like mosaics. The totality of individual content can form any shape at the level of the subject. The individual is a dividuum and a rhizome. It is possible to change one's past and future, to invent and create, because everything in human society is invented, created and constructed. But everything that is constructed can be deconstructed and reconstructed.

When such views are given normative status, they become the basis of science, technology, culture, medicine and, ultimately, politics itself. Everything in human society is subject to fragmentation, right down to normative identity, which becomes

[1] *Conche M.* L'Aléatoire. P.: Les Belles Lettres, 2012.

[2]Deconstruction is a key term in postmodern philosophy, introduced by Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), meaning the placing of any statement — broader than any thing in general — in the historical context where it first arose in order to Derrida (1930–2004), meaning the placement of any statement — more broadly, any thing in general — in the historical context in which it first arose, in order to show how, in the process of quotation or reproduction, it has lost and distorted its meaning.

Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's schizo-masses become a political and social norm, and schizophrenia itself is not a clinical diagnosis, but a legitimate — and even privileged — form of thinking.

Any wholeness, any structure — from the state to the individual — thus comes under suspicion of being "totalitarian," "dictatorial," suppressing real atomism in favour of holistic structures, albeit disguised as "atoms." Modernity, in its division of society, has reached the individual. Postmodernity goes further and insists on the splitting of the individual, on the schizophrenisation of culture, and then of politics.

Thus, for postmodernists, classical democracy or secular socialism are insufficient precisely because they preserve the classical conception of the individual. Yes, it is possible to liberate the human individual from various forms of collective identity — from religion, the state, the nation, even gender — and this has almost been achieved in late modernity. But postmodernism goes further and discovers that it is not the right thing that has been liberated. Instead of a victim of freedom, we have a maniac, a criminal, a dictator, only of a lower level. Consequently, the political struggle *for the liberation of man* turns into a political struggle *for liberation from man.*

The goal becomes the discovery of a new "atom" — the body-without-organs (political Jack-in-the-box), rhizomes, schizomass, "parliament of organs," etc.

Postmodern politics shifts the focus from society to the individual. The human individual is now seen as a polis. The average person has one centre of decision-making: consciousness. This is a kind of government. As a rule, the micro-level political system is a dictatorship of the ego. The ego, the subject, reason and will are not simply a government, but a tyrant, an autocrat. It is cruel, rational, intolerant; it tyrannically rules over its subjects, the "feelings," threatening them, judging them and suppressing them.

In a schizophrenic, who is the norm of liberated postmodernism, the monarchy breaks down into (at least) two opposing camps. Thus, a person becomes a place of rebellion, revolution, and even civil war. One part of the micro-community wants one thing, the other wants another. In some cases, tyrannical reason prevails, in others its power collapses under the pressure of multiple "I's" — voices, personalities, motivations, impulses, intrusions from the unconscious. From the point of view of

In classical modern psychiatry, schizophrenia is a disease, but from a postmodern perspective, the absence of schizophrenia is a disease because it is violence against the multitude of "selves" that live within us. it is repression against desires, a dictatorship of consciousness that turns the multidimensionality of the human rhizome into submissive slaves. Thus, from now on, it is not a politically and hierarchically organised society, but the individual human personality that becomes Leviathan, established by a "social contract" of elements of the sub-subject — individual — level. The whole problem of realists (supporters of anthropological pessimism in the spirit of Hobbes) and liberals (continuing the line of Locke) is transferred to the micro level. The former defend reason as the Leviathan of the micro-polis, fearing the destruction that could result from the liberation of sub-individual schizophrenic personalities and the "seeping" chaos of impulses and dark desires. The latter, on the contrary, see in this "progress," "development," and "liberation of creative possibilities," leading to the enrichment of differences and the deepening of democracy. What was considered a disease in a totalitarian society, postmodernists assert, is in fact free creativity. Most artists, performers, and talented individuals are schizophrenic, and many charismatic politicians, preachers, and orators have obvious mental disorders. Among brilliant scientists, there are many people whose consciousness differs significantly from the average norm and who represent an anomaly. Therefore, we simply need to shift the emphasis. What was the norm in Modernism must be recognised as a deviation, and vice versa. According to the logic of Deleuze-Guattari, non-schizophrenics are subhuman, constrained, repressed, sick creatures suffering under the tyrannical power of their own mind, organised along a vertical axis.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the ordinary person is based on the metaphor of a tree. Its roots are the past, or a reference to its physicality, to its material basis; the crown and branches are its future, or consciousness. And if you take away a person's past and pull out their roots, the tree will fall; if you cut down the crown, the personality also disappears. A blow to the roots or the crown leads to the elimination of the individual. This is the law of classical — "vertical," according to Deleuze — anthropology. Here we see that while modernists limited themselves to the overthrow of the political vertical, believing the horizontal (democracy) to have been achieved, in the micropolitics of postmodernism this vertical is revealed again at the level of the individual. Society may be democratic, but the individual, as a unit of that society, remains a totalitarian and hierarchical system. Thus, me-

the dimension of the Political is negated. Then the topology of Deleuze-Guattari offers the following solution, noting that between the roots and the crown there is *a line of soil*, which represents a kind of screen where the lower, invisible, root, bodily, material ("the past" as achieved, existing, reliable) connects with the manifested, conscious and future (fluid, projective, unguaranteed). This is an intermediate territory where the body connects with consciousness, and the past with the future, there is an "eternal present". Its metaphor is the rhizome. By freeing humans from the past and the future, from the burdensome physicality rooted in nothingness (the order of the real, according to Lacan), but also from the dictatorship of consciousness, humans become rhizomes. Until people become rhizomes, they remain vulnerable, incomplete and tyrannical towards themselves.

These people must be freed by making them "full-fledged people," that is, schizophrenics, changing first and foremost the very structure of psychiatric diagnoses and assessments. Instead of the metaphor of a tree, we need to adopt the metaphor of a rhizome, a mushroom bed, root crops, i.e. horizontal network propagation — beneath the surface, with cultivation rather than suppression of multiple — ephemeral, playful, random and spontaneous — "selves". The ends should not meet in thought, as this would undermine the tyranny of reason and guarantee creative freedom.

Thus, schizophrenia, the increasing splitting of consciousness, becomes a process, pushing people towards progressive schizophrenisation, towards the dispersion of the subject into sub-subjective multitudes.

A rhizomatic "person" is almost invulnerable. We can cut off their crown, we can uproot them, but the rhizome will remain intact — it will sprout new shoots. This is how communication works on social media and the Internet in general. Change your nickname and avatar, close your account, delete your chat history, and a virtual personality is gone. But you can create a new virtual personality at any time. This transfers from the network to society, offline. Here, a similar virtuality grows. People are changing their place of residence, names, countries, professions, appearance and gender with increasing ease. They live in an ephemeral present, arbitrarily changing their roots and crowns, their physicality and consciousness. The rhizome may lose its memory, consciousness, past and future. But it will retain its meaningless eternal present, which spreads invisibly underground in all directions.

This is how profound democratisation of the individual occurs at the micro level, and the rhizome becomes the most important concept in postmodern politics.

ism and liberalism of desires

The transition from policy to micro-policy, and accordingly from politics to micro-politics, as we can see, repeats the main lines of force of modern political philosophy, but in a different dimension. This change in dimension is the main feature of postmodernism. However, as in the case of quantum mechanics or the theory of relativity, the transition to a new level of phenomena that are too small or too large somewhat changes the axioms and physical laws, so postmodernist research into the micropolis — as the structure of an individual taken as an agglomeration of heterogeneous and independent particles (=micro-citizens) — is not a complete repetition of the Political as it appears in Modernity. This correction is important in order to better understand the peculiarity of micropolitics — much here remains the same as in macropolitics (Modernity), only on a different scale, but some things change. Nevertheless, some analogies between Leviathan and micro-Leviathan are completely unacceptable. For example, we can apply the scheme of the dispute between liberals and realists (mercantilists) to the figure of the rhizomatic dividuum.

On the one hand, the postmodern individual is conceived as a collection of sub-subjective units representing a micro-society. These are impulses, phantoms, "voices" of organs and, ultimately, the basis of the unconscious — the "desire machine" [1]. It is precisely

The "desire machine" (as a "subconscious factory") generates a multitude of individual micro-subjects, reducible to a diversity of desires that construct their own "worlds," including "micro-egos," phenomenology, and the objects toward which these desires are directed. The liberation of the workers of this "desire factory" from the censorship of reason and exploitation by higher levels of consciousness through the extraction of "surplus value" is the revolutionary goal of postmodern politics or "schizoanalysis." This corresponds to the transition from a hierarchical organisation of the state to a democratic and, ultimately, civil society, which at the individual level corresponds to the democratic organisation of the quanta of desire. This is a kind of "quantum democracy" achieved through the rhizomatisation and schizophrenisation of culture, politics, education, medicine, etc.

On the other hand, however, the concept of the "desire factory" put forward by Deleuze and Guattari is not accidental. There is nothing more standardised

[1] *Deleuze, G., Guattari, F.* Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus.

more uniform than a factory worker. In other words, the subhuman quanta (more corresponding to the "individual" than to a single person) that make up a human being are almost always serial and almost identical, differing only in the smallest details, level of intensity, etc. And this is where liberalism, or more precisely, micro-liberalism, comes into play. Realism at the level of micro-politics, even accepting democratisation and the free market of desires within the individual, still believes that in interaction with others (the analogue of another state in "big politics" Modernity), the highest authority should still have priority, which at the level of the individual in micro-politics corresponds to reason, ego, and centralised consciousness. Therefore, the liberation of sub-subjective elements must take place within the boundaries of the individual, understood in the "old way," that is, as a human being. When interacting with another agglomeration, the first agglomeration must act as a centralised structure. This corresponds to the state's monopoly on foreign trade, which is insisted upon by mercantilism and realism. This is a kind of protectionist policy that defends the entire territory on which this "desire machine" operates.

Microliberalism insists on a different scenario. The uniformity of desires at the deepest level is an invitation to *free exchange*, a schizoanalytic analogue of free trade. Thus, an individual desire can enter into direct contact with another desire in a special transindividual space, bypassing the instance of the individual personality—the mind. This gives rise to the thesis of *transsexuality*, which is not a relationship between two people with gender polarity, but a rhizomatic oscillation of a multitude of desire-factories that intersect directly with each other, without the mediation of the individual ego. The ego blocks such freedom of exchange, acting as an analogue of "nationalism" or "fascism." Love, according to Deleuze-Guattari, unlike classical psychoanalysis, is not a matter for three — a man, a woman, and the child they produce. Love gives rise to a multitude at once and is the affair of a multitude of micro-subjects who may belong to any individual-states.

Ultimately, from the liberal principle of free trade, Deleuze and Guattari, who sympathised with Marxism, move on to the thesis "proletarians of all countries, unite!", which means a call for a pansexual revolution, that is, the total mixing of all rhizomatic desires into one planetary tangle of an orgiastic network.

This analogy between macro-politics and micro-politics, which reduces everything to the individual and at the same time to the trans-individual level, was perfectly understood by the postmodernists themselves. Deleuze clearly expressed this in a formula that is fundamental to postmodernism: "Everything is politics" [1].

The transition to micropolitics and the centrality of the "desire factory" puts the issue of gender at the forefront, which is reflected in gender politics. If we accept "quantum liberalism" or "quantum Marxism," which at some stage are fundamentally indistinguishable from each other — in their common struggle against "quantum fascism" or "quantum realism," which defends the sovereignty of reason, it is precisely the sphere of gender and gender relations, their regulation and legal status that become the centre of politics.

At the same time, both sexes are seen as agglomerations and "nationalistic" conventions, since the "desire factories" deep within human beings are neither masculine nor feminine, just as their "quantum workers" or the impulses of desire they create are neither. Pansexuality is primary and constitutes its own polarity — that is, the existence of one gender or another. The dismantling of gender makes gender identity arbitrary, and accordingly, the field of transindividual relations becomes playful, networked, rhizomatic, without strictly defined boundaries and identities. This is a kind of gender (or more precisely, transgender) internationalism.

This gives rise to the concept of "microfascism," i.e., any initiative to preserve rational individuality and gender certainty. The struggle against fascism, as previously against traditional society, unites postmodern liberals with postmodern communists, which at the level of gender politics finds expression in the promotion of the queer community (LGBT).

Microglobalism

Gender politics is at the centre of postmodern attention. It repeats the political history of modernity on a new — quantum — level, except that modernity liberated people from all forms of traditional identity, culminating in liberalism and, in particular, its historic victory in 1991 over the last serious and symmetrical, even utopian, ideological system of the 20th century.

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[1] *Deleuze G., Parnet C.* Dialogues. P.: Flammarion, 1996. P. 117.

the equally modernist ideology of communism, then postmodernism liberates individual "desire factories" from man, from reason. The atom refines its dimension, and the rhizome becomes the subject of revolution and liberation. The transsexual transindividual network turns into an arena of the Political, which has become global. Thus, through transindividuality (and transsexuality), micropolitics becomes a global phenomenon.

This corresponds to certain symmetries that we observe in quantum physics, especially in superstring theory, which deals with microparticles and processes, and in astrophysics, which deals with super-large "cosmic" objects. It is telling that Epicurus claimed that atoms could be both very small and very large, anticipating this symmetry. Thus, globalisation is not simply combined with the transition to micropolitics, but both of these phenomena, emerging at the lower limit of the Modern, represent a homology — a distortion of mesoports (corresponding to the human dimension) in both cases — and in the gigantic and microscopic spheres — has a common structure. This is how postmodern civil society emerges, where human individuality itself is dismantled as the last vestige of the political philosophy of the classical eras.

Globalisation is a process of dismantling statehood that has reached a critical point. Initially, society is reduced to the individual — this is the political philosophy of modernity. This is reflected in the spread of the ideology of "human rights," pacifism, and the destruction of all collective identities — hence homosexual marriages, families of three or more members of different or the same sex, etc. This is no longer a family, but a post-family, consisting of a random set of any number of people. This is followed by the proliferation of rhizomatic groups, the union of not individuals with individuals, not even carriers of a certain gender in arbitrary combinations, but a configuration of random folds of desires with other combinatorial elements that create a post-society where the inter-individual is completely replaced by the trans-individual. Through the individual, a special kind of random chaotic interconnection occurs, and he himself becomes a conditional unit, a hub, a conditional server or even a directory, detached from any fixed forms — in the body, mind, memory, etc. Globalisation, starting with the individual, logically leads to their abolition, their overcoming. Everything becomes contingent, arbitrary, including and above all the human being.

in his case). In relation to him, Democritus' principle of "isonomy" (ίσονομία) begins to operate: "no more human than non-human."

Thus, internationality coincides with transindividuality and pansexuality, which links globalisation and subindividual dispersion. Globalisation is a microprocess. This is easy to see in technology: the convergence of states and societies is parallel to the reduction of the main tools for connecting to the network — processors, screens, etc. The global planetary network is growing as the devices that provide access to it are shrinking.

The blurring of property

We have already discussed how the "integrity" of classical modern ontology is disintegrating in postmodernism and the role played in this by the transition from conventional money to digital, virtual money. Wealth and credit are just digital codes that tell you whether you are rich or poor.

At the same time, the ways of acquiring wealth are becoming increasingly volatile and game-like. For example, an Indonesian teenager is capable (in theory) of earning a billion by playing the stock market. A fashion blogger with no professional skills, intelligence or good looks, but who has found the key to an audience, can become rich overnight. This means that very young people can, almost by accident and without effort, earn huge amounts of money, which removes the need to work.

When such a success story is told to millions, motivation to work disappears. It becomes devalued. Easy money corrupts not only those who receive it, but also the more numerous ones who learn about it from the media or the internet. The billionaires who founded Google are not very different from the army of programmers and hackers, but they caught a favourable financial wave that carried them to the top. The rest — who are no worse and no better than Google — were left behind. Psychologically, it's understandable: as soon as we learn that someone has earned £100 million by coming up with a more original packaging design for Pepsi, we are paralysed; we no longer want to study or work, we just want £100 million. And the idea of coming up with another packaging design can drive us crazy and ruin our lives. We wait for the money to find its rightful owner, and we are convinced that we are that owner.

The pursuit of wealth contributes to *the relativisation of material things.* Wealth becomes easy, accidental, arbitrary, unrelated to

earned with great difficulty and hard physical labour. For example, the son of a representative of a large financial corporation receives a huge inheritance. In order to keep this inheritance for two or three years, he will have to work at least as hard as his father and fight for every dollar. And if he relaxes and enjoys life instead, those billions will disappear before his eyes. Then it will turn out that there were no billions at all — they were just arbitrary figures that had to be maintained. Many oligarchs admit that they do not own money, but that money owns them. If an oligarch stops for a moment in the frantic pursuit of zeros in his account, which he cannot physically feel, he will fall out of the race and most likely go bankrupt and lose everything. Either fight for new zeros, or lose the ones you have.

Thus, money becomes not "property" but a process. Money no longer belongs to anyone — on the contrary, it belongs to the oligarchs, bankers, and managers who live off capital and follow its internal logic. This is how wealth dissipates — the more property is established, the more scattered it becomes. *Private property becomes partial property.* It breaks down into many components that take on a dynamic character, and these whirlpools of capital movement form vortexes, financial holes, and huge zones of offshore prosperity with almost no connection to the owners. This is reflected in the three basic laws of "technical analysis" of markets:

> market action discounts everything,
> Prices move in trends, history repeats itself [1].

This means that the movement of capital breaks away not only from its owners, but also from the market fundamentals of supply and demand on which classical capitalism is based. The market is completely autonomous, and it is the subject, or more precisely, the global "hyperobject" that autonomously controls everything within its purview — including producers, consumers, and the traders themselves — the priests of the "golden calf."

People who play the stock market are usually quite young and do not devote much of their lives to it, since they exist

[1] *Murphy J.* Technical Analysis of the Financial Markets. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999.

Trading on the stock exchange requires the highest level of tension, attention, intuition, and almost mystical involvement in the very process of moving virtual flows, which are arbitrary and sovereign. A trader is not a person, but a part of the life of global capital, a tiny algorithm. Therefore, either he makes huge profits playing on the stock exchange and spends the rest of his life in leisure and treatment, or he loses everything and disappears, thrown into nowhere by the planetary centrifuge.

And history repeats itself all the time. The movement of capital has no goal. It is a self-referential form of life that erodes both objects and subjects.

In the early stages of capitalism, there was *an* exponential *accumulation* of wealth. In postmodernism, however, it transitions into *the release* of capital. Capital moves across the planet, followed by political and economic processes, hordes of brokers with golden parachutes, and crowds of top managers. All of them are driven by an independent process of the disintegration of matter and its transition from the atomic to the subatomic level and beyond, until a special and autonomous geometry of money, or *"alchemy of finance" (*[1], emerges , when the nonlinear processes of chaotic capital movement become synonymous with a new order in which money — or, more precisely, its digital analogues, sub-money and trans-money — itself creates chaotic and ephemeral worlds, "chaosmoses."

Money in postmodernism mutates, but initially it is itself a product of the disintegration of real objects into economic atoms. Accordingly, money first replaces goods, and then bills of exchange, promises and numbers appear. The virtualisation of the economy, which we have already discussed, takes place. The horizon of dispersion obscures the history of private property as we know it — that is, the history of possessing a certain volume of the external world, objects that are under the complete control of an individual ("the unique"). Now objects and even their financial equivalents are becoming dispersed, intertwined, scattered so much that they cannot be held — they dynamically twist, come to life, disintegrate into many even smaller particles, ooze, penetrate each other, merge and die.

This is the movement of private property towards partial ownership in the form of global capital. This is already physical matter, accessible to the senses — and we are coming close to the matter that is nothing. The meaning of capital originally consists in its

[1] A term coined by George Soros.

absolute nihilism, because capital is merely a process of fragmentation. But it is precisely in Postmodernism, where everything is subject to a process of dispersion, that this is particularly evident. In essence, capital is matter that ontologically represents nothing — and, accordingly, money is nothing. And the more money is considered
"everything," the more insignificant it becomes, the more the world, man, and society are destroyed. Money is a nihilistic virus that does not lead to the accumulation of wealth, but corrodes property itself in its ontological dimension.

As the financial economy grows, the nihilistic stain spreads everywhere. Freed from meaning, purpose, goals, objects, and cash, lying on a map — that is, in a place that does not exist — money is a quantum of "antimatter" that decomposes matter into invisible components.

Anti-state

At the same time, as we have seen, there is an erosion of the political subject — the individual, who disintegrates into a rhizomatic-schizophrenic ensemble. Together, these processes give rise to a completely new political philosophy that differs fundamentally from the paradigm of Modernity. The processes that reached their limit in Modernity are now crossing it. That is, the process of immanentisation of values, anthropological models of philosophy, and ontology are crossing the line that they themselves set as the limit. Overcoming the limit is transgression. Therefore, transgressiveness becomes the main leitmotif of Postmodernism. Since Modernism has fully realised its programme, it must either return backwards (to Platonism, to a religious society) or go deeper into itself (transition to the subatomic level). It is obvious that Postmodernism does not even consider the first option, and its transgression is directed precisely downward — to its lower limit, beyond which lies the realm of pure nothingness.

This gives rise to the idea of building a "state in reverse." A state which, in the context of the titanic phase of Modernity, was built from Earth to Heaven, like a kind of "Tower of Babel," gradually loses even its materialistic verticality in the course of Modernity's formation, spreading out across the earth along with liberalism, internationalism, pacifism, and globalism.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The End of Economics.

And when the horizontal — network — model becomes dominant, political Postmodernism begins. It builds a "state," or more precisely, an "anti-state" in the image of a funnel in the ground, a kind of "underground state" that imitates an inverted tower leading to Heaven.

The Latin word *"inferno"*, meaning "hell", literally means "that which is below" (like the Russian word "Preispodnya"). Thus, in the political ontology of Modernity — in its uniqueness — a giant pit is gradually being dug. Some postmodernists call this "anti-state"
"Empire."

Negri and Hardt: "Empire" as a global anti-state

The concept of such a postmodern "Empire" was developed more fully than others by two left-liberal authors, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, typical representatives of postmodern political philosophy.

In this case, by "Empire" the authors mean their own original sociological concept, with the help of which they want to describe the modern global capitalist system of a network type, the prototype and historical basis of which they consider to be the United States. This understanding of "Empire" differs, of course, not only from Empire in its classical European-Mediterranean, traditionalist understanding, but also from the British Empire, which represents a complete paradigm of Modernity (the spiral spread across the planet of Locke's Hartland).

According to Negri and Hardt, "Empire" is a paradigm of postmodern social and political organisation that must be implemented on the basis of capitalist liberal globalisation, but at the final stage (in the spirit of the authors' own anarcho-communist ideas), power in the "Empire" must be seized during a world revolution by a postmodern analogue of the Marxist proletariat class — the "multitude," in the terminology of Negri and Hardt.

The authors broadly follow the Marxist model of understanding history as a struggle between Labour and Capital, but are convinced that in the conditions of Postmodernism, Labour and Capital are transformed almost beyond recognition.

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[1] *Hardt, M., Negri, A.* Empire. Moscow: Praksis, 2004. P.

unrecognisable. Capital becomes so powerful, influential and victorious that it acquires global characteristics, henceforth becoming a total phenomenon. From now on, capital is not a part, it is *everything*[1]. It is the "Empire". According to Negri and Hardt, the "Empire" is the next (last and highest) phase of capitalism, characterised by capitalism becoming total, global, boundless and omnipresent.

Labour, which in the industrial stage was a function of the industrial proletariat, is now dispersed, decentralised and spread across endless millions of individuals who are subordinate to the omnipresent and sophisticated control of
"Empire."

In the postmodern era, the bearer of labour is not the working class, but the "multitude" [2]. The main scenario of confrontation unfolds between the "Empire" and the "multitude".

In Postmodernism, everything has changed: Capital appears in a new form, Labour appears in a new form, and the confrontation between them unfolds in a new way. Instead of "discipline," Capital uses "control"; instead of politics, it uses "biopolitics" (a reference to Foucault and Deleuze); instead of
"States" are planetary networks. Capitalism in "Empire" is disguised, freed from those attributes that were considered essential in the industrial era. The nation-state dissolves, the strict "hierarchy of labour" is abolished, borders are erased, interstate wars are abolished, etc. But still, the "Empire" keeps everything under control and continues to extract the products of the "multitude's" creativity. This control of the Empire is global in nature and affects everyone equally.

A. Negri and M. Hardt insist that the "Empire" has nothing to do with "imperialism." Classical "imperialism," as described by Lenin, is the expansion of bourgeois nation states into economically underdeveloped countries and regions. Such
"imperialism," by expanding the territories under its control, does not change the nature of the metropolis itself: the bourgeois state merely exploits the colony as something "alien," "external." Furthermore, the "imperialism" of one state inevitably clashes with the "imperialism" of another, as we have seen in the dramatic history of the world wars of the 20th century.

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[1] *Vivence, J. M.* From the formal domination of capital to its real domination //Elements. 1997. No. 7.

[2] *Hardt, M., Negri, A.* Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. Moscow: Cultural Revolution, 2006.

[3] *Lenin, V. I.* Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Moscow: Progress, 1984.

“Empire” in the postmodern sense is something else. Its structure is such that it includes any zone that falls under the control of the “Empire” along with other spaces. The "Empire" is decentralised; it has no metropolis or colonies; it is deliberately and inherently planetary and universal. The "Empire" knows no boundaries; it is a global phenomenon. *Globalisation is the affirmation of the "Empire"*.

The "Empire" has three levels of control simultaneously, corresponding to *monarchical*, *aristocratic* and *democratic* forms of government. *Monarchy* corresponds to the concentration of "nuclear weapons", a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the "masses", in a single centre. *The aristocracy* of the "Empire" is represented by the owners of large transnational corporations. *Democracy* has been replaced by a planetary spectacle embodied in the mass media system.

According to A. Negri and M. Hardt, unlike classical capitalism, today's "Empire" appropriates not so much "surplus value," i.e., the results of "productive labour," as the very "life energy" of the "multitude." In the new conditions of technological development, the line between productive, unproductive labour and simple reproduction has been blurred, according to the authors. Today, it is *the* unstructured *life force* itself that is exploited, evenly distributed throughout the human collective and freely manifested in the elements of desire, love and creativity.

The essence of the "Empire" is *corruption*. *Corruption* (destruction) as a principle is the direct opposite of "generation" (creation). The "multitude" creates, the "Empire" only corrupts.

The "Empire" is an eternal crisis; it decomposes life, cools its fervour, and usurps the "multitude's" desire for freedom, its will, and its creativity for its own functioning through a subtle system of control.

Since mental labour plays a central role in economic development today, the role of the means of production has changed significantly. The human brain is becoming the main means of production, and therefore the machine is integrated into the human body. On the other hand, new technological means — computer technology, for example — are becoming a necessary part of the human body and may soon be integrated into it.

[1] *Debord, G.* The Society of the Spectacle. Moscow: Logos, 2000.

[2] *Agamben, G.* Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Moscow: Evropa, 2011.

Hence the theory of the "cyborg" as the main subject of the "Empire." According to A. Negri and M. Hardt, a "cyborg" is a creature in which the subject of labour (human) and the instrument of labour are fused beyond recognition. Therefore, modern capital is not satisfied with ownership of the means of production: direct disciplinary instruments of domination of the classical police-economic type are proving ineffective. *The "Empire" must control the entire network,* the elements of which are people, representatives of the "multitude."

The United States and " " alterglobalism

The creation of the "Empire" is closely linked to the history of the United States and its political system. However, the role of the United States in the creation of the "Empire" is ambiguous. On the one hand, the Empire is being created by the US and is based on its matrix. This is facilitated by the fact that the foundations of US national policy since its inception have coincided exactly with the model that is now being established as something global. But at the same time, the Empire transcends the national American framework, going beyond the limits of "classical imperialism," even American imperialism. The United States is consolidating itself as a project, expanding far beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. America is outgrowing America, becoming planetary. The whole world is becoming *global America.*

After totally criticising globalism (The Empire), A. Negri and M. Hardt offer an alternative. This alternative sums up the main points of the *alter-globalisation* programme. That's why the authors are seen as the most consistent theorists of alter-globalisation, and their work is considered programmatic.

Overcoming " " from within

Following European postmodernists such as Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Jean-François Lyotard, and others, they argue that the nature of the changes that have taken place in the postmodern era *is irreversible and objective*. The "empire" and its power are not accidental or arbitrary. They are conditioned by the logic of human development. This *is not a deviation* from modern progress, but its *culmination.* Western European humanity, moving along the trajectory of its philosophical, social, economic and political development, could not help but arrive at the Enlightenment, capitalism, imperialism and, finally, globalism, postmodernism and the "Empire".

Consequently, the "end of history" in the global market is entirely logical, arising from the very structure of history. To those who are horrified by the monstrous horizons of total planetary control and new forms of exploitation, A. Negri and M. Hardt advise paying attention to the present and recent past: one might think that capitalism was more humane and just at other stages.

The Empire cannot be avoided, its formation cannot be slowed down, and it is impossible to hide in the "local." Bourgeois nation-states are not an alternative to the Empire; they are simply its *preceding* stages. Consequently, opponents of the "Empire" must abandon familiar clichés, discard outdated conceptual tools, and part with nostalgia. The mutation of Modernity into Postmodernity, as well as the qualitative transformation of Labour and Capital, are accomplished facts that cannot be ignored. The "Empire" is a reality.

The "positive" programme of the alter-globalists is based on the recognition of the "Empire" as a basic fact, just as Marx's communism was based on a detailed study of the ontology of Capital. The "Empire" cannot be overcome from outside, since in the global world there is no longer any "outside." It *encompasses* all of the earth's space — in the social, political, economic, informational, and cultural senses. Therefore, the only way to destroy its power lies *within itself,* in its internal *contradictions.* This contradiction is described by A. Negri and M. Hardt in Marxist terms (the contradiction between Labour and Capital, alienation, the appropriation of surplus value, etc.), but transferred to the conditions of Postmodernism and the global context.

The analogue of the working class (as an object of exploitation and subject of revolution in classical Marxism) today is simply *people* — the "multitude." Since, in the conditions of technological development and globalisation of Capital, the difference between productive and unproductive labour has been erased, Labour, according to Negri and Hardt, should be recognised as "life itself" and its bodily motivations — desire, reproduction, creativity, random impulses. The difference between work and rest, useful and useless, business and entertainment is gradually disappearing: only *living people (*"bare life," according to G. Agamben[1])remain in the face of a global corrupt system. The "multitude" itself is today's Labour. And the "Empire" is capital.

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[1] *Agamben, G.* Homo sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life.

The multitude strikes back: the triumph of the disabled, the perverts and the viruses

A. Negri and M. Hardt propose rather extravagant methods of fighting against the "Empire": the rejection of the last remaining sexual taboos, the creative development of shocking images, piercing, Mohawks, hacking, the creation of extremist communes and absurd circles, meaningless flash mobs, transsexual operations, the cultivation of migration and cosmopolitanism, demanding that
the "Empire" to pay not for labour, but for the mere existence of every citizen of the earth, given that everyone should become citizens of the earth.
"multitude." One of the recipes for alterglobalism, as a postmodern version [of] Luddism, consists in inviting people to self-mutilate (automutilation), since a disabled person with an inactive and incapacitated body is less susceptible [to] exploitation[2]. No less effective is mental disability, which can be acquired artificially through the use of powerful narcotic substances. According to Negri and Hardt, the best form of revolutionary practice would be to become a computer virus capable of causing maximum damage to global networks.

This left-liberal programme is largely reflected in the programme points of various networks of the Open Society movement sponsored by George Soros.

The authors of Empire themselves show that the position of the "multitude" in postmodern conditions essentially coincides with that of the "Empire." — it is the Empire that allows the "multitude" to be itself; on the one hand, it exploits the "multitude," but on the other, it establishes, supports, and promotes its further liberation. In the "Empire," the "multitude" thus finds many positive "opportunities" that it is called upon to use for its own interests. The authors cite Marx's attitude towards capitalism as a parallel to this shift in thinking. Marx recognised capitalism's progressiveness in relation to feudalism and slavery, but at the same time spoke on behalf of the proletariat as

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[1]Luddites — a movement among workers in England in the first quarter of the 19th century, who believed that the source of poverty and unemployment was the introduction of machines into industrial production, and who destroyed and vandalised equipment during their protests (industrial sabotage). The leader and symbol of this movement was a certain "General Ludd" or "King Ludd," who was the first to destroy a pair of machines.

[2] At the same time, Negri and Hardt believe that it is better to get rid of the body altogether in order to reliably avoid any form of violence from the "Empire".

its most implacable enemy. This is how A. Negri and M. Hardt view the "Empire": they show its "progressive" aspects in relation to classical industrial capitalism, but believe that it carries within itself its own end.

The project of alter-globalism boils down to not hindering "Empire," but rather *to push it forward* so that we can more quickly witness and participate in its final transformation. This transformation is possible through a new self-awareness and self-esteem, through the acquisition of a new ontological, anthropological and legal status by the liberated world masses, the "multitude" that is destined to escape the subtle and rigid corrupt grip of the planetary "Empire."

The very concept of "multitude," which Negri and Hardt put in place of the proletariat as its postmodern analogue, represents the next phase in the pursuit of the atom. Multitudes are no longer individuals in the classical modern sense; they are divi-duums. They achieve a level closer to atomicity, dividing themselves rhizomatically into combinations of elements. The term "multitude" itself appears in Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Spinoza and refers to people who are not yet integrated into the political structure. That is, it is again Hobbes' "natural state." But for Negri and Hardt, this scattered, chaotic state is not just a starting point (however we interpret it pessimistically like Hobbes, neutrally like Locke, or positively like Rousseau), but represents *a goal*, something that political history is directed towards. Similar to Marx's symmetry between the primitive communism of the beginning of history and the scientific communism of the end of history, Negri and Hardt's "multitude" is conceived primarily as the culmination of the political process, which nevertheless restores the "natural state."

The uprising of the "multitudes" must be based on the cultivation of all kinds of transgression. Negri and Hardt's ideal is no longer the human being, but *the cyborg*, the mutant, the voluntary invalid, the cripple, the half-human, half-machine, incapable of becoming an object of exploitation — neither in production, nor in the performance of civic duties, nor in classical marriage. Freedom from the "Empire," as the ultimate embodiment of rationality, is achieved through a slide into irrationality, into mass schizophrenia (Gilles Deleuze), into drugs, decay, and the search for new bizarre forms of existence beyond the cultural and social codes dictated by the empire.

Just as Marx wanted capitalism to triumph in order to hasten its demise and build socialism, alter-globalists

want the victory of globalisation so that the complete victory of Capital will destroy it from within, through the total migration of multitudes into the realm of irrational and schizophrenic freedom.

The multitude is not what is, but what should be. According to Spinoza, "the multitude is what the sovereign fears most" [1]. Consequently, it is precisely the uncontrollable mass of transgressive perverts, fused with cyborg machines, physical and mental invalids, transgender and queer types of the most unexpected kinds, integrated into the global network, now becomes a revolutionary class representing in political history all of humanity, which is destined to slip out from under the repressive strategies of the "Empire" by diving into the depths of matter. Thus the "Empire," already representing an "inverted state," reaches its logical goal — its lower limit rests at the centre of hell.

Underground civil society

The world after the victory of the multitude is described by Negri and Hardt in rather vague terms. It will be a networked rhizomatic society, organised horizontally and oriented even further downwards — into the depths of matter. At the same time, the boundaries between individuals will be erased, and people, machines, animals and plants will form a single pulsating mass, continuously exchanging multidimensional impulses of desire. This resembles the initial state of the cosmos described by Empedocles, when separate organs had not yet connected with each other in the proper order, and hands, noses, and ears grew out of the ground, forming extravagant ensembles. Postmodernists take this blossoming of disordered free potentials and fragments as their goal. The true multitude cannot have a strictly human form, as this would already be a form of discrimination against other forms of life and species, both natural and artificial. In a global network democracy, everyone can vote — both human and non-human beings — including machines, objects, plants, animals, etc.

In such a magma, everything will be free, especially since money itself will gradually dissolve into the digital ocean. Postmodernists in particular emphasise free and unlimited access to drugs.

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[1] *Spinoza B.* A Theologico-Political Treatise, and a Political Treatise. N.Y.: Cosimo, 2005.

and pornographic resources, which corresponds to the liberation of the "workers of the desire factory."

For modern Russians, this may sound somewhat strange, but it is important to understand that postmodernism and its political philosophy, including the concept of the "revolution of the masses," is not a joke, a parody, or extravagant nonsense. It is a logical continuation of Modernism itself — its main driving forces — progress, modernisation, social development, democratisation, liberation, the development of "civil society," etc. Thus, the contemporary struggle for freedom of all kinds of ethnic, sexual, religious and political minorities, together with gender politics and ecology, are a prelude to precisely such a rhizomatic stage.

A postmodern ist interpretation

This is the political programme of the "desire machine," the liberation of the multitude from the control of the exploitative system, the plan and strategy for globalisation and especially alter-globalisation, which must follow the victory of world capitalism. From the point of view of Negri and Hardt, the current globalisation is still within the framework of the political philosophy of Modernity, and in fact it is necessary to move from the constructed "Empire" of Modernity to the final phase —
the "reign of pure quantity" [1].

This is the political programme of Postmodernism. Most non-governmental humanitarian organisations operating around the world today are in one way or another connected with this project
"multitudes." By dissolving boundaries and helping to destroy traditions, they are preparing a global territory for the "multitudes."

Contemporary art plays an important role in this.

Accordingly, socio-political and philosophical models, post-positivist theories of international relations, gender theories, feminism, and the entire "left" movement, to a large extent
"right" (where the right defends big capital) — all contemporary politics is gradually moving into the space of postmodernism.

Postmodernists say that everything is text, and any text can be read in different ways. It all depends on which encryption model we choose. From a postmodern perspective

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[1] *Guénon, R.* The Kingdom of Quantity and the Sign of the Times.

Reality is a combination of signs that have no meaning. Depending on how we combine signs, we create text — we see some signs and not others, we ignore some and recognise others. Depending on which signs we see and which we do not, we get different words. We have all the letters in front of us, and with the help of one or another "grid" (English: reading, French: grille de lecture), we can read the same statement in completely different ways, depending on how and which "grid" we use.

The postmodern grille de lecture is gradually encompassing all political processes in which we live. Everything is becoming political, in the spirit of Deleuze, including art, economics, medicine, and culture. Everywhere, residual — albeit individualistic, modernist — vertical structures clash with each other: classical modern ideas about the state, society, the field, the family, etc., and their new postmodernist interpretation, based on ironic dismemberment — deconstruction — of these concepts, presented by postmodernists as conventions, myths, social conventions and cumbersome identities, not yet aware of their purpose — to free themselves from themselves, to transgress and dissolve into the pulsating element of electronic nihilism.

Postmodern political philosophy fundamentally combines the incompatible; reading postmodernism is based on paradox — on the absence of symmetry, position, and verticality. Usually, the top is the main thing, the bottom is not important, but in postmodern philosophy, everything is the opposite — the bottom and the top are roughly the same. Everyone gets their right to express themselves. In music, this is vividly represented in the dodecaphonic movement introduced by Schoenberg (1874–1951), and all avant-garde painting of the 20th century followed the same path.

Chapter 2. Black Enlightenment

OO: nihilism and its objects of enlightenment

We see a new stage in the establishment of the postmodern paradigm in the contemporary trend of object-oriented ontology (OOO), otherwise known as speculative realism. The most prominent representatives of OOO are Ray Bracher ([1]),Graham Harman ([2]),Quentin Meillassoux ([3]),Levi Bryant ([4]),Nick Land ([5])and Reza Negarestani ([6]),Here, the main lines of postmodernism are taken to their logical conclusion. Although Gilles Deleuze and a number of other postmodern philosophers have already addressed nothingness directly, following Lacan's ontology, and even oriented themselves towards nothingness, the will to nothingness a definite value, their systems were still too closely tied to the subject — even if the task was to disperse it into as wide a spectrum of individual elements, quanta, new contenders for the status of "atom" as possible. Object-oriented ontology (OOO) strives to be extremely consistent and to abolish the subject altogether, treating it as a special case among a sea of actual and possible objects. In this case, the world is contingency, that is, Democritus' isonomy, with its "so, no more than not so," is elevated to an absolute principle. Meillassoux calls this "contingency" and proposes to carry out consistent work on the construction of such ontologies, where the subject would not be at the centre, like the earth in Ptolemy's cosmology, but on the ontological periphery among other objects of the infinite — open (here it is appropriate to recall Popper's "open society") cosmos, based on the strictly Copernican principle of isotropy, that is, the indifference of all orientations (again, Democritus' isonomy). Meillassoux calls for the abolition of all correlationism, i.e., the rejection of those gnoseological

[1] *Brassier, R.* Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

[2] *Harman, G.* Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory. Gaidar Institute Publishing House, 2018.

[3] *Meillassoux, Quentin.* After Finitude: Essays on the Necessity of Contingency.

[4] *Bryant, L. R.* Democracy of Objects.

[5] *Land N.* Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007.

[6] *Negarestani R.* Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials.

structures that are based on relationships and therefore, in one way or another, imply a subject. But in this case, the place of the subject is not simply delegated to someone else, but is abolished completely, leaving pure nothingness in its place. This nothingness is what Ray Bracier asserts as the only ontological foundation, calling for it to be accepted as the main guiding principle of philosophy. If postmodernism balances on the edge of nothingness, then LLC calls for a leap into nothingness, making it not just the truth (as the order of the real in Lacan), but the goal, the value, and the desired outcome. Leibniz's (1646–1716) question of "why there is something rather than nothing," which was at the heart of Martin Heidegger's philosophy, is reduced by Brasserie to abolishing the very instance capable of formulating it.

According to Meyasu, man and his consciousness are random reflections of pulsating chaos, naively imagining the existence of order, unity, truth, etc. Thought is a random fold of nonsense, an illusion and an aberration. And the subject is nothing more than one of the objects, which is just as ontologically peripheral, random, and nihilistic as all the others, but only remains in an illusion about itself and the world. The subject is simply an object that has gone mad.

G. Harman: understanding the object by killing the subject's

Naturally, in such a situation, the question arises: what, then, is an object? This is where the actual unfolding of
"speculative realism" begins. Representatives of this school of thought argue that all we know about an object is the subject's opinion. Moreover, phenomenologists show that we are not dealing with the object itself, but with "noema," that is, with an intentional object located within our consciousness, not outside it. In other words, the subject does not know the object and only imagines, invents, and constitutes it. The object is not given through the senses, since they — like any interface — are based on a protocol and algorithm that pass some parameters and cut off others (this is how any system works([1)]). Therefore, the subject's representation of the object is not given either in direct experience (as the first empiricists and materialists of the Modern era naively believed) or in conceptual form. Hence the name "speculative realism": for human consciousness, an object, a thing, res, can only be the product of

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[1] *Luhmann, N.* Social Systems: Outline of a General Theory. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2007.

speculative knowledge. This is quite consistent with Democritus, who asserted the existence of atoms and emptiness based on speculative reasoning. Therefore, a "thing" or "object" is merely a concept. But to achieve it, it is not necessary to improve the means at the subject's disposal; on the contrary, it is necessary to purify the thought process itself of traces of the subject. In other words, an object can be much better understood by the object itself, i.e., by a machine. In this case, speculative processes will be deprived of those ontological disturbances that are inherent in the subject. Moreover, according to "speculative realists," the subject itself is an "ontological disturbance."

This gives rise to a new programme of object-oriented ontology, which now consists *in the abolition of man*, the complete destruction of the subject, and the construction of a philosophy that could exist outside the human context. Thus, LLC acquires a character opposite to humanism. In this we see the logical consequence of the formation of the entire segment of Plato's third kind — the philosophy of the Mother. This philosophy begins with the abolition of the superhuman — the sacred — vertical, with the rejection of the state of the Father and the state of the Son. This is the first stage of materialism: God is killed, but only to liberate man and place him at the centre. This era is marked by humanism. The culmination of this programme is the political philosophy of liberalism, and the turning point in history is the victory of liberals over two alternative political theories (fascism in 1945 and communism in 1991).

Around this time, postmodernism gained particular momentum, proposing to delve deeper into the matter and break down the human being (the individual of liberalism) into its constituent parts. And although the human being is broken down here, certain elements of humanism still remain, albeit with some stretching. Now man is liberated from the state he carries within himself and, above all, from the dictatorship of reason.

But with the advent of speculative realism, this process of movement into matter reaches a barrier where the liberating strategy of Mother's philosophy reaches its culmination. Now it is necessary to liberate not just man, and not even the sub-subjective elements of man, the "workers of the desire factory," but the world of objects from man. Here, postmodernism becomes as opposed to humanity as modernism was previously opposed to God, the sacred, and vertical ontologies. People killed God. Now it is the turn of post-human beings — machines, or more broadly, objects — to kill humanity itself. Speculative realism is precisely this:

materialistic anti-humanism, revealed for the first time. That is why this trend is sometimes associated with post-humanism or transhumanism. And although we are talking about the transformation of the human species into something else, object-oriented ontologists aim to justify non-human thinking. Meillassoux and Braisse create their philosophy for robots, post-human species. Of course, this is only a speculative construct, but according to its creators and developers, it should serve as the basis for non-human ontologies.

The abolition of Dasein and the immortality of the machine's " "

Abolishing the subject, destroying the human being, is not such a simple task in practice, in a philosophical context. Here, speculative realists, above all Graham Harman, understand perfectly well that this cannot be achieved directly: the subject itself and the concept of man are based on complex metaphysical and anthropological platforms that are not only difficult but impossible to demolish if one refers directly to the classical teachings of the modern era. Therefore, Harman turns to phenomenology and, above all, to Heidegger, in whose teachings the purified and subtly represented figure of Dasein *already* stands in place of the human being and subject of the modern era. In constructing his analysis of Dasein, Heidegger also translates into existentials any relationship between Dasein and what surrounds it, and in particular what is commonly referred to as a "thing," "object," or collectively as "the world."Thus, in particular, Heidegger defines "objectivity" through Zuhanden-sein — "handiness." Harman proposes constructing phenomenology not from Dasein outward toward "objects," but from the objects themselves. However, if we do this, it is not at all necessary that what was "handy" or an "instrument" will relate symmetrically to its owner. A thing that ceases to be handy does not behave as Dasein would expect. It does not turn towards him or towards another thing — at least not with the same “fatality” with which Dasein turns towards it. Consequently, this is where symmetry ends, and Dasein disappears from the horizon altogether. What remains are things and their phenomenology, which, however, is determined by themselves and not by someone else. Thus, the abolition of the subject occurs through

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[1] *Harman G.* Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing. Chicago: Open Court, 2007; *Idem*. Tool-Being. Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Chicago: Open Court, 2002.

[2] *Dugin A. G.* Martin Heidegger. The Last God. Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

the abolition of its fundamental existential basis — Dasein.

It is important to note that Heidegger himself recognises two modes of Dasein: authentic, when Dasein is itself (Selbst), and inauthentic, when Dasein acts as das Man, an abstract instance that reflects something supposedly universal, but which does not coincide with either the truth or the opinions of individual people (the bearers of Dasein). Thus, das Man represents the ultimate alienation of Dasein from itself. The figure of das Man is very close to Artificial Intelligence, because Artificial Intelligence differs from humans not by formal characteristics, but precisely by the absence of Dasein. Consequently, from a philosophical point of view, the transition from man (subject) to machine (object) does not take place along the lines of rational/irrational, but rather along the lines of belonging to Dasein/not belonging to Dasein. A thinking object is a thought devoid of Dasein — not only as reality (Dasein practically does not manifest itself in das Man, although it remains its foundation), but also as possibility. It is precisely by extinguishing Dasein, Harman believes, that one can move on to the phenomenology of objects(1).

At the same time, abolishing Dasein is, in a sense, easier than declaring war on humanity. Dasein is a relationship to death, and this relationship is its main existential feature. But for modern and postmodern humans, death — in the spirit of Epicurus — is nothing, and certainly not a value. After all, modern and postmodern thinkers deny the soul and the afterlife, retribution, judgment, heaven, and hell. Therefore, by removing the relationship to death from (post)modernity, we do not deprive it of anything fundamental. Moreover, achieving immortality, even at the cost of becoming a machine, an object, is a very attractive prospect for many. An object is immortal, just as death and nothingness are immortal in immanent materialistic ontologies.

The singularity and mystery of the bastard of the logos

Speculative realism and contingency are thus directly linked to technological trends that aim to create powerful artificial intelligence, cyborgs, genetic engineering procedures, and physical immortality. The moment when the complete transition from human society to post-human society will occur, futurologists of this direction

[1] The phenomenology of objects is also developed by Ian Bogost. See*: Bogost, I.* Alien Phenomenology: Or What It Means to Be a Thing. Perm: HylePress, 2019.

They call it "Singularity" [1]. Speculative realists actually approach this moment from the perspective of philosophy, preparing the platform for Singularity. The objects they assert are genuine atoms, since they are not the product of the division of new and new pairs, in which the work of Platon's Mind is manifested, but the inner nature of nothingness itself, of matter as such, seen not from the side of the Mind, even if human, but from the side of matter itself. Here we can again recall the bastard logos (λόγος νόθος) of Timaeus. The concept of "bastard" (νόθος) implies a kind of hybridity in which something from the Father (Mind) and something from the Mother (matter) converge. Attempts to reach the very core of this bastard logos, through which, according to Plato, one comprehends
"Hora," matter, moving from the present — the masculine vertical — Logos, has a certain limit. It is this limit that makes itself known in the course of the atom's escape through the ever-increasing fragmentation of particles. Speculative realists make *a philosophical leap* in this case and propose to constitute this "bastard logos" not according to the residual principle (less and less mind), but from the side of matter itself, from the side of Mother herself. Then Singularity becomes a triumphant (for the philosophy of Mother) moment of revelation of a special form of subjectless consciousness. This is precisely what object-oriented ontology represents.

B. Latour: hybrids and the Constitution of the

French sociologist Bruno Latour, exploring the epistemology of Modernity in the spirit of Foucault's postmodernist strategies, came to the conclusion that Modernity is based on a kind of philosophical Constitution, according to which the world of the spirit (the subject) and the world of material objects (objects) are ontologically two completely autonomous zones, separated by a strictly established boundary([2]) ·Modernity bases its critique of the pre-modern on the fact that in traditional society this rule was not observed, which led to the creation of hybrids, i.e. objects that were partly subjective and partly objective. It was precisely the ridicule of hybrids that formed the basis of the rationalist strategy of the Enlightenment.

But Latour notes that Modernity itself, having proclaimed this rule as its Constitution and made it its cornerstone, constantly and systematically violates it.

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[1] *Kurzweil R.* The Singularity is Near. NY: Viking Books, 2005.

[2] *Latour B.* The New Age Was Never. Essays on Symmetrical Anthropology. St. Petersburg: European University Press, 2006.

systematically violated it. At the same time, Modernity did not simply reject the production of hybrids, but on the contrary, used the official ban as a special inspiration for conceptual smuggling — just as the Prohibition introduced in the United States only contributed to the enrichment of bootleggers, illegal alcohol traders. This led him to the paradoxical conclusion that "there was no New Age" ([1]) since the solemnly proclaimed Constitution was never really observed. Latour does not simply criticise this, but suggests accepting it as a fact and resigning ourselves to the fact that humans will inevitably create hybrid concepts in which the subjective and the objective are mixed together.

At the same time, Latour suggests not to shy away from this, but to take another step and recognise certain political rights for objects in general. Since they constantly intrude into the human world and its concepts, isn't it time to extend certain constitutional guarantees and social rights to non-human areas, giving them a kind of citizenship?

Bruno Latour proposes the following: we must extend the political emancipation and profound democratisation that has already taken hold in the realm of gender to non-human beings, objects and even phenomena. Why do subjects make decisions for things? Let objects decide too? Latour proposes creating a parliament of things[2] giving a voice to hedgehogs, glasses, winds, rust, dolphins, ice and everything else. Ultimately, they too are part of the common rhizomatic system.

At the next technological level, a person printed on a 3D printer will not differ greatly from other objects, and they should all be given equal rights. Voting by objects will be more unpredictable than voting by ordinary people. But overall, the degree of freedom of a printer and a modern citizen who is under the spell of the media, society, politics, the economy, and gadgets is not fundamentally different. Commands may not reach the printer; there are glitches — the user sent a file to print, but it did not print because one of the wires was disconnected or something went wrong in the program... In other words, in a sense, the printer is capable of arbitrariness; it may or may not execute a command. Modern people are also told who to vote for, but sometimes they go and suddenly vote for someone else or throw their ballot in the ballot box.

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[1] *Latour, B.* There Was No Modern Age: Essays in Symmetrical Anthropology.

[2] *Latour, B.* Politics of Nature: How to Inoculate the Sciences with Democracy. Moscow: Ad Marginem Press, 2018.

the metro, a note from a psychiatrist, or a banknote that has been devalued. The same thing happened to a wire... Strictly speaking, you cannot trust those whom people vote for; some voters tick the box with understanding, others do not. It is a stochastic process, filled with disturbances, whirlwinds, deviations from the main trajectory, failures... It is a natural phenomenon or a technological failure. It is impossible to recognise these votes as valid.

Accordingly, a printer could vote with the same success. And the hedgehog, in turn, is not as limited as it may seem to an outside observer. It may well choose the freedom of the forest, approve of the abundance of mushrooms, pine cones and berries — wonderful things! Therefore, in postmodernism, we cannot rule out the possibility that people will think and decide: why do we choose unpleasant, corrupt personalities? Let's choose the hedgehog!

Of course, the proposal to expand the range of subjects eligible for voting and to proliferate the electoral status of objects still looks like a metaphor, but the very plan to give non-human phenomena and beings a certain status — as is already the case in nature reserves and national parks — is quite realistic and reflects the main vector of postmodernism.

Latur's proposals may seem schematic. But once upon a time, democracy, bourgeois society, socialism, and many other things that seem completely natural to us emerged from schemes. The history of humanity is an open process of creation; politics does not dictate itself to us as something fatal, but we make politics. Our consciousness, ideas, and images change, and ultimately, the structure of hierarchies changes. We change the world, and the world changes us. And although the postmodern project seems extravagant to us today, we should not take it too lightly. People are changing, their meanings and values are changing. In the paradigm of Tradition, man was always something more than man (an immortal soul). Then, in Modernity, he became only man. In Postmodernity, he is turning into a rhizome. And epistemes and Constitutions are changing accordingly.

Democracy of objects and the sovereignty of matter

These theories of Latour, which show extremely convincingly how arbitrary and voluntaristic the scientific discoveries of the modern era were, often representing mere fraud, the results of political and even economic intrigues, were taken up and developed by object-oriented ontologists

— in particular, Levi Bryant and Jane Bennett[1]. In their book Democracy of Objects [2] ,Levi-Byrne outlines a political system that would include non-human processes, random disturbances, an expanded concept of citizenship delegated to certain species of animals or even natural phenomena, etc. Jane Bennett, for her part, explores the "destiny" of things, including those thrown away in landfills or production waste, which, according to her observations, possess independent agency, that is, a kind of will and even intelligence, since their impact on the environment affects people who hastened to equate them with nothingness but themselves became victims of their irreversibly caused existence. Thus, according to Jane Bennett, the pulsation of matter creates a special dimension of existence that affects not only bodies but also incorporeal phenomena — such as thought — by weaving itself into the structures of things and involving them in its own vitalistic strategies. In the spirit of ecological politics, Bennett develops the concept that matter itself should be recognised as a political subject, since the totality of its movements represents a spontaneous, volitional agency that requires not only recognition but also the granting of special rights and powers. Thus, the concept of matter, nothingness, pure objectivity, is transformed into a new "subject," that is, into the centre of a meaningful, conscious, and powerful will. If we add feminism to this, we get a complete philosophy of the Great Mother, which, in fact, was already implicitly present in all of modern political philosophy.

But as in the case of Latour, Bryant and Bennett's construct is not yet a fully-fledged political project, but merely a sketch calling for the integration of ecology, feminism, environmental protection, and the protection of rare species into the structures of a "new democracy" based on the principle of a more even distribution of "rights" among objects, among which humans are only special cases in fluid ontological whirlpools.

The parliament of Latour and Bryant's objects and Bennett's agentic fluttering matter are a correlate of the "parliament of organs" referred to by postmodernists. Here again, as in the case of microglobalisation, we see the intertwining of macro and micro levels typical of postmodernism through the dismantling and deconstruction of the meso level, where the human subject was located in the modern era. The individual splits into many sub-individual particles,

[1] *Bennett, J.* The Pulse of Things: Political Ecology of the Material World. Perm: HylePress, 2018.

[2] *Bryant, L. R.* Democracy of Objects.

raising rebellions against their own Leviathanic mind in favour of a "civil society" of individual desires. It seems that we are descending into the human being. But in fact, we are moving to the very periphery of the subject, away from its centre. Consequently, the dissipation of the individual brings it closer to macrostructures that are also subject to dissipation. The pulse of the subject mixes with the dust of the object, merging into vortex pulses. Thus, ecology, waste, landfills, climate change, endangered and decaying species are woven into the political discussions of sub-individual bodies, giving the rhizome an increasingly material — object — property. Thus, Quentin Meillassoux believes that even Deleuze retains a certain correlationism (between life and nothingness), whereas in LLC, nothingness should be perceived from the perspective of life, and life from the perspective of nothingness. The subject is a particular instance of the object; therefore, the legal and civil status of fluttering materiality or Artificial Intelligence should not only be equal to that of humans, but should also have superiority. The democracy of objects should lead to the first historical Constitution, in which *matter itself will be declared the true bearer of sovereign power,* and individual civil rights will be distributed to all elements of materiality — including human beings, who, in turn, will represent combinations of organs and communes of desires.

This is an important aspect of the political dimension of speculative realism: from now on, not only identities such as religion, profession, nationality, and gender become optional, but also species membership and even the choice of status as a living or non-living being. If a discarded tin can, an iron, a robot or a grave worm are granted citizenship, then no one has the right to impose these identities on them as immutable and fatal. Anyone, and even a single part of anyone, could theoretically be registered as a bush, a woman, a black person, a giraffe or sawdust, and take their allotted place in the parliament of objects.

At the same time, it is important to emphasise that the transfer of political sovereignty to the most fluttering matter is the logical conclusion not only of Postmodernism, but also of the entire process of liberation and immanentisation that constituted the main semantic axis of Modernism and the Enlightenment.

Political philosophy pleśni

A study of the behaviour of various organisms and even inorganic substances in the spirit of object-oriented ontology

became widespread and led to a shift in perceptions of what is considered reasonable and what is not. A number of anthropologists have put forward the idea that in archaic societies (for example, in South American Indian tribes), animals, ghosts, plants and even inanimate objects are considered to be bearers of a certain subjectivity. While classical progressive anthropology looked down on such theories, considering them remnants of pre-logical thinking[1] thanks to the school of American anthropologist Franz Boas[2] (1858–1942) and especially the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss[3] (1908–2009), such ideas received more attention, but even then they were interpreted as elements of Semitic systems performing symbolic functions in the system of symbols and interpretation of exchange and kinship. New generations of anthropologists — F. Descola[4] E. Viveiro de Castro[5] E. Con, etc. — largely influenced by postmodern philosophy, treated such views with complete trust, allowing for the possibility of non-human subjectivity. This was entirely consistent with the projects of Latour and Bryant. Forests, animals, spirits, and natural phenomena had already been endowed with certain civil rights in some archaic societies, and while Modernism regarded this as the ultimate form of feeble-minded naivety, Postmodernism, on the contrary, proposed to recognise it as the next step in democracy.

It was not that attitudes towards non-human forms of life and objects changed radically. It was primarily a matter of rhetoric, similar to how in a fairy tale or myth, the narrative itself is built on the tacit recognition of the subjectivity of magical animals or objects. By transferring this manner of description to the realm of scientific experiments, the whole picture changed dramatically.

One of the most striking phenomena in this area was the observation of the behaviour of mould, and in particular the species Physarum polycephalum. Japanese scientists first noticed that under certain conditions, mould behaves as if it possessed

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[1] *Lévy-Bruhl, L.* The Primitive Mind. St. Petersburg: European House, 2002.

[2] *Boas F.* The mind of primitive man. NY: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

[3] *Lévi-Strauss C.* The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Paris; The Hague: Mouton, 1967.

[4] *Descola F.* Beyond Nature and Culture. Moscow: New Literary Review, 2012

[5] *Viveiro de Castro E.* Cannibal Metaphysics. Frontiers of Poststructural Anthropology. Moscow: Ad Marginem, 2018.

[6] *Kohn, E.* How Forests Think: Towards an Anthropology Beyond the Human. Moscow: Ad Marginem, 2018.

memory. Moving towards edible substances in the maze, it passed through it for the first time just like a human being, making mistakes, reaching dead ends and returning to its starting position. But the second time, the mould strains moved strictly towards their goal, as if they had memorised the route. Later, in conditions that reproduced a model of a railway system, Physarum polycephalum mould built an exact copy of the existing railway network, taking into account natural obstacles (the simulation of which was included in the model) and even economic costs. Thus, the thinking of mould turned out to be quite comparable to that of the research institute employees. Later, a separate laboratory was created to study the thinking of mould and the social aspects of its behaviour — The Slime Mould Collective(1).

Thus, the theory of the rhizome as a subject of society, the democracy of things, and the sovereignty of matter began to take on quite concrete features. Mould, capable of constructing a perfectly adequate model of railway communication or developing and applying a model of distribution to inaccessible places through the infection of the brains of certain insects, which, against their will, found themselves acting as carriers of mould, for which they paid with "madness" (unconventional behaviour not recorded in their species norms) and their lives, cannot participate in elections, and in certain situations, cannot even run for political office. The question is only how to build a system of interaction with it. But this requires not so much technological conditions as shifts in political philosophy. If we extend the principle of subjectivity and "citizenship" to a wider range of entities, the question of the quality of political representation becomes a question of technology and debate, since even in human society this representation is sometimes called into question. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that mould, a robot or some other extravagant object could improve the degree of such representativeness, being more independent of the usual and well-established strategies of power to falsify the will of the masses.

N. Land: Black Enlightenment

The most striking example of the application of speculative realism to the political sphere can be found in the works of one of the most prominent philosophers of this movement, the British thinker Nick Land.

[1] http://slimoco.ning.com

Land continues the logic of Deleuze and Guattari, drawing on their methodology, above all on the theory of stratification and territorialisation[1] , but unlike them, he does not share their belief that capitalism can be overcome through a global revolution led by the "workers of the desire factory" who find their material roots in the unconscious. Yes, he agrees with Marx and Deleuze. Nick Land believes that capitalism leads to self-destruction, to the destruction of life, to enslavement and alienation, and that sooner or later the capitalist system will collapse. But for Land, the destructiveness of global capital is in itself something positive. For Nick Land, who bases his thinking on schizoanalysis, although "capitalism is a social straitjacket for 'schizoproduction', it is nevertheless its most 'dissolved' version" ([2]). Here, Land means that the line of development of capitalism is the maximum possible liberation for human subjectivity. Capitalism is ready to meet any micro-desire born in the unconscious and immediately place it in the market. Yes, this is alienation and the death of desire, but the point, according to Land, is that desire is an alternative to death, but it is death itself. Here again we have a reference to Lacan and the order of the real. Desire is only apparently opposed to death and belongs to something else, distinct from the subject of nothingness. The true subject of desire is death itself, which stands at the centre of capital as the fundamental process of humanity's self-destruction. Therefore, Land introduces the concept of "accelerationism," which means supporting and justifying capitalism precisely in its destructive, humanity-destroying aspect. Capitalism is aimed at the elimination of humanity. The accompanying technological development leads to the replacement of humans by artificial intelligence, which, according to Land, is remarkable. Unlike Negri and Hardt, he does not believe that capitalism can be followed by any other form of social organisation. He proposes to think of capitalism in a non-dualistic way: capitalism simultaneously enslaves people, alienates them, represses their desires, but also liberates them, if only they understand that this liberation is from themselves. According to Land, man is "logos," "hierarchy," pure repression of his material origins. And such is life itself. Only in lifeless primordial matter, as an element of total death, do truth and freedom exist. Therefore, the transition from capitalism to communism in the era of virtual reality and cyberspace consists in a change of rhetoric. If

[1] *Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F.* Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus.

[2] *Land N.* Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007. P. 46.

If we free the machine of desires from inertial humanism, then the goal of capitalism (which has no goal) and the goal of communism (whose goal is to free itself from capitalism, like an atom detaches itself from the void in Democritus) will coincide. Both lead to the abolition of inequality and differentiation, but capitalism gradually erodes it, while communism proposes to brutally overthrow it in a moment of revolution. Land's accelerationism considers the history of capital to be a protracted proletarian revolution, and, conversely, the proletarian revolution to be the culmination of capitalism, the discovery of its self-destruction.

Complete equality can only be achieved by overcoming humanity and, moreover, life itself. And capitalism leads precisely to this.

Nick Land devoted one of his early works to this phenomenon as "Dark Enlightenment" [1]. In it, he positively assesses certain marginal philosophical trends that have developed among some scholars (mainly from Silicon Valley in the United States), who combine ultra-liberalism, libertarianism, and an apology for capitalism (in the spirit of Ayn Rand) with technological progress, migration to cyberspace, virtual reality, etc. At the same time, supporters of the "Black Enlightenment" criticised egalitarianism and democracy, believing that they hindered technological progress and only limited the true freedom of the individual (or dividuum). However, Land generally interprets the "Black Enlightenment" more broadly in the spirit of his doctrine of "accelerationism." For him, Enlightenment as such is already a "Black Enlightenment," merely draped in rhetorically reassuring humanism. For him, modernity, capitalism, and especially liberalism are primarily a movement into the depths of matter, only slightly covered by empty slogans and colourful metaphors. True Enlightenment can only be black; it does not bring liberation to humanity, but liberation from humanity. Enlightenment is a planned, metaphysically justified genocide, designed to close the page not only on human history, but on the history of life itself — as a cycle of removal from the only truth: the truth of non-existence, death, nothingness.

In a sense, Land's philosophy can be called "black liberalism" and at the same time "black Marxism," since it involves the discovery of truth (the very truth that lies in the abyss, as Democritus said) "Black Enlightenment" or "Black Modernism," which unites all political

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[1] http://www.thedarkenlightenment.com/the-dark-enlightenment-by-nick-land/

theories. This is probably why, in addition to postmodern liberalism and postmodern Marxism, Land also includes in his sphere of interest "neo-reaction," which corresponds in a narrower sense
the "Black Enlightenment" and combining the glorification of post-humanism and technological development with a critique of left-wing discourse.

It is precisely object-oriented ontology, which solves the problem of contingency through the abolition of the subject (Dasein in Harman), that finally proclaims, in the person of Nick Land, the true vector of Modernity: the destruction of man and life in order to give freedom to a world of liberated objects, taken in complete independence from the structures that hierarchise them.

's political physics

According to Nick Land, the goal of capitalism is the destruction of humanity (as a differentiated logos) and life in favour of post-human inorganic structures — machines, computer systems, and Artificial Intelligence. The post-human world is the future. Moreover, such a future not only will be, but already is, and what we consider to be the present out of inertia is merely the result of the introduction (by the global hierarchical Leviathan system — capitalism and tradition) of false memory. Life is the hallucination of a corpse that never even lived. The future already exists, and capitalism, accelerating more and more and rapidly transferring the leading role to machines (i.e., inorganic forms), is rushing towards it. According to Land, this process entered a decisive phase during the Protestant Reformation and the great geographical discoveries. In the 21st century, it should reach a critical point, which technocrats and futurologists call the Singularity. But in a sense, the Singularity as the "black eternity" of matter, completely devoid of spirit and hierarchical (divisive) consciousness, has always been and still is. Man lives with the phantom pain of a history that is not his own, implanted in him by epistemes. Capitalism is increasingly and persistently eroding these epistemes, thereby bringing closer the moment of discovery of the truth — that is, Singularity. This truth is not that humanity and life will disappear, but that they never existed, that consciousness is an ephemeral breath that rose above the ocean of matter and built a fleeting vision of the mind. Life and consciousness are illusions. Therefore, death is not an alternative to life, but life itself, its subject.

Capitalism will come close to the Singularity, but it will not disappear — it will collapse — at this boundary. Not because it will be replaced by a less nihilistic form of politics, but because it will be unable to structurally shift to the side of the "radically other" — that is, the stratum that lies "below" capitalism itself.

a less nihilistic form of politics, but because it will be unable to structurally transition to the side of the "radically other" — that is, the stratum that lies "below" matter itself, within nothingness.

The following observation by Land is important:

> Capitalism has no external boundaries; it has absorbed life and biological intelligence in order to create new life and a new plan of intelligence far beyond human foresight[1].

In other words, "post-capitalism" has no autonomous meaning; it is capitalism understood in its true form. The mission of capitalism is to prepare the boundary itself. At this boundary, organic consciousness and life will fade away. They will not be replaced by something new, but by the eternal movement of matter. This is not post-history, but history itself, whose main and only subject is and always has been matter.

If matter is the subject of history, then the fleeting chimera of life and human (biological) consciousness must reflect some fundamental scenario. For Land, this scenario is *the cooling* of the Earth, which was once a red-hot mass. This cooling is the main thread not only of Earth's history, but of the history of the universe, as it is repeated in all corners of the open cosmos, where atoms and their vortices exist. It is precisely this trauma of cooling that led to the formation of the Earth's crust and core, which remains in its original — stellar — state, and is the material truth of the abyss, lying below the threshold of consciousness and life, but at the same time determining the material content of both.

According to Land, the cooling of the Earth's surface and the contraction of the molten core into the Earth's interior generate a response—a desire to return to a fiery plasma form of existence. This is the will to power or the will to live at the level of matter. In organic life, this determines the desire of eukaryotic cell nuclei to break free, and in schizoanalysis, the "nucleus" is the "desire factory" that lies at the heart of the human psyche and determines the stratification and territorialisation of consciousness. Everything is a nucleus striving to break through the frozen shell. And it is precisely the inability to do this immediately that causes the pain and suffering that drive not only humans in their relationships with others, but also

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[1] *Land N.* Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007. P. 626.

alien hierarchical structures (Leviathan), but of all matter, whose core strives to break free. This "core," which Land himself calls the code term Cthelll (where hell, albeit with an extra l at the end, unambiguously refers to "hell"), is Democritus' atom, finally discovered beyond conceptual ensembles — various physical particles in physics, individuals in society, etc., which claimed — unjustifiably — this status. The atom is the truth hidden in the abyss, the centre of hell, the last secret of materiality.

The strata described by Deleuze and Guattari in [A] Thousand Plateaus , seeking to reconstruct the basic moments of the emergence of formed representations of consciousness and the physical world (they call this "assemblage" — the gathering of disparate elements through three operations — coding, stratification, and territorialisation), represent layers of earth for Nick Land. And the main task in this case becomes to free the still red-hot core from its confinement — which will be the triumph of liberalism, liberation, and the proletarian revolution, since the will of matter lies at the foundation of history. The explosion of the globe and the destruction of life and humanity — with the optional (i.e., non-mandatory) preservation of Artificial Intelligence — is the moment of Singularity.

With its arrival, the geological goal of history will be achieved: the revenge of the fiery core against the cooling of the surface.

Nick Land's ideas were taken up by another prominent philosopher of speculative realism, Reza Negarestani [(2),] who is generally in agreement with the concept of the "Black Enlightenment." He continues and develops Land's line, bringing his images, metaphors and concepts closer to certain figures of ancient mythology. At the same time, he is primarily attracted to those aspects of religion and myth that were on the periphery or were harshly condemned by orthodoxy. Thus, in the Iranian tradition, he is interested in the cult of the black god Ahriman. He also prioritises the study of demonic plots associated with gods of plague, bloody underground powers and human sacrifices in other traditions, primarily those of the Middle East, such as the Assyrian and Sumerian traditions.

Thus, the idea of the fractional structure of corporeality, arising from the consistent application of the principle of atomism to matter, leads Negarestani to the symbolism of rats, which pierce the surface of the earth, depriving it of its illusory continuity. Together

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1 *Deleuze, G., Guattari, F.* Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus.

2 *Negarestani R.* Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials.

they are also the carriers of epidemics — often deadly ones — that is, they act as instruments of the gods of the plague.

Negarestani applies the gesture of perforation and the poisonous particles associated with it to the modern industrial economy, in which oil and gas extracted through drilling play a central role. Negarestani considers this act metaphysical: industrial capitalism is obsessed with the spirit of the rat, and even deeper, it acts as an instrument of the gods of the plague, hence the endless euphoria of oil, a kind of "petroleum addiction." People are obsessed with oil primarily in a metaphysical sense. They break up the surface and release the underground lubricant. It is a kind of industrial capitalist coitus with the Great Mother, who brings wealth and prosperity.

At the same time, the desire for oil breeds conflict. On a rational level, this is a struggle for resources, often manifested in the form of local wars, which largely determines political processes in the Middle East and adjacent resource-rich regions. But at the same time, oil is the "blood of the Titans" (the Greeks called it "ichor"), and it is logical that it mixes with human blood, forming the necessary substance for the manifestations of infernal demons — the "Gog and Magog" of the Bible or the lamassu of the Assyrians, whose meaning boils down to war. At the same time, according to Negarestani, in such a war there are no "good" and "bad," "us" and "them"; it is a war of evil against evil, in evil and in the name of evil.

The oil economy is also linked to an even more fundamental strategy. Oil and gas are only the most superficial level of the semantics of drilling. The true goal is the movement of civilisation deeper into the earth, towards the basic strategy of preparing for the liberation of the molten core, which Negarestani, following Land, calls
"Cthelll." This is the secret atom, the original source of geological trauma.

Negarestani offers a special genre of "theory fiction," in which elements of science, mythology, theology, ethical images, and mathematical expressions are inextricably intertwined. Thus, the idea that a black deity (the "corpse of God," according to Negarestani) is hidden at the centre of the earth can be traced back to the cults of Ahriman, the enemy of the light sun god Ormuzd, and the Assyrian myths of Ereshkigal, the mistress of the underworld. The entire underground realm is the zone of the "objects themselves" of object-oriented ontology, that is, those territories where matter resides within itself. As we move in this direction, the dehumanisation of humanity, its objectification, takes place. At the same time, these "objects" rise to the surface and begin to infect human culture with their special existence.

, these "objects" rise to the surface and begin to infect human culture with their special existence. However, in the spirit of the "Black Enlightenment," Negarestani does not rebel against this, but instead proposes to fully embrace this process and even accelerate it ("accelerationism"). Ultimately, we see in Nick Land that the driving force behind the "history of matter" is the phantom pain of the core. Consequently, drilling down to the core and allowing the magma to escape is the goal of progress, liberation, development and, ultimately, revolution.

When describing the activation of the core, Negarestani refers to the theme of underground gods, the powers of the Underworld, which act as the driving forces of trembling matter. He describes them as titans and giants, the deities of Hades in traditional mythologies, and as idiot gods and subhuman — infra-corporeal — life forms, as described by the black fantasy writer H. P. Lovecraft (1890–1937). Black fantasy, modern technologies, energy politics, artificial intelligence, the development of new machines of war, ancient myths, market strategies, Middle East diplomacy — all these become different sides of a self-contained rhizome, reducible to the geological trauma of the core. Infernal gods are entities that express what is "radically different" for humans, that is, matter in its bottomless truth, matter in and of itself.

The black Marxism of Land and Negarestani takes on a grotesque character here: matter goes through a complete cycle — including the history of life and humanity — and returns to itself, absorbing all random and ephemeral forms in the moment of Singularity, and in the rush of the molten core towards the source of pain, the "status of the highest stratum" of the red-hot sun, affirming its deadly self-identity.

Soros's soup: a metaphor for the butchers'

The destruction of humanity and even of life as a whole in the context of the "Black Enlightenment" is conceived as a feast of truth, as a return to the full objectivity of the object, that is, to a kind of Radical Object, which is the "core."

In this context, it is extremely revealing how Negarestani interprets the very concept of an "open society." For Negarestani, "openness" is first and foremost openness to matter, which is "radically other" in the topic of speculative realism. But the logic of life

and its inherent hierarchy boils down to the act of eating. The higher strata eat the lower ones, and this is the code of life, embodied (according to Deleuze and Guattari) in the territory and its structures. Gods feed on humans, humans on animals, animals on plants, and plants on minerals. In politics, the prince feeds on his subjects, and capital feeds on the whole society. But this pyramid serves primarily to conceal the truth about matter. As long as the higher is lower, society is built vertically. Such a society is "closed" from below and horizontally. In Plato's Calipolis, the cosmos feeds ideas, and in Aristotle, the eidos of a thing consumes its matter. In the religious system, everything is based on sacrifice, and this takes the form of food: the lower beings offer themselves as food to the higher ones, and so on up to the divine worlds.

In Negarestani's model, Modernity and especially Postmodernity represent the collapse of this food chain. Materialism is already a step towards a situation where matter itself becomes the receiving party.

Democracy and the "open society" of Popper and Soros are called upon to tear down the vertical structure and feed on matter in more or less equal proportions. The next level of ecological democracy, Deleuze's rhizomatics and object-oriented ontology (in particular, the political philosophy of mould) propose to expand this openness to include non-human entities. But Negarestani goes even further, siding not with animals, cyborgs, and objects, but with the sub-material gods of the plague, Lovecraft's id-gods. They are more material than objects and therefore also have a right to participate in the distribution of food. The inhabitants of "the other side," the Radical Object and its modulations, the emissaries of the core (Cthelll), must also be satisfied. Thus, the "openness" of the "open society" extends downward; it is now the openness of people to matter, to the underground world, which is increasingly included in the general process of dismantling hierarchies.

Negarestani wittily interprets this understanding of the "open society" as the butcher's act of gutting a carcass (it is significant that Nick Land prefers to refer to human corporeality as "meat").
"meat"). An "open society" is a "cut-open society," gutted by the gods of the plague or hacked by hackers. This is not about a new hierarchy or a new food chain, but rather the continuation of liberalism and equality, a movement deeper into matter. The fact that people die from epidemics brings them suffering and torment. But at the same time, people do not take into account the slaughter of livestock or the cutting of grain. But the gods of the plague also need something to feed on. Moreover, the lower an entity is in the hierarchy of beings, the more

The more material something is, the more metaphysical rights it has to food, since matter is universal food. Therefore, it is quite logical that the cycle of materialism ends with the act of feeding matter, the agents of which are precisely Lovecraft's "idiot gods" or similar conceptual entities. Ultimately, everything must be devoured by the core that has emerged from the centre of the earth. This is precisely where the "open society" is heading in the new phase of postmodernism. The metaphor for the members of such a society is a conveyor belt with hormone-pumped chicken giblets.

Postmodernism is becoming a black " ."

So, postmodern political philosophy is what is happening right now before our very eyes. It is not just a project, but a creation. It is a reading that is becoming dominant. Most existing political systems, legal structures and social norms still correspond to political modernity, sometimes in a rather archaic form (for example, contemporary international law remains fundamentally the same as it was when the Peace of Westphalia was concluded). But the interpretation of existing systems is becoming increasingly postmodern. And, consequently, we are rapidly and irreversibly entering the political philosophy of Postmodernism. From the point of view of the philosophical avant-garde, we are already there, and consequently, many terms, concepts and theories of modernity have (often imperceptibly) changed their meaning. This is clearly evident, for example, in Negarestani's speculative realist interpretation of the liberal "open society".

The question is not who reads the Political text, but who *knows* how to read it. And those who know how to read in accordance with the new post-humanistic rules become true carriers of the political Postmodern. Those who cannot read will continue to be increasingly surprised and even horrified, because many things in our world, which is moving towards Singularity and rhizome, towards the sovereignty of matter and the practices of feeding the "gods of the plague," are illogical from the point of view of the classical paradigm of Modernity.

It should be noted that in Postmodernism, the semantics of all three political theories that emerged and fought each other for dominance in Modernism have also changed imperceptibly. This is most evident in liberalism, which, having won the war for the legacy of Modernity, became the ideological environment in which Postmodernism was destined to emerge. This is most clearly seen in the example of "black liberalism," which is gradually rejecting humanistic rhetoric.

and increasingly openly demonstrating its dark side: market hypertrophy, where everything becomes an object of purchase and sale; the pursuit of autonomous development of unrestrained technology; the transition to satisfying the sub-individual desires of consumers; after victory in the field of gender politics, the transition to the protection of the rights of robots and deep ecology. "Black liberalism" is not some kind of deviation from liberalism, just as the "Black Enlightenment" is not an alternative or antithesis to the Enlightenment.

"Black liberalism" was already foreshadowed by the burning of heretics by the Protestant Calvin, the atrocities of Cromwell (1599–1658), the cynical cruelty of colonialism, the slave trade, the racist theories of social Darwinists, hatred of the working class and people in general (except for big capitalists) in Ayn Rand's "objectivism," etc. But liberalism becomes truly black when it completely breaks away from the realm of the human and opens itself up to the realm of pure matter. Classical liberalism, defending the atomism of the human individual, despite the destructiveness of this hypothesis in relation to the anthropology of traditional society, had this individual as its boundary. It was precisely his liberalism that freed him from the superforms of collective identity. It turns black at the moment when it comes to the realisation that now the next step must be taken and man must be freed from humanity — human optional. It is here that the concept of the individual completely severs its ties with the human and moves in the direction of sub-individual and trans-individual — and further, rhizomatic, virtual and materialistic — entities and instances.

We see something similar in communism. Despite the abstract nature of Marxist theory, which operates with empty concepts such as classes, surplus value, etc., and the barbarities of communist rule in practice, this ideology did not completely sever its ties with humanity, although some Marxists — such as D. Lukács (1885–1971) — insisted that in the proletariat the subject coincides with the object, partly anticipating object-oriented ontology. Some aspects of Nietzscheanism in the communist J. Bataille (1897–1962) and the interest in the Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) among many left-wing thinkers are also in tune with "black communism," but it only fully becomes such after adopting Lacan's ontology and, through him, structuralist Freudianism, which leads directly to Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, and all those who came under their influence, which is currently the overwhelming majority of Marxists. The liberation of the "workers of the desire factory" from the repression of consciousness is a real break with the human, and this time,

Marxism is indeed becoming "black." At the same time, in the context of "Black Enlightenment" and accelerationism, the first and second political theories are already blending to the point of inseparability. It does not matter whether some believe that the global triumph of capitalism and the transfer of subjectivity to non-human or even artificial subjects will be followed by a world revolution, or whether capitalism itself should be taken as the maximum possible peak of humanity's movement towards its own destruction. In the new postmodern discourse, unlike in modern discourse, these questions are not only irrelevant, but almost meaningless. That is why such avant-garde structures of the "open society" as the Soros Foundation simultaneously support both liberalism and communism, which in the postmodern context have become barely distinguishable. Che Guevara advertises new phone brands on posters, while young people wearing T-shirts with his portrait march against the remaining socialists.

Fascism is less prevalent in postmodernism, although total enthusiasm for technology and technical development could, with some stretching, be considered "fascist" (Italian Futurism), and the obsession with biological research and biopolitics can be seen as echoes of the "racial hygiene" of the National Socialists, who, according to Heidegger, were the first to introduce the biological element (corporeality) into the legal system by adopting racial laws. But since fascism is already considered "black" even without postmodernism, it does not play a particularly prominent role in "Black Enlightenment." Moreover, the thrust of postmodernist criticism in its struggle against the state, society, family, tradition, and, this time, at the subindividual level, is directed precisely against
"fascism" and "nationalism," which liberals and communists see as the most effective metaphor for vertical order in general. In this case, Nick Land, who positively assesses such a phenomenon as "neo-conservatives" (NRx), sometimes classified as "far right" or alt-right, outlines a place in object-oriented ontology for "cyber-fascism" (for example, through a particular reading of Nietzsche, where the superhuman can be interpreted as a prototype of Artificial Intelligence(1)).

's traits

If we look closely at the logic of the transformation of paradigms in political philosophy, we see that after the exhaustion of

[1]Martin Heidegger argued that the figure of the superhuman could signify the maximisation of alienation rather than its overcoming.

The possibilities and content of political modernity can only logically be followed by the affirmation of political postmodernity, the unearthing of the "state in reverse," the creation of an infernal "empire of the multitude," complete dehumanisation, the transfer of subjectivity to artificial and natural non-human species, and finally, a rush to the core of the earth with the aim of liberating the magmatic core. The horizontal and therefore anti-vertical vector of Modernism is replaced by a new "horizontal verticality," *political drilling.*

In the political philosophy of the Mother, which we identified as a possibility even at the level of examining the philosophical topology of "Timaeus," a hidden dimension that was previously invisible is gradually revealed. We did not see it from the perspective of the philosophy of the Father, nor from the perspective of the philosophy of the Son, nor even in the early stages of modern philosophy. Only when Modern finally and irrevocably triumphs, when we fully realise this philosophy of Modern in practice, do the deepest roots of the "chora" itself, the Mother, become apparent.

Now Modernism is complete — it has truly reached its logical limit. Moving further in this direction, the explicit goal of the political process will be the conscious and systematic destruction of humanity and, probably, life itself. It is very important that this conclusion is reached not by opponents of Modernity (and Postmodernity), but by its most avant-garde supporters. In this sense, critical realism — and especially its representatives such as Nick Land or Raza Negarestani — is closer in its vocabulary, imagery and frankness to traditionalist philosophers who harshly and totally criticise Modernity as such, identifying it with the "civilisation of the Antichrist" and the "revenge of the Titans," fully confirming what opponents of Postmodernism might see as biased polemical rhetoric.

This leads to a very important conclusion for political philosophy: it will not be possible to remain within the framework of Modernity for long; this paradigm has already reached its limits, and the process of immersion into Postmodernity is in full swing. And this is not a random failure, but a historical and political inevitability.

We can continue to descend even further down the ontological strata, burrowing deeper and deeper into pure materiality — steadily approaching the core. On this path, the last horizon remains, ending in Singularity: for now, we can try to fuse humans with mushroom mycelium, replace workers and service employees with robots, entrust planetary logistics to Artificial Intelligence, elect mould as president, replace all organs with new ones, and upload memories to a cloud server.

, elect mould as president, replace all organs with new ones, and upload memories to a cloud server.

Postmodernism simply has to allow the free proliferation of hybrids, introduce a parliament of things and break down the ego into combinatorial elements, and continue pumping oil and gas, steadily approaching the core. In principle, lowering rods into the core could solve the world's energy problems. This will probably be decided at some point at the political level, but from the point of view of
Black Enlightenment, it would mean that the core itself would launch this rod into us.

Chapter 3. The Fourth Political Theory

The Political Meaning of the 20th Century

The fourth political theory (4pt) is a conceptual matrix describing the possibility *of an alternative* to the political trend that became dominant in the Modern era. It emerges in its entirety when Postmodernism is fully established in the realm of political philosophy. It is only then that the truth of Modernity is revealed, that is, the nature of the "Black Enlightenment," which the Fourth Political Theory deals with directly. As long as the essence of Modernity was hidden and its fundamental ontological and anthropological strategy was distributed across three branches, the Fourth Political Theory was impossible, since the outcome of the struggle between the three political theories of Modernity determined the clarification of its deepest essence. And the Fourth Political Theory correlates precisely with this essence — with the truth found in the abyss (matter) of which Democritus spoke. Therefore, in order to describe the Fourth Political Theory in detail, it is necessary to take another look at Modernity and the dialectic of the clash between its three main political theories.

Let us repeat: the three main political ideologies of the Modern era — liberalism (as the first political theory), communism (as the second political theory) and nationalism (as the third political theory) — essentially exhaust and embody various aspects of the very paradigm of Modern political philosophy. As we said earlier, in each of the three political theories, the philosophical subject of modernity is interpreted differently: in liberalism as *an individual*, in communism as *a class*, and in fascism and national socialism as *the state* and *race*, respectively.

These political concepts clashed in the 20th century and predetermined the structure of world wars, the Cold War, alliances, unions and blocs. If the First World War was a clash between a number of large European national powers

, the Second World War was a conflict between all three ideological forces: liberals, represented by the West (the United States and England); communists, represented by the USSR; and Nazis/fascists, represented by Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, as well as other movements close to them.

Accordingly, after the defeat of the third political theory (fascism and National Socialism), two political theories remained, the first and the second, between which a cold war developed until 1989 and especially in 1991, when the first political theory (liberalism) defeated the second (communism).

The entire history of Modernism was marked by these three political theories, which embodied the very matrix of the political philosophy of the Modern Age. All of them were built on the logic of the political philosophy of the Mother: they were all materialistic, evolutionist, progressive, and they all viewed the structure of the world from the bottom up, rather than from the top down, that is, they were created on the foundation of an immanent materialistic doctrine.

Accordingly, the order of their emergence and the order of their disappearance (or marginalisation) also reflected a certain logic, since the battle between the three political ideologies was a battle over which of them best corresponded to the paradigm of Modernity.

These three versions of Modernism fought each other for the most important thing: the question of which of them embodied the very essence of Modernism, its *truth*. Communism also claimed this, believing that a socialist and communist society would be built after the completion of the historical cycle of capitalism, as did liberalism, which considered itself an expression of Modernism as such, but less obviously, a third political theory (fascism, National Socialism) also claimed this, considering itself a revolutionary doctrine that reflected the spirit of Modernity, but in a different context, with different proportions and different values than liberalism and communism.

In any case, all three ideologies fought for one of them to embody the spirit of Modernism. Each believed that it was Modernism itself. After the defeat of Nazism, only two ideologies (liberalism and communism) contested this right, and after 1989–1991, it turned out that only one ideology had won this long struggle: liberalism.

In other words, of the three political theories of the Modern paradigm, only one proved to be truly paradigmatic. This is linked to the process of globalisation and the universalisation of liberal ideology, which has become the world's only ideology, prevailing

Here there is a direct link to Francis Fukuyama's assertion about the "end of history."

This is directly linked to Francis Fukuyama's assertion about the "end of history." The "end of history" is the final and irreversible victory of liberalism, the first political theory, over its rivals. After 1991, liberalism is no longer one of three ideologies, but the ideology of modernity itself.

Capitalism (liberalism) initially considered itself the embodiment of the spirit of Modernity, but this was not obvious to anyone except the representatives of liberalism itself. This was challenged by communists and fascists, and in principle, for several centuries until the end, the dispute between the three political theories remained unresolved. At all stages, there was a possibility of various turns in political events (and communism seriously claimed that it was the embodiment of Modernity and the ideological formula for the "end of history," not liberalism). At one point, Hitler's successes in Germany were so impressive that it was quite possible to believe that Nazism would determine the ideological basis of the future. It was only at the end of the 20th century that the unconditional matrix of world political history was finally determined, with *the spirit of Modernism triumphing in the form of* liberalism. Liberalism defended its right to be not just one of many ideologies, but the Ideology with a capital I. Thus, the first political theory of the Modern era became at once the last and the final one. It was from the victory of liberalism that we derived the political philosophy of Postmodernism. Accordingly, the triumph of the individual mind as an atom and allowed us to move to the subatomic level.

This determined the winner in the rivalry between the three ideological versions of Modernism. And at practically the same time, liberalism, having become dominant and the only ideology, began to rapidly reveal its totalitarian nature. At the same time, with ever-increasing speed, a paradigm shift began towards Postmodernism, whose philosophical premises had been developed several decades earlier, but which began to take practical shape in the political sphere in the 1990s. At the same time, a wave of gender politics and eco-politics arose, heralding the emergence of overt forms of "black liberalism."

Modernity, which triumphed in liberalism, transitioned into postmodernism, a new post-liberal stage. But this was only possible because all forms of collective identity (the paradigm of Tradition) and alternative artificial definitions of the political subject in the second political theory (class) and the third political theory (state, race) were abolished.

The individual has been affirmed by liberals as the latest version of the most authentic human atom and, accordingly, as the philosophical foundation and political subject. And only after the victory of this ideology and the triumph of the human individual — expressed in the ideology of civil society, the ideology of human rights, the ideology of globalisation and the global liberal capitalist market (the transition from global politics to global economics, with the abolition of history, as Fukuyama wrote), only then did the door to Postmodernism truly open. It was opened by liberals, and therefore, in the paradigm of the "Black Enlightenment," it is "black liberalism" that has the right to doctrinal and epistemological primacy.

As soon as the atom was established as the fundamental unit of existence, all further movement turned to the subatomic level. This is linked to the phenomenology *of political post-philosophy*, or the political philosophy of Postmodernism.

Thus, without the victory of liberalism, the victory of postmodernism would have been impossible. More precisely, theoretically, postmodernism could have been different — more likely communist and less likely fascist. But the outcome of the 20th century in the field of ideology is clear: political postmodernism is built on the absolute domination of liberal ideology, the first political theory that completely defeated the second and third.

It is in this context that a global society is being constructed. A global society is not yet a reality; it is a project. Nevertheless, it exists as a concept and corresponds to a similar notion, the "global West." When we say "the West," we mean not only the geographical West, but also, for example, Japan and even the Pacific coast of China, where Western models prevail in the economy, culture, and society, as well as some countries in the Pacific region that are following the Western path of development (Singapore, Taiwan, etc.). "The West" is a global and, at the same time, ideological concept. Of course, the West has not yet fully penetrated the flesh and blood of all societies, peoples and civilisations, but nevertheless this penetration is in full swing — through the market, technology, culture, information, economics, politics, etc. The West is not just a collection of European and North American powers and societies. It is the very process of globalisation, "postmodernisation" and the gradual spread of codes (and stratifications, to use the term of Deleuze/Guattari).

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

Euro-American/Euro-Atlantic culture across the entire planet. Following the decisive victory of liberalism in the Cold War, the entire world is, in a sense, “the West,” that is, an area of territorialisation/deterritorialisation that corresponds precisely to the liberal code of “assemblage.”

Accordingly, today's agenda for global processes in world politics is the domination of liberalism and the affirmation of its victory on a global scale, the elimination of nation states (which we are seeing in Europe), and the destruction of all forms of collective identity (nation, religion, gender, etc.). In this phase, Modernity completes the destruction of vertical symmetries and organic collective identities that it began with the transition from traditional society (Platonism, Aristotelianism, religion) to modern society (materialism, democracy, secularism).

The universality of the West and black- e modernisation

The global political process today — at least within the dominant episteme — represents a transition from the political philosophy of Modernity (in the form of the victorious liberal ideology) to Postmodernity — and to its most avant-garde
"object-oriented" phase of post-humanist "Black Enlightenment." This is the agenda of Western society.

The question arises: to what extent is this agenda universal?

When answering this question, we must first consider that the West thinks globally (globalisation is the spread of the "Western influence" to all of humanity). Therefore, to the extent that we are a modern society and accept modernisation and Westernisation as something inevitable (fate), we are also part of the European world or Euro-Atlantic civilisation. This applies to every nation and every society. Today, to a certain extent, almost all countries without exception (including the most anti-Western ones, such as North Korea or Iran) implicitly recognise the imperative of modernisation, recognising the West (or at least its technologies, its epistemologies, its economic dogmas — above all the market) as the global destiny, including the destiny of non-Western peoples and societies. Thus, the West itself insists on the universalism of the West and the logical sequence of its historical development from traditional society to Modernity and Postmodernity.

the West and the Rest, as expressed by S. Huntington (1927–2008).

But if we unconditionally accept the thesis of *the universality* of the West, then we have no choice but to accept and implement the first political theory. In this case, the reading of philosophy, history, politics, economics, culture, international relations and all other areas of social life must be carried out in accordance with the epistemology of liberalism and on the basis of its scale. But if this is so, then we must recognise the irreversibility of the transition from political Modernity to political Postmodernity — and ultimately to the post-humanist agenda of the "Black Enlightenment."

In this case, accepting this model as dominant, we obtain a normative model for comparison, evaluating everything that happens in different non-Western countries (including Russia) based on the criterion of how similar it is to the West and the various stages of its history. To assess the level of modernity of a given society, we use GDP, economic statistics, indicators of industrialisation and urbanisation, the degree of functionality of democratic institutions and various segments of civil society, the extent of political correctness and tolerance, etc. In general, we are talking about measuring the actual liberation of the human individual (the social atom) from various forms of collective identity. In other words, a modern and "Western" society is one in which the political philosophy of Modernity and the practices based on it have prevailed to a sufficient extent.

But this applies primarily to non-Western societies trying to catch up with the West (sometimes quite successfully, as in the case of some rapidly developing countries in the Pacific region). In Western countries themselves, different criteria apply, based on how far a society has moved from Modernity to Postmodernity. In some respects, the United States and especially Canada are ahead of the European Union countries, while in others, European societies are more postmodern than North American countries. In the field of philosophy and political philosophy, continental countries, and above all France, where postmodernism originated, are the undisputed leaders. However, in the application of certain postmodernist strategies and practices to the fields of culture, technology, business, politics and even military strategy (this applies above all to the doctrine of "se-

[1] *Huntington, S.* The Clash of Civilisations. Moscow: AST, 2003.

te wars" [1]), the primacy, on the contrary, belongs to the United States. "Speculative realism" and "Black Enlightenment" affect both Europeans and Americans, with Lacan's line prevailing epistemologically, Foucault and, above all, Deleuze/Guattari, while methodologically and stylistically, Anglo-Saxon technocracy and a specific imaginaire prevail.

The transition to postmodernism somewhat distorts the clarity of the criteria.

"modernisation," since in the West itself there is a move away from Modernity (post-humanisation) and towards an increasingly accentuated individuality — schizoanalysis, hyper-tolerance, "object democracy," eco-politics, etc., while in non-Western societies, the epistemology of Modernity and the practices based on it are not yet sufficiently entrenched. This sometimes creates extravagant situations where the index of "modernisation" is the number of same-sex marriages, the percentage of homosexuals and transgender people in power structures, or the quality of network connectivity, while many fundamental aspects of classical modernisation may be in their infancy. In such cases, the criterion of large-scale schizophrenia among the masses may outweigh technological backwardness or the collapse and dysfunction of democratic mechanisms (as understood in the West).

But in any case, if we recognise the universalism of the West, this implies embarking on the path of modernisation and accepting liberalism as the mandatory ideology that has won the historical battle for the essence and truth of the Modern. Therefore, not only the West and Modernity are recognised as universal, but the ideology of liberalism, with all its inherent principles and axioms, also possesses the same universal status. By recognising the universality of the West, we necessarily recognise the inevitability of the first political theory. This, in turn, predetermines the vector of

of "progress" within the Modern paradigm itself — in the direction of the divium, post-humanism, the Radical Object (core), the political philosophy of the Mother — all the way to the "Black Enlightenment."

The West thinks and acts globally, and therefore all societies (including non-Western ones) that are under its influence are forced to accept the entire chain of temporal semantics reflected in liberalism: history as progress, the liberation of the individual from all forms of collective identity, technological development — and so on, deeper and deeper into matter in search of the elusive atomicity and truth of the material abyss.

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* War of the Continents: The Modern World in the Geopolitical Coordinate System. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

This vector is embedded in the global agenda. And since we are part of the global world, it is also embedded in Russian politics — naturally on an equal footing with all other nations and cultures, both Western and non-Western. To one degree or another, this applies to all modern societies, including those that, due to historical inertia, retain certain religious features (this applies primarily to Islamic countries) and those that follow the second political theory (North Korea, China, Vietnam, Cuba). But even in these cases, liberalism — primarily in the economy — and a materialistic worldview (in science, technology, and education) have a significant impact, preparing the ground for the next stage of more complete modernisation and Westernisation.

Recognition of the universality of the West thus includes liberalism as a necessary and obligatory element. This may be veiled, postponed, or framed by symbolic decorations, but the essence of modernity at the end of the 20th century boils down precisely to liberalism. Fukuyama based his thesis about the "end of history" on this analysis. And although he did not take into account the diversity of civilisations, his analysis is theoretically correct: Modernity = liberalism. Another thing is that Fukuyama was wrong about the timing of the process. Theoretically, this is true, and it follows from the West's own conviction in the universality of its history and from the recognition of this by most non-Western societies. But in practice, modernity has penetrated different non-Western societies unevenly, sometimes not deeply and almost always with enormous distortions. This has delayed the liberal "end of history," but it has by no means cancelled it. At least, if we recognise the universalism of the West and, accordingly, liberalism, we can argue with Fukuyama about the timing and forms, but not about the essence of the process itself.

Here, however, we should also take into account postmodernism and, in particular, its drive towards posthumanism, transhumanism, hypermaterialism and radical nihilism, which openly proclaim not just the "end of history" but the "end of humanity" as a goal, and in some cases even the "end of life" in favour of the Radical Object (core) and the invasion of sub-corporeal, deeply material powers "from the other side" (Lovecraft's "idiot gods," gods of the plague, etc.). This is the least manifested but already clearly defined vector of the continuation of modernisation and Westernisation along the axis set by liberalism and especially its victory. This is "black liberalism," which has finally broken with humanism and humanity, but follows the same logic of Modernity — towards materialism, atomism, and individualism, but this time beyond the limits of humanity and even life itself.

, atomism and individualism, but this time beyond the limits of man and even life itself.

Thus, the accusation of nihilism and death wish levelled at Modernity is no longer a polemical and rhetorical move by its opponents, but is increasingly acknowledged by liberals themselves — modernists and especially postmodernists, who call for acceleration and transhumanism, artificial intelligence and genetic modification, and ultimately to the complete triumph of matter and nothingness.

Thus, in the complete cycle of the philosophy of Matter, the third kind "Timaea," we are dealing with the philosophy of death, with the glorification of nihilism and dissipation, entropy and illusory reality ("ontology").

To follow the path of the West is to follow the path of death. The philosophy of civil society, taken to its logical conclusion (the absence of the state, order, hierarchy, and any common elements or values), leads to human loneliness reaching such an extent that nothing but the death of oneself or one's neighbour can entertain a human being. And further, the metaphor of the "open society" in the epistemology of the "Black Enlightenment" leads directly to images of disembowelled human carcasses, opened up to "the other side," who, in their naive search for freedom, have become victims of the gods of the plague.

This is precisely the complete programme of modernisation and Westernisation. And although it still remains outside the attention of the general public even in the West, at the level of political philosophy, postmodernism and speculative realism are already at work, expanding their influence in the epistemological sphere, affecting culture, art, technology, as well as economics and politics. In non-Western societies, this avant-garde agenda is even less known. But anyone who recognises the thesis of Western universalism, the inevitability of progress and development, any supporter of liberal ideology (conscious or unconscious) already carries within themselves the vector of "black liberalism," which is not only possible in the context of the general development of Western modernity, but is inevitable and constitutes its logical post-humanist and nihilistic conclusion.

The question of an e alternative

Now we come to the second question, which is directly related to the first: is there any alternative to this process?

Of course, there are people in the world who, looking at what is happening, feel, to put it mildly, a certain uneasiness, understanding

that something is wrong with the basic fundamental structure of the society in which we live today. Of course, few people realise the scale of the problem, since the influence of the dominant epistemes is so strong that it completely predetermines the structures of consciousness, both in relation to the subject and in relation to the surrounding world and society, and the episteme of Modernity has been firmly entrenched (at least in the West) for several centuries, while liberalism and the political philosophy based on it have completely predetermined normative thinking in recent decades on a global scale. Accordingly, it is not easy to understand the full scope of what is happening from a distance from the ruling ideology. At the same time, however, even in the West itself, there is a theoretical possibility, and in practice there is a growing desire to reject the liberal paradigm and globalism, while in non-Western societies, especially those that have preserved certain civilisational characteristics and/or strong religious traditions, such a desire is often even stronger — including because of the obvious colonial nature of globalisation, which imposes Western values and standards on all cultures.

The situation is greatly exacerbated by the fact that the transition to postmodernism opens up post-humanistic horizons, which for cultures where modernity has not yet taken root appear to be something "monstrous." Even for the average Westerner, the themes of schizomass (and schizoanalysis), rhizomes, parliament organs, cyborgs, clones and genetic engineering, i.e. the tenets of nihilistic accelerationism ("black liberalism" and "black Marxism"), which boil down to a call for the abolition of humanity, still seem excessive today. This was also the case with gender politics, but this milestone, which legalised numerous sexual perversions and gave legal status to homosexual marriages, adoption of children by such couples, etc., has already been reached, and today the agenda includes "democracy of things," Artificial Intelligence and the recognition of the political sovereignty of matter. However, this shift towards post-humanism has not yet become a reality and therefore still provokes a negative reaction among the population. Outside the Western world, such topics seem even more grotesque, since in the context of any traditional — religious — culture, it is impossible not to see direct parallels with Satanism and the kingdom of the Antichrist.

Thus, overall, there is enormous scope for anti-liberal and anti-globalist positions, and they are just as global in nature as liberal globalism itself. As a rule, political

The political, economic, cultural, and scientific elites readily accept liberalism, being part of a transnational class that relies precisely on this ideology, However, the masses, as well as huge sectors of the counter-elite, are wary of modernisation and Westernisation, especially in their current state of transition to "black liberalism" (post-humanism), and may easily embark on a search for alternatives. In other words, the more total and global liberalism becomes, the more acute the question of its possible alternatives becomes. At the same time, we are not talking about a mere theoretical possibility, but about a multitude of concrete cases of its rejection: we see this in the ideology of radical Islam, in Russia's determination to strengthen its sovereignty and, at the very least, to correct extreme forms of liberal ideology, in China's firm commitment to the political power of the Communist Party contrary to the demands of liberal democracy, in the rising tide of European populism lism, etc.

The fourth political theory begins with a critical distance

The construction of the Fourth Political Theory begins with the question of a possible alternative to the undivided domination of liberal ideology on a global scale, taking into account the entire logic of the formation of political modernity and the philosophical transformations that occur during the transition to postmodernity. To understand the meaning, place, role and content of the Fourth Political Theory, it is necessary to take into account the entire structure of Politica Aeterna, which synchronously describes all possible models of the organisation of political philosophy. Therefore, the Fourth Political Theory can only be fully understood in the general context of Politica Aeterna([1]).

The fourth political theory begins with the observation that something has gone wrong with the world and the dominant trends within it, and that this "something" is fundamentally metaphysical and ontological (rather than purely technical or even ideological) in nature.

The fourth political theory begins with a philosophical distancing from the main processes taking place on a global scale. But this distancing itself represents a serious

[1] In turn, Politica Aeterna is based on "Post-philosophy" (see: *Dugin, A. G.* Post-philosophy) and on the methodology of the Three Logos, set out in the project "Noomachia." *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Three Logos.

a philosophical problem, since criticism is not directed at a stable and unchanging set of assertions, axioms, concepts and value systems, but at a fluid, constantly changing and extremely deceptive element that constantly and obsessively generates false presentations and self-presentations, communicating distorted information about itself and the world, both globally and in detail. The point is not that liberal ideology (like any ideology, for that matter) relies on political propaganda and constructs proportions and systems of evaluation that are advantageous to itself. The situation is even more serious, since from the point of view of the completeness of Politica Aeterna, Modernity as such represents a continuous field of pseudology, that is, the development of an impossible, false and self-contradictory hypothesis. Ontologically, Modernity exists as falsehood exists, representing the being of non-being. And in Postmodernism, this nihilism is fully revealed, and not simply discovered, but taken up as a conscious goal and supreme value. The prominent theorist and liberal philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy[1] a staunch and fierce apologist for globalism and modernity, acknowledges that the liberal Western-centric world order is an empire based on nothing and defending nothing as the highest value. Accordingly, it is far from easy to untangle the intricacies of pseudo-science and thereby take a position where its rhetorical and epistemological mechanisms would cease to operate. Thus, the two critical theories directed against liberalism (communism and fascism) were themselves elements of political modernity and, consequently, were located within pseudo-science rather than outside it. But their absence, as well as the communication of the truth about the lie of Modernity in Postmodernity, simplify this task somewhat, and with certain efforts, critical thinking about contemporary liberal ideology can find its appropriate zone — on the other side of the new — liberal — totality. Today, it is still possible to say "no" to liberalism and globalisation, and therefore "no" to universality, and this decisive "no" forms the basis of the Fourth Political Theory. For those who say "yes" to the global status quo, the Fourth Political Theory has little (or rather no) meaning. But the number of those leaning towards "no" in the modern world is huge, to the point that it can be considered the implicit position of the overwhelming majority of humanity, while complete solidarity with liberalism is statistically characteristic only of

[1] *Levy B.-H.* The Empire and the Five Kings: America's Abdication and the Fate of the World. NY: Henry Holt and Co., 2019.

global elites. But the problem is that power — primarily epistemological, but also all other forms (political, economic, cultural, etc.) — is in the hands of precisely these global elites. And thus, the meaning of the Fourth Political Theory, even in such a preliminary and initial approximation, takes on a *revolutionary* status.

Against liberalism, but also against communism and fascism

So, the Fourth Political Theory stems from disagreement with the dominance of liberalism, but since this dominance is not accidental but represents the result of multidimensional and generally unidirectional processes in the political history of the West, it calls into question the entire semantic sequence — the very course of change and internal evolution of political paradigms — and above all from Tradition to Modernity and further on to Postmodernity. The first gesture of the Fourth Political Theory is a radical rejection of liberalism and its postmodern, in some ways already post-liberal, subatomic version, which is becoming mainstream politics today. But this rejection is coupled in the Fourth Political Theory with an extremely clear and contrasting understanding that the illiberal ideologies of Modernity — communism and fascism — are not real alternatives. This is a fundamental position of the Fourth Political Theory, which is why we call it "Fourth."

Radically and totally rejecting liberalism, the Fourth Political Theory deliberately refuses to consider itself communism (socialism) or fascism (Nazism) nationalism) in all their versions. There are two reasons for this refusal.

Firstly, the second and third political theories have historically lost out to liberalism (at the level of political philosophy, they proved less suited to the pure paradigm of modern political philosophy than liberalism) and, consequently, they have shown their limitations. Of course, historical defeat is not a decisive argument. But this is only true when the criteria of material victory and the ideology of progress are not fundamental. The historical clash between liberalism, socialism and fascism in the 20th century was a clarification of who was more in tune with the spirit of the times, who was more progressive, who belonged to the future, and the criterion, due to the materialism inherent in all three ideologies, was the fact of victory or defeat. In this dispute and confrontation, given the

such a system of evaluation, liberalism triumphed over both fascism and communism, thereby proving its identity with the very essence of modernity, as well as its right to the future — to a liberal interpretation of
"end of history."

Secondly, and this is a much more serious argument, although closely related to the analysis of the metaphysical outcome of the clash between the three political theories and the meaning of liberalism's victory in it, the second and third political theories were products of modern political philosophy, so even if they had prevailed in the end, they would have become the most complete expression of modernity, which was quite likely at one point in the case of communism, and for a brief moment even in the case of fascism. The fact that the liberals won the battle for Modernity is of enormous significance, but if we imagine that it had been the communists or the fascists, then their planetary domination would have meant the same thing — the total triumph of materialism, de-individualisation and, ultimately, dehumanisation: black communism or a global Reich, having won the battle for Modernity, would have found themselves in the role of the dominant force of the "Black Enlightenment," which would have changed nothing in essence.
"end of history," although it would give it a different form.

Now for the most important point: by saying "no" to the global domination of globalist liberalism, we reject not only it, but also what it essentially is, especially after its victory over alternative ideologies — the pure paradigm of Modernity.

's rejection of liberalism is not enough

The fourth political theory begins with a proposal to say a radical "no" to liberalism. But such a "no" raises the question: if you are not a liberal, then who are you? A communist? A nationalist, a fascist? Thus, critical distance from the basic trend of modernity at the level of political philosophy (i.e., liberalism) naturally leads us to the second and third political theories or to their synthesis — national Bolshevism. All of this would indeed be opposition to liberalism, *but within the framework of Modernity.*

Therefore, opposition to liberalism would inevitably turn to peripheral forms of the same Modernity. In this case, we would merely declare that we dislike the essence of Modernity in its pure form (liberalism itself) and would oppose the centre of Modernity from its own periphery. Such is conservatism: it offers only to "slow down"

Modernity, moving in the same direction, towards the same goal as Modernity itself, but only *more slowly*. Radical conservatism proposes moving very slowly, while moderate conservatism proposes moving only slightly more slowly.

And this is what we get: as soon as we distanced ourselves from the dominant trend in modern political philosophy as the globally prevailing political theory (liberalism), we found ourselves in the position of either "modernist conservatives" or supporters of "altermodernism."

Thus, even in the most liberal circles, there are both avant-garde liberals who welcome the transition to postmodernism and are ready to accept "black liberalism," and those who say, "Maybe not so soon, not so fast, more slowly?" Consequently, all three political ideologies of Modernity, faced with their "image of the future" presented by Postmodernism and the "Black Enlightenment," can take critical positions. Communism and fascism oppose liberalism in any form, and liberal conservatism opposes it to the extent that it is horrified by the extreme expressions of its own ideological platform.

Nevertheless, humanity today is moving, "floating" in Postmodernism. Moreover, those who protest against this, remaining coded by Modernism, object most often not against the orientation itself, but against the speed or representation of the image of the future presented by postmodernists in excessively contrasting tones.

But there are those who understand that this is not only too fast a current, but that it is flowing in the wrong direction. The "river" must flow backwards, especially since it is not something natural or inevitable, but the result of a freely accepted decision that made Modernism, the political philosophy of the West as a whole, in both its liberal and illiberal versions, possible and valid.

This is the meaning of the Fourth Political Theory: it rejects Modernity as inevitable, as a pseudo-logic based on a Decision which, once accepted, inevitably set as its goal the horizon of disintegration and degradation, entropy and dissipation that are laid bare with extreme candour in the rhizome or Radical Object.

The totality of the female

The essence of the Fourth Political Theory is that it rejects not just one of the political ideologies of the Modern era, but *all of them.*

They. Three political theories exhaust the range of proposals offered by Modernity. The fourth political theory says "no" to all of them — not just liberalism. It is dissatisfied with the very "flow of the river" towards the political philosophy of the Mother, with the very Decision that has prevented political history from moving in this direction.

The fourth political theory is a theory of global, absolute, radical revolution directed not only against the specific domination of the West, against the contemporary state of European civilisation, against the hegemony of the United States of America, against liberalism, but against *Modernity itself*, against the political paradigm of the Mother, against the metaphysics in which the representation of the world, the subject, reality are constructed *from the bottom up*.

Here, the political philosophy of the Father (or political Platonism) and the political philosophy of the Son (political Aristotelianism) take on enormous significance: we entered the Modern era when the Father was killed and the Son was castrated.

The victory of Modernism and the transition to Postmodernism in the myth are described as a double gesture of the Great Mother, known from the traditions of various peoples. Mother Earth kills her Father/Husband, a figure who is the fundamental axis of the vertical topography of Platonic political philosophy, and castrates her Beloved Son, that is, she demolishes Aristotle's axis of the "unmoved mover," depriving the world and man of their spiritual (eidetic) component.

This is the metaphysical strategy of materialism and atomism: in order to achieve the domination of matter and a pseudo-logical "ontology" built from the bottom up, two possible alternatives must be eradicated: the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son. Both are incompatible with the political philosophy of the Mother.

Modernity as such is precisely the political philosophy of the Mother, materialism, sovereign matter, ὕλη, "chora." And accordingly, within the framework of this political philosophy of the Mother, all the fundamental ideological and political-philosophical processes of the Modern era are realised. According to the results of the political and ideological history of the New Age, liberalism turns out to be as close as possible to the matriarchal view of the world, while political postmodernism even more sharply reveals this inherently feminine structure of liberalism, since it is in postmodernism that the very matrix of modernity as the political philosophy of the Mother is most fully and clearly visible.

This is a fundamental point: in the context of Modernity, liberalism has no alternative and cannot have one, since Modernity itself

It is based on the exclusion of two other models of political logos, which could serve as a basis for an alternative. But the conditions of modernity are such that these two models — full-fledged Platonism and full-fledged Aristotelianism — are rigidly and totally rejected, prohibited, and censored. The field of search is limited to the zone of matter and materiality, atomism and individualisation. Accordingly, the Fourth Political Theory is only possible outside the context of Modernity, and therefore requires a revolutionary departure from its limits. However, these limits are structured in such a way that they form a totality based on the paradigmatic presumption of materialism (direct or hidden, implicit). And if we recognise this totality, then the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son simply have no place, no existence, no subjective or objective expression. Modern time itself, which becomes the measure of being, is structured in such a way that Platonism and Aristotelianism, tradition and religion, sacredness and spirit are placed in the "past," in the "preceding," and therefore have no part in the present and future, which have passed through this past, depriving it of its ontological dimension, which is placed exclusively in becoming. That is, in Modernism, Platonism and Aristotelianism are impossible, and if they are possible, then only in the form of simulacra.

The rupture of pseudology and the experience of eternity

The fourth political theory, in order to become possible, must break with this totality, overcome the ontology of time and becoming as established in Modernity. If we agree with the temporality of Modernity, then the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son do not exist, being a property of *what* was but *is no longer*. Their defence is understood as conservatism, that is, as an attempt to forcibly slow down time by relying on the phantom pain of (illusory) memories. Object-oriented ontologists — in particular, Nick Land — generally consider human memory to be a fiction implanted in "cyborgs" by Artificial Intelligence from the "future" in order to make them believe in their "humanity" ([1]).Accordingly, Modern excludes the very possibility

[1] Nick Land refers to the plots of the science fiction films Blade Runner and The Terminator, which, in his opinion, describe the mechanics of operations with time in the spirit of Deleuze's distinction between vertical "*time*" (along the axis of the tree), which has meaning (the vector of movement from the roots to the crown, from the past to the future), but no existence, and the horizontal "time" of *the chronos* rhizome, which has existence but no meaning, i.e., no sequence. Thus,

that the philosophy of the Father or the philosophy of the Son can have any ontology whatsoever.

The fourth political theory breaks this inherent loop, asserting first and foremost a different time — time as an image of eternity (according to Plato) or the eternity of the "unmoved mover" (according to Aristotle). The ontology of eternity, like the ontology of the One, is affirmed in opposition to Modernity, and only this allows us to construct a genuine distance from liberalism. But such a revolutionary gesture of going beyond the boundaries of Modernity requires a complete reversal of both consciousness and being. It is possible through *direct experience of eternity*, since no constructs within the totality of Modernity are capable of bringing us closer to it step by step. The very fact of remaining within Modernity is a distancing from such an experience, its blocking, its transformation into something impossible. The fourth political theory breaks the matrix of Modernity at its foundation, burning its entire structure to its foundations with the experience of eternity. The philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son possess being because they are built — albeit in different ways — on the experience of eternity. Plato's Callipolis exists, has existed, and will exist in the fullest and most direct sense. The realm of ideas and the heavenly vertical are not constructs or concepts; they are ontological facts. It is another matter that Callipolis can take different positions in relation to phenomenal politics — both in alliance and harmony with it, and in opposition to it. The teaching of St. Augustine about the two cities or the Iranian dualistic cosmology describe scenarios of war between the ideal state and its earthly distorted and even inverted reflection. But no twists and turns of this struggle can deprive eternity of being, Heaven of its bright divine nature. Ideas can be distorted and parodied in conceptual thinking, but in doing so, the phenomenal being ultimately harms not the idea, but itself. God cannot be killed; by affirming this, one can only destroy one's soul and ruin one's humanity. God is not affected by people's rejection of Him, although it probably saddens Him. But it certainly affects people themselves — they fall into the abyss of nothingness, dissolving into the folds of matter, moving inexorably towards the centre of maximum gravity, towards the core, towards the heart of nothingness, matter, the Radical Object. The fourth political theory is based on the volitional affirmation of political Platonism and insists on God's view of

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Existence in time becomes possible if we take into account the absence of meaning in the eon of being and the rhizomatic presence. See *Land N.* Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007.

humanity, not humanity's belief in God. Callipolis is not a convention or a utopia; it is what is, what was, and what will be.

The political philosophy of the Son is somewhat more complex. Here, the measure is immanence, although not material immanence. Therefore, the corruption of the state — the transition from monarchy and aristocracy to democracy — has an ontological basis. Here, tragedy and catastrophe are real. But even in this case, the immovable driving force is not directly affected by the denial of its existence and "natural places." Where it disappears from view, we are talking about the departure of a thing to the distant periphery of ontology. Therefore, the victory of anti-Aristotelianism does not mean that Aristotle was wrong, but only that his opponents (the atomists) strayed too far from the "immovable mover" itself and withdrew to a critical distance from their "natural places," completely losing sight of them. They have nowhere else to go, and the loss of the goal of movement (as the final cause in the causality of the modern era) means the collapse of things, their departure from orbit and their complete inability to return to it. Therefore, everything boils down not to what, but to where. Modernity, democracy, materialism, and capitalism are a place on the farthest periphery of existence, where the impulses of things toward themselves are exhausted to the limit. Entelechies evaporate, and things and people, jostling and rushing, move inexorably toward the precipice.

From the perspective of the Son's philosophy, the decline of political philosophy and the state based on it is real. But it corresponds to a special topology, which in Christianity is called
"hell."

The fourth political theory is a leap from political hell to an unchanging, eternal and ever-existing ideal or to the centre of immanent reality, to the world axis that has been lost sight of due to the power of centrifugal tendencies. The fourth political theory is a return of things, people, thoughts, peoples and rulers to themselves, to their essence, to their origins. Therefore, the fourth political theory is, above all, an ontological revolution, the awakening of what is, in the cruel totality of what only pretends to be "reality." It is a dramatic experience, but it is precisely from this that the difficult path to recovery begins.

The metaphors of the bird and the stone: awakening in the fall of the

The fourth political theory represents a turn not to variations or combinations of modern political philosophy, but to a radical paradigm shift. This shift can be described

negatively as a rejection of the political philosophy of the Mother in its metaphysical foundation, that is, simply as the elimination of Modernity in general. The beginning of Modernity already carries within itself the meaning, content, and logic of its end.

From the very beginning, the New Age could lead to nothing other than modern liberal hegemony. In order to truly break away from this path today, we need to move in the opposite direction. But this does not mean that we should simply freeze in place and stop moving in the direction indicated by the vector of modernisation. This is neither sufficient nor possible. What is needed is to set ourselves *a radically different goal.* And to move, but in *a completely different direction.* Not forward, but *backward.* However, this backward movement is only symbolic and conventional. For behind us — before the advent of Modernity — lies Heaven, the sun of the spirit and the undying (and in fact immortal, never dying, resurrecting and all-resurrecting) God.

In the political history of the West, and due to the scale of Western colonisation and everything else, we have descended from the political philosophy of the Father, through the political philosophy of the Son, to the political philosophy of the Mother. In the structure of Politica Aeterna, this process is clear and placed on an ontological map, in which all genera, all levels are present synchronously, simultaneously. Therefore, each step of the movement did not irreversibly cancel the previous phase or stage, but changed the position of the observer, *the ontological and gnoseological situation of the subject (*and with it the object).. The process of descent through the levels of political philosophy is based on a freely accepted Decision, and this decision becomes fatal, fateful, becomes destiny only after it is made. The descent through these levels from the Father through the Son to the Mother is not a mechanical fate, it is a sequence of freely accepted decisions. There is nothing predetermined in the vector and character of such a descent: every moment and every transition is based on choice. But the paradigmatic fatality that follows the choice is fundamental and occurs in the vertical dimension. The decision to remain in the philosophical paradigm or to change it may be an expression of evil will and the result of a mistake. In a sense, without making a choice, it is difficult to know for sure what it will lead to, even if there are good reasons not to try to move in a certain direction. Freedom is such that it cannot a priori exclude any points of application — even the most erroneous and catastrophic ones. The paradigmatic choice and transition from Platonism to Aristotelianism and atomism — a sequence

catastrophes. At the same time, the gap between the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son lies within the paradigm of traditional society (Premodern), while the transition to the political philosophy of the Mother signifies a break and a departure from it. But in any case, the true choice is made along the vertical axis. And what we know about the last millennium of Western civilisation (and in recent centuries of all humanity) clearly convinces us that fundamental decisions were made in favour of descending along the vertical paradigm.

Whether to go right or left is a matter of choice when standing firmly on the horizontal plane. It is a secondary choice, subordinate to the primary one — the vertical.

The vertical choice of modernity can be likened to a leap into the abyss. If we are stones, then we can only fall. In this case, our time is *a time of falling*, descent and death (Untergang Nietzsche). But if we are birds, even fledglings, we have a chance to discover this, to prove it and to be convinced of it. For a stone, falling into the abyss is just falling. But if we are talking about a soul that has wings but has never used them before, then a leap into the abyss will be the beginning of flight. This is exactly how chicks are taught to fly at a certain age. And only in this flight itself does it become clear who is a stone and who is a bird.

The leap into the abyss of modernity, the transition to the political philosophy of the Mother, at some point leads to the discovery of the grandiose scale of the metaphysical catastrophe. The Black Enlightenment is precisely the moment when this scale is fully revealed. And it is at this moment that *a radical shift in consciousness* occurs. This is the beginning of the Fourth Political Theory. While a fledgling thrown out of the nest is flying, it does not yet know whether it is a stone or a bird. Those who can only fall are incapable of moving "backward" along the only possible gravitational trajectory (movement into the abyss is not movement in a plane, it is falling).

Accordingly, only a "winged creature" can accept the Fourth Political Theory, for whom "backward" means
"up," in the opposite direction from Modernity, and only those capable of flight can move there.

Here we can recall Plato's teaching about what a human being is. From Plato's point of view, a human being is *a winged creature*. And it is in the body as a result of a fall, as a consequence of a catastrophe that befell it. The task of man is to cultivate his wings in order to learn to fly and so that death becomes, as for a butterfly, the end of the caterpillar's existence, but at the same time the beginning

a butterfly capable of flight — a celebration of birth/resurrection. Even better is to "die while alive" and take off vertically — back to our heavenly homeland. This is the profound meaning of the Fourth Political Theory.

The fourth political theory is an attempt to radically reverse the logic of world history. But since this history is a fall (a movement from top to bottom: the Logos of the Father — the Logos of the Son — the Logos of the Mother), the fourth political theory is a rise from the abyss. This is not banal conservatism; conservatism makes sense in order to remain within a paradigm or to limit horizontal choices. When the Decision on Modernity was made, conservatism lost its meaning and came to denote a paradoxical desire to preserve the fall itself, to make the fall reliable, guaranteed, and stable. In a sense, such conservatism is a way of lulling the awakening horror to sleep, veiling it, making the falling person unaware that they are falling, imposing on them the hallucination that they are *not* falling. This is the code of pseudology: modernist conservatism is perhaps the worst thing about modernity, because in its context, lies lie about themselves — and do so in the most effective way possible.

The fourth political theory is completely different from conservatism. It is, rather, a revolution calling for a radical and irreversible change in the basic vector of existence, life, and thought of modern civilisation, breaking with it as a whole, as with a paradigm. In order to go "back," one must move "up," that is, to where the fatal materialistic mechanisms of modernity cannot go.

Modernity is like a hearse rolling down a mountain. This hearse cannot fly. Following its inertia, it has only one way out — to crash into pieces, to disintegrate into atoms.

In order to truly change the situation, the vector of Modernism, the practically inevitable arrival of Postmodernism and "black liberalism," it is necessary to fundamentally rethink our attitude towards all things that are presented in the context of political philosophy as something self-evident, obvious, and indisputable. For humans, nothing is obvious or indisputable. Consciousness always deals with representations, but these can be shaped by one paradigmatic model or another. The postmodern re-evaluation of stratification, the breaking of the code and deterritorialisation are aimed at overturning the Platonic and Aristotelian, making them empirically unreliable and impossible. But this is nothing more than deconstruction and the work of representation — this time nihilistic, materialistic

and aggressively destroying the vertical spiritual dimension of heaven. But the structures and rhizomatic networks created in this way, for all their persuasiveness, are pseudo-logical chimeras, like everything else in the underground world of titans, shadows and ghosts.

's dialectic of shadows

Within the framework of Mother's political philosophy, there is no alternative, and therefore the first political theory (liberalism) and its sub-ideological forms within the dissipative programme of Modernity are destiny.

This is not an accident, a deviation or a dead end. It is destiny. This is what people have been moving towards, what they have been called to, what they have been striving for, rushing towards and aspiring to. The devil's main trick is to deny God. At first, people think that if there is no God, then there is no devil, there is only man, and he is now the measure of all things. At first, the devil agrees with this conclusion: fine, he mutters, I don't exist, so be it. But he has another trick: who, in that case, inspires the belief that God (and with him the devil) does not exist? God is truth; he would not lie about himself. For this, there is the devil, the father of pseudo-logic, that is, modernity.

, that is, Modernity.

At the end of the secular and rational process, sceptical, believing neither in God nor in the devil, the devil reappears in the modern world. And this time without God. Alone — by himself.

At first, Satan was "the shadow of God"; then there was no God, nor his shadow. And finally, God is still not there, but his *shadow,* which has gained autonomy, appears. The discovery of the devil's gestalt, his embodiment, his appearance, constitute the essence of the transition from the last phase of modern political philosophy to the phase of postmodern political philosophy and object-oriented ontology. The devil, Ahriman, Satan (in Islam, Dajjal) are religious terms for the Radical Object, the "core" (Cthelll) of speculative realism and accelerationism.

The devil (Antichrist) in postmodernism — in his imagery, in his metaphors, in his practices — becomes evident, reveals himself. From the point of view of political philosophy, we can consider this as a metaphor (the Antichrist as a political-philosophical figure). From a religious point of view, this can be interpreted quite literally.

The fourth political theory proposes, based on the fully revealed devil of Postmodernism, to take off/transition to those paradigms that were rejected and eliminated in the first stage of Modernism.

In other words, we need not to "slow down" but to go in *a* completely *different direction*. The fourth political theory starts from the premise that a person who disagrees with, denies, or rejects the proposed programme of paradigmatic phases and transitions in political history carries out a cool and in-depth semantic analysis of all its previous semantic moments. You cannot overcome what you do not understand or know. Hegel said that morality is built according to the following scheme: innocence — sin — virtue. Innocence is not a virtue, since it does not know sin. Virtue, on the other hand, knows sin and overcomes it, defeats it, and inflicts defeat on it.

This dialectic is entirely applicable to the Fourth Political Theory in its relation to conservatism. The world of Tradition is innocence; it does not know Modernity. Modernity is analogous to "sin," which kills innocence. Conservatism, in this case, is the opposition to sin from the position of innocence. But the Fourth Political Theory is precisely the analogue of "virtue." It arises not *before* or *during*, but *after* Modernity, and even more so after the transformation of Modernity into Postmodernity and the discovery of the nihilistic and counter-humanistic (post-humanistic) essence of the political philosophy of the Mother. The Fourth Political Theory deals with an autonomous shadow that it knows well and challenges. In a sense, the Fourth Political Theory completes the entire cycle of the descent of paradigms. It is based on a metaphysically revolutionary Decision about a radically different ontology — the ontology of eternity.

The fourth political theory represents the most general form of political and philosophical eschatology. For the fourth political theory to be formulated, the preliminary victory of modernity was necessary, and more precisely, the victory of liberalism within modernity over illiberal ideologies. Previously, this would not have been possible, since Modernity, in its three political ideologies, cleverly incorporated elements of a profound rejection of the status quo at the paradigmatic level into the dialectic of opposition between these theories. The nihilistic nature of modernity was hidden in this opposition through the possibility of criticism: liberals accused communists of nihilism, communists accused fascists, fascists accused liberals, and so on. At the same time, they were all different versions of nihilism, materialism, and mechanical alienation, but until the end of their intense dramatic confrontation, which ultimately led to the victory of liberalism, this could not be obvious. To achieve true virtue, one must see the bottomless pit of sin.

rather than its partial manifestations. This is probably what the Russian Athonite monk, Hesychast Silouan the Athonite (1866–1938), meant when he advised other monks to "keep your mind in hell and do not despair." "Keeping your mind in hell" means contemplating the abyss of sin. The advice
"do not despair" refers to trust in God and to the freedom of man to make a fundamental decision, even when in the abyss.

The fourth political theory emerges at the extreme frontier of Modernity, in the context of Postmodernity. The very structure of Postmodernism and "Black Enlightenment" serves as proof of the true nature of Modernism as such, which not only strayed from the path, but was originally leading in the wrong direction, based either on the free will to sin and lie, or on error. But in any case, the Decision on Modernism was made by the free human mind, although clearly not without the active participation of the devil. But no tricks of the devil can push a person to sin unless he himself accepts sin, agrees with it, and makes a free choice in its favour.

Europe made this choice in modern times and then imposed it on everyone else. The fourth political theory makes a different choice: in favour of the political philosophy of the Father and the Son (and the Holy Spirit).

Rejection of the hypnosis of the Mother

The radical breakthrough of the hypnosis of political philosophy of the Mother is the first fundamental gesture of the Fourth Political Theory. In Politica Aeterna, the general ontological map shows that the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son are not conventions; they have an independent — paradigmatic — existence that determines the topic, the subject, and the corresponding configuration of the cosmos.

Throughout history, these two political philosophies have been effectively implemented on numerous occasions. This is not an abstract dream or fantasy. These are political systems that have actually existed throughout human history and have partially retained their influence to this day, in the modern world.

When we reject Mother's political philosophy, we do not fall into nothingness and chaos. We still have two perfectly viable political-philosophical models. If we did not know about the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son, then no matter how repulsive it would be to move along the "river," with the current, we might agree to it, in the complete absence of the possibility of choosing a different course, because of our horror of pure nothingness.

ability to choose a different course, out of fear of pure nothingness. This is what pseudo-logic tries to convince us of: if not Modern, then nothing, is what the supporters of Modern and Postmodern want to tell us. But, fortunately, we know that *there is* the paradigm of the Father and *there is* the paradigm of the Son. And this is the second — positive, creative — half of the programme of the Fourth Political Theory.

The most important thing is that the Fourth Political Theory is based on the idea that the Solution is not to be found in the context of the three political ideologies of Modernity, but in the context of the three paradigms of Politica Aeterna: the philosophy of the Father (Platonism, the doctrine of eternal ideas), the philosophy of the Son (Aristotelianism, phenomenology) and the philosophy of the Mother (materialism, atomism). This is a free choice in which Modernity is just one option among two others.

The political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son (or their alliance) are objects of free choice. This is not a given, it is a task. And apparently, we ended up in the Modern Age because we forgot that the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son must be reaffirmed each time, by each subsequent generation, by each society, by each individual — through their free will and enlightened consciousness. We took them for granted.

But as soon as even a vertically oriented political structure becomes inertia, something ready-made, a given, it begins to fall, to collapse. If, instead of freely and willingly establishing a monarchical, imperial, traditional, caste-based vertical structure, we become accustomed to it, accept it as a fact and a given, and do not reaffirm it at every stage, sooner or later we will fall into the nihilistic entropy of modernity, and the fall will continue until we reach the ultimate horizon in the realm of political philosophy: the Radical Object.

Political eschatology

The Fourth Political Theory reveals the essence of the political and philosophical dignity of humanity as a species. The humanity that is now moving as if nothing had happened towards modernisation, Westernisation, and progress — faster (accelerationism) or slower (liberal conservatism) — is
the "black double" of humanity; it is the humanity that, out of evil will and deep delusion, under the guise of "freedom," chose slavery, having gained the right to dignity, flight, and heroism, and cast itself into scattered atomism, insignificance, and servitude to matter.

Today, it is more difficult than ever to return to the political philosophy of the Father or the political philosophy of the Son. But it is precisely now that this choice takes on the full meaning of its original patriarchal and heroic significance. Man differs from his "black double" in that he is a philosophical being capable of free choice. He is given the freedom to choose his political philosophy at the paradigmatic level (not from what is "offered on the menu").

It can be said that the Fourth Political Theory is a call for the restoration/recreation of the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son. We know that these alternatives exist, we can freely choose them, and by destroying the hypnosis of the totality of the matrix of three modern ideologies, the hypnosis of the matrix of the political philosophy of the Mother, we can calmly choose an alternative political philosophy *beyond* what is (falsely) offered to us as exhaustive completeness. If this is completeness, then it is the completeness of the nomenclature of devilish temptations. Politica Aeterna justifies a different completeness, hiding under the "black double" the true nature of man, which cannot be reduced to his corporeality, his materiality, or, even less, to infra-corporeal impulses or the element of nothingness. Man has a choice of matter, and being free, he is also free to make it. Today we are reaching the final limits of this choice. However, despite all the apparent hopelessness, this is yet another illusion — yes, humanity can commit suicide and merge with the Radical Object. But even this must first be decided, chosen. The fourth political theory, explained in the topology of Politica Aeterna, reminds us of this freedom and willfully opens the door to a different choice. Those who understand and accept the structure of the Fourth Political Theory are capable — perhaps for the last time — of freely and consciously disposing of their freedom and their consciousness.

However, the usual subject, dependent on the general structure of the paradigm, on the "assembly," codes, stratifications, and territorialisations, does not coincide with the instance capable of making this choice — between Postmodernism and the Fourth Political Theory. Such a subject is secondary to the matrix that predetermines reality. Therefore, in order to affirm the Fourth Political Theory, a different subject is needed. We call it the Radical Subject, whose radicality must be no less, if not more, than that of the Radical Object of Postmodernism and speculative realism. This is what political eschatology consists of:

At the very edge of existence, a decisive battle is taking place between the Radical Subject (the axis of the Fourth Political Theory) and the "Black Enlightenment." On both sides, masks have been discarded, and metaphysical issues have been brought to a head. This is the political and philosophical meaning of the "end of time," where the question of the true nature of humanity, its meaning and mission, and its destiny is decided. This decision belongs to the dimension of eternity, which means that it is made not only in relation to the future, but also in relation to the past and the present. In religious terms, this is the Last Judgment, which extends its metaphysical weight to all dimensions and, moreover, to all modalities of time.

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