


HEIDEGGER & ARISTOTLE



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in memoriam patris

Foreword

That well-known Anglo-Saxon scholar of ancient thought Jonathan Barnes once said, or rather wrote, that if Aristotle had lived in our century he would certainly have settled in Oxford, and some time of the year he would have spent in Leuven. Someone else, wittily, has pointed out to Barnes that, at least holidays, Aristotle would perhaps have spent them in Padua.

To complete the anachronism, I add my own. I believe that if he had lived in the 20th century, Aristotle would neither have gone to Oxford to argue with Jonathan Barnes, nor to Leuven or Padua, but would probably have preferred Heidegger as his interlocutor.

The survey I present here could be said to provide evidence for the plausibility of this finition. Indeed, it prefigures to show that Heideggerian thought represents one of the densest filosofical moments of Aristotle's presence in our century.

It is likely that at first glance this assumption is not entirely convincing. The only articulate Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle that was known until very recently, the essay on the essence and concept of *physis*, despite its originality, does not seem sufficient to suffrag the legitimacy of the hypothesis. All the more so since, due to the stubborn hermeticism of its language, it has not been effectively appreciated and valorised except in the circles of the initiates of Heideggerism, while in the world of Aristotelian scholars it has aroused neither particular enthusiasm nor wide approval.

The investigation carried out here is intended to show that the presence of Aristotle in Heideggerian thought is not restricted to the essay on *physis*, nor does it only manifest itself in the form of an interpretation in the narrow sense of the

term. Rather, it is a generalised presence that pervades the whole of Heidegger's work and is configured in the form of a confrontation aimed at a radical appropriation and assimilation of the heritage of Aristotelian ontology.

For this reason, at the centre of the investigation, occupying the largest space, is the period in which this configuration of confrontation becomes strongly characterised. This is, as will be shown, the period of *Being and Time* and the ten-year 'silence' preceding its publication. At first glance, in this period the presence of Aristotle appears more faded than elsewhere, and for this reason it had not been noticed until now; but, as will be seen, this happens precisely because Heideggerian assimilation is so rapacious that it almost erases the traces of what it makes its own.

In the perspective that opens up, once this presence has been grasped, it is also possible to understand more deeply, in themselves and in their unitary connection, the other two moments of the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger, namely the youthful period, in which Heidegger confronts the Aristotelian problematic of being through the reading of Brentano and Carl Braig, and the later moment of the confrontation, the one that culminates in the essay on *physis*. These two moments, which (especially the second) have received some attention, also gain new depth from the connection with the central phase of the confrontation. Since it is not necessary to re-present them in all their articulation, which is already known to scholars, we only wanted to highlight the new evaluation and valorisation that they require in the reading perspective indicated.

In this sense, the intention to show the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger and thus to indicate in Heideggerian thought one of the dense moments of Aristotle's incidence in our century, should not be confused with a stance or a defence of Heideggerian fortifications of Aristotelian texts. Far from wishing to break a lance in favour of Heidegger's interpretative violence, the intention is rather to emphasise how the productivity of Heideggerian confrontation with Aristotle does not consist so much in the interpretation of the text as such, but in being able to recover and bring up to date the philosophical problems it represents, in short, in reviving and reanimating the substance of the text.

speculative text, re-proposing to our century those fundamental questions that the Greeks first posed and that our century, the age of technology, seems to have removed.

The image of Heidegger as an existentialist first, and to some extent also the more recent image of Heidegger as a transcender of metaphysics - especially where transcending becomes the watchword that dispenses with coming to terms with tradition - have certainly not helped to ensure that the radical depth of Heidegger's confrontation with metaphysics, particularly with the Greeks, is grasped and examined in its authentic meaning.

In the long crisis of the great filosofia that followed the finishing of the Hegelian system, Heidegger restored to us with his work the sense of what it means to think in a big way. And if it is true that great thinkers are, at most, one per century, Heidegger is undoubtedly the thinker of the 20th century. This is not only because of the greatness and depth of his work, which is coming to light in all its grandeur. Not only because of the acute sensitivity that, despite all appearances, Heidegger has shown towards the fundamental problems of our age: the waning of religious consciousness, the crisis of traditional values and the disbelief in a merely instrumental reason, the finish of the absolute on earth and the unstoppable closing of the epochal horizon of technology. But also and above all for the fact that, with a radicality that no one else after Hegel had dared, Heidegger was able to rethink the occurrence of Western philosophy as a whole, re-proposing as a filosofic problem the question of the foundations of the present epoch and its essential connection with Greek thought.

It is within this horizon that Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle must be considered. And the Heideggerian disposition that emerges from the confrontation with Aristotle simultaneously characterises Heidegger's attitude towards the Greeks. Thus, the words that Heidegger preface his 1931 course on the ninth book of *Metaphysics* can be extended to characterise not only that course on Aristotle, but his entire confrontation with the Greeks in general and the speculative tension in which this confrontation maintains his thought. Quoting from fragment 419 of *The Will to Power*, he says:

The intimate will of this course is connoted by a saying of Nietzsche's: "Perhaps in a few centuries' time it will be judged that all German philosophy has its true dignity in being a step-by-step reconquest of ancient ground, and that any claim to 'originality' sounds petty and ridiculous in relation to the higher claim of the Germans to have reestablished the link that seemed broken, the link with the Greeks, the highest type of 'man' that has appeared so far"¹.

The research carried out here on the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger was planned within the broader framework of an examination of Heidegger's confrontation with the great founding moments of Western philosophy, namely, in addition to Aristotle and the Greeks, with Kant, with Hegel and dialectical thought, and with Husserl. Various circumstances have provided the occasion to anticipate in different venues the results of the examination of these comparisons, to which the present research is closely connected and to which I therefore refer: on the comparison with the *Greeks* in general *Heidegger and the Greeks*, "Bollettino della Società Filosofica Italiana", 1984, no. 122 n.s., pp. 22-38; on the comparison with Kant: *Soggettività e temporalità: considerazioni sull'interpretazione heideggeriana di Kant alla luce delle lezioni di Marburgo*, in AA.VV., *Kant a due secoli dalla critica*, edited by G. Micheli and G. Santinello, La Scuola, Brescia 1984; on the comparison with Hegel e il pensiero dialettico: *Heidegger e Hegel. La fine della filosofia e il compito del pensare*, premised as *Introduction* to M. Heidegger, *Hegel e i Greci*, Verifiche, Trento 1977, pp. 7- 87; *Adorno e Heidegger: soggettività e catharsis*, 'Nuova corrente', 27, 1980, no. 81, pp. 91-121; *Adorno e Heidegger: un dialogo postumo?* "Il Pensiero", n.s. 23, 1982, pp. 87-110 (special issue on Heidegger); on the comparison with Husserl: *La trasformazione della fenomenologia da Husserl a Heidegger*, "Theoria", 4, 1984, pp. 125-165; infine: *Heidegger in Marburg: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl, Aristoteles und Kant*, "Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger", 37, 1984, pp. 48-69, 172-188.

F. V.

Notes

¹HGA XXXIII, p. ix. This is a fragment from August-September 1885 (now in F. Nietzsche, *Opere. VII/3: Frammenti postumi 1884-1885*, translated by S. Giametta, edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari, Adelphi, Milan 1975, p. 369).

Bibliographic notice

Aristotle's works are cited as usual according to the pagination of the Bekker edition: ARISTOTELIS *Opera*, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia Regica Borussica, Berolini 1831-1870, editio altera quam curavit Olof Gigon, apud W. de Gruyter, Berolini 1960-61.

To avoid the jumble of acronyms, Heidegger's works are cited according to the *Gesamtausgabe* (Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1975 ff.) under the unique abbreviation HGA. The Roman numeral indicates the volume, the Arabic numeral the page. For the reader's convenience, we give an overview of the volumes that have appeared so far and those that have not yet appeared, but whose contents are referred to in the text, with the corresponding abbreviations.

HGA I= *Frühe Schriften*. Hg. von F.-W. von Herrmann (1978). HGA

II= *Sein und Zeit*. Hg. von F.-W. von Herrmann (1977).

HGA IV = *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. Hg. von F.-W. von Herrmann (1982). HGA V

= *Holzwege*. Hg. von F.-W. von Herrmann (1978).

HGA IX= *Wegmarken*. Hg. von F.-W. von Herrmann (1976).

HGA XIII= *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Hg. von H. Heidegger (1983).

HGA XVIII= *Aristoteles: Rhetorik*. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1924.

HGA XX = *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925 hg. von P. Jaeger (1979).

HGA XXI = *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. Marburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1925/26 hg. von W. Biemel (1976).

HGA XXII = *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1926. HGA

XXIII= *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant*. Marburger Vorlesung

Wintersemester 1926/27 hg. von H. Tietjen (in preparation).

HGA XXIV= *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1927 hg. von F.-W. von Herrmann (1975).

HGA XXV= *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Marburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1927/28 hg. von I. Görland (1977).

HGA XXVI = *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1928 hg. von K. Held (1978).

HGA XXIX/XXX = *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1929/30 hg. von F.-W. von Herrmann (1983).

HGA XXXI= *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1930 hg. von H. Tietjen (1982).

HGA XXXII = *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1930/31 hg. von I. Görland (1980).

HGA XXXIII= *Aristoteles: Metaphysik IX, 1-3*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1931 hg. von H. Hüni (1981).

HGA XXXV = *Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides)*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1932 hg. von K. Held (in preparation).

HGA XXXIX= *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1934/35 hg. von S. Ziegler (1980).

HGA XL = *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1935 hg. von P. Jaeger (1983).

HGA XLI= *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1935/36 hg. von P. Jaeger (1984).

HGA XLV = *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1937/38 hg. von F.-W. Herrmann (1984).

HGA LI= *Grundbegriffe*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1941 hg. von P. Jaeger (1981). HGA LII= *Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken"*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1941/42 hg. von C. Ochwad (1982).

HGA LIII = *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister"*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1942 hg. von W. Biemel (1984).

HGA LIV = *Parmenides*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1942/43 hg. von M.S. Frings (1982).

HGA LV= *Heraklit. 1: Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit)*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1943. 2: *Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1944. Hg. von M.S. Frings (1979).

HGA LX= *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1921.

HGA LXI= *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*. Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1921/22 hg. von W. und K. Bröcker (in preparation).

HGA LXII= *Ontologie. Phänomenologische Hermeneutik der Faktizität*. Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1923.

Of the course from the winter semester 1920/21 *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* (which I was able to read at Nachschri□) there are no plans to publish it, because - according to a communication from F.-W. von Herrmann - no original of it (as well as of the other courses from the first Fribourg teaching that will not be published) has remained.

Bibliographical indications concerning other writings by Heidegger not yet published in the *Gesamtausgabe* as well as those concerning the Italian translations used are indicated in the footnotes. *Being and Time*, for which, in view of the different editions, an indication of the paragraphs is also always given, is quoted in the translation (sometimes slightly modified) by P. Chiodi (Utet, Turin 1969²).

Tools for the study of *Being and Time* include the useful *Index zu Heideggers "Sein und Zeit"*, zusammengestellt von I. Feick, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1968². Of a purely filological-textual character, on the other hand, is the analysis conducted with the aid of the computer by R.A. Bast - H.P. Delfosse, *Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heidegger "Sein und Zeit"*. 1: *Stellenindizes, Philologisch-kritischer Apparat*, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1980 (a second volume is announced).

The most comprehensive bibliographical repertory is represented by the three volumes of H.-M. Sass: *Heidegger- Bibliographie*, Hain, Meisenheim a. G. 1968; *Materialien zur Heidegger-Bibliographie 1917-1972*, Hain, Meisenheim a. G. 1975; *Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and Glossar*, Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green 1982. For a discussion of the most important Heideggerian studies of the last ten years or so I refer to my reviews: *Nochmals Heidegger? Eine Bilanz der neuen internationalen Heidegger-Forschung*, "Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger", 33, 1980, pp. 366-386; *Interpreting Heidegger. Review of Studies on Life, Work and Incidence*, 'Phenomenology and Society', 4, 1981, pp. 359-396.

I. Introductory remarks

The critical confrontation with Aristotle through the interpretation of certain central texts of the *corpus aristotelicum* is a recurring motif in Heidegger's thought and marks decisive stages in his evolution. According to the autobiographical accounts of Heidegger himself, the years of his high school and university education are already characterised by his confrontation with the Aristotelian problematic of being. It is true that this first approach to Aristotle is filled through reading Brentano (and Braig); but, in spite of the scarcity of available documents, it is nevertheless possible to question the influence that Brentano's interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the plurivocity of being - with its characteristic accentuation of the weight of the *analogia entis* and with its singular attempt at a systematic deduction of categories from a *dihairesis* of being - may have had on the emergence in Heidegger of the problem of the fundamental unitary sense that governs the multiplicity of senses of being.

The first real confrontation with Aristotle is undertaken by Heidegger during his first Freiburg lectureship, i.e. between 1915 and 1923 (with the interruption due to wartime events between 1917 and 1919). This confrontation, which developed especially from 1919 onwards, culminated in the drafting of a voluminous manuscript (unpublished to this day), the essential results of which were to be published in the form of an article in Husserl's 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung'. At the centre of the interpretative work conducted there were those Aristotelian texts such as the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the third book of the *De anima*, books I (1-2), VII-IX of the *Metaphysics* and the first book of the *Physics*, which even in the later stages of the confrontation of

Heidegger with Aristotle generally constitute the decisive textual references.

In the particularly fruitful period of his teaching in Marburg (from the winter semester of 1923/24 to the summer semester of 1928), the confrontation with Aristotle is widely taken up and continued, until it settles in some decisive passages of *Being and Time*. The dense points of this resumption are at least three: firstly, the course of the summer semester 1924, devoted to an interpretation of the *Rhetoric*, in which Heidegger detaches the doctrine of the passions from the context of the technique of discourse and strives to show how it represents an ontological theory of the states of the 'subject'; secondly, the course of the winter semester of 1925/26, in the central part of which Heidegger addresses the problem of truth by taking Aristotle's treatment of it as the guiding file; finally, the course of the summer semester of 1927, devoted to *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, in which, in addition to numerous cursory references to Aristotle, there is a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's conception of time.

Even in the period of his second Freiburg teaching (from the winter semester of 1928/29 until almost the end of the war), and especially in the years immediately following his call to Freiburg, Heidegger took up and developed his confrontation with the great Stagirite. This is testified firstly by the course of the winter semester of 1929/30, at the end of which (§ 72) Heidegger takes up his own interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth from a changed or at least changing perspective; it is then confirmed by the course of the summer semester of 1930, in the first part of which there is an interpretation of *Met.* IX, 10; and it is reaffirmed in a definitive way in the course of the summer semester 1931, entirely devoted to an interpretation of the first three chapters of Book IX of *Metaphysics*.

This quick list gives an idea of the insistence with which, up to the beginning of the 1930s, Heidegger places the consideration of Aristotelian ontology at the centre of his confrontation with tradition. After the turning point, however, in parallel with the change in the overall tone that characterises Heidegger's attitude towards metaphysics and, therefore, in concomitance with the transformation of the *de-constructive* intent into a need to go beyond, the focal point of the confrontation with tradition also shifts. If the confrontation with the dense moments of the metaphysical foundation was central to the project of fundamental ontology, with the

slip into the background and then as the founding intentions fade, the terms of reference also change. Instead of Aristotle, Kant and Husserl, thinkers such as Nietzsche, Hölderlin and the Presocratics take over Heidegger's attention. The essay on the concept of *physis* (written in 1939 and published in 1958) thus seems to be the last articulate confrontation with Aristotle.

In order to grasp the terms of this comparison in their authentic significance, it is then a matter of discovering and highlighting the speculative dynamic that connects all the moments of Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle in a unitary systematic plot. Now, however, this dynamic takes place not only at the level, so to speak, of the surface, namely along the lines of Heidegger's direct reading of Aristotelian texts. There is also another dimension of Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle, which is particularly significant and interesting, and which eludes a superficial verification and requires, rather, a probing in depth in order to be uncovered. This is that dimension of confrontation, of which Heidegger seems to have wanted, at least in his published works, to disperse the traces. It does not take place or manifest itself in the exegesis of this or that Aristotelian text, but rather corresponds to a resumption and radicalisation, i.e. an appropriation, of certain fundamental Aristotelian determinations that Heidegger uses in the treatment and solution of certain central problems of his speculation.

By way of illustration, some themes of this radical appropriation can be anticipated here, which will be examined in the course of the research. It will be seen, for example, that in presenting his own ontological understanding of the phenomenon of truth, Heidegger intends to corroborate it with the authority of Aristotle, affannihilating himself to show how already for Aristotle preaching is not the only locus of truth, but how it has its foundation first and foremost in the discovering attitude of conscious life (*psyche hos aletheuein*) and thus in the truthful character of the entity itself (*on hos alethes*). Alternatively, it will be seen how the distinction of the three fundamental modes of being proposed in *Being and Time*, namely beingness (*Dasein*), usability (*Zuhandenheit*) and simple presence (*Vorhandenheit*), tacitly takes up the substance of the Aristotelian determinations of *praxis*, *poiesis* and *theoria*. Furthermore, it will be seen how in the determination of the fundamental mode of being of conscious life

human, understood as being, Heidegger appropriates the fundamental practical determinations that Aristotle offers in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. And in finally, it will be possible to unearth unsuspected correspondences between Heideggerian 'existentialist' vocabulary and as many Aristotelian concepts, showing how *Gewissen* is the 'translation' of *phronesis*, how *Sorge* recalls Aristotelian *orexis* and how perhaps *Entschlossenheit* is the German cast of *prohairesis*; Similarly, it will be possible to show how in the determination of *Befindlichkeit* Heidegger 'ontologises' the Aristotelian doctrine of *pathe*, and likewise how he takes up certain characteristics of the *nous praktikos* in the determination of *Verstehen*. In short, it can be shown that in the determination of being as a unity of active moments and factual determinations, of spontaneity and passivity, Heidegger thinks of the Aristotelian characterisation of man as a synthesis and as a unity of *nous orektikos* and *orexis dianoetike*.

Before aff tackling the examination of this articulated presence of Aristotle in Heidegger, a preliminary clarification should be made regarding the different modes of approach that characterise Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle from time to time. From a methodological point of view, assuming Heidegger's technical terminology, Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle could in general be connoted in a first phase, up to the beginning of the 1930s, as 'destruction', while later, that is, after the turning point (chronologically situated precisely at the beginning of the 1930s), it is implemented as a localisation of Aristotelian thought in the history of metaphysics as the history of the forgetting of being. Now, these terminological characterisations taken on in Heideggerian language may appear somewhat ambiguous or at least worn out, all the more so since the wear and tear to which the extensive bibliography on Heidegger has subjected them has finally weakened their bite. It is therefore appropriate to clarify the procedures that Heidegger follows in his confrontation with tradition, in general, and with Aristotle, in particular. This is not to call to mind once again the meaning of those well-known methodological clarifications, but rather to highlight the systematic horizon within which they take on consistency, and to fix the finality they must serve.

The so-called 'phenomenological destruction' of traditional ontology - a term by which, until the end of the 1920s, Heidegger referred to his methodological attitude, at once of critical detachment and rapacious assimilation, towards the metaphysical tradition - is in fact the indispensable premise that follows the intention of a truly radical construction. And truly radical is for Heidegger that construction that rests on fundamental ontology or - as he himself calls it - on the metaphysics of being, which would draw on that foundation, namely being itself, from which it would be possible to explicate in its full articulation the connection of being and time.

That the 'phenomenological destruction' of traditional ontology pursues foundational intentions can be seen very clearly from a passage in the summer semester course of 1927, from which it emerges that Heidegger thinks of destruction as an integrative moment of the phenomenological method of reduction. More precisely, after stating that he wanted to take up the method of reduction theorised by Husserl - understanding it, however, not in the transcendental sense as "leading the phenomenological gaze back from the natural attitude of man living in the world of things and persons to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences"¹ - but rather in the ontological sense of a "leading the phenomenological gaze back (... from the being to the understanding of the being (...) of this being"⁽²⁾ - Heidegger affirms that it must be supplemented and completed by the moments of destruction and construction. *Reduction, destruction* and *construction* are thus conceived by Heidegger in their mutual connection as constitutive moments of the phenomenological method. Thus, the confrontation with the history of filosofia in terms of 'destruction' becomes a preliminary moment to phenomenological construction. As Heidegger himself affirms: 'The construction of filosofia is necessarily destruction, that is, a destruction of the handed-down implemented by means of the historical return to tradition, which does not signify a negation and condemnation of tradition to nullity, but precisely on the contrary a positive appropriation of it. Since construction belongs to destruction, in a certain sense filosofic knowledge is at the same time historical knowledge. To the concept of

filosofia as a science, to the concept of phenomenological research belongs the 'history of filosofia'""³.

The critical confrontation with tradition is here sustained within the horizon of a fundamental finitism, represented by the metaphysics of being, within which Heidegger considers possible, and consequently pursues, foundational aims. As a paradigmatic model and as a privileged point of reference in the implementation of this programme, Aristotelian thought is constantly borne in mind, in which, at least initially, Heidegger is convinced that he can identify a determination of the fundamental modes of being of conscious life and a phenomenology of its natural attitudes, both of which - even if placed within the horizon of the Greek understanding of being as presence - are free from the prejudicial burdens of modern theories of the subject.

From the beginning of the 1930s onwards, however, when the confrontation with the metaphysical tradition matured and became more and more decisive in terms of a critical detachment from what is considered the history of the forgetting of being that occurs in the very event of being, Heidegger disengaged his own finitivism from the attitude of foundational thought previously assumed, gradually blurring and abandoning the foundational intentions pursued in fundamental ontology. And it is in correspondence with this changed disposition towards traditional metaphysical foundations that there is a change of references on the horizon of Heideggerian thought: while Nietzsche, Hölderlin and the Pre-Socratics come to the fore, the centrality previously accorded to Aristotle is reviewed in a changed light. Despite the seminars that Heidegger continues to hold on Aristotelian thought, the latter no longer seems to occupy a privileged position either as an object of direct interpretation or as a file conductor in unravelling the fabric of his own speculation. The essay on the Aristotelian concept of *physis*, which would seem to contradict this affirmation, actually confirms it. For the greatness Heidegger assigns to Aristotle is interpreted, after all, as the echo and reverberation of the original splendour of *the Physis* of the Presocratics. A

The latter, then, and not so much Aristotelian thought, has the function of a determining horizon.

Thus, despite the almost constant presence of Aristotle in the horizon of Heidegger's speculative interests, the differences of disposition and importance cannot be suppressed. Even at a quick glance, the phase in which the confrontation reaches its maximum intensity stands out unmistakably. This is the moment in which Heidegger - by taking on the problems left open by Husserl and seeking their solution through a progressive transformation and radicalisation of the ontological framework of phenomenology - arrives at the idea and design of a fundamental ontology. And it is precisely to the speculative horizon within which fundamental ontology takes shape, that is, the perspective that in the 1920s Heidegger follows and realises to its extreme possibilities, that is linked the predominant motivation from which Heidegger's interest in Aristotle springs.

The decade preceding the publication of *Being and Time* (1927), i.e. the last years of his first Freiburg teaching and the entire Marburg period, are characterised speculatively by the vigour with which, in his confrontation with Aristotle, Heidegger puts this founding intention into practice. From a general point of view, it takes the form of the desire for a truly radical understanding of filosofic knowledge, that is, in the need to locate and determine the primary source from which the firm of philosophy arises and unravels, and to which it returns.

Keeping therefore in mind the centrality of this phase of Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle, it is now a matter of directly examining how it arises, unfolds and concludes. Before beginning this examination, however, a brief remark must be made about the studies on the subject. Well, compared to other Heideggerian interpretations of classics of filosofia, that of Aristotle has suffered comparatively less from the diffidence with which specialists have reciprocated the forcing and violence carried out by Heidegger on the texts. So much so, that in the vast sea of Aristotelian studies, an interpretative direction has been formed, represented by scholars who are partly known and afferminated, and who are inspired more or less by the

less openly to the exegetical indications provided by Heidegger⁴. The same cannot be said, however, with regard to studies on Heidegger's general confrontation with Aristotle, that is, on the role that Aristotle's interpretation plays in the evolution of Heideggerian thought. On this subject, the otherwise overabundant literature on Heidegger includes but a few studies⁵. Helping to fill this gap is indirectly within the scope of the present research.

Notes

¹HGA XXIV, 29.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*, 31.

⁽⁴⁾ W. Bröcker, *Aristoteles*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1935; H. Weiss, *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles*, Haus zum Falken, Basel 1942 (anastatic reprint, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1967); W. Szilasi, *Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes*, Francke, Bern 1946 (especially the second part containing interpretations of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the ninth and twelfth books of the *Metaphysics* and the second book of the *De anima*); K. Ulmer, *Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristoteles. Ein Beitrag zur Aufklärung der metaphysischen Herkunft der modernen Technik*, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1953; A. Guzzoni, *Die Einheit des on pollachos legomenon bei Aristoteles*, Phil. Diss., Freiburg i. Br. 1957; E. Tugendhat, *Ti kata tinos. Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe*, Alber, Freiburg-München 1958; R. Boehm, *Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche. Zu Aristoteles' Abhandlung "Über das Sein und das Seiende" (Metaphysik Z)*, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1965; E. Vollrath, *Studien zur Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles*, Henn, Ratingen 1969; Id., *Die These der Metaphysik. Zur Gestalt der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles, Kant und Hegel*, Henn, Ratingen 1969 (especially pp. 15-92); F. Wiplinger, *Physis und Logos. Zum Körperphänomen in seiner Bedeutung für den Ursprung der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles*, Alber, Freiburg-München 1971; U. Guzzoni, *Grund und Allgemeinheit. Untersuchung zum Aristotelischen Verständnis der ontologischen Gründe*, Hain, Meisenheim a. G. 1975; K.H. Volkmann-Schluck, *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1979; I. Schüssler, *Aristoteles. Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Das Problem der Verselbständigung der Wissenschaften*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1982.

⁵So few that the main ones can be recalled in the space of a note: W. Marx, *Heidegger und die Tradition*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1961, pp. 25-51 ("Gestalt und Sinn der Aristotelischen ousia"); K.H. Ilting, *Sein als Bewegtheit. Zu Heidegger, Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis (Aristoteles, Physik B 1)*, 'Philosophische Rundschau', 10, 1962, pp. 31-49; J. Richardson, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 'The Heythrop Journal', 5, 1964, pp. 58-64; O. Laffoucrière, *Le destin de la pensée et "la mort de Dieu" selon Heidegger* (Phaenomenologica, 24), Nijhoff, La Haye 1968, pp. 74-105; D. Lewis, *Aristotle's Theory of Time: Destructive Ontology from Heideggerian Principles*, 'Kinesis', 2, 1970, pp. 81-92; W.F. Hood, *The Aristotelian Versus the Heideggerian Approach to the Problem of Technology, in Philosophy and Technology. Readings in the philosophical problems of technology*, ed. with an introduction by C. Mitcham and R. Mackey, The Free Press, New York 1972, pp. 347-363; J. Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger. Philosophie grecque*, Editions de minuit, Paris 1973, pp. 93-121, 124-145; Th. Sheehan, *Heidegger, Aristotle, and Phenomenology*, 'Philosophy Today', 19, 1975, pp. 87-94; D.E. Starr, *Entity and Existence. An Ontological Investigation of Aristotle and Heidegger*, Burt

Franklin, New York 1975; D.F. Krell, *On the Manifold Meaning of Aletheia: Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger*, "Research in Phenomenology", 5, 1975, pp. 77-94; H. Seidl, *Zur Seinsfrage bei Aristoteles und Heidegger*, 'Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung', 30, 1976, pp. 203-226; W.G. Brown, *An Inquiry Into the Question About Truth and Sense in the Thinking of Heidegger and Aristotle*, Phil. Diss., Pennsylvania State University 1978; Th. Sheehan, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind*, in *Contemporary Philosophy. IV: Philosophy of Mind*, ed. by G. Fløistad, Nijhoff The Hague-Boston-London 1983, pp. 287-318; Id, *On the Way to Ereignis: Heidegger's Interpretation of Physis*, in *Continental Philosophy in America*, ed. by H.J. Silverman, J. Sallis, Th.M. Seebohm, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg 1983, pp. 131-164; F. Volpi, *Heidegger in Marburg: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles*, "Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger", 37, 1984, pp. 172-188.

II. Aristotle's presence at the origins of the Heideggerian conception of being

The ten-year silence that preceded the publication of *Being and Time* clearly separates Heidegger's early production, namely the writings published between 1912 and 1917¹, from the *opus magnum* and the production after 1927. Added to this chronological separation are at least three other reasons that effectively isolated Heidegger's early production from the rest of his oeuvre and removed it, so to speak, from the interest that Heideggerian speculation notoriously enjoys among filosofic historiography.

The first and most obvious of these reasons is the observation that Heidegger's actual thought is to be found in *Being and Time*, whereas the influences of neo-Kantism and early Husserlian phenomenology, in particular the critique of psychologism contained in the first book of the *Logical Investigations*, find their place in the field of early writings. A second reason is the fact that, while the qualitative gap between the early production and *Being and Time* appears abysmal, there has so far been a lack of a sufficient textual basis for identifying and following the genetic connection between the two moments. Because of this impediment, and this is the third reason for the lack of interest, the discussion of the problems relating to the evolution of Heideggerian thought has been absorbed almost entirely by the tormented question of the 'turning point'.

It is only in more recent times that a certain interest has arisen in Heideggerian early production, especially following the publication of some autobiographical indications provided by Heidegger himself² and on the occasion of the reprinting in one volume of the three major early works, namely the doctoral thesis on *The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism*

(1913), the dissertation on *The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus* (1915) and the lecture for the attainment of the *venia legendi* on *The Concept of Time in the Science of History* (1916)⁽³⁾. Consequently, an attempt has been made to grasp the significance of this early phase of thought by looking for its hidden connections with the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* or even with Heideggerian thought as a whole.

There is a diversity of results to which scholars who have addressed this issue have so far come. This diversity is due both to the different starting intentions and methodological approaches, and to the fact that the interpretation of the meaning of Heidegger's early writings presupposes an interpretative pronouncement on his mature thought, and it is well known that the multiplicity of exegetical approaches to it further distorts the horizons and reading perspectives according to which one approaches Heidegger's early production⁴.

It is reasonable to think, however, that despite the diversity of the While it is undeniable that there is a large gap between the language and thought of *Being and Time* and the still immature style of the early writings, it is also true that an analysis of these writings makes it easier to discover any influences that may have had a bearing on the formation and development of Heideggerian thought proper, precisely because they are the product and expression of a period of formation. This consideration also suggests that at the basis of the interest in the young Heidegger lies not only the erudite intention of a filological reconstruction of the genesis of his thought, but also the need to better understand, by observing them in their beginnings, some of the fundamental nodes and problems of Heideggerian speculation, first and foremost the problem of being.

The reconstruction of Heidegger's own intellectual biography also fits in with the meaning of these observations. Commiserating on the significance of the early writings in relation to his mature thought, Heidegger affirmed that 'at the time of the writing of these youthful and, in the literal sense of the term, unarmed essays' he still knew nothing of what would later develop into his

thought; however, even in their tentative character, they already indicate the line of the future path, namely 'in the form of the problem of categories the question of *being*, in the form of the theory of signification the question of *language*'⁵.

In this way, by indicating the presence *in nuce* in the youthful writings of the two fundamental problems of his mature speculation, Heidegger circumscribes to this aspect the motives of interest that his early writings present and, by hypothesizing their reading, offers himself orientative indications for the interpretation of his own speculative path. The current publication of the *Gesamtausgabe* will certainly provide important material for a better understanding of this self-interpretation and for verifying step by step the transition from the problematic of his early writings to that of *Being and Time*. This can already be realised on the basis of the Marburg Lectures published so far, but the edition of the first Fribourg Lectures⁶ will be particularly important in this respect.

For now, however, one can already avail oneself of a number of insights autobiographical information that Heidegger gave and that can be valuable, directly or indirectly, for the reconstruction of the circumstances of his intellectual and filosofic formation. Almost every one of the directions they indicate could be made the subject of further investigation and further research: the reading of Brentano's dissertation *On the manifold meaning of being according to Aristotle*, the study of the treatise *Vom Sein* by the theologian Carl Braig, the teaching of the art historian Wilhelm Vöge, the reading of Hölderlin (1908), the repeated reading of the *Logical Researches*; moreover, the proximity and comparison with Heinrich Rickert and with Emil Lask, the interest in the pre-Protestant German mysticism of Meister Eckhart and in particular in the Alemannic mysticism⁷; in finally, a whole series of ferments that manifested themselves in German cultural life between 1910 and 1914, such as the second enlarged edition of Nietzsche's *The Will to Power*, the translations of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, the revival of interest in Hegel and Schelling, the publication of Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften*, the poetry of Rilke and Trakl.

Among all these indications, the following obviously acquire prominence particularly those that refer to the emergence in Heidegger of the need

of a re-proposition of the problem of being, since it remains constantly present throughout Heideggerian thought and is claimed by Heidegger himself as the unitary thematic horizon that embraces the different perspectives through which his speculative evolution passes. In this sense, then, those autobiographical details in which Heidegger recalls his youthful reading of Brentano's dissertation *On the manifold meaning of being according to Aristotle* and that of Carl Braig's treatise *Vom Sein* are particularly important. It is therefore a question of subjecting these two references to closer scrutiny, in order to verify the origins of Heideggerian conception of being and the emergence of Aristotle's presence filtered through the scholastic interpretation of Brentano and Braig.

1. Reading Brentano

As Heidegger himself states, reading Franz Brentano's dissertation was the first incentive for him to deal with Aristotelian ontology and, drawing from Brentano's thesis the motivation for further questions, to pose the problem of the unity of the multiple senses of being. The question Heidegger asks himself is the following: if, as Brentano's investigation makes clear, being is said in multiple ways, what then is the ultimate foundation on which this plurivocity rests, what is the unitary sense of being?⁸

On the significance of this early reading and on the influence that Brent's interpretation of Aristotle had on Heidegger, I have soffddetermined in a previous investigation, highlighting the tendency present in the young Heidegger to pose the problem of the uni(voci)ty of being and showing how it corresponds to a similar tendency present in Brent's interpretation of Aristotle⁹. Referring to the analysis of Heidegger's filosofic formation and his early writings developed there, allow me here to recall only the fundamental traits and guidelines of this first confrontation with the Aristotelian problematic of being.

As is well known, Brentano's dissertation on the multiplicity of the senses of being in Aristotle (published in 1862)⁽¹⁰⁾ occupies an important place in the history of Aristotelian studies both for its original solutions

that it proposes, as well as for the filosofic prominence its author later achieved. It represents one of the most enduring fruits of the Aristotelian historiography of the second half of the last century, which can be made to begin with Brentano's teacher, namely A. Trendelenburg. From the point of view of the filosofic penetration of the problems, in particular for the solution of the aporias of Aristotelian ontology (interpreted decisively as the doctrine of substance), it still retains much of its value today, especially among scholastically oriented scholars¹¹.

Brentano afftakes the Aristotelian doctrine of the plurivocity of being from its four fundamental meanings: (1) The first meaning is that of being *per se* (*on kath'hauto*) and of being by accident (*on kata symbebekos*), the discussion of which - with particular attention to being by accident - occupies the second chapter. (2) The second significate is that of being as true (*on hos alethes*), examined in the third chapter. (3) The third significate is that of being according to potency or according to act (*on dynamei kai energeiai*), the subject of the fourth chapter. (4) Infinally, the fourth and last fundamental significate is that according to the figures of the categories (*on kata ta schemata ton kategorion*), analysed in the fifth chapter. For Brentano, who - as mentioned above - interprets Aristotelian ontology as a doctrine of substance (the first of the categories), the latter is the most important fundamental meaning of being among the four listed.

The fundamental part of Brentano's dissertation is precisely that in which he examines the different meanings of being according to the figures of the categories. There he affresses the problem of the analogical homonymy of being in its being between pure synonymy and *apotyches* homonymy, proposing a solution that stands out for two aspects. Firstly, because of Brentano's adherence to the scholastic doctrine of the analogy of proportionality and analogy in relation to the same term, in the light of which he interprets the analogical unity of being in Aristotle in a strong sense; secondly, because Brentano, having interpreted the unity of analogy in a strong sense, considers a deduction or 'division' of the categories to be possible that serves as a systematic criterion for their classification. Thus, they would not be

affact in that rhapsodic juxtaposition that Kant and later Hegel criticised, but would arise from a real systematic *dihairesis* of being.

As to the first of the two aspects, Brentano critically discusses three interpretations of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories (ch. V, § 1). A *first interpretation*, supported with some variants by Ch.A. Brandis, L. Strümpell and E. Zeller, sees the categories not as real concepts, but merely as the predicative structure within which all real concepts must be ordered. A second and a third interpretation, noting that the categories are not forms of predication of concepts, ascertain that they are rather universal concepts. These last two interpretations differ in emphasising different aspects. Indeed, the *second interpretation* considers categories as concepts not in the sense of conceptual representations, of concepts taken separately, but in the logical sense of concepts of judgement, i.e. as parts of the latter and, therefore, as predicates, indeed, as universal predicates. A. Trendelenburg, F. Biese and T. Waitz are said to have been the main advocates of this in the 19th century, but the translators who rendered *kategoriai* with *praedicamenta* (and, according to Trendelenburg, also the ancient commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisia, Alexander Aegaeus and Porphyry) would have agreed with this interpretation for Brentano. The *third interpretation*, supported by H. Bonitz and C. Ritter, but also accepted by Hegel, agrees with the second in holding, against the first, that the categories are not the structure of the concepts, but the concepts themselves. But, in difference to the latter, it does not understand concepts as referring to judgement, but rather as taken as universals, as supreme genera of being and not so much of predication. It thus intends to deny that categories are mere predicates and that their table is derived from an exclusively logico-grammatical consideration.

In taking his stance, Brentano shows sympathy with the ontological vigour of the third thesis, even though he shows that he does not entirely agree with it and even though, moreover, he complements it with many elements drawn from the second. He affirms that the categories are: (1) real concepts, *onta kath'hauto exo tes dianois*, (2) analogical meanings of being according to the analogy of proportionality and according to the analogy with respect to the same term, (3) universal concepts as supreme genera

of being, distinguished from each other by their different relationship to substance and by the different ways in which they are predicated of it.

As regards their classification, as mentioned above, Brentano considers it possible to rigorously determine their criterion, i.e. to give a 'deductive proof', on the basis of a division of being. This is the crucial point and at the same time the most original note of Brentano's interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories, in which the accentuation of the analogical unity of being and the attempt at a systematic deduction of the categories go hand in hand.

Brentano attributes both the strong interpretation of analogy and the very classification of categories by division from the common concept of being to Aristotle himself, although he admits that Aristotle never mentions this. However, according to Brentano, it is likely that Aristotle himself proceeded to the systematic deduction he hypothesised for two reasons: firstly, because it is unthinkable that he would have settled for a *pistis dia tes epagoges*, having instead the possibility of a *pistis dia syllogismou*; secondly, because the expression *hai dihairetheisai kategoriai*, recurring several times (*An. Pr.* I, 37; *Top.* IV, 1; *De an.* I, 1, 401a 24; 5, 410a 14), would make one think of a division operation, namely that *dihairesis tou ontos* from which the categories would result.

As to how this division is made, it starts from the common concept of being by dividing it into its two fundamental modes, the being of substance (*ousia*) and the being of accident (*symbebekos*). The first mode, that of substance, cannot be divided any further (although it is possible to distinguish different types of substance). The second, that of the accident, on the other hand, is analogical and can be divided into two further classes, depending on whether the accidents belong to the substance in an absolute way or only in relation to something else: we thus have the class of absolute accidents or affections (*pathe*) and the class of relations (*pros ti*). In fine, absolute accidents can be divided, according to their relation to the substance, in three ways: absolute accidents inherent to the substance as *enyparchonta* (i.e. the *poson* and the *poion*); absolute accidents that are *pros to hypokeimenon* and not *en toi hypokeimenoi* and that in general are *kineseis* (the *poiein* and the *paschein*); finally, absolute accidents with the character of *ta en tini* (the *pou* and the *pote*). Brentano thus derives the complete table of

categories (whose number is eight for him and not ten): *ousia*, *poson*, *poion*, *poiein*, *paschein*, *pou*, *pote*, *pros ti*.

This solution, which aims to grasp the unitary structure of being and its foundation, reveals clear scholastic influences. They emerge above all in the tendency to conceive of being - even for Brentano the Aristotelian prohibition of positing it as genus - as that common element from which the categories can be deduced by division. Moreover, in his attempt at a systematic deduction of the categories, Brentano explicitly refers not only to Thomas (ch. V, § 14), in whose conception of being - as has been shown¹²- there are univocal cystic influences of neo-Platonic origin, but also to commentators of neo-Platonic orientation such as Ammonius, Pseudo-Augustine and Isidore of Seville (ch. V, § 14).

This is probably the aspect of Brentano's treatment of the problem of being in Aristotle that most thematically affects Heidegger's filosofic formation. The hypothesis that such an incidence suffrages is that, if the confrontation with Aristotelian ontology that Brentano's reading requires lies at the origins of Heideggerian thought on being, this confrontation is implemented within the horizon of the need, already present in Brentano, to grasp the unitary nature of being, that is, to lead the multiplicity of its meanings back to a unitary foundation.

This fundamental instance remains substantially present in the subsequent developments of Heideggerian speculation. Even later, in fact, when Heidegger afftreats the problem of being in Aristotle independently of the Brentanian interpretation, his reflections will remain firmly bound to the leading file represented by the search for the fundamental unitary meaning of being. In particular, if we follow Heidegger's course in dealing with this question in the 1920s and early 1930s, we can see how in this period he alternately essays each of the four fundamental meanings of being in relation to its capacity to serve as a unitary foundation of the others. And one can see how the idea that this fundamental significate is that of substance, that is, of being in the sense of the categories, as Brentano claimed, is quickly abandoned by Heidegger. He rather develops the conviction that this

meaning is that of being as true, and because of this conviction he endeavours to show how already in Aristotle there is an ontological understanding of the phenomenon of truth (which in his thought is later taken up and radicalised in the equation of being and *aletheia*). Infinitely, probably already from the beginning of the 1930s (as can be seen on the basis of the course of the summer semester of 1931, dedicated to an interpretation of the first three chapters of the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*), being in the sense of truth is succeeded as a fundamental meaning by being in the sense of *energeia*, since in it Heidegger sees the reverberation of the original understanding of being as *Physis* (which after the turn, as we know, is that dimension that Heidegger wants to thematise as prior to and other than *Metaphysics*).

2. Carl Braig's reading

Returning now to the first formation, it is possible to reconstruct the meaning of another early reading that Heidegger himself explicitly mentions along with Brentano's dissertation, namely his reading of the treatise *Vom Sein. Abriß der Ontologie* by Carl Braig.

Braig had taught at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Freiburg initially (from 1893 to 1897) as professor of propaedeutic filosofico-theology and later (from 1897 to 1919) as professor of dogmatics. Heidegger, who from the winter semester of 1909/10 until the summer semester of 1911 had studied theology and had taken Braig's courses in Introduction to Dogmatics (1910/11) and Theological Cosmology (1911)¹³, remembers his teaching with praise:

"After four semesters I abandoned the study of theology and devoted myself entirely to philosophy. But I still took a theology course in the years after 1911, Carl Braig's dogmatics course. My interest in speculative theology drove me to it, especially the penetrating way of thinking that the said teacher implemented in every lecture. In the few walks in which I had the opportunity to accompany him, I heard from him for the first time of the importance of Schelling and Hegel for speculative theology in difference from the doctrinal system of scholasticism. Thus the tension between ontology and speculative theology as the structure of metaphysics entered the horizon of my research.

Heidegger's two references, one to the treatise *Vom Sein* and the other to Braig's theological teaching (with the discovery of Schelling and Hegel), already provide in themselves the measure and thematic horizon within which Braig's importance for Heidegger's education can be determined. Since what is in the foreground here is the ontological problematic and the confrontation with the Aristotelian tradition, the first reference is especially relevant. Let me therefore touch only fleetingly on the second reference, and then move on to a more detailed examination of the treatise *Vom Sein*.

With regard to Braig's theological teaching and his conversations with him during his university years, Heidegger emphasises how it was through Braig that he first discovered the importance of Schelling and Hegel. Moreover, the reappraisal that Braig would make of these thinkers within speculative theology as an alternative to the systems of scholasticism would stimulate him to think of the relationship between ontology and theology as a structural tension that connotes metaphysics itself. Given the centrality of this motif of reflection in Heidegger's work, this is undoubtedly an important reference, although, in truth, it sounds strange when one considers the character of Braig's work as a theologian and as a philosopher as a whole¹⁵. The latter, in effect, can be placed historically in the context of German neo-scholasticism at the dawn of the anti-modernist polemic, and is presented as a whole as a systematic compendium of Catholic doctrine. Even though it is not compactly inspired by the strictest orthodoxy, but is open to its own solutions and developments, Braig's work explicitly takes on apologetic intentions, supporting them with acumen not only against positivism and modernism (understood, moreover, in a very particular way), but also against modern philosophy and, especially, against Kant and idealism.

Heidegger, on the other hand, remembers Braig precisely in relation to the discovery of Schelling and Hegel, and in another passage in which he mentions him, he speaks of him as "the last exponent of the speculative tradition of Tübingen, which, through confrontation with Hegel and Schelling, gave rank and breadth to Catholic theology"¹⁶. Effectively, Braig had published the most important of his early writings, an essay on the natural knowledge of God according to Thomas Aquinas, in the "Theologische

Quartalschriŕ', which was the journal of the so-called 'Tübingen Catholic School'. In order to assess Heidegger's indication fully and to verify its historical consistency, it would therefore be necessary to ascertain the extent to which the influence of this school, which, above all through the figure of Franz Anton Staudenmaier and his first- and second-generation pupils, had been different in Freiburg teaching dogmatics since the mid-19th century, was still present in Freiburg circles during the years in which Heidegger studied there.

But let us come to the other aspect mentioned by Heidegger, the one that is of direct interest for the purposes of our research. It is a question of examining Braig's treatise *Vom Sein* more closely, in order to ascertain, if only by way of hypothesis, whether there are any trends or speculative perspectives in it regarding the treatment of the problem of being that might have had an impact on Heidegger's filosofic formation.

The treatise *Vom Sein. Abriß der Ontologie* (1896), which Heidegger claims to have begun reading as early as his last year of high school (1908/9), constitutes the central tome of the three-volume work *Die Grundzüge der Philosophie*, which appeared in Freiburg for the publisher Herder between 1896 and 1897 and comprised, in addition to the volume cited above, a first tome *Vom Denken. Abriß der Logik* (1896) and a concluding tome *Vom Erkennen. Abriß der Noetik* (1897). This work, which undoubtedly constitutes Braig's greatest systematic effort and marks the culmination of his activity as a Catholic theologian, is an acute compendium of filosofia that expounds in an original manner the fundamental doctrines of scholastic ontology, logic and gnoseology, in substantial conformity with Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine, but with constant consideration of the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. Moreover, on many points Braig distances himself from scholastic orthodoxy and attempts his own solutions.

The treatise is divided into the three aforementioned tomes, devoted respectively to ontology, logic and the theory of knowledge. The central tome, which deals with being, is in turn divided into three parts, in accordance with the threefold articulation that, according to Braig, characterises the various themes of ontology as the science of being in general; these themes are: eidology, i.e. the doctrine of being as it questions the properties of entities ('Vom Wesen des Seienden', pp. 18-99), nomology, i.e. the doctrine of laws concerning the effects of entities

in their being and in their moving ('Vom Wirken des Seienden', pp. 100-133) and teleology, i.e. the doctrine of the fine of entities ('Vom Zwecke des Seienden', pp. 134-158).

In this original framework, but which in substance is intended to be no more than a *metaphysica generalis*, the fundamental themes and questions of Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology are examined; the concepts of being, existence, nothingness, substance and accident, space and time, potency and act, reality and necessity are treated in particular; and this repertoire is then supplemented at the end of each chapter with an anthological selection of passages taken from the works of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and from the doctrinal corpus of the Catholic Church (quoted mainly in support and as a historical-systematic illustration of the theses presented in the text).

Already on account of these general features, Braig's treatise can be said to have contributed - in conjunction with Brentano's dissertation - to direct the young Heidegger's interests towards the problematic of ontology, polarising his attention in particular towards classics such as Aristotle, Thomas and Suarez. And even the apparently irrelevant fact that at the end of the various chapters - as well as quoting passages from classical texts on ontology - Braig offereferences the etymological reconstruction of the concepts examined from time to time, he is probably no stranger to the emergence in Heidegger of that habit with etymologies that snakes through his work, and by virtue of which he goes to unearth in the original etymon of fundamental words of Western thought the sedimentation of deep metaphysical senses.

These elements, which testify to Braig's importance for Heidegger's education in a significant but rather external way, are however also confirmed on a more substantial level. Although it is risky, if not impossible, given the scarcity of the sources accessible to date, to go beyond the ascertainment of parallels and thematic correspondences, certain hypotheses can nevertheless be advanced in this regard.

If one considers, for example, the way Braig conceives and determines the task of filosofare, it does not seem entirely illegitimate or arbitrary to see in it a repertoire of themes and problems on which Heidegger will draw,

albeit developing them with a far greater depth and radicality. Thus, in the treatise *Vom Sein* Braig conceives filosofia as that science which examines the presuppositions of common consciousness and the principles of the particular sciences and culminates in the science of being. It is then subdivided into metaphysics, theology and ontology: insofar as, by seeking the foundation of being in the sensible entity and not finding it there, it searches for it in the metempirical, it is metaphysics; insofar as it grasps the ultimate foundation of all entities in absolute being, that is, in God, it is theology; finally, insofar as it deals with being as such, in its formal characteristics, it is ontology. And it is precisely the ontological enquiry that Braig considers the task par excellence of filosofia, which, insofar as it is ontology, is called by Braig the fundamental, or principal, or central science (Fundamentalwissenschaft, Prinzipalwissenschaft, Zentralwissenschaft), in a twofold sense of first science and science of foundations¹⁷.

Certainly proclaimed from an inherently scholastic perspective, this programmatic demand for a science of being as such still sounds like a vigorous opposition to the subjectivism andgnoseologism of modern filosofics and as a resolute affirmation of the need for a revival of classical ontology. Now, as we know, Heidegger too will renew the demand for a science of being as being and will call fundamental ontology (*Fundamentalontologie*) the thought that takes on this demand for a radical renewal of ontology. As for the development of the programme of a fundamental ontology as a thematisation of the relationship between being and time, it is curious that Braig, too, albeit in a scholastic context and in a completely different way, considers the relationship with time to be decisive in the understanding of being and devotes the whole of the final part of the eidology to dealing with this problem. There he treats and discusses the common understanding of time, the philosophical conceptions that seek to explain it, and the psychological origins of the metaphysical and ontological determinations of time.

In relation to the problem of being, and with particular regard to the relationship with Aristotelian ontology, it is necessary, however, to take a closer look at how Braig conceives and determines being above all with regard to the doctrine of its plurivocity or univocity. One can indeed see that even

In Braig, and precisely in his acceptance of the doctrine of God as *ipsum esse* and in his reconnection not only to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, but also to the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition, there is a need to grasp the unitary nature of being; indeed, this need seems almost to give rise to an ontological differentiation between being in its unity and the multiplicity of entities.

It must first be noted, however, that by placing himself in the tradition of Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology, Braig essentially adheres to the doctrine of the plurivocity of entity. He affstates in fact that the latter is always determined and multiple, and precisely according to the determinacy and multiplicity of what are its not only *constant* but also *constitutive* elements, namely the categories. He says that being is predicated in as many ways as there are 'the general, special, accidental and individual determinations of the being'¹⁸. Again in accordance with the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, he also emphasises that this plurivocity is not arbitrary, but is coordinated according to the analogical order. On the contrary, he reaffirms the unitary sense of analogy, affstating that the plurivocity of being does not prevent us from grasping the uniqueness of being, since the latter would be a plurivocal concept, but unique, and its fundamental determination would be being-one in being-diverse¹⁹.

Elsewhere, in a passage at the beginning of *Vom Erkennen*, Braig defines being in *general* as a "collective concept" (*Sammelbegriff*): "By *being in general* is not meant the verb that unites subject and predicate of a judgement: 'God is good'. Nor do we designate being as the predicate in existential propositions: 'It is so, God is'. Being as subject is a collective word [and in a footnote he adds: *ipsum esse, esse simpliciter, esse actuale s. formale, actus entis, to einai haplos, to on he on, ousia, energeia, entelecheia*]"²⁰. Moreover, when dealing with being in general, Braig denies that it can be hypostatized as existing separately from the entities, and says: "Es gibt kein bloßes und allgemeines Sein, es sind Seiende"²¹. And he therefore denies the possibility of giving a true definition of being, asserting that "attempts to give conceptual determinations of being are all fallacious and contradictory. Being is 'position', 'doing', 'energy', 'afferation', 'foundation of possibility':

definitions such as this exchange the first cognitive note of being with the essential connotation of being'²².

Braig nevertheless intends to grasp and think about the unity of being and, indeed, he sees this as one of the fundamental tasks of ontology. Right at the beginning of the treatise *Vom Sein*, he affirms that the question 'what is being insofar as it is' must guide the search for an identical image (*eidos*) in all beings (and this is why he designates the first part of the ontological search with the term 'eidology')⁽²³⁾. It is interesting then to consider how he thinks of the unity of being with respect to categorical differentiations. He says: "Our universal judgement is: 'Being is'. The sense of this judgement is: every being is a thing-substance with characteristics of substance, it is substance with accidents. The *all-inclusive category*, which includes in itself and under itself all the other possible categories, is, both logically and ontologically, the category of 'substance and accident'"²⁴. Now, it can be noted that this attempt to think in the common concept of beingness the unity of substance and accident is analogous in structure to that made by Brentano; since Brentano too, accentuating the unifying force of the analogy, traced the multiplicity of the senses of being according to the categories firstly to substance and accident and then to the concept of beingness.

Furthermore, Braig adheres to the conception of God as *ipsum esse*. This doctrine, developed - as we know - above all by Thomas Aquinas, contains a tendency to substantiate being, i.e. to conceive it as a hypostasis and to identify it with God, even if, above all in Thomas, this tendency, probably of neo-Platonic origin, is skilfully combined with the doctrine of the multiplicity of the senses of creaturely being²⁵. Now, Braig not only adheres to this doctrine, but at certain points he almost seems to want to introduce with it an ontological distinction between being and entities. Which, in the perspective considered here of the genesis of the problem of being in Heidegger, is very significant.

Thus, at the very opening of the treatise *Vom Sein*, in place of a preface Braig quotes an extensive passage from Bonaventure of Bagnoregio's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, in which *ipsum esse* is distinguished from individual entities: "*Ipsum esse adeo in se certissimum, quod non potest cogitari non esse, quia ipsum esse purissimum non occurrit nisi in plena fuga non-*

esse, sicut et *nihil* in plena fuga *esse*. (...) *esse* nominat ipsum purum actum entis: *esse* igitur est, quod primo cadit in intellectum (...)”²⁶. The passage then goes on to illustrate the difficulties that this ontological difference engenders: "Mira est caecitas intellectus, qui non considerat illud, quod prius videt et sine quo nihil potest cognoscere. Sed sicut oculus, intentus in varias colorum differentias, lucem, per quam videt cetera, non videt, et si videt, non advertit: sic oculus mentis nostrae, intentus in entia particularia et universalia, ipsum *esse* extra omne genus, licet primo occurrat menti et per ipsum alia, tamen non advertit. Unde verissime apparet, quod, 'sicut oculus vespertilionis se habet ad lucem, ita se habet oculus mentis nostrae ad manifestissima naturae' [cf. Arist. *Met.* II, 1, 993 b 9-11]: quia assuefactus ad tenebras entium et phantasmata sensibilibus, cum ipsam lucem summi *esse* intuetur, videtur sibi nihil videre, non intelligens, quod ipsa caligo summa est mentis nostrae illuminatio, sicut, quando videt oculus puram lucem, videtur sibi nihil videre”²⁷.

Braig's adherence to the idea of an ontological difference between being and the bodies is then confirmed by what he argues in the concluding parts of his treatise. There, observing that the conclusions of ontology constitute the fundamental theme of theology and that, therefore, ontology has its own fulfilment in theology, Braig affstates the necessity of grasping a universal order of being and affstates furthermore that the principle of this order is to be sought in God as *ipsum esse*, of whom he says that he is "he who is in virtue of his own essence", "original foundation of the beings" and "original One"²⁸. This confirms the suspicion that also in Braig the Aristotelian conception of the plurivocity of being is superimposed on the scholastic tendency to hypostatise the concept of God as *ipsum esse*.

Now, in noting these tendencies present in Braig's treatise and in hypothesising their possible impact on the constitution of the problematic of being in the young Heidegger, it must be said first and foremost that the importance of this survey must be calibrated with due caution. In fact, if from a thematic point of view there is no doubt that Braig, together with Brentano, contributed to orienting research

of being in the young Heidegger, it appears more difficult to specify the effective extent of its incidence.

Considering, however, that the reading of Braig's treatise took place - almost in parallel with Brentano's - at a very young age, and considering that at least up to the dissertation, Heidegger's thought showed itself to be extremely ductile and receptive to the speculative stimuli given to it, it is not entirely improbable that Braig's treatise *Vom Sein* contributed, first of all from a general point of view, to direct Heidegger's interest in the ontological problematic and, secondly, more specifically, to channel the nascent question of being in a certain direction or, if you like, to confirm the direction it had taken following the reading of Brentano's dissertation: i.e. the tendency to place the emphasis of the research primarily on the guiding significance of being rather than on the multiplicity of its significates, even if this tendency stems precisely from the need to better understand the doctrine of the plurivocity of being²⁹.

Therefore, if one integrates the repertoire of themes and problems that the Braig sets before the young Heidegger's eyes with the consideration of the problem of the unitary meaning of being, raised in him by the reading of Brentano, one will then have the extremes and the essential coordinates to read the youthful writings from this perspective and in this light, that is, to grasp in the presence of Aristotle the criterion that orders the elements contained in them and the guiding file to orient oneself then in the ten-year silence that precedes the publication of *Being and Time*.

Notes

¹These writings are: *Das Realitätsproblem in der modernen Philosophie*, 'Philosophisches Jahrbuch', 25, 1912, pp. 353-363; *Neuere Forschungen über Logik*, 'Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland', 38, 1912, pp. 465-472, 517-524, 565-570; rec. by F. Ohmann, *Kants Briefe in Auswahl*, 'Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland', 39, 1912, p. 74; rec. by N. von Bubnoff, *Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit. Ein grundlegender theoretisch-philosophischer Gegensatz in seinen typischen Ausgestaltungen und in seiner Bedeutung für die modernen philosophischen Theorien*, "Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland", 39, 1913, pp. 178-179; rec. by F. Brentano, *Von der Klassifikation psychischer Phänomene*, "Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland", 40, 1914, pp. 233-234; rec. by C. Sentroul, *Kant und Aristoteles*, "Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland", 40, 1914, pp. 330-332; rec. by F. Gross, *Kant-*

Laienbrevier, 'Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland', 40, 1914, pp. 376-377; *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik*, J.A. Barth, Leipzig 1914; *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, J.C. Mohr (P. Siebeck), Tübingen 1916; *Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft*, 'Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik', 1916, pp. 173-188; *Selbstanzeige: Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, 'Kant-Studien', 21, 1917, pp. 467-468. All these writings are now included in HGA I. They were translated into Italian by A. Babolin: *Scritti filosofici (1912-1917)*, La Garangola, Padua 1972 (volume including all the above-mentioned minor writings and the youthful poem *Abendgang auf der Reichenau*); *La dottrina del giudizio nello psicologismo*, La Garangola, Padua 1972; *La dottrina delle categorie e del significato in Duns Scotus*, Laterza, Rome-Bari 1974.

²This information, provided by Heidegger on various occasions, is collected under the title *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie* in M. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1969, pp. 81-90 (translated into Italian by E. Mazzarella, *Tempo ed essere*, Guida, Naples 1980, pp. 183-191).

³Collected in M. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1972, and now republished in HGA I with some marginal notes by Heidegger.

⁴The specific studies on Heidegger's early writings are not many, so that it is possible to list the most important ones here: M. Campo, *Psicologia, logica e ontologia nel primo Heidegger*, "Rivista di Filosofia neoscolastica", 31, 1939, pp. 474-491; C. Baglietto, *La formazione del pensiero di M. Heidegger nei suoi scritti giovanili*, "Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa", 26, 1957, pp. 190-221; K. Lehmann, *Vom Ursprung und Sinn der Seinsfrage im Denken Martin Heideggers*, Phil. Diss., Rome 1962 (from this thesis are derived the two subsequent articles by the same author: *Metaphysik, Transzendentalphilosophie und Phänomenologie in den ersten Schriften Martin Heideggers (1912-1916)* and *Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger*, both in

"Philosophisches Jahrbuch", 71, 1963/64, pp. 331-357, and 74, 1966, pp. 126-153; I. Manzano, *La 'Habilitationsschrift' de Martin Heidegger sobre Escoto*, "Verdad y Vida", 24, 1966, pp. 305-325; Garulli, *Problemi dell'Ur-Heidegger*, Argalia, Urbino 1969; K. Hobe, *Zwischen Rickert und Heidegger*, 'Philosophisches Jahrbuch', 78, 1971, pp. 360-376 (especially the second part on the relationship between Lask and Heidegger); A. Babolin, *The filosofic research of the young Martin Heidegger in today's criticism*, in Heidegger, *Scritti filosofici*, pp. 9-127; Th. Kiesel, *On the Dimension of a Phenomenology of Science in Husserl and the Young Dr. Heidegger*, 'Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology', 4, 1973,

pp. 217-234; E. Morscher, *Von der Frage nach dem Sein von Sinn zur Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein. Der Denkweg des frühen Heidegger*, 'Philosophisches Jahrbuch', 80, 1973, pp. 379-385; J.D. Caputo, *Phenomenology, Mysticism and the 'Speculative Grammar': A Study of Heidegger's 'Habilitationsschrift'*,

"Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology", 5, 1974, pp. 101-117; Th.A. Fay, *Heidegger on Logic: A Genetic Study of His Thoughts on Logic*, "Journal of the History of Philosophy", 12, 1974,

pp. 77-94; R. Gumpfenberg, *Die transzendentalphilosophische Urteils- und Bedeutungsproblematik in M. Heideggers "Frühe Schriften"*, in *Akte des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, de Gruyter, Berlin 1974, vol. II/2, pp. 751-761; A. Savignano, *Psychologism and filosofic judgment in M. Heidegger*, X. Zubiri, J. Maréchal, La Garangola, Padua 1976, pp. 77-130; R.M. Stewart, *Psychologism, Sinn und Urteil in the Early Writings of Heidegger*, Phil. Diss., Syracuse University, New York 1977; E. Garulli, *Heidegger e la storia della ontologia*, Argalia, Urbino 1978, pp. 7-48; A. Palma, *Wo knüpft das Zeichen an die Welt an? Il giovane Heidegger (1912-1917)*, "Nuova corrente", no. 76/77, 1978, pp. 266-277;

J.D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas*, Fordham University Press, New York 1982; A. Marini, *Introduzione storico-sistemica*, in M. Heidegger, *Il senso dell'essere e la svolta*, edited by A.M., La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1982, pp. vii-xc; W.D. Gudopp, *Der junge Heidegger. Realität und Wahrheit in der Vorgeschichte von 'Sein und Zeit'*, VMB, Frankfurt a. M. 1983 (rich in information, but unfortunately provided in a misleading interpretative horizon).

⁵HGA I, 55.

⁶In addition to Aristotle, the subject of these lectures was mainly Husserl, early Christian thought, the phenomenology of religion, and Augustine and Neo-Platonism.

⁷It is not improbable that the interest in mysticism was aroused in the young Heidegger by Engelbert Krebs (Freiburg 4-10-1881 - ibid. 29-11-1950), who was his friend and confidant, and who initially held a few seminars with him. Among his works are: *Meister Dietrich von Freiberg*, Münster 1906; *Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert*, Freiburg i. Br. 1909; *Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik*, Münster 1912; *Was kein Auge gesehen*, Freiburg i. Br. 1918; *Grundfragen der kirchlichen Mystik*, Freiburg i. Br. 1921; *Dogma und Leben*, 2 vols., Paderborn 1921-1925; *St. Augustin. Der Mensch und Kirchenvater*, Köln 1930.

⁸Heidegger, *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*, p. 81 (Ital. transl., p. 183).

⁹F. Volpi, *Heidegger and Brentano. L'aristotelismo e il problema dell'univocità dell'essere nella formazione filosofica del giovane Martin Heidegger*, Cedam, Padua 1976.

¹⁰F. Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, Herder, Freiburg i. Br. 1862 (anastatic reprint, Olms, Hildesheim 1960).

¹¹For example J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto 1951, and G. Reale, *Il concetto di filosofia prima e l'unità della metafisica di Aristotele*, Vita e pensiero, Milan 1961. Contrast this with P. Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1962, and especially W. Leszl, *Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Aristotle's treatment of types of equivocity and its relevance to his metaphysical theories*, Antenore, Padua 1970.

¹²Cf. K. Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*, Brill, Leiden 1966; E. Berti, *Aristotelianism e neoplatonismo nella dottrina tomistica di Dio come "ipsum esse"*, in Id., *Studi aristotelici*, Japadre, L'Aquila 1975, pp. 347-351.

¹³Cf. B. Casper, *Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg (1909-1923)*, "Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv", 32, 1980, pp. 534-541, who gives a detailed list of all the courses taken by Heidegger at the Faculty of Theology in Freiburg.

¹⁴Heidegger, *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*, p. 82 (Ital. transl., p. 184).

¹⁵Carl Braig (Kanzach/Württemberg 10-2-1853 - Freiburg 24-3-1923) was an acute apologist for Catholic doctrine, especially against positivism and modern philosophy. He wrote among others: *Natürliche Gotteserkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin*, "Theologische Quartalschrift", 63, 1881, pp. 511-596; *Die Zukunftsreligion des Unbewußten*, Freiburg i. Br. 1882 (against E. von Hartmann); *Das philosophische System von Lotze*, Freiburg i. Br. 1884; *Gottesbeweis oder Gottesbeweise?*, Stuttgart 1888 (against K. Gutberlet); *Die Freiheit der philosophischen Forschung*, Freiburg i. Br. 1894 (inaugural academic proslution); *Die Grundzüge der Philosophie*, 3 vols., Freiburg i. Br. 1896-1897; *Abriß der Christologie*, Freiburg i. Br. 1907; *Modernstes Christentum und moderne Religionspsychologie*, Freiburg i. Br. 1907; *Was soll der Gebildete vom Modernismus wissen?*, Freiburg i. Br. 1908; *Der Modernismus*. Br. 1908; *Der Modernismus und die Freiheit der Wissenschaft*, Freiburg i. Br. Br. 1911; *Die Gotteslehre*, Freiburg i. Br. 1912. For a collocation of Braig's work in the context of Neo-Scholasticism cf. C. Fabro, *Il significato e i contenuti dell'enciclica "Aeterni Patris"*, in *Atti dell'VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale*, Pontificia Accademia di s. Tommaso, Vatican City 1981, pp. 66-88. On Braig's work in general cf.

F. Träger, *Das empirische Denken Carl Braigs*, 'Perspektiven der Philosophie', 5, 1979, pp. 341-356, and on the relationship with Heidegger: R. Schaeffler, *Frömmigkeit des Denkens? Martin Heidegger und die katholische Theologie*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1978, pp. 1-10.

¹⁶HGA I, 57.

¹⁷Braig, *Vom Sein*, p. 6.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 23.

¹⁹Ibid, p. 28.

²⁰Braig, *Vom Erkennen*, p. 1.

²¹Braig, *Vom Sein*, p. 6.

²²Ibid, pp. 21-22.

²³See therein, p. 18.

²⁴Ibid, p. 54.

²⁵Cf. Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*; Berti, *Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism in the Thomistic doctrine of God as "ipsum esse"*. Also cf. on the problem of the *analogia entis*, in connection with the problem of the *ipsum esse*: P. Grenet, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin a-t-il trouvé dans Aristote l'analogia entis?*, in *L'attualità della problematica aristotelica*, Antenore, Padua 1970, pp. 153-175; P. Aubenque, *Les origines de la doctrine de l'analogie de l'être*, "Les Etudes Philosophiques", no. 1, 1978, pp. 1-12. (On *analogia entis*, in general, the treatise by E. Przywara, *Analogia entis*, Johannes, Einsiedeln 1962, remains invaluable).

²⁶Braig, *Vom Sein*, p. v (the passage is taken from *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, V, 3).

²⁷Ibid, pp. v-vi (from *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, V, 4).

²⁸See therein, pp. 149-158, especially pp. 156-157.

²⁹On this aspect of the problem of being in Heidegger in comparison with the Neo-Platonic doctrine of being see W. Beierwaltes, *Identität und Differenz*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1980, pp. 131-143, and in comparison with the Platonic theory of principles H. Krämer, *Plato e i fondamenti della metafisica*, introd. and transl. by G. Reale, Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1972, pp. 307-310; in finally, on the analogies and connections of the Heideggerian understanding of being as *aletheia* with the tradition of the *metafisica* of light see K. Hedwig, *Sphaera lucis. Studien zur Intelligibilität des Seienden im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation*, Aschendorff, Münster 1980, in particular pp. 2-5.

III. Truth, subject, temporality: the presence of Aristotle in Marburg Courses and *Being and Time*

1. *Setting the comparison*

The publication of the courses Heidegger taught in Marburg from the winter semester of 1923/24 to the summer semester of 1928 sheds light on the development of his thought in the years immediately preceding the publication of *Being and Time*, i.e. in one of its most intense and most fruitful moments. In the context of the confrontation with tradition considered here, this period is also of particular interest, as it is predominantly characterised by Heidegger's confrontation with certain great founding moments of traditional ontological thought, i.e., in the order in which they are implemented, the confrontation with Husserl, Aristotle and Kant (but also with Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes and Leibniz).

All these comparisons, and especially the one with Aristotle, are implemented within the horizon of the Heideggerian attempt to question the presuppositions of traditional ontology and to prepare the ground for a truly radical refoundation of it. This questioning and this refoundation are carried out, on the one hand, by laying bare the reductiveness of the metaphysical understanding of being as presence (connected to an understanding of time that privileges the dimension of the present); on the other hand, by identifying in the specific mode of being of human life, that is, of being, the structural foundation for the radical re-proposition of the problem of being.

There is therefore a connection that is not merely external that links these confrontations of Heidegger with tradition, and in particular the three main ones, the one with Husserl, the one with Aristotle and the one with Kant. As for their succession, it can be said that Heidegger first of all confronts Husserlian phenomenology and then arrives at the interpretation of Aristotle from the questions that had remained unanswered in the confrontation with Husserl. In Husserl's thought, in fact, he had come to see, completed and taken to its extreme consequences, the foundation of a philosophy of the subject oriented mainly on scientific knowledge and on theoretical-logical categories. Turning to Aristotle, on the other hand, he believes he can discern in him a *complete* repertoire of the fundamental ontological determinations of human life, and moreover without the presuppositions of the modern filosofies of the subject. In Kant, infine, Heidegger will strive to see an overcoming of the traditional forgetfulness of the connection of being and time, due to the fact that Kant would have attempted to think of the unity of the fundamental determinations of human life, which Aristotle had identified, but approached rhapsodically without putting their unity into question; and, albeit unconsciously, Kant would have determined this unity as temporality, thus connecting temporality and subjectivity and drawing on that foundation of finitude which - just as the Heideggerian equation of being and original temporality is intended to prove - allows the problem of being and time to be re-proposed.

Turning now to the interpretation of Aristotle, the difference with respect to the previous comparison, the one conducted in the younger years following the reading of Brentano and Braig, is immediately apparent, both in terms of the greater thematic breadth, the more mature and profound speculative commitment, and infinally for the higher level of interpretation achieved. While maintaining the centrality and fundamentality of the problem of being, a certain thematic shift is also evident. For although being remains the general horizon and the ultimate final aim of the research, Heidegger now develops the comparison with Aristotle regarding those themes that will later be central also in *Being and Time*; there are at least three of them: the problem of *truth*, the problem of the '*subject*', and the problem of *temporality*.

To understand this thematic shift and the qualitative leap **t h a t** accompanies its implementation, it is worth considering that the years

The time between his thesis and his call to Marburg, i.e. the years of his first teaching in Freiburg, marked a period of reflection, crisis and radical change for Heidegger. There is a significant document, which is worth quoting in full, in which one can grasp the profound transformation of Heidegger in those years. It is a letter dated 9 January 1919 and addressed to Engelbert Krebs¹. Here is the text:

Dear Mr. Professor,

The past two years, in which I was concerned to clarify my filosofic position in principle, leaving aside any particular scientific task, led me to results for which, if I were in an extrafilosofic constraint, I could not be guaranteed freedom of conviction and teaching.

Gnoseological convictions involving the theory of historical knowledge made the *system* of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me, but not Christianity and metaphysics (the latter, however, in a new sense).

I believe I have perceived all too strongly - perhaps more so than its official functionaries - how many values the Catholic Middle Ages carry with them, and we are still a long way from truly appreciating them. My investigations into the phenomenology of religion, which will hold the Middle Ages in high regard, are intended to testify, in lieu of any discussion, that through a transformation of my basic position I have not allowed myself to postpone objective and sober judgement and high regard for the Catholic world of life to a polemic of a stymied and desolate apostate.

Therefore, also in the future it will be my care to remain in contact with Catholic scholars who see and admit problems and are able to identify with different beliefs.

It is therefore particularly precious to me - and for this I would like to thank you very cordially - not to lose the benefit of your precious friendship. My wife, who visited you recently, and myself would like to maintain the very special confidence with you. It is difficult to live as a philosopher; intimate sincerity before oneself and those one has to teach demands sacrifices and renunciations and struggles, which to the scientific craftsman always remain alien.

I believe that I have an inner vocation to philosophy and, by implementing it in research and teaching, I believe that I am doing what my strength allows me to do for the eternal destination of the inner man, and thus I believe that I alone justify before God my existence and my work.

Sincerely yours, Martin Heidegger.

The more this document makes us perceive the radicality with which the young Heidegger approaches the task of filosofy, the more we must regret not having the writings from this period, so that we can follow, as in the Marburg period, the maturation of his thought². Fortunately, however, we know from various testimonies, at least in broad outline, the main themes Heidegger dealt with during his first Freiburg teaching³. And we know that in this period he devotes great and repeated attention to the

Aristotelian thought. The list of courses and seminars Heidegger gave shows how often he returned to Aristotle: in the summer semester of 1916, together with Krebs, he gave a seminar on selected passages from Aristotle's logical writings; in the summer semester of 1921 (in parallel with a course on *Augustine and Neo-Platonism*) he read the *De anima* in a seminar exercise; in the winter semester of 1921/22 he gave a course on *Physics* (now announced in HGA LXI under the title *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles*); in the summer semester of 1922 he again gave a full course on selected passages from Aristotle's ontology and logic; and in the summer semester of 1922 he gave a course on the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology and logic: *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles*); in the summer semester 1922 again a whole course on selected passages from Aristotle's ontology and logic and also, in parallel, a seminar on the *Nicomachean Ethics*; in finally, in the winter semester 1922/23 a seminar on Books IV-V of the *Physics*⁴.

The results of this intense confrontation with Aristotle were to be elaborated by Heidegger in a large manuscript, the essential contents of which were to be published in an article planned for the "Husserl's 'Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung', but never appeared. In it, Heidegger is said to have dealt with Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book II of the *De anima*, Books I (1-2), VII-IX of the *Metaphysics* and Book I (8) of the *Physics*, i.e. all those texts by Aristotle that also later represent the focal points of the comparison⁵.

Heidegger remembers this moment of confrontation with Aristotle in the following way: "The more the fruitfulness of the growing familiarity with the phenomenological view for the interpretation of Aristotle's writings was evident to me, the less I could separate myself from Aristotle and the other Greek thinkers. But to tell the truth, I could not yet assess at the time what decisive consequences this *new way of addressing Aristotle* was to bring with it. When I myself, starting in 1919, (...) tested in the seminary a transformed understanding of Aristotle, my interest turned again to the *Logical Searches*, especially the second of the first edition. The difference enunciated here between sensible intuition and categorical intuition revealed itself to me in all its significance for the determination of the manifold meaning of the entity"⁶.

This important confrontation with Aristotle from the years of his early Freiburg teaching is then taken up in the Marburg courses, in which the interpretation of Aristotle appears closely connected to the elaboration of Heidegger's speculative programme, i.e. the

re-proposition of the problem of being through the analysis of beingness. For this reason, Marburg's interpretation of Aristotle differentiates from the interpretations following the turn. In it, it is not a matter - as, for example, in the essay on the Aristotelian concept of *physis* - of interpreting within an already constituted horizon, that of the history of metaphysics as the history of the forgetfulness of being, an essential moment of it (the Aristotelian one), in order to test the consistency of the general framework and the belonging of the moment to the framework. In Marburg, continuing the research begun earlier in his last years in Freiburg, it is a matter for Heidegger of grasping in Aristotelian thought certain essential determinations and moments that, with appropriate restructuring, will serve him as an essential aid in pursuing his own foundational finalities.

As for its chronological extension, this comparison is concentrated above all in the first years of the Marburg teaching. From the mid-1920s onwards, more precisely from around the middle of the winter semester of 1925/26, Heidegger's interest was to be focused on Kant.

With the exception of the course on *Rhetoric* from the summer semester of 1924, we now have almost all of the Marburg Lectures relevant to the comparison with Aristotle⁷. Moreover, even for the course on *Rhetoric* one can assume what its content was in principle, and precisely by taking into account those passages from the other Marburg lectures and *Being and Time* in which - most probably taking up considerations developed in that course - Heidegger deals with the doctrine of the passions contained in Book II of the *Rhetoric*. And it is known that here he uses it in the context of the analysis of Being as "the first systematic hermeneutics of the everyday being-assembly", emphasising its ontological scope and asserting that "the ontological-fundamental interpretation of the principles of the passions has not made any noteworthy progress since Aristotle onwards"⁸.

Based on the other published Marburg courses, it is now a matter of examine the central presence of Aristotle in all the essential stages of Heidegger's speculative development up to *Being and Time*; and this not only in the decisive moments of the ontological transformation of the

phenomenology and detachment from Husserl, but also in those passages in which, although Aristotle is not the focus of commitment and attention, that ontological tension developed and tempered in Heidegger's grappling with Aristotelian texts is nevertheless perceptible. This examination can then be conducted in the most appropriate way by following the order of the three fundamental problems that emerge: the problem of truth, the problem of the 'subject' and the problem of temporality.

2. *The problem of truth*

To focus his attention on the problem of truth, Heidegger arrives by means of a combination of Husserl and Aristotle, of phenomenology and ontology, traces of which can be seen in the first of the Marburg courses we currently have, namely that of the summer semester of 1925 published under the title *Prolegomena to a history of the concept of time*⁹.

Heidegger's focus here is predominantly on the critical confrontation with Husserl. Nonetheless, one frequently encounters the obvious signs of Heidegger's earlier interpretation of Aristotle, which are often accompanied by the programmatic declaration of the need to broaden the confrontation to all the fundamental areas of the filosofic question and to systematically connect the results of this broadened confrontation with the problems arising from the critical appropriation of phenomenology.

The introductory part of the course, which is devoted to illustrating the meaning and tasks of phenomenology, presents some very significant passages in this sense. In a first of them, in the context of an exposition of the general sense and importance of the Husserlian discovery of categorical intuition, Heidegger touches precisely on the problem of truth, and precisely on the question of the distinction and characterisation of the ontological understanding of truth as opposed to the merely gnoseological understanding. Now, in dealing with this problem, Heidegger observes that 'phenomenology (...) breaks with the limitation of the concept of truth to acts that connect (*beziehende Akte*), to judgements' and thus 'without having an explicit awareness of this, returns to the breadth of the concept of truth in which the Greeks - Aristotle - could

to call perception as such and the 'mere' perception of something true"¹⁰.

This rupture and this return are for Heidegger the necessary consequence of the Husserlian thesis, according to which not only acts of a predicative type (in Aristotelian language acts of *synthesis* and *diahairesis*), but also 'simple' acts, i.e. monothetical or monoradial (*einstrahlig*), such as the perception of a colour, can be 'identified' (*Ausweisung*) and, therefore, can have the character of truth. This implies, in Heidegger's eyes, an ontological broadening of the concept of truth as opposed to the traditional gnoseological understanding, according to which truth would instead only be found in the synthesis and separation of representations, as had been afferminated especially by Rickertian neo-Kantism. Heidegger, therefore, wants to emphasise as Husserl's merit the fact that he restores the idea of a pre-categorical, ante-predicative truth; and it is this idea of truth that Heidegger sees afferminated for the first time in Greek thought and, in particular, in Aristotle.

By the same token, in the Husserlian thesis - also developed like the previous one in the *Logical Investigations* - according to which categorical acts are 'grounded acts', i.e. they ultimately rest on the foundation of sensible intuition, Heidegger thinks he can discover a correspondence with the Aristotelian thesis, formulated in *De an.* III, 431 a 16- 17, according to which, as he translates, 'the soul cannot understand (*vermeinen*) anything unless something has first been shown to it' (*dio oudepote noei aneu phantasmatos he phyche*)¹¹.

What Heidegger wants to emphasise by observing this correspondence, is the basic assumption that Husserl's thought and that of Aristotle have in common, and which must be made their own by every filosofia that moves from the point of view of the finite, namely the assumption that a thought that does not rest on sensibility, a thought 'without foundational sensibility', is nonsense. And this is a conviction that Heidegger will find confirmed and developed systematically in Kant, for whom, as we know, there are two sources of knowledge (of that finite being that is man), namely sensibility and the intellect, the one without the other being blind, and the other without the first being empty. And this is the finitistic conviction

fundamental that Heidegger will make his own in his approach to the problem of cognitive access to being, basing it precisely on the ontological structure of being itself.

However, these correspondences that Heidegger discerns between Husserlian phenomenology and Aristotle do not only apply in a positive sense. Even there where Heideggerian detachment from the one-sidedness of Husserl's orientation on the problems of *theoria* and scientific knowledge matures, even there where the fundamental critical point emerges according to which Husserl would not sufficiently clarify the ontological horizon of his research and would remain tied to the *filosofia* of the subject and the metaphysics of presence, well, in this case, too, Heidegger brings Husserl and Aristotle into contact, since Husserl would be the one who brings to completion the tradition that has its origin in Aristotle.

Therefore, against Husserlian phenomenology he critically observes: "It thus turns out that the starting position for the elaboration of pure consciousness is a *theoretical* position, which, of course, in itself at first is neither an objection nor an accident, but it is so insofar as subsequently, starting from this theoretical basis, the claim is raised to determine the entire field of attitudes, especially the practical ones"¹². And the objection that Heidegger advances towards the end of the course with regard to the Aristotelian categories clearly goes in exactly the same direction: "The Aristotelian categories: *ousia, poion, poson, pou, pote, pros ti* (*hypokeimenon - symbebekota*: what already always has to be together with mere presence, the a priori possibilities of something as something), in the traditional sense: substance, quality, quantity, place, time, relation, are already all drawn into this singular dimension of a *mere grasping of things* (*Dingerfassen*) and of a certain kind of discourse about it, i.e. *the theoretical assertion*. But already for Aristotle these categories became the categories in absolute; they were at the same time the ground for the determination of the categories of the object in general, i.e. the determinations that pertain to every something insofar as it is in general something, whether it is in the world or thought"¹³.

Despite this critical observation, however, in this period, the Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle is mainly characterised

by the effort to positively appropriate the fundamental determinations of Aristotelian ontology, and in particular its understanding of the phenomenon of truth, in order to use them in the analysis of the structural moments of being. The way in which Heidegger enacts this recovery and appropriation of Aristotle in a positive sense emerges with particular clarity in the course of the following semester (1925/26), now published under the title *Logic. The Question of Truth*¹⁴.

The interpretation of Aristotle occupies the first part of the course, in which Heidegger discusses 'the problem of truth at the decisive beginning of filosofic logic' as well as 'the roots of traditional logic'. The fundamental finality, which guides the course of the research, is to grasp the original locus of truth and to determine by virtue of this grasp the fundamental structure of the *logos*. As is well known, this is a task that engages Heidegger in the central paragraphs of *Being and Time* (above all in §§ 7 B, 33, 44), where it is affached and resolved in the context of existential analytics. Whereas, however, in the *opus magnum* the direct interpretation of Aristotelian texts is pushed into the background in order to leave room for the development and treatment of the problem itself, in the course of 1925/26 the proportion is reversed, and the confrontation with Aristotle is documented in its original breadth.


Heidegger starts here - as he will also do in *Being and Time* - from a problematisation of the three traditional theses on truth: the first thesis affirms that the locus of truth is the proposition; the second says that truth is the adequation or coincidence of thought and being, of representation and thing; the third, infinally, attributes the authorship of both the previous assertions to Aristotle.

Heidegger questions these three theses following a threefold argumentative progression. First, he distinguishes the semantic moment in language from the apophantic moment expressed in assertion or predication (1). He then examines the peculiar structure of predication, i.e. its possibility of being true or false, in order to lay bare its foundation (2). The latter is infinally grasped by distinguishing the being-true (*Wahrsein*) of predication from the truth (*Wahrheit*) in a

most original, ante-predictive, ontological sense, that is, from that truth which is the very character of being (3).

(1)

On the basis of a reading of the first chapter of *De interpretatione*, supplemented by references to the third book of *De anima*, Heidegger grasps and determines the character of the *logos* as that 'discovering' attitude of conscious human life, of being, through which in language and speech it accesses being and makes it manifest. As distinct from the simple inarticulate and non-semantic sounds (*psophoi agrammatoi*) of animals, the properly semantic sounds (*phonai semantikai*) represent the elementary units of human language. They can be simple or they can connect. If they are simple, one has the simple saying (*phasis, dictio*), which expresses single nouns (*onomata, nomina*) or single verbs (*rhemata, verba*). If, on the other hand, they are linking, then the saying in the true sense, i.e. the discourse, the *logos*, originates. In turn, the latter can be non-apophantive - such as prayer (*euche*) or other forms of *logos* analysed in the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* - or apophantive. In *apophansis*, predication, as the form par excellence of discourse, we have affirmation (*kataphasis, affirmatio*) and negation (*apophasis, negatio*). And it is precisely in these last two forms that *the logos* assumes the character of being-true or false. Schematically, this structuring of language can be raffigured as follows:



Heidegger intends to show that the possibility of being-true or false, a characteristic of apophantic discourse, of predication, is not an original determination of truth; instead, it is grounded in an ontologically anterior moment, that is, in the phenomenon of discovering, and more precisely still in the discovering attitude that is proper to being insofar as it is open to the world of entities. Apophantic discourse is precisely one of the ways in which beingness accesses and discovers beingness. And just as the *logos apophantikos* represents one of the possibilities of discovering being, so too its being-true or false is only one particular mode of the phenomenon of truth. The latter, therefore, must be grasped as a whole in a more original dimension.

(2)

In order to grasp this, one must first ask oneself about the conditions of the possibility of the being-true or false of predication, that is, of that discovering attitude of being implemented in the discursive-predicative forms of the *logos*. Now, developing his considerations again on the basis of the Aristotelian text, Heidegger identifies the condition of the possibility of the being-true or false of predication in the dual structure of the *logos*, that is, in its being *synthesis* or *dihairesis*, in its connecting or dissociating. Once this is done, he then asks what is the unitary structure and the foundation from which this dual determination arises.

The answer to this question comes to light through an interpretation of *Met.* IV, 7 and VI, 4 as well as *De int.* 1, in the course of which Heidegger comes to identify the fundamental unity sought with the structure of the 'insofar' (*Als*) that underlies predication, and which in turn is grounded in that original (hermeneutic) 'insofar' that is the structure of understanding as a determination of being¹⁵. Of this structure of the 'insofar' in the original sense, Heidegger says that it "is the structure that belongs to understanding as such; the understanding that must be understood as a fundamental mode of the being of our being"¹⁶; he therefore concludes that "the structure of the 'insofar' is the fundamental hermeneutical structure of the being of the entity that we call

being"¹⁷. Consequently, the being-truth of predication refers back to the structure that characterises being itself in its discovering disposition, in its unveiling being (*aletheuein*). Thus, in determining the structure of beingness as a being-discovering or being-revealing, Heidegger rethinks and reformulates in an original way the sense of the Aristotelian determination of the soul (*psyche*) as a being-in-the-true (*aletheuein*) in the sense of being-revealing¹⁸.

(3)

The determination of beingness as unveiling (*psyche hos aletheuein*) is in turn grounded in the determination of beingness itself as truth in the sense of being-discovered (*on hos alethes*). In effect, the discovering attitude of being-ness is founded on the fact that the being itself can be discovered and unveiled, i.e. on the fact that it has the character of manifestation and as such is accessible to being-ness. That is to say, only if truth in the sense of being-discovered is a character of being itself and if it is therefore accessible to being, can being relate to being in the attitude of uncovering.

Now, with this ontological determination of truth as the character of the entity itself, Heidegger intends to restore the original meaning of the Aristotelian understanding of *on hos alethes*, as it is formulated above all in *Met.* IX, 10. For Heidegger, in fact, the tenth chapter of Book IX of the *Metaphysics* represents a dense point in Aristotelian ontology, from which "the problem of truth must be developed historically as far back as Parmenides and as far forward as Stoa, Boethius, the Middle Ages, Descartes and modern philosophy up to Hegel"¹⁹.

Polemicalizing the interpretations of the problem of truth in Aristotle given by Schwegler, Jaeger, and Ross, and mocking the contradictions in which their *aurea mediocritas* filosofica would end up entangling them, Heidegger re-evaluates the interpretations most sensitive to filosofic problems such as those of Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, and Bonitz. With these and against those, he points out how in the tenth chapter of the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* an essential connection between the problem of being and the problem of truth is conceived and, moreover, how in this context the Greek determination of knowing comes to light,

the originality and fundamentality of intuition²⁰. Heidegger's intention is to show how "only through the characterisation of being from the *alethes*, does being reach its full and authentic determination" and "to what extent the highest degree of the consideration of being is reached with this"²¹.

As is well known, the Aristotelian text in question deals with the problem of the determination of being. The latter, having previously been analysed in the sense of *ousia* and *energeia*, is now considered in the sense of being true. Now, in considering being as true, a distinction must be made between two cases, which Aristotle deals with respectively in the first (1051 a 34 - b 17) and second part (b 17 - 1052 a 11) of the chapter: the case of compound entities (*syntheta*) and the case of non-compound, i.e. simple, indivisible entities (*asyntheta*).

As for compound entities, they can be such in two ways: (1) always (*aei on, adynata allos echein*), and then the *logos* connecting them will either always be true, if it unites them when they are united and separates them when they are separated, or always false, if it unites them when they are separated and separates them when they are united; or (2) sometimes yes and sometimes no (*ta endechomena allos*), and then the *logos* connecting them will sometimes be true and sometimes false.

As far as non-compound entities (*asyntheta*) are concerned, they cannot be grasped in the linking discourse, *synthesis* or *dihairesis*, i.e. in the predicative structure of something as something. Their truth is different from the being-true or false of predication. For Heidegger, Aristotle grasps truth here as a character of the entity itself, as the very example given ('true gold') would illustrate. Truth in this sense can be grasped in the direct apprehension of the *noein* (*vernehmen*, Vernunft) that Aristotle designates as a 'touching' (*thigein, thigganein*). Around it there is no error, as in preaching, but simply a non-grasping, a not knowing (*agnoein*), in the sense that one either grasps it in its tangibility or one does not grasp it affatto.

Now, summarising these considerations of Heidegger's on the problem of truth, it can be said that through the interpretation of the Aristotelian text he derives a 'topology' of the places of truth that can be reconstructed as follows: (1) true is first of all the entity

itself insofar as it has the character of being-discovered, of unveiling (*on hos alethes*). (2) Beingness itself, conscious life, is true insofar as it has the character of being-discovered (*psyche hos aletheuein*). But beingness can be discoverable in two fundamental ways: (2.1) by intuiting, i.e. by grasping directly, and precisely by means of the *aisthesis* (which always refers to its *idion* and is therefore always true) or by means of the *noein*, which grasps its object by 'touching' it (*thigein*, *thigganein*) and which cannot be false, but can simply not be acted upon (*agnoein*); or (2.2) connecting, namely in the non-linguistic discovering attitude, which can be practical (*techne*, *praxis*) or theoretical (*sophia*), or linguistic, whose most exalted form is preaching (*logos apophantikos*).

If, on the one hand, with this differentiation of the concept of truth, Heidegger disengages its understanding from exclusive reference to predication, and thus makes it possible to attain a broader ontological horizon from which it is possible to reconsider the problem, on the other hand the question of the foundations and presuppositions on which the Aristotelian understanding of truth as a character of being itself ultimately rests still remains open for him. The question Heidegger asks himself is: 'What must it mean to be, affiso that being-discovered (= truth) can be understood as the character of being and even as the most authentic, affiso that consequently the being must ultimately be interpreted in relation to its being from being-discovered?'²².

Now, the task of a radical filosofic reflection is for Heidegger first and foremost to inquire about this identification of being and truth and to 'make its unexpressed presuppositions comprehensible, starting with the implicit, not explicitly given, understanding of being of Aristotle and the Greeks'²³. In laying bare the roots of this unthematized understanding of being, Heidegger simultaneously lays the foundations for his own interpretation of the history of metaphysics.

Indeed, affin order for truth in the sense of being-discovered, of unveiling, to be qualified as a character of being itself, it is necessary for being to be understood in a certain way, namely as presence (*Anwesenheit*). Since only that which is first determined as something present can then be grasped as something uncovered, unveiled, i.e.

of true in the sense that Heidegger sees encapsulated in the etymology of the Greek word *a-letheia*.

Thus, on the basis of the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth, Heidegger's conviction takes root - which will be confirmed by the famous interpretation of the Platonic myth of the cave²⁴ - that at the beginning of Western metaphysics lies the fundamental presupposition that makes being tacitly understood as presence. This in turn rests on an unquestioned connection of being and time, within the horizon of which the temporal dimension of the present is presupposed as decisive. And to an understanding of time in which the present is the fundamental determination, there necessarily corresponds an understanding of being as presence.

At the end of his interpretation of the problem of truth in Aristotle, Heidegger thus comes to interpret metaphysics as thinking about presences, i.e. as thinking that does not question the relationship between being and time in its full extent. As early as the winter semester of 1925/26 he says: '(...) insofar as being is understood as presence and being-discovered as present, insofar as presence (*Anwesenheit*) and present (*Gegenwart*) are presence (*Präsenz*), through truth being as presence (*Anwesenheit*) can, indeed must, be determined as present (*Gegenwart*), so that the present is the supreme mode of presence. Plato already designates being as present. And the technical term *ousia*, which in the history of filosofia is referred to quite meaninglessly as substance, means nothing other than presence in a well-determined sense. Of course, it must necessarily be emphasised that the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, determined being as *ousia*, but they were a long way from understanding what it properly means to determine being as presence and present. The present *is a character of time*. Understanding being as presence from the present means understanding being from time'²⁵.

Moving thus from this questioning of the unbroken assumptions of metaphysics - but not yet leading them back, as he later does, to the very occurrence of being itself - Heidegger can set about to develop positively the task of a radical foundation of ontology in which the relation of being and time is thematised. At the same time, in

Starting from the understanding of the connection of being and time, the guiding file that guides the interpretation of the history of metaphysics unfolds:

"Once one has understood the problem of the intimate connection of the understanding of being from time, one then somehow has a lamp to illuminate the history of the problem of being and the history of filosofia in general, so that it now receives meaning"²⁶.

With the discovery and determination of the authentic theme of his own thought, namely the connection of being and time, Heidegger is placed in the condition of critically coming to terms with the great founding moments of ontology and progressively distancing himself from them. In particular, as far as Aristotle is concerned, the positive appropriation noted in the examination of the problem of truth progressively transitions into an attitude of critical distancing. Decisive in this sense is the irruption of Kant's figure in Heidegger's thought. In the course of the winter semester of 1925/26, interrupting the interpretation of Aristotle and modifying the announced programme of lectures, Heidegger moves on to deal entirely with Kant, in whom he believes he can see

"the only one that presages something about the connection of the understanding of being and the characters of being with time"²⁷.

However, despite this departure from Aristotle, the confrontation with his thought in the Marburg courses proves to be decisive with regard to at least two other problems, which will need to be examined, namely the problem of the 'subject' and the problem of temporality.

3. The 'subject' problem

Similarly to what had happened with the problem of truth, in relation to the question of the 'subject', that is, in relation to the determination of the fundamental mode of being of conscious life, of the nature of man, of being, Heidegger turns to Aristotle to seek in him the solution to those problems that Husserlian phenomenology left open.

In effects, in Heidegger's eyes, the determination that Husserl gave of human subjectivity in terms of consciousness and ego was jammed in a fundamental aporia, namely the aporia of the ego's belonging to the

world and the simultaneous constitution of the world by the 'I'. The solution put forward by Husserl, for whom a distinction had to be made between the psychological 'I' that belongs to the world and the transcendental 'I' that constitutes it, i.e. between the real being of the world and the ideal being of the world, was not considered satisfactory by Heidegger.

While agreeing with Husserl that the constitution of the experience of the world cannot be explained by having recourse to an entity that has the same characterisation of being as the world, and while therefore agreeing on the need to have recourse to an entity with a different ontological structure, Heidegger disagrees with Husserl's determination of the latter in terms of transcendental subjectivity, consciousness or the self. Firstly because Husserl would not have sufficiently clarified the mode of being of this entity, which as a constituent is the archimedean point of his theory of knowing; but then also because Husserl's determination of subjectivity would have been derived predominantly and unilaterally from the implicit orientation on determinations of a theoretical and rationalistic type.

Now, as the topology of the places of truth reconstructed by Heidegger on the basis of Aristotle's interpretation makes clear, *theoria* and reason are only one of the many possible modes of that discovering attitude through which man has access to things and grasps them. Alongside *theoria*, and perhaps before *theoria*, there are, for example, the practical-moral attitude (*praxis*) and the practical-technical attitude (*poiesis*), which also represent a way in which being is in relation to being and discovers it.

It is then understandable why Heidegger also has recourse to Aristotle on this issue, finding in him the original determinations of conscious life that he seeks. In an interpretation of Book VI of *the Nicomachean Ethics* dating back to the years of his early Freiburg teaching, but of which clear traces remain in the Marburg courses and in *Being and Time*, Heidegger believes he can identify in Aristotle's treatment of the dianoetic virtues the elaboration of as many determinations of conscious human life, which Husserl had instead flattened out to the categories of *theoria* alone.

The need to break away from Husserl was also brought about by the circumstance that through the 'hermeneutics of *effettività*' developed during his first Freiburg teaching on the basis of the interpretation of early Christian thought, Heidegger had come to the conviction that in order to grasp human life in the original fullness of its being, it was necessary to access it before the levelling that the objectivising categories of *theoria* operate on it. In doing so, Heidegger had started, among other things, from Luther's critique of Aristotelian terminology, recovering the latter positively, however, and emphasising, for example, the importance of the Aristotelian determination of *kairos*²⁸.

It is within this horizon, characterised by the opposition to the Husserlian theoretical determination of the subject and by the productive appropriation of Aristotelian determinations, that the analysis of the modes of being of human life that Heidegger elaborates in the Marburg courses and expounds in a completed form in the analytic of existence in *Being and Time* should be read and understood. It will then be possible to understand how the central determinations of being are derived by Heidegger through a re-proposition and radicalisation of that determination of human life already thought of and elaborated by Aristotle.

Now, leaving aside all other aspects of the analytic of being presented in *Being and Time*, it can be said that from an ontological point of view it introduces the distinction of three modes of being fundamental, namely beingness (*Dasein*), usability (*Zuhandenheit*) and simple presence (*Vorhandenheit*). As is well known, being-in-the-world - characterised as a being-within-the-world that is open to being and characterised in this openness (*Erschlossenheit*) by certain so-called 'existential' structures - is the mode of being proper to human life. As such, being-in-being is radically distinct from the mode of being of the being different from it (*nichtdaseinsmäßiges Seiendes*), i.e. from the mode of being of 'things'. These, depending on the arrangement in which being relates to them, can be encountered either in the mode of being of usability (when they are used as tools or implements in an operational context) or in that of mere presence (when they are the object of mere observation). With all the cautions that such a *raffronto* imposes, it is not daring to see a correspondence, not only formal, between the distinction

Heideggerian determination of these three modes of being (*Dasein*, *Zuhandenheit*, *Vorhandenheit*) and the Aristotelian determination of *praxis*, *poiesis*, and *theoria* (which, as we have seen, Heidegger interprets as modes of being-discovering being in relation to being). The affirmation of this correspondence nevertheless demands a justification. For while the parallel between *poiesis* and *Zuhandenheit* and between *theoria* and *Vorhandenheit* is self-evident, the correspondence between *praxis* and *Dasein* is not entirely clear. Indeed, when considered in the light of current interpretations of the analytic of being, this correspondence appears quite unusual. Let us therefore attempt an explanation.

First, however, a further consideration should be made. That is, it must be noted that, even if the correspondence were full, what profoundly distinguishes the Heideggerian distribution from that of Aristotle is the hierarchy according to which the three modes of being are coordinated. In Aristotle, in fact, it is the character of the entity to which the theoretical attitude, the practical attitude and the poietic attitude are respectively directed that serves as the criterion for ordering them according to a scale of value; and it is precisely because of the character of its object that *theoria* is considered the lofty activity for man. In Heidegger, on the other hand, the order of value among the three distinct modes of being is not oriented to the object, but is derived from a reflection on the peculiarity of the mode of being proper to human life, to beingness, and from the assignment to the latter of ontic and ontological primacy. This peculiarity and this primacy are founded, as we intend to show, on the practical determination of being. Put differently: what we want to show is that the Heideggerian characterisation of human life in terms of being aims at grasping the fundamental ontological determination on which all other determinations of being rest, and that this fundamental determination of being is grasped from an understanding of its mode of being as a practical (- moral) mode of being.

On careful consideration, this already appears from the first and most general characterisation of being that Heidegger introduces in § 4 and then develops in § 9 of *Being and Time*. Being is here characterised in its essence as a having-to-be (*Zusein*), i.e. as that entity in which there is always something going on.

its own being, in the sense that it, whether it knows it or not, refers, indeed always has to refer, to its own being. Now, this reference of beingness to its own being is not a reference in which beingness is observed, ascertained, and described in its truth, but it is a *practical* reference, in the sense that beingness has to take on its own being, making itself responsible for it. It is not a matter of a reflexive retreat of the type of *inspectio sui*, that is, it is not a theoretical, ascertaining and truthful attitude, which turns to being in order to grasp its characters and properties in the same way that it can turn to external reality. Rather, it is a reference that, insofar as it requires a *decision* about one's being, is of an eminently practical type²⁹.

It is in the light of the understanding of this eminently practical character of being's reference to its own being that the meaning of the other fundamental determinations of being that Heidegger elaborates can be fully grasped. It can be understood first and foremost why Heidegger denotes the basic unitary determination of being as care (*Sorge*), which is precisely the fundamental mode of the unclosing (*Erschlossenheit*) of being-in-the-world and the unity of existentialities. But one also understands better why Heidegger denotes in general the being's referring to things as a taking care of (*Besorgen*) - in which the *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit* have their unitary foundation - and the being's referring to others as a having care (*Fürsorge*); This is better understood, since we now know that all these determinations of being have in common the practical character of 'care' for the reason that the very being of being has an eminently practical connotation³⁰.

Heidegger then further questions the foundation of this practical connotation of being; that is, he asks what is the basic ontological character of being on which it rests. The answer he gives to this question is that the being of being is not something merely punctiform and actual, but is a *being-possessing* that expands beyond the confines of its actuality, both in the direction of the future, in the design and actualization of its being, and in the direction of the past, in the sense that the latter is always the condition and horizon of its designing. Being-possibility is thus a 'suspended being' of being that is the

ontological dimension of its freedom, of its being-freedom-for; it is precisely because of this connotation that it is forced to take on the burden of deciding on its own being, that burden manifested in the fundamental feeling of anguish³¹.

By systematically exploiting the ontological scope of the discovery of the eminently practical character of beingness as having-to-be (which is openness, beingness-possessing and freedom), Heidegger can critique the understanding of man's being enacted by metaphysics.

The latter, in effetti, disregarding the practical character of human life, assumes as the privileged and determining perspective in knowing that of neutral observation, of ascertainment and description of a truthful type; the objectivising cognitive function - linked to the ideal of visual grasping - is absolutized as the paradigm of knowing. Now, the constative and truthful attitude that thus develops not only confers on the entity that is man the capacity to reflect all other entities in a de-subjectivised and de-prospectivised, and therefore objective and universal, knowledge; but it is also assumed as the cognitive modality for grasping and determining the being of human life itself, which would then be grasped and 'ascertained' through a reflexive withdrawal into itself. The metaphysical tradition precisely bases the ontological primacy of man on the capacity that human life has to cognitively reflect all external reality as well as itself: human life is *consciousness* and *self-consciousness*.

For Heidegger, the traditional assumption of the theoretical-observational attitude as the original and determining cognitive mode signifies a twofold misrecognition. First of all, it signifies a misrecognition of the original mode of being's relation to things, of taking care of them (*Besorgen*), which first and foremost is a dealing with them in the technical-practical disposition (*Zuhandenheit*) and which only secondarily can be an observation of them as simple presences (*Vorhandenheit*). Above all, however, it is a misrecognition of the practical-moral character of being's reference to its own being, which does not allow itself to be grasped in this peculiarity if understood according to the objectifying categories of mere observation.

From his own discovery, Heidegger derives some fundamental ontological consequences for the determination of the fundamental mode of being of human life. (1) By critiquing the insufficiently radical metaphysical distinctions of man and nature, subject and object, consciousness and world, Heidegger radically recasts the ontic and ontological primacy of being on the basis of the practical determination of being. He thus radically distinguishes the ontological constitution of being from that of other entities. (2) In characterising this constitution as a temporally determined constitution, he founds against the metaphysical primacy of the present the priority of the dimension of the future, and precisely on the basis of the consideration that it is future being that the practical disposition must take charge of, it is future being that is decided. (This being, moreover, has the character of always-being, that is, the character that Heidegger designates with the term *Jemeinigkeit*.) (3) Finally, Heidegger declares the necessity of encompassing on the basis of this discovery all the fundamental determinations of human life in their articulation and unitary connection.

What we now propose to show, is that the structure of human life that Heidegger here highlights and valorises as the ontological constitution of being, is at bottom a resumption and re-proposition of the substantial sense of that characterisation of being and of the moral life of man that Aristotle elaborates in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

This may appear curious once again, if one considers that in presenting the task of existential analytics, Heidegger criticises two traditional theses which in their original formulation are traced back to Aristotle, namely the thesis according to which the primacy of man is founded on the soul as a cognitive mirroring of being³², and the thesis that man has his essential determination in being *animal rationale*³³.

Nonetheless, beyond Heidegger's opposition to certain Aristotelian theses, especially those that have become the baggage of the Western metaphysical tradition, a reading of *Being and Time* illuminated by the consideration of the Marburg courses confirms the aforementioned hypothesis. Heidegger himself, moreover, admits to having positively appropriated

Aristotle. Thus, for example, in a footnote to § 42 of *Being and Time*, in the context of determining the being of being as cure in the light of an interpretation of the ancient fable of the *Cure*, he declares that 'the point of view adopted in the present analytical analysis of being with regard to cure revealed itself to the author in the occasion of an attempt at an interpretation of Augustinian (i.e. Greco-Christian) anthropology *with reference to the essential foundations reached in Aristotelian ontology*'¹³⁴.

The analyses carried out so far have already provided some elements for understanding the ways in which Heidegger's appropriation of the 'essential foundations' achieved in Aristotelian thought. From them, in fact, it emerges how Heidegger turns to Aristotle to seek the determinations fundamentals of life human life in alternative to the theoretical connotation given by Husserl. And the correspondence between the Aristotelian determinations of *praxis*, *poiesis* and *theoria*, and the Heideggerian distinction of the three fundamental modes of being of *Dasein*, *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit* was then highlighted. It is now possible to make a further point, from which it will become clear how Heidegger refers in particular to the Aristotelian determination of *praxis* as that mode of being in the truth of the soul which has its own finish in itself, and how he uses it in the determination of the structure of being.

Indeed, if one considers the radical distinction that Heidegger introduces on the basis of the practical determination of the being of being between the mode of being of human life and the mode of being of other entities, one can see how it corresponds in substance to what Aristotle also observes in the context of his own practical filosofia with regard to human living. According to Aristotle, in the case of human living it is not a matter of pure and simple living (*zen*), but it is a matter of *how to live*, that is, of living in the best way, of living well (*eu zen*). And this means that man is that very particular entity that has to *decide* on the ways and forms of his living, choosing the best of them. Similarly, for Heidegger, beingness is that particular entity for which its own being is at stake, i.e. that entity that must always and in any case take on the burden of deciding its own being; indeed, the *authentic* realisation of existence only occurs where beingness recognises itself in this duty of its own.

decide, which reflects the practical structure of his being, and does not flee from it, but accepts it and takes it on.

In this substantial correspondence with Aristotle, however, Heidegger makes a radical shift that must be highlighted. Aristotle in fact founds this characteristic of human life on the basis of the determination of man as *an animal rationale*, i.e. as that living being who is endowed with *logos*; precisely because he is endowed with *logos*, man is able to evaluate and decide on his own living and the ways and forms of its implementation. Heidegger, on the other hand, reverses this foundational relationship, so to speak, so that in his conception it is the *logos* that is grounded in the distinctiveness of being of being and that is interpreted as a mode of the latter's actuation, and not vice versa. The original essential determination of man therefore lies not in his being as a rational animal, but in the disposition and practical connotation of his mode of being.

Put differently: in the Aristotelian conception a determination of man as a rational animal is given, derived from theoretical considerations of an anthropological and metaphysical kind, within the horizon of which the practical-moral consideration then observes man's being and living in this determined aspect. In the Heideggerian conception, on the other hand, every determination of a theoretical kind, be it metaphysical, anthropological, or psychological, is regarded as non-original with respect to the eminently practical connotation of the being of being and is consequently bracketed and set aside in the characterization of the latter. The result is that the practical disposition that connotes the being of beingness is absolutized and radicalised to the point of becoming its fundamental ontological determination.

Therefore, the practical-moral connotation of human living given by Heidegger, despite the substantial analogy highlighted, fits into a different ontological framework and consequently takes on different values.

Thus, in Aristotle, practical consideration has to do with man as the subject of action and, as a consideration of a particular aspect of human life, it stands alongside many other possible considerations, which observe man in other respects. Therefore, as

examines living as acting, Aristotelian practical philosophy does not exhaust the consideration of the being of the entity that is man.

In Heidegger, on the other hand, the practical-moral determination is not just one determined aspect among many others, but is the fundamental connotation of being. It thus becomes the ontological determination of being, and therefore assumes an all-encompassing dimension with respect to the actualization of being, so to speak, in the sense that the practical-moral reference to one's own being is not only in the performance of determined actions or in the pursuit of determined finalities, but occurs both in performing and in not performing, both in pursuing and in not pursuing. That is, it concerns living itself in its raw nakedness. As a consequence of this, living assumes for man the character of something necessary and inescapable, in the sense that it cannot be avoided, but must be assumed in its weight.

The being-possibility of being, which is the foundation of its concrete planning, is not expressed or realised so much in the choice of determined ends and in the decision of particular actions, but before every decision and every choice, and precisely in the very fact of not being able not to choose and not being able not to decide. For the very fact of not being able to choose and not deciding is ultimately a way of choosing and deciding, i.e. a way in which the being of being is acted out.

Founded on the practical determination of the being-power, the concept of freedom also takes on a different significance in Heidegger. It does not so much mean being able to decide positively for this or that, but becomes the fundamental structure that underlies all being able to decide. Or, paradoxically put: at the basis of being able to decide lies freedom as a not being able not to decide. Freedom is then for the being that weight which, as a weight of its own being and unlike any other weight, can neither be laid down nor relieved. Precisely in the absence of all action and in the absence of all virtue, the true burden is announced in the fundamental feeling of anguish, that is to say, that burden which the being, whether it wants to or not, has to take on, and which is not so much that of individual determined actions, but that of its being and its living in its totality.

It is evident here how the Heideggerian characterisation of the structure of being-ness as a having-to-be exposes itself to existentialist interpretation. If, however, one bears in mind both the reflection on the

Aristotelian practical philosophy, from which it derives, as much as the ontological direction in which it is directed, it will be possible to avoid the danger of this reductive reading even where it becomes more insidious, namely where Heidegger enters into the heart of the analysis of being and examines care in its three fundamental articulations. In considering this central moment of Heideggerian conception, one must therefore stick even more firmly to the figure that highlighted the connection between the latter and the Aristotelian consideration of man's moral being.

It is well known that the first connotation of being that Heidegger enucleates at the beginning of his analysis of existence is that of being-in-the-world; with this determination he intends to understand the cooriginality of being and world, overcoming the Cartesian split of subject and object, of consciousness and world. Precisely insofar as it is co-original with the world, being-in-the-world is 'open', 'disclosed' with respect to the entities it encounters in the world, and this is why it is designated by Heidegger as 'openness' or 'disclosure' (*Erschlossenheit*).

Now, through a series of analyses that need not be repeated in detail here, Heidegger describes the configuration of this apertural structure that connotes the being of being. What must be carefully considered are the three fundamental moments of this structure, which are at the same time the three most important existential ones. They are the *Befindlichkeit*, i.e. the emotional situation or, as we might perhaps translate it, humour, the *Verstehen*, i.e. understanding, and the *Rede* (or also *Artikulation*), i.e. discourse³⁵.

The mere translation of these terms, however, does not allow us to grasp their meaning; on the contrary, it risks concealing it. Instead, it becomes clearer if one manages to see and grasp in them the substance of as many traditional determinations of man's being (particularly as a subject of action), which Heidegger rethinks and reformulates, radically transforming them within the ontological framework he elaborates. Thus, *Befindlichkeit* can be made to correspond to what is traditionally the moment of the subject's passivity and receptivity; in *Verstehen* can be seen the moment of spontaneity and activity; both are then articulated according to the modes of discourse (*Rede*). Moreover, at least with regard to the first two

determinations, it is possible to find in them remote Aristotelian ascendants. Let us then take a closer look at how Heidegger conceives them.

In the *Befindlichkeit* he says that beingness is disclosed in its having-to-be, it is placed before its 'that there is and that it has to be', and precisely in that way that hides from it 'its whence and where', and which Heidegger designates as its being-thrown (*Geworfenheit*). Moreover, *Befindlichkeit* opens up being-ness as being-in-the-world in its totality (as Heidegger shows through his analysis of the phenomenon of depression). Finally, to the *Befindlichkeit* is "connected an opening assignment to the world in which we can encounter that which procures affions"³⁶.

What Heidegger wants to highlight with this characterisation of *Befindlichkeit* is that human life is not only expressed and constituted in the active and pure moments of spontaneity and rationality, but also in those turbid moments that are traditionally understood as passions and that he understands precisely in terms of *Befindlichkeit*. And this explication, recognition and constitution of human life in the 'passions' also confirms the discovery made by Heidegger with the aid of Aristotelian practical philosophy, namely the discovery that the fundamental determination of being is an eminently practical determination. If we then consider that it is precisely in this context that Heidegger refers to the Aristotelian doctrine of *pathe*³⁷, it is not far-fetched to think that in the determination of *Befindlichkeit* as a fundamental connotation of being Heidegger appropriates this Aristotelian doctrine, detaching it from the context in which Aristotle presents it in Book II of the *Rhetoric* and transforming it into an ontological sense. Finally, the fact that *Befindlichkeit* has its foundation in the structure of being as *Sorge*, and that in Aristotle the *pathe* moves the soul of man insofar as it is appetitive, that is, insofar as it is structured as *orexis*, suggests a further unsuspected correspondence, that is, between *Sorge* and *orexis*.

As for the determination of understanding (*Verstehen*), it represents, as mentioned above, the spontaneous and active moment of beingness, the productivity of its being-possibility. Heidegger says that 'understanding is the existential being of beingness itself, and it is siffatto that this being reveals to itself how things are about

of the being that is proper to it'³⁸. (38) This affirmation contains a twofold indication: firstly, it means that understanding - despite what the term, especially in Italian, might lead one to think - is that spontaneous and productive moment thanks to which beingness plans and implements its own being, that is, refers to it in that practical disposition that has been brought to light. Secondly, it means that this moment is accompanied by knowledge, in the sense that in the practical self-reference to its own being, beingness constitutes its self-awareness, its 'self-consciousness'. This is why Heidegger says that beingness has in this practical determination its own transparency (*Durchsicht*), that is, it 'sees' through itself and constitutes itself in this 'seeing' as identical. Understanding is thus also to be understood as an eminently practical connotation of beingness. In a passage from the summer semester course of 1927, in which Heidegger deals with the problem of *Verstehen*, he says very explicitly that it is 'the true and proper sense of acting'³⁹. This then allows us to hazard the hypothesis that in the *Verstehen* lies a re-comprehension of the Aristotelian determination of the *nous praktikos*. In fact, just as in the Aristotelian theory of acting the *nous praktikos* represents the complementary moment with respect to *orexis*, so too in Heidegger understanding is the complementary determination with respect to *Befindlichkeit*; it is the pure and spontaneous design to which corresponds the opaque and passive foundation of the situationality from which it moves and to which it always remains bound.

Heidegger, moreover, roots *Verstehen* - which is expressed and articulated as *Besorgen* in reference to things, as *Fürsorge* in reference to others, and as *Worumwillen* in reference to himself - in the foundation of care, in the same way that he had previously rooted *Befindlichkeit* in it. Thus, in care (*Sorge*) the moments of *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* are brought back to their unitary foundation, that is, to that original practical determination that connotes the apertural character of being-in-the-world.

Now, in determining how this original unity of passive and active moments, of receptivity and spontaneity, of appetitiveness and rationality, arises, Heidegger can be said to repropose and reformulate the same problem that Aristotle first identifies when he says that

Man is both *nous praktikos* and *orexis dianoetike*⁴⁰. The correspondence between care as the fundamental determination of the openness of being-in-the-world and the practical determination of man given by Aristotle is thus complete.

Heidegger, of course, insists on differences. He claims for his own determination of care a deeper ontological level than that achieved by Aristotelian categories, asserting that care is ontologically prior to the distinction of *praxis* and *theoria*.

"Care, as a unitary structural totality, is situated, by its existential apriority, 'before' every 'behaviour' and every 'situation' of being (i.e. *within* each of them). Care, moreover, does not introduce the primacy of 'practical' behaviour over theoretical behaviour. The purely intuitive determination of a simple presence has the character of care no less than 'political action' or mere recreational enjoyment. 'Theory' and 'praxis' are possibilities of the being of an entity whose being must be determined as care⁴¹.

Of course, Heidegger can claim this difference, due to the fact that he does not see in care a particular attitude of being, whether theoretical, practical or poetic, but rather the unitary foundation that makes these different attitudes possible. The fact remains, however, that in specifying the fundamental characteristics of this unitary foundation that is care he resorts to determinations drawn substantially from Aristotelian practical philosophy. And the fact that he repeatedly feels the need to distance himself from an interpretation of care in this sense, rather than dispel it, finds to confirm the suspicion that this is the right direction in which to look.

Thus, when Heidegger tells us that 'the attempt to conceive of the phenomenon of care, and of its strict unity, on the model of particular acts or tendencies, such as wanting, desiring, impulse or inclination'⁴² is also doomed to failure, he actually provides us with the thematic referents to which to think in order to understand care. The same is true when he asserts: "Wanting and desiring, ontologically, are necessarily rooted in the being as care and are not mere lived experiences, ontologically indifferent and immersed in a 'current' that is completely indeterminate as to the meaning of its being. The same

of inclination and impulse. They too, insofar as they are found in pure form in being, are founded in care⁴³. In asserting this, Heidegger evidently intends to emphasise the greater radicality of his own conception and to affirm the ontological anteriority of care with respect to the other named determinations. But this differentiation between the ontological level of care and that of the other determinations is necessary precisely because care is thematically homogeneous with respect to them. And, moreover, it is precisely this homogeneity in thematic substance that makes it the unitary ontological foundation of them.

This homogeneity between care and the traditional determinations of *orexis*, impulse and inclination is particularly evident in Heidegger's treatment of the phenomenon of care during the summer semester of 1925. There, in fact, Heidegger illustrates the phenomenon of care precisely in relation to the moments of impulse (*Drang*) and inclination (*Hang*), showing that he considers the latter as an explication of the structure of *Sorge* itself. Regardless of the ontological distinction that Heidegger emphasises, this reaffirms the hypothesised correspondence between care (and its manifestation in the phenomena of *Drang* and *Hang*) and the articulation of *orexis* in the two moments of *dioxis* and *phyge* (*Eth. Nic.* VI, 2, 1139 a 21-23)⁽⁴⁴⁾.

In the light of all these considerations that highlight the thematic connection and correspondence between the Heideggerian analysis of being and the Aristotelian consideration of man's moral action, it is then also understandable why, as Gadamer recalled, when faced with the difficulty of translating the term *phronesis* Heidegger could exclaim: "Das ist das Gewissen!"⁴⁵. He was evidently thinking of the self-determination of consciousness (*Gewissen*), in which the having-to-be, i.e. the structural practical disposition of beingness, manifests itself to itself. A re-reading in this perspective of §§ 54-60 of *Being and Time*, in which the "being's attestation of an authentic beingness and decision" is discussed, can highlight how in deriving his own determination of consciousness Heidegger also turns to Aristotle, and precisely to the structure of that practical knowledge that Aristotle designates by the term *phronesis*. Here too, however, it should be noted that while the

phronesis concerns man's being and moral action, consciousness becomes for Heidegger an ontological connotation of being, a determination of his being.

Now, in that series of analyses of everyday life that the existentialist season misunderstood, but at the same time made famous, Heidegger shows how, by reason of its own structure of having-to-be, in which it has to take charge of its own being, being finds itself disoriented and tends for the most part, in its everyday attitude, to free itself of this load; It then actuates its being not from itself, but according to those modes that the everyday impersonality of *Si (Man)* prefigures and makes available to it, and that it, inauthentically, assumes. This disorientation (*Unheimlichkeit*) and this tendency that Heidegger calls dejection (*Verfallen*) are innate in being, precisely because that practical self-determination that connotes it in its very structure is not something that can be evaded, but is the necessary consequence of its mode of being.

Consciousness, in particular the willingness to listen to consciousness that Heidegger calls the willingness-to-have-consciousness, then represents for beingness the possibility of freeing itself from the impersonal and inauthentic forms of *Yes*, insofar as in it beingness is placed before its own self. Heidegger says that 'consciousness reveals itself as an *attestation* of the being of beingness, in which being is called before its most original beingness'⁴⁶. And if, by virtue of the call of consciousness, beingness frees itself from the blandishments of everyday impersonality and takes directly upon itself the weight of the determination of its own being, it then lies in authenticity. Consciousness thus calls the being to decide for its own having-to-be, to choose for its own authentic being, and directs it towards authenticity.

The correspondence between *Gewissen* and *phronesis* that Heidegger notes does not then appear entirely unjustified. Indeed, just as conscience orients being towards the authenticity of choosing oneself, so *phronesis* represents in Aristotle the practical knowledge capable of guiding man's actions and choices in a morally good sense, directing him towards living well, towards the best form of life. Moreover, this correspondence is

confirmed by the analysis of a further determination essentially linked to consciousness, namely decision.

The decision (*Entschlossenheit*) is that structural disposition in which the being is insofar as it wants to have consciousness, insofar as it listens to the call of consciousness and *chooses* itself, taking charge of its own being. It can now be observed that just as consciousness corresponds to *phronesis*, so too the decision has its counterpart in the Aristotelian determination of *prohairesis*; for just as in Aristotle having *phronesis*, i.e. being *phronimos*, determines the morally good character of *prohairesis*, similarly in Heidegger the will-to-have-consciousness disposes beingness to that decision for authenticity in which it chooses to be itself. Furthermore, Heidegger asserts that the decision is always relative to the existential phenomenon of the *situation*, just as for Aristotle practical wisdom is knowledge of *kairos*⁴⁷.

The fundamental difference from Aristotle is that Heidegger elevates these practical determinations to ontological connotations of man's very being. That is to say, for Heidegger, *Gewissen* and *Entschlossenheit* are not, as it were, the fruit of a *hexis* productively and positively achieved by a moral subject, but are ontological structures that connote the very finitude of being itself of beingness, which exists only on the foundation of a being-givenness that it does not itself posit. This is why Heidegger says of consciousness that it is "an *attestation* of the beingness of beingness, in which beingness is called before its being-ness more original"⁴⁸. And this is why he says of the decision that it is "the authentic openness, attested in being itself by its consciousness, that is, *the tacit and anguished self-determination in the most proper being-guilty*"⁴⁹. This is why, in finally, Heidegger can insist on the difference between the ontological character of his own determinations and the practical-moral character of traditional determinations. He can thus affirm: 'The phenomenon we have analysed under the name of decision cannot be compared to an empty *'habitus'* or an indeterminate *'velleity'*'. The decision does not merely represent a situation by becoming aware of it, but has already settled into it. Insofar as it is decided, being already *acts*. We deliberately avoid the term *'act'*. For it should again be understood so broadly as to encompass both the activity and the passivity of resistance; moreover

It favours the ontological misunderstanding of beingness, as if the decision were a particular behaviour of the practical faculty, as opposed to the theoretical faculty. But care (...) encompasses the being of being in such an original and global way that it, as a totality, must be presupposed in any division of behaviour into practical and theoretical (...)''⁵⁰.

As before, here too Heidegger's clarification puts us on the right track. For while it is true that it makes us realise the difference between the ontological level of Heideggerian analysis and the practical-moral level of Aristotelian enquiry, it at the same time unequivocally reveals that the ontological determinations given by Heidegger are derived from an ontological radicalisation and absolutization of Aristotle's practical-moral determinations and that, therefore, there is a substantial thematic homogeneity between the two.

In general, then, with regard to the whole series of unsuspected correspondences that have been noted and highlighted, the following can be observed: if, on the one hand, in his intention to oppose the unilateral Husserlian determination of the subject on the basis of categories derived from *theoria*, Heidegger finds in Aristotelian practical filosofia the elaboration of the original determinations of human living, on the other hand he extrapolates these determinations from the context of the theory of moral action and absolutizes them, making them the fundamental ontological determinations of being.

It is precisely because of this absolutization, which leads him to conceive and formulate the central problem of his own philosophising in a clear-cut and decisive manner, that Heidegger develops a critical attitude towards Aristotelian thought regarding the problem of the 'subject', an attitude that matches and confirms the distancing that became necessary at the end of the debate on the problem of truth.

In effetti, the absolutization and radicalisation in an ontological sense of the practical determinations of human life does not only lead to the enucleation and thematic connotation of the various existentialities, but also to the grasping of the *unitary ontological structure* of being that underlies them, that is to say, to the grasping of that structure that is represented, as we know, by care in its character

temporal, or from original temporality (so designated to distinguish it from temporality understood naturalistically). In Aristotelian thought, on the other hand, from which the eminently practical sense of the conscious reference of human life to itself, of the relation of being to its own being, is drawn, the problem of man's unitary mode of being would not have been posed with sufficient radicality. For Heidegger, in short, Aristotle would have provided an ingenious 'phenomenology' of the fundamental determinations of human life (*theoria, poiesis, praxis*, and all the others that have been named and appropriated by Heidegger), without, however, explicitly posing the problem of their fundamental unity.

And the reason for this omission lies, according to Heidegger, in the fundamental presupposition that underlies Aristotelian thought and that had already conditioned its interpretation of the phenomenon of truth, namely the presupposition of a certain understanding of time and a certain understanding of being, in which the connection of being and time is not grasped in its full extent. And precisely because Aristotle would remain bound to a naturalistic conception of time, he would not arrive at the grasp of original temporality as the fundamental unity of the determinations of human life. Let us see, then, how Heidegger addresses the problem of temporality.

4. The problem of temporality

In order to understand Heidegger's approach to the problem of temporality - in particular to understand correctly the Heideggerian conception of original temporality as the structure of human life itself in opposition to the naturalistic conception of time - it is important to bear in mind that already in the first Fribourg courses Heidegger had examined and emphasised the differences between the 'chronological' understanding of time proper to the Greeks and the 'kairological' experience of time typical of early Christianity. He had illustrated, above all, how in the latter, in relation to the expectation of Christ and in relation to the fact that one must be prepared for this coming (since, as St. Paul recalls, he will come "like a thief in the night"), a veritable revolution is produced in the understanding of the temporal character of human existence⁵¹.

Precisely by moving from a filosofic consideration of this Christian experience of the temporal character of existence - but seeking, at least initially, to recover in a positive way the determination of *kairos* that Aristotle provides in the context of his own practical philosophy - Heidegger progressively matures the conviction that temporality itself is the fundamental unitary structure of human life⁵². And because of the maturing of this conviction he also progressively distances himself from those understandings of time that do not focus on the temporal character of existence, but rather on the objective and natural determinations of time.

The first direct mention of the Aristotelian understanding of time to be found in Heidegger's texts published to date is clearly made within this critical horizon. This mention is found in the course of the winter semester of 1925/26, during which, as has already been noted, Heidegger interrupts the interpretation of Aristotle that he had begun and dedicates himself to Kant, because he believes he can see in him the grasping of the connection of subjectivity and temporality (and consequently also a thematisation of the connection of being and time)⁵³.

In the context of this interpretation of Kant is a first critique of the Aristotelian conception of time. In illustrating the centrality of the problem of time in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger makes an *excursus* on the understanding of time in Hegel and Bergson, to show how both remain substantially within the horizon traced by Aristotle. But this horizon is for Heidegger the horizon of a non-original, but naturalistic understanding of time. Thus, with respect to Kant, who for Heidegger breaks this horizon and comes to grasp the connection of temporality and subjectivity, i.e. understands the essentially temporal structure of the finite subject, Hegel and Bergson represent a regress, precisely because they return to the Aristotelian understanding of time, which is a naturalistic understanding. This same criticism will be taken up and re-expressed by Heidegger also in *Being and Time*, and precisely in § 82 and in a discussed footnote to this paragraph, where he wants to show precisely Hegel's dependence on the Aristotelian conception of time even in the terminology⁵⁴.

But the most articulate critical confrontation with the Aristotelian conception of time is found in the course of the summer semester of 1927, now published under the title *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*⁵⁵. This course, which is illuminating for Heidegger's confrontation with tradition, contains a detailed interpretation of the five chapters of the *Physics* devoted to the problem of time. In order to comprehensively embrace the horizon in which the problem of temporality and the interpretation of the Aristotelian conception are affronted here, it is appropriate to consider how Heidegger develops in this course the problematic of being and its connection to time from an analysis of certain traditional theses on being, which are that of Kant, that of medieval ontology (referring to Aristotle), that of modern ontology and that of classical logic. In particular, Heidegger shows how each of these theses is connected with an interpretation of man's fundamental attitudes towards being, and how the structure of the intentional attitude considered determinant conditions the respective understanding of being.

(1)

Heidegger first examines the Kantian thesis that being (*Sein*) in the sense of existence (*Dasein*) is not a real predicate. This thesis, which as is well known represents one of the most debated points of Kantian thought, is interpreted by Heidegger by understanding the Kantian term *real* in the scholastic sense of *realitas*, as it is fixed above all in Suarez (who, as is well known, has a great influence on German thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). *Realitas* and *Realität* do not signify 'external reality' in this sense, but signify the determination and characterisation of the being of *res*, they signify a *Sachbestimmung*; and according to Heidegger, precisely for this reason, i.e. because he understands *Realität* in this sense of *realitas*, Kant counts the category of *Realität* among the categories of quality (*Realität, Negation, Limitation*) and not among those of modality (*Möglichkeit, Wirklichkeit, Notwendigkeit*).

To say, then, that being in the sense of existing is not a real predicate means, according to this interpretation, that by attributing an existence (an 'external reality') to something we are not adding to this something any

qualitative determination. Now, this not only tells us what Kant means by reality, but also enlightens us about his understanding of being in the sense of the existence of 'external reality'. And through an interpretation of the Kantian concept of *Wirklichkeit*, of which it will be sufficient here to report only the outcome, Heidegger arrives at the result that for Kant being in the sense of the existence of external reality has the significant of 'absolute position', and precisely of absolute position with respect to perception, which is in him the intentional attitude of the subject implicitly considered as determinant⁵⁶.

(2)

Subsequently, Heidegger discusses the thesis held generally in medieval thought, but dating back to Aristotle, according to which the ontological constitution of the entity comprises the two fundamental moments of *essentia* and *existentia*; in particular, Heidegger examines the different meanings given to these two terms and the problem of their distinction (*distinctio*) and their connection (*complicatio*) in the *ens creatum*. There are three main conceptions that Heidegger considers: that of Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist school, according to which this distinction is to be understood in the sense of a *distinctio realis*; that of Duns Scotus and the Scotist school, who understand it instead as a *distinctio modalis*; and finally that of Suarez, for whom the distinction is a *distinctio rationis*.

Beginning with a discussion of these three conceptions, Heidegger then goes back to the Greek origins of this distinction, to show the rootedness of medieval ontology in Greek thought, and then advances to Kant, to show how Kantian metaphysics depends on scholastic ontology.

This reconstruction in brief of the history of the distinction of *essentia* and *existentia*, which starts from medieval ontology, goes back to the Greeks and arrives at Kant, is done by Heidegger with the intention of understanding what understanding of being is implied in this distinction, and what man's intentional attitude it must presuppose as the determining attitude. The result that Heidegger arrives at - among other things through an interpretation of Plato that preludes to the

subsequent to the myth of the cave⁵⁷- is that the attitude considered as decisive is the productive attitude, the technical-practical attitude, in which a preliminary distinction of the essence (in the sense of form and model) from the moment of its realisation is required, that is, the conferring on it of an existence in the material⁵⁸.

(3)

Thirdly, Heidegger examines the thesis of modern ontology, according to which the two fundamental modes of being are the being of nature (*res extensa*) and the being of spirit (*res cogitans*). Heidegger's preferred term of reference for discussing the idea of being in modern ontology is again Kant, since Kant stands between the beginning (Descartes) and the completion (Hegel) of the latter and is the key to its development between rationalism and idealism. Now, as the fundamental determination within the horizon of which modern ontology comprises the problem of being and that of subjectivity, Heidegger examines how Kant understands and determines the structure of the subject. In particular, he illustrates Kant's determinations of *personalitas transcendentalis* (the self of apperception), *personalitas empirica* (the self of apprehension) and *personalitas moralis* (the self as a person and as fine in itself), seeing in Kant's understanding of the subject an implicit and almost unconscious grasp of the temporal structure of human life. Although Kant does not go so far as to explicitly thematise the subject's mode of being in this sense, he nevertheless comes to give it a determination, that of person and fine-in-itself, which is very close to grasping it in its specific ontological character. And yet, even the Kantian understanding remains unsatisfactory in Heidegger's eyes, because in it the Cartesian split of being into *res cogitans* and *res extensa* remains at bottom. Moreover, according to Heidegger, the Kantian understanding of the subject as finite substance implicitly refers back to an understanding of being in the sense of being-produced, since for Kant '*finitude* is the *necessary dependence on receptivity*, that is, it is the *impossibility of being by itself the author and producer of another being*. Only he who is the author of another being knows it in its true and proper being. The being of things is understood as being-product'⁵⁹.

(4)

Finally, Heidegger considers the thesis of classical logic, according to which being can be expressed in the plurivocal function of the copula. Referring to four exemplary conceptions of the copula, that of Aristotle, that of Hobbes, that of J.S. Mill and that of Lotze, Heidegger distinguishes the possible significations of the copula and the understandings of being that they imply: '*First*: being in the sense of 'is' does not have a signification in its own right. This is the old Aristotelian thesis: *proxeminei synthesin tina*, it has a significant only in the thought it connects. *Second*: this being signifies according to Hobbes the being cause of the linkability of subject and predicate. *Third*: being signifies the 'what is' (*Was-sein*), the *esse essentiae*. *Fourth*: being in so-called nominal propositions is equivalent to 'significating', or means existing in the sense of present being (*Vorhandensein*), *esse existentiae* (Mill). *Fifth*: being means the being-true or false implicitly expressed in every judgement. *Sixth*: being-true - and with this we return to Aristotle - expresses an entity that is only in thought, but not in things'⁶⁰.

In Heidegger's intentions, the treatment of these four theses traditional on being must clear the ground for a radical re-proposition of the problem of being. Indeed, it puts on the table what Heidegger considers the four fundamental ontological problems:

"firstly, the problem of *ontological* difference, of the difference of being and beingness; secondly, the problem of the *fundamental articulation of being*, the contents of beingness and the mode of being of beingness; thirdly, the problem of the *possible modifications of being* and of the *unity of the concept of being* in its multiplicity; fourthly, the problem of the character of *truth of being*"⁶¹.

Now, the treatment of these fundamental ontological problems - which are part of the set of questions that Heidegger should have addressed in the unpublished part of *Being and Time* - explicitly requires the thematisation of the connection of being with time. In particular, this thematisation, with the introduction of the consideration of time, must be able to lead to the grasping of the ontological difference, which is the most difficult problem and the one that Heidegger holds most dear. And this is

possible, in the plan that Heidegger presents here⁶², in a progression that

involves four consecutive steps. First, it is a matter of examining time and temporality in their essential characterisation in both the common understanding and the 'existential' understanding. In a next step it is then a matter of distinguishing temporality as the structure of being (*Zeitlichkeit*) from temporality as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being itself (*Temporalität*). A third step can then lead the analysis to connect being and temporality. Finally, in the light of grasping this connection, it will be possible to thematise ontological difference.

What is of interest here and needs to be examined is the detailed interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of time that Heidegger carries out in the execution of the first step of this programme, i.e. within the framework of the analysis of time and temporality in the common understanding. The intention Heidegger pursues is to 'penetrate through the common understanding of time to the (original) temporality, in which the ontological constitution of being is rooted and to which time understood in the common sense belongs'⁶³.

Now, in the analysis of the common understanding of time, Heidegger focuses on the Aristotelian treatment, since, as he explicitly points out, the latter represents the earliest and most radical filosofic codification of the common experience of time, and virtually all the main filosofic treatments of the phenomenon (Plotinus, Simplicio, Augustine, Suarez, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and Bergson) depend on it. As Heidegger himself asserts, "it can be said that afterwards we have not essentially gone beyond the stage of the Aristotelian treatment of the problem, apart from a few, few exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless fundamentally maintain the Aristotelian concept of time"⁶⁴.

Thus, at the beginning of the second part of the 1927 summer semester course,

Heidegger sets out to interpret those five chapters of the *Physics* (IV, 10, 217 b 29 - 14, 224 b 17) in which Aristotle expounds his conception of time⁶⁵. Since Heidegger first summarises the content of the Aristotelian text chapter by chapter, taking care to focus on the fundamental aporias presented there, it is

It is interesting to first see - on the basis of this synopsis - the problems that Heidegger considers important and which he deals with.

(1)

In the first chapter of Aristotle's treatment of time (*Phys.* IV, 10), the problem is set out in two fundamental directions, namely on the one hand in the direction of grasping the mode of being of time, and on the other in the direction of determining its essence. Corresponding to this are two fundamental aporias: (a) the first is whether time belongs to the entity or to the non-entity (*poteron ton onton estin e ton me onton*, 217 b 31), whether it presents itself as such in itself, or whether it appears instead as a property of another entity; (b) the second aporia concerns its nature (*tis he physis hautou*, 217 b 32).

Regarding the first question, Heidegger points out how Aristotle arranges the aporia in such a way that the answer must at first appear negative; since time cannot appear as an entity in the sense of substance, since the parts that constitute it are not: the past, in fact, is no longer and the future is not yet. On the other hand, neither does the present appear to be able to be considered as an entity: for it cannot contain the multiplicity of instants, of 'nows' (*nyn*), that should constitute it, because each instant is always determined in its singularity as 'this here' (and the instant that preceded it is a now-not-now, and the one that will follow it a now-not-yet). Moreover, the instant that is present is never the same, but always another.

Heidegger then goes on to sift through the Aristotelian discussion of the views of predecessors, emphasising the importance for Aristotle of historiographical consideration in the theoretical discussion of aporias. The two opinions recalled are first of all that of those who identified time with the movement of the universe (*he tou holou kinesis*, 218 a 33), i.e. - as Heidegger translates - 'das Ganze des Seienden, das sich bewegt'¹⁶⁶, and then that of those who hold that time is the sphere itself (*he sphaira aute*, 218 b 1).

In spite of Aristotle's assessment of these views, Heidegger seeks to highlight their foundation of meaning. Thus, he emphasises how the idea that time is the movement of the universe

is not arbitrary, but has its roots in myth. He also points out that the view that time is the celestial sphere itself is based on the consideration that since all things are in time and are also within the celestial sphere, then the celestial sphere and time coincide.

Moreover, beyond their foundation of meaning in myth, what is important in these views is the idea, which they have in common, that time is a certain movement (*kinesis tis*) or a certain change (*metabole tis*). But while movement and change are always in *the* body itself that is moving or changing (*en autoi toi kinoumenoi*), time on the other hand is equally everywhere and at all things (*ho de chronos homoios kai pantachou kai para pasin*, 218 b 13). With this consideration the fundamental distinction of time and motion is drawn: time is not motion, even though it does not exist without motion (*oute kinesis, oute aneu kinesis*, 219 a 1). Time is therefore something closely related to movement, it is something of movement, a property of movement; and the problem will therefore be to know what property, what of movement is time (*ti tes kineseos estin*, 219 a 3).

(2)

Leaving aside the many questions that Aristotle emphasises in the second chapter (*Phys. IV, 11*) of his treatment of time, Heidegger offers above all on what is the fundamental assertion of the entire Aristotelian theory of time, namely on the famous definition, according to which time is the number of movement according to before and after (*touto gar estin ho chronos, arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai hysteron*, 219 b 1-2). Among the problems that this definition raises and that Heidegger notes, there is first of all that of showing how the experience of movement implies the experience of time, and then there is that of determining the concept of number and that of instant.

(3)

In the next chapter (*Phys. IV, 12*), a concept that in Heidegger's eyes is fundamental is introduced and determined, namely the concept of being-in-time (*to en chronoi einai*), rendered by the German term *Innerzeitigkeit*. The explanation that Aristotle gives of it, saying that it is in time that whose existence is measured with time, is fundamental to

understand the connection between movement and time, since not only movement, which is in time, is measured by it, but also time itself is measured by movement. In connection with the determination of the concept of 'intratemporality' other fundamental questions are posed, of which Heidegger emphasises above all that of the relationship between number and time, between time and stillness, in finally that of the relationship between time in its three dimensions and that which lies outside it, that which is extratemporal.

(4)

The central problem of the penultimate chapter (*Phys.* IV, 13) is, according to Heidegger, that of the unity of time in the multiplicity of the succession of instants, of the 'now', that is, the problem of understanding how the instant, the now (*to nyn*), as the elementary unity to which all temporal determinations must be traced, can constitute the foundation of the continuity (*synecheia*) of time. In this context, the determinations of the *ede*, *arti*, *palai* and *exaiphnes* are also specified.

(5)

Among the problems in the last chapter of Aristotle's treatment of time (*Phys.* IV, 14), Heidegger at first of all addresses that of the determination of before (*proteron*) and after (*hysteron*), whose function in the definition of time is decisive. Next comes the question of where time is and how it is (a question that is also taken up in Book VIII, where time is connected with celestial movement and the *nous*). And in answering this question one arrives at a further problem, which for Heidegger is fundamental, namely the problem of the dependence of time on the soul, in the sense that, as will be seen, if time is the number of movement, it can only exist if one admits the existence of a numerant, and that numerant is the soul; and for Heidegger it is then a matter of grasping the fundamental ontological determination of the soul, on the basis of which alone it is possible to understand what it means to say that time is in the soul. The solution to these problems is, according to Heidegger, closely connected with the determination of the concept of intratemporality (*Innerzeitigkeit*) and with the answer to the aporia raised already in Chapter X on the

ontological location of time. And since for Aristotle, time is a certain property of motion and is measured by reason of motion, in order to resolve the question of the ontological 'place' of time, it is necessary to find that motion upon which time is originally measured. And that movement is the revolution (*kyklophoria*) of the first celestial sphere.

Having thus put on the table the main problems that the Aristotelian treatment of time presents, Heidegger concentrates on the interpretation of the definition according to which time is the number of movement according to before and after. In doing so, he strives to bring out the deep speculative dynamic that animates the Aristotelian treatment of the problem and unites the various questions raised in a unified file. Heidegger's interpretative strategy unfolds in several stages, the sequence of which it is opportune to give here: (1) It is first of all a question of determining the phenomenon of time in relation to the phenomena with which it is closely connected in a relationship of *akolouthein*, and which are movement (*kinesis* or *metabole*), dimensionality (*megethos*) and continuity (*synecheia*). (2) Next we need to consider the analogies and disanalogies between time and space, distinguishing in particular the instant (*nyn*) from the point (*stigma*) by the character of passage (*ek tinos eis ti*) that the former possesses and the latter does not, and by the character of limitation that pertains to the latter and not to the former. (3) It is then necessary to understand the determination of number, both by distinguishing between the numbered and the numbering, and by considering that while the point as limit belongs to the being of that which it delimits (i.e. it has the same characteristics as it does), the instant - through which the movement is numbered, obtaining time - insofar as it is not limit is not part of the being of the movement. Consequently, time as the number of movement can only be certainly experienced on the basis of movement, but it does not have the being of movement. (4) Lastly, it is a question of specifying the relationship between numbered and numbering, and more precisely between time as the numbering of movement and the soul as that which numbers it.

But let us proceed along the lines of the Heideggerian interpretation. It is then first of all to understand what it means that time is something proper to movement and that we experience it when we follow a body in motion; since, at first sight, this does not

seems quite obvious. Just consider, as Heidegger notes, a concrete example, a hand moving from left to right by rotating on one of its ends.

If, in observing this moving body, we ask ourselves where time is and where it can be found, we must first of all note that it is certainly not a property of the hand, nor its colour, nor its extension, nor its corporeity, nor its point (should we think of it as a line). And, in effetti, Aristotle does not say that time is a property of the *body* in motion, but a property of *motion* itself. And it is by looking at the latter as such that time can be grasped.

However, Heidegger continues, even then the difficulties do not seem to have been overcome, since we can follow the movement of the hand - which is a local movement - by observing its passage from one position to another, without, however, with this we have yet grasped time. If we then stop the movement of the hand, we say that the hand stands still, but that time continues to pass. It would then appear that time is not related to movement and does not depend on it.

Aristotle, in fact, does not say that time is movement (*kinesis*), but something of movement (*kineseos ti*). And we must then see how and according to what modalities time manifests itself in movement, of which it must be a property. Now, observing that in its movement the hand passes through each of the places on its path in a given time, we can say that movement happens in time, i.e. that it is intratemporal. But, Heidegger asks, if time manifests itself in movement as movement happens within time, what then is time? Is it a kind of container that encompasses movement and which movement, so to speak, always carries? And if the hand stops, if movement stops, then does time also stop with it? Is there time in stillness?

If we hold fast to the idea that time is a property of motion, as Aristotle says, it would seem that with the cessation of motion, the passing of time must also cease. Yet we say that the hand has *stood still for a certain time*. But, again, Aristotle does not merely say, in an indeterminate way, that time is something of movement,

but indicates precisely what it is of the movement. This what the number is.

But even this clarification does not seem to clear the field of all difficulties. It is strange, in fact, Heidegger observes, that time is determined on the basis of number, which as such is considered as something beyond time, something timeless, independent of time. It is true that Aristotle says that time is number in the sense of numbered (*arithmoumenon*); but, taking the example of the hand, what is it about its movement that is numbered? Since the hand moves according to a local motion, we can evidently number the individual places, the individual points, through which it passes in its movement.

However, even if we numbered all the places and points through which it passes in its movement, we would still not grasp time, because the sum of these places or points does not result in time, but in the path taken by the hand, i.e. it does not give a temporal determination, but a spatial one.

We could then count the speed of the pointer according to the formula that fixes indicate to us ($c = s:t$), i.e. by dividing the distance covered by the time taken to cover it. But in this way we could at most see that even in the determination of speed, time is involved in some way, without this being able to be determined more precisely. On the contrary, Heidegger points out how the fixed formula, instead of dissipating, seems to aggravate the difficulties; for it is curious that movements *take up* time, without time being consumed by this employment: if we in fact think that in a given period of time a certain number of movements take place, and if we then think that in the same period of time a double number of movements take place, the time 'employed' will not have changed, but will remain the same, as if, contrary to what has been said so far, time did not depend on the number of movements.

We do not find what time is,' Heidegger asserts, 'not even if we mark each point in the path of the hand with a number and in the passing of the hand we find the numbering of its movement. Yet,' Heidegger continues, 'when we take the watch out of our pocket,

on the dial of which the path of the hand is marked by numbers, and we follow the movement of the hand, we say that the hand tells us the time. We say we read time by the movement of the watch hand and the numbers that mark it. We say that the clock measures time and indicates it to us.

But beyond our everyday use of it, even the measurement of time by the clock does not actually tell us what time is in itself, it does not let us know where it is, what its ontological location is. Obviously, it will be said, such a location is not in the clock, even though in the natural everyday attitude it is precisely from the clock that we derive the indication of time, just as at one time - before there were clocks - it was derived from measuring the movement of the sun. But where then is time? Where is its 'place', if it always appears and is experienced where we follow the movement of a body, without it ever being where the body in motion itself is?

If, in saying that time is the number of movement, Aristotle grasps a fundamental truth of the common experience of time, the genius of his definition lies, for Heidegger, in the fact that it also defines the horizon within which we can derive an indication of a temporal character from the numeration of movement; that is, the Aristotelian definition of time indicates the preconceptions within which we must consider movement (of the sun or of the hands of the clock) if we wish to derive an indication of time from it. This sought-after horizon is defined by the determinations of *before and after*: we experience time when we follow a movement and number it in relation to before and after.

However, Heidegger again objects, before and after are already temporal determinations. To say, then, that time is the number of the movement according to the before and after is equivalent to saying that time is time. And the Aristotelian definition then seems to be infixed by the vice of a *petitio principii*, it seems to be a tautology.

However, the tautology and the *petitio principii* are only apparent, and once this appearance is dissolved, the depth of the Aristotelian definition becomes transparent again. The solution to tautology lies for Heidegger in the fact that the determinations of before and after, employed

in defining, designate a temporal dimension different from that indicated by the time that is the subject of defining; that is, the temporality to which the before and after refer is something more original than the time that is to be defined. The apparent tautology, then, would indicate that the phenomenon of time (the subject to be defined) can only be understood from the determination of a more original temporality (indicated by the before and after). Now, according to Heidegger, this more original temporality, in which the common experience of time is founded, is the temporality of the soul, it is the original temporal structure of being.

Thus, the apparent tautology that threatens the Aristotelian definition of time with inconsistency, in reality reveals itself to be an indication of a fundamental instance, namely the search for the principle, the *petere principium* in the positive sense, in such a way that the phenomenon of time, as it is commonly experienced, can be adequately founded and interpreted with reference to the principle that original temporality represents. And even in general, the apparent point-by-point questioning of the Aristotelian determination of time that Heidegger undertakes does not so much aim at a critique as at highlighting how in its genius and depth the Aristotelian definition responds to fundamental aporias emerging from the natural understanding of time and leads through their solution to a filosofic understanding of the phenomenon.

Before turning now to the analysis of original temporality, it is appropriate to sofftdiscuss some as yet unexplained aspects of the Aristotelian conception of time, namely the determination of time in relation to movement, continuity and dimensionality.

Since time is related to movement, it is important to bear in mind that movement (both as *kinesis* and as *metabole*) is understood by Aristotle in a broad sense, namely not only as local, loco-motion (*phora*), but also as qualitative change (*alloiosis*) and as growth or diminution (*auxesis* or *phthisis*); and the common characteristic of all these species of movement is that of being a passage from something to something else (*ek tinos eis ti*). This characteristic is not to be understood in the spatial sense, but in the sense of structural determination of movement⁶⁷. It causes movement to have a dimensionality,

which Aristotle designates by the term *megethos* (magnitude, extension); and to the passage (*ek tinos eis ti*) that takes place according to this dimensionality is coessential continuity (*synecheia*).

Movement is thus structurally connected with dimensionality (and with continuity), and Aristotle expresses this connection by saying that "movement follows on from greatness" (*akolouthei toi megethei he kinesis*, 219 a 11). For Heidegger, this *akolouthein* expresses nothing less than a "a priori foundational connection (*apriorischer Fundierungszusammenhang*)"⁶⁸, which it is essential to understand correctly, since Aristotle also employs it to express the relationship between time and motion, where he says that "time follows movement" (*ho chronos akolouthei tei kinesei*, 219 b 23). This means that with time, movement or the limit case of movement, i.e. stillness, is always presupposed; and since movement presupposes dimensionality and continuity, the experience of time also presupposes in turn movement, dimensionality and continuity.

As for the determination of continuity, it is important to understand how the continuum is experienced and how it is constituted through its elements, i.e. points. Now, just as in the experience of movement we always grasp the body in movement, not the movement itself (*tode gar ti to pheromenon, he de kinesis ou*, 219 b 30), so too in the case of the continuum we never grasp continuity as such, but always the individual elements that form it, i.e. the points (experienced in a given horizon and in a given succession). The movement of the hand, for example, we grasp it when we perceive its passage from one point to another, from this point here to that point there, from here to there. That is, the passage is always experienced as a passage occurring between two determined points, and the two points to which the passage refers are not just any two points, but are determined by a precise succession, that of before and after. We grasp the passage if we hold the first point still as a before and, holding it still as such, we expect the next point to arrive as a after. That is, we experience the passage by holding still the before and expecting the after. By following the movement of the hand we say: *now* here, *now* there, and so in the horizon of before and after we experience time.

It is true that by following the passages of the hand from one point to another we are actually following a movement and not yet time; but precisely in order to mark the different points through which the hand passes, we say now-here and *now-there*, and by pronouncing this *now* we attribute time to the movement, we anticipate the temporal determination and impose it on a given movement (that of the hands or that of the sun). Thus, when we look at the clock and say "it is *now* nine o'clock", we 'impose' time on the clock, we read a number and understand that number as a temporal indication. Time is not in the clock, but when we say 'now', it tells us a number that in the horizon of this *now* becomes time. Time arises from the fact that we read the number of movement in the horizon of the temporal determination of time. But from where do we derive this *now*? For Heidegger, we derive it out of - so to speak - ourselves, we derive it from the temporal dilation that characterises our very being as finite being. That is, the primary source of the experience of time is the very structure of the soul, of human life, of being, which has the fundamental character of temporality.

But let us take a closer look at the nature of the now, of the instant, which - as Aristotle says - is what is numbered following the movement according to the before and after (*hei d'arithmeton to proteron kai hysteron, to nyn estin*, 219 b 25). In order to understand the nature of the instant, it is necessary to be clear about the character of before and after; that is, it is necessary to bear in mind that while their determination seems to be primarily a determination of a local character, since they indicate the succession from one place to another, in reality it is a temporal determination, since the temporal sense of before and after must be presupposed in order to understand the local sense; as Aristotle says, before and after have an *apostasis pros to nyn* (223 a 5-6).

The instant, the now, then, has the very special character of constituting identity and otherness of time, that is, both of constituting time and of dividing it into a now-now and a now-not-yet, into a before and a after (*kai syneches te de ho chronos to nyn, kai diheiretai kata to nyn*, 220 a 5). This is because the instant in a certain way is always the same and in a certain other way is not (*to de nyn esti men hos to auto, esti d'hos ou to auto*, 219 b 12-13), since - as Aristotle explains - it is *to gar to auto ho pot'hen - to d'ainai autoi*

heteron (219 b 10-11). Against the current interpretation, for which this means that the instant is always the same as to existence and always different in its essence, Heidegger interprets this expression in the opposite sense, so that the instant would be the same as to essence and always different as to existence.

Another essential characteristic of the instant is that it is not to be understood as mere punctuality, as if the temporal continuum were to be understood in analogy with the line, and the instant that constitutes the line corresponds to the point that constitutes the line; rather, the instant has the character of the horizon, since the beginning and the ending, as well as the character of dimensionality and extensionality, belong to it as constituent moments. Furthermore, insofar as the instant has the character of passage (*ek tinos eis ti*), it is never like a point next to another point, it is never a limit (if not accidentally in reference to something else and not as such); insofar as it is passage and dimensionality, it is open and dilated towards the dimension of no longer and not yet; that is, with the instant one can mark limits, but it is never in itself a limit ⁷⁰.

The instant is not limit (*peras*), but is number (*arithmos*). Aristotle makes a clear distinction between the two moments in the sense that while limit belongs to the being of what is bounded, number can determine something (by numbering and measuring) without being part of what is numbered or measured and without having its mode of being. By saying, then, that time is number of movement, Aristotle indicates that we experience it by numbering and measuring movement, without, however, making time - precisely as number - part of movement or of the wavy body⁷¹.

As a number, the instant - and therefore also time, which consists of instants - is measure (*metron*). And the being measured of a moving body relative to its movement is its being-in-time, its intratemporality (*to en chronoi einai*, 221 a 4). That things are in time means that they are measured in their fluire with time in relation to the latter's dimensional character. But they are not measured as such, but only in the specific character of being-in-movement, that is, only insofar as they are in motion or at rest (*metresei d'ho chronos to kinoumenon kai to emeroun, hei to men kinoumenon to de emeroun*, 221 b 16-

18). Obviously, things are in time in a different sense from instants, which are in time by constituting it. Things in motion are contained in time in the same way as the number is contained in the numerant. To express the way in which time contains things, Aristotle uses the verb *periechesthai*, and by this he means that time encompasses things in motion, but is not part of them. And it is because of this particular relationship that, without time being movement, wherever we experience movement we also experience with it the time that embraces it (*hama gar kineseos aisthanometha kai chronou*, 219 a 3).

Now, from the fact that we experience time where we experience movement, a decisive *aporia* arises, on which Heidegger leverages to give his interpretation of the Aristotelian text a turn in the direction of the equation he established of being and temporality. The *aporia* arises from the fact that we can think of situations, such as that of darkness, in which our experience of the movement of sensible bodies is interrupted. And one must then ask whether with the experience of movement the experience of time is also interrupted. Evidently not, because, as Aristotle explains (219 a 4-6), we would still experience the movement of our psychic states; that is, since the soul manifests itself as something that is in motion, time always manifests itself with it too. Hence the further *aporia*: if there were no soul, would time exist or not? (*poteron de me ouses psyches eie an ho chronos he ou*, 224 a 21). Evidently not, also because, as has been said, if time is the number of movement, the soul is that entity that numbers it (223 at 25). The ontological locus of time, so Heidegger concludes his interpretation, is the soul.

This assignment of time to the soul as its ontological locus could, however, make it appear that time is something subjective. And this would contrast with the interpretation of the phenomenon of intratemporality, in which it was seen that time 'contains' and 'embraces' natural entities and things, and as such is objective, indeed the most objective of all 'objects'. Thus, on the one hand it seems to be objectively present everywhere, by sky (*en ouranoi*), by sea (*en thalassei*) and by land (*en gei*), i.e. everywhere (*en panti*), on the other hand it seems to be something relative to the soul (*psyche*). In observing this (223 a 16-18), Aristotle grasps an *aporia* from which arises that dichotomy between

the subjective understanding and the objective understanding of time destined to span the entire history of Western philosophy.

Now, relying on this fundamental aporia, Heidegger grafts his own analysis of the ontological structure of being onto the interpretation of the Aristotelian treatment of time. In fact, from Heidegger's point of view, the problem of the subjectivity or objectivity of time can only be resolved by clarifying the fundamental mode of being of that entity that numbers movement and is therefore the seat of the experience of time, i.e. for Aristotle the soul (*psyche*), for Heidegger the being (*Dasein*).

The Aristotelian treatment of time, although it grasps the essential connection of time and soul, does not, however, according to Heidegger, explicitly pose the problem of the fundamental mode of being specific to human life, of being, and consequently it does not even come to grasp its unitary temporal structure; in short, it does not tap into original temporality. And in this sense it represents in Heidegger's eyes the first and most rigorous filosofic understanding of the common experience of time. However, thanks to the depth that is inherent in it, and which paradoxically manifests itself in the appearance of a tautology and a petition of principle, it refers by its very dynamic to the most original dimension of temporality that Heidegger sets out to thematise.

As is well known, the grasp of temporality as the unitary ontological structure of being is the point of arrival of the analysis of existence conducted in *Being and Time*. Just as Husserl - albeit within the horizon of a metaphysics of presence and orienting himself on the primacy of *theoria* - had come, through the analysis of the internal consciousness of time, to grasp the connection of the intentionality of consciousness with temporality, so Heidegger comes, through the analysis of the common experience of time and its filosofic codification in Aristotle, to grasp the fundamental problem of the temporal structure of being⁷².

Within the horizon of the grasping of this structure, the three dimensions of time, as they are distinguished in common experience, are rooted by Heidegger in three fundamental attitudes, namely the waiting (*Gewärtigen*) that makes the experience of the future possible, the

present (*Gegenwärtigen*) that underlies the experience of the present, and finally the preserving (*Behalten*) and, as its borderline case, the forgetting (*Vergessen*) that make the experience of the past possible. The foundation of these attitudes is original temporality. The latter, in turn, rests on the fundamental ontological determination of beingness as being-possibility, which, as has been shown, opens up and determines itself in reference to itself, in reference to the world, and in reference to others in a fundamentally practical sense. And the determination of being as original temporality must therefore be seen and grasped in connection with the eminently practical connotation of being. And, conversely, it is in original temporality that the practical determinations previously highlighted, such as *Befindlichkeit* or *Verstehen* or *Sorge*, have their ontological foundation.

It is precisely from this connection of temporality and the practical structure of being that two decisive consequences for the Heideggerian understanding of time and being arise. Firstly, as has already been pointed out, because of the practical connotation of the being of being, the decisive temporal dimension becomes the future, since it is future being that is at stake in the practical decision. And this allows Heidegger to contrast the traditional pre-eminence of the present in Western thought from Aristotle to Husserl. Secondly, depending on whether beingness takes upon itself the weight of its own practical determination or disposes of it by taking refuge in the impersonal forms of Yes, temporality will be enacted in authentic or inauthentic ways. In the authentic actualization of its own power-being, being is always ahead of itself (*vorweg*), it is e-static, it e-sists, and thus matures that authentic dimension of the future that Heidegger designates as anticipation (*Vorlaufen*). Corresponding to this is the authentic maturation of the present as moment (*Augenblick*) and the authentic realisation of the past as repetition (*Wiederholung*).

These authentic realisations of temporality undergo an inauthentic deformation as a result of the innate tendency in being to deject, that is, the tendency to get rid of the burden that having to decide about one's being entails. In removing this having to confront one's own being, that is, in removing the call of consciousness to take on the burden of the decision around one's own being,


Being also removes the future as the determining dimension of the temporality of its being. In the inauthentic attitude, which removes itself from having to decide about its being (which, insofar as it has not yet been decided, is future), the determining dimension becomes that of the present, the being in the true sense becomes the being that is present, at which the being loses itself by forgetting itself. In accordance with this, the future and the past will also undergo inauthentic deformations in their realisation.

The result of the interconnection of temporal structure and practical structure of being can then be summarised in the following diagram (the boxes marked in bold stand for the respectively determining temporal dimension).

<div>Disposizione pratica</div> <div>Dimensione temporale</div>	AUTENTICITÀ	INAUTENTICITÀ
FUTURO	<div>anticipazione</div> <div>(Vorlaufen)</div>	<div>aspettarsi</div> <div>(Gewärtigen)</div>
PRESENTE	<div>attimo</div> <div>(Augenblick)</div>	<div>presentare</div> <div>(Gegenwärtigen)</div>
PASSATO	<div>ripetizione</div> <div>(Wiederholung)</div>	<div>dimenticare</div> <div>(Vergessen)</div>

This articulation of temporality, which Heidegger describes at length in *Being and Time* (§§ 65-71), is intrinsically connected with the practical determination of being as care, of which original temporality is the unitary ontological sense. Bearing in mind the remarks made about the practical connotation of being of beingness, this connection, which is described as follows in the Heideggerian vocabulary, can also be seen in a new light: care is a unity of existentiality, effectivity and dejection; but existentiality is a being-before-itself (*Sich- vorweg-sein*) that corresponds to the dimension of the future, effectivity is a being-already-in-the-world (*Schon-sein-in-der-Welt*) that corresponds to the dimension of the past, and dejection is a being-at-the-intramundane-being (*Sein-bei-innerweltlich-begegnendem-Seienden*) that corresponds to the dimension of the present. Therefore, temporality corresponds in the

its threefold articulation to the articulation of care and represents its unitary ontological foundation. And since care is the very character of being of beingness, it represents at the same time the unitary ontological structure of this being. This connection can also be illustrated with a diagram.



From these clarifications on Heideggerian interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of time, it is clear how Heidegger arrives, starting from Aristotle, to grasp the problem that in this period lies at the centre of his speculative concerns, namely the problem of the determination of the fundamental mode of being of being. And just as previously, through the analysis of the phenomenon of truth, he had come to grasp in the being-discovering a first character of the being of being, just as then afftackling the problem of the 'subject' he had identified the eminently practical connotation of this being, so now, in the light of the interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of time, he comes to establish the ontological equation of being and original temporality.

Because of this ontological radicalisation of temporality, Heidegger then matures the reasons for his detachment from traditional conceptions of time, which, including Aristotle's, would remain tied to a naturalistic orientation that would prevent them from grasping the temporal structure of being.

As he illustrates in a significant passage from his course of the summer semester of 1928 - in which he takes a critical stance towards Husserl's conception of time in his *Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Internal Consciousness of Time*, which Heidegger published that very year ⁽⁷³⁾ the distinctive notes of the traditional understanding of time are as follows: "1) Time is itself first and foremost something that is present in some way and in some place, something that is in motion, and precisely that flows or, as

let us say, passing. 2) Time as transitory (in a way, the paradigm of transitoriness in general) is something in the 'soul', in the subject, in consciousness, which is why we need an inner consciousness to grasp it. Consequently, the possibilities of the understanding and interpretation of time also depend essentially on the respective understanding of the soul, the subject, consciousness, being. 3) Time is indeed something that passes fluendo in the soul, but it does not properly belong to the centre of the soul. In fact, time has always been seen in connection with space; and it is in space, it is spatial, what we experience with our senses; this is also true of time: time belongs to sensibility (...). 4) From Plato onwards, time is distinguished from eternity and this is thought of in a more or less theological way. What is temporal then becomes earthly with respect to what is heavenly¹⁷⁴.

Within the horizon of this naturalistic understanding of time is for Heidegger impossible to come to an understanding of the ontological connection of being and temporality. But precisely because such an understanding - as he tries to show in the light of Aristotle's interpretation - cannot completely conceal the dynamics of the problem, it is open to a radical problematisation and 'refers back *according to its own phenomenal content* to an original *time, temporality*'⁷⁵. (75) For Heidegger, it is precisely a matter of grasping the temporality of being in its originality, and this means for him no longer filtering it through the objectifying categories of *theoria*, but grasping it in relation to the specificity of its eminently practical connotation.

The essential traits of the 'existential' understanding of time derived from this are: "1) To the essence of time belongs its ecstatic character. 2) Along with this ecstatic constitution belongs to time its horizon character. 3) Time does not pass, nor stands, but matures. Maturation (*Zeitigung*) is the original phenomenon of 'movement'. 4) Time is not relative to sensibility, but more original than it, as well as to spirit and reason (...). 5) From the point of view of method, it should be noted that since time constitutes the metaphysical connection of being, it is not grasped precisely when being is placed in any theoretical thematisation, whether as psychic totality, as

subject that knows and wants, as self-consciousness or as a unity of body, soul and spirit. Rather, the analysis of beingness must choose as its guiding horizon that which, before any theory, beyond any theory and despite all theories, remains decisive in the effective existence of being-in-itself of beingness in its being-togetherness with others and in its relation to entities that do not conform to being"⁷⁶.

This enumeration of the salient features of the Heideggerian understanding of time, in particular the conclusion it reaches, shows in sufficiency how the determination of original temporality is deeply grafted onto the practical determination of the mode of being of being previously highlighted. Thus, the interpretation of the Aristotelian treatment of time, which arrives at the individualisation of temporality as the ontological structure of being, is closely connected with the discussion of the problem of truth and the problem of the 'subject', showing how the critical confrontation with Aristotle, conducted by Heidegger in the Marburg courses and in *Being and Time*, embraces in its breadth the whole range of the three fundamental problems that occupy Heideggerian thought in this decisive phase of its evolution. In effect, Aristotle's interpretation of the questions of truth, the 'subject', and temporality animates the Heideggerian project of a radical recomprehension of the fundamental structure of human life in terms of being, and through this recomprehension it will be possible for Heidegger, distancing himself from tradition, to draw on that radically assured foundation on which the metaphysics of finitude can rest.

5. *The outcomes of the confrontation*

In reconstructing the presence of Aristotle along the path taken by Heidegger in the Marburg Lectures and in *Being and Time*, we first saw how, by interpreting the different levels of the occurrence of the phenomenon of truth in the light of Aristotelian texts, Heidegger calls into question the theories that see in judgement and assertion the original place of its manifestation and how he shows instead that only in a broader ontological horizon can the phenomenon of truth be grasped and understood in its originality. Now, if the point of this

The ontological deepening of the problem of truth is the grasping of that equation of being and truth which, even after the turning point, remains at the centre of Heideggerian reflection on being; the decisive aspect here is that Heidegger arrives at this equation, at this stage of his thought, by locating the phenomenon of truth in the discovering attitude of being, in relation to which being itself is a being-discovered (by being), that is, a being-true in the ontological sense. Being-in-being (*psyche*) is thus determined as that entity whose special character is being-in-the-true (*aletheuein*), i.e. unveiling and being-discovering.

We then saw how the result of this interpretation of the phenomenon of truth in Aristotle constitutes for Heidegger a confirmation of the rightness of the direction in which he was questioning the horizon of Husserlian phenomenology. If, in fact, on the one hand Heidegger takes on the fundamental problem of phenomenology, that is, the problem of understanding the subjectivity of the subject, on the other hand he is progressively persuaded of the insufficient ontological radicality of the Husserlian approach to the problem, insofar as Husserl orients his own understanding of the subject prevalently on the analysis of cognitive acts, and in particular on those proper to scientific knowledge, thus tacitly assuming as the horizon of his own understanding the traditional primacy of *theoria*.

It is for this reason that, as we have tried to highlight, already from the early 1920s Heidegger turns to Aristotle seeing or believing he can see in him a comprehensive analysis of the practical, poietic and theoretical attitudes of human life in its being-in-the-true, that is, as Heidegger interprets it, in its discovering being. In particular, Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* provides Heidegger with a phenomenological analysis of the fundamental modes of being-in-the-true of being in its relation to itself, to others, and to the world of things. In this phenomenology of human life, the structural moments of *theoria*, *praxis*, and *poiesis* would be grasped and determined for the first time, on which Heidegger orients himself in drawing the distinction of the three modes of being of *Dasein*, *Zuhandenheit*, and *Vorhandenheit*, which represent the ontological framework of the analytic of existence.

As we have tried to show, in the very determination of the specific mode of being of being, and precisely in defining the character of the reference that being always makes to its own being as having-to-be, Heidegger takes the Aristotelian thematisation of acting *as praxis* and of the virtue of acting as *phronesis* as the guiding file of his analysis. Within the horizon opened up by this consideration, an attempt was then made to read in this light certain fundamental determinations of being, such as the *Zu-sein*, the *Sorge*, the *Befindlichkeit*, the *Verstehen*, the *Gewissen* and the *Entschlossenheit*, suggesting the hypothesis that in them the meaning of as many Aristotelian determinations, such as *praxis*, *orexis*, *nous praktikos*, *phronesis* and *prohairesis*, is taken up and rethought in a transformed ontological framework.

However, this attitude of productive appropriation is progressively incorporated into a critical stance towards tradition, in general, and Aristotle, in particular. This gradual detachment matures, as we have seen, at the same time as another in-depth interpretation of Aristotle, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of the phenomenon of time, through which Heidegger arrives at the conviction that the Aristotelian thematisation of human life certainly grasps the fundamental attitudes, namely the theoretical, practical and poietic ones, but that it does not yet explicitly pose the problem of the profound unitary connection on which they are based. In other words, Aristotle would not have explicitly posed the problem of determining what is the specific mode of being of human life, of the soul, that makes possible the plurality of other modes in which it is in truth.

Precisely through the interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of the phenomenon of time, Heidegger believes that he can identify the decisive reason for this omission in the circumstance that Aristotle would have remained within the horizon of a naturalistic understanding of time, which, oriented above all on the observation of natural entities, would be unsuitable for grasping the specificity of the originally temporal structure of human existence.

Aristotle's interpretation of the three fundamental problems of truth, 'subject' and temporality leads to

Heidegger thus critically distances himself from the approach in which they are traditionally affixed and resolved, and shows how these problems require, by their very intrinsic dynamic, a more radical ontological understanding and, in particular, an explicit thematisation of the unitary ontological structure of being as finite being.

For the maturation of this position, as mentioned above, the great confrontation with Kant is decisive, which takes over from the confrontation with Aristotle and which Heidegger develops above all in the second half of the 1920s. In Kant, in fact, at least at first, Heidegger sees the one who first arrives at grasping the problem of the unitary ontological determination of man's being, attempting a radical solution, and precisely by founding the two strains of our knowledge (sensibility and intellect) in the *common root of* transcendental imagination (interpreted by Heidegger as temporality). And against the Neo-Kantian interpretation, he sees in the *Critique of Pure Reason* not a theory of knowing nor even a theory of scientific knowledge, but rather a metaphysical clarification of the structure of the finite subject. In Kant, therefore, he sees the position of that problem which he takes as his own.

This affinity is then confirmed by the fact that even in the Kantian determination of the subject as the subject of action, and precisely in the distinction of person and thing, of entity that is I (*ichliches Seiendes*) and entity that is not I (*nichtichliches Seiendes*), Heidegger sees neither more nor less than an anticipation of his own radical distinction between the mode of being of beingness (*daseinsmäßiges Seiendes*) and the mode of being of entities that are not (*nichtdaseinsmäßiges Seiendes*). In this sense, he can then assert that the Kantian determination of man as a person and as finite in himself - by virtue of which the *personalitas moralis* is constituted in the feeling of respect (in the face of moral law and freedom) - refers back to the same problem that he treats in terms of *Sorge*⁷⁷. And in the same vein, at the end of the course of the winter semester of 1927/28, entirely devoted to an interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he reaffirms his own discovery of Kant: 'When a few years ago [presumably in the winter semester of 1925/26] I studied again the

Critique of Pure Reason and I read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, the blindfolds fell from my eyes and Kant became for me an essential confirmation of the correctness of the path along which I was searching⁷⁸.

However, like the comparison with Aristotle, the comparison with Kant will also come to the critical conclusion that Kant's attempt to determine the ontological structure of subjectivity is not sufficiently radical; Thus, remaining substantially within the Cartesian horizon of a dichotomous understanding of being that separates thought and extension, and remaining at bottom tied to a naturalistic understanding of time, Kant would not arrive at a radical determination of the unitary ontological structure on which the theoretical and practical determinations of the subject rest⁷⁹.

This very task of a determination of ontological unity structural of human life, namely as original temporality, is assumed and affronted explicitly by Heidegger in the *Analytics of Existence*, on which his metaphysics of finitude rests.

It can be said, then, that the fundamental outcome to which the confrontation with Aristotle (and later with Kant) leads is the systematic development, radicalisation and solution of the problem from which Heidegger had taken his cue in the horizon of Husserlian phenomenology, namely the problem of the ontological determination of the fundamental mode of being of human life. By grasping the structure of finite being in its characters of being-discovering (truth), of having-to-be, and of temporality, Heidegger thinks he has with it that archimedean point on the basis of which he can radically pursue the foundational intentions that have inspired his confrontation with tradition from the very beginning, and thus arrive, through the de(co)struction of traditional ontology, at that metaphysics of being or fundamental ontology that he expounds in *Being and Time* (and on whose project he continues to work until the end of the 1920s).

The search for the presence of Aristotle in the Marburg courses and in *Being and Time* concludes with an unsuspected outcome, namely with tangible evidence that this presence - which in Heidegger studies is rarely

has been identified and even more rarely has its real importance been assessed⁸⁰ - is a central and decisive presence. As we have tried to show, this presence is fruitfully grafted - in the form of a verification of the scope of the fundamental meanings of being, in particular of being as true - into Heidegger's revival, radicalisation and ontological transformation of Husserlian phenomenology, and especially into the fundamental task he sets himself, namely the ontological clarification of the mode of being of the 'subject', of human life, of being.

Finally, one last consideration remains to be made. That is, it remains to be considered that if the finding of a consistent and almost generalised presence of Aristotle in Heidegger's Marburg and *Being and Time* definitively removes the existentialist blindness to the ontological problematic present in the Heideggerian analysis of existence, this is only to be seen as a result, so to speak, of the research carried out. In the first place, in fact, above all by emphasising the significance of the Heideggerian reference to Aristotelian practical filosofia, it aims to emphasise - as a supplement to a generic ontological removal of the existentialist misunderstanding - that the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger up to the turning point is not so much an indication of a generic presence of the ontological problem of being as the ultimate final aim of the investigation, but rather of the concrete realisation of an analysis of the *character* of being of being, that is, of an analysis of its temporality, its practical connotation and its finitude as ontological determinations, as those ontological determinations on the basis of which alone - in fundamental ontology - it is possible to pose the problem of being.

Notes

¹This letter is preserved in *the Nachlaß* of Engelbert Krebs at the Seminar of Dogmatics at the University of Freiburg, and was published by B. Casper in *Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg (1909-1923)*, "Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv", 32, 1980, pp. 534-541, especially p. 541. On Heidegger's activity in these years see Th. Sheehan, *Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography*, in Id. (Ed.), *Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker*, Precedent Publishing, Chicago 1981, pp. 3-19; on the relationship with Husserl see K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls* (Husserliana Dokumente, 1), Nijhoff, Den Haag 1977.

²Initially not included in the programme of the *Gesamtausgabe*, the publication of the courses of the first Freiburg teaching is now announced as an appendix to Section II. Of the total of fifteen courses taught by Heidegger, however, only seven have been announced. According to a statement by the main editor of the edition (F.-W. von Herrmann), the manuscripts for the other courses were destroyed by Heidegger himself (cf. F.-W. von Herrmann, *Die Edition der Vorlesungen Heideggers in seiner Gesamtausgabe letzter Hand*, "Freiburger Universitätsblätter", 1982, no. 78, pp. 85-102).

³A complete list of courses and seminars held by Heidegger can be found in W.J. Richardson, *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought* (Phaenomenologica, 13), Nijhoff, The Hague 1963, pp. 663-671. Some indication of the content of the courses in the first Freiburg teaching is given by O. Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, Neske, Pfullingen 1983², pp. 36-45 (also important is the afterword to the second edition, pp. 319-355); in particular on the interpretation of Aristotle see H.-G. Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege*, Mohr, Tübingen 1983, pp. 31-32, 118, 131; finally, on the 1920/21 course cf. Th. Sheehan, *Heidegger and his course on the 'Phenomenology of Religion' (1920/21)*, 'Philosophia', 31, 1980, pp. 431-446.

⁴See Richardson, *Heidegger*, pp. 663-664.

⁵Cf. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl (Phaenomenologica, 25), Nijhoff, Den Haag 1968, pp. 25-27; also Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege*, p. 118.

⁶Heidegger, *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*, p. 86 (Italics, p. 187). The italics are mine.

⁷I say 'almost all' because - in addition to the 1924 course on *Rhetoric* - two Marburg courses remain to be published that are of some importance for the comparison with Aristotle. These are the summer semester 1926 course on *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*, which in the *Nachschrift* that I am aware of deals with Aristotle on pp. 5-24 (especially on Book I of the *Metaphysics*) and 76-102, and the winter semester 1926/27 course on *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant*.

⁸HGA II, 184-185 (= *Being and Time*, § 29, Ital. transl., p. 231). Heidegger also expresses his appreciation of the *Rhetoric* in other contexts, for instance by emphasising the distinction between the semantic moment and the apophantic-predicative moment of the *logos*. Thus, in a passage from the course of the winter semester of 1929/30 he observes that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle identified and carried out for the first time 'the grand task of subjecting the forms and constructs of non-theoretical discourse to interpretation' (HGA XXIX/XXX, 439).

⁹*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925 hg. von P. Jaeger, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1977 (= HGA XX). On the problematics of this course in general see W. Biemel, *Heideggers Stellung zur Phänomenologie in der Marburger Zeit*, in E.W. Orth (Hg.), *Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger in der Sicht neuer Quellen* (Phänomenologische Forschungen, 6/7), Alber, Freiburg-München 1978, pp. 141-223. On Heideggerian terminology in this course see Th. Kiesel, *Der Zeitbegriff beim früheren Heidegger*, in E.W. Orth (Hg.), *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Phänomenologische Forschungen, 14), Alber, Freiburg-München 1983, pp. 192-211.

¹⁰HGA XX, 85, 87. On Heidegger's relationship with Husserl I refer to my study *The Transformation of Phenomenology from Husserl to Heidegger*, 'Theoria', 4, 1984, no. 1, pp. 125-165.

¹¹HGA XX, 94. It is interesting to note that here *noein* is rendered by Heidegger using the Husserlian technical term *vermeinen*, whereas he later translates *noein* and *nous* as *vernehmen* and *Vernunft* respectively.

¹²*Ibid*, 162. Italics are mine.

¹³Ibid, 301.

¹⁴*Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit.* Marburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1925/26 hg. von W. Biemel, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1976 (= HGA XXI). On the problems of this course cf. M. Bonola, *Verità e interpretazione nello Heidegger di "Essere e Tempo"*, Filosofia, Turin 1983; G. Scrimieri, *Fenomenologia ed ermeneutica tra Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger*, Levante, Bari 1983, pp. 141-178. Cf. also A. Fabris, *Logica ed ermeneutica. Interpretation of Heidegger*, Ets, Pisa 1982, pp. 25-68.

¹⁵The distinction between 'insofar as' hermeneutic and 'insofar as' apophantic is not yet calibrated in the same terms as it will be in *Being and Time*. While in this course he holds firm to the Aristotelian distinction between the semanticity of the *logos* in general and the apophanticity of the *logos* as assertion, in § 7 and especially § 33 of *Being and Time* he emphasises the apophantic character of the *logos* in general, to then ground it in the originality of the hermeneutic 'insofar'. The problem of the apophanticity of the *logos* is taken up again, in a changed perspective, during the winter semester of 1929/30 (cf. HGA XXIX/XXX, §§ 71-73). On the relationship between *logos* and sign, which it is not possible to consider here, see the remarks of C. Sini, *Heidegger e il problema del segno*, "L'uomo, un segno", 3, 1979, pp. 43-58.

¹⁶HGA XXI, 150.

¹⁷Ibid, footnote.

¹⁸As is well known, in *Being and Time* the apertural character of being is designated by the technical term *Erschlossenheit*. In the Marburg courses, particularly the one from the summer semester of 1925, Heideggerian terminology is not yet defined in this sense; indeed, in this course Heidegger speaks of 'Erschlossenheit der Welt' and 'Entdecktheit des Daseins'. On the connection of openness and truth as constitutive characteristics of being, the critical observations of E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, de Gruyter, Berlin 1970², in particular pp. 256-362 (who was already able to take Heidegger's Marburg courses into account at *Nachschriften* by Helene Weiß); cf. also the equally important considerations of C.F. Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung. Das Methodenproblem in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers*, Bouvier-Grundmann, Bonn 1974.

¹⁹HGA XXI, 171. The interpretation of *Met.* IX, 10 was taken up extensively during the summer semester of 1930 (cf. HGA XXXI, § 9, 66-109).

²⁰HGA XXI, 171.

²¹Ibid, 179.

²²Ibid, 190.

²³Ibid, 191.

²⁴In this regard, it is interesting to note that already during the summer semester of 1927 there is a significant reference to the Platonic myth of the cave, to which Heidegger refers in an attempt to specify the relationship between the idea of the good and the determinations of *poiein*, *praxis* and *techne* (cf. HGA XXIV, 400-405).

²⁵HGA XXI, 193.

²⁶Ibid, 194.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸A significant trace of the importance of this determination is what Heidegger says about it towards the end of the course in the summer semester of 1927: "Aristotle already saw the phenomenon of the moment, the *kairos*, and defined it in the sixth book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, but in such a way that he fails to connect the specific temporal character of the *kairos* with what he calls

otherwise time (*nyn*)' (HGA XXIV, 409). - On the importance of the *young* Luther for the Heideggerian hermeneutics of *effettività* see Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, pp. 40-41.

²⁹Cf. E. Tugendhat, *Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1979, pp. 164-244; also M. Bartels, *Selbstbewußtsein und Unbewußtes*, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1976, pp. 132-189. However, it is important to note that this practical (in the Aristotelian sense) connotation of beingness as having-to-be is maintained by Heidegger only as long as he attempts the determination of beingness from being itself in its quasi-transcendental purity. (See also M. Ruggenini, *Il soggetto e la tecnica. Heidegger interprete inattuale dell'epoca presente*, Bulzoni, Rome 1977, pp. 41-70, can speak of an early Heidegger 'subjectivism'). Later, when it came to understanding being from being, Heidegger scrupulously erased all traces of this practical determination and traced the apertural character of existence not to having-from-being, but to the horizon of being itself. Hence the significant terminological correction - 'to be' instead of 'having-to-be' - made in § 9 from the seventh edition of *Being and Time*. The recomprehension of existence no longer in reference to having-to-be pure and simple, but in reference to being itself, can be seen in *Of the Essence of Truth* (especially § 4), dating from 1930 but published in 1943, and in the *Introduction* (1949) to the fifth edition of *What is Metaphysics?* (both texts are now in HGA IX, 177-202, 365-383, transl. it. edited by U. Galimberti, Adelphi, Milan, forthcoming). Heidegger's handwritten notes to the so-called "Hüttenexemplar" of *Being and Time* (now published in HGA II) also provide unequivocal evidence of this re-comprehension. It also manifests itself, moreover, in the corrections Heidegger makes to his own interpretation of Aristotle, for example at the finish of the course in the winter semester of 1929/30 (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit*), where, resuming his own interpretation of the problem of truth in Aristotle of 1925/26, he no longer traces truth back to the discovering attitude of being, but to its free being (*Freisein*), i.e. no longer to the spontaneity of being, but to the ontological connotation of its situational horizon (free-being) (cf. HGA XXIX/XXX, §§ 72-73).

³⁰See *Being and Time*, §§ 41-42, 63-65, and also HGA XX, § 31; XXIV, § 15. 54-58, stresses that the 'project of the world' is an 'original praxis'; from our perspective, which emphasises the reference to Aristotelian practical filosofia, it should be noted, however, that the character of original praxis pertains to being not only in its reference to the world of things (i.e. in *Besorgen*), but also in its reference to itself, to its own being (i.e. *as Zu-sein*). The same observation can be made with regard to the acute interpretation of the *Besorgen* proposed by G. Prauss, *Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers "Sein und Zeit"*, Alber, Freiburg-München 1977. - In order to understand this correctly, it is important to bear in mind the interpretation of the concept of *praxis* that, particularly from the early 1920s onwards, Heidegger gives on the basis of Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Through this interpretation, in fact, Heidegger believes he is able to grasp two uses of the concept of *praxis* in Aristotle. In a first sense, it designates man's action that has its fine end in itself and not in the production of works: in this sense, man's *praxeis* stands alongside *poieseis*, *epistemai* and *methodoi* (cf. *Eth. Nic.* I, 1 1094 a 1). In a more radical and deeper sense, on the other hand, *praxis* would be the form of movement (*kinesis*) proper to human life in general, and the *poieseis* and *epistemai* would then be modes of the actualization of this original *praxis*, would be actualizations of the specific movement of human life. *Praxis*, thus understood as the *kinesis* proper to man, acquires the character of the fundamental determination of man's being, that is, it becomes its ontological character. The original *praxis* thus becomes for Heidegger the structure of being of being. - Of this interpretation, developed above all in courses and in manuscripts still

unpublished, visible traces also remain in the writings published during his lifetime, such as in the courses on Nietzsche, where, for example, there is a significant passage in which Heidegger explicitly says that 'the highest degree of the living being is man, the fundamental mode of his *movement* is action: *praxis*' (Nietzsche, Neske, Pfullingen 1961, vol. I, p. 67; italics are mine. See also pp. 66-69).

³¹Cf. *Being and Time*, § 40. In the light of the detection of the practical character of the determination of being-ness as having-to-be and considering Heidegger's productive appropriation of Aristotelian practical philosophy, it should also be possible to remove the consistent textual foothold that existentialist readings of Heidegger have found in precisely these passages of *Being and Time* (cf. for all that of A. De Waelhens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger*, Nauwelaerts, Louvain-Paris 1942, and that of P. Chiodi, *L'esistenzialismo di Heidegger*, Taylor, Turin 1965).

³²See *Being and Time*, § 4.

³³See there, § 10.

³⁴HGA II, 264 (= *Being and Time*, § 42 note, Ital. transl. p. 309).

³⁵Cf. *Being and Time*, § 28. On the connection of these three existentials with the discovering character of being, cf. Bonola, *Truth and Interpretation in Heidegger's Being and Time*, pp. 81-125. For an analysis of the *Rede*, not examined in detail here, cf. L. Amoroso, *Discourse as existential structure and the pragmatic dimension of communication. Glosse al § 34 di "Sein und Zeit" di M. Heidegger*, "Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa", series III, VI/4, 1976, pp. 1263-1275.

³⁶HGA II, 183 (= *Being and Time*, § 29, transl. it., p. 230). The German original reads: 'In der Befindlichkeit liegt existenzial eine erschließende Angewiesenheit auf Welt, aus der her Angehendes begegnen kann'. It is interesting to note that Heidegger had previously used the term *Befindlichkeit* to translate the Augustinian concept of *affectio* (cf. Th. Sheehan, *The original draft of Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit": "Der Begriff der Zeit" (1924)*, "Man, a sign", 3, 1979, no. 1-2, pp. 111-112, and Id, *Heidegger and his course on the 'Phenomenology of Religion'*, p. 441).

³⁷See *Being and Time*, §§ 29-30.

³⁸HGA II, 192 (= *Being and Time*, § 31, Ital. transl., pp. 238-239).

³⁹HGA XXIV, 393.

⁴⁰Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* VI, 2, 1139 b 4-5. Cf. also the commentary on this passage that Heidegger gives in *Nietzsche*, vol. I, pp. 66-68.

⁴¹HGA II, 257 (= *Being and Time*, § 41, Ital. transl., p. 303).

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴See HGA XX, § 31, in particular pp. 409-411. Further evidence of the correspondence of *Sorge* and *orexis* is to be found in the same course of 1925, precisely where Heidegger proposes a translation of the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: *pantes anthropoi tou eidenai oregontai physei* is rendered as 'Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens' (HGA XX, 380), where the correspondence of *oregontai* and *Sorge* is to be noted. Previously, in particular in the course on the phenomenology of religion in 1920/21, instead of the term *Sorge* Heidegger had used the term *Sichbekümmern* (corresponding to the Greek *epimeleia*), a usage also attested in the 1919/21 review of Jaspers (now in HGA IX, 1-44). - To understand the full importance of this parallel between *Sorge* and *orexis*, it is interesting finally to note that Heidegger believes he can also find a correspondence for these two determinations in Kant, and precisely in the 'feeling of respect' (*Gefühl der Achtung*) that lies at the foundation of *personalitas moralis* (HGA XXIV, 185-199); in particular, Heidegger expressly indicates here that

The Kantian concept of *Gefühl*, determined by analogy with the concepts of *Neigung* and *Furcht*, corresponds to the Aristotelian concept of *orexis* with its two moments of *dioxis* and *phyge* (HGA XXIV, 192-193).

⁴⁵Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *Heidegger und die Marburger Theologie*, in O. Pöggeler (Hg.), *Heidegger. Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks*, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln 1970², pp. 169-178, here p. 171 (now in Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege*, pp. 29-40, especially p. 32).

⁴⁶HGA II, 382-383 (= *Being and Time*, § 58, transl. it., p. 427). Despite the problematic nature of the general framework of interpretation, on the ontological depth of the phenomenon of consciousness (and the determinations of being connected to it) the observations of V. Vitiello, *Heidegger: Nothingness and the Foundation of Historicity. Dalla Überwindung der Metaphysik alla Daseinsanalyse*, Argalia, Urbino 1976, pp. 405-425 (but see also the whole of Part II).

⁴⁷HGA XXIV, 409. On the essential connection between decision and the phenomenon of death, which it is neither possible nor relevant here to examine for the purposes of what we want to show, cf. G. Vattimo, *Essere, storia, linguaggio in Heidegger*, Filosofia, Torino 1963, pp. 37-74, and U.M. Ugazio, *Il problema della morte nella filosofia di Heidegger*, Mursia, Milano 1976, pp. 19-67. See also F. Costa, *Heidegger e la teologia*, Longo, Ravenna 1974, pp. 89-179.

⁴⁸HGA II, 382-383 (= *Being and Time*, § 58, Ital. transl., p. 427).

⁴⁹HGA II, 393 (= *Being and Time*, § 60, Ital. transl., p. 438).

⁵⁰HGA II, 398 (= *Being and Time*, § 60, Ital. transl., p. 443).

⁵¹See Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, pp. 36-45; Sheehan, *Heidegger and his course on the "Phenomenology of Religion" (1920-21)*, especially pp. 443 ff.

⁵²On the structure of being as original temporality cf. Vattimo, *Being, History and Language in Heidegger*, pp. 37-74; Vitiello, *Heidegger: Nothingness and the Foundation of Historicity*, pp. 426-465. In general on the problem of time in Heidegger see H. Birault, *Heidegger et l'expérience de la pensée*, Gallimard, Paris 1978, especially pp. 14-43, 531-621; V. Vitiello, *Heidegger, Hegel e il problema del tempo*, in Id., *Dialettica ed ermeneutica: Hegel e Heidegger*, Guida, Naples 1979, pp. 7-43; O. Pöggeler, *Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger*, in Orth (Hg.), *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger*, pp. 152-191; Id., *Heidegger und das Problem der Zeit*, in *L'héritage de Kant*, Beauchesne, Paris 1982, pp. 287-307.

⁵³I illustrated the way in which Heidegger grasps this connection in Kant in my essay *Soggettività e temporalità: considerazioni sull'interpretazione heideggeriana di Kant alla luce delle lezioni di Marburgo*, in *Kant a due secoli dalla Critica*, edited by G. Micheli and G. Santinello, La Scuola, Brescia 1984.

⁽⁵⁴⁾J. Derrida, *Ousia et gramme. Note sur une note de Sein und Zeit*, in Id., *Marges de la philosophie*, Editions de minuit, Paris 1972, pp. 31-78, has instead attempted to show how Hegel frees himself from the naturalistic understanding of time and explicitly thematises the essential connection of subject and time.

⁵⁵*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1927 hg. von. F.-W. von Herrmann, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1975 (= HGA XXIV).

⁵⁶Cf. HGA XXIV, §§ 7-9. On the Kantian thesis that existence is not a real predicate, Heidegger also returns briefly during the winter semester of 1929/30 in the context of an interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of *logos*. Here he notes that the Kantian thesis coincides with the thesis that Aristotle enunciates at the end of the third chapter of *De interpretatione*, according to which being or non-being are not signs of the thing (*oude gar to einai e me einai semeion esti tou pragmatos*, 16 b 22-23) (cf. HGA XXIX/XXX, 469-473).

⁵⁷See HGA XXIV, 400-405.

⁵⁸See there, § 10-12.

⁵⁹Ibid, 214 (and in general, for the interpretation of the being thesis of modern ontology, see §§ 13-15).

⁶⁰Ibid, 290-291 (generally cf. §§ 16-18). In his interpretation of Aristotle, Heidegger takes up here the considerations he made in the winter semester of 1925/26, with the difference that here (as indeed in *Being and Time*) he emphasises the apophantive character of the *logos*.

⁶¹Ibid, 321.

⁶²Ibid. 322-324. On the problem of ontological difference in early Heidegger see A. Rosales, *Transzendenz und Differenz. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der ontologischen Differenz beim frühen Heidegger* (Phaenomenologica, 33), Nijhoff, Den Haag 1970.

⁶³Ibid, 324.

⁶⁴Ibid, 336.

⁶⁵Ibid, 327-361 (§ 19 a). On the problem of time in Aristotle cf. P.F. Conen, *Die Zeittheorie des Aristoteles*, Beck, München 1964; J. Moreau, *L'espace et le temps selon Aristote*, Antenore, Padova 1965; L. Ruggiu, *Tempo coscienza e essere nella filosofia di Aristotele*, Paideia, Brescia 1970; J. Hintikka, *Time and Necessity*, O.U.P., Oxford 1973; V. Goldschmidt, *Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote. Commentaire sur le Quatrième livre de la "Physique" (10-14) et sur la "Poétique"*, Vrin, Paris 1982; R. Sorabji, *Time, Creation and Continuum*, Duckworth, London 1983.

⁶⁶HGA XXIV, 331.

⁶⁷In Heidegger's opinion, Bergson misunderstood this character of the dimensionality of time in Aristotle, conceiving it simply, in analogy with space, as spatial extension (cf. *ibid.*, 343-344). A more extensive critique of Bergson's understanding of time is to be found in Winter Semester 1925/26 (HGA XXI, S 21) and in *Being and Time* (§ 82). - On the problem of time in Bergson see R.W. Meyer, *Bergson in Deutschland. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Zeitauffassung*, in E.W. Orth (Hg.), *Studien zum Zeitproblem in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Phänomenologische Forschungen, 13), Alber, Freiburg-München 1982, pp. 10-64; also E. Lisciani Petrini, *Memoria e poesia. Bergson, Jankélévitch, Heidegger*, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Naples 1983, pp. 15-65.

⁶⁸Heidegger grasps here the importance of the term *akolouthein* Aristotle, studied later especially by J. Hintikka, *Time and Necessity*, ch. III (but see also E.P. Brandon, *Hintikka on akolouthein*, "Phronesis", 23, 1978, pp. 173-177, and W. Rehder, *Über Hintikkas Interpretation von akolouthein in De interpretatione 12-13*, 'Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie', 62, 1980, pp. 58- 66).

⁶⁹This is what Heidegger emphasises here, whereas in the footnote to § 82 of *Being and Time* he had said that

"Aristotle understands *nyn* as *stigma*" (HGA II, 570; Ital. transl., p. 613).

⁷⁰In the footnote to § 82 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger had said: "Aristotle conceives *nyn* as *horos*" (HGA II, 570; Ital. transl., p. 613).

⁷¹In this regard Heidegger observes: "With this a peculiar character of time is revealed, which will later be interpreted by Kant in a certain sense as the form of intuition" (HGA XXIV, 353).

⁷²With the fundamental difference, moreover, that for Heidegger temporality is more original than intentionality and constitutes its foundation; as Heidegger himself observes:

"Intentionality - the being-directed-to-something and the reciprocal inherence of *intentio* and *intentum* -, which in phenomenology is commonly designated as the ultimate original phenomenon, has the condition of its possibility in temporality and in its ec-static-horizontal character" (*ibid*),

378-379). On this problem see also H. Rombach, *Phänomenologie des gegenwärtigen Bewußtseins*, Alber, Freiburg-München 1980, pp. 66-113. For an illustration of the differences between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian understanding of temporality and subjectivity, I refer you to my essay *Subjectivity and Temporality: Conjectures on the Problem of Time in Twentieth-Century filosofia*, "Bulletin of the International Centre for the History of Space and Time", 1984, no. 3, and the relevant bibliography.

⁽⁷³⁾ E. Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, hg. von M. Heidegger, Niemeyer, Halle 1928, now with supplementary texts and critical appendices edited by R. Boehm: E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893-1917)* (Husserliana X), Nijhoff, Den Haag 1966 (translated by A. Marini, *Per la fenomenologia della coscienza interna del tempo (1893- 1917)*, Angeli, Milan 1981).

⁷⁴HGA XXVI, 254-255.

⁷⁵HGA XXIV, 362.

⁷⁶HGA XXVI, 256.

⁷⁷See HGA XX, 220, 380; XXIV, 190-194 (see also above, footnote 44).

⁷⁸HGA XXV, 431.

⁷⁹Cf. *ibid.*, 207. On Heideggerian appropriation of Kant and the critique of the Kantian determination of subject see I. Görland, *Transzendenz und Selbst. Eine Phase in Heideggers Denken*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1981, and also my *Subjectivity and Temporality: Considerations on Heideggerian Interpretation of Kant in the Light of the Marburg Lectures* (cf. footnote 53).

⁸⁰The main studies on Heidegger and Aristotle have been mentioned in footnote 5 on p. 18. It is significant that despite the numerous interpretations of Aristotle inspired by Heidegger (especially the essay on the concept of *physis*) such as those of W. Bröcker, H. Weiß, K. Ulmer, A. Guzzoni, E. Tugendhat, R. Boehm, E. Vollrath, F. Wiplinger (cf. footnote 4 on p. 17), among the essays devoted to Heideggerian interpretations of the classics of *filosofia* included in *Festschrift* for the 80th birthday (*Durchblicke. Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1970) there is none on the interpretation of Aristotle.

IV. Aristotle's presence after the 'turn'

1. *The radicalisation of the critique of metaphysics*

Deliberately, in order to highlight the presence of Aristotle in those phases of Heideggerian thought in which it had not been noted or fully appreciated, namely in the period of his youthful formation, in that of his first Freiburg teaching and in that of Marburg, that Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle, which is also the best known, namely the essay *Dell'essenza e del concetto di Physis* (*Aristotele, Fisica B 1*), which was written in 1939, but not published until 1958 in the journal "Il Pensiero"⁽¹⁾, has been put on the back burner in the course of the investigation. Effectively, this essay had so far been the only moment of Aristotle's presence in Heidegger to be explicitly considered and studied; and it is essentially from the reading perspective opened up by it that many of the studies on Aristotle that have been mentioned have also generally been inspired².

Even at first glance, the difference of perspective, the different tone that underpins the approach Heidegger takes here, compared to the productive assimilation process that has been highlighted through the analysis of the writings of the 1920s. How can this profound difference be explained? What are the reasons for this conspicuous variation in rhythm that prevents one from grasping the connection and continuity between the two moments, and that risks concealing the true underlying finalities in relation to which the essay on *physis* can be understood?

Up to now, by putting this writing in brackets, we have intended to emphasise more strongly the character of appropriation and assimilation that the comparison with Aristotle takes on prior to the 'turn', and precisely in a context in which Heidegger, while questioning the insufficient

radicality of the metaphysical foundation, he takes it up again in order to deconstruct and reconstruct it on a truly radical basis. Without examining in detail the content of the essay on *physis* - both because it is already widely known to scholars and because such an examination would force a series of filological corrections - let us see what the filosofic problematic is that it repropose in the light of Aristotle and how this reproposal is connected with the different intentions and aims of the previous comparison.

It is all too easy to observe that between the first positive appropriation and the critical evaluation of the last Heidegger, to explain all its differences, lies the so-called 'turning point', that is, that deepening and change of sign both in relation to the possibility of the discourse on being, and in relation to the Western history of this (failed) discourse. The 'turning point', in fact, produces, as we know, (1) a change in the starting perspective, by reason of which it is no longer a question of accessing the problem of being from the clarification of the ontological structure of that being capable of posing the problem, but rather of thematising the structure of the occurrence of being itself; (2) the 'turning point' produces, secondly, the need to revise and 'deepen' the understanding of being itself, whose fundamental mode of being is no longer seen starting from its pure, quasi-transcendental structure, but rather in the horizon of the historical-epochal happening of being, in which it is located; (3) the 'turning point' goes finally hand in hand with a radicalisation of the critique of metaphysics: in fact, it produces in Heidegger the abandonment of the foundational intentions pursued in fundamental ontology, since these intentions had been based on the analysis of the structure of being, which now no longer serves as an archimedean point, but is included within the horizon of the happening of being; With this abandonment, Heidegger's attitude towards Western filosofia also changes, which is no longer seen as a forgetfulness of being due to an insufficiently radical approach to the problem, an approach that can be corrected, radicalised and refounded, but as a forgetfulness that is due to the structure of the very happening of being.

If one then compares Aristotle's appropriation, as it emerged in the course of our investigation, with the comparison that takes place in the essay on *physis*, one can understand the differences in the finalities pursued,

in the subject matter dealt with and in the very language used. While in fact up to the 'turning point' the confrontation with Aristotle takes place substantially in the context of an attempt at a radical re-founding of ontology, and while therefore, precisely for this reason, prior to the 'turning point' the confrontation with Aristotle - together with the confrontation with Kant - lies at the centre of a great effort of critical re-appropriation of tradition, in the essay on *physis* Heidegger has already gained an attitude of radical and decisive distancing from metaphysics, in the sense that, having crossed it and having grasped in this crossing the essential connection of Greek metaphysics and modern technique, he now aims at its transcendence. Similarly, after the 'turning point' it is no longer the great founding moments of metaphysics with which Heidegger attunes himself, but rather those thinkers who support his attempt to go beyond it, in the sense that they precede the metaphysical decision (the Pre-Socratics) or call it into question by bringing it to completion (Nietzsche) or by pressing beyond it (Hölderlin).

The essay on the Aristotelian concept of *physis* is situated within this horizon of decisive detachment from metaphysics, and it is in this critical context that Aristotle is assigned a decisive role *within* metaphysics. Without giving the Heideggerian analysis of Aristotle after the 'turn' a detailed interpretation, it is a matter of illuminating its connection with the previous moment, which lies at the heart of our research, and of understanding the *internal logic* that leads in the development of Heideggerian thought to this evolution of the relationship with Aristotle.

We now have at our disposal some texts that lie somewhere between the first positive appropriation and the essay on *physis* and which, therefore, provide very useful documentation in this sense. These are courses given by Heidegger between the end of the 1920s and the early 1930s, i.e. in the years in which the maturation of the 'turning point' usually takes place; by following them, it is possible to grasp *in fi rst* place the progressive change in Heideggerian perspective in the deepening and radicalisation of his critique of tradition. In particular, the course of the winter semester 1929/30, that of the summer semester 1930, and in finally that of the summer semester 1931, in which Heidegger returns several times to Aristotle, provide the possibility of following step by step the modification of Heideggerian interpretation in relation to the maturing of the new perspective.

2. *The Placement of the Logos in the Occurrence of Truth (1929/30)*

Towards the end of the course of the winter semester of 1929/30 there is an articulate reprise of the interpretation of the phenomenon of the *logos* and its truthful character in Aristotle³. The same problem had already been treated by Heidegger several times, and several times, with significant frequency, it would be taken up again in the course of the 1930s⁴. Of the reworking of the interpretation of Aristotle that Heidegger offers here, what is interesting to note is the change in the perspective from which he interprets the apophantic character of the *logos* and its being-true or false, since this change clearly indicates the direction in which the Heideggerian reflection and with it the interpretation of Aristotle is developing, and is aware of developing⁽⁵⁾.

Whereas previously Heidegger had traced the possibility of the being-true or false of the asseverative discourse back to the discovering *attitude* of beingness, now, in the modified interpretation, he locates it in its *being-free* to discover. The seemingly insignificant variation that replaces 'attitude' with 'being-free' actually indicates an essential movement in the Heideggerian approach to the problem in the direction of what will be its later development. In fact, while saying that the foundation of the apophantine *logos* lies in the discovering attitude of being emphasises, so to speak, the active, productive and founding function of being itself, saying that this foundation lies in the free-being of being for discovering emphasises and accentuates instead the ontological horizon from which the discovering takes place and by which it is therefore conditioned; that is, it connotes the situatedness of being as a finite being, placing the accent on the happening in which discovering by being takes place, which, however, it is not being that sets, but in which it is always set as free to discover.

The structure of the discovery that takes place in the *logos* is thus seen in its entirety in an essential connection with the structure of the world co-original to being, where, again, it is not the acting function of being that is emphasised, but rather the manifestativity of the entity that presents itself to being in the horizon of the world. Let us now take a closer look at how this happens.

As before, here too Heidegger starts from a distinction between the semanticity of *the logos* in general and the apophanticity of the asseverative *logos*, emphasising that while the theory of the *logos* that develops in the Western tradition privileges the moment of apophanticity, in Aristotle the semanticity that is proper to all *logos* is still clearly distinguished from the apophanticity that characterises predication, that is, that discourse that can be true or false.

Compared to the previous interpretation of the semantic character of the *logos*, given for example in *Being and Time* (§§ 7 B, 33), the way Heidegger understands the Aristotelian thesis here is indicative of the direction in which his thought is developing. He notes with reference to the first chapters of *De interpretatione* that the semanticity of *the logos* is not by nature (*physei*), but by convention (*kata syntheken*), and is connected to the genesis of a symbol (*hotan genetai symbolon*), Heidegger understands 'convention' and 'genesis of a symbol' not in the common and traditional sense that these expressions have, but rather by seeing in them an essentially ontological sense, namely affstating that the convention that generates a symbol signifies nothing more than the common opening of a horizon of understanding about being: "Speaking, saying happens in this agreeing and for this agreeing with that which from the beginning is debatable and as such graspable, with that on which several persons at once can and must agree among themselves, as on that which in discourse must be common. Since the *logos* is founded in the *genesis* of the *symbolon*, it is *kata syntheken*, by *convention*"⁶. Not only that, but Heidegger affirms further that the character of this openness that the symbol produces is transcendence, understood of course in the particular sense that he attributes to this term: "What Aristotle, in a very obscure way and without any explication, sees with a stroke of genius under the title of *symbolon*, is nothing other than what we today call *transcendence*. There is language only in an entity that by its essence *transcends*. This is the meaning of the Aristotelian thesis: a *logos* is *kata syntheken*"⁷.

Against the traditional interpretation of this thesis Heidegger observes critically: 'I do not wish to recount here what interpreters have made of this Aristotelian thesis. Nor is it accidental that interpreters have lost their way here, since in the reflection on the essence

Of the *logos* before Aristotle, two theories and theses had effectively emerged in such a way that it almost seems as if Aristotle took a stand for one of them. Aristotle says: the *logos* is not *physei*, it is not the product of any fixed event or process, it is nothing like digestion or the circulation of blood, but has its genesis in something completely different, it is not *physei*, but *kata syntheke*. This corresponds to the *Logos* thesis of the predecessors, according to which language is *thesei*: speech does not come into being, does not take place and is not formed as an organic process, but is what it is on the basis of an agreement. Insofar as Aristotle also says *kata syntheke*, he seems to be of the opinion that language is formed in this way, that sounds are produced and people agree: we mean this or that. This happens, but he does not grasp the intimate essence of the *genesis* of language itself, which Aristotle saw in a much deeper way, starting to a certain extent from these theories, but surpassing them with decisive new steps⁸.

The fundamental novelty that Aristotle would introduce would be it is precisely the ontological consideration of the genesis of language, which Heidegger, summarising his interpretation, understands as follows: "Speech arises from that *essential agreement* of men among themselves, in accordance with which, *in their being reciprocally together, they are open to the surrounding entity*, on which in particular they agree and that is, at the same time, they can also not agree"⁹. And it is essential to emphasise that this agreement does not depend on the will of the individuals participating in the agreement, but is the horizon within which their participation occurs.

This aspect of language, which precedes and conditions participation in it, is accentuated by Heidegger not only in the interpretation of the semanticity of the *logos* in general, but also in the ontological foundation of the apophanticity of asseverative discourse, and precisely by showing the connection of the structure of the *logos* to the structure of the world. Here, too, Heidegger reiterates that the being-true or false of the *logos* derives from its character of *synthesis* or *dihairesis* expressed in the copula, which is here defined as the indifference of the totality of *Was-sein*, *Daß-sein* and *Wahr-sein*¹⁰; and here, too, this character is founded ontologically in the discovering attitude (*Verhalten*) of man¹¹,

rather in the power (*Vermögen*) that man has to discover being and to constitute a world¹², so that the constitution of the world is "the foundation of the intimate possibility of the *logos*"¹³. However, whereas previously Heidegger had seen the foundation of the discovering attitude in the structure of the hermeneutic *insofar as* it connotes being itself as comprehension, here he asserts that the structure of the *insofar as it is*, even before the structure of comprehension, the essential determination of the world itself understood in the sense of the manifestation of being as a whole. In this way, the structure of the *in quanto* is connected in a common root not only and not so much with being, but also and above all with being itself.

This is why Heidegger can decisively assert that "the *logos* is not autonomous, but is grounded in something more original"¹⁴, i.e. it is rooted in that dimension that precedes it ontologically and which Heidegger is probing here. This is why he adds that "the *logos* does not establish a relationship with the entity as such, but is *founded* on it"¹⁵. For this reason, in a sense that already announces the interpretation of the *logos* given in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935), he infinally concludes that "the apophantic *logos* not only does not establish a relation with being, but does not even produce the manifestation of being. It only makes use of this and *that*, if it wants to be what it can be: to discover or to cover that which it shows. (...) The *logos apophantikos* only *exposes* what is already manifest, but does not actually constitute the manifestation of the being.

The shift that Heidegger makes here is, on closer inspection, twofold. Attention and thematic focus are in fact shifted not only from the asseverative *logos* to the ante-predictive dimension that precedes it and in which it is grounded, but also from the *logos* as a mode of active discovery by being to the ontological occurrence of truth in the sense of the unveiling of the being in which the *logos* is located. In the text, the first shift is formulated as follows: "The *logos apophantikos* as assertion is certain in the possibility of being-true or being-false, but this mode of being-true, of becoming manifest, is grounded in a manifestativity that we, since it is *prior to predication* and assertion, designate as *ante-predicative manifestativity* or rather as *pre-logical truth*. Logical is here taken in a very narrow sense, that is, in reference to the *logos apophantikos*

in the interpreted form. With reference to it there is a manifestativity that is *before* it, and precisely *before* it in the determined sense that this original manifestativity founds the possibility of the being-true or being-false of the *logos*, it precedes it by founding it¹⁷. The second shift announces itself instead where Heidegger affirms: "If the *logos apophantikos* refers back to something more original with regard to its intimate possibility, and if this something more original stands in some connection with what we call the *world* and the *formation of the world*, then judgements and propositions are not in themselves primarily formative of the world, even if they belong to the formation of a world. (...) *Prior to the actuation and for the actuation of every assertion there must already be possible in the asserting man an open-being for the entity itself, about which he always judges. And this being-openness is located in a happening which it is not man who determines: "Ante-predicative manifestativity not only must in general already always happen and be happening, if the assertion that makes the seeing - this way or that way - is to be able to be realised, but this ante-predicative manifestativity must itself be such a happening, in which a determined letting oneself be bound (Sich- bindenlassen) takes place"*¹⁹. This fundamental happening that precedes the discovering attitude of beingness in relation to the manifestativity of beingness is what Heidegger calls free-being or freedom. It is, however, no longer understood in that sense and in that eminently practical connotation in which it had been understood in the 1920s; it is no longer that non-power-not-to-decide which is the ontological foundation of the designing of being, but it is that being-freedom for the being which is located in the *happening of the design of the world and in the domination of the world (Walten der Welt)*²⁰.

It is then clear that here, in conjunction with the evolution of his speculative position, Heidegger modifies his way of understanding the ontological foundation of the *logos*, and precisely by emphasising in the cooriginarity of the plexus of beingness and the world, of aperturality and being-opening, no longer the active configuration of openness by beingness, but rather its situating itself in an event that encompasses and comprehends it. This clearly prefigures the outcome Heidegger arrives at, for example, during the summer semester of 1935 on the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, in the

in which, attempting to illuminate the pre-metaphysical dimension of thought, Heidegger takes up his theory of the logos and reformulates it by proposing to replace the metaphysical definition of man as *zoion logon echon* with an understanding of *Physis* as *logos anthropon echon*²¹.

3. *Being as Presence and as Truth (1930)*

Parallel to this thematisation of the discovery of being within the horizon of the occurrence of being understood as manifestativity, Heidegger matures the need for a fundamental clarification of the determination of truth as manifestativity in relation to the metaphysical understanding of being as presence and as *manifestativum sui*. The dense point of the treatment of being as presence and as truth, and of the reciprocal inherence of these two determinations, can be identified in an interpretation of Book IX of the *Metaphysics* that Heidegger takes up (although he had already begun it in the winter semester of 1925/26⁽²²⁾) and develops in the early 1930s, namely by interpreting in the summer semester of 1930 *Met. IX, 10* and in the summer semester 1931 *Met. IX, 1-3*.

As seen above, being in the sense of truth is that determination on the analysis of which Heidegger worked intensively in his confrontation with Aristotle during the 1920s, and it is that fundamental signification of being which - in contrast to the traditional privileging of substance - Heidegger considers the guiding signification in understanding the unity of being. Now, in taking up the problem of truth during the 1930s in the perspective modified by the 'turn', Heidegger aims above all to emphasise that *the aletheuein* is grounded in the manifestative structure of the *alethes on*, while at the same time being concerned to grasp the structure of manifestation in relation to the Aristotelian and Greek understanding of being.

There are essentially two fundamental outcomes of this in-depth analysis of the truth phenomenon. (1) First of all, the conviction that was already affected at the end of the discussion in the winter semester of 1925/26 is confirmed and consolidated, namely the conviction that Aristotelian thought and Greek thought move in

general in the horizon of the unconscious metaphysical decision that presupposes, without thematizing it, an understanding of being as constant presence (*beständige Anwesenheit*). (2) Secondly, the clarification of the structure of being as manifestation and as constant presence leads Heidegger to hypothesize that in Aristotle the mode par excellence in which being exhibits these two characteristics is being in the sense of *energeia*. But to understand being as *energeia* means for Heidegger to understand it in the horizon of movement (*Bewegtheit*), and the being that *is* on this horizon in the most straightforward sense is that which has the principle of movement in itself, that is, being as *physis*.

Thus the essential traces of the logical connection between the perspective of the confrontation with Aristotle in the 1920s and the subsequent interpretation culminating in the essay on *physis* are indicated. To this should also be added the discovery of the pre-Socratics, or rather the emergence of the reference to pre-Socratic thought as a decisive reference, the beginning of which can be chronologically located at the beginning of the 1930s, and precisely in 1932 in *The Beginning of Western philosophy: Anaximander and Parmenides* and then in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*²³; and then the discovery of Nietzsche as the fulfilment of metaphysics²⁴ and the poetry of Hölderlin as a lyrical exercise of the new beginning²⁵. Well then, precisely in the in-depth questioning of the filosofic tradition in the light of the Presocratics, Nietzsche and Hölderlin, and in the attempt to grasp a pre-metaphysical dimension of thought, Heidegger arrives at the conviction that the Aristotelian concept of *physis* is not an original determination, but is already obscured by the metaphysical decision within the horizon of which being is understood as presence.

Within these essential coordinates, which allow for a deeper evaluation of Aristotle's presence in the perspective of the so-called 'second' Heidegger, it is now a question of seeing more closely how Heidegger interprets being in the sense of the true in the light of *Met.* IX, 10 and then being in the sense of *energeia* in the light of *Met.* IX, 1-3.

The *excursus* on *Met.* IX, 10, made in the first part of the course in the summer semester of 1930²⁶, begins with an illustration of the Greek understanding of being as constant presence, which for Heidegger is the horizon within which all Greek thought moves. In a form that already appears

Essentially one that will also be found in later writings, Heidegger argues here in fact that the Greeks implicitly understood being as constant presence, and precisely by focusing on the constant presence of that which for them is subtended and persists (*hypomenon*) in the movement of coming into presence (*parousia*, *Anwesenung*) and of the removal from presence (*apousia*, *Abwesenung*) on the part of the entity. This something that remains is what is considered by the Greeks as the most proper being and is designated as *ousia*. Heidegger affirms: '1) The interpretation of movement as the fundamental character of being is orientated on *apousia* and *parousia*, on absence and presence. 2) The attempt to clarify what is of being, e.g. of beautiful things as such, is orientated on *parousia*. 3) The traditional conception of *ousia* in the sense of substance also contains the original meaning of *ousia* as *parousia*. Later, starting from here, Heidegger will argue that since permanence is such in relation to a happening and to a movement, and precisely in relation to the movement of passing (*metabole*) from the *apousia* to the *parousia*, the happening of being has the character of 'motility' (*Bewegtheit*), and the movement par excellence is that which Aristotle conceives of as the passage and progression from *dynamis* to *energeia*²⁸.

Now, it is within this horizon of the Greek understanding of being as presence that Heidegger emphasizes again the problem of the four fundamental significates of being (in the sense of categories, in the sense of true and false, in the sense of act and power, and in the sense of accident), in order to verify whether and how they connect with this fundamental significate of constant presence. In particular, he intends to test here whether the significate of being as true (*Met.* IX, 10) and thus the significate of being as *energeia* (*Met.* IX, 1-3) connect with it.

In the tenth chapter of the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*, dealing with being in the sense of *energeia*, Aristotle affirms that being taken in this sense is *to kyriotata on* (1051 b 1), i.e. being in the most proper sense, and that it is referred to things themselves (*touto d'epi ton pragmaton*, 1051 b 2). This poses problems of congruence, since in the first chapters of the same book Aristotle had said that the most proper being is that taken in the sense of *energeia*; not only that, but in *Met.* VI, 4 he had also affirmed that being in the sense of truth is in thought, is a certain affection of thought

(*tes dianoias ti pathos*), and is therefore not relative to things (*aletheuein ouk en tois pragmasin*). This is a difficulty that Aristotelian scholars soon perceived and discussed, admittedly with mixed results, but at least arriving at the commonly accepted conviction that the problematic of the chapter does not properly connect with that of the rest of the book. Heidegger observes that here 'with reference to the *textual question of whether this chapter on being-true belongs to Book IX, the real problem* emerges at the same time, that is, *the question of the meaning of being-true itself, more precisely the problem of the connection of being as being-true and being as being-real*'²⁹.

Heidegger clashes here, however, with the theses held by Aristotle scholars, in particular those held by Schwegler, Jaeger and Ross. Schwegler had observed that this chapter cannot belong to the 9th book, as its logical content (of being in the sense of the true) does not connect with the metaphysical content of the rest of the book³⁰. Jaeger, while adhering to Schwegler's opinion, believed that it was probably Aristotle himself who added chapter ten as an appendix to the book, despite the lack of a strict systematic connection with it. As for the difficulties represented by the fact that in chapter ten being in the sense of the true is called *to kyriotata on*, whereas in the earlier chapters it would be being as *energeia*, Jaeger resolved this by asserting that here *kyriotata* does not mean 'more authentic' or 'more proper', but 'more common' and 'more usual'³¹. In finally, precisely because of this difficulties, Ross had intervened in the text by proposing to elide *kyriotata*³².

For Heidegger, all three of these solutions stem from a misunderstanding of the filosofic problematic of the book, namely the misunderstanding of the connection of the determination of truth with that of *energeia*. Against Ross polemizes: "There is not the slightest reason for such a gross intervention in the text, which here is completely fine. It is just that the inconvenience of the *kyriotata* in relation to what is supposed to be the content of the chapter is annoying"³³.

Against Jaeger observes: "If us us us like does Jaeger, to Schwegler's special interpretation, according to which a chapter on logic cannot be part of *Metaphysics*, then it would be consistent not to

attribute the addition of the chapter to Aristotle himself, all the more so when one considers how the Aristotelian books and chapters are composed and formed"³⁴. As for Jaeger's interpretation of the *kyriotata*, Heidegger rejects it, noting: "Jaeger's view is all the more curious in that in justifying the inconsistency of the chapter with the book he goes even further than Schwegler. Jaeger sees the greatest 'external' obstacle to the chapter's affiliation with the book in the fact that, according to the chapter's position, the *on alethes* should not only be part of the theme, but this *on* should also have the value of *kyriotata*, of entity-true as a more proper entity. 'This possibility,' Heidegger quotes Jaeger here, 'seems improbable to me, and will be so for anyone. 'If someone were to argue for the collocation of IX, 10 *on the* basis that only here does one arrive at the *kyriotata on*, he would misunderstand the letter and think in a non-Aristotelian way'. Jaeger means that he who affirms that Aristotle conceives of being-true here as being most proper, does not understand what *kyriotata on* means and has an idea of being that is completely distant from the Aristotelian one. On the contrary, I affirm that those who maintain that IX, 10 belongs to IX, or rather see in it the true culmination of metaphysics in general, not only do not think in a non-Aristotelian way, but think in a purely Aristotelian way, indeed in a simply ancient way"³⁵.

Infine, against Schwegler and in general against blindness for the filosofic problematic of the chapter, Heidegger concludes: 'But how could the chapter's authentic theme have been so crudely and stubbornly missed? The commentators and those who quote them have also read and interpreted the chapter. Of course, but between reading and reading there is difference. The question is whether we read with the right eyes, i.e. whether we are generally prepared in ourselves to see what needs to be seen. That is, whether or not we are up to the task, i.e. whether or not we understand in a sufficiently original way the problem of being and thus the problem of truth and their possible connection, in order to move within the horizon in which the ancient filosofia of Plato and Aristotle holds itself back, so to speak. Or if we dare to approach the filosofic tradition with worn-out filosofic concepts and the pseudo-problems they produce, and with this painful exegetical paraphernalia we pretend to establish what must be in the text and what it is permissible for Aristotle to have thought.

This is what happens in *Schwegler*. One knows that the problem of truth belongs to logic. Being is taken for obvious anyway and one does not even question it. If Aristotle now presents a chapter in the main book of the doctrine of being that already in the first sentence deals with truth, then it has no place here. Whether this proceeding then degenerates in a more or less raffinate or coarse manner, this does not in the least change the fundamental unacceptability of such a methodology¹³⁶.

Thus, against *Schwegler*, against *Jaeger* and against *Ross* (and instead making the theses of *Thomas*, *Suarez* and *Bonitz* his own)⁽³⁷⁾, *Heidegger* not only argues that chapter 10 belongs to book IX, but also affstates that it represents the apex of Aristotle's treatment of the problem of being: "The fact that Aristotle concludes with IX, 10, that is, the fact that he *interprets being-true as authentic being, is the first and last radical expression* of the fundamental and decisive understanding of being and truth in ancient metaphysics"³⁸. For *Heidegger*, in fact, Aristotle deals here with truth taken in its eminently ontological sense and insofar as it relates to things themselves (whereas the truth dealt with in *Met.* VI, 4 is the being-truth of propositions, i.e. of that connecting and separating that takes place in thought).

Heidegger also intends to show that the priority of being as true in the ontological sense that results from *Met.* IX, 10, i.e. essentially the priority of *alethes on* over *the aletheuein* proper to the soul's connecting and separating, is closely connected with the Greek and Aristotelian understanding of being as constant presence. The truth of preaching, in fact, cannot be assigned the character of priority, since preaching can uncover but can also conceal, and because of this character, the truth of being that it manifests cannot have a guaranteed constant presence. On the contrary, the latter is greatest in being itself, which as such cannot be true or false, but is always true; and it will then be greatest in that being which cannot be otherwise than it is and whose truth and presence are constant in the highest degree. This is the case with the simple and the indivisible. The character of truth, interpreted in connection with the idea of being as constant presence, is therefore in a supreme sense - in gradation

in decreasing gradation - to the simple (*hapla*), the incomposed (*asyntheta*) and the indivisible (*adihaireta*), and to a lesser extent - again in decreasing gradation - to compounds such as *synkeimena* and *symbekota*. *Hapla*, *asyntheta*, *adihaireta*, *synkeimena* and *symbekota* thus represent the gradation of being in relation to its character of constant presence and truth.

Indeed, Heidegger observes: 'When is it that entity can be true in the proper sense, when is it as such properly true? (...) Answer: when every possibility that the being is not true is excluded in every respect. When does this happen, and what does truth mean here? When being belongs to truth. How is this possible? When being-truth constitutes the most proper characteristic of being as such. But what is being? Constant presence. When, therefore, truth itself signifies nothing other than the supreme and most proper presence, then it is truth. This is a metaphysical question, indeed the purest metaphysical question, and it has nothing to do with gnoseology'³⁹.

The same argument is also taken up and restated from a different angle: "1) Authentic being is *the on energeiai*. *Energeia* is authentic being in the sense of remaining in constant presence. 2) Truth is the unveiling of beingness and only on the basis of this unveiling and in relation to it is true in a derived sense - i.e. assuming or rejecting the unveiled - that which grasps and determines beingness itself: the *aletheuein*, the *phanai* or *kataphanai* to *alethes*. 3) Precisely because truth is by its essence unveiling of the being, the respective mode of unveiling (truth) is regulated and determined according to this species of being, that is, according to its being'⁴⁰.

Heidegger can then conclude that in the tenth chapter of Book IX of the *Metaphysics*, the essential connection and co-partnership of being and truth is thought of in such a way that truth in the sense of unveiling constitutes the most proper character of being, thought of in turn as presence. Returning infinitely to the textual question in the light of the considerations that have been made, he can direct it resolutely, observing: "We see that in IX, 10 (...) the progressive exclusion of the possibility of truth from non-truth is discussed, in order to grasp the latter in its most proper sense. In IX, 10 the most radical grasp of the

IX's fundamental problem. In a word: Chapter IX, 10, is not an appendix, but the intimately necessary keystone of the entire Book IX, which is the most central of the entire Metaphysics"⁴¹.

4. *The Unity of Being and Being as Energeia (1931)*


Having thus grasped the determination of being as true in relation to the Greek understanding of being as presence, it is then a matter for Heidegger to establish how it relates to the determination of *energeia* (*Met.* IX, 1-3). The interpretation of these three chapters of the ninth book of *the Metaphysics* takes up the entire course of the summer semester of 1931. Beyond the details of this interpretation, it should be noted in general that this is an important course for at least two reasons.

(1) First of all, it is important because Heidegger frames the interpretation of *Met.* IX, 1-3 in an overall reconsideration of Aristotelian ontology, and this reconsideration represents an essential point of reference in assessing the evolution of Heidegger's exegetical attitude. (2) But it is also important because through the interpretation of *Met.* IX, 1-3 Heidegger comes to realise that the determination of *being as energeia* is not only closely connected with the determination of being as truth, but also holds within itself a decisive trace for the search for what lies before and beyond metaphysics, a search in which Heidegger engages in ever greater depth.

The introductory part of the course (§§ 1-6) confirms very clearly the hypothesis presented in the framework of the investigation carried out here, namely that the general horizon of Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle is that of the problem of the four fundamental significates of being, i.e. that horizon which is already profiled in *nuce* following the reading of Brentano and Braig and which is essayed with various probes and in-depth studies in the course of the 1920s. Here, at the beginning of the 1931 course, after having examined in the previous semesters the signification of being as true, and approaching the examination of the last fundamental signification of being, Heidegger takes stock of the situation and re-presents in a synthetic but illuminating framework the entire problematic of being as *pollachos legomenon*. Beyond the restatement of the problematic, what needs to be put into

Evidence is that here the direction of Heidegger's questioning is concentrated and converges towards its focal point; that is, it aims unequivocally at the grasping of the fundamental unity of being, at that finish towards which it had been oriented from the earliest beginnings.

Thus, the problematic of the four fundamental meanings of being is here reconsidered and reworked by Heidegger in clear reference to the problem of grasping the ultimate unity that governs that plurivocity. The scheme in which Heidegger synoptically summarises the problematic of being as *pollachos legomenon* clearly indicates the direction towards which, thinking *with* Aristotle *against* Aristotle, Heideggerian questioning is oriented⁴².



Heidegger sees in Aristotelian doctrine both the position of the problem of the unity of the multiple meanings of being and an attempt to think of its solution, namely in the theory of analogy and in the reflections on the convertibility of being and one. However, the Aristotelian way of thinking about the unity of being is in Heidegger's eyes too weak. Indeed, he observes: 'Certainly, it could be said that Aristotle holds to the most original radical affinity of being and unity; certainly, it will also be admitted that Aristotle at the same time also makes constant reference to the *pollachos*. Only with this nothing has yet been done to resolve the decisive question: in what way is the *on (einai) hei pollachos legomenon*, being insofar as it is said plurivocally, is *koinon ti*, is it in some way common to the many?'⁴³.

Instead, Heidegger explicitly poses the question of the unity of being in a strong sense, as evidenced by the overlapping questions that trouble him: "This being is something that lies before every

explanation, i.e. something that subsists for itself and in this self-subsistence is the true essence of being? Or is being by its essence never inexplicit, so that multiplicity and its unfolding constitute precisely the singular unity of that which is collected in itself? Is being transmitted to the individual modes in such a way that through this transmission it distributes itself, but without being divided in this distribution, as if it were dispersed as if fragmented and lost its unity, its very essence? And if so, how must and how can something like this happen? What dominates in this happening?"⁴⁴.

Within the horizon of the metaphysical decision that turns its gaze away from the originality of being and turns it exclusively to being, there is, according to Heidegger, no space to ask these questions. He thus observes that 'neither Aristotle nor his predecessors posed these questions, nor did they seek a ground for these questions as questions'; and he adds that in the even more fixed concealment of later philosophy and particularly in modern philosophy 'only the different meanings of being and the different 'categories' have been systematised in accordance with the mathematical idea of science'⁴⁵. This last development represents a regress with respect to Aristotle, because in Heidegger's eyes Aristotle was at least tormented by the problem of the unity of the *pollachos legomenon*, so much so that "in him we find the cue for an answer. And this cue strikes at the extreme limit of what was generally possible on the terrain of the ancient approach to the problem of being"⁴⁶.

The solution Heidegger refers to here is the one put forward in the form of the analogical unity of being, i.e. the unity that results from the reference of all categories to the first of them, i.e. to substance. It is the unity of being that is due to its analogical homonymy, which lies somewhere between pure homonymy and synonymy, between absolute equivocity and univocity. However, this solution is not satisfactory for Heidegger, it is - as mentioned above - too weak, since it explains at best the unity of being only in reference to the multiplicity of its categorical senses, but not in relation to its other extra-categorical senses, namely being as true (in the ontological sense) and being as *energeia*. Heidegger affirms thus: 'The analogy

of being is not a solution to the problem of being, indeed it is not even a real elaboration of the problem, but it is the title of the most leathery aporia, the lack of a way out in which ancient thought has walled itself in, and with it subsequent thought up to the present day⁴⁷.

Now, in the course of the research it has been pointed out how, in his comparison with Aristotle, Heidegger has been searching for this unity from the very beginning and how he alternately essays the various fundamental meanings of being in relation to the possibility of grasping and deriving from them the indication of what is the unity – fundamental unity

– the original of being – itself. E – what characterises the development of the Heideggerian attitude towards Aristotle – this is our thesis – is that he tries from time to time to consider each of the various meanings as decisive, initially perhaps that of substance, then that of truth and finally that of *energeia*. As for – to the – significance of the

substance, – significance – traditionally regarded as fundamental and also considered as such by Brentano, it can be assumed – that Heidegger – himself – convinced well – soon – of – its inadequacy to serve as the fundamental signification of being, since it, instead of accounting for the fullness of its senses, restricts them within the metaphysical-scholastic horizon of presence and *theoria*. Here, against the reduction of ontology to usology, Heidegger observes: 'On the basis of the initial proposition of *Met.* IX, 1, it was already concluded in the Middle Ages that the first fundamental guiding meaning of being in absolute – for its four modes all together, not just one of them and its multiplicity – would be *ousia*, which is usually translated as 'substance'. As if being-possible, being-real and being-true were also to be brought back to being in the sense of substance. In the nineteenth century, people were all the more inclined to do this (especially Brentano), because in the meantime being, being-possible and being-true had gained recognition as categories. Therefore, it is commonly believed that the Aristotelian doctrine of being is a 'doctrine of substance'. This is an error born in – part

– from the insufficient interpretation of *pollachos*; more precisely: not seen that only a problem is being prepared here. (W. Jaeger's construction on Aristotle is also based on this fundamental error)"⁴⁸.

As far as the meaning of being as true is concerned, we have seen how, in the 1920s, Heidegger thoroughly verified its ontological significance, returning several times to the problem and to Aristotle's treatment of it. We then saw how Heidegger distinguished truth, as a character of the occurrence of being itself, from being-truth, which distinguishes the discovering attitude of being insofar as it cooriginally stands in relation to the being that manifests itself to him. And we have also seen how through this interpretation Heidegger matured the conviction that the Greek understanding of being was closely linked to the idea of constant presence (which would have prevented the explicit thematisation of the entire temporal extension of being).

Here, in the course of 1931, Heidegger comes to that decisive discovery that - together with the in-depth confrontation with the Presocratics, with Nietzsche and with Hölderlin, and together with the reading of Ernst Jünger - profoundly affects the development of his filosofic perspective and his critical-assimilative disposition towards Aristotle: I mean the discovery, or rather, the emergence in a decisive way of the signification of being as *energeia*, which not only provides Heidegger with a decisive aid in understanding the unity of being, but also refers back to that unthought of metaphysics, which precedes it and conditions it as a removed possibility; it is the arising, total and original signification of being as *physis*⁴⁹.

Thus, if through the interpretation of the four fundamental significations of being Heidegger convinces himself that they presuppose an idea of being as constant presence, and if he then examines the connection of this idea with those four fundamental significations, here, in the examination of being as *energeia* (in which the manifestation of being reaches its highest expression), he is referred back to what is before the *energeia*, before truth and all the other meanings, that is, he is referred back to their common unitary source. This source is precisely being in its original occurrence, the basis of which is the structure of appearance (*Aletheia*) and having in itself the principle of movement (*Physis*).

Heidegger, in short, in retracing the scale of the four fundamental meanings of being, finds in the Aristotelian determinations of truth and *energeia* a fundamental and illuminating indication: it does not

not only allows us to think of the unity of being as a presence in the horizon of the metaphysical decision that has already taken place, but also refers back to that still unprejudiced and undecided understanding of being that Heidegger believes he can grasp in the pre-Socratic experience of *Physis*⁵⁰.

At this point, as Heidegger's commitment to transcending and abandoning metaphysics deepens, the centrality of the confrontation with Aristotle (as well as with the other great founding moments of Western thought) gradually fades away, and in its place is replaced by a major confrontation with the Pre-Socratics, in particular with Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus. The 1939 essay on essence and the concept of *physis* in Aristotle, Heidegger's last articulate confrontation with the Aristotelian text, is clearly situated in the atmosphere created by the reading of the Presocratics.

5. *Being as 'Physis' and its capture in 'Techne'.*

To fully understand the changed perspective in which the essay on the Aristotelian concept of *physis* is placed, it is necessary to consider a further element, namely the emergence in Heideggerian thought of the problem of technique. In fact, *physis* manifests itself to Heidegger as the original meaning of being precisely at the same time as the conviction matures in him that the metaphysics, which conceals that originality, is essentially connected with the phenomenon of technique, and indeed that it reaches its inversion, that is, its total explication and its fulfilment, only where the technical disposition that connotes it reaches its fullest and most perfect realisation, that is, in the essence of modern technique.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger is certainly not yet the critic of technique that he would later become. A lexicographical analysis of the text proves this, since, as the computer tells us, the word 'technique' appears in *Being and Time* only twice⁵¹. But there is a structural reason why the Heidegger of *Being and Time* could not, however, criticise technique in the way he later does. In this work, in fact, it is precisely that fundamental attitude of being towards things that essentially corresponds to the disposition of technique, namely the attitude of caring, that is characterised in an essentially positive way

which is firstly a dealing with things in the sense of using them in operational contexts (*Zuhandenheit*), and only secondly a simple observation of them in their presence (*Vorhandenheit*). But the utilisation of things in operational contexts is precisely that attitude that in modern technology is elevated to power and absolutized for the purpose of mastering the entity; it is precisely that attitude that the latest Heidegger radically questions.

In the course of Heidegger's analysis of the phenomenon of truth in the 1920s, it was also shown how Heidegger interpreted *techne* as one of the ways in which being is discovering, i.e. accessing and relating to being; and this accessing and relating is characterised by Heidegger, who appropriates the determinations given by Aristotle in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as an *aletheuein*, i.e. with an essentially positive value.

How is it then that Heidegger arrives at that critical attitude towards technology, in whose essence as the fulfilment of metaphysics he sees the destiny of the present age tormented by the travails of nihilism being consummated?

It is precisely in the texts of the 1930s that one can almost touch the take-over of the Heideggerian conviction that the meta-fisical decision, by which the original *Physis* is captured and subjugated into presence, is enacted through *techne*⁵². In general, one can say that the emergence in Heidegger of the understanding of *techne* as a decision characterising the opening of meaning that connotes metaphysics is closely connected with the conviction that the fundamental meaning of being presupposed by the Greeks is that of constant presence. Indeed, this understanding of being implies for Heidegger the privileging of a specific intentional attitude, namely that attitude that more than any other opens the being in its being and maintains it in presence, namely *techne*.

However, it should be noted that, at least at first, and certainly in relation to the origins of Greek thought, the Heideggerian view of the phenomenon of *techne* has neither a critical nor a negative connotation. Rather, *techne* is seen as the way par excellence through which the Greeks discovered *physis*. In one of the first

courses in which Heideggerian meditation on the phenomenon of technique begins to emerge, that is, during the summer semester of 1930, Heidegger asserts that for the Greeks "*techne* does not designate 'technique' as a *practical* activity, nor is it restricted primarily to the skill of the craftsman, but *means production* in the broadest sense and the 'knowledge' that guides it. In it is expressed the contention for the being-present of the entity"⁵³. In the course of the winter semester of 1937/38, in yet another return to the problem of the truth of the *logos* - a return that takes on a particular documentary significance because it is conducted within the horizon of the speculative deepening that Heidegger carries out in his major work after the 'turning point', i.e. in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (1936-1938) -, Heidegger now decisively thematises the Greek understanding of being as presence in relation to the 'technical' openness of its meaning, at the same time offering those clarifications on the relationship between *physis* and *techne* that he had promised in 1935's *Introduction to Metaphysics*⁵⁴.

Here Heidegger asserts that *techne* is originally the attitude par excellence of the Greeks vis-à-vis *physis*, is that disposition by virtue of which, setting himself and understanding himself as different from *physis*, Greek man unveils *physis* in his being and keeps it unveiled as such in his character as *physis*. He points out: "The original tuning in is not (...) an adaptation in the sense that man simply becomes *physis*, but on the contrary an adequate distinguishing, that is, such that he holds firm to his measure, the *physis*, and in this way relates and establishes demeanour. If, however, man is not the entity itself as a whole, but that which is placed in the midst of the entity as the custodian of its unveiling, this perceiving and this custodian cannot determine themselves again as *physis*, but must be that other which is adequate to *physis*, which liberates it and which also grasps it"⁵⁵. And this attitude which is other than *physis*, but which precisely as other can maintain *physis* in its original openness and its unveiling as *physis*, is *techne*.

Heidegger can then reiterate that for the Greeks '*techne* does not mean Nor does 'technique' in the sense of the mechanical installation of the entity mean art in the sense of mere skill and ability in some proceeding or handling. *Techne* means a knowing, being

competent in proceeding against the entity (and meeting with the entity), that is, against *physis*. (...) *techne* means in fact: to grasp the being that opens up from itself in that in which it as such shows itself, in its appearance, *eidos*, *idea*, in order to cure and allow the being itself to grow in conformity with it, or to establish itself within the being as a whole through the production and installation of something corresponding. Heidegger points out, however:

"*Techne* is the way to proceed *against physis*, but here not yet in order to overff it and to exploit it, and above all not in order to make use and calculation a principle, but on the contrary, in order to maintain in unveiling the dominance of *physis*. We must therefore say: since in the fundamental disposition of astonishment the determining need (*die stimmende Not*) is the pure recognition of the entity as such, the perception of *physis* in its *aletheia*, the technique and its implementation as that which is totally other with respect to *physis*, the totally other which belongs to *physis* in the most essential way, become a necessity"⁵⁷.

This is why modern technique must be distinguished from Greek *techne*, even though in

The latter has its essential foundation. Heidegger says that from the Greek word *techne* "we must keep away the word 'technique' that is customary today and linguistically derived from it as well as all the semantic connections that the name 'technique' evokes"⁵⁸. However, he adds immediately afterwards: "*The fact that* one could and should have arrived at modern and contemporary technique is founded in the beginning and is motivated by the not-possible-to-retain beginning. This means that today's technique - precisely as a form of 'total mobilisation' (*Ernst Jünger*) - is only conceivable from the beginning of the fundamental Western position with regard to the entity as such in its entirety, provided that we aspire to a 'metaphysical' understanding and are not content to frame technique in political finality.

The 'metaphysical' understanding of the phenomenon of technique to which Heidegger here alludes is obviously that which he matures in the horizon of the well-established discovery of the Pre-Socratics, in the tormented confrontation with Nietzsche and in the elective affinity with Hölderlin's crepuscular theophany; it is the understanding in which, as we know, technique is interpreted as the essential fulfilment of the original motivation of Greek metaphysics. Heidegger here confirms his conviction that

In the great Greek filosofia, in Plato and in Aristotle, the original experience of being as *Physis* and as *Aletheia* is concealed by a fundamental and progressive ambiguity, which is the ambiguity of *techne* as an attitude that *liberates* and *discovers physis*, but at the same time *seizes* and *captures* it. *The techne*, in the understanding of which this second sense is progressively afferminated, thus represents the appropriate ground for that essential change that marks the beginning of metaphysics. The original experience of being as *Physis* and as *Aletheia* is restricted, especially beginning with Plato, to the determinations of the *idea* and the *orthotes*, i.e. it is only experienced within the circumscribed metaphysical horizon of the problem of the adequacy of its grasping, and no longer in the fullness of its manifestation, which nevertheless, especially in Aristotle, still shines through.

Here, then, is how, immediately following the writing of the essay on the Aristotelian concept of *physis*, that horizon of understanding is constituted within which the essay is designed and in reference to which the hermetisms that obscure its meaning can be dissolved.

The interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of *physis*, which Heidegger conducts with strict textual reference to the first chapter of the second book of the *Physics*, is presented as the 'translation' of the text into a language that brings to light the pulsating filosofic problems that enliven the text and that millennia-old conceptual encrustations have concealed. It is actually an attempt to shake the obviousness that numbs the understanding of Aristotelian determinations, in order to bring out the decisive importance of *Physics* for the development of all subsequent Western metaphysics.

At least briefly, it is worth recalling the capital thematic points on which Heidegger soffers his attention and which, at the same time, mark the rhythms of his interpretation of *Phys. B*, 1. They are:

- 1) First of all, the distinction between entities by nature (*ta physei onta*) and artefacts (*ta poioumena*), made on the basis of the observation that the former have in themselves the principle of movement and stillness (*la physis*), whereas the latter do not have in themselves, but in something else, the principle of their production (*la techne*) (192 b 8-32);

2) the characteristic of entities by nature to be substance (*ousia*), since they are substratum (*hypokeimenon*) and nature is always in a substratum (192 b 33-34);

3) the indemonstrability of entities by nature in the sense of their being as immediately accessible to experience as colours are to sight (193 at 3-8);

4) nature's characteristic of being prime matter, which is the substratum of each being that has in itself the principle of movement (*he prote hekastoi hypokeimene hyle*), and form (*he morphe kai to eidos to kata ton logon*) (193 a 28-31); Heidegger sees the novelty of these determinations in the fact that they are determinations of the mode of being of *physis*, not mere determinations of the being such as those of *rhythmos* and *to proton enyparchon hekastoi arrhythmiston* that are employed in the understanding of nature by predecessors (193 at 9-28);

5) the fundamental difference of nature and technology as regards generation (for from man is born man, whereas from the bed is not born the bed, 193 b 8-9);

6) the fact that as generation, nature is said by Aristotle to be a pathway to nature itself (*hodos eis physin*) (193 b 12-13);

7) the fact that form and nature are said to be twofold, since deprivation (*steresis*) is also in a certain sense form (193 b 18-21).

Without going into the details of the Heideggerian interpretation here, it will be sufficient to fix the fundamental outcomes it arrives at.

(1) Heidegger first of all comes to think of the peculiarity of the Aristotelian determination of nature, which consists in its being for natural entities both as principle of movement (*arche kineseos tou kinoumenou kath'hauto*) and as figure and form (*morphe kai eidos*), and precisely as *genesis* and as *kinesis*. From the unity of these two determinations results the essential connotation of nature according to Aristotle, which Heidegger interprets as a connotation of being, i.e. as a determination of the being of natural entities, and not as a character of the entity; the whole difference from the mode of being of the products of *techne* also results, a difference that influences decisively the maturation of Heidegger's critical attitude towards modern technology.

(2) In developing his interpretation, Heidegger suffers with particular insistence on certain key terms in Aristotle's treatment, the meaning of which would be obscured and distorted by the Latin translations. Thus, he cannot, for example, remove the idea that *epagoge* means induction, that *aition* means cause, that *arche* can be translated as principle, that *ousia* is equivalent to substance, *energeia* to act, *dynamis* to potency, *hyle* to matter, and so on in the case of other fundamental concepts.

(3) Among the latter, a particular importance in determining the Aristotelian conception of *physis* belongs to the concept of *steresis*, usually translated as 'deprivation'. For Heidegger, the concept of *steresis* is to be understood in strict reference to the Aristotelian conviction that nature is the process of coming into the presence (*Anwesenung*) and of removing oneself from the presence (*Abwesenung*) of the entity (according to Heraclitus' saying that "nature loves to hide itself", fr. 93).

(4) Finally, the fact that Aristotle considers *physis* as a *genos tou ontos*, reveals in Heidegger's eyes that in him it is no longer experienced as the original sense of being in its totality, as was the case in pre-Socratic thought, but in a way - with respect to the latter - that is derivative, i.e. already concealed by the emergence of technology. And yet Aristotle's greatness (even compared to Plato) lies in the fact that in him that sense is not completely concealed, but is preserved and reverberated, for example where he says that *ousia* is a *physis tis* (*Met.* IV, 3).

In the light of these considerations, it can be observed that the importance of this essay in the development of Heideggerian thought lies in the fact that in the Aristotelian reflection on *physis* Heidegger finds the grasping and determination of a being that has in itself the principle of movement and life, and that as such is differentiated from the mode of being of the products of technology; But in the Aristotelian reflection, the essential connection of *physis* and *techne* emerges and is also thought of for the first time, and precisely in such a way that, on the one hand, it still bears within itself the trace of the original pre-metaphysical openness and, on the other hand, marks a decisive beginning for the whole of the West.

If we then consider that the contemporary epoch as a whole is understood by Heidegger as the epoch of the realisation of technology, which is the total forgetting of *Physis*, that is, of that being that is neither produced and made by man nor dependent on him, we can then understand what importance the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of *physis* assumes not only in relation to the comparison with Aristotle, but in general in the questioning of metaphysics and in the desire to go beyond the line of its occurrence, to scrutinise, in short, its before and its after, connecting *Physis* and *Techne* as the beginning and the completion of an essential event that has its foundation in the structure of being itself.

As for the importance of Aristotle in this perspective in which Heidegger radicalises his critique of metaphysics, it should be noted, however, that in reality this importance for Heidegger lies in the fact that in Aristotle the original pre-Socratic sense of *physis* still echoes and that, therefore, through his thought it is possible to go back to that sense. The fact, on the other hand, that in Aristotle the consideration of *techne* emerges, and furthermore those conceptual determinations that are decisive for all Western thought are grasped, marks the greatness of Aristotle *within* the horizon of metaphysics; so that this greatness is substantially preceded, especially in the perspective of the last Heidegger, by a negative sign.

The general horizon of Heideggerian speculation is no longer characterised here by the desire to radically appropriate the foundational intentions of the great filosofic tradition (Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Husserl), but it is the abandonment of these foundations and the turning to the experience of a new thought that matures through the reading of the Presocratics (as virgin and auroral thought), Nietzsche (as the experience of the fulfilment of metaphysics), and Hölderlin (as 'hermetic' thought that bears the message of a new beginning). The progressive waning of the presence of Aristotle in the writings of the late Heidegger, despite the albeit numerous scattered references⁶⁰, confirms this shift in perspective and intent.

In a certain sense, however, it can be observed that even here *the thematic horizon of ontology*, i.e. the horizon Heidegger gains through the confrontation with Aristotle, remains decisive. This is because the research

of what lies before and beyond the metaphysical decision is also conducted, after all, precisely from, and essentially without leaving, the thematic horizon of the problem of being; it is precisely within this horizon that Heidegger implements his understanding, his anamnesis, and his critique of the metaphysical illness and, consequently, also his search for the unthought of Western filosofia. But the horizon of the problem of being is also a *determinate* horizon; it is precisely that horizon which identifies the original motivation of filosofia with the ontological problem and which is first constituted precisely with Aristotle⁶¹.

And it can be said that Heidegger remains within the Aristotelian horizon of ontological questioning not only where he reconnects the foundations of the modern age with Greek thought, interpreting modern technology as the most radical response to the Greek way of questioning about being. But he remains substantially bound to this horizon even where his critique of Western filosofice becomes more resolute, since this critique is essentially based only on a difference of intensity in the questioning, only on the different radicality that the thematisation of the relation of being and time or the introduction of ontological difference imply, but not on the abandonment of the *thematic horizon* of metaphysical questioning, not on the dismissal of the ontological problematic, which from Aristotle onwards becomes the original motivation and central theme of filosofia.

Notes

⁽¹⁾ M. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis. Aristoteles, Physik B 1*, 'Il Pensiero', 3, 1958, pp. 131-156, 265-290 (with transl. it. by G. Guzzoni), now in HGA IX, 239-301.

²Even among themselves, despite their common inspiration from Heidegger, these studies present numerous differences and divergences both in the way they understand this inspiration and in the themes they consider. Thus, for example, W. Bröcker's monograph (*Aristoteles*, 1935) moves clearly within the interpretative horizon that Heidegger opened up in the early 1930s, conceiving the Aristotelian concept of being as 'motility' (*Bewegtheit*). The survey by H. Weiss (*Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles*, 1942) can take into account in dealing with the concept of *physis* the further developments of the Heideggerian reflection; moreover, it is in my opinion also important because in ch. 3 (pp. 99-153) it closely refers back to the Heideggerian interpretation of *praxis* (*Eth. Nic.* VI) as the fundamental mode of being of human life, confirming the thesis put forward in our survey (cf. III, 3). Also in the Freiburg environment and at Heidegger's school, thus being able to take account of unpublished texts and courses, the works of K. Ulmer (*Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristoteles*, 1953), E. Tugendhat (*Ti kata tinos*, 1958) and A. Guzzoni (*Die Einheit des pollachos legomenon bei Aristoteles*, 1957) were conceived and written, which take account of

especially the perspective of the late Heidegger. The investigation by F. Wiplinger (*Physis und Logos*, 1971) adheres closely to it, not least because of its author's particular closeness to Heidegger. A much freer reference to the Heideggerian interpretation, criticising it on some fundamental points, is instead made in another more recent investigation from the Freiburg environment, namely U. Guzzoni (*Grund und Allgemeinheit*, 1975). Other works conceived in environments other than Freiburg also refer more or less directly to Heidegger, such as the monograph by R. Boehm (*Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche*, 1965) or the studies produced in the Cologne environment: E. Vollrath (*Studien zur Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles*, 1969), K.-H. Volkmann-Schluck (*Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, 1979), I. Schüssler (*Aristoteles. Philosophie und Wissenschaft*, 1982). (For complete bibliographical indications on these studies see footnote on p. 17.)

³See HGA XXIX/XXX, §§ 71-73.

⁴It had already been dealt with during the winter semester of 1925/26 (*Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*), in *Being and Time* (§§ 7 B, 33, 44), in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (§§ 7, 22, section III) (translated by M.E. Reina, edited by V. Verra, Laterza, Rome-Bari 1981) and in *Of the Essence of the Foundation* (section I). In the course of the 1930s, this problem was to be taken up and explored several times, and in this sense it constitutes a privileged theme to follow the evolution of Heideggerian position.

⁵Cf. HGA XXIX/XXX, 441, where Heidegger explicitly asserts that he now treats the problem of the *logos* "in a form that *differences*" from the previous one.

⁶Ibid. 446-447.

⁷Ibid, 447. On the modifications that the term 'transcendence' undergoes in Heidegger precisely at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s see Görland, *Transzendenz und Selbst*, especially pp. 26-100. On the Heideggerian concept of 'symbol' cf. J.E. Doherty, *Sein, Mensch und Symbol. Heidegger und die Auseinandersetzung mit dem neukantianischen Symbolbegriff*, Bouvier-Grundmann, Bonn 1972.

⁸HGA XXIX/XXX, 447.

⁹Ibid, 447-448.

¹⁰Cf. *ibid.*, 456-483.

¹¹Ibid. 486.

¹²Ibid, 489.

¹³Ibid, 486.

¹⁴Ibid, 491.

¹⁵Ibid, 492.

¹⁶Ibid, 494.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid, 494-496.

¹⁹Ibid, 497. Although not specifically referring to this passage, but more generally to the significance of the shifts that are announced with the 'turning point', one should bear in mind the observations of S. Natoli, *Ermeneutica e genealogia*, Feltrinelli-Bocca, Milano 1981, pp. 111-134, for whom even in the 'second' Heidegger "being remains an essential figure and in its own way a keystone in the access to being", although he concedes that in *Being and Time* Heidegger concentrates "more intensely on the subjective modes of access than on the fundamental ontological dimension to which, on the other hand, being already belongs" (*ibid.*, p. 127). Thus he observes: "The ever fuller emergence of this belonging gives *Dasein* its definitive character; being does not cease to be the fundamental happening, but is the '*happening of Being*' (...). Ontological development does not

destroys the special characteristics of *Dasein*, but makes them complementary and blurs them in relation to the ontological essence that constitutes it' (*ibid.*).

²⁰HGA XXIX/XXX, 507.

²¹Cf. HGA XL, § 54 (translated by G. Masi with an introduction by G. Vattimo, *Introduzione alla metafisica*, Mursia, Milan 1968, p. 181).

²²See HGA XXI, 170-182.

²³In fact, an early articulate reference to Presocratic thought (in particular Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, Protagoras) can already be found in the summer 1926 semester course *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (in *Nachschriebe* pp. 24-43). But the truly great confrontation with the Presocratics is that which begins in the winter semester course 1942/43 on *Parmenides* (= HGA LIV) and in those on *Heraclitus* in the summer of 1943 and 1944 (now both in HGA LV). Among the published texts of the later Heidegger, the *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Neske, Pfullingen 1954 (translated into Italian by G. Vattimo, *Saggi e discorsi*, Mursia, Milan 1976) are especially important for the comparison with the Presocratics, especially the essays collected in the third part.

²⁴The courses taught on Nietzsche from the mid-1930s, as is well known, were published by Heidegger himself (*Nietzsche*, 2 vols., Neske, Pfullingen 1961).

²⁵In addition to the *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (now in HGA IV, transl. it. by L. Amoroso, Adelphi, Milan, in preparation), Heidegger confronts himself with Hölderlin in the winter semester of 1934/35 on *Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"* (= HGA XXXIX), in the winter semester of 1941/42 on *Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken"* (= HGA LII) and in the summer semester of 1942 on *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister"* (= HGA LIII).

²⁶See HGA XXXI, §§ 6-9.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 66.

²⁸Within this thematic and interpretative horizon is developed the already cited interpretation of Bröcker, *Aristoteles* (1935). But this is also the horizon in which Marcuse's first interpretation of Hegelian thought moves (cf. H. Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1932, 1968², transl. it. by E. Arnaud, presentation by M. Dal Pra, *L'ontologia di Hegel e la fondazione di una teoria della storicità*, La Nuova Italia, Florence 1969).

²⁹HGA XXXI, 81.

³⁰Cf. A. Schwegler, *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles*. Grundtext, Übersetzung und Kommentar nebst erläuternden Abhandlungen, 4 vols., Tübingen 1847-1848 (anastatic reprint, Minerva, Frankfurt a. M. 1960), vol. IV, p. 186.

³¹See W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Weidmann, Berlin 1912, pp. 49-52.

³²Cf. W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, 2 vols., O.U.P., London 1924, vol. II, p. 274.

³³HGA XXXI, 83.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 82.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶*Ibid.*, 89.

³⁷See HGA XXI, 170 ff.

³⁸HGA XXXI, 82.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 92.

⁴⁰Ibid, 93-94.

⁴¹Ibid, 107.

⁴²Cf. HGA XXXIII, 17. It is interesting to compare this scheme with the one proposed by Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, pp. 175-177. Brentano in fact tries in his scheme to connect the categorical plurivocity of being with the common concept of being; for Heidegger it is not only a matter of explaining plurivocity according to the categories, but also plurivocity according to the other fundamental determinations of being; the question marks indicate both the difficulties of solving the problem and the direction in which his questioning tends.

⁴³HGA XXXIII, 31-32.

⁴⁴Ibid, 31. In brackets Heidegger then significantly adds: "These are questions subsequent to *Being and Time*!".

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid. 46. On the mediaeval concept of analogy Heidegger observes: 'The *analogia entis* - which is again being peddled as a slogan today - played a role, but not as a problem of being, but as a desirable means of formulating with filosofic expressions a conviction of faith. The God of the Christian faith, though creator and ruler of the world, is absolutely different and separate from the latter; he is, however, the being in the supreme sense, the *summum ens*; but beings are also the creatures infinitely different from him, the *ens finitum*. How can the *ens infinitum* and the *ens finitum* both be called *ens*, both be included in the same concept of 'being'? Is *ens* only *aequivocal* or *univocal*, or just *analogical*? One is saved from difficulty with the aid of analogy, which is not a solution, but a formula. The only one who sought the solution, Meister Eckhart, says: God does not 'is' affact, because 'being' is a finite predicate and cannot be said to be affact of God. (Admittedly, this was only a cue that disappeared in Eckhart's later development, although it remained alive in his thought in another respect). To medieval theology the problem of analogy was handed down through Plotinus, who discusses it, already in that bent, in the VI *Ennead*" (HGA XXXIII, 46-47).

⁴⁸Ibid, 45-46.

⁴⁹An early discussion of the Aristotelian concept of *physis*, which is a prelude to the theses set out later in the more famous essay of 1939 (1958), can be found at the opening of the course for the winter semester of 1929/30 in the context of a discussion of the meaning of the term *meta-fisica* (cf. XXIX/XXX, § 8 d). The importance of Aristotle in this development of Heideggerian thought has been highlighted in numerous studies by Th. Sheehan, notably in *On the Way to Ereignis: Heidegger's Interpretation of Physis*, in *Continental Philosophy in America*, ed. by H.J. Silverman, J. Sallis, Th.M. Seebohm, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg 1983, pp. 131-164.

⁵⁰This was at least until the retraction made in Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pp. 77-78.

⁵¹Cf. R.A. Bast - H.P. Delfosse, *Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers "Sein und Zeit"*, 1, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1980, p. 262.

⁵²Important for the maturing of this conviction in Heidegger is the influence of E. Jünger's book *Der Arbeiter* (1932), which - together with Jünger's other work *Die totale Mobilmachung* (1930) - was immediately read and studied by Heidegger with attention, precisely because of the interpretation of technique and nihilism that it offers. Cf. Heidegger's own indications in *Das Rektorat 1933/34. Tatsachen und Gedanken* (in essence the account that Heidegger presented in the autumn of 1945 along with his request for reinstatement in teaching), now published by H. Heidegger

in appendix to the re-edition of M. Heidegger, *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität*, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, pp. 21-43, in particular pp. 24-25. The two writings by Jünger cited above are now included respectively in vols. 7 and 8 of E. Jünger, *Sämtliche Schriften*, Klett- Cotta, Stuttgart 1978 ff.; on the debate between Jünger and Heidegger see E. Jünger, *Über die Linie*, in *Anteile*. Martin Heidegger zum 60. Geburtstag, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1950, pp. 245-283, and Heidegger's reply *Über 'Die Linie'*, in *Freundschaftliche Begegnungen*. Ernst Jünger zum 60. Geburtstag, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1955, pp. 9-45 (now under the title *Zur Seinsfrage* in HGA IX, 385-426).

⁵³HGA XXXI, 72.

⁵⁴HGA XL, 19 (Ital. transl., p. 28).

⁵⁵HGA XLV, 178. To this connecting and contrasting of *physis* and *techne* corresponds, structuring itself analogously, the interplay of *earth* and *work of art* that Heidegger treats in the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*, now in HGA V, 1-74 (transl. it. edited by P. Chiodi, La Nuova Italia, Florence 1968, pp. 3-69). The importance of Heidegger's filosofic thematisation of the concept of 'earth' (a concept that is not identifiable *tout court* with that of *physis*) has been highlighted by W. Welsch, *The 'earth' in the Heideggerian determination of the work of art*, "Journal of Aesthetics", 1981, no. 7, pp. 24-65.

⁵⁶HGA XLV, 179. Hand in hand with the 'technical' opening of the sense of *physis* goes the restriction of the latter's original sense. Already in the course of 1929/30 Heidegger had observed how this restriction can be touched upon in the Aristotelian treatment of *physis*; in particular, he had emphasised the double meaning that the latter takes on in Aristotle, that is, the meaning of entity as a whole and at the same time of mode of being, i.e. 'nature', of it (cf. HGA XXIX/XXX, § 8 d). In fact, he points out: 'The expression *physis* develops in the direction of two fundamental meanings: *physis* as *physei onta*, the being as it becomes accessible in *fisica*, in the investigation of nature in the strict sense, and *physis* in the second meaning of nature, as we use this expression today when we speak of the nature of the thing, of the being of the thing. *Physis* in the sense of that which constitutes the being and essence of an entity is *ousia*. The separation of these two meanings of *physis*, the being itself and the being of the being, and its history and development reach their culmination with Aristotle, who grasps the questioning of *physei onta* as a whole (*physis* in the first sense) and the questioning of *ousia* (*physis* in the second sense) together and designates this questioning as *prote philosophia*, i.e. filosofia prima, filosofia in the true and proper sense' (HGA XXIX/XXX, 51-52).

⁵⁷HGA XLV, 179. On this issue see H. Boeder, *Topologia der Metaphysik*, Alber, Freiburg-München 1980, pp. 53-165, and also U. Galimberti, *Linguaggio e civiltà*, Mursia, Milan 1977, pp. 67-91.

⁵⁸HGA XLV, 178-179.

⁵⁹Ibid, 179. On the problem of technology in Heidegger see especially J. Loscerbo, *Being and Technology. A Study in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (Phaenomenologica, 82), Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-London 1981. Among the most important Italian contributions see P. De Vitiis, *Heidegger e la fine della filosofia*, La Nuova Italia, Florence 1974, pp. 129-142; F. Bosio, *La filosofia, Dio, l'uomo e il mondo nell'età della tecnica secondo il pensiero di Martin Heidegger*, Levante, Bari 1977, pp. 99-134 (by the same author see also *Heidegger e il tramonto dell'Occidente*, "Il Pensiero", n.s. 23, 1982, pp. 7-36); Vitiello, *Heidegger: il nulla e la fondazione della storicità*, pp. 19-63; Ruggenini, *Il soggetto e la tecnica*, in particular pp. 305-324; E. Mazzarella, *Tecnica e metafisica. Saggio su Heidegger*, Guida, Naples 1981, in particular pp. 229-301; M. Cacciari, *Salvezza che cade. Saggio sulla questione della Tecnica di Martin Heidegger*, Il Centauro, 1982, no. 6, pp. 70-101.

⁶⁰Amongst the main references to Aristotle by the 'second' Heidegger are: HGA V (= *Holzwege*), 80-81, 322-325, 351 (Ital. transl., pp. 77, 300-302, 327); *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, pp. 9-13, 41 ff., 68 (Ital. transl., pp. 8-10, 31 ff., 49); *Was heißt Denken?*, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1954, pp. 40-41, 47, 128, 134-135 (Ital. transl. by U. Ugazio and G. Vattimo, preface by G. Vattimo, *Che cosa significa pensare?* Sugarco, Milano 1978-1979, pp. 92-94, 101, 83-84, 92-93); *Was ist das - die Philosophie?*, Neske, Pfullingen 1956 (translated into Italian by C. Angelino, *Che cos'è la filosofia?*, Il Melangolo, Genova 1981); *Der Satz vom Grund*, Neske, Pfullingen 1957, pp. 29-30, 110-114, 120-121, 135-136; *Nietzsche*, vol. I, pp. 66-69, 76-78, 160, 595, 597, 599-604; vol. II, pp. 73-77, 111-112, 131-132, 167, 237-238, 403-411, 416, 430; HGA IX, 437-438 (translated by F. Volpi, *Hegel e i Greci*, Verifiche, Trento 1977, pp. 103-104).

⁶¹Cf. K. Held, *Heideggers These vom Ende der Metaphysik*, "Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung", 34, 1980, pp. 535-560.

V. Concluding remarks

Turning now to the assumption with which we introduced the theme of the research, a few considerations seem appropriate to take up the guiding file along which the investigation unfolded and to illuminate its overall sense.

The presence of Aristotle in Heideggerian thought emerged in an initially unsuspected proportion and was illustrated in the main stages of its emergence and its impact on the formation of Heidegger's filosofic perspective. The setting up of the problem of being and its unity in the youthful phase, the subsequent verification of its four fundamental significations and the assimilative appropriation of Aristotelian ontology and practical filosofia in the 1920s, infinally the careful auscultation of determinations such as *aletheia*, *energeia* and *physis* in search of the unthought of metaphysics after the 'turning point': these are the key stages of the analysis that made it possible to make our hypothesis plausible and to show Heidegger's grappling with Aristotle in action.

Apart from the massive and diffuso character of the presence and apart from the fundamental nature of the themes that characterise it, what we wanted to bring to light, and which it is appropriate to emphasise once again in the conclusion, is the particular horizon in which this presence manifests itself, that is, the tension and speculative disposition that characterise Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotelian texts, in such a way that - as we said at the beginning - Heideggerian thought represents a *dense point* of the presence of Aristotle in our century. It does not offer us a simple interpretation of Aristotle, but makes a radical attempt to renew in a lively understanding the fundamental problems that

for the first time in the Aristotelian text are grasped and exposed to Western thought.

Consideration of the comparison from this perspective also reveals the main reasons of interest that it may offire. First of all, in fact, if one does not stop at the first impact with the hermeticisms of the exegesis of *Phys. B 1*, but keep in mind the entire development of Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle as reconstructed here, it is easier to understand and accept the fact that what Heidegger is aiming at is not so much the historical truth about Aristotle, but the speculative stresses that the Aristotelian text presents. And it is easier, as a consequence, to set aside for a moment that historical-filological compulsion ingrained in us, which is bound to make us feel ill at ease with speculative passages that cannot fail to appear as forcings and as violence, if they are commensurate with a parameter and a finality that are not their own, that is, with historical truth and its ascertainment. And so we could open ourselves more willingly to the consideration of the confrontation by concentrating on the filosofical problems that it raises and that demand to be affronted.

Secondly, the detection of the presence of Aristotle, especially at those central junctures of Heidegger's reflection in *Being and Time*, where it had not hitherto been suspected, documents how, in the formulation and development of his philosophical project, Heidegger knows how to take up and rethink in a new form fundamental problems and determinations of Aristotelian ontology and practical philosophy, giving them new relevance and renewed impact. This allows us at the same time to highlight a further important dimension of Heidegger's work, grasping in it not so much the highest expression of existentialism and not only the radical will to go beyond metaphysics, but also and above all the most vigorous contemporary attempt to rethink the fundamental problems of filosofia that are posed for the first time in Greece.

Finally, precisely in relation to this connection with Greek thought, Heideggerian comparison with Aristotle offers considerable food for thought for the analysis of the crisis of meaning in modernity, since it proposes an understanding of our age that, however problematic the sometimes prophetic tones of its implementation may appear,

nevertheless indicates a way to question the '-isms' of modernity and to grasp them more deeply in their connection with the fundamental thought of the West, namely with Greek thought. In this sense, one could say that, in reconnecting the broken link with Greekness, Heidegger represents for our century what Hegel had represented for the 19th century.

However, it is precisely in this search for a connection with Greek thought, a search that the comparison with Aristotle exemplifies and illustrates in the best possible way, that a problematic aspect emerges that cannot be overlooked, and which differentiates Heideggerian approach to Greekness from that of Hegelianism, bringing it rather closer to Nietzsche's critique of Greek metaphysics. What I mean is that in Heideggerian confrontation with Aristotle and Greek thought, one can generally see a fundamental ambivalence that manifests itself in the methodological oxymorons to which Heidegger is prone - destruction as radical appropriation, crossing as overcoming and transcending, '*Überwindung*' as '*Verwindung*' - and which demands to be clarified. Indeed, on the one hand, Heidegger emphasises that the Greeks, and in particular Aristotle, represent the *radical dimension* of the West, so that an understanding of the present age that does not take this root into account is unfounded and contradictory. On the other hand, however, this return to the Greeks is implemented by him in the form of a radical questioning of Western thought in which Greek philosophy itself is involved.

Thus, we have seen that Heidegger's radical appropriation of Aristotelian ontology and practical philosophy allows him to solve the problems in which modern philosophy of the subject, and in particular Husserl's phenomenology, are stranded, but in the end he discovers, and must therefore question, the presuppositions on which the Aristotelian understanding of being itself rests (which, indeed, is fundamental for the West precisely because of this). The ontological deepening that Heidegger enacts, first as 'destruction' and then as 'stepping back' and going beyond, knows no stopping point and is accomplished with an almost total consummation of the traditional space of philosophy and with the arrival at a thought that no longer wants to be philosophy, but radical

questioning of filosofia, and which takes shape in the ways of a 'memorative thought' or 'poetical thought'.

Therefore, while Hegel in the last century still thought he could take up and bring to fruition from the point of view of the absolute the original motivation of filosofia, which is first manifested in the Greek ideal of *logos* and *episteme*, Heidegger instead represents in our century the radical leave-taking from all those forms of thought that are founded on the traditional modes of *logos* and *ratio*. And in this sense he takes up and makes his own the finitistic and nihilistic legacy of Nietzsche.

This calls for some critical observations before concluding. The abandonment of metaphysics and the renunciation of the forms of onto-theo-logical thought that emerge above all in the last Heidegger, are based essentially on a diagnosis and a critique of the present epoch, in which the essence of modern technology is interpreted as the fullest and most complete implementation of the original motivation from which filosofia and *episteme* were born in Greece. The Heideggerian thesis is well known: technique represents the all-encompassing epochal horizon that connotes our modernity. Its foundation is to be seen in the fundamental metaphysical decision that occurs with the Greeks, with the filosofia of Plato and Aristotle, and that would consist in turning our gaze away from the original openness of being and towards being, interpreted as that which is present and which is maintained in presence by *techne*. With this incipient oblivion of being in favour of the entity in the sense of the entity-present, the foundations would be laid, on which subsequent Western history could develop as the history of the conquest and the cognitive and operational domination of the entity by man, who in turn would increasingly afferma himself as subject over the entity that he bends and subjugates as object. And this project of domination would come to fulfilment in modern technology. The essence of modern technology would thus be the complete forgetting of being (as *Aletheia* and as *Physis*), and precisely in the twofold sense of being the forgetting of being and the forgetting of this forgetting.

Without going into the details of Heideggerian interpretation of modern technology, let us fix that aspect of it which appears most relevant in relation to our investigation. It consists in the fact that Heidegger thinks he can grasp an essential connection between the essence

of modern technology and the Greek ideal of *filosofia* and *episteme*, namely in the sense that the technique modern would constitute the realisation and fulfilment of the original motivation of filosofic and epistemic knowledge. Metaphysics and all its forms, from the Greek *episteme* to the Nietzschean will to power, are interpreted as figures of a unitary history, all of which aim at the entity in its presential character and are ultimately all driven by the will to dominate it through the knowing and the doing. The essence of modern technique, in which this attitude towards the entity becomes total and absolute, would represent therefore the ultimate form of metaphysics, the form in which the latter would reach its culmination, its fulfilment and its finish. What is more, in the last Heidegger this fate of the metaphysical oblivion of being and subjectivity is not seen as a machination of man, as a conscious and intentional decision, but belongs to the happening of being itself and is therefore interpreted as an event that is beyond man's control. One consequence of this diagnosis is that the recovery from the illness of metaphysics and technology, which has become acute in the present age, can no longer be achieved on the basis of traditional forces. Recourse to traditional archimedical points such as the *logos* or *ratio* is thwarted by the Heideggerian belief – Heideggerian conviction that they represent the prehistory of technology and that, as such, they are not able to relieve us, let alone emancipate us from it. On the contrary, such a recourse would involve us even more inextricably in the vicious circle of metaphysics and technique.

Renunciation, self-denial, abandonment would then be the alternative commandments. They would be the only ways to awaken consciousness from the oblivion of being. And the preparation for such an awakening Heidegger promises himself from a meditation on the history of metaphysics as the history of the forgetting of being and from a search for what is other than this history, for the other that, as a removed possibility, accompanies it in its deepest unconscious. Stressing that he has no universal panaceas to offer, Heidegger appeals rather, in the steel canopy that oppresses the disenchanting world of nihilism and technology, to that heroic attitude of thought that alone should make it possible to maintain equilibrium in the vortex of nihilism; that should open the

way to a new beginning; that would appease, in the rediscovered origin, the fate of *Techne*.

Now, this diagnosis of modern disease, which connects technology with metaphysics and Greek thought, runs the risk of tarnishing the positive sense of the confrontation with Aristotle and the Greeks that our investigation has aimed to highlight, while confirming the need to go beyond and abandon metaphysics. Nor is it worth the pretext of the sometimes apocalyptic and messianic tones that connote such a diagnosis to justify the refusal to consider it seriously. All the more so because Heidegger grasps with extreme lucidity precisely that essential aspect of the modern era that is now perceived as problematic from many quarters.

Allow me then to put forward a critical hypothesis, which would allow us to redeem the substantial sense of that connection with the Greeks that Heidegger himself taught us to seek. In short, this hypothesis could be formulated as follows: as pertinent and centred as Heidegger's diagnosis of the modern world's pathologies appears to be, his anamnesis of the disease is equally problematic. Because it is precisely because he traces the pathological state of modernity back to the original motivation of *filosofia* and interprets it, moreover, within the framework of the very occurrence of being removed from human disposition, it is precisely because of this that Heidegger must renounce any concrete indications and above all any reference to traditional forms of therapy. Neither reason nor intellect can any longer provide the necessary orientation and support. After the experience of disenchantment with the world, there is no longer any virtue or morality possible. The catharsis is affigiven ultimately to *Gelassenheit*, that heroic disposition of thought that enables one to withstand the test of nihilism and technology. But this heroism, which can no longer even be, as the old Husserl hoped, a heroism of reason, risks creating around it an arbitrariness and a vacuum in which restorative or utopian reactions easily take hold.

Heidegger is fully aware of this, as his response to Ernst Jünger, for example, unequivocally shows. Faced with the problem of overcoming nihilism which, as Nietzsche perceives in a famous fragment of *The Will to Power* (no. 23), threatens to become the *normal condition*, Heidegger does not fall

in the naivety of those attempts that think they can cross the line of nihilism without posing and thinking deeply about the problem that metaphysics, whether of the living God or the dead God, has removed in forgetfulness, namely the problem of being. In fact, he observes: 'Today there is a particular danger of measuring the ponderability of thought according to the rhythm of calculating and planning, which immediately legitimise their technical inventions for everyone through economic success. This evaluation demands too much of thought according to parameters that are alien to it. At the same time, it attributes to thought the arrogant claim to know the solution to enigmas and to bring salvation'¹. On the other hand, Heidegger makes his own the need to gather the integral forces and possible aids to maintain equilibrium in the "vortex of nihilism"².

But where are these integral forces? And how can they be revived and gathered? Having interpreted *the logos* and *ratio* as the prehistory of technique and having thus renounced them, Heidegger seeks to find these forces intact in the approach of thought to the experience of poetising, that is, in that experiment of poetising thought in which he sees the alternative way to the calculating and representational thought of technique.

In choosing - admittedly for the best reasons - this attitude, Heidegger rightly drew attention to the problem of the one-dimensional development of the *logos*, which in the modern era is increasingly understood and reduced in the sense of axiomatisation, calculation and instrumentality; but this choice represents at the same time, clearly stated, a renunciation of the achievements of Western rationalism that cannot but appear problematic. If only because - to paraphrase Heraclitus - the *logos* is precisely what men have in common and what enables them to found a common world (fr. 2), while those who sleep or dream each have their own world (fr. 89).

For this reason, while acknowledging the depth and lucidity of Heideggerian analyses, one would have to question his abandonment of the Greek tradition of *filosofia* and *episteme*; for this one would have to investigate the deeper motivations of his search for their 'other'. Allow me, then, to mention here at least two of these assumptions, which seem to me to be relevant in relation to the investigation undertaken.

Firstly, it seems to me that the Heideggerian conviction that in the essence of modern technology the realisation of the original motivation of Greek filosofia and *episteme* is accomplished should be questioned. That is, one should ask whether the development of the *logos*, which animates Greek filosofia, in the modern sense of calculative, axiomatic, and instrumental reason really represents its complete realisation, or rather its reductive and one-sided development.

The second presupposition, deriving from Heideggerian thematisation of the connection between being and time, seems to me to consist in the reversal of the traditional thesis according to which the *logos* stands above time. If, for Greek thought, *the logos* represents the archimedean point on the basis of which, by freeing himself from the dross of temporality, man is able to rise above the particularity and perspective of his knowing and achieve the universal and the ideal, for Heidegger, on the other hand - who here contaminates the Hegelian thesis of the temporal kernel of truth with the Nietzschean affertainment of the perspectival nature of knowledge - it is no longer *the logos* that stands above time, but it is time that conditions the epochal forms and manifestations of the *logos*.

As far as this last point is concerned, it is certainly difficult to think of being able to truly question the reasons that Heidegger so forcefully exhibited for his finitism. For nowadays, effectively, there no longer seems to be any privileged perspective, there no longer seems to be any archimedical point on the basis of which everything can be grasped and described. If this function was once assigned to the *logos*, and if ever again attempts have been made to seek a moment of the whole, myth or religion, art or philosophy, politics or morality, capable of representing the whole, today all such attempts seem destined from the outset to fail. Nihilistic disenchantment has consumed them. Modernity thus seems to have led us to a situation that could be defined as a *crisis of self-description*. Because neither religion nor myth, neither art nor filosofia, neither morality nor politics are any longer able to grasp the whole and speak on its behalf. The negative terminology widely diffused today - crisis of values, crisis of meaning, negative thinking, nihilism - seems to me to bear clear witness to this.

Yet, even sharing Heideggerian finitism, his anamnesis of the illness of the contemporary era still appears problematic.

We thus return to the first questioned point, namely the belief that the present condition of technology is the necessary consequence of the original motivation of Greek filosofic and *episteme*. For if we understand the Greek *logos* of filosofic and epistemic knowledge not in the ontological horizon of the problem of being as an instrument for the apprehension of being, but rather, as opposed to doxastic knowledge, as an ideal of deprospectivization and desubjectivization of the natural perspectivalness and subjectivity of life, i.e. as the need to attain a point of view that is not itself a subjective and particular point of view, but the need to liberate oneself from all subjectivity and particularity, then technique as the implementation of dominion over being and as the fulfilment of modern subjectivity is affect not the realisation of the original motivation of the Greek ideal of filosofia and *episteme*, but on the contrary its loss and betrayal. That is to say: only a one-sided and reductive development of *the logos* in the sense of calculating, axiomatising and instrumental reason led to the essence of modern technology, not the *logos* as such.

If one accepts this hypothesis, then it is permissible to think that alongside the *logos* of *techne* there is also a *logos* of *praxis* in the sense of *phronesis* and a *logos* of *theorein* in the sense of *questioning*, i.e. of asking for reason and questioning, which are characteristic of filosofising. If one sticks to this differentiation and this plurivocity of the *logos*, one can then think that the essence of modern technology is not so much oblivion of being as *oblivion of the logos*. Oblivion of a *logos* that has its foundation of meaning in the multivocity of being and in the plurality of worlds and forms of life. Oblivion of a *logos* that precisely in Aristotle had its best historical understanding.

One of the most urgent tasks of postnihilistic thought, that is, of a thought capable of recovering the fullness of *the logos* and its polyvalence, would be to show how *the logos* in this complete sense is capable of rendering transparent the cultural semantics of myth and religion, of art and filosofia, of morality and politics, and precisely not only in their rational components, that is, in conformity with the *logos*, but also in their own specificity. With this, one could probably correspond to the need that vivifies Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle, that is, the need for a resumption and productive appropriation of the

Aristotelian heritage capable of discerning its actuality and historicity; with this, we could perhaps recover the link to the original motivation of the *logos*; with this, we would prepare the ground on which, perhaps, one day, a postnihilistic future will be able to overcome our crisis of self-description.

Notes

¹HGA IX, 406.

²*Ibid.*

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