


# EMPEDOCLES

~ EXTENT FRAGMENTS ~



# **BERSERKER**

## **BOOKS**





## 7. ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ

1(2) Sextus adv. math. 7.122

ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ λέγοντες κατὰ τὸν Ἑ. κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦ δὲ ὀρθοῦ λόγου τὸν μὲν τινα θεὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον. ὦν τὸν μὲν θεὸν ἀνέξοιστον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον ἐξοιστόν. λέγει δὲ περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὴν κρίσιν ἀληθοῦς ὑπάρχειν οὕτως·

- στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται,  
πολλὰ δὲ δείλ' ἔμπαια, τὰ τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας.  
παῦρον †δὲ ζῶῃσι βίου† μέρος ἀθρήσαντες  
ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,  
5 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτφ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος  
πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ' ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὐρεῖν·  
οὕτως οὐτ' ἐπιδεκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὐτ' ἐπακουστά  
οὔτε νόφ περιληπτὰ.

περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἄληπτον εἶναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκνεῖται ὁ ἀνθρώπινος λόγος ληπτὴν ὑπάρχειν, διασαφεῖ τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπιφέρων

σὺ <δ'> οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὥδ' ἐλιάσθης,  
πεύσεαι †τοῦ πλεῖον γε† βροτείῃ μῆτις ὄρων.

2 Procl. in Tim. 175c  
Plu. aud. poet. 17e, D.L. 9.73

4 Plu. de Is. et Os. 360c

5 D.L. 9.73

7-8

2 δειλ' ἔμπαϊα Emperius, Karsten : δειλεμπεα codd. : δειλ' ἔπεα P, δειρ' ἔπεα Q Procl. : δειν' ἔπεα Stephanus 3 δὲ ζῶης ἰδίου Diels : δὲ ζῶης ἀβίου Scaliger : δ' ἐν ζῶῃσι βίου Wilam., DK ἀθρήσαντες Scaliger : ἀθρήσαντος vel ἀθροίσαντος codd. 6 τὸ δ' ὄλον Bergk : τὸ δὲ ὄλον codd. πᾶς add. Bergk, Diels : μᾶψ Stein : τίς ἄρ' H. Fränkel 8 νόψ Plu. D.L. : νῶ codd. δ' add. Bergk 9 παύσεαι N οὐ πλέον ἢ Karsten, Diels : οὐ πλέον οὔτι H. Fränkel

**2(3) Sextus *adv. math.* 7.124 [post 1(2).8-9]**

καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξῆς ἐπιπλήξας τοῖς πλέον ἐπαγγελλομένοις γιγνώσκειν παρίστησιν ὅτι τὸ δὲ ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως λαμβανόμενον πιστόν ἐστι, τοῦ λόγου τούτων ἐπιστατοῦντος, καί περ πρότερον καταδραμῶν τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν πίστεως. φησὶ γάρ

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,  
ἐκ δ' ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγὴν·  
καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,  
ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,  
5 πέμπε παρ' Εὐσεβείης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἄρμα.

1 ἀποτρέψατε Scaliger : ἀπετρέψατε codd. 2 ὀχετεύσατε Stephanus : ὠχεύσατε N, ἐχεύσατε E, ὀχεύσατε Ls

**3(131) Hippolytus *RH* 7.31.3**

κόσμον γάρ φησιν εἶναι ὁ 'Ε. τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκου διοικούμενον τοῦ πονηροῦ καὶ ἕτερον νοητὸν τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς φιλίας ... μέσον δὲ εἶναι τῶν διαφόρων ἀρχῶν δίκαιον λόγον ... τοῦτον δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν δίκαιον λόγον τὸν τῇ φιλίᾳ συναγωνιζόμενον Μοῦσαν ὁ 'Ε. προσαγορεύων, καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ συναγωνιζέσθαι παρακαλεῖ, λέγων ὡδὲ πως·

εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα,  
ἡμετέρας μελέτας <ἄδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν,  
εὐχομένῃ νῦν αὐτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια,  
ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι.

1 εἰκάραι φημερίων codd., corr. Miller 2 ἄδε τοι suppl. Wilam. : μέλε τοι Diels 3 εὐχομένων codd., corr. Schneidewin

**4(1) D.L. 8.60**

ἦν δ' ὁ Πανσανίας, ὥς φησιν Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Σάτυρος, ἐρώμενος αὐτοῦ, ψ

δὴ καὶ τὰ Περὶ φύσεως προσπεφώνηκεν οὕτως.

Πανσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλύθι, δαΐφρονος Ἀρχίτεω νιέ

Ἀρχίτεω DK (ex Anth. Gr. 7.508.1) : Ἀρχίτου codd. (cf. D.L. 8.61.3, Iamb. Vit. Pyth. 113)

5(3) Sextus *adv. math.* 7.125 [post 2(3).1-5]

μηδέ σέ γ' εὐδόξιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς  
πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ' ᾧ θ' ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν  
θάρσει, καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι ἴθαάξει†.  
ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάση παλάμῃ πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,  
5 μῆτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων ἴπιστει† πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκοήν  
ἢ ἀκοήν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,  
μῆτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόση πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,  
γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἡ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

1-2 Clem. *Strom.* 5.59.3      3 Procl. in *Tim.* 106e, Plu. *mult. am.* 93b

2 ἐφ' ᾧ θ' ὁσίης Clem. : ἐφωθοείης codd.      3 τὰδε τοι Procl.      θοάξει  
codd., Procl. : θαμύζειν (θαυμάζειν C<sup>1</sup>) Plu. : θοάσσεις Karsten: θοάζειν G.  
Hermann, Diels      4 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄθρει πᾶς codd., corr. Bergk      5 πιστήν  
Bergk, H. Fränkel : ὄψει ἔχων πίστιν Ellis      8 δ' Karsten : θ' codd.

6(4) Clement *Strom.* 5.18.4

ἀλλὰ κακοῖς μὲν κάρτα πέλει κρατέουσιν ἀπιστεῖν.  
ὥς δὲ παρ' ἡμετέρης κέλεται πιστώματα Μούσης  
γνώθι, διατμηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχχοις λόγιοι.

τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κακοῖς τοῦτο σύνθηες, φησὶν ὁ Ἑ., τὸ ἐθέλειν κρατεῖν τῶν ἀληθῶν διὰ τοῦ ἀπιστεῖν.

1-2 Theodoret. *Gr. aff.* 1.71

1 κάρτα πέλει codd., Theodoret. : χαρτὰ πέλει Diels : κάρτα μέλει Her-

worden, DK

2 ὥδε γὰρ Theodoret.

3 διατμισθέντος Wilam. :

διασσηθέντος Diels

## 7(6) Aetius 1.3.20

Ἔ. τέτταρα μὲν λέγει στοιχεῖα, πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν, δύο δὲ ἀρχικὰς δυνάμεις, φίλαν τε καὶ νεῖκος· ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνωτική, τὸ δὲ διαιρετικόν. φησὶ δὲ οὕτως·

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε·  
Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἡδ' Ἀιδωνεύς,  
Νῆστις θ' ἥ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον.

Δία μὲν γὰρ λέγει τὴν ζέσιν καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα, Ἥρην δὲ φερέσβιον τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν δὲ γῆν τὸν Ἀιδωνέα· Νῆστιν δὲ καὶ κρούνωμα βρότειον οἶονεὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ.

1-3 S.E., *adv. math.* 9.362, 10.315, Stob. 1.10.11, Hippol. *RH* 7.29.4, 10.7.3, Probus *Verg. Buc.* 11.4, Tz. *ex. Il.* 53.23, Eus. *PE* 14.14.6 1 Clem. *Strom.* 6.17.4, Philp. in *Phys.* 88.6 2-3 D.L. 8.76, Athenagoras 22, Heraclit. *All.* 24 3 cf. *Suda* s.v. Nēstis

1 γὰρ S.E., Heraclit. : τῶν codd. ἄκουε] ἔασιν Probus 2 ἀργῆς S.E., Probus, D.L., Athenagoras, Heraclit. : αἰθήρ codd., Tz. : ἄηρ Hippol. 10.7 (om. 7.29) 3 τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον codd., S.E., Heraclit. : τέγγει κρουνώ μακρόγιον vel μαβρόντιον Hippol. : τ' ἐπικούρου νόμα βρότειον Athenagoras : ἐπικικροῖ δμμα βροτειον D.L. : γε πικροῖς νόμα βρότειον γένος Probus, *Suda*

8(17) Simplicius in *Phys.* 157.25

ὁ δὲ Ἔ. τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τὰ πεπερασμένα καὶ τὴν κατὰ περίοδον ἀποκατάστασιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν οὕτως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν παραδίδωσι·

δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι  
ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλεόν' ἐξ ἐνὸς εἶναι.  
δοιῇ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιῇ δ' ἀπόλειψις·  
τὴν μὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει τ' ὀλέκει τε,  
5 ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφυομένων ἴθρυφθεῖσα δρεπτή·  
καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει,



- ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότῃτι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,  
 ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.  
 <οὕτως ἢ μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι>  
 10 ἦδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἐνὸς πλέον' ἐκτελέθουσι,  
 τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών·  
 ἢ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει,  
 ταύτῃ δ' αἰὲν ἕασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.  
 ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλυθι, μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὖξει·  
 15 ὥς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ξείπα πιφάυσκων πείρατα μύθων,  
 δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡδέξῃθι μόνον εἶναι  
 ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἐνὸς εἶναι,  
 πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἡέρος ἀπλετον ὕψος·  
 νείκος τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντην,  
 20 καὶ φιλότῃς ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε·  
 τὴν σὺ νόφ' δέρκευ, μῆδ' ὀμμασιν ἦσο τεθηπώς·  
 ἦτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νομίζεται ἔμφυτος ἄρθροισι,  
 τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι,  
 Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυμον ἦδ' Ἀφροδίτην·  
 25 τὴν οὐ τις μετὰ τοῖσιν ἐλισσομένην δεδάηκε  
 θνητὸς ἀνὴρ· σὺ δ' ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν.  
 ταῦτα γὰρ ἰσά τε πάντα καὶ ἡλικά γένναν ἕασι,  
 τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ' ἦθος ἐκάστω,  
 ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο.  
 30 καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὐδ' ἴα'ρ τι' ἐπιγίγνεται οὐδ' ἀπολήγει·  
 εἴτε γὰρ ἐφθείροντο διαμπερές, οὐκέτ' ἂν ἦσαν.  
 τοῦτο δ' ἐπανυξήσειε τὸ πᾶν τί κε, καὶ πόθεν ἐλθόν;  
 πῇ δέ κε κῆξαπόλοιτο, ἐπεὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἐρήμον;  
 ἀλλ' αὖτ' ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα  
 35 γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἡνεκές αἰὲν ὁμοῖα.

1–2 (= 16–17) *Simp. in Phys.* 161.6    7–13 (om. 9) *Simp. in Cael.* 141.1, 293.25    7–8 *Simp. in Phys.* 25.29, 1318.25, in *Cael.* 530.14, *Stob.* 1.10.11, D.L. 8.76    9–13 *Arist. Phys.* 250b30    11 *Simp. in Phys.* 1124.23    12–13 *Simp. in Phys.* 160.20, 1125.1    14 *Stob.* 2.31.6, *Clem. Strom.* 5.85.3  
 17–20 *Simp. in Phys.* 26.1    18–20 *S.E. adv. math.* 9.10    18 *Plu. amic.* 63d, *Clem. Strom.* 6.17.4    18, 20 *Athenagoras* 22    19–20 *S.E. adv. math.* 10.317, *Hippol. RH* 10.7.3    20–21 *Plu. amat.* 756d    21 *Simp. in Phys.* 188.26, *Clem. Strom.* 5.15.4    27 *Arist. GC* 333a19, *Philp. in GC* 258.4, 261.22    29 *Simp. in Phys.* 1184.7    32 *MXG* 975b1, cf. 976b25

**5** δρυφθελσα E : θρεφθελσα Panzerbieter διέπτυ Scaliger **9** ex Arist. *Phys.* 250b30 (cf. 16 (26)) **14** μάθη Bergk : μέθη codd. : μάθησις Stob., Clem. **18** αἰθέρος Plu., Clem. **20** φιλή S.E. 10.317, Athenagoras : φιλά Hippol. ἐν] μετὰ S.E., Athenagoras, Hippol. **25** μετὰ τοισιν Brandis : μετ' ὄσσοισιν (ὄσοισιν F) codd. **30** οὐδ' ἄρ ἐπὶ γίνεταί οὐδ' F : οὐτ' ἄρ τέ τι γίγνεται οὐτ' Diels **32** πόθεν οὖν τί κ' ἐπέλθοι MXG 976b : παντί τε καὶ ἐλθόν MXG 975b **33** κῆξαπόλοιτο Diels : κε καὶ κήρυξ ἀπόλοιτο codd. : κῆρ' ἀπόλοιτο Bollack

### 9(12) MXG 975a36

ἐτι εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι μήτε ἀπολέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅμως τί κωλύει τὰ μὲν γενόμενα αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀλδιὰ, ὥς καὶ 'Ε. λέγει; ἅπαντα γὰρ κάκεινος ταῦτ' ὁμολογήσας, ὅτι

ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἔοντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι,  
καί τ' ἐὼν ἐξαπόλεσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον·  
αἰεὶ γὰρ †θήσεσθαι† ὅπη κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδῃ.

ὅμως τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀλδιὰ εἶναι φησι, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα γίνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγόνενα ἐκ τούτων. οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐτέρα, ὥς οἴεται, γένεσις ἐστι τοῖς οὖσιν.

### 1-2 Philo *aet. mund.* 2

**1** ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἔοντος scripsi : ἐκ τε μὴ ὄντος codd. : ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμῇ ὄντος Philo : ἐκ τε γὰρ οὐδ' ἄμ' ἔοντος Diels **2** καὶ τ' ἐὼν Diels : τό τε ὄν codd. : τι τό τε ὄν Philo ἐξαπόλεσθαι Diels : ἐξόλλυσθαι codd. : ἐξαπολεῖσθαι Philo ἄπυστον Diels : ἀπρηκτον codd. : ἄπανστον Philo **3** τῇ γ' ἔσται Panzerbieter, Diels : περιέσται Mullach : τοι θήσεται Wytttenbach

### 10(13) MXG 976b22

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ 'Ε. κινεῖσθαι μὲν αἰεὶ φησι συγκρινόμενα τὸν ἅπαντα ἐνδ-ελεχῶς χρόνον, οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγων ὥς τοῦ παντός, οὐδὲ κενεόν. πόθεν οὖν τί κ' ἐπέλθοι; ὅταν δὲ εἰς μίαν μορφήν συγκριθῇ, ὥς ἐν εἶναι,

οὐδέ τι τοῦ παντός κενεὸν πέλει οὐδὲ περισσόν

### 1 Aet. 1.18.2 Theodoret. 4.14

οὐδέ τι τοῦ παντός κενεὸν Aet. : οὐδέν (φησι) τό γε κενεὸν codd.

# 11(16) Hippolytus RH 7.29.10

καὶ ἔστι πάντων τῶν γεγονότων τῆς γενέσεως δημιουργὸς καὶ ποιητὴς τὸ νεικος  
τὸ ὀλέθριον, τῆς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τῶν γεγονότων ἐξαγωγῆς καὶ μεταβολῆς  
καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐν ἀποκαταστάσεως ἡ φιλία· περὶ ὧν ὁ 'Ε. ὅτι ἔστιν ἀθάνατα  
δύο καὶ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ γενέσθαι μηδέποτε εἰληφότα, ἀλλὰ λέγει τοι-  
οῦτόν τινα τρόπον.

ἔ<στ>ι γὰρ ὡς πάρος ἦν τε καὶ ἔσσεται, οὐδέ ποτ' οἶω  
τούτων ἀμφοτέρων κενεώσεται ἄσπετος αἰών.

τίνων τούτων; τοῦ νεικος καὶ τῆς φιλίας· οὐ γὰρ ἤρξαντο γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ  
προῆσαν καὶ ἔσονται ἀεὶ δια τὴν ἀγεννησίαν φθορὰν ὑπομείναι μὴ δυνάμενα·  
τὸ δὲ πῦρ <καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ> καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ ὁ ἀήρ θνήσκοντα καὶ ἀναβιούντα.

## 1-2 Hippol. RH 6.25.1

1 ἔστι γὰρ ὡς πάρος ἦν Lloyd-Jones : εἰ (ἦν 6.25) γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἦν codd. :  
ἡ γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἔσκε Diels ἔσσεται οὐδέ ποτ' οἶω Miller : καὶ ἔσται οὐδέ-  
πω τοῖω codd. 2 κενεώσεται Diels : κενώσεται (καινὸς ἔσται 6.25) codd. :  
κεινώσεται Miller ἄσπετος Miller : ἄσβετος codd.

## 12(8) Aetius 1.30.1

'Ε. φύσιν μηδενὸς εἶναι, μῆξιν δὲ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ διάστασιν, γράφει γὰρ  
οὕτως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Φυσικῶν·

ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἀπάντων  
θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτῇ,  
ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μεγέντων  
ἐστί, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

1-4 Plu. *adv. Col.* 1111f 1, 3-4 Arist. *Metaph.* 1015a1 1, 3 Arist. *GC*  
314b7 3 Arist. *GC* 333b14, *Simp. in Phys.* 161.19, 180.30, 235.23, *in Cael.*  
306.5, *Philp. in Phys.* 840.8, 896.26, *in GC* 14.18, 15.8, 16, 263.21, *Alex.*  
*Aphr. in Metaph.* 359.19 3-4 *MXG* 975b7 (cf. *Tz. ex. Il.* 54.25) 4 cf.  
*Ascl. in Metaph.* 311.33



1 ἀπάντων] ἐόντων Arist. *Metaph.*, om. GC : ἐκάστου Plu.  
θανάτοιο τελευταίη codd. : οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη Plu.

2 οὐλομένου

### 13(9) Plutarch. *adv. Col.* 1113a

τοσοῦτον δ' ἐδέησε (ὁ 'Ε.) τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὄντα καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς φαινομένοις ὥστε μὴδὲ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, ἀλλ' ὅσον εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπτουσιν ἀπάτην παρεῖχεν ἀφελῶν αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὸ νενομισμένον ἐν τούτοις·

οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μίγνυντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἵκωνται  
ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων  
ἢ κατ' οἰωνῶν, τότε μὲν τό <γέ φασι> γενέσθαι,  
εὔτε δ' ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ' αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον·

5 †ἢ θέμεις† καλέουσι, νόμῳ δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.

Ἄ ὁ Κολώτης παραθέμενος οὐ συνειδεν ὅτι φῶτας μὲν καὶ θήρας καὶ θάμνους καὶ οἰωνοὺς ὁ 'Ε. οὐκ ἀνήρηκεν, ἃ γέ φησι μίγνυνμένων τῶν στοιχείων ἀποτελεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ τῇ συγκρίσει ταύτη καὶ διακρίσει "φύσιν" τίνα καὶ "πότμον δυσδαίμονα" καὶ "θάνατον ἀλόγτην" ἐπικατηγοροῦντας ἢ σφάλλονται διδάξας οὐκ ἀφείλετο τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰθισμέναις φωναῖς περὶ αὐτῶν.

5 Plu. *praec. reip.* 82of, cf. *adv. Col.* 1112f

1 μίγνυντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἵκωνται Diels : μίγνυν φῶς αἰθέρι lac. vi-viii litt. codd. : μίγνυν φάος αἰθέρος ἵκη Mullach 3 τό γέ φασι scripsi : τον lac. vi litt. codd. : τὸ λέγουσι Reiske, Diels : τάδε φασι Xylander : τὸ νέμονται Burnet 5 ἢ θέμεις καλέουσι Plu. 82o : εἶναι καλέουσι codd. : ἢ θέμεις οὐ καλέουσι Wyttenbach, Diels : οὐ θέμεις ἢ καλέουσι Wilam. νόμῳ] ὁμῶς codd. : νόμῳ Plu. 82o

### 14(21) Simplicius in *Phys.* 159.10 [post 8(17).1-35]

πλείονα δὲ ἄλλα εἰπὼν (ὁ 'Ε.) ἐπάγει ἐκάστου τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν χαρακτήρα, τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἡλίον καλῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα αὐγὴν καὶ οὐρανόν, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ δμβρον καὶ θάλασσαν. λέγει δὲ οὕτως·

ἀλλ' ἄγε, τῶνδ' ὁάρων προτέρων ἐπιμάρτυρα δέρκευ,  
εἴ τι καὶ ἐν προτέροισι λιπόξυλον ἐπλετο μορφῇ,  
ἡέλιον μὲν λευκὸν ὄραν καὶ θερμὸν ἀπάντην,  
ἄμβροτα δ' ὅσσ' †δεῖτο† καὶ ἀργεῖ δέυεται αὐγῇ,



- 5 ὄμβρον δ' ἐν πᾶσι δνοφόντά τε ῥιγαλέον τε·  
 ἐκ δ' αἷης προρέουσι †θέλημα† τε καὶ στερεωπά.  
 ἐν δὲ κότῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἀνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,  
 σὺν δ' ἔβη ἐν φιλότῃ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται.  
 ἐκ τῶν πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται ὀπίσσω,  
 10 δένδρεά τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἡδὲ γυναῖκες,  
 θῆρές τ' ὠωνοὶ τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθύς,  
 καὶ τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέριστοι.  
 αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα  
 γίγνεται ἀλλοιωπά· †τόγον διάκρισις† ἀμείβει.

3–12 Simp. in Phys. 33.8    3–4 Plu. de prim. frig. 949f    3, 5 Arist. GC 314 b20    3 Gal. simpl. med. 11.461K    9–12 Arist. Metaph. 1000a29    9–11 [Arist.] mund. 399b26    9 Clem. Strom. 6.17.4    10–13 Ascl. in Metaph. 197.33

2 μορφῇ Ald. : μορφή codd.    3 λευκόν . . . θερμόν Arist. : λαμπρόν . . . θερμόν Plu. : θερμόν . . . λαμπρόν codd., Gal. ὄρα EL(Arist.), Plu. : ὄρα F (Simp. 32)    4 ὅσσ' ἔδεται DE, ὅσσε δέ τε F (Simp. 33) : ὅσσ' ἴδει τε Diels : ὅσσ' εἶδει τε Wackernagel    5 δνοφόντα (ζοφ-HL) Arist., Plu. exc. gX : δνοφόντα codd., gX(Plu.)    6 θέλημα ED<sup>2</sup>, θελήματα F (Simp. 33) : θέλυμα Diels : θελεμνά Wilam.    στερέωμα Simp. 33    9 scripsi : ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν (παντὸς ἄτην D, πάντ' ἦν F) ὅσα τ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται codd., om. γὰρ Diels : ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάντα ὅσα τε ἦν ὅσα τέ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται Simp. 33 : ἐξ ὧν πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἔσθ' ὅσα τ' ἔσται ὀπίσσω Arist. : ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὅσα γῆν ὅσα τ' ἔσσεται ὅσα τ' ἔασιν Clem. 14 τόγον διάκρισις D, τόγον διάκρσις E : τόσον διὰ κρήσις Diels : τὰ γὰρ δία κρήσις coniecti

# 15(23) Simplicius in Phys. 159.27 [post 14(21).1–14]

καὶ παράδειγμα δὲ ἐναργὲς παρέθετο τοῦ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι τὰ διάφορα·

ὥς δ' ὅποτεν γραφεῖς ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν,  
 ἀνέρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε,  
 οἳ τ' ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν,  
 ἀρμονίῃ μίξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ' ἐλάσσω,  
 5 ἐκ τῶν εἶδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι,  
 δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἡδὲ γυναῖκας,  
 θῆράς τ' ὠωνοὺς τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθύς,  
 καὶ τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῇσι φερίστους·

- οὕτω μή σ' ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω ἄλλοθεν εἶναι  
 10 θνητῶν, ὅσσα γε δῆλα †γεγάσιν† ἄσπετα, πηγῇν,  
 ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ' ἴσθι, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας.

2 ἄμφω codd. : ἄμφι Ald. δεδαῶτες F 4 ἁρμονίη F, ἁρμενίη DE  
 μίξαντες D 6 κτίζοντες D 9 μή σ'] μὴν F καινύτω Blass :  
 καί νυ τῷ D, καί νυ τῷ F, καί νυ τῷ E 10 γεγάσιν Diels

**16(26)** Simplicius in *Phys.* 33.18 [post 14(21).1-12]

καὶ ὀλίγον δὲ προσελθὼν φησιν

- ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσιν περιπλομένοις κύκλοις,  
 καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ αὖξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης.  
 αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα  
 γίγνont' ἀνθρωποὶ τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν,  
 5 ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότῃτι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓνα κόσμον,  
 ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει,  
 εἰσόκεν †ἐν† συμφύοντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γέννεται.  
 οὕτως ἢ μὲν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι,  
 ἢ δὲ πάλιν διαφύοντος ἐνὸς πλέον' ἐκτελέθουσι,  
 10 τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών·  
 ἢ δὲ τάδ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερές οὐδαμὰ λήγει,  
 ταύτῃ δ' αἰὲν ἕασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.

1-2 Simp. in *Phys.* 160.16 1 Simp. in *Phys.* 1185.19 5-6 cf. 8(17).7-8  
 8-12 Arist. *Phys.* 250b20, cf. 8(17).9-13

4 θηρῶν Sturz : κτηρῶν codd. : θνητῶν Bergk 6 φορεύμενα 8(17).8 :  
 φορούμενα codd. 7 ἐν E, ὄν F, ὄν D : ἄν Ald. : αὖ Bywater

**17(25)** Schol. in *Plat. Gorg.* 498e

παροιμία "δὺς καὶ τρεῖς τὸ καλόν", ὅτι χρηρὴ περὶ τῶν καλῶν πολλάκις λέγειν.  
 'Ε. τὸ ἔπος, ἂφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ παροιμία· φησὶ γὰρ

καὶ δις γάρ, ὃ δεῖ, καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν,

Plu. s.v.s. *Ep.* 1103f

ἐνισπεῖν] ἀκουσαι Plu.

**18(24)** Plutarch *def. or.* 418c

ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ τὸ Ἐμπεδόκλειον εἶπειν δόξω

κορυφὰς ἐτέρας ἐτέρησι προσάπτων  
μύθων †μῆτε λέγειν† ἀτραπὸν μίαν,

ἔασατέ με τοῖς πρώτοις τὸ προσήκον ἐπιθεῖναι τέλος· ἥδη γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ γεγ-  
όναμεν.

**2** μῆτε λέγειν] μὴ τελείειν Knatz, Diels : μῆτ' ἐλθεῖν Lloyd-Jones

**19(27)** Plutarch. *fac. lun.* 926d

ὥσθ' ὅρα καὶ σκόπει, δαιμόνιε, μὴ μεριστὰς καὶ ἀπάγων ἕκαστον, ὅπου πέ-  
φυκεν εἶναι, διάλυσίν τινα κόσμου φιλοσοφῆς καὶ τὸ νεῖκος ἐπάγῃς τὸ Ἐ.  
τοῖς πράγμασι· μᾶλλον δὲ τοὺς παλαιούς κινήσας Τιτᾶνας ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ  
Γίγαντας καὶ τὴν μυθικὴν ἐκείνην καὶ φοβερὰν ἀκοσμίαν καὶ πλημμέλειαν  
ἐπιδεῖν ποθῆς, χωρὶς τὸ βαρὺ πᾶν καὶ χωρὶς τιθεὶς τὸ κοῦφον

ἐνθ' οὗτ' ἡελίοιο †δεδίττεται† ἀγλαὸν εἶδος,  
οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' αἴης λάσιον μένος, οὐδὲ θάλασσα

ὥς φησιν Ἐ.· οὐ γῆ θερμότητος μετεῖχεν, οὐχ ὕδωρ πνεύματος, οὐκ ἄνω τι  
τῶν βαρέων, οὐ κάτω τι τῶν κούφων, ἀλλ' ἀκρατοὶ καὶ ἄστοργοι καὶ μονάδες  
αἱ τῶν ὄλων ἀρχαί, μὴ προσιέμεναι σύγκρισιν ἐτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον μηδὲ  
κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσαι καὶ ἀποστρεφόμεναι καὶ φερόμεναι φορὰς ἰδίᾳς  
καὶ αὐθάδεις οὕτως εἶχον, ὥς ἔχει πᾶν οὐ θεὸς ἀπεστι κατὰ Πλάτωνα, τουτέστιν  
ὥς ἔχει τὰ σώματα, νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπολιπούσης.

**1** δεδίσκεται Karsten

**2** μένος Bergk : γένος codd. : δέμας Karsten

**20(36)** Aristotle *Metaph.* 1000b1

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν τὸ νεῖκος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐν αὖ ἦν ἅπαντα, ὥς φησὶν (Ἐ.).  
ὅταν γὰρ συνέλθῃ, τότε δὲ

〈τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ〉 ἔσχατον ἵστατο νεῖκος.

διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ τὸν εὐδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἡττον φρόνιμον εἶναι τῶν

ἄλλων· οὐ γὰρ γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα· τὸ γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμόῳ.

Ascl. in *Metaph.* 198.1, Stob. 1.10.11

τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ suppl. ex Stobaeo

## 21(27) Simplicius in *Phys.* 1183.24

τοῦτο δὲ “ἔοικεν Ἐ. ἂν εἰπεῖν, ὅτε λέγει ὅτι το κρατεῖν καὶ κινεῖν ἐν μέρει τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν,” εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων κινήσεων ἡρεμία μεταξὺ ἐστίν. Εὐδῆμος δὲ τὴν ἀκινήσιαν ἐν τῇ τῆς φιλίας ἐπικρατεῖα κατὰ τὸν σφαῖρον ἐκδέχεται, ἐπειδὴν ἅπαντα συγκριθῇ,

ἐνθ’ οὗτ’ ἡελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα,

ἀλλ’, ὥς φησιν,

οὕτως ἀρμονίης πυκινῷ κρυφῷ ἐστήρικται  
σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίῃ περιηγεί γαίων.

3 *Simp. in Cael.* 591.5, *Procl. in Tim.* 160d, *Ach. Tat Intr. Arat.* 6 (37.13), *Anon. in Arat.* 1.6 (97.25), *M. Ant.* 12.3

2 ἀρμονίης A, ἀρμονίας M, ἀρμονίως F κρυφῷ A, κρυφῷ M, κρύφει F ἐστήρικται AM, ἐστήρικτο F 3 σφαῖρας κυκλοτερὴς Anon. μονίῃ M, μονη lac. iv litt. F : μόνη DE (in *Cael.*), *Procl.* : μούνη *Ach.* : μανία *Anon.* περιγηθεί M, περιγήθει AF, E (in *Cael.*) : περὶ γῆθει F, περὶ γῆθ ἡ D, περιγήθ E<sup>2</sup> (in *Cael.*) γαίων in *Cael.* : αἰων codd. : χαίρων *Ach.*, *Anon.*, Q (*Procl.*): χαῖρον cet. codd. *Procl.*

## 22(29/28) Hippolytus *RH* 7.29.13

καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἰδέας, ὅποια τίς ἐστίν ὑπὸ τῆς φιλίας κοσμουμένη, λέγει (Ἐ.) τοιοῦτόν τινα τρόπον·

οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτοιου δύο κλάδοι ἀΐσσονται,  
οὐ πόδες, οὐ θαῖ γούν’, οὐ μήδεα γεννήεντα,



ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἦν καὶ ἴσος ἔστιν αὐτῷ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ κάλλιστον εἶδος τοῦ κόσμου ἢ φιλία ἐκ πολλῶν ἐν ἀπεργάζεται· τὸ δὲ νεῖκος, τὸ τῆς τῶν κατὰ μέρος διακοσμῆσεως αἰτίον, ἐξ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου ἀποσπᾶ καὶ ἀπεργάζεται πολλά.

Stobaeus 1.15.2

ἀλλ' ὃ γε πάντοθεν ἴσος <ἐοῖ> καὶ πάμπαν ἀπείρων,  
σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίῃ περιηγεί γαίων.

2 γοῦν' 97(134).3 : γούνατ' codd. 3 ἐοῖ add. Maas : ἦν Diels 4  
μονίῃ περιηγεί γαίων 21(27).3 : μιμῆς περιτεθῇ (-τεῖθη P) χαίρων codd.

23(30) Aristotle *Metaph.* 1000b9

ἀλλ' ὅθεν δὴ ὁ λόγος, τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι συμβαίνει αὐτῷ τὸ νεῖκος μὴθὲν μᾶλλον φθορᾶς ἢ τοῦ εἶναι αἰτίον. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἡ φιλότις τοῦ εἶναι· συν-  
άγουσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐν φθείρει τᾶλλα. καὶ ἅμα δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίον  
οὐθὲν λέγει, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι οὕτως πέφυκεν·

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐνὶ μελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη,  
ἐς τιμάς τ' ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο,  
ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ' ἐλήλαται ὄρκου

ὡς ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ὄν μεταβάλλειν· αἰτίαν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης δηλοῖ.

1–3 Simp. in *Phys.* 1184.14 2–3 Syrian. in *Metaph.* 43.34 3 Ascl. in  
*Metaph.* 198.33

1 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ Simp. : ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ codd. ἐν μελέεσσιν F (Simp.) : ἐνι-  
μελέεσσιν A(Simp.), Diels ἐρέφθη Simp. 2 ἐς Simp. : εἰς (ἐπὶ G<sup>b</sup>I<sup>b</sup>,  
Syrian.) codd. 3 δ σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος F (Simp.) παρ' ἐλήλαται Diels :  
παρελήλατο ETC<sup>b</sup>, Ascl. : παρήλατο SB<sup>b</sup> : παρελήλαται A<sup>b</sup>, Simp. : παρ'  
ἐλήλατο Sturz

24(31) Simplicius in *Phys.* 1184.2 [post 21(27).3]

ἄρξαιμένου δὲ πάλιν τοῦ νεῖκου ἐπικρατεῖν τότε πάλιν κίνησις ἐν τῷ σφαίρῳ  
γίνεται·

πάντα γὰρ ἐξείης πελεμίζετο γυῖα θεοῖο.

πελεμίζετο A, πολεμίζετο FM γυῖα] γαῖα F

## 25(22) Simplicius in Phys. 160.26

καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἂν τις τὸν διττὸν αἰνύττεσθαι διάκοσμον οἴοιτο·

- ἄρθμια μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἑαυτῶν πάντα μέρεσσιν,  
 ἡλέκτωρ τε χθών τε καὶ οὐρανὸς ἡδὲ θάλασσα,  
 ὅσσα φιν ἐν θνητοῖσιν ἀποπλαχθέντα πέφυκεν.  
 ὥς δ' αὐτως ὅσα κρήσιν ἐπαρκέα μᾶλλον ἔασιν  
 5 ἀλλήλοισ ἐστερκται ὁμοιωθέντ' Ἀφροδίτῃ·  
 ἐχθρὰ μάλιστα' <ὅσα> πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι  
 γέννη τε κρήσει τε καὶ εἶδεσιν ἐκμακτοῖσι,  
 πάντῃ συγγίγνεσθαι ἀήθεα καὶ μάλα λυγρὰ  
 †νεικεογεννέστησιν† ὅτι σφισι †γένναν ὀργᾶ†.

καὶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς ἡρμύονται ταῦτα, δεδήλωκεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς μᾶλλον ἡνωται καὶ “ἀλλήλοισ ἐστερκται ὁμοιωθέντα Ἀφροδίτῃ,” καὶ ὅτι κἂν πανταχοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν νοητὰ τῇ φιλῇ ὁμοίωται, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νεῖκος κρατηθέντα καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον διασπασθέντα ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν γενέσει ἐν ἐκμακτοῖς καὶ εἰκονικοῖς εἶδεσιν ὑπέστησαν τοῖς νεικεογενέσι καὶ ἀήθως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν ἔνωσιν τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα.

## 6-7 (πλεῖστον . . . ἐκμακτοῖσιν) Thphr. Sens. 16

1 ἄρτια F ταῦτα Diels : αὐτὰ F, ἑαυτὰ DE 3 ἀποπλαχθέντα D,  
 ἀποπλαχθέντα EF 4 κρᾶσιν codd. 6 ἐχθρὰ Thphr. : ἐχθρα F,  
 ἔργα DE μάλιστα' ὅσα πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι conieci : πλεῖ-  
 στον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι μάλιστα codd., om. μάλιστα Thphr. : <δ' α>  
 suppl. Diels 7 κρᾶσει codd. 8-9 om. F 9 νεικεογεννηταῖσι  
 Scaliger, νεικεογεννητῇσι Karsten : νεῖκος ἐννεσίγησιν Panzerbieter, Diels  
 γένναν ἔοργεν Diels : πᾶν δέμας ὀργᾶ Karsten : γένναι ἐν ὀργῇ conieci

## 26(20) Simplicius in Phys. 1124.7

δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἄμφω θεωρεῖν τὴν τε ἔνωσιν καὶ τὴν διά-  
 κρισιν αἰ μὲν ἄμφω, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλην ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις μέρεσσιν ἢ ἐν  
 ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις χρόνοις ἐπικρατοῦσαν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ νεῖκος καὶ  
 τὴν φιλίαν παρὰ μέρος ἐπικρατεῖν ἐπὶ τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἰχθύων καὶ θηρίων  
 καὶ ὀρνέων ὁ ἔ. φησι τάδε γράφων·

τοῦτο μὲν ἄμ βροτέων μελέων ἀριδείκετον ὄγκον·

- ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότῃτι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα  
 γυῖα, τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε, βίου θαλέθοντος ἐν ἀκμῇ·  
 ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε κακῇσι διατμηθέντ' ἐρίδεσσι  
 5 πλάζεται ἀνδιχ' ἕκαστα περὶ ῥηγμῖνι βίοιο.  
 ὡς δ' αὐτως θάμνοισι καὶ ἰχθύσιν ὕδρομελάθροισι  
 θηρσί τ' ὀρειλεχέεσσιν ἰδὲ πτεροβάμοσι κύμβαις.

1 τοῦτον codd. ἀμβροτέρων M, ἀν βροτέων AF : ἀν βροτέων Diels  
 2 cf. 8(17).7 3 σώματα FM θαλέοντος F : θαλέθουσιν Karsten  
 4 ἐρίδεσσι Ald. : ἐρίδεσι A, ἐρίδεσιν F, ἐριδέσιος M 5 περὶ ῥηγμῖνεσι  
 F, περὶ ῥηγμῖνι A, Diels 6 ὕδρομελάκροισι M 7 θηρσί τ' ὀρειλεχέ-  
 εσσιν Schneider : θηρσί τ' ὀρειμελέεσσιν AM, θερσί τε ῥημελέεσσιν F ἡδὲ  
 πτεροβάσι M, ἡδέπερ F

## 27(38) Clement Strom. 5.48.2

σφίγξ δὲ οὐχ ἡ τῶν ὄλων σύνδεσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν  
 Ἄρατον περιφορά, ἀλλὰ τάχα μὲν ὁ διτῶν πνευματικὸς τόνος καὶ συνέχων  
 τὸν κόσμον εἴη ἂν ἄμεινον δὲ ἐκδέχεσθαι τὸν αἰθέρα πάντα συνέχοντα καὶ  
 σφίγγοντα, καθὰ καὶ ὁ Ἑ. φησιν·

εἰ δ' ἄγε τοι λέξω †πρῶθ' ἥλιον ἀρχὴν  
 ἐξ ὧν δῆ† ἐγένοντο τὰ νῦν ἐσορῶμεν ἅπαντα,  
 γαῖά τε καὶ πόντος πολυκύμων ἡδ' ὕγρὸς ἀήρ  
 Τιτὰν ἡδ' αἰθήρ σφίγγων περὶ κύκλον ἅπαντα.

1 πρῶτ' ἐξ ὧν ἥλιος ἀρχὴν / τὰλλα τε δῆλ' conieci (δῆλ' H. Weil) : πρῶθ'  
 ἥλικά τ' ἀρχὴν / ἐξ ὧν δῆλ' Diels : ἡλίου ἀρχὴν Stein 2 ἐσορώμενα  
 πάντα codd. corr. Gomperz

## 28(51) Eustathius ad Od. 1.321

οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀνόπαια λέγουσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀφανῆς, πόρρω τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ. δοκεῖ δὲ  
 τισὶ καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀνωφερῆς εἶναι, ὠρμημένοις ἐκ τῶν Ἑ. εἰπόντος ἐπὶ πυρὸς  
 τό

καρπαλίμως δ' ἀνόπαιον.

Hdn. schem. Hom. (EM 311 D)

δὲ ἀνόπαιον Hdn.

**29(53)** Aristotle *Phys.* 196a20

... ὥσπερ 'Ε. οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀέρα ἀνωτάτω ἀποκρίνεσθαι φησιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν τύχη· λέγει γοῦν ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ ὡς

οὕτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τότε, πολλάκι δ' ἄλλως.

καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῶων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖστα φησίν.

Arist. *GC* 334a3, *Simp. in Phys.* 327.18, 330.35, 358.11, 1318.28, *Phlp. in Phys.* 261.22, *Them. in Phys.* 49.9

**30(54)** Aristotle *GC* 334a4 [post 29(53)]

ὅτε δέ φησι πεφυκέναι τὸ πῦρ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ὁ δ' αἰθέρ, φησί,

μακρῇσι κατὰ χθόνα δύετο ῥίζαις.

**31(37)** Aristotle *GC* 333a35

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αὖξησης ἂν εἴη κατ' 'Ε., ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν· πυρὶ γὰρ αὖξει τὸ πῦρ,

αὖξει δὲ χθών μὲν σφέτερον δέμας, αἰθέρα δ' αἰθήρ.

δέμας H, γένος cet. codd.

**32(52)** Proclus *in Tim.* 141e

καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ γῆς ρύακές εἰσι πυρός, ὥς πού φησι καὶ 'Ε.

πολλὰ δ' ἔνερθ' οὐδὲος πυρὰ καίεται.

καὶ οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν, πῶς οὖν ἐν ὕδατι ὅν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται· χωρεῖ γὰρ πάντα δε' ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ ἔστι καὶ τὸ φῶς πῦρ διὸν διὰ πάντων.

ἔνερθεν codd. corr. Sturz

**33(39)** Aristotle *Cael.* 294a21

οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ ταῦτα ἀπειρον τὸ κάτω τῆς γῆς εἶναι φασιν, ἐπ' ἀπειρον αὐτὴν ἐρριζῶσθαι λέγοντες, ὥσπερ Εὐνοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος, ἵνα μὴ πράγματ' ἔχωσι ζητοῦντες τὴν αἰτίαν· διὸ καὶ 'Ε. οὕτως ἐπέπληξεν, εἰπὼν ὡς



εἴπερ ἀπείρονα γῆς τε βάθη καὶ θαψιλὸς αἰθήρ,  
ὥς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ γλώσσης ἐλθόντα ματαίως  
ἐκκέχυνται στομάτων, ὀλίγον τοῦ παντός ἰδόντων . . .

1–3 MXG 976a35    1 cf. Simp. in Cael. 522.11    2–3 Clem. Strom. 6.149.1

2 γλώσσης (γλώσση E) codd., Clem. : γλώσσας Wilam., DK : βροτέων  
MXG ἐλθόντα Clem. : ῥηθέντα codd., MXG    3 εἰδόντων H, Clem.

34(40) Plutarch *fac. lun.* 920c

. . . ὥς που καὶ Ἐ. τὴν ἐκατέρων ἀποδίδωσιν οὐκ ἀηδῶς διαφορὰν·

ἥλιος ὀξυβελῆς ἢ δ' ἰλάειρα σελήνη,

τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ἱλαρὸν καὶ ἄλυπον οὕτω προσαγορεύσας.

ὀξυμελῆς codd. : ὀξυβελῆς Xylander    ἢ δ' ἰλάειρα Diels, cf. s.v. ἰλάειρα  
Hsch. : ἡ δὲ λάειρα codd.

35(41) Macrobius 1.17.46

Apollo Ἐλεεύς appellatur ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλττεσθαι περὶ τὴν γῆν . . . ἢ ὅτι  
συναλισθέντος πολλοῦ πυρὸς περιπολεῖ ut ait E. :

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀλισθεὶς μέγαν οὐρανὸν ἀμφιπολεύει.

EM, Suda s.v. hēlios

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀλισθεὶς EM : ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀλεισθαι Suda : οὐνεκ' ἀναλισθεὶς  
(ἀναλλισθεὶς BPR, ἀναλυθεὶς S) codd.    μέγαν] μέσον EM

36(44) Plutarch *Pyth. or.* 400b

ὕμεῖς δὲ τοῦ μὲν Ἐ. καταγελᾶτε φάσκοντος τὸν ἥλιον περὶ γῆν ἀνακλάσει  
φωτὸς οὐρανοῦ γενόμενον αὐθις

ἀνταυγεὶ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἀταρβήτοισι προσώποις.

Gal. *us. part.* 3. 182K

ἀνταυγεῖ Sturz : ἀνταυγεῖν codd. : ἀνταυγέω Gal. πρὸς] τὸν Gal.

**37(47)** *Anecdota Graeca* (Bekker) 1.337.15

ἀγῆς· τοῦτο ἀπὸ συνθέτου καταλείπεται τοῦ εὐαγῆς ἢ παναγῆς. 'E.'

ἄθρει μὲν γὰρ ἀνακτος ἐναντίον ἀγέα κύκλον.

**38(43)** *Plutarch fac. lun.* 929d

... οἶον αἶ τε φωναὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀνακλάσεις ἀμαυροτέρον ἀναφαίνουσι τὴν τοῦ φθέγματος αἶ τε πληγαὶ τῶν ἀφαλλομένων βελῶν μαλακώτεραι προσπίπτουσιν,

ὥς αὐτὴ τύφασσα σεληναίης κύκλον εὐρύν

ἀσθενῇ καὶ ἀμυδρὰν ἀνάρροϊαν ἴσχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς, διὰ τὴν κλάσιν ἐκλυομένης τῆς δυνάμεως.

Philo *prov.* 2. 70 quemadmodum E.: "lumen accipiens lunaris globus magnus largusque mox illico reversus est ut currens caelum attingeret."

αὐτὴ Xylander : αὐτή codd.

**39(45)** *Achilles Tatius Intr. Arat.* 16(43.6)

εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ πρῶτον τὸν ἥλιον λέγουσιν, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν σελήνην, τρίτον δὲ τὸν Κρόνον. ἡ δὲ πλείων δόξα καθ' ἣν πρώτην ἢ σελήνην, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπόσπασμα τοῦ ἡλίου λέγουσιν αὐτήν, ὥς καὶ 'E.'

κυκλωτερές περὶ γαῖαν ἐλίσσεται ἀλλότριον φῶς.

**40(46)** *Plutarch fac. lun.* 925b

τῆς δὲ γῆς τρόπον τινὰ φαύει (ἢ σελήνην) καὶ περιφερομένη πλησίον,

ἄρματος ὥσπερ ἂν ἵχνος ἐλίσσεται

φησὶν Ἐ.

ἡ [τε] περὶ ἄκρην

οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σκιὰν αὐτῆς ὑπερβάλλει πολλάκις ἐπὶ μικρὸν αἰρομένην τῷ  
παμμέγεθες εἶναι τὸ φωτίζον· ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔοικεν ἐν χρῶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἐν  
ἀγκάλας τῆς γῆς περιπολεῖν, ὥστ' ἀντιφράττεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον ὑπ' αὐτῆς,  
. . . διὸ λεκτέον ὅμαι θαρροῦντας ἐν τοῖς τῆς γῆς ὄροις εἶναι τὴν σελήνην  
ὑπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἐπιπροσθουμένην.

1 ὡς πέρι χνοίη ἐλίσσεται Panzerbieter, Diels  
litt. E, xxv B

2 ἄκραν codd., lac. xvii

41(42) Plutarch *fac. lun.* 929c, cf. 934d

αὐτὴ (ἡ σελήνη) τε γὰρ ἄδηλός ἐστι τηνικαῦτα κάκεινον (τὸν ἥλιον) ἀπέκρυψε  
καὶ ἠφάνισε πολλάκις

†ἀπεσκεύασε† δέ οἱ αὐγάς

ὥς φησιν Ἐ.

†έσ τε αἶαν† καθύπερθεν, ἀπεσκνίφωσε δὲ γαίης  
τόσσον ὅσον τ' εὖρος γλαυκώπιδος ἔπλετο μήνης,

καθάπερ εἰς νύκτα καὶ σκότος οὐκ εἰς ἄστρον ἕτερον τοῦ φωτὸς ἐμπεσόντος.

1 ἀπεσκεδάσεν Xylander : ἀπεσκίασεν Bergk : ἀπεστέγασεν Diels  
γαῖαν Xylander : ἔστ' ἂν ἰη Diels

2 ἐς

42(48) Plutarch *quaest. Plat.* 1006e

καὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν ὥρολογίων γνώμονες οὐ συμμεθιστάμενοι ταῖς σκιαῖς ἀλλ'  
ἐστῶτες ὀργανα καὶ χρόνου μέτρα γηγόνασι, μιμούμενοι τῆς γῆς τὸ ἐπιπροσθού  
τῷ ἡλίῳ περὶ αὐτὴν ὑποφερομένην, καθάπερ εἶπεν Ἐ.

νύκτα δὲ γαῖα τίθησιν ὑφισταμένη φαέεσσι.

ἐφισταμένη Scaliger : ὑφισταμένοιο Diels φαέεσσι Sturz : φάεσσι codd.

43(49) Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 720

σκοτεινὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁ ἀήρ κατ' Ἐ.

νυκτὸς ἐρημαίης ἀλαώπιδος

ἀλαώπιδος Xylander, cf. Hsch. s.v. ἀλαώπιν· σκοτεινήν : ἀγλαώπιδος codd.

**44(50)** Tzetzes *All. II.* 15.86

ἡ Ποσειδῶνος κέλευσις ἐξ Ἰριδος ὑπάρχει  
ἢ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς καλοῦσα  
δπερ φησὶν Ἑμπεδοκλῆς εἴτε τις τῶν ἐτέρων·  
Ἰρις δ' ἐκ πελάγους ἄνεμον φέρει ἢ μέγαν δμβρον.

**45(56)** Hephaestio *Enchir.* 1.3.4

θέσει μακρὰ γίνονται . . . καὶ Ἑ.

ἄλς ἐπάγη ριπῇσιν ἑωσμένος ἡέλιος.

**46(55)** Aristotle *Mete.* 357a24

ὁμοίως δὲ γελοῖον καὶ εἴ τις εἰπῶν

γῆς ἰδρῶτα θάλασσαν

οἷται τι σαφές εἰρηκέναι, καθάπερ Ἑ.· πρὸς πόλιν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἰπῶν  
ἴσως εἴρηκεν ἱκανῶς (ἢ γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιητικόν), πρὸς δὲ τὸ γινῶναι τὴν  
φύσιν οὐχ ἱκανῶς.

Arist. *Mete.* 353b11, Olymp. in *Mete.* 151.4, cf. 155.8, Alex. Aphr. in *Mete.*  
67.14, 80.31, 81.16, Aet. 3.16.3

ἰδρῶτα τῆς γῆς εἶναι τὴν θάλατταν codd. : τὴν θάλατταν ἰδρῶτα γῆς  
Olymp. : ἰδρῶτα τῆς γῆς Aet.

**47(35).**1–15 Simplicius in *Cael.* 528.30; 16–17 ex in *Phys.* 32.13

μήποτε δὲ κἂν ἐπικρατῇ ἐν τούτῳ (τῷ κόσμῳ) τὸ νεῖκος ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σφαίρῳ  
ἢ φιλίας, ἀλλ' ἄμφω ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν λέγονται γίνεσθαι. καὶ τάχα οὐδὲν κωλύει  
παραθέσθαι τινὰ τῶν τοῦ Ἑ. ἐπὶ τοῦτο δηλοῦντα·



- αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνορσος ἐλεύσομαι ἐς πόρον ὕμνων,  
 τὸν πρότερον κατέλεξα, λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων  
 κεῖνον· ἐπεὶ νεῖκος μὲν ἐνέρτατον ἔκετο βένθος  
 δίνης, ἐν δὲ μέσῃ φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται,  
 5 ἐν τῇ δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἐν μόνον εἶναι,  
 οὐκ ἄφαρ, ἀλλὰ θελημὰ συνιστάμεν' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα.  
 τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν·  
 πολλὰ δ' ἄμικτ' ἔστηκε κεραιομένοισιν ἐναλλάξ,  
 ὅσος' ἔτι νεῖκος ἔρυκε μετάρσιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀμεμφέως  
 10 πῶ πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ' ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου,  
 ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τ' ἐνέμιμνε μελέων τὰ δὲ τ' ἐξεβεβήκει.  
 ὅσων δ' αἰὲν ὑπεκπροθέοι, τόσων αἰὲν ἐπήρει  
 ἠπιόφρων φιλότητος ἀμεμφέος ἄμβροτος ὁρμή·  
 αἰψά δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι,  
 15 ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.  
 τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν,  
 παντοίαις ἰδέησιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.

ἐν τούτοις δηλοῦται ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἀπλῇ διακοσμήσει ὑποστέλλεται μὲν τὸ νεῖκος, ἡ δὲ φιλότης ἐπικρατεῖ, ὅταν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ στροφάλιγγι, τουτέστι τῇ δίνῃ, γένηται, ὥστε καὶ τῆς φιλότητος ἐπικρατούσης ἔστιν ἡ δίνη, καὶ ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῶν στοιχείων ἀμικτα μένει ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, τὰ δὲ μιγνύμενα ποιεῖ τὰ θνητὰ καὶ ζῶα καὶ φυτὰ, διότι πάλιν διαλύεται τὰ μιγνύμενα.

3–17 Simp. in Phys. 32.13 5, 10–13 Simp. in Cael. 587.11.14 7 EM  
 s.v. ethnos 14–15 Arist. Poet. 1461a24, Ath. 10.423f 15 Plu. quaest. conv.  
 677d

2 λόγου Bergk : λόγῳ codd. ἐπιχετεύων A 5 ἐν τῇ δὴ DE (in Phys.) :  
 ἐν τῇ ἢ δε A : ἐν τηδὶ A (Cael. 587) : ἐνθ' ἡδὴ Bergk 6 ἀλλ' ἐθελημὰ  
 F ἄλλα codd. : ἄλλο in Phys. 8 ἄμικτ' ἔστι κεκρασμένοισιν E,  
 ἄμικτ' (ἄμικτα F) ἔστηκε κερασμένοισι DF (in Phys.) : ἄμικθ' ἔστηκε κε-  
 ραιομένοισιν Stein : ἄμικτ' ἔστηκε κεραιομένοισιν Diels ἐλλάξ A 9  
 ἀμεμφέος F, ἀμραφέως A 10 πῶ F, τὸ A : οὐπω Cael. 587, DE (in  
 Phys.) : πῶ cet. codd. : τῶν Diels 12 ὑπεκπροθέοι F (in Phys.) 13  
 ἠπιόφρων codd. : πίφρων DE, ἡ περίφρων F (in Phys.) ἀμφροσσον A  
 14 θνητὰ φύοντο Ath. 15 ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο scripsi : ζωρά τε τὰ  
 πρὶν ἀκριτα codd. : ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἀκρητα Ath., Plu. : ζῶα τε πρὶν  
 κέκριτο (κέκτητο A<sup>c</sup>) Arist. : ζωρά τε πρὶν τὰ κέκρητο Bergk : ζωρά τε τὰ  
 πρὶν, ἐκρητο Diels διαλλάσσοντα Ath. 17 παντοίαισιν ἰδέεσσιν DE

**48(96)** Simplicius in *Phys.* 300.19

καὶ γὰρ λόγῳ τινὶ ποιεῖ (ὁ 'Ε.) σάρκας καὶ ὀστούν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον.  
λέγει γοῦν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν·

ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρονοις χοάνοις  
τῷ δύο τῶν ὀκτῶ μερέων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης,  
τέσσαρα δ' 'Ηφαίστοιο· τὰ δ' ὀστέα λευκὰ γέγοντο,  
ἁρμονίης κόλλησιν ἁρηρότα θεσπεσίηθεν.

τούτεστιν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων αἰτίων καὶ μάλιστα τῆς φιλίας ἦτοι ἁρμονίας· ταῖς  
γὰρ ταύτης κόλλαις ἁρμόζεται.

1-3 Arist. *De An.* 410a4, Alex. Aphr. in *Metaph.* 135.15, Ascl. in *Metaph.*  
112.1, Them. in *de An.* 33.12, Sophon. in *de An.* 32.15 2-3 Alex. Aphr.  
in *Metaph.* 828.8, Syrian. in *Metaph.* 188.17, cf. Simp. in *de An.* 68.5, Philp.  
in *de An.* 176.30

1 ἐπίηρος LF Alex. εὐρυστέρονοις B Sophon., CZ Them. : εὐτόκτοις EF,  
A Alex. 2 τῷ τῶν ESTUX Arist., (exc. τὰ Z) Ascl., Them., Sophon. :  
τὰς DE, W Arist., Alex., Syrian. : τὰ F, cet. Arist. : τῷ Steinhart, Diels  
μοιράων DE, UVW Arist. A Alex., Z Them. 3 λευκὰ γέγοντο codd.,  
TVW Arist. : λεύκ' ἐγένοντο cet.

**49(34)** Aristotle *Mete.* 381b31

τὸ γὰρ ὑγρὸν τῷ ξηρῷ αἰτίον τοῦ ὀρῆζεσθαι καὶ ἐκότερον ἐκατέρῳ ὅλον κόλλα  
γίγνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ 'Ε. ἐποίησεν ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς (Περσικοῖς Ε).

ἄλφριτον ὕδατι κολλήσας . . .

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον σῶμα.

[Arist.] *probl.* 929b16, Alex. Aphr. in *Mete.* 199.6, Olymp. in *Mete.* 297.19

**50(57)** Simplicius in *Cael.* 586.7

ἐρωτᾷ δέ, πότερον οὐχ ὅλ' αὖτε ἦν τότε οὕτω κινεῖσθαι ἀτάκτως, ὥστε καὶ  
μίγνυσθαι τοιαύτας μίξεις ἕνια, ἐξ ὧν "συνίσταται τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνιστ-  
άμενα σώματα, ὅσον ὅσ' αὖ καὶ σάρκες" καὶ ὅλως τὰ τῶν ζώων μέρη καὶ  
τῶν φυτῶν καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ, "καθάπερ 'Ε. γίνεσθαι φησιν  
ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότῆτος" λέγων·

ἣ πολλὰ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν.

... ὁ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς μίξεως παράδειγμα ἀκούει, ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται τὰ κατὰ φύσιν σώματα, καὶ συναίρεσθαι δοκεῖ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότῃτος τοῦτο λέγεσθαι μίξεως αἰτίας οὐσης ὥσπερ τοῦ νείκους διακρίσεως. πῶς δὲ ἂν εἴη μίξεως σημαντικὸν ἢ “ἀναύχενος κόρη” καὶ τὰλλα τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἑ. λεγόμενα ἐν τούτοις

γυμνοὶ δ' ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες εὐνίδες ὤμων,  
ὀμματα τ' οἷ' ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων,

καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα, ἅπερ οὐκ ἔστι μίξεως παραδείγματα, ἐξ ἧς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνίσταται;

1 Arist. *Cael.* 300b30, *De An.* 430a29, *GA* 722b20, *Simp. in de An.* 250.23, *in Cat.* 337.2, *Philp. in de An.* 545.19, *in GC* 27.35; Tz. *ad Lyc.* 507, 711, *ad Alleg. II.* 4.33

1 ἡ codd., Arist. *GA* : om. Arist. *Cael.* : ὡς Tz. πολλῶν pleri. ἀναύχενος βλαστῶσιν *Simp. Cat.* 2 ἐπλάζοντο E, ἐμπλάζοντο A 3 οἷα D, οἷα AE

51(59) *Simplicius in Cael.* 587.18 [post 47(35).10-13]

ἐν ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ καταστάσει “μονομελῇ” ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ νείκους διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο τῆς πρὸς ἀλληλα μίξεως ἐφείμενα

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μείζον ἐμίσγητο δαίμονι δαίμων,

ὅτε τοῦ νείκους ἐπεκράτει λοιπὸν ἡ φιλότῃς,

ταῦτά τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπῃ συνέκυρσεν ἕκαστα,  
ἄλλα τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκῇ ἐξεγένοντο.

ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότῃτος οὖν ὁ Ἑ. ἐκεῖνα εἶπεν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπικρατούσης ἤδη τῆς φιλότῃτος, ἀλλ' ὡς μελλούσης ἐπικρατεῖν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἄμικτα καὶ μονόγυια δηλούσης.

2 *Simp. in Phys.* 327.20, 331.2



1 δαίμονι om. A      2 ἑκαστα] ἅπαντα in *Phys.*

52(61) Aelian NA 16.29

'Ε. ὁ φυσικός φησι περὶ ζώων ιδιότητος λέγων καὶ ἐκεῖνος δήπου γίνεσθαι  
τινα συμφυῆ καὶ κράσει μορφῆς μὲν διάφορα, ἐνώσει δὲ σώματος συμπλακέντα·  
ἃ δὲ λέγει, ταῦτά ἐστι·

πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερν' ἐφύοντο,  
βουγενῇ ἀνδρόπρωρα, τὰ δ' ἔμπαλιν ἐξανέτελλον  
ἀνδροφυῇ βούκρανα, μεμιγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν  
τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῇ, †σκιεροῖς† ἡσκημένα γυίοις.

2 Arist. *Phys.* 198b32, 199b11; Simp. in *Phys.* 372.1, 380.20, 381.3, 7, 13, 383.  
4; Them. in *Phys.* 62.3; Philp. in *Phys.* 314.13; Plu. *adv. Col.* 1123b

1 ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι codd., emend. Karsten      2 ἐξανατέλλειν codd.,  
emend. Karsten      3 ἀνδρογενῇ βούπρωρα Simp. in *Phys.* 381.7 ἀπ'  
Karsten : ὑπ' codd.      4 χλιεροῖς Karsten : στιβαροῖς Bergk : διεροῖς  
Panzerbieter : στείροισι vel σκιροῖς Diels

53(62) Simplicius in *Phys.* 381.29

εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ 'Ε. ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν πρὸ τῆς τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ  
γυναικείων σωμάτων διαρθρώσεως ταυτὶ τὰ ἔπη·

νῦν δ' ἄγ', ὅπως ἀνδρῶν τε πολυκλαύτων τε γυναικῶν  
ἐννυχίους ὄρηκας ἀνήγαγε κρινόμενον πῦρ,  
τῶνδε κλύ'· οὐ γὰρ μῦθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ' ἀδαήμων.  
οὐλοφνεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον,  
5 ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδους αἴσαν ἔχοντες·  
τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἰκέσθαι,  
οὔτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας,  
οὔτ' ἐνοπήν τοῦτ'† ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι †γύων†.

3 cf. Arist. *Phys.* 199b9

1 ἄγε πως F      3 τῶνδ' ἔκλυ' E      5 ἰδεος Diels      8 οὔτ' F, οἷα τ'  
E, οὔτ' αὐ Ald. : οἷόν τ' Diels      γῆρυν Ald. : γυῖον Stein, Diels : οἷη τ'



ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυίων Bollack

**54(64)** Plutarch *quaest. nat.* 917c

ἢ καὶ τὸ συντρέφεσθαι καὶ συναγελάζεσθαι τὰ θήλεα τοῖς ἄρρεσιν ἀνάμνησιν ποιεῖ τῶν ἀφροδισίων καὶ συνεκκαλεῖται τὴν ὄρεξιν· ὥς ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων Ἔ. ἐποίησε

τῷ δ' ἐπὶ καὶ πόθος εἶτε †διὰ πέψεως ἀμμίσγων†

ἀμμίστων uA, ἀμίσθων n : εἰσι δι' ὄψιος ἀμμιμνήσκων (εἰσι Karsten, δι' ὄψιος Wyttenbach) Diels

**55(66)** Schol. in *Eurip. Phoen.* 18

Ἔ. ὁ φυσικὸς ἀλληγορῶν φησι

σχιστοὺς λειμῶνας . . . Ἀφροδίτης

ἐν οἷς ἡ τῶν παίδων γένεσις ἐστίν.

λειμῶνας AT, λιμῶνας M, λιμένας B

**56(63)** Aristotle *GA* 764b15

οὔτε γὰρ διεσπασμένον ἐνδέχεται τὸ σῶμα τοῦ σπέρματος εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ θήλει τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄρρενι, καθάπερ Ἔ. φησὶν εἰπών·

ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις, ἡ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρὸς

Arist. *GA* 722b12, Phlp. in *GA* 166.25, cf. Gal. *sem.* 4.616K

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ἡ δ' ἐν γυναικὶ add. Phlp.

**57(65)** Aristotle *GA* 723a23

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰ τὸ θήλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐν τῇ κηΐσει διαφέρει, καθάπερ Ἔ. λέγει

ἐν δ' ἐχύθη καθαροῖσι· τὰ μὲν τελέθουσι γυναῖκες

ψύχους ἀντιάσαντα

1 Phlp. in GA 30.4, cf. Arist. GA 764a1

1 ἐλύθη S      2 <τὰ δ' ἐμπαλιν ἄρρενα θερμοῦ> add. Diels

58(67) Galen Hipp. Ep. 17.1002 K

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Παρμενίδης οὕτως ἔφη “δεξιτεροῖσι μὲν κούρους, λαοῖσι δ' αὖ κούρας.” ὁ δὲ Ἑ. οὕτως·

ἐν γὰρ θερμότηρῳ τὸ κατ' ἄρρενα ἐπλετο †γαίης†,  
καὶ μέλανες διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδρομελέστεροι ἄνδρες  
καὶ λαχνήντες μᾶλλον.

1 τοκάς ἄρρενος ἐπλετο γαστήρ Diels : τὸ κατ' ἄρρενα ἐπλετο γαστρός Sturz

2 ἀδρομελέστεροι Karsten : ἀνδροδέστεροι codd.

59(68) Aristotle GA 777a7, cf. Philoponus in GA 208.9

τὸ γὰρ γάλα πεπεμμένον αἶμά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διεφθαρμένον. Ἑ. δ' ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπελάμβανεν ἢ οὐκ εὖ μετήνεγκε ποιήσας ὥς τὸ αἶμα (τὸ γάλα codd.)

μηνὸς ἐν ὀγδοάτῳ δεκάτῃ πύον ἐπλετο λευκόν.

60(71) Simplicius in Cael. 529.28 [post 87(95).1]

ὅτι δὲ περὶ τούτων λέγει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, ἄκουε τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν·

εἰ δέ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἐπλετο πίστις,  
πὼς ὕδατος γαίης τε καὶ αἰθέρος ἡελίου τε  
κιρναμένων εἶδη τε γενοῖατο χροῖά τε θνητῶν  
τόσσ' ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρμοσθέντ' Ἀφροδίτῃ

1 δέ τις F, δ' ἔτι c  
γεγάασι A

4 τόσσ' Karsten : τοῖα codd. τοῖ οἷα Wilam.

61(33) Plutarch amic. mult. 95a

τοῦναντίον οὖν ἔοικεν ἢ καλουμένη πολυφιλία <τῇ φιλίᾳ> ποιεῖν. ἢ μὲν

γὰρ συνάγει καὶ συνίστησι καὶ συνέχει καταπυκνοῦσα τὰς ὁμίλαις καὶ φιλοφροσύναις

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ὁπὸς γάλα λευκὸν ἐγόμφωσεν καὶ ἔδησε

κατ' Ἑ. (τοιαύτην γὰρ ἡ φιλία βούλεται ποιεῖν ἐνότητα καὶ σύμπηξιν), ἡ δὲ πολυφιλία . . .

ἐπηξε LC

**62(73)** Simplicius in *Cael.* 530.5 [post 60(71).1–4]

καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα·

ὥς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεὶ τ' ἐδίηγεν ἐν ὄμβρῳ,  
εἶδεα ποιπνύουσα θοῶ πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι

**1** ἐδείκνεεν A      **2** εἰ δὲ ἀποπνοιοῦσα A      θεῶ F

**63(72)** Athenaeus 8.334b

οὐ λαμβάνει δὲ με καὶ ὅτι κοινῶς πάντες οἱ ἰχθύες καμασῆνες ὑπὸ Ἑ. ἐλέχθησαν τοῦ φυσικοῦ οὕτως·

πῶς καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ καὶ εἰνάλιοι καμασῆνες

**64(77–78)** Theophrastus *CP* 1.13.2, cf. Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 649c

εἰ δὲ καὶ συνεχῶς ὁ ἀῆρ ἀκολουθοίη τούτοις (τοῖς δένδροις), ἴσως οὐδὲ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα δόξειεν ἂν ἀλόγως ἔχειν οὐδ' ὥς Ἑ. αἰφύλλα καὶ ἐμπεδόκαρπά φησι θάλλειν

καρπῶν ἀφθονίῃσι κατ' ἥερα πάντ' ἐνιαυτόν,

ὑποτιθέμενός τινα τοῦ ἀέρος κρᾶσιν, τὴν ἐαρινήν, κοινήν.

αἰφύλλα] ἐμπεδόφυλλον Plu. : δένδρεα δ' ἐμπεδόφυλλα καὶ ἐμπεδόκαρπα τέθηλεν *versum* Hermann., edd. κατήρεα Scaliger : κατήορα Stein

**65(79)** Aristotle *GA* 731a4

καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγει Ἑ. ποιήσας

οὕτω δ' ὥστοκεῖ μακρὰ δένδρεα πρῶτον ἐλαίας.

τὸ τε γὰρ ὥδιν κύημά ἐστι, καὶ ἔκ τινος αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ζῶον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τροφή.

Thphr. *CP* 1.7.1, Phlp. in *GA* 63.11

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μακρά] μικρά PSY, Phlp.

**66(80)** Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 683d

τοῦ δ' Ἑ. εἰρηκότος

οὐνεκεν ὀψίγονοί τε σίδαι καὶ ὑπέρφλοια μῆλα

τὸ μὲν τῶν σιδῶν ἐπίθετον νοεῖν, ὅτι τοῦ φθινοπώρου λήγοντος ἤδη καὶ τῶν κανυμάτων μαραινομένων ἐκπέπτουσι τὸν καρπὸν . . . τὰ δὲ μῆλα καθ' ἥντινα διάνοιαν ὁ σοφὸς “ὑπέρφλοια” προσειρήκοι, διαπορεῖν.

ὑπέρφλοια Karsten : ὑπέρφλοια codd.

**67(81)** Plutarch *quaest. nat.* 912c

ἡ δὲ πέψις ἔοικεν εἶναι σῆψις, ὥς Ἑ. μαρτυρεῖ λέγων

οἶνος ἀπὸ φλοιοῦ πέλεται σαπὲν ἐν ξύλῳ ὕδωρ.

Plu. *quaest. nat.* 919d, Arist. *Top.* 127a19, Alex. Aphr. in *Top.* 357.12, Anon. in *Plat. Theat.* 24.39

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ὕδιν φλοιῷ Xylander

**68(74)** Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 685f

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ζῶων οὐδὲν ἂν χερσαῖον ἢ πτηνὸν εἶπεῖν ἔχοις οὕτω γόνιμον ὥς πάντα τὰ θαλάττια· πρὸς δὲ καὶ πεποίηκεν ὁ Ἑ.

φῶλον ἄμουσον ἄγουσα πολυσπερέων καμασῆνων.

**69(76)** Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 618b

καὶ τὸν θεὸν ὀρᾷς, ὃν “ἀριστοτέχνην” ἡμῶν ὁ Πίνδαρος προσεῖπεν, οὐ πανταχοῦ τὸ πῦρ ἄνω τάττοντα καὶ κάτω τὴν γῆν ἀλλ’ ὥς ἂν αἱ χρεῖαι τῶν σωμάτων ἀπαιτῶσιν·

τοῦτο μὲν ἐν κόγχαισι θαλασσονόμοις βαρυνάτοισι·  
ναὶ μὴν κηρύκων τε λιθορρίνων χελύων τε,

φησὶν Ἐ.

ἐνθ’ ὄφει χθόνα χρωτὸς ὑπέρτατα ναιετάουσιν.

**2–3** Plu. *fac. lun.* 927f

**1** θαλασσονόμων Diels

**70(75)** Simplicius *in Cael.* 530.8 [post 62(73)]

καὶ πάλιν

τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι μακρὰ πέπηγεν,  
Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμῃσι πλάδης τοιῆσδε τυχόντα

**2** Simp. *in Phys.* 331.9

**2** παλάμῃσι (-μῃς F) πλάδης τοιῆσδε codd. : παλάμῃσι πλάδης (πλάσης E)  
τοιῆς τι *in Phys.*

**71(82)** Aristotle *Mete.* 387b4

λέγω δὲ καὶ ὅσα καὶ τρίχας καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν ταῦτῳ· οὐ γὰρ κεῖται  
ὄνομα κοινόν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ὅμως ἐν ταῦτῳ πάντ’ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ  
Ἐ. φησι

ταῦτά τρίχες καὶ φύλλα καὶ οἰωνῶν πτερὰ πυκνά  
καὶ λεπίδες γίνονται ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσι.

Olymp. *in Mete.* 335.22

2 λοιπίδες E φολιδονίδες Olymp. : φλονίδες Karsten

72(83) Plutarch *fort.* 98d

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὥπλισται καὶ ὁδοῦσι καὶ κέντροις,

αὐτὰρ ἐχίνοις  
ὄξυβελεῖς χαῖται νώτοις ἐπιπεφρίκασι.

1 ἐχίνοις Vulcob. : ἐχίνος codd.

2 ὄξυβελοῖς W, ὄξυβελῆς O χαῖται

Vulcob. : καί τε N, δέ τε cet. codd.

73(89) Plutarch *quaest. nat.* 916d

σκόπει δὴ, κατ' Ἐ. γνοῦς ὅτι

πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαὶ ὅσος' ἐγένοντο·

οὐ γὰρ ζώων μόνον οὐδὲ φυτῶν οὐδὲ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίθων  
ἀπεισιν ἐνδεδελεχῶς πολλὰ ρεύματα καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου.

ἀπορροαί A ante corr. : ἀπορροαί cet. codd.

74(91) Philoponus in GA 123.15

καὶ ὧν μὲν εἰσι τὰ ναστὰ καὶ οἱ πόροι, τουτέστι τὰ κοῖλα καὶ πυκνὰ σύμμετρα, ὥστε δ' ἀλλήλων χωρεῖν, τούτων ἔφασκεν (ὁ Ἐ.) εἶναι μῆξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν, οἷον ὕδατος καὶ οἴνου, ὧν δὲ ἀσύμμετρα, ἅμικτα ταῦτα ἔφασκεν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἔλαιον καὶ ὕδωρ· φησὶ γὰρ

(ὕδωρ) οἶνον μᾶλλον †ἐναρίθμιον†, αὐτὰρ ἐλαίῳ  
οὐκ ἐθέλει.

ταῦτα λέγων κατὰ παντὸς σώματος τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἡμίονων ἀτεκνίας  
ἀπεδίδου.

Alex. Aphr. *quaest.* 72.26, cf. Arist. GA 723a18

1 ἐναρίθμιον codd., Alex. : ἐνάρθμιον Karsten



**75(90)** Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 663a

εἴτε γὰρ ἐξ ὁμοίων ἀναλαμβάνει τὸ οἶκετον ἢ φύσις εἰς τὸν ὄγκον αὐτόθεν ἢ ποικίλῃ τροφῇ πολλὰς μεθιέουσα ποιότητας ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἐκάστῳ μέρει τὸ πρόσφορον ἀναδίδωσιν· ὥστε γίνεσθαι τὸ τοῦ 'Ε.

ὥς γλυκὺ μὲν [ἐπὶ] γλυκὺ μάρπτει, πικρὸν δ' ἐπὶ πικρὸν ὀρουσεν,  
ὄξυ δ' ἐπ' ὄξυ <ἐβη>, †δαλερὸν δαλεροῦ λαβέτωσ†

Macrobius *Sat.* 7.5.17

1 ἐπὶ om. Macr. 2 ἐβη suppl. Macr. θερμὸν δ' ἐποχεύετο θερμῷ  
Macr. : δαερὸν δ' ἐποχεύετο δαηρῷ Diels : δαερὸν δ' ἐποχεύετο δαερῷ Maas

**76(93)** Plutarch *def. or.* 433b

ἄλλα γὰρ ἄλλοις οἶκεια καὶ πρόσφορα καθάπερ τῆς μὲν πορφύρας ὁ κυαμὸς τῆς δὲ κόκκου τὸ νίτρον δοκεῖ τὴν βαφὴν ἄγειν μεμιγμένον,

βύσσω δὲ †γλαυκῆς κρόκου† καταμίσγεται ἀκτίς,

ὥς 'Ε. εἴρηκε.

γλαύκοιο Xylander καὶ κρόκου J, κρόκον ΠΒ, κρόνου Gu ἀκτίς] om.  
FΠΒ : αἶθος Xylander : ἀκτῆς Wilam. γλαυκῇ κόκκου καταμίσγεται ἄνθος  
Wyttenbach : γλαυκῆς κόκκος καταμίσγεται ἀκτῆς Diels : γλαύκοιο κρόκου  
καταμίσγεται ἀκτίς Bennet

**77(109)** Aristotle *De An.* 404b8

ἄσσοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν, ταύτην, ὥσπερ 'Ε. μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως·

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπάπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,  
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον,  
στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δὲ τε νεῖκει λυγρῷ.

1-3 Arist. *Metaph.* 1000b6, S.E. *adv. math.* 1.303, 7.92, 121, Hippol. *RH* 6.11.1, Philp. in *GC* 268.17, Sophon. in *de An.* 12.22 1-2 Ascl. in *Metaph.* 198.11, Gal. *plac. Hipp.* 5.627K, Stob. 1.51.7 1,3 Procl. in *Tim.* 233c;

Phlp. *in de An.* 182.1    1 Phlp. *in de An.* 150.12, 180.21, 469.20, 489.27, 570.24, Them. *in de An.* 10.20 14.18, 34.8, Sophon. *in de An.* 26.16, Gal. *plac. Hipp.* 5.631K

2 ἡέρι δ' ἡέρα S.E. 1.303    διον codd., Gal., Stob. : διαν cet., om. Hippol. ἄδηλον E    3 στοργῇ δὲ στοργῇ codd.    δέ τε] δέ τι B<sup>b</sup>C<sup>b</sup> *Metaph.* : ἐπὶ Hippol. : δέ γε S.E. 7.92, Procl.

### 78(107) Theophrastus *Sens.* 10

τὸ μὲν γὰρ φρονεῖν εἶναι τοῖς ὁμοίοις, τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις, ὥς ἢ ταῦτόν ἢ παραπλήσιον ὃν τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν φρόνησιν. διαριθμησάμενος γὰρ, ὥς ἕκαστον ἐκάστω γνωρίζειν, ἐπὶ τέλει προσέθηκεν ὥς

ἐκ τούτων <ὥς> πάντα πεπήχασιν ἀρμοσθέντα  
καὶ τούτοις φρονέουσι καὶ ἡδοντ' ἡδ' ἀνιώνται.

διὸ καὶ τῷ αἵματι μάλιστα φρονεῖν· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα κεκρᾶσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν μερῶν.

1 γάρ add. Karsten, lacunam xiv litt. indicat P : ὥς Lloyd-Jones    2 ἡδοντ' ἡδ' Karsten : ἡδονται καὶ codd.

### 79(106) Aristotle *Metaph.* 1009b17

καὶ γὰρ 'Ε. μεταβάλλοντας τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ τὴν φρόνησιν·

πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

Arist. *De An.* 427a23, Alex. Aphr. *in Metaph.* 306.18, Ascl. *in Metaph.* 277.9, Phlp. *in de An.* 485.23, Them. *in de An.* 87.22, Sophon. *in de An.* 115.26

ἐναύξεται ETA<sup>b</sup>, Alex.

### 80(108) Aristotle *Metaph.* 1009b19 [post 79(106).1]

καὶ ἐν ἐτέροις δὲ λέγει ὅτι

ὅσσον <δ'> ἄλλοιοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ  
καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοῖα παρίσταται



Arist. *De An.* 427a24, Alex. Aphr. in *Metaph.* 306.24, Ascl. in *Metaph.* 277.17, Phlp. in *de An.* 486.16, cf. Simp. in *de An.* 202.30

1 δ' add. Diels : γ' Sturz μετέφην STA<sup>b</sup> τόσον ἄρ] ὅθεν *De An.*, Phlp.  
2 καὶ τὸ φαντίζεσθαι καὶ ὀνειρώττειν φρονεῖν T (*De An.*) παρίστατο  
codd. : καθίσταται T (*De An.*)

**81(103)** Simplicius in *Phys.* 331.12 [post 70(75).2]

καὶ πολλὰ ἂν τις εὔροι ἐκ τῶν 'Ε. Φυσικῶν τοιαῦτα παραθέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦτο·

τῇδε μὲν οὖν λότῃτι τύχῃς πεφρόνηκεν ἅπαντα.

**82(104)** Simplicius in *Phys.* 331.41 [post 81(103)]

καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον·

καὶ καθ' ὅσον μὲν ἀραιότατα ξυνέκυρσε πεσόντα

ἀραιότατα Scaliger : ἀραιότατα codd.

**83(98)** Simplicius in *Phys.* 31.31

ὅτι γὰρ οὐχ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι φίλια μὲν μόνῃ κατ' 'Ε. τὸν νοητὸν ἐποίησε κόσμον, νεῖκος δὲ μόνον τὸν αἰσθητόν, ἀλλ' ἄμφω πανταχοῦ οἰκείως θεωρεῖ, ἄκουσον αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς λεγομένων, ἐν οἷς καὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα δημιουργικῆς συγκράσεως τὴν 'Αφροδίτην ἦτοι τὴν φίλιαν αἰτίαν φησί. καλεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ καὶ 'Ηφαιστον καὶ ἥλιον καὶ φλόγα, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ὄμβρον, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα αἰθέρα. λέγει οὖν πολλαχοῦ μὲν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὲ τοῖς ἐπεσιν·

ἡ δὲ χθὼν τούτοισιν ἴση συνέκυρσε μάλιστα,  
'Ηφαιστῷ τ' ὄμβρῳ τε καὶ αἰθέρι παμφανόωντι,  
Κύπριδος ὀρμυσθεῖσα τελείους ἐν λιμένεσσιν,  
εἴτ' ὀλίγον μείζων ἦϊτε πλέον ἐστίν† ἐλάσσων.  
5 ἐκ τῶν αἰμά τ' ἔγεντο καὶ ἄλλῃς εἶδεα σαρκός.

1 Simp. in *Phys.* 331.5

3 ὀρμησθεῖσα DE 4 μείζον εἴτε πλέον ἐστὶν ἐλάσσον F μείζων εἴτε  
 πλέονεσσιν ἐλάσσων Panzerbieter : εἴτ' ἐν πλέονεσσιν Dodds 5 αἶμα  
 τέγεντο D, αἶματ' ἔγεντο E, αἶματ' ἐγένοντο F : αἶμά τε γέντο Sturz

**84(85)** Simplicius in *Phys.* 331.3

“καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζώων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεισταῖα φησιν,” ὥς ὅταν  
 λέγῃ [83(98).1], καὶ πάλιν

ἡ δὲ φλόξ ἱλάειρα μινυνθαδῆς τύχε γαίης,

καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις [70(75).2]. καὶ πολλὰ ἂν τις εὔροι ἐκ τῶν Ἑ. Φυσικῶν τοιαῦτα  
 παραθέσθαι.

ἡ δὴ D, ἡδη E φλόξ om. E φύχε DF

**85(86)** Simplicius in *Cael.* 529.21

ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ γενέσεως τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τῶν σωματικῶν τοῦτων λέγων ἐπήγαγεν

ἐξ ὧν ὀμματ' ἐπηξεν ἀτειρέα δι' Ἀφροδίτη.

**86(87)** Simplicius in *Cael.* 529.24 [post 85(86)]

καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον

γόμοις ἀσκήσασα καταστόργοις Ἀφροδίτη

**87(95)** Simplicius in *Cael.* 529.26 [post 86(87)]

καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν λέγων τοῦ τοῦς μὲν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ, τοῦς δὲ ἐν νυκτὶ κάλλιον ὄραν

Κύπριδος (φησὶν) ἐν παλάμῃσιν ὅτε ξυμ πρώτ' ἐφύοντο.

**88(84)** Aristotle *Sens.* 437b23

Ἑ. δ' ἔοικε νομίζοντι ὅτε μὲν ἐξιδόντος τοῦ φωτός, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον  
 βλέπειν. λέγει γοὺν οὕτως·

ὥς δ' ὅτε τις πρόοδον νοέων ὠπλίσσατο λύχνον,  
 χειμερίην διὰ νύκτα πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο,

- ἄψας παντοίων ἀνέμων λαμπτήρας ἀμοργούς,  
 οἷ τ' ἀνέμων μὲν πνεῦμα διασκιδνᾶσιν ἀέντων,  
 5 φῶς δ' ἔξω διαθρῶσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν,  
 λάμπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν·  
 ὥς δὲ τότε' ἐν μήνιγξιν ἐεργμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ  
 λεπτῆσιν <τ'> ὀθόνησι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρην·  
 αἱ δ' ὕδατος μὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον ἀμφινάοντος,  
 10 πῦρ δ' ἔξω δίδεσκον ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν.

ὅτε μὲν οὕτως ὁρᾶν φησιν, ὅτε δὲ ταῖς ἀπορροαῖς ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρωμένων.

1–10 cf. Arist. *Sens.* 437b14. Alex. *Aphr. in Sens.* 23.11 8 cf. Eust. *ad Od.* 20.21

3 ἀμοργούς Alex. 4 αἷ τ' EMPYG<sup>a</sup> 5 φῶς] πῦρ EMPYG<sup>a</sup>, add. supra ἢ φῶς il ἔξω διάνταται τρεῖατο θεσπεσίησιν ὀθόνησιν διαθρῶσκον P 7 ἐεργμένον L, ἐερμένον W, ἐελμένον EM, ἐεκμένον Y, ἐκμένον G<sup>a</sup> 8 add. τ' Diels ὀθόνοιςιν X, χοανῆσιν P, χθονίησι EMYG<sup>a</sup>il λοχάζετο EMYil, λοχάζετα G<sup>a</sup>, ἐχεῖατο L, ἐχεύατο cet. codd. αἱ χοάνησι διάντα τετρήατο θεσπεσίησιν conl. Blass ex P v.5, incl. Diels post 8 9 ἀμφινάοντος Bekker : ἀμφινάέντος (ἀμφὶ καέντος M) codd. 10 δίδεσκον P : διαθρῶσκον cet. codd.

89(88) Strabo 8.364.3

παρ' Ἐ. δέ

μία γίγνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὀψ,

ἢ ὀψις.

Arist. *Poet.* 1458a5

ὀψ codd. : ὀγς (ὁ B<sup>c</sup>) Arist.

90(94) Plutarch *quaest. nat.* 39, cf. Aristotle *GA* 779b28

cur aqua in summa parte alba, in fundo vero nigra spectatur? an quod profunditas nigredinis mater est, ut quae solis radios prius quam ad eam

descendant, obtundant et labefactet? superficies autem quoniam continuo a sole afficitur, candorem luminis recipiat oportet. quod ipsum et E. approbat :

et niger in fundo fluvii color exstat ab umbra,  
atque cavernosis itidem spectatur in antris.

**91(100) Aristotle Resp. 473a15**

λέγει δὲ περὶ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ 'Ε. . . . καὶ περὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν μυκτῆρων ἀναπνοῆς λέγων οὐεται καὶ περὶ τῆς κυρίας λέγειν ἀναπνοῆς . . . γίνεσθαι δέ φησι τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ ἐκπνοὴν διὰ τὸ φλέβας εἶναι τινας, ἐν αἷς ἔνεστι μὲν αἷμα, οὐ μέντοι πλήρεις εἰσὶν αἵματος, ἔχουσι δὲ πόρους εἰς τὸν ἔξω ἀέρα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἐλάττους, τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος μεζζους· διὸ τοῦ αἵματος πεφυκότες κινεῖσθαι ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κάτω μὲν φερομένου εἰσρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀναπνοήν, ἄνω δ' ἰόντος ἐκπίπτειν θύραζε καὶ γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐκπνοήν, παρειακάζων τὸ συμβαῖνον ταῖς κλεψύδραις·

- ὥδε δ' ἀναπνεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπνεῖ· πᾶσι λίφαιμοι  
σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύματον κατὰ σῶμα τέτανται,  
καὶ σφιν ἐπὶ στομίοις πυκναῖς τέττηνται ἄλλοξιν  
ρίνων ἔσχατα τέτθηρα διαμπερές, ὥστε φόνον μὲν  
5 κεῦθιν, αἰθέρι δ' εὐπορίην διόδοισι τετμῆσθαι.  
ἐνθεν ἔπειθ' ὁπότε μὲν ἀπαῖξῃ τέρεν αἷμα,  
αἰθήρ παφλάζων καταῖσσεται οἷδματι μάρψ,  
εὐτε δ' ἀναθρώσκη πάλιν ἐκπνέει, ὥσπερ ὅταν παῖς  
κλεψύδρῃ παίζουσα διειπετέος χαλκοῖο·  
10 εὐτε μὲν αὐλοῦ πορθμὸν ἐπ' εὐεῖδεῖ χερὶ θεῖσα  
εἰς ὕδατος βάπτῃσι τέρεν δέμας ἀργυφέοιο,  
†οὔδετ' ἐς† ἄγροσδ' ὄμβρος ἐσέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μιν εἵργει  
ἀέρος ὄγκος ἔσωθε πεσῶν ἐπὶ τρήματα πυκνά,  
εἰσόκ' ἀποστεγάσῃ πυκινὸν ῥόον· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα  
15 πνεύματος ἐλλείποντος ἐσέρχεται αἰσιμον ὕδωρ.  
ὥς δ' αὐτως ὅθ' ὕδωρ μὲν ἔχει κατὰ βένθεα χαλκοῦ,  
πορθμοῦ χωσθέντος βροτέφ' χροῖ ἡδὲ πόροιο,  
αἰθήρ δ' ἐκτός, ἔσω λεληγμένος, ὄμβρον ἐρύκει  
ἀμφὶ πύλας ἡθμοῖο δυσχερός, ἅκρα κρατύνων,  
20 εἰσόκε χειρὶ μετῇ· τότε δ' αὖ πάλιν, ἔμπαλιν ἢ πρίν,  
πνεύματος ἐμπίπτοντος ὑπεκθέει αἰσιμον ὕδωρ.  
ὥς δ' αὐτως τέρεν αἷμα κλαδασσόμενον διὰ γυῖων  
ὁππότε μὲν παλινόρσον ἐπαῖξειε μυχόνδε,  
αἰθέρος εὐθὺς ῥεῦμα κατέρχεται οἷδματι θύον,



25 εὔτε δ' ἀναθρόσκη, πάλιν ἐκπνέει ἴσον ὀπίσσω.

cf. Michael in *PN* 124.15

**1** λείφαιμοι NVn, δίαιμοι Mil **3** πυκναῖς MZil, πυκνῶς vel πυκνοῖς cet. codd. ἄλεξι V, δόναξι Mil **4** τέθρα G·H·Lmo, τέθρα cet. codd., Mich. φόνον Mil, φανόν cet. codd. **5** εὐπορίην LQH·f, εὐπνοίαν pr.Z, εὐπορίαν cet. codd. **6** ἐπαῖξοι corr. i, ἐπάξοι pr.i, ἐπάξειε l, ἐπάξη M pr.Z, ἀπαῖξη LXG·H·mo, ἐπαῖξη cet. codd. **8** ἀναθρόσκη Karsten : ἀναθρώσκει codd. ἐκπνέει Diels : ἐκπνέει codd. **9** κλεψύδρη Diels : κλεψύδραι vel κλεψύδρην codd. παῖζῃσι il, παῖζουσι MZ διειπετέος Diels, δι' εὐπαγέος P, δι' εὐπετέος S, διειπετέος ZMil, δι' εὐπετέος cet. codd. **12** οὐδέτ' ἐς vel οὐδ' ὅτι ἐς codd. : οὐδ' ἔτ' ἐς Diels, οὐδεῖς DK : οὐδέ τις Bollack **13** αἰθέρος Stein, Burnet **14** ἀποστεγάσει Pfmō, ἀποστεγάση M pr.Z, il **15** ἐκλείποντος MZil αἰσιμον Mich. : αὔξιμον vel αἰσιμον codd. **17** χρωσθέντος G·H·LQf, χρωσθέντος cet. codd. χρωῖ ἡδὲ f, χροῖῃδε NPVno, χροῖῃνδε MZ, χροῖνε δέ il, χροῖ ἡδὲ X πόρους Mil **19** ἡθμοῖο PSXZ, ἰσθμοῖο cet. codd. **21** ἐκλείποντος MZG·iln ὑπεκθέει MZil, ὑπεκθεῖ cet. codd. **23** ἐπαῖξειε (ἐπάξειε MZ) codd. : ἀπαῖξειε Stein, Diels **24** αἰθέρος MZil, ἕτερον cet. codd. : τοῦτερον Furley οἷμα τιταίνον MZil **25** ἀναθρόσκη Karsten : ἀναθρώσκοι il, ἀναθρόσκη MSZ, ἀναθρώσκει cet. codd. ἐκπνέει Diels : ἐκπνέει codd.

**92(101)** Plutarch *quaest. nat.* 917e

πότερον αἱ κύνες, ὥς φησιν 'E.

κέρματα θηρέων μελέων μυκτῆρσιν ἐρευνῶν,

τὰς ἀπορροὰς ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, ἃς ἐναπολείπει τὰ θηρία τῇ ὕλῃ . . .

Alexander *probl.* 22.7

ζῶντος μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ συνεχῆ εἶναι τὴν δσμὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θηρίου αἰσθάνονται, τεθνεώτος δὲ πέπανται βέουσα· οὐ γὰρ καταλείπει, ὥσπερ 'E., ὥς

. . . ἀπέλειπε ποδῶν ἀπαλῇ περὶ ποίῃ

**1** Plu. *curios.* 52of, cf. Anon. in *Plat. Theaet.* 71.3

**1** κέρματα Anon. : κέμματα (κόμματα B) codd. : πέλματα J<sup>1</sup>, τέρματα cet. Plu. 52of έρευνῶν Plu. 52of : έρευνῶσαι codd. **2** περιποία codd. : πνεύματα θ' ὅσσ' ἀπέλειπε ποδῶν ἀπαλῇ περὶ ποίᾱ Diels : ζῶονθ' ὅσσ' DK : ὁσμάθ' ὅσσ' Pearson

**93(102)** Theophrastus *Sens.* 22

οὐ γὰρ ἴσως καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν αἷτιον τῆς ὁσφρήσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὡς ἐκ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων μαρτυρεῖται καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων παθῶν· ὁ δ' ὡς ταύτης οὐσης τῆς αἰτίας καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει πάλιν εἴρηκεν ὥσπερ ἐπισημαίνόμενος

ὥδε μὲν οὖν πνοιῆς τε λελόγχασι πάντα καὶ ὁσμῶν.

πνοιῆς Stephanus : πνοῆς codd.

**94(105)** Stobaeus 1.49.53

οἴεται γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ αἵματι εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ τὰ θνητὰ φρόνησιν . . . 'Ε. δὲ οὕτω φαίνεται ὡς ὄργάνου πρὸς σύνεσιν τοῦ αἵματος ὄντος λέγειν·

αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι †τετραμμένα ἀντιθρῶντος†  
τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κικλήσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν·  
αἵμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

**3** EM s.v. αἷμα, cf. Censorinus 6.1, Chalc. *Tim.* 218

**1** τετραμμένη Grotius ἀντιθρῶντος P<sup>2</sup>, ἀντιθρορόντος Scaliger : ἀμφιθρο-  
ώντος Karsten **2** κυκλίσκεται Heeren

**95(132)** Clement *Strom.* 5.140.5

ὄλβιος

ὡς ἔοικεν, ἄρα ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν 'Ε.,

ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,  
δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.

γνώσιν καὶ ἀγνωσίαν ὁρους εὐδαιμονίας κακοδαιμονίας τε θείως ἐδήλωσεν.

**96(133)** Clement *Strom.* 5.81.2

τὸ γὰρ τοι θεῖον, ὃ Ἀκραγαντίνος φησι ποιητής,

οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν  
 ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἥπερ τε μεγίστη  
 πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἀμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει.

Theodoret. *Gr. aff.* 1.74

**1** πελάσαι δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς (ὀφθαλμοῖσιν, V) οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφικτόν CV Theodoret.

**2** ἥπερ τε codd. : ἥπερ γε Karsten

**97(134)** Ammonius in *Int.* 249.1

διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος σοφὸς ἐπιρραπίσας τοὺς περὶ θεῶν ὡς  
 ἀνθρωποειδῶν ὄντων παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς λεγόμενους μύθους, ἐπήγαγε προσηγ-  
 ουμένως μὲν περὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, περὶ οὗ ἦν αὐτῷ προσεχῶς ὁ λόγος, κατὰ δὲ  
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ θείου παντὸς ἀπλῶς ἀποφαινόμενος

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρομέη κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται,  
 [οὐ μὲν ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀΐσσουνσι,]  
 οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν', οὐ μήδεα λαγχνέντα,  
 ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μῦνονον,  
 5 φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουνσα θοῇσιν.

διὰ τοῦ "ἱερῇ" καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἀνιιττόμενος αἰτίαν.

**1–5** Tz. *Chil.* 13.80    **1** (1, 3–5 mg.) Olymp. in *Gorg.* 4.3    **4–5** Tz. *Chil.*  
 7.517

**1** οὕτε Ammon., Olymp. mg. : οὐ μὲν Tz. ἀνδρομέη] βροτέη Tz.    **2**  
 νώτων γε codd., corr. Schneider ἀΐσσουνσι codd. : ἀΐσσονται Stein, vers.  
 seclusi    **3** πόδες] χέρεις Olymp. mg. γοῦνα καὶ Tz. μήδεα] στήθεα  
 superscrip. A

**98(27a)** Plutarch *princ. phil.* 777c

ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλοσοφίας τελευτῶν σύμφωνον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἄμεμπτον  
 ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μεστὸν εἰρήνης καὶ φιλοφροσύνης τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀεὶ παρ-  
 ἔχεται τὸν ἀνθρώπον

οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιμος ἐν μελέεσσιν.

οὐ δῆρις codd. corr. Xylander ἀναίσιμος Meziriae : ἀνέσιμος w, ἐναίσιμος cet. codd.

**99(129)** Porphyry *Vit. Pyth.* 30

τούτοις καὶ 'Ε. μαρτυρεῖ λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ·

ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς,  
 ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον.  
 παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων·  
 ὁππότε γὰρ πάσῃσιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν,  
 5 ῥεῖά γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον,  
 καὶ τε δέκ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τ' εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν.

τὸ γὰρ “περιώσια” καὶ “τῶν ὄντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστα” καὶ “πραπίδων πλοῦτον” καὶ τὰ ἐοικότα ἐμφαντικὰ μάλιστα τῆς ἐξαιρέτου καὶ ἀκριβεστέρας παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους διοργανώσεως ἐν τε τῷ ὀρᾶν καὶ τῷ ἀκούειν καὶ τῷ νοεῖν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου.

**1–6** Iamb. *Vit. Pyth.* 67      **1–2** D.L. 8.54

**3** σοφῶν add. τ' Wilam.      **5** ρεῖ' ὃ γε Cobet      ἕκαστον Iamb. : ἕκαστα codd.

**100(110)** Hippolytus *RH* 7.29.25

τοιαύτη τις ἢ κατὰ τὸν 'Ε. ἡμῶν ἢ τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ συνεστῶσα φιλοσοφεῖται. εἶναι δέ φησι καὶ νοητὴν τρίτην τινὰ δύναμιν, ἣν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπινοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι, λέγων ὡδὲ πως·

εἰ γὰρ καὶ σφ' ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας  
 εὐμενέως καθαρῇσιν ἐποπτεύσεις μελέτησιν,  
 ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι' αἰῶνος παρέσσονται,  
 ἄλλα τε πόλλ' ἀπὸ τῶνδε κτ(ήσε)αι· αὐτὰ γὰρ αὖξει  
 5 ταῦτ' εἰς ἡθὺς ἕκαστον, ὅπη φύσις ἐστὶν ἐκάστω.  
 εἰ δὲ σύ γ' ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι οἷα κατ' ἀνδρας  
 μυρία δειλὰ πέλονται ἅ τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας,



ἡ σ' ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο  
 σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἰκέσθαι.  
 10 πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἰσαν.

10 Hippol. RH 6.12.1, S.E. *adv. math.* 8.286

1 καὶ ἐν σφαδίνῃσιν codd. : κεν σφ' ἀδινῇσιν Schneidewin 2 ἐποπτεύσεις  
 scripsi : ἐποπτεύεις codd. : ἐποπτεύσης Schneid. 3 τέ Schneid. : δέ  
 codd. 4 τῶνδεκτ(ή-η)ται codd. : τῶνδ' ἐκτῆσαι Diels : τῶνδε κτῆσ-  
 εται Bollack 5 ἦθος Miller : ἔθος codd. 6 τάλλ' οἶων ἐπιδέξεις  
 codd. corr. Schneid. 7 δῆλα codd. : δείλα Schneid. 8 τ' Diels :  
 τά τ' codd. 9 μερίμνας Schneid. : μέριμναι codd. 10 ἡ σ' Meineke :  
 σῆς codd. περιπλομένοιο Miller : περιπλομένοις codd. 10 νώματος  
 αἰσαν S.E. : γνωματοσίσον codd. : γνώμην ἴσῃν Hippol. 6.12

### 101(111) D.L. 8.59

τοῦτόν φησι ὁ Σάτυρος λέγειν ὡς αὐτὸς (ὁ Γοργίας) παρεῖη τῷ 'Ε. γοητεύοντι.  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι τοῦτό τε καὶ ἄλλα πλείω,  
 δι' ὧν φησι·

φάρμακα δ' ὅσσα γεγᾶσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ  
 πεύσῃ, ἐπεὶ μούνη σοι ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα.  
 παύσεις δ' ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος οἷ τ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν  
 ὀρνύμενοι πνοαῖσι καταφθινύθουσιν ἀρούρας·  
 5 καὶ πάλιν, ἣν ἐθέλῃσθα, παλίντιτα πνεύματ' ἐπάξεις·  
 θήσεις δ' ἐξ ὀμβροιο κελαינוῦ καίριον αὐχμόν  
 ἀνθρώποις, θήσεις δέ καὶ ἐξ αὐχμοῖο θερείου  
 ρεύματα δενδρεόθρεπτα, †τάτ' αἰθέρι ναιήσονται†,  
 ἄξεις δ' ἐξ 'Αἰδαο καταφθιμένου μένος ἀνδρός.

1–9 Suda s.v. ἄπνους, Tz. Chil. 2.909 3–5 Clem. 6.30.2

4 πνοαῖσι] θνητοῖσι Clem. ἀρούρας Clem., Tz. : ἀρούραν codd. 5  
 ἦν κ' P, Suda, ἦν F, ἦν καὶ ἐθέλῃσθα B : εὐτ' ἐθέλῃσθα Clem. παλίντιτα  
 Suda 6 θήσεις F, (om. ἐπάξεις) Clem. : τήσεις B, στήσεις P, Suda, Tz.  
 7 θήσεις B<sup>2</sup>F, θήσει B<sup>1</sup>, στήσεις P, Tz. θερείου P<sup>2</sup>, Tz. : θερείοις BFP<sup>1</sup>,  
 om. Suda 8 τάτ' αἰθέρι ναιήσονται P<sup>1</sup>, ταταιθεριναίης ὄντα B, τάτε  
 θέρειναήσονται F, τάτ' ἐνθέρι ἀήσονται P<sup>2</sup> : τά τ' ἐν θέρει ἔσονται Suda :  
 τά τ' αἰθέρινα θήσονται Tz. : τά τ' αἰθέρι ναιήσονται Diels : τά τ' αἰθέρι  
 ἀλίσσονται Wilam.

## 8. ΚΑΘΑΡΜΟΙ

**102(112)** 1,2, 4-11 D.L. 8.61 (3 Diod. Sic. 13.83.2; 10,12 Clem. Strom. 6.30.3)

τὴν γοῦν ἄπνουν ὁ Ἡρακλείδης φησὶ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, ὥς τριάκοντα ἡμέρας συντηρεῖν ἄπνουν καὶ ἄσφυκτον τὸ σῶμα· ὅθεν εἶπεν αὐτόν καὶ ἰητρὸν καὶ μάντιν, λαμβάνων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν στίχων·

- ὦ φίλοι, οἳ μέγα ἄστν κατά ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος  
ναίετ' ἄν' ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργων,  
(ξείνων αἰδοῖσι λιμένες κακότητος ἄπειροι,)  
χαίρετ'· ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός  
5 πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικεν,  
ταῖναις τε περίστεπτος στέφουσιν τε θαλερίοις·  
†τοῖσιν ἅμ' ἄν† ἔκωμαι ἐς ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα  
ἀνδράσιν ἡδὲ γυναιξὶ σεβίζομαι· οἳ δ' ἅμ' ἔπονται  
μυρίοι ἐξερέοντες ὅπη πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός,  
10 οἳ μὲν μαντοσυνέων κεχρημένοι, οἳ δ' ἐπὶ νούσων  
παντοίων ἐπύθοντο κλύειν εὐηκέα βάξιν,  
δηρὸν δὴ χαλεπήσι πεπαρμένοι <ἄμφ' ὁδύνησιν>.

**1-2, 4-6** Anth. Gr. 9.569    **1-2** D.L. 8.54    **4-5** D.L. 8.66, S.E. *adv.math.* 1.302    **4** Plot. 4.7.10.38, Tz. *ex.II.* 29.24, Philostr. *Vit. Ap.* 1.1, Lucian. *laps.* 2, Suda s.v. Empedoklēs, Pythagoras

**2** πόλεος Merzdorf : πόληος F,P (Anth.), πολέως BP<sup>1</sup>, Pl (Anth.)    **3** ex D.S. 13.83.2, fortasse falso inser.    **4** ὑμῖν] ὕμνιν Philostr., Suda, Luc. (exc. F) : εἰμὶ M (Plot.), F (Luc.)    **5** τετιμνημένος B, ABVCR (S.E.)

ἔοικεν *Anth.* : ἔοικα codd. 6 περίστρεπτος F, P (*Anth.*) θαλείοις  
*Anth.*, θαλίος codd. 7 τοῖσιν ἄμ' ἄν BP<sup>1</sup>F, ἄμ' εὐτ' ἄν P<sup>2</sup> : πᾶσι δὲ  
 τοῖς ἄν Wilam. : πᾶσι δ' ἄμ' εὐτ' ἄν coniecti 10 δ' ἐπὶ Clem. : δέ τι  
 codd. νοῦσον Clem. 12 θηρόν δῆ Sylburg : σιδηρόν vel σιδηράν  
 Clem. χαλεποῖσι Clem. corr. Bergk ἄμφ' ὀδύνησιν add. Bergk

**103(114)** Clement *Strom.* 5.9.1

καί μοι σφόδρα ἐπεινεῖν ἔπεισι τὸν Ἀκραγαντίνον ποιητὴν ἐξυμνοῦντα τὴν  
 πίστιν ὧδὲ πως·

ὦ φίλοι, οἷδα μὲν οὐνεκ' ἀληθείῃ πάρα μύθοις  
 οὐς ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· μάλα δ' ἀργαλέῃ γε τέτυκται  
 ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσζηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή·

1 οὐνεκ' Meineke : οὐν ἐκ τ' codd. 2 ἔγωγ codd. corr. Sylburg

**104(11)** Plutarch *adv. Col.* 1113c

ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ μὴ τοῦτο κινεῖν τὸ ἐκφορικὸν ὃ 'Ε., ἀλλ' ὥς πρότερον  
 εἴρηται, πραγματικῶς διαφέρεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γενέσεως, ἣν "φύσιν"  
 τινὲς καλοῦσι. δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα διὰ τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν·

νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολερόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι,  
 οἷ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔδον ἐλπίζουσιν,  
 ἣ τι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη·

ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ ἐπη μέγα βοῶντός ἐστι τοῖς ὧτα ἔχουσιν, ὥς οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ  
 γένεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθορὰν ἀλλὰ τὴν "ἀπάντη," τουτέστι  
 τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπολλύουσιν.

3 τι E : τοι B ἀπάντη Xylander : πάντη codd.

**105(113)** Sextus *adv. math.* 1.302 [post 102(112).4–5]

καὶ πάλιν·

ἀλλὰ τί τοῖσδ' ἐπείκειμ' ὥσει μέγα χρῆμά τι πράσσων,  
 εἰ θνητῶν περίειμι πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων;

... συνήσει ὅτι ὁ 'Ε. θεὸν ἑαυτὸν ὑποσηγώρευσε, ἐπεὶ μόνος καθαρὸν ἀπὸ

κακίας τηρήσας τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἀνεπιθόλωτον τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεῷ τὸν ἐκτὸς κατέλληφεν.

2 πολυφθορέων ABCVR

106(15) Plutarch *adv. Col.* 1113d [post 104(11)]

ἐπεὶ τῷ γε βουλομένῳ μὴ ἀγρίως οὕτως μηδὲ ἡλιθίως ἀλλὰ πραότερον συκοφαντεῖν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἂν αἰτιάσασθαι παράσχοι, τοῦ 'Ε. λέγοντος

οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιοτο,  
ὥς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιωσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι,  
τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν, καὶ σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,  
πρὶν δὲ πάγην τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσὶν.

ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἀρνούμενου μὴ εἶναι τοὺς γεγονότας καὶ ζῶντάς ἐστιν, εἶναι δὲ μᾶλλον οἰομένου καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας.

1 φρέσι post ἀνὴρ codd. corr. Xylander      3 δειλά Bergk : δεινά codd.  
4 ἐπεὶ add. Reiske      λύθεν Xylander : λυθέντ' codd.

107(115) 1, 3, 5, 6, 13 Plutarch *exil.* 607c; 1-2, 4-12, 13, 14 Hippolytus *RH* 7.29.14-23

1-2 Simp. in *Phys.* 1184.9, Stob. 2.8.42      6-7 Origen *Cels.* 8.53      9-12 Plu. *de Is. et Os.* 361c, vii. *aer.* 83of; Eus. *PE* 5.5.2      13-14 Ascl. in *Metaph.* 197.20; Phlp. in *GC* 266.4, in *de An.* 73.32, in *Phys.* 24.20; Plot. 4.8.1.19; Hierocl. in *CA* 54

Plutarch *exil.* 607c

ὁ δ' 'Ε. ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας

1 ἔστιν ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν φήμισμα παλαιόν,  
3 εὐτέ τις ἀμπλακίησι φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα †μιν†  
5 δαίμονες οἳ τε μακράϊωνος λελάχασι βίοιο,  
6 τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι,  
13 τὴν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἴμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,

οὐχ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ' ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντας ἀποδείκνυσι μετανάστας ἐνταῦθα καὶ ξένους καὶ φυγάδας ἡμᾶς ὄντας.



Hippolytus *RH* 7.29.14 [post 22(29).1–2, 4]

καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει περὶ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ γεννήσεως ὁ 'Ε.

13 τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ <νῦν> εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,

τουτέστι θεὸν καλῶν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου ἐνότητα, ἐν ᾧ ἦν πρὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους ἀποσπασθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τούτοις τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νείκους διακόσμησιν· 14 “νεῖκει” γὰρ φησι “μαί(νο)μένῳ πίσυρος,” νεῖκος μαί(νο)μενον καὶ τεταραγμένον καὶ ἄστατον τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ὁ 'Ε. ἀποκαλῶν. αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ καταδίκη καὶ ἀνάγκη τῶν ψυχῶν, ὧν ἀποσπᾷ τὸ νεῖκος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ δημιουργεῖ καὶ ἐργάζεται, λέγων τοιοῦτόν τινα τρόπον·

4 ὅς καὶ ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομώσει,

5 δαίμονες οὔτε μακροαῖωνος λελάχασι βίοιο,

“δαίμονας” τὰς ψυχὰς λέγων “μακράωνας,” ὅτι εἰσι ἀθάνατοι καὶ μακροὺς ζῶσιν αἰῶνας·

6 τρεῖς μὲν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλλάλῃσθαι,

“μάκαρας” καλῶν τοὺς συνηγμένους ὑπὸ τῆς φιλείας ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς τὴν ἐνότητα τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ νοητοῦ. τούτους οὖν φησιν “ἀλλάλῃσθαι” καὶ

7 φρομένους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἶδεα θνητῶν,

8 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.

“ἀργαλέας κελεύθους” φησὶν εἶναι τῶν ψυχῶν τὰς εἰς τὰ σώματα μεταβολὰς καὶ μετακοσμήσεις. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει·

8 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους·

“μεταλλάσσουσι” γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ σῶμα ἐκ σώματος, ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους μεταβαλλόμεναι καὶ κολαζόμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐώμεναι μένειν εἰς τὸ ἐν· ἀλλὰ κολάζεσθαι ἐν πάσαις κολάσεσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους τὰς ψυχὰς μεταβαλλομένας σῶμα ἐκ σώματος.

9 αἰθέριόν γε (φησί) μένος ψυχὰς πόντονδε διώκει,

10 πόντος δ' ἐς χθονὸς οὐδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ' ἐς αὐγὰς

11 ἡελίου φαέθοντος, ὃ δ' αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίναις·

12 ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες.



codd. = Hippol. 7.29.14, exc.v. 3 codd. = Plu. 607c

**1** ἔστιν Simp. : ἔστι τι codd., Plu. ἀνάγκης Plu. : ἀνάγκη codd., Simp. σφρήγισμα A, σφράγισμα FM (Simp.) **2** κατεσφραγισμένον Simp. : κατεσφραγισμένον codd., Stob. **3** φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα μιν codd. : φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα μένη Stephanus, edd. **4** ὅς καὶ] νείκει θ' ὅς κ(ε) Diels : ὅς κεν τὴν van der Ben : ὅρκον ὅτις κ(ε) temptavi ἐπομόσση Schneidewin : ἐπομώσει codd. **5** δαίμονες οἳ τε Plu. : δαιμόνιοι τε codd. μακραίωνες λελόγγασι βλοιο Plu. : μακραίωνος λελάγασι βλοῖς codd. **6** μιν Plu. : μὲν codd. Origen, ἀλλάγησθαι Plu. : ἀλλάσασθε codd. **7** φυόμενον Stein : φυομένους codd. : γινομένην Origen παντοίαν Origen χρόνου Bergk : χρόνον codd., Origen εἶδεα edd. : ἰδέα codd. : ἰδέαν Origen **9** Plu. (om. μὲν) 361c, 830f, Eus. : αἰθέρειόν γε μένος ψυχᾶς πόντονδε ἔχθονός διώκει codd. **10** ἀνέπτυσσε Plu. 830 αὐγᾶς] αὐθις Plu. 361 : λυγᾶς X, λυγᾶς J Plu. 830 **11** φαέθοντος] ἀκάμαντος (ἀκάματος zab 830) Plu. 13 τὴν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἴμι Plu. : νῦν om. codd. : ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ δεῦρ' εἴμι Phlp., Ascl. **14** αἰθομένῳ Ascl.

### 108(117) Hippolytus RH 1.3.1

Ἐ. δὲ μετὰ τούτους γενόμενος καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων φύσεως εἶπε πολλά, ὥς ἀναστρέφονται διοικούντες τὰ κατὰ τὴν γῆν ὄντες πλείστοι, οὗτος τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν νείκος καὶ φιλίαν ἔφη· καὶ τὸ τῆς μονάδος νοερὸν πῦρ τὸν θεόν, καὶ συνεστάναι ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυθήσεσθαι· ᾧ σχεδὸν καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ συντίθεται δόγματι, ἐκπύρωσιν προσδοκῶντες. μάλιστα δὲ πάντων συγκατατίθεται τῇ μετενσωματώσει, οὕτως εἰπὼν·

ἦδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε  
θάμνος τ' ὀλώνος τε καὶ ἔξαλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

οὗτος πάσας εἰς πάντα τὰ ζῷα μεταλλάττειν εἶπε τὰς ψυχὰς.

**1–2** Clem. Strom. 6.24.3, Ath. 8.365a, D.L. 8.77, Them. in de An. 35.13, Phlp. in de An. 140.7, Sophon. in de An. 24.39, Eust. ad Od. 18.79, Olymp. in Phd. 58.17, Anth. Gr. 9.569, Cyrill. Jul. 872c, cf. Chalcid. Tim. 197 **1** Philostr. Vit. Ap. 1.1, Suda s.v. Empedoklēs, Pythagoras **2** Proclus in R. 2.333.8

**1** ἦτοι μὲν γὰρ codd. : ἦδη ποτ' Ath., Eust. κοῦρός τε κούρη τε codd. pler. Phlp. : κούρη (κούρη Philostr.) τε κόρος τε R Phlp., Ath., Them., Philostr., Eust., Cyrill., Suda **2** ἑξαλλός B : ἑξ ἄλός Eust., Ath., Anth. Gr., Phlp.,



Sophon. : εἰν ἀλλ Clem. : ἐξ ἀλὸς, ἐξαλλὸς var. Olymp. ἔλλοπος Clem. : ἔμπορος codd., Ath., Phil., Them., Sophon., Procl. : ἔμυρος D.L., Anth. Gr. : ἄμφορος vel νήχυτος Olymp. : φαίδιμος Cyrill.

**109(116)** Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 745d

ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἄτοπος . . . τὰς δὲ Μούσας ἢ παραλείπων παντάπασιν ἢ τοῖς τῶν Μοιρῶν ὀνόμασι προσαγορεύων καὶ καλῶν θυγατέρας Ἀνάγκης. ἄμουςον γὰρ Ἀνάγκη, μουσικὸν δὲ ἢ Πειθῶ, καὶ Μούσαις †φιλοδαμοῦσα† πολὺ μᾶλλον οἶμαι τῆς Ἐ. Χάριτος

στυγέει δύσκλητον Ἀνάγκην.

**110(126)** Stobaeus 1.49.60 (ex Porphyry.)

αὐτῆς γὰρ τῆς μετακοσμήσεως εἰμαρμένη καὶ φύσις ὑπὸ Ἐ. δαίμων ἀνηγόρευται·

σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶν

καὶ μεταμπίσχουσα τὰς ψυχὰς.

Plu. *esu. carn.* 998c

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ἀλλογνῶτι Plu. : ἀλλοιχῶτι vel ἀλλογνῶτι codd. : ἀλλοιόχρωτι Karsten

**111(119)** Plutarch *exil.* 607d [post 107(115).1, 3, 5, 6, 13]

“οὐ γὰρ αἶμα” φησὶν “ἡμῶν οὐδὲ πνεῦμα συγκαθέν, ὡ ἄνθρωποι, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν παρέσκεν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τούτων τὸ σῶμα συμπέπλασται γηγενὲς καὶ θνητόν,” τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἀλλαχόθεν ἡκούσης δεῦρο, τὴν γένεσιν ἀποδημίαν ὑποκορίζεται τῷ πραοτάτῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων· τὸ δ’ ἀληθέστατον, φεύγει καὶ πλανᾶται θεοῖς ἐλαννομένη δόγμασι καὶ νόμοις· εἴτα . . . ἐνδεδεμένη τῷ σώματι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀναφέρειν μηδὲ μνημονεύειν

ἐξ οἷος τιμῆς τε καὶ ὅσσου μήκεος ὄλβου

μεθέστηκεν, οὐ Σάρδεων Ἀθήνας . . . ἀλλ’ οὐρανοῦ καὶ σελήνης γῆν ἀμειψαμένη καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ γῆς βίον.

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Clem. *Strom.* 4.13.1, Hippol. *RH* 5.7.30, Stob. 3.40.5



δσσου edd. : δσου codd., Stob. : ολου Clem., om. Hippol.

**112(118)** Clement *Strom.* 3.14.1 (cf. Sextus *adv. math.* 11.96)

Ἡράκλειτος γοῦν κακίζων φαίνεται τὴν γένεσιν, ἐπειδὴν φῆ· (22B20). δῆλος δὲ αὐτῷ συμφερόμενος καὶ Ἑ. λέγων·

κλαῦσά τε καὶ κώκυσα ἰδὼν ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον.

**113(121)** 1–2, 4 Hierocles in *CA* 54, 2–3 Proclus in *Cra.* 97.23

ἄνεισι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἔξιν ἀπολαμβάνει, εἰ φύγοι τὰ περὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν

ἄτερπέα χῶρον

ὥς ὁ αὐτὸς λέγει,

ἐνθα φόνος τε κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν,  
(αὐχμηραὶ τε νόσοι καὶ σήψεις ἔργα τε βευστά)

εἰς δὲ οἱ ἐμπεσόντες

Ἄτης ἂν λειμῶνα κατὰ σκότος ἡλάσκουσιν.

ἡ δὲ ἐφεις τοῦ φεύγοντος τὸν τῆς “Ἄτης λειμῶνα” πρὸς τὸν τῆς Ἀληθείας ἐπέλγεται λειμῶνα, ὃν ἀπολιπὼν τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πετρορρυήσεως εἰς γῆινον ἔρχεται σῶμα ὀλβίου αἰῶνος ἀμερθείς.

**2, 4** Procl. in *R.* 2.157.27    **2** Philo *Prov.* (ap. Eus. *PE* 8.14.23), Theo Sm. 149.6    **4** Procl. in *Tim.* 339b, Them. *Or.* 178a

**2** φόνος τελοῦνται Eus. : κοτός τε φόνος τε Theo, Procl.    **3** ex Procl. in *Cra.* 97.23 fortasse falso inser.    **4** ἂν λειμῶνα Bentley : ἀνὰ λειμῶνα codd. : ἐν λειμῶνι Procl.    ἡλάσκουσι] ἱλάσκονται Procl.

**114(124)** Clement *Strom.* 3.14.2 [post 130(125)]

καὶ πάλιν·

ὦ πόποι, ὦ δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος, ὦ δυσάναλβον,

οἷων ἐξ ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν ἐγένεσθε.

2 Porph. *abst.* 3.27, Eus. *PE* 14.18.28

1 ἡ δειλὸν codd. corr. Scaliger      2 τοίων ἐκ τ' ἐρίδων Porph., Eus. :  
οἷων ἐξ ἐρείδων codd.      στοναχῶν] νεικέων Porph.      γενόμεσθα Porph. :  
πέπλασθε Eus.

115(120) Porphyry *antr. nymph.* 8 (cf. Plot. 4.8.1.33)

ἀφ' ὧν οἶμαι ὁρμώμενοι καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ μετὰ τούτους Πλάτων ἄντρον  
καὶ σπήλαιον τὸν κόσμον ἀπεφήνατο. παρὰ τε γὰρ 'Ε. αἱ ψυχοπομποὶ δυνά-  
μεις λέγουσιν

ἡλύθομεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄντρον ὑπόστεγον . . .

116(122) Plutarch *tranq. an.* 474b

οὐ γάρ, ὥς ὁ Μένανδρός φησιν, "ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται | εὐθὺς  
γενομένῳ. μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου | ἀγαθός," ἀλλὰ μάλλον, ὥς 'Ε., διτταί τινες  
ἕκαστον ἡμῶν γινόμενον παραλαμβάνουσι καὶ κατάρχονται μοῖραι καὶ δαί-  
μονες·

ἐνθ' ἦσαν Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἥλιόπη ταναῶπις,  
Δηρίς θ' αἰματόεσσα καὶ Ἀρμονίη θεμερῶπις,  
Καλλιστώ τ' Αἰσχυρή τε, Θώσά τε Δηναίη τε,  
Νημερτής τ' ἐρόεσσα μελάγκουρός τ' Ἀσάφεια.

2 cf. Plu. *de Is. et Os.* 370d      4 cf. Tz. *Chil.* 12.509

2 θερμερῶπις YhS<sup>2</sup>, γε μερῶπις Δ      3 δηναίη Δ, δαιναίη cet. codd.  
4 μελάγκουρος Tz : μελάγκαρποτ' NRS, μελανκαρπώτ' G<sup>1</sup>XY<sup>1</sup>, μελάγκαρπός  
τ' cet. codd.

117(123) Cornutus *Comph.* 17(30.3)

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἡ τῶν λεγομένων Τιτάνων ἐστὶ γένεσις. οὗτοι δ' ἂν εἰεν  
διαφοραὶ τῶν ὄντων· ὥς γὰρ 'Ε. φυσικῶς ἐξαριθμεῖται

Φυσώ τε Φθιμένη τε, καὶ Εὐναίη καὶ Ἑγερεσις,

Κινώ τ' Ἀστεμφής τε, πολυστέφανός τε Μεγιστώ,  
καὶ Ὑφορίη Σωπή τε καὶ Ὀμφαίη

καὶ πολλὰς ἄλλας, τὴν εἰρημένην ποικιλίαν τῶν ὄντων αἰνιττόμενος.

3 φορή NB, φορήν MXPlc, φυρή cet. codd. σωπή Bergk : σοφήν MXPlc,  
σόφη b, σομφήν V : σομφή Karsten ὀμφαλήν vel ὀμφαίην codd.

# 118(128) Porphyry *abst.* 2.20 (1–8), 2.27 (8–10)

τὰ μὲν ἀρχαῖα τῶν ἱερῶν . . . τὰ ὑδρόσπονδα, τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα μελίσπονδα  
. . . εἴτ' ἐλαιόσπονδα· τέλος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τὰ ὑστερον γεγονότα οἰνόσπονδα.  
μαρτυρεῖται δὲ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν κύρβων . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' Ἑ.,  
ὅς περὶ τῆς θεογονίας διεξιὼν καὶ περὶ τῶν θυμάτων παρεμφαίνει λέγων·

οὐδὲ τις ἦν κείνοισιν Ἄρης θεὸς οὐδὲ Κυδοιμός  
οὐδὲ Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς οὐδὲ Κρόνος οὐδὲ Ποσειδῶν,  
ἀλλὰ Κύπρις βασίλεια,

ἣ ἐστὶν ἡ φίλα·

τὴν οἷ γ' εὐσεβέεσσιν ἀγάλμασιν ἱλάσκοντο  
5 γραπτοῖς τε ζώοισι μύροισι τε δαιδαλεόδοις  
σμίρνης τ' ἀκρήτου θυσίαις λιβάνου τε θυώδους,  
ξανθῶν τε σπονδᾶς μελίτων ῥίπτοντες ἐς οὐδᾶς,

ἅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐτι σφύζεται παρ' ἐνόοις ὅλον ἔχοντι τινὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ὄντα,

ταύρων δ' Ὑκρίτοισι φόνους οὐ δεύετο βωμός,  
ἀλλὰ μύσος τοῦτ' ἔσκεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστον,  
10 θυμὸν ἀπορραΐσαντας ἐέδμεναι ἡέα γυῖα.

1–7 Ath. 12.510c 1–3 Eust. *ad Il.* 22.116 8–10 Eus. *PE* 4.14.7, Cyrill.  
*Jul.* 76.972d

2 οὐδ' ὁ Κρ. οὐδ' ὁ Π. codd. : οὐδὲ Κρ. om. Eus. 4 ἱλάσκονται Ath.  
5 δαιδαλεόδοις codd. 6 σμίρνοις τε Ath. ἀκράτου codd. 7  
ξουθῶν τε σπονδᾶς μελίτων ῥίπτοντες codd. 8 ἀκρίτοις codd., Cyrill. :  
ἀκράτοις Eus. : ἀκρήτοις Scaliger : ἀρρήτοις Fabricius 9–10 *ex abst.*  
2.27, Eus., Cyrill. inser. 9 ἔσχον Cyrill. 10 ἀπορρέσαντας codd.

ἐέδμεναι Cyrill. : ἐέλμεναι codd. : ἔδμεναι (ἔσμεναι AH) Eus. : ἐ<ν>έδμεναι  
Diels ἡέα Vigier : ἡία codd., Eus., Cyrill. : ἡπία Reiske

**119(130)** Schol. in Nic. Ther. 453

τὰ κτίλα ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καὶ τιθασσῶν τίθεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς πόλιν  
προσηγουμένων κριῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λιπαρῶν. ὁ δὲ Ἑ. ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καὶ  
πραέων·

ἦσαν δὲ κτίλα πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώποισι προσηνῇ,  
θῆρες τ' οἰωνοί τε, φιλοφροσύνη τε δεδήει.

**1** ἦσαν δὲ καὶ P, ἦσαν γὰρ L : ἐνθ' ἦσαν Karsten **2** φῆρες P οἰωνοί  
τε Sturz : ἀνθρωποί τε codd.

**120(139)** Porphry *abst.* 2.31

ἐπεὶ δ' ἀναμάρτητος οὐδεὶς, λοιπὸν ἀκείσθαι τοῖς ὕστερον διὰ τῶν καθαρμῶν  
τὰς πρόσθε περὶ τὴν τροφήν ἀμαρτίας. τοῦτο δὲ ὁμοίως γένοιτ' ἂν, εἰ πρὸ  
ὀμμάτων ποιησάμενοι τὸ δεινὸν ἀνευφημῶσαιμεν κατὰ τὸν Ἑ. λέγοντες·

οἷμοι ὅτ' οὐ πρόσθεν με διώλεσε νηλεὲς ἡμαρ  
πρὶν σχέτλι' ἔργα βορᾶς περὶ χεῖλεσι μητίσασθαι.

**2** σχέτλια ἔργα βορᾶς πρὶν χεῖλεσι H. Fränkel

**121(135)** Aristotle *Rhet.* 1373b16

ἔστι γάρ, ὃ μαντεύονται τε πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικον . . .  
καὶ ὥς Ἑ. λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἐμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν  
δίκαιον τισὶ δ' οὐ δίκαιον,

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος  
αἰθέρος ἡνεκέως τέταται διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

**2** τέτακται QY<sup>b</sup>Z<sup>b</sup> αὐγῆς Y<sup>b</sup>Z<sup>b</sup>A<sup>c</sup>, αὐ γῆς cet. codd.

**122(136)** Sextus *adv. math.* 9.119, cf. Chalcid. *Tim.* 197

οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἑ. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν Ἱταλῶν πληθός  
φασὶ μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι τινα κοινωνίαν,  
ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς



τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. διόπερ καὶ κτείνοντες αὐτὰ καὶ ταῖς σαρκὶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενοι ἀδικήσομέν τε καὶ ἀσεβήσομεν ὡς συγγενεῖς ἀναιροῦντες. ἔνθεν καὶ παρήνουν οὗτοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἐμφύλων . . . καὶ 'Ε. πού ψησιν

οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσηχέος; οὐκ ἐσοράτε  
ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείησι νόοιο;

**123(145)** Clement *Protr.* 2.27.3

ταύτη τοι ἡμεῖς οἱ τῆς ἀνομίας υἱοὶ ποτε διὰ τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν τοῦ λόγου νῦν υἱοὶ γεγονάμεν τοῦ θεοῦ· ὑμῖν δὲ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος ὑποδύεται ποιητῆς ὁ 'Ακραγαντίνος 'Ε·

τοιγάρτοι χαλεπῇσιν ἀλύνοντες κακότησιν  
οὐποτε δειλαίων ἀχέων λωφήσετε θυμόν.

**124(137)** Sextus *adv. math.* 9.129 [post 122(136)]

καί

μορφὴν δ' ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν αἰέρας  
σφάξει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος †οἱ δὲ πορεύνται†  
λίσσόμενον θύοντες· †ὁ δ' ἀνήκουστος† ὁμοκλέων  
σφάξας ἐν μεγάροισι κακὴν ἀλεγύνατο δαίτα.

- 5 ὡς δ' αὐτως πατέρ' υἱὸς ἐλὼν καὶ μητέρα παῖδες  
θυμὸν ἀπορραΐσαντε φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν.

ταῦτα δὴ παρήνουν οἱ περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν, πταίνοντες· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἔστι τι διῆκον δι' ἡμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων πνεῦμα, εὐθὺς ἔστι τις ἡμῖν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων.

1–2 Plu. *superst.* 171c, Origen *Cels.* 5.49, cf. Chalcidius *Tim.* 197

1 διαλλάξαντα Γ, διαλλάξαντι W εἶρας XN, εἰράς Y, εἰρά W, *λερά* J<sup>2</sup> ἐν *λεροῖς* Dn (Plu.) 2 σφάξει Origen, σφάζει codd. οἱ δὲ πορεύνται LE, οἷδα πορεύντα N : οἱ δ' ἐπορεύνται Bergk : οἱ δ' ἀπορεύνται DK : *οἱ κτρά* πορεύντα Zuntz 3 λίσσόμενον (λίσσόμενοι s) θύοντες codd. : λίσσόμενον θύοντες Hermann : λίσσόμενοι θύοντες Wilam. δὲ νήκουστος Bergk : δ' αὖ νήκουστος Diels 6 ἀπορραΐσαντε Karsten : ἀπορραΐσαντα codd.

**125(138)** Aristotle *Poet.* 1457b13

ἀπ' εἰδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος οἶον

χαλκῷ ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας

καὶ “τάμων ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ” [129(143)]· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ταμεῖν, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ἀρύσαι εἴρηκεν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τί ἐστιν.

χαλκὸν ἀπὸ ψυχῆς ἀερείσας N<sup>a</sup>

**126(144)** Plutarch *coh. in.* 464b

ἐπὶ πᾶσι τολύν τὸ μὲν τοῦ 'Ε. μέγα καὶ θεῖον ἡγούμεν, τὸ

νηστεῦσαι κακότητος.

**127(140)** Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 646d

καὶ οὐ μόνως ὡς ἔοικε κατ' 'Ε, τῆς

δάφνης [τῶν] φύλλων ἀπο πάμπαν ἔχεσθαι

χρή, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φείδεσθαι δένδρων ἀπάντων καὶ μὴ κοσμεῖν ἑαυτοῦς ταῖς ἐκείνων ἀκοσμίαις, βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τὰ φύλλα συλῶντας αὐτῶν.

**128(141)** Gellius 4.11.9, cf. 4.11.2, *Geoponica* 2.35.8

videtur autem de *κνάμῳ* non esitato causam erroris fuisse, quia in E. carmine qui disciplinas Pythagorae secutus est, versus hic invenitur:

δειλοί, πάνδειλοι, κνάμων ἀπο χειρας ἔχεσθαι.

πάνδειλοι om. Gr. ἐλέσθαι vel ἐλέσθαις s: ἔχεσθε (-σθαι CH) Gr.

**129(143)** Theon 15.7, Aristotle *Poet.* 1457b14

κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἡ τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων παράδοσις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχει καθαρόν τινα οἶον ἢ ἐν τοῖς προσήκουσι μαθήμασιν ἐκ παίδων συγγυμνασία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ 'Ε.

κρηνῶν ἀπο πέντε ταμῶν ταναήκει χαλκῷ

δεῖν ἀπορρύπτεσθαι.

Arist. *Poet.* 1457b14

πέντ' ἀνιμῶντά φησιν ἀτειρεῖ (ταμόντα ταναήκει *man. pr.*) *codd.* τεμῶν  
(ταμῶν *Bekker*) ἀτειρεῖ *Ar. exc.* ταναήκει *R* : τάμοντ' ἐν ἀτειρεῖ *Diels*

**130(125)** *Clement Strom.* 3.14.2 [post 112(118)]

καὶ ἔτι

ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ζῶων ἐτίθει νεκρὰ εἶδε' ἀμείβων.

εἶδε *Sylburg* : ἡδὲ *codd.*

**131(127)** *Aelian NA* 12.7, cf. *Schol. Aphth. ap. Hermann* *Orphica* 511  
λέγει δὲ καὶ 'Ε. τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι μετοίκησιν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ μὲν ἐς  
ζῶον ἢ λῆξις αὐτὸν μεταγάροι,λέοντα γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ ἐς φυτὸν, δάφνην. ἃ  
δὲ 'Ε. λέγει ταῦτά ἐστιν

ἐν θήρεσσιλέοντες ὀρειλεχέες χαμαιεῦναι  
γίγνονται, δάφναι δ' ἐνὶ δένδρεσιν ἡυκόμοισιν.

**1** θήρεσσι *Schol.* : θηρσὶ δὲ *codd.*      **2** ἐν *Schol.*

**132(146)** *Clement Strom.* 4.150.1 cf. *Theodoret.* 8.36

φησὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ 'Ε. τῶν σοφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς θεοὺς γίνεσθαι ὡδὲ πως γράφων·

εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντις τε καὶ ὑμνόπολοι καὶ ἱητροί  
καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται·  
ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι.

**133(147)** *Clement Strom.* 5.122.3, cf. *Eusebius PE* 13.31.49

ἦν δὲ ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως διαβιώσωμεν, μακάριοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα, μακαριώτεροι  
δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐνθὲνδε ἀπαλλαγὴν, οὐ χρόνῳ τινὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες, ἀλλ'  
ἐν αἰῶνι ἀναπαύεσθαι δυνάμενοι

ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι αὐτοτράπεζοι  
†έόντες† ἀνδρείων ἀχέων ἀπόκληροι, ἀτειρεῖς,

ἡ φιλόσοφος 'Ε. λέγει ποιητική.

**1** αὐτοτράπεζοι Eus. : ἐν τε τραπέζαις codd.      **2** ἐόντες] εὐνιες Scaliger :  
εὐφρονες? Zuntz : τέρποντ' van der Ben : ἐόντες post ἀπόκληροὶ transposui  
ἀχαιῶν codd., corr. Stephanus      ἀτειρεῖς Eus., ἀτηρεῖς codd.



## 9. Addenda

### 134(5) Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 728e

ἔλεγε δὲ τῆς ἔχεμυθίας τοῦτο γέρας εἶναι τοὺς ἰχθὺς καλεῖν <ἐλλοπας> οἷον ἐλλομένην τὴν ὄπα καὶ καθειρημένην ἔχοντας. καὶ τὸν ὁμῶνυμον ἔμοι τῷ Πανσανίᾳ Πυθαγορικῶς παραινεῖν τὰ δόγματα ἴστέγουσαι φρενὸς ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐλάσσω†, καὶ ὅλως θείον ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν σιωπὴν τοὺς ἄνδρας.

στεγάζσαι φρενὸς ἔλλοπος εἴσω Wyttenbach

### 135(7) Hesychius s.v. ἀγέννητα

ἀγέννητα· στοιχεῖα παρ' Ἑ.

### 136(10) Plutarch *adv. Col.* 1113b

ἃ ὁ Κολάτης παραθέμενος οὐ συνεῖδεν, ὅτι φῶτας μὲν καὶ θήρας καὶ θάμνους καὶ ὀλωνοὺς ὁ Ἑ. οὐκ ἀνήρηκεν, ἃ γέ φησι μιγνυμένων τῶν στοιχείων ἀποτελεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ τῇ συγκρίσει ταύτῃ καὶ διακρίσει φύσιν τινὰ καὶ πότμον δυσδαίμονα καὶ θάνατον ἀλόγτην ἐπικατηγοροῦντας ἢ σφάλλονται διδάξας, οὐκ ἀφείλετο τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰθισμέναις φωναῖς περὶ αὐτῶν.

### 137(19) Plutarch *prim. frig.* 952b

καὶ ὅλως τὸ μὲν πῦρ διαστατικόν ἐστι καὶ διαιρετικόν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ κολλητικόν καὶ σχετικόν, τῇ ὑγρότητι συνέχον καὶ πῆττον· ἢ καὶ παρέσχεν Ἑ. ὑπόνοιαν ὥς τὸ μὲν πῦρ νεῖκος οὐλόμενον, σχεδύνην δὲ φιλότητα τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύων.

### 138(32) [Arist.] *lin. insec.* 972b30

τὸ ἄρθρον διαφορὰ πῶς ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ Ἑ. ἐποίησε ἰδιὸν δεῖν ὁρθῶς†.

δύω δέει ἄρθρον Diels

**139(58)** Simplicius in *Cael.* 587.18

ἐν ταύτῃ οὖν καταστάσει μουνομελῆ ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ νείκους διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα μίξεως ἐφειμένα.

**140(60)** Plutarch *adv. Col.* 1123b

ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἕτερα τραγικώτερα τοῖς Ἑ. εἰκότα τεράσματος ὧν κατατελῶσιν, εἰλέποδ' ἀκριτόχειρα καὶ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα.

**141(69)** Proclus in *R.* 2.34.26

ὅτι καὶ ὁ Ἑ. οἶδεν τὸν διπλοῦν τῶν γεννήσεων χρόνον. διὸ καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καλεῖ διγόνους καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἡμερῶν αὐτὸς εἶπεν καὶ ὅτι τὰ ὀκτάμηνα ἄγονα.

**142(70)** Rufus *Ephes.* 229, p.166.11

τὸ δὲ βρέφος περιέχεται χιτῶσι, τῷ μὲν λεπτῷ καὶ μαλακῷ ἁμῶν αὐτὸν Ἑ. καλεῖ.

**143(92)** Aristotle *GA* 747a34

Ἑ. δ' αἰτιᾶται τὸ μῆμα τὸ τῶν σπερμάτων γίνεσθαι πυκνὸν ἐκ μαλακῆς τῆς γονῆς οὐσης ἐκατέρας· συναρμόττειν γὰρ τὰ κοῖλα τοῖς πυκνοῖς ἀλλήλων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων γίνεσθαι ἐκ μαλακῶν σκληρὸν ὥσπερ τῷ καττιτέρω μειχθέντα τὸν χαλκόν.

**144(97)** Aristotle *Part. An.* 640a19

Ἑ. οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε λέγων ὑπάρχειν πολλὰ τοῖς ζώοις διὰ τὸ συμβῆναι οὕτως ἐν τῇ γενέσει οἷον καὶ τὴν ῥάχιν τοιαύτην ἔχειν ὅτι στραφέντος καταχθῆναι συνέβη.

**145(99)** Theophrastus *Sens.* 9

τὴν δ' ἀκοήν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν γίνεσθαι ψόφων, ὅταν ὁ ἀῆρ ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς κινηθεὶς ἡχῇ ἐντός. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἶναι κώδωνα τῶν ὕψων ἡχῶν τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν προσαγορεύει σάρκινον ὄζον· κινουμένην δὲ παλεῖν τὸν ἄερα πρὸς τὰ στερεὰ καὶ ποιεῖν ἡχον.

**146(142)** Voll. Herc. N. 1012 col.18

δηλον γάρ ὡς οἱ μὲν κήρυκες φθένξονται, ἡ δ' Ἑλλας φθένξεται. μία δὴ δύναμις τοῦ σημαينوμένου. τὰτὸ δὲ καὶ παρ' Ἑ. γέγονεν ὅτε λέγεται·

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ τε Διὸς τέγχοι δόμοι αἰγ[ιόχοιο  
οὐ]τ[ε ποτ'] Ἀίδεω δέ [.....]κ[....] στέγος

**147(148–150)** Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 683e

καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ καλλιγραφίας ἔνεκα τοῖς εὐπροσωποτάτοις τῶν ἐπιθέτων ὥσπερ ἀνθηροῖς χρώμασι τὰ πράγματα γανοῦν εἰωθότος, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον οὐσίας τινὸς ἢ δυνάμεως δῆλωμα ποιοῦντος ὅλον ἀμφιβρότην χθόνα τὸ τῇ ψυχῇ περικείμενον σῶμα, καὶ νεφεληγερέτην τὸν ἀέρα καὶ πολυαίματον τὸ ἥπαρ.

**148(151)** Plutarch *amat.* 756e

“ζεῖδωρον” γὰρ αὐτὴν (Ἀφροδίτην) Ἑ., “εὐκαρπον” δὲ Σοφοκλῆς ἐμμελῶς πάνυ καὶ πρεπόντως ὠνόμασαν.

**149(152)** Aristotle *Poet.* 1457b22

... ἡ δὲ γῆρας πρὸς βίον, καὶ ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίου ἢ ὥσπερ Ἑ. δυσμὰς βίου.

**150(153)** Hesychius s.v. βαυβώ

βαυβώ· τιθήνη Δήμητρος. σημαίνει δὲ καὶ κοιλίαν ὡς παρ' Ἑ.

**151(153a)** Theon 104.1

τὸ γοῦν βρέφος δοκεῖ τελειοῦσθαι ἐν ἐπτὰ ἐβδομάσιν, ὡς Ἑ. αἰνύττεται ἐν τοῖς Καθαρμοῖς.

**152** Herodian *Καθολικὴ Προσφῶδια*,

παρὰ μέντοι Ἑ. ἐν β' Καθαρμῶν ἐστὶν εὐρέσθαι ἐκτεταμένον τὸ α, ὡς δηλονότι καὶ τῆς συγκριτικῆς παραγωγῆς· μανότερος γὰρ ἔφη ὡς τρανότερος·

τῶν γὰρ ὅσα ῥίζαις μὲν ἐπασσυτέραι[σιν] ἔγερθε  
μᾶνότεροις [δ' ὀ]ρπ[ηξ]ιν ὑπέστη τηλεθ[άοντα].





## 10. *Physics*

### FRAGMENTS 1-6 THE RIGHT APPROACH

#### 1(2)

*The powers spread over the body are constricted, and many afflictions burst in and dull their meditations. After observing a small part of life in their lifetime, subject to a swift death they are borne up and waft away like smoke; they are convinced only of that which each has experienced as they are driven in all directions, yet all boast of finding the whole. These things are not so to be seen or heard by men or grasped with mind. But you now, since you have come aside to this place, will learn within the reach of human understanding.*

Sextus quotes this fragment soon after 77 (109) to show that, although E. supposed that the external world can be known by means of the like elements of which we are constituted, there is evidence for the alternative view, that the criterion of truth resides not in the senses but in reason. Proclus, on *Tim.* 34c, quotes line 2 in support of Plato's statement that we are subject to chance and speak in a random way; according to E. we are exiles from god and open to the constant attacks of afflictions that blunt our vision of reality. Plutarch uses line 4 on the brevity of life to corroborate Plato's remark that human conceit is futile (cf. *Laws* 716a-b), and lines 7-8 (*οὕτως . . . περιληπτά*) in conjunction with Xenophanes' words (DK 21 B34.1-2) to show that truth is hard to come by. Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Pyrrho, puts the same quotation, together with line 5, with evidence from Archilochus, Euripides, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Zeno of Elea, and even Homer as backing for skepticism. (For E.'s as-

simulation later to the ranks of the Skeptics cf. Cicero *Acad.* 1.12.44, 2.5.14, 23.74).

1 *στεινωποὶ παλάμαι*: the "devices" for understanding (cf. *ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμῃ* and *πόρος νοῆσαι*, 5(3).4, 7) are the sense organs, with that of touch being spread over the whole body. The metaphor of the road to understanding is common in Parmenides (e.g., frs. 2.4, 7.2, 8.18) and is taken up again by E. in frs. 5(3). 4-7 and 96(133); cf. Lactantius 3.28.12 "E. angustas esse sensuum semitas queritur." *κέχυνται*: the line is quoted in the Epicurean *Corpus* (Vol. Herc. VII<sup>2</sup> f. 22, c. 29) with *τέτανται*, the verb of 91(100).2.

2 *ἐμπαα*: justified by Karsten from Aeschylus *Ag.* 187 and Proclus' explanation, *πολλὰ γὰρ ἐμπίπτοντα τοῖς ὄντως ἡμῖν δειλοῖς . . . ἀμβλύνει τὴν τῶν ὄντων θεωρίαν*. The line is echoed in 100(110).7.

3 *δὲ ζῶῃσι βίου*: corrected plausibly to *δ' ἐν ζῶῃσι βίου* by Wilamowitz. Burnet (*EGP* p. 204, n. 3) adopts Scaliger's *δὲ ζῶῃς ἀβίου* and compares *τὸ δὴ βίοντον καλέουσι*, 106(15).2.

4 *ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην*: Homeric phrasing, cf. *Il.* 18.95, 458, 23.100, *Od.* 1.266, and also Lucretius 3.455-56. The line obviously precludes individual survival after death.

6: cf. Heraclitus fr. 2 *ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν*, and E. 33(39).3.

7-8 *οὕτως . . . περιληπτὰ: ἐπιδερκτά* and *ἐπακουστά* are forms found only here in classical Greek; with *νόῳ περιληπτὰ* cf. *νοήσει περιληπτόν*, Plato *Tim.* 28a. Diels translates, "So wenig lässt sich dies für die Menschen sehen oder hören . . .," and similarly Guthrie, "So little are these things to be seen or heard by men" (*HGP* vol. 2, p. 138). The sense seems to be that *τάδε*, the general subject, almost equivalent to *τὸ ὄλον*, is not perceptible or understandable to the average man. Men usually are mistaken in method, attitude, and aim, and easily distracted (cf. 100(110). 6-7); they are also unable to go beyond their immediate experience, which they misinterpret and overrate. The contrast is one familiar from Heraclitus and Parmenides, between the man who knows and the run of mortals who learn nothing, a contrast E. makes again in 95(132), where he calls the man who has understanding *ὄλβιος*, as against the *δειλός* who has only an unclear *doxa*. (Cf. especially Heraclitus frs. 1 and 2 and Parmenides fr. 6.4-7.)

8 *ἐπεὶ ὧδ' ἐλάσθη*: this Homeric phrase has been interpreted as addressed to E. with the sense "since you have strayed (or come down) to this earth," or to Pausanias similarly; it has also been construed as

"since you have shared my exile" (cf. Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 138, n. 4). A less strained sense, "since you have come to me (to learn)," seems preferable and in accord with 100(110) and 101(111). LSJ, s.v. *λάζομαι*, gives "stray from the straight path," but the opposite is implied, viz. "recoil (from error) to learn the truth."

9 οὐ πλεῖδόν γε: Karsten's emendation οὐ πλεόν ἤε has been followed by Stein and Diels. H. Fränkel's οὐ πλεόν οὔτι is plausible on the interpretation that E. claims to be a θεὸς ἄμβροτος and to have superhuman wisdom, but as Diels-Kranz points out, this does not accord with Sextus' introductory remark that truth can be reached ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκνεῖται ὁ ἀνθρώπινος λόγος. E.'s attitude is more modest here, and the fragment should be taken in conjunction with 5(3) and 100(110). Men generally do not grasp the truth of things, but this does not mean that it is unattainable. If Pausanias, under E.'s guidance, makes careful use of the evidence provided by his senses and brings in *nous* to supplement their deficiencies, then, within the given limitations, it is possible to achieve genuine understanding.

## 2(3)

*But turn from my tongue, o gods, the madness of these men, and from hallowed lips let a pure stream flow. And I entreat you, virgin Muse, white-armed, of long memory, send of that which it is right and fitting for mortals to hear, driving the well-reined chariot from the place of reverence.*

Sextus gives these lines in conjunction with 5(3) as coming ἐξῆς on the preceding fragment, and he uses them to show that, having previously inveighed against the senses, E. still wishes to claim that their evidence can be reliable. The fragment has been divided after the fifth line, for the person addressed changes from the Muse to Pausanias, and a transitional passage is needed. That Sextus does omit a considerable number of lines from his quotations without indicating that he does so is supported by his citation of Parmenides earlier at 7.111. There frs. 7.2-6 and 8.1-2 of Parmenides run straight on from fr. 1.1-30, although it is known from Plato (*Soph.* 237a, 258d) and Simplicius (*in Cael.* 557.25 to 558.1-2) that the lines were not consecutive.

1 τῶν μὲν μανίην: the *mania* has two aspects—the futility of what is put forward and the impiety of transgressing the boundaries of *themis* in professions of knowledge. Referring to Sextus' phrase οἱ πλεόν ἐπαγγελ-



λόμενοι γιγνώσκειν, Diels gives Parmenides as an example of those whom E. is criticizing, but from the careful consideration E. gives to Parmenides' work and the use he makes of some Eleatic arguments, this seems unlikely. As in the previous fragment, and in keeping with the Pre-socratic tradition, E.'s attack is a general one on all who put forward rash and ill-considered opinions. The ritualistic language of this fragment makes it more than the stock poetic request for divine assistance; its general tone seems more suited to the *Katharmoi* and shows how the edges of a division between the two poems as religious versus scientific are blurred.

2 ὀχετεύσατε: Stephanus' emendation. The metaphor from irrigation is used again in fr. 47(35).2.

3 πολυμνήστη Μοῦσα: Burnet and Guthrie translate the epithet as "much-wooded," Diels "vielgefeierte," and Bignone "molto contesa." Karsten, however, has "memor" and LSJ "much-remembering," "mindful," a sense, appropriate here, that is argued for by E. Fraenkel in his note on Aeschylus *Ag.* 821 (but Denniston and Page claim the passive "much-remembered," as at *Ag.* 1459). A play on the Homeric word is probably intended; cf. the different meaning E. gives to the Homeric μινυνθάδιος, μυχός, ὄρηξ, ἀλλότριος φώς, etc. ἄντομαι in the next line is an example; in Homer it means "meet," usually with hostile intent, and it is first found with the sense "meet with prayers," "entreat," here in E.

4-5: Sturz, Karsten, and Burnet put a stop after ἀκούειν and take the chariot as object of πέμπε, but ἄντομαι does not seem to have been used with an infinitive (cf. Euripides *Andr.* 921-22 ἄντομαί σε Δία καλοῦσα . . . πέμψον με). Guthrie (*HGP* vol. 2, p. 127) omits ἄντομαι and supplies an object for the verb, translating, "in so far as it is lawful for us creatures of a day to hear, escort me, driving the chariot . . .," but this reads strangely. To whom does the chariot belong? Karsten suggests that Εὐσεβείης be taken with ἄρμα, comparing *Χαρίτων ἄρματα*, Simonides 148.10 (Bergk), and *ἄρμα Περσίδων*, Pindar *Pyth.* 10.65. Burnet supposes that the Muse will drive E.'s chariot, but this would make the fragment contradictory—if E. was already at the shrine of Piety he would not be asking to keep within the bounds of *themis*. Parmenides (fr. 1) represented himself as driven in his chariot by the daughters of the Sun to the abode of the goddess, but E.'s prayer is rather for the Muse to come in her chariot, παρ' Εὐσεβείης, to his assistance; so Aphrodite in a golden chariot from her father's house to Sappho, fr. 1.6-8. For the literary convention of a goddess coming in a chariot cf. the examples cited by Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* p. 7.



## 3(131)

*If for the sake of any one of mortal men, immortal Muse, (it pleased you) that our cares came to your attention, now once more, Kalliopeia, answer a prayer, and stand by as a worthy account of the blessed gods is being unfolded.*

Hippolytus understands the Muse addressed in this fragment to be an allegory for the *δίκαιος λόγος*, a principle described as an intermediary between Love and Strife but working with Love for unity. The interpretation is unwarranted, for the epithets given to the Muse in fr. 2(3).3 and the mention of her in fr. 6(4).2 show that E. is working within the framework of Pierian inspiration.

1–3 *εἰ γὰρ . . . Καλλιόπεια*: on the *ὕμνος κλητικός* cf. E. Fraenkel *Philologus* 1931, pp. 3–9, and further references given by Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 1963, p. 83, n. 7. The structure of the appeal “If ever in the past . . . come now” is a common one, cf. Sappho fr. 1.5–7 with Page *Sappho and Alcaeus* p. 17, n. 3, and Lloyd-Jones *JHS* 1963, pp. 83–84. *ἐφημερίων* has been taken as masculine, as in 2(3).4. Schneidewin (*Philologus* 1851, p. 167), followed by Stein, supposes *ἐφημερίων* to be neuter, writes *τί σοι* for *τινος*, *ἡμετερῆς* for *ἡμετέρας*, and supplies *ἔμελε*. It has then been argued that since E. is referring to an earlier work of his own, namely the *Physics*, the fragment belongs to the *Katharmoi* (cf. Diels *SPAW* 1898, p. 399). However, with a supplement on the lines suggested by Wilamowitz, the reference to a previous poem by E. fails. The sense is quite general: “If in the past a poet’s work has pleased you, come now and bring inspiration in answer to an appeal.” (For *αὐτε* as the repetition not of an action but of a type of action cf. Page *Sappho and Alcaeus* p. 13, n. 3, and for E.’s use of *ἡμέτερος* for “of men in general” cf. 96(133). 2.) Hippolytus’ mention, in the context of the fragment, of the *κόσμοι* brought about by Love and Strife makes the lines more suited to the *Physics* than to the *Katharmoi*, and it is in the *Physics* that the Muse is addressed (cf. 2(3).3–5) and that an *ἀγαθὸς λόγος* about the gods is revealed in detail (cf. 8(17).26, where, after an account of the four roots and Love and Strife, E. adds, *σὺ δ’ ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν*).

4 *ἀμφὶ θεῶν . . . ἀγαθὸν λόγον*: cf. Xenophanes fr. 34.1–2 and Parmenides 8.50–51 for their announcement of a new and personal *logos*; E. too has a new conception of *θεός*.

## 4(1)

*And you, Pausanias, son of wise Anchitos, hear me.*

The line is one of the eight fragments quoted specifically from the *Physics*; the phrasing is Homeric, cf. *Il.* 8.152, 11.197, 450. Nothing definite is known about Pausanias. Since the *Physics* was addressed to him he was assumed to have been Empedocles' devoted and favored disciple, and so he figures in the biographers (cf. the supposed intimacy between Parmenides and Zeno, D.L. 9.25). According to Heraclides Ponticus, Pausanias was present at the feast following the cure of the *ἄπνους*, and he organized a search for Empedocles on his subsequent disappearance; however, he later told the people that E. would not return and that they must sacrifice to him as if he had become a god (cf. D.L. 8.67–69). The whole account is denied by Timaeus, who claims that if it were true, Pausanias, being a wealthy man, would have set up a statue or shrine to E. (D.L. 8.71). Galen cites Pausanias, Philistion, and E. together as Italian doctors (*meth. med.* 1.1, 10.6K, and cf. Heraclides Ponticus on E. explaining the problem of the *ἄπνους* to Pausanias, D.L. 8.60). Pausanias is also called a doctor and a native of Gela in the epigram quoted by Diogenes immediately after this fragment:

Παυσανίην ἡγηρὸν ἐπώνυμον Ἀγχιτέω υἱόν  
 φῶτ' Ἀσκληπιάδην πατρὶς ἔθρεψε Γέλα,  
 ὃς πολλοὺς μογεροῖσι μαραινομένους καμάτοισι  
 φῶτας ἀπέστρεφεν Φερσεφόνης ἀδύτων.

The epigram, however, as chapter 1 has shown, is almost certainly spurious. Anchitos, the father of Pausanias, is known elsewhere only in an anecdote told by Iamblichus (*Vit. Pyth.* 113), in which a young guest of Anchitos is about to avenge his father with an attack on his host but is calmed by E.'s music.

### 5(3)

*And do not let (it) compel you to take up garlands of glory and honor from men, on condition that you speak recklessly, overstepping propriety, and so then sit on the high throne of wisdom. But come, observe with every power in what way each thing is clear, without holding any seeing as more reliable compared with hearing, nor echoing ear above piercings of the tongue; and do not keep back trust at all from the other parts of the body by which there is a channel for understanding, but understand each thing in the way in which it is clear.*

Sextus gives the lines immediately after 2(3) as a continuous quotation.



Clement mentions the (later) distinction that was made in the Pythagorean school between the ἀκουσματικοί and the genuine philosophers, and he claims that the Peripatetics similarly separated *doxa* from εὐκλεία and truth; the first two lines of this fragment are then quoted anonymously, followed by evidence for the same distinction from Heraclitus, frs. 104 and 29, Demosthenes, *de cor.* 296, and Parmenides, fr. 1.29–30. Proclus, praising the caution Plato shows in the *Timaeus* (29d) regarding the ability of mortal men to give an exact account of the gods and of the universe, complains that a similar hesitation was not found in Heraclitus, who contrasted his own knowledge with the ignorance of others, or in Empedocles, who guaranteed to reveal the truth, or in the Stoics. Plutarch quotes the second half of the third line, as a well-known phrase, to describe Meno's high opinion of his own training in argument.

1–3 μηδέ σέ . . . θοάξει: because lines 4–8 are clearly addressed to Pausanias, and fr. 2(3) is addressed to the Muse, there would have been a break in Sextus' quotation, cf. the commentary on 2(3); it is hard to see how lines 1–3 could be interpreted as spoken to the Muse, and Clement, Proclus, and Plutarch all put the lines in a context of human wisdom. If some verses have been omitted by Sextus, then they would give the transitional passage and also perhaps provide a subject for βιήσεται; this is preferable to supposing that the flowers themselves exercise compulsion, as is assumed by Diels-Kranz (cf. ἀέθλια κάλ' ἀνελέσθαι *Od.* 21.117). μὴ with the future indicative seems here to be used with a prohibitive force (cf. W. W. Goodwin *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* p. 19, par. 70, but also B. L. Gildersleeve *Syntax of Classical Greek from Homer to Demosthenes* p. 270), and the subject may well have been a general one, even τᾶδε, i.e., "what I am about to tell you." Karsten marks a lacuna after εἰπεῖν, takes θάρσει as imperative, ends the line with θοάσσεις, and translates, "aude, et sic in sapientiae culmen evolabis." This suits the contexts given in Clement and Proclus of the wisdom of the one who knows the truth as contrasted with general ignorance, but it goes against the more modest approach of the previous fragments. Perhaps the infinitive θοάζειν is a correct conjecture, with the general sense, "Do not be seduced by the glamor of a reputation for wisdom into putting my words to an improper use" (cf. Xenophanes' claim to honor because of his *sophia*, fr. 2.11–12).

5 ὅφιν ἔχων πίσται: the dative πίσται is a syntactical oddity here, and the translation given by Diels-Kranz is unsatisfactory. Ellis's suggestion of ὅφει ἔχων πίσταιν meets with difficulty in the accusatives of the following

line; *δψιν ἔχων πιστήν* is better, and for the construction with the comparative cf. *Od.* 18.162.

6 *τρανώματα γλώσσης*: probably not "the clear instructions of the tongue" (Burnet), or "what the tongue makes plain" (Guthrie), but "the piercings of the tongue" by pores that account for the sense of taste, connecting with *τετραίνω* (rather than *τρανόω*, a late verb), cf. 91(100).3 *πυκναῖς τέτρηνται ἄλοξιν*.

7-8 *μήτε . . . ἕκαστον*: the early editors, Sturz, Karsten, and Mülach, put a stop after *νοῆσαι* and take the passage as a contrast between the deceptive evidence given by the senses and the true understanding reached by *νοῦς* independently of them. But this is forcing the construction to give a skeptical slant which is at variance with E.'s position elsewhere, as for example 14(21).1, 26(20), and 77(109). E. rather is picking up the Eleatic distinction between perception and reason (cf. Parmenides frs. 7.4-5 and 6.6-7) and contradicting it; to a considerable extent the senses can help us to understand the structure and functioning of the universe. Perception of the familiar earth, air, sea, and fire, for example, reveals the qualities of the roots of which all things are composed; a sharp biological eye sees essential similarities in organic formations. But there is a limit to the senses, and *νοῦς* then works independently, as in grasping the nature of Philotēs (8(17).21) or of the god (96(133).1-3). It is less certain whether E. has Heraclitus in mind (cf. fr. 101a *ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ὧτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες*), but the combination of perceiving with learning is in the Presocratic tradition, cf. Heraclitus fr. 55, Xenophanes fr. 24 (the god's seeing and hearing being without specific organs), and the Hippocratic *Regimen* 1.23, where seven senses are listed as the means to *γνώσις*, a list that could serve as a commentary on τὰ ἄλλα γνῖα of lines 7-8: *ἀκοὴ φόφου, ὄψις φανεράων, ῥίνες ὀσμῆς, γλῶσσα ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀηδίας, στόμα διαλέκτου, σῶμα ψάσιος, θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ πνεύματος διέξοδοι ἔξω καὶ ἔσω*. Alcmaeon thought of *πόροι* as channels stretching from the organ to the brain, Theophrastus *Sens.* 26, Chalcidius *Tim.* 279 (DK 24 A10), but when E. calls each sense a *πόρος νοῆσαι*, and eyes and hands the "highway of persuasion that leads to the *φρήν* for men" (96(133).2-3), is he being as literal as Alcmaeon? It may be true that *νοῦς* "coordinates and interprets the testimony of the senses into an understanding of the whole" (von Fritz *CPh* 1946, p. 20), but there are reasonable grounds for supposing that this works on a physical basis. Blood, the heart-blood in particular, is the organ of thought (94(105), Theophrastus *Sens.* 10), the channels of blood are stretched throughout the body, noticeably in the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and hand, and the blood moves to



and from the surface of the skin; it is likely that the blood channels convey sensations from the organs to the thorax, cf. further the commentaries on 91(100) and 94(105).

#### 6(4)

*It is indeed the habit of mean men to disbelieve what is authoritative, but do you learn as the assurances of my Muse urge, after the argument has been divided within your breast.*

Clement interprets these lines as the general inclination of the *κακοί*, through distrust, to overcome the truth; E.'s own doctrine, however, carries conviction. The point of view is supported with reference to the Greek principle of learning like by like, and with quotations from Proverbs 26:5, 1 Corinthians 1:22, Matthew 5:45, and Romans 3:29. Theodoretus gives the first two lines as agreeing with Heraclitus fr. 34. According to E., disbelievers are *κακοί*, according to Heraclitus those without understanding are like the deaf. The theme is developed and brings in Parmenides fr. 4.1, Solon fr. 16, and E. again with 96(133).

1 *κάρτα πέλει*: a weak phrase. Diels suggested *χάρτα πέλει*, translating, "mali homines gaudent diffidere eis qui optinent" (PPF p. 107), but later adopted *κάρτα μέλει*: "doch Niedrigen liegt es nur zu sehr am Herzen, den Starken zu misstrauen" (Vors.<sup>3</sup> p. 225). The datives are ambiguous. Both contexts understand *κακοῖς* as masculine and take it with the finite verb, *κακός* here implying "slow-learning" (cf. Sophocles *Ajax* 964, *OT* 545, *Phil.* 910), combined with a moral slur. *κρατέουσιν* may also be masculine, and opposed to *κακοῖς*, as "those who are superior in knowledge," including E., but it is more likely to be neuter, equivalent to *τὰ ἀληθῆ*, which have the backing of the Muse. (On neuter references for *κρατεῖν* cf. Mullach *FPG* p. 33.) The *μέν* and *δέ* contrast (which is avoided in Theodoretus' adaptation of the second line) seems to be between what the *κακοί* do—distrust the truth—and what the *πιστώματα* of the Muse urge—attention to the *logos* (cf. 103(114).1–3).

2 *πιστώματα*: not "effata" (Karsten) or "arcana" (Bergk), but rather "the objective reliable signs that justify confidence" (cf. Verdenius *Mnemosyne* 1948, p. 13); similarly *Διὸς πιστώματα*, Aeschylus *Eum.* 214, and cf. Aristotle *Rhet.* 1376a17.

3 *γνῶθι*: on *γινώσκειν* in E., where the meaning is shifting from "recognize an object directly by the senses" to "understand a thought"

(although to understand a thought is still to recognize and understand its object), cf. von Fritz *CPh* 1946, p. 17, n. 1. διατμηθέντος . . . λόγοιο: σπλάγχνα, like φρήν, 96(133).3, and περικάρδιον αἷμα, 94(105).3, refers to the part of the thorax that is the physical basis of thinking, where the *logos* is in some sense incorporated. The process of incorporation is not made clear in this fragment (and there is little help to be gained from passages like Plato *Phdr.* 265e and Vergil *Aen.* 8.20). It seems that, provided the recipient is in the right condition for assimilating the *logos*, there is a dividing and separating (cf. Parmenides fr. 7.5–6) or (if Diels's διασσηθέντος is accepted) a sifting of the *logos* in and around the heart; the thoughts thus received then increase and strengthen εἰς ἦθος ἔκαστον; cf. further the commentary on 100(110).

FRAGMENTS 7–11      BASIC PRINCIPLES: FOUR ROOTS,  
LOVE, AND STRIFE

7(6)

*Hear first the four roots of all things: bright Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus and Nestis, whose tears are the source of mortal streams.*

These lines on the πολυθρύλητα στοιχεῖα of E. are given generally in listings of Presocratic ἀρχαί, and the authorities quoting them are concerned mainly with the allocation of the divine names to the different roots. But Sextus also allies the Stoics to E. as positing similar elements, Heraclitus claims that the lines are in imitation of *Iliad* 3.276–79, and Clement gives them a Pythagorean context. Hippolytus at *RH* 7.29 divides the roots into δύο ὑλικά—earth and water, and δύο ὁργανα—air and fire, but at 10.7 he takes all four as ὑλικά in contrast to the active principles of Love and Strife. Clement adds 8(17).18 and 14(21).9 to the first line as a continuous quotation; in Stobaeus, 20(36) is appended to the fragment. Tzetzes refers it to the first book of the *Περὶ Φύσεως*.

1 ῥιζώματα: “root clumps,” literally of trees (cf. Theophrastus *CP* 3.3.4), but used also of ancestry (Theodectes 3), and in Aeschylus of the offspring (*Sept.* 413). Nearer to E.’s meaning is the use of ῥίζα by Hesiod, *Erga* 19 (and cf. Homer *Od.* 9.390), and by Aristotle of the inquiry of the philosophers of old into ἀρχαὶ καὶ ῥίζαι γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, *Mete.* 353b1. The notable parallel is the Pythagorean oath



οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρῃ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτόν,  
παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥίζωμά τ' ἔχουσιν (or ῥίζωμάτ' ἔχουσιν)

quoted at Aetius 1.3.8, Sextus *adv. math.* 7.94, Porphyry *Vit. Pyth.* 20, and Iamblichus *Vit. Pyth.* 150. It is impossible to date the oath, but it does not appear in the earlier tradition, and the introduction of φύσις in this sense is suspiciously late. If there is a connection, the Pythagoreans are more likely to have borrowed the unusual term ῥίζωμα from E. than vice versa (cf. also *θηητῶν πηγῇ*, 15(23).10). The poetic word implies for E. "foundation," "living source of increase and growth," and perhaps also "basic nature"; cf. the comprehensive use of ῥίζα and ῥιζοτόμος, Theophrastus *HP* 9.8 and also Lucretius 2.103 and Proclus in *Tim.* 130c.

2 Ζεὺς . . . Ἀϊδωνεύς: the allocation of the divine names to the different roots was disputed even in antiquity. One tradition, which identified Aidoneus with air and Hera with earth, was put forward by the Homeric allegorists and applied to E. by Diogenes and Hippolytus (cf. Heraclitus *All.* 24, 41, Stobaeus 1.10.11, Hippolytus *RH* 7.29.4, D.L. 8.76, and for the connection, Diels *Doxographi Graeci* pp. 88–99). In Hippolytus, Aidoneus as air is argued from the etymology, ὅτι πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ βλέποντες μόνον αὐτὸν οὐ καθορῶμεν, and the epithet φερέσβιος, applied by E. to Hera, is taken to refer to earth. But Aidoneus (i.e., Hades) is most easily understood as earth (cf. the arguments put forward by Millerd *Empedocles* p. 31), and φερέσβιος, an epithet of earth in Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns, may well have been deliberately transferred by E. to the root of air, which in one form is the breath essential to life (cf. Aristophanes *Nubes* 570: Αἰθέρα σεμνότατον, βιοθρέμμουνα πάντων); this would be in accordance with his custom of putting established phrasing in a new setting. The "Homeric" line of interpretation should therefore almost certainly be rejected as a late rereading of E. Similarly the interpretation put forward by Knatz ("Empedoclea" pp. 1–9) and Thiele (*Hermes* 1897, pp. 68–78), and approved by Burnet (*EGP* p. 229, n. 3), which refers Zeus to *aithēr*, Hera to earth, and Aidoneus to fire, may be disregarded. This view has no support from the many ancient commentators on the lines, and the identification of Zeus with E.'s *aithēr* requires the rejection of all E.'s uses of ἀήρ for the element of air. The best tradition is the Theophrastean one, which gives Zeus as fire, Hera as air, and Aidoneus as earth, cf. Aetius 1.3.20, Philodemus *piet.* 2 (DK 31 A33), and also Plutarch *de Is. et Os.* 363d. Hera as air appears in the *Cratylus* (404c), this view has support from Menander 1.5.2 (DK 31 A23), and it was this interpretation of the names of the elements that was taken over by the

Stoics, cf. Cicero *ND* 2.66 and the long list of parallel references cited by Pease *ND* vol. 2, p. 716. For discussions of the question cf. Millerd *Empedocles* pp. 30–32, Bignone *Empedocle* pp. 542–44, Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, pp. 144–46.

3 *Νῆστις* . . . *βρότειον*: there are variant readings of this line, but the contexts in Aetius and Heraclitus confirm the phrase *τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον*. In Eustathius, Nestis is given as a Sicilian goddess (*Il.* 1180.14), but apart from the mention of her here and at 48(96).2 she does not appear in classical literature. Two attempts to explain the name were given. One, originating from Simplicius (*in de An.* 68.13–14), gives the derivation *ἀπὸ τοῦ νάειν καὶ βεῖν*; the other, from Hippolytus (*RH* 7.29.4), connects her with *νηστις* = “fasting” (cf. 126(144) *νηστεῦσαι κακότητος*) and interprets, *ὅτι τροφῆς αἵτιον γινόμενον τρέφειν οὐκ εὐτονεῖ τὰ τρεφόμενα*. All agree that she represents the root of water, and Sturz suggested that as Aidoneus is earth, Nestis may be Persephone, the name referring to underground streams. If Nestis was a Sicilian name for Persephone rather than an obscure water nymph, this would give a pointed contrast with the Olympian couple and balance the four (which are *ἰσά τε πάντα*, 8(17).27) more exactly. This, however, is only conjecture, and E. did not have a strict terminology for the roots; see the table of terms in chap. 2.

### 8(17)

*A twofold tale I shall tell: at one time it grew to be one only from many, and at another again it divided to be many from one. There is a double birth of what is mortal, and a double passing away; for the uniting of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it, and the other is reared and scattered as they are again being divided. And these things never cease their continual exchange of position, at one time all coming together into one through love, at another again being borne away from each other by strife's repulsion. (So, insofar as one is accustomed to arise from many) and many are produced from one as it is again being divided, to this extent they are born and have no abiding life; but insofar as they never cease their continual exchange, so far they are forever unaltered in the cycle.*

*But come, hear my words, for learning brings an increase of wisdom. Even as I said before, when I was stating the range of my discourse, a twofold tale I shall tell: at one time it grew to be one only from many, and at another again it divided to be many from one—fire and water and earth and measureless height of air, with pernicious strife apart from these, matched (to them) in every direction, and love*



*among them, their equal in length and breadth. Contemplate her with the mind, and do not sit staring dazed; she is acknowledged to be inborn also in the bodies of men, and because of her their thoughts are friendly and they work together, giving her the name Joy, as well as Aphrodite. No mortal has perceived her as she whirls among them; do you though attend to the progress of my argument, which does not mislead.*

*All these are equal and of like age, but each has a different prerogative, and its particular character, and they prevail in turn as the time comes round. Moreover, nothing comes to birth later in addition to these, and there is no passing away, for if they were continuously perishing they would no longer exist. And what would increase this whole, and from where would it come? How would it be completely destroyed, since nothing is without them? No, these are the only real things, but as they run through each other they become different objects at different times, yet they are throughout forever the same.*

This is the longest and most important of the extant fragments. It is quoted in full by Simplicius from the first book of E.'s *Physics* (in *Phys.* 157.27), and since Simplicius also describes the opening verses as *τὰ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ παρατεθέντα* (in *Phys.* 161.14–15), the fragment has been put earlier than it had been in Diels's arrangement. The contexts of the various lines quoted in a considerable range of sources give the substance of the fragment as follows: as Love and Strife alternately gain the ascendancy over all things the cosmos is brought into existence and destroyed in unceasing succession (Simp. in *Phys.* 157.25, in *Cael.* 140.30, 293.19–23, 530.11–12, D.L. 8.76; on Arist. *Phys.* 250b27–251a5 and Simp. in *Phys.* 1124.19–1125.24, cf. below on 16(26).8–12); Love and Strife are motive principles working on the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water, and they are not perceptible to the senses but intelligible by νοῦς (Simp. in *Phys.* 25.24, 188.23, D.L. 8.76, S.E. *adv. math.* 9.10, 10.317, Plu. *amat.* 756d, Hippol. *RH* 10.7.3, Clem. *Strom.* 5.15.4, 6.17.4); E. thought of the four elements as equal in some way, prevailing inevitably in turn; birth is explained by their uniting and death by their separation, for nothing can be added to or subtracted from their sum (Arist. *GC* 333a16, Philp. in *GC* 257.32, 261.21, Simp. in *Phys.* 157.25, 161.13, 1184.5, *MXG* 975b10, 976b22).

1–2 (=16–17) ἡὗξήθη . . . εἶναι, δέφου . . . εἶναι: the infinitives are consecutive, cf. Goodwin *MT* par. 775. What is the subject of the finite verbs? Guthrie translates, “at a certain time one alone grew out

of many," but gives an alternative on the lines suggested above in a footnote (*HGP* vol. 2, p. 153). The unexpressed subject is probably *πάντα* (cf. below on line 4 and 14(21).7) or *τὸ ὅλον* (cf. 1(2).6), the "twofold tale" being the two cosmic changes (1) from many to one, and (2) from one to many. When the lines are repeated at 16–17 the uniting and separating totality is spelled out as fire, water, earth, and air, to which Love and Strife are added.

3–5 *ἀπόλειψις*: the abstract noun is unusual in epic and in its opposition to *γένεσις* (Parmenides' word is *ἄλεθρος*, fr. 8.21); normally the meaning is "desertion" (Thucydides, Demosthenes, Xenophon) or "failing" (of rivers or of the moon in Aristotle). *θρεφθεῖσα*, Panzerbieter's emendation of Simplicius' *θρυφθεῖσα*, with Scaliger's *διέπτῃ* for *δρεπτῇ*, balances *τίκτει τ' ὀλέκει τε*. Karsten keeps *θρυφθεῖσα*, changes *ὀλέκει* to *αὔξει*, and *δοιή* (admittedly an unusually early use of the singular) to *τοίῃ*; but this is unnecessary surgery to remove the idea of a second or double generation. Bollack tries *δρυφθεῖσ' ἀποδρύπτει*, translating "dispersant, se disperse." Other recent views on the lines are summarized by A. A. Long in *The Pre-Socratics*, ed. A. P. D. Mourelatos, pp. 404–12. *τῇν μὲν . . . ἢ δέ*: Diels refers the two pronouns to *γένεσις*, "at valent etiam mutatis mutandis de *ἀπολείψει*" (*PPF* p. 112). Sturz had understood the first pronoun as *γένεσις* and the second as *ἀπόλειψις*, but it seems rather that both pronouns should refer to both nouns, the compact expression being elucidated by the verbs. There is a first generation and a "failing" of mortal things when *θνητά* are brought to birth and then destroyed by the many coming into one, and a second when *θνητά* are again reared and scattered as many "divide" (a distinctive Empedoclean sense; *διαφύομαι* = "germinate" Thphr. *CP* 2.17.7, "intervene" or "grow between" Hdt. 1.61, Thphr. *CP* 3.7.9, and later "be inseparably connected with").

6–8 *ταῦτα*: like *πάντα* in line 3, which unite and separate, identified in line 18 as earth, air, fire, and water. *φορεύμενα*: Ionic form; Stobaeus has *φρουρούμενα*. Lines 6–8 add the information that the move from many to one is the work of Love, and that from one to many is due to Strife; the alternation between the two is unceasing. The last two lines are repeated at 16(26).5–6, line 7 at 26(20).2, and line 8, with some variation, at 26(20).4. The connection of likeness and unity with Love, and of enmity and separation with Strife, is found again at 25(22).4–8. Lines 6–8 are part of the outline of E.'s cosmic scheme, as the first two lines of the fragment and the phrase *πάντων σύνοδος* show. He is concerned here with the eternal succession of the two phases of all things



coming into one through Love and separating into many through Strife. This is universal activity which later is to be found at work in individual organisms, in the same way as the materials that make up the individual are identified with the world masses. (For the attempts to deny any cosmic reference at all cf. note 110 in chapter 2.)

9 οὕτως . . . φύεσθαι: the line has been supplied here from Aristotle *Phys.* 250b30 and Simplicius in *Phys.* 33.26; for this and the following four lines cf. the commentary on 16(26).8–12 with the Aristotelian context.

14 ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλύθι: one of several formulaic monitions to Pausanias found throughout the poem, especially when a new and important point is to be made, cf. 4(1), 5(3).4, 6(4).3, 15(23).11, 17(38).1, 53(62).1, 100(110).10. Here the explanation of the nature and function of the four roots and Love and Strife gives body to the schematic outline of the first verses of the fragment. μάθη: Stobaeus has μάθησις and omits τοι, which has the support of Clement's paraphrase; Simplicius gives μέθη (which Sturz tried to justify by referring to Plato *Lysis* 222c), changed by Bergk to μάθη. This would be the only occurrence of the noun, except for the Doric genitive in Hesychius: μάθας, μαθήσεως. For the literal increase that learning brings cf. 100(110).4–5.

15 πείρατα μύθων: cf. Homer *Il.* 23.350 of Nestor ἐκάστων πείρατ' ἔειπε.

16–17: cf. lines 1–2.

18: previously the roots had been given under somewhat enigmatic divine names (cf. 7(6).1–2), but they are now listed in familiar terms. The first three—fire, water, and earth—are straightforward. For the fourth Simplicius has ἡέρος, and Plutarch and Clement αἰθέρος; the epithet is ἀπλετον in Simplicius and Clement and ἡπιον in Plutarch, Sextus, and Athenagoras, ἡπιον perhaps coming into the text from Parmenides B 8.56–57; for ἀπλετον cf. 121(135).2. Burnet (*EGP* p. 219, n. 3; p. 228, n. 2) accepts αἰθέρος here, denying that the element was ever called ἀήρ by E. αἰθήρ admittedly is the most common word for this root in E., but his terminology is not fixed (cf. 91(100).13, 25(22).2, 91(100).15, and the table in chap. 2). Elsewhere ὑγρὸς ἀήρ and Τίταν αἰθήρ refer to the same root, the former in its occupation of the lower atmosphere and the latter in that of the higher, cf. the commentary on 27(38).3–4.

19–20: the formal introduction of the uniting and separating agents, already mentioned briefly in lines 7–8. νεῖκος οὐλόμενον: cf. νεῖκος ἔχθει line 8. The baneful nature of Strife, and the innate hatred that brings about separation, is emphasized from the start, giving Aristotle

grounds for regarding it as a principle of evil, cf. *Metaph.* 985a4-10, Plutarch *de Is. et Os.* 370e. ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη: "equal in every way," "uniform," as in Hesiod *Theog.* 524 and Parmenides fr. 8.44. It is not that Strife is materially equal in weight to each or all of the roots but that its power can stretch evenly and comprehensively over them all.

20 ἐν τοῖσιν: alternatively μετὰ τοῖσιν, cf. line 25. No significant contrast need be made with δίχα τῶν in the previous line, except perhaps that Strife as a separating agency works apart, and Love from within, cf. Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 154. ἴση μήκος τε πλάτος τε: like ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη above, for Love's uniform extension over the roots.

21: the contrast between visual perception and intellectual recognition is clearly made, with a corresponding distinction in objects. Earth, air, fire, and water are visible, and their nature can be understood from observation (cf. 14(21).1-6), but Love is not a material entity like them and can be grasped only by νοῦς, so Parmenides fr. 4.1. There is also an underlying separation of subjects, familiar from Heraclitus and Parmenides, of the one who has reached true understanding from the ordinary masses, who in comparison are like people sleeping or stunned; cf. Heraclitus fr. 1, Parmenides fr. 6.7, and E. earlier at 1(2).1-6. Like the nature of Love, that of the supreme god is not to be reached or understood by the senses, cf. 96(133).1-3.

22 νομίζεται: changed by Karsten to ἐνίζεται on the grounds of the verse contradicting lines 25-26, but the second reference is to the elements. Men recognize the presence of Philotēs, or Aphrodite, well enough within their bodies and observe the effects on human thinking and action, but its universal working on the roots is not perceptible and has not been understood as the functioning of the same principle as that which powerfully influences themselves.

24 Γηθοσύνην: Homeric, cf. *Il.* 21.390 and also 13.29 (where "the ascription to nature of a distinctly human emotion is unique in Homer," Leaf ad loc.). ἐπώνυμον: cf. *Il.* 9.562.

25 μετὰ τοῖσιν: Brandis's correction for the unmetrical μετ' ὁσοοισιν, giving a reference to the roots, as in line 20. Other suggestions are μεθ' ἅπασιν (Sturz), μεθ' ὁλοοισιν (Panzerbieter), γ' ὁσοοισιν (Preller), and τ' ὁσοοισιν (Ellis).

26 ἄκουε . . . ἀπατηλόν: a direct challenge to Parmenides' deprecation of his *Doxa*, fr. 8.52.

27 ταῦτα . . . ἔασι: whether or not there is a lacuna after line 26, the subject of line 27 is the roots. This is clear (1) in the continuation in lines 34-35 (for it is the roots which in running through each other become the



various phenomena), (2) in the near repetition of lines 29 and 34 in 16(26), where the reference is to the elements, and (3) in the ancient commentaries on line 27. It is the four roots that are equal and of like age, and that make up the totality of the world mass, allowing for no addition or subtraction. Love and Strife are not "things" like the roots and cannot be compared with them; their control can extend over them, however, as was explained in lines 19-20, and the question of their eternity is taken up separately in 11(16). The roots are *ἴσα πάντα* (cf. Parmenides fr. 9.4 of fire and night—*ἴσοι ἀμρότεροι*), but Aristotle queries what is meant by this. Granted that for E. the elements are absolutely basic and incapable of being transformed into each other (cf. *GC* 315a15-16), then if they are quantitatively comparable there must be a common unit of measurement, which would deny their ultimate nature. This would also be the case if they were dynamically comparable, cf. *Mete.* 340a14, and chap. 2, n. 79. But if the comparison is analogical, e.g., one is as hot as another is white, it is qualitative, and the elements should be called "similar," not "equal," cf. Aristotle *GC* 333a20-34, Philoponus in *GC* 257.32-258.4, 261.21-25, Joachim on Aristotle *GC*, pp. 231-33. E. was probably being straightforward and assuming that the roots were equal in age, honor, and power, and in their total sums (cf. lines 27-29 here, and also, e.g., the equal amounts and pressures involved in 91(100).6-21). The basic argument against any one element predominating had probably been put forward already by Anaximander, cf. Aristotle *Phys.* 204b28, Simplicius in *Phys.* 479.32, and Kahn *Anaximander* p. 186, n. 1.

28 *τιμῆς* . . . *ἐκάστω*: cf. Parmenides on fire and night, fr. 8.57-58. Each root has its own individual and inalienable nature, which is preserved throughout, as explained by Simplicius, in *Phys.* 159.13, introducing 14(21) after this fragment. This assumption of permanent, inherent characteristics is essential to the idea of an element, and the emphasis E. placed on it is one of his important contributions to Greek science. Difficulties, however, arise with the positing of a stage of such mingling of the roots that these characteristics are not discernible; see chap. 2.

29 *ἐν* . . . *χρόνοιο*: the reference is still to the roots, cf. below on 16(26).1, where the line is repeated with *κύκλοι* for *χρόνοιο*.

30 οὐδ' ἄρ' *τι* ἐπιγίγνεται: P. Maas accepts the elision of the iota of *τι* here (*Greek Metre*, trans. H. Lloyd-Jones, pp. 73, 74), giving as parallels *ἔστι τι Ἀνάγκης χοῆμα*—a doubtful variant for 107(115).1—and Theocritus 30.12, against which cf. A. S. F. Gow *Theocritus*, ad loc.

Karsten emended to ἄρ οὐτ' ἐπιγίγνεται, and Diels in some despair to ἄρ τέ τι γίγνεται, cf. *SPAW* 1897, p. 1069. Professor H. Lloyd-Jones has suggested in a personal communication οὐδ' ἄρτι(= now, lately) τι γίνεται. For the sense cf. Parmenides fr. 8.36–37 and also Lucretius 2.296.

31 εἴτε . . . ἦσαν: cf. the emphatic statement of this Eleatic argument by Melissus, fr. 7(2) εἰ τοίνυν τριχὶ μὴ μυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον γίνοιτο, ὀλεῖται πᾶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ. Karsten suspects a missing line after line 31, but εἴτε “non respondet alterum, quia alterum lemma variata forma l. 32 continuatur,” Diels *PPF* p. 114.

32–33 τοῦτο . . . ἐρῆμον: here E. takes over Parmenides' arguments for the denial of birth and death to what is (cf. fr. 8.6–7, 19–20) and applies them to the four roots, which have no temporal starting or stopping points. Further, Parmenides had claimed that μὴ ὄν could not intervene to prevent what is from reaching its like, nor could there be any variation in density or rarity, cf. fr. 8.23–25, 44–48. E. reinterprets these points, first by asserting that the roots occupy all the available place (τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἐρῆμον), and then by equating μὴ ὄν with κενόν, resulting in a denial of empty place to interrupt or alter the consistency of the roots, cf. 10(13).

33 ἀλλ' αὐτ' ἔστιν ταῦτα: picking up the τῶνδε of the previous line, the reference continues to be to the roots, cf. 14 (21).13.

34 ἦνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα: the Eleatic argument for self-consistency (cf. Parmenides fr. 8.46–48) is applied to the individual roots, completing the point made in line 28—each root has its own τιμή and ἦθος, which are preserved inviolate through the various arrangements and rearrangements of parts in the formation of θνητά. Parmenides was led from the premise ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ὁμοῖον to conclude that his subject was unique (cf. G. E. L. Owen *CQ* 10 (1960) pp. 92–93), but E., in positing a mosaic shifting of four eternal roots in a *plenum*, retained their temporal and spatial continuity while allowing plurality and divisibility.

## 9(12)

*It is impossible for there to be a coming into existence from that which is not, and for what exists to be completely destroyed cannot be fulfilled, nor is to be heard of; for when and where it is thrust, then and there it will be.*

Philo quotes the first two lines of the fragment anonymously, to show that nothing can come from or pass away into nothing. The three lines and



the author are given in *MXG*, where the fragment is connected with 12(8).3–4 as supporting the assertion that since the roots are eternal, there is no absolute genesis or destruction, but an apparent genesis arises from their arrangements and rearrangements.

1 ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἐόντος: a suggested amalgam of ἐκ τε μὴ ὄντος (*MXG*) and ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ οὐδ' ἀμὴ ὄντος (Philo), so Bollack: ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ μὴ ἐόντος. Diels has ἐκ τε τοῦ γὰρ οὐδ' ἀμὴ ἐόντος, but Parmenides usually negates ὄν with μὴ, cf. frs. 2.7, 7.1, 8.7, and 12, and he frequently has the article, e.g., frs. 2.7, 4.2, 8.32, 35, and 37. ἀμύχανόν ἐστι: almost equivalent to "is logically impossible," cf. G. E. R. Lloyd *Polarity and Analogy* pp. 423–24.

2 ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον: cf. Parmenides frs. 2.7–8, 8.8–9, 8.17, and Melissus fr. 2. ἄπυστον is Mangey's suggestion, adopted by Diels, for Philo's ἄπανυστον, which makes no sense here; there is a similar corruption at Parmenides fr. 8.21, where the MSS D and E of Simplicius in *Cael.* read ἄπανυστος for ἄπυστος. The ἀπρηκτον of *MXG* may be an attempt to make sense of ἄπυστον. For a defense of ἄπανυστον as the *lectio difficilior* cf. Bignone *Empedocle* pp. 398–400.

3 †θήσεσθαι†: Panzerbieter, followed by Diels, emends to τῇ γ' ἔσται, which gives the line a rhetorical flourish. The subject is obviously ἐόν, and the verse so read would make it clear that the preceding two lines had a double reference. There can be no genesis from what is not, nor destruction of what is, in any temporal or spatial sense; ἐόν always exists, and as a *plenum* it occupies all available space, so that there is no time when nor place where it is not. ἐρεῖδω has a slightly different meaning at 100(110).1.

## 10(13)

*There is no part of the whole that is empty or overfull.*

The line is quoted by Aetius under the heading *Περὶ κενοῦ* and is listed by Theodoretus among several theories on the theme. *MXG* gives it as the condition prevailing after the coming together into unity.

E. is picking up Parmenides' argument on the spatial continuity and consistency of his subject (cf. fr. 8.22–25): there cannot be different degrees of existence at different parts. For Parmenides there is no μὴ ὄν to interrupt the consistency, but E. moves one stage further and identifies μὴ ὄν in its spatial sense with κενόν—an identification adopted by Melis-

sus and similarly used in his denial of variance, cf. Melissus fr. 7.(7)–(8), and also Anaxagoras, fr. 5. The invariance is most marked in the homogeneity of the sphere under Love (which may have induced the context in *MXG*) but always holds true; the roots are incapable of expanding or contracting, and they keep their character inviolate through the mosaic-like arrangements and rearrangements in the *plenum*.

Diels prints as a separate fragment (B 14) the phrase just before this verse in *MXG*: τοῦ παντός <δ'> οὐδὲ <ν> κενεόν. πόθεν οὖν τί κ' ἐπέλθοι; but this makes for needless repetition and may well be an imperfectly remembered conflation of 8(17).32 and 10(13).

### 11(16)

*They are as they were before and shall be, and never, I think, will endless time be emptied of these two.*

Hippolytus gives as the subject of the fragment Love and Strife, at *RH* 7.29 attributing the lines to E. but at 6.25 to “the Pythagoreans.” He comments that the character of Love is peaceful and unifying whereas Strife is destructive and separates, and that the action of the two continues without beginning or end.

1 ἔ<στ>ι γὰρ ὡς πάρος ἦν τε καὶ ἔσσεται: a suggestion made in a personal communication by Professor H. Lloyd-Jones for the MSS εἰ γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἦν καὶ ἔσται.

The Homeric formula (e.g., *Il.* 1.70) has the three tenses. After dealing in 8(17).27–35, 9(12), and 10(13) with the four roots, denying them beginning or end in time, spatial variation, and the possibility of addition to or subtraction from their totality, E. then moves on to his motive principles and postulates for them an eternal existence. (Since they were probably not thought of as material bodies in the same way as the roots were, the question of spatial stopping and starting points for them does not arise; see chap. 2.)

## FRAGMENTS 12–15 MIXING AND SEPARATING

### 12(8)

*Here is another point: of all mortal things no one has birth, or any end in pernicious*



death, but there is only mixing, and separating of what has been mixed, and to these men give the name "birth."

The fragment is quoted by Aetius from the first book of the *Physics*. An appropriate place for it is after the general exposition of 8(17) and the related Eleatic arguments. For his next point, E. in this and the following four fragments turns to the world we know and the language we use, showing first that there is no real genesis or destruction of mortal things but only arrangements and rearrangements of their component elements.

1 φύσις: the word is here taken by Plutarch to mean γένεσις in contrast to θάνατος: *ὅτι γὰρ ἀντὶ τῆς γενέσεως εἴρηκε τὴν φύσιν, ἀντιθεὶς τὸν θάνατον ἀντὶ δὲ δὴ λωκεν ὁ ἔ.* (*adv. Col.* 1112a and cf. 1112f). This is the sense also given to φύσις in this context in Aristotle *GC* 314b7 (cf. *Phys.* 193b12), *MXG* 975b6; Philoponus in *GC* 14.14, 15.6–8, 15–17, 263.20–24; Simplicius in *Cael.* 306.3, in *Phys.* 161.18, 180.25–30, 235.20–23; in Alexander it is taken as equivalent to ἔγνωσις, in *Metaph.* 359.17–21. At *Metaph.* 1014b35 Aristotle quotes the fragment, without the second line giving the required balance of θάνατος to φύσις, to illustrate the meaning of φύσις as οὐσία (and cf. *GC* 333b11–14, though Joachim argues for φύσις as γένεσις here, *ad GC* 314b7–8). Although such a meaning, or something akin to it, must be implied in E.'s other uses of the word at 56(63) and 100(110).5, this fragment, quoted in its entirety by Plutarch, should probably be given his interpretation. The controversy has continued into modern times, cf. A. O. Lovejoy *PhR* 1909, p. 371; Burnet *EGP* pp. 10–11, 363–64, 205 n. 4; Ross *Ar. Metaph.* vol. 1, pp. 297–98. Opposed to these are W. A. Heidel *Proceedings of the American Academy* 1910, p. 98; Kirk *Heraclitus* pp. 228–30; Kahn *Anaximander* p. 23; Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 140; and cf. G. A. Seeck *Hermes* 1967, pp. 36–41; J. Owens *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 1976, pp. 87–100; N. van der Ben *Phronesis* 1978, pp. 204–06. ἀπάντων: the variant ἐκάστου reflects a frequent confusion, cf. 8(17).8, 19 and 51(59).2.

2 θανάτοις τελευτῇ: Lovejoy, loc. cit., understands the phrase as (no) "end of death," i.e., θνητὰ never stop dying, but it is more likely to mean "end that is death," like the standard θανάτοις τέλος, e.g., Homer *Il.* 3.309, 5.553, 16.502, 855, 22.361, and Aeschylus *Sept.* 906. E. seems simply to be saying that despite our normal way of speaking, θνητὰ are not really born, nor (paradoxically) do they die, because strictly speaking they are temporary arrangements of parts of immortal "roots." The

coming into such an arrangement is φύσις, and the dissolution of the arrangement marks the end of that individual as such. This is spelled out in the next fragment.

3 μίξις: for the assumption that the *mixis* of parts of roots to make an organism is a mosaiclike arrangement in which the pieces retain their character, and not a kind of "chemical" mixture, see chap. 2.

4 ἐπὶ τοῖς . . . ἀνθρώποισιν: cf. line 5 of fr. 13(9). It would not seem that φύσις was a common word for E.'s contemporaries to adopt, but he may have had in mind the verbal usage, as in the next fragment. When a *mixis* is formed, there occurs what is termed γενέσθαι (or φύεσθαι).

### 13(9)

*When they have been mixed in the form of a man and come to the air, or in the form of the race of wild animals, or of plants, or of birds, then people say that this is to be born, and when they separate they call this again ill-fated death; these terms are not right, but I follow the custom and use them myself.*

The fragment comes, with 12(8), 104(11), and 106(15), in Plutarch's defense of E. against the charge put forward by Colotes, that E., in abolishing generation, abolished life itself. As Plutarch points out, E. is not doing away with living creatures but showing that terms like birth and death, when applied to them, are misleading; organisms are formed by a mingling in a certain arrangement of parts of eternal roots, and they cease to exist as such when the arrangement breaks up. Provided it is recognized that the terms are not strictly accurate, that birth is really mingling and death separating, the conventional expressions may still be used.

1 μίγντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἔκωνται: Diels's suggestion for the MSS μίγεν φῶς αἰθέρι and a lacuna of 6-8 letters; he adds, "fortasse φῶς Byzantinorum more vocis φῶτα explicandae causa superscriptum" (PPF p. 109). On this reading the subject would be the roots, and the sense would be, "when parts of the roots have formed into an arrangement or mixture with human shape and come to the air." "Coming to the air" may be a poetic paraphrase for "being born" (cf. Lucretius 1.170) but could be more exact, for E.'s theory is that the fetus is ἄπνοος and takes its first breath at birth, the intake of air compensating for a loss of moisture, cf. Aetius 4.22.1, 5.15.3.

3 τό <γέ φασί> γενέσθαι: Panzerbieter's filling of the second lacuna



in the fragment. The subject, from the first line, consists of people in general, who speak inaccurately of birth when there is only *mixis*.

5 †ἡ θέμις† καλέουσι: the reading at 82of, but εἶναι καλέουσι at 1112f. Attempts to make a satisfactory rendering include ἐν γε νόμῳ κ. Reiske, *εἰκαίως* κ. Karsten, and ἀλοίτην κ. Wytttenbach (cf. DK 31 B10). Stein suggested the conflation ἡ θέμις ἐστί, καλοῦσι, taking θέμις in a weaker sense and close to νόμος. But if θέμις is stressed as “right” (cf. 2(3).4 and Hesiod *Theog.* 396), a negative is obviously required. Wytttenbach had ἡ θέμις <οὐ> for 82of, and Wilamowitz <οὐ> θέμις ἡ (cf. *Hermes* 1930, p. 246). Diels adopts Wytttenbach’s reading as the most reasonable suggestion, on the Homeric pattern with the dative. On the inaccuracy of conventional naming cf. Parmenides fr. 8.38, Anaxagoras fr. 17.

#### 14(21)

*But come, if the form of my preceding argument was in any way incomplete, take note of the witnesses of these to what I have said before: sun with its radiant appearance and pervading warmth, heavenly bodies bathed in heat and shining light, rain everywhere dark and chill, and from earth issue firmly rooted solids. Under strife they have different forms and are all separate, but they come together in love and are desired by one another. From them comes all that was and is and will be hereafter—trees have sprung from them, and men and women, and animals and birds and water-nourished fish, and long-lived gods too, highest in honor. For these are the only real things, and as they run through each other they assume different shapes, for the mixing interchanges them.*

Simplicius quotes the fragment in full at *in Phys.* 159.13, after the whole of 8(17), as a continuation of the account of the roots, showing that each has its own character and is recognizable in a familiar form—“sun,” for example, is fire, “sky” is air, and “rain” and “sea” are water (cf. the table in chap. 2). At *in Phys.* 33.8 Simplicius follows lines 3–12 of this fragment on 47(35), there to point out that mixing results when both Love and Strife are at work.

1 τῶνδ’ . . . ἐπιμάτρυρα: the genitives are clumsy. Stein suggested τῶν for τῶνδ’, and Diels followed Wilamowitz with τόνδ’, taking ἐπιμάτρυρα as masculine singular rather than neuter plural; but a number of phenomena will be pointed out by E. in support of the theory put forward, and the line should probably be left as in Simplicius.

2 λιπόξυλον: "lacking wood," and so "feeble," "defective"; found also at 60(71).1 applied to *πίστις* but apparently not elsewhere, cf. *λίφαιμος*, 91(100).1. *μορφή*: used by Parmenides of fire and night (fr. 8.53), but here the sense is "form of argument." To express his meaning more clearly E. will offer as evidence of the existence and character of the four roots the familiar elemental masses around us.

4 ὅσσ' †ἐδεῖτο†: emended by Diels to ὅσσ' ἰδὲι τε and further corrected by Wackernagel to ὅσσ' εἶδεν τε (cf. *SPAW* 1884, p. 366; *Philologus* 1931, pp. 134-35). The word *εἶδεν* is related to *ιδρώς*, and the definition in Hesychius is *εἶδενος· θάλπουρος, καύματος*. The *ἄμβροτα* are the moon and stars, the moon being composed of air shut in by fire, and the stars of fire squeezed out from the air (cf. [Plut.] *Strom.* ap. Eus. *PE* 1.8.10, Aet. 2.13.2). If the reading *εἶδεν* is right, and the sense of heat uppermost, then in this line E. would be pointing to the *ἄμβροτα* as instances of a combination of fire and air; cf. 53(62).5, where heat rather than moisture (which is given in *ὑδατος*) is indicated.

6 †θέλμα†: the vocabulary of lines 5-6 is uncommon (*δνοφόντα*, *ρίγαλέον*, and *στερεωπά* are *ἀπ. λεγ.*), and the form and sense of this word cannot be decided. *θελμά* (cf. 47(35).6) is inappropriate, and *ἐθελυμνά* (advocated by Karsten and Stein from the *Suda* and Favorinus) unsatisfactory. Diels followed Sturz with *θέλυμνα*, as a simple form of the Homeric *προθέλυμνα* (*Il.* 9.541, 10.15, 13.130, and cf. O'Brien *ECC* pp. 266-67), but now *θελεμνά* is generally accepted from the definition in Hesychius: *ὄλον ἐκ ρίζων*. At *GC* 315a10, in an obvious reference to this fragment, Aristotle says of E., *λέγει τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λευκὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν βαρὺ καὶ σκληρόν*, but "close-packed" or "firmly rooted" is not exactly *βαρὺ*. Also, the verb *προρέουσι*, associated in epic with the free flowing of rivers and streams (cf. *Il.* 21.260, *Od.* 5.444, and especially Hes. *Theog.* 792), is difficult to understand with a subject of this kind. Perhaps E. wrote no more than *θάλασσα* (cf. the reference in Simplicius' introduction of the fragment), the weight and hardness mentioned by Aristotle both being implied in *στερεωπά*—rocks and stones brought along by the water. In any case the theory of an exclusive tetrad of opposites cannot be fastened on E. from this fragment.

7-8: the subject is the four roots, mentioned under familiar names and forms in the preceding lines, and the statement is a general one about their activity when influenced by the motive principles—under Strife (only here in the *Physics* called *κότος*) they keep their individual forms in separated masses, in Love they come together into a unity. When both



Love and Strife are active, as Simplicius explains (*in Phys.* 33.4), *thnēta* result.

9: I have accepted Aristotle's version of the line, but with *ἐκ τῶν* for *ἐξ ὧν*, as at 15(23).5 and 83(98).5. E. has adopted the common formula for past, present, and future, probably as a deliberate challenge to Parmenides' denial of tenses (fr. 8.5). The list that follows, comprising plant, animal, bird, fish, human, and divine life, is repeated at 15(23).6, the *θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι* significantly also appearing in the *Katharmoi* as the highest in the series of lives, cf. 132(146).3.

13–14: line 13 repeats 8(17).34, but there is a change in the second line of the couplet. The emphasis in 8(17) is on the permanence and changelessness of the roots, here it is on their ability to produce all kinds of *thnēta* as they mingle with each other (cf. 47(35).16–17). As against Diels's suggestion for the completion of line 14 a connection is required, and E. does not elsewhere use *τόσος* without a corresponding relative. Stein and Mullach independently argued for *διάπτυξις γὰρ ἀμείβει*, a rearrangement of Karsten's suggestion from Simplicius' commentary on 12(8).3: *ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξιν τε καὶ διάλλαξιν μίγντων, καὶ σύνοδον διάπτυξιν τε γενέσθαι ἐν μέρει αἴσης* (*in Phys.* 161.20). I conjecture *τὰ γὰρ διὰ κρήσεις ἀμείβει*, for the tmesis comparing Parmenides fr. 8.41.

### 15(23)

*As painters, men well taught by wisdom in the practice of their art, decorate temple offerings when they take in their hands pigments of various colors, and after fitting them in close combination—more of some and less of others—they produce from them shapes resembling all things, creating trees and men and women, animals and birds and water-nourished fish, and long-lived gods too, highest in honor; so let not error convince you in your mind that there is any other source for the countless perishables that are seen, but know this clearly, since the account you have heard is divinely revealed.*

Simplicius quotes the lines as an illustration given by E. of the theory set out in 14(21), refers them to this present world in which plant, animal, and human life results from the activity of both Love and Strife, and connects them with 16(26).1–2 and 11–12. For a discussion of the simile see chap. 2, pp. 38–39.

2 ἀμυρὶ . . . δεδαῶτε: the duals *δεδαῶτε* (line 2), *μίξαντε* (line 4),

and κτίζοντε (line 6) are puzzling; the earlier editors attempted to avoid them by reading δεδαῶτες (which is given in the Simp. MS F), μάξαντε, and κτίζουσι respectively. Duals for plurals in Homer, e.g., at *Il.* 3.279, 8.186, 16.371, and 17.387, have been discussed by P. Chantraine (*Grammaire Homérique* vol. 2, p. 28), J. Wackernagel (*Vorlesungen über Syntax* pp. 77–80), and E. Schwyzler and A. Debrunner (*Griechische Grammatik* vol. 2, p. 46); more recently C. Segal has suggested a formal reason for the duals in *Iliad* book 9 (“The Embassy and the Duals of *Iliad* 9.182–98,” *GRBS* 1968, pp. 109–14). The duals here may have resulted from the Simplicius MSS reading of ἄμφω for ἀμφί, or perhaps E. is allowing himself a striking flexibility in the forms, cf. 124(137).6.

4 ἀρμονίῃ μίξαντε: “mixed” colors are referred to in Theophrastus *Sens.* 77–78 (on Democritus), Plato *Tim.* 68d, and [Aristotle] *Col.* 792a–b and *Mete.* 372a5. In the introduction it was argued that the mixing of colors in “harmony” described in this fragment is not a blending to produce further shades but the setting of pigments of different colors side by side; the φάρμακα are the appropriate colors ready before the painters start on their pictures. Cf. also 48(96).4, and J. B. Skemp’s translation of Plato *Pol.* 277c: “because [the outline] has still to be painted in colours properly balanced with one another.” It is uncertain whether a correlation is to be made between the four roots and the four simple colors of black, white, red, and “ochre” (cf. W. Kranz, “Die ältesten Farbenlehren der Griechen,” *Hermes* 1912, pp. 126–28). The correspondence is made for E. at Stobaeus *Ecl.* 1.5.3; four colors as canonic are attributed to the Pythagoreans (Aet. 1.15.7, and cf. [Arist.] *De Mundo* 396b13); and they seem to be the ones generally used by fifth-century painters. The number of colors, however, is not as important as the fact that only a few are required in order to produce (in two dimensions) all kinds of θνητά.

6–8: this list was also given in 14(21).11–13. The same wide variety of θνητά comes from the four roots as the painter can reproduce in his art with a few colors.

9 καίνύτω: established by Blass from Hesychius καίνύτω· νικάτω, the only known appearance of the active form of καίνυμαι.

10 γεγάασιν: Diels’s emendation to γεγάκασιν *metris causa* is generally accepted; he compares γεγάκειν in Pindar (*Ol.* 6.49), and Hesychius has the participle γεγακώς. E.’s forms elsewhere are γεγάσι 60(71).4, and γεγάσι 101(111).1. The line is uncharacteristically stilted and perhaps should be rearranged, e.g.,

πηγὴν ὅσσα γε θνητῶν ἄσπετα δῆλα γεγάσιν.



The metaphor of  $\pi\eta\gamma\eta$ , with  $\rho\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\mu\alpha$ , for the source  $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  φύσεως appears in the Pythagorean oath by the tetractys, Aetius 1.3.8, and cf. 7(6).1.

11  $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$   $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ :  $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$  is taken to refer (1) to E. himself as a god, e.g., by Bidez, *Biographie* p. 102, and by W. Nestlé, "Der Dualismus des Empedokles," *Philologus* 1906, pp. 545–57, comparing 102(112).4; (2) to Aphrodite/Philotēs by Bollack, *Empédocle* vol. 1, p. 265, n. 2, and p. 310; and (3) to the Muse, by Karsten, Diels, Bignone, and others. (3) is surely correct. The  $\mu\acute{\omega}\theta\omicron\varsigma$  of the physical poem comes from the Muse, addressed in 2(3).4, and specifically as Calliope in 3(131).1–4; her  $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$  guarantee the truth of E.'s *logos*, as at 3(131).4 and 6(4).2–3, and cf. Parmenides fr. 1.22–23. Self-reference here would be an example of the *mania* condemned in 2(3).1 and 5(3).1–3; cf. the commentary on 1(2).9.

#### FRAGMENTS 16–22 MANY TO ONE IN THE COSMOS: THE SPHERE

##### 16(26)

*They prevail in turn as the cycle moves round, and decrease into each other and increase in appointed succession. For these are the only real things, and as they run through one another they become men and the kinds of other animals, at one time coming into one order through love, at another again being borne away from each other by strife's hate, until they come together into the whole and are subdued. So, insofar as one is accustomed to arise from many, and many are produced from one as it is again being divided, to this extent they are born and have no abiding life; but insofar as they never cease their continual exchange, so far they are forever unaltered in the cycle.*

The fragment is quoted in full by Simplicius as coming soon after 14(21); he refers it to the genesis of one from many under Love, of many from one under Strife, and of  $\theta\nu\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$  in this world  $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}$   $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\acute{o}\delta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ . It is a rewording of the fundamental principle of the uniting and separating of the four roots by reason of the agency of Love and Strife. Lines 1, 3–4, 5–6, and 8–12 repeat 8(17).29, 34–35, 7–8, and 9–13 respectively. Lines 2 and 7 are new, filling in, in a striking manner, the processes involved;  $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  (line 1) and  $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$  (line 5) are important variants on the endings of 8(17).29 and 7.

Commentators tend to complicate the simple explanatory structure



of the fragment. The subject is the four roots, the "many." As usual, E. starts his account with the roots in separation. At the appropriate time in the cycle they are in control. In appointed succession they then move from many to one (their masses getting smaller as they mingle) and from one to many (their masses increasing). As they run through each other in both processes they become men and animals. They move from many to one through Love, and from one to many because of Strife, until, coming (again) into one they are subdued. The unity of the four roots described in line 7, which entails the loss of their visible individual characteristics, is the opposite state of affairs to that of line 1. In going from many to one and from one to many they have temporary existences as men and other animals, but in persisting through the recurring exchange of position they are unaltered.

1 ἐν δὲ μέρει . . . κύκλοιο: repeated from 8(17).29 with κύκλοιο for χρόνοιο, itself a refinement on the Homeric περιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν (*Od.* 1.16, and in the singular 11.248). The substitution is a deliberate (and perhaps a pioneer) assertion that time is cyclical, as Aristotle observes later, "to say that things that come into being form a circle is to say that there is a cycle of time" (*Phys.* 223b30–34, Oxford trans.). κύκλοιο in the first line, picked up by κατὰ κύκλον in the last, sets the fragment in the large-scale context of recurring time.

The subject of κρατέουσι here and in 8(17).29 is the four roots. E. uses singular and plural verbs with this subject, and also masculine and neuter adjectives. In 8(17) the line is obscure and could perhaps refer to a Milesian world picture of warring opposites with regional and seasonal aggressions and compensations, but the context of 16(26) contrasts the time of domination with a time of getting smaller and bigger (i.e., of becoming one from many and many from one), and of complete subjection. The roots are subdued when they are together, and conversely, when they prevail they are separate.

2 φθίνει . . . αἴσης: the roots have a turn at being dominant and separate, and also a turn at getting smaller and at getting bigger; this is explained in lines 5–6 as moving from many to one under Love and moving from one to many under Strife. Exchanging position either way involves "running through each other," and in running through each other the roots become men and other animals. They get smaller as their individual masses dwindle while mingling, and they get bigger as the bits return to their own kind.

3 αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα: "for there are these very things," "these are

the real things" (cf. *αὐτὸς οὗτος*, LSJ s.v. *αὐτός* 1.7), rather than "they are themselves" (O'Brien) or "Ils sont, toujours même" (Bollack). "There are just these" (Guthrie) shifts the emphasis slightly. The roots running through each other become different things at different times (8(17).35), things with different faces (14(21).14), and here, more explicitly, men and other animals.

5 *εἰς ἕνα κόσμον*: the roots run through each other producing men and animals, at one time when going from many to one, and at another when going from one to many, but they stop doing so when dominant and many or subdued and one. Coming into one *kosmos* in line 5 is the same process as coming into one whole in line 7, a more precise version here of *εἰς ἕν ἅπαντα* at 8(17).7. *Kosmos* is used in the sense of "total world order" as it was by Heraclitus, fr. 30, and probably the Pythagoreans (Aet. 2.1.1) and Parmenides (D.L. 8.48). For this sense of *kosmos* in the Presocratics cf. Kirk *Heraclitus* pp. 307–24, Guthrie *HGP* vol. 1, pp. 454–59, and G. Vlastos *Plato's Universe* chap. 1.

7 *τὸ πᾶν*: when used elsewhere by E. means "the whole," "the sum total," 8(17).32, 10(13).1, 33(39).3, and so here, rather than an adverb, "completely." Nor should it be taken as the subject of *γένηται*, involving an unwarranted change of subject from, and then back to, the four roots, and leaving *συμφύντα* unaccounted for. (O'Brien's elaborate metrical argument for *τὸ πᾶν* as subject, *ECC* pp. 322–23, is incorrect, for it is not the case that all the following lines except 8 "have a third foot trochaic caesura dividing the line according to sense," and his translation, "until (the time comes when) they grow together as one and the whole is defeated," does not fit the text he prints.) *τὸ πᾶν* therefore belongs with *συμφύντα* in the sense of the roots "coming together into the whole." The word before the participle is in doubt and is given variously as *ἐν*, *ὅν*, or *ὅν*; Diels suggested *ἐς ἕν* (*PPF* p. 118). *εἰσόκεν εἰς συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν* would be more appropriate, and for the order cf. LSJ s.v. *εἰς*, B. *ὑπένερχε γένηται*: the roots are "underneath" in the opposite sense to their prevailing (cf. line 1), because they are not separate and dominant masses but are in such a mixing of discrete particles that none of their characteristics is visibly distinct. Line 7 is a rewording of line 5 as line 1 is of line 6.

8–12: quoted separately by Aristotle (*Phys.* 250b20) and repeated from 8(17).9–13. The lines are given to illustrate movement and rest in E., movement when Love makes one from many or Strife many from one, and "rest" in the times—or time—between. For the many to become one implies a time (of "rest") when they were many, and for the one to



divide into many implies a time (of "rest") when there was the one. That Aristotle did not spell out the implications may be a fault, but he is free of the grosser error of deliberate concealment and misinterpretation, see chap. 2 and the discussions cited there.

10: the line sums up 12(8) and 13(9), as well as lines 2–6. The roots appear to undergo both genesis and an early death in their compound forms of men and other animals; this happens as they run through each other, getting "smaller" (going from many to one) and "bigger" (moving from one to many). Lines 11–12 give the contrast to line 10. The "exchange of position" results in temporary compounds, but the permanence of the exchange from many to one and from one to many in a circle (or cycle) of time ensures the permanence of the roots. (Long argues that the activity described in line 8 takes an extended period of time but that the one in line 9 is immediate; the activities also of lines 5 and 7 take an extended time whereas that of line 6 is immediate, *Pre-Socratics* p. 412. But the participles in lines 5, 6, 7, and 9 are all present, and it is perverse to read such an extreme time difference into the similar constructions.) ἀκίνητοι is "unaltered" in a mainly temporal sense, cf. Parmenides fr. 8.26, 38, and Owen *CQ* 1960, p. 97.

## 17(25)

*For what is right is worth repeating.*

The line is given by the scholiast as the source of the proverb δὴς καὶ τρίς τὸ καλόν, and by Plutarch to justify a second refutation of Epicurus. Except at *Laws* 754c, (with δὴς only), Plato uses the δὴς καὶ τρίς version, *Gorg.* 498e, *Phlb.* 60a, *Laws* 956e. Repetition of lines in whole or in part in the extant fragments of E. are as follows: 8(17).1–2 at 16–17, 6 at 12 and at 16(26).11, 7–8 at 16(26).5–6, 9–13 at 16(26).8–12, 29 at 16(26).1, 34 at 14(21).13 and 16(26).3; 14(21).10–12 at 15(23).6–8; 16(26).4 at 113(121).2; 19(27).1 at 21(27).1; 22(29).1–2 at 97(134).2–3; 47(35).7 at 16; 88(84).5 at 10; 91(100).7–8 at 24–25. Repetition is so obviously a feature of E.'s method that attempts to alter the arrangement of the fragments solely to avoid it are unjustified. Repetitions, formally in the epic tradition, are used as summaries, reminders, and reinforcements, and minor differences are often significant, e.g., περιπλομένον χρόνον/κύκλον at 8(17).29 and 16(26).1. Most often the repetition is a development or a particular application of what has been said previously in a



general context. Here the reference is likely to be to the considerable repetition of 8(17) in 16(26), but the fragment may also imply advance notice of a more comprehensive reiteration—an outline of the whole cosmology followed by detailed consideration of particular sections (cf. the commentary on 18(24) and Parmenides' program, fr. 8.2–4).

### 18(24)

*Joining one chief point to another, so as not to pursue only one path of discourse.*

μη τελέειν is generally accepted by all but Bollack, who retains Plutarch's reading, finding a parallel in 47(35).1–2. The construction in both versions is strained and perhaps should be emended (in a personal communication Professor H. Lloyd-Jones suggested μήτ' ἐλθεῖν), but the sense is clear, and the context in Plutarch refers to E. avoiding the exclusive pursuit of one argument. The fragment corroborates the suggestion that E.'s method is to give the main points of his argument—the κορυφαί (cf. 8(17).15 πιφαύσκων πείρατα μύθων)—and then to develop in further (but not exhaustive) detail the sections of especial relevance or interest. It expressly contradicts the claim advanced by Bollack, Hölscher, and Solmsen that the *Physics* is an account of “a single linear development” (A. A. Long's phrase, *The Pre-Socratics* p. 398).

The program that follows summarizes the cosmic stages, starting from the roots in separation, from which the strifeless sphere is derived. There is then the particular account of the entry of Strife, the articulation of the cosmic masses and the related meteorology, followed by a return, in the nature of a digression, to the complementary stage of the retreat of Strife and the resulting monstrous forms. Fragment 53(62) resumes the account with the full-scale zoogony and biology that logically follow the cosmogony given prior to the digression.

### 19(27)

*There the shining form of the sun is not shown, nor the shaggy might of earth, nor sea.*

The meaning of δε(ι)δίσσομαι is “frighten” or “fear,” and Karsten's δεδίσκεται is therefore generally accepted. Bollack, however, argues for the retention of δεδίσσεται with a sense related to δέικνυμι. He also retains γένος, comparing 25(22).7 and 100(110).9, but the reference here

is to the earth as we know it, cf. *αλθέριον μένος* 107(115).9. *λάσιον* implies strength and roughness, and cf. the analogues of hair, 71(82).

The roots in separation provide a logical starting point for E.'s account of the cosmic stages. Plutarch's context sets the lines firmly in a description of the four elements completely unmixed under Strife, prior to their being brought into a *harmonia* by the power of Love. The *φοβερά ἀκοσμία* is comparable to that described by Plato at *Tim.* 53a–b. Even if Plutarch's quotations are not always accurate, it would be perverse to reject him as a key authority on E. and to refer these lines to an opposite state of affairs than that described by him. (Plutarch is said to have written a ten-book commentary on E., cf. Hippolytus *RH* 5.20.6 and the discussion by O'Brien, *ECC* p. 33, n. 2. For the lines as a supposed reference to elements under Love, cf. the commentary on 21(27) below.)

Sun, earth, and sea as we know them are not recognizable when the elemental masses are completely distinct (*ἄκρατοι καὶ ἄστοργοι* in Plutarch's paraphrase) and in their "natural," i.e., logically prior, state. Earth is at the center (cf. Aristotle *Cael.* 295a30), surrounded by water, air, and fire in concentric layers, each clinging to its own kind and shunning association with any other. Aristotle implies at *Metaph.* 1050b23, 985a25, and *Phys.* 250b26 that the separate elements are at rest, but at *Cael.* 301a15 that they are moving, and this is supported by the participles in the Plutarch context. Perhaps neither rest nor motion in an absolute sense is appropriate, for, according to Plutarch, both start with the increasing influence of Love, cf. 927a.

I suggest there is a vibration (comparable to the uninterrupted shaking of the winnower) as the roots continue to try to shun each other but, in the absence of void, cannot do so completely—a natural (and mindless) *ἀκοσμία*, subsequently resolved into the preferable *ἁρμονία* and *κοινωνία* imposed by Philotēs. (Cf. Simplicius in *Cael.* 530.17–20: when the elements are separated by Strife and unmixed there is no *syntaxis* in the relation of sky to earth.)

## 20(36)

*Strife was retreating from them to the extremity as they were coming together.*

Since the complete line is given in Stobaeus immediately after 7(6), *τῶν* refers to the four roots. Schneidewin was the first to suggest inserting the line in 47(35) in place of line 7 (which is repeated at line 16), and he

was followed by Diels, Kirk-Raven, and Guthrie (*HGP* vol. 2, p. 178, n. 4), but this attributes carelessness to Simplicius' quotation unnecessarily. The line helps to bridge the *κορυφαί* of 19(27) and 21(27) with the transition from unmixed roots under Strife to mixed under Love. The verb takes the genitive in the sense of "retire from," "give up possession of" (cf. LSJ s.v. *ἐξίστημι* II), and *ἔσχατον* is accusative of end of motion (cf. 47(35).10 *ἐπ' ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου*). In Aristotle's truncated version the sense is closer to "whenever everything came together, then Strife's position was at the extremity," and the immediate context is a carping criticism of the god for the comparative poverty of his knowledge resulting from his lack of acquaintance with Strife; fr. 77(109) is quoted to support the criticism. More important, Aristotle points out that Strife is a cause of genesis no less than Love, and Love a cause of destruction—*συνάγουσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐν φθείρει τὰ ἄλλα*.

## 21(27)

*There the swift limbs of the sun are not distinguished . . . in this way it is held fast in the close covering of harmony, a rounded sphere, rejoicing in encircling stillness.*

Simplicius quotes from Eudemus in support of a time of rest between the initiation of movement and control by Love, and that by Strife; in the complete *ἐπικράτεια* of Love all things come together. For E. this means that the minute particles of roots are so mingled that it is impossible to pick out any one and distinguish it from another. (On the mixing of the elements in the sphere, and Aristotle's commentary, see chap. 2. J. Longrigg's article, *CR* 1967, pp. 1–4, is a reworking of the Arundel thesis, pp. 146–49.) In 19(27).1 the *eidos* of the sun is not apparent because all the particles of fire have come together, and here the particles cannot be discerned (except perhaps by Lynceus, cf. Aristotle *GC* 328a16) because they are closely mingled with other minute parts of earth, air, and water; cf. also the commentary on *φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα* 16(26).2. (*ἐνθα* is probably spatial as in 69(76).3 and almost certainly 113(121).2 and 116(122).1.) Partial repetition in the two lines does not mean that they are to be conflated (cf. on 17(25) above), especially when they are referred to opposite states of affairs.

2 *κρυφῶ*: surely not "Verliess" (DK), "ténèbres" (Bollack), or



"obscurity" (Guthrie) for the rejoicing, intelligent god. The parallel is Parmenides B 8.29–31. E., like Parmenides, has a metaphor of constraint for the uniform stability and changelessness which in this case are imposed by *harmonia* (another name for Philia/Aphrodite, and less personalized as a cohesive principle, 48(96).4).

3 σφαῖρος: according to the scholiast on Aratus a masculine form of σφαῖρα coined by E. on the analogy of Ἑσπερος for Ἑσπέρα. For the seemingly redundant κυκλοτερής cf. Parmenides 8.43—εὐκύκλου σφαίρης—but E. may be deliberately emphasizing the shape, which was not the main feature of Parmenides' simile. περιηγεί: Simplicius has περιηγθεί, defended by O'Brien *ECC* 284, with inadequate parallels. Bollack reads περιηγθεί γαίων here and περιηγεί χαίρων at 22(29/28).4, but the change in the line is weak and περιηγθείς unsuitable for the abstract noun μονίη. For the joy of the god cf. Gēthosunē as another name for Philia, 8(17).24. μονίη: whether μονίη means "rest" (from μένω) or "solitude" (from μόνος) has been extensively discussed; cf. Jaeger *TEGP* p. 141, Burnet *EGP* p. 210, Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 169, n. 3, O'Brien *ECC* pp. 22–24, Bollack *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 137, Kahn *Gnomon* 1969, p. 441. The available evidence, however, strongly supports the sense "stillness" (Guthrie's translation), "absence of change or movement"—cf. the Homeric καμμονίη, Xenophanes fr. 26 and Parmenides fr. 8.29–31; Eudemos, the main authority for the line, understood the word as ἀκίνησις. (Tyrtaeus 1.54, with Diehl's references, is arguable support.) "Rejoicing in solitude" is not a Greek characteristic, and Plato has to defend the god's solitude as being no impediment to his happiness, *Tim.* 34b, but repose and freedom from disturbances feature as a desirable state of affairs in the mainstream of Greek thought from Homer (*Od.* 6.42–46) onward. μονίη would still have an aural association with μόνος, however, and the unusual word was probably deliberately chosen for its ambiguity. The combination, attributed to Heraclitus and Parmenides, of "a philosopher's interest in literal, original and paradigmatic meaning, with something of the poet's sensitivity to the psychological suggestiveness and acoustic associations of words" could be claimed for E., cf. Mourelatos *The Pre-Socratics* p. 347.

## 22(29/28)

*For two branches do not spring from his back, he has no feet, no swift knees, no organs of reproduction, but he is equal to himself in every direction, without any beginning or end, a rounded sphere, rejoicing in encircling stillness.*

The fragment is here given as a conflation of Diels's 29 and 28. Hippolytus quotes the first two lines, and his version of what follows—ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην καὶ ἴσος ἔστιν αὐτῷ—is an unmetrical summary, after a previous warning that the quotation was not exact. (σφαῖραν ἔην at Simplicius in *Phys.* 1124.1 is unhelpful. ἔην is not given in F; without it there are not the additional complications of a tense change and a neuter form. Moreover, οὐδετέρως preceding ποτὲ καλεῖ σφαῖρον looks contradictory; the clause in Simplicius should perhaps be transposed to the end of the sentence at in *Phys.* 1124.4.)

Line 4 repeats 21(27).3, and line 2, with one small change, is applied to the denial of human form to the φρῆν ἱερή of 97(134). The absence of Strife, which features here as a state of the cosmos under Love, is also applicable to the individual wise man, as at 98(27a), and M. Antoninus uses line 4 as a paradigm for the philosophic state. Furthermore, Hippolytus quotes 107(115) after this fragment, relating the entry of Strife into the sphere, and the consequent disruption, to the embodiment of the daimons in a variety of mortal forms. Intelligence and the absence of *stasis* result from the physical structure of component parts achieving homogeneous mingling through the activity of Love. Such is the character of the sphere here described; and the description connects with that of the wise μάη and shows how the daimon of the *Katharmoi* is to be understood.

1 κλάδοι: for the similarity of parts in animals and plants, cf. hair and leaves at 71(82). ἀΐσσονται: "shoot up," cf. Pindar *Nem.* 8.40 of a tree, but also "move about rapidly," and the ambiguity is probably deliberate (Hesiod *Theog.* 150). The absence of arms, legs, and generative organs also characterizes the οὐλοφυεῖς τύποι of 53(62), the prehuman forms that arise at the beginning of the transition from Love's control to Strife's control. The denial of human form in this fragment may well be a development of Xenophanes fr. 23.2 (as Plato later—the god has no need of hands for grasping or for self-defense, nor of feet for the movement appropriate to him, *Tim.* 33d), but E. is involved in a more general and radical rethinking of what it means to be a god, elaborating a theory of cosmic divinity that was already adumbrated in Presocratic thinking (see chap. 3).

3 ὃ γε πάντοθεν ἴσος <έοι>: <έοι> is supplied by P. Maas, and the phrase is an obvious echo of οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον and ἑωυτῷ πάντοσε τωυτόν at Parmenides fr. 8.49 and 57. E. has copied Parmenides in the concepts of uniqueness, uniformity, balance, and stability but has used



them for a stage in a cosmic alternation, derived from and giving way to plurality and change. There is also a material content, and so Parmenides' simile of a sphere is now applied literally. *πάμπαν ἀπείρων* fills out the physical description, for the sphere, even more than the circle, has no spatial starting or stopping point. There is also the implication that there are no internal frontiers dividing one element off from another, as is the case in the cosmos under Strife.

FRAGMENTS 23-46 ONE TO MANY IN THE COSMOS:  
THE PRESENT WORLD

23(30)

*But when great strife had grown in the frame and leapt upward to its honors as the time was being completed, a time of exchange for them, which has been defined by a broad oath*

This important fragment refers in strong poetical terms to the inevitable end of the dominion of Love and, with the increase of Strife, the beginning of movement as the one breaks into many. In Aristotle's commentary on the lines (*Metaph.* 1000b9-20) Love and Strife are both viewed as generative and destructive—Strife destroys the one but brings many into existence, and Love generates the one but destroys everything else. (But E. is praised for his consistency in keeping the elements permanent.) E., however, gives no reason for the change apart from *anankē*, which itself requires explanation. Simplicius (*in Phys.* 1184) reiterates Aristotle's complaint, and in this context gives interesting parallels. That "this is the way things are and must be" is E.'s explanation for the cyclic time of 8(17).29, the beginning of movement in the sphere at 24(31), and the oracle of *anankē*, strengthened by broad oaths, which gives the time for the separation of the daimon from the gods. Asclepius summarizes the first line as *ἡνίκα τὸ νείκος ἐπεκράτησε* (cf. Simplicius' setting of the lines *ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ νείκου ἐπικρατείας*), paraphrases the second, and after quoting the third explains that the oath is called broad *ὥς πάλιν χορηγοῦντα τὰ πάντα*. It is quite clear that we have a reference to the assumption of power by Strife as a recurring event.

1 *ἀντάρ ἐπεί*: cf. 51(59).1, rather than Aristotle's pedestrian version, but Aristotle's *ἐθρέφθη* "had grown," "had increased in size" (cf. *II.* 2.661), and not *ἐρέφθη* (accepted by Bollack and translated "l'emporta"). *μέγα* is most obviously attributive. *ἐνὶ μελέεσσιν*: the long iota of the



preposition is acceptable, as at 26(20).5, cf. P. Maas, *Greek Metre* p. 79. *μελέεσσιν*, like *γυῖα* in the following fragment, refers to the frame or structure of the sphere, consisting, before the breakup, of the four roots perfectly harmonized. Strife is now “in” the frame in the sense that it is and will be active there. The reverse procedure, of retreat from the *μέλη*, is given in 47(35).11.

2 *ἀνόρουσε*: the language is violent, and the image is perhaps that of a military attack. Strife, from the circumference of the sphere (cf. 20(36).1), makes for the center, consolidates its position, and then makes forays outward over more and more territory; *τιμαί* sums up the victorious outcome.

3 *ἀμοιβαῖος*: the time given to Love to dominate comes to an end and is replaced by a time given to Strife. Bollack takes *ὄρκου* with it and translates “en lieu d’une large enceinte.” A period of time cannot, however, be recompensed by a *ὄρκος* but only by a similar period, as letters (Hdt. 6.4) or invitations to dinner (Pindar *Ol.* 1.39) are exchanged, or soldiers replaced (*Il.* 13.793), or keys fitted to doors (Parmenides fr. 1.14). That the predominance of Love must be recompensed by the predominance of its opposite is an application of the idea of cosmic justice and retribution worked out in time found in Anaximander’s fragment, and of *metra* governed by *logos* in Heraclitus. The time has been “marked out,” *ἐλήλαται*, by an oath, as a wall or trench is defined (cf. LSJ s.v. *ἐλαύνω* III.2 and esp. Hesiod *Theog.* 726 and Herodotus 1.146, 6.62). There is no need to wonder who swears the broad oath. Its function is to add solemnity and certainty to the necessary exchange of times of power for the cosmic forces, in somewhat the same way as Parmenides speaks of the necessity of invariance in terms of the bonds of Anankē, and as Plato brings in *εἰμαρμένη* for the reversal of the cycle in the myth (*Pol.* 272d6–e7).

## 24(31)

*For one by one all the parts of god began to tremble.*

Strife’s attack on the sphere destroys both its unity and its rest. Simplicius quotes the line after 21(27) with a repeated *πάλιν*: at the commencement again of Strife’s dominion, then again there is movement in the sphere and the parts become articulated.

*ἐξείης*: “in turn,” “one after the other,” as at *Il.* 15.137 and 22.240; for *πελεμίζετο* cf. *Il.* 8.443 of Olympos shaking under the feet of Zeus.

πάντα . . . γυῖα θεοῖο: the "limbs" are not personal, for this is denied at 22(29) and 97(134), nor are they bits of elements that can be distinguished, for no section of the mixture can be picked out as having discernible characteristics (cf. 21 and 19[27]); they are the totality of spatial parts, like μέλη at 23(30).1 and 47(35).11. θεοῖο is important as the only identification in the fragments of the sphere with god, though Ammonius gives the reference of φρῆν ἰερόν at 97(134).3 as περὶ τοῦ θείου παντός. That E. ascribes divinity to the sum total of the four roots in a state of perfect mixture under Love is obviously relevant to an understanding of the nature of the daimon, cf. the commentary on 107(115).

## 25(22)

*For all these—sun and earth and sky and sea—are one with the parts of themselves that have been separated from them and born in mortal things. In the same way, those that are more ready to combine are made similar by Aphrodite and feel mutual affection. But such as are most different from each other in birth and mixture and in the molding of their forms are most hostile, quite inexperienced in union, and grieving deeply at their generation in strife, in that they were born in wrath.*

There is little help for the interpretation of this fragment from the two sources, for although Simplicius connects the lines with the general behavior of the roots in the cosmic changes of 16(26).1–2, 11–12, his Neoplatonism contrasts intelligible and perceptible worlds, and Theophrastus takes lines 6–7 out of context as an illustration of pain resulting from the interaction of opposites. O'Brien discusses the fragment at confusing and confused length (*ECC* pp. 305–12), Bollack tries diagrams (vol. 1, pp. 181–83), and M. C. Stokes concludes that an analysis of fr. 22 supports his supposition that "in talking about unity and plurality E. did not know what he was talking about" (*One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* p. 172). But the basic argument in this and the following fragment is clear. E. is anxious to show (1) that earth, air, fire, and water have the same character in the parts of themselves that make up mortal things as in their discernible world masses, and (2) that the activity of Love and Strife, as we know them, is similar to, and a prime illustration of, their cosmic functions. Lines 1–3 make the first point: as Strife's control increases, the four roots come together as the sun, earth, sea, and sky we perceive, but the process is not complete; parts of the four roots are still mixed with each other as *thnēta*, and over these Love and Strife are both active. Lines 4–5 give the working of Love, and 6–9 of Strife. Some individual mixtures can



still be combined, and Love makes them similar to each other so that they want to come together; others, however, are incapable of such unions, and since they cannot come together as wholes, nor can their separate parts join with "their own dear kind" (cf. fr. 100(110).9), they have a wretched existence as a result of Strife's activity. The reference here is to *thnēta* in general, with the particular application to the different forms of life in the following fragment.

2 ἡλέκτωρ . . . θάλασσα: in apposition to the subject ταῦτα πάντα. The discernible masses of the four roots are friendly with the parts of themselves (μέρεσσιν as the antecedent to ὅσσα) that make up the constituent portions of mortal things, for they have the same characteristics and are of the same family. With ἄρθμα here cf. ποθέοντα and φέλην γένναν in 100(110). 9, and of fire θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἰκέσθαι, 53(62).6.

3 φιν: the pronoun, despite the Doric form, is probably not to be emended (e.g., to νῦν as by Stein) but to be taken generally—"the parts) which have strayed, as far as they (the subjects in line 2) are concerned, and have been cut off and born in mortal things . . ."

4 ὥς δ' αὐτως: one or more lines which would make the comparison more specific may have been lost between 3 and 4, but the point is that, as with the four roots, the cosmic behavior of Love and Strife is the same as that experienced now. ὅσα refers back to ὅσσα and μέρεσσιν—"as many (separated parts) as are better adapted for mixing (κρήσει would be preferable to κρήσιν) are made like by Aphrodite (cf. 60(71).4) and are desired by one another." There are two processes in this outline: (1) Aphrodite brings separate parts of roots into mixtures where suitable proportions are available (cf. 48(96).4), and (2) the mixtures combine as the result of the same form of attraction that brings about sexual union. The details of "molding," "gluing," and "nailing" of the parts into wholes are given later, cf. frs. 60–87, especially 60(71), 62(73), and 86(87).

6 ἔχθρὰ μάλιστ' ὅσα πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι: my conjecture for the Simplicius line ἔχθρα πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι μάλιστα. μάλιστα is not given by Theophrastus, who starts his direct quotation with πλεῖστον. Diels's addition (from Panzerbieter) of <δ' ἄ> is harsh and leaves πλεῖστον unconnected with ἔχθρα. ἔχθρα πλεῖστον is metrically unpleasing, despite O'Brien's defense of it, *ECC* p. 310. A contrast is obviously needed between what can be mixed and is brought together by Love, and what cannot and is kept apart in enmity by Strife.

7 γέννη . . . ἐκμακτοῖσι: Theophrastus refers the line to an explanation of pain by the interaction of opposites (whereas pleasure is explained



by an interaction of likes); this would seem to involve the theory of pores, since there can be no mixing where the pores do not fit (cf. the commentary on 77[109]). But even if he has taken lines 6–7 out of context there is still support for their reference, namely collections of parts of different roots that cannot come easily, if at all, into further combinations. They are incompatible because of the way they are (*γέννη*), the lack of proportion in their composition (*κρήσει*), and their shape. Like mixtures are brought together by Love, unlike ones stay separate; detailed references to what can and cannot mix come later. As well as the implications for sensation and knowledge, lines 6–8 provide a framework of medical relevance for the structure of living things, cf. *Reg.* 1.6.29 *προσίζει τὸ σύμφορον τῷ συμφόρῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀσύμφορον πολεμεῖ καὶ μάχεται καὶ διαλλάσσει ἀπ' ἀλλήλων*.

9: *νεικεογεννέστησιν* is impossible as it stands. Karsten, after Scaliger, suggests *νεικεογεννητῆσι* from *νεικεογενέσι* in the Simplicius context. The sense would be passive—"strife-generated"—and preferable to the Panzerbieter-Diels *νείκεος ἐννεσίησιν*, which brings in a new notion, unknown to Simplicius' paraphrase. My suggestion *ὅτι σφισι γένναι ἐν ὀργῇ* to resolve the corruption at the end of the line would give E.'s own explanation for the unusual *νεικεογεννητῆσιν*. The grief and anger at being generated in a world of increasing strife are personalized in the *Katharmoi*, cf. 112(118), 114(124), and 123(145).

## 26(20)

*This is well known in the mass of mortal limbs: at one time, in the maturity of a vigorous life, all the limbs that are the body's portion come into one under love; at another time again, torn asunder by evil strifes, they wander, each apart, on the shore of life. So it is too for plants, and for fish that live in the water, and for wild animals who have their lairs in the hills, and for the wing-spied gulls.*

The fragment is given only by Simplicius to show how Love and Strife prevail in turn among men and other living organisms. The lines have been variously interpreted as referring, for example, to sexual intercourse (Kranz), health and sickness (Bignone), life in the womb (Panzerbieter), the "fantastic situation" of 50 (57).1–3 (Guthrie), and a hypothetical "third stage of increasing Strife" (O'Brien). But, as Stokes observes (*One and Many* p. 165), E. is using something *conspicuous* among men as an illustration of what is less obvious. So far in the poem E. has given an outline of the nature of the roots, the way in which they all unite under

Love and move apart under Strife, and their mixing and separating in the seeming birth and death of *thnēta*. We then have a more detailed account of the many in separation, their coming into one in the sphere, and the breakup of the sphere into many, with the subsequent emergence of the visible masses of sun, earth, sky, and sea. This large-scale uniting and separating can be illustrated by what is familiar among men, plants, fish, animals, and birds. E. continues with some meteorological details and then in 47(35) picks up the question of living things in general; in the many-to-one stage limbs and monsters arise initially, and in 53(62) we have the origins of man in the present movement of one to many. In this context what is familiar and conspicuous among living organisms, and an illustration of uniting and separating on a larger scale, is of course birth and growth, and death, or as E. prefers to put it, parts coming together into a *σῶμα* and subsequently disintegrating. Fragment 26(20) is a fuller explanation (as Love and Strife are now seen to be involved), in more poetical terms, of 12(8), where it was said that there is no birth or death for *thnēta*, ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μετέντων.

1 τοῦτο: so Diels for τοῦτον. The reference would be to a more general statement of the activity of Love and Strife—possibly that given in the previous fragment—which is illustrated by something “outstanding” or “well known” in the body.

3 τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε: what is well known is that the limbs which the body had and now holds as its portion (for the perfect cf. 93(102).1, 107(115).5) are at one time coordinated and vigorous in the prime of life (which E. explains as due to Love) but at another lose their strength, wither, and decay.

4 κακῆσι . . . ἐρίδεσσι: a variant of νεῖκος οὐλόμενον, for the specific manifestations of strife among men in war and disease.

5 περὶ ῥηγμῖνι βίοιο: cf. *Il.* 1.437, 8.501. The seashore is the border line between land and sea, and the shore of life would be a border line too, that between life and death, where one hovers when sick, or old, or wounded. The violence implicit in ῥηγμῖνι (cf. ῥήγνυμι) repeats that of the previous line, and there may be a link with ῥέω. E. perhaps wishes to cover both the loss of limbs in battle and the wasting of the body in illness as physical consequences of Strife's disruption, cf. σήψεις ἔργα τε ῥευστά related to Strife and the joyless land in 113(121), and also Plato *Tim.* 84c τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως ἐξ ἀνάγκης ρυείσης (quoted by Big-none, p. 410). The separate limbs of 50(57) are not relevant here in the illustration of the less by the more obvious. Too much stress need not be



laid on *πλάζεται* in line 5 in a passage already rich in metaphor (cf. Stokes *One and Many* p. 166 and also Parmenides fr. 16.1); the word implies isolation and insecurity as well as physical movement.

6-7: plants (more literally "bushes"), fish, animals, and birds complete the list of the forms of life affected, like men, by Love and Strife, and like them, strong and flourishing at one time, withering, disintegrating, and dying at another. The lines connect with the *Katharmoi* (1) when E. gives a sense in which he has experienced life as a *thamnos*, bird, and fish in 108(117), and (2) in the exhortation to refrain from violating plant and animal life (frs. 124-29), which would promote Strife's disintegration of wholes. The recall of this list at 13(9) is support for line 5 here referring to the *διάλλαξις* of the roots (*εὔτε δ' ἀποκρινθῶσι*, 13(19).4) at the time of so-called death.

7 *κύμβαις*: the species of bird is probably not significant (e.g., as moving between sky and sea, so Bollack *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 107); the gull, a "headfirst diver" (if that is the sense from *κύβη*) is the most obvious form of bird life in a harbor town.

## 27(38)

*Come now, I shall tell you from what sources, in the beginning, the sun and all those others which we now see became distinct—earth and swelling sea, moist air, and Titan sky, whose circle binds all things fast.*

Clement quotes the lines with approval for showing *aithēr* as a containing and binding principle. In the context of E.'s poem the fragment obviously marks a transition to a new section. After the identification of the visible elemental masses with the four roots in the previous two fragments, frs. 27-46 give details of how these masses came to have their present form and position in the cosmogony brought about by Strife's activity. Then, with 47(35), E. breaks off and returns to the many-to-one stage for the beginning of his account of *thnēta*.

1: Clement's text is defective, and *ἥλιον* is probably out of position, for the sun cannot be the source of the other elements that are equal to it. Sturz and Karsten suggest a lacuna after the first line where the other three roots would have been listed, but this is unduly repetitive; and Diels's *ἥλικα* as a substantive is an unsatisfactory guess. Hence my conjecture, with the addition of something like *<τᾶλλα τε>*.

4 *Τιτάν αἰθήρ*: *αἰθήρ* and *ἄήρ* are both used for air, cf. the commen-



tary on 31(37), 83(98), and the list of terms for the roots in chap. 2. The terms are used here in a cosmogonical context for the two obvious divisions of air—the mist close to the earth's surface, and the bright sky above, seen as the encircling οὐρανός, containing and confining the world within itself (cf. 25(22).2 for οὐρανός as air; also ὁ κύκλος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Hdt. 1.131). The air has been hardened or “frozen” by the fire that is now running beneath it, an idea probably going back to Anaximenes, cf. Aetius 2.11.12, 14.3, and the doxography at DK 31 A51. There is no reason to suppose, as does O'Brien, *ECC* pp. 291–92, that E. is so confused as to use *aithēr* for a mixture of two elements. Although Titan may later have been related to the sun (but I argued that “Titania astra,” Vergil *Aen.* 6.725, is probably the sun and stars, *PVS* 1964, pp. 27–28), here the connotations for air are the vast size and strength of an Atlas, needed to hold fast the cosmos.

## 28(51)

*swiftly upward*

Eustathius says that the words in E. refer to fire. There is also the reference to fire in *Et. M.* 311d with the spelling ἀνόπεαν, and the definition is οἱ μὲν ἀφανῆ, τινὲς δὲ τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι. In Homer, *Od.* 1.320, ἀνόπαια in ὄρνυς δ' ὧς ἀνόπαια διέπτατο is the hole in the roof to which the smoke from the fire ascends, cf. F. H. Witton *AJP* 1958, pp. 414–15. If the reference is to fire in E., it would apply to the first movements of fire under Strife, when the parts of the roots begin to separate out and to move away from the center. Some air and fire were separated first, then the sea was sweated out from the earth, and the misty layer of air settled around the earth, cf. Aetius 2.6.3, Simplicius in *Cael.* 528.21–24, [Plut.] *Strom.* 10, Philo *prov.* 2.60.

## 29(53)

*for it chanced to be running in this way then, but often in other ways*

The line is quoted twice by Aristotle and is also in the commentators. The subject is air, called by Aristotle with reference to E. both αἰθήρ and ἀήρ, and the context is the κοσμοποιία, when Strife begins to separate the roots, διέκρινε μὲν γὰρ τὸ νεῖκος, ἡνέχθη δ' ἄνω ὁ αἰθήρ, *GC* 334a1. Aristotle's complaint is that air does not act systematically. Strife is directly responsible for the initial separating, but then τύχη seems to take over.

At one time air goes upward, at another fire, and air moves downward (as in the next fragment) and, presumably from ἄλλως, in other directions too. Despite his criticism, Aristotle provides support for the present continuation of the separation, indicated in 31(37) and 32(52). On the disorder following the initial separating, cf. Tzetzes *ex. Il.* 42.17 (DK 31 A66): ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ πυρὸς ὑπερνικῶντος καὶ καταφλέγοντος, ὅτε δὲ τῆς ὕδατος ὑπερβλυσούσης καὶ κατακλυζούσης ἐπιρροῆς.

### 30(54)

(Air) with deep roots sank down over the earth.

Aristotle gives the fragment in the same context as the previous one. Sometimes air moves up, but at times fire does, cf. 53(62).6, and air moves down and covers the surface of the earth as mist. (κατά with the accusative is "on," "over," "throughout," rather than "down into," cf. LSJ s.v. κατά B.I.2.) According to Aristotle, E. says that the cosmos is ἐπὶ τοῦ νείκουσ νῦν as πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας, but Aristotle finds no precise explanation for the cause of motion. It would seem that E. (1) gave a general account of the beginning of movement brought about by Strife, as at 23(30) and 24(31), and then, (2) in explaining the formation of the visible masses, showed that the general tendency of the roots was to move to their own kind, cf. the next fragment; Aristotle's complaint is that a logical connection between (1) and (2) is required. The present state of affairs, until the movement of the roots is completed, Aristotle can ascribe only to chance. The vocabulary of the fragment recalls Hesiod *Erga* 19; cf. the commentary on 33(39).

### 31(37)

Earth increases its own bulk, and air increases air.

The continuing collection of parts of fire, earth, air (and presumably water) into distinctive masses as described by E. is, for Aristotle, not a true αὐξήσις (which involves a complete merging) but a *prosthesis* of the parts. The increase of the bulk of earth is due to the natural tendency of the roots, i.e., the way they act of their own accord, when not kept together by Aphrodite riveting, gluing, or nailing them. An ordered arrangement of parts is the result, in nature, of constraint applied to the material by

Aphrodite, and in the case of man a disciplined mental effort is needed, cf. 100(110).1–9. Lucretius takes up the wording of the fragment in 2.1114–15. The line and its context is one of many counterexamples to O'Brien's explanation that *aithēr* for E. is always a mixture of fire and air, *ECC* pp. 291–92.

### 32(52)

*And many fires burn beneath the surface of the earth.*

Like 29(53), the fragment shows that the separation of the elements into four masses is not yet complete. All the fire has not yet gone “upward,” but some still remains within the earth. Earlier, after the separation of the sea, fire in the earth warmed some of the remaining water to produce hot springs; it hardened parts of earth into rock and, as some of it moved up, produced trees, and then men and women, cf. [Arist.] *probl.* 937a11, Plutarch *de prim. frig.* 953e, Seneca *QNat* 3.24.1, Aetius 5.26.4, and the commentary on 53(62).1–2. The evidence for fire in the earth was at hand in the volcanic areas of Sicily and southern Italy, with Etna as a prime example.

### 33(39)

*If the depths of earth, and extensive air, are without limit, as has come foolishly from the tongue of the mouths of many who have seen but a little of the whole*

The fragment contains a criticism of the simplistic but understandable view that the sky stretches upward and the earth downward indefinitely, cf. *ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν* *Il.* 7.446, *Od.* 1.98, Hesiod *Theog.* 187, and, on the depths of Tartarus *Theog.* 807; as in 1(2).1–6, however, E. has little sympathy with the limited scope of popular beliefs. Clement quotes the last two lines in a criticism of general ignorance about the nature of divinity, but Aristotle and *MXG* refer the three lines specifically to Xenophanes, and Aristotle complains of Xenophanes' laziness in positing a bottomless earth to save himself from having to think of a reason for its staying still. Simplicius did not know of a relevant passage from Xenophanes, but from Achilles *Isag.* 4.34.11 we have fr. 28, where it is said that the earth has an upper limit at our feet—*τὸ κάτω δ' ἐς ἀπειρον ἱκνεῖται*. For E. the amount of earth, as of fire, air, and water, is limited;



from his explanation of eclipses, and of the earth being held still by the rotation of the sky, it is clear that he envisaged it as spherical, cf. 41(42), 42(48), Aristotle *Cael.* 295a17, 300b3, *κυκλοτερής* at Aetius 2.20.13, and the explanation of tropic circles, 2.23.3.

1: *δαφιλός* is a form of *δαφιλής* unique to E.

2: *γλώσσης ἐλθόντα* is more likely to have been displaced by *βροτέων ῥηθέντα* than the other way around.

### 34(40)

*sharp-arrowed sun and kindly moon*

The line is quoted by Plutarch as a pleasing distinction made by E. between the sun and the moon. After the separating of the roots into distinguishable masses, E., in the Presocratic tradition, gives an account of the sun and the moon. *ἡέλιος ὠκέα γυῖα* in 21(27) is some support for *ὄξυμελής*, but the contrast with the moon is not so obvious. *ὄξυβελής* is more appropriate and means “sharp-arrowed” rather than “sharp-shooting,” cf. “sharp-pointed” for the hedgehog, 72(83).2. The form *ἰλάειρος*, if the emendation is correct, is found only in E.; it occurs again in 84(85) of *φλόξ* for, probably, the fire in the eye. There the first two syllables are short, as one would expect from *ἰλαρός* (but *ἰλαός* at *Il.* 1.583). Rather than a change of quantity here I suspect a half-foot lacuna before *ἡδ’*, or the two phrases may come from different lines. The meaning of *ἰλάειρα* would seem to be both “kindly” and “pleasant” (cf. Plutarch’s *ἄλυπον*), in contrast, in a Mediterranean climate, to the sun’s harshness.

### 35(41)

*but (the sun), after being collected together, moves round the great sky*

For Macrobius *ἀμφοπολεύει* is, exceptionally, equivalent to *περιπολεῖ*, and the subject is the sun, explained as a collection of parts of fire. The uncompounded *ἀλίζειν* is used for people, especially soldiers, assembling, and here metaphorically for the parts of fire coming together to form the sun. One would expect a complementary description of the moon to follow with *ἡ δέ*. For E.’s sun as fire, cf. *πυρὸς ἄθροισμα μέγα* D.L. 8.77, and Aetius 2.6.3. On the *Stromateis* notice that the *physis* of the sun is not fire, cf. the next fragment.

## 36(44)

*he shines back to Olympus with fearless face*

Ὀλυμπος is used in the sense of the extreme limit of the sky (as in Parmenides fr. 11), which E. sees in the *Katharmoi* as the home of the gods. Beneath it are air and fire. Plutarch quotes this line in the context of a seemingly absurd explanation of the sun as an *anaklasis* of the light of the sky.

The surface of the sun facing the sky draws to itself parts of the fire in it, on the principle (1) of parts of the same element being primitively aware of each other and coming together (cf. on 100(110).9), and (2) of a convex surface attracting light. Now the shape of the moon for E., according to Plutarch, is φακοειδές, "lentiform" (*Qu. Rom.* 288b, DK 31 A60), and the comparison with a common object is typical of E. Aristotle, *Cael.* 287a20, uses φακοειδές, along with σφαιροειδές and ῥοειδές, as a standard shape, and the Latin word directly relates the lentil seed to the form of a lens, i.e., disc-shaped from the front view but an elongated double convex from the side (cf. *Enc. Brit.* 13th ed., *Gray's Manual of Botany* 1970, and *OED* s.v. lentil). No notice is extant on the shape of the sun for E., but I suspect it was lentiform too, larger than the moon (cf. 37[47]), with a diameter equal to that of the earth (Aet. 2.21.2). From E.'s known interest in reflections and the movement of light (cf. Arist. *De An.* 418b20, *Sens.* 446a26) and the knowledge of convex refraction at the time (cf. Theophrastus *Ign.* 73), this fragment, taken with 35(41) and 43(49), can perhaps be interpreted on the following lines. The lentiform sun moves round the spherical earth, and as it does so it attracts the fire from the *ouranos* into its upper convex surface, and then, through the lower surface, it transmits heat and light to the earth below. At night, when the sun travels under the earth, the bulk of the earth itself blocks off the light from our part of the earth's surface.

There is, however, a different account, found only in Aetius and the *Stromateis* (Aet. 2.20.13, Eus. *PE* 1.8.10 [DK 31 A56 and 30]), but adopted and elaborated in modern commentators (cf., for example, the extraordinary diagrams in Bollack, vol. 1, pp. 188–89, vol. 3, pp. 259, 270, 291, 299). It is a strange theory of two rotating suns, the one being the apparent sun, the other a semicosmos filled with fire, corresponding to a semicosmos of air mixed with a little fire (which was supposed to explain night). Thankfully this absurdity can be discarded: (1) it conflicts with the fragments, for (a) fr. 36(44) does not fit it on any acceptable sense of Olympus, (b) fr. 42(48) offers a reasonable and quite different explana-

tion of night, and (c) all the sun fragments refer quite clearly to the sun we know; (2) there is no trace of such a theory elsewhere—if it were genuine one would have expected some comment from Aristotle, the commentators, or Plutarch; (3) it is at variance with the main lines of Presocratic cosmology and the Greek tradition generally (and indeed what could E. have said that could be summarized in such anachronistic language as Aet. 2.20.13?); (4) it is inherently absurd and contradicted by the simplest observation; and (5) confusions have often crept into the doxography by the time of Aetius and the *Stromateis*. E. may have spoken of something like “half of the sun, which is like a lentil in shape, collecting fire,” which was incorrectly summarized as a hemisphere of fire and then taken as a hemisphere of the cosmos filled with fire.

### 37(47)

*she contemplates the bright circle of her lord facing her.*

The line is quoted for the form ἀγής, compounded in ἐθαγής. This means “bright,” “brilliant,” for the sun at Parmenides fr. 10, and so it does here, rather than “pure,” “holy,” although the aural ambiguity is probably deliberate, cf. μόνιη 21(27). No subject is given for this line, but the moon is obviously appropriate, cf. Parmenides again, fr. 15.

### 38(43)

*as the ray, after striking the broad circle of the moon*

The moon shines because it reflects the sun’s light. The discovery is attributed to Thales at Aetius 2.28.5 and is said to have been adopted by Pythagoras, Parmenides, E., and Anaxagoras. Plato names Anaxagoras in this context (*Cra.* 409b), and Plutarch both Anaxagoras and E., *fac. lun.* 929b and d, and cf. the next fragment. When the moon is struck on its convex surface by the sun’s rays it collects the light, but since it is νεφευδής and made of compressed air it does not refract it; thus we see only a pale reflection of the sun, without its heat and brightness, cf. Plutarch’s context here, and also Aetius 2.25.15.

### 39(45)

*a circle of borrowed light moves swiftly round the earth*



ἀλλότριον φῶς is Parmenides' adaptation of the Homeric phrase, cf. *Il.* 5.214, *Od.* 18.219, Parmenides fr. 14. The Homeric sense is "a man from somewhere else," and Parmenides, "a light from somewhere else." There can be no doubt that Parmenides, and E. after him, assumed that the moon took its light from the sun. The recognition of this, and that the moon moves round the earth, are two basic advances in selenology.

#### 40(46)

*as the course of the chariot turns round and back, round the summit she*

The text of this fragment is corrupt, but from Plutarch's context E. is comparing the moon to a chariot in the closeness of its rotation round the earth. With the reading ὥς πέρι χυόῃ (which scans oddly), the simile refers to the nave of the chariot wheel scraping the post on the turn, but perhaps Plutarch's text can be kept. The sense then is that the course of the moon round the earth is as close as that of the chariot round the post. The chariot traces a semicircle as it turns, whereas the moon traces a full circle round the earth. The point is the closeness to the "top" of the earth's surface (ἡ ἄκρῃ) on the turn, not an elliptical-shaped course. From the context it looks as if E. related the phases of the moon, as well as lunar eclipses, to the extent to which the moon is overshadowed by the earth, but no further details are available. The distance of the moon from the earth is given as half that of the moon from the sun, Aetius 2.31.1.

#### 41(42)

*She dispersed his rays to earth from the upper side, and cast on the earth a shadow equal to the breadth of the silvery moon.*

Again the text is corrupt. ἀπεσκέυασε does not scan in the line, and the sense is strange. Diels's ἀπεστέγασεν keeps the meter, but "uncover" (cf. 91(100).14) is the opposite to what is required; ἀπεσκέδασε is preferable. καθύπερθεν: "from the upper side," cf. *Od.* 10.353; and †ἔσ τε αἶαν† probably contains a reference not to the earth, which comes in the second part of the line, but to the moon or sky—the substitution of something like ἐς αὐτήν would give the required sense. In an eclipse of the sun the moon is directly between the sun and the earth. This would mean, according to E., that the upper convexity of the moon dispersed the sun's rays in the sky, and the dark undersurface cast a shadow on the

earth equal to the moon's own breadth. The sun and the earth have the same diameter (Aet. 2.21.2), but the moon is smaller than both, and so it darkens only part of the earth. There is no need to suppose that E. influenced, or was influenced by, Anaxagoras in the explanation of eclipses. Their accounts are not the same (for Anaxagoras still seems to find a use for Anaximenes' "dark objects") and were probably reached independently. *γλαυκώπιδος*: Athena's epithet for the brightness of her eyes, and so here of the bright-faced or silvery moon (cf. LSJ s.v. *γλαυκός*); at 934d, when discussing the changing colors of the moon, Plutarch quotes E.'s *γλαυκῶπις* for bluish gray.

#### 42(48)

*and earth causes night by coming under the rays.*

E.'s understanding of the cause of night is authenticated by this line and is therefore preferable to the "hemisphere of air" theory in the doxographical transmission from Aetius, cf. the commentary on 36(44). As the sun goes under the earth, the imposition of the earth's bulk prevents its light from reaching our surface. It is tempting to assume that E. realized that this meant it was daytime then for the antipodes. In his astronomical observations E. may have used a measuring device such as the one described by Plutarch here.

#### 43(49)

*of desolate, blind-eyed night*

When the sun is beneath the earth the air on our surface is dark. The night is *ἀλαῶπις* because it is without the eye of the sun (cf. the Cyclops, *Od.* 9.516), and *ἐρημός* because of the sense of vastness and solitude.

#### 44(50)

*and Iris brings wind or heavy rain from the sea.*

Tzetzes is not certain about the attribution of the verse to E., because, as he goes on to say, he has only a summary and not the text. The line does not appear in the early editors, nor now in Bollack. The succession of dactyls is unpleasing and the meaning is not immediately clear. Wind

is not usually associated with Iris, and as Zeus' messenger, and the bridge between Olympus and earth, she comes with rain not from the sea but from a bright sky. Here there may be a conflation with the more sophisticated view of moisture being drawn up from the sea, blown onto land, and then descending as rain, with the rainbow then linking the three areas of sea, air, and earth.

#### 45(56)

*salt was crystallized under pressure from the rays of the sun.*

The line is quoted as an example of lengthening in *thesis* (i.e., ἄλς for ἄλς). With the aorist ἐπάρη it may come in the context of the early formation of the world, when salt was crystallized by the sun in much the same way as parts of earth were hardened into rock by the fire in it, cf. the commentary on 32(52) and 46(55). Kypris makes use of the hardening properties of fire, 62(73).

#### 46(55)

*sea, sweat of earth*

The kind of analogy in 71(82) is here used on a larger scale. Men perspire as the result of intense activity in the sun; in the same way, the salt water commenced to exude from the earth as it was put under pressure by the initial cosmic rotation and also heated by the sun, cf. Aetius 2.6.3, 3.16.3, and Lucretius 5.488. Aristotle dismisses this as poetic metaphor and an inadequate explanation for the saltiness of the sea. Fresh water in the sea that provides nourishment for fish (cf. Aelian *NA* 9.64) may be explained by 45(56): continued action by the sun crystallizes out some of the salt, leaving that part of the water salt free.

FRAGMENTS 47–52 MANY TO ONE AND INDIVIDUAL  
LIFE: LIMBS AND MONSTERS

#### 47(35)

*But I shall turn back to the path of song I traced before, leading off from one argument this argument: when strife had reached the lowest depth of the whirl and*



love comes into the center of the eddy, in her then all these things unite to be one only; not immediately, but coming together from different directions at will. And, as they were being mixed, countless types of mortal things poured forth, but many, which strife still restrained from above, stayed unmixed, alternating with those which were combining, for it had not yet perfectly and completely stood out as far as the furthest limits of the circle, but part remained within and part had gone out of the frame. And, in proportion as it continually ran on ahead, a mild, immortal onrush of perfect love was continually pursuing it. Immediately what were formerly accustomed to be immortal became mortal, and formerly unmixed things were in a mixed state, owing to the exchanging of their ways. And, as they were being mixed, countless types of mortal things poured forth, fitted with all kinds of forms, a wonder to see.

This is one of the most important fragments for an understanding of E., and it is to be taken closely with 8(17) and 16(26). Fragment 16(26) contains the *logos* from which E. is going to draw off this new one (cf. his method at 18(24).1); there E. picked up from 8(17) the main cosmic movements of many to one under Love, and one to many under Strife. This was followed through from 19(27) to 24(31). Then, in 25(22) and 26(20), the characteristics of the four roots and of Love and Strife as experienced by men were shown to be consistent with them in their cosmic role. The main points of the cosmogony of our world followed, as the four roots, the many, separate out from their unity.

The first stages of ἀλλοτε δ' αὖ διχ' ἑκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει have been explained, and in this fragment we go back to ἀλλοτε μὲν φιλότῃτι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓνα κόσμον for further details, cf. 16(26).5-6, 8(17).7-8, and Simplicius in *Cael.* 587 (which gives lines 10-13 here as an explanation of line 5, itself a rewording of 16(26).5). The details, however, are few, as Aristotle complained, *Cael.* 301a14. There was perhaps little more than the general description of the rise of *thnēta* given in this fragment, and of the formation of single limbs and monsters. Mythical creatures are firmly put in an era other than our own, and this is confirmed by Simplicius, in *Cael.* 587, who relates 50(57) and 51(59) to the same *katastasis* as 35(47).5 and 10-13.

2 ἐξοχετεύων: "drawing off" of water into channels, and here of a minor theme from the main topic of the explanation of our present world. There are a number of unusual words in this fragment as a whole, which have caused confusion in the MSS tradition.

3-4: the δίνη and the στροφάλιγξ must both refer to the cosmic rota-

tion started at the separation of the four masses, cf. Aristotle *Cael.* 295a17, Simplicius in *Cael.* 528.20, Aetius 2.6.3. Strife has reached the “undermost depth” of the whirl in the sense that it has control of the whole rotation to the center. Earth, air, fire, and water at this stage are immortal (i.e., not made up into mortal things) and unmixed, cf. lines 14–15; and the cosmos as we know it has passed away, cf. Aetius 2.4.8, *Ἐ. τὸν κόσμον φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀντεπικράτειαν τοῦ νείκους καὶ τῆς φιλίας*, and Simplicius in *Cael.* 293.18. Then, and the metaphor is probably military, Love strikes at the center from her position at the *ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου* and gradually consolidates her hold on the field from there, compelling Strife in turn to make a gradual retreat. With *γένηται* Love could not already be at the center (pushed there by Strife, as is assumed by Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 179, O’Brien *ECC* p. 117, and others) if she comes to be there. The subjunctive is probably acceptable for the recurring event, as Simplicius gives in his paraphrase—*ὅταν γένηται*. I would maintain that Love stays at the *ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου* during the increase of Strife, i.e., that at the extreme circumference there is a band of elements in the state of perfect mixture that was enjoyed in the sphere, that this is regarded also as the abode of the gods, and that to it human thought in its best condition is related. In Aetius this area—the subtraction of *ὁ κόσμος* from *τὸ πᾶν*—is called *ἀργὴ ὕλη* (1.5.2; cf. Aristotle on the existence of the divine, outside space and time, at the circumference of the world, *Cael.* 1.9; and also chap. 3).

5–6: a more elaborate version of what it means for the many to come into one, outlined at 8(17).7, 16(26).5, 26(20).2, and cf. the commentary on 20(36).1. There is a contrast here between *ἄφαρ* and *θελημά* (or *ἐθελημά*); Love does not gain the whole territory in one swoop, but “volunteers” come to join from different parts.

7: cf. the commentary on 20(36); there is no need to substitute that line for line 7 here, despite the repetition at line 16; such a repetition, of the details after the outline, is in E.’s style.

8–9: with *ἔστηκε*, *ἄμ(ε)ιχθ’* would be needed, and the tense sequence is awkward but not impossible, cf. *ἔξέστηκεν* in line 10; perhaps the MSS *ἔστηκε* as an imperfect of *στήκειν* can be accepted, as it is by Diels-Kranz, Bollack, and Solmsen. *μετάρσιον*: a description of Strife as acting “from above” rather than “in suspense” (Guthrie’s translation). Strife puts up a dogged resistance and, while Love is bringing the roots together, is able to keep parts of them separate even as it retreats.

10 *ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου*: cf. 20(36) *ἐξ ἔσχατον ἵστατο νεῖκος*, referring to the outer edge of the circumference, to which Strife retreats



when the many come into one, and which is now Love's last area during the separation into many; cf. the commentary on lines 3-4. Aristotle is continuing the Presocratic tradition, of which E. is firmly a part, by describing the region in both physical and theological terms, *Cael.* 1.9.

11: μελέων with ἐξεβεβήκει for the parts, or frame, of the universe, as in 23(30).1, and cf. 24(31). Strife has control over some parts of the elemental masses, and elsewhere it has given up territory before the advance of Love.

13 ὀρμή: the word does not give increased material status to Love and should not be translated "stream" (cf. LSJ s.v.). The language is metaphorical, of the pursuer and the pursued, and the emphasis is on the effect for the four roots of the tussle between being held separate and being brought together. ἡπιόφρων, "gentle-thinking," "mild" (perhaps a coinage by E.), and ἄμβροτος are transferred from Philotēs, who is also ἀμεμψής, "perfect," "without reproach." ἀμεμψέως in line 9, however, of Strife's movement, is closer to "perfectly," in the nonmoral sense of "completely."

15 ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο: for the reading, and for the sense of ζωρός as "unmixed," cf. my note in *CR* 1962, pp. 109-11; the objections raised by O'Brien, *CR* 1965, pp. 1-4, West, *CR* 1966, p. 136, and Solmsen, *CR* 1967, pp. 245-46, I find unconvincing.

16-17: the immortal and unmixed roots take on a variety of forms as they mix with each other under the increasing power of Love. Although the language of these lines could well refer to the many wondrous kinds of life around us, and 16(26).4-5 seems to imply a race of men arising as the many come into one, I do not think that E. described a world under increasing Love that is identical to the present one. He found in this part of his scheme a means of relegating to another era the hybrid creatures of myth and alien religion. At 53(62) he returns from his digression to the exposition of our world, which was left at 46(55), and describes the rise of human life after the cosmogony. Fragment 51(59) shows that the strange creatures arose as the roots were coming closer and closer together, whereas πῦρ κρινόμενον at 53(62).2 gives the generation of men and women when fire is separating out of the mixture.

#### 48(96)

*And the kindly earth received into its broad hollows of the eight parts two of the brightness of Nestis and four of Hephaistos; and these came to be white bones, marvelously held together by the gluing of Harmony.*



The first three lines are quoted approvingly by Aristotle for showing that it is not the elements of which something is made that give it its character, but the *logos* of their combination. This understanding of explanation by form is elaborated by the commentators, and in a similar context in the *De Anima* Philoponus and Simplicius see Pythagorean influence. In his commentary in *in Phys.* Simplicius quotes the four lines and says that they come from the first book of E.'s *Physika*. The fragment therefore belongs before 53(62), which is from the second book. In the first book this would seem to be the most suitable place for the fragment—after 47(35) as giving a detail of the formation of ἔθνεα μωρία θνητῶν (and ἀρηρότα is repeated from line 17), and before the description of the individual limbs. The fragment is similar to 83(98), but because E. connects blood with human thought, 83(98) would seem to go better with the physiological fragments relating to life as we know it.

1 ἐπίηρος: the masculine is not found elsewhere. It is glossed by Simplicius as ἐναρμόνιος, with χάνα as ἐν ὅς ἡ τῶν μινυμένων γίνεται κρᾶσις (cf. *in de An.* 68.2–10 with *Il.* 18.470 quoted). The earth is the receptacle and also provides one quarter of the material. εὐστέρος (ἄπ. λεγ.), like εὐρύστερος, is appropriate for mother earth, but the epithet is somewhat infelicitously transferred. There is an alternative, easier, reading, εὐτύκτοις “well-made,” but it is unsuitable for holes in the earth.

2 τῶ: Steinhart's suggestion for τῶν (the majority), τάς, and τὰ of the MSS. The neuter in line 3 makes the reading τὰς δύο τῶν μοίρων difficult, and E. does not use μοῖρα elsewhere. λάχε: similar to συνέκρυσσε at 83(98).1, and probably the basis for Aristotle's question whether Love is the cause of any chance mixture or only of mixture κατὰ λόγον (*De An.* 408a21). Both seem to be involved—sections of the elements come together in the general many-to-one movement, and where the proportions are appropriate, Love makes an organic part. Νήσιδος αἷγλης: the commentators take the phrase as referring to both water and air, and give the *logos* of bone as 4 parts fire : 2 earth : 1 water : 1 air; the radiance or bright transparency in the meaning of αἷγλη can refer to water or air. Air is included in 83(98) as αἰθὴρ παμφανόνων, but the four elements, in almost equal proportion in the heart-blood, are needed there to explain the physical constitution of thought. There is no reason to suppose that all four are constituents of everything. Four parts fire : 2 earth : 2 water is a very simple *logos*, and it is unlikely that E. gave more intricate details of proportions than those for bone and blood, relying on the painting

simile, 15(23), as a general guide. (The structure of sinews and nails is given in Aetius 5.22.1, and hands and tongue are mentioned by Theophrastus, *Sens.* 11.) E.'s achievement is in the understanding of the principle of proportions of elements in the formation of organisms, rather than in any sophistication in the principle's development.

3 *ὅστέα λευκὰ γέγοντο*: the excess of fire in the proportion accounts for the dryness and whiteness of bones (cf. Simplicius, Philoponus, and Sophonias on *De An.* 409b21); the hard and brittle quality would also be accounted for, cf. the commentary on 62(73). Sinews, according to Aetius (5.22.1), have twice as much water as they do fire and earth, and when they are hardened by air in this proportion they become claws and nails. The phrasing here is an adaptation of Homer's *ὅστέα λευκὰ λέγοντο*, *Il.* 24.793; the separateness of the bones picked up is recalled in this fashioning of individual bones that are not yet part of an organic whole, cf. 50(57).

4 *ἀρμονίης*: a name for Philia, as Simplicius explains (and the reference is reinforced by the rare word *θεσπεσίηθεν*), the artisan of living forms and their parts, cf. 85(86), 86(87), 60(71), 62(73), 70(75). The "gluing" does not imply an additional ingredient, but water is worked into the earth and the compound hardened by the fire (cf. the next fragment). The technique is like that of Hephaistos or Prometheus, cf. Hesiod *Theog.* 571, *Erga* 60–61, Ovid *Met.* 1.80–83.

#### 49(34)

*when he had glued barley meal with water*

Aristotle quotes the fragment as an example of the mutual relationship between wet and dry ingredients, which bind each other, so that a compound body is formed from both. The words obviously belong in the context of the craftsmanship of Love in making living kinds, but the participle is masculine. I suggest that the fragment is part of a simile in which Love is compared to a baker, who kneads together wet and dry ingredients into a malleable dough, pats it into shape, and "gives it to fire to harden," cf. 62(73). It could well be an illustration of 48(96), with *κολλήσας* picking up the unusual *κόλλησιν*. On the other hand there is the faint possibility that the reading *ἐν τοῖς Περσικοῖς* in *probl.* 929b16 and *Mete.* MS E is correct, and that the fragment refers to the preparation of food on campaign.



## 50(57)

*Here many heads sprang up without necks, bare arms were wandering without shoulders, and eyes needing foreheads strayed singly.*

The heads, arms, and eyes in this extraordinary fragment seem to have been thought of as shooting up from the earth (as the result of the first mingling of the roots as they move from many to one) and then moving or floating aimlessly. Aristotle was interested enough to quote the first line three times: (1) as a mild joke with reference to the synthesis of truth and error, *De An.* 430a27; (2) as an additional problem in the discussion of combinations resulting from disordered movement, *Cael.* 300b25; and (3) in dismissing the notion of separate parts coming together, *GA* 722b17. Simplicius, on the *Cael.* passage, disagrees with Alexander's interpretation of the line as a *μίξεως παράδειγμα* on the grounds that the disordered movements belong with the many-to-one phase of 47(35).5. Philoponus (in *GA* 28 and in *de An.* 545) explains that at first Strife, not Love, was dominant, which is why the limbs were in isolated and disordered movement, and they would have continued so had Love not been able eventually to bring them together. Aristotle firmly puts line 1 *ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος* in the passages cited in *Cael.* and *GA*; in the same section in *Cael.* he states that E. did not give a cosmogony *ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος* (*Cael.* 301a16 and the context given at a10), and further, at *GA* 722b25, he contrasts the world then, *ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος*, with what is now the case. The evidence from Aristotle confirms the suggestion that E. used the many-to-one phase briefly, as a way of both accounting for, and dismissing from the present time, the hybrid creatures of myth.

1 ἢ μέν: "here," "on the earth," as at *GA* 722b25. *ἐβλάστησαν*: "sprang up," like shoots from the earth; the verb is used for the different forms of life at 14(21).10. This is the only known occurrence of *ἀναύχενες* in Greek.

2: arms are "bare" because they are not attached to shoulders (or to hands, for Philoponus adds *αἱ μεγάλαι χεῖρες* to the list of separate parts, and the phrase may conceal a direct quotation, in *GA* 28.3); cf. also *μουννομελῆς*, Simplicius in *Cael.* 587.18, discussed at 139(58), and the heads, hands, and feet at in *Phys.* 372.4.

3: the eyes are not in pairs or fixed in sockets; and there were further weird examples of single limbs—Simplicius adds *καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα* after this line. E. indulges himself in the exotic vocabulary but firmly removes



creatures like the Cyclops from the consideration of life as we know it by putting them, and the parts of which they are made, in a different era. For separate limbs and parts as Peak Cult offerings, cf. B. C. Dietrich *Hist.* 1969, pp. 259–60.

### 51(59)

*But as god mingled further with god they fell together as they chanced to meet each other, and many others in addition to these were continually arising.*

Simplicius sets the line in the same *katastasis* as 47(35).10–13; ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος is the time when Love is not yet dominant but is in the process of becoming so, and there are still τὰ ἄμικτα καὶ μονόγυια. Love and Strife are related as potential victor and vanquished. Although ἐμίσητο is used in Homer for hostile engagement (but, except for *Il.* 4.456, with further qualification to give to the verb a definitely hostile sense), in E. the verb is constantly used of the roots combining, and so producing a mortal compound, cf. 12(8).3, 13(9).1, 47(35).7 and 16, and also δεῖ ἀλλήλων θέοντα at 8(17).34, 14(21).13, 16(26).3. δαίμονι δαίμων therefore refers to the roots which are gods, cf. the commentary on 7(6). There is no conflict with the one other use of δαίμων, in the *Katharmoi* at 107(115).5, for there the δαίμονες in their physical aspect are to be seen as (perfect) combinations of their constituent earth, air, fire, and water, which are singly, and in perfect combination, “gods.” (The conclusion of O’Brien’s long discussion [*ECC* pp. 325–36] is that δαίμονι δαίμων here means “the pieces of Love in separate limbs [which] mix with one another.”)

2 ταῦτα: the subject is still the roots. They first cause the genesis of single limbs as their parts come together, and then, as they mingle further, combinations of limbs. ὅπη συνέκυρσεν ἑκαστα: the clause is quoted on its own by Simplicius, at *in Phys.* 327.19 with 29(53), and at *in Phys.* 331.2, to illustrate τύχη in E. The disorder of the roots here, when the many begin to come into one, is like that of their initial separation when the one is becoming many, cf. the commentary on 29(53). In both cases the disorder is temporarily controlled by Love in the production of *thnēta*.

3: ἐξεγένοντο with χθονός understood, cf. ἐξανέτελλον at 52(61).2 and 53(62).4, as well as ἐβλάστησαν in 50(57).

### 52(61)

*Many creatures with a face and breasts on both sides were produced, man-faced*

bulls arose and again bull-headed men, (others) with male and female nature combined, and the bodies they had were dark.

The four lines are given by Aelian in a brief context of E. speaking of composite creatures, with two forms in one body. βουγενῇ ἀνδρόπρωρα in line 2 became a well-known phrase for biform creatures, quoted twice by Aristotle, and then by Plutarch and the Aristotelian commentators.

1 ἐφύοντο: Karsten, followed by most editors, changed the infinitives here and in the next line to imperfects. A large number of strange creatures were continually being born and coming up from the earth (cf. the commentary on line 3 of the previous fragment), but from the contexts of 50(57) it seems they are also formed by combinations of the wandering single limbs; e.g., Aristotle, after quoting 50(57).1, adds ἐπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φιλή (‘E. ξφη), *De An.* 430a30. κόρσαι in 50(57).1 is more precisely the front half of the head or the temples (cf. *Il.* 4.502); if two of these meet, a Janus-like, double-faced head results, and this would be the sense of ἀμφιπρόσωπα. There are precedents for such creatures in myth. Otus and Ephialtes were punished in Tartarus by being tied back to back on either side of a column, and this composite figure, like Janus, seems to be connected with a calendar symbol. (Cf. Hyginus *fab.* 28, and Toepffer s.v. *Aloadai PW*; *Culex* 234 has the giants face to face, however. Plutarch uses ἀμφιπρόσωπος of Janus, *Num.* 19.6) Similarly the two-headed dog, Orthros-Sirius, regarded the old and the new year, and the three faces of Hecate at the crossroads looked in different directions. Multiple-headed creatures were familiar in the representations of Cerberus, Scylla, and Hydra, and cf. the three-headed serpent ἀμφιστρεφές, *Il.* 11.40. ἀμφίστερνα: the double Ephialtes-Otus figure has two sets of breasts as well as two faces, but E. may have in mind a creature similar to the triform Geryon, with two upper parts from one waist. For Aristophanes’ myth, cf. the commentary on line 3.

3 ἀνδροφυῇ βούκρανα: the Minotaur was the most famous example of the bull-headed man. Dionysus had the epithet βουγενής (Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 364f) and had representations with a bull’s head or horns, as did the river gods, in particular Achelous, who took on this form in his fight with Heracles (cf. ἀνδρείῳ κύτει βούπρωρος, Soph. *Trach.* 12–13); and there was Ἥρα βοῶπις and also Io. The bull-man biforms are exemplars of all the composite creatures from Greek mythology, such as Centaurs, Harpies, Erynnēs, and in particular from Hesiod’s *Theogony*, Echidne and her children, the Chimaera and Sphinx; there are similar hybrids in the religions of Egypt and Carthage. E. dismissed these creatures of myth



from the world as we know it and, while offering an explanation of their genesis, relegated them to a different era (as Plato later placed the non-reproducing earth-born men and animals in a different time cycle, in the *Politicus* myth, 271a-c).

It is an exaggeration to read Darwinism back into E. from the ancient comments on this line. Aristotle gives a counterargument to his own teleological principles when he says that some creatures have been preserved because they were put together ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου in an appropriate way—ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ ἼΕ. λέγει τὰ βουγενῇ ἀνδρόπρωρα (*Phys.* 198b29–32. ἀπόλλυται need not refer the quotation to the present; E.'s phrase is an example—from the past—of the general principle). To be consistent, E. should have extended his notion to plants and spoken of ἀμπελογενῇ ἐλαιόπρωρα, which is absurd. For Aristotle the mortality of the βουγενῇ ἀνδρόπρωρα would be explained by a corruption of the seed (*Phys.* 199b5–10). In E. we do not find an understanding of selection and mutation with divergence of parts of the species from the original stock, or new functions and organs developing out of old ones, with the passing on of heritable variations (except in the interesting case of the backbone being vertebrated because it had broken in the womb, cf. Aristotle *Part. An.* 640a19). Instead, there are the simpler recognitions that (1) for survival a species or “animal-kind” must be able to reproduce itself, and (2) it must have appropriate organic parts fulfilling mutual needs, cf. ἐγένετο ζῶα καὶ ἔμεινεν διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοις ἐκπληροῦν τὴν χρεῖαν and ὅσα μὴ κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον συνῆλθε λόγον, ἐφθάρη, Simplicius in *Phys.* 372.3–11. The Epicureans later countered this by denying the genesis of composite creatures in the first place, cf. Lucretius 5.878–924.

μεμγμένα: the participle brings in an additional set of creatures (listed, like βουγενῇ ἀνδρόπρωρα, without a connecting particle), rather than adding a further complication to the preceding ones. Androgynous forms belong with other hybrids in a different era from the present. The best known was Hermaphroditos, a private and public cult figure in the 4th century and probably earlier, cf. Theophrastus *Char.* 16.10, *Anth.* 2.102, 9.783; others include Agdistis and Phanes, and with a change of sex, Attis, Caeneus, and Teiresias. There are also the spherical creatures of Aristophanes' myth (Plato *Symp.* 189d–190a). One of their kinds was ἀνδρόγυνον; the name survives but the type has disappeared, explains Aristophanes. His creatures double up human forms and are then halved. There is no way of knowing whether the notion was first suggested by these lines of E., and then exaggerated and caricatured.



4 σκιεροῖς γυίοις: γυῖα is used in Homer and E., and generally, of the body as a whole. If the reading is correct, σκιεροῖς must refer to the color (cf. τὸ σκιερὸν μέλαν φαίνεται, of the sea's surface, [Arist.] *Col.* 791a23). The creatures here are dark colored or swarthy, in the same way as men are described as μέλανες at 58(67).2. The various emendations (cf. the *ap. crit.*) to give meanings like "warm," "sturdy," "lively," "sterile," or "hard" are unnecessary. All the creatures mentioned in this fragment pass away as the many come more and more into one, so Aristotle *Metaph.* 1000b12: in bringing the elements into one, Love destroys everything else.

FRAGMENTS 53-72 ONE TO MANY AND INDIVIDUAL  
LIFE: HUMANS, ANIMALS, AND PLANTS

53(62)

*And now hear this—how fire, as it was being separated, brought up by night the shoots of men and pitiable women, for the account is to the point and well informed. First, whole-nature forms, having a share of both water and heat, sprang up from the earth; fire, as it tended to reach its like, kept sending them up, when they did not as yet show the lovely shape of limbs, or voice or language native to man.*

Simplicius quotes the fragment from the second book of the *Physics*, which, *contra* the DK ordering, obviously puts it after 48(96) of the first book. It has the appearance of a fresh start, emphasized by the request for particular attention, and after the digression on the many-to-one stage (with which frs. 47(35)–52(61) are concerned), it goes back to the present one-to-many separation to give the account of the rise of human life following the cosmogony. κρινόμενον πῦρ, which initiates this stage, is the antithesis of ἐπεὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων of 51(59).1, which produced the mythical creatures of the other era. That the present time is fundamentally an unhappy one is indicated here by πολυκλαύτων, as it is by other expressions in the *Katharmoi* fragments 112(118), 114(124), and 123(145). Hesiodic pessimism is given a philosophical basis in the view of life increasingly dominated by a separative principle.

1 πολυκλαύτων: the passive sense "much-lamented," and so "pitiable," is earlier and more appropriate here than the active "tearful," cf. Aeschylus *Pers.* 674, Euripides *Ion* 869, and the passive πολὺκλήτος, *Il.* 4.438, 10.420.

2 ἐννυχίους: "by night," but also of the dead (cf. Soph. *OC* 1558), as ἀνήγαγε of bringing up from the dead (and cf. Hes. *Theog.* 626). The origin of human life, like the abode of the dead, is shrouded in darkness. The darkness may be literal in that the early forms of men and women come up before day and night are distinguished. From line 6 it is clear that some fire has already been separated out, but the sun may not yet have been articulated and its light shed around—πρὶν τὸν ἥλιον περι-απλωθῆναι, as in the notice on the origin of trees, Aetius 5.26.4. ὄρπηκας (or probably ὄρπηκας): used especially of saplings (cf. fr. 152). With this word E. relates human to plant life (cf. line 4, and also 65(79), 71(82), and Aet. 5.26.4) and provides a nonmythical explanation for the autochthonous traditions as well as giving a new context to Homeric vocabulary (cf. *Il.* 21.37–38 on Lycaon, with ἐννύχιος and ὄρπηκας). κρινόμενον πῦρ: in the further movement of one to many, fire was separating from the earth and moving toward the fire already under the circumference of the cosmos, i.e., parts of fire were being picked out and becoming distinguishable because of the tendency of parts of the same root to converge when not brought into a compound by Love, cf. line 6 here and 100 (110).9. As fire is being separated it brings up the first forms of human life from the earth.

3: an affirmation, in the introduction to this key topic, of the veracity and authority of E.'s account, cf. 3(131).3, 6(4), 15(23).11, 103(114).1–2. The first adjective is ἄπ. λεγ. and the second rare without a genitive.

4 οὐλοφυεῖς τύποι: "whole-nature" or perhaps "whole-growing" forms; the adjective, like ἀνδροφυής and γυναικοφυής in 52(61), is a unique compound. These τύποι (1) originate human life, (2) come up from the earth, (3) have a due amount of water and heat, and (4) have not (yet) any defined limbs or voice. Despite the hint in ὄρπηκας (line 2), their growth from earth, and their early genesis (Aet. 5.26.4), they are unlikely to be trees, which are self-reproductive and have articulate limbs. There is no suggestion of an evolution from trees to men (cf. Simp. in *Cael.* 586.23, Phlp. in *Phys.* 318.27); and, if they were trees, why should they be described in such an obscure way? Nor can they be compared with the first race of men in Aristophanes' myth (Plato *Symph.* 189d), who have their limbs and sex clearly differentiated; only in ἀνδρόγυνον is there an echo of E., not of his "whole-nature" forms but of one of the "wrong" combinations of unattached limbs (cf. the commentary on 52(61).3).

In this context Simplicius criticizes Aristotle's suggestion that σπέρμα, as the true οὐλοφυές, is relevant here, and he adds a definition of the



adjective: ὁ καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτὸ πᾶν ἐστίν (Arist. *Phys.* 199b9, *Simp. in Phys.* 382.15, and cf. Aristotle's use of ὁλοφυῆς for birds, where there is no distinction of thorax and abdomen, *Part. An.* 693a25). The τύποι seem rather to be primitive shapes of warm, moist earth (cf. on line 5). As such they recall the modeling of Pandora by Hephaistos (Hes. *Erga* 61, *Theog.* 571) and the spontaneous generation in the autochthonous myths, but the concept is firmly in the Presocratic tradition. It relates to the theory of the earliest forms of life in Anaximander (cf. *Aet.* 5.19.4), Xenophanes (frs. 27 and 29), Anaxagoras, and Archelaus (cf. *D.L.* 2.9 and 17), and to the "embryos" in the (probably) Presocratic account in Diodorus (1.7, and cf. A. Burton *Diodorus Siculus I* pp. 44-47, for a survey of the evidence on the sources here), as well as providing a precedent for the Epicurean theory of "wombs" (Lucretius 5.805-20).

5: the τύποι have a due part (αἷσα, cf. φλόγος αἷσα, *Parm.* fr. 12.2) of water and heat (for the sense of εἶδος cf. the commentary on 14(21).4); they are sent up from the earth (sense and scansion connect χθονός with the verb, cf. "E. natos homines ex terra ait ut blitum," Varro fr. 27, *DK* 31 A72), which implies an accretion of earth to the other ingredients. Earth, moisture, and warmth provide the material for primitive life (cf. the commentary on line 4; the parallel with *Genesis* 2:7 is obvious). From the last sentence of Aetius 5.19.5 it would seem that the *aïsa* determined the kind of living creature that would develop—some tending to water, some, with an excess of fire, flying into the air, and the heavier ones earthbound (cf. again the different kinds of life arising when the "membranes" break, *Diod. Sic.* 1.7.4-5).

6 θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἐκέσθαι: cf. σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φιλήν ἐπὶ γένην ἐκέσθαι, 100(110)9. Parts of the same root are primitively aware of and tend toward their like when not restrained into compounds by Love, cf. the commentary on 81(103).

7: the τύποι as yet have no articulate limbs, nor flesh and blood (which require air, cf. 83(98).2 and 5). The further articulation is due to the separative power of Strife, but the μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας and the detailed structure of the organism are due to Love, in much the same way as Aphrodite adds *charis* to the shape made by Hephaistos, *Hesiod Erga* 65

8: I prefer the Aldine reading of this line: οὐτ' ἐνοπήν οὐτ' αὖ ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γῆρυν. Diels and most editors change γύων to γυῖον (with οἶον τ' after ἐνοπήν), but the singular is rare and un-Homeric, and reads oddly as referring to the "Schamglied." Bollack has οἷον τ' and γυῖων, which makes the vocal organ a γυῖον. The point is surely that the τύποι are as yet mute (the μέλη have been dealt with in the previous line) and



cannot speak a particular language (cf. οὐδ' ἴα γῆρυς, *Il.* 4.437) or make even an inarticulate cry (cf. ἐνοπήν τε γόον τε, *Il.* 24.160).

#### 54(64)

*And on him desire too*

Plutarch quotes the fragment in a context of the farrowing habits of sows. He wonders if the greater fertility of domestic sows can be due to the herding of the two sexes together, so that proximity “reminds” the male of copulation and provokes mutual desire, which according to E. is the case among human beings. The causal chain of proximity–memory–desire is partially confirmed by the Aetius notice (5.19.5) that the generation following the οὐλοφρεῖς τύποι was self-reproducing, the stimulus for the male coming from female beauty. One would expect this line to refer to the three links in some way, and the commonly accepted version is τῷ δ' ἐπὶ καὶ πόθος εἶσι, δι' ὅφιος ἀμμιμνήσκων, cf. *ap. crit.* But this is illogical; it is not that desire reminds him through sight but that desire is reminded through sight, i.e., that sight reminds him and stimulates desire. Other suggestions are δι' ἄφιος αἰμ' ἀναμίσγων (Ellis *CR* 1902, p. 270) and Bollack's διαμπερέως ἀμμίσγων. The fragment is hopelessly corrupt, and as with other lines having Plutarch as the only source (e.g., 40[46], 41[42], 76[93], and cf. 75[90]), it may be that his memory failed him. Perhaps the original was something like τῷ δ' ἐπὶ καὶ πόθος ἱκνεῖται μεμνημένος ὁφει, with ἀμμίσγων in the next line for the copulation following the desire.

#### 55(66)

*the divided meadows of Aphrodite*

From the context and the plowing metaphor in *Phoen.* 18, λειμῶνας and not λιμένας is the correct reading, E.'s reference to the female genitals being the more obscene, according to the scholiast. The οὐλοφρεῖς τύποι precede the generation of men and women; the fragments, therefore, dealing with human reproduction and embryology would appropriately come soon after 53(62).

#### 56(63)

*But the substance of the limbs is separated, part in (the body of) the man*

Aristotle quotes the fragment to criticize E. (with Democritus) for having the *sōma* of the seed “torn apart,” some in the male and some in the female (*GA* 764b17), and elsewhere he explains that for E. the two parts are like a *σύνβολον* (722b11). Galen elaborates on this, adding that the separated parts are brought together in the union stimulated by desire (*sem.* 4.616K). *σῶμα* in the Aristotelian context shows that *φύσις* here must mean the actual substance or structure of the embryo, which is pulled apart and then put together again (cf. *φύσις* at 100(110).5 and *μελέων φύσις*, *Parm.* fr. 16.3; however, *φύσις* is “birth” in 12(8), cf. the commentary there). The line obviously continued with a reference to the female, and this is indicated in Aristotle and Philoponus. The Philoponus context (*in GA* 166.25) also shows that E. is thinking of each organic part being divided (rather than different “limbs” from each, although this is also suggested, *in GA* 27.4). This makes E. more modern than Aristotle here, and in line with recent findings on the nature of genetic material. “Each human cell has two sets of chromosomes. One group is provided by the male parent of an individual, and the other group by the female parent” (*Enc. Brit. Macr.* 1974, 6.742).

### 57(65)

*They were poured in pure places; some met with cold and became women*

The subject must be some neuter plural expression for semen. The “pure places” refer to the female receptacle, purified by the evacuation of the menses (cf. *LSJ* s.v. *κάθαρσις* II). In the context at *GA* 723a24 Aristotle quotes the fragment as evidence that sex is determined at conception. Aristotle refers to it again at *GA* 764a1–6, where E. is said to explain sex differentiation not by right and left, but by the temperature of the womb. This means, according to Aristotle (and cf. Philoponus *in GA* 166.8), that if conception takes place soon after menstruation the womb is warmer and the resulting embryo male; if later in the month, a “cold” womb causes the offspring to be female. This is in fact wrong (for the high temperature comes with ovulation at the middle and not the beginning of the menstrual cycle), but it need not be foisted on E.; his words simply relate the temperature of the womb to the sex of the offspring, cf. the commentary on the next fragment.

### 58(67)

*For the male was in the warmer . . . this is the reason why men are dark, more powerfully built, and hairier.*



The whole context of this fragment is disputed. If *γαίης* is accepted, the reference is to the early genesis of human life from the earth, when, according to Aetius 5.7.1–2, the first men appeared in the south and east, and the first women in the north, which aligns them with hot and cold respectively. *γαστρός*, however, was suspected by Sturz but accepted by Karsten; Diels's suggestion is *τοκάς ἄρρενος ἐπλετο γαστήρ*. Galen quotes the fragment with Parmenides fr. 17 as linking the right side of the womb with the male, but the notice is abbreviated. He wants support for a Hippocratic connection of right, black, and hot; the first is related to male in the embryology of Parmenides, and the last two in that of E. Galen is surely not so confused here (as Longrigg argues, *Philologus* 1964, pp. 297–99) as to refer a fragment supposedly dealing with north and south parts of the earth to right and left in the womb. As Galen is the only authority for the line, it is sensible to accept his embryological context for it. I suspect that only the first line gives E.'s exact words, with the quotation possibly ending at *ἐπλετο*; *γαίης* was then an attempt to finish the line from the following *καί* (and any genitive is suspect there because of the distance from *ἐν θερμοτέρῳ*). The last two lines look like a summary, for *καί μέλανες διὰ τοῦτο* is prosaic and an exact repetition from the Hippocratic quotation Galen is defending; also, the succession of spondees in *καὶ λαχνηέντες μάλλον* is untypical and unpleasing. (Censorinus, 6.8.10, DK 31 A81, links male and female with right and left in E. and Anaxagoras, "but his interpretation should probably be ruled out" states G. E. R. Lloyd, *JHS* 1962, p. 60, n. 19; yet in Aristotle *GA* 764a36 there is an imprecise reference on the sexes of twins which might support this link for E. The link could be accommodated by supposing that on E.'s theory males are conceived when the womb is warmer, and the resulting embryo later attaches itself to the right side of the uterine lining; the converse would be true for females. The interval before any attachment is in fact five days.)

2 *μέλανες*: not necessarily a reference to Ethiopians, but a conventional contrast between swarthy men and pale women. *ἀδρομελέστεροι* is Karsten's suggestion from the *ἀδροτής*–*ἀδροτής* confusion in Homer; *ἀνδρωδέστεροι* is tautologous.

3 *λαχνηέντες*: hair is the human analogue of leaves (71(82).1), and growth in abundance is due to heat. Hairiness connects also with specific maleness in the denial of anthropomorphic attributes to divinity, 97(134).3.



## 59(68)

*On the tenth day of the eighth month it became a white pus.*

Aristotle is in agreement with E. that milk is a form of blood (cf. *GA* 739b25; Kranz changed τὸ γάλα to τὸ αἶμα in the present context, and Diels deleted it, but the sense is clear). But he criticizes him for supposing that it is decomposed or putrefied rather than concocted blood—either E. has misunderstood or he is using an inappropriate metaphor. There is a metaphor like this in 67(81), for wine as “rotten” water. The general theory of an agent (here probably heat) acting on a liquid and causing a basic change is implied, and this was important in the medical theories of κρασις and πέψις. In this fragment the language is influenced by the similarity of πύον to πυός, and colostrum is an unpleasant-looking, puslike substance in the two or three days before the appearance of the milk.

The tenth day of the eighth month is a precise date, and it is hard to see the reason why it is given. Mammary growth in pregnancy is an obvious indication of organic change, but there is no noticeable sudden alteration on or around the date given here. And by some process which is still obscure, it is the delivery that actually initiates lactation, so that milk is available even for the seven-month child. It can only be assumed that there is some other, irretrievable, significance in the numbers involved.

## 60(71)

*But if your belief about these things in any way lacked assurance, how, from the combining of water, earth, air, and sun came the forms and color of mortal things which have now arisen, fitted together by Aphrodite*

Simplicius quotes 85(86), 86(87), 87(95), and then here gives the general principle of the work of Aphrodite in this present world in producing the variety of life as we know it from the combinations of four elements. Two other fragments that show Kypris at work follow, 62(73) and 70(75). This fragment has therefore been put as an introduction to the biological and physiological section. In the present world there is an increasing separation of elements, but Aphrodite is able to counteract this for a time by bringing together parts of the separating elements into temporary compounds, with the resulting variety of *thnēta*.

1 *λεπόξυλος*: the adjective is unique to E., cf. 14(21). 2. E.'s appeal is

to reason. Any doubts Pausanias may still have about the reliability of the account of the different forms of life being produced from a mingling of four elements will be allayed by the evidence from phenomena observable now.

2-4: the language recalls 15(23); the artist working with his colors in two dimensions is now seen to be an exemplar of Aphrodite creating a three-dimensional world from the four elements. *συναρμοσθέντα* in line 4 recalls *ἀρμονίῃ μίξαντε* at 15(23).4 and reinforces the notion that it is not a chemical mixture which is involved, but a fitting together to make a whole, cf. *συνάρμοσας* of a boat, Euripides *Hel.* 233, and of the wooden horse, *Tro.* 11; cf. also Galen's notice that for E. all *σώματα* on earth are produced from four elements *οὐ μὴν κεκραμένων γε δι' ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μικρὰ μόρια παρακειμένων τε καὶ φανόντων*, *Hipp. nat. hom.* 15.49K. *χροῖα*: cf. Parmenides fr. 8.41, Anaxagoras fr. 4.4; the form is possibly neuter plural, cf. DK ad 31 B 71.

### 61(33)

*As when the sap (of the fig tree) has riveted and set white milk*

The fragment is an example of an agent working on a liquid and solidifying it. Plutarch quotes the simile to illustrate the close bond of *philia* contrasted with divisive *polyphilia*. In Homer the like-worded simile relates to speed, *Il.* 5.902; Aristotle makes the comparison for the action of semen, *GA* 771b23 and cf. 737a14. *ὀπός* is the sap of the fig tree used for curdling, but, in curdling, the juice also putrefies the milk, which makes the change like that in 59(68) and 67(81). *ἔδησε*: *ἐπηξε* LC (Plut.), and this is the verb used with *ὀπός* in Homer loc. cit., and in Aristotle *HA* 522b2; for *δεῖν* as "harden," "set," cf. [Hippocrates] *Off.* 17. The exact application of the simile is not known, but the use of *γόμφοι* in 86(87), and Plutarch's connection with *philia*, suggest that it belongs in the general context of Aphrodite's work on the elements to produce specific compounds.

### 62(73)

*And as, at that time, when Kypris was busily producing forms, she moistened earth in water and gave it to swift fire to harden*

The fragment is quoted without comment by Simplicius, along with

85(86), 86(87), 87(95), 60(71), and 70(75), all of which mention Aphrodite/Kypris as a craftsman responsible for forms of life and their organic parts; and, adds Simplicius, E. is speaking about this *kosmos*. The language here is of the potter and his clay shapes, moistened and then fired. *εἶδος* is used by E. for the kinds of animate life, in the *Physics* 60(71).3 and cf. 15(23).5, 83(98).5, 25(22).7, and in the *Katharmoi* 107(115).7 and 130(125).

2 εἶδεα ποιπνύουσα: Stein suggested αἰθέρ' ἐπιπνέουσα to bring in all four elements, but air is not an ingredient in the hard substance of bone, 48(96), or in the τύποι, 53(62), and emendation is unnecessary. For ποιπνύω with an accusative, cf. Pindar *Pyth.* 10.64, and the analogous σπεύδω, LSJ s.v., I. κρατῶναι: "strengthen," "harden," but in 91(100).19 "get possession of," "control"; for the sense here cf. Xenophon *Lac.* 2.3 and [Hippocrates] *Fract.* 7.

### 63(72)

*How tall trees and fishes in the sea*

The line is quoted by Athenaeus to show E.'s use of the rare word *καμασῆνες* for fish in general (cf. also 68(74).1). This section gives scope to E.'s wide-ranging biological interests and observations within the framework of the explanation of *thnēta* as combinations of earth, air, fire, and water.

### 64(77–78)

*(Trees ever-bearing leaves and ever-bearing fruit flourish) with fruit in abundance all the year due to the air.*

A first line was made from ἐμπεδόκαρπα and θάλλειν in Theophrastus, and Plutarch's identification of ἐμπεδόφυλλον in E. with ἀειθαλές, *quaest. conv.* 649c. ἡέρα in line 2 fits the Theophrastean context, referring in particular to the climate, in this case temperate and springlike. There is no indication of the poem to which the fragment belongs, and Stein, following Karsten, assigned it to the age of Kypris in the *Katharmoi*, cf. 118(128). But there is no hint in Theophrastus or Plutarch that the reference is to a condition that no longer exists, and it is more appropriate to assign it to the group of fragments dealing with the nature of trees, but cf. the commentary on fr. 152.



From Theophrastus and Plutarch here, and Aetius 5.26.4, E.'s explanation of nondeciduous trees, with the laurel, olive, and date palm singled out, can be pieced together. All trees, as the first ζῶα, and therefore closer to the greater influence of Love, have a symmetry in the combination of their constituent elements (and so they combine the *logos* of male and female). The moisture in them, however, is evaporated by summer heat, which causes the leaves to shrivel and fall, and the nourishment taken in is not retained because of the funnel-like arrangement of their pores. But evergreens have an excess of moisture, which survives the summer evaporation, and a symmetrical arrangement of pores that admit regular nourishment. Generally, the temperate zone in which these trees grow balances internal with external symmetry, and so they remain constant.

It is botanically impossible for trees to have fruit all year round in the same way as they do leaves (for the flower precedes the fruit), and the reference must be to a tree regularly bearing a heavy crop. The lines recall the orchard of Alcinous (*Od.* 7.114–18), where the fruit does not fail summer or winter, and this is because the temperate zephyr allows the trees to bear their fruit at different times. In the orchard are pears, apples, pomegranates, figs, and olives, and E.'s interest in date palms was noted above (Aet. 5.26.4, where it is also said that fruits are the excess of water and fire in the plant). Of these the olive and palm are non-deciduous, extremely long-lived, and consistently have abundant fruit. The explanation of such fruitfulness is in the harmony between the *krasis* of the tree's constitution and that of the surrounding air or climate, which nicely blends heat and cold. In the unique compound adjectives with ἐμπεδο- I suspect E. is making use of a mild pun on his own name.

## 65(79)

*In this way tall trees produce olive eggs first*

Aristotle praises E. for his vocabulary here, for a fruit is analogous to an egg in that each is a κύημα, with the seed surrounded by the nourishment necessary for its growth; in plants this is a consequence of their bisexual nature. Theophrastus elaborates on this comparison along similar lines. Philoponus, less plausibly, reads μικρὰ δένδρεα, taken as accusative with ἐλαίας in apposition, and no subject specified; he says that the olive stones can be called eggs and olives and also small trees, because of their potential for growth.

μικρὰ δένδρεα: cf. *Od.* 7.114 again of Alcinous' orchard. φωτοκεῖ:

with ἐλαίᾱς as an extended accusative (rather than a genitive singular, which would make a strange circumlocution, and the form would probably be ἐλαίης). The verb later became a technical biological term contrasted with ζωοτοκεῖν. As Aristotle recognized, E. had the insight to see not merely a resemblance in their oval shape between an olive and an egg but a true analogy based on the functioning of the parts, and this in turn confirms the basic kinship between plant and animal life, which is a key point of the *Katharmoi*.

### 66(80)

*This is why pomegranates come late in the season, and apples are exceptionally succulent.*

The discussion in Plutarch starts with Homer's *μηλέαι ἀγλαόκαρποι* (*Od.* 7.115) and then introduces this line. The explanation for the late ripening of pomegranates is clear. It is a question of the internal structure of the plant and the outside temperature (cf. the commentary on 64(77–78), and ἀήρ is again used in this connection). The pomegranate has relatively little moisture, and so it cannot reach the right consistency in the summer heat but waits until the air is cooler. Plutarch, however, does not understand what E. means by ὑπέρφλοια μῆλα. He says that E.'s epithets are not ornamental but always explain some essential fact or function. Two suggestions are made. Either the prepositional prefix means "excessive," and -φλοια "freshness," "bloom," as in Aratus (*Phaen.* 335), or it means "outside"; the husk of an apple is the shiny covering of the seeds, and the edible part is therefore "outside the husk." Yet if the adjectives are not attributive, the same explanation has to cover both pomegranates and apples. Perhaps it is that outside cool air is in sympathy with and encourages the moisture within. For the pomegranate the late season gives its meager moisture a chance to develop, for the apple a temperate climate results in an excess of moisture and so a succulent fruit.

*ὀψίγονοι*: again a Homeric word is given a new context, and the tie between the plant and human world is strengthened in the application of the word for the men born later to the late fruit of the season. ὑπέρφλοια: Karsten's emendation, *metris causa*.

### 67(81)

*Water from the skin, fermented in wood, becomes wine.*



Like 59(68) and 61(33), this is an example of a change in a liquid brought about by putrefaction. Aristotle dismisses the suggestion that wine is (of the genus) water; Plutarch concentrates on *σῆψις*, identifying it with *πέψις* for E. in his first quotation of the line, and seeing it as a characteristic of wine in the second. In the previous fragment *φλοιός* seemed to refer to the (edible) part of the apple surrounding the seeds, and I suggest it has a similar meaning here, as the part of the grape surrounding the seeds. In wine making, after the pressing, the juice and skins of the grapes are put into wooden casks or vats (which is surely the meaning of *ἐν ξύλῳ*, for *ξύλον* is wood cut and put to some use); fermentation is induced spontaneously by the (yeast) particles present in the grape itself, and especially on the skin. During the transformation of the grape juice into wine there is a "vigorous evolution of carbon dioxide giving the impression of boiling" (*Chambers Enc.* 1968, s.v. fermentation). The processes of concoction and putrefaction are closely related or even indistinguishable, and to their more obvious medical and physiological associations is here added a phenomenon from plant life.

#### 68(74)

*leading the songless tribe of prolific fish*

The point of Plutarch's quotation is that E. recognized that fish are prolific, more so than creatures of land or air. *πολυσπερής*, Homer's adjective for "widespread men," was understood by Plutarch as "much-sowing," "fertile," and, characteristically, E. makes use of the ambiguity latent in the adjective. The general context in *quaest. conv.* is a discussion of salt as an erotic stimulant, and this is suggested as a reason for Aphrodite's birth from the sea and the numerous offspring of Poseidon and the sea gods. If the feminine participle referred to Aphrodite one would expect Plutarch to mention this as corroborative evidence, but Nestis would be more appropriate for the subject as having command of the creatures in her element. The particular force of *ἄμουσον* surely is that fish are bloodless and so are denied a sophisticated form of *phronēsis*, one consequence of which is that they have no articulate voice. (The assertion that the line refers to Aphrodite leading fish from land to sea in another era, cf. O'Brien *ECC* pp. 190-94, nullifies the point of Plutarch's citation, for if the fish are coming from land they would not be prolific because they live in the salt sea; and it would be extraordinary for E. to be talking about fish in another era, and not those we know. In the commentary on 47(35)



it was argued that E. treated the many-to-one era in a digression to accommodate some creatures of myth; his main task is to account for the present world, when the many are being separated out. The τύποι sent up by fire from the earth go to the element to which they are akin, according to the character of their mixture, so Aetius 5.19.5; any excess of the opposite element is overcome by the surrounding “home” element, cf. Aristotle *Resp.* 477b1–478a11 and Theophrastus *caus. plant.* 1.21.5.)

### 69(76)

*For those with heavy backs who live in the sea, this (is found) in mussels, and indeed you will notice that earth is on the top surface of the flesh of tritons and stony skinned turtles.*

The three lines are quoted by Plutarch in *quaest. conv.* in a context of the right criterion for seating guests, where it is suggested that affinity rather than rank should be considered. In nature, fire is not always above earth, but the god—Pindar’s ἀριστοτέχνης who is Zeus, but for E. Aphrodite—makes an arrangement in accordance with the function of the organism. Similarly, with the quotation of the last two lines in *fac. lun.*, Plutarch argues against a “natural” position for earth and fire but says that their places are assigned as is appropriate or useful.

1 θαλασσονόμοις: Diels changed the compound to θαλασσονόμων and put a colon at the end of the second line, but E. surely is speaking of three different kinds of “hard-backed sea dwellers”—mussels, which are completely enclosed in a hard covering, tritons (possibly including sea snails), and the reptilian turtles. The collection and hardening of earth on the back is an arrangement of elements achieved by Love for the protection of the organism, in defiance of the movement of the elements to their own kind under Strife. From a comparison with the following fragment it is fair to deduce that E. understood that the carapace is the turtle’s bone structure “on top,” in fact, the backbone and ribs joined by bony plates.

### 70(75)

*But of those which are compact within and loosely formed without, having chanced on this kind of flaccidity at the hands of Kypris*

Simplicius quotes these lines without comment as the last of six fragments,

said to come fairly close together, which show Aphrodite/Kypris as a craftsman, fashioning the elements into organisms and organic parts, in *Cael.* 529–30, and cf. the commentary on 60(71). The second line is quoted at in *Phys.* 331.9 as the fourth of seven examples (from many more, adds Simplicius) in E.'s *Physics* on the use of chance. This is given in the verbs *συγκυρεῖν*, 29(53), 51(59).2, 83(98).1, 82(104), and *τυγχάνειν*, here and at 84(85), and in the noun *τύχη*, 81(103). In this fragment the combination of *τυγχάνειν* and the work of Kypris is like that of *συγκυρεῖν* and Kypris for the production of blood and flesh, 83(98) and cf. 82(104), and *τυγχάνειν* and Aphrodite for that of eyes, 84(85) and 85(86). Aristotle complains that E. uses *τύχη* without identifying it with *Philia* or *Neikos* and without giving any explanation of it (*Phys.* 196a12–24 quoting 29[53]). It would seem that, as the four roots are moving haphazardly but in the general direction of separated masses, some of the parts are united into organic compounds by Kypris, as a potter, carpenter, smith, or sculptor works the material he “chances on” to a shape of his own design.

1 *μανά*: the lengthened first alpha of this adjective is the point of the quotation of fr. 152. The reference to the “rare” or “loosely formed” covering would be to any flesh-covered creature, in contrast to those mentioned in 69(76).

## 71(82)

*As the same things, hair, leaves, the close-packed feathers of birds, and scales on strong limbs grow.*

The fragment supports Aristotle's brief comment on bones, hair, and the like being analogous; it is recalled in *HA* 487b20 and imitated in Lucretius 5.788. In a similar way E. related eggs and olives, 65(79); called the ear a “shoot,” Theophrastus *Sens.* 9; spoke of the *δρπηκες* of men and women; and conversely called trees the first *ζῶα*, 53(62) and Aetius 5.26.4. In more general terms all things “think” and feel pleasure and pain, cf. 78(107) and 81(103). This serves to break down the barriers between plant, bird, animal, and human life, and so makes it easier to understand the transition between them made by the daimon of the *Katharmoi*. The acute observation here of the connection between leaves, scales, feathers, and hair relates the forms of life in different elements and the structure of

less and more advanced and articulate types, as well, perhaps, as showing the first awareness of biological analogy and homology.

### 72(83)

*but for hedgehogs sharp-pointed hairs bristle on their backs.*

The fragment is used by Plutarch to illustrate the well-worn theme that animals are better endowed than men for their own defense, whereas the compensation for man is his power of reasoning. This is unlikely to be the context in E.'s poem, which asserts that all things have *phronēsis*, 78(107) and 81(103). The fragment seems rather to belong to the previous one, adding another humble example to the list there. *χαίτη*: the word for human hair, the mane of a horse or lion, and leaves (cf. LSJ s.v.) is well chosen, in this setting, for the hedgehog's spines. (J. Longrigg's attempt to find a further analogue for E. in gills and lungs is unwarranted guesswork and fails to take into account Act. 5.24.2, cf. "Empedocles' Fiery Fish," *JWI* 1965, pp. 314–15.)

## FRAGMENTS 73–83 PERCEPTION AND THOUGHT

### 73(89)

*There are effluences from all things in existence.*

This line is quoted in the course of a complex answer to the question, "Why does the octopus change color?" In addition to Theophrastus' explanation that it does so out of cowardice (and for self-defense, *soll. an.* 978e), Plutarch suggests that minute particles detached from rocks and sprayed by the sea pass into the porous skin of the octopus; when the creature is frightened, it contracts its body so that the effluences are held on the surface of the skin and do not penetrate (cf. a similar explanation in *amic. mult.* 96f). This is considered as a particular application of E.'s theory, according to which all bodies have pores closely packed on their surfaces, and effluences are given off not only by the roots but also by compounds; these effluences are capable of entering the pores that are symmetrical, cf. Plato *Meno* 76c and Theophrastus *Sens.* 7. The theory is a general one of mixture (as in 14(21).13–14 of the roots, *δε' ἀλλήλων δὲ*



θέοντα γίγνεται ἀλλοιωπά· τὰ γὰρ διὰ κρήσις ἀμείβει, and Theophrastus *Sens.* 12, ὅλως γὰρ ποιεῖ τὴν μίξιν τῇ συμμετρίας τῶν πόρων), but in practice it seems to have been restricted to explaining perception and growth, and various phenomena such as reflections (Aetius 4.14.1, *Pap. Ox.* 1609.13.94, DK 31 B109a) and the attraction of the magnet (Alex. Aphr. *quaest.* 72.26 on 74(91), and Plutarch *quaest. nat.* 916d). Aristotle unfavorably contrasts E.'s explanation of ποιεῖν-πάσχειν and μίξις by means of pores and effluences with that of the atomists, whose postulation of indivisible solids interspersed by void allowed a more systematic and comprehensive account of all forms of change, *GC* 324b25-35. Further criticisms are that any explanation using pores and effluences is superfluous (since bodies adapted by nature for reciprocal contact will interact even without pores) and is also inconsistent with E.'s denial of void, *GC* 325b5-11, 326b7-28, and cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 13. It has been suggested that some light may be thrown on the question whether the pores are empty or full by referring to the original meaning of *poros*, a "ford," which can yield and allow entry to a body but which shows no gap before the body enters, cf. Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 234, n. 3; but this is to reinstate Aristotle's "divisible body," *GC* 326b26-28. From the account of the magnet it seems that E. supposed the pores to be filled with air that is displaced by a concentration of effluences (cf. the commentary on the next fragment, and also Philoponus in *GC* 178.2).

Alcmaeon was probably the first to have spoken of pores in an anatomical sense, but in his case they were channels leading from the sense organ to the brain, Theophrastus *Sens.* 25-26; E. perhaps had this in mind in the phrase πόρος νοῆσαι, 5(3).7. E. speaks of πόρος ὕμνων, 47(35).1, but in the extant fragments does not use the word πόρος for his description of pores in the body; instead he uses ἄλοκες, 91(100).3. His theory of pores and effluences was discussed and elaborated in the medical writers (e.g., *Reg.* I.23, *Anon. Lond.* 26, 31-34, and cf. 36), and was taken up especially by Democritus and Epicurus for their account of "idols" (cf. Theophr. *Sens.* 50, Lucretius 1.309-28, 2.69, 4.46-109). The theory seems to have originated with E., for although Parmenides is cited with E., Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus as explaining perception by symmetry of pores (Aet. 4.9.6), he is not mentioned elsewhere in this connection, and his name may well have been included from a misunderstanding of Aristotle's *Metaph.* 1009b12-25.

#### 74(91)

(Water) combines more with wine, but refuses with oil.

ἐνάρθμον is ἄπ. λεγ. but an obvious correction for the unmetrical ἐναρ-  
 ἱθμον, cf. ἄρθμος, 8(17).23 and 25(22).1. For the use of ἐθέλειν here cf.  
 Plato *Soph.* 252e. Philoponus, like Plutarch in the context of the previous  
 fragment, mentions the universal application of E.'s theory of pores and  
 implies that he used the terms κοῖλα and πυκνά, although they are not  
 found in this sense in the extant fragments. There is evidence of three  
 examples used in connection with the theory. (1) Here, as Philoponus  
 explains, symmetry of κοῖλα and πυκνά in water and wine accounts for  
 their combining, and lack of symmetry for the inability of water to mix  
 with oil. (2) Alexander applies the theory here to the working of the  
 magnet. The effluences from the stone disperse the air obstructing the  
 pores of the iron, then the effluences from the iron move toward the pores  
 of the stone and, being commensurate, fit into them; the iron follows of  
 itself. (3) Philoponus, paraphrasing Aristotle, also gives E.'s use of the  
 theory to explain the sterility of mules. According to E. the semen of the  
 horse and ass have commensurate κοῖλα and πυκνά, and from the min-  
 gling of the two soft substances a hard (and sterile) compound results;  
 Aristotle finds this explanation, like (1) above, unsatisfactory, cf. *GA*  
 747a35–b26 and the commentary on 143(92).

### 75(90)

*So sweet seized on sweet, bitter rushed to bitter, sharp came to sharp, and hot coupled  
 with hot.*

In this fragment it seems likely that θερμόν in Macrobius is a simplifica-  
 tion of a more unusual word in the original. Hesychius gives μέλαν, καί  
 τὸ καίόμενον for δαερόν, and θερμόν, καυματηρόν, λαμπρόν for δαηρόν.  
 Diels therefore suggests δαερὸν δ' ἐποχεῖτο δαηρῶ, and Maas δαερὸν δ'  
 ἐποχεύετο δαερῶ (cf. *DK* vol. 1, p. 344, n. 5), for the synizesis comparing  
*Il.* 24.769. This keeps the balance of the repetition of the quality (cf.  
 77[109]) and retains ἐποχεύετο from Macrobius. Bollack writes ἀλερὸς  
 δ' ἐποτεύεθ' ἀληρῶ, and Maas has three lines from a combination of the  
 two sources. The verbs with their forceful metaphors should probably be  
 taken as past, rather than "gnomic," as Burnet and Kranz suggest,  
 though the activity described still continues. According to Theophrastus,  
 E. explained growth as well as mixture and perception by pores and  
 effluences, and both Plutarch and Macrobius refer the fragment to  
 nutrition, cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 12 and Aristotle *De An.* 416a30. It would  
 seem that the food is broken up by a σῆψις in the stomach (cf. Galen  
*def. med.* 99, 19.372K, Plato *Phaedo* 96a–b); it then passes to the liver, where



it is transformed into blood (cf. τὴν δὲ γαστέρα πέττουσαν, τὸ δὲ ἥπαρ ἐξαίματουν, *Simp. in Phys.* 372.5, πολυαίματον τὸ ἥπαρ, *Plutarch quaest. conv.* 683e). The blood moves through the body and gives to each part what is necessary for its nutrition and growth, cf. *Aetius* 5.27.1.

In *Alcmaeon* an indefinite number of opposite *dynamis* are cited as acting in the body, *Aetius* 5.30.1, and in *Ancient Medicine* the number is also indefinite, the example quoted including salt, bitter, sweet, and acid; special significance is denied to hot and cold. E. here gives the action of obvious *dynamis* in different kinds of food, but without connecting them specifically to the roots. After E., when his doctrine of four roots prevailed in medical theory, the number of powers in the body was restricted to four, and the opposites were conflated with the humors, cf. *VM* 14, 16, and chap. 1.

## 76(93)

*And the gleam of bright saffron mixes in with the linen.*

Many suggestions have been put forward for the interpretation of this line. Diels translates his text "Mit der Byssosfarbe aber wird des blauen Holunders Beere gemischt" and cites *Hesychius* to justify his interpretation of βύσσος as the color. Yet the context in *Plutarch* refers the line to dyeing rather than to a mixing of colors, no parallel is offered for a mixing of this particular kind, and three initial spondees are heavy (77(109).3 is exceptionally solemn). On the same line is *Wytttenbach's* version followed by *Karsten* and *Stein*, and also by *Millerd*, but with ἀκτίς for ἄνθος, and the translation "the brilliance of the scarlet dye mixed thoroughly with the grey cloth." This is unsatisfactory for there is still the metrical difficulty, and γλαυκός, which implies some brightness of color, should probably not be taken with βύσσος, since it is important for the material which is to be dyed to be as neutral as possible, cf. *Plato Rep.* 429d. With *Bennet's* reading, the only change required is in the gender of the adjective, ἀκτίς can be used metaphorically to indicate brightness or penetration (cf. *LSJ* s.v.), and saffron was well known as a dye, cf. *Aeschylus Pers.* 660, *Ag.* 239. The simile from an everyday craft is typical of E., and an apt illustration of the affinity of certain substances and of the fast union resulting. The fragment's place in the poem is not known, but it may belong with the description of the forms produced by *Kypris*. It has been grouped with the fragments dealing with effluences and with the



attraction of elements in nutrition and perception, because Plutarch quotes the line as an example of a combination of ingredients that are *ολκεῖα* and *πρόσφορα*. His purpose is to give support to the theory that *μικαντικὴ ἀναθυμίασις*, having some affinity to the soul, fits into, fills, and holds fast its rarefied structure.

### 77(109)

*With earth we perceive earth, with water water, with air divine air, with fire destructive fire, with love love, and strife with baneful strife.*

These lines on *ἡ γυνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ* are the most widely quoted from E.'s work. Aristotle, in *De An.* 404b16, connects the lines with Plato's *Timaeus*, cf. *Tim.* 35a, 45b, and Sextus with Plato and Pythagoreanism, although he gives the theory as being of some antiquity (cf. *Od.* 17.218). There is a hint of the theory in Alcmaeon, cf. Aristotle *De An.* 405a30, and after E. the attraction of like to like was important in the cosmogonies of Anaxagoras and Democritus, cf. *Simp. in Phys.* 27.11 and Democritus fr. 164. Galen explains the fragment by connecting a root with each sense, saying that sight involves fire, hearing air, touch earth, taste moisture, and smell "vapor," but this is a neat simplification; it is known from 88(84) that both fire and water are involved in vision, and Theophrastus remarks in *Sens.* 9 that E. did not deal with touch or taste, except under a general heading of perception by means of pores.

E. explained perception in general terms by symmetry of pores and the attraction of similars. (Cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 10 and 7, where asymmetry of pores in the sense organ and object explains why organs cannot distinguish each other's objects—the pores are too wide or too narrow for contact.) Theophrastus also adds that for E. *phronēsis* is the same or much the same as *aisthēsis*. This is from Aristotle, who puts E. with Democritus and "almost everyone else" as identifying *phronēsis* and *aisthēsis*, and supposing this to be an *ἀλλοίωσις* (*Metaph.* 1009b12; cf. Galen's description of E.'s theory of perception as *ἀλλοίωσις ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων*, *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* 5.627K). It is clear that E. supposed that the attraction of like for like covered a whole range, from the basic form of a part of one root being aware of another part like itself and moving toward it (cf. 53(62).6 and 100(110).9), through compounds that can sense and combine with similar compounds, to perfect mixtures that are assimilated to their like, the process of highest (i.e., purest) thought. It would not be possible to make a distinction, in Peripatetic terminology, between *aisthēsis* and *phronēsis*

at any particular point along the scale, and as Theophrastus asks, *Sens.* 12, τί διοίσει τὰ ἐμψυχα πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων; for on this theory nothing is inanimate or without sensation at however simple a level. Now if, with the fire within, we perceive the fire without, we increase the fire in our constitution (this notion is already in Parmenides, and probably Heraclitus; see chap. 3), and so with earth, air, and water. Further, we have control to some extent over our perceptions and thoughts, and over the increase, for better or worse, of what is perceived and thought. But this control also applies to that which unites and that which separates the constituents, which on a moral plane means that we can increase the strength of Love or Strife in us by concentrating on its like in the outside world, cf. further the commentary on 100(110).10.

2 δῖον: cf. *Il.* 16.365, with αἰθήρ as feminine in Homer. αἰδηλον: the adjective, as probably in Parmenides fr. 10.3, is ambiguous here between "destructive" and "unseen." The two epithets in this line are reminders of the divine status of the roots.

### 78(107)

*All things are fitted together and constructed out of these, and by means of them they think and feel pleasure and pain.*

From the Theophrastean context Stein was probably correct in attaching these two lines to 77(109), cf. Simplicius in *de An.* 27.34–37. The principle that all things have *phronēsis*, in varying degrees according to their elemental structure, connects with 77(109) and also with 81(103) and 100(110).10; here it is also combined with an explanation of pleasure and pain.

E.'s theory of pleasure is difficult to reconstruct, as there are only two brief notices in Theophrastus (*Sens.* 9, 16) and two in Aetius (4.9.15 and 5.28.1), the second of which is corrupt. Desire is said to arise from a deficiency in the constituent elements; and this deficiency, which needs to be remedied, is of something bearing a resemblance to the subject. Pleasure occurs with the action of like on like and the replenishment of the deficiency by a similar mixture; pain is caused by contraries, for dissimilar compounds are hostile to each other, Aetius 5.28.1, Theophrastus *Sens.* 9 and 16 quoting 25(22).6–7.

From this scanty evidence (and adding *Sens.* 23) it seems that, as with *aisthēsis* and *phronēsis*, all things, on however simple a level, are capable of



feeling pleasure and pain. Satisfactory perception and cognition, i.e., arising from a symmetry of subject and object, is pleasant, and the same holds true for nutrition, cf. Aetius 4.9.14. The animal is aware of its need for nourishment, and this, like perception, is based on the attraction of like to like, cf. the commentary on 75(70); deficiency causes *orexis*, and pleasure arises from the replenishment. The other desire E. interprets is that of sex, again an *orexis* for a unity of likes, that brought about by Aphrodite, and for a return to a former harmony, cf. Aetius 5.19.5, E. 8(17).22 and 54(64).

Theophrastus says that E. explained pain by contraries, but pain relates to perception, which is by likes, *Sens.* 16. E.'s meaning, however, is likely to be less sophisticated than Theophrastus expects. The simple and general statement here covers a great number of instances and involves the six fundamentals. It could be illustrated by pain encountered in nutrition when the food absorbed cannot be assimilated to the body, in perception when there is a lack of symmetry as with the bright light or loud noise (cf. *Sens.* 8), and in human relations when attempts at friendship turn to hostility because of incompatibility. A further implication made explicit by Theophrastus is that ignorance is painful, *Sens.* 23.

1 <ὥς>: an informal suggestion made by Professor H. Lloyd-Jones in place of Karsten's commonly accepted <γάρ>. πεπήγασιν ἄρμωσθέντα: almost a technical phrase of E.'s for the formation of organic compounds, cf. 70(75), 85(86), 60(71).4.

## 79(106)

*For man's wisdom grows according to what is present.*

This line is taken with the following fragment by Aristotle and the commentators; it is also related in *Metaph.* to Parmenides fr. 16, Anaxagoras, and an unknown Homeric phrase, and in *De An.* to *Od.* 18.136. The point made is that according to earlier thinkers *aisthēsis* and *phronēsis* are not distinguished (cf. the commentary on 77[109]); both are *sōmatikon* and of like by like. Alexander gives the sense in which πρὸς παρεόν is to be taken: πρὸς τὸ παρὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἢ φρόνησις γίνεται, in *Metaph.* 306.17. According to E., then, the external condition affects the internal structure, and so the quality and quantity of the individual's wisdom; in Aristotle's summary, when men change their *hexis* they change their thinking, *Metaph.* 1009b19. It is worth noticing the connection



Asclepius makes with medical theory. Following Aristotle he says that for E. a change of *hexis* is a change of *phronēsis* ὡς ἂν ταῖς κράσεσι τοῦ σώματος ἐπομένων τῶν ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων, καθάπερ καί τινες τῶν λατρῶν εἰρήκασι, in *Metaph.* 277.6. A satisfactory mixture of bodily elements is a healthy state (and pleasant, cf. the previous fragment) and conducive to thought, which thrives in the appropriate environment. Specifically human understanding differs from animal perception in its complexity and in the extent to which it is in the individual's control, cf. the commentaries on 80(108) and 100(110).

### 80(108)

*Insofar as they have changed in their nature, so far changed thoughts are always present to them.*

This fragment comes with the previous one in the two quotations by Aristotle and the commentators, and it emphasizes it. There it was said that the external condition affects the growth of the thinking, and here that an internal change of structure results in a change of thought. Simplicius and Philoponus relate the lines specifically to dreaming, to the effect that dreams at night are conditioned by a man's physical changes during the day, Simplicius in *de An.* 202.25, Philoponus in *de An.* 486.13, and cf. the reading of T at Aristotle *De An.* 427a25. Explanations of dreams are rare among the Presocratics, and E.'s is well accommodated to his general theory. In the discussion Aristotle does not mention dreams but loss of consciousness (*Metaph.* 1009b25; the phrase on Hector is not in the extant text of Homer). If the "Homeric" reference is relevant to E., as *κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα* suggests, there is here the extreme case of a blow to the physical system resulting in incoherent and uncharacteristic thoughts, comparable perhaps to the fantasies resulting from a modern anesthetic.

### 81(103)

*There by the will of chance all things have thought*

The line is quoted with the following fragment without comment by Simplicius as an illustration of the use of *τύχη* in E., cf. the commentary on 70(75).

*λόττητι*: cf. the Homeric *θεῶν λόττητι*, *Il.* 19.9, *Od.* 7.214, in pessimistic

contexts.  $\tau\tilde{\eta}\delta\epsilon$  must be local, meaning “there” in the mixture of earth, air, fire, and water as it happens to be, for it is out of these that all things are constructed and by means of them that thought is to be explained, cf. the commentary on 78(107).

### 82(104)

*And insofar as the finest happened to have fallen together*

This is the last of the lines quoted by Simplicius on  $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta$ , coming, he says, shortly after the previous fragment.  $\sigmaυν\acute{\epsilon}κυρσε$  is used of random movement in 29(53) and 51(59).2, and again, with reference to the elements, in the first line of the following fragment. The “finest” of the four roots are air and fire, and if the connection with the following fragment is correct, it is the amount of these, balancing to a more or less precise degree the amount of earth and water, that together with them are made by Aphrodite into blood, the organ of thought for men. It is not a defect in Love’s workmanship but the quantity of the constituent ingredients—and this is a matter of “chance”—which accounts for the thoughts of some men being inferior to those of others (but the individual can improve his own thought structure, cf. the commentary on 100[110]). There is a similar explanation for other compounds; the coming together of the ingredients is fortuitous (cf. Aristotle *GC* 333b10–11), but where the proportions in which they come together are appropriate, Aphrodite produces an organism or organic part, cf. the commentaries on 60(71) and 70(75).

### 83(98)

*And earth, anchored in the perfect harbors of Aphrodite, chanced to come together with them in almost equal quantities, with Hephaistos and rain and all-shining air, either a little more, or less where there was more. From these came blood and the forms of different flesh.*

The first line is quoted by Simplicius in the list of fragments on  $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta$  (cf. the commentary on 70[75]), and the five lines in a general discussion of Love and Strife both being active in the present world, of Philia/Aphrodite as the craftsman, and here specifically of E.’s terminology for the roots; fire is called Hephaistos, *hēlios*, and *phlox*, water *ombros*, and air *aithēr*. The fragment explains the formation of blood, and it is the blood

around the heart that is the organ of human thought, cf. 94(105).3. Theophrastus gives the reason for this: διὸ καὶ τῷ αἵματι μάλιστα φρονεῖν· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα κεκρᾶσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν μερῶν (*Sens.* 10). Blood is composed of fire, air, earth, and water combined in a ratio approximating to 1 : 1 : 1 : 1. The exact proportion was present throughout the sphere under Love's complete control, and the combination which now comes nearest to that is found in blood. The importance of blood as the instrument of thought and the best work of Aphrodite, which is explained in the *Physics*, immediately illuminates the prohibition against bloodshed, set out forcefully in the *Katharmoi*. How well the organ functions depends on the proportion of the constituent ingredients in its physical structure. Two further examples are given by Theophrastus in his notice that a particular skill is due to the μέση κρᾶσις in an organ—the orator, who has a good mixture in his tongue, and the craftsman, who has one in his hands, *Sens.* 10–11.

1 ἢ δὲ χθών: as in 48(96), earth gives a secure hold to the other elements, as well as being an integral part of their composition.

2: for the variety of terms for the four roots cf. the table in chap. 2.

3: the metaphor of “perfect harbors” is unexpected. In other comparable fragments Aphrodite/Kypris is active, fitting together, 60(71); nailing, 86(87); gluing, 48(96); molding, 85(86); working with her hands, 70(75) and 87(95); and generally being busy, 62(73). I suspect that the reference here is to the womb, where the tissues are first formed, cf. Sophocles *OT* 1208, and E.’s metaphor at 55(66). The harbor is “perfect,” but the somewhat random coming together of the roots into it results in the imperfection; Kypris produces the best possible result from the given material, cf. the activity of the Demiurge, Plato *Tim.* 41d.

4 †εἴτε πλέον ἐστίν†: Professor Dodds suggested εἴτ’ ἐν πλεόνεσσιν to me for this crux. The proportion is not perfect, cf. ἴση μάλιστα in line 1, and so the amount of earth does not exactly match the separate amounts of fire, air, and water, but may be a little more (with less of the other three) or less (where they are more).

5 ἄλλης εἶδεα σαρκός: cf. Aetius 5.22.1 Ἐ. τὰς μὲν σάρκας γεννᾶσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἴσων τῇ κρᾶσει τεττάρων στοιχείων. The *eidos* is given by the proportion of the constituent ingredients—with less earth there is blood, and with more, flesh, cf. Hipp. *Nat. Puer.* 15 of the fetus: τοῦ αἵματος . . . πηγνυμένου σὰρξ γίνεται.



## FRAGMENTS 84–93 SIGHT, RESPIRATION, AND SMELL

**84(85)**

*The gentle flame met with a slight portion of earth.*

The verse comes after the first line of the previous fragment in the list of quotations by Simplicius illustrating E.'s use of *τύχη*, in *Phys.* 331.7. In the introduction to the previous fragment at in *Phys.* 32, *phlox* was listed with Hephaistos as one of E.'s terms for fire. It is not known to which of the *μύρια τῶν ζώων* the verse refers, but from the description of the constituent fire and the amount of earth it is reasonable to suggest the eye. *μυνηθαδής*: literally "short-lived" in Homer, cf. of Hector, *Il.* 15.612, and men in general, *Od.* 19.328. The adjective is a reminder that the combination of ingredients that constitute the bodily parts is temporary, cf. 12(8).

**85(86)**

*Out of these the goddess Aphrodite fashioned untiring eyes.*

If the previous fragment refers to eyes a lacuna follows, as water and air are also in the eye, cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 7. This line occurs with the two following fragments in Simplicius' list of examples of the work of Kypris/Aphrodite on the roots to produce organic parts.

For *ἐπηξε* cf. the similar use of the verb at 70(75), 78(107), and also 106(15).4.

**86(87)**

*Aphrodite, having fitted (them) with rivets of affection*

The line is given by Simplicius as coming soon after the previous one, and presumably in the same context of the formation of eyes. *ἀσκεῖν*, like *πηγύναι*, is for the work of a craftsman. The *γόμφοι* (cf. 61[33]), rather than nailing the eyes to the skull or connecting them with each other (cf. 89[88]), bind the constituent elements to each other (cf. *Tim.* 43a of the gods working on fire and water). They are bonds of affection in that Love brings the elements together and also makes them want to

stay together, contrary to their tendency to stay with their own kind, cf. 14(21).8 and 25(22).5.

### 87(95)

*When they first grew together in the hands of Kypris*

The line comes after the two previous fragments in the same context of Kypris/Aphrodite as the craftsman, but it is concerned with the specific reason why some see better at night and others by day. The subject of the verb would then be an expression for parts of fire and water, for eyes with less fire in their constitution see better by day, and those with less water, by night, cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 8 and the commentary on the next fragment.

### 88(84)

*As when a man who intends to make a journey prepares a light for himself, a flame of fire burning through a wintry night; he fits linen screens against all the winds which break the blast of the winds as they blow, but the light that is more diffuse leaps through, and shines across the threshold with unfailing beams. In the same way the elemental fire, wrapped in membranes and delicate tissues, was then concealed in the round pupil—these kept back the surrounding deep water, but let through the more diffuse light.*

The fragment is given by Aristotle with a brief comment that E. at one time, apparently, explains vision by an issue of light from the eye and at another by effluences from the objects seen. Alexander paraphrases the fragment in his commentary on Aristotle here and refers it to Plato's exposition of E.'s theory in the *Meno* (76c–d). Eusebius mentions the adjective in κύκλοπα κούρην as a poetic application of Κύκλωψ (*Od.* 20.19). The whole passage is Homeric in vocabulary and rhythm, as well as in the simile form, cf. especially lines 1 and *Od.* 2.20, 2 and *Il.* 12.279 and 8.563, 3 and *Il.* 2.397, 4 and *Il.* 5.525, and 8 and *Il.* 18.595.

2 διὰ νύκτα: "through the night," cf. *Il.* 2.57 and commonly in Homer; here, for the time the flame burns rather than the extent of the journey.

3 ἀμοργούς: the meaning is unclear, even to Alexander, but an appropriate sense is "linen" (cf. ὀθόνησι in line 8) from the famous Amor-gian flax, cf. Bollack *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 322. The traveler prepared the

lantern by lighting the wick, and then, since he was going out in bad weather, shielded the flame with screens of fine material attached to the frame (horn plates were also used for this purpose). *παντοίων ἀνέμων* is probably an independent genitive, the point being that, whatever the winds, the flame is safe because it is protected on four sides.

5 *ταναώτερον*: translated “more diffuse,” but literally “longer” or “more stretched out”; Alexander’s paraphrase gives *τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς τὸ λεπτότατον*.

6 *κατὰ βηλόν*: not the sky, as Alexander paraphrases from the Homeric threshold of Olympus, or a part of the lantern, but most obviously the threshold of the traveler’s house, where he pauses a moment to find his way by the lantern’s unfailing light (cf. *δμματα ἀτείρεα*, 85[86]).

7 *ὠγύγιον*: an obscure word which seems to mean “ancient,” “born long ago”; here, perhaps, from the contrast with *ἄφθιτον* for the water of Styx (Hesiod *Theog.* 805), “without a known beginning,” and appropriate therefore for the element of fire.

8 *λοχάζετο*: Guthrie accepts the reading *λοχέσαστο* from Förster and Ross, with the gynecologically peculiar sense “fire gave birth to,” *HGP* vol. 2, p. 235. Burnet had kept *λοχάζετο* with Aphrodite as subject and translated, “even so did she entrap the elemental fire, the round pupil,” but Bollack understands “ainsi alors Aphrodite couchait . . .” (vol. 3, p. 325). But the verb is more likely to be middle, with the general sense that the fire “kept itself concealed” in the dark aperture of the pupil—there is still the poetic ambiguity of the little girl with her soft wrappings and the center of the eye with its protective covering, cf. the note below on the whole fragment. The line *<αἶ> χοάνησι δίαντα τετρήατο θεσπεσίησιν*, which was made up by Blass from a reading in P of line 5 (cf. *ap. crit.*) and inserted here, should be discarded, cf. also Bollack *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 327. The syntax of the relative pronoun is strange, the composition from the version of a line four verses earlier in P is unwarranted, and it would be a physiological oddity to have *χοάνας*, “funnel-shaped holes,” in the protective membranes. (O’Brien seems unaware that the line on which he bases much of the argument of his article, *JHS* 1970, pp. 140–79, is an intrusion into the text.) If anything is to be salvaged from the confused line in P, it is that there are pores in the fire.

The structure of the eye as presented here is remarkably accurate. Seven extant fragments deal with the eyes; it is clear that E. was interested in and may well have examined in detail their composition and functioning (Alcmaeon is said to have dissected the eye, cf. DK 24 A10). The conclusions appear to be as follows: the fiery part of the eye (i.e., the lens,



cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 37 and J. I. Beare *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition* p. 10) is concealed behind the dark opening of the pupil and protected by membranes and tissues (in fact, by the colored membrane of the iris and by the ciliary processes and fibers). These are composed of earth and air (cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 7, where Diels's addition of <ὕδωρ καὶ> is unnecessary and confusing). Surrounding the membranes, and prevented by them from quenching the fire, is water (in effect in the anterior and posterior chambers, and there is also the vitreous body behind; the general correctness of E.'s account can be seen from a comparison with figs. 13.13 and 13.18 in *Gray's Anatomy* 1973, pp. 1045 and 1048). There are pores in the fire and in the water, and these "alternate" in that the water is on either side of the fire (τοὺς δὲ πόρους ἐναλλάξ κεῖσθαι τοῦ τε πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος, Thphr. loc. cit.; for a restricted sense of ἐναλλάξ cf. ἰσχεῖν τὼ ποδ' ἐναλλάξ, Aristoph. *Nub.* 983). Vision occurs when effluences from objects fit into these pores, dark colors being seen when their effluences fit into the pores of water, and light colors when their effluences fit into the pores of fire (cf. Plato *Meno* 76c, Thphr. *Sens.* 7, Aristotle *Sens.* 438a4; 77(109) is a general statement of awareness and recognition, and not relevant for the detailed functioning of the eyes, cf. the commentary on that fragment). Eyes that have less fire, i.e., a smaller pupil and lens, see better by day, and those with more fire, by night (Thphr. *Sens.* 8; this is an obvious conclusion from the dilation of pupils in poor light). The former type of eyes are black or dark, the latter *glaukos* (a conjecture criticized by Aristotle, *GA* 779b15). And, according to Theophrastus *Sens.* 8, the best eyes have equal proportions of fire and water (i.e., the amount of fire in the lens and the amount of water in the surrounding chambers are equivalent; the vitreous body would not come into the calculations).

But in quoting the fragment in the *De Sensu* Aristotle says that at one time E. apparently explains vision by fire coming from the eye, as here, and at another by effluences from what is seen. (For a discussion of the two versions, cf. A. A. Long, *CQ* 1966, pp. 262-64; W. J. Verdenius, *Studia Vollgraff* 1948, pp. 155-64; D. O'Brien, *JHS* 1970, pp. 140-46 and the bibliography given, pp. 157-58.) There is no incompatibility here. From Plato and Theophrastus it is clear that for E. vision occurs when the effluences fit into the pores of the eye (cf. *Meno* 76c, *Sens.* 7), and there is no question of a coalescence of fire from the eye and light from the object, as in Plato *Tim.* 45b, *Theaet.* 156d. But light from fire within the eye is as necessary for vision as external light, and the two are complementary (for eyes with less fire see better by day, and those with more, by night,

*Sens.* 8). The main point of the lantern simile, moreover, is to show the function of the membranes, which keep the water in the eye from the fire but allow the fire to penetrate.

(There is a faint possibility that E. understood the working of the lens to be comparable to that of the sun, cf. the commentary on 36(44): effluences are collected on the outer convex surface and then refracted from the inner convex surface to the back of the eye, in fact, to the retina. The fire in the eye would then be like a lantern, but with only two opposite sides emitting light. The light penetrates outside the organ to contribute to the light necessary for sight (and also probably to account for “flashing” eyes), but it also refracts the image of light-colored objects through the vitreous body to the back of the organ, in order to give the actual perception of the object. As well as receiving effluences into its pores, the eye, like any other object, gives off its own, cf. the commentary on 73[89].)

### 89(88)

*from both (eyes) comes one seeing*

The point of the fragment is not known, as it is quoted by Aristotle and Strabo only for the form  $\delta\psi$  instead of  $\delta\psi\epsilon\varsigma$ . And since the word is ambiguous, the sense may be either that the two eyes focus on a single subject or that one vision results from the impression on two eyes. The former is the version attributed to Pythagoras and Parmenides (for the rays from each eye embrace the object like outstretched hands, *Aet.* 4.13.9–10), but the latter is more appropriate for E.’s theory. Perhaps he adapted Alcmaeon’s view, or saw independently, that a “path” from each eye joins at the point where the two impressions are combined (and this also explains why the two eyes move together, cf. Chalcidius, DK 24 A10). The next stage for E. would be for the composite impression to be accepted by the blood and taken to the heart, rather than received in the brain.

### 90(94)

*And black color in the depths of a river comes from the shadow, and is seen in the same way in hollowed caverns.*

The fragment occurs in one of the eight “questions” from Plutarch’s *quaest. nat.*, preserved only in the Latin translation of Gilbert Longeuil.



The "question" is, "Cur aqua in summa parte alba, in fundo vero nigra spectatur?" The first suggestion, for which E.'s lines are quoted in support, is that the surface is illuminated by the sun, but the force of the rays is diminished when they penetrate deep water. Now, E. held water to be black and fire white, and black to be perceived by the water in the eye, and white by the fire (Thphr. *Sens.* 17, and cf. the commentary on the previous fragment). Water, therefore, when it is out of reach of the sun's illumination, as in the depths of a river or in underground caves, appears black, cf. 14(21).5. The fragment and its context imply an interest on E.'s part in the nature and extent of the penetration of water by light. Gilbert Longeuil's translations from the Greek, where they can be checked, are not accurate, cf. F. H. Sandbach's introduction to the Loeb translation, *Plutarch's Moralia* XI, p. 142. I tentatively suggest the following as an attempt at restoring the original Greek:

καὶ μέλαν ἐν βένθει ποταμοῦ χρωμ' ἐκ σκοτόεντος,  
ἥδ' ἐνορᾶται ὁμῶς ταῦτ' ἐγκοίλοισιν ἐν ἀντροῖς.

### 91(100)

*This is the way in which all things breathe in and out: they all have channels of flesh, which the blood leaves, stretched over the surface of the body, and at the mouth of these the outside of the skin is pierced right through with close-set holes, so that blood is contained, but a passage is cut for air to pass through freely. Then, when the smooth blood rushes away from the surface, a wild surge of blustering air rushes through, and when the blood leaps up, the air breathes out again. It is like a girl playing with a clepsydra of shining bronze—when she puts the mouth of the pipe against her pretty hand and dips it into the smooth body of shining water, no liquid yet enters the vessel, but the mass of air pressing from within against the close-set perforations holds it back until she releases the compressed current, and then, as the air escapes, a due amount of water enters. Similarly, when she has water in the hollow of the bronze vessel, and the neck and passage are closed by human hand, the air outside, pressing inward, keeps the water in at the gates of the harsh-sounding strainer, controlling the defenses, until the girl releases her hand; then, the reverse of the former process—as the air rushes in, a due amount of water runs out before it. In the same way, when the smooth blood surging through the body rushes back and inward, a flooding stream of air at once comes pouring in, and when the blood leaps up, an equal amount (of air) in turn breathes back out again.*

Despite Aristotle's interest in E.'s theory of respiration, as shown by the



length of the quotation, he criticizes E. on three counts: (1) for not explaining the purpose of respiration, (2) for not making clear the kinds of ζῶα included in his theory, and (3) for supposing that nose-breathing is primary breathing. The lines are paraphrased somewhat ineptly by Michael of Ephesus, and briefly summarized at Aetius 4.22.1. An intimidating amount has been written on these twenty-five lines. Ancient commentaries are well summarized in Karsten *EAc* pp. 245–51, and in recent times the most interesting discussions are by J. U. Powell, *CQ* 1923, pp. 172–74; H. Last, *CQ* 1924, pp. 169–73; M. Timparano Cardini, *PP* 1957, pp. 250–70; D. J. Furley, *JHS* 1957, pp. 31–34; N. B. Booth, *JHS* 1960, pp. 10–15; G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* 1966, pp. 328–33; G. A. Seeck, *Hermes* 1967, pp. 36–41; T. D. Worthen, *Isis* 1970, pp. 520–30; D. O'Brien, *JHS* 1970, pp. 140–83; and cf. further his bibliographies on pp. 170 and 176, n. 177. The fragment as a whole is here discussed after the notes.

1 πάντα: cf. 93(102); a general theory of respiration is to be given, and, as Aristotle complains, we do not know exactly what types of life are included in it. λίφαιμοι: translated “bloodless” by Burnet, Kirk-Raven, and others, but it is said in lines 4–5 that there is blood in the tubes. Booth, Guthrie, and Bollack have “partly filled with blood,” “containing little blood,” and “pauvre en sang” respectively from Aristotle *Resp.* 473b2, but these do not explain the adjective and go ill with the language of “rushing” and “leaping” that characterizes the movement of this blood. The prefix is generally passive, “left by” and so “with-out,” but it can be active, cf. Euripides *Or.* 1305, and the description of Heracles in Theocritus 13.73 as λιπονάυτης, i.e., “a sailor who leaves,” “a deserter.” From this it is possible that σύριγγες λίφαιμοι are “channels that the blood leaves,” as they are filled alternately with blood and air; cf. also Sophocles *Ajax* 1412.

2 πύματον κατὰ σῶμα: “over the surface of the body,” πύματος being used not in the occasional late sense of “nethermost” but as in Homer for “outermost,” cf. *Il.* 6.118, 18.608, and also ῥινὸς ὑπὲρ πνύματης, *Il.* 13.616, of Menelaus’ strike above “the outside top end—i.e., the bridge—of the nose” between the eyes, which are dislodged by the blow.

4 ῥινῶν ἔσχατα τέρθρα: “the outer extremities of the skin,” i.e., the epidermis above the cutis; the meaning of ἔσχατα is clinched by comparing ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου, 47(35).10, the outside limit or circumference of the cosmos. The great controversy over whether ῥινῶν is genitive plural of ῥινός (“skin”) or of ῥίς (“nose”) is like that on μονή, 21(27).3,

22(28).4, as "rest" or "solitude." In both cases the first is the meaning appropriate to the context, but the ambiguity in the word chosen allows E. also to suggest the second, cf. Kahn's reference to "studied ambiguity in E.," *Gnomon* 1969, p. 439. Other examples of such "studied ambiguity" are *αἰδῆλον*, 77(109).2, *πολυκλαύτων*, 53(62).1, *πολυμνήστη*, 2(3).3, and *πύον*, 59(68).1. In the general theory, it would seem, E. supposed that primitive animal types breathe in and out through pores in the skin (and perhaps there is an implication that plants "breathe" through their leaf surfaces), but in the higher animal types there are two particularly large "holes" in the surface—the nostrils—which are primary examples of pore-breathing. And this would account for Aristotle's second and third criticisms. For Aristotle primary breathing is not nose-breathing but involves the special apparatus of the *artēria*.

If this interpretation of the lines is right, then the link between E.'s simple theory of nose-breathing as a form of skin-breathing with an oscillatory movement of blood and air, and the complexities of Plato's "circulation" of air involving skin, lungs, nose, and mouth (*Tim.* 79), may well be the medical emphasis on unimpeded cutaneous and nasal respiration in the healthy body, cf. Philistion *Anon. Lond.* 20.43–50. The account in Aetius 4.22.1 and 5.15.3 seems to mean that at birth the mucus in the body is ejected through the nose and mouth—the process is hastened by holding the baby up by its feet—as a preliminary to cutaneous and nasal inhalation of air. The instances of *ρίς* and *ρίνός* in Homer are listed by O'Brien, *JHS* 1970, pp. 173–74.

6 *ἐνθεν*: "from there," i.e., from the holes at the surface. For the movements of fire and air in lines 6–8 Bollack aptly compares the vocabulary in the to-and-fro fighting between Achilles and the river, *Empédocle* vol. 3, pp. 483–84, and *Il.* 21.233–71, especially 233–34.

8–25: the simile is in the standard Homeric form: (1) *x* is the case, (2) it is as when *y*, (3) even so is *x* the case. (3) repeats the original state of affairs given in (1), often in similar wording, cf. *Il.* 13.587, 21.361, 22.138, 188, 306 of Achilles and Hector, and many others. So here lines 22–24 repeat the general sense of 6–8; there is no reason to suppose that E. would deliberately avoid the repetition of (1) in (3). The child "playing" is introduced because it allows a possible move with the clepsydra (immersing it full of air in the water) that would not be shown in its orthodox use. (A child today will play in a similar manner with a drinking straw and a glass of liquid; the straw has only one perforation at the bottom end whereas the clepsydra has many, but it works on the same principle.)



9 κλεψύδρη: Diels's emendation; the accusative would refer to a well-known game. The clepsydra was a common household contrivance used for transferring small amounts of liquid from one container to another, and perhaps for measuring. It had a narrow opening at the top, which could be plugged by hand, and a perforated base, cf. the illustrations in Last, *CQ* 1924, p. 170, and Bollack *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 484. The clepsydra is used here in a simile in which the movement of air into and out of the openings of the body in respiration is compared to that of water into and out of the perforated base of the clepsydra; the fragment does not describe a controlled experiment of any kind. Worthen, *Isis* 1970, p. 527, aptly compares William Harvey saying that the heart is like a force pump; the clepsydra, like the force pump, is a basic model rather than an experimental device. διειπετέος: Bollack rejects the emendation and writes δι' εὑπετέος χαλκοῖο on the grounds that the extant examples of a clepsydra are pottery.

13 ἀέρος (perhaps ἥερος) ὄγκος: the emphatic assertion of the corporeality of air matching the pressure of ὕδατος δέμας.

15 πνεύματος ἐλλείποντος (ἐμπίπτοντος, line 21): the genitive absolutes on the movement of air correspond to the temporal clauses, lines 6 and 23, and 8 and 25, on the movement of blood, giving syntactical confirmation of the correspondence of air in the clepsydra to blood in the body. αἷσιμον ὕδωρ: cf. the same phrase in line 21. The "due amount" of water that enters and leaves the clepsydra is equivalent to the quantity of air it previously contained.

16 ὅτε . . . ἔχει: corresponds to εὔτε . . . βάπτῃσι, lines 10-11, the girl being the subject of both verbs; in her game she first has air in the clepsydra, and then water.

19: air outside keeps the water in the clepsydra in a state of siege; the gates are the exit for the water, i.e., the perforations, through which it rushes at the first opportunity. The irregular gurgling made by the water entering and filling the strainer accounts for its being called δυσῆχής. ἰσθμοῖο, interpreted as "of the neck end," is irrelevant in the context, and the reading ἡθμοῖο preferable.

22 κλαδασσόμενον: glossed by Michael, in *PN* 124.15, as μετὰ ῥύμης καὶ παραχῆς.

23: Homeric phrasing, cf. *Od.* 22.270 of the suitors retreating before Odysseus.

This fragment gives the first extant Greek physiological theory to connect respiration with the movement of the blood. E. recognizes that the blood is in continuous motion as air is inspired and exhaled; the



movement, however, is not circular but oscillatory, being to and from the body's surface in the same "channels." The details of the comparison with the clepsydra are set out below, and some explanatory notes added.

*Respiration and the Simile of the Clepsydra*

*Breathing in:*

A(i)	<i>static:</i>	blood inside	(restraint of pores)	air outside, lines 4-5
A(ii)	<i>inhale:</i>	blood to center away from holes	<i>followed by</i>	air in through holes, lines 6, 23-24
a(i)	<i>static:</i>	air inside	(air pressure)	water outside, lines 10-14
a(ii)	<i>unplug:</i>	air out up away from holes	<i>followed by</i>	water in through holes, line 15

*Breathing out:*

B(i)	<i>static:</i>	blood withdrawn at center		air inside
B(ii)	<i>exhale:</i>	blood to surface toward holes	<i>follows</i>	air out through holes, lines 8, 25
b(i)	<i>static:</i>	air outside		water inside, lines 16-19
b(ii)	<i>unplug:</i>	air in down toward holes	<i>follows</i>	water out through holes, lines 20-21

*Notes*

Air in (a) and (b) is the analogue of blood in (A) and (B), and water in (a) and (b) is the analogue of air in (A) and (B); the correspondence is reinforced by the syntax of subordination, cf. the commentary on line 15.

The detailed explanation of a(i) and b(i) establishes that a stream of air and a stream of liquid can occupy the same amount of space and exert equivalent pressures.

Holes at the base of the clepsydra are analogous to pores in the skin (including, I suggest, the two big "pores" of the nostrils). There is some correspondence between the restraint of the pores at the surface of the body and the pressure of air at the perforated surface of the clepsydra in keeping the two elements separate at the "static" stage of A(i) and a(i).

The deliberate unplugging by the child in a(ii) and b(ii) is analogous to the mechanical initiation of movement in the blood.

The failure of the comparison, that air goes right outside the clepsydra through the top vent in a(ii) but blood does not leave the body, is diminished by concentrating on the movements in relation to the perforated surface in each case.

There is no implication of void in E.'s theory of respiration. Line 23 refers to the area of the heart and lungs that expands with blood and air during inhalation and returns to normal during exhalation. It is not that a previous "void" is filled but that additional material is taken in, and the chest expands to accommodate it.

## 92(101)

*Tracking with nostrils fragments of animal bodies (which they) left from their paws on the soft grass*

It is not certain that the two lines are consecutive, but the immediate context in the sources suggests a close relationship. Plutarch quotes the first in a simile about hounds trained to concentrate on a single scent (*curios.* 520e–f) and, under the heading of why spoors are difficult to track in spring (*quaest. nat.* 917e), as part of an explanation of how dogs keep to a trail by picking up the ἀπορροιαί left by animals. The second line is quoted by Alexander in a question about the extinction of the body's distinctive odor at death.

1 κέρματα: the first word was obviously puzzling, as the variants show. There are only late parallels for κέρματα as “fragments,” but κείρω is well established (and cf. κερματίζω, Plato *Rep.* 525e, *Tim.* 62a). μωκτῆρες, specifically for “nostrils,” was not used in the previous fragment, but it was obviously available if an unambiguous reference to nasal breathing only were needed.

2: for various suggestions for filling the lacuna, cf. the *ap. crit.* If this line follows the preceding one, a neuter plural subject for the verb would be needed, relating to the previous genitives. Perhaps the original was something like <ὅσος> ἀπέλειπε ποδῶν <τοιαῦτα> ἀπαλῇ περιῖ ποίῃ, cf. τὰς ἀπορροίας . . . ἃς ἐναπολείπει τὰ θηρία τῇ ὕλῃ in Plutarch's paraphrase, *quaest. nat.* 917e. Whatever the reading, it is clear that a physical explanation of smell is put forward. The odor is a series of effluent particles that meet the nostrils of the trained hound, and so indicate the trail, cf. the next fragment.

## 93(102)

*In this way all things are apportioned breathing and smelling.*

Theophrastus briefly summarizes E.'s theory of smell at *Sens.* 9 and criticizes it in some detail in 21–22, where the quotation is given as the climax of E.'s account. The context shows that ὁσμή (or ὀδμή) is to be understood as the sense rather than the object of smell, but the ambiguity, strengthened by the plural, persists; the emission of odors, as well as the ability, however primitive, to perceive them, is general. The point that leads to the climax of this line in Theophrastus is that smelling relates to

breathing and is explicable by it: ὀσφρησιν δὲ γίνεσθαι τῇ ἀναπνοῇ, *Sens.* 9. Theophrastus counters this with examples of animals that do not breathe but have a sense of smell, and also by saying that if the keenest sense of smell accompanies the most vigorous breathing, then those with short or labored breath should be most sensitive to smells, which is not the case (*Sens.* 21–22). For Theophrastus, breathing is not the αἴτιον of smell but is connected with it κατὰ συμβεβηκός; however, his excessive zeal in criticizing E. leads to inconsistencies in his own theory (cf. G. M. Stratton *Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle* pp. 39–40). Odor, for E., is the actual emanation from the object that stimulates the sense when it is symmetrical with the pores of the organ. In man and developed forms of animal life the organ is most obviously the nostrils, and despite Theophrastus, it seems E. was aware that respiratory difficulties affect the sense of smell, cf. Aetius 4.17.2. It was argued in the commentary on 91(100) that pores over the skin, including the nostrils, are involved in respiration, so it is likely that E. recognized the sensitivity to smell that extends over the body in lower forms of life—and the wide application of both kinds of smelling is indicated by πάντα here, corresponding to that in 91(100).1. On the modernity of E. here cf. *Chambers Enc.* s.v. “Taste and Smell,” where it is said that the entry of odorous molecules into ultramicroscopic holes pierced in the outer covering of the body’s structure is still the accepted explanation of the working of this sense, and *Enc. Brit. Macr.* IV, p. 188a, where the entry of odorant particles into special receptive “sockets” on the cell surface is put forward as one of the latest theories in the still unresolved debate over how smell works.

#### FRAGMENTS 94–101 MIND, HOLY MIND, AND THE ADVANTAGE OF RIGHT THINKING

##### 94(105)

(the heart) nourished in seas of blood coursing to and fro, and there above all is what men call thought, because, for men, blood around the heart is thought.

The lines are quoted in Stobaeus from Porphyry’s *De Styge*. The cognitive function of the concentration of blood around the heart is connected to Homeric evidence that the heating of the heart-blood in anger results in temporary loss of reason.



1: Grotius's *τετραμμένη* is generally accepted for *τετραμμένα*, except by Bollack, who keeps the MSS reading, *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 445. He suggests an adaptation of Homer's description of the four springs by Circe's cave (*Od.* 5.70–71) for the four elements centered around the heart. (Variations, however, on *τετραμμένος* occur in the same fourth foot position six times in Homer, which may account for the reading here.) A subject is required, possibly *κραδίη* (the heart being the first organ to be articulated in the embryo, Censorinus 6.1, DK 31 A84), rather than *φρήν* or *φρόνησις*, which would preempt *νόημα* in the following lines. *ἀντιθορόντος* (Scaliger's emendation of *ἀντιθ(ο)ρώντος*) could not be "leap to meet" (LSJ) but "leap up in turn," cf. *κραδίη ἐκθρόσκει*, *Il.* 10.94, and *ἀναθρόσκειν* of the blood in 91(100).8, 25. Blood moves to and from the heart as it balances the intake and exhalation of air in respiration.

2 *μάλιστα*: for thought by other means in the body cf. 1(2).1 and 5(3).4–8. *κυκλίσκεται*: the suggestion *κυκλίσκεται* is unsuitable, as the movement of the blood for E. is oscillatory and not circulatory, and the verb is unknown.

3 *ἀνθρώποις*: all things think (cf. 100(110).10), and the quality of the thought depends on the constituent elements. For men these are best blended in the blood, but there is thinking inferior and superior to that of man, cf. chap. 3. *περικάρδιον*: first attested here but taken up in medical writings and in the Aristotelian commentators, cf. Rufus *Onom.* 163, Galen *us. part.* 6.16, Simplicius in *Phys.* 392.24. The third line is quoted separately in the Etymologies and frequently paraphrased, e.g., Cicero *Tusc.* 1.19 "E. animam esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem," Macrobius *Somn. Scip.* 1.14 and Tertullian *De Anim.* 5 "E. a sanguine animam," Galen *Plac. Hipp.* 2.8.

In the fifth century Greek medicine was divided on the question of the heart or brain being the center of intelligence. The context of this fragment shows the survival of the adducement of Homeric evidence for the connection of the heart with thinking. It is hard to assess the influence E. might have had in the debate, but his stand is echoed in some of the Hippocratic writings, in Aristotle, and in the Epicureans and Stoics. (In *De Corde* 10, for example, man's intelligence is situated specifically in the left chamber of the heart; this was thought to be filled with an airlike substance having some affinities to Stoic *pneuma*, cf. C. R. S. Harris *The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine* pp. 94, 238–41, and *passim*.) E.'s particular innovation, however, is to relate thought not to the heart but to the blood coursing around it, cf. Aetius

4.5.8, Theodoretus 5.22. A detailed commentary giving evidence from observation on the connection of the constitution of the blood with intelligence is found in the Hippocratic *Flat.* 14, ending *ἔχοιμι δ' ἂν πολλὰ τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν, ἐν οἷσιν αἱ τοῦ αἵματος ἐξαλλαγαὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἐξαλλάσσουσιν*, and cf. *Reg.* 1.25 and *Anon. Lond.* 1 on Hippias of Croton. For E. it is the exact mixture of the four roots in the blood that accounts for thought, and also probably for the prohibition against bloodshed given in the *Katharmoi* (cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 10 and frs. 122–25). It also seems likely that blood played a physical part in bringing to the cardinal nexus the understanding achieved by the *πόροι νοῆσαι* spread over the body, 5(3).4, 7, and cf. 1(2).1. There is a concentration of blood in the individual organs, which accounts for their relative efficiency (cf. Theophrastus *Sens.* 24), and in respiration the blood in the vessels oscillates between the pores at the surface of the body and the area of the heart.

### 95(132)

*Happy the man who has gained the wealth of divine understanding, wretched he who cherishes an unenlightened opinion about the gods.*

The fragment is given by Clement in a series of “thefts” from Greek texts to parallel Christian writings, and he emphasizes the connection of knowledge with happiness, and ignorance with unhappiness. But there is also in the fragment the Parmenidean contrast between knowledge and light and *doxa* and darkness (and cf. *σκοτίη γνώμη*, Democritus fr. 11).

The fragment connects closely with the next two, which give part of the content of the required understanding, with 99(129) in the example of the man who did achieve understanding, and with 100(110), which shows how the individual will be *δλβιος* or *δειλός*. The physiological term *πραπίδες* in line 1 here, 99(129).2, 4, and 100(110).1 strengthens the connection, and the phrase *πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον* is actually repeated at 99(129).2. The remaining fragments from here to the end of the *Physics* cohere and plausibly belong together in this position, cf. chap. 4. On *πραπίδες* and thought cf. Hesiod *Theog.* 656 and the commentary on 100(110).

### 96(133)

*It is not possible to bring (the divine) close within reach of our eyes or to grasp him with the hands, by which the broadest path of persuasion for men leads to the mind.*



Clement quotes the fragment with Solon fr. 16 and John 1.18 on the divine as invisible. Theodoretus, no doubt copying him, connects it with 6(4).1–2 (which supports the assignation to the *Physics*), Solon fr. 16, and Antisthenes fr. 24 in the context of relying on *πίστις* when the senses prove inadequate. (Solon's fr. 17 is even more relevant: *πάντη δ' ἄθανάτων ἀφανὴς νόος ἀνθρώποισιν*.) The fragment contrasts knowledge within the range of the senses (the senses, for example, perceive the characteristics and activity of earth, air, fire, and water) and knowledge outside the range of the senses, such as that of the nature of the divine, cf. the commentary on Philia, 8(17).21, 25–26.

1 *πελάσασθαι*: the transitive use of the middle is paralleled in *Il.* 17.341; for the meaning of the line cf. Diels *Hermes* 1880, pp. 171–72, with reference to *Il.* 1.587, 3.306.

2 *ἤπερ*: Karsten's emendation has been retained, the relative referring to both sight and touch, which are the most convincing of the senses. The "wagon road" exaggerates the *πόρος νοῆσαι* of 5(3).7, cf. *ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή*, 103(114).3 and Parmenides fr. 4.4. The road to understanding via the senses is direct and unimpeded, but it is not the way by which the divine is grasped.

### 97(134)

*For he is not equipped with a human head on a body, [two branches do not spring from his back,] he has no feet, no swift knees, no shaggy genitals, but he is mind alone, holy and inexpressible, darting through the whole cosmos with swift thoughts.*

The five lines are quoted by Ammonius in a context of E.'s censure of anthropomorphic gods, where, in particular, Apollo is referred to, and in these lines, *τὸ θεῖον πᾶν*. Tzetzes, *Chil.* 13.74–78, gives the five lines as a summary of E.'s view of god, as well as lines 4–5 at *Chil.* 7.517–18, which are prefaced with 'E. *τῷ τρίτῳ τε τῶν Φυσικῶν δεικνύων*. The defense of Tzetzes against Diels here (and Diels's assignation of the fragment to the *Katharmoi*) has been taken up by Wilamowitz, *Kleine Schriften* p. 498; Bignone, *Empédocle* pp. 631–49; Zuntz, *Persephone* pp. 214–18; van der Ben, *Proem* pp. 44–46; and see chap. 3. The first line is given by Olympiodorus on E.'s anticipation of Plato's denial of anything *σωματικόν* to god, and the whole fragment without line 2 is in the margin.

Following the marginalia I would write the fragment without the second line. It does not fit grammatically after the first, the point is made without including shoulders and arms with the other parts mentioned,



and the fragment has elegance and balance as a quatrain. The line comes from 22(29/28).1 (and little rests on whether the active or middle form of the verb is read), where it starts a similar quatrain—two lines of denial of anthropomorphic organs and two of positive definition. The rhythm and details of the first couplet of this fragment recall Hephaestus wiping his face, hands, neck, and shaggy chest at *Il.* 18.413–14 (which probably accounts for the variants *χέρες* for *πόδες*, and *στήθεα* for *μήδεα* in line 3).

4 *ἐπλετο*: for the aorist of the verb with present sense, cf. *Il.* 2.480, 6.434, 7.31, *Od.* 21.397.

5 *φροντίσι*: the Homeric use of the dative with *ἀτσων* and compounds is for rushing with a sword or spear, *Il.* 8.88, 10.348, 11.361, or with horses, 17.460. E. here gives a striking adaptation of the epic construction, combined with the Homeric recognition of the speed of thought, cf. *Od.* 7.36.

Ammonius and Tzetzes emphasize that the fragment is E.'s definition of god, and his own recognition of innovation here is seen in 3(131) and 95(132). He is giving an *ἀγαθὸς λόγος* of the gods to counteract the dark *doxa* which makes men miserable. The true gods are earth, air, fire, and water, and Philia and Neikos, cf. 7(6), 51(59), 8(17).24, 11(16); traditional gods are combinations of the four roots formed in the same way as plants, animals, and men. But the sphere is a god, comprising the four roots, which have been brought together by Philia in balance, joy, and stillness, cf. 21(27), 22(29/28), 24(31). The *φρὴν ἑρῇ* is surely to be connected with it, as the similarities between this fragment and 22(29/28) show. The four roots in proportion give thought; for man the best mixture is achieved in the blood, which is consequently the instrument of thought (cf. 94(105) and Theophrastus *Sens.* 10), but for the god the mixture is exact, a one-to-one proportion of the elements throughout. This means that the *φρὴν* is physical (cf. *καταΐσσεται* used of the intake of air, 91(100).7) but inaccessible to the senses, for perfect mixture has no perceptible qualities, cf. chap. 3, pp. 73–74. The *φρὴν ἑρῇ* would be that which now remains of the sphere-god after the shattering of its unity and rest by Strife—holding at the circumference and, in the form of swift thoughts, darting through the whole. The new sense of *κόσμος* (cf. Heraclitus fr. 30), emphasized by *ἅπας*, broadens traditional views of god and opens the way to a new theology based on the denial of anthropomorphic features, the positive connection with thought, and the world dimension that has been adumbrated by Xenophanes, frs. 23–26. For the connection of this fragment with the daimons, cf. the commentary on 107(115).

Ammonius indicates that E. specifically criticized the traditional view of Apollo. Apart from a *Proem* to Apollo attributed to E. (D.L. 8.57; see chap. 1 and the context of 35[41]), a connection between E. and Apollo is lacking, and an introduction of the Pythagoreans is unhelpful (cf. Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 256, n. 1). If Ammonius is correct, two explanations for a connection may tentatively be put forward: (1) as prophets, minstrels, and healers instantiate the highest type of life on earth (132(146).1), the patron of these ways of life would be held in highest regard; (2) Apollo is to be explained as the intelligent source of heavenly fire and so accounts for Hippolytus' notice that E. identified *ὁ θεός* with *νοερὸν πῦρ*, . . . *καὶ (ἐφη) συνεστάναι ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυθήσεσθαι* (*RH* 1.3, DK 31 A31). The basic idea here (in spite of confusion with Heraclitus and the Stoics), that everything has its origin and end in an intellectual but physically based principle of world dimensions, supports the contention that *φρῆν* *ἐεργή* is derived from and will again identify with the god of 22(29/28). (S.M. Darcus, "Daimon Parallels the Holy Phren in E.," *Phronesis* 22, pp. 175–90, analyzes the meaning of *φρῆν* in terms of activity and shape and of the cognates *φρόντις* and *φρονεῖν*. The conclusions that the "sphere of Love" is one of the stages of the Holy Phren's activity and that the spherical shape persists are in agreement with the above argument, but the suggestion that the Phren has only two *phrontides*—Love and Hate—is without foundation. Some clarification of *phrontides*, or at least a dual, is needed to support such a basic identification, but there is no hint in E. or the doxography that *νεῖκος*, described as *οὐλόμενον* and *μαινόμενον*, is a *phrontis* of god, and that half his thinking is concerned with hate. Aristotle expressly denies it, *Metaph.* 1000b5, and cf. further the commentary on 107[115].)

### 98(27a)

*no discord or unseemly warring in the limbs*

Bergk attributed the line, quoted anonymously in Plutarch, to E. The attribution is justified, for *Δῆρις* is contrasted with *Ἀρμονίη* in 116(122).2, *ἐν μελέεσσιν* repeats the phrase at 23(30).1, and Plutarch's context of *φιλία* and *φιλοφροσύνη* is Empedoclean, cf. 119(130).2.

All editors accept without question the reference of this fragment to the description of the sphere in 21(27) and 22(29/28). The "limbs" are said to be those of the sphere given in 23(30).1 and 24(31), and when the roots come together in Love, Strife obviously is absent. But Plutarch has



no hint of such a cosmic explanation. He is speaking of the man who comes to virtue through philosophy by means of "the speech in the mind" (ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), which aims at *philia*. Such a man is σύμφωνος ἑαυτῷ, full of φιλοφροσύνη; the absence of *stasis* and *dēris* is explained as the absence of conflict between πάθος and λόγος—all his parts are εὐμενῇ (cf. the use of εὐμενέως, 100(110).2) and φίλα (cf. the description of the wise man in Horace *Sat.* 2.7.86, "in se totus, teres atque rotundus"). The line therefore probably belongs with the contrast, given in 100(110), between following E.'s philosophy and yielding to human desires, and with the example of the wise man in 99(129)—i.e., one who instantiates, as far as possible, divine intelligence in man. The observed behavior of earth, air, fire, and water, and of Love and Strife, reflects their cosmic activity, cf. the commentary on 25(22); divinity and holy thought are explained in terms of the harmonious mixture of constituent parts (cf. the commentary on the previous fragment), and it would be observed in man that attention to the right kind of thinking results in the physical constitution of the individual being balanced and strifeless, cf. the commentaries on the next two fragments. To this extent the individual is a microcosm.

### 99(129)

*And there was among them a man knowing an immense amount, who had acquired a great treasure of thoughts, master especially of all kinds of wise works; for whenever he reached out with all his thoughts, easily he saw each of the things that there are, in ten and even twenty generations of men.*

A reference to Pythagoras here is given in the source common to Iamblichus and Porphyry, and also in Diogenes Laertius (from Timaeus), who adds that some say that Parmenides is meant. This suggests that the person was anonymous in E. but easily assumed to be Pythagoras because of his proverbial wisdom, cf. Heraclitus frs. 40, 129, Herodotus 4.95. Parmenides is an attractive suggestion for the reference, and his influence on E. is pervasive, but the recognition of plurality and time implicit in the last two lines requires explanation.

The meaning of ἐν κείνοισιν, and so the context of the whole fragment, is in dispute. Editors after Stein assign it to the "Golden Age" of 118(128).<sup>1</sup> because of the repetition of ἐν κείνοισιν. But the reason is insufficient. Pythagoras did not live in the distant past, and if the refer-



ence is anonymous, what is the significance of an exceptionally wise but unknown person living then? Nor is it a solution to put Pythagoras in an age of heroes preceding the present age of iron (as Zuntz does, *Persephone* p. 209), for E. surely would not have believed in a distinctive heroic age only fifty years before his own time. Van der Ben sees the *τῆς* as a netherworld guide, *Proem* p. 181. But these interpretations create unnecessary difficulties. In 95(132) the man who has a treasure of thoughts is congratulated, and in 100(110) Pausanias is exhorted to increase his wisdom by his own effort and concentration. Between the two it would be appropriate to cite as a model the example of a man, perhaps Pythagoras, who did have a treasure of thoughts and wide-ranging wisdom (cf. the exercises in concentration which aimed to enhance the strength of the soul, Burkert *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* p. 213).

3 σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων: cf. καλῶν ἔ. ἔργων, *Ion Eleg.* 1.15, where the καλὰ ἔργα of which Dionysus is master are drinking, playing, and thinking just thoughts. The phrase here covers understanding of different matters, and also perhaps the practical application of this understanding, especially in medicine, music, and prophecy, cf. 102(112).9-12 and 132(146).1-2. An exaggeration of the skills that come from increased understanding is given in 101(111). Zuntz, following Stein, transposes lines 2 and 3, although 1 and 2 are quoted as a couplet in Diogenes.

4 πραπίδεσιν: πραπίδες, recurring in this last group of fragments in the *Physics* at 95(132).1, 100(110).1, and 2 and 4 here, like φρήν and φρένες (cf. 96(133).3, 103(114).3, 8(17).14), is a reminder of the physical basis of thought. The verb ὀρέξαιτο also has a physical connotation, and it is picked up by ἐπορέξεαι in line 6 of the next fragment, which further anchors this fragment to its present position.

5 ῥεῖά γε: a comparison with ἀργαλήν γε, 103(114).2, tells against emendation here. For the metaphor in λεύσσεσκεν cf. Parmenides fr. 4.1.

6: for the reading of the line cf. Denniston *Greek Particles* p. 530 and van der Ben *Proem* p. 185. Ten and twenty are alternatives, and the numbers are not to be taken precisely, cf. the gifts ten and twenty times as great that Achilles would disdain, *Il.* 9.379, 22.349. It would be unwarranted to suppose that this line refers to Pythagoras remembering twenty, or an indefinite number, of incarnations, as has been understood by the commentators, e.g., Sturz ad loc., O'Brien *ECC* p. 335, n. 1, Burkert *Lore and Science* p. 213, Guthrie *HGP* vol. 2, p. 251, and if αἰών has only human connotations, the memory is of twenty incarnations as a man.

This is unlikely. The fragment sets out to describe a wise man, to be an example, I would suggest, for Pausanias. The wealth of wisdom acquired is emphasized in each of the first three lines; the last three show that when this wisdom is applied there is understanding of a comprehensive range of topics, covering a considerable extent of time. The last line could refer to the future rather than the past, and more plausibly so, given 132(146). The line is an adaptation of the assumed range of the prophet's wisdom,  $\delta\varsigma \eta\delta\eta \tau\acute{\alpha} \tau' \acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \tau\acute{\alpha} \tau' \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha \pi\rho\acute{o} \tau' \acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$ , *Il.* 1.70, and cf. Parmenides 4.1, 1.28.

### 100(110)

*If you push them firmly under your crowded thoughts, and contemplate them favorably with unsullied and constant attention, assuredly all these will be with you through life, and you will gain much else from them, for of themselves they will cause each thing to grow into the character, according to the nature of each. But if you yourself should reach out for things of a different kind, for the countless trivialities which come among men and dull their meditations, straightaway these will leave you as the time comes round, longing to reach their own familiar kind; for know that all things have intelligence and a share of thought.*

This important fragment is given by Hippolytus, who significantly links it with 107(115) and sees in it a reference to  $\nu\sigma\eta\tau\eta \tau\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\eta \tau\iota\varsigma \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$  other than Love and Strife. He gives the last line after 77(109) and applies it to parts of fire engaged in thought. This line is also quoted by Sextus, who takes it to include plants and animals. The fragment is discussed by H. Schwabl, *WS* 1956, pp. 49–56; A. A. Long *CQ* 1966, pp. 268–73; and Bollack, *Empédocle* vol. 3, pp. 576–85, who prints it as the last fragment of the poem.

1:  $\sigma\phi\alpha\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\nu$  is unknown, hence the correction to  $\sigma\phi' \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\nu\eta\sigma\iota\nu$  ( $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\omicron \pi\rho\alpha\pi\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\iota\nu$ )—the throbbing, crowded thoughts in the thorax under which “they” are to be pushed (cf. 9(12).3 for the meaning of  $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ ) and then contemplated. (So Penelope speaks of  $\pi\upsilon\kappa\iota\nu\acute{\alpha}\iota . . . \acute{\alpha}\mu\phi' \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\nu\acute{o}\nu \kappa\eta\rho$  |  $\acute{o}\xi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota \mu\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\delta\acute{\omega}\nu\alpha\iota$ , *Od.* 19.516–17.) What does  $\sigma\phi\epsilon$ , the object of  $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$  and  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\pi\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\eta\varsigma$ , refer to? Answers include: “die Gründkräften der Natur,” Schwabl *WS* p. 54; “die Lehren des Meisters,” Diels *Vors.* 31 B110, “true statements about the world (conceived in physical terms),” Long *CQ* 1966, p. 269; “les puissances . . . sans doute les six,” Bollack *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 577. These suggestions are all to some extent correct.



In Homer words are winged (*Il.* 1.201, 2.7, 4.69, etc.), go past the barrier of the teeth (*Il.* 4.350, 14.83, etc.), and are put by the listener into his or her θυμός—μῦθον πεπνυμένον ἔνθετο θυμῷ (*Od.* 1.361, 21.355); cf. Hesiod *Erga* 274. So here. Pausanias is being urged to take the words that E. has spoken on the nature and activity of the four roots and Love and Strife, words which are themselves well constituted of the four roots, to put them deep down under his other thoughts, and in the language of initiation rites, to contemplate them with the correct disposition, and with assiduous and uncontaminated attention. Such a physical representation of words and thoughts, found in Homer, continues through the work of other Presocratics (Heraclitus is an obvious example) to Plato (in such passages as *Tim.* 71b, where thoughts are said to have reflections on the liver's surface), Aristotle (e.g., *Metaph.* 1072b20 νοητὸς γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτόν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν), and the Stoics' assumption of φωναί as σώματα (cf. S. E. *adv. math.* 8.12).

2: the initiation vocabulary of the line expresses Pausanias' meditation on E.'s words in terms of his being granted the final revelation after purificatory rituals, but this is to add solemnity to the poem's epilogue rather than to indicate "Orphic" or Pythagorean affiliations on E.'s part. (The language of the exordium is similar, cf. ἐκ δ' ὁσίῳ στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγῇν, 2(3).2.) μελέται indicates constant practice and effort, as in athletic training, military duty, or rehearsing, cf. LSJ s.v.

3 ταῦτα: the same reference as σφε in line 1. The thoughts, with their physical basis, if rightly regarded, will stay with Pausanias through life; the additional bonus is given in line 5. The verse is Homeric, cf. *Od.* 2.306.

4: τῶνδε κτήσεαι seems the best interpretation of a corrupt text, preferable to a future perfect form or a future middle with passive sense, for which LSJ gives only Plotinus as an example.

4-5: as with ταῦτα in line 3, αὔξει is probably transitive (cf. Long *CQ* 1966, p. 270, n. 1), and its object ἑκάστον, i.e., each appropriate thought within the body. The words and thoughts of E. are combinations of earth, air, fire, and water, and, being wise words, are well-blended combinations. If Pausanias takes them in and studies them, he will find that they will increase his like pieces of knowledge in the appropriate way—ὅπη φύσις ἐστὶν ἐκάστω. The process is cumulative, and so this increase in turn makes Pausanias more receptive to additional knowledge. εἰς ἥθος: the noun is ambiguous. It might refer to the individual constituent parts of earth, air, fire, and water as at 8(17).28, and is so taken by Long, *CQ* 1966, p. 269: "the ἥθος of fire would be fieriness"; but taking



in E.'s words is not going to increase the fieriness of the fire in Pausanias. Moreover, the thought is composite, and its activity as separate elements is the result of rejection, not assimilation. The *ἦθος* could be that of each thought which is stimulated to grow in the appropriate way, but this is covered by the clause *ὅπη φύσεις ἐστὶν ἐκάστω*. Most probably *ἦθος* refers to Pausanias' own character, i.e., his thinking self. The knowledge conveyed by E.'s thoughts and words, after being admitted and contemplated, becomes embedded in the heart area; it thus brings Pausanias closer to the condition of being a wise man both by causing the amount of right thoughts in the constitution to grow and by increasing his receptiveness to such thoughts. The basic idea was put forward by Parmenides in fr. 16 and was used previously by E. in 8(17).14, 79(106), and 80(108). Pausanias' control of the process brings lines 4-5 close to fr. 119 of Heraclitus, and also to passages like Sophocles' *Ajax* 595, where Ajax refuses to allow his *ἦθος* to be educated. *ἦθος* also may well be the specific reference for *νοητὴ τρίτη τις δύναμις* in the Hippolytus context, i.e., the well-blended combination of elements that has cognitive powers, observed in the cosmos as *φρῆν ἑρῆ* and in the individual as the thinking self, cf. the commentary on the daimons, 107(115).

6-7: the lines deliberately recall 1(2).1-2 in expression and content. At the beginning of the poem E. contrasts men of blunt thoughts and limited experience who claim knowledge of the whole with Pausanias, who will achieve genuine understanding. Now, on completion of his explanation, E. promises Pausanias that the understanding will be permanent, given good will and assiduous concentration, but if Pausanias allows himself to be distracted, the wise thoughts will leave and each of the constituent parts will become separate and drawn to its own elemental mass. *ἀλλοῖα* and *μυρία δειλά* refer to the variety of particulars around us with which men busy themselves, but which, when they divert or intrude, impede our understanding of the real nature of the world. *περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο*: cf. the similar phrasing in 8(17).29 and 16(26).1 for the time of the domination of the elements. The resolution of a well-blended combination of elements, which comprises a thought, into its parts, is a microcosm of the perfect mixture of the sphere separating into individual elemental masses. The *χρόνος* for the individual must be his so-called death, and it contrasts with the *αἰών* of line 3 (cf. *Il.* 16.453). If therefore Pausanias heeds E.'s teaching there will be a sense in which he survives death, cf. the commentaries on 107(115) and 132(146).

9 *φίλῃν ἐπὶ γένναν ἰκέσθαι*: the basic *φρόνησις* (cf. line 10) exhibited by earth, air, fire, and water is an awareness of another part like itself

and a tendency to move toward it when not held in a compound by Love.

10 γάρ: the particle shows that the elements are to be included in the πάντα that have φρόνησις; for the form of primitive awareness that is the "intelligence" of the roots, cf. the commentary on line 9. In plant and animal life the thinking becomes more sophisticated as elements in combinations are involved. Men, because of the special character of the heart-blood, are able to comprehend the simple and the complex. With E. (and with Pausanias if his disposition and attention are as they should be) the blending of the mixture in the organ of thought becomes exact, and the real nature of the world intelligible. At the highest level the individual would communicate with the φρῆν ἑεργή, which itself is constituted of elements arranged in the same way, cf. Long *CQ* 1966, pp. 270-71, the commentaries on 80(108), 81(103), and 97(134).4, and chap. 3.

### 101(111)

*You will learn remedies for ills and help against old age, since for you alone shall I accomplish all these things. You will check the force of tireless winds, which sweep over land and destroy fields with their blasts; and again, if you wish, you will restore compensating breezes. After black rain you will bring dry weather in season for men, and too after summer dryness you will bring tree-nourishing showers (which live in air), and you will lead from Hades the life-force of a dead man.*

The fragment is quoted by Diogenes from Satyrus. E. is called a doctor, but Gorgias' claim to have witnessed E.'s "wonder-working" is added. The lines are given in support of this claim and are followed by an account from Timaeus of E. checking winds (and consequently being called κωλυσάνεμος), and from Heraclides of E. curing the woman who was ἀpnous. Both accounts are in the *Suda* in the context of the whole fragment, with κωλυσάνεμος and γόης repeated. Clement has the wind-checking story as the basis for lines 3-5, and he connects it with 102(112).12; the wind is described as noxious and causing sterility, whereas in Timaeus' account it is merely violent and damages the crops. It is checked by stretching asses' skins along hill (or possibly cliff) tops or, in Plutarch's account (*curios.* 515c), by blocking a gorge. It is likely that the various accounts go back to Timaeus, who made up the story from E.'s lines, using the connection between skins and weather magic (cf. *Od.* 10.19 and Guthrie's comments, *HGP* vol. 2, p. 134, n. 2); and perhaps there was some play on Pausanias' name. There is, however, a slight possibility



that E. made a practical attempt at constructing a windbreak, in the same enterprising spirit in which he is said to have diverted a river; see chap. 1. The main point is that E. expects that an understanding of the nature of earth, air, fire, and water alone and in combinations will bring with it the ability to manipulate them. This may well have been thought to extend to medicine, where a knowledge of respiration could lead to the restoration of the breathing mechanism, cf. the commentary on line 9. Bollack puts the fragment at the beginning of the *Physics* between 1(2) and 2(3). This makes the promise of "wonder-working" the purpose of the exposition rather than some benefits added after the exposition has been grasped. Karsten and Mullach take it as a fragment ἐκ τῶν Ἰατρικῶν.

1: that two items are mentioned here, (1) remedies for illnesses and (2) means of keeping off old age, is supported by the similar phrasing in *Hom. Hym. Apoll.* 193. E. confirms his success in (1) at 102(112).11-12, and (2) is an obvious extension of (1) in the practical application of the knowledge acquired.

2: in the singular address, emphatic here as at the beginning of the poem, E. is in the tradition of Hesiod and Theognis. In assuming a very limited audience capable of appreciating a complex philosophical argument E. follows Heraclitus and Parmenides. There is no need to suppose (from Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 728e) that E. is being particularly Pythagorean.

3-8: these six lines are devoted to showing how the balance of the elemental natural states should be maintained, with the expectation of eventually controlling the elements and achieving that balance. *παλίν τιτα* (line 5) is found elsewhere only at *Od.* 1.379, and in an active sense; *δενδρεόθρεπτα* is ἄπ. λεγ.

8 ἥ τ' ἄτ' αἰθέρι ναιήσονται†: the future form of the verb, adopted with a query by DK, is unacceptable in form and sense. The *ρεύματα* come after summer drought, and this rules out versions with ἐν θέρει. Bollack suggests τὰ τ' αἰθέρι ναιετάουσι and sees a reference to "fleuves du ciel," comparable to the fires in the earth of 32(52), as an example of the present composite nature of the elements (*Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 25). E. seems to be adapting the Homeric αἰθέρι νάων (of Zeus, *Il.* 2.412) as well as indicating that the *ρεύματα* are rainfalls rather than floods.

9: as with the account of wind checking, that of the *apnous* may have been fabricated from these lines, or E. may have been emboldened to write them as a result of some success on a particular occasion. The interest in respiration shown in 91(100) and a confidence in understanding the process may have encouraged E. to try to restore the breathing



mechanism in the *apnous*, and resuscitation could look like bringing the dead to life. For the details in Heraclides and an assessment, see chap. 1. The linking of medical practice to philosophical theory is condemned by the author of *Ancient Medicine* (20.1); the particular mention of E. there suggests that he did expect his knowledge to have practical application.

## 11. *Katharmoi*

FRAGMENTS 102–106 EXHORTATION TO THE CITIZENS  
OF ACRAGAS

### 102(112)

*My friends who live in the great town of the tawny Acragas, on the city's citadel, who care for good deeds (havens of kindness for strangers, men ignorant of misfortune), greetings! I tell you I travel up and down as an immortal god, mortal no longer, honored by all as it seems, crowned with ribbons and fresh garlands. Whenever I enter prospering towns I am revered by both men and women. They follow me in countless numbers, to ask where their advantage lies, some seeking prophecies, others, long pierced by harsh pains, ask to hear the word of healing for all kinds of illnesses.*

From Diogenes' quotation of the first two lines at 8.54 (αὐτὸς ἐναρχόμενος τῶν Καθαρμοῶν φησιν) it is clear that this is the beginning of the *Katharmoi*. At 8.61 Diogenes connects the fragment with the story of the *apnous* (cf. 101(111).9) and gives it as Heraclides' evidence for E. being *λατρός* and *μάντις*. At 8.66, lines 4–5 (χαίρετε . . . πωλεῦμαι) are said to be Timaeus' evidence for E. being *ἀλαζῶν καὶ φίλαντος*. The connection with 101(111) is found again in Clement, specifically lines 3–5 of that fragment with 10 and 12 here. In *Anth. Gr.* 9.569, *Suda*, and *Philostratus*, line 4 is taken closely with 108(117). The line is explained by Sextus (*adv. math.* 1.302), not, according to the obvious assumption, as a boast but as arising from the conviction that E. had kept free from evil, and so, by means of the god within, apprehended the god without (τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεῷ τὸν ἐκτὸς κατέλγηεν); this interpretation is supported by Plotinus, 4.7.10.38. The line commonly accepted as the third of this

fragment is given only by Diodorus, to illustrate, in his context, the hospitality of the citizens of Acragas.

1-4 ὦ φίλοι . . . χαίρετε: E. greets his peers in Acragas from abroad (as the present tenses in lines 5-8 show). He was perhaps on a tour of southern Italy (cf. D.L. 8.52), and while on his travels dedicates his poem and sends its message to his friends in his home town. Diels gratuitously understands him as being in exile and hoping for a recall through flattery and the account of his triumphs (*SPAW* 1898, pp. 396-99). The exile is supported by Tucker (*CR* 1931, pp. 49-50), who argues somewhat perversely, because of difficulties with 123(145), that E. is ironically addressing his enemies, and he emphasizes Lucian's rendering of χαίρετε as "farewell" (*laps.* 2). But Lucian quotes the whole line as a parting consequent on apotheosis, comparable to the farewell to life of Euripides *Phoen.* 1453; this may be because the line was well known as an independent unit (cf. the sources for the fragment), and so used by Lucian for his own purposes. On a possible conflict with 123(145) cf. the commentary on that fragment.

1 κάτα: with ἄστυ, cf. *Il.* 12.318, *Od.* 17.246, 21.346. The citadel, named after its river below, was built on the natural fortification of a cliff overlooking the harbor, and the city wall followed the contours of the slope, cf. the map and description in Freeman *Sicily* vol. 2, pp. 222-32; according to Diodorus there were over 20,000 citizens (13.84). ξανθὸς Ἀκράγας is the river Acragas, which gave the name to the city and which was colored the brownish yellow of lions, horses, and honey (cf. 118(128).7)—a color epitomized in the name of the Trojan river Xanthos, cf. Zuntz *Persephone*, pp. 181-82, 186, Bruno *Form and Colour in Greek Painting*, p. 90.

3: Diodorus gives the line on its own as a description by E. of the people of Acragas. Sturz and subsequent editors insert it here, but it was deleted by H. Fränkel; Zuntz puts it later, in the second book of the *Katharmoi*, on the grounds that it is superfluous in this position and postpones the greeting to the fourth line. It does, however, make explicit the description ἀγαθὼν μελεδήμονες ἔργων. The particular good work that the men of Acragas practice and are well known for is their hospitality, αἰδοῖσθαι being active here—"showing kindness," as in Aeschylus *Supp.* 28. Diodorus gives the example of Tallias, who kept open house and once fed and clothed 500 cavalry (13.83). In the adjacent chapters he elaborates on the wealth of the citizens and the scale of their buildings—εὐδαιμονίας πλήρη is his description of the city, another way of saying



that the citizens were *κακότητος ἄπειροι*. They could afford to be generous because they were untouched (as yet) by life's misery. (Guthrie, *HGP* vol. 2, p. 246, n. 3, quotes a similar phrase from the Orphic *Lithica*, line 15.)

4 ὅμῳν: the dative is probably "ethic" (cf. Hdt. 5.30), not limiting, with the narrator and listener juxtaposed, cf. Zuntz on Wilamowitz, *Persephone*, p. 190. Help in explaining *θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός* comes from 132(146). The four top lives which precede joining the ranks of the gods are combined in E. as prophet, minstrel, healer, and leader, and the apparent unanimous recognition of his qualifications by people of different towns confirms his expectation. Sextus' interpretation of the line as the apprehension by pure *nous*—the god within—of the god without, and Plotinus' description of E. in the same context as *εἰς τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ (τὸ θεῖον) ὁμοιότητα ἀτενίσας*, point to a connection with the end of the *Physics*, where it is suggested that pure mind, in contemplating wise thoughts, can approximate to the *φρὴν ἰερή*. E., like the Homeric heroes but in a new kind of way, is *ἰσόθεος*.

5 ὥσπερ *ἔοικεν*: the *Anth. Gr.* reading is preferable to the personal form, which is not normally used parenthetically or without an infinitive expressed. And *ἔοικε* meaning "it is fitting" is "mostly with neg. and followed by inf.," LSJ s.v. The obvious translation therefore is "as it seems," to be taken with the previous phrase. E.'s status as *ἰσόθεος* (cf. the previous note) is confirmed by the apparently unanimous acclamation accorded him.

6: the people show how they honor E. by crowning him with ribbons (a sign of victory, celebration, or honor generally, cf. Alcibiades transferring them from his own head to that of Socrates, Plato *Symp.* 212e) and fresh garlands (Alcibiades, *Symp.* loc. cit., has them of ivy and violets; olive, myrtle, and laurel are other possibilities). *ταυνίαις metris causa*, cf. LSJ s.v.

7-8: for the crux I suggest *πᾶσι δ' ἄμ' εὖτ' ἄν*, translating, "by all, by both men and women, I am revered, whenever I enter prospering towns." E. is not saying that an entourage accompanies him from town to town, but that when he approaches a populous town its inhabitants flock to greet him and put their questions to him.

9: the thousands who greet him and walk with him want answers from him in his roles of *mantis* and healer. The *πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός* does not refer to a particular, separate request—"how can I make money?"—but to a general one—"what is the best way to proceed?"—subdivided into the areas of prophecy and medicine. E. presents himself here in the

*Katharmoi* as giving a practical application to the wisdom which in the *Physics* he promised was in Pausanias' power to achieve, frs. 100(110) and 101(111). In particular, knowledge of the structure and functioning of the human body, a key interest in the *Physics*, will help in effecting cures.

11 εὐηκέα βάζειν: the phrasing is ambiguous, cf. chap 1, p. 10. It would seem, however, to be less likely to mean an incantation than an instant diagnosis and suggestion for a remedy, which would be all that the conditions of a crowded street surgery would allow.

12: the line was retrieved and completed by Bergk, for the noun comparing *Il.* 5.399.

### 103(114)

*My friends, I know that there is truth in the words which I shall speak, but indeed it comes hard to men, and the onrush of conviction to the mind is unwelcome.*

Clement sees the fragment as praise for *pistis*, mentioning in the context Numa's temple to Fides as well as 1 Cor. 11: 5, Heraclitus fr. 28, and Plato *Tim.* 22c-e. The address sets the fragment in the *Katharmoi*, and the promise of truth puts it near the beginning of the poem. The language of cognition, however, is that of the *Physics*. The words which E. speaks enter, as they are heard, into the mind of the listener as a "stream" (ὄρμη here, πηγὴ at 2(3).2, and cf. 96(133).2-3), and because they are true they bring with them conviction. So in 6(4) Pausanias is urged to learn by analyzing in his σπλάγχνα the πιστώματα of the Muse, and in 100(110) to contemplate and assimilate them. E. compliments his friends in expecting them to be, like Pausanias, receptive to and appreciative of the truth. Most men have "narrow" perceptions, impeded by distractions, and so find it hard to admit truth and be convinced, cf. 1(2).1-5, 6(4).1, 100(110).6-8.

2 ἀργαλέη: the adjective goes with ἀληθείη, rather than being held in suspense until ὀρμή. The Homeric adjective for war, death, illness, fire, and *eris* (used in connection with the workings of Strife at 107(115).8) is applied by E. to the "hard" attainment of truth.

3 δύσζηλος: according to LSJ, the prefix δυσ- "destroys the good sense of a word or increases the bad," but the adjective δύσζηλος is translated as "eager." The word, however, continues the sense of ἀργαλέη, meaning "disagreeable," "troublesome," "invidious," cf.



Hesiod *Erga* 195. That the ordinary man resents new truths and does not want to be convinced is a commonplace, cf. Heraclitus fr. 97 and the outstanding example in Plato *Rep.* 515c-516e of the pain and vexation felt by the prisoner when first turned to the light.

#### 104(11)

*Fools, for their meditations are not far-reaching thoughts, men who suppose that what formerly did not exist comes into existence, or that something dies and is completely destroyed.*

This fragment and 106(15) come close together in Plutarch, and although they are quoted from E. in support of the interpretation of 13(9) as a factual denial of generation from and destruction into the nonexistent, there is no indication of which poem they are from. They have been here transferred to the *Katharmoi* on the grounds that their emphatic affirmation of continuous existence, and for men in particular of life and experience before birth and after death, suits the subject matter of the *Katharmoi* and is appropriate as an introduction to 107(115). And the impatience with common belief sounded in the first word of this fragment follows easily on the difficulties the ordinary man has with the truth, as described in the previous fragment. The denial of absolute genesis and destruction is in Parmenidean language (cf. fr. 8.5-14) and reiterates the basic argument of E.'s *Physics*, cf. 8(17).30, 9(12), 11(16), 12(8), and 13(9).

1 νήπιοι: for the condemnation of thoughtless naïveté cf. 124(137).2. δολιχόφρονες: ἄπ. λεγ. δολιχαίων, 14(21).12, 15(23).8, is a similar coinage. For μέριμναι being blunted, cf. 1(2).2 and 100(110).7.

#### 105(113)

*But why do I lay stress on this, as if it were some great achievement of mine, if I am superior to many-times-dying mortal men?*

The lines are quoted by Sextus after 102(112).4-5 as a further instance of E. claiming to be a god, not, says Sextus, from boastfulness, but because he has been able to apprehend the god without by means of the god within, i.e., by pure *nous*. To this could be added the specific superiority E. has



in that, now possessing perfected *nous* and enjoying the highest form of life on earth, he is soon to join the gods and be free of death. All this is to be explained in the poem that follows.

2: πολυφθερέων is ἄπ. λεγ. and ambiguous. It could mean that men are liable to death in many forms or that individual men die many times. Although editors adopt the former sense, the latter is preferable. Instead of a cliché, superfluous after θνητῶν, there is a pointed contrast between men, who go through many lives and deaths (“exchanging one hard way of life for another,” cf. 107(115).8), and E., who no longer has to do so; cf. the commentaries on 108(117) and 133(147).

### 106(15)

*A man who is wise in such matters would not surmise in his mind that men are, and good and ill befall them, for as long as they live, for a lifetime as they call it, and that before they were formed, and after they have disintegrated, they do not exist at all.*

For the context in Plutarch cf. the commentary on 104(11). An appropriate place for these lines is before 107(115), which explains how it is that men exist and good and ill happen to them both before and after the life known here. As Plutarch says, E. affirms that those who have not yet been born, and the already dead, *are* in some way. According to the *Physics* birth and death are arrangements and rearrangements of parts of eternally existing roots, and this groundwork helps toward the understanding of this fragment and the next.

1 φρεσί: cf. the index s.v. φρήν. Wisdom comes with the assimilation, analysis, and contemplation of statements of truth in the heart region; for the complete phrase, cf. *Il.* 1.107.

2: the subject of the verbs is, as in line 4, men; they use inaccurate terms, as at 13(19).5.

3: δειλά is symmetrically superior to δεινά with ἐσθλά, cf. Hesiod fr. 164(DK 2B7).

4 πάγεν: for the verb as an almost technical term in E. for the formation of organs and organisms from the elements, cf. 70(75).1, 78(107).1, and 85(86).

## FRAGMENTS 107-108 THE DECREE OF NECESSITY

## 107(115)

*There is a decree of necessity, ratified long ago by gods, eternal and sealed by broad oaths, that whenever one in error, from fear, (defiles) his own limbs, having by his error made false the oath he swore—daimons to whom life long-lasting is apportioned—he wanders from the blessed ones for three times countless years, being born throughout the time as all kinds of mortal forms, exchanging one hard way of life for another. For the force of air pursues him into sea, and sea spits him out onto earth's surface, earth casts him into the rays of blazing sun, and sun into the eddies of air; one takes him from another, and all abhor him. I too am now one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, having put my trust in raving strife.*

These lines are among the most crucial for an understanding of E., but they are fraught with difficulties. Before coming to details of text and meaning, there are basic questions of how many lines make up the fragment, in what order they belong, to which poem they should be assigned, what they are in the most general way concerned with, and what the basic context might be.

As can be seen from the text printed here, the fragment is an amalgam of Plutarch *exil.* 607c, where 5 lines out of 14 are given without any indication that there are omissions, and Hippolytus (*RH* 7.29.14-23), who quotes 13 lines and in a different order (the last is first and the first two last), interspersed with commentary. The last line and a half, however, was well known as an independent quotation (called τὸ πολυθρόλυτον ἐκεῖνο περὶ ψυχῆς by Philoponus) but in three different versions.

On the strength of the phrase with which Plutarch introduces his selection of lines, ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας, van der Ben reverts to the edition of Karsten and prints part of the fragment as the opening lines of the *Physics*; and then, because of their connection with this fragment, he moves 27 more fragments to the so-called *Proem* of the *Physics*. But Plutarch's phrase should not be given the strict meaning, "E. set out as the first lines of the *Physics* . . .," for the following reasons: (1) ἐν ἀρχῇ would need the article to mean unambiguously "at the very beginning of"; without it the sense could well be "as a starting point." (2) τῆς φιλοσοφίας may refer either to the *Katharmoi* or the *Physics*; Plutarch could have taken either the account of the elements or that of the *psychē* (as he paraphrased the context here) as E.'s "philosophy" par excellence, and either could have been read before the other in separate



rolls. (3) *προαναφωνήσας* does not have to refer "not only to the proem but to the very first words of it" (van der Ben *Proem* p. 19), as Plutarch's phrase *προανακρούσασθαι καὶ προαναφωνῆναι* (*esu. carn.* 996b) shows. Plutarch discusses for the length of nine Teubner pages the prohibition against meat eating before he hesitatingly makes a start on the principle underlying it. (4) We know Plutarch is not giving verbatim the opening of the *Physics*, as he promptly drops lines 2, 4, and 7-12. (5) The first topic of the *Physics* is the four roots, cf. *πρῶτον ἄκουε*, 7(6).1, after an exhortation to Pausanias to listen, 4(1); according to van der Ben's ordering these both come inexplicably late. (6) A prohibition against eating meat was one of the themes of the *Katharmoi* (cf. Hippol. *RH* 7.30.3-4), and the explanation for it surely belongs with it in the same poem (cf. chap. 4). The openings of the poems are more likely to be: *Physics*—remarks on limited human knowledge, prayer to Muse, address to Pausanias, and major theme, fr. 7(6); *Katharmoi*—address to friends, remarks on limited human knowledge, and major theme, fr. 107(115).

After moving 28 fragments from their traditional position in the *Katharmoi* to the beginning of the *Physics*, van der Ben then interprets them as a *katabasis* myth. The first-person expositor is not, however, E. but "the 'I' of the myth," who tells of a visit he made while still alive to the realm of the dead in the far west of a flat (!) earth, to a meadow where the dead wait for a return to life. There a "perfect man" acted as a guide and led "the 'I' of the myth" to a cave where the dead put on flesh and blood and were addressed in a "prebirth speech" on the kinship of living creatures. Zuntz, in book 2 of *Persephone*, also interpreted fr. 107(115) as the introduction to a *katabasis* myth, which he claimed was the subject of the first book of the *Katharmoi*. In his version the daimon E., being guilty of murder, was led, probably by Hermes, to a place of horror in the Netherworld, the abode of Furies and monsters and the reception ground for exiles awaiting incarnation. From there he came to a cave and was addressed by a deity, probably Persephone, in a long speech explaining the law governing incarnations. However, the account given here of this and the next fragment rejects their incorporation into a *katabasis* myth of any kind as being unsupported by ancient testimony and requiring a biased reading of the text. The fragments are comprehensible on their own and in relation to the theories of the *Physics*, and they do not need any such imaginative framework.

All the main sources for the lines of this fragment—Plutarch, Hippolytus, Philoponus, Asclepius, and Plotinus—agree that E. is here talking *περὶ ψυχῆς*. Hippolytus and Philoponus in their contexts explain the



ψυχῇ in terms of the four roots and as being influenced by Love and Strife; Asclepius adds to this that the language of "path up" and "path down" of the soul is used συμβολικῶς (in *Metaph.* 197.17). The purport is that the thinking soul, which in the *Physics* was shown to consist of elements in a good ratio instantiated in the heart-blood and, in the best ratio, characterless and akin to the φρῆν ἱερή, in the *Katharmoi* is spoken of in terms of a daimon who, because of the inevitable workings of necessity, is cut off from his origins. Hippolytus further explains the daimons as united by Love, then scattered by Strife, and the scattered parts brought together by Love: τὰ ἀπεσπασμένα τοῦ παντός . . . (τὴν φιλικὴν) προσάγειν καὶ ἐν ποιεῖν (*RH* 7.29.24). The whole account is finally related to the *Physics* by an explicit connection with 100(110).

1 ἔστιν: ἔστι τι is metrically inadmissible, cf. the commentary on 8(17).30, and unnecessarily dilutes the sense. ἀνάγκης χρῆμα: comparable to the θεσμὸς Ἀδραστέας of Plato's *Phdr.* 248c, the *logos* of the daughter of Anankē, *Rep.* 617d, and the Vergilian "fata deum." χρῆμα from χράω is unique here; the sense is "proclamation," "decree," the content of which is given in lines 3–8. φήφισμα: a ratification long ago by gods who are represented as voting to accept and swearing to abide by what must inevitably happen. For the gods here cf. the commentaries on 3(131).4, 14(21).12, 15(23).8, 95(132).2, 132(146).3, and on line 5 below.

2 πλατέεσσι . . . ὄροισι: the unusual adjective recalls immediately the "broad oath" of 23(30).3. The oath is the mark in both poems of the entry of Strife, the disruption of a state of unity and harmony, and the consequent generation of *thnēta*. It is here reinforced by the "seal" metaphor of authenticity and approval.

3: φοβῶ φίλα γυῖα μιν is the reading of the Plutarch MSS; the line is not in Hippolytus. The emendation φόνω . . . μὴνῃ is that of Stephanus in 1572; Xylander's text (1574) and translation are innocent of it. Wyttenbach has Stephanus' text and Xylander's translation without noting the discrepancy, and from then on Stephanus' reading has been unquestioningly adopted, and with it the melodramatic picture of a bloodstained spirit, epitomized in Jaeger's translation, "Whenever a demon . . . shall sinfully soil his hands with murderous blood" (*TEGP* p. 145); cf. van der Ben *Proem* p. 56, "[Strife is] fed as it were with the blood on the god's hands like an Erinyes." The moral *for men* from the account of the daimon is prohibition against bloodshed, but the explicit mention of gore on a god in this solemn first exposition can be discarded; the daimon is

said to make a mistake from fear. (For ἀμπλακίησι cf. 122(136).2.) If μίγη is the correct verb to deduce from μιν, then φίλα γυῖα μίγη is comparable to the phrase μαίνειν τὸ θεῖον of Plato *Tim.* 69d, which refers to pollution of the divine (i.e., thinking) part of the soul, cf. also Sophocles *Ant.* 1044. Separation from one's fellows is widely recognized as the consequence of *miasma*, and so it would be in these terms that the isolation of the daimon is expressed. Fear is an adequate motive, but if the noun is corrupt Panzerbieter's ἀμπλακίησι φρενῶν (as Pindar *Pyth.* 3.24) would be a welcome reading.

4 δὲ καί: Diels's νεῖκει θ' δὲ κ(ε) with ἀμαρτήσας as ὁμαρτήσας (and so printed by Kirk-Raven *PP* p. 351) is quite unacceptable; Strife enters with panache in line 14, and there is no justification in text or sense for an earlier intrusion. Zuntz, following Knatz and Wilamowitz, rejects the line outright, cf. the discussion by Hershbell, *Phronesis* 1973, pp. 191–93. But a clause on perjury is most appropriate here, for like *miasma*, perjury brought with it exile from one's peers; the outstanding precedent is Hesiod, *Theog.* 793–806, and cf. *Erga* 282–85. The daimon, involved in *miasma*, is represented as having broken the oath with which necessity's decree was ratified; on both counts alienation and exile follow. From Hesiod *Theog.* 793, Homer *Il.* 3.279, and the full formula for perjury given in Aristophanes *Ran.* 150, I suggest for the line ὅρκον ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ἀμαρτήσας ἐπομόσση. The participle ἀμαρτήσας is admissible, given E.'s preference for a weak aorist for βλαστάνειν, 14(21).10, 50(57).1, and his occasional flexibility with forms, cf. λελάχασι in the following line; and the participle picks up ἀμπλακίησι in line 3. The daimon is alienated when there is a deviation, but this does not mean that "culpable sin" or even choice or free will is attributable to the daimon.

5 δαίμονες: antecedent to the relative clause and in apposition to the indefinite τις of line 3; the anacoluthon is unexceptional, given that δαιμόνων is metrically impossible. The daimons are the gods of line 1, of 132(146).3, and in the *Physics* of 14(21).12 and 15(23).8, "long-lived" but not immortal, being composed, like all other forms of life, of earth, air, fire, and water in combination. Their excellence is in the harmony of the combination. In the *Physics* the rejoicing god, which is the whole cosmos brought into unity, is infiltrated by Strife; the consequent spoiling of the proportion and rearrangement of the roots bring with it a world of mortal things. In the *Katharmoi* the process is seen as individual gods cut off from their peers and born as a series of forms of mortal life. None of this implies that the daimon is an immortal soul persisting as an



identifiable individual, and it is not so taken by the sources, even by those who give the content of the fragment as *περὶ ψυχῆς*, cf. the commentary on the next fragment. *λελάχασι' τετεύχασι*, Hesychius; E. has the orthodox form at 93(100).1.

6: the time during which the daimon is represented as separated from his fellows is not an exact ten or thirty thousand years (*ῶρα* can be taken as a year or a season—a third of a year, cf. LSJ s.v.) but is indefinitely expressed, for the individual, when constituted as a man, has some control over the length of the process, cf. the commentaries on 100(110) and 122(136) ff. For related times cf. Aeschylus *PV* 94, Herodotus 2.123, Pindar *Ol.* 2.58–91 and fr. 127 (and the commentary on them by von Fritz, *Phronesis* 1957, pp. 85–94), Plato *Rep.* 546b, 615b, *Tim.* 39d, *Phdr.* 248e, *Pol.* 272d–e, and the varying terms of banishment for different kinds of homicide, Plato *Leg.* 866–69; in the Hesiod passage (*Theog.* 793–804) the period of banishment by the Styx for perjury is nine years (after one year's "coma"), cf. Homer *Il.* 18.400 (on Hephaistos) and 8.404. On the Ibscher papyrus for line 6 see M. L. West *CR* 1962, p. 120.

7: *φρόμενον* refers back to *τίς* in line 3 and agrees with the participle in the following line, giving a particular description of what an indefinite number of daimons suffer; the plural reading is Hippolytus' adaptation of the line to his commentary. *εἴδεα θνητῶν*: for the immortal taking on mortal form, cf. 25(22).3, 47(35).14, and for *εἴδεα* as the consequent (temporary) structures of arrangements of parts of earth, air, fire, and water, cf. 60(71).3 and 62(73).2. *διὰ χρόνου*: cf. West on Hesiod *Theog.* 190. There is no call for an attempt to synchronize the time with that of the return of the elements to the unity of the sphere, as, for example, do Kirk-Raven, *PP* p. 352, and O'Brien, *ECC* p. 89. The "blessed god" survives through those vicissitudes of Strife which the *Katharmoi* describes in terms of daimons separated from and rejoining their peers.

8: the line is explained in 9–12. The daimon exchanges one hard way of life for another when the "roots" of which he is constituted are rearranged over a period of time to be parts of different forms of mortal life in different elements.

9–11: the terms for the individual masses in which the daimon takes on different forms of life deliberately recall the *Physics*, cf. the table of terms in chap. 2. The daimon, i.e., his physical structure, is spoken of as cast from one element to another because the conditions do not allow the parts to become properly constituted or settled, cf. chap. 3. The following fragment fills in some details but without exact correspondence. A form of life in air (as a bird) can be followed by that of a fish in the sea,



then plant life on land, then a life in fire, and in air again, which with earth is likely to include animals and humans; on this cf. Aristotle *Resp.* 477a26–31 and *GA* 761b13. Life in fire (the meaning of ἥλκος here, for which φαέθων is the more appropriate epithet) was recognized, e.g., the salamander, the “flies” in the furnace, Aristotle *HA* 552b16–18, and perhaps forms of life seen on Etna. (Aristotle’s notice, *GA* 761b18–23, that life in fire can be only on the moon is due to his own cosmology, cf. Jaeger *Aristotle* pp. 144–48, A. L. Peck’s note in the Loeb *GA*, p. 312, and W. Lameere *L’Antiquité classique* 1949, pp. 287–301.)

12: the line is an adaptation of Hesiod *Theog.* 800. The strong language of the attitude of each elemental mass to the living things in it has its explanation in the *Physics*, where the differentiation of the elements is shown as the work of Strife, and each is attracted only to its own like parts, cf. 100(110).9; as such they could be looked on as the agents of Strife. So Hippolytus’ commentary on the lines shows that the living things are hated and harassed by Strife and prevented from settling, but are pitied by Love, who tries to bring them back into their former unity.

13: Zuntz, *Persephone* p. 198, defends Plutarch’s reading and translates, “this way I myself am now going”; but which way? Hippolytus’ note is more appropriate (with νῦν supplied from Plutarch); the sense is that E. is one of the wanderers estranged from the gods now (but he expects soon to return). Proclus’ paraphrase of the line in the context of 1(2), in *Tim.* 175c, supports the connection of the daimon’s nature with the quality of thought.

14: E.’s “trust in raving strife” does not imply deliberate choice or the availability and rejection of an alternative “trust in Love.” “Trust in Strife” is a stage in the necessary course of events preceding the generation of *thnēta*.

### 108(117)

*For before now I have been at some time boy and girl, bush, bird, and a mute fish in the sea.*

The fragment is widely quoted in late authors, which points to its survival in a compendium, independently of its context. This accounts too for the connection with Pythagoreanism found in many of the sources. Hippolytus has a more interesting confusion with the Stoics: the god that is the unity of all things is a thinking god (cf. *φρῆν ἐερῆ*, 97(134).4), but the separating from the god and returning to it is explained in terms of the Stoic *ekpyrōsis*. This indicates that the *egō* of this fragment and of line

13 in 107(115) is to be understood as a part that has come from and will be reassimilated into the *νοερός θεός* rather than as an individual surviving as such (e.g., as the "separate bundle of Love," Kirk-Raven *PP* p. 359, following Cornford *CAH* vol. 4, pp. 563-69, H. S. Long *AJPh* 1949, pp. 142-48, and amplified by O'Brien, *ECC* p. 329, or as a "divine potency stripped, for an aeon, of his divine identity," Zuntz *Persephone* p. 271, or as a "separate entity, divine in nature, that expressed Love and Strife," S. Darcus *Phronesis* 1977, p. 187; for a point of view explaining daimons in terms of elements cf. H. E. Barnes *CJ* 1967, pp. 18-23, and C. H. Kahn in *AGPh* 1960, pp. 3-35). This fragment does not imply a remembrance of the previous lives described, but it is an inference from the decree that the daimon be born in different elements as different kinds of living things. E. looks back and recognizes that the parts that now make up himself, a properly constituted *egō*, have been used for different kinds of lives in different elements, none of which was satisfactory or settled, cf. chap. 3.

1: boy and girl cover both sexes (without any of the implications, common in reincarnation theories, that the female is inferior), but they are also examples of lives that are not properly settled, because they are cut off before maturity.

2: the sources, although numerous, are interrelated, and the text of the end of the line is uncertain. *θήρ* in some form is an obvious omission (cf. 13(9).2, 14(21).11, 26(20).7), and attempts have been made to insert it, e.g., van der Ben suggests *θήρ καὶ ἀλίσπορος ἰχθύς*. Exact correspondence is not necessary; and bush, bird, and fish are examples of lives in earth, air, and water. With reservation I accept *ἐξάλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς* as "in (or on) the sea (the noun indicating the bitterness of the environment, cf. Homer *Od.* 12.27) a mute fish" (with *ἔλλοπος* as an alternative form of *ἔλλοψ*—"unable to make articulate sound," the second disadvantage of life as a fish; cf. the use of this adjective for Echo, Theocritus *Syr.* 18).

#### FRAGMENTS 109-117 FROM GOOD FORTUNE TO THE ILL FORTUNE OF LIFE ON EARTH

##### 109(116)

(she) *abhors necessity, hard to bear.*

Anankē here must surely have the same reference as 107(115).1 (rather than being one of a pair of opposites following 116(122), as Zuntz maintains, *Persephone* bk. 2, p. 256). Ammonius (in Plutarch's context), in reply to the Peripatetic, fixes the reference by denying that "the necessity among the gods" is hard to bear. The other well-known instance of the adjective, at Aeschylus *Ag.* 1571, is similarly applied to acceptance of a course of events that is "hard to bear," but Clytemnestra is willing to accept it on oath to the daimon of the house. Charis (who is Philia under another name, cf. Gēthosunē, 8(17).24, and the other titles, Plu. *de Is. et Os.* 370d) "abhors necessity"—in terms of the *Physics*, because of the inevitable completion of a time (marked by an oath) when the one has to become many, and in terms of the *Katharmoi*, because of necessity's decree (marked by an oath), which requires the inevitable separation of daimons from their fellows, and these, as Hippolytus explains, she pities and tries to restore to their former unity (*RH* 7.29.21).

### 110(126)

*clothing ( ?the daimon) in an unfamiliar garment of flesh*

The only appropriate feminine candidate for the participle is Anankē, interpreted by the sources as *physis*, i.e., what has to happen in the natural course of events. δαίμονα would provide the obvious accusative, perhaps being the first word of the line following the fragment. σαρκῶν χιτῶν is a mortal body, σάρκες being a composite term for skin and tissues, and χιτῶν an anatomical metaphor (cf. LSJ s.v., IV), used again as such in the context of E.'s fr. 142(70). Necessity or nature "putting around a mortal body" is a particular description of the way in which the daimon is born, i.e., his substance reconstituted as a form of living creature, cf. 107(115).7. The garment is "unfamiliar" ("unrecognized" or "unrecognizable," cf. Hdt. 1.85) because an alien and hard way of life is taken up by one who was represented as being previously a happy god, cf. the commentary on the "unfamiliar place" of 112(118).

### 111(119)

*from what honor and from what great extent of happiness*

Clement quotes the line as words spoken directly by E. on coming among mortals, Plutarch, on his being an exile and wanderer according to divine



laws, exchanging "sky and moon" for earth. Hippolytus has no attribution, and the line occurs in the discussion of a heresy of souls coming from a primal man or Adam, to be born here of clay. The disagreement between the soul "remembering" a former state in Hippolytus and "forgetting" it in Plutarch is due to the quite different contexts, the Naasene heresy in the former and the Platonic reference in the latter. It is not significant except in suggesting that neither context gave supporting evidence for E. speaking of the daimon in such terms. The main point to be deduced from the sources is that E. is speaking of himself as having been in a happy state previously, but now an exile, born in mortal form on earth as a consequence of the working of cosmic laws.

### 112(118)

*I wept and wailed on seeing an unfamiliar place*

Plutarch (*soll. an.* 964d) has a comparison similar to Clement's between Heraclitus and E. on their railing at nature. Sextus preserves a fragment of Epicurus relating the line to a baby's first cry upon exposure to air (*adv. math.* 11.96). The fragment continues in the context of the previous one—the contrast between the earlier happiness and the grief at being born as a mortal creature. The "unfamiliar place" is this world, as Plutarch stated emphatically on 111(119); the former life has been exchanged for  $\gamma\eta$  καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ γῆς βίος. (The wording of the fragment looks like an adaptation of Penelope's grief for her geese, *Od.* 19.541.)

### 113(121)

*(a joyless place) where (there are) slaughter and hatred and hordes of other violent deaths (and parching fevers and consumptions and ?dropsy) . . . they wander in darkness over the field of Atē.*

1 ἀτερπέα χῶρον: apparently a variation on ἀσυνήθεια χῶρον of the previous fragment. This suggests that the line beginning ἐνθα φόνος follows immediately on that fragment as part of a description of life on earth (cf. τὰ περὶ γῆν in Hierocles' context) and in some measure explains it. The line recalls 14(21).7 of the *Physics* and also 26(20).4–5. In those fragments, in the process of one becoming many, Strife keeps men apart and is the cause of hatred and death among them; here too the world is presented as a place where hatred and violent death are rife.

3: I indicate my suspicions about the authenticity of the line by parentheses. It is not in Hierocles; Proclus has it with the previous line in connection with the healing powers of Apollo, but without attribution; for a possible home for it as part of a Chaldean oracle, cf. H. Saffrey *RPh* 1969, pp. 64–67. Its meaning is obscure, but if it is genuine it would seem to be a list of diseases characterized by the excess of an element—fever by fire (cf. 101(111).6–7), and consumption and dropsy (if that is the correct interpretation) by water.

4: the change of subject in Hierocles points to a lacuna. Some editors suggest further lists, but we have them in 116(122) and 117(123), cf. the commentaries on them. \**Ἀτῆς ἂν λειμῶνα*: those who wander in the field are, in Hierocles' language, the "fallen," i.e., daimons who are born as mortal creatures. They move over the face of the earth, living out their hard way of life here, not in some mythical area located in Hades, so Themistius, *Or.* 178: τὸν ἐπίγειον τόπον καὶ \**Ἀτῆς λειμῶνα ἐπονομάζοντα*. Dodds, *Plato: Gorgias* p. 375, has shown that the "asphodel meadow" of *Od.* 11.539 is the common source for fields that are (1) the home of blessed souls, as in Pindar fr. 114; Aristophanes *Ran.* 326; "Orpheus," Diod. Sic. 1.96.2; the "Gold Leaf" poem, DK 1 B20.6; (2) the place of judgment in Plato's myths, *Gorg.* 524a2, *Rep.* 614e2. The "field of Atē" is E.'s deviation from the Homeric tradition. Whatever the exact meaning of Atē (cf. Dodds *GI* pp. 2–8, 17–18, 37–41), it is an associate of νεῖκος μαινόμενον, bringing catastrophe and ruin, and characterizing, with darkness, a world coming under the domination of Strife.

#### 114(124)

*Alas, poor unhappy race of mortal creatures, from what strifes and lamentations were you born.*

The lines are from Clement, quoted after 112(118) and 130(125) and followed by well-known lines from Theognis (*Eleg.* 1. 425–27), Euripides (frs. 452 and 638), Homer (*Il.* 6.146), and others who take a pessimistic view of mortal life. Porphyry quotes the second line anonymously, and Eusebius includes it in a pastiche of satirical lines by Timon. The general sense of the previous three fragments—the pity for mortal creatures—is continued (for θνητά as an almost technical term in E. to cover plant, animal, and human life, cf. 8(17).3; 12(8).2; 15(23).10; 25(22).3; 47(35).7, 16; 60(71).3). They are born of ἔριδες inasmuch as it is the power of Strife that brings about the generation of *thnēta*, cf. 26(20).4; Porphyry's

reading of *νεικέων* for *στοναχῶν* reinforces the link with the Strife of the *Physics*.

### 115(120)

*We have come under this roofed cave.*

Porphry and Plotinus, the sources for the line, refer the cave mentioned here to this world, and so it should be understood. Although Zuntz assigns the cave to Hades, he admits that he "knows of no Greek instance" of a cave in the underworld, *Persephone* p. 255; for this world as a cave, though without any necessarily "Orphic" connotations, cf. Proclus in *Tim.* 29c, τῶν παλαιῶν ἄντρον καλοῦντων τὸν κόσμον, the discussions by Jaeger, *TEGP* p. 149; Bignone, *Empedocle* p. 493; Millerd, *Empedocles* p. 93; Dodds, *GI* p. 174, n. 114; and in detail J. H. Wright, "The Origin of Plato's Cave," *HSPH* 1906, 131-42. "A 'Cave' is not a 'Field'," as Zuntz says, p. 204, but this is not an argument against a highly metaphorical poet like E., who can speak of "funnels" in the earth (48(96).1) and the "seashore of life" (26(20).5), describing life here both as on a gloomy field of Atē (he had already used "field" metaphorically in 55[66]) and as in a (gloomy) cave. The life of the gods compared to ours in brightness and joy is as this one compared to underground living, which gives the sources an obvious comparison with Plato *Rep.* 7. Little can be deduced from the anonymous and anachronistic *ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις* mentioned by Porphyry, especially since any connecting verb has to be supplied.

### 116(122)

*There were Earth and far-seeing Sun, bloody Discord and serene Harmony, Beauty and Ugliness, Speed and Slowness, lovely Truth and blind Uncertainty.*

With the next fragment, which probably follows this, there is a list of pairs of feminine personifications, many of them unusual adjectival forms, and some perhaps coined by E. The Index Verborum shows ten words from the two fragments as ἄπ. λεγ. In the introductory ἐνθα and in the formation of the nouns and compound adjectives the list is closely modeled on the catalogue of the Nereids in Homer *Il.* 18.39-49 and in Hesiod *Theog.* 240-64, and cf. the Oceanids, 346-61. Plutarch contrasts the personifications as spirits of good and evil accompanying men through life (*tranq.*



an. 474b), and at *de Is. et Os.* 370d the second pair given here are identified with Philia and Neikos; the members of each pair, however, especially in the next fragment, are not all opposed as obviously good and bad. *ἐνθα* indicates the same provenance as frs. 112(118), 113(121), and 115(120), namely this world, the area for the interplay of a number of opposite conditions. There is no “impossible” conflict with 113(121), as claimed by van der Ben, *Proem* p. 159. The existence of oppositions within an overall structure of the domination of strife is Heraclitean.

1: the “nymphs” of Earth and far-seeing Sun give the setting for mortal life, which is on the earth and under the sun. (Zuntz, *Persephone* p. 256, claims yet another mythical region in the underworld, where these personages “condition the daimon’s impending incarnate existence.”)

2: Plutarch identifies this pair with the Love and Strife of the *Physics*. It would be appropriate for them to be given prior mention here, after the basic scene of earth and sun, as the overwhelming influences in mortal life.

3 *Θόωσα*: the mother of Polyphemus, *Od.* 1.71. E. seems to be using an etymological link with *θέω* and *θόος*. The point of contrast with the feminine of *δηναιός*—“long-lived,” “long-lasting”—is not clear; perhaps it is “swift youth” versus “slow old age” rather than the conventional “Haste and Tarrying.”

4 *Νημερτής*: the name occurs in the Homeric and Hesiodic list of Nereids, and it is an epithet of Proteus and Nereus. Truth contrasts with obscurity, certainty with “dark opinion,” cf. 95(132).2. The color of the latter’s hair is irrelevant, even if the derivation from *κείρω* can be justified; *μελάγκουρος* is with black, i.e., sightless pupils, so Mullach, *FPG* vol. 3, p. 22, and cf. *δόξαι τυφλαί* of Plato *Rep.* 506c and van der Ben’s discussion, *Proem* p. 162.

### 117(123)

*Birth and Death, Sleep and Wakefulness, Movement and Rest, much-crowned Splendor and ?Vileness, Silence and Speech.*

The lines continue the catalogue of female personifications in the previous fragment, which as Cornutus says, are “riddles” for *ἡ ποικιλία τῶν δυνάμεων*.

1: “Birth and Death” are probably the first pair, rather than the

conventional "Growth and Decay," cf. 12(18).4. Φυσώ (with υ), like Κινώ and Μεγιστώ in line 2, is ἄπ. λεγ., coined on the model of Δωτώ τε Πρωτώ τε, *Il.* 18.43, Hesiod *Theog.* 248.

2-3 Μεγιστώ: the "Splendor" of the prosperous man in his prime. †φορή† is difficult. Φορή is usually read, presumably connecting with the root of φερόνω and -ύσσω. If this could give a contrast of wretched poverty with prosperity, it would be an obvious and appropriate one.

3 Σωπή: Bergk's reading here gives the needed opposite to Ὀμπαίη, from ὀμψή—any speech, but especially one that is pleasing or, in Homer, divine.

#### FRAGMENTS 118-125 MISFORTUNE INTENSIFIED BY THE SHEDDING OF BLOOD

##### 118(128)

*They did not have Ares as god or Kydoimos, nor king Zeus nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but queen Kypris. Her they propitiated with holy images and painted animal figures, with perfumes of subtle fragrance and offerings of distilled myrrh and sweet-smelling frankincense, and pouring on the earth libations of golden honey. Their altar was not drenched by the (? unspeakable) slaughter of bulls, but this was the greatest defilement among men—to bereave of life and eat noble limbs.*

The passage from Porphyry occurs in an extract from Theophrastus on early sacrifices. The first libations were of water, then of honey, oil, and wine; E.'s lines are given in support. The whole is set in the early history of man: "When friendship and a proper sense of the duties pertaining to kindred natures were possessed by all men, no one slaughtered any living being, in consequence of thinking that other animals were allied to him. But when strife and tumult (Ares and Kydoimos), every kind of contention, and the principle of war, invaded mankind, then, for the first time, no one in reality spared any one of his kindred natures" (*abst.* 2.21, trans. T. Taylor, 1823). The connection with the *Physics*, reinforced by the identification of Kypris with Philia, is clear. There is here a particular description of the life of men (ἐν ἀνθρώποισι in line 9 is unambiguous) at the beginning of their generation, when Love was dominant over Strife, but now the positions are being reversed. It need not be assumed from the introductory phrase περὶ τῆς θεογονίας διεξέων that E. inserted

a complete Hesiodic-type theogony into his poem; the description may cover just the first three lines of this fragment.

1 κείνοισιν: the first generations of men. Kydoimos accompanies Ares and Enyo, *Il.* 5.593, and is personified with Eris on Achilles' shield, 18.535; he is the attendant of Polemos in Aristophanes' *Pax*.

2: βασιλεύς, like the feminine in the next line, is attributive rather than predicative, cf. *Hom. Hym. Cer.* 358. The denial of a reign of Kronos counters Hesiod's golden race of men, *Erga* 111.

3 Κύπρις: for the identification with Philia in the *Physics* cf. 62(73), 70(75).2, 83(98).3, 87(95). The polemic in these three lines directed against traditional theology would be particularly scathing to the people of Acragas, where the line of new and magnificent temples to various deities stretched along the south wall, chief of them being the (unfinished) one to Zeus. (It is interesting to speculate whether the additional temple, attributed to Concordia and built some 50 years after the Olympeion, i.e., ca. 430, could have been due to E.'s influence; on the details of the temples cf. K. H. Waters, *Anc. Soc.* 1974, pp. 8–10.)

4–7: Kypris is offered (1) *agalmata*—presumably representations of the goddess, (2) painted animal figures (as she would be the patroness of living creatures when they lived in friendship, cf. the commentary on the next fragment), (3) perfumes, frankincense, and myrrh (*Matt.* 2:11 is a striking parallel), (4) honey. For bloodless offerings generally as belonging to the early history of man, cf. Porphyry's context here, *Plato Laws* 782, and Pausanias 8.2.3. For the anecdote, obviously fabricated from this fragment, of a bull of meal and honey offered by E. at Olympia, see chap. 1.

8–10: cf. "the men of old who thought it unholy to stain the altars of the gods with blood," *Plato Laws* 782c, and the early Athenians, Pausanias 8.2.3. †ἀκρίτοις† φόνους: "unmixed blood" looks like a confusion with line 6; in support of ἀρρήτοις cf. δειπνων ἀρρήτων, *Sophocles El.* 203. For the violent language of line 10, cf. 124(137).6; φίλας σάρκας there confirms ἡέα γυῖα here and an infinitive of ἐδουσιν. ἐέδμεναι is a unique form but perhaps admissible for E.

### 119(130)

*All creatures, both animals and birds, were tame and gentle to men, and bright was the flame of their friendship.*



The fragment, preserved only in the *Schol.*, complements the previous one and perhaps followed it. Under the sway of Kypris men did not kill, sacrifice, or eat animals, and they in turn were gentle to men. The tameness of animals is a traditional feature of "Golden Age" literature, cf. Isaiah 11:6, Vergil *Ecl.* 4.22, *Orac. Sib.* 3.791-93; for the opposite view, of the cruelty of animals to primitive man, cf. the ghoulish description by Lucretius, 5.990-98.

2: ἄνθρωποι is obvious dittography, hence Sturz's emendation; the enmity of (some) birds to men is illustrated at Aeschylus *Sept.* 1020 and Sophocles *Ant.* 1082. For φιλοφροσύνη as the work of Love, cf. her introduction at 8(17).23, and for the contrast with Strife, cf. Homer *Il.* 9.256-57. The commonplace metaphor of fire for the feelings aroused by Aphrodite has in this context a striking beauty.

### 120(139)

*Alas that the pitiless day did not destroy me first, before I devised for my lips the cruel deed of eating flesh.*

The heinous crime of eating meat is tantamount, in E.'s theory, to cannibalism, because of the kinship of living things, which is a consequence of their common structures and the way in which these structures are separated and re-formed into different kinds of mortal life. One of the most abominable of all acts in myth and tragedy, the eating of one's kin, E. sees perpetrated in the sacrificial meal, cf. 122(136). E. represents himself as having been guilty of this, not, I think, as a god (as if he had been tempted by steak after a diet of ambrosia, in H. E. Barnes's vivid wording, *CJ* 1967, p. 22), but in human form. It is what he interprets as appalling human action that gives point to his warning to his fellow men.

2: Fränkel's reordering of the line is to be commended, as it removes the unlikely σκέτλια and eliminates the problem of the meaning of the preposition here. χείλεσι is then dative either of instrument with βορᾶς (in an active sense "of eating flesh") or of indirect object with the infinitive. For σκέτλια ἔργα cf. *Od.* 9.295 of Polyphemus' cannibalism.

### 121(135)

*but the law for all extends throughout wide-ruling air and measureless sunlight.*

Aristotle quotes the fragment with Sophocles *Ant.* 456–57 to illustrate universal law, a natural justice binding on all, the content of which for E. is a prohibition against killing living creatures. The lines are therefore an introduction to 122(136) and 124(137). The law recalls that of Heraclitus (fr. 114) and also that of Hesiod *Erga* 276–78, which has, however, a specifically human application: fish, animals, and birds devour each other because, unlike men, they have no *dikē*.

1 ἀλλὰ . . . μέν: “a stereotyped opening formula,” Denniston, *Greek Particles* p. 366, in a discussion of Xenophon, and cf. the Homeric uses, p. 378. It is unnecessary and confusing to suppose that the particles indicate a contrast between a law in the sky and one on earth (as DK vol. 1, p. 366, and others). There is a single universal law, the range of which extends from the surface of the earth to the boundary of the cosmos, that is applicable to all who breathe the air and live in the light of the sun. εὐρυμέδων: rare as an adjective but used of the sea, personified in Poseidon at Pindar *Ol.* 8.31.

2 αἰθέρος: E.’s word for the element of air, see the table in chap. 2. ἀπλέτου: applied to the extent of air, 8(17).18, and here to the light of the sun; not “boundless” (cf. 33[39]) but “measureless,” cf. Hesychius ἀπλετον· ἀμέτρητον.

## 122(136)

*Will you not cease from the din of slaughter? Do you not see that you are devouring one another because of your careless way of thinking?*

In Sextus this fragment is followed by its elaboration in 124(137). According to his context, E. as well as Pythagoras and the other Italians believed in a kinship of man with the gods and with animals. The slaying and eating of animals is therefore the destruction of one’s own family; for a contemporary philosophical defense of animal rights on similar lines cf. R. Knowles Morris and M. W. Fox, eds., *On the Fifth Day: Animal Rights and Human Ethics*. The “law” of the previous fragment is interpreted as a *pneuma* pervading the whole cosmos, and this looks like a Stoic version of the φρῆν ἱερή of 97(134).4.

1 δυσσηχέος: the Homeric epithet for war is deliberately recalled, cf. *Il.* 7.395 and 11.590; killing an animal is comparable to killing a man in battle.

2 ἀκηδέησι νόοιο: a variant on the Homeric ἀφραδέησι νόοιο, *Il.* 10.122, where Agamemnon denies that Menelaus is lazy or careless. The deficiency of the understanding of the ordinary man is a standard complaint with E., as with Heraclitus and Parmenides. As in 107(115).3 the wrong action may be due to ignorance or carelessness, but this does not exempt one from the consequences.

### 123(145)

*That is why, being distraught with bitter misfortunes, you will never lighten your hearts of grievous sorrows.*

1 τοιγάρτοι: "approximating in force to διὰ ταῦτα καί," Denniston, *Greek Particles* p. 566, and cf. Aeschylus *Supp.* 654. This gives the connection with the previous fragment: "you do not stop slaughtering and devouring each other, and that is why your sufferings do not cease." The main difficulty in the fragment is the apparent inconsistency with 102(112).3, which, wherever it belongs, has the phrase κακότητος ἄπειροι of the men of Acragas (cf. the commentary on the line), who are here spoken of as distraught χαλεπῇσι κακότησιν and never free of grievous sorrows. But it is a standard sermonizing tactic to show that apparent prosperity is built on shifting sands. The overall view of life in the *Physics* and the *Katharmoi* is one of Hesiodic pessimism as the domination by Strife increases, cf. *Erga.* 200-01 for phrasing similar to that here, and also the commentary on 114(124); a respite can be won only if there is a concerted refusal to further the work of Strife. The individual can by intellectual effort revert to his former status where he will be free of human sorrows, cf. 100(110) and 133(147). A warning to the men of Acragas that despite their show of wealth and security they were not immune to misfortune may well have struck home, if they looked back into the past to the tyranny of Phalaris, reflected on the contemporary political unrest, and saw in the future a lethal threat from Carthage.

### 124(137)

*The father will lift up his dear son in a changed form, and, blind fool, as he prays he will slay him, and those who take part in the sacrifice ?bring (the victim) as he pleads. But the father, deaf to his cries, slays him in his house and prepares an evil feast. In the same way son seizes father, and children their mother, and having bereaved them of life devour the flesh of those they love.*



Sextus adds the fragment to 122(136) with *καί*, but Chalcidius puts it “*alio loco*.” Plutarch’s quotation, to illustrate those who unwittingly slay their kin, stops at *νήπιος*. The whole fragment is a horrifying account of what the theory of the kinship of life implies in practice (Xenophanes made a joke of it in fr. 7). It is a description that recalls the great family murders of tragedy, and in particular is in the opening lines strongly reminiscent of Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter as told by the chorus in Aeschylus *Ag.* 218–47. E. shows the father engaged in the ritual of raising a victim at an altar and, after the customary prayer, slaying, carving, and eating it in a family meal. The outwardly pious act is most impious. (Heraclitus, without E.’s motivation, had felt revulsion at the proceedings, fr. 5.) However, even in E.’s terms, it would be a rare coincidence for the prematurely dead son to take on immediately the form of a sacrificial animal, but the extreme example is taken to reinforce the exhortation against any slaying of living creatures (and so furthering the work of Strife).

2–3: for a comprehensive list of suggestions for the text of these lines cf. van der Ben *Proem* pp. 201–02, and for a detailed discussion cf. Zuntz *Persephone* pp. 220–26. It is clear that no definitive conclusion can be reached. I suggest Origen’s future, *σφάζει*, which gives the following stages of the narrative: (1) The father stands at the altar ready to carry out the sacrifice, but he is *μέγα νήπιος*, totally and tragically unaware of disaster, as are Patroclus, *Il.* 16.46, and Andromache, *Il.* 22.445 (and cf. 122(136).2). (2) The attendants bring on the remonstrating victim; for *λίσσόμενον* cf. Iphigenia’s pleas *λιτὰς δὲ καὶ κληδόνας πατρώους*, *Ag.* 228. With a large animal, perhaps a calf (cf. line 4), and a formal ceremony there would obviously be attendants, and so for the unacceptable *πορεύνται* a verb like *φέρονται* is needed. (The line has an unusual lengthening, *θύοντες*, cf. *ἀλύοντες* in the previous fragment.) (3) The father kills the victim, deaf in his turn to its cries (accepting Diels’s *ὁ δ’ αὖ νήκουστος*), and prepares the meat.

6 *ἀπορραΐσαντε*: for the dual cf. 15(23).2, 4, 6; it may be due here to the juxtaposition *μητέρα παῖδες*, recalling the matricide by Orestes and Electra. The line contrasts with the practice in the early history of man, 118(128).9–10.

### 125(138)

*drawing off life with bronze*

The fragment comes with 129(143) in Aristotle as two citations from the same poet, and that this is E. is confirmed by Theon's quotation of the latter fragment and attribution to him. Both fragments seem to be concerned with ritual sacrifice and so are placed here in the *Katharmoi*. Aristotle is discussing metaphor in general and gives the two quotations as examples of that from species to species, for ἀρύσαι is used for ταμεῖν and ταμεῖν for ἀρύσαι, the prosaic word for both being ἀφελεῖν. ψυχή, the only instance of the word in the fragments, is the principle of life and thought concentrated, in E.'s theory, in the blood around the heart. The official "takes away" the life, i.e., metaphorically "draws it off" or, nonmetaphorically, "severs" it with the sharp bronze sacrificial knife. The victim is bled to death by having its throat cut, and it is this wastage that E. emphasizes as both the ruin of the work of Love and the furtherance of that of Strife.

#### FRAGMENTS 126–129 FURTHER ADVICE

##### 126(144)

*to be empty of misfortune*

Plutarch has high praise for this phrase, and it looks like a tag that he found appropriate to attach to his discussion of the restraining of anger, along with sex, wine, and lies. But this is not sufficient to give it a moral connotation in E. κακότης for him is human misery generally, cf. the commentaries on the other instances at 102(112).3 and 123(145).1. νηστεύσαι seems to mean "not to eat," "to be empty" of food; van der Ben, *Proem* p. 211, quotes Callimachus fr. 191.61–63 for another example of the verb with a genitive—νηστεύειν τῶν ἐμπνεόντων—but this may be a parody of E. There is no reason to assume that there is an imperative here. "To be free of ill" is a description of the state that might be achieved if E.'s words are heeded (cf. the last two fragments of the *Physics*), and it is in fact achieved by those who join the gods, cf. 133(147).2.

##### 127(140)

*to keep completely from leaves of laurel*

Plutarch in his context extends E.'s prohibition against picking laurel

leaves to picking the leaves of all trees, because of the injury to them. In E.'s catalogues of living things (related because they share a common structure, cf. 13(9).2, 26(20).6, and also 12(8).2), *θάμνος*, which refers to the larger forms of plant life such as bushes and trees, is included, and of these the laurel, or bay, is chief, cf. 131(127).2. The preservation of the tree unharmed, as with an animal, allows its constitution to become properly arranged and settled, and so a re-formation as a higher type of life is expedited. The selection of the laurel does not of itself imply a particular interest on E.'s part in Apollo (cf. the commentary on 97[134]) but would rather be a criticism of a cult involving leaves plucked from the tree.

*ἐχέσθαι*: I doubt that the infinitive is for the imperative and that E. is giving curt instructions to his friends. The context suggests *χρή* with the infinitive, and the recommendation probably belonged with the passages warning against harming animals (rather than being one of a hypothetical list of rules supposed necessary to justify the title *Katharmoi*).

#### 128(141)

*wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans*

This appalling line should be rejected as a genuine quotation from E. In *Geoponica* it is attributed to Orpheus, and a similar phrase is ascribed to Pythagoras in Callimachus fr. 128. Gellius, who gives the Callimachus fragment as well as the attribution to E. here, is late and unreliable. The line is a parody of E.—a pastiche of *Od.* 22.316 and fragments 127(140) and 114(124). *πάνδεϊλος* does not appear again until the third century A.D.; it would have been unacceptable to the addressees. A list of possible explanations for the Pythagorean taboo on beans is given by Guthrie, *HGP*, vol. 1, pp. 184–85; they (with the exception of the political interpretation) connect beans with sex, life or soul, or the dead. If E. did accept such a taboo, the most reasonable one is the medical one—that an excessive amount of beans is bad for the heart and blood.

#### 129(143)

*cutting from five streams with a long bronze blade*

For the context in Aristotle cf. the commentary on 125(138); Theon gives the attribution, and the first hand of the MS confirms the reading,



cf. P. Maas *ByzZ* 1936, p. 456. As van der Ben shows (*Proem* pp. 203–08), the phrase is not concerned with some unknown ritual of collecting water in a container from five springs but, like 125(138), with drawing blood with a knife. *παναήκει χαλκῷ* is Homeric for the blade of a sword or ax or the point of a spear; *ταμῶν* according to Aristotle would be, less metaphorically, *ἀρύσας*. The object therefore can only be a liquid, and the obvious liquid one “draws” with a long bronze blade is blood. The “springs” therefore must be metaphorical, and van der Ben suggests that “streams of blood” from five sacrificial animals are intended. Perhaps, rather, the “springs” are the five senses, the sources of sensation, which cease to function as the victim is bled. This may all be connected, as Theon’s context suggests, with a ritual of purification by blood (which E. would inveigh against), cf. Heraclitus fr. 5.

#### FRAGMENTS 130–133 THE HIERARCHY OF LIVES

##### 130(125)

*for from living creatures it set out dead bodies, changing the form*

Clement quotes the line as a unit with 112(118), and with other famous lines of an extremely pessimistic nature, illustrating the misery and brevity of human life; for the list see the commentary on 112(118). The missing masculine subject is therefore probably something like *πόλεμος*, and the context not a piece of mythical mysticism but a straightforward reminder that the living die and their structure decomposes, cf. from the *Physics* 14(21).13–14. If the death is abrupt or violent, the result of the work of Strife, then the reconstitution of the parts would be into inferior and even more temporary forms of life; the consequences when the opposite state of affairs prevails are given in the next three fragments.

##### 131(127)

*Among animals they are born as lions that make their lairs in the hills and bed on the ground, and among fair-leaved trees as laurels.*

Aelian explains the fragment as a ranking of forms of mortal life. Best of all is human life, but among ζῷα that of the lion is best, and among plants that of the laurel. ζῷον is a comprehensive term, and there is no

reason to suppose that E. gave a more explicit and pedestrian list, including, for example, the dolphin as the best form among fish, the snake among reptiles, and the eagle among birds. (The late Roman *Kore Kosmou* fragment, Herm. ap. Stob. fr. xxiii, Nock-Festugière iv, pp. 13–14, enthusiastically adopted by Zuntz, *Persephone* pp. 232–33, is too remote and confused to be helpful for an elaboration of the lines here. The  $\lambda\eta\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  in Aelian's context is an anachronistic intrusion from Plato *Rep.* 10, 617e.)

1  $\delta\phi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\chi\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\varsigma$ : the adjective occurs in the *Physics* at 26(20).7 (if the reading is correct) in the list of different forms of life, but apparently nowhere else. There is an interesting discussion of lions in chapter 12 of Aelian, including an account of their deification in Egypt, their connection with fire, with dreams and prophecies, and with the punishing of perjury. They are carnivorous but, unlike men, cannot change their ways.

2  $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\gamma\omicron\upsilon\omicron\tau\alpha\iota$ : the subject would be “mortals,” i.e., those who have lived and died as temporary combinations of elements.  $\eta\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\acute{o}\mu\omicron\iota\sigma\iota\nu$ : a reminder from *Physics* 71(82) that hair and leaves are analogous parts. The choice of laurel would be particularly appropriate for its supposedly prophetic properties (cf. Hesiod *Theog.* 30), without implying any particular honor to Apollo, cf. the commentaries on 97(134) and 127(140).

### 132(146)

*And at the end they come among men on earth as prophets, minstrels, physicians, and leaders, and from these they arise as gods, highest in honor.*

A list of the best types of human life starts with Homer, *Od.* 17.384–86. Hesiod singles out wise kings who are like gods among men, *Theog.* 91–93. Pindar, fr. 133, has kings, athletes, and wise men, and in *Ol.* 2 the favored are instantiated in Peleus, Cadmus, and Achilles and include those who abide by their oaths, *Ol.* 2.120 and cf. 107(115).4. For Plato, philosophers are preeminent (*Phaedo* 114c), for Cicero statesmen (*Somn. Scip.* passim, but musicians and astronomers also qualify, chap 18), and for Vergil the number includes heroes, priests, and prophets headed by the priest/minstrel Orpheus and the minstrel/physician Musaeus, *Aen.* 6.642–68. And  $\lambda\alpha\tau\rho\acute{o}\mu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\varsigma$  is a traditional title for Apollo and Asclepius, cf. Aeschylus *Eum.* 62, *Supp.* 263. It is probable that E. supposed all four types of life to be united in himself.

2 *πρόμοι*: not the Homeric *πρόμαχοι* but the statesman and leader in peace; on E.'s political leadership see chap. 1.

3 *θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι*: the description of the gods in *Physics* 14(21).12 and 15(23).8 is a reminder of the common basis of the two poems and of the status of gods as beings not totally different from men but as having the same origin and constitution as them, superior only in the longer term to their existence; and these gods at the culmination of the types of lives are again the *δαίμονες* given at the beginning of the *Katharmoi*, see chap. 3.

### 133(147)

*With other immortals they share hearth and table, having no part in human sorrows, unwearied.*

The lines follow closely if not immediately on the previous fragment as a more detailed description of the daimons, both before they are born as the different types of mortal life and again when the mortal becomes immortal. But "immortal" for E. is not an unending and unchanging state, as it is in Clement's Christian adaptation of the fragment, but one that alternates with "mortal"; there is no incompatibility with 107(115).5. The description is not to be taken literally, but it puts into more comprehensible human terms that unity with divine thought proffered to Pausanias at the end of the *Physics*, in much the same way as the separation is described in terms of the wrongdoing which among men results in exile.

1 *ἀντοτράπεζοι*: ἄπ. λεγ., if the reading is correct, cf. *ὁμοτράπεζοι καὶ ὀμέστιοι*, Plutarch *quaest. conv.* 703c. The most famous mortal to join the banquet of the gods was Herakles, cf. Homer *Od.* 11.602–04, Horace *Carm.* 4.30, and in general Hesiod *Theog.* 796, 802, Plato *Phdr.* 247a, Vergil *Ecl.* 4.62–63.

2 †*ἐόντες*†: postponing the participle until after *ἀπόκληροι* saves the meter; for the phrase cf. *ἀποκλάρος πόνων*, Pindar *Pyth.* 5.71. The "human sorrows" that the gods escape have been elaborated throughout the *Katharmoi*, e.g., 107(115).8, 112(118), and 123(145).



## 12. Addenda

### FRAGMENTS 134-152

The group of quotations in this section contains single words from E., phrases that are too meager to be treated as separate fragments, and lines in which the text is so corrupt that nothing positive can be said.

**134(5)** The question under discussion is Pythagorean abstention from fish. One of the speakers in the dialogue, another Empedocles, puts forward a secondhand etymology as a reason for respecting fish as keepers of silence. He adds that his namesake was speaking *Πυθαγορικῶς* to Pausanias in his exhortation to cover the teaching in his "silent heart." Both *ἔλλοπας* and *ἔλλοπος* here are conjectures, and the form itself is uncertain, cf. the commentary on 108(117).2. Even if Wyttenbach's emendation is accepted, and the translation "silent heart" along the right lines, Plutarch's Pythagorean implications are unjustified. An exhortation to take in E.'s words well and meditate on them is in the same tone as 6(4).3 and 100(11).1-2.

**135(7)** It is unlikely that *ἀγένητα* (or *ἀγέννητα*, the Hesychius reading) was used by E. as a noun. The singular as an adjective is in Parmenides fr. 8.3 contrasting with *ἀνώλεθρον*, and Hippolytus (not Heraclitus, *pace* LSJ) has the adjective in the introduction to Heraclitus fr. 50. Elsewhere in fifth-century authors the word means "not having happened" (e.g., Soph. *Trach.* 743), "baseless," "low-born," and at Sophocles

OC 973, "not yet born." E. could well have adopted the adjective in the Eleatic sense of "without birth or beginning" for the four roots and/or Love and Strife, cf. 8(17).30-34 and 11(16).

**136(10)** The quotation comes immediately after 13(9) and is a comment on it. *φῶτας*, *θῆρας*, *θάμνους*, and *οἰωνούς* are repeated from the fragment, and for *μειγνυμένων τῶν στοιχείων* cf. 47(35).7, 16, and also 51(59).1, 15(23).5, 12(8).3, and 13(9).1. *φύσις* is the controversial word from 12(8).1, which Plutarch here too clearly takes as "birth," a *σύγκρισις* of the roots, as opposed to "death," their *διάκρισις*. *πότμος δυσδαίμων* is from line 4 of 13(9) and *θάνατος ἀλοίτης* a variant on it and on the *θάνατος οὐλόμενος* of 12(8).2. It is uncertain whether *ἀλοίτης* is E.'s adjective or Plutarch's alternative for *οὐλόμενος*, but the sense "wicked" holds in either case, as *ἀλείτης* is used of Paris, *Il.* 3.28, and of the suitors, *Od.* 20.121. Death, in a conventional sense, is a "wrongdoer" but hardly, in E.'s terms, an "avenger." A comparison with *Ἀθηνᾶ Ἀλοῖτις* (Lyc. *Alex.* 936) is misleading, cf. Bollack *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 100.

**137(19)** *νεῖκος οὐλόμενον* occurs at 8(17).19, and for the adjective cf. 77(109).3 and 107(115).14. *σχεδύνη* is *ἄπ. λεγ.* The context provides the sense of "binding" for the adherence of the parts of the compounds formed by Love, in contrast to the destructive function of Strife, cf. *κολλητικόν* here and 48(96).4, 49(34). Plutarch wants to identify Strife with fire and Love with water, despite E.'s regarding fire as a hardening or setting agent for the roots. That Plutarch did not suppose that E. identified Strife with fire and Love with water but found the opposition of Strife and Love as destructive and unifying forces useful for his own contrast between fire and water is shown by his earlier quotation of 14(21).3-4 at 949f; there fire and water have their obvious identification with sun and rain as elements.

**138(32)** The phrase and its context in *lin. insec.*, listing differences between "joint" and "pivot," are corrupt. Even if Diels's Heraclitean reading of *δύω δέξει ἄρθρον* is acceptable, it does not fit the context, for it gives no reason for the joint being *διαφορά πως*. The phrase may have been part of a medical simile for the work of Aphrodite on the elements, but E.'s use of *ἄρθρον* at 8(17).22 does not have any technical sense. There is little to be extracted from this passage.

**139(58)** The sentence comes between the quotation of lines 10–13 of 47(35) and fr. 51(59). The *katastasis* that features the *μουνομελῆ* is designated by Simplicius as that in which Strife is retreating before the advance of Love. Examples of the *μουνομελῆ*, called by Simplicius *τὰ ἄμκτα καὶ μονόγυια*, are given in 50(57); the word is ἄπ. λεγ. and probably E.'s coinage. *ἐπλανᾶτο* occurs also at 50(57).3.

**140(60)** *βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα* is from 52(61).2 and *εἰλίποδ' ἀκριτόχειρα* a cognate phrase. *εἰλίπους* is an epithet of oxen—"with rolling walk," "lumbering." *ἀκριτόχειρος* is ἄπ. λεγ., defined in LSJ as "with countless hands," a bizarre picture even in the present context. A more appropriate sense would be "with hands not properly articulated or distinguishable"; as the other phrase shows, the creatures are oxlike, with some crude human features. Both phrases belong in the general context of 52(61); Plutarch is using such creatures along with the Furies as absurd nightmare visions which the Epicureans are compelled to accept as true impressions. This is some confirmation that E. does not have such creatures in the present *katastasis*, cf. the commentary on 52(61).3.

**141(69)** *διγόνους*: elsewhere "twin-born," "double," "twin-bearing," but here, from the Proclus context, "capable of two terms of childbearing," i.e., after pregnancies of seven or nine months' duration. Proclus elaborates E.'s observation of a gynecological detail in terms of Pythagorean/Platonic number symbolism, based on 35 as the sum of the numbers 2–8, 45 of 1–9, and their respective multiplication by 6.

**142(70)** *ἀμνίον*: the fine inner membrane enclosing the fetus, which breaks with the waters at birth. The word, with its ovine connection, is a typically Empedoclean combination of observation and analogy and has survived as the technical medical term; for the sense cf. the *φλοιός* which Anaximander thought enveloped early man, Aetius 5.19.4, and the *χιτών* of 110(126). The general context of frs. 141–42 is with 55–59, but cf. the commentary on 151(153a).

**143(92)** The notice from Aristotle on E.'s theory of the sterility of mules may come either from the section of the *Physics* on reproduction or later, from that on types of mixture, cf. the commentary on 74(91). E.'s explanation, which Aristotle rejects, is that as the combination of two soft



substances (copper and tin) produces a hard alloy (bronze), so the mixing of the soft secretions in the coupling of horse and ass results in a "hard" offspring, the infertile mule. In both cases, and as with water and wine, the process is a fitting together of *κοῖλα* and *στερεά* in the two substances, the sexual connotation of *μειγνύναι* probably also being involved here. The original phrase may have been *χαλκὸν κασσιτέρῳ μίγνεντα*.

**144(97)** A fragment can hardly be extracted from the word *ράχιν* here, but the point, that the backbone is divided into vertebrae because it was broken originally by its twisted position in the womb, is significant for the interpretation of 52(61). The explanation is incompatible with teleology and the consequent immutability of species, and is therefore rejected outright by Aristotle.

**145(99)** *ῥῆξος* deliberately links plant and animal organs, cf. the commentary on 71(82).1-2. E.'s theory of hearing, probably coming after the section on sight (frs. 84-89), is given enigmatically in Theophrastus *Sens.* 9 and 21, and in Aetius 4.16.1. According to Aetius and *Sens.* 21 a sound like that of a bell is heard within, and this suggests that *Sens.* 9 here is an abbreviated version—the *κώδων* mentioned is an inner extension of the "sprig of flesh" of the auricle. With the MS *ἐξωθεν* in the first line retained, and *τῶν ἴσων ἤχων* taken as echoes "equal to," i.e., "reproducing" the original sound, the theory might be reconstructed as follows: external sounds, which are emanations of air particles, enter the channel of the outer ear and, presumably because they fit the pores of the organ, reverberate as in a trumpet bell in what is now called the middle ear. (A modern general account of the process also uses a simile: "the central portion of the drum-membrane vibrates as a stiff cone in response to sound," *Enc. Brit. Macr.* 5.1120-28, esp. 1125.) Theophrastus' question at *Sens.* 21, "How can we hear the internal sound?" is crucial, but E.'s failure to answer it should not be held against him. He is on the right track, and exactly how we hear the inner sound, i.e., how the mechanical vibrations are turned into nerve impulses, is still not fully understood.

**146(142)** These two lines are quoted for the grammatical point of a singular verb having both plural and singular subject. The reading of the first line can be accepted. For the second there are, among others, the following suggestions: *οὔτε ποτ' ἰδέω δέχεται ἡδ' οἰκτρῆς τέγος αὐδῆς*

(Diels); *τέρποι ἄν οὐδ(ἐ) αἰνῆς Ἑκάτης τέγος ἡλιτόποινον* (Bignone); *οὔτ' ἄρα πως Αἰδεω δέχεται κατὰ γῆς τέγος ἔνδον* (van der Ben). *δέχεται* seems preferable for the common verb, and the line scans if it starts with *οὔτ' Αἰδεω δέχεται*. Little can be done with the end. The overall sense is, “the house of aegis-bearing Zeus does not receive him, nor that of Hades.” The context is probably the *Katharmoi*, the “him” being the daimon, and the meaning similar to the rejection of the daimon by the elements at 107(115).9–12. From 7(6).2 we know that Zeus is fire (especially and appropriately the fire in the heavens) and Aidoneus/Hades earth.

**147(148–50)** Plutarch praises a point of E.’s style, that his adjectives are not merely decorative but give essential information, and he quotes three disconnected examples; their contexts can only be hazarded. *ἀμφιβρότην χθόνα*—“man-enclosing earth”—perhaps connects with the *χιτών* of 110(126) or with the *τύποι* sent up from earth, 53(62).4, or with the formation of living things by Kypris; whatever its placing, the Homeric adjective for a shield has been put to a new use. Some straightforward meteorological reference is perhaps behind the transference of Zeus’ Homeric adjective *νεφεληγερέτην* to air. *πολυαίματον τὸ ἥπαρ* suggests that the physiological section was quite detailed. After the heart the liver is the most important organ, a repository of the lifeblood, with an essential part to play in digestion and embryology, and the source of blood and *pneuma* for the fetus, cf. Soranus, DK 31 A79.

**148(151)** *ζείδωρος*: the Homeric epithet for the earth, usually interpreted as “grain-giving,” with an etymological twist means “life-giving” here (from *ζάω* rather than *ζεῖα*) and is applied to Philia/Aphrodite, cf. 14(21).8–11. Plutarch again commends E.’s choice of adjective.

**149(152)** The reference is to types of metaphor, and, in the same context as 129(143), Aristotle is describing metaphor by analogy; his second example is of old age being to life as evening is to day. Evening will then be called the old age of day (of which we have no examples), and old age the evening or sunset of life (which became a cliché, cf. Plato *Laws* 770a and other examples cited by A. Gudeman, *Aristoteles Poetik* p. 359). The text adopted here is that of P<sup>2</sup> (Gudeman), which quotes the last example as being from E.; elsewhere *ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐ.* comes after *ἡμέρας*, giving a reference to a phrase of E. well known to Aristotle but unknown to us.



**150(153)** βαμβώ: an obscure word, connected probably with “sleeping” or “rocking to sleep” as βαμβάω. The appropriate “cavity” would be where the unborn sleeps before birth, i.e., the womb, either that of the individual mother or, metaphorically, of the earth, cf. 48(96).1 and 53(62).4–6. For the likely connection of a figurine of the womb with the cult of Demeter cf. Bollack, *Empédocle* vol. 3, pp. 401–02.

**151(153a)** A notice on the formation of the embryo would be expected to come from the *Physics* in the context of frs. 55–59. There is, however, no reason to doubt the attribution to the *Katharmoi* because of the subject matter (as Zuntz does, *Persephone* p. 235, n. 1, and Bollack, *Empédocle* vol. 3, p. 539, following Wilamowitz). ἀνέττεται shows that there is not a detailed exposition, and a brief mention of the growth of the embryo could belong with the putting on of the χιτών of flesh, 110(126), or the birth cry of 112(118). Whatever number theory may be involved here (cf. the commentaries on 59[68] and 141[69]), the time given happens to be correct. By the end of the seventh week internal and external organs are articulated, “the stage of the embryo ends and ‘fetus’ is the preferred term.” *Enc. Brit. Macr.* 6.74.

**152** This fragment, published by H. Hunger in 1967 (*Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 1967, pp. 1–33) and discussed by M. L. West (*Maia* 1968, p. 199), F. Lasserre (*MH* 1969, p. 82), and van der Ben (*Proem* pp. 15–16, 18) is important for showing that there were two books of the *Katharmoi*. It also breaks down further the long-held view that the *Physics* is concerned only with “nature” and the *Katharmoi* with “religion,” which led to one of only two other fragments explicitly assigned to the *Katharmoi* being transferred (cf. the previous note). The quotation is given to illustrate an unexciting lengthening of alpha. τῶν γὰρ ὅσα ῥίζαις (or ῥίζῃς) μὲν ἐπασσοντέρα . . . μανωτέροις ὀρπηξιν . . . τηλεθάοντα seems clear, and the gaps are here filled according to Lasserre. The sense is, “of those thriving with roots closer set and branches spaced farther apart”—a mundane arboreal allusion. Perhaps it belongs toward the end of the *Katharmoi* in the account of the different forms of life and their highest exemplars. The contrast between compact and rare parts, as well as the actual wording, recalls 70(75).1: τῶν δ’ ὅσ’ ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δ’ ἔκτοθι μανὰ πέπηγεν.



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## Bibliographical Afterword

Since 1981 the study of the Presocratics has flourished, and Empedocles has shared in this prosperity. The comprehensive studies published in this period include the revised Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, with Schofield in 1983, and a century bibliography by Paquet and others (1988). Dumont gave the Greek text of Diels/Kranz with a French translation (1988), while Mansfeld had a similar presentation with Greek and facing German translation in the Reclam series (1986), as well as his background volume on the historiography (1990). A selection of the fragments in Greek with commentary appeared in Wright (1985), a comprehensive English translation of contexts and fragments in the Penguin Classics by Barnes (1987), and more recently a substantial *Introduction* to the Presocratics by McKirahan for Hackett (1994), which contains an essay on each individual, preceded by a translation of the main texts.

Specifically on Empedocles there is a verse translation by Lombardo (1982), the thin Bryn Mawr commentary by Johnston (1985), and the rather disappointing *Phoenix* volume by Inwood (1992). This gives the fragments in Greek, a translation of them with their contexts and the Diels-Kranz (A) *Testimonia*, but very little in the way of commentary on particular or general issues. Inwood put all the fragments into one poem called *Katharmoi* with *Physika* 'as a kind of alternative title', taking to extremes a tendency that first began with Van der Ben (1975, in the main bibliography) to remove 107(115) with some related fragments to the beginning of the *Physics*; this was answered among others by Calzolari (1984), who supported the present stand with B2 and 3 as the openers. Sedley (1989) favoured Van der Ben's ordering, but for different reasons, and reduced *Katharmoi* to a set of purificatory oracles and 'healing utterances', using some evidence from Lucretius to bolster his case. He argued cogently, although I still find the transition then necessary, from a popular address for the citizens of Acragas to a more technical account for a favoured student, too abrupt (see pp. 81-2 above). Inwood's more drastic move, as well as his complicated use of contexts with double translations, was apparently influenced by Osborne (1987a). A new home was found for fr. 49(34) by Sider (1982) in Empedocles' *Persika* as an account of food supplies for the Persian army, and Solmsen earlier (1980) had suggested ascribing frs. 95-7(132-4) to the *Hymn to Apollo*.

The two volume *Index Empedocleus* (1991) by Imbraguglia and others is a mixed compilation. One volume is devoted to reproducing Wright's Index



Verborum, expanded by some words which might be direct quotations from the (A) Testimonia; the other gives a text (in a poor Greek font) with 'Commento alle varie lectiones e riferimenti bibliografici', but prefaced by some useful essays, especially on the language, style and vocabulary of Empedocles. This is a topic on which there is still much work to be done, although it was touched on by Edwards (1991); a particular example was examined by Slings (1991), and Robb (1983) produced an important collection of related general essays.

There was also surprisingly little textual analysis of individual fragments. The six main notes are on 12(8) by Nilles (1989) which accuses Aristotle of some sharp practice here, Janko (1986) on the difficult reading of 14(21).6, Meriani (1991) on *anaesimos* at 96(27a), Sider (1984) on 48(96), Rösler (1983) on the opening of *Katharmoi* at 102(112) and Janssen's contrast in 1984 of *Nemertēs* and *Asapheia* at 116(122).4; Mansfeld also has a note on the manuscript tradition of *Katharmoi* (1994).

An important new volume by Kingsley (1995b) re-examines Empedocles' involvement in the Pythagorean tradition and the practitioners of magic, but without shunting him out of the history of Presocratic philosophy; Kingsley's work is particularly noteworthy in that he introduces virtually unknown Arabic and Armenian texts. Less controversially, Kerferd (1986) discusses the connection of Empedocles and Gorgias; Castner (1987), Edwards (1989) and Mesturini (1989), along with Sedley, trace the influence of Empedocles on Lucretius on various topics; Obbink (1988) is interested in the title of Hermachus' polemic against Empedocles, whereas Kohlschütter (1991) studies his place in Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*. Kyriakou (1994) finds Empedoclean echoes in Apollonius of Rhodes; Sedley (1992) looks at Theophrastus and Empedocles on vision, but Gallavotti (1985) tackles the range of the diffusion of Empedocles' work from Aristotle to Averroes.

It is encouraging that the controversy about the interpretation of Empedocles' cosmology, and in particular the cycle of phases involved, has moved from the undue prominence it had centre stage, and is settling into the main lines accepted in the present volume. Van der Ben (1984) argued for 8(17).3-5 referring to cycles of life, and Brown (1984) opted for a linear rather than a cyclic development, but he is in a minority. Graham (1988) on 8(17) supported the double creation view as does Stevens (1989), who comes to the problem from her analysis of Simplicius, and Steiger (1986) from a comparison of the cosmologies of Empedocles and Parmenides; Osborne too (1987b) supports the cycle of daimons linked to the elements and the motive forces, albeit in the one poem.

Taking *Katharmoi* still as giving some account of the life of the *daimon* and the achievement of wisdom, Karin Alt has two thoughtful articles in *Hermes* on the complex themes involved (1987/8), and Ruocco (1987) links the concepts of Daimon, Sphairos and Ananke. Panagiotou (1984) and Demoulie (1993) pursued the theme as directly related to Empedocles, and Chitwood (1986) found the anecdote of the leap into Etna a logical and poetically appropriate end for him.

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## **BOOKS**

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