


APOLLO



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BOOKS



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APOLLO

The Wind, the Spirit, and the God

Four Studies

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I. APOLLO'S TEMPLE SERVANT

I most certainly do not stand alone in my love for the opening of Euripides' tragedy *Ion*. From time immemorial the great monody, the hero's solo which follows the prologue, has radiated the warmth and intimacy of a remarkable devotion to one's home. We have once to encounter the simple and obvious homeyness in an example such as this so that we can then envisage it in general—to be at home in a Greek temple. Therein rests the uniqueness of the whole cheerfully concluding tragedy and especially of this polished passage, which is not in need of praise but of attention to every detail. Attention has already been granted to the drama so long as it has been devoted to the figure of Ion and his appearance. I would like to serve it with an adapted prose rendering of the Greek text, as least insofar as the German [English] language allows this. As the limit of possibility becomes attainable in doing so, one is reminded of the peculiarities of the Greek.

I am already inclined to take up the suggestion made by Schiller to Goethe in his letter of March 10, 1802, when referring to this certain uniqueness I just mentioned. 'T hear that Wieland has let himself be persuaded to translate Euripides' *Ion*, and they say he has made completely astonishing discoveries as to how much is hidden within this Greek *Ion*." Schiller speaks specifically of the "Greek" *Ion* since, at that time in Weimar, August Wilhelm Schlegel's work of the same name was being performed. Yet we wish not to make an attempt at ascertaining what the people of 1800 thought of the

Greek work, although we would give very much to have had Holderin make an open allusion to this appearance of an Apollonian youth! We have instead the possibility of being allowed to address ourselves and to set ourselves, so to speak, to the text. To do just this, let us now provide guidance through an analysis of the elements which to the reader of the text—if not indeed to previous, distinguished commentators—are ever present and reasonably concrete, and let us do this without introducing our remarks with much more than what introduction was offered on the stage itself. The Athenian stage in the last quarter of the fifth century B.C. did not reveal much when the *Ion* was staged for the first time except, of course, that in this drama a temple was substituted for the palace of the normal tragedy and that from the fifth verse on, as it was delivered, no one could doubt which temple was meant. There was hardly a need for any indication in the scenery. As soon as one became aware that it was the much-frequented, widely renowned oracular temple that was meant, the landscape of Delphi rose above the building. When the Greeks, unlike us, spoke of the magnificence of a landscape, it was all the more concrete and immediate—to those, that is, who had seen Delphi, the Phaedriades, Mt. Parnassus's steep walls of rock covered even in early spring-time with deep snow (which is what the visitor to the temple saw in the background), and the Sacred Way itself above the mysterious ravine of the unseen Pleistos, down to which slopes the incline beneath the temple precinct.

Through recollection and because of its fame, the temple of Apollo at Delphi, lying more splendidly in its landscape than any other shrine of ancient Greece, rises as one hears the words of the poet. And we speak not of that temple the ruins of which *we* visit when we travel to Delphi but of an Ur-temple, massive, bathed in full colors, and still almost lifted into the air by the fantastic forms on its flowering tiles. Because the archaic Greek art with its marvelous tiles has come alive for us, we can envision it in this way, while earlier we had conceived of it as that later temple, a sketch authentic only in its main features—gables and cornices in the Doric style. The time is the very end of night, so early in the morning that we must assume that an exterior sign, the closed door of the temple, would serve to indicate the twilight of first

daybreak: the time of the God of all twilights, Hermes, who with winged feet was the first person to step onto the stage and introduce himself to the audience, who had taken their seats perhaps while it was still dark.

I wish not to recount his prologue to the drama word by word but only to review briefly the story antecedent to the action following the prologue. It was a story which began in the twilight of a cave on the north slope of the acropolis. It was there the amorous encounter between Apollo and fair Creusa, the lone daughter of Erechtheus, King of Athens, took place. With the aid of the Gods, her pregnancy remained a secret. But she believed that he had forsaken her, kept the birth a secret, and exposed the child in a round basket in the same cave in which she had conceived him. She was not aware that Hermes had been commanded by his brother to bring the infant to Delphi that very night. The priestess found the child in the temple as she crossed into the sanctuary at dawn. There the child grew up into a fine youth as the servant and property of the God. Not knowing that he was his son, he served Apollo and guarded the gold treasure of the temple. Hermes now foretells how Ion is to be established as heir apparent of Athens, and he is the first to call him by the name of the future ancestor of all Ionians, the predominate race in Attica, many islands, and the Asian coastland. The nameless temple servant was shortly to be named Ion.

With these words the God disappears. Under the columns of the portico, out of the temple door, which now opens opposite the approaching sunlight, steps he who is yet nameless for mankind—Apollo's temple servant. The great cloak, which the youths attending the sacrifice—and they are just as pure as he—wear on the Parthenon frieze, envelopes him entirely. Yet when he throws it off—as is narrated in a later scene—in heroic excitement, he stands there before the astonished Delphians naked like the archaic statues of youth. Now, however, as he enters for *his* scene, his great solo song, he holds in his hand a bundle of laurel twigs which serves as his broom. One sees it although he looks not at the ground but at the sky.

Goethe also described for us this cosmic situation, the steps of light in the sunrise upon the lofty mountains. The modern counterpart to Ion's song, it is

one of the renowned strophes which Faust delivers after his awakening at the beginning of the second part of the tragedy. It should for this very reason prepare us for the Greek version which is otherwise by nature quite different.

Look up! The huge, mountainous summits
Already announce their most impressive hour.
They first can enjoy the eternal light,
Which only later turns to us below.
Now upon the mountain pasture of green-sloping meadows
A new splendor and clarity are lavished.
And gradually it proceeds downwards—
It shines!—and unfortunately is already blinding.
Last dance, I am off, saturated with pain in my eyes.

The pain in the eyes announces the "profusion of flames," the "sea of fire," the accompanying symbol of its existence, the fullness of which man cannot endure. "Is it love? Is it hate? Burning, it encircles us, exchanging pain and joy prodigiously." Goethe regularly correlates "fire" [*Feuer*] and "prodigiously" [*ungeheuer*] by rhyming them. "So then the sun remains at my back."

How does Ion gather in the same light, indeed even greater light amidst the lofty mountains of Greece? The profusion of flames gathers itself together in a ball and is mastered—in the form which has reached us via the convention of the "solar chariot" but which here more soberly manifests its sense of plasticity, something which Goethe valued so highly that he characterized himself as a worker in Plastic as opposed to workers in the Symbolic. One must not forget that it is song which follows here in prose: "Here is the chariot, resplendent four-horse team." The solar chariot! The temple servant of Apollo announces it to the Delphians who sleep deep within the shadows of the high mountains. They need this announcement; it is no idle song. But this useful announcement, "the charge of the day"—and precisely this very day, as we soon will hear—becomes song! The words of the youth give shape to the light.

Here is the chariot, resplendent four-horse team.
Helios offers it to radiate above the earth,
The stars take flight driven by such heavenly fire
Into the holy night.
Parnassus's insurmountable summit
Is illuminated
Receiving the day's
Wheel of light for mortals;
The waterless smoke of fragrant myrrh up to the pediment
Of Apollo swirls.
The maiden sits already on her tripod, filled with the god,
The Pythia, and chanting a song to the Greeks,
Which Apollo has her sound out.
But, Delphian guardians of Apollo, to Castalia's silver
Eddies come! Bathed in the dew-clear water
Hurry your way up to the temple!
It is good to hold one's tongue from inauspicious speech
And to say good words
To those wishing to make inquiry of the oracle
Each in his own tongue.

The sunrise atop the lofty mountain belongs to us still today. But gone is the Delphic cult, wherein all the youth's allusions, descriptions, and callings have meaning, from where amidst the smoke of the fragrant and arid myrrh, the smoke-offering, Ion delivers his song. It is evoked through these words, as through no other in all of Greek literature. It is the dawn of the day for which the priestess of Apollo, the Pythia, who had spent the preceding night sitting on the tripod and its mysterious basin, had pronounced an oracle. Such a day occurred only on the seventh of the month (originally of only the spring month Bysios, Apollo's birthday). The Delphic priests, the guardians of the God, began this day with a bath of purification in the copiously flowing Castalian Spring. For this the youthful servant, the first to arise today, wakes

We, however—this is the task in which we continually since infancy
Have been laboring—with laurel shoots,

Sacred garlands, will purify
The entrance to Apollo; with drops of water
We sprinkle the ground; the flocks of birds
Which pollute the offerings
We will frighten away with our bow;
For being a motherless and fatherless child
I serve the temple of Apollo
Which has nurtured me.

It is a situation characteristic for a Greek tragedy that we find ourselves with these words to be acting as audience or spectators. We know about the secret that the hero brings onto the stage even if he is unknowing of his own destiny. But here it is not a ghastly secret, as was Oedipus's, but a radiating secret which penetrates through the words and gestures and through the deeds and behavior of the unsuspecting youth: it is the secret of his being the son of God. This divine descent is well-established in the birth of the hero, but he embodies it as if it would not be present in the undeserved, natural way. He embodies it consciously and as a model for all who wish to serve Apollo. And that is what *all* Greek youths did, even if not as temple servants.

The broom of laurel. It belongs naturally only in the hand of a temple slave. Does not, however, the most unpretentious and most domestic of all actions, sweeping, precisely because of its simplicity serve as an unrivaled symbol of the great plainness of the Greek idea of a "pure and purifying god," of Phoebus? All refined, metaphorical interpretations of purity are by means of this broom swept away; we are to understand it literally. Nor is the bow, Apollo's weapon, easily forgotten. With it Ion threatens the birds, the natural enemies of the elegant tile-work of the archaic temple. Yet he turns himself now to his broom:

Come, oh newly-blossomed,
Oh my working servant, all beautiful laurel,
Who sweeps the shrine of Phoebus,
The foundation of the temple!
You come from the immortal gardens,

Where holy waters like dew
Issuing a constantly flowing stream
Moisten the holy foliage of fragrant myrtle.
With this I sweep the floor of the god,
For the whole day with the sun's
Swift wing,
In my sacred service.

So continues the youth's song. He modulates into the style of a paean, the song of celebration sung in honor of Apollo—and in this way he then reaches the climax—in praise of a service which is like Ion's service. Of what then does he sing? Of Ion's service, unforgettable lines for one who is inclined toward some sort of divine service:

Fair is my toil, O
Phoebus; before your house I serve you,
Honoring the oracular seat.
My toil is full of glory,
To serve the gods with my hands,
Not mortals, but immortals!
In performing glorious tasks
Will I never tire.
It is Phoebus, my father, who has engendered me:
For him who feeds me, I bless;
I call my sustenance by
The name of father,
Phoebus, lord of this temple.

In these last words, which in the mouth of a son sound so self-seeking, evidence is given that the essence of fatherhood is from something divine, not animal, from real fatherhood, to which Apollo was not unfaithful and which was on the contrary uniquely worthy to him. Divine parentage is not simple generation but care for the engendered. Stefan George was aware of this in his own past. His father, although an owner of a vineyard and concerned with earning money, smoothed the road for his son, the value of which he could

only presume, without forcing him to earn money. "That I call divine!" proclaimed the poet as he spoke about his father.*

In this way, Apollo proved himself to be a true father by having his son grow up in his temple and by providing for him. The son could see in this his own divine parentage. The myth of the begetting of the father of the race through the race-god Apollo originates in a purely Ionian, fictitious, and futile invention in the quest for the spiritual reality of an experienceable divine parentage. Or was the myth already from the beginning *the myth of just that?* In any case we gain a picture of Euripides, the so-called destroyer of myth, different from that which must have been based upon the reproaches of an unwitting Creusa who believed herself and her child to have been completely abandoned! And the God showed also what it actually was to be Apollo's child in that he let his son, even more than all other youths, take on his own likeness. Often statues of youths stood about his temple—the most famous archaic *kuroi* which earlier were thought to be statues of Apollo. To be sure, the God could be depicted as just such a youth, yet that adolescent youths could be assimilated to him was also reverence of him. And in the assimilation, Ion surely, as Euripides characterized him, is as close as possible.

*Sabine Lepsius, *Stefan George* (Berlin, 1935), p. 41.

II. THE SPIRIT

Some years ago one spoke of a "crisis" only in reference to classical studies. Today one speaks of the crisis of humanistic studies. In fact, today we are experiencing nothing but crises. What does "crisis" mean in general? And what is its significance in respect to the sciences? Since during these "crises" we suffer from so many kinds of confusions of conceptions, may I be permitted to treat first what is most basic about crisis before I address the question of whether the still more difficult concept of spirit is comprehensible without confusion and errors.

"Crisis" is *krisis*, an exact translation of the Greek word. It signifies separation, division, contention, selection, and then also decision and judgment, i.e., passing sentence. Crisis is a situation in which no values are of uncontested validity, no behavior indisputably correct. A crisis must first be decided, and precisely that it must be decided and that nothing else is self-evident already constitutes a decision against, a judgment leading toward the direction of conviction, a sentence. But by whom? From which judge's bench?

If this criterion applies to anywhere, then it does here. The history of the world is the world's tribunal; or, with less reverence for the powers who form history: It is the course of the world which so decides that it must be decided anew with consideration for validity and correctness. In relation to the

sciences, crisis signifies a situation in which a public judgment is made concerning their justification, concerning the values that are derived from them, and without taking into account whether or not it pleases the experts in the sciences. In the worst circumstances this decision is made through deadly silence.

It was not the worst sign, although it was an indication of the crisis, when a book on classical philology entitled its subject matter "The Science of What is Not-Worth-Knowing."^{*} Far worse is it if today's humanistic studies do not now summon that criticism which, long before the appearance of the aforementioned little book, Nietzsche had practiced in classical philology and historical scholarship in general; for a crisis can be so great that only the initiated speak about it. Meanwhile, the general public remains in silence, and they might find everything which humanistic studies can discover to be so little worth knowing that they will not at all any longer concern themselves over its contemporary status.

So with what are the humanistic studies concerned? The natural sciences are concerned with the structures of nature. But these are concerns which themselves already belong to a province of being other than that of nature, a province which does not conflict with nature and which has still yet another non-spatial extension. It is the "Realm of the Spirit." The natural scientist also enters this realm; he produces a spiritual phenomenon out of a natural phenomenon, a minimum of scientific "work" even in the most modest natural-scientific statement. Humanistic studies, on the other hand, do concern themselves with "works"—not only with scientific works but also with all the works which man has ever produced, and to be sure, they do so according to the contemporary conception of the sciences with a complete indifference to the value of their objects.

The philological and antiquarian sciences of the older style seemed to experience a triumph of the spirit with the collection of every linguistic work, every work whatsoever, including those with a modicum of artistic quality,

^{*}L. Hatvany, *Die Wissenschaft des Nichtwissenswerten* (Munich, 1914).

even the inartistic and utterly worthless so long as they could be collected as spiritual works and therefore as subjects of humanistic studies. Included were not only great poetry and philosophy but also every treatise written on poetry and philosophy, not only the creations of the masters but also the inferior works of their pupils, in fact, all the mass-produced works of the ungifted of every age.

The collection of all these works as if they were consequences of the spirit, and then the crisis of humanistic studies precisely in the lands where this triumph of spirit occurred: this is a remarkable sequence of events, is it not? Much may have contributed toward the crisis, but by no means did a truly high assessment of the spirit and its genuinely triumphal preeminence do so. In truth it was a matter of the opposite, a *reductio ad absurdum* which existed similarly in the equation of the non-spiritual with the spiritual and in that of the spiritless with the spirit. Ultimately, it came to a struggle against this would-be "spirit" and to the crisis of humanistic studies.

What is spirit? We must finally ask this in total earnestness and expect an answer corresponding to some direct experience. Is there basically such an answer? We must consider the inconsistency, a dissonance analogous to musical discord, that we detect immediately when the mass-produced literature of the unspiritual is characterized as *Work of the Spirit*. Purely theoretically, if the experience of the truly spiritual is either ignored or contradicted, then this inconsistency could be reconciled; one could therefore establish and define the spirit as a simple common denominator for whatever variety of material one thinks is applicable under this rubric. But we are seeking not a definition of the spirit which will satisfy a preconceived opinion of its works or a so-called "spiritual life in the multiplicity of its manifestations" (Nicolai Hartmann). We seek a definition which corresponds to a psychic reality, to something which is experienced directly and which is called "spirit." Is there some such thing? And is it scientifically comprehensible?

Insofar as we are dealing with a psychic reality, the science of psychology might come into consideration here. The spirit must announce itself to psychology, and it must be attested as a psychic reality and as characteristically

discernible from the other psychic realities. The appearance of the word "spirit" is not sufficient, for a word cannot always evoke a psychic reality nor the same one in every context. In any event, the German word *Geist* in all applications constantly designates something negative, for it is virtually detached from any meaning in the contexts of the sensible, the purely corporeal experience, or the experiences of blowing and breathing. *Geist* as "a certain, gusting, phantom breeze" for northern German sailors is a vestigial peculiarity from the older, secular usage. Luther in his translation of the Bible took care that in a significant passage of John, which we will soon examine, he rendered the Greek word *pneuma* in its "spiritual" sense as "wind," while even he himself following Meister Eckhart had spoken of this same wind as "*der Geist geistet wo er will*" ("The wind 'winds' where it wishes").

Such distinctions and restrictions are based on theory, on a well-established Christian world view. In one context, the word *Geist* signifies spirit (or spirits) and, in another context, substance (or corporeal beings). However, the non-theoretical passages in the sacred Christian texts are so direct that the inquiry about the comprehensibility of spirit must originate with them. These passages are unsubstitutable for the sciences not only because of the manner in which they speak of spirit but also because the whole later history of the notion of "spirit" is determined through them. I give both decisive passages in translation; the passages where "spirit" is named are given in Greek as well:

There was a man of the Pharisees named Nicodemus, a member of the high council of the Jews. He came to Jesus at night and said to him, "Rabbi, we know that you have come from God as a teacher, for no one can make these signs which you make unless God is with him." Jesus answered and said to him, "Truly, truly, I say to you, unless someone is born from above he cannot see the kingdom of God." Nicodemus said to him, "How can anyone be born if he is old? Can he somehow enter his mother's womb for the second time and be born?" Jesus answered, "Truly, truly, I say to you, if someone is not born of water and the spirit

[*ean me gennethei ex bydatos kai pneumatos*], he cannot enter the kingdom of God. What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit [*to gegennemenon ek tou pneumatos pneuma estin*]."
(John 3: 1-6)

The Gottingen Commentary's analysis correctly identifies the essential theme of this passage—the need to understand Jesus and his word completely—but one's understanding remains completely independent of one's attitude toward the conversation's historical authenticity. The character of Nicodemus serves primarily to demonstrate the large difference between that which Jesus preaches and that which even the best among the rest of the Jews of his day could absorb. There is throughout the discourse—the commentator is again correct here—a peculiarly lucid and deep sense of reality as well as a genuine consciousness of the responsibility toward reality. Jesus sought to bring the fundamentally and thoroughly reclusive Nicodemus, absorbed in the fantasy of his learning, to see what there is. To effect this sense of reality, the concept of "being born from above" is described as occurring not only "out of water" but also "out of the spirit." Nicodemus is to grasp the method through which the essence of the other world "above" can occur down here within us by means of this word which, in both Aramaic and Greek, has the basic meaning of "wind." In the following, I act contrarily to Luther in that I repeat the word *Geist* to render *pneuma* uniformly, and yet I hope to draw attention to the fact that it can also mean "wind."

" 'Do not be astonished,' " so reads the continuation,

"that I said to you that you must be born from above. The wind blows where it pleases, and you hear its sound but know not whence it comes nor where it goes [*to pneuma bopou thelei pnei, kai ten phonen autou akoueis, all' ouk oidas pothen erchetai kaipou hypagei*; in the Vulgate *pneuma* is rendered not with *ventus* but with the ambiguous *spiritus*: *spiritus ubi vult spirat et vocem eius audis sed non seis unde veniat et quo vadat*]. Thus it is for all that are born from the spirit [*houtos estin pas bo gegennemenos ek tou pneumatos—sic est omnis, qui natus est ex spiritu*]y (John 3: 7-8)

This means that he who has such an experience as that depicted here in this account is completely absorbed in the wind whose sudden irruption he witnesses. He experiences the turbulent presence of something utterly different "from the above"; it is something that draws like the wind from an unknown source and proceeds toward an unknown end. Yet while it progresses like wind, it nevertheless is something which is somehow even in one's self, in the moment in which one has this experience. It is *Geist*—wind and spirit; it "blows" and "thus it is for all that are born from the spirit." In this way and under these circumstances, the turbulent existence comes forth. Even the *figura etymologica* in the Greek text—to *pneuma pnei*—has its special sense preserved verbatim in *der Geist geistet* with the meaning "the gust gusts" or "the spirit spirits." It emphasizes the occurrence, the turbulent movement of its presence, and precisely in its fundamental meaning of "wind," the word *pneuma* evokes here the type of "event" that generally can be expressed only in the language of simile; otherwise, the phenomenon would be an inexpressible event. Indeed, even if it were to be narrated directly as an event, the narrator would still have difficulty in escaping the use of the language of simile.

"When now the day of the Pentecost had come," so runs the narration,

they were all gathered together at one place when suddenly from the heavens a great gust blew down, as if from a hurricane, and filled the entire house in which they sojourned; and there appeared to them tongues, as if of fire, which scattered and settled upon each of them. Then they were all filled with heavenly spirit [*eplesthesan pantes pneumatōs autois*] and began to speak in strange tongues as the spirit gave them speech [*kathos to pneuma edidou apophthegesthai autois*]. (Acts 2: 1-4)

Here we can once again disregard the historicity of the event and make our examination from the narrator's viewpoint. He wishes to evoke the unspeakable event, the experience of that spirit which for him is the Holy Spirit, and he does just this at the outset when he describes the hurricane as a preface to the prodigy of fire. He does so by virtue of his "powerful imagination and deliberation," as the Göttingen commentator asserts, so it is

felicitous for him to employ the directness of what is untheoretical. Our first question, whether there was in general something called "spirit" that could be directly experienced, can be affirmed without question on the basis of these New Testament accounts. Were it only the roaring and gusting of the wind and not also a completely different turbulent presence, would not ancient belief have admitted that, by that naming of this atmospheric phenomenon, the experience of something utterly different could be evoked?

The commentator on the Acts of the Apostles could easily draw a comparison between the pre-Christian conception of *theia epinoia*, *theion*, or *hieron pneuma*, *adflatus* or *flatus divinus*, and the philosophical doctrines which are based on them. Such comparisons when correctly interpreted are inevitably—what they always contribute to source questions—allusions to an archetypal human experience which can only be best expressed through the language of the simile, in this case through the simile of the blowing wind. An archetypal experience does not reflect merely a primordial experience but an experience in which one obtains an absolute immediacy with the timeless fundamentals of life. In this sense, love and death are also archetypal experiences. It is the narration of an archetypal experience by means of the language of simile, i.e., metaphorical expression, which we call mythology. But mythological metaphorical expressions are distinguished from the non-mythological in that the mythological refer specifically to something permanent in the world and reveal an aspect of a constant and unchanging world. They are not merely similar to this permanence and unchangeability. They allow man to glimpse the timelessness of the similarity, and they themselves journey into this timelessness.

As if they were themselves eternal, they also reach a special form of existence. A mythological night is not only an experience recurring daily but also the timeless night of that step in the existence process which precedes the "light" Being formed in every Becoming and which follows in every Passing-Away. This step in the existence process or this manner of existence, not dependent on its daily materialization, not connected with time in general, almost something of substance, inevitably "returns" to us from

"another kingdom." The process and form of the spirit's existence are similar, with the difference that with the spirit we do not conceive of a sensible experience, as with the night, but always of something derivative of "another kingdom." The word "spirit" (*Geist*) is already mythology, by an archetypal simile the evocation of an archetypal experience; it does not originate with Christianity but was from time immemorial capable of reaching this kind of substantiality.

Should we wish to ascertain the details of this archetypal experience, we should examine those pagan texts containing the extremely evocative force of mythology—where simile and simile-like passages are employed to describe otherwise indescribable events and actions. Such a text is Vergil's description of the Apollonian revelation to the Sibyl in Book 6 of the *Aeneid*. I call attention to only its most salient features.

Before all else, it seems to be essential to anticipate the revelation at a location which has many entrances and exits. Here it is the renowned cavern in the hillside at Cumae:

quo lati ducunt aditus centum, ostia centum
unde ruunt totidem voces, responsa Sibyllae

Where one hundred broad entrances and one hundred
mouths lead down,
And from which rush so many sounds, the replies of the Sibyl

In reality these are shafts which pierce the corridor of the sacred grotto and admit the light. According to Vergil's description, there are doors whose function it is to open themselves for the moment of revelation. The Sibyl makes this clear; she already senses the God:

poscere fata
tempus, ait, deus ecce deus.

"It is time to ask for
The Fates," she said, "The God! Behold! The God!"

And continuing,

Cui talia fanti

ante fores subito non voltus, non color unus,
non comptae mansere comae, sed pectus anhelum,
et rabie fera corda tument, maiorque videri
nec mortale sonans, adflata est numine quando
iam propertore dei. Cessas in vota precesque,
Tros, ait, Aenea? cessas? neque enim ante dehiscunt
attonitae magna ora domus.

As she spoke these words before the entrance way,
Her face and her color suddenly changed;
Her hair flew into disarray; her breast heaved,
And her wild heart was swollen with frenzy. She seemed to grow
In size and made sounds not mortal. She breathed in
The now approaching god. "Do you hesitate to pray
And make vows, Trojan Aeneas?" she said. "Do you?
Until you pray the great doors will not be shaken open."

The divine presence reveals itself in a wind which disheveled her hair, filled her within, and rendered her swollen like a sail. But that is not enough; as if convulsed by lightning and thunder, the entire sanctuary is to be shaken, that is, *attonitae*, which reminds us of "the gust blew down, as if from a hurricane" of the Acts of the Apostles, and at this convulsion the gates and doors open themselves. The words of Aeneas also refer to a great blast of wind:

foliis tantum ne carmina manda,
ne turbata volent rapidis ludibria ventis:
ipsa canas oro.

Only do not entrust your oracles to leaves;
I fear the swift, playful winds might confuse them.
I beg you, sing them aloud.

It is not a playful breeze which is expected here but rather the turbulent presence of the God, the same which causes the womanly nature of the Sibyl tempestuous suffering:

At Phoebi nondum patiens immanis in antro
bacchatur vates, magnum si pectore possit
excussisse deum; tanto magis ille fatigat
os rabidum, fera corda domans, fingitque premendo.

But the prophetess had not yet submitted to dread Apollo;
She ran for frenzy about the cave as if she could
Shake off the great god from her breast. But all the more
He tormented her raving countenance, overpowering her fierce heart,
Yanking and tugging the reins.

This divine presence, like a powerful gust of air, has suddenly burst open the mighty doors of the sanctuary, and the divine manifestation arrives through the rushing air:

ostia iamque domus patuere ingentia centum
sponte sua vatisque ferunt responsa per auras.

And now one hundred huge doors open
By themselves and convey the prophetess's responses through the air.

What is happening here? There is no doubt—"it spirits." The same features we found in the spirit's two New Testament parallels are here as well. Besides this, there is another feature which appears less foreign to the psychologist than the windiness, the breeziness of this experience, although even this apparently elementary phenomenon is of a similar essence. This new feature is the sudden self-opening of that which has been closed. The passageway is laid free and open; the unexpected, or at least the unknown and anticipated, exits or enters. We seem here to be extremely close to the unconscious and to have at least glimpsed the path through which the accessibility of the spirit—the spiriting of the spirit—becomes psychologically comprehensible.

We experience this comprehensibleness most directly in mythology, for even today mythological narrations still overwhelm us. In Vergil, it is not that we are affected so much by the Sibyl's raging as by our sympathetic feeling for the spiritual atmosphere, the ubiquitous ambience of emotional excitement which culminates with the acts of opening and revelation. And this is

just how modern man visualizes the spirit, that most stubborn, most insoluble mythologem of European culture—entirely in mythological narration.

Through Vergil we have already reached the domain of Apollo. The Sibyl's feminine resistance to his spiritual power, which affects us in her extremely rebellious behavior, accords with the many accounts of Apollo's luckless amours. These mythologems entail a psychological problem in themselves, but another poetic representation, the Delian epiphany of Apollo, points out the greatest problem which the experience of the spirit will present to psychology, and that is the regular reference to "spirit" as a substance which is an absolute quantity but which at the same time reveals itself as subject and object of events. For this substance no better word can be found than our neologism "spiriting." In Delos it is Apollo who arrives, and it is the self-opening of the door which conveys to the "spirit" the peculiarly open and agitated ambience. And he is at the same time the object of the spiritual experience and of the observation by the few who, already chosen for their own worth, are able to have or are worthy of having this experience.

Did not Christ also say to Nicodemus, "We speak what we know and we testify to what we have seen [*bo heorakamen*] but you do not accept our testimony"? It is always only a "small flock" who can get a glimpse of that absolute value which indicates spirituality.

The greatest problem for psychology is at times to do justice to the objective content of the spiritual experience and not to deprive the spiritual—because in its appearance it is a psychic reality—of its intrinsic value, that is, not to subjectivize it and then to psychoanalyze it away. In mythology, the matter is less complex, for that which "spirits" is clearly a God, and as an object it is clearly divine. I quote here the inexpressibly exquisite description of the Delian epiphany in Callimachus's *Hymn to Apollo*:

How Apollo's laurel sapling shakes!
How the whole temple shakes! Away, away with the wicked!
It must be Phoebus kicking at the door with his fair foot.
Do you not see? The Delian palm nods gently,
All of a sudden; the swan sings beautifully in the air.

Bolts of the doors, thrust yourselves back.
Keys—open the doors! For the god is no longer far away.
So, young men, prepare yourselves for singing and dancing.
Apollo appears not to all, only to the good.
He who sees him is great; who does not is lowly.
We will see you, Worker From Afar, and we will never be lowly.

I could conclude here—although the older texts involving Apollo, primarily the Homeric hymn, would lead us even deeper into the secrets of the spirit—if I had not at first spoken of a crisis of humanistic studies. The crisis was preceded by a false triumph of the spirit. Because of an artificial distinction, the spirit was separated from the profound gravity of the directly experienced realities of life, and there was not perceived within the spirit an archetypal experience of humanity which, to a certain extent like the archetypal experience of love, not everyone may share to the same degree. There is a thinness of conception where it is considered blasphemous to speak of love or of spirit. Those who concern themselves with humanistic studies have above all access to the sources whence that archetypal experience flows inexhaustibly, and this perpetual flooding and pouring forth of experience, which is the minimum characteristic of the spirit, distinguishes also the true works of the spirit. They should lead us back to these experiences over and over again if the humanistic studies are to retain their qualifications as sciences of the spirit.

III. APOLLONIAN EPIPHANIES

1. Introduction

Your book will be written only by him,
Who approaches in windiness . . .

Theodor Hellmuth von Hoch

The author was faced with the task of using the evidence of Greek mythology for discussing the theme of *Geist* ('spirit') within a specific, limited framework. To this theme, the mythological approach presents a special aspect connected not with the history of philosophy but with the history of religion. But both the histories of philosophy and religion presuppose some common element of *Geist* which is applicable to general humanity, do they not? It may be that the common element has no linguistic connection with the word *Geist*, but this author necessarily utilizes one nonetheless. He must, for the word *Geist* undergoes numerous but subtle modifications of meaning throughout the course of its development in various disciplines, modifications which are at times of a religious, or philosophical, or more empirical, or purely theoretical origin, yet they can coexist because the various disciplines know of only a faded version of the experience of the *Geist* as well as of the theories about it. If one were to grasp them at the moment, so to speak, of their formation by philosophers, poets, or religious authorities, they might all become immediately intelligible. Otherwise, the nuances of meaning form mere dictionary material, not the living stuff of a scholarly evocation. And not only

those who speak the word *Geist* but even those who believe that they have some daily dealing with *Geist* must be occasionally warned that, despite the multifarious meanings of the word, it can still imply some direct experience.

Let us for the moment dwell on only the non-availability of spiritual occurrences, the situation in which "the realization did not flash where our wish and pleasure would have it but where it is given us."¹ Such a situation would have no special meaning if it were to be an accident, like a sudden inspiration, but it is something expected, like the culmination of scientific research and discovery, and thus something prepared. This produces a paradox, the non-availability of what is expected and prepared, which gives even to the utterly irreligious spiritual occurrence (directed toward "life below"—to use Rilke's word) something in common with a specific type of religious epiphany. There are the epiphanies, namely, in which the appearance, the exaltation "breaking in to life below," not only reveals itself with its presence but also is completely open and filled with light. Even he whose perception is a profane one trains his vision on the illumined terrestrial reality, and yet it is as if he can and must proceed to a view of and an immersion into this exaltation. This is the exact point where even the scholar and philosopher can speak only in religious language. He does this ordinarily in that Christian expression which leads us historically beyond the limits of profane spiritual history to an original phenomenology of the spirit; it speaks of the source of the spiritual experience as if it were something blowing, a turbulent presence sweeping along like the wind—"the spirit blows where it wishes."

This expression is taken from John (3: 8), and a similar passage in Acts (2: 1-4) describes the realization of this comparison. They show us what a powerful expression, one derived from natural phenomena, was needed to express the epiphanic quality of such events. In fact, later, amidst Christian civilization, even completely profane, cognitive experiences are called "spiritual events."

The psychic reality of this type of epiphany must be recognized independently of the indeterminable historicity of the Nicodemus discourse and the Pentecost miracle, texts which move the reader directly and rouse

human, and not specifically Christian, echoes. If one is to search for epiphanies in ancient religions, these, too, are phenomenologically characterized through a wind-like appearance of the "expected and prepared non-availability." So it is to Apollo that the searcher must turn, particularly to Vergil's presentation of the Apollo epiphany at Cumae. Like the house in which the Apostles were assembled, the sanctuary at Cumae is shaken when the breath of the approaching God blows around the priestess: *adflata est numine quando iam proprio dei* (*Aen.* 6. 50).

Earlier considerations of spirit by the author treated these two New Testament accounts as well as this pagan one.² He allows himself in this introduction only to recall the phenomenologically equal description of a modern poet's epiphanic experience—the account of the genesis of the *Duino Elegies* in Duino and especially at the Chateau de Muzot: "For one or two days everything was inexpressibly stormy; it was a hurricane in spirit [as then in Duino]."³ The poet did not consider the word "spirit" sufficient by itself to represent the extent of the turbulence; it was better compared to a spiritual event. Instead of such a hurricane-like spirituality, the author has opted to investigate several Apollonian epiphanies which phenomenologically have less or not more to do with wind. But the question is: How will they appear to us if we approach them by paying special attention to "spirit"? We should begin with the texts with which we made our earlier investigations, and here we should commence with the evocation of the classical Apollonian form.⁴

2. *Callimachus* Hymn to Apollo

How Apollo's laurel sapling shakes!
 How the whole temple shakes! Away, away with the wicked!
 It must be Phoebus kicking at the door with his fair foot.
 Do you not see? The Delian palm nods gently,
 All of a sudden; the swan sings beautifully in the air. 5
 Bolts of the doors, thrust yourselves back.
 Keys—open the doors! For the god is no longer far away.

So, young men, prepare yourselves for singing and dancing.
 Apollo appears not to all, only to the good.
 He who sees him is great; who does not is lowly. 10
 We will see you, Worker From Afar, and we will never be lowly.
 Let the cithara not be silent.
 Nor your step noiseless with Apollo approaching, you children,
 If you intend to complete the marriage vows and to cut your silvery hair,
 And if the wall is to stand on its aging foundations. 15
 Well done the youths; the strings are no longer at rest.

 Be silent and hear the song of Apollo's glory.
 Even the sea is silent, for bards celebrate
 The cithara or bow, weapons of Lycoreian Phoebus.
 Neither does mother Thetis mournfully lament for her Achilles 20
 If she hears "Hie Paian, Hie Paian."
 Even the weeping rock forgets its griefs—
 The sobbing stone forever fixed in Phrygia,
 Marble where once a woman gaped sorrowfully.
 Cry "Hie, Hie"; it is a poor thing to contest the blessed. 25
 May he who fights with the blessed fight my king,
 And may he who fights my king also fight with Apollo.
 The chorus which sings to Apollo with its heart
 He will honor. He has the power; he sits on the right hand of Zeus.
 Neither will the chorus sing of Apollo for only one day; 30
 He is worthy of many hymns. Who would not readily sing of Apollo?

 Golden is Apollo's mantle and golden its clasp,
 As are his lyre and Lyctian bow and quiver;
 Golden are his sandals, for Apollo is rich in gold.
 Rich in possessions; you might have proof of this at Delphi. 35
 Always fair, always young! Never do
 Traces of down touch his blooming cheeks.
 His hair drips fragrant oils to the ground,
 But streaming from the locks of Apollo is not fat
 But Panacaea. In the city where these dew drops 40
 Fall to earth all things are secure.

 None is so versatile in skill as Apollo.
 He watches over the archer; he watches over the bard;

Phoebus's are both the bow and song.
His are the prophets and prophetesses; from Phoebus
Physicians learn the skill of postponing death.

We call him the god of herds since that time
When by the Amphryssus he tended the yoked pair of horses
And was burning with love for unmarried Admetus.
With ease would the herd of cattle grow larger, nor would
The feeding goats lack young in pasture if Apollo
Casts his eye on them. Nor will
Ewes be without milk or lambs. All will bear young,
And not single offspring, but twins.

Men who plan cities are followers of
Phoebus, for Phoebus rejoices in the
Founding of cities, and Phoebus himself lays the foundations.
At four years Phoebus created his first foundation
Near the round lake in fair Ortygia.
Artemis hunted and continually brought the heads
Of Cynthian goats, and Apollo built the altar.
Below he laid the foundation of horn and then created the altar
Of horns, and he built the surrounding walls of horn.
Thus did Phoebus learn to construct his first foundation.

Phoebus also showed my fertile city to Battus,
And a raven led the people to Libya,
Flying on their right, and he swore to our king
To grant them walls. Apollo's oath is forever valued.
Oh Apollo! Many call you Boedromius,
Many Clarius. Everywhere he has many a name
But I call him Carneius, as did my ancestors.
Sparta, Carneius, was your first foundation,
Thera second, and third the town of Cyrene.
From Sparta the sixth generation after Oedipus
Conveyed you to the Theraian colony. And from Thera
Stout Aristoteles brought you to the Asbystian earth,
And he built you there a fine palace. In the city
He prescribed a continuing ritual, Phoebus, in which
Many bulls fall to their haunches and die.

Hie, Hie Carneius, often invoked! Your altars 80
 Bear in the spring all the flowers which the Horai
 Nurture in all their colors as the West breathes its dew,
 As well as the sweet crocus in winter. For you the eternal fire,
 And never does the ash feed on the coals of yesterday.
 Phoebus rejoiced greatly when the girded men of Enyo 85
 Danced with the fair-haired Libyan ladies
 When the awaited Carneian season came round.
 But the Dorians were not yet able to reach
 Cyre's springs. They still lived in thickly wooded Azilis.
 The Lord saw these himself and showed them to his bride 90
 As he stood on the jagged hill of Myrtussa, where
 Hypsellus's daughter slew the lion, destroyer of Eurypylus's cattle.
 Apollo has seen no other dance more divine,
 Nor, mindful of the previous rape, has he granted such benefits
 To any city as to Cyrene. Nor have the children of Battus 95
 Honored any god more than Apollo.

"Hie Hie Paian" resounds because the people
 Of Delphi first established this refrain
 When with your golden bow you gave proof of your skill from afar.
 A fantastic beast faced you as you descended to Delphi, 100
 A horrible serpent. You slew him shooting
 One swift arrow after another. The people cried
 "Hie Hie Paian! Shoot the arrow!" Your mother surely
 Begat you as a helper, and since then you live in song.

Envy spoke secretly into the ear of Apollo, 105
 "I do not honor the singer who does not sing so great as is the sea."
 Apollo kicked Envy with his foot and spoke thus:
 "The stream of the Assyrian river is great, but it bears
 In its waters much waste from the earth and much refuse.
 The bees do not carry to Deo just any water 110
 But what was pure and unsullied, a small, trickling stream
 From a sacred spring, its finest product."
 Hail, Lord. Ridicule and Envy away!

In the poem, Callimachus describes cult (the event and rite—lines 1-16), recites a cult song (lines 17-104), and at the conclusion reveals a divine scene (lines 105-13). It is as if he describes, virtually builds, a two-part stage on earth and in the sky above; the poet uses the magical power of his poetry to stand on the lower terrestrial stage and to sing his genuine hymn, the cult song of Apollo. To do this, he conjures up the choir of youths and says in his song how he would speak through them if he were Pindar or another poet of choral lyric.¹ The great central panel of the poem, the hymn proper, is the epic version of a choral song, that is, the very song Callimachus would have had the youths sing were he a poet of choral lyric. In reality, however, he has no singing performed, although singing was the foundation of poetry in Greek life, be it in the Greek homeland or transplanted to the newer Cyrene. In fact, in the colony of Cyrene, the genuine and more traditional Hellenic life flourished more so than in the Hellenistic metropolis of Egypt. Here, in Alexandria, the Greek scholar collected and preserved in the library the product of the homeland, the intellectual flowering of that earlier Greek life, while the poet—and Callimachus of Cyrene was both scholar and poet—extracted what was preserved in books and used it in a manner novel for those books and for their readers.²

He himself in the final scene indicates this new intellectual position of his. That divine scene is, considered purely formally, of the same type as the divine scenes in Homer, and the viewpoint of all such scenes since Homer has been the poet's viewpoint, not that of the common mortals who generally recognize the divine only as the effect of a "God," a "*claimon*." The Homeric viewpoint was already an "intellectual position," a position of clear perception. Callimachus's position is "intellectual" in a different sense; his by this time is a position of examination into the demands of the art, of the standards of a more refined taste, and of a special, intellectual culture elevated above the general culture of the masses. In his intellectual point of view, the learned poet associates himself closely with Apollo, a God who decides for him what is the proper artistic judgment—a most subtle of intellectual matters—and what is malicious censure (*Momus*), which accompanies envy

(*Pbthonos*). With his knowledge about great and small festivals of Hellenic religion and with his superior poetic art, Callimachus celebrates this God by representing the greatest event of an Apollonian sanctuary.

The prefatory cult scene of the hymn (lines 1-16) is devoted to this event—the coming of the God. On a human level, the sacred rite consists of the youthful chorus's preparation for song and dance and of the sounding of the lyre. But with the first verse, the poet is already speaking of the God whose coming fills this scene. He came to Delphi, as is well-known, from the Hyperboreans and to Delos from Lycia, to which he periodically retired in regular disappearances and reappearances.⁹ His reappearance causes choruses to form; the singing and dancing begin:

qualis ubi hibernam Lyciam Xanthique fluenta
deserit ac Delum maternam invisit Apollo
instauratque choros . . .

As when Apollo deserts his wintry Lycia and the
streams of Xanthus
To visit his maternal Delos
and to renew the choruses . . .

This is the testimony of Vergil (*Aen.* 4. 143-45), who describes the great Hellenistic Delian festival as if primordial peoples were the attendants.

mixtique altaria circum
Cretesque Dryopesque fremunt pictique Agathyrsi.

And around the altar are mingled
Cretans and Dryopians and tattooed Agathyrsans in an uproar.

By its very existence, not to mention its action, the chorus bears witness to the presence of the God. In a Paean, a song of calling and greeting, Alcaeus foretold of the arrival of Apollo at Delphi—"the nightingales, swallows, and cicadas sing"; for him, too, the approaching of the God is virtually musical.⁹

The poem of Callimachus begins with signs of the epiphany:

hoion eseisato , , .
How it shakes . . .

This is no simple presentiment of "delicate nature," as it seemed to that modern interpreter who fortunately already overthrew the crude, materialistic mentality of the previous exegesis.¹⁰ It is something more. The trembling runs through not only the laurel bush but also through the "Whole structure"—the whole temple (*holon to melatbron*). And then the palm sweetly bending! If one considers that the poet only in the hymn proper with the word

euphemette —

Be silent (and hear the song of Apollo's glory)

is turning to the festival congregation, which he himself has summoned, and is absorbed completely in the illusion of the stage, which he himself also created, then one should expect now that he tells us the name of the place where he assumes the persona of chorus leader. He does this in fact here in the entrance scene where he is speaking directly to us, the listeners and readers. It is here that he names the Delian palm, the sacred palm which the great Goddess Leto clasped during the labor which was to bring Apollo into the world.¹¹ For Odysseus that palm was still young (*phoinikos neon er-nos*—*Od.* 6. 163) and exceptionally beautiful. It was even then, already, in the archaic period, the famed Delian palm. We ought not to be surprised if on Delos it is pointed out and spoken of as "the Delian palm." This differentiates it from all other palms which have no connection with Apollo's birth. It is inherently Delian; the island of Apollo's birth is unthinkable without it. When then, at the beginning of the fourth century B.C., the pious Athenian general Nicias had a palm of brass erected for the glory of Apollo, it gave, apparently,¹² two palms to the island. Then the real palm, the "Delian palm," had its living imitator which stood in the sanctuary of Leto. But the new palm, this rootless, bronze colossus, was once upturned by the powerful winds of the sea, the power of which is attested today by the twisted trees and the windmills of the neighboring island of Mykonos. It also overturned the colossal Naxian statue of Apollo;¹³ both statue and palm were reerected.¹⁴

All the mountains and islands which dared not receive the expectant, roaming Leto feared the power of a colossal, archaic God. They trembled at the

mere thought that the great God would descend upon them and that they would have to sink under his greatness.

hai de mal' etromeon kai edeidisan

Who greatly trembled and feared . . .

So it is described in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (line 47), which proceeds to narrate how Delos won an assurance from the Goddess that, because of the child who was to be born, she—the small, craggy island and, according to a variant of the birth mythologem, a swimming island—should not disappear into the depths of the sea (lines 66-74):

But I fear this rumor, Leto; I will not conceal it from you.
For they say that Apollo will be one very presumptuous
And will be powerful among the immortals
And mortal men upon the fruit-bearing fields.
So I fear exceedingly in my heart and soul
That when he should first see the light of the sun
He will dishonor me, since I am of hard and rocky soil,
Turn me over with his feet, and thrust me into the depths of the sea.
Then above my head the great waves of the sea will
Ever wash.

Leto then swore a mighty oath that Delos would remain Apollo's sacred island for eternity. According to the variant of the floating island, it then for the first time strikes roots in the foundations of the sea" and so is thought to be frequented by earthquakes less often than the rest of the islands of the Greek archipelago." Nevertheless, Callimachus names not Delos but Apollo "unshakable" (*astybeliktos*)." Whenever he set foot on the island, which could jolt it under the waves, there was—no earthquake, for Apollo is no God of earthquakes—but a trembling from above, from the tops of the laurel trees and the Delian palm; and because Delos witnessed his birth, the first epiphany, it was to be there for eternity.

Apollo already with the one foot ("It must be Phoebus kicking at the door with his fair foot.") is there in a plastic conception—a gigantic appearance.

The God kicks at the temple portal with his foot, for if he wished to strike it with his hand, he would have to bend over low. And it is quite odd to consider that Apollo will shift a step from the giganticness of an archaic divinity to his conversation with the literary Envy. He is envisaged no longer only in a plastic manner, in the way of the Homeric hymn, whereby it was still possible to capture all the statuesque power and the entire substance of the God in a colossal statue-like form. This old giganticness, without losing the power of the divinity, is bound up with beauty ("with his fair foot Phoebus struck the portal"). This visual beauty penetrated also into the aural. According to the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, that first epiphany, the birth, was preceded significantly by nine days and nights of labor.¹⁸ According to the hymn in which Callimachus celebrates the island of Delos, swans, the sacred birds of Apollo, sang while circling seven—another significant number—times around the island of the imminent birth.¹⁹ The eighth time they did not sing, for the God was delivered. All primal fear, all primal darkness, is gone. Only the raven, as the single witness of that darkness which Apollo can master,²⁰ appears in the "hymn proper" (line 66). But in his epiphany, "the swan sings beautifully in the air." The God is already present—with his power which makes the world quake around mankind and in beauty which fills the world with music. His complete presence forces what is still closed to open itself. Surely not without good reason does the poet cry:

Bolts of the doors, thrust yourselves back.
Keys—open the doors!

After this command, the onlooker or listener must shift his point of view. Up to this point he directed his eyes toward the temple. Now he is to shift to the human elements, to the poet and chorus. This does not mean a turning-within in the sense of a shift from the outside, from the surrounding world, and in no way is there to be a frenzied internalization for the humans, who together with their surroundings now stand before the complete presence of the God. Especially when we recollect the Vergilian description of the frenzy of Apollo's priestess at Cumae—her streaming hair, her heaving breast, and

her raging heart seething in madness²¹—will we perceive immediately a serene clarity pouring over the entire Callimachean poem and its world. Even the poet sings specifically of the extreme tranquility of the elements while all else is in agitation.

Even the sea is silent, for bards celebrate
The cithara or bow, weapons of Lycorean Phoebus.
Neither does mother Thetis mournfully lament for her Achilles
If she hears "Hie Paian, Hie Paian."

And from where do the effects of poet's song and the cry of "Paian" draw their force if not from the presence of the God? At the moment in which song and cry ring out, Apollo is present there not only with his foot. He comes indeed from without, from the surroundings, but he encounters something which has an affinity with mankind, and with this the epiphany is completed.

So the verses which follow the "Keys—open the doors!" are clear. The God no longer lingers in the distance (*ho gar theos ouketi makren*), and the hymn continues,

So, young men, prepare yourselves for singing and dancing.
Apollo appears not to all, only to the good.
He who sees him is great; who does not is lowly.
We will see you, Worker From Afar, and we will never be lowly.

In this passage, the poet is already speaking to his chorus. He no doubt conceives of it as a chorus of Cyrenaic youths whom he has led in this conjured-up world of Apollonian epiphany to Delos to sing for the glory of the God coming from the East. The words which he directs to his chorus—and the poet's chorus is the chorus of youths already singing and dancing—are reminiscent of Homer's words:

hēpollon ou panti phaeinetai—
Apollo appears not to all.

This is how it reads in Callimachus, and in Homer, where in the *Odyssey* Pallas Athena is seen only by Odysseus and the dogs (16. 161):

ou gar pos pantessi theoi phainontai enargeis
For the blessed Gods appear not to all in the open.²²

When the Gods do appear to them, men find in this a terror difficult to endure {II. 20. 131):

... chalepoi de theoi phanesthai enargeis
... for frightful are heavenly Gods to behold openly.

According to both Homeric passages, the Gods are clearly visible {enargeis) when they make their full epiphanies, and it is granted that only those living a chosen, fortunate existence may experience such epiphanies without risk. The Phaeacians are among the chosen, and their king, Alcinous, glories in this {Od. 7. 201):

aiei gar to paros ge theoi phainontai enargeis
hemin, eut' erdosin agakleitas hekatombas
For before this the Gods have always appeared openly to us
When we offer splendid hecatombs.

Callimachus attributes this ability also to his chosen; it is the privilege of a small group of which he, as the poet, is leader. If he did not so emphasize that he himself was one of the viewers of the God, one could believe he was playing the role of a pedagogical, pious imposter, proclaiming to the youths that only the noble {all' ho tis esthlos) can glimpse Apollo and that he who glimpses him is great but he who cannot is inconspicuous, a non-entity {litos). Who then chooses *not* to look?

The emphasis with which the poet declares his persona as the ideal chorus leader for a potential, and for that matter a truly realized, view of the God—

opsometh', o Hecarge, kai essometh' oupote litoi
We will see you, Worker from Afar, and we will never be lowly.

—this emphasis gives a particularly special impact to the ensuing passages, including the final scene with its divinities and literary subject matter.

So speaks the poet in professing a vision which takes its justification from his conscious and sublime spirituality and derives the very occurrence of the

awaited epiphany from there as well. Callimachus is not speaking to us—of the modern world—but to Hellenes, those in attendance at the Delian festival, and he believes that with this spirituality he evokes the Delian epiphany, the very "coming"²³ of the God which he celebrates as a Cyrenean. In his consciously spiritual approach, he is celebrating a past epiphany and he is celebrating as well a present epiphany, and so he does not even add a new dimension of fervor of this religious event; for inspiration by the Muse has for ages been inherent in the cult of Apollo as the characteristic expression of his divinity. The swan, the singing bird of Apollo,²⁴ appears not only in the hymns of Callimachus but also is represented on Delian coins above the palm.²⁵ The contests of Delphi inspired by the Muses became more famous than the choruses of Delos, and deriving directly from these is a curiosity which can be identified as the sole Hellenic parallel to that Christian spiritual miracle—the Apostles' "speaking in tongues." It is described by the choir of Delian maids in the *Homeric Hymn* (lines 158-64):

And when they first praise Apollo
And then both Leto and Artemis who pours forth arrows,
They sing a hymn mindful of ancient men and women,
And charm the races of man. They know how to imitate the
Sounds of men. Each would say that he himself
Sings, so fitting their fair song to each.

Callimachus himself continues the sequence of this type of spiritual miracle, the miracle of all the illusion-creating arts of the Muses. The spiritual dimension of that world of man and his surroundings in which the Apollonian epiphany occurs demands of the poet much less specific allusions to make the event which is evident to him contemporary for the Greek audience and reader. The poet is required to make more of an effort to connect quite subtly this spirituality with the natural setting. Classical scholarship has unfairly attributed the possibility of such natural setting, some sort of connection between the sun and Apollonian cult, to K. O. Mueller's attempt at a historically accurate portrait of Apollo.²⁶ The tragedy in the scholarly for-

tunes of this great savant and important student of mythology is that he is associated more with his misconceptions than with the finest products of his learning—the positive evaluations of so many mythological traditions.²⁷ He was himself conscious that with this denial of every connection between Apollo and that natural force the Greeks called Helios he stood in opposition to the conceptions and observations of several ancient poets. One of these was Callimachus, who—and we need to cite this after K. O. Mueller himself—takes extreme exception to those

Who separate Apollo from the all-encompassing sun
And Artemis from gently striding Deione.²⁸

We need not raise the entire question of natural settings, which since Homer have been deliberately suppressed as "the silent names of the gods" [*ta sigonta onomata daimonon*],²⁹ to observe how Callimachus has woven into his Apollonian epiphany the gold of a true sunrise. We begin with the birth. In Theognis (lines 5-11), the birth of the God fills the island with ambrosial fragrance, and the earth laughs. In Callimachus everything at that moment is full of golden radiance:³⁰ Delos's rock-bed, the pool artistically and characteristically round for the cult of the sun, the sacred olive tree, which otherwise is only a splendid silver," not to mention the palm, the Greek name of which [*phoinix*] also suggests the sun's red color, and the river Inopos. Surely our poet does not distinguish his Apollo from the "all-encompassing sun." A similar suggestion of Apollo's solar aspect is easily recognizable as well in the description of the epiphany in his *Hymn to Apollo*.

Characteristically, this epiphany not only occurs in a peculiar space, which reaches likewise to the environs and the whole of humanity, the inner and the outer; it also progresses through an extraordinary kind of time. The time is cultic time; its dawning hour begins to proceed with the waxing presence of the God, who at first is present with only one showing. He knocks before he appears completely; in the early light before sunrise, the might of Apollo already manifests itself. Nonetheless, he has not been revealed to the eyes of the body but is to be received by the entirety of the human who is receptive

to the spiritual. He sees him in the ephemeral moment of the epiphany which is also paradoxically timeless as "he sits on the right hand of Zeus" (line 29). The poet implies such a timeless, spiritual vision when he cries, "We will see you, Worker from Afar, and we will never be lowly." And he commands his chorus to be prepared yet with music and dance for the instant of the epiphany.

Let the cithara not be silent,
Nor your step noiseless with Apollo approaching, you children,

Well done the youths; the strings are no longer at rest.

The poet Scythinus tells us how appropriate the prelude with its lyre is for an Apollonian epiphany which comes to fulfillment only at sunrise: the *plec-trum*, with which Phoebus strums his lyre, is the light of the sun.²²

Since the poet in his "hymn proper," in the epic-like *Paian* of his ideal chorus, begins: "Be silent and hear the song of Apollo's glory" (at this, the congregation, not the chorus, should grow silent), we should have with the illusion of the spiritual presence of the God the illusion of the sunrise as well. The cry "Hie Hie *Paian*," which curbs even the lament of Thetis and the weeping of Niobe when each "hears" it (line 21), is intended for the rising sun which only just now begins to be visible with these first words of the song. The poet orders, "Cry out" (line 25), but he implies here, so to speak, an avowal to and an entrance for the divinity who still needs to combat an adversary. This is the meaning of his words: "Cry 'Hie Hie'; it is a poor thing to contest the blessed." Callimachus will tell us still later about this struggle, how and against whom Apollo would first fight. Here the passage abounds in the kingliness of the God and all the magnificence which flows from it upon the singers—the glory and the richness of the songs. A richness not only for the day of epiphany:

Neither will the chorus sing of Apollo for only one day;
He is worthy of many hymns.²³ Who would not readily sing of Apollo?

And there he stands already before our spiritual eyes, clothed, so to speak, with the perceivable, visible sun:²⁴

Golden is Apollo's mantle" and golden its clasp,
As are his lyre and Lycian bow and quiver;
Golden are his sandals, for Apollo is rich in gold.

From the characteristics of *polychrysos* from the goldenness in a literal sense, the poet makes the transition to the characteristic of *polykteanos* ("with many possessions"). Callimachus then returns to the epiphany—and our discussion should concern the epiphany alone—only in the final mythological passage of his song. He writes here (line 97) *hie hie paieon akouomen, houneka touto* (literally, "We hear, 'Hail, hail Paian.'"). This does not mean that the congregation raised up this cry for the first time here toward the end of the "hymn proper." Perhaps the poet's conception has the chorus raise the cry with particular exuberance now because the sun with all its might is already risen. The form *akouomen* allows for the sense "we always hear." What Callimachus wishes to add is the mythological foundation. How is it that such a cry is made?

because the people
Of Delphi first established this refrain
When with your golden bow you gave proof of your skill from afar.
A fantastic beast faced you as you descended to Delphi,
A horrible serpent. You slew him shooting
One swift arrow after another. The people cried
"Hie Hie Paian! Shoot the arrow!" Your mother surely
Begot you as a helper, and since then you live in song.

The archetypal enemy is the "beast" (*daimonios ther*), the dreaded "serpent" (*ainos ophis*) with whom the God fought at Delphi, and Callimachus hardly separated this mythological being from the conquered nocturnal darkness any more than he wished to distinguish the appearing Apollo from the rising sun. In the same way, sunbeams, the plectrum of the God strumming on his golden lyre, are also the arrows shot incessantly from his golden bow. "How would his cheering, enlivening power be characterized in such a one-sided description?" asked K. O. Mueller,⁷⁴ not considering how Apollo's two contradictory aspects are expressed by lyre and bow, instruments so

closely comparable in this structure²⁷ and poignantly accentuated even in Callimachus (line 19).

e kitharin e toxa . . .

die cithara or bow . . .

One thing he did not consider: how light itself, the perceptible and the spiritual, can have the harmful sharpness of arrows where it inevitably encounters darkness.

3. *Aeschylus* *Eumenides* 181-82

This is not the place to analyze all the passages of ancient literature which describe Apollonian appearances, but as a contrast to a Delian epiphany we should examine a Delphic one. It is Aeschylus in the *Eumenides*, the third tragedy of his Orestes trilogy, who offers us the unorthodox view. On stage the temple portal of the Apollonian sanctuary at Delphi is visible. The Pythia, prophetess and priestess of the God, enters the temple to take her seat, the seat of the prophetess, and to proclaim oracular responses to the inquiries made of her. First she opens the door, disappears into the cella, and then returns running. She verbally describes the pollution which frightened her away, but then she reveals to the audience the interior of the temple deep within the hidden sanctum, the adyton; and they then see Orestes, a matricide by Apollo's bidding, sitting on the sacred stone monument called the omphalos which marks the navel of the earth. The Erinyes with their frightful, gorgonesque faces had pursued Orestes here and are now scattered around the adyton sunken in slumber. At first Apollo, benevolent, appears—and this is not surprising—in his temple, and accompanying him is his brother Hermes to whom he has entrusted the suppliant for safe conduct and protection. Only after the ghost of the murdered mother, Clytemnestra, has roused the Erinyes, who then are ready to confront the God of the sanctuary, does Apollo reveal himself as if in an epiphany. Threatening with his bow, he is in the fullness of his divine majesty (line 179):

Out! I command you! Leave this dwelling
Immediately. Out of my holy sanctuary of prophecy,
Or you will feel the soaring, shining serpent
Shot from my hammered-gold bow string.

With these words he begins his rhesis, and it is particularly the last two verses which are worth our attention,

me kai labousa ptenon argesten ophin,
chryselatou thomingos exormomenon . . . ,¹⁸

Apollo is making his appearance here as a shining divinity, and he drives the dark powers, the figures of nocturnal fright, from his sanctuary. Gold glistens on his bow. One can compare his dark appearance at the beginning of the *Iad*. There he arrives (line 44):

Down from the peaks of Olympus he strode angry in his heart,
With his bow and doubly covered quiver on his shoulders.
The arrows clattered on the shoulders of the angry god
As he moved. He went like the night.
Then he sat far from the ships and shot an arrow;
And there was a terrible clang of the silver bow.
First the mules and swift hounds it strikes,
Then a weapon with its sharp edge aimed at the men
He shoots; the corpse fires burned often and everywhere.

In view of this description of an Apollonian epiphany—the first in Greek literature—one cannot deny that this great God, who in Homer is regularly invoked together with Zeus, could have a very dark aspect. As golden as he might appear in Callimachus, here he comes literally "like the night" (*ho d' eie nukti eoikos*). It is true that Homer compares both the gaze of Hector bursting into the Greek encampment¹⁹ and the menacing bearing of Heracles in Hades to night,²⁰ but this does not deprive Apollo of his nocturnality. Other passages in Homer attest to his bright aspect; the God who in his nightly aspect has a silver bow and therefore earns the epithet *argyrotokos* is also at the same time he "of the golden sword" (*chrysaoros*).²¹ The hero known as Chrysaor in the substantive form of the latter epithet sprang from

the womb of the beheaded Medusa, a mythological being whose relationship to the light which breaks through and flashes out could scarcely be clearer.⁴²

To the Greeks, Apollo also appears clothed in the night, and he shoots his deadly arrows from the bow which is silver like the moon; this also we would learn from Homer if we otherwise had little information about the wolf aspect of Apollo.⁴³ In the *Eumenides* his bow shines with the gold of the sun. For the arrow, however, the poet has a peculiar periphrasis. He calls it "a winged serpent" (*ptenos opbis*).⁴⁴ It is almost like a kenning, an enigmatically compact metaphor worthy of tragic poetry's elevated diction.⁴⁵ If it were not that this description of the God's arrow had such a paradoxical effect precisely in Delphi, the site of his celebrated struggle against the serpent, one would not take special notice. But what is directed at the serpent is at that moment like a serpent. The circumlocution, the arrow as serpent, leads to such a paradox, but only if it is something more than the individual whim of the poet.⁴⁶ And judging by the mythological material, one may assume it is something more. A comparable equation of arrow and serpent occurs in the variants of a saga which is connected with Apollonian cult.

Troy, which was under the protection of Apollo, the God of the silver bow, could not be taken without the bow of Heracles.⁴⁷ This bow belonged to Philoctetes who, because of his hideous wound, had been left behind on a deserted island. The similarity between this wound and the unhealable wound of Chiron—the wise centaur and prototypical physician, and the teacher of so many heroes, even of Heracles—is so great that, according to one version of the sage, Philoctetes just like Chiron is wounded by a poisoned arrow of Heracles; the arrow fell on his foot.⁴⁸ According to another version, he was pricked by the poisonous arrow which protected the mysterious sanctuary of the Goddess Chryse.⁴⁹ Even the Goddess herself is a mysterious figure. She is identified explicitly only with Pallas Athena,⁵⁰ but her close connection to Apollo results from this: one of the places named after her—the island of Chryse, where Philoctetes was wounded and which, supposedly, is to have later sunk into the sea⁵¹—was precisely that town Chryse which was under the special protection of Apollo, and in the first book of the *Iliad* the priest of

Chryse, the father of Chryseis, prayed to Apollo to punish the Greeks with his arrows. There was also the version according to which Philoctetes suffered the snake bite while making an offering to Apollo."

The protection of Troy depends upon Apollo's bow and arrows; it is Apollo who guides even the arrow of Paris against Achilles. And, in a more mysterious sphere, it also depends on a snake bite. It would perhaps not be impossible to acquire some more information about the nocturnal Apollo from the serpentine sphere of the golden Goddess "Chryse." Only on the basis of the proposed equation may the association between arrow and serpent, the association between poisonous serpent and poisoned arrow, be made even more clear than it already seems in the ancient commentators. It was an absolutely real association in that the poisoning of the arrow functioned originally as a substitute for and a virtual imitation of the poisonous snake. The arrow was then a winged serpent, particularly in that it was shot from the bow of a God who was himself related to serpents. Of course, this is a relationship not well-known, but it is one explicitly attested.¹³ Snakes were kept for Apollo in one of his sacred groves in Epirus just as they were for Asclepius in Epidauros, the former in a round peribolos, the latter in a tholos. When a virginal priestess fed the snakes, their acceptance of the holy victuals was considered a type of oracular response, and it was told that they were descended from the Delphic serpent Python and were the "play things" (*athyrma*) of the God.

These snakes were doubtlessly harmless creatures, the same sort one finds in the cult of Asclepius. There is a story that, before the snakes of the cult of Asclepius were brought to Rome, they climbed a palm in the Apollonian sanctuary of Antium;¹⁴ it shows the possibility of a harmony between the Delian tree and the animal which played such a significant role in *mythos* and *cultus* at Delphi. In Delphic cult, so far as we know about this, the serpent is surely not a tamed, sacred creature but a certain primordial being whose mythological fate, his slaughter at the hands of Apollo, is celebrated and re-enacted.¹⁵ His hostile relationship with Apollo seems to be quite unambiguous. According to the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, our earliest evidence,

the primordial creature was a female serpent, not *drakon* but *drakina* (line 300). She is described as

A gigantic, well-fed, wild monster, who brought
Many evils to men on earth, many to men themselves,
And many to long-shanked sheep; she was a bloody bane.

(line 304)

Hera chose this feminine creature to be wet nurse to Typhaon, another mythological "evil," as the poet of the hymn tells us, but even later he gives her no proper name and accounts for (lines 371-73) only the place-name Pytho and the epithet of Apollo, Pythios.⁵⁶ The customary appellation for the snake, Python, which occurs first among post-classical authors, comes from the same root, yet its precise meaning is unclear. The "well-fed" (*zatrephes*) monster of the hymn corresponds well with the name transmitted elsewhere —Delphyne," which is constructed from the root *delph-* 'belly, uterus.' And soon after his birth, Apollo defeated a devouring, giant snake at the place "Delphoi"⁵⁷ named similarly after the womb."

Not so unequivocal is the connection between the monster and the oracle. According to the Homeric hymn, Apollo defeats the dragoness after he has already established the oracle. Our second classical source, Aeschylus in the *Eumenides* (lines 1-9), tells with the precision of an uninterrupted sacred tradition how the possession of the oracle passed from its founder, the earth goddess Gaia, through Themis and Phoebe to Phoebus Apollo. Aeschylus says nothing about a struggle for the possession of the oracular seat. This does not exclude another struggle, one similar to that described by both hymnal poets, Callimachus and the Homeric. The primal sense of an archetypal, mythological struggle can be founded, without reference to any possession, on the existence of both combatants, Apollo and the devouring snake. And it is possible that later, after this kind of archetypal mythology had generally lost its meaning, arguments emerged which made out of the archetypal devourer a devourer of sheep, as we find already in the Homeric hymn, or a female guardian of the earth Goddess's oracle, as we read first in Euripides.⁵⁸

In the tradition, nonetheless, the guardian and dragoness still retains its inherently aggressive character, and because of this she later becomes a robber and pirate named "Python."⁶¹

These are the two variants in the literary tradition which account for the connection between the dragoness and the oracle. Both, not only the older tradition which describes the struggle alone but also the other which connects it with the possession of the oracle, have Apollo's adversary destroyed in a way which befits her and corresponds to the possible meaning of the Python, "to putrefy." The opinion would also be expressed that the omphalos at Delphi might be the tomb of the serpent,⁶² and there was noteworthy information offered about his skin, her teeth, and her bones as well as their connection with the tripod, itself an enigma.⁶³ None of these facts,⁶⁴ however, corresponds to a series of monuments which show a connection between the omphalos and the serpent. The bulk of all omphalos representations⁶⁵ depicts a particular monumental tradition, a third variant of the connection between serpent and oracle; it consists of accidentally preserved material which dates only from the post-classical era.⁶⁶ The literary texts treating the killing and disposal of the dragoness cannot provide suitable exegesis for these pictorial representations without contradicting the pictorial evidence. Visible on the monuments is a close connection between the Apollonian cult-stone and the serpent, that is, the serpent-encircled omphalos; it points out to us the possibility of an entirely positive relationship between the God and this animal, a serpent who is in the service of Apollo.

That the ancient onlooker upon seeing a serpent encircling the omphalos might think of a friendly, even beneficial, animal is proven by a Pergamene coin; on the one side it has the head of Asclepius, on the other the snake-encircled omphalos.⁶⁷ A coin from Delphi has the same representation of serpent and omphalos⁶⁸ and thus shows that the snake on the Pergamene coin was meant to be a Delphic snake. It certainly represented divinity, for this is the only interpretation which can be applied to a coin bearing a depiction of Asclepius. Corresponding to the representation on the Delphian coin are a small, marble imitation of the omphalos found on Delos,⁶⁹ a relief from

Delos,⁷⁶ and a group of omphalos representations on Etruscan ash-urns.⁷⁷ In a Pompeian fresco, the creature lowers his head in defeat before lyre-playing Apollo,⁷⁸ a tableau which corresponds to the literary accounts. Similar is the relief on a Roman candelabrum base⁷⁹ in which Apollo lets his lyre rest on the serpent-encircling omphalos. The lyre here is victorious power, and the snake appears in submission to and under the domination of the same power. On a relief from Miletus the snake, wound around the omphalos, rests under the God's bow as if protected by it.⁸⁰ In a less-known Pompeian fresco, the creature again wrapped around the omphalos raises his head to threaten an approaching giant snake, an aggressive monster.⁸¹ It shows that the serpent itself can assume the role of combatant against the serpent.⁸² Nor let us forget the snake of a famous sculpture which otherwise suggests no special relationship to Delphi at all and which depicts the God in one of his best-known epiphanies. We refer to the small and modest snake (which could be the creation of either a Greek master or a Roman copyist), with its head looking upwards toward the tree trunk in the background of the Apollo Belvedere.⁸³

The Apollo Belvedere has already shot his arrow from the bow,⁸⁴ but next to the arrows in his quiver we find his snake as well. Aeschylus's easily resolved enigma, the "whizzing, winged snake," incorporates what otherwise exists separately—two means and forms of expression of Apollonian activity. Both can be fatal—the biting snake and the sharp arrow. And both can also be curative—both the arrow directed against dark powers and the snake of the physician and prophet, the *iatromantis*, as the Pythia refers to him in the *Eumenides* (line 62). The arrows could also have a spiritual significance as light-bearing sunbeams. And the snake? We would not explain it but turn our attention to its ambiguity. One possibility is that it could be an expression for sunshine. A great tragedian labeled Helios a "fire-born snake" (*pyrigenes drakon*).⁸⁵ But if one considers the entire tradition, of which only a small part can be discussed in this selective essay, he should not feel a need to reduce the bright and dark form of Apollo to something which can be known by another name, e.g., Helios. For the Greeks, Apollo was something quite special, more than son of the celestial body, and even more than the mature, paternal sun

God. Like all the great Olympians," he is, so to speak, the center of the world from which the whole of existence seems to have a different appearance. Apollo's? It is bright and dark, transparent but also abundant in dangers and misfortunes, the source of which is the "spirit."

The *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* makes an early mention of such dangers where Apollo denies the gift of the true prophecy, that which reveals the *Nous* (*noos*) of Zeus," to his brother Hermes (lines 533-41):

But, divine born, noble one, the gift of prophecy for which you ask
Is rightful neither for you nor for any other of the immortals
To acquire. It is for the mind of Zeus alone. But I
Have affirmed, promised, and utterly sworn
That no other of the immortal gods besides me
Will know the thoroughly wise counsel of Zeus.
So you, my brother bearing the gold wand, do not command
Me to reveal the divine decrees which far-seeing Zeus plans.
I will do harm to some mortals and benefit others.

(*delesomai*). And as for the misfortunes, whose source is the spirit, let us in conclusion call a witness from a completely profane, yet purely and utterly Greek, sphere who is at the same time a member of general humanity and of all our commonality. "And yet," Alcibiades tells us of his philosophical episode with Socrates in Plato's *Symposium* (217 E):

I am bitten just as one bitten by the teeth of the viper. For they say that he to whom this has happened would prefer to describe his experience only to others who have been bitten. These alone can understand and pardon whatever he has done or spoken because of the pain. And I have been bitten more painfully and in the most painful place where one can be bitten, for I am struck and bitten in the heart or in the soul or however one names it, by the speeches of philosophy which lay hold of a young, not ignoble soul more vehemently than a viper bite and can force it to do or say anything.

IV. IMMORTALITY and APOLLONIAN RELIGION

I.

It is just as difficult not to devote oneself to the effect of the *Phaedo*, the great Platonic dialogue on the soul, as it seems easy to close one's mind to its argument. Cleombrotus of Ambracia, so reads an epigram of Callimachus, leapt to his death after reading the *Phaedo*, and Cato Uticensis twice read the *Phaedo* in preparation for his suicide even though he was a Stoic and not a student of the Academy. Similarly, in confronting death, great men of more recent history also compared the harmony of the *Phaedo*'s mood and the inextinguishable, Christian belief in immortality. In his poetic reworking, Lamartine intensified this harmony with the tones of the Evangelists. Obviously, the *Phaedo* has some religious value, and the reader of the dialogue cannot escape this question which he must direct toward the discipline of religious studies: What aspects of the *Phaedo*'s effect, pathos, and content can from the outset be clarified within the atmosphere of ancient religion?

Our consideration begins with the *Phaedo*. It should form, so to speak, the fundamental text for the ensuing meditations. In preparing to do so, we must first address quite briefly two problematic points of a more general, historical nature—the historical veracity of the *Phaedo* and the meaning of myth in Socratic dialogue. Not until after we do this can we attempt to understand the *Phaedo* from the standpoint of Greek religion.

Today there is a demand for a more thorough historical approach to Plato. It has taken precedence over the eternal problem posed in critical-historical

analysis, that is, how to apportion the living, whole Socrates of the *Phaedo* between his actual self and Plato. Such an analysis surely obscures the meaningful experiences and the profundities of life and death one encounters in Plato's words, and, in addition, it promises no positive result even after so many years of being almost exclusively employed for this very purpose. But prominent scholars, specifically the promulgators of "common sense" in Platonic scholarship,¹ have noticed that every word with which Socrates makes an observation about death in the *Phaedo*, at least if not connected with Platonic doctrine, could be his own testimony on the immortality of the soul; so neither do we have any clearer right to call into question this aim and sense of Plato's work of art. The outer framework of the *Phaedo* consists of a dedication to such people who are able particularly to appreciate Socrates' arguments on these matters of the soul—to Pythagoreans. The narrative proceeds entirely amidst the pretensions of historical fidelity; the participants and auditors of the conversation are painstakingly detailed as witnesses. In doing so Plato can very effectively give a greater impact to his own ideas, because he applies them over his substratum of accurately recorded Socratic observations. We are not ignoring Plato's ideas. It is just that we are not searching for the mosaic lines in those areas where everything formed virtually by a metal casting appears in the light of the *sic moritur iustus*.

Our problem originates in the very spirit of the Platonic dialogue. In Socratic discourse—and precisely in the form immortalized by Plato—it is not merely insights, thoughts, and theories which stand side by side but men whose "yes," whose *homologia*, is not indifferent even for historians of philosophy. If Calicles in the *Gorgias* is convinced or constrained to lay down his arms, that means more for Socrates than would his victory over some principle-less adventurer. The only valuable testimony is that of an adversary who, with a conviction which is rooted in his character, advocates the opposition of conscious principles. In the *Phaedo* such an adversary could be only Socrates himself, the analytic iconoclast demanding complete evidence, a spirit critical of the Pythagoreans who professed the immortality of the soul. So we must ask what already from the outset, and so thoroughly, convinced

this Socrates—the heuristic inquirer whose probings still affect modern man—to advise even Pythagoreans about the immortality of the soul. This Greek concept, also the most abstract, confronts us with human, possibly even with divine, countenance and requires of all our humanity some understanding.

But even a religious understanding cannot be reached in the traditional way. We find this to be true as soon as we begin analyzing the history of religion in the *Phaedo* in the passage where one has traditionally undertaken such an exegesis—at the end of the dialogue. Conclusion myths in Plato, both in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere, treat the destiny of the soul after death. This is what belongs first of all, according to the commonly held conception, in the history of religion. The most significant and interesting observations of this discipline have been useful for us, yet the most important of all is the identification of the turning point in the history of Greek religion marked by the myths of the Platonic dialogues. Up to this point,

The sky and the depths of the earth, the wide ruling forms from which flow all salvation, all loftiness, all exaltation, all horror, all sustenance for the soul. . . remote antiquity was until then an enormous *temenos* filled with a forest of statues—archetypes, prototypes, and guarantees for the present.

This is how Karl Reinhardt, the distinguished specialist, describes the pre-Socratic cosmos.¹ With Socrates begins the modification in the direction of the inner, of the soul. The new prayer says, "Grant me, Lord, that I be well within." Such turning inwards, this newly born Greek soul, is, to use Reinhardt's terminology, the mother of Platonic myth. "The mythical world matured and grew outside of and within the soul." The myths which Plato has Socrates narrate are the products of this new, spiritual development. They do not exist before philosophy as if they were its preconditions; they follow it. For the present, however, it is just these preconditions which interest us.

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates deemphasizes the importance of the conclusion myth also in another way. "To maintain that all is as I say," he says after

finishing his mythical narration, "is not proper for an intelligent person." Still, he considers it worthwhile to risk the danger of pure conjecture—the *dulce periculum* of the mystical transition—because the description of the soul's destiny in the other world which he sketches out in the myth follows from his preceding, more serious discussion. The *Mythos* follows the *Logos*. What Socrates ventures to profess is of another sort. "I expect," he says at the beginning of the dialogue, "to be among good men. But I would not insist on that too firmly. Nevertheless, be assured I do insist, if on any of these matters, that I be among the gods who would be good masters to me." And as Socrates attached no doubt to the existence and to the goodness of the Gods in death—to the goodness of that real state of death which is unconnected with that fairytale-like conception of the other world—so Socrates considered the existence of the Gods in general to be a certainty. They are those to whom we belong, just as our animals belong to us. This comparison is a signpost even for those attempting to understand this dialogue from the standpoint of Greek religion.

2.

The Greek Gods, the "wide-ruling forms" of the pre-Socratic cosmos, the forest of statues—archetypes and prototypes—are best compared, considering the degree and significance of their reality, with the Platonic Ideas. Knowledge of the Gods is of a loftier sort than the *pistis* of Platonic epistemology, sheer faith. Centuries later, particularly in the Christian era, this Greek word appears regularly in reference to religious belief. From a passage of the *Gorgias** however, it is clear that Pythagorean doctrine, which served as Plato's model, attributed the inclination toward belief, and so also belief itself, to the lowest, most basic impulse of the soul.¹ The object of *pistis* can at its most sublime be divinely inspired revelation, encouragement, promise, or an appropriate doctrine, but for the acknowledgment of its existence, for "religion" in this sense, there is in general no Greek word; this is precisely

because the Greeks considered the reality of the Gods to be no less substantial than the reality of the world whose aspects they form. The most common mode of behavior practiced in the presence of these Gods they called *eulabeia* ("circumspection").⁴ The very foundation for knowledge about the Gods is suggested by the religious and later the purely spiritual meaning of the word "theory" (*theorem*), that is, "inspection." The world of the Gods, then the world of Ideas: they stand not only in historical and logical sequence before the new myth of the soul but also according to their quality of reality. Historians of philosophy had previously inquired to what extent Socrates' proof of immortality obtained its force from the doctrine of Ideas. This is a question which corresponds closely to our problem which we now venture to formulate quite specifically: To what extent is this same proof of immortality rooted in Socrates' personal vision of the Greek Gods?

This master of raising consciousness has left us not a moment for doubting what that powerful reality was, the experience of which provided him with all his resolute convictions about the soul. At the beginning of the dialogue, the celebrated discussions about true philosophizing as exercising for death call to witness experiences which give meaning to his turning to the view of that world full of Ideas, isolated and different from all others. The approaching toward the purely immaterial and spiritual, the intense longing for the intelligence which is detached from the senses, the consciously progressive release from corporeal restraint of which Socrates speaks acts as a single surge toward active and passive transcendence. This attitude could be synthesized in the maxim of Paulus's succinct Latin translation—*non contemptantibus nobis quae videntur, sed quae non videntur*. With this Socrates wins the valued affirmation he had sought from his Pythagorean interlocutor. His central argument for the immortality of the soul later returns to this type of evaluation by experience. The soul is already exalted through its transcendence—the "invisibility," according to the text of the *Phaedo*—to the divine; indeed the truth (the Ideas themselves) is invisible. *Invisibilia non decipiunt*; we can say this once again as a spiritualistic dogma. Kant's counterproof for the simple soul reducible to nothing is surely not to be im-

plied here, because to be simple up to the point of invisibility is from the very beginning the most intensely and persistently sought objective of the soul which aspires to perfect consciousness. Such an imperturbable consciousness of direction feeds itself on the intellectual and ascetic life's foundation of experience and on the striving for its goal: to be invisible is the way of the supernatural (not sub-natural), the way of divinity.

What a spiritual reality, the reality of the forceful attraction of a superior clarity of understanding, is inherent in the *Phaedo*! Socrates consciously gives it prominence. It casts a bright light upon his complete preparedness and readiness for death on this bittersweet last day. As a spiritual reality, even unavowed, it dominates Socrates' train of thought, and in it originate these otherwise inexplicable analyses of the theoretical argument. Socrates' ardent and fatal desire for clearness in the *Phaedo* is its all-penetrating element, its atmosphere, its life line, just as Eros is for the other great Platonic dialogue on immortality—the *Symposium*. We understand now how Socrates, the great lover of conceptual clarity, could agree with the doctrine of immortality which he expresses in the *Phaedo*. We have not found the biographical, psychological explanation of why Plato has presented us with this particular portrait of Socrates, nor have we been able to specify the position of the *Phaedo*'s philosophical content in the history of ideas. We proceed from the self-contained world of this work of art and come now upon the path of a completely human understanding to a greater reality which is conjured up through Plato's talent. To this greater reality, the life and death of Socrates have bestowed a historical body, and its effect continues because it is itself timeless. Its action and effect remain still without limit.

3.

The world of Greek Gods is so vast and encompassing that it contains not only Aphrodite and Eros, the Gods of the *Symposium*, but even the aim and the transcendental quintessence of Socrates' ardent desire for clearness. The

evidence of a Greek God is his cult. Even before now it could not be doubted that that type of exercising of the soul to which Socrates alludes in the *Phaedo* was common among the Pythagoreans or that such a catharsis of the soul had its origin in a religious context. But historians of religion have usually comprehended such a cathartic procedure—even the most sublime purging of the soul—as individualized magic which does not belong to the sphere of the state cults of the great Greek Gods. Just as the poets of Old Comedy, they often look only at the crude external appearance of the ascetic Pythagorean life and do not seek a connection with that higher reality which could structure the philosophical life as well as state religion. Perhaps not only those looking from afar can hardly appreciate an attitude that might notice only the barefootedness of St. Francis's disciples but not the cathedrals which rose up in their footsteps.

Will not the classical scholar who searches for traces of the creative power of the Pythagorean era in Metapontum's fields of grain come exultantly upon the lofty, solitary remains of the two Apollo temples? The "Pythagorean life" with its ascetic elements is a lifestyle thoroughly appropriate for the worship of Apollo. According to later sources, Pythagoras is Apollo's son genealogically or at least spiritually. This association gives a certain consistency to all our traces of the Pythagorean era, and the legend's intrinsic truth is that the Apollonian reality procured its philosophical way of thinking and moral conduct, its conception of the world and its form of government through Pythagoras.⁴

That Apollo whom Nietzsche characterized is not to be included here. That Apollo of an imaginary world is himself a mere dream image. But even when we consider the unimaginary Apollo of substance, we should not juxtapose the Apollonian with the Dionysian only to comprehend it as one of the two possible, aesthetic, and world-forming powers which the Greeks conceptualized also as divinities. Already a long time before Nietzsche, a great historical spirit of classical scholarship, Karl Otfried Miiller, had reached the observation that, in Apollonian cult, "the sensation of divine being in opposition to that felt in nature worship" was "supernaturalistic, deriving from an

activity different and separate from the life of nature; it is from similar sensations that the religion of Abraham arose."⁹ To comprehend the Greek conception here, we will need to transform this statement, but we will need to do so without sacrificing Miiller's observation about transcendence. Apollo—and every Greek God—is an archetype which the Greeks recognized as a metaphysical form of experienced psychic realities and plastic, observed, natural realities. One can therefore call it most simply a higher reality. This label refers to the God's formal transcendence whether he manifests himself as a reality amidst the life of the soul or as a natural reality. Philological studies in religion had in essence reached this viewpoint already with Walter F. Otto's interpretation of the Greek Gods. Since to Otto's classic description of Apollo¹⁰ we find ourselves now adding the nuances required for historical completeness, it will be obvious to what extent it substantially represented the concept of transcendence.¹¹ Yet only a few sketchy strokes will be needed to revise Otto's description, for even if we seem to deviate from him in the general effect of our presentation, we will still not contradict the outcome of his interpretation.¹²

Apollo's epithets are *Phoebus* and *hagnos*. He is the pure, holy, cleansing God. His purity makes him analogous to the sunlight. The *Heoios* Apollo, the "god of the morrow," is, however, when on a deserted island the Argonauts encounter him at the very moment of daybreak, not Nearness but Separation.¹³ He is the God from afar; his oracular pronouncements are heard from a distance, and also his arrows strike from a distance—with inevitable death. His kingdom is the remote fantasy land of the Hyperboreans "beyond the mountains" (which is what the word means). It is the home of the perfect existence and of Euthanasia, the blessed death, where those weary of life hurl themselves when cheerfully adorned from a crag into the sea.¹⁴ The Greeks recognized this Apollonian world in the northern landscape of gleaming snow, and each year Apollo came in his white, swan-drawn carriage from there to his Delphic sanctuary. He came at midsummer in one of the great mortal moments of Greek nature, when hidden behind the twittering of the birds is, so to speak, the all-destructive heat reaching its greatest intensity on

the highly spiritual, blazing mountain ridge. Even the griffin belongs to him, for the fantastic form of supernatural being is well-suited to Apollo's distance from life.

"Distance"—we may now employ Otto's term.¹¹

On the surface this word expresses only something negative, but its implication is something most positive—the attitude of cognition. Apollo objects to extreme proximity, the self-consciousness of things, the blurred gaze, and equally the spiritual exchange, the mystical inebriation and its ecstatic dream. He wants not soul (in the Dionysiac sense) but spirit. In Apollo we encounter the spirit of observable knowledge which stands in antithesis to existence and to the world with unequalled freedom—the genuine Greek spirit which was destined to produce not merely so many arts but ultimately even science.

This is not a purely modern interpretation. For the Greeks Apollo is the God of spiritual men but not exclusively the God of the poets. He is also the God of Pythagoras. Recently, there was an attempt to connect Apollo with the primitive existence of the shepherd, but the only evidence for this is his serving as shepherd in the fable of Admetus, originally a Lord of the Underworld.¹² Physicians have a special relationship to him. The invocation "Paian" addresses in him the victorious and the healing. And he is also father of the chthonic Asclepius, the great double-faced one who releases from illness surely—as death freed Socrates. With the sound of his lyre, Apollo holds all together in harmony. His plectrum is the ray of sunshine. And this music pours out the black clouds of dream to the head of Zeus's eagle.

This is the character of Apollo's divinity. There is an inner cohesion that we surely need not destroy if, instead of repressing, we accentuate his seemingly contradictory shining aspect. We must think of the Ideal of invisibility in the *Phaedo* which for the philosophers signifies completely transparent brightness, but for common eyes the darkness and, in this sense, the invisible. We are then capable of seeking in the religious history of Apollo's character that level of cognition where darkness is not only mixed in with the light but

also dominates it. This level of cognition resembles the viewpoint of corporeal man in the *Phaedo*; it is the perception of primitive religion, a muddled experience and sensation which on a loftier Hellenic level was to be the cognition and observation of pure Forms. Accordingly, the more primitive perception is what one expects to find wherever the influence of Homeric religion, which reflected the Greek Gods for the first time in their classical form, was not felt. Italy first encountered the Hellenic Gods at the pre-Homeric level¹⁷ and adhered to the darker side of Apollo for a long time. On Mt. Soracte one worshipped Apollo as *Soranus Pater*, who is virtually a Lord of the Underworld. His priests there called themselves wolves. In Rome he is Veiovis, the Jupiter of the Underworld. The Capitoline sanctuary by his temple stands under the protection of *Deus Lucoris*, a name suggesting *Lykoreia*, the wolf-town above Delphi.¹⁸ In Italy Apollo is a dark and fatal God. Even the knowing smile of the Apollo of Veii—that admired, "Etruscan smile"—is a wolf's smile. He who goes with wolves is himself followed by the all-devouring murkiness of death. Murkiness and wolves: it is as if they are united as one—*lupi ceu raptores atra in nebula*¹⁹ Where is the distinction between wolf and darkness in the "night of the wolf"? In Asia Minor, Lycia is the name of the "land of the wolf"; it is Apollo's land, just as is the wolf-worshipping Lykaonia.²⁰ Leto, Apollo's divine mother, came to Delos in the form of a wolf to give birth to her son.²¹ She came from the land of the Hyperboreans who are also called Belcae, a wolf-like name.²² Apollo himself in raven form guided the people of Thera.²³ The dark birds, the raven and crow, together with the wolf are his holy animals, and they represent his essence just as does the swan in his other aspect. In Apollo's figure, Germanic mythology's Odin of Bitter Death is in union with the White Swan-knight of Sweet Death—Lohengrin.

Here lies Apollo's mystery, and here also lies the mystery of Socrates. Apollo's swan aspect is just as genuine as the revelation of death's reality in the deeply cast shadow which falls on him—in the form of the raven and wolf. And it is none other than Socrates who is the first to give an account of the spiritual basis for Apollo's association with the swan. He is not employing symbolism here; the discourse does not contain artificial symbolism. He describes and explains the natural occurrence of the swan-song with a true knowledge of nature. "They sing before this as well," it says in the *Phaedo*,

But when they sense that they are about to die they sing quite frequently and most beautifully. They rejoice because they are about to approach the gods whose servants they are. Men, however, in their fear of death relate false tales about swans. They say that it is in pain and mourning that swans sing about their deaths. They do not consider that birds do not sing when they are hungry or cold or suffering from some other misery, not even the nightingale or swallow or hoopoe. But they say that the birds sing to bemoan their sadness. But I do not believe that they sing in pain, nor do I believe the lies about the swans. They are Apollo's birds; they see the future and know therefore all the good which awaits us in death, so they sense on that day a blissfulness greater than ever before. And I consider myself like the swans to be in the service of the same master. I, too, am the holy property of god.

"Nearness to death," "longing for death." The entire *Phaedo* is filled with these strains of the swan-song. Those who have wished to cite the most important aspects of the *Phaedo* have always had to realize this.¹⁴ But in addition we now understand the actual objective in Socrates' desire for death—the otherworldliness which since prehistory has attracted man with its ecstatic catharsis by immersion into purity. Apollo, the God of the spirit, gives us the knowledge to know about his own essence. And although the outline is not so sharp and the approach somewhat different, his deathly aspect is traceable also in the primitive era. But that animalistic vitality accounts in "the darkness" of the *Phaedo* only for the life-denying core of the reality of

Apollo, the greatest of the Greek Gods after Zeus. The concept of immortality apparently did not at all belong to the religion of the destructively purging Apollo. Pythagoras himself doubtlessly deserves credit for the fusion of the two Apollos, but if one is to judge from the objections raised by the Pythagorean associates of Socrates it becomes evident that the Pythagoreans in his day considered only the Apollonian purging-process to be of importance. This process, however, as in Buddhism where we find close parallels to the objections," can lead to the ceasing of existence. According to Cebes, the soul can dissipate into numerous bodies and ultimately disintegrate entirely. According to Simmias, it can come to an end much as would harmony if musical instruments were to "crumble to pieces."

With his consciousness of immortality, Socrates stands, however, in the midst of the Apollonian religion. Apollo is, as seen from the viewpoint of the soul, an aspect of the individual's ceasing to be, of a reality which when seen from one angle is dark. But it has still an entirely different aspect, for it is connected with the most sublime view of purity, with the view toward a complete reduction of the multiplicity of life. Now every obscurity disappears. This is Apollo, the soul's darkness and the soul's clarity. His essence is such that he can be darkness and clarity at the same time. His character comprises in itself the realization of consummate purity, and if there is one who cannot grasp the significance of this realization, to him the Apollonian religion will signify not immortality but only the cultic, metaphysical basis for the intense longing for complete purity—Apollo himself.

If, on the other hand, there is one like Socrates to whom "purity itself" is a reality hard as diamond, his soul will be given immortality in the Apollonian religion; with complete purification it enters into a certain state of being. The dictates for Apollonian purification apply to the whole man, and this includes the soul. "Stranger, enter pure into the sanctuary of the pure god; wet your soul with spring water." The soul, which is conceptually not yet separated from life, draws purification from water. In the archaic period, Delphi—where according to an epigram of the *Anthology*,²⁶ this voice resounded—was in fact the ancient world's center for the religion of general

purification. Then, at the threshold of a new era, Socrates experiences in the condition of a soul more and more separated from life, in *phronesis*, the Apollonian impetus for purification. But the next step after the separation is already the tenet of the immortality of the soul, not in the Dionysian sense²⁷ but in the Apollonian conception set forth in the *Phaedo*.

Delphi had acknowledged Socrates. According to all that we know of Delphic maxims, we have no sufficient basis for doubting the confession made in Plato's setting of the *Apology*—that his whole search for truth was in the service of the Delphian God. Something wolfish and Apollonian is perceptible even in Socrates' irreverent interrogations of men and iconoclastic examinations of doctrines. In the *Phaedo* the other Apollonian impetus prevails. The dialogue begins just after the imprisoned Socrates had been composing a hymn to the glory of Apollo. But in a deeper sense, the entire *Phaedo* is a hymn to Apollo. In his swan-like confession about the swan-song, Socrates calls himself a priest or a prophet of the God, Apollo's "holy property." Following Pythagoras's ground-breaking, now legendary rethinking of Apollonian religion, this Socratic experience now directs the path of Apollonian religion toward the great transition—to the new myth of the soul and myth of the Idea which takes the place of the view of the old and revered divine realities but does not divorce itself from the Delphian God. Inextinguishably present in every word of the *Phaedo*, even if he is not present in person, is the creative spirit of transition, the prophet, poet, philosopher of Apollonian transcendence—Plato. We are doing him no injustice by viewing the *Phaedo* as a document of Apollonian religion. Plato like Pythagoras is *Apolloniakos*.²⁸ He is the swan of the Academic altar of Eros which Socrates imagines, the swan flying in the bosom of its master.²⁹ Among the Athenians, he is Apollo's earthly son whose birth members of the Academy always celebrated on Apollo's birthday.³⁰ Later, they had information that before his death an aging Plato had dreamt of being transformed into a swan.³¹ With such ease, the ancients used legendary material to accentuate the connection, the same connection which today we are forced to reconstruct by using the tedious modern methodology of posing and solving problems.

For an understanding of the *Phaedo*, it is essential to realize that in this dialogue Socrates has complete mastery over the captivating vision of that spiritual purity which for the unspiritual—and Socrates is completely conscious of this—can mean only something deadly and dark. Apollo's true existence corresponds to this experience as a spiritual reality. Be it experienced by Greek or by non-Greek, it is always a fundamentally Greek conception of God which belongs to the Apollonian religion, named or unnamed. Inevitably, every religion as a historical phenomenon undergoes the process of solidification. The character of Apollo which Socrates encounters is not that loosened form, as it necessarily must seem in our analysis. And the figures of the "forest of statues" continually become fixed and statuesque. Yet they are not strangers who meet here: the man of spirit and a God who was worshipped only somewhat mechanically. As a Greek, Socrates—and certainly Plato as well—has a direct understanding of what in Apollonian religion was fundamental and connected even in its mood with the Socratic experience. Every one of the significant avowals to Apollo spoken in the dialogue bears witness to this. Early Pythagoreans and later Platonic philosophers through the religiously even more eventful centuries clung to their God all the more consciously. Only with the complete dissolution of the Hellenic world did the solidification become complete.

5.

Immortality and the Apollonian religion are inseparable in the *Phaedo*, so their intrinsic connection with the doctrine of Ideas takes on no lesser significance. In fact, it attains new meaning. The Ideas are the Greeks' immanent antidote to the doctrines of Buddhism. This applies as well to the divinities. The Idea of Purity is nothing short of an assign, and in its form of being it is an image of the great purifier's higher reality, the "pure divinity" of Phoebus. And as the *Symposium's* Idea of Beauty included all-pervasive Aphrodite's smile of the sea and heavens, so does the powerful and deathly

transcendental force spring from that divinity whose cult and intelligibility connect Socrates with the totality of the Apollo-worshipping Greek world. The entire contents of the *Phaedo* are subsumed by the Apollonian elements of antiquity. The picture is similar to the many-colored globe of its conclusion myth; it reveals humanity and nature as seen in the forms of the Greek Gods. The transparent glimmer playing in the darkness which we could label "the Apollonian color" is only one of many colors. Above Apollo remains the embracing reality of his father Zeus. But Apollo's sphere is that in which religion and philosophy could coincide in this fashion and that in which the irresistible pathos of Socrates' last speech took place. In this sphere, the Pythia and Athenian philosopher form a oneness with two appearances. In it, Greek science since Pythagoras bases its cosmos, and in it Augustus—like Plato, according to the legend, Apollo's son²²—establishes the peace of the world, just as every other ancient civilizing force realized the magnificently ordering gestures of the Apollo from the Olympia temple's pediment. He bestows order; order is deadly for demonic licentiousness, and its deadliness is the deadliness of numbers. They mark the path of that reduction which is Apollonian in the highest degree attainable by us.

The concept of immortality *alone* is never Apollonian. The complete possession of the secrets of the universe is Zeus's quality. To be conscious of one's own particular spiritual values, to be a wolf to the unspiritual, to be a swan in front of the highest purity of the spirit—this we have inherited from antiquity as Apollonian religion.

Translator's Afterword

For nearly three millenia now, Apollo has managed to maintain the same elusiveness he cultivated for his first positively identifiable appearance in Greek literature just after the opening of the *Iliad*. As the dark but uncontaminated bringer of plague and later the perfidious ally of Patroclus and Hector, and elsewhere as a deity incapable of consummating a successful relationship with Cassandra, Marpessa, Daphne, or Coronis, the Apollo of purely mythographical literature hardly conjures up the glorious vision one finds inherent in the pages of Winckelmann, Nietzsche, and, for that matter, in almost all of classical scholarship of the past two hundred years. Today we are too easily surprised to find the Apollo of Euripides' *Ion* and of Aeschylus's *Eumenides* to be a negative, so it seems, factor, and yet the Greeks and especially the Athenians, from whom so much of our information about and impressions of Hellenic antiquity derive, hardly seem to have considered Apollo to be the God "most Greek of the Greek gods." He could be treacherous, traitorous, and ambiguous. He ordered the Athenians out of their city in fear of the Persian onslaught and at Amyclae offered the Spartans more assistance than the Athenians deemed equitable. His sanctuary at Delphi was a Hellenic Palestine tossed back and forth as the premium political football of the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries B.C., and his earthly spokesperson could do little but find herself obliged to honor her present or

imminent master. The Romans, of course, particularly after the carefully orchestrated revival of Apollonian cult under the Principate, looked upon the God more kindly, if with less comprehension of his original significance, and it is from this first century that Apollo begins to acquire generally that ultimate, glorious, "most Hellenic" aura he still bears today.

Only a handful of scholars have taken it upon themselves to investigate the Hellenic Apollo's historical origins and primary psychic forces, and of these few scholars the most productive and the most successful was Kerenyi. Indeed, if one scans the lists of scholarly work done in this century on the Olympian deities, he will find a disproportionately small amount of material on Apollo, disproportionate, that is, to the amount of 'Greekness' we attribute to him. The only significant book to treat the Hellenic Apollo and to appear within the last two generations has been Karl Kerenyi's *Apollon* which earned its way into three separate printings and editions (1937, 1941, and 1953) and now rests in *Apollon und Niobe* (Munich/Vienna, 1980), the fourth volume of the collected works carefully edited by Magda Kerenyi. It is from this volume that the second ("*Der Geist*"), third ("*Apollon-Epiphaniien*"), and fourth ("*Unsterblichkeit und Apollonreligion*") of the essays here translated are found. What Kerenyi understood better than other scholars of his and the subsequent generations was that Apollo was a mysterious and arcane deity and that the clarity of his solar functions should not completely bleach out the shadows lurking in various aspects of his cult. The bringer of plague, the striker from afar, the God of wolves symbolized by serpents, and he who carries away mad prophetesses in maniacal, wind-driven frenzies—this is the darker Apollo about whom Kerenyi chose to enlighten us.

Kerenyi has too often been labeled the archetypal, archetyping Jungian. Of course, he studied and worked closely with the master early on in his career, and the concept of the archetype is utterly assumed in his studies. But I would prefer to label Kerenyi, if I may not label him a "Kerenyian," a symbolist. This helps to put Kerenyi's work in perspective, for his emphases on such Apollonian symbols as the serpent, the sun, the laurel, the wind, the wolf, the

swan, and the youthful male help not only to distinguish Kerenyi as representative of a distinct branch of modern psychological study in myth but also to identify him as part of a continuing methodology of mythological criticism well-established by the time of "Heraclitus' *Quaestiones homericæ*" and continued via Fulgentius into the allegorization of Ovid in twelfth-century France, beyond Spenser's *Faerie Queene* into Freud, Jung, and Kerenyi. This symbolistic approach allows Kere'nyi the elasticity he needs to convey his highly idiosyncratic associations; it allows him, for instance, to take his reader by surprise when, toward the close of his discussion of Ion's dramatic initial appearance (as truly the son of Apollo) during sunrise at Delphi, he adds that the audience, too, must have taken their seats in the theatre just before or during sunrise. It allows him also to convey quite efficiently the similarity of the windy, spiritual experience felt by the apostles and by the prophetess at Cumae even though they are culturally unacquainted, and it then allows him to join to the ancient narrative several modern reminiscences—the North Sea sailors, Stefan George's comment about his father—which give both an immediacy and a permanence—in this sense, an archetype, although hardly labeled as such—to the symbol. One may well find himself disagreeing with Kerenyi's analysis of or even approach to an ancient bit of evidence, be it pottery piece or literary piece, but there will be few who can find in Kerenyi's symbols and symbolistic approach no inspiration or relevance to their own thoughts.

Kere'nyi also developed his own prose style—at times nearly poetic, often romantic, usually elusive, and always well-suited to just such an approach to mythical material. He wrote each sentence as a self-contained unit, which is reflective of his understanding of the process of symbolic and mythical construction, and rarely does one thought lead easily into the next—annoying, to be sure, to those desperately trying to understand Kerenyi's ideas but effectively and no doubt intentionally conducive to, as it is again reflective of, symbolistic thought. The sort of symbolic coincidences which led the evangelist, Vergil, and the North Sea sailor to have similar conceptions of spiritual experiences he understood to be at work also in his own prose, which abounds

in not at all unintentional verbal echoes of the symbolic matter under discussion: false interpretations of Ion's broom must be "swept away," and English parallels fail me for the ironies Kerenyi inserts into the introduction of his chapter on the spirit (*"Der Geist"*) by contrasting *Geist* and *Geisteswissenschaften*, which is a word etymologically suggesting "the sciences of the spirit" but which has been reduced to simply "humanistic studies" or, even more simply, "the arts" in contemporary academic usage. Wherever practicable I have tried to convey the irony of such passages which Kerenyi must have spent some time in constructing, but there are too often barriers which forbid an easy translation from the German to English. (The same, of course, is true for the translations from Latin and Greek, which are my own.)

The four essays translated in this volume are representative of Kerenyi's work in Apollonian studies. Without covering the expanse found in the entire *Apollon* volume, these four essays include: (1) a symbolistic analysis of the opening of Euripides' *Ion* which gives us a very different understanding of the drama and of Apollo's poor reputation derived from previous misunderstanding of it (from *"Apollons Tempeldiener"* now found in the the second volume of the collected works); (2) both a general and a specific statement on the meaning of the spirit and its realities within Apollonian religion (*"Der Geist"*); (3) a second symbolistic analysis, the most extensive, of two of the most significant Apollonian epiphanies in all of Greek literature—those in Callimachus's *Hymn to Apollo* and in Aeschylus's *Eumenides* (*"Apollon-Epiphaniien"*); and (4) a third symbolistic analysis of the significance of Apollonian religion in Plato's *Phaedo* and, for that matter, in the life (and death) of Socrates (*"Unsterblichkeit und Apollonreligion"*). There is an abundance of material to digest here, and it is hoped that the reader takes with him an understanding of "the darker Apollo" and of Kerenyi's methodology, as well as a desire to find more of the same in *Apollon und Niobe*. There is, incidentally, the alternative, Manheim translation available for the final essay, which can be found in the volume *Spirit and Nature* (Bollingen Series XXX, New York, 1954), pp. 49-74. While the latter was approved by the original author himself, the ones found in the present volume

have each been scrutinized by Magda Kerenyi and, in Chapter IV at least, checked against the original Hungarian draft. Magda Kerenyi has also kindly provided me with the updated bibliographical material found in the notes at the end of the volume, and I wish here to thank her again for her cooperation and helpful suggestions in all areas of preparation of the translations.

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Notes

III.

1. Heinrich Barth, to the Swiss University Conference of June 30, 1945, printed in *Easier Studentenschaft* (1945), pp. 131 f., and quoted at length in *Eranos Jahrbuch 13-1945*, pp. 12 f.
2. See Chapter II, "The Spirit," this volume.
3. R. M. Rilke, *Briefe aus Muzot; 1921 bis 1926* (Leipzig, 1940), p. 114; see also pp. 116 and 118, where the expression "in einem strahlenden Nachsturm" ("in the radiant moment after the storm") is used.
4. The Greek text is that of U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Callimachi hymni et epigrammata* (Berlin, 1907). [The English translation is my own—trans.]
5. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung* (Berlin, 1924), 2: 77 f.
6. Cf. Kerenyi, "Die Papyri und das Wesen der alexandrinischen Kultur," in *Apollon und Niobe*, Werkausgabe Bd IV (Munich, 1980), pp. 161 ff.
7. O. Joergensen, "Das Auftreten der Gotter in den Buchern 9-12 der *Odyssee*," *Hermes* 39 (1904): 357 f.; Erik Heden, *Homerische Gotterstudien* (Uppsala, 1912); M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (Munich, 1941), 1: 203; K. Kerenyi, *Antike Religion*, Werkausgabe VII (Munich, 1971), p. 94.
8. Preller-Robert, *Griechische Mythologie* (Berlin, 1894), 1: 224 f.; L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1904), 4: 288 f.
9. Cf. Himerius *Or.* 14. 10.
10. Ernst Howald, *Der Dichter Kallimachos von Kyrene* (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1943), p. 87, against Wilamowitz (*supra*, n. 5), pp. 78 f.
11. *Hymn. Horn. Ap.* 117; Callim. *Del.* 210.

12. Cf. E. Bethe, "Leto auf Delos," *Hermes* 71 (1936): 358.
13. Plut. *Nic.* 3; W. A. Laidlaw, *A History of Delos* (Oxford, 1933), p. 69; according to the Delian Semos (*ap.* Ath. 11. 502), who flourished after 250 B.C., this bronze palm was likewise erected by the Naxians as an offering. Cf. Ross, *Inselreisen* (Stuttgart, 1840), 1: 34.
14. The archaeological findings in Laidlaw (see *supra*, n. 13), p. 72.
15. Pind. fr. 78-79 Bowra.
16. Cf. Hdt. 6. 78, Thuc. 2. 8, Pliny *HN* 4. 12, Sen. *QNat* 6. 26.
17. *Del.* 26.
18. Cf. Kerenyi, *Goddesses of Sun and Moon* (Dallas, 1979), p. 73.
19. For the hebdomadal time reckoning, with which Apollo is closely connected, cf. Nilsson (*supra*, n. 7), 1: 614.
20. Cf. p. 57 in this volume.
21. Cf. *Aen.* 6. 48: *non comptae mansere comae, sed pectus anhelum et rabie fera corda tument* ("Her hair fell into disarray, but her breast heaves and her fierce heart swells with frenzy").
22. On this point, cf. Kerenyi, *Antike Religion* (see *supra*, n. 7), pp. 99 f., 134.
23. Line 13, on the other hand, has the otherwise famous expression *Pboibou . . . epidemesantos*; cf. Menander *De encom.* A.
24. *Pl. Phd.* 85 B.
25. *British Museum Catalogues of Coins*, "Delos," p. 99, n. 2, 3, and pi. 23. 2.
26. Here one may have specific objections to the one-sidedness of this interpretation. The uncertainties of Apollonian religion are of a greater scope and require a unifying solution which will eliminate none of the God's well-attested aspects.
27. Contemporary scholars find that his scholarly hostility to the sun made his death one of particular and singular tragic proportions. F. G. Welcker wrote to J. D. Guigniot (in Ernst Renan, *Etudes d'histoire religieuse* [Paris, 1924], p. 44), "The misfortunate man never recognized the solar aspect of Apollo's divinity, and the god punished him accordingly; amidst the very ruins of his own temple how his shafts are still formidable for those who are bold enough to confront them!" In a visit to Delphi, he had exposed himself to the sun in excessive amounts and died of sunstroke.
28. *Geschichten Hellenischer Stamme und Stadte* 1-3, *Die Dorier* (Breslau, 1844), 1: 291. The reference is from Callimachus *Hecale* fr. 48.
29. Apollo should be one such name of Helios: Eur. *Phaethon*.
30. *Del.* 260-63. Cf. Kerenyi, *Tochter der Sonne* (Zurich, 1944), p. 29, and *Eranos Jahrbuch* 11 — 1943, p. 97.

31. Cf. Eur. *IT* 1098 f., with J. E. Harrison, *Themis* (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 191 f., who not unconvincingly assigns the Delian olive to the lunar aspect of Artemis.

32. Scythinus fr. 14.

33. The word in Callimachus, *euymnos*, suggests "easily abundant" to those who would glorify Apollo, "with hymns" to those who would sing to him.

34. Others had already looked for parallels for the Apollonian myth in the vision of the "woman robed in the sun" (*Rev.* 12. 1); cf. Albrecht Dieterich, *Abraxas* (Leipzig, 1891), p. 118, but also cf. Franz J. Boll, *Aus der Offenbarung Johannis* (Leipzig, 1914), p. 108 f.

35. In Callimachus *to endyton* means generally "garment."

36. *Die Dorte* (see supra, n. 28), p. 286.

37. Cf. W. F. Otto, *Die Götter Griechenlands* (Frankfurt, 1934), p. 95; English edition (see n. 10 to chap. IV): pp. 74 f.

38. The prologue (line 183) reads *aneis hyp' algous melan' ap' anthron aphron* ("lest in pain you heave up that black spume from mankind").

39. *Il.* 12. 463: *nukti thoei atalantos hypopia*.

40. *Od.* 11. 606; both references in Otto (see supra, n. 37), p. 96.

41. *Il.* 5. 509, 15. 256.

42. The same epithet is applied also to Goddesses who are most clearly associated with Medusa, e.g., Demeter (*Hymn. Horn. Cer.* 4) and (one aspect of) Artemis (*Hdt.* 8. 77), and it is to a certain extent comparable with the situation on the Gorgon pediment of Corfu where the beheaded and yet uninjured Goddess proudly displays Chrysaor standing next to her.

43. The most important information can be found in the handbooks; the latest information and the entire picture are brought into connection with Apollo's essence in this volume, pp. 55-56.

44. The word *argestes*, which Droysen translates as *zischende* ("hissing"), is also an epithet of lightning.

45. As it is already in the ancient interpretation—*tragikoteron ophin eipen to belos dia ton ion*. They also saw already the similarity in that both were poisonous. We shall return to this.

46. In Hor. *Carm.* 3. 17. 5-6, on the other hand, it is called *serpens . . . similis sagittae*.

47. The evidence for the following is in Preller (see supra, n. 8), 2: 24, 1093 f. and 1207 f.

48. Serv. *Aen.* 3. 402.
49. Soph. *Phil.* 1326 (.
50. *Schol. in Il.* 2. 722.
51. Paus. 8. 33. 4.
52. Apollod. *Epit.* 3. 27.
53. Ael. *NA* 11. 3. A legend about the death of Heracleides Ponticus leads one to infer that snakes were maintained in the adyton of Delphi; cf. Hermippus *ap.* D. L. 5. 91.
54. In Val. Max 1. 8. 2. Further in Kerenyi, *Der gbtliche Arzt** (Darmstadt, 1975), p. 11; English edition: *Asklepios*, Bollingen Series LXV: 3 (New York, 1959), p. 14.
55. In the festival of "Septerion," which belongs to a special study along with an inquiry about the Apollonian dragon slaying.
56. From *pythesthai* 'to putrefy, rot; to smell.'
57. Ap. Rhod. 2. 706, with scholion. The masculine form "Delphynes" is derived from that. That the feminine form is the original is established by its presence in the Homeric hymn.
58. The connection between the God just born and a place with such a name has also a positive aspect. Cf. Kerenyi in Jung-Kerenyi, *Einführung in das Wesen der Mythologie* (Amsterdam-Leipzig, 1941), pp. 77 f. (*Humanistische Seelenforschung*, Werkausgabe I [Munich, 1966], pp. 97 f.); English edition: Jung-Kerenyi, *Essays on a Science of Mythology*, Bollingen Series XXII (Princeton, 1969), p. 51.
59. Cf. the passages in T. Schreiber, *Apollon Pythoktonos* (Leipzig, 1897), pp. 4 f.
60. *IT* 1247.
61. At least since Ephorus. Cf. Plut. *Quaest. Graec.* 12, with commentary by W. R. Halliday, *The Greek Questions of Plutarch* (Oxford, 1928).
62. Varro *Ling.* 7. 17 and Hesych. s.v. *Toxiou bounos*.
63. Serv. *Aen.* 3. 360 and 6. 347; Hyg. *Fab.* 140.
64. Lucian *Astr.* 23 refers to a constellation, Hesychius and Suidas s.v. *python* not.
65. A compilation, which today is surely lacking in completeness, is in the three essays by W. H. Roscher, "Omphalos," *Abhandlungen der K. Sachsichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1913); "Neue Omphalosstudien," *Abhandlungen der K. Sachsichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1915); and "Der Omphalosgedanke bei verschiedenen Volkern, besonders der semitischen,"

Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft (Leipzig, 1918).

66. An inquiry which reaches further into ancient times must consider also the offering of the Plataeans, a field where there is much preliminary study to do. Cf. A. B. Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge, 1915), 2: 193 f.

67. *Brit. Mus. Cat. Coins*, "Mysiae," pi. 27. 4, from the second or first century B.C.

68. *Brit. Mus. Cat. Coins*, "Central Greece," p. 14. 3, from the fourth century B.C.; Roscher II, pi. II, 14, after a plaster cast in (Friedrich) Imhoof Blumer. On the obverse, a head of Demeter with a veil.

69. Roscher II, pi. V, 2, after M. Bulard, *Monuments et Memoires* Plot 14 (1907), fig. 19.

70. Roscher II, pi. IH, 3, after Bulard (*supra*, n. 69), fig. 20.

71. Roscher II, pi. III, 3, after Heinrich Brunn and Gustaf Koerte, *Rilievi di urne etrusche* (Rome, 1890-96), II, pi. XCIV, 2; pi. XLVII; and II, pi. LXXV, 1.

72. Roscher I, 93, after Paul Herrmann (Bruckmann), *Denkmaler der Malerei des Altertums* (Munich, 1904), III, pi. 20, color pi. II. That the snake is "dying or even dead" is the opinion of Roscher. J. E. Harrison (see *supra*, n. 31), p. 424, speaks precisely of a "wounded and bleeding" beast. The color plate in Herrmann-Bruckmann shows blood flowing from the mouth of the beast.

73. Roscher II, pi. IV, 2 after *Annali dell'Inst.*, 1850, pi. B; Brunn says in his description of the candelabrum found in the baths of Titus, "the serpent sacred to Apollo."

74. Roscher II, pi. V, 4, after Georg Kawerau and Albert Rehm, *Das Delphinion in Milet* (Berlin, 1914), fig. 101. A "great, conic, serpent encircled, marble omphalos from the necropolis of Miletus, after a photograph by B. Schroder" in Roscher I, pi. VI, 5.

75. Roscher II, pi. IV, 4 after Bulard, fig. 21, who published there only a sketch "to give a sufficiently precise idea of the representation." In fact, the almost hemispherical omphalos standing on a quadrangular base corresponds exactly to the form of the omphalos in the fresco with the "dying" snake. Bulard's combination (p. 72) is therefore disproved.

76. Roscher, who likewise finds Bulard's combination to be so groundless a deviation that he does not mention it once, asserts, "Perhaps the depiction refers only to playful fantasy (p. 55). He believes that, because the picture depicts "a completely singular motif." But his belief assumes the utterly groundless belief that without ex-

ception all variants of the Delphic mythologem have been transmitted to us. This is not true,

77. The arrow is not a modern addition; cf. the sketch by an anonymous artist of the late fifteenth century of the unrestored statue, C. de Tolnay, *The Youth of Michelangelo* (Princeton, 1943), fig. 113. The giant Typhon, its head hanging down in defeat, on an Apollo statue in the Louvre (Farnell [see supra, n. 8], IV, fig. 45) is antique. Cf. W. Frohner, *Notice de la sculpture antique du Musée National du Louvre* (Paris, 1876), pp. 97 f., where a whole series of Apollo statues (certainly "Roman copies") with the small "serpent familier"* is detailed. Earlier archaeological reports were well aware of the existence of this serpentine attribute, but modern accounts ignore it.

78. In the right hand, now missing, he probably held the laurel branch; cf. Wolfgang Helbig, *Führer durch die öffentlichen Sammlungen klassischer Altertümer in Rom* (Leipzig, 1912), I: 105 f.

79. Eur. fr. 937; cf. Kerenyi, "Vater Helios" in *Eranos Jahrbuch* 10—1943, p. 88; *Tochter der Sonne* (see supra, n. 30), p. 18.

80. Kerenyi, "Hermes der Seelenführer," *Albae Vigiliae* N. F. 1 (Zurich, 1944), pp. 64 f.; English edition: *Hermes Guide of Souls* (Zurich, 1976), pp. 53 f.

81. The interpretation of the passage, where *noein* ('to perceive') and the perception belonging to it—the *nous* found in Homeric poetry and in Hesiod—is an indispensable prerequisite for a scholarly inquiry into the place of spirit (*Geist*) in the history of Greek philosophy; it does not, however, belong in our study. Cf. Kerenyi, *Die antike Religion* (see supra, n. 7), pp. 111 f., 161 f. [*Antike Religion*, Werkausgabe VII [Munich, 1971], pp. 137 f.]; *Prometheus*, *Albae Vigiliae* N. F. 4 (Zurich, 1946), p. 30 [*Prometheus* [Reinbek Hamburg, 1962], p. 53; English edition: *Prometheus*, Bollingen Series LXV: 1 [New York, 1963], p. 47]. Here let it be added only that while the *nous* is connected with the paternal God Zeus, the realization of perception—even the realization of the spirit where "it blows," "it spirits," i.e., the epiphany—is an aspect of his son Apollo.

IV.

1. J. Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford, 1925), pp. ix ff., and A. E. Taylor, *Plato* (London, 1929), pp. 174 ff.

2. K. Reinhardt, *Platos Mythen* (Bonn, 1927), pp. 23 ff.

3. Pl. *Phdr.* 279 B.

4. Ibid., 439 B.
5. Cf. Taylor (supra, n. 1), 1: 120.
6. Cf. "Eulabeia," *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbucher*, p. 193.
7. Cf. K. Kerényi, *Antike Religion* (Munich, 1971), pp. 97 ff.
8. Cf. Kerényi, "Pythagoras und Orpheus" in *Humanistische Seelenforschung*, Werkausgabe VII (Munich, 1966), pp. 18 ff.
9. Karl Ottfried Muller, *Geschichten Hellenischer Stämme und Städte* II—III, *Die Dorer* (Breslau, 1884), 1: 309.
10. Walter F. Otto, *The Homeric Gods*, trans. Moses Hadas (London, 1979), pp. 61 ff.
11. The word "transcendence" is to be understood here in the sense of the earlier study "Antike Religion und Religionpsychologie" (in *Apollon und Niobe*, Werkausgabe IV [Munich, 1980], pp. 15-30) as an extension beyond the merely spiritual from the realms of nature or the spiritual or both realms simultaneously.
12. A corroboration in F. Altheim, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1933), 3: 45.
13. Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 2. 686.
14. Pompon. 3. 5.
15. Otto (see supra, n. 10), p. 78. On the effect of Apollonian music, cf. Pind. *Pyth.* I. 1 f.
16. According to Hesychius, s.v. *Admetou kore* the great Thessalian Goddess Pheraia, elsewhere known as Hecate, is the *kore* of Admetus. On the identity of these three forms, all of which are connected with the Underworld, cf. Jung—Kerényi, *Einführung in das Wesen der Mythologie* (Zurich, 1951), 4: 161; English edition: *Essays on a Science of Mythology*, Bollingen Series XXII (Princeton, 1969), p. 109.
17. Franz. Altheim, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1931), 1: 46 ff., and *Epochen der römischen Geschichte* (Frankfurt, 1934), pp. 45 ff., 110 ff.
18. Altheim (see supra, n. 17), 1: 52 ff.; *Epochen* 142.
19. Cf. Verg. *Aen.* 2. 355.
20. P. Kretschmer, *Kleinasiatische Forschungen* (1937), 1: 1 ff.
21. Arist. *Hist. An.* 6. 29.
22. Pompon. 3. 36.
23. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (Berlin, 1931), 1: 145 ff.
24. Reinhardt (see supra, n. 2), p. 95.
25. Sanyuttanikaya 5. 10.

26. *Anth. Pal.* 14. 71.
27. Kerenyi, *Pythagoras und Orpheus* (see supra, n. 8), pp. 31 ff.
28. Anon. *Vit. Plat.*
29. Apul. *De dog. Plat.* 1.1.
30. Hermann Usener, *Das Weihnachtsfest* (Bonn, 1889 and 1911), p. 72.
31. Olympiodorus and Anon. *Vit. Plat.*
32. Suet. *Aug.* 94; see further in Otto Immisch, *Aus Roms Zeitwende* (Leipzig, 1931), pp. 22 ff.

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